Transcript of 178-10004-10056.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 178-10004-10056 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination Syslem Date: 8727/20 1 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY ROCKCOM RECORD NUMBER = 178-10004-10056 RECORD SERIES ASSASSINATION FILES AGENCY FILE NUMBER MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (9) Document Informalion ORIGINATOR CIA FROM: TO DIRECTOR, CIA TITLE : [Restricted] DATE : 11/14/1962 PAGES 33 SUBJECTS CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS CUBA CIA ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICA TION Secret RESTRICTIONS IB; IC CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW = 08/04/1993 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS v9.1 39 Top ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== IV awk1vs < KJ64 5 S, I5~ Top SFCRET: DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST 19 178-10004-10056 14 November 1962 SCi. Vf HEHORANDUM #UH : Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT CIA Handling of the Sov iet Build-up In Cuba , 1 July 16 October 1962 Ag The_Background 1 The USSR S decision to develop Cuba as a military base must have been made by the spring of 1962 , and prepara- tions within the USSR must have been under way from that tine on There also must have been planning activities In Cuba ) particularly reconnaissance: and survey work _ The only indication of these operations which has So far been 1 found is a single intercepted personal message on 11 April to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at the Kapustin Yar missile test range This fragment was not judged solid or important enough to warrant inclusion by itself in current intelligence publications_ I 1 2_ Thus ) until the first evidence of the. deployment began to C Ome in late in Washington had n0 warning Of the USSR S intention Intelligence officers dealing with Cuba were focussing during July on the direction Soviet- Cuban relations would take following Sov iet acquiescence in Castro' s assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in 1 the "Escalante affair This attitude was reflected In reporting on the visit of Raul Castro to MoScow early In the month The President s Intelligence Checklist, which will normally be used in this memorandum as the record of CIA reporting to the President Secretaries of State and De fense General Taylor and McGeorge Bundy = reported on 4 July that Raul was IV probably seeking more Sov iet military afd and , specifically more advanced equipment such as the MIG-2ls and surface-to-air nlssfles which the USSR is already providing to Indonesia, Egypt and Iraq The Checklist of 19 July however noted that Raul had Teft Moscow without the usual publicity and . communique and surmised that this was "a pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive _ (The Central intelligence_Bulletin, whenever coordination permitted carried ma terial generally similar to the content of the Checklist.) TOP SICRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Httesp Em Ceed R Faplalen Pnjir THE WhIte HoUs: ofsicf July, ScI ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST TYE !HITZ ~3 L ; 3 , The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem In this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62 The Situation and Prospecta In Cuba, passed by USIB on 1 August 1962 as the inte lligence foundation.for MONGOOSE This estimate stated that: a . "By force of circumstarces 9 the USSR is beconing ever more deeply committed to preserve and, strengthen: the Castro regime The USSR however bas avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingenc ies _ 0} b 01 He believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas We also bel ieve it unlikely that the Blcc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estinate C "The Soviets would: almost. certainly never Intend to hazard tbeir own safety for Cuba ' s sake but "have sought to create the impression that Cuba was under the protection cf thelr missile power d "We believe that the Blcc will continue to limit Its military assistance to Cuba [o defensive weapons7 _ Such a policy would not preclude the prOvision of. more advanced jet fighters_ 9 surface-to- air missiles and modern radars or even the pro- vision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers . -2- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALI Photoony iom} Gereld R Fonlbely PRS ER: Rx ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST { B The Soviet Operation Begins 4 _ During the last two weeks 0f July Soviet ships carrying equipment and personnel for the build-up made their first voyages to Cuban ports the first arriving In the period 26-29 July _ Knowledge 0f some of these mov e- ments reached CIA through routine intelllgence coverage of Soviet shipping before tbe ships reached Cuba No particular Significance is normally attached to such voyages _ However evidence, gradually accumulated that the "behavior pattern" of these shlps was similar to that of Soviet ships carrying arns to other countries that even greater security measures than usual were in effect, that a number of the shlps were coming fron Baltic rather tban Black Sea ports that some of these were passenger ships and flnally that there was a general movement 0f Bloc: shipping toward Cuba: on an unprecedented scale 5 . Apparently the first recognition of unusual activity in any intelligence publication was a note in a daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal use Commenting on an NSA report that certain Soviet 'ships were en route to Cuba mhich had declared for other destinations this paper stated on 1 August tha t "at lease some if not a11 of the ships involved probably are carrying additionai bilitary equipnent to Cuba_ This statement was In direct contradiction to NSAs*com - ment on the; same information 9 ine ~that it-tended to corroborate 2 report by the Braziiian Ambassador in Hevana (earlier interceptedeby NSA)) that Raul Castro had asked the' USSR to take back excess war materiel 6 _ CIA was also in disagreement with DIA over inter_ pretationiof. intelligence on the movenent of shipping to Cuba throughout the month of August 'The resulting dif_ ficulties in coordination of the Central Intelligence Bulletin held up publication from 3 August to 9 August of the first Item on the Cuban build-up in that publica- tion As late as 29 August DIA in ItS own daily Intelligence Summary said that "The hlgh volume 0f Shipping probably " reflects planned increases In trade between the USSR and Cuba There were further dlf- ficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences In the Interpretation 0f photography of aircraft crates deck- loaded on Soviet ships ; the record shows that CIA was iom Gerelr Fard Lizy TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST THE 7 WHITE 1 0fic pnotooop;j -37 ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS. RUFF IDEALIST right Fipally, It should be noted that there is a long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photo_ graphy on deck cargoes and faster service in returning these pictures to Hashington _ 7 _ The Checklist reported the accumulating inforna- tion fully to the President _ On 4 August it stated that "Eleven Soviet ships are on thelr way to Havana and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms Such a dellvery would not be far short of the total amount of arms delivered in the first half 0f 1962 _ M On 9 August it said "Soviet shipments to Cuba have been arriving on an unprecedented scale Since nid-July _ Some 32 vessels are Involved at least balf of these we believe to be carrying arms Five passenger ships with a total capacity 01 about 3 , 000 . persons have already arrived Sone 0f the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians and we have no reason to doubt this We do not believe there are any combat troops among them 11 8 The DCI on 8 August briefed the Republican Policy Committee 9 emphasizing the arrival 0f Soviet military equlpnert ard techiicians _ Two days later , at a #ONGCOSE meeting , he again stressed the Importance of this intel- ligence and raised questions as to wha t purpose was behind the sudden movement of men and materiel He said that the United States must face the possibillty of the USSR locating MRBHs in Cuba as a step that 18 could justify because of US missile bases in places like Italy and Turkey _ 9 Soviet operations in August involved prImar the establishment of surface-to-alr missile and coast defense missile positions By the mlddle of August CIA was: receiving a large volune 0r agent and refugee reporting whlch while understandably garbled and fragmentary , enabled analysts to pinpoint areas OI con- struction and identify some of the equipment coning in_ On 18 August the Checklist reported "There are grounds for thinking that the Targe influx of Soviet milftary equlpment and technicians Into Cuba lately could be connected with the beginning of constructlon Of surface_ to-air missile sltes _ What we know So far is that the shipments have included quantitles 0f electronic transportation and construction equipment some of it simflar to Sovlet equlpment whicn showed up in Indonesia for the building of SAM Installations and that many of the arriving Soviets are constructlon personnel 1i There were further Checklist itens along tne same line on 23 and 28 August -4- Atotooopy Iron Gerab R.fond mnd crondm nrit A T) OIIDOO DTTTt Tntat tan ily la ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST C The July Overflt Program 10 _ On 10 July General Taylor motivated primarily by the extensive use of aerial reconnaissance in following Chi_ nese Communist military activities in Fukien had asked the DCI for a comprehensive review of aerial photography activi- ties The end-product of this exercise was a series of mem- oranda dated approxinately 16 July from the DD/ I to the DCI The one on Cuba recommended that U-2 flights over Cuba be continued at their current level of two a month _ It cited inter alia in justification that earlier missions over Cuba had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false M10 and that "our most important need is for any evidence of the de _ ployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-2ls in Cuba T} This proposal was approved by the Special Group on 19 July .and later by the President: 11. The first of the two Cuban 0-2 missions authorized for. August was flown on 5 August 9 probably just too soon to detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment enter_ ing the island at tnat time The second mission was orig- inally scheduled for 8 August but cancelled because of weather _ The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to the second August mission "whenever the immediate situa tion with regard to Soviet materiel justified it_ Mi COHOR reaffirmed its requirement for the second mission on 13 August The mis_ sion was again scheduled for the period beginning on the 19th , held up for 9 days by wea ther and eventually flown on 29 August. (See Para 19) 4 5_ Fhntoonpy inm TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST GereR Fom ght fly lpay ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 1 TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST D Promulgation of NSAM 181 and the Response 12 On 21 August the DCI attended a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office a t which were: also presen t Secretary- McNamara Under Secretary Johnson the Attorney General 9 Generals Tayior and Lemnitzer and McGeorge Budy _ He told this group that in- formation available since 10 August indicated the extent of So_ viet aid was much grea ter than previously thought and that tbis probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installa- tions or missile sites probably ground-to-air The DCI again raised the possibility that the Soviets would locate MRBHs in Cuba and there developed a discussion of possible US courses of action in case they did SO . It was agreed that the DCI would fully brief the President the next (which he did) and that Rusk 1 McNamara Gilpa tric, Taylor Bundy and the DCI would dis_ cuss the situation with the President on 23 August 13_ At the meeting of the 23rd , a number of actions were decided upon to deal with wha t was agreed to be a critical problem for the United Sta tes Thbese actions were formalized in NSAM 181 (In addition , the President asked for a continu- ing analysis of the number and types of Bloc personnel and equipment in Cuba) Thus , by 23 August CIA had alerted the highest levels of the government to 2 rapidly unfolding Soviet military development in Cuba including the probable establish- ment of surface-to-air missiie sites and the danger of surface_ to-surface missiles_ Furthermore the President had taken aC- tion on tbe intelligence received _ There was at this time Do evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being installed--in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route from the USSR--but the possibility had been discussed by the President and bis advisors 14_ The paragraphs of NSAM 181 applicable to CIA dealt with: a) release of Information b) MONGOOSE and c) An anal- ysis Which7 should be prepared of the probable military, pO- ltica1 and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the US Tt The first two subjects are outside the scope of this memorandum; the third exists as a_ memorandum dated 31 August prepared largely by McGeorge Bundy and the DD/ I , This paper which had the benefit of preliminary results of the 29 August 0-2 mission concluded that the introduction of sur- face-to-air missiles was the "most probable present Soviet mis_ sile activity and tha t such missiles would be a serious threat to aerial reconnaissance 9 but rot to "determined US a t- tack It stated that "surface-to-surface missiles with nu- clear warheads would constitute a very significant military -6- Ptotocray Iom) GeralR Fun TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST TXE 'PRGF:; whIte day Uar ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== TOOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PROPERTY 0F THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICF threat to the' continental US The memorandun concluded that introduction of any missiles "will have a substantial political and psychological impact , while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great a larm 15_ In a memorandum Of 27 August , General Carter reported to Mr Bundy wha t actions CIA was taking in response to NSAM _ 181 He named the officers responsible for the three items mentioned above and listed the following additional measures : a Task Force WY was to look into the possibility of removing restrictions on moun ting clandestine opera tions out of Guantanano _ b. The Board of National Estimates was to establish a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and types Of Communist Bloc personnel entering Cuba 9 quantity and types. of Bloc equipment and its probable use , and all construc_ tion 1 particularly missile' sites: C The Board was also .to assess the' physical and psychological dangers to the US and Latin America of missile installations in Cuba (The two Board actions which were later synthesized in the paper which eventually appeared on 19 September as SNIE 85-3 had already been set in motion by tbe DD/I , in a memo to the AD/NE of 24 August) d CIA was to begin immediately publishing a daily paper on Cuba , including current intelligence estimative aS_ sessments and coverage of the. press to be distributed to the President Bundy McNamara , Gilpatric, Lemnitzer Rusk, Taylor and Robert Kennedy _ This paper the Cuban Highiights memoran- dum was issued CIA beginning 27 August , using 2 philosophy and format similar to the Checklist. A few additional officials were later added to its distribution It was discontinued on 19 September because General Carter and the DD/ I concluded that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban re- porting in regular intelligence publications) e CIA would arrange intelligence collection over - M flights "as frequently as the situation demands (The results 0f this action make up the central theme of this paper .) f Task Force WY was to prepare a plan of operations for MONGOOSE B Plus 16 _ The minutes of USIB show that at its next mee 29 August , Mr Hilsman requested an_ SNIE on the military build- up in Cuba , to be submitted to US IB a t its next regular meeting; ~7- TOP SECRCT DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Atrolooy frm Gab R Fu}bat} by ting ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS , RUFF IDEALIST< i: NJ.S Presumably Hr Hilsman was also acting in response to NSAM 181 _ In any case the paper he requested and the Board memorandum already requested by the DDII were combined . Successive drafts of such a paper prepared by the ONE staff were quickly over_ taken by the photography which became aVailable after 29 August, At the USIB meeting of 7 September further attempts to write it were deferred until the new information could be digested This estima te SNIE 85-3-62 was in fact passed by USIB on 19 September Its substance will be discussed later (See Paras 26-29) 17_ Also at the 29 August USIB meeting two other perti- nent subjects were discussed _ First, General Carter and Hr Cline raised the question of more rapid delivery from Turkey and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships (see para 6) Second General Carter informed the Board that he had two earlier asked General Lemnitzer about the possi bility of low-level photography using RF-lOl or F8U aircraft and that Lemni tzer had replied that something "could be up _ The conversation with Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction telephoned from out of tow by the DCI who was concerned over the long delay of the 29 August mission by wea ther (The DCI departed Hashington on leave on 23 August 9 wen t first to the West Coast, left the coun on 30 August for the Riviera , and returned to Washington on 23 September ) On 30 August Lemn itzer told the Special Group of this discussion Fith General Carter The Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and reopen it "when specific targets and information needs could be identified . I1 8- Anlcoxy TOP_SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST iom Bald R Faid Ubrary 077112 days dug try ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST E Hard Intelligence on the_Build-Up (Defensive Phase) 18. During the last week in August CIA continued to follow the progress of the Soviet build-up, using shipping information comunications intelligence and agent and refugee sources _ The Checklist of 29 August reported that: "There is no sign Of a let-up in the movement of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba . latest count there have during the six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by Ships under Communist charter IYe note that deliveries of industrial equipnent , foodstuffs and other nonmilitary items are belng made iargely on chartered' Western ships, probably because S0 many Sov let ships are involved in hauling military gear _ 19_ The first hard evidence on what the Soviets were up to in Cuba was prov ided by photogra phy of the 29 August mission _ The President was told in the Checklist of 31 August that: "Preliminary information from the 30 [sic7 August U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites On the western half of the island Manning of this many sites would require some 1500-2000. Bloc troops Fe are able to report on the basis of what 1s known So far that construction of the sites appears to be fairly advanced and that there are canvas-covered missiles in the Vicinity Of_ some" sites The existence of additional sites can probably be assumed. "The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined number Of Sov iet tanks The Cubans have had Sov iet tanks for some time but this is our first indica- tion that they nOw have boats of: this type They appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats mounting two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated range of 35 nautical miles _ After further analysis this Information appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September On the 4th and Sth , General Carter briefed 2 number of congress Ional leaders } Including the Senate Foregn Relations and Armed Services Conmittees In a White House statement also 0f 4 September 1 the President publicly confirmed the presence of SA-2s and KOMAR-class boats _ -9- Photoory TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST hrom Gaila R Fard "By past Lbay ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST_ 20 The 29 August mission bad confirmed the establish- ment Of a missile defense of Western Cuba The first mission for September (of the two which bad been authorized as a routine matter by the Spec Ial Group on 19 July; see para 10 ) was flown on schedule on 5 September and revealed similar defenses in Las Villas Prov ince In retrospect 2 it can be seen that the two groups of SA-2 sites surrounded 'the areas in. which MRBH and IRBM site construction was planned Photography of these areas io the 29 August and 5 September misslons however gave n0 recognizable evidence that any such construction was then under way (although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material at Guanajay Site 1 on 29 August) In fact, there was probably no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at the time (see discussion in paras _ 36-39) 21 _ More detailed readout of the 29 August mission had by about 6 September led CIA analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site_-possibly surface-to-surface__ at Banes , On the northeastern coast General Carter S0 Informed the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense on 6 Se ptember No equivalent of such a weapon had beer Identified in the USSR In earlier U-2 photography _ Lacking such background further information and study were necessary to determine the characteristics and range of the missiles _ Programs for both were set in motion . 22 . COMOR at the request of the Secretary of State On 9 September reviewed the vehicles available for reconnais_ sance of Banes. The next General Carter in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requested "necessary actions (including Special Group a pproval) to provide for the employ- ment_ when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance M1 against the cruise-missile site at Banes At the Special Group meeting of 14 September a JCS repre- sentative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba; hcwever the Secretary of Defense was recorded a5 not wanting the operation considered further until results Of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets were available ) 1.e General Carter's proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10 September (see paras 24-25) Meanwhile further ana lysis Of the 5 September photography had resuited In a CIA study dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile A fully checked-out Item appeared In the Central Intelllgence Bulletin of 18 September _ 10- Pialacci frm) TOp SECRIT DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Carld R Ford Lbrary day , ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PROPERTY 0f THE Whitf Nnnsf Ortr 23 . One additional Item was picked up by the 5 September mlssion, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield along with several others still in crates_ This was not reported by CIA in the Checklist but was reported In the Central Intelligence Bulletin OI 8 September _ Actually > these MIG-21 crates Treadily Identifiable from photograpbs) had arrived in 'Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship wbIch had been photographed en route but the, photogra= were mot received io Washington for several weeks Upon' the arrival Of these and phbotographs of other ships carrying MIG-21 crates 9 an 1tem was published in the Central Intelll- gence Bulletin of 27 September--with DIA wtthholding con- currence (see para 6) --that between 22 and 30 MIG-2ls had been delivered to Cuba_ This information was also reported In the Checklist of 27 September _ -ll- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Photocrzy hrom (damld R. Ford Lbary phs ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Fe?Es F The New Overflight Program 24 _ The results of the 29 August and 5 September mls- slons In particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites led to a fuli revlew of the overflight program for Cuba _ This took place In the White House on 10 September Among those pre - sent were Mr Rusk Hr Robert Kennedy , Mr {ecie:ogs Bindkis General Carter and General Lansdale _ The decisions of meetIng are cruclal to the record; and some discussion of the atmosphere Ln whicb they were taken is required_ There were three major factors a On 30 August a SAC U-2 had overflown Sakhalin Island The USSR had protested on 4 September , the US had acknowledged the overfllght and the Incident has recelved major play in tbe world press_ This bad been followed on 8 September by the loss Of Mission GRC_127 over Conmunist Chlna acconpanied by even greater publicity. As a result, most of the participants were-_to varying degrees--reluctant to chance another 0U-2 incident at this tire This meant that they were naturally besitant to authorize any flights over areas where SA-2s might be operational_e b Second there 1s no record that the MRBH problen mas discussed The bard intelligence gathered 50 - far on the Soviet build-up (the Banes problen was still up In the alr) 3 Fias not such a5 to produce 2 sense of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required The establishnent of SA-2s and, other advanced defensive systems had: been foreseen in the NIE of 1 August -and their probable arrival had been fully reported during the intervening period Hence confirmation came not as a shock , but aS. 2 problem to be dealt with deliberately_ (It may even have served to relax the sense of urgency generated by tbe President 5 decisions of 23 August the known usually being less alarning than the unknown . ) The participants therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the rest of Cuba from which the full story of what the USSR had Into the island could be developed, They felt no Immediate need for reccoverage of the areas covered by the two previous mlsslons Finally, the particlpants were operating Ln the atmosphere of the time The Cubans had been clalming that U.S_ Invasion was Imminent The Sov let diplomatic and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention -12- Photocrpy from TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Gerald R Fund Ebbary put ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST on Berlin and hinting at a confrontation late in the year thus creating the Inpression that a Berlin crisis would not come until after the US election In fact the USSR ln its statenent of the following (11 September) on Cuba stated this explicitly_ There were vague hints of Khrushchev ' s In- tent to attend the UNGA in New York Khrushchev appears now to have been throwing up a diplomatic smoke-screen behind which to carry_ out the deployment of strategic forces Into Cuba but those present at the meeting 0f 10 September did not have the benefft of this hindsight Furthermore they must a11 bave been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially the campaign Issue tbat could most seriously danage the Admin- Istration in the election campalgn then beginning _ 25 _ At the meeting = 9 the Secretary of State objected to the CIA proposal for two extended overflights covering the remainder of the island not covered In the 29 August and 5 Septenber missions He insisted, instead that coverage 0f the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flghts over: international waters would not be combined mith over- fllghts of Cuban territory To meet his wIshes the program was divided into four flights two overflights and two peri_ pheral _ One overflight was to be over the Isle of Pines and the other over the part of Cuba east of 770 West to cover Guantanamo and Banes One `'peripheral flight was to cover the north coast of eastern Cuba the other the soutb coast The overflights would be quick "in-and-out" operations 9 while 211 four were to be 'designed for maximun safety. (There Is apparently no written record that 2 decision was made not to fly over known SA-2 sites but in Obtaining approval for the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance (that they dld not do so . ) Later the DCI negotiated with the Depart- ment of State permission to extend tbe Isle of Pines mis- slon over the of Pigs area Of. Cuba proper The Presi- dent approved this program } authorlzlng three flights in September In addition to the one remalning of the normal September allocation (Special Group action 0f 19 July) Thus, the record shows that the President authorized every- thing the Special Group requested . -13- R TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST day Bay Ptoolocq hom Cereldd / Ford = Lial ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST QIHHE WHITE "ficf G_ SNIE 85-3-62 26 _ The lack of urgency expressed in these decisions was also reflected in the deliberations over and the content of SNIE 85-3-62 The Military Build_up in Cuba passed by USIB on 19 September This estimate which was generated by tbe issuance 0f NSAM 181 must be' viewed a5 a symptom Of the state Of mind in the Intelligence Community and in Washington gen - erally during the first half of September _ There were no dis- sents and no major disagreements in preparation of the final draft. Its key findings are as follows ; a "He believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it and consequently that the main purpose of the military build_ up in Cuba i5 to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that tbe US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it_ The Soviets eviden hope. to deter any such a ttempt by enhanc- ing Castro S defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation At the same time they evidently recog_ nize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat 0 their present purpose b "The Soviets thenselves are probably still uncer- tain about their future military program for Cuba Indeed they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions as they go along _ "As the build-up continues the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose but of 2 more 'offensive character: e.g., light bomb_ ers _ submarines and additional types of short-range surface-to_ 1 surface mLssiles d. "However they are well aware that the question of offensive a5 opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a 11 major tical issue e "The establishment on Cuban s0il of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the US would be in- compatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would Indicate a far grea ter willingness to increase the level of risk In US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far However Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the -147 Prlocrpy Irom TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Cers R Fad PRJFni: Kojse tly poli Lbiayy ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== M TP SBCRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEATIST Soviet strategic posture and in that connection the feasibility and utility of deploying nuciear delivery systems to Cuba _ There- fore this contingency must be examined carefully , even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy_ f_ "Soviet planners might see some utility in deploy- ing MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplenent the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets' beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles "i 8 "The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp de- parture from Soviet practice_ since such weapons have 50 far not been installed even in Sa tellite territory _ Tbe Soviets might think that the political effect of defying the US by sta- tioning Soviet nuclear striking power in So menacing a position would be worth 2 deal 1f they could get away with it. How- ever they would almost certainly estimate that this could not Tt be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction . hJ "Although the Soviets may see some' military advan- tages in Cuba a5 a strategic strike base the risks would be grea t and the political inplications wouid run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America_ They do not . propose to win the region for communism by military conquest _ They count instead on a process of tical action 27' _ In commenting on these statements it must first be rec- ognized that the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR was Willing to accept was: gravely in error It should a lso be recognized that the community was virtually unanimous in support of this judgment; deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was without precedent_ Further , while the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba in the period 7-15 September (see para 37) the first reports from ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington by 19 September ; there was no evidence available that MRBMs were on the way _ Wha t the estimate failed to however was to adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were mov- ing and to the great probability that the new installations were manned by Soviet personnel _ The community was still thinking in terms of the rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid pro- grams for the UAR Iraq, and Indonesia (and indeed for Cuba in the 1960-62 period) when there was already evidence that the Cuban program bad departed from this pattern _ 28 . Moreover the Indonesian program too had broken the pattern only a mon th before when the USSR showed itself will- ing to accept 2 substantially increased degree of risk for the 15_ TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST R uffice Kyse MMFFE good poli give do , good Piatccopy Ceredd 'irom Fond = Uwary ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS ' RUTF IDEALIST sake of 2 tical ga in some thing less than vital to Soviet interests The original contracts for Indonesia had been roughly similar to those for the DAR and Iraq - They included 14 SA-2 sites 12 KOHARs 26 TU-l6s (12 equipped with air-to- surface missiles) and 12 submarines al1 to be manned by In- donesians and to be delivered at a pace consonant with the re-' quired training of personnel However as the crisis over West New Guinea: approached its climax 0f. August Soviet eager_ ness to embroil the Indonesians in open warfare with the. Dutch led them to accelerate delivery schedules and to permit the use of_ Soviet personnel to operate sone 0f the weapons being provided _ Six submarines manned by Soviet crews ac" tually con- ducted war pa trols under nominal Indonesian command _ Thus by mid-August the TSSR had show itself willing to take sone risk of military engagement with an ally Of the United States, a1- beit the degree of risk involved was far less than in tbe Cu- ban ven ture 29 _ For the record there is no evidence that the ex- istence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting influence on later_ de- cisions It was not for instance cited to support an argu- ment against continuing overflights _ Nor did it affect current intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the estimative process and provides a check on the con tinuing val- idity of standing estima tes -16- R TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUTFF IDEALIST poli Ptotocpy _Gereld E fom Ford [ Lbay ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST H: Views of the DCI 30 The only available record of dissent from the judgments made in Hashington during the first half of September both estimative and operational is that Of the DCI hinseif, although vacationing on the Riviera was kept informed by CIA cable On 7 September , he cabled General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that hunch Is we mlght face pros) t of Sov iet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types In Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast US and possibly Caribbean areas I On 10 Septenber the DCI again cabled "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba appears to me quite possible measures_ now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MBHs to be Iostalled by Soviets after. present phase completed and country secured fron overflights, Suggest Board of Na tional Estimates study motives (The Board S response is In effect contained in SNIE 85-3 ; ) 31_ On 13 ' September and again on 16 September the DCI repeated these premonitions In the latter cable he added "Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but be lieve CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger of a' surprise and' also that detection of preparatory ste ps possibly beyond our ca pability once Cuba defense system operative Finally on 20 September the DCI expressed reservations on the conc lusions of SNIE 85-3 , which had been cabled to saying "as an alternatfve I can see that an Offensive Sov iet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most Important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take I unexpected risks in order to establish such a Ition These views were provided' to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates _ 32 _ As a result Of the DCI' s pressure there was a renewed examination of other methods of reconnaissance of Cuba (It should be noted here: that this discussion was in terns of what might be. necessary after the establishment Of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible , with the implicit thought that at this point would the Soviets risk the introduction of such wea pons as MRBMs ) On 19 September at USIB General Carter stated his desire to use RF-IO1s over Cuba He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Speclal -17- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST R who, "my pec - him, pOS only Prolocopy @wcld hom Ford Lbary ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHEESS RUFF IDEALIST 07 Housf Group, adding that "we cannot put a stop to collection in Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the point of decision was reached _ The Special Group at its next meeting approved consideration of the use of FIREFLY and COMOR forwarded to USIB on 27 September a program for its use . (No FIREFLY missions have been attempted.) 33_ Another attempt during this period to addi- tional coverage was the programming of KEYHOLIE Mission 9045 (29 September 2 ctober) to_photograph Cuba The results were unsatisfactory , largely because 0f cloud cover -18- TOP SICRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PROPERTY THE WHITE oeixi yet get Pholocopy GerekdR from Ford = Ubiary ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST 1" 1 IS CIA Reporting during September 34 _ The progressive uncovering of the Sov iet program in Cuba- was reported in detail CIA current intelligence Pertinent samples from the Checklist are; a "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at 12 , but the likelihood that others are under con- struction growS with the latest evidence pointing to M1_ the Isle Of Pines as one of the additlonal locations (14 September) b "A message intercepted" yesterday on a net serving Soviet forces in Germany called for volunteers for the protection of Cuba We are not sure '0f the weight to be placed On this and another Intercept referring to the isolation Of volunteers If valid, 9 tbey would suggest that the Influx of Soviet military personnel to Cuba is not finlshed We are investlgating furthber (15 September) C Ti Fe have spotted two more Soviet passenger vessels en route to Cuba Their arrival will raise our estimate of technicians 0n the scene to about 4,200 _ We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey Prov Ince M (18 September) d. "The Interce ptionv"on- l5-September Ofwa Signal from a missile-associated radar , probably coming from the surface-tO-air missile: site at Mariel suggests that the site 1s or soon will be operational_ "The message asking for volunteers for service In Cuba , which we reported Saturday, has now cropped up- On enough Sov iet military radio nets to reveal that a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on 11 There is no indication of the numbers involved ." (19 September) "Evidence is still coming in on Moscow '8 canvass of 1ts military forces for volunteers to serve in Cuba _ This activity 1s puzzling; we have never seen apything like it before "The move. may be purely administrative: to replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to for some time On the other hand 1t could mean another sizable Increment to Soviet personnel In Cuba or a belief In MoscOw that Its people are idkely to be engaged in ccmbat IYe are trying to a better answer (21 September) -19- R Top SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST vTi by yet stay get Ptolocopy Cerakd from Ford = Library ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST f , "Our running account of the number of Soviet dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid- July is now over 100 About 85 Of these probably were carrying military hardware . "The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered Testern correspondents to in for new credentials by today telling them that al1 Of Cuba beyond Havana 5 city iinits Js out of bounds except by special per- mission_ m (27 September) 35 _ During thls period General Carter 1 at the President s instructions briefed General Eisenhower On the Cuban situa- tion on 10 September On 12 September he briefed the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees Although" out Of time sequence 1t should als0 be noted here because the Information presented was essentially more of the same , that the DCI again briefed General Eisenhower on 3 October and Congressman Cannon on 9 October ~20- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST put Ptotooaby CezhR 6oa} Forq! !Yibrar ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST The Sovlet Offensive Depleyment 36 _ At this point _ it is necessary to retrace a few steps In time and discuss what was actually going on in Cuba Exanination of information now available makes it possible to outline with a fair degree of confidence a time-table of the Soviet program which is generally consistent from site to site_ This begins with the construction of SAM defenses first in the west around San Cristobal and Guanajay then in central` Cuba around Sagua la Grande and . Renedios , finally In the rest of the island _ Next in each case comes the eviction of local inhabitants at each- site road improvenent and the establishment Of restricted construction areas Finally comes the arrival of equipment at each site according to what appears a carefully prepared schedule Apparently no recog_ nizable missile equipment was moved to the MRBH Sites and no major construction was. begun at the IRBM sites until a t least two weeks after the last: 0-2 overflight of the area and until the US had publicly. acknowledged the presence of SA-2 sites In Cuba _ 37 _ The first iarge pieces of equipment for the MEBM sltes negr Sen Cristobal were' probably shipped from the USSR on the ship Omsk which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 Septenber_ A second , shipment followed on the Poltava which arrived on 15 Septenber This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by truck: at night with the first convoys probably arriving at the sites about 17 September That is 17 September is the earllest date at which photography might have detected the first MRBH equipment at San Cristobal 38 Construction equlpment and material for the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about mid-August minor activity of an indefintte type was noted there in the 29 August photography _ and major construction had probably begun by 15 September (The fact that ship- ments to Guanajay started before those to San Cristobal reflects the longer lead-time required for construction of a fixed sIte) It is not possible to say how soon after 15 Septenber the activity might have been recognizable from the a1r as an IRBM site 39. The sites In Las Villas Province were established on a slightly later but similar time scale Equlpment for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites was probably landed at Casilda on the south coast The most likely ship to have carried the large items 1s the Kimovsk mhich docked -21- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Ptotooopy Gerakt R from Ford = Ubary ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS : RUFF ` IDEALIST there On 22 September This equipment must have moved to the site during the last week of Septenber and was probably detectable from photography after 1 October_ The Remedios IRBM site construction was parallel to the Guanajay schedule } but also about two weeks behind Photography 0f 5 September was negative but road improvement began shortly thereafter rand a flow of construction material from the port of Isabela on the north coast began _ The estimated date for the be- ginning of major construction is about l October Again the date at which the site acquired a recognizable graphic Signature is not deterninable -22- ~TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST photo_ Ptotccopy Cerald R' from Ford @ Library ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Cf K. The Targeting of San Cristobal 40 _ Although the sites themselves were closed to ground observation ; the movement of equipment to them from the ports was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a_ number of individuals wbo later fled, to_ the US The agents reported this informa- tion as soon as they were able but in most cases had to de_ pend on secret writing for communication Hence , there was 2 lag of several days at least before their information became available Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer for other and uncontrollable reasons--the time of the in_ dividual 's decision to leave Cuba his discovery of means for doing sO, and his delivery to an interrogation center Many of the reports So received dealt with unidentifiable construc- tion activity_ Many of them because of the tine-lags noted above did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October 9 and some are still coming in 41_ Nevertheless by about 1 October, the San Cristobal area had been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requested _ This represents a consider_ able technical achievement: _ To understand why , it is again necessary to back-track in time Since the momen t f Castro's triuphal march into Havana 1 the Intelligence Community bad been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and mis_ sile installations in Cuba There were ' several hundred such reports _ claiming the presence of everything from small arms to ICBMS before August 1960,, 1.e "1 before the USSR bad sup- plied Cuba with any weapons at al1. More specifically CIA 's files Contain 211 intelligence reports (this does not include press items ) on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before L Jan 1962 A11 of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity_ CIL analysts had natura_ lly come to view al such reports with 2 high degree of suspicion 42 _ On 15 February 1962 an Interagency Interrogation center was established by CIA at Opa Locka near Miami to handle Cu- ban rafugees and improvz the quality of intelligence collected from them _ It was manned by trained bilingual interrogators from the armed services and CIA The establishment of Opa Locka coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity re- ceived in Washington When the defensive phase of the Soviet buildup began the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very rapidly and provided information on the types of equip- ment coming in On the use of Soviet personnel and on the se_ curity precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation (Such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited in para 9) -23- R TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDCALIST PRG?ER, THF wixute Ir:: 6KRS good Fhotcoopy Cerald from For Lbay ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISY 43 _ For the better part of two years CIA had been check- ing information obtained from refugee , defector and agent sources with MPIC whenever it was apparen t that the informa- tion was of a kind that could be verified or negated by aerial reconnaissance In May 1962 NPIC began publishing a series of formal listings (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba) in which these reports were evaTuated in the Tight or photogra- phic coverage _ In the 7 issues of this: publication between 31 Hay and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it for comment _ Of this total only three cited missile activity which could not be linked directly to the SA-2 and cruise mis_ sile deployments _ NPIC's evidence negated those three 44 . When the first indications of build-up began to_ come in in August, these procedures were further tightened _ CIA current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/ I 's office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the con- struction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC . (This instruction was in the field of intelli- gence technique rather than of policy; it had 'o relation to later restrictions; (see para 50) Between 14 August and mid- October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check On 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the. possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba A great_ many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally by telephone In all cases NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding- 45 . On 20. August the COMOR Targeting Working Group (chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first conpre- hensive card file system for Cuban targets An example of its procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande area Based on refugee reporting the COMOR Targeting Working Group on 27 August pinpointed four farms in this area as sus_ pect missile sites Readout of the 29 August coverage showed an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis for the reported activity there and the target card Ras changed to show a_ confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that know_ ledge that this site was in the area could have led analysts to misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of the SAM development,but 'in fact no such reports were received _ 46 _ By September the volume of agent and refugee report- ing had become very large indeed During the mon th 882 re- ports on internal activities in Cuba were dissemina ted exclu- sive of telegraphic dissemination_ The CIA clandestine col- lectors report that their output represented only the small 11shable fraction of the raw ma terial collected ) A substantial -24- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST WHLIE moust Uifilt pub- Fhotccopy CeralR fom) FamL Ltery ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== {f TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST: '; proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive mis- siles and related activities Knowledge on the part of the analysts that such 2 deployment was in fact going on the normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in tell- ing an offensive missile from a defensive one tended to throw 3 sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployent when t finally began The CIA enalytic' apparatus howe YRBM recognized und correlated the first authentic reports of equipnent ever to be received in Washington_ and took action them _ It targeted the San Cristobal area , not as another locatioe where alleged missile activity should be negated photography but as a suspect SS-4 site 47 _ This process took about three weeks from the date mben the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to the preparation of the target card _ The two reports from Opa Locka which triggered it were : a An observation in Havana on 12 September of a convoy carrying: long canvas-covered' objects which the source identified under interrogation as resembling SS-4s This re_ port which was disseminated by CIA on 21 September contained sufficient accurate detail to alert intelligence analysts _ b An observation on 17 Septenber of a Convoy mOV - ing toward the San Cristobal area _ This information , received on 27 September 9 dovetailed: in many respects with the earlier report. 48 . The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact to a and that there was a_ possibility of the seen the same convoy SS-4 identification. being genuine A_ day or So earlier; a target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base Now this card was removed and with the two reports cited above and other less specific information on activity in this area which was beginning to trickle a new card was prepared between 1 and 3 October which was In effect a priority require- for photographic coverage This card was used in the tenteting of the 14 Oc tober flight (see para 63) It read as tar "Collateral reports indicate the existence of a re- Solicted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of including an SSM site under construction particularly SS-4 Shyster The area is bounded by a line connecting the follow- ing four tow: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/22441) ; San Diego del Los Banos (8325N/2235w) ; San Cristobal (8301N/22431) and Pozos (8317N/22501Y ) Requirement: Search the area deli- Gestea for possible surface missile construction ; with parti- nea It cular attention to 8S-4 Shyster -25_ TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFT IDEALIST PrjpekTY nrc: 3 plus by in , Ftotoopy Gerald R. hom Fode Lbayy ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST 49 Ar 'ther report_ too general to be used in the process described 2 #ve is nevertheless of interest as the first good information distributed On the Soviet offensive build-up_ On 20 September CIA disseminated an agent report that Castro 5 personal pilot , Claudio Morinas had said on 9 September "We have 40-mile range guided missiies both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air and we have a radar system which covers: , ; sector by _ sector 211 of the Cuban air space and '(beyond) as far as Florida There are also many, mobile ramps for inter_ mediate range rockets" IL: -26- R TP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Ptiotocpy Qerad fom Ford L Ilbay ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Iera. L. Limitations on Publications 50 _ At some point probably just after 27 September , an iten on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might ha ve been written for CIA current inteiligence publications It could not be , written because there was an injunction not to do So By the time that hard informa tion began to come in early in September the USIB principals had become acutely conscious of the distinction publicly made by the President between of_ fensive and defensive weapons in Cuba Aware that they were dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that "leakage of intelligence on offensive weapons true or false would seriously limit the President's freedom. of action in deal- ing with what might become a major interna tional crisis, they had evolved a system for limiting dissenination of such infor- mation Analysis would con tinue_ and senior policy officials would be briefed but no ma terial would appear in formal intel- ligence publications without the approval_ of the USIB principals _ These instructions were first issued 'orally 9' and later (on 11 October) formalized by US IB in the 'PSALM" system (X-Ray Funnel for SIGINT) _ The key passages_ in USIB 's order were: "Such informa tion or intelligence will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals_ on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue Of their responsibilities as ad- to the President bave a need to know and "There i5 no visers however' to inhibit the essential analytic pro- intent hereby , } 01 cess 51 _ It should also be noted tbat the order not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration (Para 44) rescinded _ The effect this would have had on re- had never been and October if the other ban had not porting in late September been in effect is difficult to determine . 52 These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist, but the Checklist writers drew for their Cuban information largely on the Cuban Da ily Summary; a compendium of reporting on Cuba published Vy CIA Since the Summary was affected by the restrictions this practice imposed by the sheer volume of rawv ma terial coming in on Cuba; bad the effect of cutting the Checklist off from information on offensive weapons neither the Checklist group nor any other 53 _ Moreover Irnew tha€ Ehe possibility that a current inteeligencesifecease might be established in Cuba had Soviet strategic missile discussed by the Pres ident been raised by the DCI and seriously his advisors more than a mon th earlier (See Para 13) In and words the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so wa tered down by other -27_ R TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Atiolocpy Cerald [ fom FoidL Ubary ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== ; TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALI SHE WHITE HOUSE time and bureaucratic process that it reached the working Level only in the form of SNIE 85-3 which held that es tablishment of such a_ base was most improbabie (See ) however para 29) 54 _ It Js difficult to say whether information from ground sources would have been published had there not been a blanket injunction against it The analysts too were sensitive to the potential political impact of the reports they were receiving; this would not have influenced them against publication , but would ha ve made thea want to be doubly sure especially on 2 subject with a history reaching back to Our Man in Havana In additicn rigid ccnpartmentation was maintained between the COMOP; Special Gro: ) organization responsible for collection and the intelligence :omponents responsible for analysis Few , if any, CIA analysts rorking on the Cuban problem even had IDEALIST clearances . As 2 result they did not know that no overflights 0f Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in tbe September program , or that this program was seriously delayed They had no way of knowing that the photographic verification they bad requested would not be soon forthcoming and they might wel1 have delayed publication from day to day in hopes Of receiving it 55 . Nevertheless , it can be established that if the injunc- tion against publication had not existed there would_ have been some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban_DailySummafy, which is not highly selective In retrospect it seems quitz pos_ sible_-but by no means certain--that they would then have been picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they would have survived the coordination process for the Cen tra 1 In- telligence Bulletin Thus at the most the President mighe bave Tearned thaE there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal slightly more than a week before he apparently did_ 56 _ In sum the CIA analysts believed they had done their duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic cover- a ge _ but no word of their concern over activity in this area had appeared in an intelligence publication_ It appears highly probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at its meeting on 9 Oc tober 1 when (see para 63) it ordered a U-2 mission which covered the area _ 57 _ The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correla- tion of reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative structure supporting the Special Group This machinery was de- signed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper work before each decision was made procedures reaching back into the early history of U-2 operations over the USSR _ They were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnais_ sance of the USSR , and not for a fast-moving situation such as that in Cuba which was rapidly becoming tactical In fact after readout of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned _ -28_ fom TOp SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Cereld R Phnure: | C#fMF Ftoicoopy Ford " Lwary ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST 7 #TE Kon rC M . Progress of the September Overflight Program 58 While the MRBM and IRBM deployment continued and the first good ground reports began to filter out of Cuba the four-flight reconnalssance program: approved on 10 Septem- ber was being pushed forward Unfortunately, this program was serlously delayed by bad weather_ Not until 26` September could the first successful nission be flown over Banes and Guantanamo (A mission was flown on 17 Septenber but its targets were completely cloud-covered) On 27 and 28 Septen_ ber the weather was bad agaln but on the 29th the Isle of Plnes L Bay of Plgs mission was successfully flown_ The weather again turned bad until 5 October when the south coast peripheral mission was accomplishea. The next the north coast periphera l mission aborted , but was success_ fully completed on 7 October 59 Thus completion of the September program took 26 days from 12 September--the earliest date on Which missions approved on the 10th could have been flown--through 7 October On 20 of these days weather was bad ov er the areas not overflown (the criterion for launch was_ a forecast of less than 25 percent cloud cover) On four days successful mis - sions miere flown On one day a mission was launched but aborted and one day was used to alert a mission which was launched the following Availability of aIrcraft was not a 1imiting factor 60 _ These missions accomplished their purpose i.e_ > " they: established almost completely the location of SA-2 sites on the island They did not-~and since they were designed to avoid SAM-defended areas could not--detect the ballistic missile deployments then under way The combined effect of the Special Group decision of 10 September and the weather conditions of the period following was to delay consideration of what reconnaissance activities should next be undertaken Over Cuba until early October -29- TOp SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST day , yet day Photocopy: Gerald R hrom Fod ! Lxtary ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== ToP' SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Pirure:,i i TheSpecial Group Dec1si0n of 9 Cctober JhE Whie HQUSe effe N_ late September the delays in accomplishing the 61 _ By with a mass of evidence that the four-flight PGogFag cooupledng had generated a greatly Sov iet build-up was It should Increased sense of urgency in Washington tion of the be noted bowever that High-bevdesioveddeca Cuba had always ibility that MRBHs might be deployed was of Soviet action after the SA-2 defense been In terms documentary evidence 0f action fully operational There JS. no SAM-defended areas until the directed toward the overflight of October _ At this Spec 1al Group (Augmented) meeting Of 4 were now (before meeting the ICI pointed out that U-2 flights restricted the last two mlsslons of the 10 Sbeteobeheg;ceranQugest:f Of by the presence of SAM sites to thetsostheettegn,%t was Cuba According to the minutes. of this meeting restric- Dy the DCI7 whether this was a rease onable questioned particularly since the SAHs were almost tion at thls time Ii The Group then ordered the NRO certainly not operational. for reconna issance of Cuba for to prepare an overall program of 9 October presentation at the Group S meeting CQMOR provided to the NRO a memO- 62 _ Cn 6 Occtober mi Inteliigence Justification and Requirements randgveeztitled01Ictea] for use In this presentation . Para: for Overflight stated that "there 1s now a ing and Al= Of thls pa per Intelligence on the progress continuing peed for Ridcudate Cute_ The very highest levels f the Sov fet aTMS build-up In this intelligence to of-the government 3e degecdeionsPOf thediate and vital con- ass1st in making policy decisions on the absence of cern to the natlon, "1 Para A2_ commenting luded the state_ Of western Cuba Since 29 August Jnc Instances, coverage "Ground observers have Zn several recent ment that of what they believe to be Sov iet MRBHs In reported S1ghtings_ must be confirmed or denied by photo Cuba These reports memorandum Were a number of target coverage _ 11 Attached to the around San 1ists on whicb the area EevicuszecOmeatedioxs for attack Cristobal appears _ ) together with recommendat- FIREFLY Of particular-targets by _ satellite {tG1B,-Zongbdegues_ this pa per or F 8u-IP/RF-1o2cchoeodeapko- the Spec ial Group full coverage on 6 Oc tober eegostendedct did not specifically Include San of two of these 11sts would have covered that Cristobal but whIch by Its nature wel1.) the other ballistic missile slte8 8s area -30- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Gerald R' aga in poss press and Ptotccopy hom Fod: Uba: ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== TOp SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST fROPE3tY Lc 63 _ At the Special Group meeting on 9 Oc tober NRO' s first recomnendation was "A 0-2 probe over the suspect MRBM Site as soon a5 weather permits_ This referred to the area targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal (see Para 48) The operation, whic h was to be supported by ELINT collection a Ircraft off the: coast also was designed to" pass over one of the: SA-2 sites which was thought to be most nearly opera_ tional_ Thus the secondary objective was to determine the status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved In getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba' as rapidly a5 possible NRO's second recommendation was therefore condi- tional: If there Is no SA-2 reaction: to the initial U-2 sortie maximum coverage of the western end of the Islard by multiple U-2s simultaneously as soon as weather permits (There were also certain other recommendations for low level, oblique 9 and FIREFLY missions . ) 64 _ The Group. gave first priority to the San Cristobal mission and recommended to the President that he approve It_ The President gave his approval--presumably learning of the San Cristobal reports at this time-_and the mission was Immediately mounted _ It was delayed by weather however from 10 through 12 October On that date operationai control was transferred to SAC There is no reason to believe that the transfer in any way delayed launching the mission , which SAC flew on 14 0tober The pilot did not fly the prescribed track but took a course at an angle to It_ Fortuna - the planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal , and the primary mission was accomplished. 65 _ After this mission had been approved _ but before It bad been flown , CIA recelved on 10 Oc tober Navy photographs taken two weeks earlier of the Sovlet Ship Kasimov off Cuba . These photographs Showed clearly 1dentifiable IC 28 crates which later showed up in U-2 photogra phy of 17 October-_along with a number of others which must have come In on unphoto- graphed Ships--at San Julian airfield in the western tip of the island _ The information appeared In the Checklist of 11 October_ (66 . During this Interim period the DCI brlefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriatlons on 10 October on the build-up, including the IL-285 He also commented on MRBMs essentially along- the lines of his cables from Nice (para 30 ) adding that there were many experts who did not belleve the Sov iets would make such a move but that he differed with them. He told the Subcommittee that he had authority for an overflight in the next or SO General -31- R TOP SCCRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST tely day Atiotocopy 6om Gerald Ford " Lbrery ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Carter saId` much the same thing to Senator Saltonstall_ the following day (11 October) In reply to Saltonstall's question about Senator Keating s charges of known MRBH sites in Cuba General Carter said that there were refugee reports but no hard evidence and that CIA hoped to photograph the areas In the next day or SO . General Carter also briefed Senator Stennis on 15 October (before the photography of. the prev Ious was available) } again along the same lines 7E -32- TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST R day Ptotooopy Gerald E from For Liay ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== 1. TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST 0 Notification of the President 67 _ By this time photography from the 14 October mission bad arrived in Washington and readout had: begun _ The Director NPIC , contacted the DD/I in the early evening of the 1sth to inform him that a possible MRBM site had been identified in the San Cristobal area _ The DD/I notified General Carter (the DCI being out of town) General Carter told hlm he would notify General Taylor and General Carroll of DIA at dinner_ and McGeorge Bundy 1f he was present As the readout progressed during the evening the information becane flrmer and the DD/I decided not to' wait until mornlng to Rotify Rhite House and State Department Officials About 2200 he passed tbe information to Hir _ Bundy and Mr Hilsman, who notified the Secretary. of State_ The following morning (16 October) General Carter and the DD/I briefed Bundy In detail and General Carter at 1100 briefed the President _ 'He -33- R TOP SECRET DINAR 'CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Wxixi Ptotocopy Weven = from Ford E ILbay

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