Transcript of 157-10014-10117.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 157-10014-10117 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination System Date: 71712015 [dentification For Agency Information AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10117 RECORD SERIES MSCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-23 Document Inforation ORIGINATOR SSCIA FROM TO TITLE : RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER DATE : 00/00/1975 PAGES 103 SUBJECTS ANTH-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT CLASSIFICA TION Declassified RESTRICTIONS IB; 1C CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW 03/21/2000 OPENING CRITERIA COMMNTS CCBOX 453 v9.| HI 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 1 ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== Date 08 /07/95 Page 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY SSCIA RECORD NUMBER 157-10014-10117 RECORDS SERIES MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMITTTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER 07-M-23 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR SSCIA FROM TO TITLE RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER DATE 00/00/75 PAGES 103 SUBJECTS ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE REPORT CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS REFERRED CURRENT STATUS POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW 01/05/99 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS CCBOX 453 [R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 2 ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 1 6 1 ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== GOODININ TESTIMONY NOTEBOOK TABLE OFi CONTENTS Sumaryl on Richard Goodwin by DiGenova A_ 4/26/61 Memo to| Bundy re "'Cuba Problem' from Goodwin _ B 5/2/61 Memo to' Goodwin re "'Possible Covert Activities against Cuba_ from Bissell C. 5/4/61 Draft of NSC Action No _ 2413 D 5/5/61 Draft Record of Actions = 483rd NSC meeting (5/5/61) Es 5/24/61 Memorandun of Conversation with Dick Bissell Tracy Barnes by Goodwin _ F. 6/10/61 Memorandum for the President re "CIA Reorganization, from Schlesinger _ G. 7/8/61 Memorandu for Mr _ Richard Goodwin re "'Cuban' Covert Plan , from Schlesinger_ H_ 9/1/61 Memorandu to the President re Cuban Task Force Meeting, 8/31_ 2 from Goodwin _ I_ 11/1/61 Memorandu to the President , Eyes Only for the President Tt re concept of a "command operation'- for from Goodwin. J 11/2/61 Memorandum , Eyes Only for the President and the Attorney General re "'operation should be organized with five staff components from Coodwin_ Ka 11/4/61 Memo 9 Eyes Only , re recomendations that "the Cuban 01 Operation be organized in five components LS 11/22/61 Memorandum to Sec _ of State Sec _ of Defense , Director of CIA Gen Taylor Gen Lansdale Richard Goodwin Siary of the major' decisions which have been made in; regard to the Cuba' Operations' from Goodwin_ M 8/10/62 Memorandu for Record re "Minutes of Meeting of Special Group ; (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE 10 August, 1962 _ N 8/13/62 Memorandun for William Harvey CIA, Robert Hurwitch, State Gen . Benjamin Harris Defense Don Wilson, USIA re "'Alternate' Course B, 11 Lansdale- 0 8/14/62 Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans) re "'Operation MONGOOSE from Harvey _ P 5/27/.75 Sumary of Goodwin Interview W Aaron re "Intelligence Activities in Latin America_ HF 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 4 Cuba, AG, re" from ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== Table of Contents 2 _ Q 6/10/75 Szulc] Testimony before SSC, excerpt_ R. 7/17/75 Sumaty of documents produced by Coodwin on 7/16/75 , by Dennin_ S_ 5/13/61 Memorandun to Goodwin re "CIA Covert Activities in the Dominican Republic_ Ta 5/29/61 Drafts and original of cable from State Dept. to (date of cable) Dearborn _ H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 5 ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== July 17 1 1975 To : F.A.0 = Schwarz/Curtis Smothers From: Joseph E_ DiGenova Re: Richard Goodwin Materials and Summary Summary A_ Goodwin Interview of_July 16 1975 Mr Goodwin was interviewed for a second time on July 16 , 1975 . He indicated' that he chaired the "Cuba Task Force 0 after the of Bigs . Paul Nitze had pre- viously chaired the group. It was this Cuba Task Force that suggested the establishment of the Lansdale project _ In this regard , Goodwin noted that Lansdale proved to be very efficient _ Goodwin indicated that he was present during the conversation between President Kennedy and Tad Szulc concerning the question Of assassinating Castro. (See Szulc' s testimony infra.) He spoke with the President after that conversation and remembers JFK saying about assassination: "We can t into that A Mn we 11 all be targets= 00 He noted that Bissell never mentioned anything to him_ 0 Goodwin , about assassination attempts . With regard to the August 10 , 1962 , meeting which he attended , Goodwin H# 30955 DocId:32423505 Page 6 Bay get ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== noted that McCone never made any oration upon the immorality of assassinating Castro. He remembered the August 10 meet- ing anq said that "assassination was not shot down 00 When pressed for details at this point, and after being shown the Lansdale (8/13/62) and Harvey (8/14/62) memoranda he said he wanted to think about #he meeting before he made any more statements about who said and' did what He noted _ 0 however , that in 1966 while in Peru with Robert Kennedy that Kennedy , in a fleeting retort to a series of questions about U. S . assassination attempts against Castro, said "Tell him (the interpreter) I saved his (Castro' s) life: At the conclusion of the interview he turned over to the Committee various documents related to Cuba which he had found in his personal papers . Those are appended to this summary_ B Goodwin Interview of May 27 1975 During the course of this earlier interview_ Goodwin alluded to the Cuba Task Force. According to the Committee notes of that interview, the discussion went as follows: In general Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on He mentioned one specific in- stance in which he had heard talk of HR 50955 DocId:322Jj05- Page 7 ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== assassinating Castro_ After the of a Cuba Task Force was established first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer Atl a meeting of the Task Force. held at the' State Department McNamara suggested' "getting rid of Castro" someone from the CIA perhaps Bissell then asked if McNamara meant 00 Executive Action" McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea- However Goodwin dia not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left_ (See interview infra 9 The Goodwin Documents The documents which Mr Goodwin has furnished_ the Committee are of no startling significance. One docu- ment , the May 2 , 1961, menorandum_ fron Bissell to Goodwin is noteworthy because it does not advise him Of the Roselli connection or the efforts: to aslsassinate Castro. Bissell notes , 10 I have not attempted to provide with much detail 709 A May 24 , 1961 , Memorandum of Conversation with Bissell Goodwin does not mention any reference by Bissell to actions against Castro on the assassination front. An Arthur Schlesinger menorandum f June 30 , 1961 , to the President discusses the need for revamping of the 8 intelli- gence set-up" of the United States . In a footnote in that memorandum , Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not 'able to control its operatives once they are in the field and of- the attendant dangers this poses . (See page 6 of the memo Mw: 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 8 Bay Pigs you by ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== The other documents indicate the thinking that went on up to the point where the Lansdale group was established as the coordinated effort against Cuba Areas of Inquiry for Goodwin Whate 8 if anything does Goodwin remember of the August 10 , 1962 meeting of the Special; Group which he attended? Is this meeting different than the meeting he refers to in his initial interview where McNamara broached the sub- ject of assassinating Castro? Or has he simply confused them and are they one and the same? How does he explain McCone ' s recollection of having given an oration on the immorality of assassina Castro when it was brought up at the August 10 meeting? Was McNamara the person who brought up the subject at that meeting? What discussion , if followed? HW 60955 DocId:32423505 Page 9 ting any, ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== SECRET Draft 4/26/61 MEMOR ANDUM To: McCeorge Bundy From: Dlck Goodwin Here aro # fcw scattered thought3 On Cha "Cai2" problera Cuba io & thrcat to tho Gocurity cf thlo United Zttcj i two besic Wayo; 18 As & dircct milltazy mcse:e %1 t0Cgib 0 YiCiec Wbich wil bc intenoiz-d 10 coniunist crrcc CillRrcatd Co.ie:8 Iowevc:, cVc! chij Increzsed dangcr Iill ko mzinimal. Cu: trczty cbligzticzg 0~.li; 03 to 6_3 defcnge of cny Amcrican rztisn Wlich ic cttackod directlya Any military rct moveg by Caotro co-lc bd irrnediitcly by Our forccz. Sirnilz?ly Wc ccel: interveno in cage of Czstzo militzzy Jid to guczfla czeetors in tke Arcricag. 20 Aa an cportez 0f revolutior: Theze d0 po Cozit tlct Cuba i3 bcing uged a3 1 base for cport 0f tha cornmurist-fideligta rcvolution: Thic i3 cono through the actual supply of funde and technlcal aocietance to inau:gent elerentc , tlrough wridcsprcad and re2goncbly effective propcganda appazatuo Includlng & ncws Ccrvice and radlo nerzk €.d troich tlc uJe*0: Cuba 25 an examplo 0f thc alliszice bctwecn fidclidrno &ad pcceesazy #3cial rcforr 6 # Identufication with & = wcifize of the peoploa This tkriit i8 cignificant 0 # copccizlly in tllo Carzibczn :zca. Hovcver, cvcn herce in :1o lest ci monthg thcro haa becn 2 cignificant dccliuo in Cuban cEcctiverczce Thic hc core becouc 0f tho Erowing Icolztion f cormunist-- fiodligtz clcrcuts from tho Demiocrztic Icf: 23 Coctro'5 Pzo-Sovict bont has H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 10 ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== SIXZI i erd a8 Co;tz? kac Lcco:c izzrcn-iszly beccmc moze apparcit; i E-ct, %3c8 6113 cosicucistc ir8 tcllevioza Trcz? Zre Lurn?, kis pereoral 4# ycrizps Cozdec] cf kcxlco. looking foz acothez, riorc etaklo: *ro iliucd of fig_lisrjo cvcz 3. While this zcznz 2 Zecli-ing neccscerily Jesecz tho ingoztznzd c Czbnj-Scviet- roverzonts; It does EJ: Ircvcrz?ttz It {5.isna matezizl n2d t22.=icz' &1d { rcvoliticresy Cilzeza wizc: ci: tomc-zo17 F3 Vorl Gitt c7oa # Cxctzo Wcz? to rerez:ber inCuencc ic &2 [2- 108. In Ezct, nc: have colvcd tko Pzo:lezz cf cotinio: (.a. roztkcas: Erosil Cciuzbi- Laclb most of tle greute-t Zznge= etc.) & %o: cwc eleicz dorzinsted Jtuzozt rGovo_zcnto, coiptzy, corgruzict Czcito, &2: t3 lcczl {~dczcngut leacozshl?. tlcir c-isterse or ctrcczeh to ccuetneto [Z21.49u55.Al has Icon scczzry gzo/13, 004 Zzic danccr 3f9 WiW %0 G aE? Tccc ricvcr: nwoveZ2e b22et s2ti-conzE3 not Zcok: to Cuba foz lczdershiza a3cigt2.C2, /ovoz # &ey & Exc3: frcri neturi_l #xeetl Ccuree ef Acticz Actiek_Aiteed 4tC49x Eectz Castro in ory %22h2n, Te ceed 2 1. Eclorc ccticy dircctly 0 # the &cgree o of Go vilcczsllity cfhij rcecccsgezc.: of fhe Cubz: cconoxy zd L;20 'oi_bly dcflizing Slrport, cf ha stitc, tie to eflciezcy itc in-Qect'cn thc Cuzen Without %uch cil acccsgz1cat it i3 bililles cf undc-crousd ozgarizction, ctcs SECRE? H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 11 crrcdc pop1l2x Portart cpotj 270 pnn 2j2ist rezizzo ccs-Flcto poj_tion PzE Popelar Po3ei- police zeozic, ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== S2CRIT 3 # impogcible to realictically determinc %ict &ltcrnative cou:ccs of action cro open to 4g, 2, To meet tho _nilitary thrcst W? CZhl Ivorl: Jut Zolcnce egrccments Vileh Ceutral Anjoriczu netiong _long tlko l.ecs guejestod witi Fro.ozzor Eoxlc. 3. WYo should ~pprozch tie govcrurert of Chilc t0 call an Inter-Arnorican arms limitztion confcrc:cca Thig ccniczcnco ohcule &cal vrith Irictlodc o ctozping cxicznal JIGz3 ghipncuto in Ee contezt 0f tho over-_ll liritctions whicb ero dcbparately cecded :n Lzlin IAmzzicz. 1a chould deciec, befozo thig meeting, wlotnez t? riskt: iu &n OAS blockccc of armc pipronto t Cuba ro outweighed tho dangcrg Involvcd in belting znd ccircluing intcrnational Bhippinza 4. Irnecizeely consele wlti1 hcadc 0f rzajor naticeg In Letlil Aujozica to sec kow far tlicy #3c wiling to %o in tcrno or collective cctions Tnis clould bo dono via & pcrconal cmicszrya Altiough Ive gkould hzvc & rcasozably clcaz idoa of what VC Want to do, tilis chould bo 2 Gonuina concultalion zzzong _lliesa All tnc myrizd propo3alg for O4S actioil, etca , Geperd On tha rcaction of other Latin nctiong 0m 0# 1 rozcton 98 uacctermincd: 5.' Undorlying all thcsc propocalc iJ tilo fecling thz: vro should not move quicly in dircct action azziugt Cubia 1 do not believe that thero i3 cny course or dircct ection which we can wigely tl:c on tho besis o current knowledgc and conditionc. SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 12 by yor ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== SzCZT 42o2188r23 03782t 4C2zeem 20 Wo @iculd provlea Carribcz: =ee038 wrigh t3 tecln.cal hel? (e-Ea #cdor Co Cpct Ircouing plened) 041 nivy %ztzol cs3stEce tp Icct thc dangcro 0f 2r718 chigaznts Izor Cuba t2 # curgoat elcrert: i1 tlozo nctionge 20 Ilc?c arc Ewo Or tzco rczl Aezgcr cpcto (Z 8. Doml-lcii Rozubic jicit} thcze Vc showld powb? ccvelcping corocretic altorrztivco t €o pzescnt regiza 0 # ozgea.zing ropl_Comic: Covcrucitc. ff to &o ro: do #Nfo then tio Ircvitello ckungej :n gcvcz_ ent %cy bo follo17ed Caztro-ttRc regircda Wlca Derzocictic &tr267c*60 orgeiiccd v? clould considcr Iccjnc cf prccigilcting tlc f] t0f r7;iilo Zcil Cun_lor &0 poocily Somozz In thio wzy we Czn czc3t mjjzi-_rril Coceel ow3z €e 6j28 02 rcplecczicat Covcra- rent 00 the timing cad initi_tivo cbould bc curs 3, Ilelp provide ccuater-pzo?: Jul:? ccjiztence to Latin zowca7;crt3 # # 8.Ea racio tan3rnisteba Tko rjcrc; w? czz or} tizcrzh Ccrioczetic- Jibcral forcco in Litic f[32ricd, Tetlez tlizj tzorgh Uju: olcuce &0 :orc eifcctivc will be ?jz propegenda Cenerel 681C2-C821ru2t2t 0022222 Cuz lonz-ringo stratcg; io tho Arcriccc chorld hzve fwo bzgic clcrzerts: Is, e0 crgaizatlon o & Bt-Qrg pcllticcl couzter-fczce. 1a kte 2 rcicy inctruzncrt in #40 ucwly orceLcd Lezguo 0 Dornocratic ?artic3. SECZ 2 MY 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 13 ex 1; ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== SzCzZZ We ahould essict tneze Particg 00 Onici_" &nd tcchalcelit ## to cicvelo? profgrescivo poiitical rcveincnt: (Ankscz: ccsec rcvol_tiorz-y Iroverentz, ecpeci:lly In the lesg progregsive coritzica) Ezouzi hclpitz ther in teci- ciqucg O organisction oim to tho village levcl, #colczical wazfare, efce U. S: povczorzor: Lelp chogld b3 covezt #48 Secsad the Alizrze Fze @lp?ozrczoa Tliy projzim Fida IcJ cznpbizio on gocizl Z1d ecoroniic ccvence iJ tij=cal 4378 0f prcvc=tig & cozzzunict talecovcza Tic Alizzj ig pzcccccizg Ebcut &3 =czicly 2c pogciblo giver present orzenizztio- cf ezfcrt, &nd Cho =izz-itzcc & svail-tlz funcs, Cosu of tccc elerziczts Z0 usaul3f2ctozy. 48 Fudj: Prcscne plog pzovicc $o3 &-3 2llccerion cf 250-350 rzizlion dollaz? Fcreh of ecceonc JJEictauccto Latkl Atiesica i2 ficczl 1962. Zt3 is cut 0f & tot2l 0f2.& billiona (Tliv gu dje8 nct iusiu-l: @9 %ocinl dcvelop- mont Iurdy. Cze iurdzed milloz cf tg willgtoto Dvisz $ tkon cvcr thclr curront flrancial crigica I 2n2 1c: clczr thzt €7 clbztostizl _loccticn could be rzecc rivoml tie cnoztzouo nccdig ir Acis {csgccizly #n Indlz #d Pel-ta:) ## Zlucizk I alevc Eczc cis b2 sorc iecrcocce Hocver, tce? fuidc &r8 Frobably ac: Cuficicr: to rczitc real cad cfiectivc ctjrt ic cconozc dcvclopmcata B Crgznizaeca: I Corrlinizt filiocyer coracg in Latm Aricriza it prosably Fill cot coric fhzough Euczillz WEr_iz6, bit thrj:;h (o ccpturo cE SZCREI H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 14 Lc: ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 6 3I rovcresece Fo carnot mcc: 9uch & Enreat Indi_cncr: revcleasazy 23 i if # # Wschl Oir Cv ?0ca] operetio3 are cficctively #0 Fell-crr nicea uncourgi--tcz 25 t9k-r2 todny- Tic 2*3372710 t9 30 Cizesc erd oCztca gha DSL ,| etcrtorsl cekuncc, CLA _-Lviticg political brzcze? tci-lc% Wicy #zx gcparste hoelc ond of2a ZO, to 833 %r022 &0 c.22t; I bcllcve &at %czelting d_u-c1 cf cEozt, In Dursuit c: gepzzete zo-ls. cf zoccurccokei] irtellizorcc. Re rtzt ozzacize our rcsully im grcz: Wzcc tolclcc: cuz b2clc object:vo i Latin AOt-Gzilitzzy Ovc;je33 czergtou 0r Zethocrztic Wogtozz-ocicnted Iticna 24 fnczic? # @ @i;2 ctrcngthcsinz t =crct cornuunist att2cke i cll @ovornracats 8o #z: tcy Lave &c tpocizy ~lkgol vith &13 zo-poz3ick:y {cr ccbloving this {t3 {33tnc0 Eroce 5sJ &r2 cortrol cvez ec ingtzumerto %hizk Giz Covernrcnt objcctive nzuct I=vg 210 Ecz conio cent-ilicetig of comrond provides Jic:23 %0 lzvc Ee8r ncedc-for ciocGivalv tngi-z ocold WiFa Iiia i7 fizlting %c: Foor: 0 # ie & "Chiel]e: Ecizjplcre Cjezallo-s"; but E6 &3s ro€ Ecceszzily rcaw & Fitzn czch }ey counssy the5e #Est be & cozkzel 0p- very lczce i: rszks tint, @ltis &lzect Iiueg to the levelg c cctiow in ratonal cpicity {ld au/kcrity Wzclnztona SICRZT HN 30965 Docld:32423505 Page 15 004 Qid 3ll =ed : ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 7p EEZ Ci; 2 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR: Nr _ Richard N. Gacwiu Assistant Special Counsel to the President SUBJECT: Possible Covert Activities against Cuba ttached is 2 brief s tatement regarding covcrt operations against Cuba _ In viewv ol your faniliarity with this subject and Jur colversations over the few days , I have not attempted to provide you with much detail_ 1aaLLut Richard M. Bissell, Jr, Deputy Director (Plans) ttachment: Paper a8 $tated above NZS Ei: Nm 30955 Docid:32423505 Fage 16 Nia y pas t ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 2 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr . Richard N. Goodwin As8istant Special Coungel to the President SUBJECT: Posible Covert Activitieg against Cuba ttached i0 & brief btatement regarding covert operations agalnst Cuba _ In view of your familiarity with thie gubject and Dur conversetione over the few day8,. I have not attempted to provide you with much detail. (Rirpo4) c- 1 Ezll + Richard M. Bie8 ell, Jr. Deputy Director (Blane) ttcbment: Paper a8 Btated above H#" 50955 DOcId:32423505 Page May past ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== STRE 2 1261 As indicated by the combined INR /ONE es timate , anti-Castro activity within Cuha will probably be muted at leas t for the next several months _ Mas t indi viduals whos 8 loyalty is in any way suspect have been arrested. A recent rleport from tle Swiss Ambassador indicated that political priskners now number 100, 000 . All internal services will continue t? wojrk Jr 2 theory o repressi)n undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties _ Cons equently, it will be difficult to carry Jn any clandestine operations and it is doubtful very that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening the Castr? regime. In of this , eviclence is still avalilable that there is opposition to the among individuals s till atllarge and that such opposition is prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover,, there are s till agents distributed through most of the six pro vinces and conmunications can S till be had either direc tly or indirec tly with these indi viduals _ At the very least thel e agents can and will continue to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency. In adldition, certain of thes e indi viduals 8 orne additional nes wh? [light be infiltrated, could ttempt to carry out Some sabotage. Indi vicual acts of sabotage are possible with relati vely few men and small amounts 3f ma terial. Succes8ive acts 3f sabotage Jr extensive TGH H 7o955 DodId:32423505 Page 18 Iviay plus spite regime plus ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== SEEK Ez3T sabotage operations are more difficult and inevi more coS tly in terms of loss of men. Nevertheles s , it would be possible, 5 tarting in the near future, to attenpt linited sabotage with a view t?j determining its feasibility and with the hope that dually an increased program might be developed. A capability als ? exists for types of maritine operations including infiltration and exfiltration of individuals anding and caching o arms , undef-water sabotage of shipping and sin211 raider operations Under present circumstances it would seer WI3ug to atteinpt tlese except on a very limited scale and,in all likelihood, raider operations should not be attempted until more information regar feasibility has been obtained. The Agency als0 has a small air arm lincluding some transport aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) attack bomber aircraft (B-26) . Although it is not abs olutely certain, thefe is reason t? suppos e that Cuban crews als0 are available for operational flights At the moment, air operations should be subs tantially eliminated with the possible exception of supply f lights to support oPp?sition elements unable- to survive Without such support. Even with/rcspect t? such operations however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful night drops is extremely limited s0 that the urgency should be great to jus tify the risk. B-26 s trikes could, 2f course, be flown against chosen targets (e. g . refineries power ts tire ts) and, if Bisp0979; #{" 8F # Q06 tably Grat ding plus plan plan ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== E3 s uccessful, miglt have the effect of extensive sabotage. In. view of the risks involved, however, and the poor deniability o U.S . support where aircralt are involved, it is reconmended that such operations be avoided at least for the present. Manolo of the MRP has asscfted an indcpendent M.P capability to conduct infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage and defection operations intv Cuba He recognizes a necd for U.S. support but is very firm in his. desire to operate a8 independently as possible of any official U.S. connectione Iis .initial reques t i9 for five boats some materiel and/some money. He admits however , that, looking ahead, additional support such &s real es tate, S0ne with training and ommunications will be required, He offers to share his inlormation with the U.S. Government, seekc U.S. advice and, at least for a peri?d of time, be willing to operate with the Revolutionary Council- Thel Council' s views are canvassed and has been asked tolprepare a prospectus giving in 52n)e detail his needs for U,S. support for the inmediate future and the step-up required over a periad of time should his elforts prove succesgful_ Thc proposal s hould certainly be examined and ziven support within rcasonable linits if the relationships proposed both with the Council and with the U,S. are satisfactory. CEGEET HY 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 20 Ray help being Ray Ray ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== CEEZET 4"2- In addition to tle activities described above, propaganda activities such a5 radio broadcasts and publication of 1ragazines and newspapers can be continucd independently by the Agency or in support of or tle Revolutionary Council, Moreover, limited tical action operations are possible_ As to both propaganda and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type of ace tivity undertaken will depend to a large extent on the decisions with respect to the ?perations described abave. Consequently, these will be noted here as mere possibilities MW-500s/4 DEld;SI4R3601. Eage; Ray poli ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== DEAET TOp Src45 3. De & BOLIQ TATDQ (3C Acclon Ho& 3413-9 Yaro for MSC, 8850 sobJece, dated 49 1961) 80 Agreed Ehee ebe politfcal obJeetlve O Ua 8. Polloy €05 Verd Coba L0 to brLng about the dorfall ot the Ceetro reg15o. Agreac chet the UnLted Stetes ahould pot undertakc all- Itary IotorventLon tn Cuba 004, bue ehould do nothloz Oyy ucll,, thec foreclose the poB8IBILIT % @ILItAry {ncere UhW: Ventiod L4 &be {UtUEB & "LxJ" > Wjlsc Agread that the Cuban Bitwatfon ghould Ba kope lnder copatan: rov Lere Lo the Mahd of tba Pos8Ib[ILty that aCEfona by Caatro Yould propt 0 reconalderatton of the deo[oled @9€ Eo {ntervende d Agrecd that &ha Walted Btacee sluld not {spose 05 Daval Or efr blackede eg[nat Cube at tto tloe, Moted the [Portence tbe PreaLdenc #ttachee Eo Obealde tleely and' 8dequate LntellLgenca 0 to Cuban @lll- tory Ilitzeo, abpecLelly the enbanccment 0f Bu0b cepabilltlae by 8Lno-Sovlet Bloe ellitary 888Lstanees taking Into account tle Po38I6llvy 08 0. 8& {ntere ventlon e 0 Enture E5 deeee ToP MEct HI 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 22 May would Lng eepsb ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== DRA E I IoP] S0cRIT 6 Boted tha Leportance che Presldede atcached [o lidae cloa Ln tha Orde Horld PEO8B @f , the ertorLeclc actona Qf tbe Ceatro:regtme. 9L aly T L, 1.,1./)1 V Hoced the Fregedent ' 0 dfrecelon ebet tha Taek Torca 0d Ceba Eako 0 detatled Bttdy 62 pobebbLe veatnasees and vuldezabilitiee In the elencete ebleh @rere control L0 Cuba cadey . Noted thee 0 Cozttee, under the dLrectlon 02 Preotor 0f Centra[ Intelyigenee, Bou Ptepato 0 lea @reelal covert oRoraclona #Ith fespest EQ Cubee' {or tbo cobo {deratfon ofthe Preasdeat. Agread chee 'no separace Cubar @llitar Eorce Dhould be oraaalead Ld tbe Walted 8tates& bre that Cuban natLonels would be encoureged t0 enllet In the Ua S. @rted {OrcB8 ard tralned {n SpeetelunltaLattelse-el-Svueh - epcal ar-Raetenatv, under' 0 Plae to ba presented by the Sacratery of Defenea In conneecIon #Ith ble revlet 02 U, 8 0 conteatLona] 'forccs & To SECRET 3505 'Fage Pbb_ K_3V rIr? Speskol ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== DRAET TOP ;bcr58 10 Agreed tbat Cdan nat_onale De Lo the Walted States BIll ba Sve0 refusea #tacue &ad 2ebLsted, ladct Ptobtem te B0 daveloped and dlrected by tha 8ocretary Ri 61 Beelth, Ealucatlon & Welfare, Ln carryIng. on thelr LL h84 _ forzer Ocarzation8 . Refugeed D33 L0 Mleal MIlL be fje eacouragcd t0' Locete 0 oeher areed6 Caban nat lonale mila 7 b h1 87ykb 6 enterIng tha Uulted Statee flL ba glven refugee Olatbe: ci ke Agreed poe to Irpoae 4} coplete trade embargo O Cuba for the present, but 42 @ter Betlona bj Castro resultad I 0 deatole t0 do' 80, all trede #Ith Cuba gould be atoppede ze Secretary O2 Btaca @gtaed to send to tbe FrosLdent #a an ealy0Ls of bow & Ua 80 embargo ou crode #lch Cua would effect gur trade roletiona GLth other @ouatt/os: nader tha Battle Acee Noted thae tbe Freafdent wuld dbcuae RIth Canedo tke PobLCIon 0f Cenadtea subaldiariee 0f D. 8. corporBtLodo In ehe dvede 02 U. S. srposItLoas ia trede enbargoe8 On Cubae Agreed Fhae eba Uplced Scetee Ohould @€ Odce Intlace nagotlaclor €0 @nlarge tbe GLlllosnese of Othor Aerle Cad #eated E0 Joln In bflateral, multilatarel and 019 SItonsornatd t@ quarantlae Ceseto$ euor 0 (1) breaktos dlploacIe releclons VIth Cubet (2) eoatrolling T02 SICREZ HW 5o955 DocId:32423505 Page' 24 Lo'~ "bu}SA L2 0 4~ary;` +;rJ ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== Toz SECR DRAZI seeivietes &8 Cuben agenes; (J) preveatLog Bubverofva rele- Cadcto} (4) Italeing ecouoale arnsshLprezta tQ (S) ereatIng 0 Gartbbeaa eecurey tfona vtb Cabe; Eo Cabea (0) taltiatdng a uxval {Orcd} 1a the CarMbbean; (7) Lnveaton o othar btates 08 Lnceruaclonal C03e Letlon 6{ Costro 8 85 naclona 08 thte: bonLsphore. pnLem by Haa Jor Progre3e should be tbst gba AllLence Qe (1) Luplacentes 00 by ' such projeces; (2) a8" Eioa e seleeted coctal devalozuast ef oeher Latfo Anor- ealerattea 0 tbe Arplesentatloa O2 aAdteional roaources Lcan aLd; (3) econoule &nd soelal develotane, for Latia AserLean eprroprle? cqnalderatton % 0 Lncluding tlon tor davelopnedt losne: IafornatIed Ageacy 43r chee tka U. 8. 2 Agreed anerLca rather erlsting progren La batto J68 tha Ceotro electronic fere thad InztLeta /*2 p, @Illtary oELeer8, mdor Aereed that Ua 80 [2e oE Stbce , ba by tba Dparteenz Eo tbreee t9 all Latta Anerlea _ dtaeuse tha Castro VItb Lettn Asorieen 0gELcere- T03 szcr HW 3i95; DocId:32423505 Page 25 Prcvont Pattol 8q7 and egert dus= all Agreed Ta?Ld Brasurod acrongthened provlotod Qo4 blp]erental vould erpand e8einst war] regbee , '}6 genadal Prepared guldance yould ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== TQ? 8ecRez DRLLI OL 8tate @heuld prepere # Agreed tbae the Secrerary 8 dee Jurtdlcsl bests {or efee- tepore 0 0 pobbtble mtl-cenmlet gcton. elv8 N DOLNICAN REIUELIC AD EATI 4, Y&sBOLIG IQQAED prorotly bbe Taak Zorce on Cube would Agrood that for eatI-camaniot botb erergeney aad long-range oE crLoes {0 @elel Or cbe Intarventlod La the eveut PresLdent' 0 0 vter that Datnlcan Republtea Rocedthe Inltlate the overtbrow o ba Untted gteres ehould pot befoze wa kned what gozarzrnt #ould Trujtllo Inst Irujllla obould be bts, &nd thee er7 ac6499 ag21 Euleilacerel._ 5otk fw $ Jwp nTho 5 0hasbun 6+8nn k~}t 1, IQP_ S2cRcT MW ` j6955 DocId:32423505 'Page 26 preparo plena: Bucceed -'7 KJ { 3J; ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== TOP SECRET COPY NO, 5 DRAFT RECORD_QE_ACTIONS 483rd NSC Meetiog (5/5/61) 1 UlS POLICY TOARD IRAN Agreed that 0 Task Force ehould be esteblLehed under the Aseletan€ Secretary of Stete for Neer Eaetern Affalra to Prepere end circulate 0 report on tbe 8ubject by 15 for discuss Lon by the Council On 19 . 2. U Sa POLICX TQWARD KOREA Agreed thac 0 Tagk Force under the Abeistent Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Bhould be eetab lfehed to prepare end circulace 0 report On the subject by 15 for dlecues Lon by the Council on 19. 3. W S, POLICY TOWARD CUBA (NSC Action Noe Memo for Ba0e 8ubject, deted 4, 1961) 2' Agreed thet U, S. policy towerd Cuba ehould aim at che downfall of Caatro, and thac BInce che meabureb agreed below ere not Ikely to achleve thle end , the matter ahould be rev Lewed ac Intervele with 8 vlew co further actione 6 Agreed that the Uofted Stete Bhould not undertake mlicary Ine terventlon In Cuba now , but Bhould do nothing that would fore - cloee the pobaibility of mflitary Intervent Lon lo the future. TOP SECRET 3696; Dobld31423506 'Page Mey May Mey May 7413-2; NSC , Hay ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== D RA FT TOP SECRET 3 & Br-& POLICY IONARD CUBA (Continued) c' Agreed thec the Unfted Steteb ehould oot Lmpobe 0 neval blockade Or @ctedpt 80 a[r wer agalnet Cuba; Ic wae noted thac nether courbe had the bupport of the Department of Defenee Or the Jolot Chlefs of Staffa 4 Noted the importance the PreeLdent attecheb co obtalning ctmely end edequate Iotelligence 08' to Cuban mIlitary cepabilitles , Fj- peclally the . enhancement Of Buch capabilitiee by Sino-Soviet b}ec miltary ass1etance, 80 that U. S, capabllicfee for Po8e [ble {n- terventIon may be mlntained at an adequate level. e, Noted the importance the Prea Ident ettechee to publication Io the Free World pre88 of the terrorietlc ectione of the Ceetro reg_ue: and to po8gIble polttical eccion to end che curredt terror: € Noted the Pregideot 8 direct Lon thet che Central Intelligence Agency , with other departueote, Bhould make 8 detefled study of Pobeible weakneseee end vulnerabilittee Lo the element? which exert concrol In Cuba todey. Agreed thet reletlons with the Revolutionary Counctl should be Lmproved end made more open, and whfle It cennot be recognized 89 8 government-In-exfle, 8upport bhould be given co It insofer 08 Lt continuee to reprebent gubetantial Cuban sentLaent , ha Agreed that no eparete Cuban mllitary force ehould be organtzed In che United Statee , but chat Cuban nat Ionale would be encouraged to enliet Ln the V. S, ermed forcee under Plane co be developed by the Secretary of Defense. TOP SECRET H# 50955, DocId:32423505 Page 28 ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== D RA ET TOP SECRET 3 . USa POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) Agreed thet Cuben netfonal8 now holding Ua S, vleicore viea8 will be g1ven refugee 8tetus and e80Leted, under 0 Progrem €o be developed and directed by che Secretary.of Heelth, Educetion end Welfare, in carrying Or' their former occupatIong . Refugeee now In Mlent Wfll be encoureged co locate In other ereeb 0 Cuban nationale entering che Unfted States wtll be given refugee` statue. All refugees will be eligtble to apply for travel privlleges , end it wa8 understood that would also be ellgtble for citizen- ghip. Agreed not to impose 8n Imnediace trade. embargo On Cuba , The Secretary Of Stece egreed co to the Preeident an analysi8 of che effecta of 8 Ua S, embargo on trede wfch Cuba In relation to the Battle Act. Ic was agreed that when an embargo Lg Io- Posed, it should be 88 complete 88 possib le, wich certeln excep- cions for Canada end with Red Cro88 dibtribucion of druge & Agreed that the Unfted States should at once Inftlete negotiation to enlarge the willingnee8 of other American otates to join Lo bileteral, multilateral and OAS arrangements agalnbt Cabtro, such 48 (1) breaking diplomatic relatione vith Cuba; (2) control- ling subversive ectivicles of Cuban agent?; (3) Preventing arwb ehfpment8 to Castro; (4) limiting economlc relatlone with Cuba; (5) creating 8 Caribbean becur force; (6) Inftating 4 naval petrol to prevenc Cuban Inve8 ion of other stete8 Lo che Cir bean; and (7) denuncletlon of Castro 88 an egent of Internetional communLem by 011 natione of thie hemiephere. TOP SECRET H# 50955 Docf4:32423505 Page 29 chey 8end icy ib~ ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== D R A F T TOP SECRET 3. U S POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) 1 Agreed that the Alllence For Progre8s ehould be 8trengthened by Buch meagureg 28 (1) rapid imp lementation of selected 8ocIal de - lopment projects; (2) acceleration of che Lmp lementation of other Letin American eLd; and (3) provision of additional res source? for Latin American economic and 8ocial development, In- clud cons iderat Ion of 8 supplemental appropriation for devel- opment loans of the order of $200-8400 million, @ Agreed that the U, 5, Information Agency would' expand its existe Progtam in Latin America, 'but not inftlete electronfc warfare ega inat che Cagtro regime ; meang of propagenda should be made availab le to non-U , S . groups . D Agreed that U; S, mIlitery officers, under general guidance co be prepared by che Department of Stace, would discuss the Caetro threat co all Latin Amertca with Latin Anertcan officers& 0 Agreed that the Secretary of Stace should Prepere 0 report On 0 po8gIble new juridical basi8 for effective anti-communist action. P Agreed that pending, eppointment of a Ab8istent Secretary of State for Latin AmerIcan Affair8, the Tagk Force On Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assis - tant to the Special Counsel to- the President . TOP `SECRET HY 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 30 ve= Ing Ing ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== TOP SECRET D R 4 E T TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REBUBLIC AND HAITI 4 US POLICY Cuba prepare promptly both emer- Agreed that the Task Force anti-communist intervention In the gency long-range for Haiti Or the Dominican Republic. Noced the event of cribes in the United States should not initiate the Pres Ident" 8 View that fllo before we knew what government would 8ucceed overthrow of Truj Trujillo should be mulcilateral. him, and that any action 5. W 8. POLICY_IOWARD BRITISH_GULANA Cuba would cons ider what can be done Agreed that the Tagk Force on the British to foreatall 8 communiet take-over In cooperation with In that country. U S POLICY IN MAINANDSOUTHEASTASL4 6 . Bhould be made to reassure Sarit and Diem 2, Noted that efforte that we are not abandohing Southeast As L8. that Sarit could be told that we ere Noted-the President'8 view b in SEATO forces to be Btae considering Inclusion lof U. S , troopg the cimlng co be dependent on deve lopwent? t Loned In Thailand, the forthcoming l4-nation Geneva Conference . dur or after cariee of State and Defenbe would be gending Noted that the Secre Ldent promptly on the number of U. S , recomendationg to.the Pree troops to be gcat Loned In Thailend. traloing TOP SECRET MA ^50955 DOn14a32423+01:, #age;; would plane and egaLnst ing 5 ." ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== 24, 1961 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH; Dick Blsgell Tracy Bafnes Mr , Bisgell agreed that no major dectgions concerning covert activities Ip Cuba phould be made before the President returne Irom hle European Howover there ar0 @ {Bw tbinge Ke thought sbould be done Immedlately: 1. That he reviee the internal CIA Or 'ganizatlon in preparation for poaeible covere activitles. Thle Means changesl bothehere and In Mtamt: 28 That a small group (30 to 40) Cuban/pilots be continued 28 pilote under commercial cover In Central America and perhppe ono Or two Arerican companlee: No commltment should be/made to them that would be ubed In futwre actlvltlesa would Ba tralned a8 Jndlviduale and not 08 edY group Or "'movement: " Thls {0 primarily to keep thelr akilla allve and to keep them evallablea 3.0 He wiohes to clean up the Nicaraguan #ituation: We have left a Jot o Mltary hardware there &8 a rasidue 8f the Cuban oporation He would like to this equipment out of there= turning somo of the B 26'8 over to Somoga and allowing gome 0f tbe Cuban pllota to remaln there t0 tralo Nlcaraguene In Olying thege planes. Tlla would be at Somoza'0 requeat and would only bo done { he Ingisted upon It a9 a re-payment-for bervices rendereda I Btrobeed that po Americana ahould be Involved Jn the train- Ing 6 Nicaraguan plote. 4 He would Like to tralo & few Cubane las radio operators. They wauld be traincd a8 individuals and would not know each other or that any others were being tralnad: Thie amounts to {Faining gome Individual agents for PogsIble future u8e. No commitments {would be made to any 0f the Men tralned: It Je folt tbat thie much actvity I8 necoseary in the next few weeke. 5. In addton, the Agency would like {Q gurvey the varioue potential Ingur - recitonery gtoupe which pow oxieta There ere @everal 0f thase groupo& three or four 0f which claim to hava a underground {n Cuba: We ebould speak t0 them: Wa ehould tell them we could make abbolutely no commlt" ment @0 t0 any futwre actlvitlee. However, he would Mko fror them an a88e5ment of what they thoughe thoy could do In tho future end # # f woro t0 be active ## what holp would requlre from the Unlted Statee. TOP SECRET Mm" 50955 FotId:31423505 Page 32 May trlpa tbey They { pull they they ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== TOP SECRET Thle woud @pable u8 to maka & Judgm ent 40 to whether Wo ghould en- gege In covort activity baged partly uPPn thla Informatlon # # Informa- uou whlch would tell u8 what help in #Recific terms would bo requlred and what we could expect Irom the8o Broupea Thle has already been dond I1 the Ca0e ol Mirona The groupe contacted would Include theCounct, the MRP, UNIDAD end MRR. 6. Jp addittong he wae Informed that Swan radlo could not be uaed by-.the USLA wa unable to as8lmdlate #t Into thels eyatera: [ guggeeted that wo might t0 fInd & Letin /Americen group, 0B 0 The Leegue Of Democretic Partioe or the Inetitute |of Polltical Education run by Jobe Flguree to W80 {Ca 1 baid that for the Councll to operate the btation did not Beem to me t0 bo deejrablee 7, 1 dlacusaed tho general altuation {n Miami and tho various newopaper reportba { pointed Out that tbe ELA agente now In Mlaml were knowa to averyona, Including the pres8, and were the gam8 poople who were Identified with pre-Invaelon actvittea Thelr prebence [ felt only In- tenelded tho rivalry among Cuban groups and gorved a8 & Iocal polnt 08 dlscontent, T requeeted that thie group be broksn up and that to the ex- teat egente wore neceabery new Peopl8 0e people not {dentified with the pre-Inveeion activitles # 0 should bo ecot to Mlaml. 8. I 5Zd egreed that po future covertlectivitioe ahould be conducted {n the Mlaml area and thet tho groupe with whor we dealt phould be scattered [n Otbar citiea throughoue the Soutaeaetern part of the countrya 1 eald that. worklng In Mlaml was like trying t0 catry on covert activitiee tn the TodIta Q{ @ Dowbpadoe. 9. We also agreed that Dr. Miro could be Informed that we were making 8 survey Of other Cuban groups but that he ghould be; told nothing more epeclflc than thet: 10. I also reforred to the pewepaper Btorlee whlch reported that Batlatiana Weto belng used supported by U.S:-CLA funds. They gald thie wae not accdratee They sald that thle would ke very carefully looked Into and that tho mose epeclilc Instructlons would 88 glven that ebdolutely no Batistlanoe ahould be bupported directly or Indirectly by tha U.S. goveruront: ToP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 33 Raya They good try city ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== TOP SECRET na I & atrongly of the oplnlon that WC must clear up the Mlaml area 28 0oor #8 poseible. Therefore, I wil- Ribicofl to expedite tbe Refugea programa probably through the u8e & Mutual Securlty funds In order t0 theee people into jaba, 6 choole, etc, In other parte 0f the countrya Unlees we do thds we Ie golag to have contioually {de Cterd Probleme in tha Mlaml area. Richard Na Goodwln TOP SECRET r Iqn gct get ing ================================================== Page 35 ================================================== chi Jezs 10, 1y6] X 817; T06 Faent 9R Aeorowbee lor 3rbnsl; 09 {nliookng viceke 02 6o0 Fbxr Verkad Ic &e9 fnrizg :%4 188 G50 #28't84 %0 & psplceic CLA cntbulsnni Iz #n0 resrr 64ses. '0ssic: % cl'0 rueid {00 prclaniy bcer Vw$ In M:0 "Ntte 04 ( M38t0glnq #urskthe n?, 4h2 !rrcAh: & 43 {ntau6gaxca "gvney at} RiIAr7+; #}Uc prtiic b+0re #Baa {0z @lxux'd bods #hust} #r# Ja Qr?ct06 Bra #fle In fhe #et320 # th# C30 0J "gavsy Uedissegd 30 ckeade tn? acftyisy Lag #Afruvi 242%04 {ew Yisble 02#9701 T}n {50c7k410 &Nfs t0 rocogolsa korlaya [z >y 158s"snt, 10 #bzt 1%i6 Gu.los 07re6f92* Irxrsd &M ~pReesetgy 289 0100: #M3c Wp}0 5e 19 Tosrein IOr {Laurc #rre f0 cwacte4 lw Tymn^D ?00bon8, Udd {nas@ GtA &ubacie 14Hl csko tadd €enelrisctiy ir U9 p4l67, Ix $;a 00 QU 20 ahrsmd, 4md; T4M Ci 62 vicety rd0rzea:ixae; 0 #il] (an lu 60 Alfazjea Inmsance} &0 wday XNazcd fcr "ovaloprenneg af wkich #$ Iok eally inuasart. '{h? %#Gunans C tbim 1893EN #74Ir: {0 tk?f CLA'€ f%embie <a; }` #rf8#d t&nt #utolokr;y %lt# Worchllbo *Ssa4; &ce Ormn Manzeicn3 #0 #prrre; #i44{b18 {842 @EscKo1 {0 0; *0 tbro& mimb;7 €99*007 {1) # Jmncmmmsfe #vc6rlt# C # xodcrt{r? caer3t:cna #)2 Lolsrtuit 46et 264 %#lat cniwlip kttzae 'Cyamocs 6J} pollcy; 43} 3 4xt*dqazfy # #e $ # JO4 @ffwid Hg # &6 0 05*b0 "1 Y"pavesd CHA Gullayw; Is &rwa [# Qecocicoal f0+mipsem %0 Eu Fazrs tA G #cpncte*8 04 Sc7nrmfun public)y- Itu Gp4r Afnf 8kn &1 ixtrer ~ntmn s DAl {icIr (irtr? raiuied Ly +0 {toii & &] ~rezzziajmlery %ehg "wWicm E4wn entm {#. %, &i:6 %xtlela VncnrX %wmhxn 2: #yaroplin Lolsgs && YeererN J%, 122:. HR 0 %css '5o933 ================================================== Page 36 ================================================== OFT 2 concepiiou @ tho relatlonchf bazwsco cperadcng #7 Irzallagcaes. Tha memnoread:at} a880 cube ste Bay@ In whica #t1 CI abs80 preb- lotno CaD perkepa &# Uaviezed L CIA Autonom Cl: condncta tbred nxein {Drte cf #ecret work} clandleatlea Irtelll = sencc collactioni. cpvort pclfficAl cpcratlono; nod paramultary Gctlviuss. I cartidg On tboye {uctlong with relativo eutonorriy- The Toa0ong {3r Iha @utonpr: a10 hietorical. When CIA bogal, she' ~tale Lcpertinetns, #ti}l tklulIng t00 Glueh iu [Qrr &f itB erad21054] #igo onm In [0r ALfelzo Jocked on thl $ new voatura Preb seepicios abd ronounced the cppartunte7 %0 selze {Irc} control Qf CMA QpbFeeone._ I dd 0Q, Ior #sarole, try to esteblleh any #lacefva Bybtarn Ci clcatanca [Q> CIA activieiloa} and sro amtadaadors irantly Prelozsed get t0 krot wias CLA 830 42't0 { betr countrieb: Asos *953 &h8 %ec?0nas %ha #cesetery @I Jsa60 &7d the Direcloz 0 Contiel bxalliseace 7c0 bsottera farsber ecrxlrred CWA 1 0 Ldopeadones {rcan gvierv(8on #Y Stare Cepartrene dc8k9. In lr0 Teereitae, CLA gtew in al98 and Powvar. Dusbae &60 ZIftiea it bofan In G8mn10 0p080 €0 Cticetip en# Etat0 Departrsnt [o &ba Gellty 4 Iee pereoncal. becacse CLA Feld highar aaberded @n4 even more perbape bocsune Aller Pulee &ve bia peeple 6017ogoo10 pro- eactica #cainge #cCesthylia Eitacks. CLa 5z9 Ablo t0 @#reet ar4 hcld 0 lazge number & ablo ard leopondent-rolndod man Tko tcre It Bodad brAlllert aettvt8e0 t0 $88 ctal, 0b8 mcz0 tonictiuna {20 Qpsratlcae develened, 8nd #be 0200808 #ole J8 played La the Inluleaion & pellcya Fy t0 titra t8a5 Etece had bagun' t0 ba fially ar858 Cf exa problerie etesead by @0 acpive Gn4 04A701r+008 ClA, le Ned 46rz stc# mloeed gh9 chadee t 0eeabllci? Ied O8r3 WieLeIlata @utnazEey< Ieala Et0*0 re - tatnat 0 narnlral mupezvi ralover covezt poltioel apozatone, llc w20 , C0 ec0G 8007Q8 Qildet Dy CLA 0 {ondonty {0 Pp#Gtns & Ptanoaed eoezatlod 08n3ot 8? & Le#tecetztzk Eteba nrvtr had ntle &0 Corera overt elerrdesisr 3ollizj3no Griloctior; 0nd % ket} J6tc 3*oo5d 63 G#-h 8708 €3 07878 Poja}icse] gorctting @18 en1n {a @0 roedrxontacc & 67ezt dlplomatlc contacts MN :50963 Docli 32423303 Paye 36 0lgp Fertly ================================================== Page 37 ================================================== SEc RLT Yoz &0 DRrt CIA bad deveicped & wlsle scries a{ fuacelara poral - Jeliag #lrsacly #xlauing functicua & the Srate Departmer; @Dd 0 tha Delcasc Degortjrucnt &8] weu. Taday % bad W' 0or nlleicel desks and olllltary #taji0; 'J$ tao bn dlgct {68 OFr Ierelga corvlce} 1I keg (or haa had) ke 6wu cembss {Orce8} 16 #Vot} {30 {t# 03w eJt {osc8- 120 Aroial bulset J0 above Mlaroe tbat Qi #be Seeeo Dejare- 7105360 Tho cooteamtrary CLA Pobssg8a8 Txoy 6i tbe cbaraceeflatiea 0 0 #taf@ #tthia 3 e*et3: EI. DoetrIne 106u34 &IA 9 cuonoy devalopod tor blatorlcal #eam0nb, It &a9 "1: ato to endure beceusw fhcre iJ nQ &octrine Gverulcs Qur conjuti << clanc e0 Ai10 cperatlcn8, T Problom & docfrica [0T CLA I3 tkc #XcZ t0 shlct {t9 various claceeatina miaaions A20 core-Ratieie wiah 0 {ree and epen cocictye J {0 idla f0 a7502 that 6087uso @be Comraunlela Caa d0 Bueb-8nd -truch; Wc at0 {roo t0 @9 &t {0o. 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Yea Mcal kald (onor el Metetcu Ia !940.&2 # * Bezty ebo3: 280 rrVfr{uao Ln Indoreato: 87@ 8a341rg B0, 000 ragm Cei #a870 egcl sll Jenr tha # 2818012 27 In 040 ehtea Irorehe " Mesaholl 7ha bxd had arperlesee %Ghtipe #ubzrlllee Ia t9 Fhluteedced: repllee "1t won Lc 60 03374' Yow FU {Icd &be2 tbzy EwU bleed Yor t0 dceeha 80 Cypzua ad Alcerie Mlugeseto ehe #Mfeelty: & cvez- cvining guervila reelstance tprorga snaer wclobe @ rllltary Icrcea Sarioue guezrilla ovamcnts{bava teaa dotoated &aly threo #mnea cince the end 0 ih? Sccond Wowka #er In Greeeo, bacaueg 7180'0 @ lectacn clcsed the northosn Rareas; jn ib0 Phllapelnes} Edd [n }olaye. L Shao lagt tEvO cb0Qe tbe Buct~Ula 3081Gnce Crdod tocavse G t4e corbination c Eq] G4 44GATYCe920_2202192 Tbo Qbruaale 15 Malleye 35 Flela 4i3z0,TTonz;1oz U3crtiaca (rrd gald) 502 {Op &b0 mlcde &d hoanto 6I tbo Pesplo 46 mboredere Lrvelved not aaly paramlllary operatizae bu} 4 vagt edncerlensl aeegram1,_czeaniaation 0 frade @alona, pollficsl reforni 834 2d Gik*7 Mesoeal Indcgenderce. I tbo GuarrMllah 09+or llea {5 ble rcvolttlorcty poegrere 080 Enet@r Iles An past &a Dro21i71 628 ncars #hlcb qnadla A0 guezzllla ta rorev 10 Ih0 ecaAzyelae: "Wiane # # Dolccel Eel 5ze[9 }ao Tca-txap 04 'gucrtixla tesfare nicg: teul; 00 Ie 0138: & {0 polleeal ebfectivov &o 2c eolncldo {viob t*O capirsricoa & tno pagslo atj LE @keir 871738eby , cedpcrecioz Ark] ar0i8tic0 Csnacs |a galnad 0 Hla 36ds4, "D9 wa werz tbe JwPror} Cf tha Inac?ce? M wc8 d0 0o TJLn} 40 @Itlatl] #iQ [0or9od} 3For50 ttera @ ectvisy; CcrccFd Orrcelves Rrith thsr wcal 00 @a #co. Fot e*o84 fbasonb, Zarertsiieary 7arlece candfst b0 Co7e0 harad 02 prinaruy 0 mlllts8 % TM#Ro' D 80 Drir,arulg @ Rrelt feR} Canpca end {ase: therefore bo dub; 68134 t# slaga acd esrclul ZcilIcal ore7algk. E pzcbebly pharald bo retaisad J0 0 recoe#tle;tar CLa ratbor tbaa trars_arred t0 Dalejo. Mi HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 44 H50 pcltt ================================================== Page 45 ================================================== (di I 5. Now +e Esta2%ea Eelier Cankell Kere [ eondar #etber &ba Brltiob erpcflarco Taieke not Ra 6 valco: Tha peeaie JOneere & #o Betiah Iskelligsnca "yesern Z8 &40 @etorminatan &0 ketp elandeatina ecelvl6y uodar Oxrist Foretgn Clfles contral: Tble contrel 40 achlcved Lo @ cumber &i 573708, 0) Secrat fateillgarce Aszvleo (ME-8) Itsal 030.ri8e Enror eho Crsatlcn & #bo Jotng ktclligence Cormieeos. waeab tas & Forelgn Otilce chalrmta (rll rocenuy S1r Foaclaa Doae 56o I8 nom tha Bslueb roptoa@rral8v0 & the UN) a5 gnich Lacludee %80 .Sorice ltallizecco dlroceoza end rcpT?Dontststo8 @4 tbo Colental Oltce &rd &o Ccrsoamwaleh Rolottena Oillee &8 EQU 00 tbe Chle 0 30. 1) bpole pollelcal wavfero diroceivoa @re erlgknsead, 3et by S0J, bea py fba Lottizallon Rabbbrch Dsgaatmcns &a th8 Forelgn (lles; eton &n coacullation wlab an Interdecertmental Worklac Croup Qo Ltcrnatlozel Ccrreiet Frcnte: aad Eador the pllirnata Oegtral 6d fbe Gvperlateadlina Uzdar-#ecrotary & eb0 Perneaaane Unen-Sccrctary'9 Dapartmere t &o Forele Celcee c} 815 ccere Ptlieacal acelon 6arzolfnd Ciba: Doe Qa7 #on= {srto t0 Forelen (Xllqe digovetvca bre [3at ba Gleared wvaca ebe eFproozlata Foraisn QBlce ge0rephlaal Ceake- 8) , wartnz gtCo0 urder IRD chelrrlapaht Etrrcra #R3ra # 0oz0 ln epacho} arQe8a #ach &8, {01 Cxameloa @lndoBvulot gala - #oza 02 t0 petia Yonah Feadval 0) 0 Foresgn Ozdlea Btefs Lisiecn Ofcer E818 Baite & ee 813 Clalel, end Ferosgn CKicd atfctale aorva 84100 &{ dsty %3 313 dect cae; All gbeco devieed mtgbt t# a0opind Jo3 U8e by e0 Streo Dozartrscese Organlereicrallte 8obe Icala m5za 4037 bhd Lrallkzerca Bgua8Y rvold Teaia OrcratroraU B1nrtgz8] bw? #bn} Led #Rrheear 8 [7eelu 6d @6 @xi palnta 8abjars t0 84tneo Doraetrrz 1} cicckrrc? #0 0 +2anc1ce @ t0 HI 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 45 ================================================== Page 46 ================================================== SFCREt Wa elorced by drectv889 Sca0 DonaztIGrt chalgrrenehip 6 Iklzg gra3n8, ed by th3 blllttadion 4 Steto Dapararacnt porb8ma01 Into eha Lntellicanc? ega3ey- Obetonnly #le O3e012 Komld pot InccQed baraveza 0acoa ## Scat0 D#parfment beiblI Wazo pregsrad &0 Ovtreatre @9 Lebted bablsa & & fuesost,' natteavtem aad delay &r4 40 tata & &arta aed prsrobafa} grlp o"jubo cftion Nv , 02et"tked 4oa_Ietelll-_2e2 Tha Releelenshl? 1ate3cn Gparelon9 @nd {Italilgence [aj6t8 perticu- legly cerploaing 03002378 Iote}l Bonca' Incledeo frv bepaveble ecalvtlce : eloncaetul calloctitj; QRd -€acercba aaabyaie Aod OFetiatlere Ina Ugad deela stah that @maMl par#iam e zo17 {atelll - Go5Ce procared Dy 07czO} IQana (MBa Dalled esturatad tn 'J947 tnst Ja 3ro?0} analyeld &4 s0 {ntelilgarta obaainakio by 0 # 0 07086 Derma4 Bnd cbovobeird moana 1onld Grr8y *3 %h Uvde 19 poreont, ahowld e9titagtee 68 #bw Ialottnaelon roquraa &x &bs DMdsaco 6 GF neeaa381 palicy" ) 623 pecend urvolvae tha ccllamed @R4 (odetprotatica 0} eui lerme 0 krfalllgonco koraver @btalnad B5d &ka pzodnctioa @ Dotinatee Unfcs @he Eritlah oyutaEy elandogeiod ccueeton l0 gratrut0d 0ko Saesat Lutollige ao #arvdca Tle 889887a1 enalrele a8d Bstiratlng tanctlaa {0 loccsed |53 tho Forelen Cillce Reewereh Departraonts Ucdor @0 Ascorican 6}ergr; CZA 0re [0oraaseridivy [0r borb clerdleerlne callestlqu @1d rCocrrcb end a8akrwlf. Tho Sata Deoest - mert'0 Darese @ trral}igons? &nvi Reerasch QJge bes 508c3783 &nd Enalyaie {@#panoiaa} ita3; Bze$ La ptaciicoa GIA 43m #6tepaltbed Codrrol Qvo? tho rFaclijoty €c4 pradclnz Datrorel cmbitnetoe {n eech 0 Ba7 00 t0 Re+e0 Si3to'9 CoCa6ti8um4on t3 Eremistirg Ite Vicwa &0 CWA (or @ccoptance Qt tojecticiba In ctgz wordce WiFro La Gzoat Britain teo Foretgs Otiico pleya tkra €eortilcaeioa #el0 In &he latelllgense fseld; Ln #b0 Unlsad Scata0 #at ral8 hod teon Da818084 by Clia H# J0n5mi Qo4r+pa P7 80 ================================================== Page 47 ================================================== SLSr IJ Tbe ergunent #galaat {ncorFozating the reaeareh &34 08tiraate {uction Jn 6t88 5J8 made bY Dwllda Ln ]9474 "Tos &0 P*opr? dedgleg & t0 0tnaliaa dn aay {orolgn counfry It Ia Intpostan? that Lafvrmadlon ebrld b8 procosced by &n #ze3cy eboce duty % J0 to Felgh {aet? end 80 #rdw conclusicae {rom #tu3e S3c8d. eaebout havlng elthor tha fecta Gr tho conclugtone warped t0 [Dae{table and oven propor proJeice8 & tbo Eaoo Mbooa d56y k} J0 ts dotarmlae Pellcy @nd wboa hav: 0nco detaztulnad & polleye 850 630 Ilkaly t0 b0 blind @ &zy lacto which mlqbt tend t0 provo €ha pallay t0 be n Leadley. Preeiaoly eba Oa10 argumar cea ba used wleh equal etlect aStlnse tha {ncorporetlon 0 tbo rezeageb end aatlmtro Inactlca la CLA L 0 $ {{ {etelligenea (0 too cloeely connacled eded eperetione: Wen tbore commietod f0 & Fartlcular oparBelon wiui fand {0 Delec} Olt ebc Imelllgence wleb valaratea 60 oporatior: Obvlouely boeb argamere canelade La 0 Cace I67 &60 eBtablaebment 4 0 Lelrly [ndeporden: reaearch a8d e82lmato gTOtro 30 # @8 R#% grQup 10 {00 (ndapenderte 00 57ad {0t0 the Oppobtte daceor} abet that aeither pollcy Dor cpereelona #AU bo 8ublecfed @3 @doquata letelllgenco checka Tke trcuble ritm t0 Cuben cporetlacs Ior aramplos wed 20t tha} Lutelligence ecd Gporatlana %Dz9 cumnbin3dy 630 precianl; ebge zhe Cuhan operatlon 65829d eysteradle {ctellgence Jadgtnonta Tba In& ellagonce branch (DDH & ClA Vae Dover Inlormed d #0 eaoterce 0I &be Ceban Oparacon Tba CESise & Nadlonal Eetncece 5as nover asked t0 commaetit Oa &ba 088uannelon {cz @9mnple; #bas @leconten? bed rascbed (b9 potpe In Cuba whare @ enccecaful }aridlaf Operetlao wollla provoka uprlaloge ballrd tb0 1lnoe ard Ceiaetleno {ro &hc MMaele; La Decerebet erd Tebroaeya @a Olitoa 4 Nadeeal Eetitretee procaced genesel Gorgassale 64 &10 Cubab oltuatlee Bue @eeo 58r0 bbclly Indopendert af tho Cubaa eperatax; [ 0rebos #erl( W 886 eplnloa hsd been Invlead DDI nonld bava (tvea qrIte @ didtaeoa: eeti.880 & &ha 8880 0 aplalcn {a Cebo {gor thut 6a bulcb &b0 Cpeta - dea 540 bacodl Tere etdeeod I0 934, tho tiacelend Ditralioa H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 47 M iod J8, ================================================== Page 48 ================================================== SECRE| 14 tkrs bnowlodge O2 #hc Cuben %poraffon Daaxted &n Mlernt Aer0 by any pumbor 5 LOw-leva} a30260 An &ho cporatlond branch & CIA, wee donled [0 (von &30 0p (llelale & tbo Antelllgeaca baanca Te Daread & Intelllsence @nd Rebaatca CI e*0 Dopastraeut @/ Etaro Erot Ovcn J008 atcrt &ka Cubaa oporaUaa Tro protlame tben, I0 to have a0 RtE gTouo seflcleesy Indepood6ns 5i bcta pollcy end Cperattotu t0 T#bige eba PTOBbuto &D {aka tha 6a50 fcr veoted Idaed @rd {uaorest? @ # Y88 gutflc?ently clese to be able to Subjaet prolected cposatiune 67 Peellcie8 1o tho Dnoct {nsbara end aoerchlng ecrtlny- #hore could &hlo &rau? ba Jacatad 7 Ith0 CV 0370 & bacore uboreinat? €0 Jtato, 48 MI+6 18 t0 U Forelgo Otilee: taon @bo ke E Luactlon nugbt be veseod [n 0 ccardinate #ubagoneye Bemachae [ndy < pendanl ci tota 8tzz0 ard CLA; elosely caantcto ertb boah & lo-dey operatlone: Tba RGE Jubegensy wvald gocalve Incelligence {roan CLA ard {rom %ate: 80 JQl 20 [rod 6*e Bervicoe @7d, 0 courde, Irom publle 8Cu*ced: @ sould [0pr #60nt9 Ln e&asl 0 fualon e CLA / DDI 8d Staee/ Irelllgonco apd Reecafah B micht ele0 tke &r08 certaln 0 t$' @ere{ce {uaetiord now canfided &0 CIA ## pbotogrephle {nterpre - latlot blographical &tev Iorelgm braadeaet Iportortog overt cclee - Uel Itaapr, 8 C8 Fhoze tudgbz be 87 additlon 0 Jolnt Italllgence Boare wieh ropresentativo8 Iram All at0 Intelllgence #gencica &nd wica 0 Steee Dopattirese cr Tfbie- Htuee chalrmar Conelueled: Tbe argument 01 ehle mdroerarduta {npllae & {elsly #sastle Toarrange - Iar @ Gur proeedr inteWiareac0 98/#w3. @ Je0 {neijoe &30 capackty G eo Seata Depertmant to @087510 camnnaad € 60 Udtrataa ard 10 d0 00 &n a0 o{legtve @nd pirpascsul 67B9. H the Btale Dopartxxate 09 @t proaont Mteffed j0 pot eapeblo 6 a88urelng elleettve cemraaed; ele Je D04 In my fudgrnent An argunxrd egalese & reslcnal cecrgaalcstica a Intell igence. I 19 &a Eryrone (Qr & draetsc Gvcrhen} 0 fbo Etato pepat uneala siGia HI 50955 DocId 32423505 Page 40 @y 0 Yce ================================================== Page 49 ================================================== Wil 13. The btructrr @ wkeh vuals AJL? dt te celeea : n > "#gcesed An ahse Derotendum womd &o #@ Zalced, 2) The &a82 Derwrtmcat wrold 6e Eran8a d genaral cloeronea pudhosity ce7 #Ll EJandaetlan 886t5*81, Thia nlghe bo #ctazbod DM Aba Britiaa model by &4a appolneiaant al & Deputy Uzderraczetosy & Stato f0x Ireolllgenc8 Wbo Foala Rct KOr Ita €octee?fy |n La3ed metter # ard pto rleht Do1v0 @0 ebalrinen & @ Jesnt Mzelligon0o beara 21 Tho Joss htalllgence Baard zrulei lnclaza {Gpr0- bortaljvos Itorn Jl 00mext0 [u @e Intalllgozce coamunlsy arid} Jeo Irr &h# Vibeea House. 9) The Qpbzet[cg brenzhas cl tk? prcgert Cl wc3ld b0 Teconttieuted 4odtt sorte tlarreloem tizie (the Meslonel kulcrtos - JJon Servica} TMle not7,egenry Iceld be cha? Fieh tocaomal = Bllsy Ior cleodcetina celleceion; [or cotort polltical cparater8 25d [@F Pererallleery ecuivlclc# Ie would @wbmnle projecte {Q tba Daputy Undereeeratary & 9t3t0 for Laclllgence {cr clearanca- ln geraral tbe @Ecccy Enctke bot $oravns? 04G B8519 [Qlettans ehtp to Steeo a8 @10 Dlgornaanan: Admlularzredad @rd ICA Presently d 4) A occond corl-Imelopatxlon: agen57 woald bo vet 4p, AGQln bwarlng 4 blardlea? tltie {the # Or0kgo Iledorsch Agea5y)e cooriie nota wMh Cho Ojctatlone exercya Thlo #Gvacy Sowld be charued Gieh roaponeibaulsy {Or calallan @rd Intarpretation: @ sdld Inclede CLA /DJJL tbo Surezu &l Intelllesrce &pd Regeasch {n Seeea, and tho varleua cezviee {lctlone now cerrlcd ca Cla (pbatogrephlc Idtezozseatan. blograpbacal {iles, {oz013n broedzan: monltoringa ecidzelfle Axcalllgence , 1n2258 07e8t CCiscalonv cte,} E mighe Bell ba lozatcd iz eh0 CLA tullalng An MaLean rebar Eohlecinges: je. CC} Tho Attorney Ceneral Mr, Bundy Mr. Dungan SE/%T F 5o9sj DOCId:32423505 Page 49 ved by ================================================== Page 50 ================================================== tirb SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE WASAINGTON 8 , 196 1 MEMORANDUM FOR MRa RICHARD GOODWIN SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Plan Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) "an island ~ wide resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal assets under close Agency control and direction"; (b) "support and guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have 3 potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations bases" in the US. In short, what is intended i8 a CIA underground formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban underground formed on criteria Of building political strength suficient to overthrow Castro. Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups most eager to control their own operations. I e. , the plan discrimi nates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc. and discriminates against men of independence and principle_ Thus these criteria elimi nate the Manuel group; yet [ can find nowhere in the docurents any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people. Leaving aside the moral merits of this discriminatior, the practical effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the prob- lem: i, e. 9 that those most capable of rallying popular support against the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable types which 'CIA would prefer for operational purposes. My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and demand that it be recast to make political sense, The is the SECRET Hhs7025n BQgId-32428503 Patje,50# July Ray key key ================================================== Page 51 ================================================== SECRET 2 statement that our covert activity "should be viewed only a8 the covert contribution to any national program designed to about the eventual replacement of the Castro government. 86 This is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba most likely to rally S upport for Castro's overthrow (which means, for example, rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban Revolution, a8 set forth in the White Paper. It is a fallacy to suppoge that clandestine activity can be carried out in a political vacuuma A . 8. ~ Arthur Schlesinger, jr. SECRET HW 50955 Docid:32423505 Page 51 bring Ray ================================================== Page 52 ================================================== September 1, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PR ESIDENT Tho Cuban Teak Force met at the Whito House on Tbureday, Auguat 31. Preaent were Under Secretary Ball. Asoiotant Secrotary Woodward, two membere of the 'ADA Buroau, Dlck Biesell, Tracy Barnee and myaelf: The following decleione were made: 1, We would procced immcdlately to digcuss with other Carribean govern- ments the poeeibillty 0 organizlng & Carribean Security Force: Thle could be organized On the bagie of Informal undergtandinge within the framework 0f oxieting treaty arrangements, 33 a verice of new bilateral treatlea, Or & formal, mutilateral troatye It woo thought that the baoie af organlzatlon would depend on the Judgrent of other Carribean countrles 88 to how they could accompliah the objective of eetebllahing the force without runnlng serioua Internal political riske. The United Statee, {or Ito part,' would pre- {er the formal multi-latoral arrangenent. Such & Carribean Security Forcc would have at lcast four major aapecte: 2) Advance commlttment to come to the aid of other 0ignatoriee threatened by Caatro rovolutlone and. perhapa the degignattoa of specifc units for participatlon in neceasary multl-lateral actlone, (2) Thc eatabllehment of & of intelligence Information cop- cerning gubveraive activitleg with proviaion for exchange of guch informatlon. (3) The establishment of a Carribean air &nd gea patrol to watch for Buapected inflltratlon cf Caetro arma OF agente. A training program In combatting gubverafve tactice, police organiaation and pfocedure, etce It was conceded that thc substantive eepecta of thls arrangement could, if be echieved Informallya However, the decieian to eeok @ More pccbbbery' focmal arrangement Wa: primarily arrlved at 0n the baale al nteraal polltlcal consldoretiong In the Unlted Statee. SECRET MW,6u9N WocId 32423505+ /Page_ 52 pool ================================================== Page 53 ================================================== 2 0 29 It wae decided that our public poature toward Cuba bhould,be a8 quiet as Pqbeible 0 0* trying to Ignore Caetro and ble iskand 38 Our covert activitiee would now be directed toward the destructon of targete Important to the economya Go refinerie8 6 plants using U.Sa equip- ment, etc, Thla would be done within the general framework of covert opera- tlona # which I8 baged on the principle that para-military actlvities ought to be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groupa which have a potential for establlehing an effective politlcal opposition to Castro withip Cuba. Within that princdple we will do all we can to Identify and ouggest targeta whose des- tructlon wlll have the marmum economlc Impact: 4 We Iill intensify our gurveillance Of Cuban trade with other countrieg and especially U, S. Bubeldiariee in other countrie8; and then employ informal mathods to attempt t divert thie trade 0 deprlving Cuba of market8 &nd sources of bupply. I underatand that We have already had a few |ucceeses In thle efforta 5. We wll eatablioh next week *# * In the State Department # # 8 Peychological warfare groupa Thie will be a full-time group Of threc or four people charged with the responsibility of as8ernbling all available Information on the Sovietiza- tion of Cuba, repreesion of human righte, fallure of the Cuban economy. etc, # much of which hag been hitherto clagcified 0 * putting thle Information into readable, popularized forma and developingimethods of diseeminating it through Latin Americaa Such dlsgemination would bo primarily through USLA channels but would Indlude feedlng it to Latin papere for "excluaive"'. etorieee-helping to prepare bCripts for Latin' American broadcast8, perhape a direct mauling list of intellectuals and government offlciale to be handled by & front group, etce The bablc idea Je to thde stuff into channels of Latin Amcrican communica- tion; Instead of treating it a8 official U. S. Fropagandaa We have belected @omeone to head thia effort # # Jim O'Donnell of George Ball'0 office who wab 0 freeelance magazinc wrlter (including work for the Satur Evening Post) for many Yeare and who Ball highly recommends. 6. The CIA wa8 abked to cone up # # within Ithe week # # with a preciee, covert Procedure for continuing the below-ground dlalogue with the Cuban government: The object of thla dlalogue 0 # to explore the po8gibllity of a within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and t0 encourage 8uch a 8plit # was fully de- tailed In my last memorandum to you: The i0 an effort to fInQ an operational technique. Richard N. Goodwin SECRET- 019 get day aplit ================================================== Page 54 ================================================== EYES ONLX FOR THE PRESIDENT November 1, 4961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: I believe that the concept 0f & "command operetion" {or Cuba: @9duecubbed witb you by the Attorney General} J8 the Only e{fective way t0 bandle an aU- out attack On tha Cuban problem Since [ underatand you are Lavorably dld - pobed toward the Idea [ will not dlecue8 the present disorgenlzed and uncoordinated operatlon cannot do the job edlectively. The beauty of such an operation over the pext [ew monthe {0 tbat we cannot losee L the best happens we Will unaeat Cagtroa I pot, then a lease we Wd emerge with @ atronger underground; better propeganda and far clearor Idea 0f the dlmenslone 0/ the problema whlch a{lece u8. The queatlon then I0 who ehould heed thle operetion I know 0 no 0u0 currente ly In Cuban aftalre at the Stete Department who can do Ito Nor I0 It & very good Idea t0 the State Department Irvolved In depth In Buch covert acelvd= tes I d0 not thlnk It ehould be centered In the CLA. Even # the CIA can flnd aomeoae Of sufficlent {orce and staturee One Of the major problems wil be to revamp CLA operatlone end thlnkleg @@ and thle wtll be very hard t0 d0 from tho -neldea I belleve that the Attorney General would be the moet effective commander o Guch @n Operationa Either [ @r gomeone el8e ahould be aselgned to hm a8 Deputy for thle actlvlty, elnce he obvloualy will not be ablo to devote full time to iE# The 0n0 danger here Ie that he mlght become too cloeely Identkfied wlth whee might not be # gucceesful operatlona Indeed, cbancee 6f succese aTe Vety speculative. Trere are & {0w anevore to thle: (J) Everyona knowledgeable {n theee affalre 5~ In and Qu} Of govern- mene ## J0 aware that the United Statee I9 alreedy bolping the underground: Tho preckee manner Of ald may be uaknowa bue the fact of ald Ie Cormod knomledgoa We WIU be blared for not winnlng Cuba back whether Or Dot wB have @ "command operatlon" and Whether Or pot the Attorney General heade It. EYES ONLY FOR IkE PRESIDENI GOP SECRET M# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page- 54 why get ================================================== Page 55 ================================================== EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT 2 # (2) He role ehould be told to only a few people at the very with most of the contact work in carrying out hla decislone being left to hle deputy . K that deputy I8 boreone Uready closely Identified with the conduct of Cuban affalra then It would appear a0 M normal channele are followed except that decisive attention would be given to the decielong whlch cere through thoee chanele. There ere probably three Or Ionr people who could fulil thig criterton Thle etill Jeavee & gubetantial danger 0f,Identifying the Attorney General &8 the fellow In chargea Thle danger muet be weighed agalnat the Increased effectiveneae Of an operation under hla command Rlcbard Na Goodwin EYES QNLI EER THE PRESIDENT TOP SECRET H 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 55 top belng ================================================== Page 56 ================================================== THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT EYES 1961 2 November MEMORANDUM with five components: should be organized I believe that the evaluation 1' Intelligence collection 2. Cuerilla underground 3. Propaganda of covert activities within Cuba) 4. Econogaic warfare (exclusive 5. Diplomatic relations to be headed by someone drtetlycteal Contact work Each of these divisions deputy who would do theesct He have a involved. youa In addition you the various gover) when direct between this the source of orders directives re4n 0 be the one identified as AEooUd was needed. dis below. 1 contact with the be from CIA for reasons see that He should 'job be to Lie Staff Assistant to you: My primary at your morning would act a8 decision were to you ' no direct opera- curre questions for discussed. I have withthe alternatives fully meetings. keeping in the back tional duties; thus to supply a topflight and he has we needa I I have talked to MacNamara as whatever additional_ to use man, as it will be necessary undezGrothdbeat way to handle % However, it Will be valuable to assign think this is the_ for thise That is why the CIA apparatus and in order to keep them happy can probably man to a8 deputy level. In this way. we a CIA involved at the command the Defense deeply between the CIA field internal conmand; can core fror relations economic warfare _ 4 will discuss Both the diplomatic this and 4 if you give the some ideas on Statee I have it with George Ball. ATTORNEY GENERAL PRESIDENT AND THE EYES ONLY FOR THE TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 56 staff operation and and responsible would would agencies nment and operation and would cussed agencies would staff presented would ent ground. guerilla promised personnel well and agents and you and operatives struggle avoid an People and signal ================================================== Page 57 ================================================== TOP SECRET ESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL EYES ONLY FOR THE PR 2 - men should be assigned to intelligence One of Bob Amory's brightest young collection evaluationa Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence propaganda, I thought we might ask should check with Ed As for this one although we from the Times work on Murrow and Dick Bissell. should probably be at the Pentago should have 3 headquarters. It will be easier to work These better security; (b} MacNamara personnel, etc; because (a) we might services, secretarial with in terms of getting whatever State' and CIA; (d) you could re- place between morning # # (c} It is a relatively in on the way to Justice every schedule to stop artange YOLI #Geadiast or post-breakfast meeting: perhaps for a meetinge Initially only should pot be discussed &taonaczrowcCone Bissell should Zeos %?egali and Rudk" of course), MacNamara, five section heads Ceorge Ball When they are named; the should know of your participation: iitea Organizing work and contactcuose to know 0 Br tke the subject is discussed tomorrow will have If this be done through Your Deputy will know about it. then already too many people (b) review with them all current are (a) name the section chiefs operations= nec- The first steps establish their authority over them to in their field, basis), and start assistance (on as a5 for financing essary headquarters; (d) arrange eokY (c) establish the physical CIA. coming largely from presumably the above items with I will begin work on to If this meets with your other matters subject, of course, final decisions on personnel approval: Richard N. Goodwin T AND THE A TTORNEY GENERAL EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDEN TOR_SECRET HM 50955 DoCId:32423505,Pagb: $ and and people get staff neutral and myself. and get operations possible small staff all approval your and ================================================== Page 58 ================================================== Cu EESQNL Novorber 4 1968 The followiug aro somo tentatlve recomnxendatlena meant t0 Borve &8 & baale o[ diecuaelon: I would recommend that tbe Cuben operatlou be organized {n five corpoaonte: 8' Lotelllgonco colloctlon and ovalnalloa b. Ucderground and guezllla C Propaganda d Econoric warfare (atler than covert cchividee Jetadn Cuba) 0e Diplomatic relatlone Although thaee Bectona WilI make use & evailable ezency capabillties te operadlonal aathorlsy lor each GE Cheae agpects % the operatlou WiU be Ia tb8 bands &f tho bection leader who Ia reeponelble t0 &bo chalrmaa & Bhe 8*orpe All &8 thoge activitles will be cornpartmentallzed s8 much 88 pogalole, 1e., only tbd chalrinsn WIU bo kopt completely Liozmed on all aopecte o tho operetione Tho operation abould have Ite phyolcal hcadquarter: In tbe Department % Dalaaze. both {or marirur becurlly &nd t0 detseh de e8 much @8 pogaIble Lror Jdent callon &3 & CLA acttvity.' Tho &re stope aro} 1.] Deaignation &f eactlon chiefe; 2 A complete curvoy by Gach aection chlef of current operedlona In bie fleld; 3. The eotabllahment o control over Oporatlons by tbe Boctan chdofs The erpanalon & operetlons whore {eeaible. Dob Amovy #hculd be Bakod to destgnato one of hle beet men to centralize 0e tatelligence callectien and ovaluetlon The Defenee Departreat gbould deslgnate tbe sectlon chlet {oF underground end guorllla acdvictes EYES ONLX TOP sCRr pige ================================================== Page 59 ================================================== LYES ONLX ~Z should diacuse @ Qanaloz 0f propaganda operationa edith Edefaticos We CM olficera # # not relating i to stepped 1p operatlons and oppropriate Ve Bhouid golect & 8ingle porgon to bo In other [ields. With these 1 have chlef, coordinating' CLA and USLA oporations: the peoreaand: cbles_cc # 0 Khe cBn be pereuaded to take # leave of eb- buggebted that Meedul perton to advise on thle aapect of tbe opezatlos godce would ba & and dplomatlc relettona should be hendled by # Both economlc warlare I i6 Important to keep the dlplomatic desigace of the State Departmeat; bort 0f control $0 that we relatlons abpect Ol this %peratton Under some situetione In the OAS, con"? involve ourgelver - potentielly emhtte : Eub who OUF operationa voting t send an Icvestigating cormlttee t Be Jed Efdel has evidence to preaent of U.S. partlcipation arc at 2 height The Deputy 0 hauld be from CIA: Bhould pot talk to the Preeea I may be that bamne contacte Tbo Prenldent Bhould be; mado -# In the most general way: But [4 Weh & few key neweren end the opezation doce nOt succeed tbo Preaidon: approacheg Chern pcrsonally of another Cuhan fallurea Tbere it 43 Inevitable that he will become te Locua which Involvad herce Tere i9 a rather large group are two typoa Qf peweren kinda There I0 nothing to bo done will hear fumor8 and atortee of varioua In tho Cuban comraunity aboue tberne Thera are & Lew newamen Fhoee contacte I exteralvo that they mlght bo able t together & coborent etorya Bto #0 mde 18 bhould be reatricted to these; elthouzh they any approncbes are to be all-out opcratlona In adutione Bhould bevez be tald we are golng t2 Wage an ehould bo done outaide the i8 much contact and operational xork 49 po8gible Mlamal areaa should be to dealga te section chleis, eatablieh thchi aubod{ Our next at2p of perbent operatione- Thie would ine and have tber make & complete gurveY here and Jn Miami Of current operationo &d capacitles clude # turvey tho firat taak &f the Defenge Depart- (and apywhere else they #re golng o} headquartere Bhould ba ment deaigaee wlth CLA a88i8tarce: The phyeical establlahed General should maintelb # generel operational 8upcr" Although the Attorney fox hlm to be the formal chairran af tho group vlolon; 1t [o probebly unwiso becauae the Fisk af identllcatlon Is {atrly high: TOP SECRET EXCS ONLX H ' 50955/ Doqolul people 0# 80 pot coverti- 80 ================================================== Page 60 ================================================== EYES CNLI M euch Idontidcaton Ji mado, and tbo Operation ig not 'guccedefal, ane other Cuban fatlare may be direcuy traccable to the Presldonta I regerd thle e9 falrly rerote In thle typo af opcration bt thc dangcr can be de= creased L{ the operation Is [ormally hoeded by someone wlo d0 not & clearly acting ct the direct beheet of the Preaideats Tle Attorney Ceneral can give aasd9tance and malntatn gcneral (upervielon on beball 0 tho Preeident. working with the Chairtnan elone #8 rather &had extending hls contacta t0 Jn- clde all tha oporatlon chtole: TOP SECRET EXTS ONLT 324i+500 Pate .60 =J< ================================================== Page 61 ================================================== Novarbos & 1968 Bob 0 # K you approve thie (It Ie baaed on & briel mamo General Lansdale) [ MlHl @end I8 &n Ite waya In addlttoa Fou #hould havd # meadipg ## @p86od # poesible 0# wlth Leaedalo and €he eenlor ropregentativeb 6 Stetea Celenee and CIA Uyoa went t' call mo 00 thle alter you have read tbe memo } wlll sugge8t # procoduto {or getting thar together& Eichard Na Goodidu TOP BECRET # EYES ONL > HF 50955 DocId:32423801. Page 61 frota ================================================== Page 62 ================================================== Netenede 14 Je04 MILORANDUM To Tle Sacsetaty 6 S0m Tho Socretany 0 Celeaed The Directar/et CIA Thm Attertvey |cenesal Cenre] Tuiler Cecera Leaakale Ilcherd Cenata Tla Iolostug Lo & Jummary % &ho mAlar docielona rhleh havo boen made iu regerd te @ho Ceba Operetions Ja @e Ftli 80 ahead #tta the #aruseod Projoce t0 belp Cebo oretthrow tn5 €qin= tuun et roglra &d eatalliaa @ Ir00 Cabt A ealete #aete # 8e dureceed ta tbse erd &# & Mrettet QI brtere Batlore] prtaaitye 2 Tro Proatena 51l} be Gendncted aadat 0# Geder@} purdenee Ltd Adosaot Cenerel, #it Genarel Lanadalo 00 Ma dalel & eperellont 3 Tbo progsamn MMl b# revlewved ta 6r0 (weoke In order t Jogertioe whetkor' Cenorel Leasdala wlu €orlittte 80 ckiet 6[ Opotasleaes 00 Tr0 NEC 3412 880u2 Eau En 808 {olastted eeteneee 96 Tha Sacretartoo '0 Btede @ad Dolense jend be Dleeetor 04 tko Cenatal [ctelll- Zerce Agency Etu apoelbe aeetor eieer? 64 tbots #apattnnens 40 petbobei Boproa Jeatativea t0 aebt0e Oi0 calel 01 e2er#tlone 0# requlred: Tetd eoelor Oideerd ebaeld t0 able @ arerciee ## eieet bbataeaivas 07 Iengh &ho Bunretarteo &8d Director # # eective Operetloea] coteaei ever @M eopeete 5{ tKolr Depastrtant'0 oporattone deallng #dea Cabaa 6a Keorledge 0 €ka enlateuee 04 €bla oporetlon aheald redettetd @ ebe tecielente 0hie #rorriotaraara Ietabero & @0 9418 due and &he poorosontattves eppetntad by @o Secretarice aad &a4 Direetaee @rttes dlecoixination 0 &hfs Aaordodea EW %0 Mtb &0 {nihotiby 04 &bm Soerelarles 08 Stetd 05 Detedae: ta Attornoy Cenerel, 0@ Cbe 4 Opecadtende rop SECRET -ET2G ONLY Mii,' 50955 DocId:32423585, Page:62 4m oay ================================================== Page 63 ================================================== # 57 ~c €/le& 418 J -77S 10 FOR Mi of 0 [ P 10 0n Mr" Mr . Ech Mr _ Wh) De_ Mr _ Ai . 1a La CIA: Mr 1 1 said i.ie tcs the that 0 f had not of the not 0F be said €hat he suci1 in tlie Nii. sona ] in a Ivc in opinion tlat yer or the 1nn the t is C colicurred Hle noted that he in eslab pcr a Poard of Points are 2 _ Es U not At Or explana 0 f S by USID _ lie Dossille 1 I, 8 f gave a at leted 3n proeress Lo in Yet WvC incelh by a J of Breat 3. po we do not of. suseested Line U.5 . Iie in co in the be sueisesled relai_ 0f 8 the Jia: t posture rd ie did br _ adl "ol 1 jn ced "ncertalin Pans ha c2 retu Doint_ of Lo 4 f vould woulcl a world- mia Plo"CKTY OF WW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 63 TXF WiLT: Hiise ( Hreve MONGOOSE August MEMORANDUM 1962 RRECORD SUBJECT: nutes Meeting Operat Special ion MONCOOSE Group (Augmented) Aygust RESENT; 1962 State: Mr _ Rusk , Ilurwi Johhson Martin, Mr _ Goodwin, itc House: General Taylor Bundy Eensc/JCS : NcNarla Lcmn i lzer , General Mr _ Gilpatric , nsdale General McCone Mr . Hlarvey USIA Mr _ Murrow Nr _ Wilson Mr _ McCone Nal iona Est ima that reg- conc was lusion fail because che Soviets Board its been Will Own inherent contained let Mr _ che McConc Castro us Veaknesses Wvill This believcs tliought scronger Lalcr thc must facc Ticel ing , Lwo fact basc chan tha Sovicts Cuba_ Cuba nOw ; Wight added cons ider his by chese the lishing two Jn Kacional MRXN neces= imna; sarily tes Secrecary chc Rusk " Lion request che four papers _ Gehera chen Lansdale Pha se courses $ (riHIIa rized now Jction brief . coinp caken ouitlined daite Cuba , incensive recenc chat saying have that have icence during learned true loolc assessment has Deen deal resistance but chal Nr _ tential Ru sk blockade Berlin_ Cula possibilitly: che perhaps thac @ishc engaiin; etc _ wish event, dlirect ehange its closely cic iacion Lerlin cow; meshedl ch-lt n5 Sovict Cuha McNal ra shippi. %, coni believe niency sticuce was linai akequa should 01) Lhis Iia rras response cion sment chis sayinc Sovict Berlin kind facilities blode kcal de coi whcreas be diffcrent ~vidc Ller _ ================================================== Page 64 ================================================== 4 _ Mr_ Rusl emphasized che desirability crcatc 1 split between Castro o€ attempting to out that such 3 splic would be old-line Cowununists _ Ile pointed interests no Iina bound co be beneficial to U.S. tter Ihich Way the balancc 0 f general connection_ it Was hard fdr power swvung In this for U.S . military hin co visualize a valid pretext currently intervention in |Cuba under any circumstances deve co fchcsextc However should reasonably viablc resistance extent Eor cxample khat some provinces the. Havana Governncnt then che U.S might oppose to such provincial 0fficials _ might desire to support In response to che abova Mr McCone the moment the prcviously-cited poinced out that at 0 Ld-line Comiiunisls Erictions bccwcen Castro and che have bcen resolved in Castro 5 Eavor and issue currently exists There has |additiona no tcrporary rapprochement becivccn Ficiel been at lcast J this 0f course be and fioscow Ile indicated that success in miay temporary _ Iic said that 'chere has been some and recruiting Cuban 0 Eficials abroad to work for the that there have been sone defections U. S . 5 The discussion' thcn turned Lo the objectives MONGOOSE program_ Mr McNamarj of the the building qucstioned Ivhethcr we cannot separate up 0 f agent assets Within Cubj From actions hurt the U.S_ in thc eyes o f wor ld that wou ld gestion by Ceneral opinion_ This led to che 5v8 - Taylor chat Ive shou d consider over-all objective Eroin one of overEhrowing changing the of causing its Visible fai che Castro regime co one lure _ In this context Mr McCond then plan (called hereafter chc variant") presented an alternate described by General Lansdalc , Lo the stepped-up Course B result 0f thc whichl he 6Jid had bcen Prepared as 3 in conc lusion chat stcpped-up 3} would not in fact thc overthrow of Cstro_ Hie result should not bc emphasized that the stepped-up ?lan undertaken unless chc U.$. is preparecl Lo atcributability for che necessary actions includir cheacvcpt use 0 f U,S _ Mi litary force= Nir McConc ng eventual risk invi an wpris said that a siepped-up B Will 9 Ihich t result in 3 bath if unsupported Not only wou ld chc U.S . be b ry-type blood would als0 be a high noise levcl lamed but chere would be created which in the press and cventually J situacion would requirelintervention_ On che oher hancl thc CIA variant Mr McConu S vicw _ aVOid all 0 f now proposed would , in invitc jn thesc daugcrs because it wvol ld not uprising . Again lic repeated his vicw that thc U. S. however facc ` a stronger Cuba in the |Eucure - niight_ 'PROPERTY 0f H# 50955 DocId:32423505 'Page 64 Thc WHitt Hoisf (W;iCf and lop give 1ly "'CIA ting ing migk. Ilunga ================================================== Page 65 ================================================== 6 The principal mcmbers 0 f the Spccial. Group after sonie discussion, chat the CIA viriant should be developed Further for consideration at nexc Thursday' s meeting of the Special Group Mr McCone WJs asked Lo stress Sconomic sabotagc and to emphasize mcasurcs to foment 3 Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions under this must be S0 designed Js to avoid ma jor atcribulion to ` Lije U,S. 7 _ General Lemnitzer tolc the Group chat the docs not wish Guantanamo used JS 2 base for operational activitics lS suggested by CIA_ Hc sa id that che other Chicfs have not given an opinion on chis but he thougkt that would agree with thc a$ he himself docs The Vicw is thac chis base is coo important Lo the U. S and too vulnerable ijo Cuban Pressure co take Lhe chance of provoking Cuban reaclion. The State reprcsentativcs agreed with this view 8 _ Kr _ Bundy suggcsted that_ a hard lookc be taken at che possibility of supporl Lo selected Cuban cxiles on 3 strictiy "disengaged" basis ; in other words shou [d bc given covert financial and tlaterial support , with tlie idea of sec what could generate 00) their Own 9 Mr _ Rusk suggested that continued pressurc should be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue Jlivc. 10_ Aclion Co bc Laken: CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-Sumarized discuss ion. This should be ready by Wesnesday , Augus t 15ch1 Thomas A.. Parrott Cc : General Lansdale Luuii"y +/e/ 3 "n ^ ttachment Agenda for Mceting PkoPEKTY (F HM 50955 DocId:32423505 Pdge 65 Waitf #oust Uffici felt, plan Navy yet chcy Nav; chey ing they _ rhr ================================================== Page 66 ================================================== D 767 3CRET-NOFURN SFECIAL HANDLING 1 Mokclus OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTCN 25,D.c. 13 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY_ CLA ROBERT HURTITCH, STATE GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE LON WILSON, USIA From: Brig. Cen. Langdale Subjcct: Altercate Couree B In cornpliance With the Cesire8 and guicance expressed in the 10 August policy-meeting on Operatlon Alongooce, we will produce an outline of an alternate Courge I3 for Bubmisgion. The CIA paper Operational' Flan (Zeduced Effort)" will be uced a8 the starting ba8i0 Since thi8 I9 t0 be a bare outliae, to permit further pollcy guidance to be ccveloped, I believc the pape? need contaln only a btatement of objectivea and & list of imple Inenting activities_ The list of activitle8 will bc urdcr the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Econoric, Poychological, Faramilitary, and Military. Wc will hold an Operational Tepresentativeg work 8e88ion in my offlce, at 1460 hourg, Tuescay, 14 Auguot, to complete the outline paper for Bubmiosion_ Each of you 13 to bring 5 copie8 of completed asgigned work to thig work 6es8i0n, to permit cach 0f ue to work fror a full set of draits . Faper8 reyuired irom each oi you ior rhe Tue meeting: Mr, Harveyi Intelligence ?olitical (splitting the regime 9 1 Ecouamic (sabotaze, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any guggegtiong for inclubion In otker cectione of the paper . Mr . Hurwitch: Statcment of Objectivcs, Folitical, and Econoinic _ flgo, 8ugge8ti0ng for inclusion in otker scctions of the papcr . EXCLUDED FRQM A;TO"ATIC jilj 484j:29 TGP-ZECZET NOFORN PNG Thls Cocuzont ccntiinz Copj {J cr' HI 50955 DORId:32423505 Page 66 72 22t bcay an; Zp5 Trow ZCll7E) 03073 ================================================== Page 67 ================================================== TOp SECREV NOFORN ' SPECIAL_HANDLING Gen. Harrig: Economic (limited deception). Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Al80, any buggebtions for Inclugion in other sectiong of the paper . Mr Wilson: Paychological (including covert). Also, any 8uggestiong Tor inclugion in other sectiona of the paper. 2 TOp SpecV; W!OkrG HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 67 ================================================== Page 68 ================================================== Res 'c/vl)s SERS1ilue 14 August 1962 MKMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Jirector (Plans) SUBJEC'[ Operation MONGOOSE 1 . Action. None. This 1nemorandum is for your information. 2: . Refcrcnce is made to our conversation on 13 Angust 1962, concc rning the Iclnorandum of that datc f101n7 Gencral Lansdale Altached is a copy pf this inemorandiim, exciscd fro1 which arc fo1r words in the second line of the pcnultinate paragraph on page 1 . 'hese fouf words Iyci@ "including liquidation. of.leadcrs . 0 3 , 'Khc questibn of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was bronght up by Secretary Mc Namara at thc mccting of the Special Grovp (Anginenteel) in Sccrctary Rusk' s OHice on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting. in ansiver t0 a comment by Mr. H Murtow, that this is not 7 subject which has hcen made a matte r of official record. I took carcfinl notes on {h1c commnents at tlis mecting 0n this Point, and the Special Gronp (Angmente d) is notl expecting any wriltcn €onincnts 01 study on th1is point. 4. Upon rcccipt of the altached mcmorandin I caled J nsdale's officc &nd, in his abscncc, pointed ont to Yrank Iand thc inarnissibility and stupidlity of putting this type of conmcnt in writing in such a document_ I advised Frank Hand that, as far a5 CIA was concc rncd_ wc would writc no docmment perlaining to this and would pa rticipatc in no open meeting discussing it. I slrongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that hc cxcise the phrase in question from all copic s of this rcinorandum, in - cluding those disseminated to State, Defcnse, and USJA . Shortly thercafter, Iansdale called back Jnd left the rncssage that hc a@recd and thati hc had 4onc 0o. EveS QR {C1 HI 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 68 SE27 SKSHEIYE ================================================== Page 69 ================================================== information also, in Your abscncc and sincc 5 . For your had bccn distributed and in thc attachcd mcmora/dui alrcady thc' Dircctor'& that this Iiht core to vicw of thc pos#ibility Walt Eldcr on the above_ altention, I informally bricled WVII_I,IAM K. HA RVEY Chief, 'Task Force W Attachrncnt Lanskale dtd 13 62 Mcmo fr Gen Elzs 0LZ {01 6801 H# 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 69 Keasz ] EixIz Aug ================================================== Page 70 ================================================== INIERVJEW AND MEETTNG SUMARY Page of _6 INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN SENSITHVE, FILE: Date: 27 1975 Time: 10:00 a.m. Place: Goodwin 5 residence, 1536 32nd St. `NW Participants : Sel Com . David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America Submitted by : Gregory F_ Treverton Dur the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, ` sRecializing in Latin America_ After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin Anerica During that period he with the President about a Latin American matter on the average once a Goodwin left the White House in the fall qf 1962 , becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-Anerican Affairs under . first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White House by President Johnson in the spring of 1964 , after the Panama crisis_ At that time, however he did not specialize on Latin America instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the: Administration late in 1965 _ 1 Assassinations In general_ 9 Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as- sassination, although it would not have surprised hin if it had gone on He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassina Castro After the of a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer_ At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department McNamara suggested M getting rid of Castro, someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page. 70 May ing. spoke day . Pigs, Bay ting ================================================== Page 71 ================================================== INTERv IEW AND METTNG SUMMARY Page 2 of 6 FILE: W Executive Action. McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea However , Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the mee after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reason able even apart from moral objections for the of had shown tha Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later, Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an article in Esquire- When he finished his period a8 Chairman of the Cuba Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo re commending that the United States let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could but- tress his position in Latin America During his time at the State Department Goodwin met every week or S0 with E C. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor did, Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967 _ Goodwin did believe, however_ that the United States was in- volved at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo S life. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominicar Republic_ There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be as t sassinated } but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern- ment was surprised when it occurred. HenryDearborn, the American Consul in Santo Domingo , had been charged with staying in contact with anti- Trujillo forces _ Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some weapons presumably handguns_ to those forces _ Goodwin suspected that H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 71 ting Bay Pigs only King, ================================================== Page 72 ================================================== INTERV JEW AND NEETTNG SUMARY Page 3 of FILE: the President probably did not know of the gun transfer but he said that the assassination and the U.S _ role with respect to it would have come as no surpris e to the President. He; doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by {the Special Group _ Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was 3 bad idea because once started, ic never lended However an agent in the field regard killings of one sort or. another as within his mission in suppor" one political faction over another And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions by bringing Batista followers into the of invasion team) In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA. 2 CIA Activities in Brazil: Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazila The United States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart In the period before 1964 9 the T.S gave political support to anti-Goulart factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast _ The W.S . had been involved in Brazilian elections for many years and presumably spent a deal in the 1963 congres- sional elections On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome to keep a contact with the Brazilian military._ How much further Walters activities might have extended Goodwin did not know = H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 72 might ting Pigs (e.g. Bay Pigs good ================================================== Page 73 ================================================== INIERV IEW AND MEETING SUMARY Page of FIIE: 3 _ CIA Activities in Chile: The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin Anerica were the means of combat- communist influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was applied to Chile,_ and the U.S_ switched its support from the conserva- tive Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on mee tings of the Special Group only rarely, only if Latin Anerica were the subject of the meeting. As he remembered the proposals that came to the Special Group were genera statements policy papers , not descriptions of recipients of support or conduits_ In line with the policy, support was given to left democrati tical elements _ The U.S _ certainly provided assistance to the Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know how much The figure of S20 million mentioned by Stern, did not seem inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested , however, the assertion that the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washing ton since the 1948 Italian campaign _ From his vantage point in the White House it did not seem S0 _ 4 Changes_during the Johnson Administration: Johnson cared less about Latin Anerica than had Kennedy-= Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert actions in the region: Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American policy, although the President did become active in the two crises__ Panama and then the Dominican Republic_ Goodwin saw a sharp change in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 73 only ting it, poli ================================================== Page 74 ================================================== INTERVIEW AND METTNG SUMARY J5_of _6 FILE: for left democratic reform ended _ Goodwin professed himself puzzled 0 by Johnson S assertion that he had discovered a murder incorporated in the Caribbean. The specific instance Johnson ever cited was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from the very beginning and SO could hardly have "discovered" it after he becane President _ 5 . Covert Operations and_Counterinsurgency: When asked about the ethos surround covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency , not covert action. There was certainly no reluctance to use covert ac tion, but no one believed that American objectives could be secured through it_ Counterinsurgency was some- thing different. A deal of money was spent training police throug AID , much more was spent chrough the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries and there was a8 well some CIA activity. At that point _ the U.S . really believed that the communists could not get elected to power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations were considered by the Special !Group (counterinsurgency) Latin Anerican matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin Anerica was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. Goodwin believed that in suM U.S_ counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla movements that began had little indigenous support. H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 74 Page only ing good ================================================== Page 75 ================================================== INTERVTEW AND MEEETING SUMMARY Page of FILE: In response to a question about NSAM" S, Goodwin noted that these cane out of the Bundy which had little formal staff_ Good - win often wrote these documents _ were both general and on occasion_ specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like Kennedy wanted co know the details of Anerican activities in Latin America_ 6 Goodwin_Suggestions: Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to- operations _ What is required is an active Congressional committee . on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active staff. Once the President is permitted Both to decide what is a major operation, and thus needs to be communicated co Congress = and who to tell the game is over, Confidence in men will not institutional checks are required _ With respect to people to be interviewed , Goodwin mentioned that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub- director_ He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger,; and with Tad Szulc_ In response to a question 9 Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the of through Cushman . He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of that H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 75 shop, They day do; Bay Pigs ================================================== Page 76 ================================================== ip "EcReT amt 25 L the United States Several months later I presume because 8 2 of that trip and several other contacts I maintain with 1 5 representatives of the Cuban government at the United Nations 1 and the Organization of American States , because of my personal 5 friendship with a nuber of people at the White Touse and Mr Goodwin , Mr Donnegan and others , in a conVersation with Mr Goodwin it was suggested that I cone and see the Attorney General: I was invited to lunch With Mr _ Kennedy at the Justice 9 Department. We discussed in considerable length the situation 10 in Cuba following the invasion, the pros and cons of some 11 different possible actions the United States government in 12 that context_ { 0 13 At the end 0f this conversation , the Attorney General 1 14 asked me whether I would have objections to meeting with his 15 brother the President. I !said I woula of course be pleased 16 to do So . 17 The following day I received a call from the [vhite House 18 indicating that the President would like for me to come in at 19 11:00 0 'clock in the morning on that in November which I 1 20 did = And I was received by the President in the company of i 21 Mr Goodwin in thz Oval Office for a conversation which lasted, L 22 if memory Serves in excess of an hour and: a half in which the Wj M 23 President discussed a number of his views on Cuba in the wake 1 24 of the Bay of Pigs asked me a number of questions concerning 1 8 25 my conversations with Preier Castro, a general review of the TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 76 by day ================================================== Page 77 ================================================== ant Top SECRET /26 7 1 situation in Cuba you know wha t the United States should do , 8 2 could do, might do in terms of either in a hostile way Or in 1 5 establishing some kind of' & dialogue , most relevant of which 1 4 I suppose was that at one point the President rather unexpectedly 5 turned to Me and said what would you say , what would you think , 6 if. I decided to authorize' the assssination of Premier Castro? Let Me add for the record that the precise wording appears in the Esquire article from the notes taken at the time I am now paraphrasing ' from memory _ This was a rather 10 Mr _ Aaron Let me read this into the record chatted 11 for a while about Cuba / and then Kennedy leaned forward in his 12 rocking chair and hurled a question at Me : What would .YOu think 8 13 if I, ordered Castro to be {assassinated? 0 1 14 Mr , Szulc. I was taken aback and So indicated to the Presidel 15 the best of my recollection, I said in the first instance as a 16 practical matter I thought this would not make all that much 17 difference even if he were because I thought that by then the 18 Cubar structure had been established to a sufficient degree 19 where the murder and disappearance of Fidel Castro would not { 20 necessarily mean the collapse of the governing system if this i 21 Were the purpose of the United States governent . L 22 In the secord place, it was more important to me , I said 4 23 to the President , that MY personal feeling was that the United 1 24 States government should not be party to murders and political 1 8 25 assassinations at which point the President leaned back and TOP SECRET HM 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 77 "We ================================================== Page 78 ================================================== amt ToP "EcRrET 27 smiled and said , well I was: testing You_ I agree with you 2 completely. 8 1 3 And then he went on for a few minutes to make the point 1 how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having recourse to assassination in foreign policy. Again , the precise quotes and the precise paraphrase I placed in the article and again I'm paraphrasing from memory now _ And the President added in this context that the reason I 10 have raised it with you , Or words to this effect, is because I am under very , very strong or powerful pressure from certain 11 12 people, whon he did not identify , to authorize an operation { resulting in the assassination of Premier Castro. And I think 0 13 1 we talked about this for few more minutes , and I think I 14 repeated the points I made originally and the President said 15 he felt.very strongly that same way and the fact he was testing 16 me or trying, to see what my response as a reporter or as a 17 citizen would be. 18 I might; add that several days ago Mr Goodwin and I had 19 3 the opportunity to discuss this and compare our respective 20 5 recollections of 'it, and Mr Goodwin S recollection is exactly 1 21 1 the same as mine. We discussed this at some length, this 22 4 being last week , and the subject being relevant to the current 23 1 flow of news and Mr Goodwin made the point to obviously if 24 1 8 President Kennedy Were planning to authorize the assassination 25 TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 78 me , ================================================== Page 79 ================================================== amt Top #eeiE# 28 7 1 of Castro , he would not likely be discussing it With you in 8 2 the full knowledge 'of a reporter and if Castro Were killed 3 5 or an attempt to kill him] would surface you would have the 4 professional duty to rush to your typewriter: and report on this 5 conVersation , eVen though it was on 2 personal basis And Mr Goodwin S judgnent , and in Ihich I concur was that pr esumably the President woula not have floated this issue with Me , and this is really responsive to my Own effort to re-evaluate after the passaqe of time the President' s sincerity 10 in disclaiming any desirel to do So 11 My impression at tha time and today fourteen years later 12 is that the President was sincere and serious in affirming his { 0 13 revulsion to such an idea of assassination 1 14 Mr Aaron . Let me ask you , when was your conversation 15 with Mr Goodwin? 16 Mr . Szulc. The mostl recent one? 17 Mr . Aaron. Yes , the one you just mentioned . 18 Mr . Szulc . Last Friday which would have been the 6th,of 19 June of this Year_ 3 20 Mr . Aaron . I read into the record 'the following o 21 paragraph from your article_ "Kennedy leaned- back in his chair | 22 smiled and said' that he, ihad been testing: me because he was y 23 under great pressure from advisers in the Intelligence 1 24 comunity (whom he did not name) to have Castro killed , but 1 8 25 that he himself violently opposed it on the grounds that for TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 79 May ================================================== Page 80 ================================================== COODW IN (TRUJILLO) The papers produced by Mr Goodwin on 7/16/7 5 contained some Trujillo-felated material Certain documents were selected from this material and are pro - duced herein under Tabs 8 and T A11 of the attached Trujillo-related dlocuments have been produccd before the Committee , and Mr Goodwin has been questioned concern them They are attached again herein for possible use in connection with questions concerning handwritten notations appearing on the documents TAB S. May_ 13 1961 Memorandum to Goodwin re CIA Covert Activities in the Dominican RepubTic Page 2 of this document contains on the original ribbon a pencilled-in circle Goodwin stated on E9BYi6/z} that this circle was placed on the original copy of the memorandum by him and indicates that the encircled ma terial (a report of the passage 0 f revolvers and carbines) struck Goodwin 7 as both significant and new to him Further , the word "neutralize" is underscored in pencil on the original copy of the memorandum Goodwin might be questioned concerning the s ignificance of this underscore TAB T Various drafts together with the UT1ginal of the 5729/6i cable from the State Department to Dearborn are attached herein Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that the handwriting on pages numbered 237 238 239 and 240 is his handwriting The handwvriting on pages 233 234 and 235 a subsequent draft of the same proposed cabje is not Goodwin 5 Goodwin suggested Ithis handwriting may be that of President Kennedy . 1 H: 50555 DocId:32423505 Page 80 ing ================================================== Page 81 ================================================== ~26.4 EYES ONLN 13 Mey 1961 MMORANDUM SUBJECT CIA Covert Activities Dominican Republic Attached is the speciel briefing paper on CIA covert activities directed egeinst the Dominican Republic which was requested by Mr Richard Goodwin of the whhite House EveS OxLy SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32423505 Page bi ================================================== Page 82 ================================================== SECh EVES ORLY PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION FOR {TE DOMINICAN RCPUBLIC I BACKGROUN A On 29 December 1960 the Speclal Group approved 8 plan of covert action to support the internal and exiled Dominican dissidents which involved provision for increased propaganda directed egainst Trujillo, and the financiel support of, selected exiled group8 Additionally this authority included authorization for CIA to mke available to selected exile groups communications end equipment support necessary for then to develop 1 capability to undertake tbe infiltration of personnel and equipment into the Dominican Republic Since none of the exiled group8 had an existing underground orgenization Within the area , it was the Speciel Group S concept that this delivery capability could be eventually used to support the plans and activities of the internal opposition with whom the Agency and the Consulate are currently in contact B On 12 January 1961 the Special Group authorized CIA to make availeble to Dominican dissidents 8 limited supply of small arms and other materials on the condition that the internal opposition develop the cepability to receive these materials and that the materials be in- troduced into the Dominican Republic by Dominicans themselves _ II_ CURRENT COVERT ACTION OFERATIONS A In lete Jenuery 1961, CIA &dvised selected internal opposition leaders thet we were prepared to make available to then limited supplies of arms comunications equipment and sabotege materials which had repeatedly requested pprovided they developed 0 cepability to receive Fy}S 0Yly SECRET M* 730933: 24 3306_ they ================================================== Page 83 ================================================== SECt' FFS Qzly 2 it vie air drops or sea infiltration To date the internal. opposition has not been eble to develop this capability , nor have been able to nominate training candidates for codei radio operators or Baboteurs This turn of events 18 primarily due to the comprehensive nature of Trujillo S security services , the understandable_fear that prevails throughout the Republic of" being caught or su8pected of anti-Trujillo_ activities/and the fact that the organized internal opposition apparently consiste of only 2 few individuals with no reel underground structure _ CIN has had in the direct custc of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo 8 very limited supply of weapons and grenades _ In response to the urgent requests from the internel" opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their: projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, #hree (3). 38 Cal revolvers and three ! (3) carbines with accompanying amunition have been passed by secure means to the oppogition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional &rmed support B_ CIA has established working relationships with belected exile group8 _ These relationships have taken into eccount_that_Fresident Betancourt of Venezuela has in effect designated former Costa Rican President Jose Figuereg as his emissary and representetive to work With Dominican exile groups Through Figueres &nd with the knowledge of Pregident Betancourt , CIA is providing financial support and technicel guidence to the following activities (1) The development of 8 Dominican exile council in San Jose Costa Rico , composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations_ 9 EYES Honly SECRET HW 50955 Docid.32423303 Page B3 they ody ================================================== Page 84 ================================================== SECRE EYES ONLy '3 and chaired by Figueres : The desi= by Betancourt_ ) 0 representative San Jose on 12 May 1961 zational meeting in had it8 first and with the of the council S progrem Subject to CIA 9 review CIA has indicated to Betancourt Of President Betancourt } concurrence the council'8 program in that it is prepared to and Figueree initial concept that the 8 month _ It i9 Figueres' the of $15,000 Trujillo, activities directed will undertale strative skills , in democratic process, edninis and train selected Dominicans of res- them to essume positions tion So a8 to equip and administra Figueres has albo ponsibility in any successor this trained, but CIA has discouraged force be that en exile peramilitary indicated & Betancourt' nor Figueres have ectivity to date 9ince neither exile that the It 18 CIA 8 clear plan for its eventual sup- have little if any on Figueres groups of the chief advantages the internal dissidents _ However among is the nuber of of the thet can and 18 being by dealings States Covernment in its to the United credits that this gives utilizing them in other operations Betancourt and Figueres in Castro until that no action be taken Betancourt has been edamant hes gerved to neutrelize his Trujillo 19 disposed of _ This of to Betancourt 1t amounts to a attitude on that since it serves Trujillo._ Likewise United States 's besic attitude are the Dominicens s0 that they the attitudes of di8sident to solidify and amenable to will make them more approachable not anti-U,8. (2) The conduct once Trujillo i9 overthrown _ U.8. Governnent objectives EvES QylY H# 50955 Dog[4:32423545 #ate gnated organi council proposed support; amount against propagande council public proposed government gment jude use popular council represented one port council support geined with against support guarantee point toward: exiled and SECRET ================================================== Page 85 ================================================== SECKH 1 EYES ONLY of radlo propaganda from Ponce_ Puerto Rico, which is under the direction of Horacio ORNES , Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Domini cana (VRD) This radio program 1s heard in the Dominican Republic 25 the voice of the ORNES orgenizetion. (3) CIA has refurbished 8 small belonging to ORNES So 88 to it the capability to deliver 8mall quantities of arms or pergonnel into the Dominican Republic_ This potential para-military boat capability ha8 not been utilized to' date. It i8 contempleted that both the ORNES propagande program and thig limited boat capability will be absorbed by the exile council now being formed Figueres C With the knowledge of President Betancourt , end using his govern- ment as the ostensible source of funds , CIA hes provided limited finencial support to 0 small group of Dominicens who are developing 8 para-military capability in Venezuela D CIA hag recently re-located Dr Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon from Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico_ Jimenez , 8 physician and university professor is 8 highly respected Doninican exile and enjoys the confidence } of the internal opposition. He is currently working with the Puerto Rican Government in developing 2 training program within the structure of the Puerto Ricen Government The objective of thi: program 18 to pro- vide 01 on-the-job 11 training for selected Doninicans in democratic processes and selected administrative skills Through Jimenez and 8 8mall group 0f recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internel oppogition, CIA is in the process of establishing conmunication channels to the in- ternal opposition which will supplement those currently in being: through EVFS 0nk V SECRET N 50955 Docid:32423503 Page '85 yacht give by ================================================== Page 86 ================================================== SECRET EYES LY 5 - our Stetion in Ciudad Trujillo_ Ea CIA hes a continuing progrem utilizing news media asset8 througb- out the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujilloe COVERT ACTIVITTES_CIA IS PREPARED To UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED IIIE A Train selected members of the internel opposition a9 code redio CIA hes the eppropriete radio equipment 11 'on-the-shelf" at operators . in Ciudad Trujillo. However , thig program hag not been ini t our Station tieted due to the internel opposition 8 feilure to provide individuals who re able: to undergo the required treining outside of the Dominicen and Willing to run the risk of having the radio equipment in Republic their possession. B_ Train selected members of the opposition in sabotage and under- ground resistance techniques Here egaln the internal opposition has provided no treining candidates or developed 8 capability to receive explosive materiels through clendestine chennels IV. POSSIBLE COVERT_ACTIONS_VHICH_REQUTRE_ADDITIONAL_AUTHORIZATION A CIA hes a supply 'of four (4) callbre 45 sub-machine guns end 8 small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of our Station in Ciudad Trujillo_ A secure means of passing these weepons to the internal oppositioni for their use in personal defense attendent to their projected efforts to remove ' Trujillo can be developed by the Station = B CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic, to requests from the internel opposition for leaflets in reaponse exploiting the excesse8 of the Trujillo regine _ EVES OhlY SECRET Hi' 50955 Docla:3212350$ Paye 86 past ================================================== Page 87 ================================================== SECRET EFI3/cely While to dete the internal opposition has developed no cepability to receive armg or bebotege materials by either air or see delivery , CIA could initiete operetions to cache isuch supplies off the coest of the Dominican Republic for later retrival by the opposition when develop buch 8 cepability_ D Initiate the training of pare litary cadres . CIA hes; been reluctant to recommend the initiation of such treining since current information indicates that any invalsion of the Republic unless masgively supported by overt action would be impractical_ EYFS BNLy: SECRET NN 50956 S605. 'Page' they ~mi ================================================== Page 88 ================================================== MaG:D< SJt CMe ' ~L #r TXE WmiTE 1 Yus: OFFICE E5e4 Z-knf 7 tr Ssodis Jr;- 03~2-77* _ SECRET mThis docunent consists of 2 pases Copy No. 0 f 9 copies; Sezics (4-te4 sh/p) FCR DEJCORN FRCN DEPARTMINT President has now approved continsency plans soncivhat revised subsequcn: i0 Jd mill be pouched to You soones:. Hope this ifl resolve your departure copy reflected rcf but Your comments and reques ts for any necessazy uncertaintics clarification Tyill be Welconcd _ iates viluable $orr pefforged' by Amb . Farlend 271 2 _ Departcent 2pprec attitude aaons dissident clecerts. iould hope self' &nd CAS in developing tained strcngthened but only if 2* a cos t acccptable fron this could be re eS naticral intcrest. If Pricc tzsy for friendsi1ip 0f cissicen standpcint rics and rcalistic pros?ec [S thus far remiin unxnoii} Guant: Whosc action cap2bzli trcin nor:2 tion end frinciplcs for Ihicn US stancs places too 8rc:t 5 upon Mich in our considcrcd sgen: siculd no t be Jccepted, iccl 80[ iavolvcs risrs 485: you Will 28r2c N@ should stand fifn_ Ikilc fully corgeizent Zunicuc cifcUgs [ances mithin _Zoginiczn Icepub:: 3 nornal Cs operatiol) , Dcparincnt is nonathclcss aecply cj:ccra:: Iviicil pzccluded cctivitics thi? cise have bcen forccd :0 cevi:i? Eron by degfec to wilich covcrt coicr 2nd cut-out safcsuaris with rezuGix fesul t IST too Opvnly identifi' nornal with mhat should be clandestinc 2ctivitics_ cntirc nist (lilce has bccn conflic ! bc twce 180 obje= 4 Funnins throuch (1; To bc S0 2ssoc iatcd Iith renoval Trujillo feGinc J5 t) ccrivc cra Di dissidcn:s anc lidezal clemcnts turcugiout Lztin ^neficj; azons (2) To disjssociate US from 2n} obvious intcrvcntion in Doninican ad;_ cven norc. So from 1ny Wolitic_l ass15sin tion which nici: Rcpublic occur SEGUT H# 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 88 YQ You?- pro-CS and Ls, posi juc= ================================================== Page 89 ================================================== L4. propeRty 0f SECRET IHE WNITE KOUSE CFFie: 2 t considered Opinion_ forner' objective canno t , repeat not, casily In Department S this rcason You should no t, fepcat no t , inform trusted override lattcr. For this > tinc of draft document which noly hold Jor dclive? opgosition leaders at copY to then. her @ with Yasuatc ad Cibao Dcpartsent spolesnzn .souh 5, In May 19 nee USG' Jc cither through Depcrtnent Or CII could be disabuse them expectation Jssassination. At sac tinc 1ssufed then this governcent party to any political thy for legitinite 2spirations Donicican pccple achieve represen: continuing sympa t offering civil rishts guarintces all citizens. tive Governner ` corcent re. covert activitics prosrin should be 6 , In response fceling any continuation thcreof should bc Gade contt:. 211rc Departnent' $ groivins cs So Js effec tivcly to disassocicte LSG_ dcepcning of covcr arranzcgen #ithtolc furtier 2ction 2nd t0 Srt crtcn i 7 In light forcgoins sujgest You with dissidcnts Fending: receip: dloclsen t$ noiy feasiblc substantave corversatio:s to bc pouched _ END CF MESSAGZ AJ : [Jikvine: jsr Hayk/ SECUEI HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 89 You ting tinf and Yjl Xour upon 229 ================================================== Page 90 ================================================== SESCTET THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHinGTON 26, 1961 MMHORANDUN HOF : Mr. McGeorge Lundy The Hhhite House Following up on Our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's neeting of thc Special 'Group, I a forwarding you 2 draft telezram which we Would like to send to Hlenry Dearborn, our Corsul Gercral in Ciucad Trujillo, supplement,ins thc Cance he will be receiving on the recently approved continzency plans _ 0 The text of this draft telcEram has been silown to the Azency and agreed to by them, I am also forwar copies of the exchange with Dearborn leading up to thc ' present; draft telegram to hima I kon it Will be: 'difficult for the Fresident to find time before he lczves to havc 2 look at this but, in view of the situ- at,ion in the Dominican Republic _ I feel that he should approve it personally S0 a5 to be sule that it is consistent With his views as stated in the MSC Record of Actions for 5. 1 Chester Bolvles Attachments : Tab A 0u Froposed outcoing telecrarn Tab B Previous exchange of tclegrams SECiET' HFr Hay gui 'dinz Hay ================================================== Page 91 ================================================== SECRET PROPOSED TELEGRAM to US Consul Gener al in Ciudad Trujillo FOJ DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT 1 President has now approved contingency plans somelvhat revised subse- quent your departure and copy Wvill be pouched to you soonest. Hope this Jvill resolve uncertainties reflected your telegram of 21 but your conments and requests for any necessary clarification' Will be welcomed 2 Depar tment appreciates valuable' work performed by Amb Farland and your= self and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements . Hould hope this could be retained and S treng thened but if at 3 cost acceptable from standpoint US national interest. If price for friendship of dissidents, Ivhose action capabilities and realistic prospec ts thus far remain unknown guantity, places too great strain upon moral tion and principles for Ivhich US stands or involves risks Wvhich in our considered judgment should not be accepted , feel sure You will agree We should stand firm. 3, While fully cognizant unique circumstances Within Dominican Republic which precluded normal CAS operation, Depar tment is none theless deeply concerned by degree to Ivhich covert ac tivities this case have been forced to deviate from normal cover cut-out safeguards Ivith result USG too openly identified with what should be clandestine ac tivities _ 4 . Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objec tives: (1) To be So associated With removal Trujillo rcgime as to derive credit among DW dissidents and liberal clements throughout Latin America; (2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more So from any tical assassination which might occur SECET Hm- 60955 Jdcl "41425505 pige 91 May only tag posi and poli ================================================== Page 92 ================================================== SECREC' 2 0 In Depar tment' $ considered opinion, former ob jec tive cannot, repeat not, easily override lattcr. For this reason you should not, repeat no t, inform trusted op- tion leaders at this time of draft document Which you now hold nor deliver copy to them. If you believe conditions specified in second and third paras Department' s telegra of 17 fulfilled, You may advise trusted opposition leaders that you assume any friendly sroup seeking to establish au thority after overthrow of Trujillo Would promp declare itself: provisional government and request armed assistance from OAS , US Venezuela and perhaps 0 ther governments _ If reply affirmative, may advise them orally lines You think such request should take _ 5. In 19 mee here Wvith Yaguate and Cibao" Depar tment spokesman sought disabuse them expec tation USG ac eithcr through Department or CIA could be party to any tical assassination. At same time assured them this government' s con tinuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve represen- tative government offering civil fights and guarantees all citizens _ 6 In response your coment re covert activities program you should be aware Depar tment' s groiing ` feeling any continuation thereof should be made cone tingent upon deepening of cover arrangements So as effectively to disassociate USG. 7 In light forcgoing suggest further action and to extent feasible substan- tive conversations with dissidents be withheld pending receipt documents nol to be pouched = END OF MESSAGE SECRET 665 posi May tly you ting May ting poli R# ================================================== Page 93 ================================================== TQP_SECIEI Thk #iE kuijE OFFICE FOR DEARBORN FRCY STA TE has now approved con tingency dis- 1 President Tvith one njor exception; Ycu are not=_ cussed during your stay here for help Erom Dominican dissicert co request 3 pre-signed request groups = tiel that You continue to work Eo 2 _ We consider it essen sentinent 2mong dissident Sroups Your strengtien pro-U.S . iraluable_ Howcver; we Jis€ Ivozk along tnis line hzs been S tion wich politica- 1 25825 ir25iol) ii-l risk'0f. U.S _ associa_ A *7 rot rU1 Mxi 4+8 '~ 017-ocet {ouiezu 0$ C] mJl iS overriding and Gust prev2il in This last iple is much you can do Eo prccect !'.€. situation folever ) there / irciudi:s #st .o- within this Eramework: of policy; intercsLs Spccific ir:sf1};c- in vnicn are rOwv the. Icasures tions follovl = dissiderc cleierts of U.S . soinrc 3 Continue tc inform 'overtiror o1 ch.r position: In case of @fxunntietr for m t? tker or n0t initicted by pro-U.S . 5r0u2- Trujillo--whe e [forl Lo consfili:ec should promptly Iake every pro-U.5 group and lausible ional {0v21;inzie . itself J3 rejsonablc 1 2nd requesc assi:cci;cl innediately declare itsclf It shoulcl O:S _ If Jdvancc ciscussiols from U,S. , Vcnezuc la Colombia TQRSRCEZI MY 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 93 plans princ engagea _ you Pfovis suc 1 and] 2-32 ================================================== Page 94 ================================================== TOE#CRET ripzkiy UF Tke Vhie KouSe OFFIcz favorable to chis procedure discuss show that dissidents are of such 3 request and procedures for content the should be made short A11 ible preparations handling it. of 2 l-reques : in advarce formulation in Writing o actual is the policy tiat, Underlying this procedure of the event. take che chance of a conunis: circums tances can we under no intervene even if we must takeover in the Dominican Republic type should not be discussed This last possibility without a request _ with the dissidents FrrrD action in of cctiors Reference to IU ltilateral tions Iill be multilateral; only that further open sanc means cion it ci cz ir the case of direct interven and: that cicn multilateral No brozder interprezz ferable for forces o be 2ctions 0 ~Tvhe ther propaganda or justified_ 411 otrer U.8 . is tinued or 2 bilateral hasis . activities--will be cor covert snll due co a5 knov } very activities are 5 . Covert lics 'develop 2 method of recciving Sup? of dissidents to inability te U.S. , cnd failure to which will effectively disassocia" or saboteurs Our for trjining as radio operalors candidates dcvelop cpcity these lincs--providcd thcy offer to help along must requcs c covcr--reinains open However, and effcctive TQE SECRZI HI 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 94 specific poss record Pre Iou]= you provide you 234 ================================================== Page 95 ================================================== TOl SECRET Tifekiy uf THF 'ITE KXQUSL OFFICE -3- further specific instruccions for any specific and receive time we are unable: to cransfer covert activity. At the present Tell then chat chis is because of our ars to dissidents thod of transfer mzy be unsafe In actual suspicion` that me transfer of arms would serve very little fact we feel that the the United States to great danger of |esaze purpose and expose Aixlt~tor LZA assassination actempt. Tne basic disclosire -of-porticipacion in]l tinue to hold open offer of covert while policy is to con and clearing the help requested , carefully examining in actual fact , che covert help is This i5 feasible beczuse ard exchangc of very slight except for verbal encouragement inforration anti-Trujillo propagenda czipaizn 6 . We intend to Iceep up and other external pressures_ overthrow of Trujillo [nilicery forces 'ill 7 FYI, in event i itions On reccipt be dispatched inediately to Ero_irves-io] and concurrencc 2 of request: from govcrnment , ~equcsf ~omlt Z- RosEti5 IcZeived and there appcars co Ie no request is rece we Nill-504 Lhen decision Will be Ede be any danger of comtunist takeover regardlcss _ This mkes it in Washington whe cher co intervene a11 1c _ End F be obtained if ac imperative that a requcst 1OPSECRET' MY_ j0955 DacLd-32423505 ~Page-96 help , specific Jas' Pos Your Provisional possib 238 ================================================== Page 96 ================================================== TQi_ SickL4 {ii 1' U; THE WHITe KUUSE UFFICE conversations imediately with dissidents in- 8 , Begin them of U,S _ position and the necessity for an inediate forming_ If they are favorable co this procedure take all request. to prepare for the immediate transmittal possible measures short of the actual preparation of a written of such a request for advance transfer to You = document Top SECRET KxnJh / 226 ================================================== Page 97 ================================================== Giy {F MEwFEhoue OFfiICe 1 Q SzcQr + Fafz-ilon Sl,t 1, President has -CE approved contingerc; planz discussed during y-ur here Kith one @Z Iajor exceztior: Yau Jre n3+ to request a Fre-s_zned re fcr help frcm Dominicar dissident grcups . 2 & We consder it essential that yo continuc to %ork to cvrcrgthen prc-U.S. n" 1< dissidert Crjlys, Jour ;ork along *his line had j8en ic abinzaile, sentinent arorg 1t " K Hoxever, Ke 378 rust not rivatXr[gerait denger of disclos lrztu.< . :ssocintion with politica? asgainationlon -ntozrentionZn-the-joninicen-Rezublic. Tfis last Inciole is ovarr 'iding an rust prevall i1 couhtful sitiationa the:e is pr mch can do to protect i3a interasts wittin this frzcework 0f policy: inclui:nz Jo' most of the measlres in whick: Yo are now erzaced, Specific instructiors Zcilo: C Juufnr: Goaitune to inforf dissident elerets cf C.3 support fcr #ceir 3 & position. { In case of assasgination or cverthrow 32 Trujillo--lhether 0r not tolu initiated by prc-U,S. Erou?--the gFoup chould ~fcz?en dake Z: i-ncdiele for assistance fron IJ.S., Venczuelz, Colorbia &na tke 0,k.5 ~is regrest request will be re Tporjcd to fivoribly b7 t3 Jh'tc+ 3*4305= 6 16 7u x-l:" selyeg the provisiona]_Egvcrrment izd request hclp :hctker or rot actlallz 35 are able to a9sune poxicr If ty are EsVorabla to tkis procedurc rcssl HI 3oi6t Dot 429505' 'Page 97 Fh; lx stay quect Horever , tncy 237 ================================================== Page 98 ================================================== 0F SZceEt 1* T2 0 #n)zalbm A<e discussed durinz ~; contingency Pres icent has ZCb a Fre-S:zu 1, to You mnajor stay herc Dominica? dissident grcups. fcr help frOnI +0 work to swrtrsti : that yr: conbinuc Rv 2. Ve consider it essentiel this line had jeen Iour work alonl inent anong dissidcnt 6r3135. { L of disclos 0 /0 }o anger 3le0 mugt Zerotl ~Republic_ Sii Hovever we iPihe-joninicer ajzeination)ez- intar-ention-? Situatio #oreve: , Tith i dountfcl is overriding this frztekork of U,3. interests Kitkin do to mch yov 1e# - In %hick atA of the measureg or of as j by ly to It %e U.S:) rouzzll _4vurable to this HI 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 98 :oiy OFFICe HOUsE White THE plan? approved request njt are exceztiori KIZ one Kith quest inE7:.z. sent 4Erit not political prevail rust and no7 < _ princiole protect can Jou not most ther illozwhe promptly Truj of should throw plausible group over ~sstnatioiI U.S .' and Pro reasonable the itself group-- ase itself declare U.S. Pro QAS te titu" arid immediate ted cons Colombia cia should effort Venezuela every government: procecilre from iona 1 cance rovis assis request and ,uch 238 ================================================== Page 99 ================================================== rpuiie' ccntont of such 2 requcst ard procccures for hordling it discuSS the specific 4 7/0 should be rade short of 1ctuol PEE zaraon In Hritirg of A1l possible prorarztions 1 adva ce of the evente Uncerlying this procedure 13 the 2 stgnod: requost circustancos, can Fe take the chance of a ccm-nist policy that, under no (a 2 Djalnican Republic e zi if we mst fitbout 3 requesta type takeover in +h4 shoulc not be discuszed with the dissidents. This last pogsiblitz to rultilateral action In record of actiong rieang La !btulatgzax Feference ozen rultilateral,' a tkzt in tha case of direct only that furthed sanctions vill be be prefcrable for €L forfes to D2 rultilaterala "o tntervent_on it fould is justificd, 4ll other [,s. actions--uhetker brad orcader 'nterpretation activities--xill be continued on a bilateral basisa propganca or covert a3 ycu' kowg very Stall duic to irabllity of 5. Cora"t activitles are, Fethod of receiting Surplies #tich 7ill effectzcely dissidents to develop a failure tc Drovide candid1.cs for training &s racio dissacoitate U.s:) ani saboteursa Ou1' offer to help along these linns--prov_ced thoy Jr [fcctive cover--rerdirs ppena #o:cver _ ) A yju c4 develop cepacity and e Y spccific covcrt activib;a A+ id= the presert Ioyo, specific !truct_cns for any ars ta dissidentsa Tell tkaz that this is tice Ke are.urable to transfer #(e" that nethod of trarsfcr 7] ~e {1 Einllorspizian. 1 because of our <uypicicn Zact feel thal the #ransfcr of arzs #Culd serve very litikc peiposo actmel ~e 27 H# J094* Vottd 82423300 Fage , :94 "OFfice Hause WMITE THE Y> coxin operatcy zst ================================================== Page 100 ================================================== wi 4& 52CRET ~l 24+ t ALA0 m #z-ltinstedisclosivo-of 373275116:2 State? t3 - danzer of etpose the United irue to hold open offer The basic policy is to pinattaI attempt. Etozitccerc thc help requcsteda fully exinining &nd clearing of covert elp, whule care is very sligk:t actual fact , the covert kelp feastble becase, in This Ja eyl,.z " for verhal ancouragcrent and 1gn ana other erterral arti-Irujillo capa 6. nle intend to keep up Prczzures. will bc dispotched irzedictelz filitej Zorccs In orerthro ATujillo sicnal Ecrerief 81 475 x 14 On 0f recuest 2) to #r6-itvaion {31 Kt WnerL; is received theyr_azrezrs ina If Zo reclest and ccncurrence, we 37 vill J6 Gde ir takeover *ken decision any darger 0f 'corrunist' trat & he ~ezzcix Tnis Fakes i+ icpcrativc ~tether o 3 interver rcgarclezs. Washietcn te ottained if at aJl possible, ter: of [3. with dissiJents info-;ije 8 . Begin Corycrsitions Jnra-iate $ ~zkczlbx for 2n imneciat- tha sozrzbox recezzity Geasl-v= 39 positioz take al1 C: 'favorahle t0 tlis Droceclre DFZXSIzI I: trey &3c of '+kc actial tFansmittil of sech & Fotf-t for thc i-teJitate trccsfcr +7 ?0:E prejare #ienty}for advance of a #ritben documentlEy-the-Jaa 416 M"36955 DocId:32423505 Page 100- uffic: NOUSE WHHiE txe great and cont specific except A-orzations proazarda cvent prov: TTo7kefy#xl ~On Y ce8t; positions _ and *ill your requect Ftzciz Fequesl. a2d pissib} short prcparation 6jo4 2t: ================================================== Page 101 ================================================== "16 RoUing IF,t' 9r3/DPKH TOP SECRE< Ki 7 AIE 29 NY 1961 1580 J CIUDAt 'RUJALIO (OP_IATIJE L LJEDIATE) 2 9i4: 41 272 :M, DIRECTOR L ONF! ciH 1-5 JEFErred ROUTiNE IFO DCi 6, D/oci 7, DDP 8, COP 9ADpP /A,10,c /CA 11, s/c 11-12 OPZCATiO L Cojfiie 70.94 T0? SC ET OUT CCe TUJ (O?LI ) Tp SECHET INFO cite Dir 42443 REF: TRUJ 06c9 (I: 13990) 42443' EiED Officer FOR CIA / RRO STATE 1 PPESIDZ:T IIA:: E0ATUDDCOHILGZIGY_?LiSS EI CLSSEL DUELiG_YQUR STAI HZ?5 !ITH ONS : AJOP CZrIon: YOre Ali:' ACT Tc iLQU%ST 4 ME-SlGl:D ROQUST FR HEL? 7;O LO:;f ICAM DIESIDKT GXCUFS: 2. WIz CO:SIDFA: IT $ATIAL IHi] YO CORfI:U; 'O :OrK % STRENGTEN PRC-U . < . SE TC ~T iONG i;. S_D:NT GROUPS - YCLE _G A[OG THIS LIZE j45 ESCM INAMYAEL:. hu.IET ic 4S"" #UC ITN Iu:K @F U.S. ASECCIA IOiv :TA PCLITILAL ASSASSIMATION SLCZ (c 4 "AZTr? QR_GZ_PAL_KLLCI Ciuiioz COALOUZ 4SSASSIiATLOt . T1S LAc?' FRICiPLE IS OV-iRAUILG A.D ;ST PEVAIL i. CrinL €1UATluiia WGIEV THERZ 1S ;CH YQU CA:: 10 13 Fi;OTECr Ua:. ITE STC G1I ZU1S FiAE ENCILK OF FOLICY, INCIUDI;G ;Csi Cz' 1 = : SUlizS I;;HCH YCi: Ai ;U;i SGGD. SPEC LfiC II;IRVCTICS FOLLCiN . 30 CONTLIE To INFQ?' D:SID:: ? ZLERES 07 {0' Si:?rikT FCK THZIR FOSATION = 1N CiSz' OF Olzrik_:J C? 'TJILUJ--ilzix?I CF :07 ILT? Ef PKO - 0.8 GRCUP -TTIZ PEC-W'a& CFCI!? MIC LD Ru 'Ziy .Ai; 7; jiro:? Co ETliezg ITSZLF 6S MEASO;AELZ A, D Pi :LBLS {RCVI EAL Guk .0 4 4 *iiCl Li LiLiATzLY CECLARE ITSTLF ~Cr AD ESZZT 43FISTARZ 7c 'a: GZ ~[., COLCzL A. iS< C008 D iN A niMC 0+0 | C & 0 $ (co:ikiU_D) l4Yi46 0 FiC ! ! TO? ECrT 4 uThenticATiN6 0 F /| C REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. No. HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 101 9i, ~c Copy ================================================== Page 102 ================================================== CLASSIFIED ESSAGE RouTing TOP EECRZI 5 Ate DIRECTOR DEFErREd CONF} ROUTiNE INFO PAGz Two OUT:60694 ;0 TRUJ (QPI) TOP , SERET INFO cite Dir 742443 IP ADVANCE DISCUSSIOHIS SHO;i 144T DSSLDMITS AFE FAVORAELE TO THIS FROCEDUFE, DISCUSS TH S?ECIFIC CO:IT- OF SUCH 4 RESUEST AI FRCCEDURES FCR HA;DLING IT_ AIL POSSIBLZ FEPAPATIONS SHOULD RE NADE 'SHORT OF ACTUAL FORMULATION I `RITING 0F 4 REAUZST Ill ADVA:CE 07 THZ EVZZIT . ONDERLYING ?HiS PRCCEDURE IS THZ POLICY THAT , DNDER NO CICUSTANCES , CAN HE TAKE TE CHAMCE 0OF A CCiUNIST TYPE TAAZOVER IR T DiIMICAN FZFCELIC LVEN IF WE MUST INTEFVEiz iITHOUT 1 RFSGEST . THIS LLST FASSIBILITY HOULD NOT EE DISCUSSED iIITH THE LLSSIDEITS 4a REFETZNCE TO MULTILATGAL ACTION IN RCOFD QF ACTiONS MEAHS OHLY THAT FURTHER OPEN . SAMC TIOiS WILL BE XULTILATERAL: AN TAt In 1HE CASE OF DIFZCT INTERVETION IT HOWLD BE PREFTIUPLE FOR FRCES TO EE MULTILATZALa NO BROADER INTERPREZATIOtl 1S JUSTIFI"D ALL OTHER U.S. ACTIONE_-[HETHE PROPAGAMDA CR COVEFT ACTIViTIES__IILL 6E' CCNTTFUID OH 1 BILATERAL EASI:. 5. COVERT ACTIVITLES Ak, AS xou MIIOw , VERY S:jLL DUZ TO IBILITY OF DISSIDETS TO DEVLLOP 4 KZIHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLfZS ;;LCH WTLL' EFFECTITELY DIS- ASSOCIATE U.Sa, AAD FAILRC TO TIOV _DE CADIDATZS 7ll TRAINING AS RALIO OPZUATOFS OR SAPOTECRS . ou OFFE To HLLP 'ALONG THESZ LI:ZS--?IOVIDLD TH:Y DEVELOP CA#ACITr MD EFFSCT CGVzR--RZiAINS OPzi_ # HOEVR, YQU ;UST ;_LCZST ANV [ZCviVE rjiI:Tf SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIO4S FOr AY SPECIFIC COVZfT ACTIVITY AT' THC ZESZ;'T TLiz VE ARE UALZ To IRANSFS A:;: To DISSICIT?_ TZLL 3 8: #Hi? THS iS fzCilEz CF C00 $ D inA TiNC 0 F F | C { ! $ Duajing 091c0 TOP CECHiT (CQEFxi]fPdAtinG 0PCl REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. No. HM 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 102 Copy ================================================== Page 103 ================================================== 4U 2 3 DIRECTOR Deferred ROUTINE OUT 60694 PAGZ TYRWE TRUJ: (OPD: ) TOP SZCHZT INFO cite Dir 42443 QUR. SUS?ICION fLiT %12llor Or' TTSFITt [AX BZ UNSAFZ. Il ACILAL FACT' #E FEzL TiAT T;E TRAMEFCR 0F ARI ;CLLL #EFVE VsI LITILE ZURPOSE AED ZXFQ: € TE UNITZD SZATES TO GEAT DAIC:: OF ASECC [AZIun ATH ASSASSiATLON ATT: ?I T[F EASIC +OLICY IS To 'CO.TLIUZ TO HOLD 0>% cfza? OF COVEIT #LP, MILLi' CAc:NULLY EAINiG ArD CLEAZING J418' S?*CI?IC H;I; ESAUERTED _ THS 18 FZI: IELK' E AiSz, I ACTUAL FACT , THS C{VzT HcIL? IS VIY #LICT ECsT IC# VITEL Zic: iPAGZNEiT 4M GCHArCE: JP IFOR.ATION. 6. Hz ISTEID O KSZ: UP AXT(-_R;IJILIO PEO?ACi ZA GAZAIG: LXD OTzR ITF"ML PRzSSI?2S . 78' FYI, I EVZ T OVS:IHEON (F TFLJILLO : LiSA:Y FLFCes WILL EZ DlS?AICHED [EDJAFZLI TC "TAiD-LY PJ. 1Tlo: . ON BECIPT OF #LiZT ErOii PROVISIONAL HOVERUE_ENT, A:D YOit COf,Cli_:C2, #5 MLL BE ?tErA:E Mi; G Li CCDATzLY_ LF YO RblUwST IS KlCzV:D .f %Z2' 4?FEAiUS TO bi' AnY Dliicz UP' COANIST LAKECVZ THEN DoiElON JLL S1 iAD; Ll #SNGIU) ; milH "? 10 IMIEV3i @GARDLZSS. THLS 4AKZS iT [' PLNATLWE TAT h 2.u"st Er OCTAINED 14 4 ALL PCSSIELK. MID FYI . 8 . EEGI: COHIVEESATiCi: jiDATCLY itH Dla S1OrA:TS liinib"Lic THZ: QF U.S PO*1TICN A;!D T;lz #ECESITY Fiut A; Iieuio Ral??. 17 IpEi Nix;" FAVCEi-L? IC [HI? PLLOCCDL'k : ZaKz 4LL #0ScL:ARn? ZO. XCX a: :IE EDiATE TKANS :ITTAL )F ScCk A BSC 781 %lli:?' 0F Jliz ACIFAL R'?:A: (? : JTS %C ,,ii "Uw iWVAXCE C00 ! 0 iN A TMg 0 F | | C E 9 $ 0{2a8in0 0F)i€ & { Ut JC"ceFzu m A DYa ovice: TOP S_C:~T REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. No. HY 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 103 Copt ================================================== Page 104 ================================================== ECTOR Deferred ROUTINE QUT 60694 PAGZ mUR Cite Dir 42443 TTiJ (OP1*) TO1' #ECZET INFO TO YOU ED C7 * CESAGZ officer C froi CIA / to State in which he asked wbat {/cornect: #ef Wis nessa_ could !ive dissidents if he coald nce 22d c"colalerient ne reciest : /6..5 assistalce proviclc dissidents Jith draft docurcnt in Tki: JLLLO overtnrown, and asked clarification oi Presidenl' 9 state: .ent tnt Jny action ajjinst ri:l JALLC should be nultilateral_ # DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED . TEXT DI RECTED To ANOTHER U.s_ COVT _ "S COMMENT ORGAN ZATION _ c/ HD/ coo !Dina Iino 0 P#LClL c/-if3 Autmenticating 0 $ic!0 Iaea9inc 0/8i€ & & ci' :C. ? REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBTED No. M. 30353 Dood32023505 104 guida event Copy page

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