</s>176-10030-10422 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK ASSASSINTATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10039-1042 RECORD SERIES : Sorensen Papers AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ORIGINAL NUMBER # : ORIGINATOR : FROM : Schlesinger, Jr. TO : President Kennedy TITLE : Memo to President CIA Reorganization Date : 30/30/1991 PAGES : 15 SUBJECTS: CIA DOCUMENT TYPE : Memoranda CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified RESTRICTIONS : 1C CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 8/21/1998 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Soresen Papers: Classified Subject Files 1961-64 Box 47, CIA, Document 1a. NW 49061 DocId: 32622644 Page 1

**Key Individuals:**

* President John F. Kennedy
* Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
* Richard and Glady Harkness
* Tom Man's
* Allan Dulles
* Miles of Ambassador
* Ambrosader Cavin
* Patrick Dean

**Dates and Locations:**

* June 30, 1961
* Paris Embassy
* Vienna Embassy
* Chile Embassy
* Indonesia
* Cuba
* United Nations
* British intelligence system
* Foreign Office
* Colonial Office
* Commonwealth Relations Office
* Information Research Department
* International Commemorative Fronds

**Significant Events and Activities:**

* CIA reorganization
* Clandestine intelligence collection
* Covert political operations
* Paramilitary warfare
* Guerrilla warfare
* British experience in keeping clandestine activity under strict, foreign office control
* The Cuban operation
* Knowledge of the Cuban operation denied to top officials
* Establishment of a research and estimate group independent of policy and operations

**Connections to JFK, the Assassination, or Related Investigations:**

* The document is a memo from Schlesinger, Jr. to President Kennedy about CIA reorganization
* The memo discusses the autonomy of CIA and its impact on US policy
* The Cuban operation was mentioned as an example of a problem with combining intelligence and operations
* The investigation into the Cuban operation was not conducted by the Office of National Estimates

**Evidence, Testimony, or Findings:**

* CIA's use of State Department cover for personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary
* CIA has increased the requirements for official cover
* CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel in some missions
* Paramilitary warfare is not considered a purely technical matter, but rather a political weapon that requires careful oversight
* Dulles' argument for a research and estimate function in State (1947)
* Denial of knowledge of the Cuban operation to top officials
* Need for an independent research and estimate group

JFK Declassified Files

176-10030-10422.pdf

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