Transcript of 157-10014-10137.pdf
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[157-10014-10137/ 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JrTC 7rotottiattum Dysttnt tate ; 7z013
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER 157-10014-10137
RECORD SERIES MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-43
Document Information
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM:
TO
TTTLE : DRAFT REPORT
DATE : 09/08/1975
PAGES : 207
SUBJECTS
SSCSGO, REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION Declassified
RESTRICTIONS IB; IC
CURRENT STATUS Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/05/2000
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS CCBOX 349
v9.|
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Date 08 /07/95
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER 157-10014-10137
RECORDS SERIES MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUHBER 07-M-43
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR SSCIA
FROM
TO
TITLE DRAFT REPORT
DATE 09/08/75
PAGES 207
SUBJECTS SSCSGO , REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE REPORT
CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS CCBOX 349
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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(Draft--9/8/75)
344
The 'Executive Action Capability
Along with the question of authorization for actual assas
sination attempts _ the Committee considered the extent and nature
of authorization for a CIA project which included as one element ,
the development of an assassination capability
(a) Introduction
Sometime in early 1961 , Richard Bissell (Deputy Director
of Plans) instructed [illiam Harvey , who was at that time the
Chief of one of CIA ' s Foreign Intelligence staffs to establish
an "executive action capability" which included research into a
capability to assassinate 'Eoreign leaders (Bissell 6/9/75 _ P_ 51;
Harvey: 6/25/75
PP . 36-37 . ) At some time within the same period
Bissell and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs) had a conversation' about the matter
Bissell Harvey and Helms all agreed that the {1 'generalized"
capability was never used" (Bissell 6/9/75 _ P_ Harvey 6/25/75
P_ 45 ; Helms 6/13/75 , P 52)
0 Executive action" is a CIA euphemism, defined by the
tes timony before the Committee a9 a project for research into
developing means. for 'overthrowing foreign political leaders includ-
ing a "capability to perform assassinations (Harvey 6/25/75 ,
2 3k.) Bissell indicated that executive action covered a "wide
spectrum of actions 01 to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign
leaders with assassination as the most extreme 01 action on the
spectrum (Bissell , 7/22/75 ; P 32) The Inspector General' s Report
c
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described executive action as a general S
tand-by capability to
carry out. assassination when required (I. G. P _ 37) . The project
was given the code nane ZR/ RIFLE by the CIA_ *
A single agent ("asset") given the cryptonym QJ / WIN
was
placed under Harvey 8 supervision for the ZR/ RIFLE project ,
but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts_
Richard Helns described. QJ/WIN S "capability"
"IE you needed somebody to carry out murder _ I guess you
had a Inan who might be prepared to carry it out 6} (Helms
6/13/75 P: 53)
Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN however to spot "individuals
with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible
TI multi Purpose use (Harvey _ 6/25/75 P_ 50) For example QJ/WIN
reported that a potential asset: in the Middle East was {1 the leader
of a gambling syndicate" 11 with an available pool of assas8ins" TT
(CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches)
However Harvey testified that
I1 'during the entire existence of the entire ZRRIFLE project
no agent was recruited for the Purpose of assassina-
tion and no even tentative targeting or target list was
ever drawn. (Harvey , 6/25/75 P_ 45.)
Project ZR/RIFLE involved , generally assessing the
problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-
X ZR/ RIFLE was a
cryptonym relating
to two Programs One was
the executive action assassination capability The other was
another program which is not part of the subject matter of this
report: (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section
with general responsibility for such Programs This second
Program was genuine but it was also to provide a-cover for: any
executive action operation (Harvey , 6/25/75 , P. 49 .)
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by assassination capability; more specifically , it involved
spotting potential agents and "researching" assassination
techniques that might be used (Bissell
}
7/17/75 _
P_ 11 and 6/9/75 ,
P _ 73 ; Harvey, 6/25/75 , PP 37-A 45) Bissell characterized
Project ZR RIFLE as "internal and Purely Preparatory" (Bissell
7/22/75 P. 32) The I G _ Report of 1967 found 7_ no indication
in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/ RIFLE
QJ / WIN was ever used" but said that "after' Harvey took over the
Castro operation he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE"' (I G
PP . 40-41.) *
(b) The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization
or Knowledge of the Executive Action Prolect
There is general agreement on one fact: at some point in
early 1961 Bis sell discussed the executive action capability with
Bundy . The timing of that conversation .and whether 6t the White
House urged thac a capability be created were matters on which
the evidence varied widely _
Harvey testified that Bis sell had told hhim that 01 the
White House"-had twice urged the creation of such a capability
and the Inspector General' s Report quoted notes of Harvey S (no
longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any
specific conversation with the House" However his initial
tes timony assumed the correctness of Harvey s notes; and stated
A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related _to the actuar
assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d) ,
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that while he could have created che capability 0n his own any
urgings would have come fron ' Bundy or Walt Rostow In a later
appearance however Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of
the capability .and that the context was a
briefing by him and
not urging by Bundy _ Bundy said he received a briefing and
gave no urging , though he raised: no objections Rostow said he
never heard of the project _
1| William Harvey testified that he was almost certain
that on January 25 and 26 , 1961_ he met. with CLA officials Sidney
Gottlieb the new Chief of CIA ' s Technical Services Division and
Arnold Silver a CIA recruiting officer , to discuss the feasibility
of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive
(Harvey , '6/25/75 , P_ 5,2) After reviewing his notes of those
meetings , Harvey testified that they took place after his initial
X As Lo the date of chese notes Harvey was asked whether his no-
tations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-4S" indicate that he spoke to 'Sidney
Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961 as opposed to 1962 Harvey testi-
fied as follows :
Q: And: is' it your judgment that that is January 26 1961 and
is about the subject of Executive Action?
Harvey : Yes , it is
Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr Bissell that
you have recounted?
Harvey: [WJell when I first looked at this . [ chought
this well this has got to be 62 _ but I am almost certain
nOW that it i5 not If this is true this might place the
firs discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early
January and this i8 difficult Lo pinpoint because there were
several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during
the 'Period in the spring and very eariy in 61 to che fall
of 61 Period but I did find out fairly early
on that Silver
0
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discussion of executive action with Bissell which he said
M might have transpired in early January" (Harvey 6/25/75 , p
52) . When Bissell was shown these notes he ` agreed with Harvey
about the 'timing of their initial discussion (Bissell 7/17/75 _
P. 10)
had ~ ~ or chat Bissell had discussed the question of assassi-
nation with Arnold Silver and this discussion . at the very
least had to Eake place after I know Bissell &lready had
discussed the matter with Silver (Harvey ,. 6/25/75 _ P 52)
Harvey had als0 testified that, after receiving Bissell ' s initial in-
structions to establish an executive action capabili
the first thing I did was discuss in theoretical,
terms with 3 few officers whon I trusted quite implicitly
the whole subject. of assassination our possible assets ;
our posture going back if you Wiil
even to the funda-
mental questions of 1 is assassination J proper weapon
of an Anerican intelligence service , and B even: if you
assune that it is is it within our
capability within
the framework of Lhis government to do it effectively
and Properly securely and discreetly . (Harvey , 6/25/75 ,
PP 37-4
38)
The Inspector General ' s Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the
early stages of the executive action Project as follows
Harvey says thac: Bissell had already discussed certain
aspects of the problem' with Arnold' Silver and wich Sidrey
Gottlieb Since Silver was already
cut in arvey .used
him in develcping the Executive Action Capability
Harvey S mention of him [Gottlieb ] in this connection
may explain 1 notation by Dr Gunn' that Harvey instructed
Gunn co discuss techniques with Gottlieb Without associa
ting the discussion with the Castro operation (I.G.
Report, Pp 37-38)
It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turn-
over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed
as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d) inEza) Thus their initial discussion of executive action can at che ieast, be
dated before
November 1961 and the "25/1" and
"26/1"
notations would have Lo refer co' January1961
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16 Harvey testified that the executive action"' capability-
was intended to include assassinations (Harvey , 6/25/75 ,_ P 35) .
His cryptic handwwritten. notes of the January 25/26 mee tings , pre -
served at the CIA contain phrases which suggest a discussion of
assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation ; "last
resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness 11 "the
magic button" and "never mention word assassination (Harvey ,
Ex _ 1,` 6/25/75)
The Inspector General S Report did not mention these
notes or their dates _ However in describing Richard Bissell' :
initial assignment of the 1 executive" action 11 project to Harvey ,
it referred to another set of Harvey S notes which were destroyed
after the preparation of the Report _ The excerpt from these notes
quoted Bissell as saying: to Harvey , "The White
House had twice
urged me to create such a capability (I_ G : P 37) Harvey .also'
testified that this "urging" TI was mentioned in his initial dis-
cussion of "executive action" with Bissell (Harvey _ 6/25/75 P 37)
However the tes timony from Bissell and White House aides in the
Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey' $
testimony a5 to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to
Bissell_
% Harvey ' s notes also contained a phrase which suggests his con-
cern what any U.S _ assassination attempts might breed retaliation
from other governments: "dangers of RIS (Russian,Intelligence
Service) counter-action and monitor if are: blamed (Harvey,
Ex_ 1 , 6/25/75 ; Bissell;, Ex 1 , 7/17/75)
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The Eollowing tes timony regarding the relationship
1! between the White House and the executive action capability
was obtained by the Committee :
Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indica-
ted that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop
an execu-
tive action capability (Harvey , 6/25/75 ,
P 37) Harvey said that
he particularly remember[ed]" that Bis sell said that he received
6i more than one urging Eron the White House (Ilarvey , '6/25/75 _
PP
36-37 ; 7/11/75 , P . . 59). However he had n0 direct 'evidence
chat Bissell actually had any such discussion wich the White House
No speciEic individual in che Wnite House was named to Hiarvey
(Harvey , 6/25/75 , P 31) Moreover he 'sid that it would have been
66 "improperF for him to have asked Bissell Who he had talked to and
'grossly improper for Bissell to have volunteered that nane
(Harvey , 6/25/75 , P 37)
Bisgcll: Bissell cpecizically -ecalled 485igning!Hirey
to investigate the capability (Bissell , 6/9/75 ,` P. 51) However
Bissell did not recall 0 a specific conversation with anybody in
the White 'House: as the origin 4} of his instruction to Harvey (Bissell
6/9/75 ,
P 51)
During. the course of several appearances before the
Committee Bissell' : testimony varied as to whether or not he had
been urged by Fhe White House to develop an executive action
capability_
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In his initial appearances before the Commitcee 0i1 June 9 and
11 1975 _ Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White
House authorization had been given_ In response Lo the 1 [ twice
quotation of larvey S notes in the Inspector General' s Report
Bissell said , "I have no reason to believe that larvey S quoce is
wrong _ (Bissell , 6/9/75 P . 51) Bissell accordingly said in his
initial' testimony that as far as he knew it was crue that he was
asked by the White Ilouse to create a general stand-by _ assassination
capability. (Bissell , 6/9/75 , P _ 49)
Based again upon larvey 1 5 missing noces ("White Hlouse urging" )
and his initial statement that he had no reason Co challenge their
accuracy , Bissell initially gave the opinion that McCeorge Bundy
6/9/.75 _ p . 49) ; Special Assistant to President Kennedy for
National Security AEfairs_ and Walt Rostow (Id_' P. 51) Depicy
Assistant to President. Kennedy during 1961 _
were the two people from
whom such a request was most likely
to have come (Id. P :' 53): because
I were the Cwo member s of. the White House staff who were 'closest
to CIA operations (Id _ P 54) :
Ac another point in his initial ces timony , Bissell, said chat
the creation of the capability 16_ 'may have been initiated withini the
Agency (Id. , P = 81) And still later he said: 10 there is lictle
doubt in my mind: that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and
possibly Bundy" (Bissell , '6/11/75 ,
P 46)
When Bissell returned to the. Committee on July 17 and 22 _ his
testimony, given in light of information gained s ince his earlier
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(Id ,
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appearances was that there was n0 Vhite llouse urging. for the creation
of the executive action project_ although tacit approval for the
"research" project was probably given by Bundy :Eter ic was esLablished
First, he was shown the llarvey notes which had been" preserved
and which without any mention of che White llouse _ indicated llarvey
had received his assignment prior
to January 25/26 1961 . Those
dates just 5 after the change of administration made
Bissell conclude that it was M _ 'very unlikely that that &ssignent
to [Harvey] was taken as a result of White Ilouse urging or consul
tation (Bissell 7/17/75 ,
P . 10) Bissell said that Bundy: did
not have any influence
on the performance of his' Agency ducies before
the Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75 ,
P _ 23) Bissell'
added thal he did not remember meeting 'with
anyone in the new ad-
ministration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell 7/22/75 _
P : . 23)
Second when he returned in Bissell also said he was con-
vinced by telephone conversations with Ros tow and Bundy that based
upon Rostow S duties_ which, in 1961 had no thing to do with
covert action
7 he "riever discussed" executive action with Ros tow
(Bissell, 7/17/75 , P 10; 7/27/75 , P;` 22)
As for Bissell ' s . final testimony (after telephone
con-
tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed
about tle capability after it had been' created (Bissell 7/17/75 _
PP 10-11; 7/22/75 _
PP .
21-22) But Bissell confirmed
his original
tes (6/9/.15 _
PP that he did not brief Bundy
On the
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July,
Bundy ;
Bundy
timony
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actual a8sassination plots against Castro already undertaker by che
CIA (Bissell, 6 /11/75 = p 47 ; ,7/22/75 _
P . 31) Bissell Was "quite
certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the
executive action capability
to the President . (Bissell, 7/22/75 _
P 35) . Bissell testified:
Q Would you think the development of 2
capability.
to
kill Eoreign leaders was a matter of sufficient impor
tance to bring to the attention of the President?
Bissell In that context and at that time and given the
limited' scope of activities within that project , I would
T1 not (Bissell 7/22/75 ,
P _ 35)
Bissell said Lhat he and Bundy . spoke about an untargeted
"capability" rather than the plan or approval for an assassination
operation (Bissell_ 7/17/75, P . 11) Bissell said that although
he does not have a specific recollection he "might have" mncncioned
Castro Lumumba and Trujillo in the course of 3 discussion' of
executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at
that moment in history: against whom such a capability might' Possibly
have been employed _ (Bissell_ 6/11/15 _ Pp 50-51)
Bissell said his impression was that 'Bundy , in addition to ex-
pressing no unfavorable reaction to tle Project, might have accually
given
3 more affirmative reaction (Bissell 7/22/75 ,
PP . 25, 28)
Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy S reaction
Js approval for the executive action' concept (Bissell _ 7/22/75 ,
P 30)
I think the testimony of this witness i5 foing
further in saying what received from' (Bundy) was in your view tantamount approval?
Bissell: I at least _ interpreted it as you can call
it approval or you could say no objection He (Bundy)
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Was briefed on some ching that Was being done
aS I nOlv
believe ori the initiative of the. Agency Iis (Bundy ' s)
comment is that he made no objection to it _ I suspect_
that his reaction Was somewhat more favorable than that_
but this is a matter that probably s Omneone listening Lo
the conversation on which such a person could have had
Jiffering interpretations (Bissell 7/22/75 _
P 33)
Bissell's testinony on any conversation with Bundy regarding;
executive action was. speculative reconstruction from first appearance
to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell
7/22/75 ;
'PP . 29 36) But Bissell naintained that more "formal and
specific' and explicit
approval would have been required" before
any
"actual overt steps in use of the capability (Bissell , 7/22/75
P _ 31)
Bissell said that llarvey S notation about White Ilouse urgings
to develop
an executive action capability may have been a
slighcly
confused account of a conversation subsequent Eo the initiation of"
the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy
5 reaction to llarvey
(Bissell 7/22/75 ,
P . 25)
Bissell testified that the development of an executive action
capability
was "undoubcedly" initiated-within the Agency (Bissell
7/22/75 _ P 22) He had acknowledged
on his first of tes timony
that this would not have been 'unusual:
it wJs the normal practice in the: Agency and 3I} impor-
tant part of its mission to create various kinds of capabilicy before there was any reason Lo be certain whether those would be used or where or how or for wlat
purpose _ The whole ongoing job of 2 secret intelli
~ gence service of recruiting agents is of that character
So it would not be particularly surprising to le if the
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decision Lo creale this capability had been taken
without an outside request (Bissell_ 6/9/75 PP 67-68)
Bundz: McGeorge Bundy als0 testified that he had a conversation
with Bissell , during which the executive action capability was dis-
cussed (Bundy , PP 4-5) Bundy S testimony conports wich
Bissell ' s on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted eapability ,
rather than an assa8sination: operation (Bundy , PP _ 4-5) But Bundy
said chat the capability included "killing che individual" (Bundy
0I 1 { P _ 5) 4 Bundy S impression was that the CIA was testing my reaction
not 41 seeking au thority" (Bundy ; P , ` 15) Bundy sunmarized his testi-
mony saying
I amn sure I {ave n0 instruction But it is only Eair to
add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment
either (Bundy , P . 10)
Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the
development of
the executive action capability or 1 pursue the matter at
4l1" (Bundy
P 19) because he was satisfied
chat this was not an operational activi and would not
become such Without two conditions First; that there
be a desire or_a request or a
guidance that there: should
be planning against some specific individual; and second
that there should be a decision to move against che indi-
vidual (Bundy , P . 7)
For example Bissell testified that on his own initiative he
had requested a CIA officer to 60 to the to T; 'make plans and develqp the -capability for an assassination attempt agins Lumnumba ;
if ordered (Bissell 6/11/75_
2
P . 55)
X Bundy &lso testified that he .had a vague recollection of hearing
about poison in relation to Cuba but he did not connect this to the
conversation about executive action (See footnote , P. 6 , Keniedy
Pre-Bay oE. section Sypra )
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Bundy testified: that he believed that neicher of chese conditions had
been fulfilled (Bundy , P . 7) _
Bundy recalled the conversation as
taking place T1 sometime in the
early nonths oF 1961." (Bundy , P _ 4) . When questioned about the;
dates in Harvey S notes Bundy rated the chance that the conversation
about executive_ action took place before January 25 when' larvey
was
already discussing the project at the CIA Pursuant to Bissell' s
directive as zero" because the new
Administralion had been
in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other
problems including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing che National
Security staff (Bundy , P. 9) .
testified that he did not
brief the President on the
executive action project :
Chairman ; And you have testified that you did not cake
the matter to the President?
Bundy As far a5 I can recall Mr Chairman
(Bundy ,
P : 16)
Bundy explained that_ the division of respons ibilily for national
security affairs excluded Rostow Erom jurisdiction
over covert opera-
tions making it unlikely that Rostow would be briefed on a project`
like ZRRIFLE (Bundy , P Rostow P . 11)
Rostow Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" that
during his ertire tenure in government , he never heard J reference
to executive action or 16 such a capability
or such an intention to
act by the U.S . 16 (Rostow PP . 10 , 13)
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Bundy
11;
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Goodpaster_ and_Gray The responsibility for national security
affairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration was
borne Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon However , there was no
evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the
development of an executive action capability_ Both Coodpaster and
Gray testified to
having
no
knowledge of it_ (Goodpaster
P _ 11;
Gray , P: 56 . )
(c) Authorization 'or Rnowledge of Executive Action_Project
BYDCI
Richard Bissell 'said he was 10 chite certain" that Allen
Dulles had Eull knowledge of the executive_ action project for two
98 } reasons first it wouldl have come to the DCI 5 attention" at che
time of the transfer oE .William Harvey between components of the
Agency to work on Cuban operations ; * and second . Bissell 1,6. would
imagine 0 it was mentioned Lo Dulles at the initiation of the project
(Bissell , 7/22/75 ,` P . 35) Bissell and ` llarvey briefed Richard lelms
on Project ZRRIFLE when he becane DDP (Bissell , 6/11/75 , P . 53 ; llarvey ,
7/11/75 , P.' 63) - But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone
about the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell , 7/17/75 _
P.
11) McCone testified that he had no
knowledge .of such a project
(McCone P . ` 43)
William Harvey said it was as sumed that the project was]
within the Paraueters permitted by the DCI But llarvey testified
that officially advising che DCI of the existence: 0f the prpject
X larvey S transfer to Cuban operations was not compleced until
late in 1961
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was we did
not cross
X
and would not there
was either crossed until specific targeting
or a specific recruitment_
specific
operation or a
(d)
6/25/75 ,
P 59)
The Question of
Lo Aczual
Vhether_Proiect_ZRRLELE
Assassin Eion Was_Connected
The Committee has
sought
to deterinine velopment' oE
an executive
whether the CLA de -
the
actual
accion capability was related
in assassination efforts _ any way to
inquiry
is whc
One question raised by
this ther the
par in the might: have perceived ass2ssinotion operations
the executive
legi
capability
as in some to the actual
way
(1)
assas8ination efforts
Conversation
Eween_Bisseli
and
In his
tes
a recollection
of
Bissell
said he did not have whether he discussed the
and Trujillo with names of.Castro_
Lumumba ,
anyone in the White
che project to
in the course
of
an executive
discuss
P
action capability (Bissell,
Bissell testified that
!6/11/75 ,
that I would
it was 1I 'perfectly
have
used examples
plausible
tinued :
(Bissell; 6/11/75,
P _ 51)
He con-
in such a
used the
chfecusames
of a capability ,
I the sorts of
names that I just
might well have
whom such a
individuals
at that
gave because these
were (Bissej}; capab might
moment in his-
against 6/11775 ,
P .51)
possibly have beeroepigyed?
Bissell and
their
both testified;
discussion
of the
that
t of the tion did not involve
capability
assa3sina -
mention of actual assassination
plans or
H# 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 17
03 bridge
have
(Ilarvey ,
Any
PTOts
ticipants
action
lending
timacy
Be
Bundy
early
timony ,
House
develop ing
51)
However
ility
tory
Bundy
however ,
developmen
for
any
5
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1
16 -
attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (1) supra) There
is no testimony to the contrary _ The account of this conversa-
tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in
withholding
from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts
against Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward_
Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security
affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information about
covert operations at the CIA
(ii) Bissell' s Instruction to Take OverResponsibility;
for Underworid Contact: November 1961
Both Bissell and Harvey recall a mee ting in November
1961 in which Harvey was instructed co take over the contact with
John Roselli (Bissell 6/11/75 PP _ 19 Harvey , 6/25/75 _ P 86 ;
and 6/11/75 _ P 19) --which had been used for the initial poison
plot
as part of Project ZR/RIFLE: Harvey' s notes placed the meeting
on Novenber 15 1961 (I.G.
9
Ps 39) during. the period in which Harvey
was freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take over
direction of Task Force W the locus 0f CIA activity againsE the
Castro regime_
According to Bissell and Harvey , the November meeting
involved only. the planning and research of a capability rather than
a targeted operation against Castro (Bissell , 7/17/15 _
P 13;
Harvey , 7/11775 _
P 60) _ But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose
of the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro and thac "it:
is 3 fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain
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17 _
it che contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivating
that operation" (Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 19) Bissell stated that
because the as8assination plot against Castro involving the syndicate
had been stood down after che of and there
Was no authorization to Pursue it actively the re-
sponsibility that was given co him [Harvey] was that of
caking over an inactive contact 1 (Bissell 7/17/75_ P: 14)
Bissell said that he had in effect , asked Iarvey to stand watch over
the contact in case any action should be required and further testi-
fied that it was never required
The Inspector General S Report stated: "After
Harvey took over che Castro operation , he ran it as one aspect
of ZRRIFLE (I.G _
1 ` P '40) Harvey recalled that during a dis -
cussion Ivith Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability ,
Bissell advised him of a then going: operation involving the' names
of Maheu and possibly Roselli and Giancana_ 'which was a part: of the
Agency s effort to develop
a capabilicy for executive action
(Harvey , 7/11/75 PP . 55 , 61) Harvey said that at the tine of
this discussion the operation had been Jt in train" for 16 approxi-
mately two years or perhaps 18 months (Warvey , 7/11/75, P . 54)
Although his "net impression 4 was that both the
"exploratory project" and the"specific operation 1 f were T6 'fully
authorized and approved" Harvey said he could not testify that
0 specific White Iouse authority for this given operation was implied
or stated' (Harvey 7/11/75 P: 54.) Bisscll does ncl recall
telling
anyone in the white House that some thing had been done to
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bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell
6/11/75 _ PP 19-20) Harvey did not recall any mention of the
White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November
meeting with Bissell (Harvey , 7/11/75 Pp 60-61)
Although Richard. Helms was
briefed and given
administrative responsibility (as DDP ) for Project ZR/ RIFLE three
months later he did not recall that: ZR/ RIFLE was ever contemplated
as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms
1
6/13/75 ,-
P 55)
Asked whether che actual assassination efforts against Castro were
related to ZR/ RIFLE (executive action) Helms testified: "'In my
mind those lines never crossed" (Helms 6/13/75 P 52) However
Bissell' s testimony leaves more ambiguity: the contact with the
syndicate which had Castro as ics target folded into the
ZR/ RIFLE project and they became (Bissell 6/11/75
P 47) . When isked by Senator Baker whether the executive action
1 { 11 "capability for assassination was used against Castro"
Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase" (Bissell 6/11/75
P_
47) _ The instruction from Bissell co Harvey on November 15
1961 however preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assas
ination operation against Castro by approximately. five months
(iii) Us e of Agent_QJWIN in_Africa
QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back -
ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive
programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project
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19
ZR/ RIFLE Harvey testified that QJ/WIN S function after the advent
of Project ZR/ RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting"' of:
1 I1 potential assets for multi-purpose covert use _
However in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was
assigned to create Project ZR/ RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent:
QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver , his
supervising CIA case officer in Europe _ William Harvey , as the
Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver: worked ,
had ordered QJ/WIN S mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147 _
0
11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission
afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey ,
1/11/61) [QJ/WIN S activities in the Congo are treated in detail
in the discussion of the Lumumba case ; see Section supra: ]
There are two factors which may raise a:
question as
:o whether QJ/WIN was
being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop
an assassination capability before ZR/ RIFLE was formally initiated
First , there is a similarity in the cast of characters :
Harvey ,
QJ /WIN Silver and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matter
and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of
ZR/RIFLE Second Bissell informed Harvey that the development of
an assassination capability had already been discussed with Silver
and Gottlieb before Harvey' s assignment to ZR/ RIFLE (Harvey 6/25/75
P 52; I.G Report , PP 37-38)
Nevertheless there does not appear to be any firm
evidence '.of a connection between QJIWIN and the to assassinate
Lumumba .
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FINAL DRAFT
TGh ~zukarK Rq 48
TRIJJILIO
Agreed to by drafting
subcomittee on
Sumary t 28 1975*
Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group Of Dinican dissidents On
May 1961 _
Trujillo was 8 brutal dictator and both the Eisenhover and
Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthraw of his regine by Dminican
dissidents_ Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Admninistrations
approved or condoned supplying arms to the dissidents _ Although there is no
evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity , certain
evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination
plans
Material support, consis of three tols and three carbines was
supplied to various dissidents Fhhile United States officials knew that the
dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo probably by assassination_ there
is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the
assassination The evidence is inconclusive a5 to haw high in the
Adninistrations information about the dissidents assassination plots
had been Fassed prior to the spring of 1961
Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States
officials for machine guns _ By the time four M-3 machine guns were shipped to
the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican in April_ it was well known
that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination
Thereafter_ however perission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents
was ` denied, and the guns were never passed. Two before the assassination
President Kernedy personally authorized a cable to the U.S. Consul General
The second par agraph under VA,3.c; and the paragraph under VII.C were
drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subconmittee but have not been
reviewed by, the Subcomnittee
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30 ,
ting pis
two
capitol
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in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government as a
matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations but
at the same time indica the United States continued to support the dissi-
dents" and stood ready to recogize them in the event were successful
in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo_
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they
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JF
CpL_
GE_ZI
I Background
Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic
in 1930 For most of his tenure_ the United States government
supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the
Caribbean ana Latin America as a protege of the United States
Trujillo S rule , always harsh and dictatorial, became more
arbitrary during the 1950's_ As a result, the United States
States image was increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many
Latin Americans
Increasing American awareness of Trujillo' $ brutality
and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused
U.S _ officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdi-
cation or downfall
As early as February 1960 the Eisenhower administration
gave high level consideration to 3 program of covert aid to
Dninican dissidents (Special Group minutes 2/10/60)
In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan
for the Dominican Republic which provided , in Part , that if the
situation deteriorated still further
the United States would immediately take tical action to
remove Trujillo from the 'Dminican Republic as soon
as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over
with tne assurance of U.S political economic and
if necessary military support_ (Memo from
Secretary of State Herter to the President 4/14/60 ;
Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to
Secretary of Defense Gates 4/21/60 .)
Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize
hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba Latin 01
'La@Mpa
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Wd 5
Anerican leaders , such as President Betancourt of VVenezuela ,
pressea the United States to take affirmative action against
Trujillo to dispel criticism that the U.S . opposed dictator-
ships of the left only. A belief that Castro 5 road to power
was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the
Dominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to a
Castro-style Communist regime (Rusk , pp . 8 , 9 )
II Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for Arms
During the spring of 1960 _ the 0.S ambassador to the
Dominican Republic, Joseph Farland made initial contact with
dissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo' 8
grasp They asked for sniper rifles Although documentary
evidence indicates that a recommendation to provide these
rifles was approved both within the State Department and: the
CIA, the rifles were never provided .
A Dissident Contacts
Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of
dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S _ and desirous of
establishing
a democratic form of government (Farland
affidavit) Prior to his finai departure fron the Dominican
Republic in 1960 the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief -
of-Mission, Xenry Darborn_ to the dissident leaders indicating that
* This Toosely-organized group , with which contact was es
tablished_ was referred to in cables correspondence , and
" memoranda as the dissidents ana is So referenced herein
L Wju"
ban
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Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16 _ 1960 CIA
Headquarters * cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communi -
cations link" between the dissidents and CIA The cable LstatedT
1Y that Dearborn S role had the unofficial approval of [Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs R,T Rubottom"
(Emphasis in original ) (HQS to Station cable 6/16/60)
Dearborn agreed. He requested, however , that the CIA
confirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that the
U.S _ would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop
effective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow but would
1 not undertake any overt action itself against Trujillo
government while it is in full control of Dominican Republic"
(Station to HQS cable. 6/17/60) CIA Headqaurters confirmed
Dearborn S unders tanding of the arrangement (HQS to Station
cable 6/19/60)
B _ The Sniper_ Rifles
During the course of a cocktail party in the Dominican
Republic , a leading dissident made a
specific request to Ambas -
sador Farland for a limited nuber of rifles with telescopic
sights. The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farland
affidavit) He apparently dia 50 after returning to Washington
in 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record 6/7/61),
* As used herein Meadquarters refers to Headquarters of the
Central Intelligency Agency ;
1I Department" indicates the
Department of State
#Zula]
H# 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 26
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May
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Documents indicate that consideration was given within
the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic _
At a June 21 1960 , mee with Ned Holman of the CIA
Western Hemisphere Division , Ambassador Farland reportedly
suggested 'possible sites for the drops
(CIA memo 6/21/60)
Documents also indicate that a meeting was held
around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs R: Rubottom and
Col J C . Chief of CIA ' s Western Hemisphere Division
Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary S view
regarding ""To what extent will the U.$ government participate
in the overthrow of Trujillo. A number of questions were
raised by King , among then:
Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles
or other devices for the removal of.key Trujillo people
from the scene?"
King S handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom 5 response to
that question was If yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)
On July 1, 1960 , 3 memorandum directed to General Cabell the Acting
Director of Central Intelligence
was prepared for Colonel King' 8
signature and in his absence , signed by his principal deputy,
Gomez (I.G. Report , P. 26) The memorandum stated that
a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked
Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate
Trujillo' : overthrow and recognized that such Arins
* Neither King nor Rubottom' recalls such a meeting , nor does
either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles
(Rubottom affidavit,{King affidayit:
EY
#ZVekan"
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Roy
King,
"C.
Rudy
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TCL+
#4
Zjlach
E
'presumably would be used against members of the Trujillo
regime _ The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided _
since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable
and therefore U.S . relations with the opposition should be as
close as possible "Providing the arms as requested would
Tt contribute significantly toward this end
(CIA memo 7/1/60)
Specifically, Ehe recommendation was to deliver to dissidents
* in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile rifles with teles
copic sights , together with 500 rounds of ammunition .
Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:
"4 _ Approval for delivery of these arms has
been given by Assistant Secretary of State
Roy Rubottom who requests that the arms be
placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest
possible moment_ (Id.}
Gomez S recormendation was concurred in by Richard
Helns as Acting DDP and approved by General Cabell
(I.G . Report , P _
The kkind '0f arms approved sterile rifles with
telescopic sights together with the statement that they would
be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime
clearly indicated the "1 targetea use for which the weapons were
intended _ (Bissell, 7/22/75 , 2 . 77) .
On July 1 , 1960 , a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA
Ieadquarters informing him of the plan to airdrop 12
telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. The
#"Sterile M1 rifles are untraceable TI rifles (3issell 7T22775 ,F.69)
02blaez
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26)
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6
cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability to
realign the sights if thrown off by the On July 14,
1960 , Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against
any further action in the Dominican Republic until after re-
solution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending
against Trujillo _ The dissidents reportedly believed that
sufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo' s
downfall without further effort on their part . (Station to
HQS cable , 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles
were never furnished
to the dissidents
On August 26 , 1960 , Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Lester Mallory repor on a meeting between
a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate' s political
officer The dissident leader was reported to have lost
enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking
of an invasion from Venezuela However by September 1 , 1960 ,
dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to
then of arms This time the request was for 200 rifles For
the next several months consideration centered on Providing
200 to 300 guns
II Sumnmer and Fall 9f_1960
In August 1960 the United States severed diplomatic
relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its
personnel - Dearborn was left as Consul General and de facto
CIA Chief of Station Consideration was given both to providing
U6u
w
485 @
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TCk TLak |
arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level
emissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate By the end of
the year
1 3 broad plan of general support to anti-Trujillo
forces both within and without the coun try, was approved _
4 Diplomatic Development
Withdrawal of U.S_ Personnel
Events occurring during the suner of .1960 further in-
tensified hemispheric opposition
to the Trujillo regime In
June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan Presi-
dent Betancourt As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillo
government At the same time , in August 1960 , the United
States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican
Republic and imposed economic sanctions
With the severance of diplomatic relations the United
States closed its Embassy _ Most American personnel including
the CIA Chief of Station left the Dominican Republic _ With
the departure. of the CIA Chief of Station Dearborn became
de facto CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by
both CIA and the State' Department _ Although: on January 20
1961 a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic ,
Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents
B_ Dearborn Reports Assassination be Only
Way to Overthrow Trujillo Regime
Dearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the
'UaElhi
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8
Bdks
KA
Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved
Trujillo' $ assassination
He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and
the CIA In July 1960 , he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom
tnat the dissiden were
in nc way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary
activicy in the foreseeable future except the
I assassination of their principal enemy _
(Dearborn to Rubottan letter , 7/14/60)
It is uncertain what portion of the information provided
Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary
level Through August of 1960 , Assistant Secretary Rubottom
his Deputy , Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine
were , within the Latin American Division of the Department ,
15 PI aware of Dearborn ' s current projects _ (Devine to Dearborn
*
letter
8
8/15/60)
September 1960 , Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubotton
as Assistant Secretary for Inter-Anerican Affairs, and Frank
Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr Mann While
serving as Special Assistant to the -Assistant Secretary , Devine
reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State
activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that
Devine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holman
and other officials of the CIA ' s Western lemisphere Division
(Devine
1
P. 7)
#Dearborn S
candid reporting to State during Ehe suer of 1960
raised concern with the Department and ne was advised that Certain
specific information should more appropriately come through "tne
obher channel" (presumably CIA communications) Dearborn was
advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19
different recipient offices (Id.)
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[6z) &wLal
W
Mann solicited Dearborn S comnents concerning plans
under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power_ Dearborn
replied in a detailed letter which concluded :
"One further point which I should probably not even
make From a purely practical standpoint it Will
be best for uS for the OAS and for the Dominican
Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo
before he leaves this island If he has his millions
and is a free agent , he will devote his life from
exile to preventing stable government in the D RS to
overturning democratic governments and establishing
dictatorships in the Caribbean and to assassinating
his enemies If I Were a Dominican which thank
heaven I am not , I would favor destroying Trujillo as
being the first necessary step in the salvation of
my country and I would regard this in fact as my
Christian duty. If you recall Dracula you will
remember it was necessary to drive a stake through
his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes
I believe sudden death would be more huane than
the solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought
he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and
WI lingering illness (Dearborn to Mann letter, 10/27/60)
C_ Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate
Throughout the fall of 1960 , efforts were made on both the
diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo
into relinquishing control and ideally , leaving the Dominican
Republic _ The use of high level emissaries , both from within
and without the ranks of government , was considered_ (Special
Group Minutes , 9/8/60 ; Mann to Dearborn corres. , '10/10/60)
None of the efforts proved successful and at the end of 1960
Trujillo was still in absolute control
D CIA Plans of October 1960
A CIA internal memorandun dated October 3 , 1960 entitled
Hl
p W25
~iJe]
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TC
10
4 ei oaie
"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican
Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans
which "have been developed on a tentative basis which appear
feasible and which might be carried out covertly CIA with
a minimal risk of exposure_ These plans provided _ in part ,
for the' following :
I3 a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols
together with ammunition and a supply of grenades to
secure cache on the South shore of the island , about
14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo
"b Delivery to the same
cache described above of an
electronic aetonating device With remote control
features which coula be planted the dissidents in
such manner as to eliminate certain Trujillo
henchmen This mighe necessitate training and intro-
ducing into the country by illegal entry a trained
technician to set the bonb and detonator (Emphasis
added) (CIA Menorandum 10/3/60)
E December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Action
On December 29 , 1960 , the Special Group considered and
approved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces _
The plan , presented by Bissell , envisioned support to both
Dominican exile groups and internal dissidents The
exile groups were to be furnished money to organize and under-
take anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yacht
for use in paramilitary activities_ Bissell emphasized"
Lvilidx_]
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'TGb? GCCEZH
306
11 to the Special Group that the proposed actions would not ,
of thenselves bring about the desired result in the near
future , lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
(Special Group Minutes _ 12/29/60)
IV . January 12', 1961 Special Group Approval of M Limited
Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material"
On January 12
1
1961 , with all members present , the
Special Group met and according to its Minutes, took the
following action with respect to the Dominican Republic:
M Mr _ Merchant explained the feeling of the Departient
of State that limited supplies of small arms and other
material should be made available for dissidents in-
side the Dominican Republic Mr Parrott said that we
believe this can be managed securely CIA and that
the plan would call for final transportation into the
country being provided by the dissidents thenselves
The Group approved the project _ (Special Group Minutes _ 1/12/61)
A Menoranda Underlying the Special Group_ Action
On January 12 1961 , Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to
Under Secretary Livingston Merchant_ The memorandun sent
through Joseph Scott, Merchant S Special Assistant, reported
on the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the United
States for its failure to furnish then with any tangible or
concrete assistance: Further, it reported:
Opposition clements havc consistently asked uS to supply
them with 0 hardware"' of various types This has included
guantities of conventional arms and also rather persis_
tently, they have askea for some of the more exotic items
and devices which they associate with revolutationary
effort_ (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)
# The members Of the Special Group were at the time : Livingston
Merchant , Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon
Gray_ Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs;
John N_ Irwin Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles
1 Director of the Central Intelligence Agency-
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Mann sugested for Merchant:' s consideration and , if he
approved for discussion the Special Group, the provision
of token quantities of selected itens desired the dissidents_
Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would
I place soine sabotage potential in the hands of dissident
1{ elements but stated that there 'would be no thought of
toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic)
11 by any such minor measure (Mann to Merchant memo 1/12/61)
This memorandun was drafted on January 11 by Mann S Special
Assistant for CIA liaison Frank Devine .
A covering memorandum from Scott to Herchant , forwarding
Mann 5 memo , was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special
Group meeting . Merchant s handwritten notations indicate that
the Special Group "agreed in terms oE Tom Mann S memo"
and that the Secretary of State was informed of that
decision by late afternoon on January 12 , 1961 (Scott
to Merchant memo , 1/12/61)
There is no ~evidence that any member of the Special Group
other than Allen Dulles , knew that the dissidents had clearly.
and repeatedly. expressed a desire for arms and explosives to
# be used then in assassination efforts_ While it is , of
course possible that such information was passed orally to
some or all of the members of the Special Group , and perhaps
even discussed by them on January 12 , 1961 , there is no
#Various CIA cables
1
including those dealing with Ehe sniper
rifles
1
indicate that copies were sent to the DCI Allen Dulles
#C
aLde
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%l3i2
€lc
documentary evidence of which the Conunittee is aware which
would establish this to be the case
On January 19 , 1961 , the last of the Eisenhower
administration Consul General Dearborn was advised that
approval had been Siven for supplying arms and other material
to the Dominican dissidents (HQS to Station cable , 1/19/61)
Shortly thereafter , Dearborn informed Devine that the
dissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver
M0 "exotic equipment (Dearborn to Devine cable , 1/31/61)
V January 20 1961 April 17, 1961
(the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay oE_Pigs)
On January 20 , 1961 the Kennedy administration took
office. Tnree of the four members of the Special Group (ali
except Allen Dulles) retired_
Prior to the Eailure of the of invasion on April
17 1961,
a number of significant events occurred_ These
events included mee tings with Dominican dissidents in
which specific assassination plans were discussed , re-
quests by dissidents for explosive devices the Passage
U.S officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside
the Dominican Republic , and the pouching to the Dominican
Republic of machine guns which had been requested by the
dissidents for use in connection with an assas8ination attempt . *
Indicated in tne post-Bay of Pigs section infra permission
to pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were never
passed _
( ~zoiay"
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These events are discussed below under subheading A
Evidlence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events
possessed by senior Anerican officials is treated thereafter.
16 As used herein senior American officials" means individuals
in the White House or serving as menbers of the Special Group
2 Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S _
to Dissidents Assassination Plans
1_ Assassination Discussione and Requests for_Explesives
At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York city
on February 10 and `15 , 1961 , CIA: officials were told repeatedly
by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot
[to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of
1 Trujillo. (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the: requests
made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following:
(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute
the death of Trujillo.
(b) Cameras and other items that could be used
to fire projectiles_
(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the
of one' s nand and transferred to Trujillo in
a handshake , causing delayed lethal results.
(a) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a
distance of: several miles (Id. )
Other methods of assassinatiny Trujillo proposed by dissidents
H Goa
LW
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15
at the February 10 or February 15 mee tings included poisoning
Trujillo' s food or medicines , ambushing his automobile , and
attacking hin with firearms and grenades_ (CIA memo for the
record 2/13/61 ; 2/16/61) *
The dissidents 1 latest plot" as described in the February
CIA memoranda was said to involve the planting of a powerful
bomb which could be detonated from a nearby electric device
along the route of Trujillo' $ evening walk (Id-)
On March 13 , 1961 a dissident in the Dominican Republic
asked for fragmentation grenades 18 Eor use during the next week
or So . This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters
on March 14 , 1961 , and was followed the next by an additional
request for 50 fragmentation grenades , 5 rapid-fire weapons ,
and 10 64 mm' anti-tank rockets Tnis further request was also
passed on to CIA !leadquarters_ (Station to HQS cable , 3/15/61)
'Tnere is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied to
the dissidents
The documentary record makes clear that Frank. Devine at
the State Department was also advised of related developments
in a March 16 , 1961 , "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained
that his spirits were in the doldruns because:
the members of our club are now prepared
in their minds to have a picnic but do not have
the ingredients for the salad Lately they have
developed a_ plan for the picnic,which just might
work if could find the proper food They
* There i5 no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to
any of these requests and the CIA officer vho drafted the
February 13 memorandum stated the view that some of the ques-
tions raised by the dissidents did not require an answer
6;
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have asked u5 Eor a Few sandwiches _ hardly
more and we are not prepared to make then
available Last week we were asked to furnish
three or four pineapples for a party in the
near future but I coula remeriber nothing in my in-
structions that would have allowed me to contri-
bute this ingredient Don E think I wasn t
tenpted _ I have rather specific guidelines
to the effect that salad ingredients will be
delivered outside the picnic grounds and will
be brought to the area another club
(Dearborn letter to Devine 3/16/61)
# After reviewing his picnic" letter , together Iith the requests
in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above Dearborn con
cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the
"pineapples were probably the requested fragmentation
grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients
outside of the picnic grounds was , almost certainly , meant to
refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group
order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic
(Dearborn 7/29 pp . 25-27)
2 The Passage ef_Pistols
a Pouching to the Dominican Republic
In a. March 15 , 1961 cable Chief of Station Owen reported
that Dearborn had asked for three 38 caliber: pistols for issue
to several dissidents_ In reply , Headquarters cabled: I1 Regret
no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against
shipment -of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor-
dinated with State (HQS to Station cable , 3/17/61) The
Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary
authorization and noted that at his last two psts , he had
received pistols via the pouch for "worthy
purposes and_
5
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therefore, he knew it could be done: (Station to Hgs cable,
3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols
and ammunition were being pouched_ However
P
the Station
Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn (Hqs _ to Station
cable, 3/24/61) *
b Reason for the CIA Instruction
Not to Tell Dearborn
Owen testified that he believed the "don 't tell Dear-
born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that
the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not
something to be unnecessarily discussed _ (Owen PP . 78 , 79)
Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used , since he knew
Owen had no other means of receiving weapons (Dearborn ,
7/29 , P . 33)
C_ Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?
Dearborn testified that he had asked for a
single pistol
for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con-
sideration (Dearborn 7/29 , PP . 29-31) He said he had been
approached by 3 Dominican contact-who lived in a remote area
and was concerned for the safety of his . family in the event
of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed
The Inspector General s Report, issued 1n connection with
a review-of these events concludes that:
"There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files
that the pistols were actually pouched _ The request
for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub-
sequent request for submachine guns _ 11 (I G Report, p~ 60)
This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March
24 , 1961, Headquarters to Station .cable ; which provides:
"C Pouchingi revolvers vand ammo *requested TRUJ 0462
(in 20040) on 28 March Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted)
18 this material being pouched . Explanation follows
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the man S fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a
# pistol
Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these
pistols to the assassination of Trujillo , a June 7 , 1961 , CIA
memorandum , unsigned, and with no attribution as to source ,
states that two of the three pistols were passed bY Owen to
Lorenzo "Nimpy" Berry , a United States citizen who was in direct
contact with the action element of the dissident group. It
should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-
ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons Whether
one or more of these 38 caliber Smith & Wesson tols
eventually came into the hands 0f the assassins
and if So , whether they were used in connection with the
assassination remain open questions
Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols
as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never
considered them in any way connected with the then-current
assassination plans_ (Dearborn 7/29, P.70 ; Owen PP . 38 , 73)
However none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the
purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen ' s cable
stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.
(Station to HQS cable , 3/15/61) Indeed the March 24 , 1961 ,
#Dearborn is clear in his recollection that ne asked Owen to
request only one pistol (Dearborn 7/29 PP . 30 , 31) Owen
on the other hand
p
testified that if his cables requested three
pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three
pistols_ (Owen P. 72)
Thie pistols were however apparently sent in one package
(HQs to Station cables ,3/21/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-
D fied that what he believed to be the one gun came wrapped
0 up ana that he passea it (Dearborn ,-7/29 ,P.30)
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cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the
very cable which was sent in response to a request by the
dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination
effort which had been previously described to Headquarters _
As with the carbines discussed below it appears that little,
if any , concern was expressea within the Agency over passing these
weapons to would-be assassins
3 Passing of the Carbines
a Request Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIA
In a March 26 , 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters
1
Owen asked
for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber Ml
carbines The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by
Navy personnel after the U.S _ broke formal diplomatic relations
in August 1960 _ Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred
in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents_
(Dearborn 7/29 , Pp . 42 _
8
43) On March 31 , 1961 CIA Headquarters
cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines . (Hqs to
Station cable , 3/31/61)
b _ Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?
The carbines were passed to tne action group contact , Berry , on April 7 ,
1961 (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually , they found
their way into the hands of one of the assassins , Antonio
de la Maza . (Station to HQS cable , 4/26/61; I.G_ Report
Pp . 46 , 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified Ehat the
carbines were
atlall times viewed-as 'strictly a token show
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of support , indicating U.S support of the dissidents' efforts
to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29 , pp . 46-48 ; Owen p . 39)
C Failure to Disclose to State Department
@Eficials in_Nashingten
There is no indication that the reguest or the passage
of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in
Washington until several weeks after the passage _ In fact, on
April 5 Ieadquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn
not to coruent in correspondence with State that the carbines
and ammunition were being passed to tae dissidents _ This cable
was sent while Owen was in Washington and it indicated that
upon his return to the Dominican Republic , he would explain
the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-
mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence
with state and he realized the necessity not to do SO , (Station
to HQS cable 4/6/61)
Dearborn testified, however that he believed_ at the
time of his April-6 cable , that someone in the State De-
partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the
passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29 , P . 44)
k4 cisWl:l:
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3 Requests For and_Pouching of the Machine Guns
a Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use
in Assassination
The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider
pouching an M3 machine gun 017 February 10 , 1961 (Owen PP 63 ,64 ;
Station to HQS cable , 3/15/61) The request was raised again
in March but no action was taken On March 20 , 1961 Owen cabled
a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns
specifying their wish that the arns be sent via the diplomatic
pouch or similar means The dissidents were said to feel that
delivery by air or transfer at sea would overly-tax their
resources (Station to HQS cable , 3/20/61)
The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly
identified in Owen S cable , as
being sought for us e in connec-
tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo_ This plan was to
kill Trujillo in, the apartment of his mistress and according
to Owen S cable:
To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-
guns and 1500 rounds amo for personal defense in
event fire fight Will use quiet weapons for basic
{ job _ (Id.)
In essence, CIA' s response was that the timing for an
assassination was wrong - Owen" was told that precipitious or
uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist ,
Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create
more problems than solutions It was
Headquarters position
that:
we should attempt to avoid precipitous action
by the internal dissidents until opposition group
and HQS are better prepared to support [assassinationTx_
effect a change in the regime and cope with the after-
Na math (HQS to Station cable 3/24/61)
Word suppTied By CIA in previously sanitized cable
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The cable als0 stated that Headquarters
was prepared
to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when
developed a capability to received them . but that security
considerations precluded use of U.S . facilities as a carrier
Soon thereafter , on April 6 , 1961 , while Owen was in Washingcon
for consultation with Headquarters , he reported on events in
the Dominican Republic and
"especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident]
leaders that they be provided with a limited number
of small arms for their own protection (specifi-
cally five M3 caliber 45 SMG s ) 81 (CIA memo
for the record 4/11/61)
b _ Pouching_ the Machine Guns is Approved
by Bissell
Accordingly , on April 7 1961,
a Pouch Restriction Waiver
Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission
to
1 pouch four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of amunition on a
Priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used
for self protection . Ii (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)
The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief
0
Nestern
temisphere Division further provided :
" "B _ A determination has been made that the issuance
of this equipment to the action group is desirable
if for no other reason than to assure this important
group 30 S continued cooperation vith and confidence in
this Agency' $ determination to live up to its earlier
commitments to the sroup. These commitments took
$ This same cable 6f March 24 1961 , 1S tne one which advised
that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched_
TCS 'Eukic
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To VESL3ER
the form of advising the group in January
1961 that we would provide limited arms
and assistance to them provided develop
the capability to receive it Operational
circumstances have prevented this group from
developing the assets capable of receiving
the above equipment through normal clandestine
channels such as air drops or sea infiltra-
11 tion _
The Waiver Request was approved by Richara Bissell, as Deputy
Director (Plans)
8 on April 10 , 1961 (Id. )
The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and
were received by the station on April 19 , 1961_ (I.G, Report ,
p. 42 ; Station to Headquarters cables 4/19/61)
On April 10 , Walter Elder Assistant to the Director , had issued
a memorandum which stated:
J6 Mr Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets
or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without
his approval p (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61) Xx
The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an
air of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that pouching
had been approved
B Knowledge of Senior American Qfficials (pre-Bay of_Pigs)
On February 14 1961, prior to the passage of weapons
but a month after the generalized approval of the passage
of arms by the Prior administration 3 meeting of
the Special Group was held with Messrs McNamara
1
Gilpatric ,
Bowles Bundy , Dulles , Bissell_ and General Cabell in attendance.
Permission to pass Ehe machine, guns was never obtained and the guns
never passed into the hands of the dissidents_ The matter is discussed
in detail beginning at page
X Elder testified that this note sent the weekend before the of Pigs
invasion of Cuba was intended to make sure that there were no unusual
planes shot down or ay unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic"
prior to the Cuba invasion _ (Elder P 51)
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The minutes state that:
IF Mr Dulles assisted by Mr Bissell then summarized
for the benefit of the new mnenbers of the Special
Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor
group during the past year and also a list of signi- 1
ficant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960
and which it is planned to continue (Special Grou Minutes
of 2/14/61)
In the course of the discussion
1
the following point, among
others , Was made :
W (a) Dominican Republic Mr Bundy asked that a
memorandum Be prepared for higher authority on the
subject of what plans can be made for a successor
I government to Trujillo_ (Id.)
The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Domini
can Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and
Bissell briefed the new members
What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as
it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to
which the Special Group
was informed concerning the means by
which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of
the Trujillo regime_ Specifically , it is not known if
the new members of the Special Group
were told that the
dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate
Trujillo Nor is it known if the Special Group was
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advised that the State Department representative in the
Doninican Republic had made the assessment that the Doninican
government could not be overthrown without the assassination
of_Trujillo.
Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection
of the details of the February 14 brie and he was unable
to say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted
by the dissidents was discussed (Bissell , 7/22 , PP . 101 , 102)
Robert McNamara , one of the new members of the Special Group
in attendance for the briefing , has no recollection as to the
specificity in which the Doninican Republic was discussed at the
February 14 meeting . He does not recall any mention by either
Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate 'rrujillo.
(McNamara affidavit)
February Memoranda
The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum
on February 15 , 1961 in response to a request concerning pro-
gress to assure an orderly takeover " should Trujillo fall }
The memorandum advisea that:
representatives in the Dominican Republic
have at considerable risk to those involved
established contacts with numerous leaders of the
underground opposition jana T the CIA
has recently been authorized to arrange for delivery
to them outside the Dorinican Republic of small arms
78 and sabotage equipment _
This reference to recent authorization for delivery f
arns indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some
briefing
concerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961
p6 Ni
X
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"Our
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d
Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujillo
elements _ Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Thomas Mann ; Deputy Assistant Secretary Willian Coerr; and
Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective
positions throughoul the transition period_ The Committee has
been furnished no docuents indicating that Secretary Rusk or
Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the
intentions of the Doninican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions
of which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly
had knowledge _ Indeed , Secretary Rusk testified that he Was not
personally So advised_ (Rusk 7/10 , PP . 41 ,42)
On February 17 , 1961 , Richard Bissell sent a briefing
paper
on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy , President Kennedy' s
National Security Advisor The paper nade note of the out-
standing Special Group approval for the provision of arms and
equipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidents
had been- informed that the U.S_ was prepared to provide such
arms and equipment as soon as
they developed the capability to
receive them .
The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leaders
had informed CIA of "their plan of action which they felt could
be implementea if they were provided with arms for 300 men ,
explosives , and remote control detonation devices M1 Various
witnesses have testified, however , that supplying arms for 300
men would , standing alone
F
indicate a E non-targeted" use for the
TC
Wzj
&k425
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arms (i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as
opposed to a specifically targeted assassination use) (Bissell,
7/29 , P. 80)
Concerning the briefing paper , Bissell testified that:
48 it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the
time of the memorandunl to Mr Bundy that these
dissident groups were and had for a long time
been hoping they could accomplish the assassination
of Trujillo As a matter of fact , the requests since
some seven or eignt months earlier was a perfectly
clear indication 0f that, So that fact was not new
knowledge_ " (Bissell 7/22 , p.102)
Vhen asked the memorandum did not include the fact that
the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo , Bissell
replied:
I I cannot tell you Mr _ Chairman. I do not
remember what considerations moved Ine I don t
know whether it was because this was commion
knowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary to
include it, or a5 you are implying , there was
an element of concealment here I would be very
K surprised if it were the latter, in this case
(Bissell 7/22 , P. 101)
In response to questions concerning the lack of information
in the February 17 , 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to
which the requested arms
might likely be put by the dissidents
Bissell stated:
I would say that the Agency s failure,
if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to 'state
in writing that the plans of the dissidents
0 would include assassination attempts _
(Bissell 7/22 _ p. 99)
Bissell' s briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the
assessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo
Vlslbi
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and the internal opposition, "which will end either with the
liquidation of 'Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete
roll up of the internal opposition _ In this regard , the fear
was expressed that existing: schedules for the delivery of
weapons to the internal opposition' might not be sufficientlv
timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be
given to caching the requested arms and other materials
(Bissell to Bundy meno , 2/17/61)
Thus , by the middle of February 1961 , the senior
members of the new administration and in view of the { for
higher authority" nature of Bundy ' s request , presuably
President Kennedy himself , Nere aware of the outstanding Special
Group approval for the passage of arms and other materials to
opposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There was
no modification or recision of the "inherited" Special Group
approval and it would seem fair, therefore to regard the
approval as
having been at least. acquiesced in the new
administration
During March and early April-1961 , operational levels
within both the CIA and the State Department learned of in-
creasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinate
Trujillo_ There is no evidence that this information was
passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group
'TGa'
E4L
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TCp ECLE ,
* except Allen Dulles: Similarly, there is no evidence that
the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching
of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed
**
to anyone outside of the CIA during this period_
VI April 17 1961 3 May 31 1961
(Bay ef_Pigs Through Irujillo_Assassination)
Following the failure of the of invasion attempts
were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican
Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassina-
tion attempt _ These efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo
were the result of instructions Erom CIA Headquarters and were
prompted by concern over filling the power vacuu which would
result from Trujillo' s death_
The machine guns arrived in the Doninican Republic but
permission to pass then to the dissidents was never given and
the guns never left the Consulate
Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a
contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted _
Two days before Trujillo' $ assassination Dearborn received
a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy .
The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of associ-
ation with political assassination , since the U.S. , a5 a matter
of general policy , could not condone assassination. The cable
* Copies Of CIA cables Including the March 20 , 1961 cabie
describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment
of his mistress were apparently sent to the office
of the Director of Central Intelligence
** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols
were being pouched was sent to the Director S office, Dulles
apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving
passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns
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,YRZU
further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of
material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of
U.S_ support for them if they were successful in overthrowing
the Trujillo government 'The cable also reconfirmed the
decision not to pass the machine guns
A Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccess-
ful U.$_ Attent to_Stop_ Assassination Effort
BY April 17 , 1961 , the Bay oE Pigs invasion had
[operation was a failedT As a result, there developed a general
realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the
Dominican Republic until Nashington was able to give further
consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and
the power vacuum which would be created (Bissell, 6/11
p.113) A cable Erom leadquarters to the Station on April 17,
1961 advised that it was most important that the machine guns
not be passed without additional Headquarters approval
The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic on April
19 1961 and Headquarters was so advised_ The earlier ad-
mlonition that the machine guns shoald be held in Station cus tody
until further notice was repeatea in a second cable Erom Head-
quarters , sent April 20 , 1961_ This decision was said to have
76 been bascd on judgnent that filling a vacuun created by assas-
sination ow bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions
I in Caribbean area. (HQs_ to Station cable 4/20/61)
The dissidents continued to press for the release of the
machine guns and their requests were passed on to ieadquarters
165 SESLZT
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31:
in cables fron Dearborn and Owen (Station to HQS cables
4/25/61) On April 25 , 1961 , Owen advised Ileadquarters that
Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was
going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2
Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three
carbines passed from the American Consulate , together with
whatever else was available (Id.)
In response to the April 26 cable
$
Headquarters restated
that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the
dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the
United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with
the aftermath of the assassination (See c/s comments ,
Station to HQs cable , 4/27/61) The following April 27
0
1961 , Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with
4 the dissidents , We doubt statement U.S _ government not now
prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from
attempt . (Station to HQS cable 4/27/61)
Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that
an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and
testified that efforts. to carry out the instructions were
unsuccessful_ In effect , the dissidents informed hin that
this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit
the convenience of the U.S_ government .
(Dearborn 7/29 , P.52)
F6;
#Lai
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On April 30 , 1961 , Dearborn advised leadquarters that
the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt
was going to take place during the first week of The
action group was reported to have in its possession three carbines ,
four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms Although
they reportedly still wanted the machine guns Dearborn advised
Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what
had , whether the U.S . wanted them to or not (Station to HQS
cable , 4/30/61)
Dearborn S cable set forth the argument of the action
group that , since the U.S . had already assisted the group to
some extent and was therefore implicated , the additional assistance
of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic re-
lationship_ The cable concluded:
'Owing to
far-reaching political implications
involved in release or non release of re-
quested items Headquarters may wish discuss fore-
11 going with State Department (Id.)
B Further Consideration of_Passing Machine_Guns
In reponse a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authori-
Passage of the machine guns The cable which was sent
to Allen Dulles with Bissell' s recomendation for its dispatch
provided:
"Since it appears that opposition group has
comitted itself to action with or without
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33
additional support , coupled with fact ref_
C items [the carbines] already made available
to them for personal defense; station authori-
zed pass ref A itens [the machine guns] to
opposition member for their additional pro-
tection on their proposed endeavor_ T (Draft of HQS
to Station cable , 5/2/61)
The cable was never sent_
In his testimony before the Comnittee Bissell characteri 9
zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns
as:
having made already a considerable
investment in this dissident group and its
plans that we might as well make the addi I
tional investment 18 (Bissell, 7/22 , P.127)
Tne following May 3 , 1961 Ray Merbert , Deputy Chief
of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA , Iho frequently acted
as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning
covert operations in the Dominican Republic , met with Adolph
Berle , Chairman of the State Department' s Interagency Task Force
on Latin America_
A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert
informed Berle that a local group in_ the Dominican Republic
wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose_
The menlorandum continued:
cross examination it developed that the
real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they
wanted guns for that purpose Herbert wanted
to know what the policy should be
M1 I told him I could not care less for Trujillo
and that this was the general sentiment . But
we did not wish to have any thing to do with any
assassination plots anywlere any time Herbert
said he felt the same way . (Berle Meno of
Conversation , 5/3/61)
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Copies of Berle' s memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;
the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
and to Special Assistant Frank Devine
Both Herbert and Devine , who had been in almost daily
contact with each other since August of 1960 , had been advised
oE the assassination plans of the dissident group . In fact,
Herbert , alony With Bissell, had signed off on the proposed
cable 0f May 2 , releasing the nachine guns for passage
C Special Group Meetings of May and Hay 18 1961
On the following the: Berle-Ierbert meeting , the
Special Group mnet and according to the minutes :
"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new
anti-Trujillo plot_ He said we never know if
one of these is going to work or not and asked
what is the status of con tingency planning should
the plot come off_ Mr Bundy said that tiis point
is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussedl
at a high level in the very near future_ " (Special
Group Minutes 5/4/61)
Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes
makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed
speculative It is not known to what extent and in what detail
Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo
plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was
Dearborn S April 30 cable La
disclosing an imminent assassination
attempt potentially utilizing U.S _ ~supplied weapons _
On May 18 , 1961 the Special Group again considered the
situation in the Dominican Republic and , according to the
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minutes :
1T Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the
internal dissidents were pressing for the
release to them of certain small arms now in
U-S _ hands in the Dominican Regublic He
inquired whether the Eeeling of the
Group remained that these arms should not be
passed The members showed no inclination to
" * take a contrary position at this time
(Emphasis supplied) (Special Group Minutes ,
5/18/61)
D Final_ Requests by Dissidents for Machine_Guns
On May 16 1961
2 Dearborn cablea the state Department
attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr , with an urgent
request from the dissidents for the machine guns The cable
advised tnat the assassination atteipt was scheduled for the
night of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were
80 percent , provision of the machine guns would reduce the
possibility of failure The dissidents reportedly stressed
to Dearborn that if the effort failed,due to U.S . refusal to
supply the machine guns the U.S would be held responsible
and would never be forgiven Dearborn reported that he had
informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations
in Hashington he was reasonably certain that authorization
could not be obtained for handing over machine guns (Dearborn
to State cable 5/16/61)
A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn sent
the sane confirmed Dearborn S judgment. It instructed him
* There was no mee Eing Qf the Special Group at which the Domini-
can Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18 'The language
attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the
Group remained not to pass the arns tends to suggest that the
guestion Of passing these arms must have been raised prior to
the 18 Group meeting ~ perhaps at tne; May? 4 1961 meeting _
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36
to continue to take the same line until he received contrary
instructions which clearly indicated had been cleared in
advance the State Department itself_ This cable from State was
approved by Under Secretary Bowles (Department to Dearborn , 5/16/61)
Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn s May 16 request in a
memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be
advised as to the Department' s policy concerning passage of
the machine guns Herbert noted that when: this request was
last taken to the Department , Berle made the decision that the
weapons not be passed _ (Memo to ARA from CIA , 5/16/61)
Devine responded to Herbert ' s menorandum on the same
advising Herbert that the Department' s policy continued to be
negative on the matter of passing the machine guns _ Herbert' s
attention was directed to tne January 12 , 1961 Special Group
limitation concerning the passage of arms; outside of the
Dominican Republic_ A copy of Devine S memorandun to Merbert
was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary qf State ,
to the attention of. his personal assistant Joseph Scott.
(Devine to Herbert memo , 5/16/61)
E_ Dearborn in Nashington for Consultation
Drafting of_Contingency Plans
At a
meeting of the National Security Council on May 5 , 1961 ,
the question of U.S_ policy toward the Dominican Republic was
considered and it was ;
"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba woula
prepare promptly both emergency and long-
range plans for anti-comunist intervention
in the event of crises in Haiti or the
By 27 , 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that
the roup was no longer requesting the arms ana had accepted the
fact that it must make do with what it had (Dearborn to State
cable 5/27/61)
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37
Dominican Republic_ Noted the President' s
view that the United States should not
initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before
we knew what government would succeed him
and that any action against Trujillo should
be multilateral (Record 0f Actions bv
National Security Council 5/5/61)
(Approved by the President , 5/16/61)
Although the precise dates are uncertain Dearborn was
recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these
contingency plans and recommendations _ Dearborn was in Nashing-
ton at least from 10 througin 13 , 1961
While in Washington , Dearborn met with State
Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur
Schlesinger of the White House staff_ Nien testifying before
the Committee_ he was unable to recall the substance of
his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger , aside from his
general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican
Republic was discussed_ He aid not recall any discussion With
Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms either those which had
been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought _
(Dearborn , 7/29 , PP . 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the
White House, however with the firn impression that Goodwin nad been
reviewing cable traffic between Nashington and the Dominican
Republic and: was very familiar with events as they then stood _
(Dearborn 7/29 , p. 62)
TAP (FC3R
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'Lisai
On May 11 1961 Dearborn prepared a two-page draft
document which set forth ways in which the U.S _ could overtly
aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo_ The draft noted
that neans of stepping up the covert program were considered
in separate papers (Dearborn draft document of l1, 1961)
Tnis Dearborn draft of 11, 1961 , was apparen used as a
basis Eor portions 0f the Mt Dominican Republic
T
Contingency
Paper discussed below
Two aocuments entitled , "Prograi of Covert Action for the
Dominican Republic" were provided to the Commnittee staff from
State Department files_ Each appears to be a draft of the
covert activities paper describec in Dearborn S May 11, 1961
memorandun : One draft recommended an expanded U.S _ offer to
deliver small explosive devices and arns (Docunent indicating
it was attached to Dominican Republic
~t
Contingency , dated
5/12/61 and bearing Nos _ 306-308) The other draft is very
similar except that it concludes that delivery of arns within
the Dominican Republic to memnbers OE the underground is not
recomended _ (Docuent from State Dept _ files bearing No. 310)
Attached to the second draft was a one-page docuent which
Frank Devine believes he wrote It listed eight nunbered
points including the following :
"1 The USG should not lend itself to direct
political assassination
"2 _ US moral posture can ill afford further
tarnishing in the eyes of the world_
#Wk SzGhleh
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"3_ We would be encouraging the action supplying
the weapons , effecting the delivery , and then
turning over only the final execution to
(unskilled) local triggermen
"4 _ So far we have seen no real evidence of action
capability. Should we entrust ourselves and
our
reputation to this extent in the absence
thereof?
"7 Can we afford a precedent which may convince
the world that our diplomatic pouches are used
to_ deliver assassination Ieapons?" (Document
from State Department files bearing No . 313)
The other points raised in document No . 313 related to the
likelihood that any such involvement by the U.$_ would ultimately
be revealed _
On May 15 , 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to
Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Pro-
grams Authorized With Respect to the-Dominican: Republic" That
document outlined the exis Special Group approvals for covert
assistance to Dominican dissidents and while imaking
no recommen
dation as to further policy , suggested that the Special Group
review the outs tanding approvals
and communicate to interested
agencies the status of such authorizations (State Dept . Gocument
from Coerr to Bowles , 5/15/61)
During this period a document dated . May 13
1
1961 , was
T6? &ZOLXZI
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prepared at the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereafter
circulated within the State Department This document ,
entitled "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic"
reported:
"CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station
in Ciudad Trujillo; a very limited supply of
weapons and grenades _ In response to the urgent
requests Erom the internal opposition leaders for
personal defense Iveapons attendant to their
projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO three
(3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with
accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure
means to the opposition The recipients have
41 repeatedly requested additional armed support .
'This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to
anyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had been
passea to dissidents in the Doninican Republic_
The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above
quoted material circled in pencil and the word 81 neutralize 01
is underscored _ Goodwin testified before the Conuittee that
he circled the above paragraph when first reading the menorandum
because the information concerning passage of the arms was new
to hin and struck him as significant_ (Goodwin 7/18 , PP . 48 ,49)
Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which Require
Additional Authorization , the memorandum to Goodwin indicated
that the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns and
a small number of grenades currently in the direct custody of
the Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing
these weapons to the internal opposition 01 for their use in
* See Scott to Bowles memorandum of 19
8
1961, enclosing copy
of Goodwin memorandum
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ANis
personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to re-
move Trujillo" could be developed by the Station_ The memo -
randum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passage
of these weapons (Id.)
On May 15 , 1961 , Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another
memorandum This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and
Contingency Plans for the Dominican Republic, I? had been received
Bundy from the State Department . Attached was an under-
lying document which began
:
01 Recent reports indicate that the internal
Dominican dissidents are becoming increasingly
determined to oust Trunillo by any means and
their plans in this regard are well advanced
The May 15 memoranduI S tressed that it was highly desirable
for the U.S ; to be identified with and to support the elements
seeking to overthrow Trujillo_ The attachment
recommended that Consul General Dearborn inform the dissidents
that if they succeed "at their Own initiative and on their Own
responsibility in forming
an acceptable provisional government
can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance
from the U.S : will be promptly and favorably answered_ Jt (Documents
from State Dept _ files bearing Nos 279-286)
F Drafts_Leading to and Final Cable of _May 29 , 1961
A copy of Dearborn S cable of 16 , 1961 , requesting
urgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard
Goodwin At the specific request of Goodwin
the State Department replied
to Dearborn on 17
TMp SEORET
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and advised him to keep in mind the President' s view , as
expressed at the 5 National Security Council Meeting , that
the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo
before knowing what government would succeed him_ (Depart -
ment to Dearborn 5/17/61)
Dearborn responded on 21 , 1961 , pointing out that
for over 3 year State Department representatives in the
Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort
to overthrow 'frujillo and had assisted the dissidents in
nunerous ways , all of which were known to the Department . It
6T was , Dearborn stated, too late to consider whether United
States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo. 11 Dearborn invited
further guidance from State
In response to Dearborn 5 request for guidance
I
the State
Department drafted a reply on May 24 The draft discussed: a
conflict between two objectives:
"i (1) To be So associated with removal Trujillo
regime a5 to derive credit among DR dissidents
and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
0 (2) To disassociate US from any obvious inter-
vention in Dominican Republic and even more So
from any political assassination which might
0 occur
Top SECBET
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It was said to be the Department 5 considered 'opinion that
"forler objective cannot , repeat not , easily override latter.
(State Dept _ to Dearborn cable , 5/24/61 not sent)
This State Departulent draft was forwarded to Under Secretary
Bowles with the colment thiat Goodwin considered it JI too negative
and that he would try his hand on a draft # for' Bundy to present
01 tomorrow morning . (Memo from Achilles to Boivles 5/24/61)
A 26 , 1961'= memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins :
"Followving
up on our discussion of the Dominican
Republic at yesterday 5 meeting of the Special
Group , I an forwarding
You a draft telegram which
we would like to send to Henry Dearborn our Consul
General in Ciudad Trujillo supplementing the
guidance he will be receiving on the recently
TB approved con- tingency plans
Minutes _ of the Special Group meeting on May 25 , 1961 d0 not,
however reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic
If, as Bowles memorandum suggests , a discussion concerning
the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting , it is
not known what the discussion involved or what decisions ,
if any , were made
Richard Goodwin personally preparea alternate drafts to
the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn Goodwin testi-
fied that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate
to Dearborn , President Kennedy S personal belief that the United
States:
didn't want to do anything that would
involve
u5 further, the United States further
in' any effort to assassinate Trujillo. I4
(Goodwin 7/10 , P.32)
Twk JCGGSZH
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At the same time Goodwin s draft raised the issue of
further covert action and transfer of arms to the dissidents
and advised Dearborn to nold out the arms J5 being available
to tne dissidents pending their ability to receive them _
It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised bY
Goodwin (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces
of the dissidents who ; it was believed , would constitute the
new government following Trujillo' s assassination and (2)
to avoid any action which might further involve the United
States in the anticipated assassination This dual purpose
is clearly evident in the cable which advised:
we must not run risk of U.S _ association
Iith political assassination since U.S _ as matter
of general policy cannot condone assasinatzon
This last principal 1s overriding and must prevail
in doubtful situation m1 (Emphasis added)
* * * * * * *
"Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S.
support for their position_ 10
According to Goodwin
8
the underscored material was inserted in
the cable" at the specific direction of Eresident Kennedy .
(Goodwin, 7/10 , PP . 22 _ 23)
With- respect to the four machine guns which were in the
Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by the
dissidents , the cable advised Dearborn that the UaS_ was unable
to transfer these arms to the dissidents: Dearborn was
instructed to:
"Tell them that this is because of our suspicion
that method of transfer may be unsafe In actual
Uc
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_ 45.5
fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would
serve very little purpose and expose the United
States to great danger 0f association with
assassination attempt _ J1
The cable , as revised by Goodwin and approved President
Kennedy , was sent to Dearborn on 29 1961 (State Dept .
to Dearborn cable 5/29/61)
VII: 30 1961 and Imediately Thereafter:
A Truiillo_Assassinated
Late in the evening of May 30 1961 Trujillo was ambushed
and assassinated near San Cristobal Dominican Republic _ The
assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed the
action group to American representatives in the Doninican Republic
ana passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and
the state Department. (Dearborn cable to State 5/30/61) The
assassination was conducted members of the action group , to
Whom the American carbines had been passed and such sketchy
information as is available indicates that one or more of the
carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when
Trujillo was killea_ (I G _ Report , Pp . 60-61) This evidence indicate
however that the actual assassination was accomplished by
handguns and shotguns _ (I.G_ Report , P. 61)
B Cables to Washington
After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington , both Consul
General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies _ According
to Dearborn 5 testimony , he did not regard the 29 cable
as a change in U.S _ policy concerning support for assassinations _
(Dearborn 7/29/75 ( P. 74)
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He interpreted the 29 cable 3s saying:
11 we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate
Trujillo , that is al1 right But we don't want
anything to this on us because we aren't
doing it it is the Dominicans who are doing
it m1 (Dearborn, 7/29 , p 104 )
Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had
always been his personal belief; that the U.S _ should not be
involved in an assassination and that if an assassination
occurred it would be strictly
a Dominican affair_ (Dearborn
7/29 , PP_ 100 , 101)
In contrast the CIA Station Chief , Owen, did regard the
cable as manifesting a change in U.S_ policy , particularly: on
the questionof supplying arms (Owen P . 120 ) He believed the
29 cable was the final word in U.S, policy on this matter
and consequently felt that the government had retreated from
its prior-position; of offering material support to the dissi-
dents and had adopted a new position of withholding such surport_
Owen 5 responsive cable to Headquarters stated:
"HQS aware extent to Which U.S . government already
associated with assassination If we are to at least
cover up tracks CIA personnel directly involved in
m assassination preparation must be withdrawn_
(Station to HQS cable , 5/30/61 )
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Immediately Eollowing the assassination , all CIA
personnel in the Dominican Republic Wvere removed from the
country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was
back in Nashington The State Department cabled the CIA station
in the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerning
contacts with dissidents and any related matters , except not to
destroy the contingency plans or the May 29 , 1961 cable to Dear-
born (HQS to Station cable , 5/31/61 .
C Immediate Post-Assassination Period
The U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick
to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated _
and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to
President Kennedy in Paris The President' s Press Secretary ,
Pierre Salinger , made the first public announcement of the
assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news
in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified
that when he learned of Salinger
S announcement he was most con-
cerned Rusk said that Trujillo' 8 son Ramfis was als0 in Paris
and he was afraid that Ramfis _ upon first learning of his
father' s death from the press secretary to the President of the
U.S _ might try to retaliate against President Kennedy_ (Rusk
32 , 33.)
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SCHNEIDER REPORT
Reviewed and Agreed to by
Draf Subcommittee on
August 27 1975
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Mnn
SCHNEIDER REPORT
Page
I_ Summarx 1
II_ The President 5 Initial General Instruction 6
and Background
4 September 15 White House Meel 6
B Background : Tracks I and II 8
C.: CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15
IIIS CIA' s InpLementation of Track II 17
A. Evolution of CIA Strategy 17
1 The "Constitutional Coup' I Approach 17
2 . Military Solution 18
B. The Chile Task Force 19
C The Use of the Attache and Interagency 20
Relations
D. The False Base 26
E_ Chief of Station 27
IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a 29
A. The Chilean Conspirators 29
B. Contacts Prior to October 15 30
C_ October 15 Decision 34
D. Planning and Attempts After October 15 36
E The Killing oE General Schneider 39
F_ Post October 22 Events 4]
V, CIAlWhite House Communication During_Track II 43
A. tember 45
B _ October
#8Q
46
33,h
E
C_ December 54
D. Did Track II End? 54
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Coup
Coup
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SCHNEIDER REPORT
I. Summary
On September 4 , 1970 , Dr Salvador Allende Gossens won a Plurality
in Chile' s Presidential election * Since n0 candidate had received a
majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that
a joint session of its Congress decide between: the first and second place
finishers_ This constitutional requirement had in the past , been Pro-
forma_ The Congress had always selected the candidate who received
highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session
was October 24 , 1970 .
On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director
Richard Helns that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to
the United Stites_ The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a
direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent
Allende s accession to the' presidency. The Agency was to take this action
without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without
informing the U.S_ Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilitcies in
general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende S accession to
power were explored the 40 Comnittee throughout this period the 40
Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever
approve that role. The institution to which the Agency was to re-
port, both for informational and approval purposes was the White House.
Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in
Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition, was made
up of Communis Socialists; Social Democrats Radicals and dissident
Christian Democrats Allende was 3 self-proclaimed Marxist and was making
his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radonire Tomic Romero,
candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party , and Jorge Alessandri
Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party _ Dr Allende won
36 . 37 of the popular_vote; Alessandri was secend. with 35.3% of the vote
Dr _ Allende 5 margin of victory was 39 0oo votes out of a total of 3 mil
lion votes cast in the election. The incumbent President Eduardo Frei
Montalvo, 3 Christian Democrat was ineligible for re-election. Chilean
law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves _
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In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President S Assis-
tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger , informed of its
activities.
Between October 5 October 20 , 1970 , the CIA made 21 contacts
with military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those
Chileans who. were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of
strong support at the highest levels of the U.S_ Government , both be-
fore and after a coup.
One oE the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators
in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief
of the General Rene Schneider who insisted the constitutional
process be followed As a.result of his strong constitutional stand
the removal of General Schneider becane a necessary ingredient in the
coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators_ Unable to have General
Schneider retired or reassigned_ the conspirators decided to kidnap
him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19 1970 ,
by a group of Chilean military officers whon the CIA was actively sup-
porting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following un-
successfully. In the early morning hours of October 22 1970 , machine
guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed
on
October 19' 'That same General Schneider was mortally
wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted
kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspira-
tors other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier
in the
2
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A Chilean military court found chat high-ranking military officers
both active and retired conspired to bring about a military coup and
to kidnap General Schneider Several of the officers whon the CIA had
contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of con-
spiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out
the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of: Ceneral Schneider were assoc-
iates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by
the CIA to be the best However , later the CIA discouraged General
Viaux because the Agency felt other officers , such as General Camilo
Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved_ General Viaux was convicted by the
military court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being
06 the "intellectal author of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General
Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile
for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende' $ assumption of
office. The military court found that the two Generals had been in
contact throughout the coup plot
The principal facts leading UP to the death of General Schneider (all
of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:
1 By the end of September 1970 , it appeared that the only feasible
way for the CIA to lement the Presidential order to prevent Allende Erom
coming to power was to Eoment a coup d'etat.
2 . All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean mili-
tary entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or ano ther
3 _ United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean
plans for a coup after it became know that the: first step would be co
kidnap General Schneider.
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4 Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made , one on October 19
the other on October 20 _ Following these attempts , and with knowledge
of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition
to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider _
5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22_ apparently conducted
by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied General
Schneider was shot and subsequently died The guns in the abor-
tive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability , not those
supplied by the CIA to the conspirators . The Chilean military court
which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had
been murdered by handguns although one machine gun was at the scene of
the killing.*
6 . While there is no question that the CIA received a direct
instruction the President On tember 15ch to attempt to foment
3 coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about
whether the White House was kept informed of and authorized , the
couP efforts in Chile after October 15 _ On one side of the conflict
is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander on the
other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House
stood down,CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on
October 1970 . After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig: agreed ~4
that the White House neither knew nor specifically approved CIA:
coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand have testi~
fied that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and
The Committee has not been able to determine whether or nct
the machine at the scene of the Schneider killing was one of the
three by the CIA.
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* thus authorized by the White House.
This conflict in tes timony , which the Comnittee has been unable
to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record_ leaves un-
answered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting
pursuant to higher authority (the CIA' s view) or was pursuing coup
activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/
Haig view)
The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the White House of
its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized
No one who testified believed that che CIA was required to seek step-by -
step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White
House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed
unwise. Both Kissinger and agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persua-
sive plan to them, it almost cer tainly would have been approved The CIA
did not believe it needed specific White House authorization to trans wea-
pons to the' Chileans; in fact, CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas
Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer,
but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the
Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to
Karamessines subordinates that he would approve their decision to do
So . He believed he Probably was informed before the weapons actually
were sent =
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II "The_President 5 Initial_General Instruction and Background
A September 15 White House Mee
On September 15 , 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for
National Security Affai Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms
and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was
Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting re-
flect both its tenor and the President' s instructions :
1 in 10 chance perhaps , but Save Chile!
worth spending
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of Embassy
$10,000 00o available more if necessary
full-time job--best men we have
game
make the economy scream
48 hours for of action
In his tescimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled
coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:
(the) impression that the President came down
very hard that he wanted sone thing done, and he
didn t much care how and that he was prepared to
make money availabie_ This was a Pretty all-
inclusive order_ If I ever carried a marshall' $
baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it
was that * (Helms tes timony , July 15 , PP . 6,10,41)
Director Helms also testified that the September 1Sth meeting with
President Nixon may have been triggered by-the presence of Augustin
Edwards , the publisher of the Santiago daily El Mercurio, in Washing-
ton That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall President of
Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast
with Kendall and Edwards (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversa-
tion was the tical situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio
and other antf-Allende forces According to Mr Helms :
- recall that prior to this meeting (with the President)
the editor of El Mercurio had cone to Washington_ and
I had been ,asked to g0 and talk to him at one of the
hotels here, this having been arranged through Don
Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company_ 1 have
this impression that the President called this meeting
where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards
presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall
about what Edwards was saying about conditions in
Chile and what was happening there_
(Helms testimony , July 15 PP . 4-5)
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However; none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within
the guidelines Helms had been given_
Senator Hart of Colorado did the kind of carte
blanche mandate you carried the marshall' s baton
that you carried out in a knapsack to stop Allende
Erom assuming office , include physical elimination?
Mr . Helms Well, not in my mind because when I be-
came Director, I had already made up my mind that we
weren t going to have any of that business when I was
Director and I had made that clear to my fellows and
I think will tell you this
'The following tember 16 , Director Helms called a meeting
at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he re-
lated to his colleagues his understanding of the President S instruc-
tions:
2 The Direclor told the group that President
Nixon had decided that an Allende" regime in Chile
was unacceptable to the United States. The Presi-
dent asked the Agency to prevent Allende from com
to power or to unseat him. The President
authorized S10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed
Further the Agency is to carry out this mission
without coordination with the Departments of State
cr Defense
(Memorandum] Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970)
Henry Kissinger S recollection of the September 15 meeting with
$ President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms Although
Dr Kissinger did not recall the President 5 instructions to be as
precise as those related by' Director Helns he did testify that:
the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting
was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent
Allende from being seated_ (Kissinger testimony , P. 13)
***
The docunents the officials from whon the Committee has heard
tes timony . are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon
authorized on tember 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a
military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not,chowever, agreenent
about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House-
and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week between
October 15 and the death of General Schneider October 22 _ This
matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider
killing.
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It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms)
to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or
to take the initiative in preventing Allende from
takIng office. (Kissinger tes timony, P. 12)
Operationally , the CIA set the President 5 instructions into motion
on September 21 _ On that two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters
to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:
3 Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende a5-
sumption of power_ Parliamentary legerdemain has
been discarded _ Military solution is objective.
to Scn . 236 , 21 September 1970)
*4*
Ba (Track Two)--This is authority granted to CIA
only , to work toward a military solution to problem .
As part of au thority we were expltcitly told that
40 Comnittee State, Ambassador and Embassy were
not to be told of this Track Two nor involved in any
matter (Hqs . to Stn- 240 ,. 21 September . 1970)
Ba Background: Tracks I II
United States Government concern over an Allende regine in Chile
did not begin with President Nixon 5 September 15 instruction to the
* CIA. For more than a year; Chile had been on the 40 Committee 5 agenda.
At an April 15 , 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of
the 40 Commitcee) the question arose as to whether anything should be
done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile.
" At that Director Helms pointed out that an election operation will
#
Covert U.S . Government involvement in large-scale tical action
programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election As in
1970 , this was in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore
Allende _ Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort.
(Colby testimony_
8 _-
July 14
7 .
1975 , P: 5)
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J 9
not be-effective unless an early enough start is made On March 25
1970_ the 40 Comittee approved 3 joint Embassy/CIA proposal recom~
mending that "spoiling operations--propaganda and other activities_-
be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent- an election victory
by Allende S Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was
authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity. On
June 18 , 1970, the U.S_ Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a
two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review
The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende
campaign; The second was a contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort
in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970_ 00
Phase II was, stated simply , a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to
vote against Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 elec-
tion. On June 27 1970, the 40 Committee increased . Eunding for the
# anti-Allende "spoilingF operation to $390,000 . decision on Ambassador
Korry S bribe Proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4
election.
The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plural-
of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his
instruction co Director Helms on
September-is** At both these meetings the
question of U,S. involvenent in a military coup .against Allende was raised
Kissinger stressed the' importance_ of these meetings when he testified be-
the. Select Committee:
#This and GEher references to 40 Comittee discussions and actions regard-
Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the
CIA entitled "Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement
in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 01 dated: October 9 , 1970 .
On August 25, 1975 , we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council
documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Govern-
ment to Prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office. On Septenber 4 the
Committee received 46 decuments Erom the White-House relating to Chile cover-
the period September 5 td
OcEobel, 1a
#*See Page 9a
Eeio E
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**Following the September 4 election, the CIA' s Directorate.of Intelli-
gence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of
an Allende government on W.S _ national interests . That assessment ,
dated September 7 , 1970, stated:
Regarding threats to W.S _ interests, we conclude that;
1 The U.$_ has no vital national interests within Chile
There would , however be tangible economic 'losses _
2 _ The world military balance of power would not be
nificantly altered by an Allende government _
3_ An Allende victory would however create consider-
able. political and psychological costs:
a Hemispheric cohesion would be threacened by
the challenge that an Allende government
would pose to the OAS and by the reactions
that it would create in other countries
We do not see, however any' likely threat
to the Peace of the region.
b . An Allende victory would represent a defin-
ite psychological set-back Lo the U.S. and
a definite psychological advance for the
Marxist idea _ (Intelligence Memorandun/
"Situation Following the Chilean Presidential
I Election, CIA $ Directorate of Intelligence
7 September 1970)
TCP SEBRET
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I_ think the meeting of tember 15th has to be
seen in the context of two Previous meetings of
the 40 Committee on September 8th and tember
14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look
at the Pros' and cons and the problems and pros -
Pects of a Chilean military coup to be organized
with United States assistance
(Kissinger tes P . 5)
According to the summary of the 40 Commi ttee mee ting on tember
8 , the following was discussed:
all concerned realized that previous plans for
a Phase II would have to be drastically redrawn.
The DCI made the point however that congressional
action against Allende was not likely to succeed
and that once Allende was in office the Chilean
opposition to hin would disintegrate and collapse
rapidly: While not advocating a specific course
of action , the Director further observed that 3
military golpe against Allende would have very
little chance of success unless undertaken soon
Both the Chairman and the 'Attorney Ceneral supported
this view At the close of the meeting the
Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a # cold-
blooded assessment" of:
1) the pros and cons and problems and pros-
pects involved should a Chilean military
coup be organized now wich U.$ assistance,
and
2) the pros and cons and problems and pros-
pects involved in organizing an effective
future Chilean opposition to Allende.
(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our
Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970
Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)-
Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee 5 request for a
#1 cold-blooded assessment" on
September 12 He stated that Lthe
Embassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat
not, move to; prevent Allende 5 accession, barring unlikely situation
of national: chaos and widespread violence _ The Ambassador went on to
say that "Our own
military people Larel unanimous in rejecting possi-
Ilp SECPET
M re4
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bility of meaningful: military intervention in political situation
He concluded by sta "What we are saying in this cold-blooded
assessment is that opportunities for Eurther 'significant USG action
with the Chilean military are nonexistent 0 (Memorandum/Ambassador 5
Response to Request Eor; nalysis of Military Option in Present Chilean
Situation, 12 September 1970)
The. CIA S' response was ih che sane vein. Viron Kissinger 5
assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the
1] CIA 5 "cold-blooded assessment in a 'memo to his boss: "Military_ ac-
tion is impossible; the military 18 incapable and 'unwilling to seize
power We have no capability Eo motivate or instigate 3 coup _ (Memo-
randum for Dr Kissinger/Chile--4O Committee Mee Monday-~September 14
September 14 , Viron P_ Vaky)
On tember 14 , the 40 Committee met to' discuss these reports and
what: &ction was to be taken:
Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared
review of tical and military options in the
Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy
and Station S 96 cold-blooded assessment The Com-
u mittee focused on the sO-called "Rube Goldberg'
gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the
Congress on October 24th resigning thereafter to
leave Frei constitutionally free-to run in a second
election for the presidency .
TOP SZCRET
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~ll-
Anbassador Korry was asked to g0 directly to President
Frei to see if he would be willing to commit himself to
this line of action A contingency of 8250,000 was
approved for covert support of projects which Frei or
I1 his trusted team deem important It was Eurther agreed
that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by the Agency
to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover
(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our
Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970
Chilean Presidential Election , 9 October 1970)
Following the September 14 Forty Committee mee ting and President
Nixon S September 15 instruction co the CIA, U.S. Government efforts
#
to prevent Allende Erom assuming office proceeded on two tracks Track
I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, in-
cluding the s250,000 contingency fund co bribe Chilean congressmen as
well as propaganda and econonic activities_ These activities were
designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his
assumption of power either through political or military means . Track
The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House
officials who were knowledgeable about the President S September 15 order
Lo the CIA. The Commnittee sent letters to various: senior officials in-
quiring if they were, in fact not knowledgeable of the Track II activities.
Those letters were sent to Secretary of Stace William Rogers_ Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard Under-
secretary of State for Political Affairs U_ Alexis Johnson . Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thonas Moorer NSC Staff Member for
Latin America Viron P . Director of the State Depar tment ' s Bureau
of Intelligence and Research Ray S _ Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission
in Santiago Harry WS Shlaudeman Thus far the Committee has received
written responses from Messrs Moorer Johnson , Shlaudeman and Cline
All except Cline have indicated that had no knowledge' of the Track II
activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a
general way , from his subordinare who handled 40 Committee work and from
former associates at the CIA_ In oral communications with Comittee
6taff members , Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware
of Track II
2
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II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon S
September 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting and
encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende_ In his testimony
before the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between Tracks
I and II:
There was work by all of the agencies to try Lo
prevent Allende from being seated and there was
work by all of the' agencies on the so-called Track
I to encourage the military to Inove against Allende
the difference between the September 15th meet-
and what was being done in general within the
government was that President Nixon was encouraging
6 more direct role for the CIA in actually organiz-
such a coup. (Kissinger testimony, Pa 13)
Tracks I and II did, in fact, move togeEher in the month Jfrez
tember_ 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry , who was Eormally
excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup becane broader and
broader_ In the 40 Committee me eting on September 14 , he and other
"appropriate members of the Embassy Mission 11 were authorized to inten-
sify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their
willingness to support the "Frei gambit' "_-a voluntary turn-over of
power to the military by Frei, who then have been eligible to
run for President in new elections_ (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Related
to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presiden-
tial Election, 9 October 1970)
In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary
Charles Meyer on September 21 Ambassador Korry indicated .that in order
to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would
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"*
have to_ be neutralized by displacement if necessary (Korry to
Meyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) testifying,
Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated #1 the degree to which Track
5
I and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on Track
I were working ori exactly the same problem as the CIA was working on
Track II_ (Kissinger testimony , P. 21)
Ambassador Korry S activites in Chile between September 4 and
October 24 support Kissinger' s view that the line separating Track I
and Track II often became blurred . For example , the Ambassador was
au thorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if
Allende were seated the military could no further military
assistance (MAP ) from the United States Later, in response to his OwnT
recomendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that
all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcone
of the Congressional election on October 24 _ On October 7 Ambassador
Korry received the following cable Erom Kissinger and Under Secretary
In this same situation report Ambassador Korry related a message that
he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating
the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should
Allende assume office.
Frei should know that not a nue-er bolt will be
allowed co reach Chile under Allende _ Once
Allende comes to we shall do all within
our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans 'to
utmost deprivation &nd poverty , a policy designed
for a long time Eo cone to accelerate the hard
features of a Communist society in Chile Hence ,
for Frei to believe that there will be much of
an alternative co utter misery, such as seeing
Chile muddle through , would be strictly illusory.
The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and the Chilean
military was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions
and of instructions to_ the field_ Helms notes: from the tember
15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation
T0 make the economy scream. Economic leverage was the primary
topic of a September 18 White House mee ting involving Kissinger,
Helns and Karamessines_
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of State U.~Alexis Johnson:
2 you are now au thorized to inform discreetly
the Chilean' military through the channels available
to You that if a successful effort is made to block
Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the
cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean
MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed
MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces If any: steps
the military should take should result in civil dis-
order we would also be prepared promptly co deliver
support and material that might be immediately re-
quired (Hqs _ to Stn 075517 7 October 1970)
The essential difference between Tracks I and II as evidenced by
instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period was not that Track
II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in
mind . The difference between the two tracka was, simply , that the CIA' s
direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion and
support for a3 coup , were to be known to 3 small group of individuals
in the White House the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II
19 matters were to be reported directly to the White House for reasons
3b of security. (Kissinger testimony , Pa 14) Thonas Karamessines, the
CIA' s Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA
contact with the White House on Track II ma tters, testified on his
understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador
Korry were excluded From Track II:
That was not 3 decision that we made But the
best I can do is suggest that there was concern
about two things _ Number one that there might
be serious objections lodged for example by
the State Department particularly if Track 2
were co be laid out at a Forty Committee mee ting.
And che other thing I can contribute to that
is that it was Eelt that the security of the
activity would be better protected if knowledge
of it were limited. (Karamessines testimony , P. 122)
TOD
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CIA Views of Difficulty of_Project
jOn one point the tes timony of CIA officials who were involved in
Track II is unanimous all said they thought Track II was unlikely
R
to succeed _ That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the
top_ all said felt they were being asked to do the impossible ,
that the risks and potential costs of the project were too. great. At
the same time, they felt had been given an explicit Presidential
order and tried to execute that order.
A few excerpts from the testimony follow:
Richard Helms _ CIA Director
Iny heart sank over this mee because_ the
possibility of bringing off some like this
seemed Lo me at that time to be just as remote as
anything could be_ In practical terms the
was constitutionalist. And when look here at
the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking
you to accomplish soue thing, it seemed really almost
inconceivable.
What I came away from the mee with
the distinct impression that we were being
asked to do almost the impossible and trying
to indicate this was going to be pretty tough _
(Helms testimony , 15 1975 , PP . 6-7)
David Phillips, Chief Chile Task Force
it is my eeling that the odds are unaccept-
able , it is some thing that is not going to work,
and we are going to be burned if we into it
what are the chances of pulling off a coup
successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from
assuming the presidency? we never even to
two chances out of 20_ (Phillips testimony , Pa 16)
I assure you that those people that I
was in touch with at the Agency just about univers-
said, my God , why are we given this as8ignment?
(Phillips tes timony, P. 53)_
James Flannery, Deputy Chief Western Hemisphere Division
There was just no question that we had to make
this effort, no matter what the odds were And
I think that most people felt that the odds were
just Pre long . (Flannery testimony , Pa 20)
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Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor S
difficulty was known to the White House . Helms commented on the Septem-
ber 15th mee "So realizing al1 of these things, I' m relatively
certain that that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough. M
(Helms tes timony , 15 , 1975 , P. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing
M out to the President that the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized
and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do some thing ,
there did not seem to be much hope. M (Karamessines testimony , Pa 10)
8
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III_ {CIGxs ImplemenEation of Track II
A < Evolution of CIA Strategy
The President S instruction to the CIA on tember 15 to prevent
Allende S assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S _
Government effort to achieve that end _ The September 15 instruction
to the CLA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup
d 'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military
circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place
without active U.S_ encouragenent and support.
There was much talk among Chilean officers about
the possibility of some kind of coup. .but this
was not the kind of talk that was being backed by ,
you know serious organizational Planning .
(Karamessines testimony , 6 , 1963 , Pa 32)
1 The "Constitutional_Coup_ Approach
Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende
victory continued simultaneous with Track II the Agency premised its
activities on the assumption that the Political avenue was a dead end
On September 21 , CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:
Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-
tion of power _ Paranilitary legerdemain has been
discarded Military solution is objective
(Hqs 236 , Sept- 21 , 1970 , Para. 3)
The initial strategy attempted, to enlist President Frei in promo
a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years . The Agency
decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a
successful military takeover (Nov . 18 , 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)
Under this plan Frei would invite the military co take over, dissolve the
Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had
been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei' s 1964 canpaign was sent to see hin
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with this message on! tember 24 _ (Task Force tenber 23)
Thomas Karamessines the Deputy Director for Plans , testified:
So this was in a sense not Track II but in a
sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully
non-violent military coup This was abandoned
when the military were reluctant to push Frei
publicly. and number two, Frei was reluctant
to leave On his own] in the absence of pressure
from the military There was left as the only
chance of success a straight military coup.
(Karamessines testimony , 6 , 1975 , P. 6)
At the sane time the Station in Santiago reported:
Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor
Schneider will act_ For that reason any scenario
in which either has to play an active role now
appears utterly unrealistic _ Overtures to lower
echelon officers (e.g. Valenzuela) can of course
be made This involves promoting Army split.
(Stn _ to 424, September 23 , 1970)
2 _ Military Solution
President Frei' $ failure even to attempt to persuade his ow party
convention on October 3-4 Erom reaching a compromise with Allende ended
all hope cf using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18
meno , Heims to Kissinger, page 16) Thus , by the beginning of October
it was clear that 3 vehicle for a military solution would have to be
found in the second echelon of Chilean officers and that the top Leader-
of the Armed Services particularly General Rene Schneider consti-
tuted 3 S tumbling block . (Santiago 424, tember 1970; Santiago 439
September 30 , 1970) The Agency' $ task was co cause 3 coup in a highly
unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented
by Frei' $ inaction, Schneider S strong constitutionalism, and the absence
of organization and: enthusiasm among those officers who were interested
in a coup.
A three-fold program was set into motion:
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Terq
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a Collect intelligence on coup-minded ofEicers;
b Create a coup climate by propaganda , disinformation,
and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to
give 3 pretext for a coup; #(Hqs _ 611 , October 7 , 1970)
C Inform those coup-minded officers:that the U.S _ Govern-
ment would give them full support in a coup short of direct
U.S. military intervention. (Iqs . October 14 , 1970)
B. The Chile Task_Force
Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special
task force was created in the CIA ' s Western Hemisphere Division to manage it.
The task force was placed under the daily:direction of the Deputy Direc-
tor for Plans Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency 5 most
experfenced and skilled operators_ were detailed to the task force .
*A cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused
on creating an
appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:
1 _ It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification
that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It
therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will
ably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism. You may
wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for
their use These could include but are not lini to: A) Firm intel.
that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along
Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state. B)Economic
situation collapsing . C)By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist
coun tries Allende assumed U.S _ would cut off material assistance to
Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers Would then
enpty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of
terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes
from Allende on this.)
2 _ Station has written some excellent prop guidances _ Using thenes
at hand and which best known to you we are now asking to prepare
intel report based on sone vell known facts some fiction to justify
coup, split opposition, and adherents for military group _ With
appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel report
which could even be planted during raids planned by' Carabineros_
3. We urge you to this idea and some concrete suggestions to plot-; KER
cers as soon as you can. should have a justification to Prosper _
(Headquarters 882 , 19 October 1970)
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David A Phillips , Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro was summoned
back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the
Division Chief William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head
of the Chile Branch , no other officers in the Division were aware of the
task force 5 activities , not even those officers who normally had responv
sibility for Chile. The task force had a special comunications channel to
Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II_
(November 18 , 1970 , Helms to Kissinger memo , page 3) Most of the
significant operational decisions were made by Phillips , Broe
Karamessines who met on a daily basis_
It should be noted that all those involved with the task force des-
cribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed , Karamessines
has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the
heaviest of Pressure to get this accomplished , and he in turn was
f1 under the heaviest of pressures to ic accomplished. (Kara-
messines testimony, August 6, 1975 , page 7) The Deputy Chief of the
Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery , testified that pressure was
" a5 tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme. (Flannery testi-
mony , July 15, 1975 , page 20) Broe testified that "I have never
through a period as we did on the Chilean thing _ I mean it was just
constant, constant, 'Just continual pressure. It was coming from the
11 White House _ (Broe testimony , August 4 , 1975, page 55)
C The Use of the_Army Attache and_Interagency_ Relations
The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the
Chilean military to carry out its task_ However the U.S_ Army At-
tache in Santiago , Colonel Paul Wimert , knew the Chilean 'military
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very well dueato his five :years of service there and his broad personal
contacts among the Chilean officers_ Following a proposal by the Chief
of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in-
telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him 33 a
channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U S _ support
for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Comnittee:
We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,
the senior military which we had not maintained and did not
have , but which we felt confident that our military represen-
tative in Chile had And we the approval of the DIA to
enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro-
cure intelligence.
(Karamessines tes timony, August 6 , 1975 , P . 6)
To obtain Wimert 5 services CIA officials prepared a suggested mes-
sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago
through CIA communications channels Because the DIA Director General
Donald V_ Bennett, was in Europe on official business
9
the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence = General Cushman invited DIA Deputy
Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28 ,
1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of
the Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized
transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:
to work closely with the CAS chief or in his absence ,
his deputy , in contacting and advising-the principal mili-
tary figures who might play 3 decisive role in any move which
might, eventually , the presidency to Allende.
Do repeat advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-
tache of this message or them any indication of its
portent In the course of your routine activities_ act in
accordance with the Ambassador 5 instructions Simultaneously ,
I wish-*and now authorize you--to act in 3 concerted Fashion
with the CAS chief
* General Bennett returned ta the;United States oni the evening of October
10 , 1970_ General Philpott was; Acting Dfrector in Bennett S absence.
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This message is for your eyes and should not be dis_
cussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will
be knowledgeable CAS will identify them . (Headquarters 380
to Santiago)
For this and 2l1 subsequent messages intended for the Attache,
the secret CIA communications channel was used_
Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-
tially the Army Attache would be used only o "obtain or procure" in-
telligence on Chilean military officers . * (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines ,
p. 6) The September 28 , 1970 message to the Attache, however. did
in fact trigger his involvement in the coup attempt According to
the Attache 8 tes timony , he received day-to-day instructions . from the
Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages
ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to
take certain actions The COS also transmitted messages from the Army
Attache to these Generals
General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II
and that he never received any communication relating thereto , nor did
he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Attache.
General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything
connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman
on tember 28 _ (Philpott, P. 16)
U . S . Army Colonel Robert C_ Roth, who in September and October 1970
was the Chief of the Kuman Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,
5
In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about
this letter Ceneral Philpott testified that he recalled signing
an authorization such as that contained in the first; paragraph of
F
Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and
instructions in paragraphs tvgrand'
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Army
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23'
duish
testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on
"a priority requirement o identify Chilean personalities who might be
M helpful in Preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile.
(Roth , Vol . I, Pa 6) Though Roth recalls: no mention of Track II as such,
the of this mission is identical to that described in the message
of September 28 bearing Philpott S signature
Beginning on October 15 , Roth kept a chronology of his activities
connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting
on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean
generals' which focused on their willingness to participate in a military
coup, Generals Bennett, Philpott, and 3 CIA representative attended _
The chronology also shows that on October Roth delivered a message to
Mr Broe to be sent by CIA channels. * A message was sent to Col Wimert
that same ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:
FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has
been rescinded_ This action does not repeat not . imply
change in our estimate of situation . On the contrary ,
it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can
E
Eormally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa_
tion develops as we anticipate_ Request up_ date on situa-
tion (Santiago 446; Ref : Headquarters 762) (Headquarters
934 , 21 October 1970)
[
Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he
followed Philpott 5 instructions to deliver biographic information on
Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that
Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this
message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-
5
sponse' Erom Broe to an earlier message_ to Colonel Winert (Roth,
Vol _ II, P.
TOp SEZRAKT
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T any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility
of che CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions (Roth ,
Pa 8 ) *
Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described
by Roth were routine DIA activities. However Colonel Roth testified:
1 believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is
that I was informed that there was concern at the highest
U.$_ Governmental level over the' possible election of Allende,
that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with
the identities of Chilean personalities that would be
and S0 forth I have no specific as to the nature 'of
the instructions or the channels through which came
Q_ It was your sense at the time that you were working on a
project that if it had not been initiated at least had
the attention of or concern of the highest level?
9#
Roth S chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe
be queried On two or three .occasions regarding a report from Wimert
and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi_
cate with Cushman if the need arose_ (Roth, P. 11) Roth also tes
fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would
be by CIA channels _ (Roth, P 41)
TCP ScceT_
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Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time
Q_ You understand from work in the Defense Departmen t
that the highest level of government usually indicated the
President of the United States?
Colonel Roth. I would assume that_
The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify
Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient . Among
these docunents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott' s
purported signature_ (Undated message _ ca. 14 October 1970) General
Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that
it was and he could not recall signing or having seen it. (Philpott ,
P. CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762)
and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General
Bennett to the Attache_ General Bennett' testified he did. not
authorize these messages:
It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military
assistance area: It goes beyond the responsibility which I
had in terms that I would have to the authority or the
approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert
action of this magnitude_ This message would not have been
signed by me (Bennett tes timony , P. 21)
According to Karamessines , only the White House had the authority Eo
issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi-
mony , P. 84 )
The' Department `of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear-
on the issue of Wimert' & Track II instructions or responses 4
DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0 Graham , the
present Director of DIA, produced no of communication documents
for the September-October 1970 period_ (Graham, P. 6) However_ Roth
5
testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on
his activities are missing 'Erom the: files: (Roth II, P.
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76125}
CIA officials maintain that acted faithfully in transmitting
messages to Generals Benrett and/or Philpott and in never sending 3
message without proper au thorization. Mr Karamessines was particularly
forceful in this regard:
I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central
In telligence Agency in which a message was received for an
individual an officer of the government anywhere, in what_
ever rtment , which was not faithfully, directly, promptly
and fully and accurately delivered to that officer or to his
authorized representative
(Karamessines tes timony , P. 79)
We may have played tricks overseas but it stopped at the
water S and we didn t play tricks among ourselves or
among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies _
(Karamessines tes timony , P. 79)
We could not remain in business for 3 if this had been
the practice of the Agency . It would have been no time at
all before we would have been found a single instance
of the kind of thing you are sugges might have taken
place would have uS out of business
(Karamessines testimony ,
P. 80)
Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache $
role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Attache.
(Kissinger tes timony , P. 22)
The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the
statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials _ There are
four possibilities that could explain the conflict First, Generals
Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their
general instructions to the Army Attache_ This possibility would be
contrary to: their sworn testimony: Second. General Bennett was not aware
of Track IT but General Philpott
was and communicated general instructions to
the Attache This Possibilicy is supported by Roth S testimony
but would be contrary to Philpott 5 sworn tes timony and his to
General Bennett informed_ Third, thc CIA acted on own and ,
after 'receiving initial 'authority from General' Philpott, co-opted and ordered
HM 50955 DOcId:32423525 Page 100
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ting
Put
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Army
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Fcu Sk
the 'Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department
of Defense of the White House . This possibility would be contrary to
the sworn tes timony of David Phillips , William Broe , Thomas Karamessines,
and William Colby . Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized
the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or
highest government authority Further that the White House staff
directed that the Attache S superiors in the Pentagon not be in-
formed . This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr
Kissinger and General Alexander
D. The Falge_Flag_Base
In order to minimize the risks oE making contact with the dissident
Chilean cfficers , the task force decided in late tember to set up 3
"False Base , 0 i. to send four staff officers to Chile posing as
nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert' s contacts
* with Chilean military officers . Given the limitations of the Station 5
resources and Colonel Wimert' & visibility, Headquarters felt the use of
88 "False Officers was necessary because don t want to miss a
0R chance . One: of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer
S0 that 00 any would be a Brazilian one. " (Headquarters 363 ,
September 1970)
use of_ 'False Officers' 10 is according to David Phillips .
an unusual practice, either by the CIA or foreign. intelligence
services . (Phillips testimony ,
PPa 47-48)
HI# 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 101
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Haig.
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" ,
"We Flag
flap
27 ,
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E
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The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and re ported
separately on their contacts Eo a cover" CIA officer in Santiago
who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the
Chief oE Station, they received their instructions Erom Washington and
not from him. (Chief of Station "testimony (Felix) August 1 , 1975 , P. 27)
E Chief of Station
Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of
Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and
the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers.
The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:
I had left no doubt in the minds #f my colleagues
and superiors that I did not consider any kind of
intervention in those constitutional Processes
desirable And one of the reasons certainly for my
last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot
act--which was done in a very pleasant , but very
intelligible manner Specifically , I was told at
that time that the Agency was not too interested in
continuously being told me that certain proposals
which had been made could not be executed or would
be counterproductive. (Chief oE Station (Felix)
tes timony , August 1 , 1975 , P. 10)
The Chief of Station s objection co Track II did not g0 unnoticed _
The following instruction to the COS was senc on October 7 : "Report
should not.contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on
action taken. (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Simply , Headquarters
wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself_
F" ? Chfn
TOP
i.
J_
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Three exanples of the Chief of Station S reporting bear out his
claim to have dissented:
Bear in mind that Parameter of action is exceed-
ingly narrow and available options_ are quite
limited and relatively simple_
(San September 23 1970)
Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism_
It is essential that We not become victims of our
own propaganda _ (Santiago 441 October 1, 1970)
Urge you do not convey impression that Station has
sure-fire method of hal let alone triggering
coup attempts _ (Santiago 477 , October 7 , 1970 , P.2)
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~29_ JE9bkS1 H
IV_ CIA Efforts co Promote a
A The Chilean_Conspirators
Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several
individuals One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General
X who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection 3 year before_ Following the
0 8 "Taenazo' revolt, and his dismissal from the Army , Viaux retained the
support of many non-comissioned and junior officers as well as being
the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA
Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile , July
15 , 1975)
Another individual around which Plotting centered was General Canilo
Valenzuela, Comnander of the Santiago Garrison_ General Valenzuela was
in league with: several other active duty officers, including Admiral
Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director
General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales , Director of
the Military Academy ; and General Joaquin Carcia, second in command_
Air Force. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18 ,
1970) All of these officers , with the possible exception of Canales
**
were in contact with Viaux as well.
#This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama -
tizing the military S denand for higher pay , but was widely interpreted
a5
an abortive coup .
#The record of mee tings between Viaux and the active military officers
is incomplete The record does show, however that Viaux met with General
Huerta around October 7 (Chile Task Force October 7) _ On October 12
Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force 14 October) One
cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member
of Viaux S inner circle of conspirators _ (Station 545, 16 October 1970)
At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux _
Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups
as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony: before the Committee , the
principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led-by active duty
military officers_ The cwo groups were in contact with each other The
record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three
Schneider kidnap atcempts
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There was considerable communication among the various plotting
elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:
I might add here that it seemed that 3
dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers
were privy co what was going On in addition to
President Frei and they were all talking to one
another exchanging views and trying to see how
best to mount the kind of coup that wanted
:o see take place. (Karamessines testimony , P. 10)
B_ Contacts Prior to October 15
The CIA' s initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within
the Chilean military to stage a coup . It recognized quickly that anti-
Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police) ,
ff but were imobilized by the tradition of military respect for the
0 Constitution" and the public and private scance of General Schneider,
Comnander in Chief of the Army . who advocated strict adherence to the
1 Constitution. (CIA Report O1 Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-
ber 1970, P. 17) The Agency 9 task, then , was to overcome 80 the apolitical
}
constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military. # (Ibid , P. 2)
Since the very of the Chilean military , embodied General
Schneider and his second-in-comuand
9
General Prat were hostile to the
idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the
second level of general officers. were to be inforned that the U.S.
* Government would support a coup both before and after it took place _
(Headquarters to Station 611 , 7 October 1970) This effort began in
earnest on October 5 when Colonel Winert informed both an Army General
("Station' s priority contact") an an Air Force Gene- of the Pro-coup
#The military officers
were told for example, that should Allende be
6
prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra-
cized, but rather can continue to count on uS for MAP support and main-
M tenance of our close relationship. 075517 7 October 1970)
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* U:S; policy_ (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473 October 6)
Three later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Comnander
0 of the Carabineros that the U.S_ Government favors a military solu-
tion and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright
Ht military intervention . (Task Force 9 October) General Huerta
informed the COS that there was no chance of a by the Chilean
high command (Task Force 10 October)
On October 7 , Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy
in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons . This was
Colonel Wimert' s first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he
*$
would ultimately Pass three submachine ton October 22 At this
mee the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues
were
trying to exert force on Frei to eliminace
Gen Schneider to either replace him, send
him out of the country _ They had even stud-
ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the
main barrier to all plans for the military
to take over the government to prevent an
Allende presidency. (Santiago 483 , 8 October)
According to the CIA' s wrap-up report on Track II between October 5
and October 20 , the CIA Station and the Attache--for the most part
the latter--made 21 contacts with military and Carabinero officials
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities 8 November 1970)
**
In his test imony , Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt_ Colonel was
affiliated with General Canales (Wimert tes timony , P. 52) In a cable
sent to Headquarters on October 18 , in which the Lt_ Colonel' s request
for three submachine guns was made the Station indicated that Wimert
believed the Army officer and his companion a tain, were in
league with-Admiral Tirado _ (Station 562 , October 18) At another polnt
in his testimony Wimert stated "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy
Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force General over here.
(Wimert testimony, Pa 107) The Committee has been unable to deternine
the exact affiliation of the Lt_ Colonel However as previously
stated both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with
General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux _
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The next October 8 , Headquarters cabled the Station in response
to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel me eting- Headquarters took note of Schneider S
resistance to coup plans and stated:
This would make it more important than
ever to renove him and to bring this new
state of events anything we or Station
can do to effect removal of Schneider? We
know this rhetorical question, but wish
inspire thought On both ends on this matter.
628 , 8 October)
During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success
looked unusually bleak . The Chile Task Force commented :
President Frei and the highest levels of the
armed forces unable to themselves together
to block Allende. The Chilean mflitary S tradi-
tion of non-intervention, Frei S reluctance to
tarnish his historical image, General Schneider 1 S
constitutional stand and most importantly ,
the lack of leadership within the government and
military are working against a military takeover_
(Task Force 8 October)
The following che Station made reference to the "rapid(ly} waning
T chances for success (Santiago 487 , 9 October) This pessimism was not
dispelled by their simultaneous judgnent : ""Station has arrived at Viaux
solution by process of elimination _ (Santiago 504 10 October) Three
days later the Task Force agreed: continue to focus our attention
on General - Viaux who now appears to the military leader willing
to block Allende." (Task Force 13 October)
If Viaux was the CIA 8 only hope of staging a coup , things were bleak
indeed _ His own colleagues Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him
as General without an army . (Santiago 495 , 9 October) Yet in the
Eirst two weeks of October he came to be 'regarded: as the 'best hope for:
carrying out the CIA' $ Track II mandate .
7
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(Hqs .
Log
pull
firm
Log ,
day
"We
be ~nly
Log,
13
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~JJ-
Although Colonel" Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with
Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 5 October) he
served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military
Actache The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several
hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9 (Santiago
6- October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that
W TI a 'mini-coup at this juncture would be coun terproductive and Viaux
should postpone his plans "while encouraging hin in a suitable manner
to maintain his posture So that he may join larger movement later if
4a it materializes . (Headquarters 585 , 6 October:)
08 The primary Purpose of the "False Rase was to contact Viaux ,
and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that
task_ Viaux reiterated his demand for an air of weapons to the
" "False Flagger and the response was the same : reject the demand
for arms , but encourage hin to planning . In essence the Agency
was buying time with Viaux: wish to encourage Viaux to expand and
}i refine his coup Planning. Gain some influence over his actions
(Headquarters 689 , 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head -
quarters authorized passing s20,000 in cash a promise of $250,000
in life insurance co_ Viaux and his associates , as a demonstration of
U.S _ support. (Headquarters 729 , 13 October)
On October 13, Headquarters indicated its concern over Schneider
by asking: "what is to Schneider fron making statement in early
hours which-will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join
Viaux?" (Headquarters 729 13 October) The Station' s response later that
same was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within
the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup_ (Santiago 527
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476 ;
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and
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"}
6kii0'
Tlw
October)R This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-
tion "a8 part of a coup rhat included Valenzuela_ I (Station 529 13 October)
At about this tine the Station began to receive encouragenent its
other contacts On October 14 ten before the Chilean Congress was
to vote, the Task Force concluded :
Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing
coup activity from other military quarters
specifically, an General (nane deleted)
Admiral Tirado the forces in Concepcion and
Valdivis and Perhaps even Frei and Ossa .
(Task Force 14 October)
C_ Qctober 15_Decision
To summarize by October 15 , General Viaux had advertised to his con-
tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with
the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen-
erals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup Plans _ *
On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander
Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile . According
to the Agency 5 record of this meeting, Karamessines 90 provided a run-
down on Viaux , the Canales meeting with Tirado , and in some detail_
the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint _ FF
(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger , Karamessines
9
and 15 October
1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot ,
at least temporarily: 0
* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup Plans was the subject of a cable
from Santiago to Headquarters:
We discount Viaux S statement that he had called off his couP at-
cempt because of False Officer S impending visit_ Other re:
porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this
weekend _ (Santiago 499 , 10 October)
There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental
in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force
Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met
with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-
00 tempt a coup. (Chile Task Force 14 October)
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-35-
It was decided by those present that the Agency
must get 3 message to Viaux warning him against
any precipitate action. In essence the message
should state: have reviewed your plans and
based on your information and ours, we come to
the conclusion that your plans for 3 coup at
this time cannot succeed _ Failing, they may re-
duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve
your assets We will stay in touch The time
will come when YOu with all your other friends
can do something. You will continue to have
TI our support = (15 October Memorandum of Conver-
sation Kissinger _ Karanessines Haig)
0 The meeting concluded according to the Agency 5 record, on Dr .
Kissinger S note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure
on every Allende weak spot in sight--now after the 24th of October ,
after 5 November and into the future until such tine as new marching
orders are given. Mr Karanessines stated that the Agency would comply. "*
The following CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
House meeting co the Station in Santiago:
2 It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by a coup _ We are to continue to
generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz-
every appropriate resource.
3_ After the most careful consideration it was
determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out
by him alone with the forces now at his disposal
would fail Thus it would be counterproductive
to our Track Two objectives It was decided that
CIA a message to Viaux warning him against
precipitate action. (Headquarters 802 16 Octo-
ber)
The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him
(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other
coup planners. (Headquarters 802 16 October) The message concluded:
"There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado ,
Canales , Valenzuela et 2l and we wish them optimum fortune 14 (Ibid.)
Secretary Kissinger' $ recollection of the October 15 meeting is not
in accord with that of Mr . Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)
that was sent the Eollowing to the Station in Santiago. This mat-
ter will be discussed in Part V of this report.
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7 36 ~
D Coup_Planning and Attempts After October 15
11 The decision Eo "de-fuse General Viaux was passed to Viaux S
father-in-law on October 17 . The in-law responded that it did ot
matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case.
(Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False
Flagger" and Viaux S father-in-law on October 18 , the Agency was in-
formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, T and that the abduc-
tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come T
(Santiago 568 , 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication
with Viaux was maintained (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,
18 Novenber 1970 , page 21)
As previously stated , by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter
*
for a coup mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts _
Ag a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:
possibilities afforded by the active
military group led by General Valenzuela
and Adniral Tirado had always seemed more
Promising than the capabilities of the Viaux
group. These military officers had the abil-
ity and resources to act providing de-
cided to move and organized themselves ac-
cordingly-
(CIA Briefing Paper , "Special Mandate from
08 the President on Chile, 15, 1975, P. 5)
mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in
this direction.
On the evening of October 17 , Colonel Wimert met with the Lt:
Colonel and the tain. requested 8 to 10 tear grenades ,
coup plotters Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to
persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October
The Station reported that the meeting turned out: to be a 98 'complete fiasco _
Schneider refused to listen to Ceneral Canales eloquent presertation of
Communist action in Chile. and adament in maintaining his non-involvement
1? stance. (Santiago 548 , 16 October)
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three ` 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition The
Captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified
by serial numbers a5 having been issued to him . Therefore unable to
17 use them. (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chief
of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns
for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were
intended for use, or were used in the kidnapping of General Schneider
The Fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the
Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing
suggests that che guns were not involved _
The machine guns and ammunition were se#t from Washington by diplo-
matic pouch on the morning of October 19 although Headquarters was
puzzled about their Purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them
but find our credulity stretched by Captain leading his troops
with sterile guns _ What 1s special Purpose for these We will
send then whether you can provide explanation or not . (Headquarters
854 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Lt_
Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con-
sisted of the six cear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux :*
* As previously stated after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in
Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela , et. al. Te
rather than Viaux _ An example of this shift in focus was the decision to
provide the Army Lt Colonel and the Arny Captain the tear gas grenades
originally intended for Viaux _ 4 cable from Santiago explained the Purpose of
this action:
"Station plans six tear ga8 grenades to
Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces
officers (deletion) instead of having False
Officer deliver them to Viaux group
Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with
active officers_ Also False Flagger
leaving evening 18 October and will not be
replaced but Wimert will stay here Hence _
important that Wimert credibility with Armed
Forces officers be strengthened
(Santiago 562 , 18 October)
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4
That same General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that
General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared
to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities 18 F
November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General
Schneider on the following evening, October 19 , at a military
dinner being for Schneider after which Schneider would be flown
to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave . Chile , Admiral Tirado would
head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the
kidnapping of Schneider the cable reports:
General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation
but not directly involved , He has been sent to
Vina to stay with prominent physfcian. Will be
seen
in public places during 19 and 20 October
to demonstrate fact that above operation not his
doing _ Will be allowed to return to Santiago at
end of week_ Military will not admit involve-
ment in Schneider S abduction which is to be
blaned on leftists (Santiago 566 , 19 October)
The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider
left in a private vehicle, rather than in his @fficial car, and his . police guard
failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt.Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that an-
other attempt would be made on October 20_ (Santiago 582 , 20 October)
Colonel Winert was authorized to Pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the, price
a agreed upon between the Plotters and the unidentified cean of abductors
* The "False Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time
the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood
that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt He stated:
Q. Were you told any of the details of how
the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?
Mr _ Sarno _ indicated it was going to be
at some sort of 3 banquet' which the General
(Schneider) would be attending.
(Sarno testirony , P. 37)
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but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he the
money . (Task Force 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela
assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move . (Task
Force 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also
failed and the Task Force concluded
Since Valenzuela' s group is apparently having
considerable difficulty executing even the first
step of its coup Plan, the prospects for a coup
succeeding or even occurring before 24 October
now appears remote. (Task Force 22 October)
E The_Killing_of_ General Schneider
In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am) Colonel Wimert
delivered the three submachine guns with ameunition co the Army Lt.
Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago. *
* Although Colonel Wimert' s testimony and the cable traffic do not
clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel
was affiliated (see page 31 ) two CIA statements on Track II tie the
weapons , and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:
The assistance requested Valenzuela
to set the plan Lof October 197 into motion
through Schneider S abuction was several sub-
machine guns , ammunition, 3 few tear gas grenades
and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus
s50,000 Eor; expenses (which was_ to be passed upon
demand
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
18 November 1970 , Pa 22)
Three sub-machine guns , together with six gas
cannisters and masks were passed: to the Valen-
zuela group at 2 am on 22 October The reason
still wanted the weapons was because
there were two days remaining before the Congress
decided che Presidential election and the Valen-
zuela group maintained some hope could still
carry out their plans _
(CIA Briefing Paper "Special Mandate the
M President on Chile, P. 7 , July 15 , 1975)
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~40-
7
At about;;7 am that the group that intended to kidnap General
Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions According to the
findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider
killing, neither the Lt. Colonel nor the Navy tain were there
Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider S car was intercepted, on his
way to work, by the abductors and he was mortally wounded when he drew
his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand
gur had been to kill General Schneider, although it also found
*
that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing
The first Station reports Eollowing the Schneider shooting said
"Military Mission sources claim General Schaeider machine gunned on
way to (San 587 22 October) and 11 Assailants used grease
N guns_ (Santiago 589 , 22 October) The submachine guns had previously
M M been described as grease guns Thus the initial reaction of the Station
was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered
several hours earlier to the Lt. Colonel_ San then informed
Headquarters "Station has instructed Col Winert to hand over s50,000
MI if Gen . Valenzuela requests (San 592 , 22 October) thus indicating
that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen -
zuela 5 paid abductors _ Later that the Station' cabled Headquarters :
The Military Court deternined that those who participated in the
shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led
conspiracy The. Court also found that this Same group had participated
in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts _
In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the
culminating in the death of General Schneider_ He received a 20-year
# prison sentence Eor being author of the crime of kidnapping which re-
sulted in serious injury to the victim. , " and a five-year exile for con-
spiring to cause a military coup. Also. convicted on the latter charge
were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado received sentences of three
years in exile.
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Arny tiago
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-41-
Station unaware if assassination was pre _
meditated or whether it constituted bungled
abduction attempt In any case, it important
to bear in mind that move against Schneider
was conceived by and executed at behest of
senior Armed Forces officers. We know that
Ceneral Valenzuela was involved_ We also
near certain that Admiral Tirado Army Lt.
Colonel and Captain witting involved
We have reason Eor believeing that General
Viaux and numerous associates Eully clued in,
but cannot prove or disprove that execution
or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to
elenents linked with Viaux _ Important factor
to bear in mind is that Armed Forces and not
retired officers or extreme rightests, set
Schneider uP for execution or abduction
All we can say is that attempt against Schneider
is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity
to prevent Allende 5 election if they are willing
to follow Valenzuela 5 scenario.
(Santiago 598, 22 October)
" Post October 22_Events
The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in_ a declara-
tion of martial law the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider
as Comnander in Chief_ and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief
of Santiago province. These measures , and others taken, caused the Chile
Task Force to make the following initial judgment :
With 24 hours remaining before the Congressional
runoff , a coup climate exists in Chile The attack
on General Schneider has Produced developments which
closely Eollow Valenzuela 5 plan _ Consequently the
plotters positions have been. enhanced
(Chile Task Force 22 October)
On October 23 , Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II:
It was agreed that a maximum effort has been achieved
and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a
successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a
Point where a military solution is at least open to
them. (Task Force T 24 October)
7
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rAiEhough" it was not immediately clear to CIA observers , the Station S
Prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as 9 result of
an abduction attempt) would 11 rally the Army firmly behind the of
consticutionalism was correcc. (Santiago 495 , 9 October) On October 24
Dr Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress . General Schneider
died the next
H# 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 117
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#6387
CIAlwite_House Communication_During Track II
The testimony given to the Conmittee by Hepry Kissinger and General
conflicts with that given by CIA officials
Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15 , 1970 , the White
House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d 'etat in Chile.
Both testified that after that date Were neither informed of nor
au thorized, CIA Track II activities including the kidnap plans of
General Schneider and the passage of weapons to, the military ters
5
By contrast , CIA officials testified that operated before and
after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House .
The conElict pertains directly to the period after October 15 , but
it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the
CIA in, the earlier period 35 well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testi-
fied that he was informed of no coup which began with the abduction
of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux 5 plan--which he
and Karamessines decided on October 15
to to forestall--but did not
know that it was to begin with Schneider S abduction
CIA officials , especially Thomas Karamessines stated that there was
close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White
House _ Karanessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to
ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines tes timony ,
Page 66) ; and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments _
(Ibid page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between
Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between
Karamessines and Kissinger 8 deputy , General Alexander Haig. Karamessines
calendar indicates that three other meetings with General
took place--but does not establish with certeinty Ehaj the topic was
GET
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they
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STRC
TrackeIr The: calendar also suggests that Karanessines and Kissinger
met on three other occasions and 50 might have had the opportunity to
discuss Track II_
Henry Kissinger S testimony before the Committee differs
6
from Karamessines in two respects: He believed Track II was 'turned
on October 15; and, after that date, he was informed neither of the coup
plans of the Chilean conspirators nor of the passage of weapons to them.
He said that Track II was
in the nature of 3 probe and not in the nature of
a plan, no plan For 3 coup was ever submitted to
the White House So my recollection of events
this was a request by President Nixon for Track II
which led to two or three mee tings which then on
October 1Sth led to being turned off by the White
House, after which Track II was dead as far as my
office was concerned , and we never received another
report on the subject _ (Kissinger testimony , P. 15)
#**
In my mind Track II was finished on Oc cober 1Sth
and I never received any further CIA information
after October 1Sth on the basis of any records that
I have been able to find_ (Ibid. , P. 59) .
General Haig' 8 testimony generally coincided with Kissinger S
recollection:
I left (the October 15th meeting) with the distinct
impression that there was nothing that could be
done in this covert area that offered promise or
hope for 3uccess. I had the distinct impression
that was Dr . Kissinger S conclusion, and that in
effect these things--and I wasn t even really
faniliar with what chese two groups were co do and
how they were :o do it, but were to cease and
desist. (Haig testimony , PP . 26-27)
#**
My recollection would be that we had no hope for a
viable, covert of action. That is the impres-
sion I got. (Ibid_ P. 29)
The following pages present the Comittee s record of communication
6
between the White House and the CIA from .September: 18 through December 2 :
HI# 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 119
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A September
#4@0
Ckrrft
September_18
Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House As
Helms notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a
Plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the l8th, according to CIA
records , there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the
conversation focused on "what econonic leverage could be exercised in
the Chilean situation. (Memorandun/Mee with DDP , 18 September)
The efficacy of economic pressure continued co be a subject of con-
cern during the last of September- Apparently that pressure was
viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit. 08
Septenber 21
The 40 Committee met. The Select Comittee has no confirmation
that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines calendar
confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger , the 40 Committee chair-
also attended , although the Committee has not been able to review
his calendar . All thac can be said about this meeting--and the meetings
of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the
meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger
an opportunity :o meet
privately and discuss Track II if desired _ In all these instances
save the 40 Committee meeting on tember 22 , the Comittee has no
evidence to confirm that such 3 private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting
actually took place _ That the CIA prepared a memorandun of conversa-
tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none
for other mee tings may provide some support for the argument that no
other such private mee tings occurred _
September_ 22
Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind a #0 domlittee d6t3
mee called to discuss Track I_ The two puep] diecussed Track 'II actions
especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei- According to
HY 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 120
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T
Kissinger told Karamessines that T our
hand of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect
and he added we were fine and it uP _ N (Memorandum for
the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)
B: Qctober
October 5
A cable sent to San released by Karamessines requested a
report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals
-~Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta-~naned in a cable of September 30 .
(Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was
needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6 _ (Santiago 556 ,
5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place,
although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony ,
PP. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended 3 40
Committee mee on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger
chaired the 40 Conmittee.
October 6
M1 The Station reported that General Viaux was ready co launch golpe
9 ? evening 9 October or morning 10 October (Santiago 472, 6 October
1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one
"with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more seri-
ous action." The Station was directed to try to ill-considered
action at this time 9p (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)
Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan ,
supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of
an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below)
makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kissinger testimony , P. 24)
FF
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Ho
Similarly; Kissinger did not remember having been informed that the
CIA had called off a coup: it regarded as premature. He stated :
My perception at that period was that if they
had a coup would come back to uS before
triggering it. at no time during the period
did in fact, tell US that had a
coup that might be ready co g0 And indeed
generally told uS the opposite_
(Kissinger tes timony , PP _ 25-26)
As Karamessines calendar indicated; there was a 40 Committee meet-
on October 6 _ He attended this meeting , along with Richard Helms
and William Broe of the CIA_ According to the minutes . of that meeting,
CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile Were not discussed
However , in an exchange with Charles Meyer who was then the State De-
tment s 'Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr , Kissinger
stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent
Allende 5 assumption of office. According to the minutes:
Mr Meyer pointed to the need to determine a' post-Allende
position such as proposed in NSSM 97 _ It was agreed that_
an
early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject = Mr _
Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait
accompli and higher authority had no intention of conced-
before the 24th; on the' contrary, he wanted no stone
left unturned . (Memorandum for the Record /Minutes of the
Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970 , 7 October
1970)
October 8
Karamessines met lunch with General (Karamessines calendar)
In his testimony , Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch
with two differenct groups of military 'plotters _ He believed there must
have been another mee ting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going
contacts
TWP SECRET
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47a
TCP SZGVET
It seems to me , although the records don t re-
flect that there was a meeting in September
a very brief one, in which I must have been
cold that there was a specific program going
underway - That probably would have been by
Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines
there I am not sure (Haig tes timony, P. 12)
October 10
Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General
He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number
of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly
very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all M
(Memorandum/ FUBELT , by William Broe, 10 October 1970)
recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 1th
His recollection accords with the CIA nemorandum of conversation_
I do know and I know that from looking at the
record this morning , that Karamessines made a
telephone call to me in which he gave a progress
reporta I recall that_ It was in effect a nega-
tive progress report, that they were just not cOm-
uP with it. (Haig testimony , Pa 12)
TOp SECRET
FM 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 123
it,
Haig.
Haig
ing
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-48 -
Haig indicated to the Comnittee that he would have passed the
substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his
role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:
I am quite confident that given my ow concep-
tion of my role at that time , that I would have
conveyed that information to Henry ,
(Haig testimony ; P. 13)
***
Q. If Mr . Karanessines was unable to see Dr _
Kissinger _ and talked to you, what degree of
latitude did you have concerning what you would
pass on to Dr Kissinger?
General At that time I would consider I
had no degree of latitude other than to convey
to him what had been given to me (Ibid
"> P. 15)
October 14
A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert, ostensibly from General
5
Bennett, authorized Wimert to select two Chilean general officers and
convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington
has authorized you to offer material support short of armed interven-
tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors may undertake to
prevent the election of Allende on October 24 _ (Headquarters to
Station cable 762 October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in
this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President ,
for no one else could have given Wimert such broad authorization_
Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted or at
least cleared with, the White House . (Karamessines testimony , P. 91)
However; Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October I4th
cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told on
the 1Oth that little was happening, he would have expected in the
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Haig.
they
in,
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-49-
mee on thevlSth_(see below) to have discussed the results of the
October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any
such discussion. (Kissinger tes timony , P. 53)
October 14
The 40 Committee met to discuss among other topics, Chile. In ad-
dition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell David
Packard , Alexis Johnson , Admiral Moorer) the mee was attended by
Karamessines , William Broe' and General Robert Cushman of the CIA Charles
Meyer from State, Viron and Ambassador Korry , who had returned to
Washington Erom Santiago for a short period 'of consultation.
According to the minutes of that mee Kissinger asked Karamessines
to 3 rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile
Karamessines pointed out that coup climate does not presently exist M
Ii He noted that the unpredictable General Viaux is the individual. seem-
ingly ready to attempt a coup and his chances of mounting a successful:
{6 one were slight _ Ambassador Korry agreed with Karamessines assessment
11 and stated that as of now it seened almost certain that Allende would
be voted into office on October 24th. Kissinger then observed that
there presently appeared to be little the U.S _ can do to influence the
Chilean situation one way or another: Other 'participants at the meet-_
concurred_ (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the
40 Committee, 14 October 1970 , 16 October 1970)
TOp SEGRET
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ting
ting
Vaky ,
ting ,
give
"a
only
ing
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49a
TOR
Qctober 15
Karamessines met with Kissinger and at the White House to dis-
cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation Karamessines
gave a run-down oil Viaux, Canales and Tirado and 89 the general situation in
Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint _ { It was concluded that' Viaux
did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a
successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions
from an unsuccessful coup: The CIA record of the mee continues:
5 _ It was decided by those present that the
Agency must. get a message to Viaux warning him
against any precipitate action. In essence our
message was to state: have reviewed your
plans , and based on your information and ours ,
we come to the conclusion that your .plans for a
coup at this time cannot succeed Failing,
may reduce your capabilities Eor the future.
Preserve your asse We will in touch_
The time will cone when you with all your: other
friends can do some thing. You will continue to
0 have our support_
6 After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup
plot at least temporarily, Dr Kissinger instruc-
ted Mr . Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in
Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main-
tain the capability for Agency operations against
Allende in the future.
8 The mee concluded on Dr Kissinger S note
that the Agency should continue keeping the pres -
sure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now
after the 24th of October after 5 November and
into the future until such time as new marching
orders 'are given _ Mr Karamessines stated that
the Agency would comply =
(Menorandum of Conversation/Dr Kissinger , Mr_
Karamessines , Gen . at the White House, 15
October 1970)
TOp SECRET
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ting
"We
they
stay :s.
ting
Haig
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3 50-
Klesinger;
}
iin his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA
memorandum of conversation as substan tially correct , although somewhat
more detailed than he would have remembered (Kissinger testimony ,
P. 52)
He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your
11 assets .
Kissinger believed that the of the October 1Sth meeting as
recorded in the CIA memorandum was inconpatible with the order the CIA
issued to its Station the next an order 0S tensibly based on the
October 15th mee And he noted in writing its memorandum of the
meeting of the 1Sth , the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maxi-
0a mum degree of authoricy. (Ibid. PP . 55-56) The October 16th order
indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous
and stated:
2 _ It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by a coup . It would be much Prefer-
able to have this transpire prior to 24 October
but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously
beyond this date_
4 There is great and continuing interest in the
activities of Tirado Canales, Valenzuela et al
and we wish them 'optimum fortune
(Headquarters 802 16 October 1970)
Kissinger recalled the October 1Sth conversation as 86 turning off
the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them. (Kissinger
testimony , P. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony_
The conclusions of that meeting were that we had
better not do anything rather than some thing that
was not going to succeed_ My general feeling
was , I left that meeting with the impression that
there was nothing authorized
(Haig testimony , Pa 13) F
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October_Lo-October 22 (approximate)
Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with
the President after a larger mee Karamessines believed this meeting
took place between October 10 and 24 _ amessines testimony , P 89 )
According to Karamessines the "President went out of his way to impress
all of those there with his conviction hat it was absolutely essential
I that the election of Mr Allende to the presidency be thwarted As
were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside
to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony , P. 8)
October 19
Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that
the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan.
beginning with the kidnap of Schneider . In testimony before the Com-
mittee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the
Valenzuela plan to Kissinger promptly , if for no other reason
than that we didn t have al1 that much promising news to report to
the White House. (Karamessines testimony , P. 72)
And as I say , if for no other reason we would have
wanted: to this kind of hopeful report to the
White House as soon as possible and it would be my
best estimate now that that is_precisely what we
did _ (P. 72)
In che afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General
for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then ,
Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela
$
If the meeting with the President occur after October 15 , that
would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that were
not directed to end their coup efforts in the October 15th mee
Unfortunately, the Committee has not access to the daily calendars
of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger which might pinpoint the
date of the President S conversation with Karamessines Those calen-
dars along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have
been subpoenaed Cfamc?
57
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ting.
(Kar=
they
"very
get
Haig
red
they
ting _
had
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-52-
Akds
plan, since the cable had arrived that morning. However General Haig
had no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nor
dId he believe he had been: informed of the Valenzuela plan. "This
1s all very new to me I hadn' t seen any of this, and I was not familiar
with this particular plan. ~or 850,000 , or any of the characters that
19 are described in here. (Haig testimony, PP 38-39)
Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of
the Valenzuela plan. He said he informed of no thing after October
1Stha (Kissinger testimony , Pa 65) He indicated that according
to his daily calendar , he had no conversation with either Karamessines
or He lns between the 15th and the 19th. (Ibid. , Pa 53) He indicated
that he never knew that the CIA was in the Process of passing guns and
t tear gas to Chilean military conspirators . He said there was no
further meeting on that subject. In anybody 5 record , mine or theirs
(the CIA' s) , none of the information from the 16th on was familiar to me,
(Ibid _
$ P. 62)
Kissinger further testified he did not know hat the United States
was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved
the abduction of General Schneider:
Senator Hart of Colorado . I am not sure that
the record clearly shows you answer to the direct
question of whether you knew or did not know that
we were negotiating with military officers with
regard to a that did involve the abduction
of General Schneider _
Secretary Kissinger. I said I did ot know .
(Kissinger testimony , P. 86)
Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction
before the Eact.
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-53-
GN
Were you aware during that period of time
of the plans to kidnap General Schneider?
General I was aware after the fact.
Q But you were never informed prior to his
attempted abduction?
General I don" t believe I was at all
OcEober 20
A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word On whatever
events may have occurred 19 October please let uS know what you can on
interim basis_ Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to
queries from high levels_ (Headquarters 883 , 20 October 1970) Karamessines
testified that the references to "high levels { in the .cable of the 2Oth
meant White House officials probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain
that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela $ plan
for the 19th and S0 would have been expected to ask what happened on the
morning of the 2Oth. (Karamessines testimony , P. 73) In contrast, Kissinger
interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light . He felt it indicated
that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance _ When
news of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believed
he would have had 0 'somebody pick
uP a telephone and say , What 1s this
(M all about? (Kissinger transcript, P . 68) -
October 22
Karamessines met with at the White House. (Karamessines calendar)
General remenbered that word of the shooting of Schneider came a5
10 a great shock" to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told him
about it in their meeting on the 22nd He thought that Kissinger either
was present at the meeting or that had gone immediately in to
7
26
Kissinger S office to relate what Karamessines had: told him (Haig testiz
mony , P. 36)
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Haig.
Haig.
Haig
Haig
he , Haig,
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Page 131
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C December
December 2
662 0ute,
4 memorand dated December 2 , 1970 , from Helms to Kissinger stated
that Helns had given
a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney Ceneral
Mitchell who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten
note on the menorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helns)
(Helms memorandum for Kissinger , 2 December 1970) The report, which
was dated November 18 , 1970 , contained a full account of CIA activities
during Track Il, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and
the Passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators _ (Report on CIA
Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970 , 18
November 1970)
In his testimony to the Committee Kissinger did not recall receiv-
the report, although he. doubted that he would have read such an
2
I "after action' report in any case. He testified that he could find
it in his files in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I,
dated November 19 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by 3 number of: aspects of
the nemorandum and report: why there were two reports the report
of the 18th apparently wJs only called to his attention on the 2nd of
December and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell_ (Kissinger
tes timony , PP. 71, 74)
D . Did Track II End?
The Committee' also received conflicting testimony about whether or
not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indi-
cated that "Track II was supposed to have ended _
9 as far as he was concerned on
October 15 _ It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presi-
dential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress_
TG;
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The Committee does not have this new "marching order" in its possession
However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took tes timony believed
that there had been no such definitive end to Track II It merely
tapered off , to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change
of government in Chile. Karamessines testimony was most explicit:
Mr Karamessines _ I am sure that the seeds that
were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact
in 1973_ I do not have any question about that
in my mind either _ (Karamessines testimony, P. 26)
***
Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there
a specific order ending it?
Mr Karamessines As far as I was concerned
Track II was really never ended _ What we were
told to do in effect was , well Allende is now
President So Track II which sought to prevent
him from becoming President, was technically out,
it was done _ But what we were told to do was to
con tinue our efforts_ alert and to do what
we could to contribute Lo the eventual achieve-
ment of the objectives and purposes of Track II_
That being the case, I don t think it 15 proper
co say that Track II was ended ,
(Ibid. , PP . 128-129)
When informed of Karamessines tes timony that Track II was never
ended, Kissinger testified:
The Chairman_ Would you take issue with that ,
with the (Karamessines) testimony?
Secretary Kissinger. Totally_ It is clear
that_ after October 1Sth that there was no
separate channel by the CIA to the White House
and that all actions with respect to Chile were
taken in the 40 Committee framework _ There was
no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to
~or contact with military people = no plots which
I am familiar with, and all the covert operations
in Chile after Allende S election the Congress
were directed towards maintaining the democratic
opposition for the 1976 election. And that was
the exclusive thrust and if there was any ther
contact with military plotting, it was totally
AET
unauthorized and this is the first that I have
heard of it. (Kissinger tes timony , pp. 75-77)
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(Draft--9/8/75)
Summary
South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother ,
Ngo Dinh Nhu _ were assassinated during
a coup by Vietnamese
generals on November 2 , 1963 _ Evidence before the Comittee
indicates that the United States Government offered encourage-
ment for the coup , but neither desired nor was involved in the
assassinations Rather Diem 5 assassination appears to have
been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals engendered by
anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the
custody of the leaders of the coup
On one occasion General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") out-
lined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and
another brother , Ngo Dinh Can 43 one of three methods being
considered for changing the government in the near future
Ambassador Henry Cabot and Deputy Chief of Mission Willian
Trueheart were: informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief
of Station who recommended that 0 we do not set ourselves
irrevocably against the assassination- plot , since the other two
alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted
struggle which would rip the Army- and the country asunder" (CIA
cable SAIG 1447 Saigon Station to DCI 10/5/63) Upon being
informed_ Director McCone sent two cables The first stated
"[w]e cannot be in the position of stimulating , approving , or
supporting 2ssassination" and the second directed that the
recommendation be withdraw because "we cannot be in position
actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging
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2
our responsibility therefor" (CIA cable , DCI to Saigon 10/5/63) ;
CIA cable DIR 73661 , DCI to Saigon _ 10/6/63)
B The_Abortive coup of August 1963
On 8 1963 , South Vietnamese troops in the city of Hue
fired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government , killing
nine and wounding fourteen 'This incident triggered a nationwide
Buddhist protest and . sharp loss of popular confidence in the
* Dien regime
On May 18 , United States Ambassador Frederick E_ Holting
net With Diem and outlined steps which the United States desired
him to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and recapture
public confidence These steps included admitting responsibility
for the [ue incident , conpensating the victims and reaffirming
religious equality in the coun try. (Pentagon Papers , P. 208) On
June 3 , Madame iJhu, the wife of Diem S brother Nhu , publicly
accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated With Comunist agents ;
Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis-
associate the United States from any repressive measures against
the Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers _ p.308) Shortly
thereafter , Madame' Jhu colmented on the self-immolation of Quang
$ Senator Gravel Edition The Pentagon_Papers, The Defense Depart-
ment History 0f United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Pp 207 _
208 Volune II Beacon Press Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon
Papers) Forller Public AfFairs Officer of the U.S Embassy in
Saigon John Mecklin} in his book Mission in Torment, An Intimate
Account of the U.S Role in Vietnan Doubleday and Company 1965
(hereinafter cited as Mecklin
1 at pages 158-60 described the"vul
nerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this
period noting that it "offered a classic opportunity for 2 Cormunist
sleeper ploy
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-3-
Duc and other Buddhist monks stating that she would like to
furnish mustard for the nonks barbecue On June 12 Trueheart
told Diem that Quang Duc S suicide had shocked the world and
again warned that the United States would break with his govern-
ment if he did not solve the Buddhist problem _ (Pentagon Papers _
P. 208 . )
Lucien Conein a CIA officer in Saigon _ X testified that the
Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought
down the Diem regime (Conein PP 42-44) These events led the
United States to apply "direct , relentless , and tablehammering
pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before
attempted with a
sovereign friendly governnent _ (Mecklin P . 169)
By July 4 , 1963 Generals Minh Don Kim, 2nd Khiem had
agreed on the necessity for a coup _ * *_
In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting,
Diem agreed to make a
Public statement offering concessions to
the Buddhists This statement took che form of an interview
Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved
in the coup
"for many years Sone of then I had known back even in
World War II Some of them were in powerful positions
and I was able to talk Co them on a Person to person basis
not a3+2 government official 1 (Conein_ P . 17.)
** Conein S After-Action Report stated that :
"The majority of the officers _ including General Minh
desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from
the political scene in South Vietnam and exile As to
Ngo Dinh Nhu and .Ngo Dinh Can there was never dissention
The attitude was that their deaths along with Madame Ngo
1 Dinh Nhu would be welcomed (Conein After-Action Report ,
P 10 . )
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with the columnist Margurite Higgins in which Diem asserted
that his policy toward the Buddhists had alwvays been conciliatory
and asked for harmony and support of the government _
Shortly after midnight
on August 21 , 1963 , ihu ordered forces
loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnan arresting monks
and sacking the sacred buildings _ Over thirty monks were injured
and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise
and viewed the attacks as a
shattering repudiation of Diem' 5
*
promises to dol (pentagon Papers , P. 21U)
On August 24 , 1963 the State Department sent a cable
(Deptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam Ilenry Cabot Lodge _
The telesram 6as prepared by Roger Hilsman Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern AEfairs , and Under Secretary of state
Averell Karriman and was approved bY President Kennedy . (Pentagon
Papers
8
P.235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Dien to take
# prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the
Buddhists
Jl wle must at same time also tell key military leaders
that US would find it impossible to continue support
GVi (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically
unless above steps are taken immediately Which we
recognize requires removal of the Nhu 5 from the scene
We wish give Dien reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu 5
but if he remains obdurate then we are prepared to accept
the obvious implication that we can no longer support
Diem You may also tell appropriate military commanders
we Will them direct support in any
interim period
of breakdown central governnent mechanism Con-
currently with above Ambassador and country teams should
urgently. exanine all possible alternative leadership and
make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem S
replacement if this should becole necessary
Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur
when no American Anbassador was in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few
before and his replacenent , Lodge _
1
had not yet arrived) (Conein ,
P.21)
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-5 -
In a cable on August 25 CIA Chief of Station John Richardson
reported the result of a conference among hinself Lodge True
heart General Harkins (Commander Military Assistance Command
Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff MACV) They
accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and
would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions" (I.G_
9
C , PP - 7-8 ) but believed' that Diem would refuse to remove his
brother from his position in the government
Early in the morning of August 26 , 1963 the Voice of America
in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids
and absolved the army The broadcast als0 reported speculation
that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South
Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers P 212) % Later on that
same Lodge presented his credentials to Diem CIA officers
Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh
respectively , and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243 ,
but to remind then that cannot be of any help during initial
action of assuming power of state
Entirely their own action
win or lose" (SAIG 0304 , 8/26/63)
A_ message from the White House on August 29 authorized
Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United
States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,
but did not involve United States armed forces _ Lodge was autho-
rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272 ,
8/29/63.) A cable from the President to
Lodge
on the same stated;
a cable to Harriman
Lodge complained that the VOA broadeast
nad 10 complicated our already difficult problem {1 by eliminating
11
; the possibility of the generals effort achieving surprise _
Loage further warned that. 19 the US must not appear publicly in
Mt
the matter thus giving Lhe kiss of death to its friends
(Cable Lodge to Harriman , 8/26/63)
Htf 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 137
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"we
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FIn
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"I have approved all the messages You are receiving from
others today_ and I emphasize that everything in these
messages has my full support We will do all that we can
to help you conclude this operations successfully
Until the very moment of the: go signal for the operation
bY the Generals I must reserve a contingent right to
change course and reverse previous instructions [hile
fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of
such a reversal I knotv from experience that failure is
more destructive than an appearance of indecision I
would of course accept full responsibility for any such
change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this
operation and its consequences (Cable 8/29/63)
In 3 reply cablev Lodge stated:
"1_ I fully understand that you have the right and
responsibility to change course at any time Of course
I Will always respect that right_
2 To be successful , this operation must be essentially
a Vietnamese affair with a momentun of its own Should
this happen you may not be able to control it, 1.e_
1 .
the
1 signal" may be given the generals_ (Cable Lodge
to President , 8/30/63)
A cable fron Saigon dated August 31 1963 , stated:
"This particular coup is finished Generals did
not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of
forces Ihere is little doubt that GWV (South
Vietnaiese Governnent) aware US role and may have con-
siderable Getail (SAIG 0499 8 /31/63)
Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later
relations between the United States representatives and the
generals _ Minh , who had initial doubts about the strength
of Anerican support , grew in' confidence
C The November 1963_Coup
American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became
increasingly apparent. On September 8 , AID Director David Bell,
in a television interview stated that Congress might cut aid
to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course
HM 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 138
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7 -
(Pentagon Papers_
P _ 214) Lodge suggested a study to deter-
mine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the
regime (Pentagon Papers P 214) . On September 12 with White
House approval Senator Church introduced a resolution in the
Senate . condemning the South Vietnamese Covernment for its
repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an
end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were
curtailed (Pentagon Papers _ PP 214-215)
In mid-September 1963 two proposals for dealing with Dien
were considered by che Administration The first contemplated
increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American
policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem s . actions
recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable and attempting
co salvage as much as possible . It was decided to adopt the
first proposal_ and to send Secretary of De fense McNamara and
General Taylor on a
fact-finding mission to Vietnam (Pentagon
Papers
} P.
215.)
On October 2 McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington
and presented their findings to the National Security Council
Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing
favorably , but warned of the dangers inherent in the political
turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Dien This
pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000.
American troops by the end of the year; ending support for the
forces responsible for the pagoda raids and continuing Lodge ' s
policy 6f remaining aloof from the regime _ The report recommended
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8 -
against 8 coup , but sugyested that alternative leadership should be
identified and cultivated_ The reconendations were promptly
approved the President (Pentagon Papers , Pp. 215-116)
On October 3 Conein contacted Minh Minh explained that a
coup was being planned
8
and requested assurances of American
support if it were successful Minh outlined three courses of
action one of which was the assassination of pien 5 brothers ,
*
Nhu and Can (Conein
2-
P. 25 ; cable Saigon to Director , 10/5/63)
The Acting Chief Of the 'CIA Station David R Smith cabled on
4< October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that we do not set
ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot , since the
other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a
protractea struggle" (Cable Saigon to Director , 10/5/63)
A cable fro1 the Director CIA to Saigon responded that:
0 (w) e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,
approving or supporting assassination but on the other
hand we are in no Way responsible for stopping every
such threat of which we might receive even partial know -
ledge _ [e certainly would not favor assassination of Diem_
We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this
matter opens door too easily for probes of our position
re others , re support of regime _ et cekera Consequently
believe best--approach is hands_off lowever naturally
interested in intelligence on anz such plan
The other courses of action were the encirclenent of Saigon
by various military units and direct confrontation between military
units involved in the coup and loyalist units
X* Colby, who was then Chief Far Eastern Division drafted
this cable for McCone Colby testified:
"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director
personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an asgas -
sination?
1 "Colby : I certainly was (Colby , P 57)
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McCone testified that he met Privately with the President and
the Attorney General; taking the position that role was
co assemble al1 information on intelligence
as to what was
going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities but
to not attempt to direct it" (McCone P_ 62) He believed the
United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone
P_
62) _ McCone testified:
"I felt that the President agreed with my posicion , des -
pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning
Diem and his conduct I urged hin to try to bring all
the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways to
encourage more support throughout the country _ My precise
words to the President and I remember them very clearly ,
was that Mr President if I was manager of a baseball
team I had one pitcher I'd keep him in the box whether
he was a good pitcher or not By that I was saying that ,
if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we
would have 3 succession of coups and political disorder
in Vietnam and it might: last several years and indeed
IX it did (McCone PP 62-63.)
McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with
the President but rather "whether we should let the coup g0
or use our influences not to" He left the meeting believing
that the President_agreed with his "hands off" recommendation
(McCone PP _ 62-63) McCone cabled Smith on October 6 :
I6 McCone directs that you withdraw reconnendation to
ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone
instructions a5 we cannot be in position acti con-
doning such course of action and thereby engaging our
responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon DIR 73661 , 10/6/63)
In response ; the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters :
"Action taken as directed_ In addition since DCM
Trueheart was also present when original recommendation
was nade specific withdrawal of recommendation at icCone' s
instruction Was also conveyed to Trueheart Ambassador
" Loclge colimented that he shares McCone S opinion (Saigon
to CIA SAIC 1463 , 10/7/63)
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Conein the CTA official who dealt directly with the Generals
testified that he was first told of McCone S response to the
assassination alternative Ambassador Lodge around October 20
(Conein , P 35) Conein testif:ed (but did not S0 indicate in
his detailed After-Acti? Report) that he then told General Don
that the United States opposed assassination and that the
General responded , "alright , you don t like we won t talk
8 about it anymore (Conein, P . 36)
The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his
ways On October 17 General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3)
informed Secretary Thuan thac the United States was suspending
aid to the special forces units responsible for the pagoda
raids until were transferred to the field and placed under
Joint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers , P. 217)
On October 27 Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem but did
not receive any comitment from Diem to comply with Anerican
requests (Pentagon Papers = P. 219)
On October Conein met with-General Don , who had
received assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United
States Don said that he would make the plans for the coup
Conein described his role as follows :
job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and
the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who
were Planning the coup to monitor those individuals who
were Planning the coup to get as much information S0
that' our government would not be caught with their pants
16 down (Conein, Pp _ 38-39)
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-l1-
available to the Ambassador four hours before it took Place
and suggested that not change his plans to g0 to the
United States on October 31 . (I.G_ C , P _ 37; Pentagon Papers_
P 219.)
On October 30 , Lodge reported to Washington that he was
powerless to stop the coup and that the matter was
entirely
in Vietnamese hands General- Harkins disagreed and cabled his
opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers _
p
220) A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed
White House concern and stated that " [w]e cannot accept conclu-
sion that we have no Power to delay or discourage a coup"
(Cable Bundy
to 10/30/63) A subsequent cable on that
same from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with
the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it
would succeed The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolve
ment and somewhat les8 strict neutrality" (Pentagon Papers
P_ 220.)
Late in the morning of November 1 , the first units involved
in the coup began-'to deploy around-Saigon The Embassy was
given only four minutes warning before the coup began , (MACV
cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512 11/1/63) An aide to
Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint
General Staff headquarters _ Conein brought 3 million piasters
(Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters which was given
to Don to Procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits
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to those killed in the coup (Conein 6/20,, P 72) $
Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during
most of the coup (I.G_
2
C, PP . 41-42) At 1:40 P. m .
)
the
Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately , and guaranteed
him and. Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, P 15)
The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards and at 4:30 P. m
the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the
resignation of Diem and Nhu Diem called Lodge and inquired
about the United States position_ responded that che
United States did not yet have a view and expressed concern
for Diem S safety (Pentagon Papers P. 221)
According to Conein S report , Minh told Nhu that if he and
Dien did not resign within five minutes the Palace would be
bombed . Minh then phoned Diem_ Dien refused to talk wich him
and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace _ Troops moved in
on the palace but Diem still refused to capitulate Minh
offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later ,
telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the
earth" Shortly before nightfall
an air assault was launched
on the Presidential Guard barracks (Conein After-Action Report ,
PP . 17-18 .)
At 6 : 20 on the morning of November 2 , Diem called General
CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup
leaders in early October (Colby 6/20 _ P 21) On October 29
calbed that a request for funds should be anticipated-
(Lodge co State No 2040 10/29/63 ; and 2063 10/30/63)
Conein received the money on October 24 and kept it in a safe
in his house
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Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to
surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport
Shortly afterwards Dien offered to surrender unconditionally
and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing_ According
to Conein an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace
at 8 : 00 a m but Diem and Nhu were not present (Conein After-
Action Report , P 24) .
At 10:30 3.m the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to
be at the Joint General Chiefs headquarters Conein declined
to view the bodies because he feared that doing
S0 might damage
United States interests (Conein P 57) _
The details of Diem S and Nhu' s deaths are not known *
Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel
from the Palace and . fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon He
opined_ that an informant must have identified them and called the
General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report P 23)
Another CIA source states that Dien and Nhu had left the palace
the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at
the church at 8 : 00 on the morning of Novenber 2 _ Ten minutes
later they were
picked up by soldiers and forced into an army
vehicle (Cable Saigon to State No 888) Minh originally told
Conein that Diem and Nhu had comitted suicide but Conein
doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a
church (Conein P 56) The Inspector General' s Report- states
that on
November" 16 1963
a field-grade officer of unknown
reliability gave the CIA Ewo photographs of the bodies of Diem
and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their
backs (I G; C PP 43-44) The source reported that Diem and
Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint
General Staff headquarters
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None of the informed sources any indication of direct or
indirect involvement of the United States X
x It must be noted that on October 30 1963 Ambassador
notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders
for evacuation and suggested Saipan as a
point for evacuation
(Saigon Station Cable No 2036 10/30/63) Conein was charged
with 'obraining the airplane Between 6 :00 and 7:00 on the
morning of November 2 Minh and Don asked Conein co procure an
aircraft Conein relayed the request to David Smith Acting
Chief of Station at the Embassy who replied that it would not
be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours
since it would have to be flown from Guam Conein testified
that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country
that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in
any other country_ There were no aircraft imediately avail-
able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country
of asylum (Conein P. 54)
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80h
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IV_ Findings_ and Conclusions
A Findings_Concerning the Plots Themselves 2
1 Officials of the United States
Government Initiated Plots to
Assassinate Fidel Castro and
Patrice Lumumba 2-
2 No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As
A Result of Assa33[nation PTots
Initiated EyWEficial: of the
United States 3
3 American Qfficials Encouraged or
Were Privy to_Coup Plots Which
ReguTted in the Death of Trujillo
Diem and Schneider
3
The_Plots_ Occurred in a Cold War
Atmosphere Perceived to be of
Crisis Proportiong 3A
5 American Officials Had Exaggerated
Notions About Their Ab1T1ty
to
Control the Actions of Coup Leaders
6 CIA Officials Made Use of_Known_Under_
worid Tgures in Assassination
EFForts 5
B Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves 5
The United States Should Not_Engage
in_As8a8sination 5
a Distinction Between Targeted
Assas8inations Ingtigated
the United States and Support
for DissidenEs_Seeking EQ
Overthrow Local Governments
b The Setting In Which the_Assas
sination Plots Occurred Explains
But Does Not Justify Then
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iii TOP SEEzazT
(a) Agency_Officials_ Failed On
Several Occaszons to Reveal
The PTots To Their Superiors
Or To Do 3o With _Sufficient
Detail and Tlaricy
27
Castre
27
Trujillo
34
Schneider
36
(b) On Qccasion Administration_Officials
Gave_Vague Instructions to 5ub-
ordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently
CTear That Assasgination Should Be
ExcTuded From Consideration 37
Schneider
38
Lumumba
38
Castro
39
6 Practices Current at the Time in_Which
the 4s8288ination PTOEs Occurred Were
Revealed the Record to Create Ehe
Risk of Confusion Rashness and
ErresponsibfTity
in the Areas Where Clarity and Sober _Judgment Was Most
Necessary
46
(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending
the Doctrine ofFausible Denial 47
(b) The_Dangers of_Using_"Circunlocution"
and Euphemism 48
(c) The Danger of_Generalized Instructions 49
(a) The_Danger of "Eloating_Authorization '
50
(e) The Problems Connected With_Creating
New Covert Capabilities 50
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Approved Drafting Subcommittee ,
EWi &S RET
107/8/75 Lumumba sections open
to poss ible reconsideration)
IV_ Findings and Conclusions
In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and
conclusions the' Committee: has been guided by the following
standards We believe these standards to be appropriate to
the conistitutional duty of a Congressional committee _
1 The Committee is not a court Its primary role is
not to deterine individual guilt or innocence but rather
to draw upon the experiences of the past to better Propose
guidance for the future
2 It: is .necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions
because of the amount of time that has Passed since the events
reviewed in this report the inabilicy of three Presidents and
many other figures to speak for thenselves _ the conflicting
and ambiguous nature of iuch of the evidence_ and the Problems
in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents
and testimony
3 , The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons
involved in the events under examination while at the same
time responding to a need to undersEard the facts in sufficient
detail to a basis for informed recommendations
With these standards in mind the Committee has arrived at
the following findings and conclusions
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A Findings Concern the Plots Thenselves
1 Qfficials of the United States Government Initiated
Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice_Lumumba
The Committee finds that officials of. the United States
Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate
Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro
The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in"the latter half
of 1960 officials of the United States Government and quick-
ly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be
used for the assassination
The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued
until 1965 _ The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars
exploding seashells , and a contaminated diving suit did not
advance beyond the laboratory phase_ The plot involving under-
world figures reached the stage of producing poison pills ,
establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba ,
procuring potential assassins within Cuba and according to one
witness, delivering the pills
to the island itself_ In the
1960 plot involving
a Cuban pilot and in the AM] LASH episode
from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement
to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known and
provided the means for carrying out the assassination
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2 No_Foreign Leaders Were_ Killed As a Result of Assas
sination Plots Initiated_by_Officials of the United
States
The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba
were never administered to hin_ and there is no evidence that
the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba' s death
at the hands of his Congolese enemies The effort to assas
sinate Castro failed_
3 Anerican Qfficials Encouraged or Were_Privy_ to
CQup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo
Dien and_Schneider
Anerican officials clearly desired the overthrow of
Trujillo , offered both encouragement and guns to local dissi-
dents attempting his overthrow and supplied them with pistols
and rifles .
American officials offered encouragenent to the Vietnamese
generals who plotted Diem S overthrow and a CIA official in
Vietnan gave the generals money after the coup had begun _
However Diem 5 assassination was neither desired nor suggested
by officials of the United States
The record reveals that the United States officials
offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted
the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider but did not desire
or encourage his death Certain high officials did know that
the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider
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4
As Director Colby testified before the Committee the death of
a
foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt In
the cases we have considered the risk of death was known in
varying degrees It was
widely known that the dissidents in
the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo; the
contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu President
Diem S brother was communicated to the upper levels of the
United States Government ; while the CIA and perhaps the White
House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap
General Schneider , it was not anticipated that he would be killed_
although the possibility of his death should have been recognized
as a .forseeable risk of his kidnapping_
4 The Plots Occurred in a Cold_War Atmosphere_Perceived
to be of_Crisis Proportions
The Committee fully appreciates the importance of
evaluating the assa8sination plots in the historical context
within which occurred_ In the _preface to this report_ we
described the Perception , generally shared within the United
States during the depths of the Cold War Ehat the country
faced a monolithic eneny in Communism That attitude
explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed
although it does not jus them _ Those involved: neverthe-
less appeared to believe they were advancing the best inter-
ests of their country _
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Y#n
5 American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions
Their_Ability to Control the Actions Qf_Coup_Leaders
Running throughout the cases considered in this report
was the expectation of American officials Ehat they could
control the actions of dissident groups which were support-
in foreign countries Events: demonstrated that the United
States had no such power This point is graphically demonstrated
cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam_
Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington
on October 30 , 1963 _ that he
was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response stated
that cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay
or discourage a coup _ The coup took place three later_
Shortly after the experience of the of CIA
headquarters. requested operatives in the Dominican Republic
to tell the dissidents to 8| turn off" the assassination attempt;
because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the
aftermath _ The dissidents replied that the assassination
was their affair ~and chat it could not be turned off to suit
che convenience of the United States Government
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TOP Sts SLUEH
5
6 CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld_Figures
in Assassination Efforts
Officials of the CILA made use of persons associated
with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the
assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were
relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and
contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens
Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were als0 used
by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed . In the
development of the Executive Action capability , one
foreign
national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other
menbers of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA
for a variety of purposes , including assassination if the need
should arise In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal back -
grounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a
volatile political situation in the Congo _
B Conclusions_Concerning the Plets Themselves
1 The United States Should Not_Engage: in Assassination
We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool
of foreign policy_ Aside from Pragmatic arguments against the
use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with
extensive- experience in covert operations we find that assas-
sination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life_
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In addition to considerations there were several
practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign
leaders These reasons are discussed in the section of
this report recommending
a statute making assassination
a crime
a Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations
Instigated by_ the United States and Support
for Dissidents_Seeking_ to Overthrow Local
Governments
Two of the five principal cases investigated
by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders
(Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by Anerican
officials Three of the cases (Trujillo , Diem Schneider)
involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local
dissidents These latter cases differed in the degree to
which assassination was contenplated by the leaders of' the
coups and the degree to which United States officials
motivated- the coups
The. Committee concludes that targeted' assassinations
instigated by the United States must be prohibited.
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Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination
The possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises
questions concerning the propriety of United States involve -
ment in coups particularly in those where the assassination
of. a foreign leader is a
likely prospect .
This country was created by violent revolt against a
regime believed co be cyrannous and our
founding fathers
the local dissidents of that era) received aid Erom foreign
countries Given that history , we should not today rule
out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants_
But passing beyond that principle , there remain serious
questions : for example whether the national interest of
the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such
support should be overt rather than covert ; what tactics
should be used; and how such actions should be authorized
and controlled by the coordinate branches of government_
The Comittee; believes that its recommendation on the question
of covert actions-in support of coups must await the Conmittee' s
final report which will be issued after a full review of
covert action in general
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TOP SE_EzT
b The_Setting_ In Which the Assassination Plets
Oecurred Explains But Does Not Justify
The Cold War setting in which the assassination
plots took place does not change our view that assassination
is unacceptable in our society_ In addition to the moral and
practical problems discussed elsewhere we find two principal
defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justifi-
ed the assassination plots :
Firs_, the assassination plots
were not necessitated by
imminent danger to the United States _ Among the cases
studied
Castro alone posed a threat to the United States but: then
only during the period: of the Cuban missile crisis Castro' s
assassination had been planned by the CIA long before that
crisis and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible
course of action during the crisis
Second we
reject absolutely
any notion that the United
States should justify its actions by the standards of totali-
tarians Our standards must be higher and this difference is
what the struggle is al1 about 'Of course, we must defend our
democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining
the very virtues we are defending_
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4
Two documents which have been supplied
to the Committee
graphically demonstrate attitudes which car lead to
tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very
ideals we must defend _
The first was written in 1954 by 3 special committee form-
ed to advise the President on covert activities. The United
States may , it said_ have Lo adopt tactics "more ruthless than
01 [those] employed by the enemy in order to meet the threat from
hostile nations The report concluded that standing
Anerican concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered "x
Although those proposals did not involve assassinations
the attitudes underlying them were as Director Colby testified
indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots
were conceived. (Colby , 6/4/75 , P. 117)
The full text of the passage is as follows
another important requirenent is an aggressive
covert psychological political and paramilitary
organization far more effective more unique and _
if necessary more ruthless than that. employed by the
enemy _ No one should be ` permitted to stand in the
way of the prompt efficient and secure accomplish-
ment of this mission_
The second consideration_ it is now clear that we
are facing an lacable enemy whose avowed objective
is world domination by whatever means at whatever
cost_ There are no rules in such a game Hitherto
acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply _ If
the U S is to survive standing American con-
cepts of American fair play: must be reconsidered_
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10
We do not think that traditional American notions of
fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries
It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we
adopt
1 ( 18 tactics more ruthless than the enemy
A second document which represents an attitude which we
find improper was sent to the Congo in: the fall of 1960 when
the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was considered _ The
chief of CIA' s Africa Division recommended a particular agent
WIROGUE because
He is indeed aware of the precepts of right
and wrong but if he is given an assignment
which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the
world but necessary because nis case officer
ordered him to carry it out then it is right ,
and he will dutifuliy undertake appropriate
action for its execution without pangs of con-
science In a word he can rationalize all
actions (Memo dated 1 160 ; Bissell Tr
6/11/75 _ P_ )
The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the
ideals of our nation_
2 The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld
Figures for Their Criminal Talents
We conclude that agencies of the United States must not
use underworld Eigures for their criminal talents* in carrying
out their operations In addition: co che corrosive effect
~Pending
our investigation Of the use of informants by the FBI and
other agencies we reserve judgment on che use of known criminals
as informants We are concerned here only with the use of persons
known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their
expertise in carrying out criminal acts
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upon our government the use of underworld figures involves
the following dangers :
a The use of underworld figures for "dirty business"
gives them the power to blackmail the government and to 'avoid
prosecution
2
for past or' future crimes For example the
figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used
their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution The CIA
also con templated attempting to quash criminal charges against
QJWIN in a
foreign tribunal
b The use of persons experienced in criminal tech-
niques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood
that crininal acts will occur Agents in the field are neces-
sarily given broad discretion_ But che risk of improper
activities is increased when persons of criminal background
are used , Particularly when they are selected precisely to take
advantage of their criminal skills or contacts _
*The corrosive effect,of dealing with underworld figures is
graphically demonstrated by the_fact that Attorney General Robert
Rennedy who had devoted much of his professional life to fight-
organized crime did not issue an order against cooperating
with such persons when he learned in 1961 that the CIA had
made use of Sam Giancana in 2 sensitive operation in Cuba
In 1962 when the Attorney General learned that the
operation had involved assassination he did according to
a CIA witness inform those brie him that underworld
figures should not be used before checking with him first ,
but failed to direct that they must never be S0 used.
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There is the danger that the United .States Govern-
ment will beconie an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and
that criminal figures will take 'advantage of their associa-
tion with the government to advance their own projects and
interests.
d; There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting
Persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the
laws of our society forbid_
The use of underworld figures by the United States Govern -
ment for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable
to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context
five decades ag0 :
Our government is che potent the omnipresent
teacher_ For or for il1 it teaches the
whole people by its example_ Crime is con -
tagious If the Government becones a law-
breaker it breeds contempt for law; it in-
vites every man to become a law unto hinself.
To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means
to declare that the Government may comit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of'
the private criminal would bring terrible
retribution_ Against this pernicious doctrine
this Court should resolutely set its face
Olmstead V _ U_ S _ 277 U.S ; 439 485 (1927)
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Lh
C Findings and Conclusions_Relating
to the Issues of Authori-
zation and Control
In the introduction to this report we set forth in
summary form, our major conclusions concerning whether the
assa8sination Plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion
elaborates and explains those conclusions
The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for
the assassination activities from two perspectives _ First,
the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking
positions authorized or were aware of the assassination
activities Second the Committee inquired whether the
officials responsible for the operational details of the
plots perceived that assassination had the approval of
their superiors or at least was the type of activity that
their superiors would not disapprove _
No doubt the CIA S general efforts against the regimes
discussed in this report were authorized at the highest
levels of the government _ But the record leaves serious
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doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by
the Administrations Even if the plots were not expressly
authorized it does not follow that the Agency personnel
believed they were acting improperly
1 The Command and Control tem for Assassina-
tions Was Such That the Plots Could Have
Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization
As emphasized throughout this report _ we are
unab le to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility
for the asga88ination plots Even after our long investiga-
tion it is unclear whether the ` conflicting and inconclusive
state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible
denial and its attendant doctrines or whether there were_
in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization
which made it pos sible for assassination efforts to have
been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government
without express authority from officials outside of those
agencies
Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have
been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government
without it having been uncon trovertibly clear that there was
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N
explicit authorization from the highest level _ The command
and control system revealed by the record made it possible for
the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without
express authorization by officials outside the Agency.
The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates
the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise
level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain While
there is no evidence that-the "plausible denial" system has
succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases considered
in this report the' possibility that a" system exists which
might permit those responsible _ for authorizing major operations
co escape responsibility is disturbing _ Responsible government
requires that public officials be held accountable for their
decisions
2 Findings_Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were
Authorized
a Diem
We find that neither the President nor any other
official in the United States Government authorized the assas
sination of Diem and his brother Nhu_ Both the DCI and top
State Department officials did know however , that the death
of Nhu at least at one
point had been contemplated by the coup
leaders _ To the contrary when the possibility that the coup
leaders were considering assassination was brought to the
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attention of the DCI he directed that the United States
would have no Part in such activity, and this information
was relayed to the coup leaders
b Schneider
We find: that neither the President nor any other
official in the United States Government authorized the assas-
sination of General Rene Schneider_ The CIA and perhaps the
White Hous e did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnap-
ping , which J5 it turned out , resulted in Schneider' s death _
C Trujillo
The Presidents and other senior officials in
the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow
of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end _
The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended
to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents
intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of
the government responsible for formulating policy is less
clear The record does establish that in the Spring of 1961
senior American officials , including the President , learned
that the dissidents intended to a88a8sinate Trujillo. and that
they desired machine guns for that Purpose . The Special Group
disapproved passage of those weapons and the President himself_
in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision indicating that the
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United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone
assassination" although he did state that if the coup succeeded
the United States would support the plotters
d Lumumba
The chain of events revealed by the documents and
testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference
that the assassination was authorized by the President .
Ic is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the
The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of"
Lumumba and taking 81 straightforward action" against him at NSC
and Special, Croup meetings with Dulles cable to the Congo ,
M Bissell' s representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority
and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support
an inference that the President and the Special Group urged
the assassination of Lumumba
Robert Johnson S testimony that he understood the President
to have ordered Lumumba' s assassination at NSC meeting does
[I a5 he said , offer a "clue" about Presidential euthorization
which , however should be read in light of the uncertain record
of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of
others in attendance at the meetings including the President' s
national security. advisors The fact that both the Chief of
Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was
Fresidential authorization for the assa8sination of Lumumba
is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because
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this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb' s meetings
with Bissell and Tweedy_ Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of
Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles statements
about Presidential authorization Richard Bissell as sumed
that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles
but Bissell had no specific_ recollection of any event when
this occurred_
The evidence leads uS to conclude tnat DDP Bissell and
DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the to assassinate
Lumumba However , we are unable to make a
finding that
President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination
effort against Luzumba because of the lack of absolute certainty
in the evidence
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Castro
There was no evidence from which the 'Committee
could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower , Kennedy ,
or Johnson
their close advisors or the Special Group authorized the
assassination of Castro
We find that the effort against Castro was clearly autho -
rized through the level of DDP It is not certain whether
Allen Dulles knew about the Plots although Bissell and
Edwards were of the opinion that he did and the credibility
of their beliefs is buttressed the fact that Dulles knew
about the Lumumba assassination plot , which was
planned and
attempted at the time of the early Castro plots _ We can find
no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred
during his tenure_ His DDP Richard Helms testified that
he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never
expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro
The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization
for the Plots against Castro was' Richard Bissell' s opinion
that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents
Eisenhower: and Kennedy after the assassination had been ' plan -
ned and was underway The assunptions underlying this opinion
are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a
finding
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First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the ploEs a
matter which is not certain Second , it assumes that Dulles
went Privately to the two Presidents--a course of action
which Helms who had far more covert action experience than
Bissell , testified was precisely what the doctrine of
plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing_ Third
it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand
from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was
being discussed
The chain of as sumptions is far too speculative for the
Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not
able to speak for thenselves Moreover it is inconsistent
with Bissell' s other testimony that "formal and explicit"
approval would be required for assassination x and con trary
to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors the men
closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy _
% If the evidence: concerning Pregident` Eisenhower S order
to assassinate Lumumba 15, correct , it should be weighed against
Bissell' s tes timony concerning circuulocutious briefings of the
Presidents in the Castro case First the Lumumba case would
imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such
matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously_ Second the Lumumba
example indicates that the President would discuss such matters
openly in an appropriate forum and would not need to be
approached_privately_ Third it can be inferred from Bissell' 8
testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had
told Dulles that he approved of the plot Dulles would not have
told anyone else of that fact _ Yet Gottiieb
S testimony in the
Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential autho-
rization for assass ination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he
was told by Dulles
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Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under
which they served never asked them to- consider assassination
There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson
knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his
Presidency_
3 CIA Officials Involved in the Assa88ination_Qpera-
tions Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permis -
sible Course of Action
The CIA officials involved' in the targeted assassination
attempts testified that they had believed that their activities
had been fully authorized *
In the case of the Lumumba a88a8sination operation
Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection
of authorization but after having reviewed the cables and
Special Group minutes testified' that authority
must nave
flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in
the 'Agency_
In the case of the assassination effort against Castro
Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the
operation involving underworld figures had been authorized
Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the had been
initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the
The lower level operatives such as 0' Connell and the
AMJ LASH case officers are not discussed in this section since
had clear orders from their immediate superiors
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plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level
within and beyond the Agency" although he had "no personal
knowledge whatever of the individuals identities_ times
exact words or channels through which such authority may
have passed" Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard
Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized
"from the highest level" and that Harvey had discussed the
ploes with Richard Helms his immediate superior_ Helns
testified that although he had never discussed assassination
with his superiors he believed:
that in these actions we were taking against
Cuba and against Fidel Castro' s government in Cuba
that they were what we had been asked to do In
other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro_
and there were no limitations put on the means
and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines
that we understood to be in play at this particular
time
The evidence points to 2
disturbing situation Agency
officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have
been within the parameters of .Permissible action but Adminis
tration officials: (including McCone)- responsible ` for formulat-
policy were not aware of the effort and did not authorize
it_ The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning
overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that
were subject to differing interpretations those responsible
for carrying out those orders .
The various Presidents and their senior advisors
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strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo , che
accession to power of Allende and the potential influence
of Patrice Lumumba_ Orders concerning action . against those
foreign leaders were
given in vigorous language _ For example
President Nixon S orders to prevent Allende from assuming
Power left Helns feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall' s
baton in my knapsack out of the oval office , it was that 4 6
Similarly General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort
against Cuba as combat situation" and Attorney General
Kennedy emphasized that solution co the Cuban problem
today carries top priority" Helms testified that the
pressure to 'get rid of [Castro and the Castro regime] was
intense , and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to
"0 'get off your ass about Cuba"
It is possible that there was a failure of communica-
tion: between policymakers and the agency personnel who were
experienced in 'secret , and often violent
>
action _ Although
policymakers testified that assassination was not intended
11 by such words as 'get rid of Castro some of their sub -
ordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that
assassination was desired and that they should proceed with-
out troubTing their superiors
The 1967 Inspector General S Report on assassinations
appropriately observed:
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The point is that of frequent resort to synechdoche
the mention of a part when the whole is to be under-
stood or vice versa Thus we encounter repeated
references to phrases such as disposing of Castro"
which may be read in the narrow literal sense of assas A -
sinating him when it is intended that it be read in
the broader figurative sense of dislodging the Castro
regime Revers the coin we find people speaking
vaguely of "doing some thing about Castro" when it is
clear that what they have specifically in mind is
killing him In a situation wherein those speaking
may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or
may not have said what they actually meant they should
not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted
differently than was intended
Differing perceptions between superiors and their sub-
ordinates were graphically illustrated in the' Castro context x
McCone
2
in 3 memorandum dated April 14, 1967 reflected as
follows :
Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in
T} P} terms such as dispose of Castro" remove Castro"
"knock off Castro" etc and this meant the overthrow
of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing
of it with a democratic regime_ Terms such as the
above appear in many working papers memoranda for the
record etc_ and as_ stated all refer to a change in
the Cuban government
"Senator Mathias Let me draw an example from history
When Thomas A Beckett was proving to be an annoyance as
Castro the King said who will rid me of this turbulent
Priest?= He didn t say , g9 out and murder him He said
who
Wili
rid me of this man and let it g0 at that
'Mr Helms
5
That is a warming reference to the problem_
"Senator Mathias : You feel that spans the generations
and the centuries?
'Mr He lms I think it does sir
"Senator Mathias And , that is typical of the kind of
thing which might be said, which might be taken by the
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Helns who had considerable experience as a covert operator
gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words_ interpret-
them as conveying authority for assassination
Helns repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit
authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of
Castro- in the early 1960' 8 _ but he said he did not construe
the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as Pro-
viding authority
to assassinate anyone As Helms testified
the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende
from ass uming office was any less than the pressure to remove
the Castro regime but rather that "I had, already made uP my
mind that we weren t going to have any of that business when
91 I was Director_
Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected
to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis
that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from
the strong language of the policymakers _ Bissell testified
1 that he had believed that formal and explicit approval"
would be required for assassination; and McManus testified
director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to
g0 forward?
'Mr Helms That is_ right But in answer to that I
realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time
and I think that any of uS would have found it very difficult
to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.$_ I
just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to
[B those things out of the oval office
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that "it never occurred to me I1 that che vigorous words of
the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing
assassination The differing perceptions may
have resulted
from their different backgrounds and training _ Neither
Bissell (an acadenician wnose Agency career for the six years
before he became DDP had been in the field of technology)
nor
McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work)
were experienced in covert operations $
The perception of certain Agency officials that assas
sination was within the range of permissible activitv was
reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions
against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level
and by the failure '0f the successive adninistrations to make
clear that assassination was not permissible . This point is
one of the subjects considered in the next section
Of course this analysis cannot be carried too far_ In
the Lumumba case for example Johnson and Dillon who were
Administration officials with no covert operation experience
construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination whiie
other persons who were not in the' Agency did not So interpret
them _
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The Failure In Communication Between Agency_Qfficials
In_Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors
In The_Agency And In The Adninistration Was: Due To
(a) The Failure of Subordinates To' Disclose
Qperations To Their Superiors and
(b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Frecise Orders
Regarding the Nature 0f Permissable Operations and to Make
Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of
Vielence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions
Sanctioned the Administrations
While we cannot find that officials responsible for
making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassina-
tion attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case)
}
Agency operatives at; least through the level of DDP neverthe-
less perceived assassination to have been permissible: This
failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity
~of assassination The Comittee finds that the failure of
Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible ,
and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected
to inform their superiors are unacceptable The Comittee
further finds that Administration officials failed_ to be
sufficiently precise
in their directions to the Agency and
that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination
was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities
that they did authorize
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(a) Agency_Officials Failed On Several Occasions To Reveal
The Plets To Their Superiors Or To Do So With Sufficient
Detail and Clarity
Several of the cases considered in this report raise
questions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficiently
informed their superiors in the' Agency or officials outside the
Agency about their activities _
Castro
The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors
of the ass288ination efforts against Castro is particularly
troubling-
Richard Bissell testified that he and. Sheffield Edwards
told Allen Dulles only "circumlocutiously' and only after
the project had: begun about the operation which used members
of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP
Richard Helms testified that they never discussed the opera-
tion with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA The _
two
officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwards
and William Harvey--testified that they never discussed the
operation witch McCone or any Government official above the
level of DDP McCone testified that he was never consulted about
the operation and that' Dulles never briefed him on its
existence On the basis: of the testimony and documentary
evidence before the Committee , it is uncertain . whether Dulles
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was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld
operation and virtually certain that it continued into
McCone ' s term without his or the Administration S knowledge
or approval
On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity
to inform his superiors about che assa8sination effort against:
Castro he either failed to inform them or misled them_
Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and
Cabell about the assassination operation underworld
11 figures but that did S0
'circumlocutiously" and then
only after contact had been made with the underworld and a
price had been offered for Castro' s death _
Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue
of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower or
Kennedy Administration _ His reason was that since he was under
Dulles in the chain of command he would normally have had no
co. discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Adminis-
0
tration officials
9'
and that he assumed that Dulles would have
circumlocutious spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
about the operation These reasons are insufficient . It was
inexcusable to wichhold such information from those responsible
for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they
might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles who
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hinself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation X
The failure Lo either inform those officials or to make
certain that they had been informed Dulles was particularly
reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions
on which Bissell should have informed them and his failure to
do S0 was misleading _ In the first weeks of the Kennedy Adminis -
tration Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development
of an assassination capability within CIA--executive action
But Bissell did not mention that an_ actual assassination attempt
was underway _ Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board
of Inquiry which was formed Lo report to che President on the
of and the Cuban situation but testified that he did
not inform the Commission of the assassination operation As
chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations
and the Bay of Bissell frequently met with officials in
the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban
operations and his advice was frequently sought_ He did not
tell them that the " CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate
Castro and did not ask if favored proceeding with the
Even assuming that Bissell correctly Perceived that Dulles
understood the nature of the operation it was inexcusable for
Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in Plain language _ Further ,
even if one accepts Bissell' s assumption that Dulles told the
Presidents they would have been told too late because Bissell
1 guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had
been planned and was
being attempted"
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effort _ He was present at the meeting with Dulles and Presi-
dent Kennedy
at which the new President was briefed on covert
action in Cuba _ but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the
assassination operation that was underway _
The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy-
makers continued during the time that Richard Helns was DDP
Helns failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation
when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills
were
sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment
9 '
and Helns excuses
are unpersuasive In of 1962
2
the Attorney General was
told that the CIA S involvement in an assassination plot had
terminated with the of Not only did Edwards who
had briefed the Attorney General know that the operation had
not been terminated, but Helns did not inform the Attorney
General that the operation was still active when he learned
that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not
inform McCone_ of the plot until August 1962 , and did S0 then
in a manner which indicated that the Plot had been terminated
before McCone became Director Helms denial that AMI LASH"
had been involved in an as8a8sination attempt in response to
Secretary of State Rusk' s inquiries was as Helns testified,
"not: truthful"
When Helns briefed President Johnson on the Castro Plots
he apparently described the activities that had occurred during
prior administrations but did not describe the AM] LASH opera-
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tion which had continued until 1965 _ Helms also failed to
inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise
question was not asked _
He Ims told the Committee that he had never raised the
assassination. operation With McCone or Kennedy Administration
officials because he had assumed that the project had been
previously authorized and that the aggressive character of
the Kennedy Administration S program against the Castro regime
made assassination permissible even in the absence of an
express instruction_ He added that he had never been convinced
that the operation would succeed and that he would have told
McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would 0 'go
anyplace
Helms reasons for not having told his superiors about
the assassination effort are unacceptable ; indeed many of: them
were reasons he should have sought express authority.
As Helms hinself testified, assassination was of a high order
of sensitivity Administration policymakers supported by
intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency , had emphasized
on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse
than Castro hinself . In addition the Special Group Augmented
required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be sub _
mitted in detail for its approval_ Although the Administration
was exer intense pressure on the CIA to do s ome
thing about
Castro and the Castro regime _ it was a 'seriOus error to have
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undertaken S0 drastic an operation without obtaining full and
equivocal permission _
William Harvey , the officer in charge of the CIA ' s attempt
uS underworld figures to assassinate Castro testified that
he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the
Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been
Eully authorized by the previous Director because he was
uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding , and because
he believed that it was Helns not his duty to inform higher
authorities_
Nonetheless the Committee believes there were occasions
on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the
assassination operation_ As head of Task Force W , the branch
of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba Harvey
reported directly to General Lans dale and the Special Group
Augmented _ The Special Group Augmented had made known that
covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, both
by explicit instruction and its practice that particular
operations be submitted in "nauseating detail" Yet Harvey
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33 Auk wdbalc H
did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group
Augmented of the assassination operation either when he was
explicitly requested to report to McCone General Taylor
and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April
1962 or when the subject of assassination was raised in the
August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval_
The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for not
having informed those responsible for formulating policy
about the assassination operation were inadequate misleading
and inconsistent _ Some officials viewed assassination as
too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors while
others considered ic not sufficiently important Harvey
testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the
underworld operation in Apr:il 1962 , because it was not
sufficiently advanced but too late to cell him about it in
August 1962 , since by that time he had decided to terinate
it On. other 'occasions officials thought disclosure was
someone else S responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was
up to Dulles' Harvey believed it was up to Helms but Helms
renarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his back
pocket"
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The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to
inform policymakers of the assassination effort against
Castro was grossly improper _ The Comnittee believes that
it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a
sensitive operation to his superior_ the DCI no matter how
grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the
operation _ Ic follows that the DCI has the same duty to
accurately inform his superiors _
Trujillo
In the Trujillo case there were several instances in
which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient
information or were not informed in a
timely fashion
At a
meeting on December 29_ 1960 , Bissell presented a
to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups
and local dissidents and stated that the plan would not bring
11 down the regime without some decisive stroke against Trujillo
himself" At 3 meeting on January 12 . 1961 , the Special Group
authorized the Passage of "limited supplies of small arms and
other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions
At this time the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating
the assassination of Trujillo had been knovil in the State Department
at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs , and by senior officials of the CIA including the DCI
Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant _ which
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was said to have been the basis upon which the: Special Group
agreed to the "limited supply' of small arms did not mention
assassination To the contrary , it spoke of sabotage potential"
and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the
[governnent] by any such minor. measure [as the supplying of
13 small arms ]
On February 17 1961 _ Richard Bissell sent a memorandum
on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy Bissell knew
that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo , but his
memorandum did not mention assassination It indicated that
19 the dissidents of action" included arms for 300 men
Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a
non-targeted paramilitary plan not an assassination
The Passage of the carbines was approved by CIA head-
quarters on March 31 , 1961 _ The State Department was apparently
unaware of this Passage for several weeks The pouching of the
machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA
The State Department official from whom the CIA sought
M permission to pas s the machine guns stated that on cross
examination the CIA official conceded that the purpose was
assassination The CIA official then agreed the United States
should have nothing to do with assassination Plots 11 anywhere
8J anytime even though the previous he and Bissell had signed-
a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for
use in connection with 3
planned assassination
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Schneider
The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were
con trary to those of the Administration It is clear that Presi-
dent- Nixon desired to prevent Allende from. assuming office even
if that required Eomenting and supporting a coup in Chile Nor
did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (includ-
as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have
been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather the issue posed
is whether White House officials were consulted and thus given
an
opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of suC-
cess , and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics
The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after Octo-
ber 15 there 1s some doubt.
The documentary record with respect to the disputed post -
October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences _ On the one
hand Karamessines ' calendar shows existence of at least one White
House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of
General Schneider on October 22_ However the absence of any sub-
stantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with several such
memoranda describing contacts with the White House between Septem-
ber 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communi-
cation on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful super-
vision on the part of the White House _
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The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a
view that action which the Committee believes called for
top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as
permissible _ without any further consultation , on the basis
of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming
power _ Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to
military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers
without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of
the Program _ We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action
of the junior officers _ But it.necessarily establishes that
there was no advance permiss ion from outside the CIA for the
passage of machine guns And it als0 suggests an attitude
within the CIA towvard consultation which was
unduly lax _
Further , this case demons trated the problems inherent in giving
an agency a "blank: check" to engage in covert operations
without specifying which actions: are and: are not permissible ,
and without adequately supervising and monitoring these
activities once begun _
(b) On Occasion , Administration Officials Gave Vague:
Instructions co Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently
Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration
While-we cannot find that high Administration Officials
expressly approved of the assassination actempts we have
noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived
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assassination to have been authorized_ Alchough those officials
were remiss in not seeking
express authorization for their
activities their superiors were als0 at fault for giving
vague instructions and Eor not explicitly ruling out assassina-
tion No written order prohibi assassination was issued
until 1972 and that order was an internal CIA directive issued
by Director Helns
Schneider
As explained above there is no evidence that assassina-
tion was ever Proposed as a method of carrying out the Presi-
dential order to prevent Allende from assuming office_ The
Committee believes however , that the granting of carte
blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case
may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of
General Schneider This was also partially due to impositing
an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably
short time Apart from the question of whether any inter-
vention was justified under the circumstances of this case,
the committee believes that the Executive in any event should
have defined the limits of permissible action
Lumumba
We are unable to make a
finding that President
Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination
effort against Lunumba because of the lack of absolute
certainty in the evidence However it appears that the
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strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and
NSC as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings _
led Dulles to believe that assassination
was desired. The
minutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of"
Lumumba an "extremely strong feeling
about the necessity
for straight forward action" and 3 refusal to rule out any
activity that might contribute to T 'getting rid of" Lumumba _
Castro
The effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an
atmosphere of extreme pressure Eisenhower and Kennedy
Administration officials. to discredit and overthrow the Castro
regime Richard Helms recalled that:
11 I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very
intense And therefore _ when you go into the record
you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty
schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure_
And we were quite frustrated_
Bissell recalled that:
"During that entire period_ the administration was
extremely sensitive about the defeat that had been
afflicted_
as they felt , on the U.S at the Bay of
and were every possible means of
getting rid of Castro
Another witness Samuel Halpern stated that sometime in
che Fall of 1961 Bissell was
"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by
both the President and the Attorney General for as he
Put it, sitting on his a5s and not
doing anything about
Tt getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime
General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation
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V Mongoose that you re in a combat situation where we have
been given full command" Secretary of Defense McNamara
confirmed that were hysterical about Castro at the time
of the of and thereafter"
Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved
contemplated violent action against Cuba _ The operation
which resulted in the of was a major paramilitary
ons laught that had the approval of the highest government
officials including the two Presidents Thereafter Attorney
General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group
mented that "a solution to che Cuban problem today carried
priority no time money , effort--or manpower is
to be spared."* Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved
propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a
revolt of the Cuban people against Castro Measures that
were considered by the top policymakers included incapacita-
sugar workers during harvest
season by the use of
chenicals blowing up bridges and production plants ; sabotaging
merchandise in third countries--even those allied with
the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba ; and arming
insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging
% The Attorney General himself took a personal interest
in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba
on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits
and me eting in Washington and Florida with Cuban: exiles
active in the covert war against the Castro government _
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of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit
and arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on Plants_ mines
and harbors
Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might
well have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials
that assassination was a Permissible tool in the effort to
overthrow the Castro regime At a Special Group meeting in
November 1960 Under Secretary Merchant inquired whether
any planning had been undertaken for "direct positive action"
against Che Guevarra Raul and Fidel Castro Cabell replied
that such a capability did not exist but might well have
left the meeting. with the impression that assassination was
not out of bounds . One phase of Lansdale 5 plans which
was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962 aimed
at inducing 0 open revolt and overthrow .of the Communist
regime' and included in the final phase an "attack on the
cadre of the regime including leaders" The Proposal
stated that "this should be a Special Target" operation
Gangster elenents might provide the best recruitment potential
against police - Several minutes from Special Group
mee tings contain language such as. "possible removal of
Castro from the Cuban scene" Although Lansdale s Proposal
was shelved _ the cype of aggressive action contemplated was
not ruled out_
On several occasions , the subject of assa88ination was
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discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials
While those officials never consented to actual assassina-
tion efforts they also failed to indicate that assassination
was impermissible as a matter of principle
In early 1961 , McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA
project described as the development of a capability to
assassinate x Bundy raised no objection and according to
Bissell may have been more affirmative Although Bissell
stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy S
remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then
underway , the fact that he believed that the development
of an assassination capability had been approved by the White
House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have
contributed to the general perception that assassination was
not prohibited .
Docunents indicate that in 1962 , Attorney General
Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate
Castro prior to the of According to the CIA
officials Present at the briefing , the Attorney General
* Bundy who was National Security Advisor to the President ,
had an
obligation
to tell_ the President of such a grave
matter even though it was only a discussion of a capability
to assassinate His failure co do S0 was a serious error;
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indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation
on the impropriety of the attempt itself There is no
evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must
not engage in ass28sination plots
At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August
1962 well after the assassination efforts were underway
Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of
whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored,
and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning
the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans . for the
assassination of Cuban leaders While McCone testified
that he had immediately made it clear that assassination
was not to be discussed or condoned , Harvey' s testimony
and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that
Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had
objected to the use of assassination or whether he was
concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any
7 Documents show that che Attorney General Robert Kennedy
learned in of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld
figures in an operation against Cuba The documentary record
further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that
the operation had involved assssination efforts until
of 1962 and that the operation was then described:to him
as having been terminated in 1961 There is no evidence
that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the
operation until that brie or thac he learned that it
had not in fact been terminated While it is curious that
the Attorney General would not have inquired further into
the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam
Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that
he did.
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event , McCone went no further_ He issued no general order
banning consideration of assassination within the Agency_
One of the. programs forwarded to General Lansdale by
the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled
"Operation Bounty and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba
offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders
Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale , it indicates that
persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assas
sination might be permissible _
While the ambivalence of Administration officials does
not excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials
or
justify their failure to seek explicit permission , it dis-
played an insufficient concern about assassination which
may have contributed co the perception that assassination
was an acceptable tactic in accomp lishing the Government S
general objectives_
With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by
the Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose
precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring
prior permission for the details of other proposed covert
operations against Cuba_ No general policy banning assas
sination was promulgated until Helns intra-agency order
in 1972 In light of the number of times in which the
subject of assassination arose, Administration officials
were remiss in not
explicitly . forbidding such activity _
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* * * * *
The Committee notes that many of the occasions on
which CIA officials should have inforued their superiors
of the assassination efforts but failed to do s0 , or did
S0 in a
misleading manner ,
were also occasions on which
Adninistration officia]s paradoxically may have reinforced
the perception that assassination was permissible
For exanple when Bissell with Bundy about an
executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that
an actual assassination operation was underway , but Bundy
failed to rule out assassination as a tactic_
In of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told
about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the of
but not about the operation that was then going on The Attorney
General however did not state that assassination was improper
When a senior administration official raised the question
of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group
meeting_ the assa8sination operation should have been revealed
but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should
also have been issued by McCone if as he testified_ he had ex-
hibited strong aversion to assassination
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6 Practices Current at the Time in_Wich the Assas -
sination Plots Qccurred_Were Revealed_by_ the Record to
Create the Risk of Confusion Rashness , and Irresponsibility
in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was
Most Necessary
Various witnesses described elements of the system
within which the assassination plots were conceived_ The
Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the
most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels
of Government with the least clarity_ We find this dis -
turbing , and view the following
concepts as particularly
dangerous
(1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial"
beyond its intended Purpose of hiding the involvement of
the United States from other countries to an effort co
shield higher officials from knowledge , and hence responsi-
bility for certain operations
(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe
serious. matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings
ought to be made clear _
(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert
action pregrams i8. sufficient to justify specific actions
such as assassination or the passage of weapons.
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(4) The theory that authority granted , or assumed co
be granted by one director or one adinistration could be
presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming
the authority with successor officials
(5) The creation of capabilities without careful
review and authorization by policymakers and the risk that
such capabilities might be used without further authoriza-
tion _
(a) The_Danger Inherent in Overextending the_Doctrine
of Plausible Denial
The original concept of plausible denial envisioned
lementing covert actions in a manner calculated co conceal
American involvement if the actions were exposed. The
doctrine was at times 1 delusion. and at times a snare_ It
was naive for policymakers co assume that sponsorship of
actions as as the of invasion could be concealed.
The Committee' s inquiry into assassination and the public
disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the
United States resorted to cloak and ~dagger tactics , its hand
was ultimately exposed. In' addition , the likelihood of
reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers
believe that their decisions will never be revealed.
Whatever can be said in defense of' the original Pur-
pose of Plausible denial--a purpose which intends. to conceal
U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of
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the doctrine to che internal decision-making process of
the Government is absurd. theory which as a matter
of doctrine places elected officials on the periphery of
the decision ~making Process is an invitation to error , an
abdication of responsibility , and 3 perversion of democratic
government _
(b) The Dangers_ of_Using "Circumlocution }1 and
"Euphemism"
According to Richard Bissell the extension of plausible
denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of cir-
cumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and
other senior officials _
Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity_
On the one hand' , it assumes' that 8enior officials should be
shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if
the truth comes out On the other hand. the concept assumes
that senior officials must be told enough , by: of double
talk , to grasp the subject _ As a consequence the theory
fails to accomplish its objective and increases the
risk of misunderstanding- Subordinate officials should des -
cribe their proposals in clear precise , and brutally frank
language ; _busy superiors are entitled to and should demand
no less
Euphemism may actually have been preferred-
1
~not because
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of plausible denial-
~ -but because the persons involved
could not bring thenselves to state in Plain language what
they intended to do and may have in_ some instances assuned
rightly or wrongly , that the listening superiors did not
want the issue squarely placed before them _ Assassinate
murder and kill are words many 'People do not want to speak
or hear They describe acts which should not even be pro -
posed _ let alone Plotted . Failing to call' dirty business
by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty
business being done
(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions
Permitting specific acts to be' taken on the basis of
general approvals of broad strategies (e.g. , keep Allende
from &8suming office get rid of the Castro regime) blurs
responsibility and accountability_ Worse still it increases
the danger that subordinates may take steps which would
have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed .
A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally
use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for
embarrassing activities
In either event we find that the gap between the
general policy objectives and the specific actions under-
taken to achieve them was far too wide _
It is important 'that policymakers review the manner in
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which their directives are implemented particularly when
the activities are sensitive secret and imune from
public scrutiny _
(d) The Danger of "Floating_Authorization
One justification advanced by Richard Helns and William
Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of under-
world figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion
that the project had already been approved by McCone 5
predecessor Allen Dulles and that further authorization was
unnecessary , at least until the operation had reached a more
advanced stage,
Similarly , most of the actions taken in the Trujillo
case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration
were authorized by the Special Group on January 12 1961 ,
at the end of the Eisenhower Administration_
The idea that authority might continue from one adminis
tration or director to the next and that there is no
to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible
decisionmaking _ Circumstances may change or judgments differ_
New officials should be given the opportunity to review
significant Programs
(e) The Problens Connected with_Creating New Covert
Capabilities
The development of a new capability raises numerous
probLems Having
a capability. to engage in certain covert
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activity increases the probability that it will occur
since the capability represents a tool that is available
for use There is the further danger that authorizing
a
capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use
without need for obtaining explicit authorization
Of course an assassination capability should never
have been created in the first place_
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Approved by
Drafting
Subcommittee
10/8/75
(with possible reservation
V RECOMMENDATIONS as to language of statute)
During our long Invegtigation of assass Ination, a number of vital issues
came Into sharp focus
Above all, stood the question' of assassination _ Our recommendations on
other issues should awalt the completion of our continuing investigations and
our final report. But we need no more information to convince uS that a flat
ban against assas8ination should be written into law .
We condenn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American
policy. Surprisingly, at present there is no statute making It a crine to assas-
sinate a foreign official outside the United States. lence for the reasons
set forth below, the Committee recommends the pronpt enactment of a statute mak-
it a Federal crime to commic or attempt an assassination, or to conspire :o
do So .
A_ General_agreement that the United States must not engage in assassina-
cion view that assassination has no Place in America S arsenal is shared by
the Adninistration.
President Ford , in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to
deal with che assassination issue stated:
I am opposed to political assassination This administration
has, not and will not use such means as instruments of national
policy_ Presidential Press Conference, June 9 1975, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential_Documents, Vol II, No Pa 611
The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination . They denounced
it 38 imoral, described it as Impractical and reninded uS thac an open soc Lety ,
most of all, runs the risk of the assassination 'of its own leaders As President
00 Kennedy was reported to have said: we can t into that kind of thing, or we
" would all be targets. (Goodwin 7/18/75 ,
Pa 4)
The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically
that assassination should be banned _ Thus Colby said:
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2
With respect to assassination my position 1s clear I
just think it is wrong And I have said so and made it
very clear to my SubordInates (5/21/75 _ P 89)
$ 'predecessor , Helms although himself involved in an earlier plot,
said he had concluded assassination should. be ruled out for both moral and
practical reasons;
As a result of my experiences through the years, when I be-
cane Director 1 had made up my mind that this' option- Aof
killing' foreign leaders,
was sone thin; that I did not want
to happen on my watch My reasons for this were these:
There are not: moral reasons but there are also
some other rather practical reasons.
It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep any -
thing like that secret Somebody. would g0 to a Con-
gressman, his Senator , he might g0 to a newspaper man , what-
ever the case may be but it just is not a practical alternaz
cive, it seens to me in our society_
Then there is another consideration . if you are going
to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader ,
chen who 1s going to take his place] running that country ,
and are you essentially better off as 3 matter of Practice
when it is over than You were before? And I can you I
think a very solid example of this wich happened 'in Vietnan
when President Diem was eliminated from the scene He then
had a revolvitig door of prime ministers after that for quite:
some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government
at a time In its history when it should have strong was
nothing but 3 caretaker government In other
words that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of
the United States.
there is no sense in my sitting here With all the ex-
perience 1 have had and not sharing with the' Committee my
feelings this It isn t because I have lost my cool_
or because I have lost my guts, It S imply because I don t
think it is a viable option in the United States of America these
Chairinan Church. Doesn t it also- follow , Mr _ Te lms = = I'
agree with what you have said fully CC- but doesn t it
also follow on the practical side apart from the side
that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do
do very grave political damage to the United States in
the world at large? I don t know to what extent the Russians
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only.
give
been
day .
is
days _
moral
they
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7 3
Involved themselves in political
their systen
assassinations but under
at least have
a better: prospect of it concealed _ Since we do like a free since . these secrets are
socfety and
revelation
going co cone out in due course , the wIll then do serious injury
to the good name and reputation of the United Staces_
Would you agree with that?
Mr Helus I would_
The Chairman _ And finally , 1f we were to selves the prerogative to
reserve to our-
vite reciprocal action
Ecom sfareinate leaders ,
we may in-
that if it S our
governments who assume
gative
prerogative co do So , it Is their prero- as well and that is another
invite with this kind of
danger that we at least action = wouldn t you agree?
Mr Helms . sir. (6/13/75 ,
PP . 76-78)
Similarly ,
John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations
because:
I didn t think It was
Government
proper Erom the standpoint of the U.S _ and the Central Intelligence
(6/6/75 ,
P. 15)
B. CLA_Directives_Baning_Assassination_
In 1972 and 1973 , Helms and
then Issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. In his order Helms
said:
It has recently again been alleged
in che engages in assassination. As
press that CIA
the case and
you are wel1 aware, this is not
To underline
Agency policy has
been clear on this issue . it however , I direct that
no such operation be undertaken,
assLsted
activicy
or
personnel or suggested by any of our (Memorandum, Helms to Deputy Directors_ 3/6/72)
in one of 2 series of orders in August 1973 arising
out of the Agencv 5
own review of prior "questionable activity,
issued an order which stated:
CIA will not engage 1n assassination
suggest to others that
nor induce assist or
to
assassination be employed _ (Memorandum _ Deputy Directors, 8/29/73) Colby
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they
keep~ ing
Yes,
foreign
foreign
Yes,
Agency .
Colby
lon?;
Colby ,
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C_ The need_ for a stacute: Commendable and welcome as they are, these:
CIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change
and someday In the future what was tried In the past may once again become 3 tempt-
ation . Assassination plots did happen . Ic would be Irresponsible for us not to do
all that we can do to prevent their happenng again. Laws express Qur soclety S
values; they deter those who might be tempted stiffen the will of those who
want to resist_
The statute we recommend , which 18 printed as an appendix to this report,
makes it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction. of the United
States 1) to 'conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a
foreign official; 2) to attempt co assassinate a Eoreign official, or .3) to assas-
sinate a foreign 'officlal_
Present law makes it crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign
official or forelgn official guest while such: a person is in the United States:
18 U.S.C. 1l16; 18 U.S.C: 1117_ However , there 15 no law which makes ic a crime
:o assassinate, or to conspire or attempt to assassinate, a foreign official
while such official is outside the United States , Our proposed statute_ is thus
designed to close this gap in che law.
Subsection (a)' of: che Proposed stacuce would punish conspiracies fored
within the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of the
Uniced States Subsection (b) 18 necessary to eliminate the loophole which would
otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad _
Subsections (c) and (4) respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill or
to kill a foreign offIcial outside the United States_
Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee
V of the United States" Eo make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S.
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5_
governmnent personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens having no relation
co the-U.S _ government: In addition, subsection (a) dealing with conspiracies
within the United States, applies to other person," whether or not a Uniced
States citizen. Noncltizens who conspire within the United States to assassi~
nate a foreign 'official clearly come within the jurisdiction of U.S_ law Sub-
sections (b) through (d) which deal with conduct outside the Unfted States , apply
to U.S_ citfzens, and to officers or enployees of the United States, whether or
not they are cltizens. Criminal liabilicy for conduct outside the United States
of persons who are not U.S. citizens or who do not hold a position as a officer
or employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where such
conduct takes place.
The term "foreign official" 1s defined in subjection (d) (2) The definf-
tion makes it clear that the offense may be comitted even though the official
belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government , Or a non-governmental
Political party. Our investigation a5 well as the realicy of international
politics
n _n has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets
for assassination.*
The offenses are linited to conduct almed at such persons because of their
official duties or status, or their political views , actfons or statements. Thus
for example, 3 conspiracy :o kill or the killing of a foreign officlal, which is
not polftically motivated would not be; punishable under this statute.
The definition of official in section (4) (2) also provides that such per -
son must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which the
United States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have
*IFor example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the
time of the plots agalnst his life, and Trujfllo, though the dictator, held no
official governmental position in the latter perfod of his regime _
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6
not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of
7T che War Powers Resolutlon _ This definition makes It clear .that, absent a decla-
ration of war or che introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant .to the
War Powers Resolution, the killing of.foreign officials is a criminal offense .
Linsert discussion of paramilitary aspect]
* * $ # *
In the course of our hearings,_ some Witnesses, while strongly condemning
assassination, asked. whether, as 3 mat ter of theory, assassination should absolutely
be ruled: out in a time ' of truly unusual national energency . Adolf Hitler was
cited as" an example Of course, the cases with whlch we were concerned were not
of: thac character.*/ In a grave emergency, the President has a linited pOver to
act, not in vfolation of the law , but in accord with his own
responsibilities
under the Constitution to defend the Nation . As the Supreme Court has declared,; the
Constitution not a suicide pact _ Tt Kennedy V .` Mendoza-Martinez 372 U.S _ 144',
160 (1963)
Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency , claimed unprecedented
power based on the. need to preserve the nation:
amy oath to Preserve the Constitution the best of
my ability, imposed upon me the 'duty of preserving, by
every indispensable means , that government L D that
nation of which that Constitution was the organic law
Was it possible to lose the nation and preserve the
Constitution? By general law life and limb must be Pro-
tected; yet often a linb must be amputated to save a life;
but a life is never wisely given to save a limb I felt
that measures , otherwise unconstitutional, might become
lawful
}
by becoming indispensable to the preservation of
che Constitution, through the preservation of the nation
The Complete Works of_Abraham_Lincoln, Vol X,
PP _ 65-66 (Nicolay and Eds 1894)
#IIndeed, in the only situation oE true national crisis the Cuban missile
crisis
5 assassination was not even considered
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to
yet
Hay ,
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7 .
Of course, whatever the extent of the President 5 ow constitutional
powers; it 1s a fundanental principle of our constitutional: system that these
powers are checked and linited by the Congress, including the Congress Power
of impeachnent As a necessary corollary, any action caken by a President pur-
suant to his linited inherent povers and in apparent conflict with che law
must be dlsclosed co the ' Congress . then may the Congress judge whether the ac-
tion truly represented , in Lincoln S phrase, an "indispensable necessity"
to
the life of the Nation
As Lincoln explained In submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress
for ratification: "In full view of his great responsibility he has, So far,
done what he has. deemed his You will now , accordIng to your own judgment
M Perform yours. (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July .4 ,
1861)
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duty.
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Appr: Drafting
Subcomnittee on {9/9/75.
EPILOGUE
'd0 not believe that the acts which we liave examincd represent the'
We
Anerican character- do not reflect che ideals which have given
of this country and 'of. the world hope for a better fuller
Che
Eairer life. We regard the assassination Plots as aberrations
We must not adopt: the tactics oE the enemy . Means are as . important
ends_ Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that' #ake
as
free. But each time we do `SO, each time the means we use .are wrong
inen
our inner strength, the strength which makes uS 'Eree, is lessened .
Despite our distaste for what we have seen , we have: great faith in
this country. The story is sad, but this country .has the strength to hear
it and co learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes
and resolve not to repeat then_ IE we do not , we will decline;; but; if we
our future will be wor of the best of: our past .
by
They
eal=
'People
thy do ,