Transcript of 176-10036-10073.pdf
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176-10036-10073] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY NARA
RECORD NUMBER 176-10036-10073
RECORD SERIES National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
ORIGINATOR
FROM Johnson
To Rostow
TITLe Meeting of Vietnam Task Force June 19 1961
DATE 6/20/1961
PAGES 5
SUBJECTS
DOCUMENT TYPE
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
CURRENT STATUS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS National Security Files, Box 193; Vietnam General 6/19/1961-
6/30/1961. Box 1
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Srov~zaa
June 20, 1961 NLEz7S-36
NLX 02 - 1/03
MEMORANDUM FOR MR _ ROSTOW
SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961
Intelligence_Briefing
Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence
briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian
border problem Embassy Saigon dia not agree with the view of
Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem. At
present; Saigon reports_ Cambodia is used primarily as:a safe
haven by guerrillas in
Viet
Nam rather than 8s an area from
which operations are mounted. The Embassy provided specific
informatlon on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested,
should be shom to Sihanouk: There was also a report that the
Indian member of the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body
should investigate subversion. This was said to heve causea
the Polish nember to ask for a recess of the ICC in order to
permit him to prepare a reply- This report, if confirmed , is
in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions
along these . lines had gone" to the Indian member of the ICC: )
It was also reportea that on Friday there may have been a
clash between Pathet: Eao and South Vietnamese forces just in-
side Laos on the highway connecting Laos-and South Viet Nam.
(South' Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some tIme. )
The. foliowing table: on operations for was also presented.
Killed Ceptured Surrendered Deserted
Viet: Cong 3824 30 37 none
GVN 240 158 none 41
Te_Local_Currency:Costs Problem
Mr_ Cottrell reported on the current status of the_
problem of meeting the local currency oosts of the 20,000 man
increase: A message_has beer Sent to Saigon requesting the
Embagsy to undertake negotiations with # the GVN and offering
three alternatives in descending order of preference:
2, The U._ S. would commit 85.1 million equivalent in
piasters _ provided the GVN proceeds without,delay; With
mobilezationoand
meets the balance of the local currency
costs from its ow resources::
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3ic /
May
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If the proposal under 2 above is not adequate to obtabz
GVN agreement , we woula offer an edditional %4.85
million in piasters _ This is estimated to be 'sufficient
to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of
the aaditional 20,000 men;
C If neither of the above proposals Proyesniffeot-
able, the U S; would: offer an additional million in
assistance in,1961 which, if the GVN would accept a , dollar/
piaster rate of 73, woula be 'sufficient to meet the piaster
cost for 1961.-
As of yesterday afternoon, no reaction had been obtainea
from Saigon. In a long conversation with Ben' Wooa, the Deputy
Director of the Task Force, Thuan was tola before ne left the
U_ Sa of our offer; under above_ On the basis of this,offer,
he indicated that he
1deula
sena instructions to Saigon to in-
itiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a
final agreement. This proble therefore, seems on its way
toward solution_
The Situation in Iaos in Relationship to South Viet_New
A large of the was devoted to discussion 'of
a draft memorandum that
'Coeetenf
read to the Task Force con-
taining his ideas With respeet to the situation in Iaos" and
what should be done about it: You are generally familiar with
his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him,
I dia not attempt to take detailed notes On the memorandum, but
his proposal runs along the following lines:
Cottrell does not believe that any arrangement to create
a neutral Laos will be viable, He does not believe that we
shoula withdraw in favor 0f the French in Laos. The French
cannot be depended 'upon to do 8 good job and the reestablishment
of their presence WIll be deeply resented throughout the former
Indo-Chinese states: The military situation In Laos is alarming:
The Pathet Lao are: now posing a serious threat in southern Laos,
Cottrell proposes that_ we seize upon some .plausible excuse to
break off the Geneva Conference_ The failure of the ICC to
stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse, He woula
then introduce That special forces and "hunter-killern forces
now being trained "in South Viet Nam into gouthern' Laos in an
effort to clean out the Pathet Lao n infection" there In the
discussion of his proposal the question was raised as to
whether the Introduction Of 0 . S; forces woula not be necessary .
Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real possibility and
emphasized the importance of our not letting 'our friends in
Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that should
prove necessary.
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em,
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Members 0f the Task Force were asked for their reactions
to the paper There was a rather surprising degree of agree=
ment that something along this line must be done or it will be
virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet
Nam There was no
'State Department_representative present at
the time except Cottrell himself. ). The ICA member ana the
representative of Jack Bell ' s office did raise questions as to
whether political and economic action by the Dien regime was
not a more
important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than
military action in Laos ;
I made
the following points about_ the proposal: First, I
observed: that this woula seem tome to raige important questions
of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at
the highest levels of government. I indicated that f woula be
unable to take a
personal stand on the.issues raised: I ex-
pressed : some surprise about the apparent: unanimity of view that,
unless we undertake mili action in Caos it woula be
virtually impossible to
tezl eftect_Velyagith
the situation in
Viet Nam. I said that while I coula see no objection to the
Viet Nam Task Force raising these 'questions, it seemed to me
that they shoula be raised much more clearly in the context of
the Viet Nam problem. That i8 the proposed memorandiun should
make. clear why the' present situation in Laos will make it
difficult, if not imposs-ble, to carry out an effective
against the Viet Cong In Viet. Nam; Cottrell agreed' to take
account of this suggestion with which there seemed to be some
agreement in the Task Force)
I; e4
Mershl ihe
6F feeling Of frustration. which has
prompted Cottreli to produce his memorandun: : I: specifically
share his doubts with respect to getting the French" back into
Iaos; (I hed: thought that this proposal haa been dropped as a
resuit of aaverse reaction from various Sectors:) The: Cottrell
proposals_ raise: very directly the question of U; S
military
'intoreeetion
in Iaos : It seems to me inconceivable
that his objective" could: be achieved without such intervention:
The proposals al8o' woula have the effect, it seems to me, . of
merging the war in' Laos with the war in Viet Nam, I do not
think that this woula be a good idea .
I think that: there i8 8 serious question as to whether the
situation in Laos is not deteriorating so thet any
likely political Solution will p leave it 8s a serious source
of infiitration into both Viet Nam and Thailand_ But I wonder
whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the Context
of contingency planning for Laos itself In :this' connection,
I do feel that the' military contingency plan that we_ haye Seen_
for Leos is based upon too narrow a contingency i:'0., a
clear feilure to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a
cease fire by the Communists, We neea to plan against the
3
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possibility .that the Geneva Conference will be prolonged in-
definitely ana that meanwhile the PL: will take over Southern
Laos 'piece by piece and bit by bit as it appears to be doing.
I wonder whether you want to check again_with Alexis Johnson
on the status of contingency planning?_ I wonder whether it
isn t about time to have the NSC and the President review the
Iaos situation?
Other_Metterg
I raised the question a8 to the next step in consideration
of Diem S proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces_ I
was tola tnat the matter was being studied in Defense. It was
the view of the DoD representative that the .possibility of such
an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it
woula take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized
and the: 30,000 currently under consideration. The' 30,000 woula
be a part Of the 100,000 since Diem was using: a 170,000 man base. )
I also
raised the question of whether food supplies
were
being cut off by the: Viet Cong (es you by a
Vietnamese ) I was' told that the
"osiesegte85%
of Viet Cong
action in this area was the recent seizure Of seven: barges
carrying sugar_ However
9
it was
al50 stated that the GVN has
given this fear as an
explanation for reduction in rIce ex-
ports_ That is, the CVN has withhela rice. from international
markets because of a fear that 'the rice .may be needed in Viet
Nam if the-VC: should begin to cut food_supply lines_ Thus it
may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange
ravbatonr eseyves:
There seemed to
be no greet concern
in the;' Task: Force
with this as a current real probiem
0
Following the meeting I
talked to the ICA 'representative about whether it would: be de-
sirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of
their fear that rice supplies may be cut_off and thus to. per-
mit them to sell more of their' rice abroad & He indicated that
politically it was very difficult to ljustify export of rice to
Viet Nam which was itself a, rice exporter:
'Today I talked with Jack King of:CIA (ONE): about- this
question: He had not made a
specizic study of it of course::
It was
hi8 impression that, while there was some VC interference
wIth rice movements; the problem was not' one of "independently
serious proportions _ That is, it was .a.reflection of the
general Vc problem which was Serious but not 'in itself a cabbe
for alarm_ It was also his impression 'that .GVN exports' of rice
had been surprisingly Well maintained: )
SEGRET
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etbit/ (3
C.
Finally; I raised the question of what planning was being
done to internationalize the border problem_ In response
Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the
situetion in Laos _ Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State
about the same point: He referred to the arrangements that are
being made for a meeting of. MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries
in the area sometime in July at which the border problem,
among others will be discussed. He also referred to the fact
that Ben Wooa i8 currently working on a counter insurgency plan
to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked
to prepare such a plan but had failed to do S0. (I find a
great inertia, epparently rooted n a basic lack of sympathy =
whenever I attempt to raise the question 0f finding some
means
to involve the international community" in the border question.
Neither Cottrell nor the State Department representatives-seem
very much: interested: Have you ever discussed this question
with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do *80:)
Following the' meeting I followea up with Cottrell on the
conversation you had had with him in the morning; asking him
whether he didn t think it would be desirable to send General
Taylor to South Viet Nam to consider the request for -&-J00,000
man increase and also to make sure thet our military activities
in South Viet Nam were really being reoriented He reactea
negatively to Jthis proposal, taking the view that it was un-
desirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work
of people in the field In a later conversation with .someone
else in State I a much more favorable reaction to this idea:
The more I think about it the more I am 'Convincea that it woula
be highly desirable. I very 'much share your uneasy feeling about
the situation::
1k
Robert H. .Johnson
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