Transcript of 178-10004-10396.pdf
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178-10004-10396] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 87317201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER 178-10004-10396
RECORD SERIES BAKER-WEIDNER FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : B-W VII-K
Document Information
ORIGINA TOR ROCK
FROM: WEIDNER, JOHN
TO FILE
TITLE INTER VIEW WITH JOHN STEIN
DATE 03/18/1975
PAGES : 8
SUBJECTS
CIA
NOSENKO, YURI
STEIN, JOHN
SECRET SER VICE
OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICA TION Secret
RESTRICTIONS IB; IC
CURRENT' STATUS Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 02/13/200]
OPENING CRITEERIA
COMMENTS Includes Advice and Waiver" statement.
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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500
March 18, 1975
David W. Belin , Nelson A_ Rockefeller ,
Chairman Executive Director
John T. Connor
C. Dougias Dillon SECRET SENSITIVE
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr. 178-10004-10396
MEMORANDUM FOR: File
FROM: James B Weidnez
SUBJECT: Interview with John Stein
I interviewed Mr_ Stein in his office at the CIA Headquarters, Langley,
Virginia on March 18, 1975 The interview commenced at ll:lo a_ m_ and
continued until approximately 1:20 P.m No one else was present_ At
the outset of the interview, Mr . Stein signed an Advice and Waiver which
is annexed hereto.
Mr. Stein, along with several other Deputies, were assigned to an Ad Hoc
Committee to review various alleged domestic activities of the CIA=
Stein's particular area wa$ the counter-intelligence staff, except for
the activities Of that staff relating to the CI/SO project and to the mail
intercept project,
Stein said that, after his review, he concluded that the job of the CI
staff was essentially to "horse" the FBI into some In fact,
according to Stein, once you eliminate CI/SO and the mail intercept
project fror the CI 8 taff, their activities were benign insofar &8 the
scope of this Commission'8 scope of inquiry was concerned. He said
that, unles s
you conclude that keeping records relating to Americans,
per se, is improper; the CI staff files contained little of interest.
(a) Action-oriented Matters
Iasked Stein whether he had found any evidence of domestic breaking
and enter directed by the CI staff. Stein said that he had found no
such activities, with one possible exception. Stein stated that, if such
activities seemed appropriate _ the CI staff would inform the Bureau
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SECRET SENSITIVE
which would accomplish the activities This was because, if anything
were discovered by virtue of the ction which would lead to a prosecution,
the action should be taken by the FBI, since the Department of Justice
would have responsibility for the prosecution.
The possible
exception to the absence of any "breaking and entering"
the CI staff was the/Toftilcase. (Toftigwas
a long term employee of
the Agency, who his house up for rent. Coincidently, another Agency
ernployee went to look at the house for ible rental_ In the cour se of 50
doing, the second employee found that there were a number of
classified documents on the third floor of the house. The employee then
reported what he found to the Agency, which sent personnel over to recover
the documents _ (The documents related to world-wide proprietaries of
the Agency with which [oftighad been involved. Ultimately (Toftikexplained
that he intended to write & book about these matters and that wa8 the
records were in his home. ) The Agency undoubtedly did not have time
to advise the Bureau much in advance (if at all) of the Agency'8 effort to
recover the subject documents_ Stein also noted that this incident did not,
in fact,
involve "breaking and entering" since the house was already opened
to allow prospective renters to examine
Stein said that he had found no instances of physical surveillance done by
the CI staff, although the staff would probably have been aware of surveillance
accorn plished by other agency components or by the Bureau. Stein cited
25 an
example an instance where a female Agency employee was found to
be living with a man who could well have been working for a_ foreign
Government. The Office of Security , therefore, a surveillance on her hous
for approximately three weeks. Discusgions were also had with an informant
within the Agency concerning this employee (Files on this case be
maintained by the Office of Security) _
Stein found no evidence of any electronic surveillance or tele phone taps
accomplished domestically by the CI staff, The staff had no personnel
who could actually take any action. The staff, in this regard, would
have had an
advisory capacity if it part icipated at all The CI staff
would simply advise the
Bureau or other components of the Agency such
a5
the Office of Security or the Office of Technical Services_ In such
instances the
CI staff would not hold the file, except perhaps 2 memorandum
relating to the particular case, but Stein found no such memoranda_
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As a digression, Stein commented that, to the extent that CI staff may
have gotten into "gray" areas, this may well have been 35 a result of
an
effort to restrict knowledge of a particular incident to the smallest
possible number of people _ Thus , rather than going to the Bureau, where
control over the dissirilation of the subject information would not be
possible_ the staff might go to another Agency cornponent such a8 the
Office of Security: Similarly, where an inves tion proved fruitless, conti-
nued maintenance of relevant files by the CI staff_ rather than by the Agency
or the Bureau generally, constituted part of an effort to avoid prejudicing
the particular subject of the investigation.
Another
general area mentioned by Stein was that involving the use
CI staff of people having an historical relationship with the staff. These
persons would be used against clearly foreign targets in the United States _
As an example, Stein said that such persons might be used to obtain access
to codes Or the like in this country.
Stein mentioned the
allegations relating to the reported breaking and entering
into the[ChilianEmbas sy. I told him that we had already reviewed this
instance, and, therefore, there was no need for him to review it any detail.
(b) Files on Americans
The major source of files on Americans maintained by CI staffwas the:
"American Targets Program V (ATP): This program involve & informa
tion received by CI staff from Agency sources, from the State Department,
and from the Military. Information might also be received from the FBI: The
purpose[ofATB]was to collate all contacts between any American and any
foreign intelligence officers, particularly those from the USSR_ The concept
of the program
was that all such contacts would be reported to CI staff,
which would index them for future reference.
Stein noted that, although the State Department actually had & formal regu -
lation requiring that all contacts with Soviets be reported, it wa$ extremely
difficult to convince State officers S0 to report. IStein spent & substantial
amount of time overseas}urider State covef, He said that, as a result of
that experience, he knows that State officefs are reluctant to report this kind
of information. (A State officer probably will not achieve promotion his
contact with Soviet personnel. ) As 3 result of this reluctance, the informa
m
tion obtained by the CI staff generally originated with the State Department'$
Office of Security.
SECRET SENSITIVE
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The AATF rogram for filing was sinply that when & name was reported
to CI staff, it was mechanically processed by personnel who exercised
no
judgment in recording the name. The names of both the Soviet and the
American people involved in the contact would be recorded: As a result of this
process, the (ATPlfile index wa 5 able to develop & deal of information
on Sov iet contacts with Americans_ If, 2s 2
result of information obtained,
CI Staff had reason to believe that & a
prticular person had been recruited
the Soviets, that inforration would be forwarded to the Office of Security
for the Agency, if any Agency officer were involved, or to FBI, if an Americar
outside the Agency was involved.
Stein explained that this program wa5 condu ted by CI staff instead af by
the FBI or State, because the program might well contain information
which would be relevant to CIA purposes , but not relevant to the purposes
of the other Agencies_ Thus, the files m ight well contain infor mation
concerning known KGB Agents. That information, in turn could have
derived from a sensitive source, the identity of which CIA would not want
to have revealed. Accordingly, the information was stored by the Agency
rather than the other possible Governmental components. Information
relevant to those components , however, was made'available to themkfrom"
the ATP 'iproject: |
The information utilized byGATElcould have been derived,as noted, from
reports of other Governmenfal components_ or from infc mation provided
by any American. This would be information provided voluntarily, either
by a
person actually having & contact with 3
foreign intelligence officer
or by persons with knowledge that someone else had had such a contact,
The information could be particularly useful, no to the CIA but to
other Governmental components . For example, the State Department' s
Office of Security might re that a State officer had had a contact over
a
long period with & Soviet. The CI staff could check all its information
On that Soviet and confirm whether they had reason to believe that the
Soviet was in fact an agent
Another source of files
on Americans held by CI staff might be the product
~of code-breaking by NSA. Thus, in reading codes, names of Americans
may appear _ Some of these may be innocuous and some may be
In any event all these names are also indexed, although the index is
separate from ATP, because of the senstivity of the NSA program as well
as the' information derived therefrom_
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The information plu into the indexing System will not become an
actual file until there is some reason for opening a file on 2
particular
person. At that (for example, a file search requested by another
Agency) all information relating to a
particular person will be collated
in one place_ This, in turn will be developed into a separate file (a
personality file). If the information on a particular person is requested
by & CIA field office, the collation process would occur and the field would
be told how the particular person had come to the attention of the Agency
in the first instance and would also be told any derogatory information which
the field station would want to know.
Other CI files derived from on-going cases. Part of these files emanate
from information provided to the Agency by defectors . For example, one
element of this information is designated "Soviet leads_ M This is because the
CI staff learned from a defector that all Soviet women employed in the United
States Embassy in the USSR during & certain were Soviet agents .
Somne of these women, in turn, married Americans, and, 25 a result, now
live in the United States_ The FBI is advised of the identity of all these
women. The CI staff, under official cover, occasionally out to inter-
view these women,
in an effort to convince them to reveal what they know
about KGB operations_ The effort was first to determine whether the
women continue to be KGB agents _ and, if not, to ther information from
them_ The general modus operandi would be to tell the women that We know
that at one tirne were KGB agents and, while we did not intend to take
any action against them, to request them to reveal information that
may have learned at that time concerning KGB operations Generally,
the women wuld agree to do s0. If they did not,ithgh 1ei898tract would, at
least temporarily, be dropped. These women arelused as #defectors who
did not defect"
Other
examples of going cases are:E journalis]] who had private contact
with George Blake, a former KGB agent in England; an American who
was tied into the Able case (in this instance, the actions are taken
16
the Bureau, but guidance by CI staff}); and a journalist who the KGB,
on three occasions, attempted unsuccessfully to recruit. #
Other files may relate to actions begun because of some kind of counter-
intelligence implication in & particular situation. In these instances CI
would maintain the files because of the particular sensitivity of the matter,
even though action may be taken another Agency component
#Stein noted that the decision as
to whether to utilize someone as a double agent is
made by the CIA_ If the decision is affirmative, the double agent would be handled by t
(if he is abroad) or by the FBI (if he is in this country)_ The exceptions to
thenpat
rn would be where the double Agent is in the United States for only & brief tin
or where he has a
s pecial relationship with a particular CIA officer.
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Other files are maintained concerning the Soviet Embassy. CIA's position
on this matter is that this is 3
State case which the Agency is running on
behalf of State.
There is also & file on
Vesco held by the CI Staff: The Agency became
involved in this situation because John Dean of the White House called and
stated that President Nixon's brother had obtained a job_with IOS. He
wanted to know what IOS was all about: CIA, in fact, had 2 file on IOS,
because it was known that the Soviets
had been attempting to penetrate that
institution as a vehicle for getting agents into this country or at least.
allowing them
to learn of economic matters relating to the United States
Stein said that, at one
Vesco's]lawyer called to say that he wanted
to have
an account of everything which had been said about Vescolover
South American radio channels _
The Agency refused this request, stating
that it wa$ beyond its charter.
(c) Defectors
There are four sorts of defectors handled by the CI Staff. The first
are those under low level cover which are being used to scan Soviet
publicationbosd todextract anythiog relating to Soviet intelligence 'hich
in light of their expertise, may recognize_ The second group of
defectors are those with "talents"_ This group are forme r KGB agents
who, 25 a result, have special knowledge: They may be used from time
to time
to go and talk With (either in the United States or abroad) USSR
citizens 'Another sort of defector is one fror Czechoslovakia]] This
particular person is highly knowledgable in Maxist-Leninist matters
Accordingly, he is used to write propaganda which is disseminated abroad,
The last category of defectors are those who are no longer in regular
contact with the agent. These particular persons are seen from time to
time for sorne
particular reason which could simply be an administrative
matter conce rning their pensions, etc.
The CI Staff also maintains a file on defectors from AAmerica
to sore other country (such as the Soviet Union, Cuba and others) .
These names are recorded becanse the persons involved may eventually
end in the (nited States once
again Or in some country other than the
up
Soviet Bloc.
This would not necessarily mean that that person is a SpY,
but it does
mean that he would be of counter-intelligence interest, At
approximately the time of the Kennedy 2s825sination the Secret Service
and the FBI became particularly interested in potential defector s from
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the United States.
(Recall that Oswald had had connections with Russia) _
This wa $ an operation which the CIA did not particularly want to under-
take.
Nonetheless the Agency did trace the names which the Bureau and
Secret Service provided in this regard: The number of these names wa $
perhaps 2, 000 including crackpots who may have a5 an off hand comment,
suggested that intended to defect for example, Rus sia The CIA
attempted to turn the program over to the Secret Service for the Bureau, but th
would not take it. The CIA utimately stopped the project and cleared all: the
files out_ This would have been approxima three ag0. Stein noted
that although the files had been eliminated, it was pOssible that some of
the names provided to the Agency had made it into the Central Agency files ,
and would not have been eliminated therefrom
I briefly discussed the NOSENKO Case with Stein: Nosenko had defected
to the United States and was admitted to this country as 3 "parolee" _ That
the Immigration and Natuialization Bureau have 3 of persons
which the Agency can br into the coun without regular immigration
papers _ These persons are the responsibility of the Agency. There was
sore iritial doubt, 25 to whether, in fact, Nosenko had been sent to the
United States by the KGB. Information obtained from another defector
tended to confirm this su5 picion: The question then was what to do with
Nosenko. It was decided for a variety of reasons , that it would be unwise to
attempt to deport him; as a result,he was kept in the United States in isolation.
After several it was determined that Nosenko was, in fact, not an
attempted double agent He wa s thereafter rehabilitated and now lives:
happily in the United States _ Although the CI had an interest in this case,
it wa 5 ac
tually run by the Office of Security.
As one aspect of the Agency's to help in services of common concern
to all Governrental agencies, the CIA recorded in computer form 2t the
request of the FAA, all information relating to hijackers. Stein thinks that
this wag probably because the CIA had the equipment which could
handle the needed material in the proper fashion. The information S0
provided would, for example _ include names of all those who were on board
hijacked planes _ Approximately two yearg ago the CIA tried to gve this
program to the FAA That Agency, however, would acce t the program,
and, therefore it was terminated CIA
ic
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ADVICE AND WAIVER
Place
24+44 Vc
Date
Kle 1/1x
Time
10:0 Ar~
Before You make any statement to, or answer
any questions froin
8
the Commission or its investigators you should understand that
have the right to renain silent_ If You: choose to answer
yaythavg yoc
say can
be used against' you in court_
You may consult a lawyer for advice before any questions are put,
and you may have 3 lawyer with you during questioning _ If you
cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you before
questioning if you wisha If ,You decide to answer questions without
a
lawyer present , you still have the right to stop answering at any
time; Or You may defer your answer until you talk to a lawyer
WAIVER
I have read and understand the foregoing advice I am willing
to make a statement ana answer questions Fl+tzZ without
at this time No promises or threats have been made to
a lawyer
or coercion of any kind has peen used against
me and no pressure
me.
Signed
Witness:
Eeze
Witness:
Witness
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