Transcript of 178-10004-10054.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 178-10004-10054 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Asassination Sysem Date: 4/17/201 Identification Fin Agency Informal on AGENCY ROCKCOM RECORD NUMBER 178-|0004-10054 RECORD SERIES ASSASSINATION FILES AGENCY FILE NUMBER : MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM: AND CIA FILES (3) Documnent Infomiation ORIGINA TOR PFIAB FROM : KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN TO RECORD TITLE: MEETING OF THE DCI WITHI PBLAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M, DATE : 12/28/1962 PAGES : [0 SUBJECTS ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS PFIAB MC CONE; JOHN OPERA TION MONGOOSE CUBAN EXILES DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICA TION Secret RESTRICTIONS IB CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVEW 09/09/2016 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Xt 52879 DocId: 32112782 Page 1 Top" ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== QC ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== CC ?TIEMTIAL FiuInsit $ JOks1o; INT"TIIGECE ADvIGOy BJAXn ACENA Foil MENTILGS 07 DECFNELi 27 20 , .1952 SUBFEC' 111 Wecenbe-2Z@ Tre Juairinn $ "i'ItcL 9:00 9.30 Jeies Oi ijar%i '# Drzft Interim @rort 9:3 7 10:0Q t0 tin Presient i0:oo 12:85 Revis; of iefl Report on intelligeice Ccxwi8 TTIVlica !iclx1s bp A2 Owo?? mT Bimp Kico"m io jci 0ii TEb: 2,).13e) [jcp:1"1 Jcr ich 1:0) 2:30 jiwnah 'ite JinJ-Adanc liolel (ie;:s 0 {w' . Imger) 2.90 3:30 @evie: cf 64 Hoslez1tt122 Fvz E.j;qin5, 227u6y-DiTEct-;{Itell-sence_ Gm of' K;u Rcvien of Tiepon: Ori Cubain pa; 3.30 Dey 1;'41@in? D;? 0 Weoidenec 0f" M"_ John Mene 7.30 1 . Wi . jortfesi D_ 0.) (3025 wiiltebve Zi3n JXo 37; DecentEr2j0 766) 9:0 9.30 'frie C:14;2n8;1 ! 5 Tce 9.30 1:O Disclialor 0: Rerort Or1 tha Cuba "rts J.0 _ euildJp #Jth the Follomin Key Intelli- gence Cc;7iir:d 0f4 4cieis: 3 _ 9:30-10:30-@"- ichw mcCone b 10:3c-11:0 Genen?l M. c:tor, Jepw Birector, CIA 7/ 1K:G1 c . 11:C0-1+736 Jt. 8nrel GC wlakc, Dlicbor. "n 7:82 /3.3; 4_ 1l:30-12*00 'foRes Husnes Depuby Direcior , In Eellibence #nd /.o lezerch , Iepertuni of Stal C 12.00-1:60 L:_ Generei Josepi Car'rall ) Diree*or , DIA CONPLDENTIA, '0 {/ 42 L3 List . LM:_ ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 2ea C)MIDEWTIAI, ;8.? # continuee ) 'Im: SUE4ECI' I Rocn 21 Eocutivc W}uflJrg "1;90 ~28e5= Sichzz R Ydszn "FArcr 765 0r Iplesecation i - Prlor-@os; 2:30 3:00 4230 36 X ~Ruseel]-Ach--_ 3ojne iRscu?:ion o; DeDort C:i #nle Clin 13_ 3.30 Erfi) #:m; Gullup :nd Ccsniete Preparation 0f' ilepcrt tO tr: Presedcnt_ (ON?IDENTIAI; Eiu Jo ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== [OP SECE THE WhitE HOUsE WAsA NGTON Am IDEALIST CORON4 MEOR ANDUM FoR 'THE FILE QYCART SUBJECT: Board Meeting of Dec ember 27 ~ 23, 1962 The Board convened at 9:(0 2.m . on Leccmber 27 * Thosge present were Dr' Killian ) Chafrman , Board members Langer Murphy , Gray , Doolittle_ Pace and Clifford and Messra Coyre and Ash Dr _ Kllllan suggested the t Board mnembers read tre dreft report #hich nnad been furnisine d to the Board on the prececing by Mr Mc Cone , the Directc r 0f Central Intelligence , setting forth the results 0f the all-*ource rewiei ihieh tne Boerci naci requested concerning U . S inlelllgerce corunitz activities with respect to th? Soviet military buildup in Ciba during the 6-mor:the preceding October 22, 1962. Thle Cnalrman asked that 3oard members make note of any comments and questlons they might Xish to raise for iIscussion &uring this tIvc neetirg_ Dr Killia sald that; he ia5 not sure the DCI'8 repc rt had the approval of the intelll- gerice comnunity at this point for he understood that Mr _ Mc Cone ia3 at tnat moent reviewing tine draft report in Seattle and it #Ias possible that some of tne conclusiong and factual detalls might not; have yet received final approval by the agencies which contributed to the preparatior Jf the report (CIA_ DIA , Stare and NSA ) Accordingly the Chairr an noted tne Inportance 01" the discussions which the Board iculd have 012 the following witn headi; of the Intelligence acercies _ The Chai an als0 thought that the Board should ajm for the preparation of a poard report to the President at the close 0f ihis 2-day meeting. Dr _ Killlan sa1d that he had verv recently talked to Mr McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board Wfll take the time it needa to produce a solid report on the handling Given by U. S. intelli- Ience agencIes to the Sovfet Filitary bulldup in Cuba _ Mr _ Bundy assurea that; the President 1ill understand that tine Board is going into thue subJect dleeply and ol Jectively Abnut; 10 days ag0 , the Chairman related _ he had received a telephone call from Mr" _ Bundy who saia tnat he kad seen an early draft 0f the DCI 's report from a ccnfidential source) and was concerned because the report did not to the basic Issues and Nr _ Bundy expressed an intention to tall to Mr Mccone th1s Dz _ Killian stated that he had an appointment to see Mr _ Bundy later in the morning at ivhich time he would ask Mr Bundy to meet Wfth the Board during the course of, this meeting_ Board members Baker and, Land were unab le to attend Handle; Wia,CQNINj : TALENI:Icvhole Hei dle viz , BYEMAN 'TO@ SECE: Chanieisz@iU} Cot do1Sysiem: day -day day get about ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 11 EQE Secret 24-day stav i12 Cuba and"our Covernment;1s equally- in the derk: atout Soviet and Cuban pien? for further activties involving other countrie3 In thio' Hemiaphe ?6 'Also .we are laeking Intel- l1gence o1 Cuba/Communlst China Xiscu3sions Mr Murphy relterated his concern that our lack 0f infomnation on such natters a3 theze indicctes ti1e absence 0f an adeq-ate intellicence C apability to keep our Government informed abo.t developnenta in Cuba at the pre- sent time and in tile future Dr Killian at this, point 1' sported to the Bozrd on t;he con- versation ihich he had; Justzhad 'th Mr "Bundy _ According to Mr Bundy the Fresldentris' fully a1are that the Board 1s - con- ducting i i3 review of the Cuba 9 ituation_ Tie President #ants an oijective report from;a group 0f;citizen: wiho have no axe to Grind ancl he 13 placing great s tore on this effort Qf the Board ih12 Chairman said that Mr Bundy wa3 obviously concerned about the prospect that tne Congress i i11 Iakre Inquiries :into the Cuba matter_ ho:ever Hr Bundy feels there is a bare possibility that Congressional investigators will be more nesitant :o raise HJjo - tneiical cuestions if they learn of the exiskence"of a $ tudy naving been made a Erolp such as the Board _ It is jir Bundy 5 hope that the Boarck iill c ~'efully co.1sider the preperation_ of 0 sani- ~ tizeci veraion 0f tnne report but if tie. Boarc end the Presicient feel that this canol be done: then therBoard shoulc try to prepare 2 report ihich 'could De used in ex:cutlve session of 3 Committee of {he Congres: Dr _ Kiliian went; on io rcport other matters Ihicin had been covered in hid discussion iith jiir Bundy _ Hie said tnat Mr Bunciy nzd expressed concer over the failure of the DCI to accept the Sige3tion that there be suinmittecl a moi'e atiequate report than the one iiich ciiz DCI foriariedi *0 t.e Bozrd cn ecember 26 _ jji? Bundy noted in siis connection that th? DCI 's report 23s1g115 {o policy mairers prime responsibility,for Zry failures witinl respect to intelligence handling- On tine question ofcavailability of . Spec1al Group records for purposes of the Boara;$ study M; 'Bundly infoi ec the: Chairman that certainly thc Board 'shouid eXamnlne such records and that could bc obtalned from, Mr Parrott (Mr Buindy comnented that" the B3ard is tine ; only groip: whic:} can nave tlis !cind 0f;acces: ) Via COMIT Handle via' BYEQAU 'Channeis Cguzdy Sjjiom SECRET by they_ Handle TAewe 45hole MOP ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== [QE SECREZ As to the Board 8 5 tudv Mr Bundy:told. Dr Killian that. the Board sould include in its" icvicm dlscussions iitn the Sccrctarles 0f State arid Defcnse' and - the Chaiiten 0f the Joint. Chiefs of Steff 5 Mr Bundy nd: cating that the Secretary of Defense ha8 parilcular reservatieng about the DCI!s report_ nnother Iatter nentioned by. Iir Buncly was his belie?' that the morale of the Intelligence. C( munity 25 a xiolc stands to suffer 1n tle absence. of a carefully done reviei rcport winich 18 being expected frOlil thc Boarel Witin regardl to the inicrim :'eport which tine Board has wnder Mr" Buncly informed the Cnai: mz that the report could be aeYivered_ *0 hin or 1t could be presented to the Fresident directly anc] iir Bundy thought 1& ~Opofoaiier that the Board presenl Jt to tinc Fresident :r pcrson: One matter d acusecl #as the Board 3 colcern about any intelligence l't-dovin in the Iake 0f the Cuba crisi3 it being Fir Bunciy 3 bel-ef' that no let-dlowin 13 in prospect if present directives 21d dimcussions 0n the sbject. nave any effeet in Government (6i cle ccnclusion of the.Cinan 's account of his discussion with Mi . Buray ' tine Board recess d.for lunch . ) At 2:30 P m , ) the Board 6a5 brlefed on the worla 81tuation Nir Thomas Lailor senior: Intelligence Officer in CIA 9 Office of Current Intelligence (Mr Ray Cline Deputy DCI/Intelligence mes on vacatio} leave and availajie to be present at this Board meeting) Fir: _ Lamlor explained chat his Oln responsibilities in- cludea tne hardling of currcnt L 1telligence matters the selection and write-Up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in memnoranda for the pmite House) and the preparation of internal in- telligence nutes for usc at the MIA working level Nir Lawlor pointed out tnat his duties Mere in the area3 0f analysis anr} production 2 not the collection, Jf intelligence His briefing of tne Board included. the following subject matters ; USSBChicon _relationd Rec imlnations betieer the USSR and Corilinis : China are the greatest in the history 0f their dispute and an , cpen brealc In_ party relations_ is most likely near USSR/Cuba: The U,HSR i3 presently reappraising it5: foretg; policy positioils in tne lielt of the Cuba crisis afteiath. NJSSR- Berlin The U;?SR 15 &t;a dlplonatic standst4llsin Bexlin 0l and this 15xtraceable to tnetusS:/chieoni i1ft IiandiesVia CQMiTejaleHE: KeyholG Camels %U neti2 BVH LOBSECREY ilg and such Dy not ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== IO The Chairman the ICI whether the MONG OOSE ac tivity presented ' any particular intelligence , Problem in the Cuba situation Mr McCone said ~;hat 1t had not He sa1d that_ in the MONGOOSE ac tivity' the: Speclal Group and the Attorney General had g1ven a great de:il: of:congideration to the neec_ for intelllgence collection Mith:respect to Cuba but the Intelligence necded: was primarilyefor covert act ion rather than other purposes Neverthieless the MONG OCSE activity contrlbuted to tre over-all' Antelligence collectionn effort on Cuba 6r _ McCone recallerl that there was a hiatug in the collection of intelligence Ol1 ' Cuba after the of' Pigs In- vasjcii ,' and when he;took'' off:ce In' November 1961 Mr McCone Y23 surprised to learn"that no Interrogation of Cuban refugees was aking plaze Thereafter'; following discussions With the President and the ; Attorne JaGeneral they the ,refugee_ 1nterrogations under;way Fr _ Murphy wondered why there had been a let-dowin in intelllgence gatnering after the of Pigs incident Fir: _ McCone said that this tookr p.ace before his time but he assumed that the reasons had to do With discouragement and other psychological fectors, In response to Dr Killian question a5 to whether anotn:r Intelifgence let-dow was In store in the wake of the Cub:: crisis Mr _ McCone sa1d that there was in fact a great daniger of such a development folloling 11 Ihat s ome officlala consider wag an "intelllgence_ victory for the Unlted States Mr } cCone noting that the Soviet SA-2's remaln in Cuba said he: had brought this up forcefully 2 ieek ago at 3.n NSC Executive Committee mneeting and the President hacl agreed to 4'01d to the USSR tnat any inter- ference iithn our aerial reco:nalssance of Cuba would be considered a5 being Most graie and Measrs McC loy. and Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov Mr McCone added that; hile JOw 5 level: rrconrelssance flights_ have been; sus pended should anye;omninou: development occur It_ W1ll be necessary to obtain;PresidentLal:epproval of the resumption of Jow-leve1 flights Sub Mr _ Pace inquired 23 _to whether there were any prohibitiong 0n7 the conduct of, Intelligend e operations Ivith regard;to}Cuba Mr McCone sald yes it 18 'dc 3ired to folloly_a more {aggressive pattern of; agent"Infiltration into. Cuba He would- 1lkexto 3ee a <3. or 4 month effort directed: toward-the obtaining_ of,stralght; Intelligence}on Cubag(in.liei of political warfare for example) to determine thestrend#of So! let}plans;1n_ Cuba The DCIYnoted; that the Soviets mayiiuletly; out Qf4Cixa _ er;theytmayuin Handie Via LeqWP JALeN PEHOE Hendlev HETHN Channg Oq Fe1 Systen} SECRET 207 asked Bay got Bay 19 get get TOP SICREL ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 'TOR fact take. one step back and twic 'steps forward and hold on to the Cuba real estate 28,3 propa Ganda end ingurgency bas@ 2s a means of keeping Castro ur der control ar In order to. retain a capability fgr quick estoration of:a Soviet offensive_ capability_ The klnd"of concelted; intelligence action which the DCI had in mind' wouid inclide (1) penetration: ofrthe: Castro government_regime_ (2) 'the Plac ement of additional agent' teams In Cuba_ (3) the continuation' ( f efforts to obtatn the ass1stance: of British French and Cerman-representatives in Cuba; (4 ) tine possible obtaining of 'useful ir telligence from the attorney Donovan Iho 1s negotlating prj goner releases and (5) posbibly the obtelning of useful information from the captain of the African_ Pilot whcjhadGa 3-hoir talkwith Castro end who yesterdey: asked"to_ see a U#S; intelligence' officer. Mr _ Pace asked whether Mr Mc Cone would favor the use of Guantanamio Naval Base a5 a base :for launching intelllgence and related operatlons ageinst Ctabz Mr Mc Cone sald that he would not be in favor of this because if Ive were caught us1ng Guantanemo for intelligence operations Cas tro would obtain UN and other support for 'Cuba S demands for W;S. 'el acuation 0f the Naval Base _ Answerirg General Doolittle '$ question_ the DCI stated that U-2 overflights of. Cuba were: g( ing: &t the rate of two a day , re- sulting in coverage of- al1 tarrets once 2 week and in coverage of; some Important targets- (e.g_ narbors) more often_ Mr _ Mc Cone sala that COMOR and USTB 11st,the,tirgets and that he then establiahes flight schedules Going back to the subject: f. Guantanamo Mr Pace .asked whether the DCI had male a s tudy of the expected intelligence return that would be obtained 1f intelligenice operations were conduc ted from: the Base L I Mr Pace: adding that he .thought such a s tudy should be made before :a final,policysdec:sion was reached _ 3 Mr; McCone sa1d that he had not: made:8uch; a otudy He, added that In August the "operators in CIA:haa; proposeci to the MONGOOSE"' Group_ that Guan tanamo Base be 80 used but th:.5 Tas opposed at.the policy level Mr Mc Cone said that herwouldqiotibe}oppoged to.a restudy .of. the proposal.at thls time In: ansierato;;Dr' 'Killlan S Inquiry Mr Mc Cone confIrmed that wevare conduc SIGINT' operations-ati} Guantanamo and Mr Kirkpatricl: notea that NSAhad onlyhrecently added two.more tions; thece Ds Handle Via' CMiNT JALEN KeYHolE Chanzels Zud SStem SECRET ting Posi- BYEMAH; Haileival Dnly ISECRET @OH ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 22 jOE Mr Murphy' asked the:DCIEto 'state: the meaning 0f MONGOOSE 11 Mr McCone explained shat 'In the MONGOOSE Group 1t % B PLUS" conceived that Pnase I would be one of gathering was iiizenewion= the possibilities for the organlzation and supply Intelllgence within Cub 1, Sut thls effort wa8 'mi only falrly of resistance; Mi Ea2u8s Castha hag 3ome. 10O,0003 Informers In place in successful becauge rrity controls through a_ syetem' of= Cuba and exercand thetero:?,:e14 did not as many teas Into ration cards and therefore, xst 10 , Phase II ias reeched WIth Cuba as had been hoped On a relatvely high MONGOOSE planning for, a) viole 1t actiong (1) "B MINUS 1I level of actions or "B-PLUS" and lesser actens or Mr; McCone that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed "B PLUS" ac tions in the absence of plans for mouldabe bacedngith because 0f his Own speculation that the U,s. would be faced MRBMs in Cuba In any case th? MONGOOSE effort became diverted cong1derationg of Sovlet activitles In ,Cuba, Mr Mc Cone stated _ by 73; In answer to a question' from Mr Murphy as to who chairs the at thls time Mr Mc Cone said that he did not Inol MoeCOSEMG Buna; 01' the Attorrey_ General was now serving 43 whetner Chairman With reference to the abserce .of photographic evidence of Soviet offensive missile deployment pl Ior to Oc tober 14 photography Mr McCone said that 19 one Jocks 8 t photography of Cuba on September 5 1t 18 possible 'to, { evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site but this { C tivity could have been that 0f agricultural workers and the e1 idence did not then point to missile Dr Killian noted ti e Board S concern that Soviet C 2m - outlvgey_ operations may 1e decel ving uS Mr McCone expressed his age concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by C amouflage Qwn Acknowledging that 01 r intelllgence estimates leave a methocls _ for error Mr Fic Cone noted that it 1s nevertheless inpoasiolergor us to say' that } e know a1l tha: Is going on In the Jsgossible_ with respect to mnissile ar tivity In response to Dr Killian's comment that public discussion: seem to indicate that U S , nissile capabilities are superior- to; th:ose 0f' the USSR the DCI considered that any such conclusion 1s erroneous and dangerous and could lead:: to 2 coniplacency which.might w(:ll result in curtallment of the U, S missile program by an economy-ninded Congress _ Mr Mc Cone added that In his; presentations to. select Committees of tne Congress he always expresses; reservations concerning U S missile; supertority Dr Killian Wondered- Whethirtthe: President the Secretary of Defense and the#Congress unde: stand thedanger: of<conclusions 'that Aoehing 156 there begause in tlbe seen Mr McCone; 'said: that undoubtedly there Eegartenaend AtorardiileevyZdependence upon pheto 'graphic: Intel 11gendeb KELE Hendle via iinm J[ORESECRET Hande Via CoitrdeGisicn SECRET get Aug said obtained pot great COMiT;tnlem

JFK Declassified Files

Back to Search

178-10004-10054.pdf

Released: March 18, 2025

Download from Archives

Page 1 of ?

This document is provided for research purposes only. For official versions, please visit the National Archives.