Transcript of 178-10004-10087.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 178-10004-10087_ 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 Jk AssassmalTon Svstem DaC. 87277120)1 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY : WILDEROTTE RECORD NUMBER 178-10004-10087 RECORD SERIES ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ASSASSINATION-RELA TED MATERIALS (3) Document Information ORIGINA TOR CIA FROM: CARL, OFFICE OF 'THE DDIS&T TO BUCHEN, PHILIP TITLE [Restricted] DATE : 07/10/1975 PAGES : 17 SUBJECTS CIA ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS DOCUMENT TYPE REPORT CLASSIFICA TION Secret RESTRICTIONS Consulted CURRENT STATUS Withhold DATE OF LAST REVIEW 08/06/1993 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Transmittal memo and 1S-page report v9.1 14 WM 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 1 ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 10 July 1975 DATE: Office of Lhe DD/SeT 24 TO: Mr . 178-10004-10087 Buchen SUBJ ECT: Attached Report REMARKS: Phil: Attached is the,interim report on the prob] you and I have discussed em the term interim since recently. I stress new informatTon we have received yesterday and from Defense as recentiy as not exhausted our own 1 search for information within CIA, Beccondz yourh concern that the investigation soaducted with the participationnve outside person or group and some that we were unable to find also the fact solution *0 et me briefly a satisfactory I fo]lowed_ outline the approach I stressed objectivity and tried to that no persons who were assure to the activities in potentially a Party PpporeuaftYVtc eestroguesfoomataa any which mighy be reiated, information or material My Associate Deputy Director Dr_ was ChefPrime; investigatctonithrtechyteaStevens , 0 advicendfog ~Dr /"; Tom" Nevison, an MD' with an research background but hired by Photocopy Itrom Gered R. Ford Libraty HW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 2 Philip have zing Sayre from ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== CIA a couple of years ag0 and could not possibly have had any prior knowledge or invo]vement_ Additionally, I used personne] my own staff to assure that compilation of inventory etc. was done in presence of people representing me who again could have had no prjor involvement. As I noted ear] ier, we are continuing our investigation internally a5 wel1 as jointly with DOD_ We will you informed _ TanL Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Liaay HI# 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 3 only from keep ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== SENSITIVE SECAET SUMMARY REPORT ON CIA INVESTIGATION OF MKNAOMI Project_Discoverx: The Initial identificaticn of the relationship between the CIA and the Biologica] Laboratory at Fort Detrick as a possible questionable activity requiring further investigation occurred in late April of this year. It resulted information provided by a CIA officer not directly associated with the project in response to. the repetitive appeals of the DCI that a/1 past activities which might now be considered questionable be brought to the attention of Agency management _ As a result of the information provided by him and by two other officers identified as having scme awareness of the project_ 1 It became clear that further investigation of the matter wa$ in order The three Identified the project at Fort Detrick as having involved the development of BW and bly CW agents and associated dissemination systems that Were suitable for clandestine use against human targets _ moreover identified Ietha agents as among those involved In the project . Concern about' these assertions was heightened because the A/DDS&T had noted in a ,recent review of the 1963 IG Survey of the Technica] Services 'Division: (TSD) that approximately $90,000 in that current fisca] was spent at |Fort Detrtck "for the ma Intenance 0f a BW capability" This statement appeared o important that a quick check was made to determine its significance. In response to questions about the activity, the cognizant officer in TSD now the Office 0f Technical Service (OTS) reported that 3 sma ) 1 effort had been carried on at Fort Detrick, but that it related to the development of incapacitants and BW/CW SEwret E2 IMP DET CL 26895 Photccopy 6om Cerald R Ford Lbxaty H# 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 4 Fean I Hareg 14604 Ary from possi They year ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== Ftotocxpy SEFZZT 6om Cerald R. Fard Library detection and did not carry the serious implications of the IG 5 report. It had in any event been terminated some years ag0. The A/DDS&T was satisfied with this response. When new &nd more disturbing information about the nature of the Fort Detrick activity emerged , however 9 the words of the IG Survey tended to give it credibility. Thus, Iate in April 1975 a search wa $ begun any records or other information avaflable on the project. Difficulties were imediately encountered because the project cryptony could not be identified. The search for records of fund transfers to Fort Detrick did ultimately produce information in that regard, however and checks by the Office of Securtty on one Of the individuals Identified as having been involved in Fort Detrick activities did provide the MKNAOMI cryptonym_ This enabled OTS to reca11 the proper files from Records Center; two MKNAOMI files were retrieved.: Some additiona] information was also - produced from the Office of Logistics files. This collection of materia] largely conf ired the nature 0f the project as reported by the informants and identified a number of people involved in the activity. Additiona] cause for concern resulted from the association of several of these people with specific assassinatic plans as revealed in the IG'$ report on that activity. A major corcern after the discovery of the records involved the disposition of a stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possible Agency use. It was not known whether or not these materials had been destroyed along with the S BW stockpiles in response to Presidential Directives of November 1969 and February 1970. An unsigned memo raising the question of the disposition of Agency materials ma intained by Fort Detrick posed the option of it stored in 2 commercia| Iabora It was the impression of those In OTS who were familiar with the project that the materia] had in fact been destroyed but no records confirming it could be found. In an attempt to find such confirmati Taboratory storage facilities in OTS were searched and in the HW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 5 for Army having tory. on , ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== SEGEET course of that search about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 6 mg of cobra venom but none Of the other materials 4 were discovered. Subsequent to the decision in late April that a full investigation of the Ft. Detrick project wa $ needed , a11 information uncovered wa s passed to the OCI , to Staff_members_of_the_Rockefeller Commissitn and to the White House staff handl Intelligence Community investigation matters. In June, Senator Church Was informed by Rod Hills of the White House that a sensitive activity was under investigation_ Sources of Information: This sumary report on the activity is based upon an investigation utilizing: (1) the files and documents uncovered as a result of the initial search which are Timited and contain only a sma ] 1 number of Agency-originated documents; (2) the materia] found in OTS storage which includes the shellfish toxin and severa]: pieces of delivery hardware; (3) interviews voluntarily given by current Agency employees who had some knowledge of the project and by a number of retired employees indicated by the records as having been more deeply Involved at stages of particular interest. (Included in the Iatter category are Tom Karamessines, Cornelius Roosevelt, Treichler and Nathan Gordon) ; . (4) information contained in the IG's Report on assassination pianning ana (5) information developed by 3 DOD investigation initiated as a result of conversa - tions with the White House about the matter; this information wa $ only recently received and has not been widely incorporated in this report, however Special_Operations Division df_Fort Detrick The Agency association with Fort Detrick involved the Specia] Operations Division (SOD) of that facility. This Division Was apparently responsib]e for 3 Phororzpy ERRET Totn Gerald R Fard Lbrary HI# 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 6 ing Ray + ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== ZCET developing special app]ications for Bl agents and toxins_ The principa] customer of its activities appears to have been the U.S. Special Forces_ Its concern was both with the development of suitable agents and delivery mechanisms for speciah use in paramilitary situations _ These app] ications clearly included one-on-one situations in which clandestine de] ivery was a concern. Both standard BH agents and biologically derived toxins were investigated by the Division_ Discussions with former Fort Detrick employees indicates that SOD was first established as a distinct, highly secure activity within Fort Detrick in about 1948, though no records going back that far have been found_ The Division was abo] ished in 1970 or 1971 as the Fort Detrick operation was terminated. CLA_Relationships withSOD_ The CIA relationship with SOD was forma]ly established in 1952 through a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical Officer for the performance of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities 0f the Special Operations' Division of the Biologica] Laboratory at Fort Detrick: The animus for establishing this relationship seems to have a belief in OTS that the specia) capabilities of the Fort Detrick group and its access to biologica] materials of &11 sorts provided the Agency with expertise and capabilities which were appropriate to its function and not otherwise available.. Discussions indicate that the perception of the requirement far such capabilities was tied to ear] ier OSS experience. Initial funding was at the S200,000 a year Ievel which to a high point in FY 1958 of $390,000 and then dwindled to $75,000 a year in the late 1960' 5 . Though there appear to be some gaps in available funding records tota] Agency funding in the period from FY 1953 through FY 1970 is EGNET Photocopy From Gerald R. Fad Lbvary HI# 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 7 Army May Army been grei ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== SZSET estimated to have been somewhat more than $3 million. These funds were apparently used to genera augment the level of effort undertaken by SOD Agency requirements for specific R&D were not levied in any programmatic way , but rather the Agency identified particular work done by SOD as part of its program supporting the Army Special Forces as being of interest and then levied requirements for the customizing of such developments for Agency use Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better defined. Thus a project approval_ memo of 1967 identifies the functiona] ca tegories of project activity: a Ma Intenance of 3 stockpile 0f incapacitating and Ietha 1 agents In readiness for operationa] use; b. Maintenance, assessment and evaluation of a designated balance of biologica] and chemica dissemina systems for operationa) readiness; C. Adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbioinoculator (a dart device suitable for the clandestine and imperceptible inoculation with BW/CW agents) to determine compatibility with vardous ma terials and to assure that the microbioinoculator cannot be 'identified structurally or easily detected upon a detaiTed autopsy; and d Provide technica] support and consultation on request to meet ad hoc requirements related to offensive and defensive.BW/CW In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining 3 stockpile of agents and del ivery systems for possible Agency use_ 5 Fhokocopy SECZET Fom Gerald R. Fard Lbrary HI# 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 8 lly being four ting ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== SEbDET Project_ Management_within CIA From its outset the project was characterized by a compartmentation that las extreme even by CIA standards_ Only two or three Agency officers at any given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities_ This work was managed first within the Biology Branch and Iater in the Chemi Branch of TSD _ Because of the sensitivity of the activity, queries by operations officers as to the availability of ma terials and delivery systems of the type being developed at Fort Detrick were automatically turned away by TSD unless initial approval for contact had been given by the Deputy Director for.Plans_ Even when this was the case, the Chief of TSD often referred the operations:officer directly to one of the cleared officers dealing with Fort Detrick and was never informed as to the nature of the discussions . This method of procedure has' been confirmed both through interviews and by the IG report on assassination planning Mo written records were kept. Though some CIA-originated documents have been found in the project files, it is clear that only a very Timited documentation of activities took place. No records on such things as material contro] 3 receipt, delivery, destruction, etc . can be found No documents relating to any possible operationa] use of the material have been found_ The files as exist are different from those norma ly ma intained in the course of a typica] CIA RED project_ As noted above, funding to the project was provided simply on the basis of augmenting the Tevel of effort estab]ished by funding. There appears to have been no relation of funding to specific tasking, nor can any strict accounting of funds on the basis of effort expended in the Agency' $ behalf be found . Project officers with Whom discussions were held stated thac the funding was simply provided to maintain the availability to the Agency of the capabilities 6 Fhotoccpy SEGET From Gerald R. Foid Lbrary HM 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 9 stry they quite Army ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== SZGZET of SOD FinaTly, there is little evidence of much specific program definition on the part of the Agency _ Though occasional specific requests for material or for investigations relating to the solution of a hypothetically posed operationa] Tem can be found the Agency with One or two exceptions through the years appears to have ridden on a program generated internally by SOD largely on the basis of Special Forces requirements _ There are one or tivo exceptions which will be discussed below _ Activities of Peculiar CIA Interest_ Though discussions with people associated with the project reflect an overriding interest in incapacitants, particularly in later years 2 available records make it clear that CIA interests included ma intaining a stockpile of Jethal materials and delivery systems _ The evidence indicates that the Agency relied upon the use of specific BW agents and toxins investigated a5 a norma] part of the Army" S BW program. However directions were given to investigate such matters a5 agent stability over varying periods of time, the suitability of specific agents for preparation in the development of dart coatings, and the preparation of materials in 3 form suitable for dusting of clothes, Pillows etc. Primary Agency interest seemed to relate to the development of dissemination equipment to be used with a standard set of agents kept On the shelf A number of such dissemination 'devices appear to be pecul iarly suited for the type 0f clandesti use one might associate with Agency operations _ Some of these were included among hardware stored for the Agency at Edgewood Arsena] subsequent to the closure of SOD : attache cases rigged to disseminate an agent into the a cigarette 7 SEGRET Fhotccopy trom Cerald R Ford Lbrary HM 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 10 prob being dry form, air, ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== S2GRET case rigged to disseminate an agent when Tighted , a fountain pen dart launcher , an engine head bolt designed to release an agent when heated, a fluorescent Tight starter to activate the Tight and then release an agent, etc. AvaiIable records do not indicate whether or not a]1 these were developed specifically for the CIA, though the DOD investigation has identified the head bolt device as falling into such a category _ The easy association of this equipment with specific Agency requirements because of its nature is apt to be misleading, however _ At a meeting jn June 1952 , at the very outset of the Agency' 5 associa- tion with SOD when CIA representatives stated as had no specific re- rements, a Tist of SOD priorities for work on dissemination devices was provided. This dissemination Tist included such things as cigarettes 2 chewing gum , cigarette lighters 9 ' wrist watches_ 9 fountain pens rings, etc . Presumably work on these devices was already underway in response to Special Forces requirements _ Nevertheless, the Agency clearly showed an interest in such devices and Ievied requirements for the special preparation of some_ One development pecu] iarly associated: with the CIA was the "'microbioinoculatol which was an extremely sma]1 dart device which could be fired through clothing to penetrate the skin So as to inoculate him with an agent. of some sort without the target' s perception of being hit. An added filip to this development was the requirement that no indications of the use 0f such a device be discernable in the course of autopsy. A Jarge amount of Agency attention was given to the problem of incapacitating guard dogs . Much of the ipment delivered to the Agency and soie of the testing 'undertaken by it involved: a dart delivery system carrying incapacitants , and an antidote used subsequently to restore the dog SEBET Pholocopy Irom ~caldR. Ford Lbrary F# 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 11 they yet quj Army equi dog ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== #ZGrET to norma] activity. Though most of the dart Taunchers used in these develop- ments Iere developed for the the Agency did request the development of a sma 1 1 hand-held dart Iauncher for its peculiar needs _ Clearly a Iot of work was done on human incapacitation. OTS apparently received continuing requests for safe, effective and rapidly acting, incapacitat- devices . Much work was done in trying to use the dart system for such purposes but rea] success was never actually achieved. Since larger amounts of appropriate agent are required to incapacitate a human than to kill no scheme Ias developed for introducing sufficient amounts: through the use of darts Attempts were made to solve this problem increasing the area of the darts ava ilable coating and for making a dart which would dissolve in tissue which could thereby introduce more materia] into the system. Hork on this pro- ject was underway Ihen the association writh SOD . ended and Edgewood Arsena] endeavored to complete the project us unexpended Fort Detrick funds Success was not achieved 9 however _ One reason for the preoccupation of those involved in the project with the incapacitant problem may well have been the substantially greater difficulty of solving it when compared to developing Iethal mechanisms Substantial work was &lso done for the Agency in the development of spoilants for: agricultura] products biologica] ma terials for the contamination of petroleum stores, and agents for use in the destruction of electronie optica] systems structura] ma terials , etc . At times in the history of the project, requirements for such materials as these were apparently very high on the Agency' s Tist. 9 SSEE; Pnotccopy tom Gerald R. Fod Lbrary HW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 12 Army , ing him, for ing CS , ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== SFCRET Shel lfish Toxin. By the Iate 1960' $ , a stockpile of some 15 to 20 different BH agents and toxins was ma intained on a regular basis by SOD for possible Agency use_ The supply included such agents as food poisons 9 infectious viruses Tethal botul inum toxin, paralytic shellfish toxin, snake (krait) venon, Microsporeum gypseum Which produces severe skin disease, etc . Varying amounts of these materials ranging from 100 grams to 100 mi]ligrams were maintained . As noted above, with the Presidential Order requi the destruction of Bl and toxin stockpiles, the question waS raised as to the disposition of Agency materials _ Though specific accounting for each agent on the Iist is not on hand , DOD indicates that, with the Tikely exception of. the shellfish toxin, a ] 1 of these materials were in fact destroyed by SOD personnel_ The shellfish; toxin 7 ~ along with 8 milligrams of cobra venom wa $ found" by David Boston 9 currently Chief of the Chemi Branch, in Vault B1O in the basement of South Buj which houses OTS _ This vault js a Tightly used Iaboratory area and historically associated with the Biology and Chemi Branches of OTS . It has been regul: used for the storage of dangerous materials of various types. In past years_ 9 the combination to the vault had been available only to the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Chemistry Branch and their secretary _ More recently , the combination had been given to other members of the Chemistry Branch as we]) . With the discovery of the material on 20 however, the combination was changed and js now available only to the Chief of the Chemistry Branch, his secretary , and OTS security officers_ On 13 June the vault was under 24-hour guard_ 10 Pholocopy tom SECGET Gereid R, Fod Laraly HW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 13 ring Army stry Iding stry arly May , put ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== SECE The freezer in Which the toxin was found is located under one of the work benches in the Iabora The Fort Detrick material was the only thing in the freezer and was in two one-ga]Ton cans along with severa] sma ] er con- tainers_ There were no Iabels on the ga]on cans, but on of each was a folded piece of paper with pertinent information about the contents _ This information provided the types and amounts of material and the date on which it was put into storage _ The shellfish toxin was . according to this information into the freezer in February 1970 , and the cobra venom, in February 1961 The shellfish toxin was packaged in severa] different forms including two individua] doses in tablet form_ The discovery of the materia] was 3 result of repeated attempts by Boston to determine what disposition had been made of Agency BH materials held by Fort Detrick_ In making one more check on this, he called Nate Gordon_ 8 a former Chief of ' the Chemi Branch, who' retired in September 1972 and asked him if. he knew what the disposition had been. Gordon stated that he thought that 'perhaps some of the shellfish toxin might not have been destroyed and was in storage in OTS. In following up on this Iead, Boston found the material in the freezer_ Though hard to understand , such materia] could in fact be stored for So long without anyone being aware @f it. The laboratory is no used for the type of work for which it was originally built and had become 3 disordered storage facility_ There have been no requirements for use Of the freezer in the inter- vening years and it is indeed possible that no. Occasion arose to: investigate the contents of the freezer _ There have been: no reported functioning difficulties with the freezer during this 'entire period_ 11 Photocopy SFCUET Gerald Rfad Lbrary HI# 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 14 tory _ top put stry ionger ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== SECRET After finding the she])fish toxin in the vault, a complete inventory was taken_ A arge number of dangerous chemicals or drugs of various types were found . These materials relate to a number of past programs of TSD, inc] luding the project , the development of harassment materials for crowd contro] or Teeting disruption 9 crop contamination programs etc Sma 1 ] amounts of severa] other Tetha] preparations were found_ Two of these are known to have been obtained by the Agency for testing at Fort Detrick_ Nothing is known about three_ others_ Also found were 3 number of L-Pills issued to agents } and formerly to U-2 pilots_ 7 for suicide purposes in the event of capture- Boston contended that he had no reco] lection of the shellfish toxin having been obtained from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory On 30 June, dis- cussions were held with Dr Gordon in an interview at which Boston was also presen Gordon stated that the toxin had in fact been ca]led back from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory on the basis 0f his own decision which resulted conversations with Boston_ It was their belief that the cost and difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it simply made no sense to have it destroyed. Apparently no one, including the Chief of was told of this decision or the fact that the material had been del ivered by Fort Detrick_ As Gordon recalled, this took place prior to his being told by the Chief of TSD to inform Fort Detrick that destruction of the materia] on the inventory Tist should take place _ Boston who was present during this discussion took no issue with Gordon 5 account_ Neither could reca1 1 precisely how the material was delivered to OTS_ } but the DOD investigation indicates that it was delivered to Boston by someone from Fort Detrick. 12 Photocopy from EEGDET Gerald R. Ford Library HI# 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 15 drug from TSD , ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== SEGRET Gordon Ias certain that the shellfish toxin in storage in OTS is the same toxin as that Tisted on the inventory . There however, a discrepancy betieen the amount in storage as calculated the Iabels and the amount shown on the inventory _ Since the material in storage is in severa] different forms and complete rel iance is placed upon Iabe] ing, however , no rea] discrepancy may actually exist. Discussions with Karamess have established that he and Helms were aware of the disposition question and that a clear decision had been made that the Agency stockpile should be 'destroyed by the and that, in accordance with Presidential Directives, the CIA should completely out of the BH business _ The explanation given by Gordon as to how the shellfish toxin came to be in Agency storage is fully consistent Iith other available information_ He stated that the material was always handled with extreme care. Undoubtedly it was s imply transferred from one freezer to another and in 'his viel was continuaTIj under adequate control _ He is certain that nothing was done with it subsequent to its delivery and prior to his departure from the Agency in 1972 . Boston has given assurance that it was untouched subsequent to that. After the discovery 0f the material 9 OTS was told to investigate ways in which could safely dispose of it with full documentation_ Edgewood Arsena] was contacted and arrangements were made to deliver the material to Edgewood for disposa] on 11 June 1975. The disposa] was to be witnessed by a representative from the IG's office. On the prior to the scheduled delivery , these arrange- ments Were cancel ed , however because the DD/S&T wished to consider further ways of insuring that the destruction of the material could not be later 13 SEGRET Phororrpy Gerald R. Ford Library HI# 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 16 iS , from ines Army get they day ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== EfrcT misinterpreted: Upon informing Edgewood Arsena] of this decision, Boston was told that while Edgewood would dispose of chemica] ma terial for the CIA 3 it would not do So in the case of biological materials since that was not con- sistent with the mission of the arsena] _ No further efforts toward the disposa] of the material have taken place; and it remains under: guard in the OTS vault. Operational Uses of_MKNAOMI_Material . There is no record associating the project with actua] operations _ Dis - cussions with those involved in the project indicate that hand-launchers with darts loaded with: incapacitant may have been delivered for use in S.E. Asia also indicate that some of the materia) Or cropsspoilants may have .been employed. While no direct connections to assassination Planning have been found, there are some disturbing similarities between the agents being investigated at Fort Detrick and some of the reported schemes incapacitating or assass- inating Castro_ For example, botul inum pills Were reportedly provided in February 1961 and again in April 1962 for use against Castro. Such pills were made for the Agency at Fort Detrick and the record shows the delivery of some in the same time period as the 1962 attempt. Another scheme in 1960 involved the treatment of cigars with botulinum toxin; the comparable treatment of cigarettes is reported in MKNAOMI files _ Consideration was given to the administration of she]lfish toxin with a pin device in Iate 1960 Both the toxin and pin delivery devices were developed at Fort Detrick_ The diving suit scheme in 1963 involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus which would produce madura foot, a serious non-specific, skin disease Hork 14 SECHET Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Ubrary HW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 17 dog They for ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== SECRET on fungal agents generalIy compatible with such an approach was underlvay at Fort Detrick shortly before this scheme was hatched and the agent wa 5 prepared at Agency direction in a form suitable for app]ication to clothing, pillow cases and So on. Tuberculosis germs with Which the breathing apparatus of the suit Were to be contaminated were ava ilable at Fort Detrick though not included in Agency stocks_ Fina" the genera ] presence of BW agents or toxins in a11 of these plans suggests.the strong influence of work carried on at Fort Detrick. None of the interviews undertaken in the course Of this investigation provide information about specific support to operations which may have involved assassination. Roosevelt, who. was Chief of TSD 1960-1962 , believed that discussions involving assassination took place but claimed to know of the' details and was skeptical as to. the seriousness of such discussions . Treichler , Chief of the Biology Branch during this period, denied ever having received requests for such support Or providing it, but these assertions appear incompatible with information he ear]ier provided to the IG 5 office during Its investigation of assassination attempts ~Treichler may constitute a connection. between the MKNAOMI project and the assassination plots involving Castro _ He was the officer responsibie for:MKNAOMI during this period = The records show his giving direction in specific terms to the preparation of materials at Fort Detrick matching those menttoned in the assassination schemes . Finally, the IG.' $ report Indicates that he delivered such materia] to.other elements of the Agency . Beyond the Castro schemes , no suggestion can be found that any of these materials or devices wa $ ever considered for use for Ietha] purposes Ptotoxopy fom Gereld R. For Liary SHerET HW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 18 J1y, from few

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