Transcript of 177-10002-10012.pdf
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177-10002-10012] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 8/26/20]
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY LBJ
RECORD NUMBER 177-10002-10012
RECORD SERIES NSF, UNARRANGED FILES, LAICUBAN SUBVERSION, BOX 5
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
Document Information
ORIGINATOR CIA
FROM
TO
TITLE
DATE ; 02/18/1963
PAGES : 7
SUBJECTS
NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
DOCUMENT TYPE DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES
CLASSIFICATION Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS 1A
CURRENT STATUS Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMNTS
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Czs 4
DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963
CUBAN SUBVERS ION IN LATIN AMERICA
I Introductory Statement
The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the
daily record of events in Latin America, and reports
fron our intelligence sources within Communist and
other left-extremist elements throughout this henis-
phere all agree on one salient conclusion : that
Fidel Castro is encouraging and supporting: the efforts
of Communists to overthrow and seize control of the
governments in Latin America _
A Analysis indicates that the immediate threat
stems less from the subversive efforts of tra _
ditional Communist movements than from Cuban
support of any and al1 active revolutionary and
terrorist movements ,
B These distinctions are not precise . In some
coun tries, Castro's original success has spurred
the established Conmunist movement to action,
and he supports it. In others, the old-time
Communists may even oppose radical action at this
time , and Castro works with more active and more
militant revolutionists_
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C In any event , we know of only two coun -
tries__Mexico and Uruguay--where Castro
appears inclined for the time being to
forego inciting violence , and this
because he wants a favorable climate for
his operations into other countries _
II Even before the October missile crisis__and
with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders
have been exhorting revolutionary movements to
violence and terrorism, and supporting their
activities.
A Cuban support takes many different forms _
We have occasional evidence of direct
participation by Cuban nationals, 45 in
the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December
We know that some funds move , generally in
cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolu-
tionaries in other countries. While we have
not been able to come up with the kind of
airtight proof a court would require that
weapons move directly from Cuba to these
same groups, we do know that Cuba furnishes
money to buy weapons, and that some guer -
rilla forces in Peru, for instance, are
equipped with Czech weapons which most
logically would come from Cuba .
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B But by and large , our evidence shows that
Cuba is not now attempting a large program
of physical support for Latin American rev
olutionaries, It rather, concentrating
on supplying the inspiration, the guidance,
the training, and the communications and
technical assistance they require_
In essence , Castro tells would-be revolu-
tionaries from other Latin American coun -
tries: "Come to Cuba;
we will pay your
way , we will train you in underground or -
ganization techniques, in guerrilla warfare,
in sabotage and in terrorism. We will See
to it that you get' back to your homeland
Once you are there, we will keep in touch
with you , give you propaganda support, send
you propaganda materials for your ' movement ,
training aids to expand your guerrilla forces,
secret communications methods, and perhaps
funds and specialized demolition equipment #
Castro 1s not, as far as we know , promising
these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons
or Cuban personnel-_either leaders, ad-
visers, or cadres . But he probably does
tell them : "If you succeed in establishing
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something effective by way of a revolu-
tionary movement in your homeland , if your
guerrillas cone down out of the hills
and confront regular armed forces, then we
may consider more concrete forms of assist_
09 ance
D. 8o it should be noted, none 'of the
movements in South America has reached this
final stage--and in fact even Castro's
Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight
a
pitched battle with regular military
formations which might have required
more
advanced weapons than small arms_
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grenades,
mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba
under Castro 18 the Latin version of the old
Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-
revolution wherever it will flourish
III, Before going into more detailed evidence of Cuban
subversion in Latin America, I should note that
Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba S
priority list for revolution
A , Fidel Castro said So to the recent meeting
of Communist front organizations for Latin
American women
1 Che Guevara and Blas Roca both empha _
sized the outlook for revolution.in
Venezuela in speeches in January _
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2 One of our established sources of proven
reliability, high in the ranks of the
Venezuelan Communist Party ((a veteran
party member and leader of the FALN) )
says the Central Conmittee agreed in Jan 44
uary that a "peaceful solution to the
present situation in Venezuela is out of
the question_ T
B This same source reported that Communist guer_
rilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela
were placed under a unified command in late
1962 , which coordinates activities with the
other militant extremist group in Venezuela ,
the MIR _ The result has been the creation of
the FALN, or Arned Forces of National Liberation
1 The FALN is currently trying to publicize
its existence by such acts a5 the hijack-
ing of the freighter ANZOATEGUI
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and by
acts of sabotage and indiscrininate shoot #8
ings _ These have also been designed to
dissuade President Betancourt from his trip
to Washington
2 _ I do not wish to minimize the violence in
Venezuela The sabotage is the work of
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experts, and is being done with advanced
types of explosives The shooting has
reached the point in Caracas where it is
not safe to go out after ten at night in
some sections of the capital = But it is
the opinion of both our people and the em-
bassy that this 1s not a threat to govern =
ment control. It is one thing for a group
of young men to race down a dark street
firing a machinegun from a speeding car
It is quite a different matter to stand
up to the armed forces, or seize and hold
government buildings .
3_ We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla
training to more nationals from Venezuela
than from any other country. I shall ex-
plain in more detail later how we arrive
at our figures on guerrilla trainees Our
best estimate now is that more than 200
Venezuelans received such training in 1962 _
a Many of these are engaged in terror _
ism in the cities, and others were
rounded up and given long prison
sentences when they committed thenselves
6 _
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prematurely last spring in a country_
side where the rural population strongly
supports the Betancourt administration
b One of our best penetrations Of the Con -
munist Party in Venezuela tells us that
at present the unified command has less
than 150 guerrillas in the field, in
widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men
each .
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