Transcript of 157-10014-10178.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 157-10014-10178] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination System Date: 7/7/2015 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10178 RECORD SERIES MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-83 Document Information ORIGINA TOR SSCIA FROM TO TITLE : DATE : 00/00/1975 PAGES : 161 SUBJECTS CASTRO, FIDEL LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION CIA DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT CLASSIFICATION Declassified RESTRICTIONS IB; IC CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW - 05/31/2000 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS CC Box 73 v9_ H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 1 ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== Date 08 /07/95 Page 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY SSCIA RECORD NUMBER 157-10014-10178 RECORDS SERIES MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER 07-M-83 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR SSCIA FROM TO TITLE DATE 00/00/75 PAGES 161 SUBJECTS LUMUMBA , PATRICE ASSASSINATION CIA CASTRO _ FIDEL DOCUMENT TYPE REPORT CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS REFERRED CURRENT STATUS POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW 01/19/99 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS CC Box 73 [R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 2 ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== INTERVIEW 'AND MEET ING SUMMARY 2 4a Congo' Chief Sf Station INTERVIEW WITH: Lumumba Assassination Plan_and Related Events REGARDING : in the Congo DATE-TIME-LOCATION : August 20 1975 12 30-3 30 P. Room 608 Carroll Arms Burton Wides Rhett Dawson Frederick Baron PRESENT: HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED: FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: MATERIALs SUBMITTED BY: INTERVIEWEE(s) EXECUTIVE SESSION: YES X NO (~ H# 50950 Dodi4;32423566 Pige 3' ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== MEMORANDUM TO Files FROM: Frederick Baron DATE August 20 , 1975 SUBJECT : Interview_with_Congo_Chief_of Station Lumumba Assassination Plan and ReTated Events in the Congo Staff Members Pregent: Burton Wides _ Rhett Dawson Frederick Baron The following is a sumary of the contents of an interview conducted with a former CIA officer concerning a period (1960-1961) in which he was Chief of Station in the Congo _ The interview was conducted from 12:30 P .m . to 3:30 P.m_ today in Room 608 of the Carroll Arms Hotel At the request of the Chief of Station (COS) 8 we agreed to take his testimony under alias He will be referred to hereinafter 28 "COS" COS GOES TO CONGO AND RECEIVES MESSENGER FROM HEADQUARTERS COS said that he arrived in the Congo. as Chief of Station in early July (probably the 10th or llth) 1960 COS said that before he left Headquarters for the Congo he did not talk with either Richard Bissell (DDP) or Bronson Tweedy (Chief_ Africa Division) about the prospect of assassinating Patrice Lumumba Soon after arriving in the Congo , COS was asked to return to Headquarters in late for briefings He said there was no talk of assassination at those meetings , either HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 4 July ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== -2 - After his return to the Congo , probably in early September COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words "someone I would recognize would appear to give me instructions for a mission I would carry out 0 1 Soon thereafter Sidney Gottlieb arrived in the Congo to meet with COS COS recognized Gottlieb from the Technical Services Division at the CIA and it was made clear that Gottlieb was the messenger referred to in the cable Gottlieb and COS met in COS 8 new apartment COS dated this meeting by the fact that he had moved into this apartment in early September } 1960 COS said that Gottlieb informed him that lethal biological agents had been developed for the assassination of Lumumba COS believes that Gottlieb brought a poison virus and probably two other lethal biological agents with hin in his But COS said it was possible that the biological weapons arrived shortly thereafter COS said that Gottlieb also provided rubber gloves , a gauze mask , and probably a hypodermic syringe equipment for administering the poisonous substances The poisonous substances were to be injected into food_ drink_ toothpaste_ or anything else that Lumumba might ingest _ Cos did not remember the appearance of the biological agents themselves but he did recall that there were approximately three different types of lethal substances provided to him _ COS said that he was "taken aback" by Gottlieb ' s assignment to him of the assassination of Lumumba COS said that he was a 0 junior Chief of Station, and he wanted to make sure to 'pin down the chain of authority for this assignment because "I had never H# 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 5 bag ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== -3- heard of anything like this Mi CoS 8 best recollection was that he had the following interchange with Sidney Cottlieb COS : Where did this brilliant idea come from? Gottlieb : The top _ COS : Who at the top? Gottlieb : The Director has instructions from President Eisenhower COS said that he could not recall the exact language of the interchange , although this was his best recollection He said Gottlieb made it clear that the President wanted to find a way to remove Lumumba from the scene He said that when Gottlieb explained the source of authorization for the assassination Plot, he made it clear that the President was the source COS said it was possible that Gottlieb used a euphemism = but it was more likely that he mentioned either "President Eisenhower 90 or "the President 10 In response to a question from the staff to paraphrase again the import of Gottlieb 's instruction to COS said that Gottlieb told him some thing to the effect that "I am giving you instructions on highest authority to assassinate Lumumba any way you can 0 COS said that Gottlieb did not insist that the assassination had to take place means of the biological agents he was supplying CoS said that this was not an exploration of the possibility of assassination Or the establishment of a mere capability for assas81 - nation were serious about it it was clear that the policy decision to assassinate Lumumba had been made _ M COS said H# 50955 DOId:32423566 Page 6 hin, by "They ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 0 1 he was not awaiting any further 'go signal in order to proceed with the assassination operation COS said that Gottlieb told him that there was to be no connec- tion with the United States if the biological agents were to be employed_ COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for use a3 an intermediary in this project, although he never moved forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the project COS said that, whether or not he used an intermediary to accomplish the assassination 9 Gottlieb made it clear that "I was to do it or find 2 way to do it COS asked Gottlieb when the lethal biological agents would lose their potency_ Gottlieb said this would happen over a long period of tine COS said that he did not remember exactly what the substances looked like, nor whether Gottlieb brought it in his and this would not be surprising because "in those there 1 were no custons checks in the Congo _ COS locked the virus in a safe at the Station to which he had access He remembers taking the virus from the safe sometime later probably after the arrest or death of Lumunba to dispose of it by burying it near the Congo River COS said that he had no training in chemistry and felt ill-equipped to deal with poisons COS asked Gottlieb if the poison left traces Gottlieb told him that it left the traces of a normal disease COS said he was never subjected to great pressure to use the poison COS added that, when he spoke with Gottlieb , "I don t HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 7 bag, days only ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== ~5 - 0 think I agreed to use it Although he also said that he did not tell Gottlieb that he would refuse to use it COS said that even though Gottlieb had told him that clearance for the assassination of Lumumba had cone from the President and the DCI he wanted verification from Headquarters of an assignment of such magnitude COS said: "I responded to Headquarters with a double-talk message , saying that I had met the messenger and re- questing confirmation I then received a cable containing double- talk confirmation, something like your assumption confirmed 'W0 COS said "I never knew who was sending me these cables They also said Director and I sent my cables with a special slug _ My M cables were probably marked to Director which is never actually seen by the DCI COS thought that he destroyed his copy of cables on this subject on instructions contained in those cables He said that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo Station COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy _ COS said that he did not discuss the operation with Glenn Fields He also said that he would not have discussed the operation with Dr Lester Houck because Houck was removed as Branch Chief in early fall due to dissatisfaction with his performance COS said that he thought an assassination effort was "a bad idea = both morally and practically However COS said that he may not have expressed his grave concern to Gottlieb because he was S0 taken aback at receiving the assignment COS thought that he told Gottlieb that he did not have 3 good means: of access to Lumumba HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 8 ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== ~6 m COS recalls raising the subject of assassination with Gottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo in the context of his (COS 's) feeling: "Thank God I never had to use it_ M8 COS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bissell as a source of authority or approval for the assassination operation COS does not recall that anyone other than the President and the DCI were indicated as the source of authority for the assassination operation_ 0 DONNELL IS DISPATCHED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONGO COS recalled the fact that Justin 0 Donnell arrived in the Congo from CIA Headquarters approximately in October of 1960 COS said that 0 'Donnell "came to eliminate Lumumba 06 COS did not re- call whether 0 Donnell recalled a conversation with Richard Bissell COS said that _ in anticipating 0 'Donnell 8 arrival he had the. impression that 0 Donnell was coming to aid in the removal of Lumumba COS said_ "I wondered if Headquarters thought I was ging my feet and that I might be relieved. - 08 COS said he did not remember discus his meeting with Sidney Gottlieb with 0 Donnell but he simply does not have a specific recollection COs said he would not dispute 0 'Donnell ' s testimony that COS had made 0 Donnell aware that a poison virus was in his safe COS said that assassination was "not excluded" as one of the means of removing Lumumba that 0 'Donnell might use But COS said that he was not certain that assassination was included a8 one of 0 Donnell 0 S tools COS said that he may have discussed HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 9 only drag- sing ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 7 with 0 Donnell a to snatch Lumumba from 0 'protective custody _ But he does not specifically remember this COS said that "0 Donnell did not seem to do anything most of the time_ 9 and I didn t take him very seriously . He spent a lot of time drinking M COS said that he was not aware of any action Donnell took to carry out an assassination or a "snatch" 0 of Lumumba COS said that the assassination had struck him from the beginning a8 3 bad idea, So he moved slowly on it. "I showed some action to Headquarters sending cables _ but never pushed it 01 COS said that he asked- 0 Donnell to clear with him any major actions he was contemplating in the Congo _ COS believes that Donnell_ was in the Congo from tember until approximately- Christmas LUMUMBA S ESCAPE COS said that Lumumba 8 escape from 0 'protective cus tody" was 3 surprise to him. He said that the CIA Station had nothing to do with it, although they investigated the incident CoS said "I was in touch with many official Congolege about where Lumumba was and how he got out_ But I did not get much good information It was assumed that Lumumba was going to Stanleyville . The Congolese flew troops to points that he would have to pass on this route _ I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the 0 Congolese_ COS added = "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect that Lumumba might start an uprising against 'white devils But HW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 10 Plan plan by Sep ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== when I arrived in Rome I read that Lumumba was captured I learned from Mobutu and Casavubu that Lumumba would be imprisoned in ville COS MEETS WITH BISSELL TWEEDY AND_KARAMESSINES_IN RONE In November 1960 , while Lumumba was at large, COS flew to Rome to meet with Richard Bissell Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines (then Chief of Station in Rome) for a briefing session on events in the Congo The meeting took place at Karamessines house COS renembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba S escape and of the situation in the Congo , but he does not recall any specific discussion of assassination He said "Perhaps we did discuss assassination = I simply don t recall I was tired. I had flown all And I wasn t in favor of assassination N BRONSON TTEEDY COS assumed that Iweedy was knowledgeable of the assassination plan _ However he does not recall specifically discussing the plan with Tweedy prior to the delivery of the poison or while he was in Possession of the poison_ COS said, did talk with Bronson Tweedy much later about it to the effect that 'thank God nothing was ever done COS did not remember whether Tweedy came to the Congo before Lumumba 8 death COS thought that he must have come later COS said however _ that if Tweedy had come earlier he probably would have asked Tweedy about the assassination mission H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 11 Thys - day "I ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== -9 - COS INFORMS DCI_SCHLESINGER OF ASSASSINATION PLAN COS said that in response to Schlesinger S request for reports on "questionable activities" within the Agency, COS met with him_ COS said that he informed Schlesinger verbally that he had received instructions to try to assassinate Lumumba COS said that he did not mention a poison virus to Schlesinger COS said that Schlesinger did not make a response to this information COS was unaware of any follow-up that was taken due to his briefing of Schlesinger QTHERS_KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ASSASSINATION PLAN COS said that he assumed that TWEEDY BISSELL = and DULLES 9 were witting of the assassination plan COS said that he did have occasion to see ALLEN DULLES from time to' time , 9 but he does not remember discussing assas8ination in any form with DULLES COS said , "I might have mentioned the assassination plan to COLBY when he became Director However COS does not have any specific recollection of a conversation with COLBY COS does not think he informed RICHARD HELMS of the assassina- tion plan _ COS said that he was never interviewed by the INSPECTOR GENERAL in 1967 in the preparation of the IG Report on Assassinations COS said that he never discussed the assassination plan with ARNOLD SILVER _ PROJECTZRRIFLE AND AGENT QJWIN COS said he never discussed the assassination plan with William Harvey (the Director of Project ZRRIFLE) COS said he never discussed assa8sination capabilities or assets with Harvey 3 H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 12 ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== tn 10- COS did not recall agent 'QJWIN He did recall that 0 Donnell may have brought an asset into the Congo to help him He said 9 however_ that based on our representation that QJWIN was in the Congo in the fall of 1960 , he must have known of QJWIN S activities WIROGUE COS does not remember the true name of agent WIROGUE nor or how he came to the Congo _ When his recollection was refreshed by seeing cable traffic 9 COS said that WIROGUE was a difficult man to handle . For a short time WIROGUE became 3 major in the Congolese Arwy _ COS said that he had wanted ROGUE to pull together a sur- veillance team COS did not recall discuss WIROGUE with 0 Donnell COS 8 only specific recollection i8 of being in WIROGUE S apartment and discussing an assa8sination squad _ COS does not think that he mentioned the use of QJWIN in connection with this "execution squad _ 0 COS said that it was conceivable that he had approached WIROCUE with the idea of using him against Lumumba But COS remembers he came to mistrust WIROGUE and felt that WIROGUE did not know what he was doing _ COS also said it was unlikely that he would have sent the cable about WIROGUE S approach to QJWIN in ordinary CIA channels as he did if he thought this related to the actual assassination mission Instead it was merely evidence that WIROGUE was out of control _ MOVING_LUMUMBA TO KATANGA CoS recalled that troops in Thysville mutinied while Lumumba was being held there COS was in contact with various Congolese HW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 13 why ing ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 11- officials and discovered that Casavubu and Mobutu had decided to to Thysville to put down the munity _ COS attempted to con- vince them not to go together did succeed in putting down the mutiny . COS did not learn that Lumumba was to be moved to Katanga until after it happened COS said his discussions with Mobutu about Mobutu 8 intentions for Lumumba left COS with the impression that Lumumba might be executed, COS said that Jack Hasey was the Acting Base Chief in Elizabethville _ and was succeeded David Whipple _ who became Base Chief in Katanga _ COS also said that Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake worked closely with COS but they never discussed with him the general question of assassination TESTIMONY WNDER_ALIAS At the outset of the interview the Comittee staff agreed to honor COS 8 request to testify under alias COS who is still in private enterprise in Zaire, said he would be in personal danger there if he were linked to this story . He said, might make me take the high jup _ I ve been on the zap list' before M0 HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 14 fly They by "They big ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== AFFIDAVI'L Va Ilon Ujh INVENTORIED: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS : DN 'Bc BY C Douglas Dillon, being first sworn do upon oath depose and state: From June 1959 until early January 19 I served as Under Secretary of State _ During approximately 35-40 percent of that time I served as Acting Secretary of State because of Secretary Herter S absence from Washington- Secre Herter who preceded me as Under' Secretary of State had served as the State Department: representative on the 54/12 Committee a predecessor of the present Forty Committee_ When I became Under Secre the President asked me to retain my earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy Accord- ingly , the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State Department' s responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State , I Was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com- mittee decisions On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis- cussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro_ On one occasion in late or early August of 19 60 , shortly after Patrice Lumumba' s visit to Washington I attended a meet- in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis- cussed _ During the discussion 0 which covered. a great variety of matters my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba Was briefly raised_ The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation- This ended considera- tion Of this subject With this_ one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attenpts against anyone Dated this 2/day of 0 19.75 _ 2D; Douglas Dillon Subscribed and sworn to before me this of 1975 0 LC Notary Publ 1 District of Columbia HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 15 3kLL duly I ,_ 61 , tary tary July ing May Proff 4058 day May PCt WHIITE HE ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== ECRE1 MEMORANDUM T0 William G_ Miller Fritz Schwarz Curt Smothers Bill Bader Burt Wides Rhett Dawson FROM : Frederick Baron RE Douglas Dillon Interview DATE : August 28 1975 I spoke today by phone with Douglas Dillon > who was on vacation in Maine concerning a paragraph in an affidavit he supplied to the Rockefeller Commission on May 21 1975 _ The paragraph records Dillon S recollection that one occasion in late July or early August of 1960 , shortly after Patrice Lumumba 5 visit to Washington I attended a meet _ in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was Gis_ cussed _ During the discussion _ which covered a great variety of matters my recollection is that 3 question regarding the possi_ bility of an assassination attempt against Lumunba w2s briefly raised _ The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation_ This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion 0f assassination attempts against anyone I explored the subject of this meeting generally with Mr Dillon on the phone and set an appointment for him to review docunents and testify 0n Tuesday, September 2 , at 3:00 p.m . in Room. G On the phone Dillon gave the following background information on the meeting at the Pentagon: 1. This was not a small meeting; eight or ten people attended . He did not think it was a meeting of a small body _ He said it was not 3 Special Group meet or NSC meeting But he was .clear that H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 16 "On ing 308 _ ing ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 2 E723 a high-level meeting dueto the participants . 2 He believes the participants included the Secretary of Zanse because Dillon S recollection is firm on the fact that Eeeting took place in the office of the Secretary of Defense _ Sicn did not remember whether Allen Dulles attended the meeting ne said CIA people were present" Dillon said Richard _sell was probably present Dillon not recall a man named art Johnson nor does he recall whether such a man was present Ahe meeting, but he said that we might be able to refresh his Cllection by giving him more backgreund on Robert Johnson Slle iid not mention on the phone the nature of Robert Johnson 5 imony before the Committee; I simply asked if Johnson was Sent at the meet 3 The mention of the subject of assassinat Lumumba was in the general context Dillon said, of Lumunba s visit to _inited States which had "convinced us that Lumumba was =hopathic , not in a well-balanced mental state_ After his 1t we wondered whether there was any way of changing the scenery M ~he Congo. Dillon' said the subject was raised in the general ;ext of "eliminating Lumumba but the discussion did not eed as far as mentioning means to be used _ 4 Dillon said that the response of the "CIA representative not necessarily a moral objection to assas5inalion but was -in the sense of indicating that the CIA did not have that of capacity" Dillon did not recall who the CIA representative was who the remark_ H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 17 "top does ing ing ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== {1h Shient [07r Sork Al,1oo22 Ix~(-2-1-W(o.LLO SEP 26 h IHz Activt September 23, 1975. Dear Dawson: enclose herewith Mr. Dillon'8 signed and notarized affidavit: Sincerely yours , sL-Ay claesgan c Dorothy de Borchgrave Mr . Rhett Dawson Senate Select Committee Room G-308' New Senate Office Building Washington, D: C. 20510 Cc Gs-Ls eQ-lc Ipuji H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 18 Vew' 1975 SELECT CCAA ETTEE 'ELil ISEWCE Mr. 6Ua Uk ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== IK-C-2-$Wlulon cudtxcd AlnaLi {k's 15 Il hc Yus h V6 SS : (o of New State )lc& County of deposes being duly of Dillon , consisting C . the to Senate I have Dawson 9 by Rhett two Study ttee to my Activities , adopt ratify to Intelligence I hereby knowledge = 15 , 1975 , to my direct him on is this Douglas J 3 me this Sworn to 9 1975 . day of G.Up_ Notary CECILIA As cf Ncw Sictc Notary No 31-4093 County in New Yok 30, Expires H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 19 Iak Cc # w2t Ln York 42 } and Sworn Douglas statement_ attached the read Counsel Respect says: With Operations prepared Governmental pages with conversation Commi upon Select based and and Septenber correct and true which statenent DilTon before September Pubfic VEFCON York Public, 5135 1977 Cualified March Commission ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== BY C: DOUGLAS DILLON STATEMENTS ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1975 TO RHETT DAWSON wish to make the following Dillon , do I , C: Douglas statement shown by Rhett Dawson 15, 1975 I Wvas 1 . On September rnmental Operations to Study Gove Senate Select Committee to Counsel } what he represented With Respect `7 to Intelligence Activities 0 € the helow National Security Council be documents of the me to dates of the 451st Meeting Exhibit 1 . Minuteso€ the National Security Couooil of The White House held in the Cabinet Room 9100-41.00 a . m Friday July 5 1960 , July 19 1960) on the President on TApproved by at the 452nd Meeting 2 . Memorandum of Discussion Council Exhibit' of the National Security July 21 9 1960 Thursday at the 456th Meeting Exhibit 3 . Memorandum ofa?isecssie Council } of the National 18 1960 Thursday , August of the 456th Meeting Exhibit 4 Minutes 02 the National Sccurity Cokooi] of The White House held in the Cabinet Room 19601.9190-41,00 a . M on Thursday, August 8den? on August 24 1960) (pproved by the Pres of the 458th Meeting Exhibit 5 _ Minutes of the National Secutity Couoomlof The White House held in the Cabinet Room 1960,2 30-4430_L1 06 Wednesday September 1 september 1S T9g0 on the President on TApp by at the 460th Meeting Exhibit 6. Memorandum ofalisccszie Council, of the National 21, 1960 Qednesday , September HW 50955 ocfd:32423566 Page 20 rovedl ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== -2 shown to me do not in any way refresh my 2 The documents contained therein &8 to events related to the recollection beyond the statements fall of 1960. I still do not have an independent Congo in the summer early regarding the assassination of Patrice recollection of any conversation that described in my affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission Lumumba other than before the Select Committee on September 2 and in my testimony Mr: Dawson that Mr: Robert Johngon has testified 3 I was informed by President Eisenhower at an NSC meeting which that he recollected a statement by for the assagsination of Lumumba After seeing he construed as being an order [am of the opinion that it is most likely that the NSC the documents listed above 1960 is the meetirg referred to by Mr: Johnson Although meeting of August 18, at that meeting I have no personal recollection the record shows that [ was present of such statement or order by the President: any Memorandum of Discussion &t the 456th Meeting 4. [note that a8 to the Thursday, August 18, 1960 (reference C, above) of the National Security Council, before the second page of the exhibit seem to be missing a page or pages immediately understanding that the six exhibits noted above, will be 5. It is my this affidavit for filing by the Select Committee appended to Prepared by me on this 23rd day of September, 1975. Rhett Dawson, Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 21 and specific Aot# ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== MEMORANDUM To : The Files INVENTORIED From: Frederick D . Baron DN 3u41 BY Date : September 5 , 1975 Re Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case I spoke by phone today with James Douglas Who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration from early December 1959 until January 21 1961 Mr Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates I interviewed Mr Douglas because of a reference to hin in Douglas Dillon testimony (Dillon p.19) Dillon said that in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting (at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi nating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely to have attended such a meeting_ Never Heara Suggestion 0f Assassination Mr Douglas said that during his tenure in office , he never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised in his presence "I never heard speculation that it was even M on anyone S mind 8 he said- Pentagon_Meeting Mr Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon in the sumer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised Mr Douglas says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting , but he has no recollection of it. Special Group_Meetings Mr Douglas attended Special Group mee tings with sone regularity_ Frequently however these meetings were attended Mr Irwin who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter ar national Security Affairs during that period, Douglas said m that Irwin was more actively in contact with the State Depart- ment and the CIA during this time (Irwin is now practicing law in New York ) Mr Douglas said that the question of assassination of Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting. H# 50955 DgcI4.32423566, Page 22 '9 by ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== Memo to Files September 5 , 1975 Page Two I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp ninutes of September 8 1960 Douglas was in attendance at this meeting _ Mr Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped that CIA people were 00 'fully aware of the top-level feeling Mi in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the discussion to which it related Note : I indicated to Mr Douglas that it probably would not be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter Mr Douglas phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September 29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago) CC : Rhett Dawson Burt Wides Fritz Schwarz Curt Smothers FDB / dsm H# 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 23_ ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== MEMORANDUM To : The Files INVENTORIED; From: Frederick D_ Baron DN 324 6Y Date : September 5 , 1975 Re : Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case _ I spoke by phone today with James Douglas who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration from early December 1959 untii January 21 1 1961. Mr Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates I interviewed Mr Douglas because of a reference to him in Douglas Dillon S testimony (Dillon P.19) Dillon said that in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting (at which Dillon said someone raised the question 0f assassi L nating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely to have attended such a meeting _ Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination Mr Douglas said that during his tenure in office he never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised in his presence M1 I never heard speculation that it was even Hf on anyone S mind , he said- Pentagon_Meeting Mr Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon in the sumer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where the question 0f assassinating Lumumba was raised Mr Douglas says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting but he has no recollection of it. Special Greup_Meetings Mr Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some regulari- Frequently , however these meetings were attended Mx Irwin who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter- national Security Affairs during that period _ Douglas said that Irwin was more actively in contact with the State Depart- ment and the CIA during this time M (Irwin is now practicing law in New York. ) Mr Douglas said that the question of assassination of Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting. H# 50955. DocId,32423566 Page 24 ty- by ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== Memo to Files September 5 , 1975 Page Two I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of September 8 1960 " Douglas_ was in attendance at this meeting. Mr Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped that CIA people were 01 'fully aware of the top-level feeling # in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the discussion to which it related Note : I indicated to Mr Douglas that it probably would not be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter Mr Douglas phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September 29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago) cc : Rhett Dawson Burt Wides Fritz Schwarz Curt Smothers FDB / dsm H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 25 ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== FRANK CHURCH Ida}O; ChairMan JOMM 6 Tower, TEXAS VIce CMAIRMAN Ix-C- ?-J - WCIRwiN) ICc Philip A. HART, Mich; HowaRD H. BAKER, Jf WALTER {ONDALE, MINN_ DARRY GOlDwATER, AR' WalTER D. MUDOLESTON KY- chaaLEs MCC: Mathias,JR MD, ROBZRT MORGAN, N:c. ichafd S, schweixer, PAa GARY HART Colo: ?llnitea States Senate WiLLMam & MILLER, STAFF cirecToR FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR; CHIEF COUNSEL SELECT COMMTTEE To CuRtiS R. SMotKERS, MinRITY COUNSEL STUdy GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WIT RESPECT To INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (PURSUANT To s. RES. 21, 9stk CONGRESS) WASHINGTON D.C: 20510 11 October 1975 INVENTORIED: ON 2p411 BY Mr John N _ Irwin II Patterson Belknap and Webb 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York , New York 10020 Dear Mr Irwin: Thank you: for' sending the rewritten version of your affida- vit_ Al1 of the changes you have made are perfectly satis factory .and accurately reflect my understanding of the state- ments you made on September 22 I am enclosing the statement with my signature S0 that you may .proceed to sign and swear to it Due to the' sensitivity of the subject matter it would be appreciated if you will not retain a copy of the affidavit A copy will remain on file at the Comittee and accessible to you at any time I look forward to receiving the sworn statement Once again many thanks for your cooperation and careful attention to this matter. Sincerely = Zueuce Fus Frederick D Baron Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 26 ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== STATEMENTS OF JOHN N IRWIN II TO FREDERICK D BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22 , 1975 Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Administration , I served as Assistant Secretary Of Defense for International Security. Affairs_ My current business address is c/o Patterson , Balknap & Webb , 30 Rockefeller Plaza , New York , N.Y _ 10020 _ 1 On September 22 , 1975 in my office I' reviewed with Mr Baron the following documents in an attempt to refresh my recollection on discussions that took place at certain governmental meetings : the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30 , 1960 and August 25 , 1960 ; the Memorandum for the Record f the National Security Meetings of July 21 , 1960 August 18 41960 an September 21 , 1960 ; and the Record of Action of the NSC Meetings of July 15 , 1960 and September 7 , 1960 . These documents indicate that I attended all of these mee tings except the NSC meeting of August 18 , 1960 , which Mr . Hadyn Williams of ISA attended . I also reviewed the affidavit of C . Douglas Dillon dated May 21 , 1975 which refers inter alia, to a meeting at the Pentagon in the sumer of 1960 _ 2 Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by reviewing the above-mentioned documents , I still have no direct recollection of the discussions which memorialize. H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 27 they ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to the United States Government during the entire course of my government service_ I do not recall ever hearing of the CIA adopting any assassination plan nor do I recall ever hearing the President make a statement that cou ld be construed as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba _ 3 In answer to a question from Mr Baron I said that in mY opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the Record of the Special 'Group Meeting of August 25 , 1960 is sufficiently broad S0 it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of assassination: It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo wou ld not necessarily rule out "con- sideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba However , I do not remember any such discussion nor do I have any direct recollection of the substance Of that meeting = 4 In answer to a question from Mr Baron I said that in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the Record of the NSC Mee ting of September 21,' 1960 is. sufficiently broad S0 it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of assassination: H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 28 ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not dis_ posed of However , I do not remember anysuch discussion nor do I have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting . 5 , Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on: the substance of the NSC Meeting of August 18 , 1960 , I do not have any recollection of such a report , nor do I have any other recollection of learning by another source of any of the substance of the discussion at that meeting . 6 It is possible that I was present at the meeting at the Pentagon to which Mr Dillon' s affidavit refers How- ever I do not remember if I were at this particular meeting ; nor do I remember attending any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised 7 In answer to a question from Mr Baron I said that in my opinion it would be improper for the Director Of the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake an assassi- nation operation without an express directive from the President. Prepared 'bY me on this of OcbRez 1975 deQaucl D 3z_ Frederick D Baron Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 29 yet day ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== (p-c -l-9-blI 'SEL COM File September 23 , 1975 Mr John N _ Irwln II Patterson Bellknep & Nebb 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York , New York 10020 Dear Yr Irnin: Encloged please . find a copy of che statenent I prepared 43 3 result of Qur recent discussion _ Please Eeel free to make ay additiong Or correc- tions In the statement . Ic would be appreciated if you would mail & sworn copy 0f your ocatement: to me 88 Joon a3 possible Thanks very much for your help in this matter Sincerely , Frederick D Baron Special Aasigtant to the Chfef Coungel Enclosure FDB / do {2c 1+577 Lism 7;+1 Jctfut7z_ 2 HW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 30 Irwin ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== STATEMENTS OF JOHi N IBWIN II TO FREDERICK D BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22 1975 Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Admin- istration I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense . My current business address is c/o Patterson_ Bellknap & Webb 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York , New York . 1 On September 22 1975 in my law office I reviewed the following documents to: refresh my recollection on discussions that toolk place at certain governmental meetings : the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group mee tings of June 30 1960 and August 25 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National 'Security Meetings of 21, 1960 , August 18 1960 and September 21 1960 ; and the Record of Action of the NSC meetings of 15 , 1960 and September 7 1960 As indicated in these documents _ I attended all of these meetings except the NSC meeting of August 18 1960 , where I was represented by Mr Williams I also reviewed the affidavit of C . las Dillon dated 21 1975 which refers inter &lia to a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960 2 , Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by reviewing the above-mentioned documents I still have no direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize _ I do not recall any discussion of any assassination connected to the United States government during the entire course of my H# 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 31 July July Iadyn Doug May plan ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== 2 - government service I do not recall whether I ever heard of the CIA adopting any assassination plan; nor do I recall whether I ever heard the President make a statement that could be construed as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumunba 3 It is my opinion as a former member of the Special Group and as a participant in the meeting of August 25 1960 that the following language from the Memorandum for the Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 01 con - sideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba However _ I do: not remember any such discussion I do not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting 4 It is my opinion as a frequent participant in NSC meetings and as 3 participant in the meeting of' September 21 1960 , that the following language from the Memorandum for the Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination: Mobutu appeared to be the effective DOwer in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of However I do not remember any such discussion I do not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting _ 5 Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the substance of the NSC meeting of August 18 1960 _ I do not have H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 32 ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== -3- any recollection 0f such a report nor do I have any other recol t lection of Learning by another source of of the substance of the discussion at that meeting _ 6 It is likely that I was present at the meeting at the Pentagon to which Mr Dillon S affidavit refers However , I do not remember if I was at this particular meeting ; nor do I re- member whether I: was present at any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assas8inating Patrice Luumba was raised 7 It is my general opinion that it would be improper for the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake an assassination operation Without an express directive from the President _ Prepared by me on this 22nd of September 1975 _ Frederick D Baron Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations' Nith Respect: to Intelligence Activities HI 50955 DocId:32423666 Page 33 any day ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== State of New York SS County of JOHIN N IRWIN II sworn deposes and says : I have read the attached s tatement consisting of three pages prepared by Frederick D_ Baron Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect: to Intelligence Activities based upon , my conversation with him on September 5 , 1975 , and I hereby adopt and ratify this state- ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge _ John N Irwin II Sworn to before me this of September 1975 _ Notary Public H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 34 being duly day ================================================== Page 35 ================================================== IX - C- 2 ~ % W(jobn! 6 MEZORAEDUZ 0F COWVEFSATIQN WITH ROBEFT JOHNSOM SUBJICT: ASEAESIIATION OF IJMMPA PAFTICIPAFTS : MiR & JOllSON AND MR. WILLIAM C. MILLER DATE: JUNE 1O, 1975 Mr& Robert Johngon wbo is now at the Overeeas Developent Council for the eurmer , telephone 234-8701, #a9 3 menber of the National Security Council staff working on Asian 8ffairs in the lost two years of the Eieenhower Adminietration &nd the first year of the Kennedy Administration. Ke said that on Occas when people were 0n vacation, he was @esigned the task of taking notes 8t NSC bectings In July or August of 1960 , Mr = Jolngon hed the tesk of note teking. After a review of world evente, by Director of CI4 Dulles, which included 0 description of Mr. Luuumba S activitles in Africa, Eisenhower turned to Dulles during the reeting in the full hearing of &ll those in atterdance, and saia sonething to the effect that Lumumba ehoula be elininated According to Mir . Johneon, there 6a& 8 stunned silence for about 15 seconds and the meeting continuea _ He eaid he wrote the notes ard that if they still exist, ere probably in the Eisenbower Preeldential papere . He said that notes generally in preeidential papers , offieiol docuente of the MSC, rerain witb the NSC _ He said that the inpression at. the tine was one of Ereat shock. He €aid he had heard of nothing like that eince, He eaid &t wa& uncharacberistic of Elgenbower to speak Of anything of eubstance during FSC meetires, reserving gent to private meetinge _ He dcee not rerenber exactly who wa & at the meeting beyond Herter and Dulleg , ond poseibly Jares Gordon en Robert MHory . H# 50955 DooId:32423566 Page 35 ion; they jude Iay , Gray ================================================== Page 36 ================================================== this under testinony . be' willing to eay I 8sked if he cautioned that 15 far he would, but he thig lie soid that baving exact vording, 8 lthough for the he coula hed the meeting 18 firm. of the iupact of tbat his mewory the meeting gaying one hour after Mr" _ Johneon unless it to testify i2 at 811 not reflection, be Eaying that such He fesrs retribution, 1a6 absolutely escentiel_ were interested in wio ha ve blackballed testimonies in the wbo hsd testified Aga= he working for the gaid he testify the Dodd case. He 88 for the cause but he ddd cant to raise to be absolutely neceseazy if it were deened this question. H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 36 sworn wculd gone vouch not and pagsed years upon called possible prefer would people past people cited in, governent_ vould euch right ================================================== Page 37 ================================================== I-c-2-9-~( MEMORANDUM TNVENTOREC: To : The Files ON 8p411 From : Frederick Da Baron Date : September 5 , 1975 Re : Interview with Robert Johnson regarding the Lumumba Case I interviewed Robert Johnson by phone this afternoon to supplement the earlier interview (June 10 1975) and examination (June 18 1975) that the Committee conducted With him At the beginning of the conversation I explained there were a number of questions raised by his interview and examination that needed to be answered on the record. Because it was inconvenient for him to make a trip to Washington in the near future and becaase of the limited amount 0f addi tional information he was able to provide we agreed that I would menorialize the important points 0f our interview in the form 0f an affidavit to which Mr Johnson would swear The following points are related as faithfully as possible in the manner in which Mr Johnson made them: 1 I never heard of a CIA plot assassinate Lumumba with lethal biological substances _ 2 To the best of my recollection President Eisen- hower turned toward Allen Dulles when he made the statement relating to Lumumba about which I have testified - 3 After the meeting at which I heard the statement by President Eisenhower which I described in my testimony on June 18 1975 I must have consulted James (Executive Secretary of the NSC) for advice on how to treat the President' s statement in my memorandum of the meeting - Mr Lay was meticulous about including in the record some form of reference to every major subject that was dis_ cussed at NSC meetings So we probably included the President' s statement in some form but in what form I do not knom In general these memo _ randa would be as corplete as we could make them Nevertheless on something as sensitive as this, we may have decided to handle it with euphemism 4 The NSC meeting of September 21 , 1961 is probably not the meeting at which I heard the President' s H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 37 3- Lay ================================================== Page 38 ================================================== Memo for the Files Page Two September 5 , 1975 statement in reference to Lumuba Based on Mr Baron 5 representation that I am not listed (either by name or position) among the participants in the memorandum of record I am convinced that I heard the President S statement at a different meeting _ 5 _ After hearing Mr Baron read portions of the minutes of the NSC meeting of September 21 1961 to ne , I do have a recollection of some of the subject matter that was discussed at that meeting_ This would not be unusual however because as a member of the NSC Planning Board I received a debriefing on the sub- ject matter of each NSC meeting _ I do not , however have a recollection of the statement by Mr Dulles II as related in the minutes of the meeting: Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 38 3 ================================================== Page 39 ================================================== STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY DN 3lzuln TO FREDERICK D BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8 , 19957 48 I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960 _ My sumer address is Route 2 , Box 273-A Stanley Virginia 22851 1 I am unable after all these years as Executive Secretarys of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC mee tings during 1960 My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings , and not as a policymaker I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba in NSC meetings during this period. 2 I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assas sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings . 3 I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made 3 remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba _ 4 I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged. 5 , In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as the notekeeper at NSC me etings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marian Boggs who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 39 Ix-C-2-8 wla; INVENTORIEP= ================================================== Page 40 ================================================== ~2 - revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval 6 If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting , it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion In highly sensitive cases no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes According to my recollection at this time there Was no fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance . Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not need to be recorded = Others were of such importance that a full i+ record was drafted by me and my deputy , 89 he attended , and circu- lated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members for approval _ In some cases only a record of the conclusions and decisions if any , were 8 imilarly drafted and approved _ As approved by the NSC members and finally the President the record of these extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very 'S trictly con- trolled distribution Prepared by me on this 8th of September } 1975 : 2-PB Frederick D Baron Special As sistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Scudy Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities I0 HY 50955. Docld:32423566- Page 40 day ================================================== Page 41 ================================================== State of Virginia SS County of Yagc JANS LAY being sworn deposes and says : I have read. the attached statement consisting of two pages pre- pared Frederick D Baron Counsel to the Senate Select Comittee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities based upon my conversation with him on September 8 1975_ and I hereby adopt and ratify this state- ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge _ 7Lwz James Sworn to before me this 2L_#L of September 1975 '84247 Yez Notary Public MYICOMMISSION EXPIRESAAVGUSL 2lT7 Mm 50955 DocId;32423566 Page 41 duly by Lay day ================================================== Page 42 ================================================== Jx ~(-2-q-LJ Leyu SEL COM File: September 1975 Mr_ Jame8 Route 2 , Box 273-A Stanley , Virginie 22851 Dear Mr Lay: Encloged please Eind 8 copy of the statement I prepared 48 3 result of Our recent discussion Please feel free to make any additions Or correc- tions in the statement It would be appreciated 1f you would mail 2 bworn Copy of your statenent to me 28 aoon 88 possible . Thanks very @uch for your help In this matter Sincerely , Frederick D Baron Speclal Asaiatant to the Chief Counsel Enclosure bcc: Rhett Dawson Fritz Schwatz TDB/ do HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 42 23 , Lay ================================================== Page 43 ================================================== STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY TO FREDERICK D BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8 , 1975 I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960 My summer address is Route 2 Box 273-A Stanley , Virginia 22851 I am unable after all these years as Executive Secretary of the NSC and subsequently of the: United States Intelligence Board to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960 _ My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings and not as' a policymaker I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba in NSC meetings during this Period . 2 I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assas - sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings 3_ I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba . 4_ I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged . 5 In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marian Boggs who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 43 ================================================== Page 44 ================================================== -2 5 revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval 6 If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting , it was_ sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying: the specially sensitive subject or the discussion In highly sensitive cases no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes According to my recollection at this time there Was no fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive matters which were usually discussed in a very linited attendance Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not need to be recorded _ Others were of such importance that a full record was drafted .by me and my deputy , as he attended and circu- lated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members for approval_ In s ome cases a record of the conclusions and decisions if any , were similarly drafted and approved . As approved by the NSC members and finally the President the record of these extr emely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly con - trolled distribution Prepared by me on this 8th of tember 1975 2 Frederick D: Baron Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 44 only day Sep: ================================================== Page 45 ================================================== State of Virginia SS County of JAMES LAY being sworn deposes and says : I have read the attached statement consis of two pages pre - pared by Frederick D Baron , Counsel to the Senate Select Comittee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities , based upon my conversation with him on September 8 _ 1975 , and I hereby adopt and ratify this state- ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge . James Sworn to before me this of September, 1975 _ Notary Public H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 45 duly ting Lay day ================================================== Page 46 ================================================== ~ptule-9 1975 Zca_ hu, Eanecc' Qjeeibed Ahz azlue 77 IA< ~xel Vakui 34727 UllUzec 6 LL_ ZEe 8427727 alu_ D Ac DU Pz32462 Euet tued Z< Zaqea 2au_ec/ 77 nZte_cees b-EEEaud Wua 0lwZec, ~( ZAZ pct& Z Zeu dexLcuZa Zexk Laue 0 hexe ux ZZc 1_Dle 3&' 7ulb 6siEeesuuc: 'ycu_ 0 22124744 Zlus Lzuueo/ D | STR IBTUI ON ori ginal + attachments = F Baron + attachments = Research Center cy no atts # blue cy no atts = clerk H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 46 ~e@Bc Uley 7 Zd Rkd LaEA 4-D/ frtu4 4e9 Liui] Acaz/ 'lus- 770717 kauye U"Aawyd ================================================== Page 47 ================================================== SCaEeuxesb f 3) 7> AedlexcckD 2&z33741 3,/927 1 teo TEe Ecut_& F~ kaauah Sacily Zxu 0( tEau-caul /960, pelulunec add&o Lo kkz? , &x 273-A, StZey Vagii 22 8s[, 4 Duc Luual ) &lfeZee 20 EieeuZu e NS< esbn2ntl LuTeeeeekex Bsa ZokeaaeEchee Qubllce c Zbcecsceco-celazzss 6 tlz Caus iu NSC [96 0, eya' feaza , Clll Xn3_ iq6714 tixea Qo clh w |ecaxzes ZL< uuuuZs 1ue2 t &e_,l Zurala- tss tzue Ae TE_ 2u@ax_ 22 uy d:sesauu) OC Ie eicaul ZaPauec Zsuc Aa_u NS @ J2 QLull eZaZEe_tEe H&p dswacsu DaduSckAZuyg Ko_ NZ 3, 6 >s 3+474032MAL' {eaxdeuz Enehaux ebe1 uaelz 3 HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 47 ScxZery 6t 'lki3 Aezco ZZze 242/ 3-870 Eu d 3t tn;_ drcX p&-8 "fleyF ducu Realot, 424 pt/ Duud ================================================== Page 48 ================================================== Kelack 2l eu Nsc FLel 2eulzt keueee cauatzed 1 640es_ DasaasiaZ 4,0 Es Aecallc} wLettze ~eesee - ce LiQa uoZo_ N 52 Z~ DUc aaaaailazz _ 1a 0C L uEol @ Lzzl 5&Ds Ua 6 Ss Ese1ts clusau lRO MxeenEex_clflz Ne ZEe baTaheezes af SC LiEtigo Lcx ZLL al zexck Zec Exe_ectine 5e bewu_lL ~az FEc bate Ol 0 2h T4 "azs,& Ved-_eli ~UlAuauby eieiltt@Ee NSC wul Qeutu< luettus [Aek& "Ekezaxtiy4: N5e ffue Aauuutcuus UE_ Aactee_ 2774 N 52 uiuuZ Kecasdf 254 qeuaet Gln"tzal 2uclez Aeuucdae 2Laia Lu Acrizo& 444c?) Cl 77757 beull Ke 7e H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 48 veetus Aj Z:cJ k/ 27 plocs SEVf 2 Fy h2r7 12 91 } ei 1s2 +4la ] 284 "#faxel _ef ec_/_ X Zc" hila ================================================== Page 49 ================================================== NSC iuiuuZo huu; Kutaixkeezl Zo hie_ Zlz 364 %2 te heulce<elllu h NS2 Sptauclec2/,960, Qze/ Zx_ Zcallct-tEe mulszeyee_ate S euaecau ZEFeak pa_&tEZ TEuatazai) H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 49 hasuq Esa( Gstid 4 nuy ================================================== Page 50 ================================================== { L STATEMENT BY "ROBERT MARANA" 1 TO FREDERICK BARON ON NOVEMBER 14' CN 242411 I am a current employee of the Central Intelligence Agency _ current address is c/o Review Staff Central In- telligence Agency Langley Virginia_ 1 In 1960 , I was employed by the CIA and one of my responsibilities in the course of my employment was to serve as the case officer at Headquarters for an agent who operated under M the cryptonym "WIROGUE I read most of the cable traffic re- lating to WIROGUE until the point of the termination of his re- lationship with the Agency _ 2 To the best of my knowledge , I participated in all training that WIROGUE received in preparation for his assignment to the Congo in 1960 3 WIROGUE was not trained in medical immunization in my presence _ I am not aware that he was provided with any such training _ 4 I have no knowledge of any 'CIA Plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba , I have no knowledge that WIROGUE was ever connected to a plot to assassinate Lumumba , nor have I heard any hint or suggestion of such a connection 10 5 _ I hereby affirm that "Robert Marana is an alias which is registered at the CIA along with my true identity _ My true signature 1s affixed to this affidavit The Senate Select 2 F 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 50 197'5vENe My ================================================== Page 51 ================================================== Committee will receive a copy of this affidavit from which my true signature' will be deleted_ This statement will remain on file at the CIA and will be available for' verification purposes for not less than five years LQ Frederick D Baron Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 51 ================================================== Page 52 ================================================== INVENTDRIED; MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES DN From : Gregory Treverton Augustn297-1975 sk Subject: Kennedy Library Tape Recording of March 13, 1963 National Security Council Meeting On this date I listened to a portion of the tape of' the March 13 i963 meeting of the National Security Council (President present ) _ I listened to it several times in order to check it against the Library trans m cript of that meeting _ The relevant portion of the statement by John McCone reads as follows : "With respect to Cuba the thinking in the Agency is_ we have to first rid of the Soviets troops , and as stated ((several words garbled) ) and use every resource we have available--political, diplomatic , otherwise- ta ~to accom- Plish that Once that is done then we believe that the monolithic structure of the Castro regime_ can be broken up Maybe we 11 have to catalyze it a little bit But we think that there are enough indicators of distress within the military and within his political Organization S0 that once the Soviets are out some military coup can be_ will be brought about Which Wiii remove the Castro government and with a strong possibility of replacing that government with a government more favorable to our interests in the Western Hemisphere Now , this is there S a lot of ifs connected with that, but it seems to use, after having thought about this a deal 9 that some such action as that is a more probably course of action that would be successful thari to try to out to envisage an uprising on the part of the population in the absence of the military With the military and security forces on behalf of Castro they can very easily frustrate and defeat any civilian uprising I think 9 as time goes on that our principal problem is going to be dealing with the future of Cuba and the future of Latin America_ I think the problems of the of and the October incident and the missiles will disappear and more and more attention is going to be brought on the part of the people on the Hill is going to be . is how we re going to dispose of this problem. Then the President speaks _ HI 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 52 }f lucte get good Pigs Bay ================================================== Page 53 ================================================== NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ORIGINAL Unauthorized Disclosure Subject TOP SECRET Vol: 1 OF 3 to Criminal Sanctions @Wipe Ilaited Statcu Sruate Rior& invenTorief: PN_ zlLzz {76r Report of Proceedings Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Tuesday , September 1975 'ashington, D.C (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Comittee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. W ASHINGTON, D: C. 20003 (202) 544-6000 TOp SECRET 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 53 486 2 , ================================================== Page 54 ================================================== SHELBURNE lynd A TOP SECRET 1 C Q N = E N % $ 2 Testimony of: Page_ 8 1 3 C _ Douglas Dillon 2 1 4 5 6 7 8 Exhibits 9 Exhibit No . 1 Exhibit No . 2 35 10 Exhibit No . 3 37 11 Exhibit No . 4 44 12 1 Exhibit No . 5 4 13 1 14 15 16 17 18 19 2 20 8 21 L 22 4 23 1 24 1 8 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 54 ================================================== Page 55 ================================================== SHELBURNE 8 lynd Top SECRET EXECUTIVE SESSION L 1 8 2 1 3 Tuesday , September 2 , 1975 1 4 5 United States Senate, 6 Select Committee to Study Governmental 7 Operations with Respect to 8 Intelligence Activities , 9 Washington , D. C . 10 The Committee met , pursuant to notice , at 3:00 0' clock 11 p.m : 8 in Room 60 8 , Capitol Hill Hotel , Senator Gary W _ Hart 12 presiding_ 1 Present: Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding) 4 13 8 : 14 Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson , 15 Professional Staff Members 16 Mr Baron Woula you state your name and address for the 17 18 record , please? Mr Dillon My name is C Douglas Dillon And my address 19 1 is Far Hills, New Jersey . 20 i Mr Baron Mr Dillon, we have a few formalities that we 21 L 22 must 9o through with every witness . W 6 I want to know first of all if you are aware that you have 23 1 the right to counsel here today? 24 7 8 Mr Dillon Yes , I am aware. 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 55 ================================================== Page 56 ================================================== TESTIMONY OF C DOUGLAS DILLON 2 TOP SECRET Mr Baron. And are You aware that You may cease answering L 1 questions at any point to seek advice of counsel? 8 2 Mr Dillon I am You have S0 notified me 1 3 Mr Baron And are you vuluntarily appearing here today 1 4 without counsel? 5 Mr Dillon Yes , I am 6 Mr Baron . Are you also aware that you have all of your 7 constitutional rights intact here before the Committee, 8 including your Fifth Amentment rights? 9 Mr Dillon I am to know that 10 Mr Baron Mr Dillon , could you please give the ll Committee a general idea of your position in the Government 12 { from say , late 1959 until March of 1961? & 13 Mr Dillon In late 1959 I was Under Secretary of State , 1 14 which was the number two position in the State Department 15 And I continued in that position until 1961 16 duties as such were two-fold_ One was the position as 17 the First Deputy to the Secretary of State, and Acting 18 Secretary in his absence from time to time , in which capacity 19 I had to be fully aware at all times of moreorless everything 1 i 20 that was in the ken of the State Department , so I coula fill 21 in for the Secretary of State as necessary . And in those L 22 days the Secretary was absent a good deal of the time , becausel u 23 there were travels abroad and various reasons I think I 1 2 24 mentioned in my affidavit that I think I served as Acting 8 25 Secretary at least a third of the time during that period TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 56 glad glad My ================================================== Page 57 ================================================== TOP SECRET 1 1 My other duty _ which was a more particular duty, was to be 8 2 in charge of the econonic side of our foreign policy, which 1 3 included economic areas of the State Department , and also L 4 included oversight and general direction of the ICA , which 5 was the name at that time of the Foreign Aid Agency And I 6 had the responsibility for Congressional relations of the 7 Foreign Aid Program ana for getting the legislation passed 8 each Year for not the detailed operation, there was a directos 9 of the ICA but I had the general oversight of it. And also a 10 military program , which was not under the ICA, but Thich was 11 run through the Defense Department , and I was the senior State 12 Department_ official involved in that area { 0 13 So I had those two different functions And for that 8 { 14 reason the setup in this area of working with the CIA and on 15 intelligence matters was somewhat different than it had been 16 prior to that Prior to my advent as Under Secretary the 17 Under Secretary had always ahndled that_ Mr Herter who was 18 my immediate predecessor handled it, and Mr Hoover before 19 When I became Under Secretary I became S0 under a_ new law that 1 20 had been passed in 1953 , at which time I was promoted to i 21 Deputy Under Secretary to the new position , which was called L 22 Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 1 which was the y 23 number three job in the Department That legislation provided 1 24 that this third Under Secretary could either be an Under 7 8 25 Secretary for Economic Affairs , as I was , or an Under Secretary TOP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 57 ================================================== Page 58 ================================================== TOP SECRET for Political Affairs , the implication being that he would be 7 2 the Under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under 8 3 3 Secretary , the number two fellow handled the eocnomic area , 1 4 which Mr Herter did not when I was first appointed as Under 5 Secretary for Economic Affairs , but then when I became Under 6 Secretary I took with me the economic responsibilities 7 So The number three fellow was named Under Secretary for 8 Political Affairs It was Mr Murphy first, and then Mr 9 Merchant _ And they handled in each case all the details of 10 the Special Group . Mr Barron And the liaison with the CIA? 11 Mr Dillon And the liaison with the CIA That was not 12 [ handled at the Assistant Secretary level, a great deal of it 0 13 1 was done at the Assistant Secretary level, but when it got 14 above that, it went to the Under Secretary of Political 15 Affairs On the other hand . when things were really important 16 I was notified, because I had to know about them if an 17 emergency came up whilte the Secretary was out of town _ But 18 that was not my particular problem_ 19 1 Mr Barron . So you would be kept notified Of major 20 8 developments in the Special Group by Mr Murphy or Mr 21 | 22 Merchant? Li v Mr Dillon Yes, major developments 23 1 And I do remember over that year of sitting in occasionall 24 2 9 on meetings that I presume were on that_ But they all dealt + 25 Top SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 58 ================================================== Page 59 ================================================== TOP SECRET 1 with economic assistance to the various political groups in 7 2 different countries when they needed help _ 8 1 5 Mr _ Barron Did you attend National Security mee tings L 4 regularly? 5 Mr Dillon . I attended National Security meetings quite regularly whenever I was in town , eith in 6 7 (Off the record discussion) 8 Senator Hart_ Mr Dillon , do you swear that the testimony 9 you are giving is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, S0 help You God? 10 Mr Dillon I do 11 Senator Hart Justtfor the record , you also understand 12 1 that all of the testimony yau have given will be covered 0 13 2 14 the oath? Mr Dillon_ That is correct 15 Senator Hart. I am sure the Staff has advised You of your 16 constitutional rights? 17 Mr . Dillon . They have 18 Mr Barron Would you read back the witness last answer? 19 1 i(The witness last answer was read. ) 20. i Mr Dillon Either in the capacity as Acting Secretary of 21 L State if the Secretary was out of town , or as one of the 22 4 Assistants when he was in town because of the fact that I had 23 1 overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and 24 Z economic programs , at that time and therefore , it was 8 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 59 by ================================================== Page 60 ================================================== TOP SECRET important that I be fully aware of everything that went on at 8 1 1 National Security meetings And they took place as You know 8 2 at that time on a regular basis every Thursday , I think it was 1 3 morning _ 1 4 Mr Baron And wherevdid_they take:place? 5 Mr Dillon. In the Capitol Room at the White House _ 6 Mr Baron Were you in a position as Under Secretary of 7 State to be aware of every major CIA operation against a 8 foreign leader or a foreign government? 9 Mr _ Dillon I think if there were any such things I would 10 assume that I would have been aware of them 11 Mr Baron Would you have also have been aware of any 12 communications or orders running from the President to the 1 0 13 Director of Central Intelligence? 1 14 Mr Dillon Only if they had been . given in my presence 15 and; I had. heard of them I wouldn t necessarily be aware of 16 them otherwise . If the President had wanted the State 17 Department to be aware of it, and they usually did there 18 was pretty good coordination there, Gordon Gray was his Specid1 19 Assistant and :would; keepreverybody notified _ But that wowlw 2 8 20 wouldn t necessarily mean that we knew of every particular 21 L thing 22 Mr Baron . In That manner were you made aware of major ui 0 23 1 CIA covert activities? 2 24 Mr Dillon. I think if they were major they were all 8 25 TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 60 ================================================== Page 61 ================================================== TOP SECRET 1 discussed at one time or another in the National Security 2 Council or they at least knew about them at that time , because 8 1 3 the major activity that was just getting underway at that time 1 4 was very much aware of the development of the capability to 5 move against Cuba 6 Mr _ Baron And what was the nature of your awareness of 7 that development? 8 Mr Dillon We discussed it quite frequently And it was 9 the setting up of camps in Central America that trained Cuban 10 exiles , and the development of plans for their use They were rather general in nature, but of which I was aware of in some 11 12 detail}_ But at that time we all knew that those plans would [ not bei ready and the capability wouldn' t be ready until 0 13 1 sometime next Year _ So if a decision was to be made to use 14 them , it would have come in the following Administration 15 Mr Baron . Were you aware of the development of any CIA 16 plans or efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro? 17 Mr Dillon: No , not at all_ 18 Mr Baron . Did you hear any discussion of that subject? 19 2 Mr Dillon. None:whatsoever.: J%A 3. 20 i Mr , Baron : Sotalthough :You:Were awarerof:CIAr covert: :: 21 L activities againstathe Cuban regime iyou:were: completely 22 Lj 6 unaware of Jany: assassination. effort against Castro?;; :} 23 1 Dillon: i The :Mmajor activityawas:: 7 therbuflding up;of 24 7 8 this capacity among the Cuban exiles, corisupposed capacity, 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 61 Mr ================================================== Page 62 ================================================== TOP SECRET 1 to invade_ Cuba and cause a change in regime 8 2 Mr Baron Turning back to your position in the 1 3 Government , isn t it true that shortly before the change of 1 4 Administrations you resigned from the State Department in 5 contemplation of res uming Government service in the Kennedy 6 Administration as Secretary of the Treasury? 7 Mr Dillon Yes 8 I might as well explain that in some detail, because it 9 was an unusual situation 10 That fall, I think it was in October just prior to the 11 election in early October , due to some mishap in London , the 12 Bank of England failed to support the price of gold at a 1 0 13 given moment , and it shot up from the support price of 835 an 2 < 14 aounce to maybe 849 or $50 And there was great perturbation 15 in the financial markets over this , the first time that it 16 had happened since the thirties when the price had been set. 17 And there began to be an outflow of gold from the US at the 18 rate of over a S100 million a week , which seemed very big in 19 those days . And it was very disturbing 20 That continued through the election And if anything, it 8 21 intendsified after the election L 22 During the election , of course, as a member of the Wj U) 23 Republic Administration while the State Department was not 1 24 involved in the election campaign , it was specifically exempt 7 8 25 from having anything to do with it 4 4 I was obviously a TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 62 ================================================== Page 63 ================================================== TOP SECRET supporter of Vice President Nixon, who was seeking election at 1 1 that time Nevertheless , about two or three weeks after the 8 2 election, about three weeks after the election, I received a 1 3 telephone call one in my office from Pierre Salinger , whom 1 4 I did not know And he told me on the telephon that Senator 5 Kennedy Ihon I knew slightly , because he was on the Foreign 6 Relations Committee would like to come and see me that 7 night. 8 And I said, that was very foolish I an at his disposal , 9 I will go see him 10 He said, that is not what the Senator said. He wants to 11 come to see you_ 12 1 And I said, very good _ I will be home all night_ 0 13 So Senator Kennedy did show up at 9 0 'clock - And he told G { 14 me that he was very concerned about this loss of gold and the 15 lack of confidence in the financial stability of the US ana 16 the worla_ And he wanted to rectify this And nobody trusted 17 him because the campaign had been made on the basis that he 18 was going to disrupt everything and didn't have anything 19 1 about finances 20 8 And So whatuhe-Wanted was to appoint someone whom he 21 thought would carry weight around the world and yet who was L 22 sympathetic to his idea of keeping the economy moving _ And 4 23 1 he had read some speeches I had made at one time or another 24 2 in my economic capacity with the State Department which 8 25 TOP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 63 day ================================================== Page 64 ================================================== 10 TOp SECRET pretty much paralleled his thinking And I had been te 1 contrary to Vice President Nixon S campaign on that issue 8 2 where he talked about growthmanship and the path to our 1 3 growh And I mentioned, I believe , in the Rockefeller Report 1 4 that at that time that we had to grow at five percent a year 5 if we wanted to produce and not have unemp loyment , and S0 6 forth 7 And I had seen Kennedy' s economic speech which he made in 8 Philadelphia at the end of October , and I thought it was just 9 great, there was nothing I could find wrong with it. Of 10 course, nobody had read it and nobody paid any attention to 11 it. And I don 't think he had ever given it, but it had been 12 released , he had been there and made:a speech and said some of 1 4 13 it And it was very carefully prepared and was quite dull 1 14 an as a result. It was written largely or suggested 15 largely , I found out later, Professor Samuels who was the 16 Dean of all economists at that time And I couldn t find 17 anything wrong with that 18 Ana he said he could not make any offer of this, and wasn t 19 doing that, but he wanted me to think about this because he 2 i 20 thought it was absolutely essential to safegard the currency 21 and all that_ L 22 Well, this came as a great surprise to me . I had made Li 6; 23 all my plans to go back home 1 7 24 To make a long story short , I talked to various people, 8 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 64 qui- push dry by ================================================== Page 65 ================================================== 111 TOP SECRET including Bob Anderson, who was then Secretary of the Treasury 1 1 And he said I& should do this And guite a few people did_ 8 2 And also the President-elect was good enough to say if I did 1 3 do this he would work with me , and I would be his top economic L 4 advisor and if there were any differences in economic advice 5 that he would side with the Treasury unless the thing was 6 serious enought to lead to a parting of the ways And one 7 commi tment that he Ivanted from me was that if there was that 8 it would not be a silent parting of the ways And that was a 9 very easy thing for me to agree to. 10 And on or after I had come back from a final meeting of 11 the OACD in Paris at which the Convention was signed , at 12 1 which I had been a leading negotiator , early in December I 0 13 had a call from him when I got back that morning saying that 1 14 he wanted me to come over to his place, that he wanted to do 15 this if I would agree 16 So I went to President Eisenhower and told him of my 17 meeting abroad and told him I was going to see Senator 18 Kennedy which he didn 't like very much And I saw him _ 19 And we talked about certain financial things that might be a 1 20 i problem, which I told him about , Ihich they turned out not to 21 be L 22 And he then right away , that morning , much to my surprise, Wj v 23 went out on the front stoop of the house in Georgetown and took 1 7 24 me out there with Robert Kennedy , whom I had never met before 8 25 TOP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 65 ================================================== Page 66 ================================================== Dllon Exh;bit 5 veptember 21, MEMORAMDUM SUBJECT Discussion at the 46oth Meeting of the Mational Security Council, Wednesday , September 1960 Fresent et the 46oth NSC Meeting were the Pres ident of the United States , presiding; the Acting Secre of State (Dillon) ; the Secretery of Defense; the Acting Director _ } Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson) Also present at the Meeting &nd perticipating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treesury; the Director_ Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secre of Comnerce Items 1, 2 and 3) ; the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett) Itens 1 and 2); Mr Ton Killefer for the President , Export-Import Bank of Washington (Items 1 end 2); and the Chelrman , Council on Foreign Economic Policy Item 3)_ Also attend the Meeting vere the Che irnan_ } Joint Chiefs of Steff; the Director of Central Intel- ligence; the Special Assistents to the President for National Secu- rity Affairs end for Security Operetions Coordination; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N_ Irwin, II; Mr Robert Peckard for the Department of State; Mr_ Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretery; the Assistent White House_ Steff Secretery; the Executive Secretery, NSC ; end the Deputy Executive Secretary , NSC _ There follows 8 s umery of the discussion at the Meeting and tbe ma in pointe taken WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENDENCE ON MTDDLE EAST PETROLEU TiSC Action No 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject dated March 26 1959 , and June 28 , 1960; NSC 6011; Memos for NSC seme subject , dated August 9 and 29,ena September 19, 1960) Mr . Gray introduced the sbject to the Council (A copy of Mr Gray 3 Briefing Note 16 filed in the Minute6 of the Meeting and another copy 16 attached to this Memorandun) _ At the conclusion of Mr _ Gray' s presentation the President sid he had received the €lowing reports on the prospecto for petroleum production in Libye _ Fe bad been told that the Libyan reserveg exceeded even tbe Sabara reserves He asked TOP SECRET W 50955 Docld.32423566 Page 66 1960 21, tary end tary ing most ================================================== Page 67 ================================================== 12 TOP SECRET untile that and announced both of us at once So I was 1 1 announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary 8 2 of the Treasury . 1 3 That rather limited my capacity in the State Department 2 4 But I did continue for two or three more Iveeks to wind things 5 up and make a proper turnover 6 And then I resigned from the State Department in January 7 and continued that preparation for the new job 8 And that is how that happened 9 Mr Baron So you left the State Department you said 10 earlier to me on January 2nd or 3rd? 11 : Mr: Diflon Or 4thcor: Sthfwsometime in thehfirst four: 12 { or::fiv:eror:six days: {And aftersthat one thing I ought to 0 13 make clear is that President Kennedy had a great interest in 8 : 14 the authority of the Presidency in foreign policy. And I 15 think he was under the impression that Secretary Dulles had 16 probably dominated President Eisenhower in some asptects 17 which I don t think was an accuare description of what 18 happened at all, but it was a generally held one at that time 19 2 So he wanted to take over this very much himself And So he 20 i put in some new people there 21 L And we came to be very close , and worked very well 22 together And I had the greatest admiration for him L v 23 1 He never at that time or later ever asked me anything aboul 24 my experience at the State Department or any foreign policy 8 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 67 day , [ ================================================== Page 68 ================================================== 13 Top SECRET thing , I was not used in any transitional sense at all 1 1 Mr Dawson . To include the of Pigs plan? 8 2 Mr Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me 1 3 And I think I might have been of some: help to him if he had , 1 4 because I had-beenraware< 0f.it righthup through January, and ih 5 particular I was aware, at least that is my understanding at 6 the time , that there was always an ultimate background in the 7 use of our naval air if those people got in trouble And I 8 don t think that was ever made clear to President Kennedy. 9 And that was too bad And when it was made clear to him he 10 reacted violently against it, and I rather doubt if he would 11 have allowed the thing to be unleashed if he had known this 12 much about it_ [ 0 13 Senator Hart Aside from the regular 54-12 meetings_ 8 did 8 14 you have contact with the CIA in any otheracapacity on a 15 routine basis? 16 Mr Dillon. No , not on a routine basis 17 Senator Hart: Occasional basis? 18 Mr . Dillon . Yes Because, for instance, I went back 19 when we were flying earlier, when we were flying US missions , { 20 8 for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department , 21 or the Defense Department , or by the CIA_ and finally bY L 22 the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor , 4 23 he was then a colonel, at the White House So I did in that 1 7 24 capacity a couple of times , as Acting Secretary, have to clear 8 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 68 Bay } ================================================== Page 69 ================================================== 14 TOP SECRET those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them And So 8 1 0 from time to time there were those moreorless informal 8 2 contacts . But they were not routine and regular They were 1 3 generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secretary and 2 4 they needed something from the State Department _ 5 Senator Hart. I don 't want to interrupt the flow of 6 questions by the Staff on this sequence , but we may want to 7 get some questions on your experience during the US situation 8 on the Doctrine of "Plausible Deniability" 9 Mr Dillon That is some thing I feel I have a good deal 10 to say about. l1 Senator Hart_ You can proceed here sequentially_ 12 1 Mr Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your 8 13 8 affidavit_ And that is , You were indicating that when you 14 joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for 15 advice on your State Department experience 16 Mr Dillon Until the time of the missile crisis when 17 they together a new , what we called an EXCOM Executive 18 Committee At that time 1 whether it was the result of the Bay 19 1 of Pigs thing , or just the fact that the President knew me 20 i better , and we had been working together for a longer time he 21 L called me in right at the beginning , and I had a: very active 22 W role in this period _ v 23 1 Mr Baron But at the beginning of the Kennedy Admini t 24 1 stration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo 8 25 : :9 {cs; TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 69 } got ================================================== Page 70 ================================================== 15 TOP SECRET affairs nor kept abreast of developments in the Congo? 8 1 Mr Dillon. No , nor any other foreign policy, except as 0 8 2 itnfell under the monetary area, with one exception_ And this 1 5 was economic entirely. That is , the President 1 because of 1 4 my past experience in the handling of this matter asked me , 5 moreorless as a favor because he didn t believe the Treasury 6 should really handle this, but he asked me if I would head the 7 US effort or set up the Alliance for Progress And there was 8 going to be a meeting down in Uruguay , Puntal del Este And 9 So I did do thta And that was the only foreign policy job 10 I did _ And that was economic in nature 1l Mr Baron Let me show You now a copy of your affidavit 12 to the Rockefeller Commission which concerns among other 1 4 13 things 3 meeting that was held in the Pentagon where the 1 14 Congo was discussed First, let me ask you if that is a true 15 copy of your affidavit? 16 Mr Dillon . It so appears 17 Mr Baron Do you recall this meeting where as You have 18 affirmed: "On one occasion in late July or early August of 19 1960 , shortly after Patrice Lumumba S visit to Washington, 3 20 I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall 8 21 Congo problem was discussed During the discussion which | 22 covered a great variety of matters 1 my recollection is that 4 23 a question regarding the possibility of assassiration attempt 1 7 24 against Lumumba was briefly raised . The CIA representative 8 25 indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of Top SECRET HM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 70 ================================================== Page 71 ================================================== 16 Top SECRET 1 operation . This ended consideration of this subject. With 2 this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassina- 8 M 1 3 tion attempts against anyone L 4 Do you recall this meeting now? 5 Mr Dillon. Yes , I recall just what I said there And I 6 think probably should expand on that a little bit, because in looking at it .it is not as clear as I would like it to be . 8 When I mentioned the assassination attempt it was not 9 necessarily limited to It T or it might have been CIA personnel It also included encouraging one of the many factions that 10 might not like him there to take action on their own , with 11 12 CIA encouragement . 1 Senator Hart. What kind Of encouragement , material 0 13 1 14 support, financial support? Mr Dillon. That , or moral support, if they did the US 15 would recognize them if they became the head _ and would help 16 them _ 17 Senator Hart. Was there any discussion that you can 18 recall of the passage 0= weapons? 19 2 Mr Dillon. No , no detail like that This Was very brief 20 8 very general , and just turned off by the CIA people at that 21 L 22 time # Mr Baron So this mention of assassination could have 23 1 included a CIA sponsored assassination attempt? 24 1 8 Mr Dillon It could have Yes_ 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 71 7 ================================================== Page 72 ================================================== 17 TOP SECRET 7 Mr Baron And it was a more general reference 8 2 Mr Dillon . It was a very general way of getting some- L 3 where. In one Of those other papers some thing was said about 1 4 getting rid of Lumumba That was really moreorless the 5 objective , not necessarily to have him leave the earth, but 6 just to get him out of the Congo and away . 7 Mr Baron Youreclear impression that the suggestion 8 contemplated assassination as one means of getting rid of 9 Lumumba? 10 Mr Dillon As a possibility_ 11 Mr Baron And let's fill in some of the context of the 12 meeting Do you recall where this meeting took place? 0 8 13 Mr Dillon. I think it took place in the Office of the 1 14 Secretary of Defense . 15 I may say that after you spoke on the telephone the other 16 I called Mr Gates 0 who was Secretary of Defense at that 17 time and who was a friend of mine then and has continued to 18 be, and asked him if he had any recollection of this particula 19 meeting . And he says he did not. But I do think it took 3 20 place in his office- And I don't recall whether he was there 8 21 or not It could be that he wasn t even there But I think L 22 it was in his Own office that it took place Wj vj 23 Mr Baron . When Fe spoke before you said that you thought 1 24 he probably was in attendance Is that still your feeling? 2 8 25 Mr Dillon _ Well, because it Ias in his office I don 't TOP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 72 day ================================================== Page 73 ================================================== 18 TOP SECRET remember him beirg there or 8aying anything All I remember 7 1 is the location ; and the fact; that the subject came up , and 8 2 the fact that there were a number of people there #aaD I don ' t 1 3 remember who they were tt and the fact that the CIA people , 2 4 whoever:. they were, were negative to any such action 5 Mr Baron About how many people were in attendance? 6 Mr Dillon I would say five or six, because I saw then 7 sitting around the desk , I would say five or six, or it 8 could have been seven or eight, n0 more . 9 Mr Baron Was this the meeting of any official body? 10 Mr Dillon No , I don t think SO . It was not a xo:i 11 note-taking type of meeting . It was not sitting around the 12 table with somebody as the Chairman 1 0 13 Senator Hart. It was ad hoc , in other words? 1 14 Mr Dillon . It was ad hoc 15 Senator Hart Would you be able to characterize the 16 nature of the CIA opposition? Was it vehement , violent, 17 casual? 18 Mr Dillon_ No It was just more orless silent, and 19 1 "there is nothing We can do It wasn t moral 1 20 8 Senator Hart. There was no policy objection? 21 Mr Dillon It wasn t stated in that way. It was just L 22 saying no , it is not a possible thing_ 4 23 Mr Baron You mentioned on the phone to me that rather 1 24 7 than acmoral objection, as you have just said, it might have 8 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 73 ================================================== Page 74 ================================================== 19 TOP SECRET been an objection on the grounds that the CIA did not have tke 1 capability to perform such an operation? 8 2 Mr Dillon. It could have been , it may have been just 3 3 some thing that they couldn t and therefore there is no 1 4 use talking about it_ 5 Mr Dawson The subject matter of the meeting W as probably 6 something which the Secretary of Defense had a leading role 7 in designing a policy for 8 right? 8 Mr Dillon I don t recall the details of what was 9 ahppening at that time in the Congo . But I do have a basic 10 recollection that over this period of time it was a pretty 11 difficult situation, with UN forces in there and all sorts 12 of troubles down in the southeastern part where the copper 1 0 13 mines were, and trying to get people out SO they wvouldn t 8 2 14 killed There was always contingency planning whether we 15 would have to use any of our forces for another evacuation 16 or something else . So it was a very mixed up and sort of a 17 hot situation at that time 18 So certainly various people in the Defense Departmen would 19 be interested Mr Gates when I spoke to him, said that he 3 8 20 personally had not given primary attention at any time to the 21 Congo He said it might have been Jim Douglas 1 Iho , as I L 22 mentioned to you there, was listed as attending one of those 4 23 meetings _ Ana I don 't recall exactly what his title was at 1 7 24 that time, but he had been , I think, Secretary of the Air 9 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 74 do , get ================================================== Page 75 ================================================== 20 TOp SECRET Force, and maybe still was at that time 1 1 Mr Baron Was it a regular occurance to convene such 8 2 meetings at the Pentagon? 1 3 Mr Dillon . We had a very close re lationship between the 2 4 State Department and the Pentagon at that time And it was 5 not unusual because of the fact that generally there would 6 be a representative of the Joint Chiefs present , and they were 7 both over there 8 and if for any reason it seemed reasonable , we 8 would do that Now usually I think the man who was responsible 9 would be this number three person in the State Department, he 10 would go to the Pentagon for many of- the meetings the 11 briefings and things like that which would be in the area of 12 the Joint Chiefs , and SO forth He was there a great deal ; 0 13 I wasn'+ there in my capaci 1 14 Mr Baron Do you have any idea why you were in 15- attendance at this particular meeting? 16 Mr Dillon . It might also have had something to do with 17 the thing that I was talking with then about all the time, a 18 totally different subject, which was military aid_ That could 19 well have been . 2 20 Mr Baron. Do you recall any of the other participants at 9 21 the meeting? L 22 Mr Dillon Not name 4 23 On the telephone youuasked me about Bissell, whether he 1 24 might have been there_ And I answered , in all probability he 2 8 25 might have , because I knew him, in fact I have known him for TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 75 ty . by ================================================== Page 76 ================================================== 21 TOp SECRET many years_ all my life. But when I was do1n here at that time 7 1 I knew he had a high position in the CIA and was in charge 8 2 1 of all this sort of stuff and he was at a number of meetings 3 L there/or even at the White House He was an advisor to Mr 4 5 Dulles So I say that is very likely- Mr Baron. By this sort of stuff would You mean covert 6 7 actions? Mr Dillon Covert actions or anything that Ias important 8 enough in that general field to involve Mr Dulles The CIA , 9 the President . He was a person there , one of the people that 10 was talked to about it. There were three people There were 11 really at that time Allen Dulles 0 General Cabell 0 and Bissell 12 ; Mr Baron . Was it your general impression that this was 8 13 1 a high level meeting a sufficiently high level mee ting So 14 that Allen Dulles might have been in attendance? 15 Mr Dillon He could have been 16 Mr Baron . And are there any other people who would have 17 been likely candidates to have been in attendance at the 18 19 meeting? 1 Mr Dillon . I imagine there must have been some represen- 20 8 tative of the military there But I don t know who it would 21 | have been - But there must have been someone else if the 22 Lj Secretary of Defense was there Now , Erwin, since he didn't 0 23 1 allow these things he might have been there That is just 24 2 8 25 supposition. ToP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 76 ================================================== Page 77 ================================================== 22 TOp SECRET Mr Baron . And I believe you had said to me before that L 1 despite your absence of a clear recolleciton as to which CIA 8 2 3 people were there , it was clear to you that some top level 3 1L 4 CIA people were there? Mr _ Dillon Top enough , So that some thing like this could 5 be raised and moreorless disposed of without even: thinking 6 7 of it any further. Senator:: Hart Let-me insert a question , if I might . This 8 9 is a losophical question_ First of all, factually, in any of the dealings formal or 10 informal, that you ever had with President Eisenhower or 11 President Kennedy , did the subject of assassination ever 12 1 arise? 0 13 1 Mr Dillon - As far as I know as I recall in dealing 14 directly with either of them no 15 Senator Hart. I would invite your speculation at this 16 point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower 17 and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy , I think 18 the Committee would be interested in your view as to the 19 1 attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say 20 8 the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders? 21 L Mr Dillon Well, that is a difficult; thing to speculate 22 4 on in a totally different atmosphere - But I think probably 23 1 both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way 24 7 8 most likely, simply weighed the process and consequence 25 TOP SECRET HI 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 77 phi ================================================== Page 78 ================================================== 23 TOP SECRET rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle 7 1 That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few 2 3 cases Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy 1 3 of the US generally both of them were very much opposed to L 4 it. 5 Senator Hart. Off the record just a second _ 6 (Off the record discussion) 7 Mr Baron. To return to the setting at the meeting at the 8 Pentagon , I wonder if you could fill in the nature of the 9 discussion that was taking place on the Congo before this 10 prospect of assassination was raised at the meeting? 11 Mr Dillon I don t recally recall it, except that it 12 was bemoaning the general presence_ Of Lumumba and the ; 0 13 difficulty of working anything aut with him , or the impossi- 1 14 bility of working anything out with him, and the exploration 15 of other possibilities_ 16 Mr Baron Did you date this meeting by any particular 17 event which took place? 18 Mr Dillon . Yes . I dated it only because it must have 19 taken place after and presumably shortly after Lumumba S 1 9 20 visit to Washington, because the impression that was left was 21 that it was very bad , that this was an individual Thom it was 7 22 impossible to deal with And the feelings of the Government 4 23 as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time _ 1 2 24 I don t think it would have possibly have occurred before he 8 25 TOp SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 78 ================================================== Page 79 ================================================== 24 TOP SECRET 8 came We hoped to see him and see what we could do to cone to 1 10 2 better understanding with him 8 3 3 Mr Baron Why did he strike You as being impossible to 2 deal with in any Way? 4 5 Mr Dillon Well, what I really recall was the impression he made rather than the individual things he said . When he was 6 in the State Department meeting , either with me or with the Secretary in my presence he spoke in a mannter that seemed 8 almost messianic in quality. And he Tvould never look you in 9 the eye. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of 10 words came out He spoke in French and he spoke it very 11 fluently. And his words didn t ever have any relation to the 12 1 particular things that we wanted to discuss And it Was just 4 13 0 ; like ships passing in the night . You had a feeling that he 14 was a person that was gripped this fervor that I can only 15 characterize as messianic _ And he was just not a rational 16 being 17 Mr _ Baron When we talked earlier I believe you 18 charaterized his personal power almost as psychotic, is that 19 right? 20 8 Mr Dillon That is right_ 21 L Mr Baron So that after he departed from the US you 22 4 and others at a high level in the State Department were 23 1 extremely concerned about this man continuing in a position 24 6 8 in the Congo? 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 79 by ================================================== Page 80 ================================================== 25 TOP SECRET 1 Mr Dillon That is right. 7 2 Mr Baron _ Do you recall who raised the question or the 8 1 3 prospect of assassination of Lumumba at this meeting? 1 4 Mr Dillon. I don t. It very likely could have come from 5 somewhere, either from the State Department or possibly Erom 6 the Defense Department in the international affairs areas , 7 someone just throwing out this question Now I said the 8 State Department. There was probably someone there besides 9 myself _ Because it wasn t usual to justube alone talking 10 about this . 11 Mr Baron Do you recall whether this was raised as a 12 question or as a suggestion? 1 13 Mr. Dillon. No , as a question & 8 : 14 Mr . Baron And who was the CIA representative that you 15 mentioned in your affidavit that responded as indicated that 16 this Was not within the capability of the CIA? Mr . Dillon That I don t recall_ But I imagine it would 17 have to have been either Allen Dulles , or possibly Cabell 0 18 but I think most likely Cabell_ 19 { Mr Baron . We have a record of the fact that Lumumba met j 20 6 with Secretary Herter in Washington on the 27th of June 1960 _ 21 L Does that accord with your memory as to the probable date of 22 4 this conversation? It would be` shortly after Lumumba ' s visit 23 1 Mr . Dillon Shortly after his visit And that must have 24 2 8 been it. And the record that you had must have been the 25 TOp SECRET H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 80 ================================================== Page 81 ================================================== 26 TOp SECRET record of the meeting that I attended that I referred to 7 1 earlier. The dates that were given in this affidavit were 8 2 supplied to me on the basis that it was shortly after his 3 3 visit So they looked up when his visit was , and that is 4 they put this in All I recall of the place and date is that 5 when I saw him off at the airport it was very hot So it must 6 have been the summer , July or August. 7 Mr Baron Let me fill you in on"a . fem-other events that 8 were happening from mid to late July, and ask you if this 9 refreshes your recollection as to the sense of urgency that 10 might have existed at a meeting such as the one you attended 11 in reference to getting rid of Lumumba It appears that on 12 the 12th of July the US had sent a carrier the Wasp , to the 1 0 13 Congo , although we had refrained from sending troops to the 8 : 14 Congo . Then on the 2Oth of July Ambassador Lodge indicated 15 that it was the US position that the UN would be urged to do 16 e verything possible to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo . 17 Then on the 22nd of July Lumumba signed a 50-year 18 contract with CINCO , a large American resources company _ But 19 that contract was disavowed by the finance minister of the 3 8 20 Congo the following day , on the 26th of July a I am sorry , it 21 was disavowed on the 26th of which wasn t the followving L 22 day . And it was in: that setting that Lumumba then came to 4 23 1 Washington . 7 24 While he was in Washington apparently Secretary Herter 8 25 pledged aid to the Congo And Mr Detweiler , who was the TOp SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 81 why July , ================================================== Page 82 ================================================== 27 TOp SECRET 1 Head of the CIMCO Company that had this huge contract in the L 2 Congo , met with people at the State Department to discuss the 8 1 3 situation as to whether the contract Ias going to be performed 1 4 or not in the Congo _ 5 Do you recall any of that background? And does that 6 refresh your recollection about the urgency of the:situation 7 at that time? Mr Dillon . No The only thing I recall is that there 8 were which I think I mentioned maybe earlier in our informa 9 conversations that there Were talks at the time about the 10 possibility of using US military force in one way or another 11 I think the fact that the Wasp was ordered there fits right 12 1 in with that sort of general recollection, that it was 8 13 1 something that we were very worried about And I don 't 14 remember this particular contract with this company . In fact_ 15 I don't think I have ever heard of CIMCO' : 16 Mr Baron Did you have an independent recollection of 17 the ordering of the Wasp to the Congo or to the shores of 18 Africa? 19 1 Mr Dillon Not of that one particular thing_ But I do 20 s renember that there was consideration of the use of military 21 | I think there was some talk about airlift capacities and 22 5 things of that nature too, at that time 23 1 Mr _ Baron. Again to refresh your recollection, I believe 24 2 8 CIMCO , C=IeM-C-0 , stands for the Congo International 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 82 ================================================== Page 83 ================================================== 28 TOP SECRET 1 Management Corporation, which was a US corporation And they 1 2 had signed a resources development contract in the Congo _ 8 3 3 Mr Dillon It must have been a company that was just 1L 4 formed for that purpose or soemthing , it sounds like. 5 Mr Baron Do You recall a visit from Ambassador 6 Timberlake , who was at that time the US Ambassador to the 7 Congo , to Washington shortly before your mee ting at the 8 Pentagon? 9 Mr Dillon No But it think it would have been normal 10 with Lumumba , who was then Prime Minister, coming here and 11 our concern about the situation, for the Ambassador to come 12 back prior to Lumumba S visit or simultaneous with it, to 1 brief the Department on the latest developments there That 0 13 1 was sort of standard operating practice_ When the head of a 14 government comes us ually the Ambassador comes with him to do 15 that 16 Mr Baron Would it fit with your memory that the CIA 17 Chief of Station and the US Ambassador had come back to 18 Washington shortly before Lumumba' s visit in preparation for 19 2 his visit to report upon events in the Congo? 20 8 Mr Dillon It is not my memory , because I don' t 21 L remember that But what I can say is that that would have 22 Wi 4; been standard practice, and I woula have been surprised if 23 1 they hadn t. 24 E 8 Mr . Baron What kind of reports would you have been 25 TOp SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 83 ================================================== Page 84 ================================================== 29 TOP' SECRET 1 getting at that time from the CIA Chief of Station and the US 1 2 Ambassador? 8 1 3 Mr Dillon Well_ we would have been getting whatever 1 reports the US Ambassador sent , the reports from the Chief of 4 5 Station would go to the CIA, and we would not those except 6 in the edited form that the CIA would give them to us 7 Mr Baron Did You receive urgings from the US Ambassador 8 from the CIA as a result of their briefings from the Chief of 9 Station in the Congo to undertake political action in the Congo toward removing Lumumba from a position of power due to 10 reports that Lumumba was heavily influenced by the Soviets? 11 Mr Dillon. I do know that he was supposedly influenced 12 1 by the Soviets But my impression of seeing him was that he 0 13 1 certainly wasn't controlled by them or anyone else , he was 14 So far gone himself that nobody could rely on him as an 15 individual. I don t recall any paticolar urgins from the 16 Ambassador , although I think they would have been natural, 17 because this was a very difficult situation, and he was there 18 and if he had been not warning against something , that would 19 3 have been very unusual 20 8 Mr Baron Aside from the recent visit Of Lumumba and 21 L the personal impression that he had made upon yourself and 22 W v the Secretary of State , there were other reasons , were there 23 1 not, to have a sense of urgency about removing him? 24 Z 8 Mr Dillon. There were all sorts of difficulties that I 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 84 get ================================================== Page 85 ================================================== 30 TOP SECRET 1 don t recall But there were those problems down arouna the L 2 copper mines , and Katanga , there was a revolution down there 8 1 3 of sorts , And there were many difficulties in the Congo at 1 4 that time 5 Mr Baron Do you recall anything else about the language 6 that was used in raising the question of assassination at the 7 meeting? 8 Mr Dillon No , I am sorry , I don t recall really anything 9 but what is in the affidavit, but just the subject came up 10 generally as a question, and it was turned off by the CIA Mr Baron Would the manner in which the question of 11 assassinating Lumumba was raised at that meeting have served 12 ; as sufficient authorization for the CIA to' proceed to develop d 13 0 1 the capability to assassinate Lumumba after that meeting? { 14 Mr Dillon Well, I don 't think they really needed any 15 authorization to develop the capabilities if they didn't use 16 them And certainly it would not have been enough authoriza- 17 tion a long shot for then to start doing that But I think 18 they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability 19 3 in this area irrespective of this , just by knowing the concern 20 8 that everyone had about Lumumba in the area That they could 21 | have done They wouldn t have to tell anyone about that 22 4 That is just developing their Own internal capability, and 23 1 then they would have to come and get permission _ 24 Z 8 Mr Baron Would the same thing hold true for the 25 TOp SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 85 by ================================================== Page 86 ================================================== 31 ToP SECRET 8 1 development of a generalized assassination capability at the 0 2 CIA that such a capability could be developed without 8 1 3 specific authorization from authority outside the CIA? 1 4 Mr Dillon _ Yes , I would think SO . 5 Mr Baron But it is clear to you that the discussion at 6 the meeting at the Pentagon that you attended would not in 7 itself have served as an authorization for an actual assassi_ 8 nation effort against Lumumba? 9 Mr Dillon. Not at all_ 10 Mr Baron Did you ever hear the phrase "Executive Action 11 during your entire tenure in Government? Mr Dillon No . The first time I ever heard it, I was 12 1 on the Rockefeller Commission 4 13 1 Mr Baron . Were you aware that the CIA undertook a projecl 14 which was run under the crytonum ZR RIFLE to develop the means 15 for carrying off an assassination if required? 16 Mr Dillon _ No , I didn't_ 17 Mr Baron And your first knowledge of any such project 18 was during your service on the Rockefeller Commission? 19 3 Mr Dillon That is right 20 i Mr Baron Earlier today we discussed Robert Johnson , 21 L who was a member of the NSC Staff in the late fifties and 22 W 6 serving until early 1962 Do you recall whether Robert 23 1 Johnson participated in this meetingat the Pentagon? 24 7 8 Mr Dillon . No , I don t recall I wouldn t think SO , 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 86 ================================================== Page 87 ================================================== 32 TOP SECRET because I wouldn t think there was necessarily anyone from the 7 1 National Security Staff_ And as I said also earlier , I don 't 8 2 personally remember Mr Johnson myself at all_ 1 3 Mr Baron _ As I represented to you earlier , Mr Johnson , L 4 in testimony before the Committee , indicated that he was 5 present at a NSC meeting in his capacity as a notetaker , 6 at which the President made a remark that clearly indicated 7 to Mr Johnson that he had ordered the assassination of 8 Lumumba And Mr Johnson said there was a silence T Mr 9 Johnson hinself was shocked , but no one at the meeting reacted 10 explicityly, and the 'meeting simply proceeded _ He places 11 this meeting in the suer of 1960 8 and said that it happened 12 ; at some point before the coup in Ihich Mobutu took power on 0 13 Septemb er l4th of 1960 _ Were you present at such a meeting? 1 14 Mr Dillon . If you mean was I present at a meeting where 15 I recall the President ordering the assassination of Lumumba 16 I don t remember such a thing . But I think that I was probabl_ 17 present at most of the Security Council meetings at that time 18 It being in August I might have been away for a week possibly 19 for a vacation , and I might have missed one . But otherwise 2 20 i I would have been there _ It could have been in view of this 21 L feeling of everybody that Lumumba was very difficult if not 22 impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace W 6 23. 1 and safety of the world, that the President expressed himself 24 7 we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of hin. 9 25 TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 87 ================================================== Page 88 ================================================== 33 TOP SECRET 1 I don t know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order 8 2 as Mr Johnson apparently did _ And I think perhaps others 1 3 present may have interpreted it other Ways But I am pretty 2 4 sure that if the President had said you go and get rid of him, 5 shoot him or some thing t R I just can 't conceive of him 6 doing that But I can conceive of him saying , let' s take 7 action and get this situation rectified, which is moreorless 8 along the lines of the various memoranda you have shown me 9 Mr Baron Did yYou ever hear the President make such a 10 remark about Lumumba let' s get rid of him , or let' s take 11 action right away on this? 12 Mr Dillon I don t remember that. But certainly this 0 0 13 was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it 1 14 wouldn t have been if the President hadn t agreed with it 15 Mr _ Baron So although you have no recollection of being 16 present at the meeting that Robert Johnson recounts , You 17 would find his testimony at least plausible? 18 Mr Dillon . It is possible- But I would think anything 19 like this was not a direct:order to have an assassination , 2 20 but let's take some. action to get rid of Lumumba get him i 21 out of office 6 22 Mr Dawson Would that be adequate implicity authoriza- Wi v tion? 23 1 Mr Dillon It would have been up to the CIA as to what 24 7 8 25 they thought _ And they could have well thought that. That TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 88 ================================================== Page 89 ================================================== 34 TOp SECRET is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether it is Lumumba or Castro. And you won 't be able in the Castro 8 2 area , or particularly in this area; to run it down , because 1 3 the people aren t here anymore But the person who really made 1 4 that decision for the CIA was Allen Dulles 5 Mr Dawson I guess I was asking for your expert opinion 6 on the command and control structure as to what adequate , 7 implicit authorization would have been? 8 Mr Dillon I think that Allen Dulles would have been 9 quite responsive to What he considered implicit authorization, 10 because he felt very strongly that we should not involved the 11 President directly in things of this nature And he was 12 1 perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that 0 13 8 maybe some of his successors wouldn t have been . And SO I : 14 think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen 15 Dulles 16 Mr Dawson _ And you were aware that that was the way the 17 system worked at that time? 18 Mr Dillon. It was the way he worked ; because he had a 19 3 very strong feeling of protecting the President from getting 20 i too closely involved With anything that was unpleasant and 21 L of this nature 22 Mr Baron So from your knowledge of Allen Dulles it is 4 23 1 conceivable that he would have taken Presidential language 24 7 such as , get rid of Lumumba and translate it into an 8 25 TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 89 ================================================== Page 90 ================================================== 35 TOp SECRET authorization for an assassination within the CIA? 1 Mr Dillon It is possible And the same thing with 8 2 1 Castro, when that came along the following year That is 3 1 perfectly possible _ 4 Mr Baron Mr Secretary , I would like to show you a 5 series of minutes from the Special Group and ask you if those 6 refresh your recollection as to the attitude of the US toward 7 the Congo in the summer and fall of 1960 , The first, Ihich 8 we will call Exhibit 2 , is dated 30 June 1960 _ 9 (The above referred to document 10 was marked Dillon Exhibit No . 2 , 11 for identification.) 12 1 8 13 1 14 15 16 17 18 19 3 20 i 21 L 22 Luj 6 23 1 24 7 8 25 TOP SECRET HY 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 90 ================================================== Page 91 ================================================== 36 TOP SECRET Mr Baron And this document refers to the election of 7 1 Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Senate of the Congo , and 8 2 recounts a report General Cabell that the US assisted Ileo 1 3 1 financially and "may have secured some influence with this 4 potentially useful individual 0 5 Did you ever see these minutes at the time they were made? 6 Mr Dillon ~No , I don t think I ever did 7 Mr . Baron Do you recall having a report of this meeting 8 from Mr Merchant who would have been State Department 9 representative at the meeting? 10 Mr Dillon No , I don 't recall I don't think I would 11 have , because this wouldn t have seemed to me to be important 12 0 enough to necessarily have been brought to my attention _ 0 13 Mr Baron _ Were you aware that Joseph Ileo was a signi- t 1 14 ficant figure in Congo politics? 15 Mr _ Dillon. I don t recall him at all now 16 Mr Baron Let me represent to you , to refresh your 17 recollection, that in September of 1960 , after Lumumba was 18 taken out of power by Kasavubu and Mobutu , he was replaced as 19 2 Prime Minister of the Congo byY Joseph Ileo . 20 8 Mr Dillon. I didn t realize that. 21 L Mr Baron Do you have any refreshed recollection nOw of 22 4 the relationship between the US and Joseph Ileo? 23 1 Mr Dillon. No 24 2 Mr Baron Generally speaking , would you have been 8 25 Top SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 91 by ================================================== Page 92 ================================================== 37 Top SECRET notified by Mr Merchant or Gordon Gray about what transpired 1 2 at a Special Group meeting? 8 1 3 Mr Dillon Not by Gordon Gray . That wasn t his job 1 But it would be by Mr _ Merchant if it was considered to be 4 5 something that was of enough importance that it might be some thing that I would have to act on or know about in my 6 7 capacity as Acting Secretary of State, whenever that arose Mr Baron . Were you awara that the US was supplying 8 11 financial support or other kinds of support to "Moderate polititions within the Congo who would be opponents of Lumumba 10 Mr '# Dillon . Not in detail, but certainly the general l1 fact that we would be doing that, yes 12 1 Mr Baron _ Let me show YOU now minutes from a Special 0 13 8 Group meeting of 25 August 1960 . Which We will marke Exhibit 3 14 3 _ 15 The above referred to document 16 was marked Exhibit No . 3 for 17 identification. ) 18 19 1 20 i 21 7 22 4 23 1 24 1 8 25 HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 92 Top SECRET ================================================== Page 93 ================================================== 3 8 TOP SECRET Mr Baron For the record , these minutes refer to a 7 1 report by Thomas Parrott, who Was the Secretary of the Special 8 2 1 3 Group on CIA activity in relation to the Congo _ Mr Parrott L outlines three CIA operations in the Congo which make use of 4 trade unions in the Congo and include the prospect that a 5 vote of no confidence in Lumumba would be arranged . 6 7 Following that report by Mr Parrott there is a paragraph which describes the action of the Group as follows : "The 8 Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in 9 order Mr Gray commented homvever that his associate had 10 expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very 11 straightforward action in this situation, and wondered whether 12 1 the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this 0 13 1 Mr Dulles replied that he had taken t he comments referred 14 to serious and had every intention of proceeding as 15 vigorously as the situation permits or requires , but added 16 that he must necessarily put himself in a position of inter_ 17 preting instructions of this kind within the bounds of 18 necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that 19 3 planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 20 8 consideration of any particular kind of activity which 21 L might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba I 22 4 Do you recall receiving a report of that meeting? 23 1 Mr Dillon No , I don t, that particular meeting . But 24 7 you would have to ask Mr Gray about that. I don t know who 8 25 ther Ni Topi SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 93 lY ================================================== Page 94 ================================================== 39 TOP SECRET they referred to as his associate , that is the key point _ He 8 1 $ worked for the President 3 2 Mr Baron Let me represent to you that we have testimony 1 3 from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes for this mee ting and 1 4 other Special Group mee tings _ that when he used the phrase 5 I MI Mr Gray' s associate or Mr Gray S friend , he was referring 6 euphemistically to the President _ 7 Mr Dillon That is what I would moreorless have assumed _ 8 But as long as you have that testimony, y assumption is 9 probably correct. And it follows the same way , that Mr 10 Dulles said he would take any comments referred to seriously. 11 And then he talks about those as instructions and the same 12 1 thing _ And it would seem to be thata And that must refer to 0 13 8 the same mee ting that your friend Mr Johnson testified to, < 14 'which I presume took place before this_ They are talking 15 about some thing that happened before this where he had 16 said his associate had expressed strong feelings about the 17 matter , and Mr Dulles said he would take the comments 18 referred to seriously. 19 2 Mr _ Baron. So it is Your impression that Mr Dulles had 20 i heard comments bY the President previous to this meeting? 21 L Mr Dillon Certainly. 22 Mr Baron Comments which called for "very S traight- 4 23 1 forward action?" 24 1 Mr . Dillion Yes , I think that is certainly what this 8 25 Top SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 94 day, ================================================== Page 95 ================================================== 40 TOP SECRET 1 said_ So I think that whatever records there are of NSC 1 2 meetings before that, that they may not have kept such records 8 1 3 in detail- And that meeting if you can find any meeting 1 4 that Mr Johnson took the notes of just prior to that, that 5 is probably the meeting 6 Mr Baron So you would assue that the language used 7 by the President heard by Mr Johnson , which indicated to 8 Mr Johnson that an assassination was at the least acceptable 9 means of getting rid Of Lumumba 1 is probably the language referred to here by Mr Dulles? 10 Mr Dillon It would sound SO , seems So l1 12 Mr Baron And would you also assume from your knowledge 1 of Special Group meetings and the Way the minutes were written 0 13 1 up , that very straightforward action could be a euphemism for 14 assassination? 15 Mr Dillon No , I wouldn t necessarily think that. It 16 wcuId just mean strong action to do some thing to get rid of 17 Lumumba , it could be a revolution , it could be anything . I 18 think it comes here that they would not necessarily rule out 19 1 consideration of any particular activity. I would think, if 20 s they were really going to mount something , they probably would 21 L have come back to the Group _ But they might not have And 22 4 again, getting back to Mr Dulles , I do not think he would 23 1 have gone back to the President and said, now , I have got the 24 2 8 capability to assassinate Lumumba , and I am going to do it 25 HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 95 TOP SECRET ================================================== Page 96 ================================================== 41 TOP SECRET next week if I have your permission , sir. He wouldn t have 1 1 done that Because where I particularly remember this , or 8 2 1 3 get the feeling particularly strong , is dating back to L something that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incident _ 4 Allen Dulles strong desire was to take the whole responsi- 5 bility for that, and resign, and be fired in disgrace , 6 publically , in order to protect the President . But the 7 President totally refused to accept any such way 'of handling 8 it. 9 Mr Baron So that says some thing not only about the 10 character of Allen Dulles 0 but the character of the President? 11 Mr _ Dillon _ Of both yes 12 1 Mr Baron That the President would be inerested in 0 13 1 taking responsibility for the orders that he had given? 14 Mr Dillon - Yes . He Was very strong that way And Mr 15 Dulles was So strong in wanting to protect the President that 16 he was willing to go out in disgrace public disgrace after 17 ten Years or more of service to the Government , just to pro- 18 tect the President, although there was nothing that he had 19 { responsibility for, primary responsibility- 20 i Mr Baron From your knowledge of Special Group meetings 21 L and minutes , it is your reading of this sentence that "it 22 Wj 0 was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not 23 1 necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind 24 7 0 8 of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba 25 H# 50955 DocId: 423566 Page 96 TOp SECRET ================================================== Page 97 ================================================== 42 TOp SECRET 1 you would read that sentence to indicate that an assassina- 2 tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might 8 1 3 be used to get rid of Lumumba? 1 4 Mr Dillon Yes , I would _ 5 Mr Baron Ana you were comme nting before that Mr Dulles might be expected say , some members of the Special Group , 6 to return to the Special Group if an assassination were being 8 mounted? 9 Mr Dillon_ Not only that, but anything being mounted 10 I mean whatever action to get rid of Lumumba , I think he would 11 probably come back and say what we are doing _ Mr Baron . But it is also your statement that, due to 12 1 the mode of operating of Allen Dulles and his character , 0 13 8 { 14 it is guite conceivable that he wouldn t have returned to the 15 Special Group with such an operation? Mr. Dillon_ That might although it is more likely 16 that what he really said was that he wouldn t return to the 17 President . 18 Mr. Baron In order to protect the President? 19 3 Mr Dillon . In order to protect the President. I think 20 8 he had looked on other officials in the Government as quite 21 L different from the President, all of the , in other words , as 22 4 expendable, and he probably would be less likely to go and 23 1 do things totally on his own And his whole idea was to 24 2 8 protect the President as the public representative of the US 25 HI 50955 DocId: 423666 Page 97 TOP SECRET bY , be , ================================================== Page 98 ================================================== 43 TOP SECRET 1 from any bad publicity in connection with this or any other 1 8 2 similar thing 1 3 Mr Baron _ But based on the discussion at this meeting 1 4 you would assume that the CIA would have the authority to 5 proceed to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba? 6 Mr Dillon No , I said that they would certai have the 7 authority to plan_ It is a close question whether this would 8 be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way this thing worked , as far as I know they didn t do anything just on their own I think they would have checked back at 10 least with the senior people in the State Department or the 11 12 Defense Department = 1 Mr Dawson Would they have done that in such a way that 4 13 2 : 14 it would be available to appear on the public record at any 15 time? Mr Dillon Maybe not It might have just been a call 16 from the Secretary of State, Mr Herter , or possibly the 17 Secretary of Defense 18 Mr Baron Do you have any independent recollection 19 2 Mr Dillon and Gordon Gray. I think they would have 20 8 kepz him notified , because he was sort of central in this 21 L thing , they wouldn t do anything without his at least knowing 22 W v about it 23 1 Mr Baron . Did you have any independent recollection of 24 1 8 being made aware of this Special Group meeting that we have 25 Top SECRET H# 50955 DocId:37423566 Page 98 nly ================================================== Page 99 ================================================== 44 TOP SECRET 1 been discussing before You saw the minutes today? 2 Mr Dillon . No , I did not 8 1 3 Mr Baron Let me show you now what we will marke as 1 4 Exhibit 4 , which is minutes of the Special Group of September 5 8 , 1960 , and point you toward the passage on the second page 6 that refers to the Congo where Gordon Gray indicates that 6 7 there is top level feeling that: vigorous action would_not: be # 8 a mistake _ 9 The above :referred:to documen was marked Dillon Exhibit No 10 4 for identification.) 11 12 1 & 13 1 14 15 16 17 18 19 3 20 j 21 L 22 4 23 1 24 7 8 25 H# 50955 DocId:42423566 Page 99 TOP SECRET ================================================== Page 100 ================================================== 45 TOP SECRET Mr Baron _ Do you have any independent recolleciton of 1 being made aware of this meeting? 8 2 Mr Dillon . No , I do not 1 3 Mr Baron . Is this consonant with your understanding of 1 4 the policy at the highest levels of the American Governnent 5 toward Lumumba at this time? 6 Mr Dillon It fits ini; with what I understood was the 7 general policy that we were very concerned with 8 Mr Baron _ Do you recall that at this period of time, in 9 early September , Lumumba had just been deposed , and there was 10 a struggle going on between Lumumba and Kasavubu for power 11 which culminated in a coup on September l4th by Mobutu and 12 1 on the 13th of September Lumumba entered the protective 8 13 cus tody of the United Nations forces in Leopoldville , do you 1 14 recall that chain of events? 15 Mr Dillon No I knew that at some point there was a 16 change in government I don t recall the detail of it at this 17 time 18 Mr Baron Are you aware that in early September Soviet 19 { planes and Soviet trucks had gone to Stanleyville? 20 8 Mr Dillon. If You tell me that is the case, I think it 21 does refresh my memory , because I do know # I do remember L 22 that we were very concerned about that sort of action by the 4 23 Soviets 1 7 24 Mr Baron And were You aware that Stanleyville was the 8 25 HY 50955 DocId:372423566 Page 100 TOp SECRET ================================================== Page 101 ================================================== 46 TOP SECRET 7 stronghold of Lumumba and his supporters? 2 Mr Dillon No , I don t recall that_ 8 1 3 Mr . Baron . Dut you do recall that at that point there was 1 4 concern at higher levels in the State Department?over the 5 connection between Lumumba and the Soviets? 6 Mr Dillon Yes very much So . 7 Mr Baron _ Let me show you Exhibit 5 , which is "minutes 8 Of the National Security Council meeting of September 21 , 9 1960. 10 (The above referred to document 11 was marked Dillon Exhibit No . 5 12 for identification.) { 6 13 1 14 15 16 17 18 19 3 20 i 21 L 22 4 23 1 Z 24 8 25 HI 50955 DocId:p2423566 Page 101 TOP SECRET ================================================== Page 102 ================================================== 47 TOP SECRET 1 Mr Dillon Yes , I seeenow that I attended this as Acting L 8 2 Secretary of State , this particular meeting_ L 3 Mr Baron And do you recall the discussion reported in 1 4 those minutes of affairs in the Congo _ that there was the 5 fear of Egyptian influence on the Congo situation on the part 6 of Lumumba and that there was some pressure being brought to 7 reconcile Kasavutu and Lumumba? 8 Mr Dillon No , I don 't recall any of the details of this 9 mee ting_ I don 't recall the meeting itslef But it fits 10 right in with the general feeling about the problem the Ivay 11 you looked at the Congo problems 12 Mr Baron The minutes refer to a visa application for 1 13 Lumumba Would that have been in connection with Lumumba' s 1 1 14 desire to come to the US to be recognized as the legitimate 15 representative of the Congo Government before the United Nations? 16 Mr Dillon . It would certainly refer to his desire to com 17 to the United Nations to get out of the Congo , where he had 18 been deposed _ Whether he cared much whether we recognized 19 2 him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt _ 20 8 I don 01 t think he had much interest in what we recognized . 21 L But I think it does show that he wanted to get out And this 22 4 was a way cf getting out. 23 1 And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and make a big] 24 Z 8 25 complaint there HI 50955 DocId:42423566 Page 102 TOP SECRET ================================================== Page 103 ================================================== 4 8 TOP SECRET Mr Baron The last paragraph of those minutes quote 7 Mr Dulles as saying: "The Soviet ships off the African 8 2 Coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situatioh 3 5 1 Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the 4 moment , but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a 5 grave danger as long as he was not disposed of M 6 Did Mr Dulles make those remarks? 7 Mr Dillon I don t recall those particular remarks 8 But he could have But again, there my Own interpretation, 9 10 "disposed of wouldn t necessarily only be assassinated , it 10 would be gotten out of the Congo to some place where he was 11 neutralized and couldn t come back in, and you could be sure 12 1 he was done with 6 13 2 Mr Baron But assassination would have been one of the 3 14 means of disposing of Lumumba , that would have been acceptablel 15 Mr Dillon I guess the word "disposed 01 could mean that 16 But that strikes me as rather surprising , because I would 17 think once he was out of office, our concern would have been 18 deescalated to some extent , it would have been more to find 19 2 some way, which should have been perfectly possible , of j 20 6 getting him out, or locking him up , or anything _ 21 L Mr Baron_ Let me represent to you that the report of 22 wi the United Nations investigation of the circumstances v; 23 1 surrounding Lumumba death, which was not reported until 24 7 February of 1961 , indicated that at this time, in late 8 25 H# 50955 DocId:42423566 Page 103 TOP SECRET 's ================================================== Page 104 ================================================== 49 TOP SECRET September of 1960 , Lumumba was in the cus of the United 1 1 Nations troops , who were actually protecting him at his 8 2 residence in Leopoldville, not restraining him from leaving; 1 3 but there was a Congolese guard surrounding the UN troops 1 4 who were prepared to arrest Lumumba if he did leave his 5 residence 6 Mr Dillon. I think I recall that now because it is 7 rather unusual circumstances 8 Mr Baron _ And then apparently in the middle of October 9 the UN had refused to surrender Lumumba to the Congolese Army 10 who had come with:ansarrest warrant for Lumumba Is it your 11 understanding that during this period of time , even after 12 { Lumumba was in the protective cus of the United Nations 8 4 13 he was still considered a potential threat and volatile force 2 14 in the Congo the US? 15 Mr Dillon. I would imagine So . And I would not be at 16 all surprised if the then rulers or officials of the 17 Congolese Government that succeeded Lumumba were concerned 18 about it, because he had this tremendous abili to stir up a 19 1 crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started 20 8 to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army , he probably 21 L would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes 22 Mr Baron We had testimony from a CIA officer , who said wj v 23 1 he had been dispatched to the Congo by CIA Headquarters for 24 7 the purpose of trying to secure Lumumba S escape from UN 8 25 H# 50955 DocId: 423566 Page 104 TOp SECRET tody tody by ty ================================================== Page 105 ================================================== 50 TOP SECRET cus and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army 1 1 where the CIA officer:'s expectation was that Lumumba would 8 2 1 receive a trial and probably capital punishment at the hands 3 1 of the Congolese Army Does this mission of the CIA officer 4 seen to conform to your Own idea of US policy at that time 5 toward Lumumba? 6 7 Mr Dillon _ Yes , I think very much So Mr Baron Now we also have testimony that the CIA 8 Chief of Station in the Congo was visited by a representative from CIA Headquarters who supplied him with lethal biological 10 agents and the equipment with which to administer these ll substances for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that 12 1 he the Chief of Station, was charged with such a mission, 4 13 8 which obviously he never carried out successfully . Have you 8 14 ever heard any mention or even a hint of such an operation? 15 Mr Dillon No , I never have 16 Mr Baron. Would such an operation seem consonant with 17 the kinds of discussions that had been recounted in those 18 Special Group meetings? 19 3 Mr Dillon. Well, to the extent particularly that one 20 a document you have showed me 21 L Mr Baron The August 23rd meeting? 22 4 Mr Dillon Yes E if assassination is a real possibility 23 1 as that indicates f this would be a way to do it. But I never 24 6 heard of it at the time and I didn t realize that there was 8 25 HI 50955 DocId: 12423566 Page 105 TOP SECRET tody ================================================== Page 106 ================================================== 51 TOP SECRET 1 any such capacity for the use of biological things I read 1 2 about that and heard about it in the Rockefeller Commission 8 1 3 with Castro, but not about this_ 1 Mr Dawvson _ Would you expect to be told about the 4 5 operational detail? 6 Mr Dillon Not in detail_ But I am rather surprised 7 that it went this far and in my position I didn t know some- 8 thing about it. It may be that they felt that it was So tight 9 that' there was no need to tell anyone except the Secretary of State I assume Secretary Herter would have known about it. 10 Mr Baron _ Would it be possible that the CIA would feel 11 that the "plausible deniability" woula have covered someone 12 1 in your position? # 13 8 Mr Dillon_ It could have , if felt that they had a } 14 clearcut 15 Mr Baron mandate to proceed with an assassination 16 17 operation? Mx Dillon . It is possible That is just supposition, 18 but it is possible. It may not really have been Mr Dulles 19 1 decision. 20 8 Mr Baron Were you aware of any connection between the 21 L CIA and the actual death of Patrice Lumumba? 22 ui 6 Mr Dillon _ No 23 11 Mr Baron Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the 24 1 8 coup 1hich brought Mobutu into firm control of the Government 25 H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 106 TOP SECRET they ================================================== Page 107 ================================================== 52 TOP SECRET in mid-September of 1960? 1 Mr Dillon _ No , I was not aware of that_ 8 2 Mr _ Baron _ And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch 1 3 Lumumba from UN protective cus and place him in the hands 1 4 of the Congolese Army? 5 Mr Dillon No , I wasn't aware of that 6 Mr Dawson Mr Secretary, Mr Baron has asked a lot of 7 questions about some of the factual parts of this And I 8 would like to follow up on some of your statements about 9 Director Dulles willingness to protect the President . I 10 think you made a very interesting and forthright observation , 11 that he was very interested in keeping the President protected 12 1 from things which may cause embarassment to: him. & 13 Mr Dillon Not personally , but that he though would 1 14 cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just 15 the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it i5 just 16 because it is the terrible Mr Dulles and the terrible CIA 17 it is not the nation And the President is the nation So 18 that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond 19 1 personality institutionally to the Presidency , which should 20 8 not be involved in this sort of thing 21 | Mr Dawson Did you investigate what may have been the 22 basis for your feeling _ 8 which is your current feeling, that Lj v 23 1 that was his way of operation? 24 2 Mr Dillon I think that it was primarily I had known 8 25 HI 50955 DocId: 423566 Page 107 TOP SECRET tody ================================================== Page 108 ================================================== in mid-September 0f 1960? 1 1 Mr Dillon No , I was not aware of that 8 2 Mr Baron And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch 1 3 Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands 1 4 of the Congolese Army? 5 Mr Dillon No , I wasn t aware of that_ 6 Mr Dawson Mr Secretary , Mr Baron has asked a lot of 7 questions about SOIe of the factual parts of this _ And I 8 would like to follow up on some of your statements about 9 Director Dulles willingness to protect the President _ I 10 think You made a very interesting and forthright observation, 11 that he was very interested in keeping the President protectedl 12 1 from things which may cause embarassment to him. 0 13 2 Mr Dillon Not personally, but that he though would < 14 cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just 15 the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just 16 because it is the terrible Mr Dulles and the terrible CIA 17 it is not the nation And the President is the nation_ So 18 that it was a fairly deep feeling Which went beyond 19 1 personality institutionally to the Presidency , which should 20 s not be involved in this sort of thing _ 21 L Mr Dawson - Did you investigate what may have been the 22 basis for your feeling _ 1 which is your current feeling, that Wj vi 23 1 that was his way of operation? 24 1 Mr Dillon = I think that it was primarily I had known 8 25 Top SECRET H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 108 ================================================== Page 109 ================================================== 53 TOp SECRET him well over his eight Years in the Foreign Service , and also 7 1 in the State Department 0 But it was highlighted because this 8 2 experience in the U-2 , in the first few days of this I was 1 3 Acting Secretary of State, and I had to bear the brunt of a 2 4 lot of that mix-up . 5 Mr Dawson Was Mr Dulles generally a responsible 6 individual in whom the President placed great trust? 7 Mr Dillon Very much SO , great trust. 8 Mr Dawson In his relationship with the President do 9 you believe that President Eisenhower was aware of Mr = Dulles 10 desire to protect him, President Eisenhower from a great 11 embarrassment? 12 1 Mr Dillon I would think So . Of course, the U-2 thing 4 13 made him aware of that, because it was not only Mr _ Dulles 8 < 14 view but it was also the view of the State Department that 15 this was the correct procedure, that the President should take 16 whatever action was necessary either with Mr Dulles or with 17 senior officials in the State Department , and blame then for 18 both , but not to accept the responsibility himself if nothing 19 1 happened _ And he disregarded our strong feelings on that. 20 i Mr . Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting in 21 L Turkey , and he made a special trip out to Camp David to urge 22 this on him, to warn him befor? he did assume responsibility 4 23 1 himself. But to no avail Hagerty was very strong for the 24 1 President taking responsibility, because I think he had a 8 25 Top SECRET HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 109 ================================================== Page 110 ================================================== 54 ToP SECRET 1 1 little different view of this_ I think he had a view that 8 2 the press looked on the President as someone Iho Was not in 1 3 full charge of the State Department at time 1 and he thought 1 4 this would contribute to that, which would be very bad for 5 the President So we were thinking of it_more from the 6 international aspect. We had the contrary feeling _ Mr Baron Did the President S trust in Allen Dulles 8 diminish significantly after the U-2 affair 9 Mr Dillon No , because there was nothing wrong with the 10 U-2 affair, except that the President had authorized it 11 specifically, it was flying on the after he authorized it 12 The only bolix that came was in the after events where this 1 4 13 silly press release announcement was put out by NASA I guess 1 14 it was , that this plane had just been sort of flying around an 15 got lost, or some thing like that And we really had a very 16 difficult time about that at the morning meeting where the 17 news came to us , which was out in the Virginia hills The 18 President had a mee ting of a restricted nature afterwards 19 including ne and Allen Dulles , the Secretary of Defense , and 3 s 20 Colonel Goodpastor 21 Anc he put me in charge of handling the whole thing and | 22 gave me the responsibility. And he wasn t fully briefed on y 23 all the cover stories or anything of this nature And I 1 7 24 went back to the State Department and Was Working diligently 8 25 on this and talking to Mr Dulles as to what we would say . ToP SECRET MY 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 110 day ================================================== Page 111 ================================================== 55 TOP SECRET 1 And the next thing we knew suddenly the President told 8 2 Colonel Goodpastor to say that this was descended fron the 1 3 State Department _ 1 4 And the next thing we knew the statement came out from 5 the US from NASA which made no sense at all 6 And of course what had happened was that Iagerty that 7 nad been the routine thing, and when it came up Hagerty was 8 to refer the press to NASA and NASA if they were referred , 9 had the cover story . 10 Anc Goodpastor I never quite found out Ivhat happened 11 in the White House, whether Goodpastor didn'+ get to Hagerty 12 or Hagerty didn t pay any attention to them , either way was 1 0 13 more likely, because Hagerty was Way senior to Goodpastor 1 14 at that time , and they had done this , and he didn t know , he 15 had been at that little meeting with the President, he didn't 16 know that it was supposed to be in the State Department And 17 that got everything off upside down_ So we were trying to 18 explain how the US Government had put out this silly statementl 19 which bore no relation to the facts , when we knew the facts 1 20 And of course at that time the Russians hadn t yet i 21 announced that they had the pilot or anything But we knew L 22 that was like toos We knelv that would happen _ I think it 4 23 followed electronically. And but it was because of this 1 24 White Fouse bolix that htis had happened _ Z 8 25 Mr Dawson . The basis for Dulles willingness throughout TOP SECRET HM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 111 lY , ================================================== Page 112 ================================================== 56 TOP SECRET 1 this period to protect the President was also I guess there 8 2 Ias some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisis 1 3 1 4 Mr Dillon We still felt strongly that that had been a 5 mistake because it put Khrushchev in a position where he 6 felt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President 7 and S0 forth _ which We felt would not have been the case 8 otherwise 9 So this didn 't change Mr Dulles at &ll, it made him even 10 stronger in wanting to protect the President , because he knew 11 the President was difficult to protect. 12 Mr Dawson During the period following the U-2 crisis { 0 13 YOU saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligence 1 14 operations? 15 Mr Dillon He did this at every National Security 16 Council mee ting_ The format of the meetings were that the 17 meeting would be called to order by the President , and then 18 he would turn to Mr Dulles for the intelligence briefing, 19 which was the first item of business in all those meetings _ 3 20 Mr Dawson On those occasions did Mr Dulles attempt to 8 21 tell the President enough where he would have some idea of L 22 What was going on , but not tell hin directly what was 4 23 happening? 1 24 Mr Dillon Most of the briefings were about intelligence 1 8 25 Ivhat other people were doing and what was happening And it TOp SECRET W 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 112 ================================================== Page 113 ================================================== 57 TOP SECRET would only be exceptional when they would deal With what we 1 were doing ourselves 8 2 1 3 Mr Dawson Deal Ivith the latter , when Mr Dulles 1 wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation , how did he 4 5 9o about achieving that or gaining that approval? Mr Dillon I don t really know I do kno in regard 6 7 to the U- 2 flights, Thich had 3 very special procedure set up whereby 2 piece of paper had to be signed in each case by the 8 Director of Central Intelligence , the Secretary of State, the 9 Secretary of Defense , or Acting Secretary of Defense , and then 10 taken to the President and approved by him before the flight 11 could take place _ And that was handled by General Goodpastor 12 1 rather than through Nr Gray. 0 13 1 Mr Dawson Did that change after the U~2 crisis? 14 Mr Dillon Io , that was the procedure. 15 Mr Dawson He knew what he was approving very clearly? 16 Mr Dillon He had been right up to this time and that 17 was the case with the U-2 : After the U-2 crisis there weren t 18 any more U-2 flights 1 and that procedure came to a sudden end 19 1 Mr Dawson In other intelligence operations which you 20 8 brought up which were required to be brought before the 21 L Special Group 22 4 Mr Dillon I don t recall that ihere were any . But if 23 1 it was needed , I don t knov Who would do it, but it would be 24 1 8 through the person who would know the most about it. And 25 ToP SECRET H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 113 ing ================================================== Page 114 ================================================== 58 TOP SECRET that would be General Goodpastor , because he was very close 7 1 to the Fresident , although he was a relatively junior officer 8 2 at that time , he was a young colonel a I think he may have 1 3 even been a major when he started there in the White House 4 But he was sort of Staff Secretary to the President on all 5 chose relations with the Pentagon and the CIA and the State 6 Department . If you wanted to see the President on some thing 7 important , it was generally through General Goodpastor rather 8 than through Gordon Gray _ And Gordon Gray handled most of 9 the detailed mechanics of se tting up meetings and that sort 10 thing . He was not as much a personal assistant to the 11 President And that job was held by General Goodpastor 12 1 Mr Dawson. But in circumstances Ivhere the President was 0 13 going to be made aware of attempts to overthrow a government 8 { 14 in front of a number of people like the Special Group of the 15 National Security Council, were you privy to some of those 16 occurances? 17 Mr Dillon I don t ever recall one 18 Mr Dawson You don t recall instances where an attempt 19 or discussion to overthrow a government or anything more 3 20 8 sinister than an assassination Was brought up? 21 L Mr Dillon No , except the discussion of preparing a 22 capacity to invade Cuba That was considered And we have W v 23 the minutes on that That was considered a number of times 1 24 1 and reported a number of times 8 25 TOP SECRET MM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 114 of ================================================== Page 115 ================================================== 59 TOp SECRET 1 Mr Dawson After an intelligence operation blows in 1 2 the sense that it is uncovered in connection with the Govern- 8 1 3 ment of the US is found , are You aware that oftentimes a 1 routine order goes out to estand down intelligence 1 to take 4 5 positiveactions in that area, are' you aware of that standard 6 operating procedure? Mr Dillon I don t quite understand what your question is there 8 Mr Dawson After the U-2 crisis did we for a period of 9 time stop agressive intelligence actions against the Soviet 10 Union? 11 Mr Dillon_ Yes , I think that was natural 12 1 Mr Dawson That was my question That is a routine 0 13 1 14 matter? Mr Dillon. That Was a natural thing _ Obviously We 15 stopped the U-2 flights because we knew they had the capacity 16 to shoot them down and so i+ was no use doing it again_ 17 And I would imagine we probably eased off on the electronic 18 flights along the coasts of the Soviet [Jnion = and kept them 19 2 further away , or disconinued them for awhile 20 8 Mr Dawson Are you aware of a similar stand down order 21 L having been issued after Lumumba was captured? 22 4 Mr Dillon . No _ 23 1 Mr Baron Mr Secretary, you mentioned earlier that you 24 1 8 might have been away from Washington in August of 1960 when 25 TOp SECRET HF 50955 DocId.32423566 Page 115 ================================================== Page 116 ================================================== 60 ToP SECRET this Special Group meeting took place on August 25th is that 1 1 correct? 8 2 Mr Dillon Yes , there is a possibility, because August 1 3 was the month , if one was going to take any time off in the 1 4 sumner , it was likely to be in August _ 5 Mr Dawson It was best to take it off during August 6 because of the miserable summers? 7 Mr Dillon . Yes And mY family had a summer place where 8 I had gone since childhood in Maine and it was easy to get to 9 I do have enough recollection to know I was there a couple of 10 times when I had to get back for a Security Council meeting 11 and there were certain weather problems from the Coast of 12 Maine. I recall one time , it coula have been this Year, or it 1 0 13 could have been a year earlier. But I know I was there those 8 3 14 summers for 3 few days _ And it could have been in August . 15 Mr Baron In reference to the meeting at the Pentagon 16 that was the subject of your affidavit, you mentioned to me 17 before We began this testimony today that from what you have 18 read recently, it is your impression that the remark of the 19 CIZ representative at that meeting which a you have said 1 20 in effect turned off the suggestion of an assassination 21 L attempt against Lumunba might have been made simply because 22 the group was too large for such a discussion? Wi 6 23 Mr Dillon . It might have been I said that because of 1 24 7 what I have learned since , anc I have learned more today T 8 25 ToP SECRET W 50955 DocId.32423566 Page 116 8 ================================================== Page 117 ================================================== 51 TOp SECRET 1 but did to develop such a capacity versus Castro 1 2 But as I have thought about it since we talked , I think that 3 1 3 is less likely. I think it is more likely that it might have 1 4 been the beginning of xhis whole idea on the CIA S part that 5 they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn' t 6 have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in 7 August 8 Mr Baron So wittingly you have been present at the 9 creation? 10 Mr Dillon The early stages yes 11 Mr Baron I have no further questions I woula simply like to say that the Committee is extremely 12 1 appreciateive of your coming here today _ This is obviously 0 13 1 a difficult and unpleasant subject to discuss And you have 14 been tremendously informative on it. So thank -you very much 15 Mr Dillon. I wish I could be more So . But the details 16 of what happened at that time , the day to day details, have 17 really departed from mY mind _ It is only those few relatively 18 unusual things that I still recall And any way I can help 19 1 I am glad to . 20 8 Mr Baron There may be one way You can right now 21 L I know that before we: startted today Bill Miller, the Staff 22 4 Director of the Comnittee , indicated that the Committee would 23 1 be interested: in hearing you out at great length on policy 24 7 8 recommendations in the intelligence field gathered both from 25 Top SECRET MM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 117 they try help ================================================== Page 118 ================================================== 62 TOP SECRET your experience in the State Department and the Treasury 7 1 Department , and also your recent service on the Rockefeller 8 2 1 5 Commission But I wondered specifically, in reference to the 1 assassination area , where we faced the need to tie up our 4 5 investigations as soon as possible, and perhaps make some 6 recommendations as soon as possible , do you have any specific 7 suggestions? Mr Dillon No , I don t think So I think that the recor 8 has shown that this is the type of thing that the US 9 Government or any of its branches cannot and should not engage 10 in. And I doubt very much that there Will be any repitition 11 of this sort of thing that took place in the early sixties , 12 { which I guess was predicated on the belief that some thing like 0 13 1 that could be done in exceptional circumstances without its 14 being surfaced and being connected with the US And I think 15 even those Fho believed that such action was morally proper 16 and might have been in the best intersts of both the US and 17 the world would think that the costs Were too heavy if it was 18 ever tracea back to the US Anc the recora seens to show that 19 1 it does get traced back So I think that there will be a 20 8 general agreement among those who are the type of people who 21 L would ordinarily think that such a thing should not be though 22 4 of as US Policy 23 1 Mr Baron _ Are there any institutional changes that You 24 7 would suggest to prevent the use of assassination as a tool 8 25 Top SECRET HF 50955 DocId.32423566 Page 118 ================================================== Page 119 ================================================== 63 TOp SECRET of foreign policy? Mr Dillon The only thing is I don t know just what 8 2 institutional changes are really necessary , but there should 1 3 1 be the clarification that the Special Group , or whatever 4 nane it is given for the Committee, would have to approve any 5 action by the CIA , whether it is assassination or military 6 action or anything else , in writing_ I think that would be 7 fine I think it is naivete to have the idea that the 8 President has to approve anything like that. I tend to agree 9 Ivith Mr _ Dulles that You should not Sei the President 10 personally involved in details of operations that might be 11 on the edge 0f Fhat is right. I am not judging just about 12 1 assassinations 1 but in any covert operation The law now is 0 13 1 that the President has to approve any covert operation I 14 think that the result now will be that there wouldn t be 15 any . I think there may be times when we Will need then, but 16 not violent ones I have in mind such things as financial 17 help and such things as that. But I don 't think the President 18 ought personally to the checks 19 3 Tir Baron Thank you again_ 20 8 (Mhereupon, at 5 :15 P . I? & , the Committee was adjcurned 21 end : nch subject to the call of the Ckair.) 22 4 23 1 24 1 8 25 TOP SECRET W 50955 DocId.32423566 Page 119 sign ================================================== Page 120 ================================================== AFFIDAVI'' V Ilon CVh ( UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS: I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first sworn , do upon oath depose and state: From June 1959 until early January 1961 , I served as Under Secretary of State During approximately 35-40 percent of that time , I served as Acting Secretary of State because of Secretary Herter' s absence from Washington_ Secretary Herter who preceded me as Under Secretary 0f State had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12 Committee a predecessor of the present Forty Committee_ When I became Under Secretary $ the President asked me to retain my earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accord- ingly , the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State Department' s responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee. Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State 0 I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com- mittee decisions On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis- cussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro. On one occasion in late or early August of 1960 , shortly after Patrice Lumumba S visit to Washington , I attended a meet- in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis_ cussed. During the discussion which covered a great variety of matters my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised: The CIA representative indicated that the, Agency did not undertake this sort of operation_ This ended considera- tion of this subject- With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone _ Dated this 21 of 1975 . 2424 Dougfas Dillon Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of May 1975 ) pnofizte; ~24 Notary Publi District of Columbia H 50955 DocId:32423666 Page 120 duly July ing day May , #iCE HOV: WHITE )HE" ================================================== Page 121 ================================================== d D Ilon 30 Junc 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD of Spccial Graup hiceting- 34_Iune SUBJECT: Minutes Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Gen, Cabell PRESENT: Messrs . 3 Congo_ Gen. Cabell mentioned briefly the fact of the election of Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Congo Senate, and the fact that we had assisted him financially. He indicated that we in no way intend to clai-n full credit for his election but, particularly in view of the very close contest, ~c might have had some effect; and in any case We may have becured some influcnce with this potentially useful individual: Cuba conversation after Gen. Cabell' s departure, In an informal that the U.S. has taken publicly about Mr. Gray expressed the that all thatit can affordto take Irom the Castzo governtacee] there is and abroid is probably beginning to {eel that both here around; that this may limit as to how far this country can be the no to take & similar tack; and that cncourige other small countries and othcr action the harder we lolger We delay with effective cconomic may make it for ourselves. and Mr. Irwin agreed, with the stipulation that Mr . Merchant affirmative action until it is prepared the United Stateg should not take_ to follow through O1 3 substintial scale. Ybauctt & THOMAS A= PARROTT 3 FXOfir; 0 THE WHITE Fichu { 67 SECRET EFES @XLY HF 50955 DocId.32423566 Page 121 Gk;lt_ 1960 opinion public opinion Pushed Utwcn 42 DDc / 8nl1 ================================================== Page 122 ================================================== to insist OnI a morC prccisc Spclling out of individual or group view 6 . Mr . Parrott als0 said that Mr. had rjiscd a related point which Mr. Barne s and he had 2 grecd hid validity, and that Mr . Barnes had undertaken to assure that it would be given adcquatc attention by the intcragency planning group. This was a concern expressed &s to planning for the support fiscal and othcrwise of 3 ncw Cuban government immediately aftcr 2 succes sful overturn of the present onc. Mr . Merchant said that he agrced with the necessity for making contingency plans of thig sort, and had in fact directed three wccks ago that State officials begin to draw them uP. afaut THOMAS 4 PARROTT {R" 'Xk :": SEGZEV EVES CaLy HF 50955 DocId.32423566 Page 122 Macy Ma cy fully ================================================== Page 123 ================================================== Jcnov enough about thc cal attitudes of the membcrs of the Frcntc , particularly &8 to basic freedoms, thcir attitudc toward rcstoration of seizcd American property , etc_ (In answcr to this , Mr . had pointed out that the Frcnte is composed of pcople who have broken with Castro, at least on the basic philogophies. ) In an attempt to clafiy thc situation With respcct to the first point, Mr . Parrott told the Group about last Monday'9 meeting with Mr _ at hich Mr. Barne s had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project: Hc said that hc was at a to understand how could have received the imprcssion that CIA 16 not aware of dissident groups_ He went on to say that in answer to Mr, Macy' s question as to the outlook, Mr . Barnes had stated and had developed at considerable length thc thesis that our view wa S one of limited optimism, and that he had cxplained in detail just this is S0; this explanation had included specific comrnents on the stcps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to asseS 5 their apparent leaders_ Mr. Parrott said further that the t had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of thc question for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country. On the secord t, Mr. Dulles said that we do Icnow a deal about the basic political sympathics of Frente mcmbers , and cited 2S an example the position that had becn taken 25 to the inclusion of certain ultra-coservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as to preserve the principles of the rcvolution_ e said that as to specific stands on restoration 0f U,S. property rights, etc. this wa s thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of a tool of the Americans_ He agreed, howevef , that Mr _ Stans 1 point was 3 valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do 60 He addled that he expects to lunch with Mr_ Stans in the near future and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further , a5 appropriatc- Mr Parrott said that there wa5 n0 disagrecment that the political idca8 of thesc individuals must be cons tantly asscsscd and must be cleafly estiblished before the operation actually comes off. He addcd, howevc r , that it should bc borne in mind that once thc sc politically-screcned individualg had issued thcir general 6tatement of objectives, our prinary opcrational .ta sk has been to hold thc FRD together, and that at this particular 8 tage it would not bc practical Piora". ! ZZT - EB THE WHITE FeJSL &7e HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 123 Politie Gray Macy , loss Macy why Poin Poin good being being ================================================== Page 124 ================================================== cl L. 6.2= V4. Cuba The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dis sident groups within Cuba - In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups a5 a test of its capabilitics (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group) _ Hc also said that we hope to have 3 paramilitary force of approximately 500 pcople ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr _ Inin' s question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase. Mr . Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director 0f the Bureau of thc Budget. The latter had told Mr. that hc had discussed the Cuban project with Mr_ Macy and that a8 1 result of this discus sion Mr _ Stans, had two rcservations that he would like Gray to look into. One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection With the latest withdrawal from thc Reservc, he had received "no cvidence" that any effective rcsistance had been identificd within Cuba_ (Mr_ Gray had answered that in the formal presentalion last week, Mr . Dullcs and Mr. Bis &ell had mentioned a nuber of such groups. ) The second had to do with 3 fceling that w @ might not 3 PRO?ERTY ()} THE WHITe #UUSt OFFIcE SEEZZT 0 ES H 50955 Doold:32423566 Page 124 Gray he, point ================================================== Page 125 ================================================== oul8 tanding intelligence, bility or drive, but that he is obviously wcll motivated. Mr . Irwin asked whethcr there might bc other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in thc church hierarchy who could be useful. Mr . Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not & very substantial forcc. Mr Dulles concurred in this , but added that this would be something to keep in mind 1 5 appropriate. C2 :{ Pkuk:": THE Wkite ?oi": 1; . SEEZT EVS C7l7 HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 125 ================================================== Page 126 ================================================== SF =T ~ EZS E3V D ulon Ekihct 3 (c } 25 August 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Mceting, 25 August 1960 PRESENT: Messrs . Merchant, Irwin, Dulles 1 Congo_ Mr. Parrott outlined broadly thrce (or Js Mr _ Dulle s latcr described them "2 1/2") operational lines thit we arc following in moun an anti-Lurumba campaign in the These included: operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange 3 vole of no Confidence in Luun and a brand new conidct with 21 alieged leader Of certain independen[ labor groups. Fie emphasized tilaE tne latter had just come up and that we ar0 now in thc process of asscssing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual_ The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr . commented, however, that his Jssociates had expressed extremely strong [eelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this Situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr_ Dulle s replied that he had taken the comments referred to scriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously &s the situation permits OT requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It w2s finally &greed that,planning for the Congo would not nccessarily rule out "consideration"! of any particular kind of acti which might contribute to ge rid of Lumumnba_ Mr . Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defensc havc given thought to thc possibility o using high officials of the Catholic Churcl in Africa to promote the gencral objeclives of the West: In this conncction, he cited 2 preliminary 2s6€s 8rent wvhich had been made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointcd by the Popc the assessment that the individual in question is 2 man of not PKOPt#ty :; TMlS I;ti 0? f SGRG ACZ THF White uis Wc I; C FAFEj 342 STRZT ~ FYFS (Wv ~1J; 10? @EZTAOX_ H 50955 Doold:32423566 Page 126 (^ = Gray, ting Congo_ ba ; Gray vity tting bcing 33 ================================================== Page 127 ================================================== V4_ Dominican Republic Mr . Dulles inquired whethcr Mr. Mcrchant wanted to discus s the proposal to dispatch a letler to Trujillo Suggesting that the latter retire' fromn Oflice. At Mr . Merchant' 8 reque&t, the DCI stated his on , which wa$ to the € ffect that he had considerable reservation a$ to the efficacy or wisdom of such a lettcr _ He said that it seemed to him much more useful to make 2 personal #pproach,which not s tood a chance of mofe @ ffective , but also could be denied, He pointed out that a' pcrsonal approach had bcen attempted s ome time a go, but that the individual in question had not been able to carry it off. Hc suggested that the approach might best be made by &n unofficial American, and that Mr. Pawley would be a belter bet than the previous individual, Mr . Merchant said that he realized his own name had been suggested, and that he was far enthusiastic about the idea_ He said further that hc has a visceral fceling #ginst asking & Chief of State to out of office either through tne medium of 2 lettcr or personal contact particularly when we do not know who might succeed him. Mr. Merchant conceded with humor the validily of Mr. Grzy' s wry commert thit Mr. Merchzzt' g ethics 2nd his pragmatisn might bz somcwkat intcrtined. Mr . said that he wa 5 entirely opposed to ha any U,S. official such a letter_ He thcught that an unofficial letter might be a different matter_ The conclusion of the Group was that it would be worth thc cffort to Mr. Pawley to attempt & direct approach to the Benefactor; it was noted that the chances of success are perhaps less than even, but that no great harm could result. There wvas 3 brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of cffcctive &ction thcre. Ar , sid that he hoped that Agency people in thc field arc fully awareof the top-levcl Iccling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss. cei = THOMAS A_ PARROTT 2 tiuc~_ &i;o- EZE LR EXLY THE W 50955 DocId.32423566 Page 127 opinic only bcing from Bet good Gray ving sign get 15. Cong? Gray 'asttf fKOn:', WhITe ================================================== Page 128 ================================================== Mr _ Dulles se id he believed 8 werront had been issued for the arrest of Lumumba Aslde from Lumumba Mobutu appears to be the only man in the Congo o ble to act vith firmness A recent ettempt to assess inate Mobutu had feiled Mr _ Dulles then reported that ke had &ttempted to provide Mobutu vith funds but thet the guards protecting Mobutu had relieved our messenger of the funds We cannot funds to Mobutu because he does not have conplete control over his guards A nlew developent has been Mobutu 3 creation of 8 council of edvisers , most of whom are graduate students The old ministers have been turned out '0f office and thefr offices have been taken over for the council wbich is intended to carry on for a temp- orary period_ Mr Dulles reported that the USSR had suifered 8 severe blo to its prestige in the Congo- Fowever, he had been surprised a t the ease with vhich the Sovlets were forced out of the Congo _ He believed that tbe Soviet diplomats ,after departing fron the Congo , went to Accre but he did not know whether had moved on towerd the USSR _ Mr _ Grey &sked vhether the Sovlets were really quitting the Congo _ Secretary Dillon said the Soviet press has not Yet edmitted that the Sovlets have the Congo _ Mr Dulles seid the Soviet diplo- mts indicated to the press before leeving that houla be back Secretary Dillon belleved it wes clear that the Soviets had not €iven up in the Congo _ Mr Dulles reported that the Soviet diplomats left the Congo S0 hurriedly that the Soviet me rkings which painted over the Congo markings on their planes were still et when left. Mr Dulles seid the Soviet ships off tbe African coast were epparently ewaiting_ 8 clarification of the situetion _ Mobutu eppearea to be tbe effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lunumba w83 not disposed of and remined 8 grave denger 25 long 88 he w88 not disposed of _ Mr Dulles observed that the 5ituation in Laos w8s still confusing and that little progresg had been made towerd the settlement of the crisig during the pest veek _ The threetening situation in Sam Neue Province_ hovever_ had been quieted 85 8 regult of the dispatch of Laotlan parachute troops to that area The situation rerains troublesome because Pethet Lao end Viet Minh forces could intervene et any time The problen 0f' the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer 9 settle- ment _ The King hes requested that General Ouene and General Phourni call upon him . A skirmmlsh between Phouni 5 forceg and Ventiane forces has been reported at Fuk Sane but lttle bloodshed resulted_ Apparently , Fhouni hes adopted tactics of carrying on 8 war of nerves egaingt Vientiane There has been firing across the Mekong River into the clty and Fhoumi epparently intends to starve out the government Meenwbile, 15 TOP SECRET H 50955 Doold:32423566 Page 128 Eet they quit they they tbey yet ================================================== Page 129 ================================================== kept uder continuing scrutiny by *ll interested rtments and #gencies to ensure that it serves the purposes of retard the Grovth 0f the war potentiel of the Sino-Soviet Bloc &nd reducing its unity- Noted that_ with respect to paregreph 11 of NSC 570l+/3, U.S_ export controls over such materiels , equipnent_ technolo€y and services a5 can be unilater- elly controlled by the United States may be imposed not only to achieve & worthwhile edverse impact on the Kar potentiel of the European Soviet Bloc , but algo to serve other U.S. policy objectives , especially with regard to technology and services _ NOTE The action in b above _ ES approved by the President subsequently transmitted to a1l holders of NSC 570l/3. 5 SIGNTPICT WORLD DEVELOFKENTS AFFEC TING U.S, SECURITY Mr Dulles seid he vould first sumarize developnents in the Con€o _ Severel African states vere making frantic efforts to save Lurumbe _ An intercepted messzge between Egypt &nd Ghana indicates that Nesser is urging the UAR , Ghana_ and Guinea to concentrate their forces in Leopoldville end pressure to bear for the maintenance of Lununba as Prime Minister Mr .Dulles renerked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo hed been placed edvisedly in north Equateur Province while the Guinee forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province _ Intercepted messa€es elso indiceted that Nasser hed asked tbat 8 council be formed in Leopoldville cons ibting of the diplomatic representatives of the UAR , Ghana _ and Guinea in that city. Tne UAR Anbassador to the Congo had been directed in concert with the Ambassadors of Ghena_ } Guinea and Morocco to ettenpt to per- sude Kasavubu to effect 8 reconciliation with Lumumba _ On tember 20 Kasavubu had &nnounced that he had reached no egreement with Lumumba but the ltter had later displeyed 8 piece of paper purporting to be en egreement with Kasavubu _ Secretary Dillon reported that Luuba had requested 2 visa for travel to Nev York 8S the representative_ of the Congo to the UN and had elso requested 2 visa 8s en officiel of the Govern - ment of the Congo = We had denied both requests for visas How- ever if Luumba asked for 8 vise to visit the U.S_ a5 0 private citizen ve vould have difficulty in turning him down .Mr.Dillon odded tbat the Congo , Government declares it vill errest Luumbe 1f he ettempts to leave tbe coul 14 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 129 depa ing bring Sep try. ================================================== Page 130 ================================================== Vll 2Zcs GYLY D. Ilon G kh,t * 8 September 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Grvup Neticg; 8 Seprcnber 1960 PRESENT: Messrs _ Merchant, Douglas , Dulles 1 Supply_Drogto_Guban Dissidents Mr. Parrott outlined the proposed supply to Cuban dissidents in the Escambray. After brief discussion, the Group approved the project as presented. Mr Farrott asked whether approval could be granted at this time con tinuing missions o€ a similz- n3ture t2 this grcup or other bodies of dissidents_ The Spccial Crcup 23reed t? this, with Mr_ Dulleg st2 that the otier members could be notified by telephone, without the necessity of convening 3 meeting. ~ Vtply6at PRcPE !'7 $ 0: THE WH!TE iCi~i Vifiil SEGZET EZES GLY MY 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 130 Auxlje Gray, drop for ting ================================================== Page 131 ================================================== -C-Z n_ 6 VI_ 9 Jnl 75 C U W ^ _slub 1 RIDEL CASTO INTFRVIEM T DAGE.iS }TI;;7 Stockholm DAGEMS RYIETER in Swedish 3 Jul 75 Pp 1 , 12 LD (Nats Holnherg interviev with Cuban Prime Minluter Castro: Thz United Staces Ho Longcr Wiants To Assassinate Ne' " ] {Excerpts ] Havana 2 July--For a man who ha; for many ycars been on the CIA dcath 14st, Cuba 5 leader Fidcl Castro Jooked rcra rkably unconccrnedl Hc sat on 3 5 ofn Swcdish Fmhassy a Tc: hours before Olof Ralne ' s departurc fron Cuiba anr] Ihen In thc tioned ,about the CIA '5 rcpcatcd attempts to ansassinatc him , hc ralsed he Kas ques both hands to the cciling in a turc of rcs ignation: "Cood I,ord he said _ "wc have known al1 that for 2 1ong time. It Seems a 1ttle ridfculous Fidel said "to hear today of disclosures of new as5858ination plans phen here 1n Cuba e already knex of them. "yet what 15 nox heing disclosed in the United States I5 only 3 small mrt , he said _ could describe 2 dozen simflar assas31nation plans and Ve Will algo do 30 vhen the U,S . Investigations are over' Dut he aId not belteve that he ran the risk of being assagninated by the CIA any longer. "If there are cuch plans today , Ke at Jezst, do knox of then _ he Gaid_ "I belleve that the Unfted staies 1s no Jonzer Interested] In 3533931nating ne--and I beleve that it hag accepted the Cuban revolution as 3 fact and that 6ooner or later it must come to an agreement with uS R = But no one can be absolutely certain he said. Raiged Eyebrows Nhat Fidel Castro sa1d while seated on the Sved tsh Embassy sofa 0ill cause s0me cyebross to be raised In many countrfes phich Cuba has accepted as internatlonal all1e5. One the key phrases of Olof Palme 's Latin American trip ha; been "a nex cconomic world order_ 0t Tt 1; 7 term which cmbraces small countrles rights to control thetr natural resources , In both tne 011 power Venezuel? and the potential 0il power , Mexico , O1of Palme's hosts have adopted the concept Kith (nthuslasm. when Fidel Castro cxplainedl his oym skepticiom concernins tnllc of "a 10M ec ononic horld order" after dinner at the Swedish Embassy , he did {0 in 2 Vfolent attack on the horld '8 ofl-prorluclng countrles_ Hc believed that w ne; vorldl order coula not crentcd by the introductfon of nex privllcgcs for 7 nC Erou)) of countrics- The Poor Are Affccted FRSHN;_ Incufficleni: to denantl that 211 countrie; have control over thelr xn raw CENVis) na terials= I1e #1d_ "11 privilczes arc crented at another!; cxpensc torlay 12 no : the industriallzed countries Khfch are affect:edl by thc 011 countries JL I4 profits hut the noor countrics hich dlo not have 0il Cla W 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 131 %es "Ye not 50 of an be ana 1975 1 t ================================================== Page 132 ================================================== REET JUL 14 1975 0 ? CUD,| vJ 9 Jul '"5 C4A 11 cocon and 0112" ha asieed 'Klat henefit 8 it t0 ccuntr les Tike Hov can you compare and 'Tanzania that al1 countries control thelr 1'2; na tcrial: when al1 this Sri Ionla ncans to tnem 1s that they must pay mor € for both 01l and industrlal goods? for nysclf , ho cxpla ined. reccive 011 from the USSR on favorablc "I an not spcakins tcrms, But 1f the 0il cointrics derand, solicarity fron thc Thfrd Horld , they blust thensclvcs uith thc problens 0f the 'Third World. 'Icy arc, Js yet, reluctant concern +o do this_ 'tharo ha3 the 0fl revenuc gonc ?" he a sked , and he answered the question. "It ha 5 been deposited in the econoiics of the Industrial world and has been used for The industrialized coitiles Will emerge from the econoiLc crisi3 stronger a1ns purchases_ than evel , It will be the developing countries which Will ba affected_ 'Ihay Do Hot Dare silent he looked at the Swedish journalists with an cxpression of Pidel Cartro fell Eenuine alarm. too severely? M he a#ed worrledly. 11 Dnt You nust under- 1: Do thlnk I 213 speaking talk about thls 'Tnere 1s no onb else Tho dare?, sInce a11 gxand tht someone a19 hoping for loans fron tne ofi coutries_ And 11e those Mno cat nezt him: 3 coifortinz Blap on the bzck . save American countrle? Iatin America 1s described today 25 2 changing In verions Iatin concinent and in both Kexico and Veneruela Olof Palme listened to the rovolutlonary diatribes which are increaslngly:prt of both these countrfes' and anti-iuperialist official language. Yidel Castro did not appear especlally inpressed hy this chanpe_ He did not mention Meioo and Vene'uele at 211 #hen hz was asked about the prospects for social revolution AmerIca--but he did mention the milltary governuents of Feru and Panaia in South Better Than Ho thing revolution can be ruled out, ne s2 id, "and #e Jro utching the "No path toxard Parjma Vith &reat interest. It 1s reaningless to prosrejsive reglaes in Pcru and 2rtedl strusgle ls necessry for revolutlon--all that cain be aafd discu3s whether mhether 1t be in Chile 0r' Cuba Mi 13 that 2 revolution Iust be based on real force, when asked for hlc oplnion of' tinc; governments Jn) Venezuela ana Kexico_ Jio Smfled cadly and he thought for 2 lonts tima Ihfch, hy thelr oxn nssurnces, arc revoluclonary , hefore ansvering: "It 13 better than nothirg. true tlt Cuba 18 recclving ccononlc a 1d from thc USSR in Soneone askcdl Lf it 16 ideol and that It ng Its "stomach in Moseow and its head In conflict With its own ofY Pckcing. Ridel Casro 1as ooviously upset by the questlon. the Cuban revolution, he sid_ "it W? : Ms But the "It K73 not they who trived else would, und +a cannot forgct tht: Wc Jmve not comi- USSR helped u5 hen no one the USSn 0x' anyone clse , who clse could luve helped pronised Irith clther The United Stntes? MM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 132 "Hc and you tus t to 4n cor u5? and ================================================== Page 133 ================================================== THE EVENING STAR (Washington) Four Star Edition, page B 4 , Monday , 5 September 1963 , Columns 4 Lt 5 "Goldwater s Toughness Challenged f} Castro by Daniel Harker , AP Staff Nriter prompted ralitterlcudenouncing Ihat he called recent on Cuban terri U-S . Mr Castro said: in kinde are prepared to fight then and U. S . leaders should think answer are aiding terrorist thai if Cuban leaders _ plans to eliminate safe_ 0 themselves Till not be The U-S_ is ana make promises to negotiate This has happened Ihich later it Will not honor_ October crisis_ to promises made durins the be seen with net nave been broken as can attacks- But I warn this is leading dangerous situation that to a very worse crisis than could lead to a October S [From an. impromptu interview reception this given by Castro at a Brazilian Ieek -] RECEF: Rom JUL 14 1975 CLA MM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 133 42 bY tory , they they always ready They Embassy ================================================== Page 134 ================================================== "IoluICAUNE New Orleans , Mondoy , 9 September 1963 , uns * 5 7 page 7 "Czstro Blasts Raids on Cuba 0-S . Imperiled Aid to Rebels 08 Leaders Tnis item was introduced by an editor' s note referring to the fact that Castro had turned up at a Brazilian Embassy reception Sal night (7 September) where he hzd submitted turday 2n impromptu interview. Harker' s to the interviel account of reached New York Sunday after- noon r 'Havana (AP ) Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: U-S_ leaders would be in danger if helped in any attempt to do with leaders of Cuba_ 01 "Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U-S_ prompted raids on Cuban Castro said: We are prepared to "RiSeEfthery' and answer in kind. U.S_ lezders that if should think are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders_ 0 thenselves will not be safe 8 World affairs seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate, a few 2go,' but now this trena has changed Wvith attacks 08 08 The U-S_ is always to negotizte and make promises which later it will not This has happened to promises made honor October crisis They have been during the be seen Ivith broken as can new attacks_ But I warn this is,leading *o a Zangerous situation that could lead toverwc crisis than October S porse RECEFD) FIPOM JUL 14 4975 C LA H 50955 DocId:32423666 Page 134 Says by they away they they days ready ================================================== Page 135 ================================================== JHE Cia In CWB4: CHRONOLOETEAL SutRX 1 CUBATTESATIOES (1) Mid-1980 Cruz 1f comortevolutionary group, Tuler Sague 2 ganster, and Cubi; Kemcs were inf' traec through Puntn Kicacos zone -4n Matanzas Provincc fox {} plc: #goinst Custro and Other lerrorism and sabotage: TNt revo]vers and &utomtic pistols 0 hdyh-powered rifle, and Targe quantities of amnunit{or were sapplied by the CIA. (2) March _ ; 1961 various Counterrevoluttonary grcups were trained and armed by the CIA_ and {nfilirated :hrough the north 0f Havena t0 assassinate Castro and support the Bay 0; Pigs invesiun Humberto Sori Marin #nd four other fnddviduals Wene infiitrated to cnordinate the activttles of vartous counterrevoluttonary groups dfrected by the CiA Inside Cuba_ Weapanry inc]uded automatic weapons 9 high-pCWered rffles Wfth scopes , amnunition, and explosives_ (3} June 7961 the Frente Revolucionario Delo (FRD) iet wtth Indfvfdua] Infiitrated into Cuba With instructions for a pot against Castro- Jeeps with bazookas iere placed {m a garage at in intersectton in Havana &nd truck with grenades wos placed ir sports clty Plan mas to ambush Castro and other Teaders_ Two participants Guf ] Termo Caula Ferrer Bnd Iliginio Menendez said when arrested that the CIR was In charge, and that contact was ina intained through Cuantanal &nd thz Swiss Embassy _ In July 1961 after of Pigs 2 CIA worked t0 consolidate counterrevolutlonary groups into the 'Unidad Resistencla United Res isturce` organization_ Jose Pujals Mederos made al) undercover vdst to Ehe United States to meet with CIA officers Bendei" (or Boulding) Karold Bishop and Car] Httch. There Mederos was appointed heed of CIA operatiens in Cuba in place 0f the arrested Aldredo Izaguirre Programs Included "selfaggress ion' aga Inst Guantantino to Justffy counter-attacks Om other countres to provoke war #gaInst Cuba (4) July 26 1961 through th? infiltratfor Cia agents Emfldo_Ado] fo Rivero Cara (9rand): Ado] fo Mendcza (Raul } and Jorge Garcta Rubio (Tony and others 9 the Uniited Pesdstance grcup deve oped 0 Plot against Castro during the 26th 0f July ebratton 'o Oriente Province_ (5) July 26 3 1961 3 the Smme growp Plerned snother plot the salne day against Castro Guring 1 rally at Revolution Square Meetings Were held at the Giantenaio Nava] Base where war material, includ Targe quantities 0f Sma71 ars , Was Supp]ied by base commander Captaln Car? E Schenweias _ (6) ATso {n July , 1961 pIctting aginst Castro was Undertaken by representatives of 11 30 ce Noviembre, "Movimentc Revolucianaria cie] Pueblo and 61 Frente RevoTuctonario [emcratico I1 The assassination attempt Izs to be carried out neal the home 0f Celiz Sanchez Marduley in Vedado . CIA instructions carle through:ccntact.s abroad with Tony Varona 9 Manuel Ray and Aurel Tano Sanchez Arango and threugh Adlra Burke and CIA agents on Guantenaxo Weepons included explosdve; mpcxtars Fiigh-powered rifles $ and 3O-caliber machine guns _ (7) September 13 1961 tke same groups Tisted In (6) above_ In ccntact with the Movimjenta de Recuperacion Revolucicnarta I1 (MFR) 'ed by Juan Jose Martore Sflva 9 made an attempt On the Mfe 0f Dr Carlcs Rafae] Rodriguez When he Was returning fiam Matanzas to Kavana. They Worked With a CIA In Matanzas and 1 cuunterrevolutonary band there Weapous #ncluded autamatic haneguns machire guns , and a high-porered rifle With telescopic sdte. {8) Octeber 4 1961 the MRR &nd "II Frente de] Escambray under CIA dfrection 9 agreed upon 3 plan for Sabotage in Havanz timed to co incide wIth the roturn nf Cuban President Osya]do Tonradn frcmn Punta de} Este n bazoaka WAs to be fired tward the President at the former presirentfal pa Tace' From 8 nearby apartnent building, witn #he Withdrawal covered by Taunching grenades aga {nst cne pubfic. Weaponis recovered inc]uded autumathc rifles and grenade Jaunchers_ MW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 135 "La cratfe co" Bay Jtm of ce) ling agent ================================================== Page 136 ================================================== 2 (9) In early 1962 with CIA Instructions through Guantanamo. Jorge Luis Cuervo Calvo reorganized several groups into the M1 Unjon de Un ddades Revolucionarias" (UDUR ) A meeting was held to plan an uprising and discuss arrangerents which had beeri made to receive equipient through Guantanano _ CIA was pressing both attempts against_Castro and staged acts_of agressIon against Guantananao _ Ca]vo outlined 'PIan Z" 0 scheme to kt1] Foreign Minister Raul Roa , and Mi then attack other Cuban leaders Who Wou]d #ttend the burda] 'The authors af the pJan are Iisted as Hernandez and Cay Gispert and members of the DRE Organ:zation headed by Jul to Hernandez Rojo Msted a5 a CIA agent infiltrated into Cuba . Weaponry Included a double-barreled shotgun , explosives 9 grenades and demo] ition tJming devices 0 one ]abeled "Block 16 Demo ]itton, M5 A1 _ In 1963 another consol idation 0f groups Was carried out with CIA dfrection from abroad through agent Nino Dlaz_ The umbre ]1a group was ResistencIa Civica 0} Anticomun ista 16 (RCA) 9 and it Incorporated the "Eercito de Ltberacion Naciona] " (ELN) 1 Movimtento de Recuperaclon Revolucfonaria" (MRR) and J} Agrupacion Montecrtstt among others The Overa]1 object Ive, a5 instructed by the CIA, was to create the impresston of a strong Interna] resistance to Castro and to inspire 3 decision for armed intervention at the meeting of OAS presddents_ Again, Instructtons came through Guantanamo _ (10) March 13, 1963, the RCA Initlated 3 plan to assassinate Castro from a house near the Unfveristy 0f Havana by firing a mortar. People arrested included Samue] Carba ]l0 Moreno . identified as 3 CIA agent. Attacks were to be made s Imultaneously on the Commtttees for the Defense 0f the Revolution and on Nationa Revo]utionary Militta sites_ Bazcokas, Imortars and machine guns were taken . (11 ) Aprt} 1, 1963 , the RCA developed 8 plan Involving sIxteen men wtth Pistols and fragmentation grenades who were to attack Castro at the Latin Amertcan Stadium. Those arrested were Enrique Rodriguez Val des (known as "Mulgado" ) , Ricardo Lopez Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo 9 and Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles (12) July 26 1963 , the RCA grouping planned to assassiniate the Minister of the Armed Forces_ 9 Rau) Castro, at Revolution Square during the 26th of July celebration. Leading those groups Involved in the plot was Ibrahim Machin Hernandez . (13) September 2B, 1963, another group Was formed through 8 relatfonship With CIA agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure; who was a French citizen Iiving in Cuba Their plan w8S to dynamite sewage pipes under the pres Idential palace _ de Ure confessed that he had been working for ard giving information to the CIA for 3 period of two years_ (14) March, 1964 a pan to assassinate Castro by Marijo Salabarria Agutar, a "gangster 0 Who had cantacts with the CIA through 1ts agent Dr_ Bernardo Milanes Lopez who sought support In Spwin from Tony Varona and Juan Bosch 6 Iisted as frtends of Salabarria The CIA gave Salabarrda weapons and "great sums of money" for a scherie which Involved Insta]]- a 30 or 50 ca] iber machine gun th a vehicle and watt- for Castro to pass by _ (15) Mid-]964, another plan to assassinate Castro was formulated by members of "Movimfento de Lfberacton Nacfonal part of the RCA block contro] led by the CIA. The effort Involved CIA agents Alberto, and Ramon Grau Sterra, members 0f 3 network headed by Ramon and Maria LeopoldIna Grau Alsina who attempted to pofson Castro In 1965 _ The mid-7964 plan ca] led for throw grenades at Castro at the Latin Amertcan Stadium. Nine men re Invo] ved_ September, 1964 0 members 'of "Elerctto de Lfberaclon Naciona] 1 (ELN) and "Frente Interna de Liberacton" (FIL), Who had been_engaged In intell igence for the CIA, began } under CIA instructions 9 to seek unffication_ H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 136 Cay_ aried Ing ing ing we ================================================== Page 137 ================================================== (16) Ona 0f the memmbers 4f #his Sroup Meuesto Cutillas Perez . 9 told Angel Miguel Arencibie Wiran " Rolando Taldvs Renzola &nd othcrs 0f 4 ploi against Castro to occur 0. 16 S+. Vedario - (17) In early 1965= counterrevoluticneries JJulio (mar Cruz Cecd]da Ferwin Conza ez Carbal?c nd Gira d Kevne Tdq 0iego Sc 6nc "ember; of an RCA sub-group kown 05 Ejercitc de Liberacion Aaciona1 were 'rking Qri d plot agalnst Castro in Santiego de Ia5 Vega This pTin Was cropped Im favor of a pTan to hit Castro at tle Latin Aericon Stadium writh another sroup In 1 nearby buflding set Wp to Fire machine guns intc the cruwd to create panic and facdlitate the escap?_ (18) In June 1965 ther Was an arrest Of tha grou) ezded by Ramon and Maria M M Leopoldina Grau A"sina (see (15) above) Wich WZS purt 0f thc Rescate and M1 Movimiento Antd coniunist& Revclucionario 4 (MAR groups sponsored by the CIA_ Marta Leopo Idina Gral had recetved TIA Instructions for poisoning Castro &t the Havana Libre Hote] Jesus Companiond Souza and Santos de Ia Caridad Perez Nunez members 0f" MAR wera to Carry oit the poisoning _ Hhen thls atiempt fatled another 5O0 cepsuie bottle %1 porison was sent by Tony Varona _ Marta AIsina also knotn JS "Polita M1 aiso recefved weapons with silencers and specia] &ssassination projectiies from the CIA. (19) In July of 1965, there Wa's an 3rrest 0f 8 group whlch represented another CIA attempt to organdze counterrevc]uticnaries, this tdie under the name "Unidad Resistencia 11 Thfs group developed 2 plan to assassinate Castro Iith a Thcmpson submacliine gun} at Vita Nouve $ restaurant, firing also at the Ministry of Interdor across the street to creatc confuston and permit the escape. Equipment Inc}uded weapons and cOmun cations gezr (20) Also In 1965 there Was 7in arrest 0f foriner Cuban commander Rolando Cubela Secades_ Cubela Wd 5 recrutted during a trlp to Madrid hy CIA agents Manuel Krtime Jorge Robreno Tne Niagdcian iuis Enrique Trasancos and Carlos Tepedno_ The planning &ls0 involved an Officia) at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid; Jose Luls Gonzales Gal larreta, &nd Alberto BTanco (ar "E7 Loco" ) - In Madrid Artime prolised boats weapons and Mem for an {nyasion 0f Cuba wfthin 72 hours to support %he assassmuat{on nf Cascras Defore returning to Cuba, CubeTa recedved from; Gallarreto a rifle wich 2 telescopic site and silencer_ (21 ) In mid-1965 two groups wtth CIA connections and contacts {n the Umited States the "0 Cwmendos 0nd the "Movdmiento 38 de Nov !embre planned to intintrate Cubu That effort Wd $ 3 ven IP , Instead Tired from gunboats at the Xf scnc larshir zone ir Mramar and at the Riveria Hotel = Tn the directton 0f the pres dentia] residence. (22) In 3 1966 these Same grcups wero Inf ltrated into the Monte Barreto Zone in Havana with the insston 0f #SSmssfnat ng Castro _ In the actton Armando Rcmero Martinez and Samelio Hertnio Diez Garcda were ktlled: &nd Antanin Cuesta ValTe hend Ot Ccitiandos 1 and Eujeni? Enrigue Zaldivar Carrienas Yere arrested . These then had been trainet n Puerto Atco by the CiA and soe had been {uvolved in the banbartmnent 0f ihe "San Pascua] a ierchant vessel &nchcrzr at tre Cafbarien Pcrt In i.05 Wtlas Province (23) On March 17 1967 three Infiltrators from the Uited Scates Felix Asencio Crespo: Wi1fredc Nartinez Diaz and Gustavo Araces Alvarez Were arrested Ihile attempthng to ind by Cayo Fragoso Thefr pTanned activity pius to assassinate Castr Gnc conduct Systemnacic sahntage io create the image cf a pjpulan uprising, t0 help ccunterrevolutionary groups In the Unfted States get official hacking These peonle had been trained by the CIA through M-30-;] if "HECE "Los Piiros Nuevos !Comardos L 18 0 47pha-36 and other organizations They kad @vtomaeic rifles boacs_ Phastile explosives 9 and comiunfcatdans ecuipient. H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 137 2 0 and they May = ================================================== Page 138 ================================================== (24) In 1971 a plan was prepared to assassinate Castro on a vistt to Chfle_ 10 The Iain protagonist was Jesus Domincuez Benitez known as "The Islanders who had been arrested by the FBI_ in 1968 for promat terrorist actions inside the United Scates: In 1970 he had participated In an unsuccessfu] attempt to infiitrate Cuba through Orjente Provinceand had soughtarefuge at Guantanamo 9 where he Was arrested for bond violation: Nonethe he was free In 1971 to participate wIth the CIA_ Chflean fasctsts 9 and Cuban counterrevo lutionaries in & scheme to assassinate Castro using 3 gun concealed in a televtsion camera _ He obtadned Venezuelan press credentfals from Cuban extles In that country. The plan was aborted= Those Involved In the plot feared for thefr Iives because the plan did not Insure their escape. ### H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 138 9 ing Jess ================================================== Page 139 ================================================== CLOSING 8T4 TEMENE FROM CUBA DOCUMENI We consider that the analysis of the informatlong we offer the licly known , the onea that the American authorities posse3g ana have not been publiched_ 0 allowg 48 to affirm that the phybical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, eapecially the Frlme Minister Fidel Castro Ruz has been a reiterated policy of the United State8 through itb subver- slve agencies making u8e Cuban counterrevolutlonarie8 1 0.8 citlzen and all kind of corrupted Individuals, inside the country a8 well a8 abroad withcut taking into congidera- tion the victims that would result from these ectiong With thlg purpoge: they have provided the partieipants With 3 great nunber of weapona explosive: technical Ieang of transportation and COmmunicetion for the accompliahment of their plang Thege are some of the connoted and proved facts of the nueroug subvergive activities that the CIa hag carrled out almed to the asga8gination of the leaderg of the Revolutionary Governlent of Cuba- 1& MW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 139 and pub of ================================================== Page 140 ================================================== THE WHITE HOUSE fOP SECRET-SENSITIVE WAshivctov EYES ONLY November 12, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR_ BUNDY SUBJECT: Shipments_ef_Contzmina Elements to Cuba 1 _ I refef to your interest in hearing more about the Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment of contamina elements to Cuba and which is 2imed bringing about 3 breakdown of 2 substantial amount of Cuban machinery_ 2_ Attached is a copy of 2 memo which I believe you drafted for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5 would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald is now conducting_ I have not core across any minutes of the April 7 meeting. (As [ recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While.I do: rot recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached memo, they indicate that Item 5 was approved. own :tt strong recollection of the fellei WpFfrom the meeting was that Items 1 through 5 were O.K_ and that the only serious problems concerned Items 6 and 7. 3 _ I assume that You still want to hear 3 status report on the Fitzgezald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I will pass this word to both Des 2nd Peter Jessup. I think this operation is probably too down the road to if indeed we do want to stop it_ In any event, You will be able to find this out, some gentle questioning, when Des gives his status report. Gc Gordon Chase J J6 1s Gt ~ } O< 707 X Qly TOP SECRET 5 SENSITIVE EYES ONLY Copy: 0 undor R Sohnson Vimar HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 140 ting ting at My far stop, by hr/ ~+ + ================================================== Page 141 ================================================== TOP SECRET April 7, 1964 Mererandum for Digcusgion ef_Cevert Pregzan Against_Cuba U_ S: covert operations 2gainst the Castro regime have recently been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12) , and a number of issues are presented which require discussion and decision at 3 higher level_ The present covert progrem is designed in support of 2 general policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro, accompanied by methods short of war to rid of the Castro regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in fact been held up for varioug reasons and it is now important to decide whether or not certain 8ubstantial and expengive activitieg sbould be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced, or (d) abandoned Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories: iL 1 . Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex- 2Luiy L filtration of agents &nd covert supply of agent operations _ 273e07334lci It is unanimously recommended that this pro- ji be continued_ 2 _ Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forrs 0f active and passive registance and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba &nd the Soviet bloc_ Recommendation: It i9 recommended that these programs be continued with regular review of their operational guidelines _ 3_ Cooperation with other 2gencies in economic denial by selec- tve economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban economy_ Recomm endation: It i9 recommended that thig program be cor- tinued: 4 _ Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements near the power centers of the regime. Recommendation: It is recommended that thig program be con- tinued, TOP SECR ET "ndon- B: Joh nson Library HF 50955 DocId.32423566 Page 141 get Lz ~it 4gram Wl Ljiidt Yi E8pY ================================================== Page 142 ================================================== TOP SECRET 2 5 , Indirect econoric sabotage with 2 low level of visibility ana detection. Programg of this sort involve possible oversezs sabotage of Cuban and pos sible addition of contaminating elerents to gengitive Cuban imports (not food) Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued 6 , CIA -controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which conducted five raids in the sunmer and fall, of 1963, before authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons . Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recorn- mended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties . 7 _ CIA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban exile gr oups operating from Central America. These groups will begin operations soon unless action is taken to to thema Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended that higher authority hear the argurents _ copy". 80 54 2 7) IchAqnn 0 { XY383 MM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 142 ships stop try ================================================== Page 143 ================================================== TOP SECRET EYES ONLY ~THE WHIE HOUsE WAShINGTON March 4, 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR MR_ BUNDY SUBJECT: Special_Group Meeting Cuba Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba 1 Artime Cut-off As you know State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this .one for the usual reasons_ DOD, reportee will also take a somrewhat reluc- tant line on cutting off Artime _ Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause u5 real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course of the next few months The advantage of this would be twofold First, it would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt uS , when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced. On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view_ 2 Pesticides The CIA will probably propose 3 deal whereby we arrange to have diTuted Cuban pesticides _ State and DOD are both likely to oppose this one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch Government; it is questionable whether we want to up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of the many bases that would have to be touched. I don't like this one either. 3 Support_to_RECE One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of seem to have changed their position. One reason some of the arguments which are spelled out in the TOP SECRET EYES ONLY copy" Lvndon B. Joh nson library HM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 143 dly, bring it, they ================================================== Page 144 ================================================== TOP SECRET EYES ONLY Mr . Bundy 2 - March 4, 1965 attached memo on the subject. Another reason State does not want to com - promise its position on Artime (i. e. If you aid to RECE, how can You stop aid to Artime? ) . State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administrati over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; want to return this money to the small contributors Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because are 11 good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked. I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off. 4. Keating_Gimmick Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Cubans DOD feels that such goings-on might be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a Ian wouldn't received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing_ While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should them invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con- traption: I am against it. 5_ CIA's Paramilitary_Capability Both DOD and State wilL probably oppose CIA' s proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD_ that, with the present world situation as it stands this is 3 good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that We could crank it up again in 2 very short space of time _ Gordon Chase TOP SECRET EYES ONLY Copy Lyndon B. Joh nson Library H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 144 give give vely they they they get keep ================================================== Page 145 ================================================== TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 12 November 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR . BUNDY SUB JECT: Policy 'Toward Cuba In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that he forward the Army study entitled, e Dance" to the Inter departmental Coordina Committee for Cuban Affairs appropriate interagency coordination 2 $ & basis for further consideration by the JCS. In the course of pr eparing a Chairman S position on "Square Dance , I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected without very serious provocation perhaps greater than that required to justify invasion: In 2ddition, even if consistent with US values on "just" international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could under 1 take such operations without ha our role discovered and re sulting in serious international liabilities _ Finally, even if "'Squa Danc e' were succe S sfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid and control would be increz sed_ As you are aware Bill Smith participated in this study, though I under stand he did not subscribe to all of its contents_ I recommend, howe ve f , that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration of "Square Dance" at this stage. Then if the Coordina Conimittee and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals, we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment_ Rcss R C. BOWMAN AF6 TOP SECR ET SENSITIVE 0 py Lyndon B. Joh nson Library H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 145 "Squar for ting ving r e ting 4~ ================================================== Page 146 ================================================== ToP S( ZRET INFORMATIC COVER SHEET COPY NO_ CGATkOl #UhheR.5) Ded !OPURUCS 2304 Cfnicz or TmE SecRetart 0f :efense ToP SECRET inforhaTion COVER ShEET The 0 { tached TOP SECRET in forr8 on conto in: do * 0 E he 8 € €ur ; y 0$ pec 0 { v hich pAramoun {c 1M1M ho, 2 ed dt sc |03ur < 0 f mhich ou !d c 0 U$ EXCEPTIONAL GRAVF DANGER To THE NXTION Spec i 0 [ c { r + in he he na in& CU$ Y od toraRe 0 f hc tnched :nforma on nu? bc x€tc ised in ccordoncc th the secur i ty r eru[0 t icns Tni; c Ov ~ he # 8 Nor A RECEIPT bu rec0r d pe ons who heve or " ny P8 0 F the document ( $ ) idcn {t4d oy nimb hov < 2ach Pe 0n r @ C € ine t he t f hed TOP SECRET informa i on s he $ &n nd {i V in the informa on 27"1 r ~4 JF 8'n oate REHARas #A4 Aecei:{d Rf !E4$ E 0 (Iodic?f 0 Po r { 0 # # nd docum0m ( > 0 4 ) S PECILL INSTRUCTIONS Destruction of tnid sheet il author zed one year ffom date of destructiorl Of the hocument aitached hereto So fGrh 9 4 Fieviels EDncy; Cf Tr/s F3RM Ar2 C8SolET_ (When 0{{9chmen } 0F € cmovad Wnc :m#i {i64) To? SECRET INFORMATION 66 4 5 9 9 3 COVER SHEET Copy Lyndon B. Johnson Library H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 146 00 cod 2 | (0i, ================================================== Page 147 ================================================== '1ow SECRE" TOP SECRET SENSITIVE COFY NO 2 JCS 2304/244-1 DISTRTBUTION G 30 October 1964 Pages_ 2 8 , incl_ REPORT BY TE J-5 to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFR on SQUARE DANCE_(U) Reference : JCS 2304/244 DECISION 1 At their meeting on 6 November 1964 , aftez making amendnents 9 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recor- mendations in paragraph 12 of this report 2. This Decision replaces pase 2_ Holders are requested to substitute the additional revised page 7 , 2nd revised Wkite pages 3 and 5, incorporating the anendments , end to destroy the superseded pages in accordance kith security resuletions 3_ The memorandum in the Enclcsure 3 tcgether Witn its Appendices 4; B, and C , Vas fortarded as JCSM-942-64_ dated: 9 Novenber to the Secretary of Defense _ 4 In that the Cormandant had expressed direct concern Of tne Marine Corps in this matter, tne provisions of Title 10 , US Ccde 141 (c)_applied and Were followed_ DISTRTBUTION > J:cer Gen _ Wheeler Cen_ Burchinal (D/JS #1 Gen Johnson {CSaCS) Gen _ Manhart (vp/Js) Gw : Adm . McDonald (cNo) Adm Davis DD/ Js ) C3 # G# 2 Cen LeMay CSAF Adm . Mustin J-3) 3 Gen _ Greene (CNC Gen Emrick (J-5 Gen Palner (DCs OPS Gen Anthis_ L3:C3 Gepy: Lindew Jelan :QE { C MW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 147 1964_ { ================================================== Page 148 ================================================== 4'o12 SECRET TOP SECRET SENSITIVE SQUARE DANCE (U) THE PROBLEM 1 To respond to a memorandum* by.the Caief of Staff, 1 TS Army = 3 tc consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of 2 Staff recomrerd to the President that the United States 3 covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry_ 4 FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2. On 21 March 1964_ 3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff in, responding**5 to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba , stated that the President would be advised of any new and promieing courses of action which could possibly bring preseure upon the Cuban regime G 3- On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff_ 3 US Army_ ) 1C a memorandum* J to the Joint Chiefe of Staff' forwarding. & 11 study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime 12 by covertly attacking the Cuban sugar industry_ The Chief 13 of Staff_ J US Army 22 coinended chat the Joint Staff acconplish 14 ioceragency cojrciarioi] Oi) the stildy proposals; and that 15 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it 16 by memorendum to the President 9 informing him that the Joint 17 Chiefa of Staff support the conclusions and recommendaticns 18 of the study and consider that the outline program therein 19 provides an adequate framework for the development of detailed 20 supporting programs and plans for participating agencies _ 21 4_ On 2 October 1964 the Operationg Deputies coneidered 22 the recommendations of the Chief of Staff_ ; US Army , and &greed 23 to refer the matter to the: Joint Staff for the preparation 24 of 2 report_ 25 Attachment to JCs72304/244 X Enclosure to JCS 2304/218-3 Copy Lyndom B. Joh nson Library "TOP SECRZT SENSITIVE J-5 2304/24471 Tox SXCRET' H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 148 sent ================================================== Page 149 ================================================== "ol SIE CRET TOP SECRET SENSITTVE 5_ On 5 October 1964 the Joint Chiefs of Staff Tvere presented with 3 briefing on the study &nd discussed sone 2 of the igsues of the proposed actions 3 DISCTSSION 6 . For discussion, see Appendix A CONCLUSIONS 7 _ The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe: that the 5 ultimate US objective toward Cuba be to establish a government in Cuba that is 2cceptable to the United States _ The . proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and 9 merits consideration by other appropriate governmental 10 egencies 23 another option, in concert with other actions, 11 for causing the . collapse of the Castro regime 12 9 . The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are 13 possible political consequences which could result from proof of US involvement in a program such 3s that proposed. 15 10_ The Interdepartmental Coordinating Coimittee for 16 Cuban Affairs i5 the proper agency to accomplish the inter- 17 agency coordination _ 18 11 The study should be forwarded to the Secretary of 19 Defense for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating 20 Cormittee for Cuban Affairs for comment and recomendation 21 preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint 22 Chiefs of Stafi 23 RECOMENDATIONS 12_ It is recomended that : 24 a_ The nenorandu in the Enclosure J together with its 25 Appendices A, B, and C , which reflects the above conclu- 26 sions be forivarded to the_Secretary: of Defense 2 Gopy: Lyndon_ B. Joh nson Library TOP SECRET SENSITIVE JCS 2304/244-1 TOP SKCRET H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 149 must 14 ================================================== Page 150 ================================================== "O1 SECRET TOP SECRET SENSITIVE b This paper NOT be forwarded t? the: commanders of 1 unified or specified commands 2 C This paper NOT be forwarded ta US officers 2ssigned 3 4 to NATO &ctivities _ d _ This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman , US 5 Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee _ Action Officer : Captain J 0 Sherman_ 9 USN J-5, Eztension 78926 . Cepy Lyndon B. Johnson Library TOP SECRET SENSITIVE JCS 2304/244-1 ToP SECRET H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 150 ================================================== Page 151 ================================================== Tx SECRET TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ENCLOSURE DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject Cuban Actions (U) On 21 March 1964 _ 9 the Joint Chiefs of Staff , in respond _ to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cubz , stated that the President would be advised of any new and promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure upon the Castro regime 2 . The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed 3 review 0i a study which examines world sugar economics and the vulner_ ebilities of Cuba 8 sugar industry. The study proposes an outline program which would undermine Castro 8 economy , deprive him of convertible currency , and cause political instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba 8 sugar industry coupled Iith US stabilization actions on the world sugar market Basically, the proposal envisions 2 three - to six-year program, beginning Tvith a 30 per cent reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by introducing 2erially from off-shore 9 a sugar cane plant paresite Bunga Subsequently, the economic and political digturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and exploited by such measures 38 spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among dreft animals controllihg rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields 9 burning cane 1 and direct other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and trensportation systems GROUP. 1 EICLUDED_ AUTOMATIC DOMLGDADC EfkD DOCLTISIFICATIO: Lyndon B:"' Joh nson Library TOP SECRET SENSITIVE JCS 2304/244-1 Enclosure MW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 151 ToP SECErE 1ng ing ================================================== Page 152 ================================================== T' €2 SECREZT TOP SZCRET SENSITIVE 3 The Joint Chiefz 0f Staff continue to' believz that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba iust be to establigh a governent in Cuba that 19 acceptable to the United states The concept 0f attacking the Cuban sugar indus by covert means wou ld furnish another option to the United Statee in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regine 4 Although the Joint Chief: of Staff recognize the possible political consequences from proof of the US involve Ient in sucn 3 program , they believe that proposals related to the expansion 0f US influence over xhe world sugar market , the stabilization of the free market, ard the covert intro duction of Bunga into Cuba _ 2 merit serious consideration Other forrg of attack propozed in the study mizht 12 talen subzequently to exploit resul economic and political turbulence _ Additicnal discussion i9 provided in Appendix A hereto 5 _ It 13 reconmended that the attached drafi nemorandura (Appendix B) ana study (Appendix C) be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affaizg fof appropriate interagency coordination and commnent as a basiz for consideration of further recommeindation py the Joint Chiefs of Staff Copy Lyndon B Joh nson Library TOP SECREZ SENSITITE Enclogure JCS 2304/244-1 (Revised by Decision 9. Novecoer 1954) 4 Qi SECRE H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 152 try ting ================================================== Page 153 ================================================== Top SECRET TOPSECRET APPENDICES A, B , AND C (6 pages) Copy: TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Lyndon B: ` Joh nSOn Library JCS 2304/244-1 Appendices A, B, 2nd C TOP SECREi: MW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 153 ================================================== Page 154 ================================================== To? SECRE ToP SECRET SENSITTVE APPENDIX A CONSIDZRATIONS OF 4 PROPOSAL TO ATTACK COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUCAR INDUSTRY 1 The ultimate success of the proposed program Tould 1 depenc , in part 3 upon the effectiveness of the economlc controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices _ 3 Ic Tvould serve no purpose to reduce Cuba' s total annual 4 procuction of sugar 'if a subsequent_ rise in the price of sugar could net the Castro regine the same amount of 5 convertible currency as it had before the program wa3 undertaken The argunents and rationale in favor of the 8 economic proposals in the study appear to have validity. 9 However , world economic s 13 a most complex subject and 10 involves many variable factors_ The important points on 11 econonic controls should be coordinated with appropriate 12 agenc ies in the governent ha- responsibility for such 13 matters _ 14 2 Assuming that success of the 2ctions of the outline 15 progrzm can be achieved , it must be acknowledged that this 16 would nct assure the downfall of the Castro Government 9 01 17 that if it did fall, a government friendly to the United 18 States Tould be installed_ Russia has too much at stake 3 19 polltically, to alloj an overthrow of a communist regime 20 for econonic reasons alone_ Success of the proposed actions 21 would_ 2 however , create serious difficulties for the Castro 22 Government and would be an additional means of exerting 23 pressure 2gainst that goverrment 24 copy Lyndon B.. Johnson Library TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Appendix A 20? &ECKE H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 154 ving ================================================== Page 155 ================================================== T0? SE81e 1" TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 3 _ There are disadvantages to the program proposed by 1 the study_ The approval for implementation of such 2 2 concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war 3 methods and Tould require a major change in national 4 policy _ There 18 the possibility of retaliation irl the event of discovery _ There is also an obvious political 5 risk associated with this proposal Should any credible evidence of US involvement ever be obtained_ 9 the political 8 1038 to the United States would be great _ Quite apart 9 from the propaganda impact of such discovery , the influence 10 of the United States in international organizations such 11 as the United Nations and the Organization of American 12 States Iould be impaired seriously_ 13 4 __ Nevertheless ; it 18 the responsibility of the Joint 14 Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the 15 President apprised of the capapilities of the military 16 establishment The subject study presents measures which 17 should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after 18 coordination with appropriate government agencies it would 19 represent another option for positive actions against the 20 Castro regime _ 21 5 NSAM 213* dated January 1963 , established 3 22 comittee to coordinate the management of all aspects 23 of US policy toward Cuba The President looks to the 24 Interdepartmental Coordinat Committee for Cuban Affairs 25 for the effective coordination 0f the execution of policy 26 decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses 27 of' action _ The subject study should be referred to this 28 committee for the necessary coordination preliminery to 29 reporting to the President 30 Copy Enc losure to JCS 2304/12jdon B Johnson Library TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Appendix A MW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 155 "n GEFn7 ing ================================================== Page 156 ================================================== J" ZCR8T TO? SSCRET SEVSITITE 6 , The Joint Chiefs of Staf'f heve a rezponsibili-y to 1 prcvide military 2dvica io th1e Ccrronder in Gief 2nd the Secretary 0f Defense _ It 18 appropriate, therefore , that : a ntter such as the propczals under consideration, 1c sent to the Secretary Cf Defense with the recommendatjon that the stucy b2 forwarded to che Interdepartmental 6 Cocrdinating Cciaittee fof coordination and coizent 23 & bzz1e fo17 coneideration of furtrer reconmerdations by tia 8 Joint Chiefs 0f 8t2ff_ 9 Lyndon B. Johnson Li brary TC? SECRET SENSITIVE Appendi: A (Revisea bJ Decizioi 9 Novenabe 2 1954) 702 820852 H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 156 K0 Copy ================================================== Page 157 ================================================== T'0w SE(RZT TOP SECRET SENSITTIVE APPENDIX B DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATINC COMMITTEE FOR CTUBAN AFFAIRS Subject : Cuban Actions (U) 1 On 21 March 1964 _ 2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Presicent that would continue to revien the probler_ of putting additional pressures on Castro and thai the 3 President Jould be advised if any new and promising courses of action were uncovered ; 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on the feasibility of uncermining the Castro regime by attack- 7 ing the Cubn sugar industry_ The study examines the Torld 8 sugar market and the vulnerabilities of Cuba ' s sugar industry , 9 and proposes a phased interagency program Which would: 10 2 Initially reduce Cuban suger production by 11 approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1966 12 production level 13 b Expand US influence in the world sugar market 14 by assignnent of quotas and other actions to insulate 15 the free market from the effects of' Cuban sugar losses _ 16 3 Apart from econoiic measures , the proposals made in 17 the study are Within existing or attainable military capa 18 bilities 'Several actions are proposed . among these 19 1s the introduction into Cuba of Bunga , a plant site 20 against sugar cane It appears feasible to introduce 21 gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a basis for plausibly 22 disavowing US involvement 23 GROU? 1' ECLUDED Goey AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING Lyndon Bzcijolmsowricibrary TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Appendix B H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 157 'wW 2%7 (79 74 they Key para ================================================== Page 158 ================================================== 7h3 R#crx TQP SZCRET SESIZIVE 4 Mindful 0i the rieks attending such actione, tha Joint 1 Chiefs of Staff have reviewed ihe proposals of the stuj &nd 2 believe thot thej offer an option for exert nel prezzures 3 against Castro_ They believe that propozalz relzied t0 the 44 expangion of US influence over che world sugar maricet_ 9 the 5 etabilization 01 the free market, and the covert introduction 6 . of Dunga into Cube, merit serious conzideration Cther forms 7 of attack proposed in the study might be %akren subzequently 8 to exploit resulting conomic and political turbulence 9 5 The study 18 forwarded nerewith with 3 request tnat 10 the concept and 2ctiona proposed in the outline pregram of 11 the study be coordinated by vour committee With other govern- 12 mental departments and agencies _ Upon completionl oi Jour 13 review end coordination, it is further requezted tnat your 14 comment < be made available to the Secretary of Defense 2nd 15 the Joint Chiefs 0f Staff_ 16 copy" TQP SECREI SENSTTIVE Lyndon B. Johnson KipraIy B (Revised o; Decisio? Move-ber 13854) Iew **1st H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 158 ing ================================================== Page 159 ================================================== Tor €ZCRE % TOP SECRET SENSITIVE APPENDIX C Report on SQUARE DANCE (U) See Attachment to JCS 2304/242 beginning on page 6 of the white attachment ) Lyndon B: Johnson Library TOP SECRET SENS ITIVE Appendix MW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 159 '2007 B12?7 Army Copy ================================================== Page 160 ================================================== Top SECRET TOPSECRET SENSITIVE COPY NO 5 Novenber 1964 DISTRIBUTION. G NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES to the HOLDERS OF JCS 2304/244-1 A Report by the J-5 on SQUARE_DANCE (u) FIRST CORRIGENDUM At the request of the ortginator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 7 , and destcroy the superseded page in accordance with security tions R C _ FORBES J : E: MANSFTELD Joint Secretariat UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachent TOP SECRET SENSITIVE lst Coorig to JCS. 23047244-1 Top SECRET H 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 160 regula ================================================== Page 161 ================================================== X - 0 - 2 ~h TOP SECRET SENSTIVE 21 July 1975 INvENTCRUEDE ON 313112 MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF 13C BY_ SUBJECT: Inspection of Clossified Documents at LBJ Library Re lated to Covert Aclions Against Cuba FROM: Loch Johnson Am 2ng the many docuents which I examined at the Johnson Library in Texas this week is one that I find perticularly alarming I wish 12 drawv it to your attention_ The document in question is from the JCS t? the Secretary of Defense dated 30 October 1964 The subject is a proposed covert action against Cuba with the code nanle SQUARE DANCE _ On 21 March the JCS responded to a, Presidential request for 2 new ideas re Lative Cuba by advising the White House that any new promis courses of action to undermine the Castro regime would be brought t? the President S attention Apparently their first bright new idea Tvas SQUARE DANCE outlined in the 30' October document (attached ) The proposal envisioned the destruction of the Cuban economy by intro- dueing aeria from off-shore a sugar cane plant parasite called Bunga 'TThe program would begin with a 30 per cent reduction of antici- pated Cuban sugar uction (see page 6) and within three-to-Six the ruination of the sugar industry would be achieved "The economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbaled and exploited continues the JCS mem? , such measures as spread_ hoof-end-euth disease gm2ng draft anima ls controlling rainfall by cloud seed mining canefie lds burning cane and direct - other acts conventional sabotage &gainst the cane milling transportation systems (6 cmphasis added ) _ In S Um , SQUA RE DANCE M would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about M the collapse of the Castro (7) In Appendix A of the SQUARE DANCE proposal the memno notes that the approva1 for implementation of the program "would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy_ Indeed it wou ld _or at; least one hopes we have not used such methods before : The proposal is nothing less than a variant of germ warfare which have had serious consequences for the civilian population At this point we do not know what happened to the SQUARE DANCE concept _ It may never have been implemented at a ].1 even partially _ (The covering mem? written by Bowman , an NSC: staffer to Bundy suggests that the White House was skeptical toward the idea . ) To me , though , 22 HF 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 161 Last 1964 to ing 1 Ly prod years "by ing ing and ing of' regime wou ld ================================================== Page 162 ================================================== the mere writing of this kind o[ proposal is 2 reprehensible first; toward the Iorst kind J[ forelgn policy mischief_ I find it even more repugnant than ingency plans for assassination_ These are not the kinds of recommendations which should filter up to the White House from the intelligence community _ The agencies must have a better sense of what is acceptable policy 3 legally and morally - As in the Huston Plan, the White House was confronted here with a series of illega] and un- ethical options 'Ihe result of SQUARE DANCE would have been parasitic death for the majjor plant and animal life in Cuba The Eeeble efforts' 2[ thc CIA to direct assassination attempts against Ca.stro pa le by comparison with this proposal for covert action I be lieve SCUARE DANCE deserves our attention_ If assassination is unacceptable surely t,oo is the widespread desbruction of plant and 2nimal life through covert germ warfare Somehow (probably through hearings and restrictive legis lation) the Congress must drive home the point that there are legal and moral 1imits to American foreign policy_ These limits may not be easy to define , but we must Note: On the third page of the second attachment (a "Memorandun for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba" written by Bundy) reference M1 is made to possible addition of con taminating elements to sensitive 18 Cuban imports (not food ) The cover memo from Gordon Chase (NSc staffer) indicates that this proposal received Presidential backing _ ~v4 ##a%87 2 2 HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 162 siep cont;_ Army try. ================================================== Page 163 ================================================== T> C-J_ ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS : Castro NNewspaper accounts report that prior to the April 17, 1961 of Pigs invasion the CIA either directly ough or thr/ Robert Maheu inlisted the aid of Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli in organizing assassination attempts against Castro . The first attempt on Castro' s life was on or about 3/13/61 The first attempt used poison and it was hoped that with Castro dead,the invasion planned and executed 3/17/61 would have a greater chance for success There were five more attempt s made on Castro' s life after 3/17/61 _ The last was in late February or early March of 1963 = Allegations from Newspaper sources ) 1 ) The CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu enlisted Sam Giancana who enlisted Johnny Roselli to or organize an assassination team directed at Fidel Castro. 2 ) Johnny Roselli headed several missions against through Castro from late March or April 1961 late February or March 1963 . 3 ) That RFK learned of this CIA-Mafia plan and aborted it . es 4 ) Roselli recefved poison capsul/ fron the CfA which he gave to Cubans assigned the task of poisoning Castro HI 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 163 Bay ================================================== Page 164 ================================================== (2 ) [4 , con't . ] before the of Pigs _ One of the Cubans was related to one of Castro' s cooks = 5 ) The assassination was intended to take place before invasion the planned Bay of Pigs/ in order to insure that CIA operation' s success 6 ) The CIA has extended services to Giancana which inc luded a break-in of Comedian Dan Rowan S Las Vegas apartment _ 7 ) Roselli worked under the direct supervision of CIA agents William Harvey and James 0 ' Connell 8 ) Individuals allegedly involved directly or indirectly with Cuban Refugees: 1 Roselli 2 _ Maheu Hunt 33 Liddy 5 Giancana James 0 ' Connel 7 William Harvey Questions 1) Who was CoS of JMV wave in Miami from 1960-1963? 2 ) Was there any positive effort among Cuban nationals to deternine if there were any Castro intelligence agent information? H# 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 164 Bay ================================================== Page 165 ================================================== (3) 3) Did any contacts or agents within the Cuban refugees ever speak of or sequest an attempt to be made on Castro' s life? If how was the situation handled? 4 In preparation for the Bay of Pigs was the assassination or neutralization of Castro seen as a desirable and positive step towards the success of the invasion? 5) Were any private raids against Cuba conducted by Cuban nationals ? Was the CIA aware passively or were such matters made known to the agency by the Cuban nationals in advance? 7 ) Did the CIA clear such actions ? 8 ) Was the CIA aware of Roselli' s actions ? 9 ) Did the CIA through whatever means enlist the aid of Johnny Roselli? 10 ) At any time has the CIA been associated with Sam Giancana? MM 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 165 S0 ,

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