Transcript of 157-10014-10046.pdf
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157-10014-10046] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Date 08/06/95
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER 157-10014-10046
RECORDS SERIES HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER 07-H-04
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR SSCIA
FROM HALLEY
TO
TITLE
DATE 08/19/75
PAGES 159
SUBJECTS JMWAVE
CIA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CASTRO , FIDEL
DOCUMENT TYPE TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS IA
CURRENT STATUS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 08 /31/98
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS Box 2
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
HH 50955 DocId:32423434 Page 1
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BNSTZON TOP SECRET
Vol; O2x]
Upnatbo 7a 9 Subject
CriG 548t3i
@le Ilnitrd BtatcH Setate k8z
tramctipl fiz
of Proccedinga
'NIVENTORIED:
DN_Zhlzz
8
Hearing held belore
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY COVERNMENTAL ;
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
9
;
Tuasday , August 19 ,
1975
Weshingron, D.C
(Stenocype Tape and
Waste turned over to the Comittee for des truct fon)
WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S_ E.
WASHINGTON, D C 20003
(202) 64+-G000
SEGEz /"
4428
toz
Report
S
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A L
1
2
C @ N 2 E N I 8
<
(WItness : Ilalley )
1
3
EXIIBITS
4 EXIIIBIT
FOR_IDENTIEICATION
5 No . 1
2
6 No . 2
60
7 No . 3
92
8 No . 4
110
^ . 9
<
10
11
~S
12 2
13.
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c
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N 16
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21 |
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TASCIOND:amt
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1
STAFF INTERVIEW
8 2
1
5 Tuesday , Auguet 19 , 1975
L
4
5 Unfted States Senate
6 Select Committee to Study: Governmenta_
7 Operations NIth Respect
8 Intelligenca Activfties
9 WashInqton , D.C_ 2
10 The Committea met, pursuant to notice , at 1.25 0' clock Pam .
11 in Room 608 _ The Carroll Arms
12 Staff: Frederick Baron , Joseph diGenova , Professional
1
13 Staff Members .
0
14
S
< 15
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20
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1
23 1
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2 25
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1 2 R @ € E E ) I N G $
8 2 Mr . Baron . Mr _ Halley , 18 It true that you ar0 here
1
3 testifying under allas , and that Halley 1sg not ectually
4 your true Ldentity?
5 Halley . That Is correcta
6 Mr . Baron _ Your true Ldentfty will be on Efle wfth th;?
review staff of the CIA and avallable for verLflcation by the
Committee if that becomeg necegsary?
Mr . Halley . That Js my understanding.
3
10 Mr . Baron . Let me show You 4 pece of paper marked
11 "Statement Regarding TestImony and Alfas and let Me ask You
12 whether this 19 the statement sfgned 45 We were begInning
13 today which Indicates your true identity and which I have 0
14 wItnessed? C
15 Mr _ Halley. Yes , that 1s the correct statement that I
16 slgned today _ There is a blank there where wBi have not filled
17 in the Senator S name _
18 Mr . Baron . All rfght.
19 the moment , let u9 leave that blank and enter it Into 1
2Q the record as as Exhibit 1 8
21 (The document referred to
1
22 was marked Halley Exhibft
1
23 No . 1 for Identffication.) 1
24
9
25
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today
1
Mr.
You {
here
For
s ,
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3
Mr _ Baron . It 18 your understanding ,
Lb It not, that we
8 2 have worked out an arrangement wIth tha reviaw #taff whereby
1
3 the statement wfll be attached to your tranacript
48 Exhfbit 1
4 and In a sanitized form, leaving
out efthar of the two reference
5 to your true Identity whlch
WIll ba avaflable at thfs
6 Agency _
7 Mr. Halley. That Js my understandIng .
Mr Baron _ You awaro tha t you have the rIght to counse
befora the Committee?
10 Mr. Halley. Yes , I am.
11 Mr _ Baron . Are you appearing here , voluntarily here
12 without counsel?
7
Ca 13 Mr Halley .
I am
4
14 Daron. You &lso aware that at any pont you are c
< 15 entitled to Cuage answering any questlons and congult with
N 16 counsel if You wish?
17 Mr . Ialley; I am aware of that_
18 Mr . Baron Finally ,
are you aware that al your Constitu-
19 tional rights are intact before the Comittee here today , 1
20
including your Fifth Amendment rights to remain sflent?
21 Mr _ Halley . I am
|
22 Mr _ Baron _ I think we should into the record the
4
23 arrangement that we made before we and correct me 1f this 1
24 is not your understanding o the arrangement , that we are
2 25
testifying here today wfthout Placing You under oath hecause
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an
only
Are
today
Yes ,
Mr . Are
Yes
8
Yes ,
put
began ,
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thera Is no Senator avallable for
that pure 'Posa , but both You and
8 2 I are contemplat havinq 4 Senator gwear you in and ask you if 1
3 your transcript is true to the best of 1 your knowledge
at some
point 49 soon as possible as it can be arranged after today' $
5 gegsion.
6 Mr . Halley . Yes . The statement that you have just made
ig my understandIng of the agreement that we entered Into prior
to this conversatfon goIng on the record _
Mr . Baron _ Thank you,
c
10 Let 4 begin then with soma
C very broad quegtions'
11 about your background in the Agency _ You tell me what You
12 Were Jn the Agency prior to your involvement with tha
13 JMIAVE station?
c
14 Mr _ Halley . I became Involved with the C Cuban affafr in
~ 15 approximately February of 1962 _ At that time, I was In Head -
~ 16 quarters . I was Chief of Forelgn Intelligence Activitleg for th
17 Eastern European DIvision. I was asked be released Erom thos
18 duties to conduct a gurvey of the opportunitles for running
19 Intelligence Operatlons against Cuba _ I was released from those 2
8 20 duties; I did engage in a survey of che posgibilitles for running
21 intelligence, counterintelligence ,
paramilitary operations
22 against Cuba .
1
1 23 Baron _ Your position as Chief of Forelgn Intelligence
24 for Eastern Europe did not involv: Cuba in any way? That wa s
9 25 your last positior before you became involved In Cuban affairs _
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Ing
Can
doing 1
to
1
Mr .
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5
Lg that correct?
8 2 Mr _ Halley . That Js correct.
1
5 I want to qualffy that. Undoubtedly , there Were some
4 actlons that were beIng conducted in the Eagtern European area
5 that reflected on Cuba but I wag not Involved In the of
6 operation . I was not fully focused Cuban operatfong until
7 approximately February of 1962 .
8 Mr. Baron . At what point did you joln the Agency?
9' Mr . Ila lley _ I jolned the Agency origlnally Jn 1951.
~
10 Mr _ Baron _ In a very general way , can You describe the
11 nature of your actlvities at the Agency prlor to February of 62
12 Mr . Ha lley When I was first assiqned to the Agency , I was
c: 13 an Army officer 011 active I went through the usua l Agency
C 1
14 training program. I was assigned to Eastern European activities c
~ 15 where I originally was focused on PolIsh and German operatlons_
16 I subsequently served from 1952 to 1959 In Germany _ In the
17 course of that service, I spent most of my time working on the
18 Eastern European satellites , Poland , Czechoslovakfa , Hungary ,
19 Romanfa , Bulgarla _ In addition , I was involved on occes lon in 1
3 20 Soviet operations and East German operations _
21 Mr . Baron . Did you have any involvement in Latin Nerican
1
22 affalrg prlor to February o€ 62?
23 Mr _ Ilalley. In the period 1960-62 ; I was responsiblel 1
{ 24 for setting up Opera tional activity In Latin Nnerica that
25 was targetted more explicitly on the Eastern European gatellites
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1
Bay Pigs
on
;
duty.
"
Yes .
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to some extent on the Sovfet UnLon. This Wab In 4 perlod of time
< 2 where the Eas European satellftes wera oxpandIng thatr
1
5 presenca In Latin America _ In my duties Ln tha Eagtern European 1
nivlsion _ I wag responsIble for gettina +hlg nrogram Golng in
5 Latln AmerIca , 90 I did have an extensfve exposure to Latin
America: in the period 60 to 62 , 49 I recall those dates _
The accuracy of thoge dates can be checked from my official
travel records , and s0
Baron. During that period of time You were actually
3
10 in Latin America helping
to set up this program?
11 Mr Halley . No I was tationed In Washington , but I C
12 travelled to Latin America during this Partfcular perlod of
time _ 13
4
14 Mr . Baron . Did you travel to Cuba at any point durlng the c
15 course of that operation?
16
Ilalley _ Not specifically. I think I transftted Cuba
17 on afr stops. being routed to various countrles _ I thlnk I was
18 at one or two Cuban airfields , but simply in transit.
19 Mr . Baron . Not long enough even to talk to the at 1 peopla
20
the Station In Cuba?
8
21 Mr . Halley _ I had no contact at any time with the
L
22
Havana Station_
'
23 Mr _ Baron . Did you pick_ up , during this perlod of time , 1
24 a genera l sense of the attitude of Latin American 1 governments
2 25
toward the Castro government? Could you characterize that
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tern
on.
Mr _
J
Mr _
No ,
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7
1
L attitude, If you dla?
8 2 Mr _ Halley . I certainly
was aware , I thlnk , of the broad 1
5 polltical trund In the Hemisphere at.that time, my Interest wag
much more narrowly focused
at that tlme on the Eastern European
5 targets , and on the Soviet target, and I wag not certainly
6 9Peciallzing Jn Cuban affairs at that Juncture.
7 Mr _ Baron . Cuba wag not VIewed at that Juncture 43 Part 0 f
8 the Sovlet target,
a8 a Sovlet satellite?
9 Mr . Ilalley . No _ it wag not_
3
10 Mr _ Baron _ Coming then to February of 62 , 19 that the
11 polnt at which You joined the JMINAVE Station In Miami?
12 Mr . Halley . No. When I first entered Into thfs survey .
13 It was to do this on a TDY basis temporary as81gnment , J
14 to complete a report on my findings , to report those at that
1 15 particular juncture to Mr . Harvey who wag the head of the Task
16 Force that was attempting to expand intelligence
coverage of
17 Cuba and { was not assigned to the station at that particular
18 point in time_
19 Mr . Baron . At what point did you join the JMAVE 1 Station?
i 20 Mr . Halley . Shortly after having completed this
survey _
21 These dates are blurred now because the survey soon
7
turned Into
22 a Permanent agslgnment. I would have to check the exact dates 1
23 Erom my service records _ but after having 1 completed the survey
24 report, shortly thereafter I wag asked to go to Mla m to become
9
25 permanently asslgned to the statlon In Miami_ I do not reca ] 1
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9
duty
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the exact date at which that permanent
of statlon' took
8 2 Place .
1
5 Mr _ Baron . Woula you asgume that that was sometime before 1
4 the end of of 62?
5 Mr. Halley . Yes. It was probably before that,
but 49 I
6 say , there are a couple of weeks gap that would have to look
at my service record to get the exact dates _ but certalnly it
could have been March, it could have been Aprfl: But I regerve
2 You know , the rlght to check my record If that L8 a critlcal
10 point In termg of what you are trying to C ogtabligh .
11 Mr Baron _ Certainly .
12 I should say generally at this pofnt, 1€ 4 anything we cover
13 gives You that kind of problem ft would_ ba
C
Immensely
14 helpful to uS if You would check your answers agalnst documents
c 15 that might be available in the CIA.
16 Mr _ Halley. Yes all right.
17 Mr Baron . In fact, let me ask you if you would check tha
18 one out, because it would be useful to know exactly when
you
19 joined the JMWAVE statlon. 1
i 20 During the period of time before you jolned JMAVE while
21 you were conducting the . survey , did you report to
L
anyone other
22 than William Harvey?
4
23 Mr Halley_ In a formal sense , thls TDY 1 was conducted on
24 beha) € o€ the task force commander who was Mr Harvey. (hfle
2
25 I was in Miami conducting the survey _ I obvlously discusged
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change
May
we
today
2
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1 matterg pertalnIng to that gurvey tha taan who wa8 then In
2 2 charge of the operational actvity In Mlaml_ Tha t team Wag
1
5 essentlally headed by Al Cox , who hag BInce died _
1
4 Mr Baron . Was that team the equfvalent of JMWAVE station?
5 Mr . Ila lley . Yes . Mr _ Cox was head , then , of what woul
6 be the egulvalent of the JMWAVE Statlon_
7 Mr _ Baron . he the head of JMWAVE untll the pInt when
you replaced him, or until the pint you bocame Chlef of the
9 JMWAVE Station?
2
10 Mr _ Halley . That is correct. He was the head of that
11 unit untl such time as I replaced him.
12 Mr _ Baron . Nere You aware during thfs survey that you 3
13 were conducting of any Iink between Task Force I and the so-callpd
C 0
C 14 Spectal Group in the White House which wag part of the Na tonal
15 Security Council structure and used the project namer: MONGOOSE
16 for anti-Cuban Operations?
17 Mr _ Halley _ My understanding at the time that I conducted
18 this survey was that there was a three-man group In exlstence
19 which Was headad by Mr _ Robert Kennedy that was conducting
a 1
20 survey to see what kind of activitles cou id be conducted aga ins 8
21 Cuba _ The other members of that particular group were Genera ]
1
22 Lansdale Mr _ Helms _
1
23 This three-man group had subordinate to It 4ll practica] 1
24 purposes the task force unit which was manaqed by Mr . Harvey .
25 I aM not familiar however with the other terminology that you
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to
Mr _
the
Was
and
for
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10
L u8ad , that 18 Project MONGOOSE , or whatevor you 8aId. I do not
8 2 know tha oxact wordg You usad _ I aM not famlllar with that
1
5 terminology _
1
4 Mr Daron. During the whole period o your involvement
5 with JMWAVE , you were not made aware of Project MONGOOSE as
such?
Mr . Halley . I am not aware of Project MONGOOSE . I do not
8 recall it as9 an acronym_ cryptonym or anythlng else that was in
9 comon usag0 in my conversationg _ 3
10 Also , You have to understand that dur that particular
11 time, Harvey was subordinate the norma ] Agency chaIn o€
12 command In other words he had parallel lines _ if will- 1 You
13 There was this three-man Task Force to whom he was reporting 4
14 regularly. At the game time, as the Task Force Commander he C
15 wag reporting to the then-DDP who was Mr _ Helmg ~
16 Mr Baron . You began your survey just about the time that
17 Mr . Helms replaced Bissell as DDP?
18 Mr _ Halley . That is right.
19 Mr Baron. Nere you aware of the command relationship 2
20 between the three-man group that you have mentioned and William 3
21 Harvey as head of Task Force I? Did' that group task Hlarvey 1
22 directly, or did Harvey 9 ag9ignments have to come through Helms
4
23 and through the DCI as opposed to this group that did not includ- 1
24 the DCI? 1
2 25 Mr _ Halley . My understandIng of it at the time was Were
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ing
Mr . to
Mr
we
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11
really talking about parallal lines . In other wordg _ thls
8 2 three-man group was meeting. Mr . Helmg wab both a member of
1
3 that particular group and the DDP_ Therefore, when he came back
1
4 from one of these meetings and issued Instructiong to Mr _ Harvey
5 It wag , know tantamount to these thngg coming through two
6 channels simultaneous one com from thfs three-man task
force and the other Ingtruction 9lmultaneously coming from Mr
Helmg who was the DDP _
6 Mr _ Baron. As far as Mr. Hlarvey wag concerned , an assLgn-
c
10 ment or order from RIchard Helmg #as an order to be taken' at
c
11 face value? Harvey did not have to questlon whether ft had the
12 s tamp of approva l from the DCI or not? Noula that have been
1
13 your operating unders tanding?
14 Mr _ Halley . That woula have been my understandirg yes
15
Certainly an instruction received from Mr _ Helms wag a va lid
16 Agency instruction.
17 Mr Baron The DCI at this point was John McCone.
1e Mr _ Halley- Tha t is correct.
19 Mr _ Baron . Do You have any knowledge of the relationshlp
1
20 between this three-man group and John McCone at that point?
8
21 Mr Ila lley . Not on" a to basis . Once I went to L
22
Mlami, I came back on a regular basis to revlew operational
v
23
plans and programs On one occasion I accompanied Mr _ McCone
1
24 to the White Iouse to qive a presentation or 9it in while the
25 presentation was belng made.
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you
1Y , ing
day day
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12
Mr . Baron. Rhere wag thls? What Wab tha forum In whfch
< 2 the pregentation wag made.
1
3 Mr . Halley . Thls was a meeting with PregIdent Kennedy and 1
4 other memberg of the then-Cabinet were present at that particula
5 meeting_
6 Mr . Baron . Was that. & Cablnet meetng or wag It 4 Special
Group meetlng 29 4 gub-unft of the National Securlty Council?
Mr _ Ha lley . You know , that happened in 1962. Thls 19
1975 . I do not recall then with precislon 49 to whether Jt wa $
2
10 a meetIng of the Cabinet or whether It wag a meeting of the
11 National Security Council, or whether it was 4 meeting of the
12 Speclal Group.
13 Mr _ Baron. That: 1g perfectly understandable. Do You recal 3
14 which Cabinet membere were present at that meeting?
~ 15 Mr _ Halley. Yes My recollection of that was that Mr .
16 McNamara was present, Mr . Rusk Was present, Mr . Kennedy , the
17 Attorney General wag present. You know , I am Just vague now
18 at this partlcular point, Those are the ones that stick out in
19 my memory 89 belng present_ 1
20 Mr _ Baron. Was the DCI present? 8
21 Mr . Halley. Yes , the DCI was present, and he gave a
L
22 prtion of the presentation. As I recall, Mr . FItzGerald gave
4
23 the other portion of the presentatlon.
1
24 Mr . Baron . Who at that Point replaced William Harvey a9 1
2 25 Chief of Task Force w?
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13 L
Mr _ Right.
8 2 of our Task of the Chlefs Force were. that
It wag 1
3 then Screber, FltzGerald ,
1 xafter
Hart. I served with
4 Thfs was a
41l four of those_ very active period,
you know_
5
with precision,
I outline
YOu canno
the datas
took over
left and FItzGerald
you know, When FltzGerald
left and Screber took
and s0 forth_ over
This 1s something that
I
to give
would to regearch
You the precise dates.
Mr . What was gubstance of this 2
10 had In which the Pres=
that
Ldent was present?
11 Mr _ This was a general
12 were
review of activities that
3 conducted against Cuba _
13
there any mention of
3
14 effort at that
any a8s2881natlon
meeting?
15 Mr _ there, Was
not. N
16 Mr _
were attending
at that polnt
17 with the
Ir connection
survey you conducted?
18 Mr_ No _ I wag attending
at that point
a8 the 19 Statlon Chief from Mlamf 1 In order to make a
20 issues
contrIbution to the 8 that were discussed ,
to the that detailed_ 1
21 substantive back-up
Eor whatever questions
be put to the 22 Agency spokesmen.
I made 1 reference to that because You
asked 23 If I the 1 relationship
Mr _ McCone and this
24 three-man group.
I said no , on a day-to-day
8 basls I did not 25" know the relationship ,
but that
were meetings that were
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Kalley.
You know , the chronology:
Harvey , then
that,
for today
when Harvey
have
Baron. the
meeting they
Ha lley .
being
Mr . Baron . Was
Ha lley. No ,
Baron . You
Ha lley.
being
fact
might
me knew
between
1
there
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14 1
attended bY mo In whIch Mr . McCona was to Indlvldual8
8 2 like Mr . Kennedy , the Attorney General _
who wab 4 member of that 1
3 group.
4 Mc _ Baron. Were you aware that that group might have gone
5 by any particular name or desIgnation?
6 Mr . Halley. No , I am not.
7
Mr _ Baron . You are not famfliar with the term Speclal
8 Group?
2
Mr . Halley . Yes I am aware of the term Spectal 'Group.
c 10 I am aware thet the chronology of the 303 Comml ttee, Specia1
N 11 40 . Commfttee and s0 forth , but a9 I Men tloned to you
12 earlier _ that particular time, I cannot 3 distingutsh between
13 whether this was an ed hoc meeting or was a Speclal .Group 3
14 meeting , or what It was .
15 Baron. Did You asgue at tha + time that the three-man
16 group that you referred to Including- the Attorney 'General_
17 General Lansda le and Richard Helms_ had a formal relationghip
18 to this larger Special Group? In other words_ wag that three_
19 man group a kind of decision-maklng sub-unft of 1 the Specia 1
i 20 or do You think it operated entirely independent
from
21 the National Security Council
structure_
L
22 Mr _ Ia lley . I do not think I can give you authoritativel 9
23 answer to that. I would go back to what I 1 previously told
24 You_ Mhen I entered into this project in February of 62 , the
25 chain of command that I was familiar with was thls. three-man
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talklng
1
Group ,
this
Mr .
Group ,
an
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15
group In constant contact wIth Mr . Tha second chain
8 2 of command , parallellng that, wag Mr _ Harvey repor- to the 1
3 DDP the DDP
1
subsequently reporting through
hfs chain of
4 command to the Dfrector_ and that would be the only way that
5 I could characterize that with any accuracy _
6 Mr _ Baron . Did thoge two chalns of comand continue
7 49 the channelg of daclaion-making
and tasking when
you were
8 or during
Your tenure 49 Chlef of Station at 'JMWAVE?'
Mr . Halley. That relationship changed_
and agaln I do c
10 not the date at my fIngertipg C at whet tfme that changed _
11 I know that shortly thereafter
I wag In Mfamf, Genaral
12 Lansdale came to vislt me , to talk Wfth me, about the
13 progregg that was made Ln the operational program_ At 9
14 some polnt &fter that, this three-man group for all Intents
~ 15 and purposes dlsappeared. Genera 1 Lansdale was reasslgned ;
N
16 the group broke up; subsequent reviews of the program were made
17 at the Special Group level. Ag an example , we would have to
18 gubmit every month the nuber of operations that we were goLng
19 to run such 4s Inffltrations Into Cuba 1 through What would be
i 20 paramfli means and these were approved by the Speclal
21 There wag an approval procedure
L
setting thoge
up ,
22 S0 subsequently the three-man group 1
disappeared and the regular
23 mechanism of the Special cama into 1 play_
1 24 I am sorry , I cannot give You a precise date for that
2
25 change , but I am sure It 1s In the record and I am sure you even
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Harvey .
tng
and
have
down 2
being
tary
Group.
for
Group
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16
hava the date becauga
tha Agoncy has beon robearching 0l1 bortb 8 2 of ma tarlal for you. I feel that you would Just have to get 1
3 thoge dateg for the record _ 1
4 Mr . Baron . We can do that.
5
Would you that every major operation that You undertook
6 at JMIAVE would have been
approvad by the Specfal
or at
leagt would have put on notce of tho nature of any
major operatIon that you were PlannIng?
Mr. why do you hot define for ne what you consider =
10 to be a major operatlon
c s0 we do not get into, you know_
a
11 problem? IE'you feef that you cannot.do' that#r
12 Baron . Perhapg
we can turn it around and could
13 you characterize the kindg of operations generally that you 9
14 would refer to this three-Man group initially ,
f the Special
0 15 later , for their approval or at leas € to put them on
16 notice the kinds that you might not refer and Instead proceee
17 unflaterally?
18 Mr _ Halley _ Initlally , the three-man group was seized
19 with the problem of conducting the survey of what 1
could be
8 20 done against Cuba _ As soon 49 that was more or less agreed
21 upon , my unders - tanding of this , as I told
7
you , thr three-man
22 group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other 1 things
23 and then the formal mechanfsm came In for 1 approval _ that
1 24 the Special Group. As procedures. became more formallzed _
we
9
25 had to submit a monthly schedule of the kInd of Opera tIons that
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say
Group
they been
Halley-
Mr . 2
say ,
40
Group
19 ,
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Page 20
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17
1
would ba conducted against Cuba
In tha paramilltary Leldo .
8 2 In other wordg , Jf we were golng to run an operatlon that 1
5 wag goIng to ba a cacho replacement In tha Cuban malrland , that
4 had to ba put say In our October schedule,
that
5 schedule had to be gubmftted to the Washington Headquarters
90
coula make It avaflable to the Speclal' Group sometma in
September _ So I would regard 4 cache , say the lowest kind of
operatIon in terms of sensitivity ,
and then you could} move up
from Inffltrations that had to ba approved In advance ,
10 regupply misslons ,
paramil operationg agaIngt fIxed Instal-
11 lations would al1 be approved.
12 Mr _ If there had 3
any operation with the
13 agsassination of FIdel Castro,
or other Cuban government 9
14 leaders a9 its objective,
would such Operation havd been
15 referred to efther the three-man group or later the Speclal
16 Group.
17 Mr . If such an operation had been propoged from
18 Miamf ; It would have had to have gone through that particular
19 process . 1
20 Mr Baron . Your answer geemg to indicate that only
21 operations that originated at the JMAVE
L
Station muld be
22 referred up for approval _ Is tha t: correct? 1
23 Mr _ Halley . That is the kind of 1 aetivity that
I have
: 24 thand knowledge of_ When I became Statlon Chlef , I told
25 You my time at this wag essenttally February of 1962 ttrough
TOP SECRET
1
In,
October
they
team
tary
Baron. been
high
an
Ha lley-
8
firs"
the
==================================================
Page 21
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TOPISECRET
18
1 eIther Juna or 0f '65 . That Wab my Btewardshtp
That wes
8 2 mY Involvement In the Cuban operatIon.
1
5 During that particular
1 Perlod of tIme , my flrsthand knowledde
4 of these events would If that kInd of operatIon Were to 9o
5 forward It would have had to go through thls approva mechanfsm
It would have had to have been some formal action
taken . If it
Were something that certainly would 2 G for gome reason might not
8 be commltted to paper_ somebody may have wanted to dacuss It
:
orally from Miami _ the chain of command would have been from
10 to whomever was the head of the Task c In Washlngton , or
11 later , when the Task Force became reintegrated Into the Western
12 Hemisphere Divigion,
I would have had to talk 3
to the Chfef of
13 the Western Hemisphere Division,
who at one tlme was FItzGerald 9
14 Baron. But 8 plan that originated at the CIA above
~ 15 the level of the Chlef of Station at JMWAVE would not hecessaril
16 have referred to Speclal for approval Ig tha t
17 correct?
18 Mx _ Halley. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, thery-
19 fore I am.trylng to restrict myself to those 2 things that I have
8 20 personal knowledge of _ In other words that Is the klhd of
21 thing that I think You should talk to,
7
you know those who were
22 Involved directly, because I think you can talk to Mr . 4 Harvey
23 or Mr . Screber or others who would be able 1 to give you) & better
1 24 Perception of that .
8
25 I want to make one point here, that once I want to Miami _
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July
be ,
me
Force
Mr:
been Group
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Page 22
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19
I Wab 4 regular Vlsltor to ' WashIngton_ alwaye or Ono or
8 2 two days at a time when there
was always 4 full agdnda of ovents 1
5 to be dscusged that related to the Station In Mlanl_
I did not
carry here , I did not engage, you know In Ldle conversation wIth
5 my assoclates_ Therefore, I wag not awara of the; EIrsthand
6 sftua tlon of how conducted busIness on a sustalned basl9
on Items that did not Immedlately Impact on Mlal_
8 Mr . Baron. Do you have.any personal knowledgo of: any
Operation run out of tha JMWAVE StatIon that could 0 construed c
10 48 an assa98inatlon effort?
c
11 Mr _ Halley. I do not.
12 Baron. Do you have firsthand knowlo 3 edge of operation
13 run out of Florlda 'with CIA Involvement that could be congtrued 2
14 a9 an assassination effort?
~ 15 Mr . Halley. I do not have any flrsthand khowledge.
16 You also have to put this in a hfstorical Perspective _ In
17 other words _ from what I hava read in the Presg 9ince then ,
18 obviougly I could put certain things together _
You are asking
19 me in this timeframe 1962 to 1965 , dia I 1 have any firsthand
8 20 knowledge at that particular time?
21 Mx _ Baron . Exactly . 1
22 Mr _ Halley . The answer to that is no , I did not_ 4
23 ou also have to put yourself In the hlstorical 1 context of
24 that particular time_ Thougands o€ refugees were comlng out of
9
25 Cuba , coming into Mlamf , Dade County up and down the FlorIda
TOP SECRET
but
1
they
No ,
Mr .
any
No ,
1
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Page 23
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20
8
There was a ragular mechanfom to Bcraan these people.
8 2 nuber of thege people had plang or Ideae changing the 1
3 BItuation in Cuba ,
1 among those Ideas for changing
the gItuation
4 In Cuba Were plans
to ag8a9sinate any number
of people In Cuba _
5 Thfs was something that
wag talked about, you could go down to
6 coffee house In downtown MLaml and Cubans would ba talking
that kind of language .
So I do not want to leave you wIth the ImpressIon that the
word assas8ination
never came acrogs my radar screen, abut we c 10 are talking about,
and my answer wag geared to a Planned Opera-- c
11 tion by CIA.
12 Mr Baron _ with CIA involvement of any sort?
13 Halley. CIA involvement? I know of no 4 operation that
14 was a planned 'operational
C
actlvity _ you know , for the sole
~
15 purpose of assassinating _ you know , Mr _ 1 , B or Mr . C. This Gmbienlt was
16 the allenteof the time. People were talking about these
17 things in the refugee community_ these kind of thIngs were
18 discussed .
19 Nr Baron . Mr . A , B or C could have 1 been Fidel Castro ,
8 20 'Raul Castro?
21 Mr _ Ilalley. It could have been
7
anyone _ This was the mood
22 of the Latin Amerlcan revolutlonary
where a coup , you know_ is 9
23 a way of life, where restaurants
and coffee 1 houses abound with
1 24 conversation about
how to run a coup. In the running of a coup _
9
25 one of the things that people talk about 1s how do you control
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Key8 .
Any
for
any
Or 4
Mr .
being
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Page 24
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21
8
1
tha leaderbhip which then exlsta
at that tIme.
{ 2 Mr _ Baron . you sayIng: that:you
4ro not aware of any= 1
3 operatlon; which:could:have had
43 one of Itb subsIdlary objec-
4
tIves _ whether the pr_ objective or not, the assassInation
5 of Fidel Cas- Raul Castro , or Che Guevara , which wag run with
6 CIA 1nvolvement?
7 Mr _ Ha lley . I woula like €o phrase that questlon sllghtly
differently, because
I think , you know , you have severa ] things
tled together. I would like to angwer your questIon thls way ,
10
During my tenure In Mfamf, I dia not Put forth any proposa 1
11 to mount an as9498nation operation.
In other wordg , there
12 wag no formal Plan , I dia not put forth any Operatlonal proposal 3
13 this line.
9
14
Secondly , I am not aware of any assas8lnation Plang befng
~ 15
put forth, you know by Mr . Harvey or by anyone else at that
16
partlcular time. That is the way I would prefer to angwer that_
17 Mr _ Baron. wha t kind of problem did you have wIth the
18
question as it was .asked?
19
Haliey .- Well_ you lumped 4 number o€ together_ 1
20
I am trying to separate these out. In 8 other words You put in
21
there a secondary or tertiary cons _ Ideration. 1
22
Mr _ Baron . Right, I am interested In that.
5
23
Mr _ Ila lley _ That is what bothers me, because
I did not 1
24
put forth any plans_ On: the other hand = I do not want to be
9
25
held 'responsible for such things 49 CIA In touch with a
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Are
1
Imary
tro ,
along
Mr .
thlngs
1
being
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Page 25
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TOP SECRET:
22 8
1 paramflitary group
In Cuba whose prImary
mLseLon
wag the 8 2 collection of
1
Intelllgence, whose gecondary mlagton might
b0 to 3 organize a resistance and, Unbeknownst
to might have had
4 their own Ideas which were never consulted wIth 4s you know _
5 never discussed with
uS , through the communlcations channels
that we had , who have been thinking _
have Planned _ and
may have attempted , to Implement assa39inatlon operations _
8 I do not feel under the comand and control mechanism that
9 exlsted that I could exercise through the Statfon over 8uch a 10 9ituation that I could be held responsible that. Therefore
11 I cannot accept your questlon on the secondary
or tertiary
12 situatfon because
I have no knowledge of those _ You may have
3
13 some knowledge and You can confront me wIth some sta tement by
14 some Cuban who said that thls wag part of his mission. I have
0 15 to look at that at the time.
N 16 Baron . We will go over some statements _ but In trying
17 to recover this ground one more time, I think It Is important
18 to dIstinguish an attempt to pin the respongibility
You ,
19 which I am not trying to do by my 1 questionfng
i 20 Mr _ Halley . That is a complicated question.
21 Mr _ Baron. The attempt to ~ undoubtedly , the
22 attempt to simply bring out your knowledge and
1 any awareness
23 that you may have had of any kind of 1 operation that had agsassina -
24 tlon as of its Objectives_ and also involved the CIA to 9
25 any extent. That is wha t I am agklng for. You
TOP SECRET
1 me ,
may
may
for
Mr _
on
1
simply
1 one
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Page 26
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TOPSECRET
23
1 Halley . Right, and I wIll Btand by my angwer; that
8 2 I put forth no plans _ I know of no plans put forth, you know 1
3 during my tenure In Mlanf In whfch 1 a894881natlon
wag part of
4 the operational rationale.
You know the way we can clarif
5 this Perhapg to your satlsfactton 1s to dlecug8 gome gpecifics_
6 If you are preparcd to talk about speciflc8 maybe I can deal
with thoge wIthin the framework of that general statement that
I made , you I know how Cubang talk. I know the rumorg
that have existed
over the Years . I slmply do not want to be
10 Identified wIth any action conducted by some group over which
11 I had no knowledge or control_ That Js my point.
12 Mr Baron . I think that answerg it for now and we will
13 cover some speciflcs later _ J
14 One more question on this dual chaln of command : On the
1 15 one hand , the Agency cheIn of comand from the DDP to Harvey
16 to at JMIYAVE , and on the other hand , the three-mah decls Lon
17 group cons isting of Attorney General _ Langdale and
18 Helms _ Would you say in the tha € this three-man
19 group appeared to you to be In control of the 1 decislon maklng
8 20 before the Special Group stepped In , that decisions were made
21 in a less formal way than were later
L
under the Special
22 Group?
9
23 Halley. I really could not addresg 1 myself to that.
24 In other words _ I never gat in On a meeting of the three-man
2
25 group . In other words
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Mr .
18 ,
only
know -
Xey
3
you
making
the
early days
they
Mr _
1
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Page 27
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TOP SECRET
24
8
Mr . On. what about tha klnd
of reporting that
w2b 8 2 regufred of you by tha
1
threa-man group
49 opposed to the. Specfal 3 Group?
4 Mr _ My requfrements
5
reporting really
stemmed
In the early from If there were any
special
requirements , he wag taklng 7 them the -three-man group
and translating
them and , In fact, much of the system of reportlng
8 In thoge early was generated by me ,and what:I' thought:
9 was requlred to Mr _ as a Tagk Force Commander
10 Informed .
I think that you undoubtedly know
the
11 record thet I worked for Mr . Harvey prior to 1962 and therefore
12 I was famfliar _
you know with his 4
style of operation and though
13 I had a clear understanding
of what he needed In an
J
14 sense. So when I
Informationa
went to Miamf I organlzed much of tha
15 reporting flow
upward , Jf you WIll, from the fleld unlt to
16 Headquarters.
17 Mr _ Baron . Jad you worked for Mr_ in Germany?
18 Halley.
I had_
19 Mr . Baron . In Berlin? 1
i 20 Mr _ Ila lley .
sir.
1
21 Baron _ This was on the famous and successful tunnel
22 operation?
1
1 23 Mr _ Halley . No _ I do not deserve any credit for the tunnel
1 24 operation. That is Mr _ Ilarvey S activity_
9
Ile kept that very
25 tightly compartmented
and in the when that was golng I
TOP SECRET
Bar
1
Halley.
fcr
days Harvey .
from
days
keep Harvey
fully
from
Harvey
Mr . Yes ,
Yes
Mr .
days
on ,
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Page 28
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25 1
1 was Involved primarily with Eaatarn
Europoan activitles.
2 Mr_ Baron. wero aware of
1 Harvay ' 8 style of
3 operating?
L
4 Mr _ Yes I worked wIth hIm G G I think the date is
5 somewhere In June
or July of 54 to somewhere in '59 . I would
6 have to Iook that up In the record _ the exact date.
le Mr _ Baron . But you say you' not had a close working
relationship With
Harvey , but you cama to be a personal
0 frfend of hls?
10 I woula like to 0 say I am a Personal frlena
11 of Mr . Harvey .
12 Mr . Baron . Returning
to 31 your statements about
the chain
13 of command , You seem to be saying that Mr _ served ci
as the
14 funnel for both of thege chaing
of c command ;
as a9 You were
~ 15 concerned , you received directives from
whatever the source
16 may have been originally ,
i9 that correct?
17 Mr . Halley _ Correct.
18 I want to make a point. Insofar as the three-man group was
19 concerned , I would see Helms In his role 1 8s the DDP In the three-
9 20 group. I would see Lansdale
Ce as I told You , Lansdale came
21 dow to vislt me in Miami On one
7
occasion.
He cama as part of
22 that: three-man group. But chain of
4
command,during my
23
visft was still from me to Harvey . 1 Lansdale 'was dow there,
24 I wag to you know , straightforward_ candid, discuss plans _
25 programs problems _ But I received my orders instructions
TOP SECRET
8
You
Mr .
Halley .
only
Mr .
Mr . Ha lley. Yes ,
Harvey
far
him,
man
my
be , 1
and
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Page 29
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26 L
1 tha control of money and forth wag vestad In the Task 8 2 Comander , Mr _
Force
Harvey .
1
3 Therefore , I never dealt wIth thts 1 three-man group
49 a 4 body . I dealt with the Indlviduals ,
you know _ and varloug
5 mutatlons .
6 Mr _ Baron. Woula you gay that the three-man group had a
less formal , more free-wheeling
style of declglon making _ 3J
8 there was a real change In the with which
You were reguireh
9 to report after the Special Group took over?
10 Mr. Halley .
I would to gay tha t the total reporting
11 became more formallzed the longer we stayed In bus I
12 cannot ascribe this to the dffference 4
of style of the three-man
13 group a5 opposed to the Agency chain of comand or subsequent
d
14 with the reguirements of the Special This evolved from
~ 15 a body of experlence that was ganed as the operation wag N 16 established and got some experfence _
17 So I woula not want to characterize that as being a result
18 of the groups _
19 Mc _ Baron . You did not have 1 any problem with the proprlety
20 of the three-man group In the early stages?
21 Mr _ Halley . I had no reagon to believe that it
22 not a duly constituted
i
In other words _ the: (_ officers tha
23 I reported to ,1n that particular 1 case, Mr . Harvey , Mr _ Helms
1 24 Were my chain of command at that particular point, were the
9
25 oneg who brlefed me the exlstence of this three-man body
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B0
rigor
have
ines8
Group_
3
1
No ,
was
body.
on
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Page 30
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27
1
and I felt that that wag 4 perfectly legltimate function
of
8 2 that body.
1
5 Mc _ Baron. brlefed you on the' exlstence of the body?
4 Mr _ Halley . My recollection of the Initial brfefing
was
5 from Mr _ Ilarvey _
6 Mr _ Baron. Do you recall how he degcrIbed that three-man
group and the responsibilitles?
8 Halley . No . Thfs was 1962 , and this 1s 1975 . As
you know from my recordg , these intervening
years have beun
10 active for Me therefore, I do not remember with preclsion
11 that conversation
In a1l of Its details . I do recall my frst
12 briefing
on the exlstence of thig three-man group being
13 Harvey .
4
14 Mr _ Baron _ You mentfoned that c General Lansdale might
c
15 occagionally
meet with you Personally . Thls I9 In Mlami , at
N 16 JMWAVE Station?
17 Mr . Hlalley .
I can only recall at this point one specific
18 meeting where he
came down to Florida in Miamf to visft.
19 Mr _ Wha t wag the substance of 1 that meeting?
9 20 Mr _ Halley . He was given some brlefings by my staff on
21 their areas of specialization, whether it was Intelli-
22 gence collection, whether it was maritime
3
activities ,
or whether
23 it was paramilitary activities _
I 1 spent a lot of time wlth him
1 24 personally, talking about where we stood , where we were making
9
25 progress In the collection of Intelligence, where we Were having
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who.
1
Mr .
very
4
from
Baron.
1
forelgn
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Page 31
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TOPESECRET:
28
1 problems _ and 80 It wag 4 gubatantIva
management operation,
8 2 problem-orlented type of conversation.
1
3 Mr Baronv .
1 What perlod of tIma would you place thfs in?
4 Mr . Probably sometime
In tha summer of '62 ,
5 bacause mY famfly
was already In Mlamf at that point, and when
6 I first Went to Miamt my fami}y wag not wIth me. I think my
wife Joined me In" Miamf sometIme In the 8wmmer of 62 , you know
I would have to regearch that. It 19 obvlously avallable
from
5
the records as to when my ` family moved
and 4 permanent change
5
10 of gtation.
C
11 Mr _ Baron: Wag there any dIscugsion whether direct or
12 Indirect of assa9sination of Cuban leaders 4 during your meetings
13 with General Lansdale?
c
4
14 Mr . Halley . I do not recall any such convergatlons . You
~ 15 know , I think that from "my polnt of vLew , we are off &a little
N 16 bit on this perspective I woula like to to focug on the
17 perspective for you in the hlstorical setting.
18 Mr . Baron . Please do .
19 Mr _ I think by your questions and 1
your Interest ,
8 20 You are narrowly focused On this a8sassinatlon
but let
21 Me turn that around a bit, and let me
L
Put it in my context at
22 the time which may help You understand
my answers . 9
23 Baron . Before You do _ can I 1 you for one moment?
1 24 I would like to get back On the track that We originally
9
25 started on of asking you about the JMIAVE Statfon in genera 1
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on.
Ma lley-
try
Halley .
thing ,
Mr _
stop
==================================================
Page 32
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29
1
1 and tha context at that tJma. Could I abk Jubt 4; coupla of
8 2 apecIfic questlons before
we do that, about threa-man group 1
3 that you ralged , and then 1 gIve you 4 full opportunity
to pull
4 0utof what we have sa id 90 far and everything that will follow
5 Into context_
6 Did You have any Individual meetings
wIth Robert Kennedy ,
7 who was then-Attorney General?
8 Mr _ Halley. You Mean IndIvldual ,
1 one On one?
Are You gaying did I have a meetlng ,~a Persona l , prlvate
10 meeting.with Ithe Attorney . General?
11 Mr _ Baron . Yes .
12 Mr . Ilalley _ The answer to that {s no 3
13 Mr _ Baron . Did You have any meetings with the Attorney J
14 General of any sort durIng this period of time ?
1 15 Mr _ Halley. I mentioned to you earlier that at thls meeting
16 that I Went to with Dlrector McCone, the Attorney General _ Mr
17 Robert Kennedy ,
was present at that White House briefing. He
18 did ask some questions which I do not remember wha t the
19 questions Were at this Partlcular point In time. I 1 answered
8 20 some of those questions thalt were Put during the course of that
| 21 partlcular presentation_ Throughout that whole period of time ,
22 that wa $ the only , if you Will, dlrect contact with
him that 1
23 I can remember_ You know , unless you can show me
1
some- thing_
24 Mr _ Daron . Dur the entire period that you were
8
25 Involved with JMWAVE?
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the
ptl
1 ing
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Page 33
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30
1
1 Mr . Halley . That 19 right.
8 2 Mr _ Baron. At that meeting agaIn, I realfze what we !
3 are dofng 1s an out of. context I Gu at that meetlng that
4 You attended _ with the Cabinet members
and the PresIdent , was
5 there any discuggion either directly
or Indirectly or by means
6 of any cIrcumlocutions:_of
tho subject of ag8a8ination?
7
Mr _ Halley . Not' that I can recall-
8 You know , my recollection of that meeting Ls ,
we went to It
9 en mass@ , the flrst you know_ Director McCone , myself ,
10 Bruce
Sheever ,
8everal other people who went. We went In
11 several cars . We went to the meeting , the Cuban Issue was the
12
ffrst item on the agenda . As I recall tha thing_ the Cuban 9
13
thing wag over after this perfod of time_ the technocrats 9
14
left, the Director John McCone stayed You Xnow during my
~ 15 presence at the meeting there was nothing discusged about
16
asga9sinations _
17 Mr:: Baron . Was there any such dlscussion between yourself
18
and John McCone or Richard Helms at any point?
19 Mr. Ialley. I never recall discussing asgag9inatlons
with 2
2Q NcCone _ Now in terms of discusslons with Richara i Helms
21 these Were conversations in which a tmospherics in Miami and
1
22 problems 1ike that would be ' discussed _ and I am sure somewhere
4
23
in some of these conversations the mood of the comunity , the 1
24
subject of assas9inations undoubtedly came uD _ This was 1 part
8 25
of the life of that particular period.
TOP SFCRET
Lgolation)
1
We ,
on.
John
==================================================
Page 34
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TOP SECRET
I cannot remembar 4 gpeclflc date, you know some tIme at
8 2 whfch that wag dfecusged _ and You know I never recelved any
1
3 Instructlon from Helms to mount an assa98Ination operation.
1
4 Mr Baron. Again , I am not trylng to unfairly pull these
5 KInds of #conversations out of thelr hlstorIcal context_ Be fore
6 we flesh out the historical context, do You have any recollection
7 of the manner In which agsa9gination might have come up between
8 yourgelf and Helms ? 3
Mr _ Halley _ Agaln , I put It In this overall context of
10 the times . We were-rurninqTForelgn' Intelllgedce< c collectton'
11 operatlons gainst cCuba wfth' classical agent means" we wete' runming
12 ollection against Cuba through paramili teams We were 3
13 involved In paramilitary operations that could be described as
14 commando raids . Thog e were the kinds of actlvitles _
0 15 We were dealing with exile groups , were debriefing
16 refugees and in .all_ 0f this convergations of assassinatlon ,
17 the Cuban penchant for it had to come up: I cannot pinpoint
18 Mr _ Baron . You do not reca1l any reference of means to
19 be used or people to be Involved?
1
20 Mr _ Malley . No Even such things as discussions of i
21 various kinds of weapons you know People , as You probably
1
22 know from this experience , every individual who deals with
23 weapons has a ditferent view on what Is the ideal weapon. If 1
24 you took a squad of ten men and gave them the free choice, I 1
e 25 sure a1l ten of them would come up with a different weapon.
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tary
we
1
am
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Page 35
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TOP SECRET
32
1
1 Therefore , when we wera standardtzing Yeapona
to our
8 2 paramilitary taams _ like that, weapons would be dlecussed
1
3 In termg of _ you know muzzle velocfty , rata of':- flren ~wefght
4 of the weapon for the Cuban to carry , because many of them were
5 gulte sma1l_ In thls context, peopla would dIscuss what Is
6 the range , can a guy us0 It to shoot gomebody at a particular
range? Is this an aggas8[nation weapon? I8 ths a qood weapon
8 for close combat?
9 Therefore the term assassInatfon was Just a part of the 11f7
10 of the fabric at that tlme. That is wha€ I am trylng to get
11 across . I just cannot articulate any more eloquently than
12 that_
3
13 Mr Baron. I think you are being qulte eloquent and
C
14 extremely informative. You mentioned tha t the phrase assassina-
~ 15 tlon would be used in the discusgions about the kInds 'of weapons
N 16 that would be used for commando raids or equipplng your
17 operatives .
18 Mr . Halley . Paramili teams , right.
19 Mr _ Baron, Was the capaclty of a weapon to be used as 1
20 an assasgina tion weapon among other uses a desirable i capacity?
21 In other words _ was that phrase used positively? 1
22 Mr . Halley . It was not. It Is the kIna of thIng
4
23 that weaves Itself Into, you know , a conversation. 1
24 instance , if you are planning a commando raid against 1
e 25
something like an 0il refinery , you have to think about how are
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1 you golng to get acrogs the guard:torca that J8 around a
8 2 refinery} One of tho questlons you have , cf courge , 1s 1f you
1
5 bypasg them,You are successful to get In wIthout a trafl or any 1
kind of a Btruggle , that Ls great. But what happens if you are
5 Implantlng your :target and the guard gtumbles on You , you know
6 the guard force then becomes an Imedlate risk to your operation
7 and usually there is a fire fight_ Therefore, this becomes a
8 question of weapons _ In other words what weapon 1g golng to
9 gIve the hishest muzzle velocity and make the largest amount of
io noise. Therefore, lif you have two weapong of co-equal cycllc
11 rate of fire and one made less rate of nolse than the other
12 for that Job You would pick the weapon with the lowest nose. 4
13 You might even silence it. You may make a silenced submachine
9
14 gune out of it.
0 15 These are the kinds of thIngs that go into these dIscuss Lon=
16 of weapons
17 Mr _ Baron: The technology of asgassination and targetted
18 shooting , are you referring to when You say assassination
19 waapon to a weapon generally capable of targetted shooting?
1
20 Mr _ Ialley. In thig particular context, I think most 8
21 People felt that the Cuban penchant for agsassination , for L
22 discussing assassination , was the kind that would have to be
4
23 done from a long range _ 1
24 You know I think tha + it is generally an accepted thesis 0
8 25 that a group of dedicated men who are prepared to give their
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8
1 can In time a88488inate almost
anybody . Now the Cuban wag not
8 2 that xInd of Person. Thati-Kag not his paychologlcal make-up.
1
3 Ha tondg to want to Ilve , to enJoy Ife , to talk about hfg
4
accomplishmunt_ Therefore, whlle weru brave and dedicated _
5 were the kind of people who woula probably engage In
6
bomething like thls In the context of tha weapon
4s a vehfcle for assa99ination, dIstance _
Therefore, In thls context you are talking about range , you
9 One of the factors becomes what
Is the accurate range
10 of a weapon 1f fired by . an expert marksman. Therefore, that is
11 the klnd of thing that woula go you know , d1scussions of
12 weapons .
3
13 Mr _ Baron. Mhen you were discussing weapons with hIgh 9
14 range and low muzzle velocity was thfs ever dlscussed In the
~ 15 context of shooting Fidel Cagtro
or other Cuban leaders as
K
16 opposed to targetted shooting
on a commando rald.
17 Mr _ Ilalley . I can recall . you no conversation in
18
which it was narrowly focused
on the question of FIdel Castro .
19 Mr . Baron . Let us go back, then , to putting this a11 1
20
into historical context. I am going to ask 1f 8 you you can
21
explain more about the structure of the JMIAVE Station, both
|
22
the channelg Lupward €rom you to the Agency and the Special
4
23 Group and the channels downward from you to your operatives , 1
24
if in the course of explaining the structure, 3 you would like to
25 make some comments about the historical context, that would be
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1 appreclated _
8 2 Mr _ Halley . I thfnk what I would Iko to do Is to 1
3 put thfe Into 8ome PerspectIve _
4 The perspective really 8tarts with the faflure of the
5 of Operation. After the faflure of tha of Plgs , the
6 Kennedy .Adminlatratlon
wanted another look taken at the problem
of Cuba _ In order to get that other Jook btarted , the Kennedy
Administration
crea ted thls three-man task force or thls three-
Man group and wanted to see what elge could ba done agalnst
10 Cuba , and that Jg when I came Into thls problem In ~ February of
11 62 .
12 Mr . Baron. Is it possible that the three-man group that
3
13 You are referring to i9 actually the Robert Kennedy-Maxwell
14 Taylor Board of Inqulry Into the reagong for the faflure of the
0 15 of PIgs operation?
16 Mr _ Malley . This three-man group s temmed out of that
17 inqulry. Ihat Its relationship was to the Inguiry , I do not knox
18 because I not involved and I never had an opportunlty once
19 I Plunged into this job , go back and read those historical 2
20 documents _ You know I am sure there is 8 Maxwell Taylor Repor
21 and 90 forth; but I have never read it. 1
22 All right.
4
23 Therefore, my first task wher I became involved In this 1
24 was the task of coming up with an operational plan to see what
8
25 kinds of intelllgence coula be collected In Cuba , S0 that by
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1 collecting thfs Intelligence ,
an a8sessment could b0 mada based
8 2 on hard facts 4s to what could be done agalnst Castro. In other 1
3 wordg; the dffference here was that people thought that the 1
4 of operatlon was not soundly grounded In Intelllgence _
5 Therefore , this was an attompt to gtart the collection of
6 Intelligence to see what could be_ done.
7 In order to collect Intelllgence at that partlcular time,
8 It wag beliaved tha t 41l avenues of approach should be used ,
9 80 that meant clagsical foreign Intelligence
operatlons
10 counterintelligence
operatlong the debrie of refugees and
11 the us0 of paramilltary meang to Put teamg Into Cuba to collect
12 Intelllgence on that part of the Island that could not be 4
13 covered by what You would call the more classical Means of 1
14 foreign intelligence collection.
€ 15 As the program was started essentally by
ma or accelerated
16 by me , we in fact got caught up with the Cuban Mlssfle Crisfg
17 that is , the advent of the Sovlet Interventlon Into Cuba and
18 our whole effort shifted to cover that Sovlet bufld-up In
19 Cuba , and thig was an Integral part to our havng detectad he 1
i 20 Sovlet build-up and the United States government takIng the
21 actions whlch did , that is to verffy thig .
1
22 There was a great problem for a while when Ie were a11
5
23 talking about hard intelligence the 'President , John Kennedy , 1
{ 24 was telling uS give us hard intelligence. We thouqht wa were
2 25 giving him hard intelligence - What he meant , in hfg defnftfon
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of hard Intelligence,
49 It turned out to wab a U-2
8 2 photograph . Ila never artIculated that to u0 In those termg 1
3 Then we' got caught
up Into the eybball to eyeball confron-
4 tation of the Cuban Mlssile Crisis. When that was over, we
5 got caught up with the problem of moni torlng: the dlgengagement
6 of the Sovlet presence In Cuba . That took us up through sometime
Into early 63_
Then we took a look agaln, because
we knew an awful lot
more about them than WB had when we started In February of 62 ,
10 to see what coula be done againgt Cuba , and It was clear at
11 that polnt that no external Invasion wag gofng to be pogsIble ,
12 because that was something that was excluded by" the Khruschev-
13 Kennedy agreement and then It wag not feasible. In any event
9
14 therefore It was 8 question of what could be done _ So we were
< 15 collecting intelligence
to contInue to on of the
16 situation. We were attempting to establish contacts wIth the
17 military establishment
in Cuba to see if there wag any . force
18 that was opposed to Castro within the military establishment
19 that would be used to <er the SItuation and 1 continue to see
20 whether there were economic pressures that could be brought
21 on Cuba that would accelerate the who le
|
problem of creating
22 an environment in which a resistance could be 1 created on an
23 island _
1
24 Nr _ Baron . Nere those the two primary tactics used at
8
25 that point when Castro had consolidated his strength and
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t8pe 3
1 when thd Unfted Statos and Rugsfa reached an agreamont that no
8 2 axternal Invag Lon of Cuba would take placo, dId you turn 1
3 Primarily to the wayg and means of fIndlng
4 dlg8ldent 1 group
wIthin Cuba that might be capable of overthrowing Castro,
5 number one , and number two_ of flndlng meang of undermining
6 the economic gtrength of tha Castro government_
7 Mr _ Ialley. In addItion, we were continulng to support
8 certaln elements of resfgtance , you know _ that were 9+fll there
9 that were not In the
10 Mr . Baron. what kInds of elements WBrB thoge?
11 Mr _ Halley. These were paramill forces that were In
3 12 Cuba , that we had put In or es tablished contact with _ or people 3
13 who Were already in the bush who we had already establlshed
14 contact with or they had established contact with 4g and we
~ 15 were provlding them wIth food , weapong and
30 forth s0 that
16 coula survive. So that it wag a multifaceted approach at that
17 partlcular time _
18 Tha t went on from the middle o€ 63 untll the middle o€
19 65 , and thes e are two distInct phases of this operation. In 1
i 20 #ffect, one , a survey , and two the Missile Crisis and Its
21 post-mortem, and then the next phase was the continuation of
1
22 Intelligence collection ,
the working or taking the goundlng with
5
23 miltary dissidents economic pressure and working wlth 1
24 natural dissIdent elements that Were still on the island_
25 I thInk you know that a11 o€ your questions have to be put
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Jnto thesa varioug timefranes . Whon you talk about, wag there
8 2 ever a dIscussion of agga88fnation ,
you know when people
1
5 were coming out and befng Intervfewed _
Yeg gome Cuban refugee 1
would say , by God , I would Ilke to go back and shoot , You know _
5 X, Y or 2 . IE might have been some commandante In his particu-
area ; It could have been Fidel Castro. Thig wasg Just part
of the fabric of the times .
Baron . Can we turn now to the gtructura of the JMWAVE
Station and explaln that a bit? Iow large was the Station?
10 What was the command structure within the Station?
11 Mr . Helley . The Sta tion started expanding In whatever
12 timeframa t was , somewhere after the survey was completed _ It 3
13 must have started expandlng sometime In March of 1962 _ You J
14 know _ by the time that it was at Its peak, which Was probably
15 somewhere just before the Cuban Mlssile 'Crislg August
16 of 1962 , it wag either the largest or the second largest my
17 recollection was that it was the second largest station in
18 existence at that time _ I would not want to be pinned down on
19 a particular number of people any particular 1
3 20 Mr . Baron. Could You give some idea as to the number
21 employees at the Station during its Peak?
L
22 Mr _ Halley_ I would somewhere in the nefghbordhood of 4
23 You know lelzee hundlzede You know aga in , this means staff and 6
24 contract employees _
25 Mr _ Baron. Wha t do You cover with the term contract
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1 employees ?
8 2 Mr Halley. Thege would be , Ingtance , maritime cas0
1
5 officers . We hfred people who had speclalized 8klls , that Is , 1
1
that could smanage 4 serfes of vesselg for us but
5 were not longterm staff employees _ These would be people who
6 would be used Lf You Will In a management organization ,
basic
implementation of the program_
8 Mr Baron . Did You have other agents or opera tiveg among
tha Cuban community or outside the Cuban communi ty that were
10 affilfated with the Station although not employed by It
11 directly?
12 Mr Ha lley . I think are going to have to define s ome 3
13 terms
4
14 Baron . Wha t I am trying to do now Is simply get 8 C
15 picture of the scope of the Station 5 strength and < Its
16 activities , how many people the Station had to ca 11 upon for
17
Its activities
18 Halley . Well_ let me to give You an answer beca us
19 I think we are go ing to get Into a semantic problem here _ 1
20 When I talk about the Station_ 45 such I would that a say
21 is roughly in the neighborhood o f kehrga bundsed people,
and thathi 1
22 was those people who would be involved in the management
vi
23
effort, the direction e ffort, the financial logistics , cover 1
24 procedures security , that kind o€ thing. All right? Flowing
25 out from that were people whom We wou l& call agents tha + is
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People who wero not knowledgeable necesgarlly of
whom
8 2 worked for or where tha cover officeg Were located ana 80 forth_ 1
5 Let us saY , Ln tha mar Itime part of the Operatlon wo mIght have
had at any one point In time , you know , up to five hundred
5 people Involved in marltime activities ,
You know?
6 Again , Jf you pIck a date, I am gure can research It.
The records are still avaflable and You how People
8 we hed , but let us take these five hundred _ What am I talking
9 about? Thes0 would be esgentially Cubans
who were the captains
10 of the Vess les that were used In Infiltration operatlons
to
11 put People on the shore of Cuba , and there were a varety of
12 techciques . In other words You might start on with
2
the mother
13 ship , which would be an LCI 7 I am not sure how familfar you 9
14 are with varloug kindg oe vessels _
15 What Is an LCI?
16 Mr: Halley . Landing craft kind of vessle , or a Patrol
17 craft, a PC , 1l0-foot Vess le , that would be a mother
18 This is the kind of that would take fuel supplies and
19 water s0 that other smaller vessels could be 127 serviced by it.
8 20 So You might start with
an operation of a mother ship towing a
1 21 sma ller boat, or having ft on its decks and going down to
22 fffteen or twenty miles from Cuha , putting the smaller 4 boat
23 over the s1de , which was a faster. boat , lower 1 silhouette . less
24 likely to be pIcked up by Cuban coastal radar , and then that
9 25 would take tha team in close to the shore where we mighe finally
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Mr . Baron
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l put them into rubber rafts where they would paddle In or us0
8 2 a sflent outboard motor 1f the was
1
5 Mr Baron. The people involved In manning thoge crafts
L
would not necessarily be employees of the Sta tlon directly?
5 They might be agents eVen non-paid agents?
6 Mr . Halley- they were not For ingtance , they
might work for a partlcular cover company . In other words , 1
am only using this as an example _ Let us wB had the ABC
Shipping Company . That ghfpping company was a 8ubs [diary 0 €
10 thu Station, if You will the ABC Shfpping Company .ran
11 maybe onu LCI and maybe two or three sma ller boats which it
12 could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy-
4
13 five employees , as an example, a 11 Cubans maybe some of them
4
14 was Nicariguans or Costa Ricans as most o f these vessels ~ S= I
C
15 would have to 9o look at each vessel.
<
16 Does that givz a feel for the size of the problem?
17 Mr . Baron . How many such companies would have been in
18 existence at that time companies operating as CIA proprietaries
19 or companies in cover and supplyIng the JMIAVE Station with
1
20 personnel with equipment?
i
21 Mr _ Malley. Me are ta lking about al1 of these companies 1
22 they probably went up into the hundreds _ I distinguish betwezn
23 companies that wer e 9et up s imply to provide cover as opposed
1
to companies that were proprietaries _ You know these terms
24
Mean different things to Me. The na ture o f. the Agency s 25
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1
Involvement In each 19 dlfferont. I a having
4 lIttle
8 2 trouble
1
5 Mr _ Baron. Could you explain what dlfferent categorleg
1
4 companius you Were receiving help from at that point, and about
5 how many of each there might have been?
6 Mr _ Ma lley . I do not think I could do that _ Wu are
talking about hundreds
of companfes that w0 uged durIng that
period of time _ Some of them might glmply have been
a company
set up and registered and run out of soma attorney 9
10 office. It gimply provided back stopping for the owershfp of
11 the smal1 boat.
12 Everything has to be owned by gomebody , it has to have
2
a
13 Coast Guard regis tration , You know th like that. Even i €
14 I had accesg to the files to answer Your question , it would
15 take me weeks to' pull a ) 1 that together to give You an answer.
16 I don' t think there is an oVerview statement_
17 Mr Baron . Would it be fair to say that You had coopera-
18 tion on a grand scale from a l1 kinds 0f people in private
19 enterprise in the Miami area, or Southern Florida? 2
8 20 Mr _ I think it would be fair to say tha t had
2 1 extensive cooperation T7 I do not like Your word "grand that
1
22 we had extens ive cooperation from the civilian sector in
5
23 Florida in the s tate of Florida , to facilitate the conduct 0 f 1
24 this clandestine mission -
25 Mr Ba ron . Did You a lso hav e extens ive cooperatlon
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cIvlc officfals and law antorcomant aganclog In bolng allowed
8 2 to operate frea or the law? For Ins tance , wore You allowod to
1
3 put vesgelg onto the water which were not Properly regis cered_
1 or which could be held Immune for Inspectlon by the Coast Guard
5 or other maritime authoritles _ and were You 4 llowed to send
people through the streets of Southern Florida Yho may have
bean armed or violae local law In some othur way , who were
held immune by arrangements that you had with law enforcement
agencleg ?
10 Mr Ia lley . have asked in esgence , three
11 questions
C 12 Mr Baron. Right:
4
13 Mr Ha lley . Let me to divide that and deal with each
C c
14 question Beparately.
~ 15 Let Ma ffrst deal with the vessels . Every vesge] that we
C
16 had was appropriately registered. There Were no short-cuts-
17 insofar a9 the U.S _ Coast Guard was concerned _ That is any
18 Vessel that was registered in the United States met appropriate
19 safety standards ana 50 forth , s0 we were not putting any
1
20 Vessels into the water that any citizen could not have Put into
8
2 1 the water_ That is we are talking about ten fifteen, twenty 1
22 foot boa ts , thirty foot boats thirty-five foot boats things
1
23 like that. Thes 0 boats were owned in elther a ~corporato. name
1
24 or by a private individual who had to register then with the
25 Coast Guara and pass norma ] Coag t Guard regulations_
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(Dscugsfon off the record. )
8
2
Mr . Baron . To continue wlth thfs , I undergtand that
1 3 safety regulatlong would hava been complied with_ but :a8 there
some sort of Immunity from Inspaction_ say Inspectlon for
5 carryIng armaments aboard a ves8 el that tha CIA had arranged
with maritlme authoritlog_
or local law enforcement authorities?
Mr _ Halley - we had operations going_ thes0 were
coordinated with the Coagt Guard in terg o€ thelr knowlng that,
You know , at a particular time group , that there would be
10 a rendezvous between two vesgels which were our vesgels , and
11 this was coordinated with the Coast Guard _
12 Mr_ Baron . Would You return to the second part of that 4
13 large question? Without reference to vessels , were CIA :
14 employees or agents on the streets of cities In Southern
~ 15 Florida immune from search or arrest by loca l law enforcement
C 16 authorlties?
17 Mr _ Halley. They were not immune _
18 Let me ask to dispel one my th that I think hag developed
19 which is reflected in your question. We were meticulous to 1
8 20 insure that no weapons were issued to anybody until the men
21 Were on the Vessel outside of the immediate waters of south
|
22 Florida , and we were meticulous to insure that when came
1
23 back from a mission that they were met at sea and a11 the 1
24 Weapons were taken away from then _
2
25 So , when You talk about a group moving around In Florida
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1 We did work out through tho entire 8tate, and I did not want
8 2 You to feel tha t I Wag legg than candld With
You , and 1
5 You sayIng gouth Florida , I 1 want to bay to You that wB
1 operated in the state of Florida _ men moving around armed under
5 our control In the state of Florida , Js Just not correct.
Thls wag all carefully controlled and
did not have thefr
weapong when came back, wB took them before landed _
90 Were not Immune_
Mr _ You did have general arrangements or agreements
10 with law enforcement
C agencleg throughout Florlda
for the
11 treatment of CIA operatives who were afffllated with the JMAVE
12 Station? 3
13 Halley . dia through our Offfce of Security ,
14 a continuing dialogue with
a number of law enforcement agencies
2 15 in Florida. If 8 problem developed ,
we would then contact them
16 and look at the issue WIthin the context of what had transplred .
17 Certainly there
was no immunity . In other words , this has be
18 looked at on a case by case basis _
19 For instance , you know , we had a training 1 site In north
8 20 Florida _ as an example_ If gomebody came oEf of that site that
21 was drunk and disorderly in town and
1
could not speak English ,
22 the loca l authorities did have a number to call to ralse this 4
23 with us see whether this was somebody 1 that wag of interest
{ 24 to. us , and then we would hava to go and settle that particular
25 case.
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Mr . Baron. Back to the structure 0f tha relationshlps
; 2 between yourself 49 Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatfve 1
5 or employees who worked underneath You at that Station, would
4 ft be fair to say that any activitieg run out: of the Station
5 ultima tely Were channeled out through you?
Halley. They should have been , and were You
know this Station went through several mutationg In organization
durlng fts existence. I guess the organizatonal structure that
existed for the longest per iod of time was gomething IIke I am
10 going to describe to You.
C
11 There was a Chlef of Station, which was mygelf . I had a
12 Deputy Chief of Station for operations . That is the gentleman
Q
13 who is now retired _ I think he is still alive , c9 by the name 0 €
c 14 Moore Robert Moore. I had a second Deputy Chfef of Station and
4 15 he was for Support Patterng . Tha t 19 a gen tleman who Is a Iso
16 retired _ a Mr Corrig
17 Then the' rest of the Station was organized into a nuber 0 f
18 branches _ Each brarch was organized along functional Iines _
19 Let give You an example. There wag a Foreign Intelligence 17
i 20 Branch These Were people in , wha t in my terminology would
2 1 classical foreign intelligence operations
That is trying to
1
22 recruit a Cuban diplomat abroad as an example, dealing with ,
4
23 You know _ a Uruquayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in 1
24 Ha vana They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might
8 25 live in some city like Havana ard a legal job as a baker or
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1
butcher or gomething but had 4 radio set In whfch coula
8 2 communlcate with through which they could communicate to us 1
3 Then there wag the Paramilitary Branch . This was the
group that ran the commando operations _ Thfg was the group that
5 put people back Into Cuba _ into regigtance groups_ or
established contact with resistance groups . Thls was a group
that also worked in putting in caches that would supply people ,
either paramilitary forces in Cuba or agente that were being
run by the Foreign Intelligence
10 All right. Then there wag a Covert Action_ people who
11 dealt with exiled refugee groups that were Involved in radio
12 activities publications that kind o€ Then there Is a
3
13 whole panoply of then there was Marftime , in terms of d
14 fInance , and So Security was a branch . Obviously , under
15 that kind of system no executive , whether he' is president of
16 a corporation or a Station Chief , can see every single piece of
17 paper that comes in or out, but clearly there was a reviem
18 procedure whereby program reviews were conducted _ individual
19 operational reviews were conducted _ 1
20 Mr . Baron. By yourself? 8
21 Halley . By myself . I do not want to leeve You with
1
22 the impression that I knew every single thing that was going
4
23 on every minute and could account for the activities three 1
24 hundred employees On a da i ly basis
2 25 Mr _ Baron : In talking about the personnel a f filfated
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on .
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L with tha Station a momont ago , I think- Wa may have croatad a: :
8 2 mislmpresgion that tha people Involved In CIA operatfong
1
3 were people who ware pald bY the Agency . Ign t It &lgo true
4 that there were many Memberg of Cuban exile groupg In Florida
5 who participated voluntarily from time time In CIA sponsored
6 operatlong ?
Mr _ Halley . I think that You may have to sharpen that up
for me . I am not sure what You really mean .
9 If you are talking about forelgn Intelllgence collections_
10 you know , the people who were producing
11 Mr . Baron. I am talking now about the paramili- tary
12 operations
4
13 Mr. Ialley . No I do not know of any People that were 9
14 involved in paramflitary operations that Were In some way
15 paid .
16 Baron. By the Agency?
17 Mr Ha lley . By the' Agency _
18 Let me make sure that we understand each other _ because
19 during this period of time there were 4 lot of Independent 1
20 Cuban groups who claimed that had 5 sponsorshLp from the
21 Agency but did not, and were operating , and there was & period
1
22 in tine when these groups could not run their operations from
i
23 Florida without runn the risk being picked up by Customs 1
24 Immigration , Coast Guard , the FDI , or if we had informa tion on
e 25 It, You know , we might pass the Information to the Coast Guard
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H age
only
1
to
not
Mr .
they
inq of
1
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50
1 90 that could them from golng _
8 2 If that I8 what you are referring to somebody 11ke Alpha
1
3 or Commando L or somebody Ilke that , were not a Part of
1
4 the CIA apparatus _
5 Mr . Baron. Although you might be aware of thefr activfties
6 Ialley . We would be aware of thelr activitfes ,
certainly c
8 Mr . Daron. Can You explaln 1f there Is anything to ada
to what we have already saId? Tha chain of command , apart from
10 Yourself as Chief of Statlon, to Task Force w and to the
11 Directorate of Plans within the Agency?
12 You would report directly to William Harvey? 1
13 Halley. William Harvey was Chief Task Force N , 1
14 later FitzGerald. My cha In of command was from Me to them.
~
15 You know , had a subordinate sta € f who helped them monitor
16 the Station 5 activity , so that it just was not the fact, you
17 know that Harvey ana Mr . FftzGerald Were totally dependent
18 on what I told them To have an eppreciation of what was going
19 on in Miami had their own staff that was following
1
20 individual operations . 8
21 For Ins tance , had a paramilitary staff that would
|
22 review our proposals for 8 paramilitary operation and might
1
23 say we think that the Station has overextended itself this 1
24 month , they want to run twenty-five operations given the
2 25 weather during this particular month of October _ We do not
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H ade
they XBep
they
Mr -
Mr . of
they
Mr _
they
they
1
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51
8 thInk could do It_ We think they Bhould ba gulded
to run
8 2 only twenty , fifteen, gomething
lfke that. So wera not 1
5
totally dependent
on Me .
4 Mr . Baron. Mhat was the nature of tha 8plit of responsi-
5
bility between
Task Force Tv and JMWAVE Statton?
6 In other words Were there certa in operatlons that wera
run dlrectly
out of Task Force W?
Mr Halley . Also , You have to put thls a hfstorical
time. wha t perlod are You talking about?
10 Mr _ Baron . During the period of your tenure. If there
11 were changeg during
your tenure at JMWAVE _ why do you not
12 explain those?
4
13 Mr . There were. Each one is dffferent. Let me 1
14
give a couple of examples _
< 15
Washington , Task Force R , essentially did
not run :;
N 16 bny . paramili- operations where took command and control
17 send people to Cuba _ For instance , if Task Force w In
18
Washington wanted to plant a _radio In Cuba which was to be: picked
19 up by foreign intelligence
agents who coula report , would 1
20
task uS implant that radio in a cache i in a particular area
21
in Cuba , for instance; Oriente province. Ne
1
would know gimply
that ft was a radio 22 perhaps : Na would then put It into
4
23
Oriente province, write up the site, gIve them 1 the rip cord
24 would communicate to the agents- in Cuba who' would: go
recover the cache. 25
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HH 50955 DocId:32423434 Page 54
they
they
1
Into
Ha lley _
You
tary they
for ing
they
to
They
1
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52 1
So had agents In Cuba that were roporting foretgn
8 2 Intelllgence
to them 00 they had collectlon
va89ets that were 1
5 reportlng to them along tho 8am0 lines that wB did They :did
work at . downstream point when FtzGerald
came In with a
5 couple of groups in other words _ had contact with
6 Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group 89 8 general
rule. al80 had contact with Manolo whfch I dia not
have contact with. So were working wIth these kinds of
larger exlle
groups .
10 The Task Force also gpeclallzed Ln much more economlc
11 activity than I dia_ Tha € 18 a question of looking at such
12 as [England- bus exports from 2503g Wieuql 1
to Cuba _
13,18
13 Baron . In terms of paramili- operations_ Jf an 9
14 assassinatfon operation had been run by Tagk ` Force W , would
c 15 you have assumed a5 Chief of Station In Mlami you would have
16 been aware of such an opera tion?
17 Mr _ Ilalley. I do not assume that.
18 Mr _ Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial
19 practice to let you know that there was an 1 operation that might
i 20 have been run through Florida Into Cuba?
21 Mr _ Halley . No _
L
22 You know the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism _
4
23 You know , let us dispel One thing very 1 promptly If you
1 24 are asking Me was I aware of all these contacts , You know with
8
25 the Ma Eia and I think I can tell you frankly at that tima I
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they
1
they
They
Ray
they
things
Mr .
tary
No ,
here.
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TOP SECRET 53
7
1 wa8 not Harvey woula come , you know , to Mlamf, to visft me
8 2 to review the activitles of the station, and whfle there would
1
5 go off on hls own and make hls contact wlth whomever he wag 1
4
meeting . I he was meeting somebody , but it was not up to
5 me to Eiud out with whom he wag meeting or he was meetlng
6 them or what he wag with them _
Mr . Baron . My question really was , I think more Innocent
than that.
Was strictly one of Involving what correct
management
10
technlques would or what kind of knowledge the Chfef of
11 Station of JMNAVE would have to have in order to do an effectivel
12 job in dealing with the Cuban community and running operations 2
13
Into Cuba? Seem to be saying that It would:not_be
9
14 necessary to run an effective Job to haVe knowledge of every
c 15 other opera tion tha t the CIA 19 running against Castro?
16 Mr . Halley. I think what I am saying during that particu-
17
lar time. _~ I do not want you to come to the concluglon that
18 I was knowledgeable of everything that ran in from or through
19 the state of Florida _ becauge during that period
of time _ for 1
20
instance, Mr . Harvey in particular was a i compartmented
21 gentleman , and it woula be keeping with his style to run an
|
22
operation in which the locus of the operation might be Florida
5
23
and I would not know about it.
1
24 Now that would be unusual thing , but it is not 1 precludeh
2 25 Mr _ Baron . Let us turn for a moment to following up on the
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knew
why
doing
be ,
You
very
an
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TOP: SECRET
54
1
1 nature of your contacts with WIlllam Harvay
In reference to any
8 2 operationg he may have In running unflaterally
agaInst Castro.
1
3 Do you recall alding Harvey In an Operatlon that he wag In 1
4 of and that wag not affflfated -wi th JMWAVE?
5 Mr _ I do not recall anythlng , I do not recall
6 anything speciffc. In other words the pattern wag In terms of
command and control, I would come to Washington
On a regular
bagis to review activity with Harvey after
we submitted our
paperwork_ Harvey was also a frequent visitor
to Florida _
10 We would have operational dlscusslong _
He woula C talk to th
11 Branch Chiefs _ he talked to people. He a1s0 went out' on his
12 own , ana he was meeting somebody , It was clear to Me that he
13 was meeting people.
But it was frankly In the way that the J
14 Agency is run and managed lt wag not a concern to me whom he-
15 was meeting .
C
16 Mr Baron. Rould It have been proper of you to inquire
17 of hm whom he was meeting?
18
Mr . Ilalley. No _ it would not have been.
19 Mr _ Baron . Did you have suspicions or 1 speculation about
20 whon he 'might have been meeting
or for what purpose that ha
21 was having these meetings?
22 Mr _ Ilalley . No = not for what purpose. There is a whole,
4
23 You know panoply of things going
on at that time. You know 1
1 24
frankly I was a Very guyi when Ilarvey was there , it occupiedl
8
25 one hunk of a lot 0 € my tine. Ie he wanted to go of € you know
TOP SECRET
charg
Halley.
4
3
1
busy
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55
1 do something else and wag golng to moat somoone 0l8d, that wag
8 2 fine with me . It enabled me to get back to my Imediate ana
1
3 more presgIng problems _
1
4 In this businesg you Just do not ask Your suparior , wha t
5 are you dolng? That Is just not crIcket; that Jg not the way
the game Is played_
Mr _ Baron . Do you recall a ~time when larvey asked You to
procure arms and equipment to be passed to 4: Cuban exile?
Halley _ To a Cuban exlle?
10 Mr. Baron. Let me strike the reference to 8 Cuban exlle.
11 Do you recall a time when Harvey esked your afd Jn procur-
12 arms ar] eguipment to be gIven to a man named Tony Varona 4
13 who was a contact of Harvey 8?
C:
14 Mr . Halley. I know Tony Varona _ He wag in the perlod
15 prior to the of he was part of the consejo_
16 Frankly , i€ You Ve something tha + you can sharpen that
17 up , I think you need some basis , that I think tha € can trigger
18 my memory here. I do not remember frankly Tony Varona being
19 In Harvey ' s
1
20 Mr _ Baran . contact with Harvey? i
21 Mr . Ilalley . You know _ I may have procured some thing for 7
22 Harvey some kind of equipment or done some kind of. operationa l
1
23 support task-
1
24 Mr _ Baron. Let us make it more specific.
1
2 25 Do you recall helplng Iarvey load a U-Haul trailer full of
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tape
Mr .
ing
2
Pigs , Bay
got
In
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TOPSECRET;
56
7
1 about S5,000 worth of armg and egulpment to ba loft In a ParkIng
8 2 lot and plcked up there by a contact of Harvey' 9? And thf8
1
3 would be In approximately AprIl of 1962 .
1
4
Ia lley . I_ do vaguely remember something about a rented
5 truck. Qulte frankly , I do not really recall a1l the detalls
of thfg et this particular time. I do not remember You know_
pergonally procur any material but it Is concefvable tha €
I did 4 request from Harvey , that I dia go to the logistics
apparatug and whatever he had requested from offIcfal s tockg
10 he was provided_
C
11 Mr . Baron. DurIng that same perlod of tima
12 Mr . Halley . I do recall some thfng about a truck. I do 2
13 not recall anything about a trailer_ My recollection of thls
4
14 truck incident geems to be a S I do not remember what It was ,
15. We did do some thing for him logistically, I do remember a truck
~
16 being involved with some logistic ma terial In terms of, &
17 parkIng lot. But frankly that is about all I can recall of It
18 at this particular time.
19 Baron . Do you have any recollection of hearIng of
1
20
poison pills In any connection during Your tenure at JMNAVE?
i
21 Mr . Ila lley . No _ I do not recall pofson pIlls? Poison L
22
pills , the only kind of thing I can recall occasfonally when
1
23 People were talking about belng on mother know what
24
would happen if Were capturcd. This was a discussion
1
25
occasionally of whether any kind of drugs shoula be Issued to
TOP SECRET
Mr .
ing
get
Mr .
ships , you
they
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57
L
the people who were mannIng. thage vesgole 00 they could do
8 2 themgelves In If they were to be captured, thlngs Ilke that,
1
5 but we never Issued any guch pIlls but thera wera dIscugslons
4 of that kInd of a problem _ I do recell BpacIflc agents who
5 Were gent back to Cuba to run a collection or to go back Into
the bush and S0 forth who asked for som8 gort of p1lls whIch
they could kIll themselves wIth If they ware capturea.
But other than that if that Is wha t you were referring
I thInk they are called L pIlls , or something , 49 they
10 Were referred to in those dayg _
11 Mr Baron. Why Were they called L plls?
12 Mr Ha Ilev _ Everything has a number or nomencla ture , I
3
13 do not know.
4
14 Mr . Baron . Did you ever hear of poison pills to ba usea
c
15 in assassinatlon Operations agalnst Fidel Castro or other
16 Cuban leaders?
17 Mr . Malley . No _
18 Is that referencing to this material that I mlght have
provlded for Harvey? Because if that Ls the case, I can dIspel
19
1
that guickly , because I would not have had access to them .
20 8
Mr Baron . You would not have access to polson pills?
21 1
Ha lley . No , I would not have access to them .
22
4
23 Mr _ Baron . why not?
1
Mr . Ilalley . I did not have them In my inventory . That is
24 1
8 not anything that I have , you know command and control of _ Tha
25
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H
1
to ,
Mr _
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58
1
1 19 . why
8 2 Mr _ Baron. They would have had to coma alrectly from
1
3 TechnIcal Services Dvislon at CIA?
1
Mr _ Ha lley . Tha t is what I'm trying to clarlfy what It 1s
5 that_ are trying to 0stablish from Me.
6 In other wordg if You are SayIng
Mr . Baron. Let 4s move further I think we can be more
epuclflc now
We have a document that: I am about to show you. I just
10 wanted to clear up. the background of It before we dIscugsed
11 the document
12 Mr Ilalley . Lut Me just make this pofnt. If You are
3
13' talking about drug pills , I had no source o€ such thlngg , S0
4
14 if that is the nature of your guestion, I can say I had nothing
15 to do wIth that. If You are talking about, you know
N 16 Mr . Baron. Armg and equipment
17 Mr . Ialley _ weapons or something _ Yes , that was In my
18 inventory. I could have issued that to Harvey , you know _ guns ,
19 ammunftion_ plastics , that kind of thing I could have had
1
20 access to= yes _ That is why I am trying to sort out really
9
21 where the thrust of your questionlng is _ 1
22 Mr _ Daron . There were two prongs to the question, you
23
have pfcked both of them up . One is whe ther you had ever heard
1
24
of poison pills in connection with an assassination operation
1
8 25
againgt Fldel Castro and your testimony would be that You had
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You
i
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59
not, Js thet correct? L
2 Mr . Halley . That I9 right:" I would not have had access {8
1
3 to those Pills myself , nor dia the Statfon _ In other wordg if
1
4 I had wanted something llke that , I would have had to corres-
5
ponded wIth WashIngton in order to have had access to It, If
6 In fact It existed_
7 Mr . Baron. You never had any guch correspondence?
8 Mr, Halley . I never had any correspondence that I can
recall.
Mr. Baron. The other problem was the supply of arms and
10
11
equipment to which you already replled.
Have You ever that Inspector General' s Report of
12
4
1967 _ prepared at the request of the DCI to Eill hlm In on `any
13
J
assa8gination efforts to which the CIA may have been connected?
1 :
Mr . Halley. No , I have not read the report.
C 15
Mr Baron_ Before you cane here today you were not shown
16
any excerpts from this report to refresh your recollection at
17
the CIA?
18
Mr Ha lley . The IG Report?
19
1
Mr _ Baron _ Yes _
20 i
Halley . I havg not.
21 7
Mr . Daron. Were shown any other documents at the CIA
22
4 today to refresh or in preparation for today s session
23 1
Mr . Ila lley. No.
24 1
e In preparation for today" S session I have had severa1
25
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read
Mr . NO ,
you
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60
1
1 convergationg wIth Seymour Boultin
8 2 Mr . Baron . Walt Elder?
1
3 Mr _ Halley . I talked to Walt Elder on the phone. You know
1
^ the people Iho are Involved in this thing . I have asked for
5 that, I ta lked to our attorney , Clarke
Mr _ Baron. George Clarke? 6
Halley .
I talked to a number of people , I asked to be0 the
newspaper clipping from the Mlamf Herald on the McGovern
10 activity. Yes _ I have looked at that kind of thing_ But I
11 have not looked at the speciflc IG Report. I have not read it,
12 I have not seen an extract of the Ig Report.
1
13 Mr Baron . Were you given any specific Instructions as to
4
14 the kinds of things that you could gay or not say here today?
C
15 Mr Halley. You know , nothing beyond what you and I
4
16 touched on which you have. already On the record.
17 Mr _ Baron . Ihich Is not to mention the names of CIA
18 officers who are still operating under cover?
19 Mr . Halley . Right, or agents who would still be viable
1
20 that I know of _ 8
21 Mr _ Daron Right. 1
22 Then let me show you a document which we will mark as
1
23 Halley Exhfbit No . 2 _
1
(The document referred
24 1
9 to was marked Ha lley
25
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Yes _ Mr.
Put
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61
1
ExhIbft No: 2 for
8
2
Identiflcation.)
1 3
5
6
8
9
10
c
11
12
13
2 14
15
16
17
18
19
1
20 8
21 L
22
4
23 1
24 1
25
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HF
1
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63
1 Mr _ Baron. Which {8 an excerpt from the Ingpector General L
2 Report of 1967 at pages 49 and 50 , and I wI1l ask You to read 8
1
3 tha portlong that I will bracket whIch deal with 4 report of
1
4
nleeting betweel yourseif ang Niiliam farvuy Involving tha
5 gupply of arms and equipment _
6 (Pause)
7 Mr . Ha lley . I have no reason to doubt this. I may have
8
provided thfs support. I do not recall s1ttIng In 4 parkIng lot
obgervlng
Mr . Baron. For the record , wa are discussIng the passage 10
that beging _ "When the pIlls were gIven to Varona through
11
Roselli Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the
12
;
support of his end the operation. Rosell passed the request
13
4
to Harvey . Harvey _ with the help of (Mr . Ka lley} , the chfef
14
of the JMIAVE Station procurea"
15
Continuing T= And then It contlnues to gay a large shopping
16
list o€ arms ana eguipment , which cost about S5 ,000 and were
17
supplfed in a parkIng lot of a drfve-in regtaurant In a rented
18
U-Haul truck.
19_
2
Woula the cost of 85,000 have been an unusual expendfture
20
at that time at JMYAVE station for arms and equipment?
21 |
Mr _ Halley. s5,000 woula have been an unusual
22
1 expenditure_
23 1
Mr . Baron . Not unusual enouqh , in fact, for You to have
24 1
e a particular memory 0 € the event?
25
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of
3
not No ,
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64
Mr _ Halley. No;
8 2 Now that I read over thls thlng , I do recall, 48 I told
1
3 you earllor before you showed me this document something about
1
4 rented truck and beIng Involved wIth Harvey In providing him
5 some logistical gupport for an activity. I do not recall this
6 gpeclfic lst of equfpment belng- Involved_ you know, sonewhere
You this and If I could check It agaInst the ffles , If there
8 are any flles avaflable , I could verify whather thls 19 correct:
9 or not.
10 Mr. Baron . Whether or not the partlcular lIst 19 correct,
11 you would say that these couple of Passage8 from the IG Report
12 generally characterize your Involvement wlth Mlarvey in this 2
13 one incident correctly?
c
14 Mr . Halley . I would want to sharpen this uP, because you
15 have one , two two paragraphg here. In the firgt paragraph
16 there is a reference to some pflls. I had nothing to do wfth
17 any pills. I have no recollection o€ any Pflls.
18 Mr _ Baron . Let uS Jump then to the very last sta tement and
19 let Me ask you 1f thls confIrms Your own sense of your knowledge
1
20 The report says : Harvey says that (Halley] here I 8
21
using your alies 67 "never knew to whom delIvery was made nor 1
22 for what purpose. (Halley] was merely called upon to furnish
1
23 support' for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise
1
24 excluded _
1
e 25 Does that generally characterlze correctly your point of
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got
9
am
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65
1
1 Involvement with thls actlvity?
8 2 Mr . Halley. I would Bay that Ja corract _
1 3 I want to go back to these other polnts , though , because
1
4 I want to be meticulously correct here. I do not recall the
5
specifics o€ thls Inventory of equipment. I do not recall_
you know , sItting In 4 parkIng
lotr survellling any
xInd of a
vehicle. On the other hand , I do recall havIng been Involved
with Ilarvey in some sort of an effort with 8 U-Haul truck_
Now therefore that last sentence You have read 19 correct,
10 I knew nothing about any o€ thfs delIvery.ana I:wag called upon
11 to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which I
12 wag otherwise excluded .
13 Mr _ Baron _ You are not denying _ are You, that You may have
C
sat near the parking lot and survellled the truck until Jt was 14
15
pIcked up?
2
Mr . Halley. I have no recollection
16
Mr . Baron. One way or the other?
17
Mr . Halley . I would say tha t my sitting In a parked
18
car with Harvey survellling 2 parkIng lot Is the xInd o€ thing
19
1
that would haVe stuck In my mlrd . I do not recall ever doing
20 8
that and tha € Ls the thing that has me a little perplexed here
21 L
and I am having trouble nwa tching this 'thlng up with own 22
5
Memory . It would have been damned unusual for Karvey and I to
23
1
have sa t in a parking lot , and I just do not recall that.
24 1
9 I do have a vague recollection of belng involved with him
25
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J
2
No
my
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66
8
1 In somo sort of caper; Involving 4 U-Raul truck.
8 2 Mr Baron. At that tIme, If Harvey had made a request of
1
3 you to supply $5,000 worth of equipment Ilka explosiveg _
4 detonators , 30 caliber rifles, 45 caliber handguns _ radios
5 and boat radar _ would have supplied that equlpment to Harvey
6 or to anyone he designated wIthout asklng him what the purpose
7 of the operation was?
8 Mr . Ilalley . Yes I would have supplled It to Flarvey or
to his desIgnated representative , depend on how that person
10 Identifled himself to ma with thg equlpment that he requested _
11 That was my chain of command and _ Je he had told me that he
12 had wanted this ma terial for any operational activlty, I would
13 have seen to It that it was issued to him. Tha t i9 the way the
1
14
Agency functions .
C:
15 Mr Baron . Would It have been standard procedure In a
<
16
paramilitary operation to procure equlpment that would not have
been traceable to the United States as the IG Report indicates
17
wag done In this case?
18
Mr . Halley . It depends. It depends on what was the
19
1
sponsorship that wag trving to be conveyed to the paramflftary
20 i
21 group. 1
In other words let uS say there was a Venezuelan busiress
22
1
man who may have been giving some assistance to a Cuhan exlle
23 1
group. If somebody had gotten in touch with that Venezuelan
24 1
9 businessman and he was saying I brought weapons into Florda
25
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1
You
Ing
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67
1
1 or aqulpment whfch I MIll gIva you, thon mayba under that kInd
8 2 4 clrcumgtance WB wouldn'€ want anythIng that would clearly
1
5 Identify It with the U,S _ government and thon that would be the
1
4 normal thing to do . I would have to know the sponsorghfp.
5 Mr . Baron . This requust would not hava been extraordinary-
6 either , to provide "sterlle" equlpment to 4 contact of Harvey' s?
Mr _ Halley _ It would not have attracted my attenton to
make Jt seem out o€ the ordInary .
Mr _ Baron . Were awaro of tho prabence of a CIA officer
10 named Jim 0' Connell In' Florida at that tIma?
11 Mr . Malley . No ;
12 Mr _ Baron . Had You been aware of, any operational
1
13 involvement that Jim 0'Connell had wIth anyone In' Florida_ et
9
14 any time?
15 Mr . Halley: I do not know Jim 0' Connell - I have seen
4
references to Jim 0' Connell In Jack Anderson S columns ana 16
17
things like that. since I have been reading the Press , but I
18 do not Know Jim 0' Connell- If he -walked into this 'room, -I
19 wouldnot recognfze him because I do not think I ever met the
1
man. I do not know who he is . I asked several of my colleagues
20 9
when I first saw his name appear in the Pregs who it was and
21 1
nobody could describe him in a way that would enable me to
22
4
remember ever having seen or met the man. 23 1
Mr Baron Hed You heard 0f the man in connection" with
24 1
8 25
operations aga Lnst Cuba
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you
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L
Mr _ Halley . I had not.
8 2 Mr _ Baron. before reading It In the newspaperg
1
5 recently?
1
4 Mr _ Malley. Before reading In the newspapers and I do not
5 know what Year I flrst read this , becausa somewhere In the back
6 0f my mInd 1s a Jack Anderson column
Mr . Baron. And a Drew Pearson column before that.
Mr . Ialley . a couple of years ag0 In which it wag
obvloug that this was obtalned from a mflitary assignee to the
10 Agency named Brad some thing I cannot think of hls name
11
right now and that he was the source of that Information. I
12 think somewhere in one of those articles hfs name had
4
13 appeared seVeral Years ago _ I frankly do not know who the quy
c9
1s _ 2 14
15 Mr _ Baron. At any point In your opera tIonal relatlonshfp
with William Harvey in connection with Cuban affairs , aJd You 16
suspect that an assasgination operation was belng run out of
17
Task Force W against Fidel Castro?
18
Mr Halley . No
19 2
Mr _ Baron . I would like to run down a list of the names 20 8
of some people who Were Involved in one way or the other with
21 1
an assassination operatlon that was being run out of Task Force
22
1
W , and I Will reprasent to you that there was Indeed an 23 1
agsassination effort or a series of efforts run out: of Task
24 1
8 Force w beginning E and out of the CIA beginning In October
25
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69
1
of 1960 Involving connectlong between CIA offlcfals and people
8 2 who have been characterlzed 4s memberg oE the Maffa , of the
1
3 gambling Syndicate who had interests in Havana and which Involved
1
4 the pasgage of poison pills to people insfde Cuba purportedly
5 for us0 against Castro In the restaurant that he frequented _
6 And this plot by William larvey 5 own admlssfon wag directed
7 by Harvey during Ilarvey 8 tenure as the Chief of Task Force W_
Mr _ Halley . I take due note o€ what You are sayIng _ I
haVe no knowledge of that. I will be glad to comment -on any
10 of the nameg My commenting on nameg Is In no way to reflect
11 any knowledge on my part of this particular activity, because
C 12 I have no knowledge of it.
13 Mr _ Baron . You have already stated tha € You have no
J
14 knowledge any assassination effort involvlng polgon pIllg?
15 Mr Halley .
16 Mr . Baron _ Did You ever hear of any assassination: schemes
17 which may or may not have been put into effect Involving
18 explodlng sea shells that Castro might pIck up by scuba diving?
19 Mr _ Ila lley . No , I do not recall any exploding gea shells
1
20 while Castro was scuba diving _ but the problem of Castro being
9
21 an avid scuba diver is Well-known to me . As I recall, somewhere 7
22 Ln thls thing there wag a refugee group or Cuban exile group
1
23 or somebody at one time in this whole activity who had focused
1
24 Olt the question of whether Fidel Castro was vulnerable at the 1
9 25 time that he was scuba diving. I have heard that dIscusged but
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of
Yes
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1 frankly I do not remember In what forum and your refarenca to
8 2 the scuba dlvIng hag trlggered that respon80. Nothing about
1
3 explodlng 90a shell8 .
1
4 Mr _ Baron. You do not recall ever hearlng Desmond
E FItzGerald mentlon that subject or hearing that Desmond
FitzGerald was involved In explorlng that possIbflity, plantinq
an: explodlng sea shell?
8 Mr . Halley . The explodlng sea shell 1s enough of an off-
beat kInd of thing that I think I would have recalled Ita I
10 don't recall ita
11 I do recall Castro S scuba dlving , and that representInq
12 a vulnerability and somewhere in the recesses o€ my memory ,
3
13 that does strike a bell with me that some exile group gomebody
4
14 was talking about Fidel Castro being vulnerable whfle he was
15 scuba diving _
~
N 16 Mr _ Baron _ Did you:ever hear of a Plan to pregent Castro
17 with a skin-diving suit in which bacteria Injurlous to his hea lth
18 would have been cultured . bacteria that would have produced
19 tuberculosis and would have produced a dreadful disease?
1
20 Malley. I have never heard of any bacteria approach
i
21 to the problem of dealing with Fidel Castro. 1
22 I do want to come back to this that I do recall some thing
4
23 about scuba diving , You know , on the range of Fidei being
1
24 vulnerable at the time he was scuha diving , but I do not recall
1
25 exploding Sea shellg or bacteria .
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1 Mr . Baron . Let ug turn then to tha Ibt of nama
8 2 Mr _ Halley . Walt 4 mInuto. Just let mo make a noto to
1
3 myself.
1
1 (Pause)
5 Mr _ Baron: Do You have any knowledge, acquired directly
6 or Indlrectly, of any Involvement-of John Roselll In Cuban
operatIons ?
Mr . Ialley . Other than readIng the paperg
Mr . Baron . Other than what you read racently In the papers
10 did you acqufre any knowledge durlng your perlod 45 Chle€ of
11 Statlon at JMNAVE of John Roselli' 9 Involvement in Cuban
12 operations?
13 Ar Halley . No I had the impression from Ilarvey going
4
14 off that he was meeting with somebody , at one polnt in time
C
15 I came to the impression that he was meeting a guy by the name
16 of John. who John was I had no Idea . We were involved Jn an
17 attempt to to find two Soviets at one point who were of
18 interest. The fellow who provided the lead to that had been
19 a member of one of tha casInog in Cuba at gome time.
1
20 Mr Baron . Do remamber who that was ? 8
21 Mr . Ha lley. No , I do not. I do not remember the man ' s 6
22 name. It may come to Me. You are asking me things , that
i
23 happened you know In 1962 _ As I have told You, I have been
1
24 Jn a lot of places _
1
25 Anyway _ when we put in a request Eor a trace on the source
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and
try
yqu
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72
1
1 of thls lead , I Wag eurprIsed wIth the gpdod wIth whIch WB
8 2 response back On thig man and khe detall8 ru down that we
1
3 got on him In termg of who ha was ana where he worked and 90
forth, and I think I concluded at that tImo that somebody knew
5 thls fellow very Well somewhere In the whole labrynth elthe
6 Justice or We or somebody had access to somebody who could give
us 4 great deal of Insight Into people who had been involved
8 with the gambllng establfshment In Cuba .
Those are the two thIngs that I can gay to you that
10 I knew at the time. Obviously I have sinca read the papers
11 I have put together in Own mind by deduction that the John
12 that I was aware of that Harvey wag in touch with mugt be John
3
13 Roselli, but I cannot provide to you
C
1
14 Baron . Would thfs pergon with contacts with gambling
€:
15 interests in Havana have been Santos Trafficante?
16 Mr _ Halley . I would have no way of knowing . I know who
17 Santos Trafficante is _
18 Mr . Baron . How do you know this?
19 Mr . Halley . This is like asking me whether I knew where
1
20 Jth Street is in downtown Miami_ Santos Trafficante is a name
a
21
that constantly was discussed among Cuban exiles and he was a L
22 well-known figure. You coula not possibly be involved :
4
Mr . Baron. Did You know of any involvement that he had
23
1
in Cuban Operations that Were connected in any way to the CIA?
24 1
9 Mr . Halley. None that I kcow o€ _ To the best of my 25
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HF
got
an
only
and
my
Mr _
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73 TOPTSECRET:
8
rocollectlon when I wag In Mlaml, Santos Trafficante wag In the
8 2 Tampa area and that Ig my recollactlon of Jt at tha time .
1
5 I al8o thInk that there Wab sone large scanda1 , when I was
1
in Mlami, that was played up In the Presg . I forget , some
5 Federal agent who was gomehow Involved wIth the Maffa and with
6 the Syndicate and there was gome iinkage In the Pres9 between
Santos Trafffcante , Cubang and the Federal agent:, but I do not
remember the details of It.
Baron. The Federal agent was not 4 CIA employee?
10 Mr _ Ilalley . No , he was not. My recolluctlon Js he was
11 Narcotics or some thing
12 Mr . Baron. You would make the same sta tement about John
0
13 Roselll that You had no knowledge of hls connectlon with any
2
14 CIA sponsored operation against the Cuban government or agalnst
1 15 Castro personally?
16 Mr . Halley . At the time that I was there You know , I
17 want to caution You that I have read the Prosg . If I have
18 trouble sorting this out, I want you to understand that E
19 Mr . Baron. I understand that clearly.
1
20 Mr . Halley . that this is a dilemma for Me Obvious ly
8
21 I told You I made my own deduction that John c the One that |
22 Harvey was in touch with, must have turned out in the context of
4
23 20/15 hindsight to be John Roselll At the time , I did not
1
24 know that _
1
9 25 Mr . Baron . Mhat about Robert Maheu? Dld You have any
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7
knowledga that he Wag Involved wIth Cuban operatlons AffIlfated
8 2 with the CIA?
1 5 Mr . Halley . No .
1
4 Again , at the time I had no knowl of Robert Maheu . I
5 have since read about Robert Maheu In the Press , allega tIons:
6 and So forth. The name i8 familiar to me now _
Mr . Baron . The same questlon for Sam GIancana .
Mr _ Halley . Again , I gay In angwer that at the time that
I was Involved in 62 and '65 I dfd not know anythIng about
10 Sam Giancana _ I have sInce read In the Presg about hlm.
11 Therefore, the name 1s familiar to me today .
12 Mr Baron . Did you know at that time that Sheffield
2
13 Edwards , who was then Director of the Office of Security , was
4
14 connected in any way: .With thoge efforts agalnst Castro persona ll-
15 or against the Castro government?
<
N 16 Mr . Halley. At that time, Shef Edwards was known to me
17 as Director of Security. That is all I had: no knowledge of
18 his involvement in any activity against Fidel Castro in a
19 Personal gense.
1
20 Shef Edwards did help Security Officers assigned to my 8
21 staff In Miami_ Therefore I would periodically go to him about L
22 the performance of his officers who were On my staff. So during
1
23 the time that I was involved In Cuban &ffalrs , Yes , I dla see 1
24 him , Yes , I did talk to him about Cuban affairs in Miaml _ the
1
9 25 performance of his officers on my staff , but nothing about anyth_ ng
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1 that he might be you know agalnst Fldel Castro.
8 2 Mr _ Baron. I wfll repregent to you that we have testimony
1
3 from Edwards and from Jim; 0'Connel} who wa8 offlcer workIng
1 In the Offlce of Security under Edwards that they were Involved
5 in the early gtages of an asgasginatlon plot agaLnst Castro
6 which wag run out of the Offfce Qf Securlty and later transferre:
to the DDP _ But you are seying that you had no knowledge of
8 any guch operation at that time?
Mr _ Ilalley. I had no knowledge. Ag I told You before , I
10 did not even know Jim 0' Connell.
11 Mr . Baron . Do You know a man by the name of Juan Orta?
12 Mr Ialley . That name ig familiar to me _ It i9 a name 1
13 that has appeared _ know across my scope. X cannot tell
4
14 you why I am familiar with it. I would have to have a trace
C
15 run , you know_ and look at the results of the trace. But the
~
16 name Juan Orta Is known to me. That does rIng a passive bell
17 in memory _
18 Mr Baron . Do remember Milliam Hlarvey having any
19 direct contact with Juan Orta ?
1
20 Mr . Ha lley . No , I Go not i
21 Mr . Daron You do not have any specific recollection of 1
22 Juan Orta S point of involvement In opera tlons against Castro?
1
23 Mr _ Halley. Juan Orta , no . It 1s a name I am familiar
1
24 with. I think You will find _ You know _ that there are a number 1
9 25 of names asked Me to look at that other thing ~6 a number
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doing ,
an
1
You
my
You
You
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76
1 of names that do rIng ball8 wlth m8, I roally would have to
8 2 have back-up material to clarlfy why 4 bell_ Thls 1s
1
3 one that happens to rlng 4 bell with me , but I have no way of
1
4 Inking It to anything , and certainly I do not link It in any
5 way In my memory to Mx . Harvey .
6 Mr . Baron. Do you remember ever hearIng of a Cuban contactl
of Willlam Harvey" 9 who went by the name o€ Maceo?
8 Mr _ Halley. No , I do not.a
Mr _ Baron . He also used the name Of-Garcla Gomez and
10 the name Godoy:
c
11 Mr . Halley . The only name that rings any bell with me
12 in Cuban contacts is Arturo Godoy . Ig this the same' man?
4
13 Mr . Baron . do not have the Efrst name of that alfas _
4
14 In what connection: 'had you heard of Arturo Godoy?
15 Mr Ialley. My recollection 19 I'V0 known Arturo Godoy
16 is that he was the fellow who was actlve In the Cuban Immigre
17
communfty in Miamis That is a1l I can tell you at this point.
18 I would have to go back_
19 Mr _ Baron. You do not remember what group he wag connected
1
with?
20 i
Mr Halley. No , I do not. But it wag a name tha t 21 L
22
obviously , You know frequently referred to In .reports . You
4
KMOlv at one time we did' monitor the Cuban community as to what
23 1
was going on in termg of these various groups and what they
24 1
9 had been doing. For some reason , Arturo Godoy rings a bell with
25
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thoy rIng
Wb
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8
me, Ag I recall, ha wag Bome bort of an actlvlet In goma
8 2 Cuban exlle group_ To glve you a definItiva answer , You know _ I
1
5 woula have to get the nama trace hIm, 'hdve "a-run on :thie !fellow
1
4 and try" to: put 1t together In some kInd of context, but that is
5 the only that rlngs any bells wIth Me.
6 Certainly In my relatlonghlp _lth Harvey , thf8 hag no
meanIng to me, Godoy Harvey Just do not any bells .
Mr _ Baron . One more name that wB already dlscusged , thet
19 Tony Varona .
10 Mr _ Halley. Yes _
11 Mr . Baron . You saLd that did know Tony Varona?
a 5 12 Mr . Halley . I know o€ Tony Varona , that he was leader of
13 the consejo , the revolutlonary counsel that had been set up to
4
14 gort of adminfster the Bay of Plgs operatlon. In the post
15 of era , Nua Cardona and Tony Varona were people who
0
16 still appeared on the exile scene and were prominent. We had
17 some dealings with Nua Cardona officers In the Station had
18 dealings with Nua Cardona and Tony . Varona pay off, You know
19 Injurles to peopoe who had been guffered during the of
1
20 things like that, widows and 90 on . I kjow who he is SO
i
21 forth , the name Is very famfliar to Me. I never Pergonally Met 1
22 with Tony Varona _
i
23 Mr Baron. Were You aware that William Harvey had an
1
24 Independent line of communication with Tony Varona?
1
8 25 Mr. Halley . No I am not.
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Godoy
and rlng
You
5
Pigs Bay
to
Pigs_ Bay
and
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1 Mr . Baron . Woula It gurprIea you If that Were the cage?
8 2 Mr _ Malley . Tha Tony Varona thing would surprlse me,
1
3 frankly. I thlnk I woula not Ga I moula ba 8urprlsed , yes .
4 Mr . Baron . Why 1g that?
5 Mr . Halley . Well, becauge here J8 4 case where the guy
was 4 prominent exile fgurenesgentlally reslding In Mlaml and
I knew of no contacts or had 'o reagons to suspect any contacts]
with ths kInd of an exile figure, though once It specifically
appeared , I was awzre of and Jt Wa g discusged . This Was done
10 under FitzGerald 8 stewardshfp with the Tagk Force. I wag
11 aware of that- I would be surprIsed 1f bombone was In touch
12 with Tony Varona and I did not know about Jt. If you told me
13 tha t is what happoued , that 1s what Ilarvey hag testiffed
4
14 I accept that. I am surprIsed by It.
C
15 Mr . Baron . What wag the na ture of the CIA relatlonship
16 to Artime?
17 Mr Halley. Nell . the Miami Station had direct: relationy
18 ship with him. As +o the nature of the project, you know Artme
19 ran from the AgenGY , from other people who actually worked with
1
'im On a first time basis . 20 i
21 Mr . Baron. Were you aware of a project called AMLASI? 7
22 Mr . Ia lley. Let me make sure we are talking about the same
9
23
thing _
1
Mr _ Baron. off the record _
24 1
2 (Discussion of € the record. )
25
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2
to ,
no
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Mr _ Baron. We have Just gone off tho record to stralghten
8 2 out the fact that wa are both talking about the bame Cuban' high
1
5 milftary officer who wag known to the CIA by the cryptonym of
1
4 AMLASH .
5 Correct 1f I am wrong , Mr . Halley , that you and I agree
6 that we are referring to the game person that wo have Identified
off the record?
Mr . Ilalley . Yes we have .
Mr _ Baron. Were you aware of contact8 between AMIASH-l ,
10 4s he was known , and Artime?
11 Halley . I think: &t the time that: thls wa$ going on , I
12 do not know whether I was or I was not I wag aware that the 1
13 CIA was in touch with AMLASH .
4
14 Mr . Baron . Did: you deal directly wfth the case officers
C
15 who ran AMLASH?
16 Mr _ Halley . I did not. My recollection of this AMLASH
17 case i9 as follows. At:some point in tlme; I- had a convergation
18 with Desmond FitzGerald In Washington during one of my 'periodic
19 visits to Washington Erom Miamf. Ne discussed at that meeting
1
20 the nature of our approach to the military establishment in i
21 Cuba _ In the context of that conversation , Mr _ FitzGerald asked 1
22 Me if I thought whether It would be a gooa idea for hlm to meet
1
23 one of these Cuban military personalities and he subsequently
1
24 identified to me the personality he was talking about was 1
9 25 AMLASH-l .
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1
1 My advica to hJm was that It would probably not ba 4 good
8 2 Idea for him to meet him, and the only thing that I could gee 1
5 coming out of that kInd of 4 contact would be that he, Mr _ 1
4 FItzGerald , would get a Personal feel for what makeg some of
5 these People tIck, In human termg that that probably was
6 too hfgh 4 price to pay for the prospect 1f anything went wrong ,
7 an Indlvidual as promfnent In Washington
48 both within the
Agency and tha soclal world In Washinaton , would be expoged In
the Press . Zhat woula create 4 flap that I thought wa 9 not
10 worth what would be gained from that meeting.
11 Baron . Woula this have been in the fall of 1963?
12 Mr Ia lley _ I no recollection of the time _ 3
13 Subgequent to that, Mr _ FitzGerald told me that he had 4
14 indzed met him ana that he had had an Interesting conversa tion c
15 with him. I subsequently recall that ths gentleman was met
16 in Spain at some point in time
17 Baron . This gentleman being AMLASH-1?
18 Mr . Halley . This gentleman, being AMLASH-1;
was met in
19 Spain. I also recall after having left the Cuban activity that 1
20 I read a Press article showing that: he had been i apprehended
21 and I remember reading the publicity of that partlcular 1
22
activity. It is also my recollection that we In a cache
'
for him. 23 1
24 That is about the gum and substance 0f it. 1
2 25 Mr . Baron _ Do you recall what the purpose o€ that cache
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Mr .
have
Mr .
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81
wag? Rag Jt a cache of armg ?
8 2 Mr . Halley _ It was 4 cache. I think tha € you could 8'
1
5 octothe recora to establish whet wag in tha cache. I do not
1
recall specifically wha€ the material wag that was In the
cache.
Mr . Baron . At the polnt that you were havIng these
convergations with Desmond FltzGerald , though, In the first
Instance the prospect of his contact directly with AMLASH-1,
in the second instance his reaction to his contact with AMLASH- 1
10 do you recall FitzGerald mentlonIng to You the fact that
11 AMLASH had requested asgurances that'hIgh officlal8 of" the U.S_
12 government would stand behind him if he undertook operatfons on
13 behalf of the CIA?
14 Mr _ Halley. I do not recall this at the time_
15 You know I also want to say , as you probably know from
16 the record , I was later Chie€ of the WH Division from 1972 to
17 1973 , and I dia read some of the files. I am famillar with
18 the case. But at the time ~ I am, trying to be schizophrenic ,
19 you know, to this in the time sequence in whlch wB are
1
20 talking about. My recollection of that is that I did not know
8
21 that. 6
22 Mr Baron It would then be your testimony that Mr _
23 FitzGerald never broached with you the subject of making a
1
24 representation to AMLASH-l that Robert Kennedy or other high
1
25 officials of the U.S _ government would stand behind hin?
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Mr . Halley. I do not racall that kInd of 4 convorsation
8 2 taklng place wIth FitzGerald In this tlmeframe that we are
1
5 talking about.
1
1 Mr . Baron . Do you recall any such convergation at any
5 point?
6 Mr _ Ila lley . No , I do not , in the timeframe that we are
talkIng about.
Baron . When I say at any point, I mean at any polnt _
since 1962 _
10 Mr. Ialley . Well, you know , In tha period 1972-73 , I did
11 Iook at 'some of,.the . files , I did read some of the ffles _ I am
12 familiar that such conversations took place and that there 9
13 were a series of . meetings _ You know _ I know who the case
C
0
14 officer was So forths
€
15 Daron _ You never discussed the subject directly with
2
16 FitzGerald?
17 Mr _ Iialley. With FitzGerald, no . I can say that my
18 knowledge of that Is secondhand fron having subgequently read
19 tha files .
1
20 Mr. Baron . Was it your impression at that time that one 8
21 of the objectives of the contact with AMLASH-1 was the assassina 1
22 tion of Fidel Castro or other hlgh Cuban leaders?
23 Mr _ Ha lley No . I never had the Impression that assassina
1
24 tion was a thrust of the activity. In other words we were
25 working across-the-board , both in the context that Desmond
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FItzGerale and hIs Btaft wera workIng on what I wag dolng In
8 2 Mlaml to to establIsh- contacts wlth tho Cuban mflftary.
1
3 In other wordg we saw this 49 4 multl-facoted approach . FIrst,
1
4 we wanted penetratlons of the Cuban mIlItary 80 that we could
5 collect Intelligence. Wha t were thelr strengths _ weaknesges
6 what was their mood , whare were thlngg golng? Secondly , wB
wanted from thesa gources opera tlonal Intelligence. Mho in
other words _ who Jn these groups were dlssatisfied 49 Fldel
congolidated. Who could provide leadership for a counter-
10 movement aga Inst Fldel?
11 Ne Were looking for people, once WB had Identffled them _
12 to see if We could establish contacts with any of these leaders
13 30 we could see whether there was a bas s for worklng toward
1
14 an overthrow of the Castro government. You know _ those were
15 the basfc steps _
16 Now you down to talkIng about how you overthrow
17 Castro , obviously the question comes In of how does a 'group who
18 Wants to run a coup or take power taKe power _ and obvlously
19 one of the things that has to be looked at is where does the
2
20 existing leadership going to be during this event, who has
8
21 control o€ the various units. So our discussions were a11 in 7
22 that context_
1
23 Mr _ Baron . Would it have surprised You or would ft
1
24 surprIse You now to learn that at least part of the contact
1
9 25 with AALASH would have Involved plenning for an assassination
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1
1 attempt agalnst Cas tro.
8 2 Halley . I certaInly wag not awara of that at the
1
5 time , a9g I recall from you know_ lookIng at the files in the
1
4 72-'73 period , seeing any evidence of that In the file at the
5 time.
6 Mr _ Baron . There are fourteen folders In the AHLASH €Ile.
7 Dia you read all of those ffles?
8 Mr . Halley . No , I dia not.
Baron _ Kow did you gather your Lmpresslon that tha t
10 was in the AMLASH fles?
11 Mr . Ha lley . I think I may have read one or two volumes
12 of whatever my question was at the time , because these cases 1
13 keep coming up. You know there mus t have been some Ingulry
1
14 at thu time that necessitated my looking at the folder or
15 dfscussing it with my staff and 90 on .
~
16 Mr Baron . As far a9 you knew_ what was the. objectIve 0 €
17 the contact with Artime?
18 Mr . Ha lley. You mean the CIA contact with Artime?
19 Mr Baron. Yes ,
1
20 Mr . Hla Iley. a concept , the hrtime thing was looked at i
21 a5 another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to 1
22 See if they coula sort of do it on their own If they could
4
23 s Lmply be given_ you know , X number of dollars , some equipment _
1
24 some guidance, and give them an opportunfty to find a Cuban 1
25 solution to what was a Cuban problem_ Tha € was also , you know
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Mr .
Mr .
As
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85
7
and Lf you havo 'not, you Bhould talk to tha People who ran the
8 2 ArtIme operatIon_ when thig Was Bet up , I thInk I partfclpated
1
3 In gIvlng Artime some tutorlal tralnlng for 4 couple of weeks
1
when this operation waS first established In order to famflfarize
5 him with gome of the problemg of trying to manage 4 large_
operatlon against Cuba because he had been out of things for a
couple of Years.
Mr . Baron . You aware that: he had been supplied a
weapon which we already agreed could b0 characterlzed 49 an
10 asgas91natlon Weapon?
11 Mr _ Halley . You gay and I?
12 Mr _ Baron . Yes .
2
13 Mr . Halley . Which weapon was that?
9
14 Mr - Baron . A hiqh-powered rifle wIth long-range and low
C
15 muzzle veloclty.
16 Mr . Ha lley . I am aware of the fact of this project that
Artime wag involved In that: he a number of weapong any 17
number of which could have been used for sniper type activities
18
I am aware of the fact that he had a base In Nicaragua to 19 2
have activities , 90 I would find It hard to slnqle out a weapon .
20 i
My recollection of that that he was given a large number of
21 1
22 weapons
1
Mr Baron _ Was one of Artime- 9 objectives to have been
23 1
to assassinate Fidel Castro?
24 1
2 Mr . Ha lley. Not that I am aware of .
25
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Were
nwe: You
got
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1 Mr _ Baron. Did you ever hear any dlecugelon to the
8 2 effect that the Agency wag attemptIng to achleve through Artime
1
3 Indirectly _ what they did not want to achleve dlrectly In a
4 fashion that .would be attributed to the CIA, namely the
5 assas9ination of Castro?
6 Mr _ Halley . I think that you have tled two Isgueg together
there and I do not thlnk I can answer the question that way.
I would llke to separate the ques tIon Into two parts _
Mr _ Baron. Go ahead _
10 Mr Halley. The fIrst part, 49 I mentloned to you earlier
11 the CIA did establish a relationship with Artime and he was
12 given funds and other support to run his approach to golving 2
13 the Cuban problem_ was One of two such actlvitles that were
C
14 run at the time _ And therefore I think that your statement 1s
15 correct that perhaps he was set up So that there could be no
16 dlrect attrlbution Jn his activities to the Unfted States
17 because he set up a base In" Nicaragua _ and the story as I recall
18 Jt was put out that: he was receiving assistance from the
19 Nicaraguan government , and therefore there wag a part of the 2
20 whole cover story , if You will, for him. 8
21 So _ yes , there was an attempt to set him up as a parallel 6
22 track or a separate track _ That does not follow from that , in
1
23 my perspective , that was geared towards assassination
1
24 Operation , because that was a fantastically large operation
2 25 involving lots of people, You XIOw , with substantial amounts of
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1
He
4
an
1
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87
7
money . I wag oppobed to It at tha tlmo. And once It wag Bet
8 2 up , and I did what I wag guppoged to do , whfch wag to train
1
5 Artime and contributa to hlg training_ I then aid not pay an
1
awful lot of. attention to the thing except what I pIcked up
5 you know. over the Years= and agaln In the 72-'73 perlod ,
and talked to offlcers who had , you know more Intimate knowledg
of It and got an appraIsal of it as to what thought had
occurred.
Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was
10 supplied Weapons for the speclfic purpose oE assassinating
11 Castro?
12 Mr . Halley. No , not for the specific purpose of asgassina-
13 ting Castro .
3
14 Mr _ Baron _ Was it your general impression that AMI;A SH- 1
C
15 was 8 reliable agent?
~
16 Mr . Halley . I really' do not know that much about him,
K
You know _ This was an operation that was run at that time out 17
of Washington and _ know _ my knowledge was as I described it 18
19 to you, the conversations with FitzGerald _ Madrid , newspaper
1
articles , so forth , in that particular timeframe _
20 i
21 Mr Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge 4s? any gambling 1
Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were 22
4
connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational
23 1
purpose including the intelligence gathering?
24 1
8 Mr . Ha lley. The case tha + I recall is this case that
25
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they
Mr .
you
only
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8 8
I mentloned to you Barller whon wB wero In touch wIth in
8 2 IndIvidual whose name I cannot remember who had been Involved
1
5 with one of the gambling houses In Cuba who came to 49 :wlth
1
leads to Soviets from a missile sIte who wanted to defect.
5 That 1s the only case that I know of. I cannot think of 'the
6 man 8 name . I can glve you a physical degcription of him, and
7 90 forth. I honestly cannot think of his name .
Mr _ Baron . You are not aware of any other use of people
with gambling Interests in Cuba for Intelllgence ga thering?
10 Mr _ Halley . Not that I am aware of _ If you have somethIng
11 specfflc that you want to pursue, 1f You can give me some otherr
12 clue than that, I just do not , out o€ my Pagt memory , I sImply 4
13 do not recall any other case but that: one-
4
14 Baron . Are you 'aware of any contact between the CIA
C
15 and Meyer Lansky?
16 Mr Halley. No , I am not aware of any contact between the
17 CIA and Meyer Lansky .
18 Mr _ Baron . Nas Howard Hunt connected with any Cuban
19 operatlons during the period of your tenure at JMWA VE Station?
1
20 Mr _ Halley. Howard Hunt was involved in the of Pigs 8
21 Operation_ After the of Pigs Operation wsg over he did not 1
22 participate in the Cuban activitles that I was aware of _
5
23 may know some thing that I do not. know because, you know You
1
24 have asked me a couple of questions here of thincs that I am 1
2 25 not aware of _ You may know some th_ chat I do not, but
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Mr .
Bay
Bay
You
ing
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8 9
1
1 certafnly he did not coma acrogg my horlzon at tho tIme that I
8 2 was In Mlamf.
1
3 Mr . Baron . Have you ever heard the phrase Executive
1
4 Actlon?
5 Mr Halley . Yes .
6 Daron. Mhat does that ggnlfy to you?
7 Mr . Ila lley . Well_ Executive Actlon 18 some gort of a
8 euphemsm 5 to eliminate gomebody , I guess Is how Jt appears
9 In the popular jargon .
10 Mr Baron . Did hear It In the Agency?
11 Mr . Halley. No , I think that this 1s a term that has been
12 bandied about in the Pregs that: has come about in the Press to
4
13 ba synonymous with killing somebody or something like that.
C
0
14 Mr . Baron . It is not, as far as You know , a euphemism in
:
15 comon usage within the Agency?
16 Mr . Ha lley- No _
Mr _ Baron. Had You ever heara of the ZRRIFLE Project run
18 by William Harvey?
Mr. Halley. No I do not know what 1t Is _ 19
1
Mr _ Baron. Have You ever heard of 20 8
Mr . Halley . I want_ to make sure here that I am accurate , 21 L
22 You xnow. You are asking me ZRFIFLE _ That 1s a cryptonym for
4
something
23 1
Mr _ Baron . Let me explain further.
24 1
8 25 Mr Ila lley . I want to sort of say , In the last thirteen
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Mr .
you
17
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L Yearg I havu sieen iterally
2 (Discusslon of € the record. ) 8
1
5 Mr Halley _ Let Me go back- You asked me about ZRRIFLE .
1
This is one of a thousand or hundreds of cryptonyms _ Ever Y
5 I read , know hundreds of pages o€ traffic_ s0 when you ask
6 Me do I know what ZRRIFLE 1g , I must answer You of f the top 0 €
my head no I have tried to be helpful _ I ha ve asked You
several times 1f You could give me a steering tip or show me
what direction you are going , I might be able to to comment
on it; but ZRRIFLE a3 guch means nothing to me You rea lly
10
could not expect that it would _ given the thousands o f these 11
things that come across my desk
( 12 4
Mr . Baron. That is absolutely undlerstandable _ I want to 13
J
14
try to 8 ee what happens in the way of getting an unre freshed
recollection from You , then I will 90 back over these two_
15
especially the next one QJIIN . Do You recall a CIA asset who
16
went by the cryptonym QJMIN?
17
Mr Halley_ No I do not_ Krowing the system S0
18
forth , norma ]ly it would have something to do with Spain. It
19
2
does not ring any bells with me That Is a 1 1 I can give You ,
20 j
a sort 0 f Pavlovian responge_ You flash QJIYIN on the screen ,
21 1
I am telling now '[ do not know , but it probably has
22
v something to do with Spain_
23
:
5 Mr Baron . Were You awre that a project involving the
24
development 0 f a capability carrying on assassination Wag
25
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HH
day
You
try
and
You
0 €
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'91
1 run by William Harvey?
8 2 Mr _ Ha lley . To deVelop the capabflfty to carry on the
1
3
assa9sinatfon?
L
Mr _ Barnn _ Yes
5 Mr . Ialley . No I havu no knowledge of Iarvey being
6
focused on a project or given the capabflfty of carrying one
out- 7
8 Mr _ Baron. Harvey has testifled , as has RIchard Bissell ,
I will represent You , that instruction was given by Blssell
10 to Harvey to set up , to develop such a capabflity in early 1961
11
and that Harvey took steps to develop such a capabilfty in
coordination with an asset In New York named QJRIN and I think 12 3
13
that period of greatest activity was in 1962 and MIN was
8 involved in spotting potential assets among the criminal under- 14
world in Europe and might be used for any nuber of dirty
15
deeds _
16
Mr diGenova _ It should be emphagized tha t the Executive
17
Action Plan that You ara referring to has had as its goal the
18
incapacitation of foreign leaders one posgibility of
19 1
Incapacitation being the ultimate weapon _ assassination. It
20 8
was just not assassination. It was a spectrum of activitfes
21 1
that could be to incapacitate a foreign leader anywhere
22
4 from illness _ chemical warfare , and then including dea th _
23 1
Correct me if I am wrong , but i+ was not just assassination.
24 1
Mr _ Daron . Does that ring any be lls ?
25
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HY ge
to
used
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7
1 Mr Halley. It doeg not_
8 2 Mr . Baron. Do have any recollection that the ZRRIFLR
L
5 Project Involving the development of an Executive Action
1
capability would have been tied in in any way to an opera tion
5 against Cuba ?
6 Mr _ Halley . No , that does not ring any bells _ none what-
goever
Mr Baron. I would like to Introduce 49 Ha lley Exhibit
3 an article from Ilarper s Magazine entitled "The Kennedy
10 Veadetta subtitled How the CIA Waged a Silent Nar Against
11 Cuba = wrftten by Taylor Branch and George Crile Iii_
12 Let me show You this article and let me ask whether 3
13 yYou have read it?
C
1
14 Mr . Halley . Yes , I have read the article.
C
15 The document referred
16 to was marked Ila lley
1 7 Exhibit No 3 for
18 identification. )
19
8
20 8
2 1 1
22
'
23 1
24
25
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HH Qwt
No
You
you
1
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1 Mr Baron. Let plck out Boma 8poclflcg and discugs L
8 2 them brlefly here,
1
3 Near the begInnlng of this article , It mentions that JMWAVE
1
4 Station operated within an annual budget of well in excess of
5 S50 million.
6 Would that be accurate to
Mr Ha lley . I do not recall whether that is an accurate
would have to go back to the records: You know as figure_
I explalned to you earlier , the start of the opera tion taking
10 place in March and escalated up. to a high' polnt;and then
dropped off . In the budgetary cycle, we are dea ling with a
11
mass of figures I would not want to give You an Inaccurate
12 2
answer Tha t is something that could be researched we have
13
( 1
the files rather than speculate for you on the buildup and
14
2
reduction the operation . I do not feel that 1s ugefulw
15
Mr Baron. As a ba llpark figure, would be able to
16
place the annua 1 budget the Station in the neighborhood
17
of tens of millions of dollars?
18
I would not, because of this transition,
19 Mr . Halley .
know period the costs Were Very high in the beginning to
20 You
8
tion, brouqit to a certain peak = and then
21 get a start-up opera 7
tapered of € and starting to be peeled back . I would want
22
9
to draw a figure
23 _
1
Mr _ diGenova Fha + would the start-up cost?
{ 24
8 Mr. Ia l ley . In terms 0 f what they Involved or dollars?
7 25
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HH age
ug
You?
We
and
in
You
of
NO ,
not
of
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1 Mr _ dLGenova . Dollars _
8 2
Mr . Halley _ I have no recollection of the dollars .
1 3
Mr Baron _ Would you say that s50 mIllion would ba in the 1
4 right ba llpark for your activtles at the peak?
5 Ialley . I Just have no recollection of the dollar
6 You might want to get that when you can retrieve
7 It in the flles. It is avallable _
3 Mr. Baron. Were the operatlons of JMWAVE coordinated with
other Latin American CIA Seation' 8 , as the artlcle indicates
10 here?
11 Mr . Halley . I think my recollection of that phase is that
12 Cuban activities with other Latin American stations were
13 coordinated with JMINAVE_
14 Mr _ Baron. Coordinated with JMWAVE?
15 Mr _ Halley . With JMWAVE .
16 Mr . Baron _ Who had the central coordinating responsibility
17 Ialley . Washington _
18 Mr _ Baron . Nas that delegated by Washirgton
19 Mr Halley. No Essentially Washington had the overall
8
20 coordinating responsibility, but that needs some elaboration. 9
21 Let say that we would becomg aware in our activities in 1
22 Miami that a number of interestinq people had come in on a
1
23 flight to Mexico Mle would a cable . down to Mexico 1
{ 24 city with an informa tion copy to Waghington, outlining who we
2 25 Were Interested in, and I would probably send somebody down to
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H age
Mr .
figure. figure
4
1
Mr -
to You?
me
City_ send
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95
L Mexico to look at the particular Cuban or the operationa)
8 2 opportunfty Jn conjunction .with the Station Chief in Mexico
1
5 So we were In gome cases 4 clearInghouse_
1
4 The Elnal coordination authority
restud In. Nashington. I
5
will say that if Mlaml wanted to do some and for local
6
politcal reasons in Mexico the Mexican Statlon' Chfef did not
want to do it, tha t would be. adjudicated , not by Miamf , but by
Washington.
Mr _ Baron . Let me quote you a pasgag0 here and see if it
10 comports with our discussions earlfer of spacial arrangements
11 You may the JMNAVE Station have had , with law enforce-
12 ment authorlties in Florida
13 The article says : I Al the boat miggions Cuba were tech
1
14
nically illegal under the Neutrality Act, the Maritime Laws ,
6
15 and Immigtation statutes , so that the Station had to work out
16
special acrangements with Customs Immigra tion and the Coast
Guard
17
Is that genera lly accurate? 18
19
Mr _ Ialley. I think , as I described to you before , there 1
20 was coordination with the Coast Guard in terms of Vessel 1
21
departures _ The other is Immigration? 1
22
Mr Baron . Customs Immigration and Coast Guard _
5
23 Nr Halley _ Immigration , there would not have been 1
24
coordination a particular You know boat tch On the {
2 25
other hand , let' s say i f a mission aborted for som9 reason ard
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city.
thing
have , may
to
or dispa
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9.6
1 a sma11 boat could not racover It8 posftlon and get back to the
8 2 mother to be plcked up and It was' adrfft or cama In to one 1
5 of the Islands or came In to the Florida coag t anywhere and was
picked up and picked up by Immigration inapectors , then they
5 would ask to have thefr case referred to 8 particular individual
6 It have 8 code number 4 color code , It may have been
phrase . But then Immigration would get In touch with us and say
8 we have thfs group , here Is what say , what 19 your Interes t
9 in this particular group , and then that would be adjudicated
10 at that polnt.
11 Now the third group was Cus toms Customg did have a
12 number of pa trols and at times when boat 1 loadings were conducted
C 13 of f the Florida Keys in particular , those were coordinated with
C
1
14 the Coast Guard S0 would not be expending their manpcwer C
15 to run down groups that were extricating with uS , in fact the
16 Agency was dofng _
17 Mr_ Baron _ The article continues to say : "It was illega l
18 for agents to travel around with machine guns and plastic
19 explosives in the cars , as they often did . The Statlon had 2 to
8 20 establish liaison with seventeen police jurisdictions a long
21 the Florida coast and into the Keys . The result was that
1
22 any agent who was arrested any thing from drunken driving to 4
23 illegal possession firearmg would be quickly released . 1
24 Is that accurate? 1
25 Mr. Malley . I commented that beforz, and we are on the
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aub
ghfp
1
may been
they
they
for
'of
on
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97
record on tha t 49 8ayIng that Wo did not drive around , there L
vehicles moving , manned by thege Cuban8 with armg and
2 weru 8
1
5 weapons on them .
1
In other words , You are coming back to the Same po Int,
1
becaus0 as I explained to You , the weapons were only given to
5
them OM the vessel and taken back Erom them when they cama back
from a mission, S0 that the sta tement 19 not actually correct_
Mr Daron . wha t about the end of tha t passage where they
8
say that the rusult, I understand that you would disagree
9
as to whether it was a result of thls kind of a practice which
10
You say was not carried on at all.
11
Mr Halley. It was not 12
8
Mr . Baron _ Did a situation exist whera any agent who was
0' 13
C
8
arrested for anything from drunken drfving to illegal possession
14
of firearms would be quickly released -
15
Mr Ia lley_ I have to go back and divide Your question
tape 6 16
into two parts There were no firearms
17
Mr Baron _ I am not gaying firearms supplied to them by
18
the CIA for a CIA misgion any agent travelling down the
19
12
street in Miami who happened to have a
Saturday Night Specia l
3 20
6
in his car who happened to be drunk while driving_ Nould
21 1
such a person be released right away or once the CIA connection
22
5 surfaced?
235
:
ansiver to that is no In other words , i f
5 Mr . Ha lley_ My
24
he had a
Saturday night Special wag picked up by the police
25
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HH age
sno
and
~~
or
or
and
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9 8
and detained and 5f he then asked to be In contact wIth 48 ,
8 2 the case would ba looked at at that particular point and If he
L
5 had a Saturday Night Special you know; there would not be any
1
Intervention on his behalf becaus e it had nothing to do with
5 his task on the behalf of CIA.
I did mentlon to You earlier we had training camps in various
parts the State_ IE somebody came out o f the trainlng camp
and did get drunk and was picked up and did not speak English
or some thing and the police jurisdictions did have a way of
10 getting In touch with us and we might intervene on a case of
11 disorderly conduct
12 Mr _ diGenova How was that established , the rela tlonship
13 liaison with these jurisdictions Had it been set up with
8
14 JMWAVE directly through Iashington and down through the FBI?
<
15 How had that been done?
16 Mr Halley. It varied_ When We started expand the
17 operation , you know there had already been a Station there
18 and there a Iso were two security units tha greater Miami
19 area In some cases the existing contacts a + the Station Were 2
20 expanded , tha same with Dade County_ In other cases the 3
21 security 0 f personnel who had tablished contact with other 1
22 jurisdictions were used to effect the introduction_ In s ome
5
23 cases we had our security people who were on my sta f f g0 out
1
24 to these jurisdictions ard identify themselves simply with a
25 badg e and a name and discuss the kinds of things that they Were
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of
4
ing
in
es
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1
inturested Ln 90 that there would not ba 4 cro8g {Of ' problems
8 2 with these jurisdictlong and therefore 4 IJalson Was opened on
1
5 that basfs , 4 multlpllcity of approaches .
1
4 Nr Baron. The articlu discusses the fact that regular
5 commando raids Were run out of JMWAVE Station to the shore of
6 Cuba , and the t those commando8_ were equipped with a1l kinds of
7 explosives and armaments
8 Is that genera lly a fair statement, tha t we were running on
9 a regular basis commando ralds to Cuba ?
10 Mr _ Ha lley. Yes _ There Were a serieg of commando raids
11 run from the Miami Station aga ingt targets In Cuba _
12 Mr . Baron. Nere assassination weapons that is , high-powerkd
13 rifles with low muzzle velocity and telescopic sights supplfed
C 1
14 to those commando teams as a matter of course?
c:
< 15 Mr Halley . No , they were not. For most of thos e
16 commando teams You Were looking for a dffferent kind of a
17 weapon: You are looking for a weapon with a high range of Eire
18 power OVer a short distance to deal with an emergency sftuation
19 rather than the kind of , You know weapon that We are talking
2
about_ 20 8
21 In other words would Eind_ that type of a group armed 1
22 with a submachine gun , as for example _
5
23 Mr Baron If an assassination waapon as we have
1
24 described it was gupplied to a commando team they would have
1
2 25 to have a specific purpose in mind Eor its use?
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1
you
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100
1 Mr Halley. Yes _
8 2 Also , again, a 1l o€ these weapons were controlled the
1
5 weapons that were issued at the time 0 € the mission on the
1
mother ship picked up on the team S return to the mother
5 ship , s0 there was accountability for the Weapons
6 Mr Baron. Would it have been unusual to supply what we
have called an assa9sination Weapon to a commando team?
Mr _ Ha lley . Well, that dependg on the mission: For
instance , let use an example_
1C Most of the missions that Were run were run aqains t targets
11 that were in fairly close proximity to the shore. Ie you are
12 going to put a party to attack Your objectives let uS the
3
13 objective was a Petroleum storage tank 1f You were going to do
c'
14 this by putting charges against the" petroleum storage tank
15 that meant that You had to have a group infiltrate close
16 enough to the charges on the tank Some distance away
from them You would them a second element of the commando
17
18 team which would be providing covering Eirz for this group in
19 case they to trouble and cannot hand le it on the ground _
20 This covering fira group might have had a light machine
i
2 1 a Be Igian Weapon. They could have these kinds 0€ weapons and 1
22 they did haVe these kinds of weapons which in the definition You
5
are using could be used as a sniper weapon or whatever but the
23 1
basic reason for having that weapon was to provide fire support
24
for the other Members uf the commando team_ And therefore wl1en
25
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HH page @z
and
me
say
2 up
Put
give
got in
1
gun _
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101
L this mlssion wag ovbr and they returned , thoge weapong were
{ 2 taken back from them and accounted for were shaken down
1
5 S0 that we did not have weaponj dlsappearing out of our
1
4 control_
5 Mr . Baron _ Such weapons high-powered rifles with telescop
6 scopes conceivably With silencers , Were supplied with some
regularity , but they were kept under tight control?
8 Mr Ialley. We had high-powered rifles _ I cannot think now
9 of a case where there was a sniper scope attached to the rifle_
10 I can think no case where there was a 9ilencer attached to
11 a rifle in ary of these commando raids _ There were a number of
12 raids conducted _ some of them involved teams of fifteen or
(7 13 twenty men . I am not prepared to say that no man ever had one
0
14 but. I do. not recall one. You know if You gave me an inventory
15 which are in the files , for each of the operations and say hera
16 is the operation plan , does this list of equipment fifteen Years
17 later look reasonahle to YOIl , I would be able to tell Yes
18 or no But off the of my head , I do not recall a sniper
scope or a silenced rifle_
8
Mr Baron . Do you know a man by the name of Rolando 20 8
21 Martinez? 1
22 Mr Halley _ Of Natergate involvement?
5
Mr Baron Yes 23
1
Mr _ Ialley . Yes I know o f hin. I have never met him 24 1
8 persona I know o€ him. Ile was a member 0f our boat
25
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HH Je
They
of
you
top
19
1ly .
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102
Infiltratlon tuam. Ho wag 4 UDT man .
8 2 Mr Baron _ In the Harper 3 article , It says that Martinez
1
5 indicatud that More than once ho was givun persona l charge c€
L
Weapons drops in which special rifles with 9flencers and tele-
5 scopic sights were left in designated inland spots _
6 Do You know o€ a factual basis for that sta tement?
Mr . Halley. Martlnez is undoubtedly factually correct when
he say9 he caches on the coast of Cuba that conta{ned weapons
9 I do not know how he would be ahle to tell what kInd of weapons
10 were in the cache. The reagon I that 1s that when one of
11 these missions were planned _ the cache was put together and
12 packed by our logistics group and once the cache was
13 togther it was brought on board the Vessel and the cache was
8
14 then turned over to the team- for infiltration 90 he would never
15 have S een the contents o f the cache he would not have opened
16 it up because it was always in a sealed container _
1 7 It is conceivable that in the pre-mission briefing that
18 he be fore he went down that he was told that we are putting
19 In a cache conta ining a radio or putting in a cache containing
12
weapons because tha : would influence what he selected as a 20 5
cache type_ In other words i € it Were a radio , we would wart 2 1 1
22 ft higher and drier than we wonld a can containing weapons that
5; were wraped in cosmolena and s0 forth He might know that they
23 1
were Wcapons but he wouldln t kro that Were s i lenced
{ 24
and they had a scope. I mus t honestly say to Yoi I doubt that
25
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10 3
Mr Baron . Did You know 0f any waapong dropg that were
8 2 mada for the purpose o € supplying someono Ins id9 Cuba with a
1
5 weapon for the a9sa99 inatfon of Fidel Cas tro?
1
4 Mr _ Malley . No not for that clearly s ta ted purpose _ As
5 I told You , we a lot oE weapons cacheg in. The weapons were
6 multi-purpoge weapons could be used . I know of no cache tha t
went In specifically for the task of playing a contributory role
to #sgassinating Fidel Casgtro
Mr _ Baron. It would not have been contrary to the policy
10 directves under which you were operating at the time to
11 supply such a weapon to someona inside Cuba who miqht have
12 access to Castro?
C:
13 Mr Halley. No , it would not have been _ instance
c9
14 I can remember several resistance groups that we had that had twd or
8
15 three hundred men that we were supplying a regular basis
<
16 Mr_ diGenova Ide Cuba?
1 7 Mr _ Halley. Ingide Cula that were essentially living in
18 thz bush to a large extent , whom we did supply weapons to and
19 got amunition to them and S0 forth And that was why I was
2
20 very careful when You mentioned this linkage before to saying
U
6
{ 2 1 that I could not ba a guaantor as to what these Men would do
1
22 with these weapons onc e they got their hands on them. They
23 Were free agents
1
24 Mr dicznova _ This is an interesting point . This has
25 come up be fore _ ar e aware our reading 0 f the record that
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2
For
}
on
Ins
'
of Ne
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1104
what you hava 8a Ia 18 a concern of not only yourself In termg of
8 2 realizing that it wag 4 poggIbflity but' of :paople' Ike Dean
1
5 Rusk and Mr McCone , who algo safd you have to realize then
1
once thesg agents are in another country and are supplied that
5 thore is little if anything we can do to control those weapons
6 after they receive them. It would be 9afe to say that that,
course , wag understood that there was a lack of control , and
to the extent that it was a problem _ It exsted and had to be
tolerated because of the nature of the opera tion , would that
10 be correct?
11 Mr . Halley. I do not know whether I want to phrase it
12 exactly as You have in terms of this lack of control _ Our
c;
;
13 mission in dealing with these groups was to ffrst, to them
1
14 in areas where WB did not have other intelligence covers . Their
C
15 first task was to collect Intelllgence _
16 The: second task was to organize a resistance which would
17 take armed action if we ever a total package together
18 that Jave us an opportunity that was the first and secondary
missions _ Once we issued the weapons to the team leader , if
19 1
20 yoa will, he had freedom to recruit from among the peasants
8
21 anybody he wanted If he gave the peasant a weapon, there 1
22 was no guarantee either by the team leader or by us that that
4
peasant would not do some thing that we did not want him to do ,
23 1
To even shoot a militiaman, you could have an argument , You
{ 24
25 know over a woman numher of things _
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put got
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Any
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1 Mr diGenova _ Wera there any restrictlong once, for
8 2 example , those weapons caches Were delivered efther by land or
1
5 air we have spoken to Mr . Murray who was in the Mavana
1
Station, for example , for awhile and Arthur Avignon wha
5 wag head of the Havana Station for awhfle who indicated that
6 they were aware of the weapons drops and_ were Intimately
7 fumiliar with where they would be .
8 Mr . Ha lley_ Tha t wug al1 before my time. I have
knowledge 0 f that. During my tine we made no drops by air.
10 Mr diGenova Were there any limitations that wera
11 placed of how the Weapons would be usad that were delivered into
12 Cuba to these internal resistance groups?
3
13 Mr . Halley. I cannot speak to this perfod that you are
4
14 addressing -
G
15 Mr diGenova During period_
16 Mr Halley. Duricg my Periodl , the weapons were issued
17 essentia lly as self-protection for the people who were living
18 in the bush . Secondly , to be in a military operation at
19 such time as wa got the whole package together Thirdly , they
{
20 were to be used for self-protection i€ they conducted reids
a
2 1 ambushes sabotage operations 1
22 Nr Daron There is one further quote from Martine z in
v
this article tha t I would like to ask You to comment on 23
1
Me is quoted as saying : I took 2 lot o f weapons to Cuba some
24
25 them Were very special weapons for special purposes They
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used
0 €
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were powerful rifleg WIth sophlsticated 8copes SprIngflelds
8 2 with bolt action, rifles by snlpers _ They were not
1
5 sent to shoot pigeons or to kill rabbits _ Everyone In the
1
4 Underground was plotting to k11l Castro the CIA was helping
5 the Underground _ I was with the Underground as well as tha CID,
6 s0 you can see I was involved the plots too, but that is
also obvious
You commented before that there was a lot of talk in the
air about assassinatlng Castro. Martinez suems to bg taking
10 that a few steps further saying that thera were actual plots
11 underway in the Cuban Underground to assassinate Castro and
12 that people who worked with the CIA were awara of those plots
13 and Were aiding them in effect by the weapons they were
14 supplying _
15 Is that an accurate S tatement?
16 Mr _ Halley . I do not think I can go &long with that
17 statement _ Martinez role as I described it to you , he is
18 accurate whan he says tha t Weapong were in :&nd that
19 he Partfcipated in putting them in. I again question how he
1
20 would know what was in each cache . 1 just do not see that , and
8
21 I would have to accept that a sort o€ secondhand statement 1
22 by him because' the way that the caches were together _
%
23 I just do not see his knowing that_
1
24 Now I don' t want to exclude , however, that any particular
25 kind weapon did not go to Cuba _ Maybe bolt-action
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used only
and
In_
J
J
No ,
Put
as
Put of-
of
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1
SprIngflelds did go In.
8 2 Mr _ diGenova . Could he have found out about thfg after
1
5 the fact from people that he knew in Cuba members the
1
resistance in Cuha tha t he knew of who would have told him the
5 nature of the Items that they would have recelved in a cache
6 delivery? Would that be one way that he could have found out?
Nas he that intimately involved _ to your knowledge?
8 Mr Malley . He was not at the time _ This is the period
that I am failiar with, 62- ' 65 . I do not know _ Maybe some
10 of thege people have come out since then , and ma} be he has
11 talked to people who have come out In '68 , 69_ things like that
12 I cannot exclude that_
{
13 At the time , I do not think, however , he would have had
1
14 that kind o€ firsthand knowledge , and therefore I have trouble
15 with that statement and I cannot identify wfth it_
16 Mr . Baron . The Harper 5 article says By the of
17 1961 , several men affiliated with the CIA had a lready been
18 foiled in attempts to kill him" meaning Castro among
19 them , Luis Toroella , executed; Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo , still in
1
20 prison; William Morgan , executed ; Antonio Veciana escaped
8
21 to the United States Mad these men succeeded _ their e fforts 7
22 would have been tied to the U.S . only indirectly , 1f at a11. "
5
23 Let me show you the passage I am readlng and ask
1
24 You whether You have any knowledge of the ccnnection o f any 0f
1
25 those Mer named to the CIA _
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fron
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1 (Pause)
8 2 Mr Halley . No there 19 no connectlon that I know of
1
3 between these nameg and CIA, Thls guy Luls Toroella doe8 not
any bells witn Me . Gutierrez Menoyo was a leader of
5 Alpha 66 _ He may have been In Cuba in 61 _ During the time
that I was involved in Cuban affairs he wag In exile for 75 he
was in Mfami for ~a lorg period of time _
Mr . Baron. Can You explain what Alpha 66 is for the
record?
10 Mr . Halley . Alpha 66 was a Cuban exile organizatlon that
11 was engaged in a number o€ raids against the Cuban government.
12 claimed to have attacked Cuban shipplng , ffshing boats and 4
13 claimed to have an organizatlon In Cuba that was a resistance
C 1
14 organization. Gutierrez Menoyo was therefore a well-known name
C
15 to me We had no direct contact with hlm_
16 Wvilliam Morgan is also a well-known name His activities
17 and exploits in Cuba are Well-known to anybody that has dealt
18 with Cuban affairs_
19 Baron . Do You have any knowledge of a connection
I
20 between any of these people and assassination a ttempts aga inst
5
21 Fidel Castro? 1
22 Mr Halley. I have none , no connection be tween these names
%
23 and CIA and attempts to assassina te Fidel Castro
1
24 Baron. The fact that: they are listed here a5 having
{
25 been involved in assassination attempts whether or they
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1
ring Eloy
They
Mr .
Mr _
not
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109
1
were connected with CIA 1s news to
8 2 Mr Ha lley . Well , no , I would not say that. If You had
1
5 Gutferrez Menoyo gitting here and 1f he were to say in 1962 I
1
attempted to shoot Fidel Castro that is Gutlerrez Menoyo dia
5 this , I would have no reagon to doubt_ I would have no basis
for proving it, uither.
Mr Baron _ You have never heard of these alleged assassina
8 tion attempts before?
Mr Halley. No
10 Morgan 8 name I would have do a file trace to myself
11 back up to date Morgan did get himself in trouble with Fidel
12 over some issue; as I recall was in prison I do not recall
13 remember 1f he was executed although this says he Kas executed
1
14 Mr . Daron _ (vha t about the last name on the list,
15 Antonio Vecfana?
16 Mr Ia lley. Tha t i9 a name that rlngs a bell with me , but
1 7 I do not attach anything to it_ In other words , it is a name
18 [ have probably read in various and sundry kinds of reports
19 [ remumber no operatlona ] relationship with him between the Miam
2
20 Station and thls man during my tenure in Miami
8
2 ] Mr Baron _ During your tenure wou ld You have been in 2 1
22 position to know that these peop le had led assassination
'
23 a ttempts ag4 inst Custro 1 € that were indeed the fact?
1
Mr Hla ey _ Not necessari ly _ I would say that thz odds 24
25 wou ld have been hfqh that we would hav? , particularly , saY
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110
Gutiurrez Menoyo . We did have a steady 8 tream of reporting on
8 2 the activities of a1l xile groups and Alph? 66 was high on the
1
5 list of groups that had a capability of dolng thls kind
1
thing . Therefore , they received quite a blt of coverage from
5 4s , from the FBI , from Customs and otherg _
6 were on everybody 9 sort of watch list_
7 Mr Baron. Let us turn now to a document tha t we will
introduce as Exhibit 4 , which is a report by Fidel Castro on
alleged attempts to assassinate hlm that ne connects to the
10 United States government and especially to the CIA _
11 (The document referred
12 to was marked Ha lley
13 Exhibit No . 4 for
1'
14 identification. )
C
15
16
1 7
19
2
20 i
21 1
22
4
23 1
24
2 25
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1
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1 Mr. Baron. Which wag released recently by Gborge McGovern ,
8 2 to whom Castro had sent thfs report.
1
5 Halley , 1s it true that I had askad you to review this
1
report before we began our session today?
5 Mr . Halley . Yes , You did , you did ask Ma to look at the
report_
Mr . Baron . Can You point to any nameg or incidents in
this report that are connected in any way In your mind to
9 actual assassination attempts against Cuba: Castro?
10 Mr Ilalley_ No , I cannot point to any names that In my
11 mind are attached to an assassination attempt against Castro;
12 You asked me to look at this originally to see if any of the
{
13 names Were familiar to me in any way. I made a list of some
3
14 of the names that rang a bell with me , for various reasons
15 One name 1s Humberto Sori Marin. I recall that he was
16 active, he was active with the DRE
17 Mr Daron. At what page is that?
18 Mr Ia lley. There is no page number
19 For instance, here S a name , Humberto Sori Marin. That
2
20 familiar to me. I do know whether that was the
i
21 reporting showing that: he was in prison , You know we constantl L
22 got reporting on , or it is a nama that I recognize in the
23 counterrevolutionary sense that it is something that crossed
1
24 my desk , to See tha name
{
2 111 rights Th 2 other name that is familiar is Tony Varona 25
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Mr .
is
from not
whyi
4
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112
1
Tha t was 4 Cuban exllo leader_ We talked about Tony Varona _ I
: 2 told You I did not know that Tony Varona had any connectlon with
1
5 Mr _ Harvey.
1
4 There is another name In here , Manolo I mentloned
5 Manolo Ray to You. He wag one of two exlle leaders who had a
6 relationship with the Agency. know , I told You Artime was
one ; Manolo is another. He is familiar to me 49 a result of
that_
Mr . Baron . You did not know of any Involvement of Manolo
10 in assaSsination effort agaInst Cagtro?
11 Halley. I do not.
12 Here is another name mentioned in the same paragraph , J
13 Aureliano Sanchez Arango . Tha t is a name that is familiar to
4
14 Me as a prominent Cuban exile.
6
15 Mr Baron_ You have no more specific recollection?
16 Mr . Ilalley . I am trying to be responsive to question
17 telling you which names ring a bell with as I run through
18 this.
19 Mr Baron. All I am trying to do is clarify for the
12
20 record the exact na ture of your recollection o€ each these i
21 names _ 1
22 Do You have any recollection of a plot a lluded in this
'i
23 report to shoot Castro with a bazooka at the Havana Stadium?
1
24 Mr Ma lley . I do not haVe any recollection of that.
25 According to this , i€ this ig correct, it took place in October
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Ray .
You
Ray
Ray an
Mr .
your
me
of
to
No ,
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113
of 61 which I woula not have had any knowledge of becauge I
8 2 Was not Involved in Cuban affalrs untll, 49 I told,you, early
1
3 February 1962 .
1
4 Mr - Baron . The same would go for the ghooting of a
5 ba zooka towards the Presidentlal Palace?
6 Ur _ Halley . I have no knowledge_
7
Mr _ Baron _ Do You have any knowledge of any efforts to
assassinate Fidel Castro run out of Guantanamo Naval Bage?
Mr _ Ilalley . I do not. As you know Guantanamo had
10 8 number of Cuban exiles in It, people who had taken refuge in
11 the basse at one time or another. During the time that I was the
12 Station Chief in Miami We did heve contacts with people at
2
13 Guantanamo _ Re did us e them for Intelligence collection
9
14 purposes _ but I do not have any linkage between that intelligenc:
15 project and assassination.
16 Mr _ Baron . Were paramilitary operations run out of
17 Guantanamo Bay?
18 Mr . Halley . They were not during my time as Statlon Chie €
19 in Miami by CIA. There was an office of ONI , office of
2
20 Nava l Intelligence representative on Guantanamo _ I have
i
21 knowledge what they may have been doing during various 1
22 periods o€ timz _ I am talking about CIA.
1
23 Mr Daron other names that struck a chord with You
1
24 in this report?
1
8 25 Mr _ Mlalley . We ll, have a namg here , Mario Salabarria
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No ,
no
of
Any
You
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114
7
Aqular; that name 4 bell wIth me , for what reason , I do
8 2 not know_ You know We would have to run 4 name tracs to get
1
5 rundow of what is In the files and what 18 in the central
1
Index for me to be able to comment on it. As I told you earlier
5 I knowv that the Agency Is dolng a11 these traces after they are
completed and get them and you want me to take a look at
it, I will bu to do So . It may trlgger some response.
This name , Ramon Grau Scerio , it ringg a bell with me . It
9 1s gulte possible that he may have been a collection agent , just
10 as is written here. I am making a deduction, but agaln, I would
11 have to look at the name traces but it i9 a name that rings a
12 bell with me
8
13 Mr . Baron. You do not remember him in connection with an
8
14 attempt to pofson the Prme Minister in June of 1965 as it says
C
15 there?
16 Mr _ Halley . No , I do not.
17 Then the next name that is on here that is familiar_
18 Here is one that We discussed , that is AMLASH-l _ we already
19 went over that one .
2
20 The other name was Manuel Artime , whom we have talked
i
21 about. L
22 Baron . Right.
1
23 Mr _ Baron_ The last name on here I cannot find it
1
24 the other name is Antouio Cuesta Valle. I cannot find it now 1
25 but that is the last name that rang a bell.
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You
glad
Mr.
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1 Mr . Baron. Do you have any recollactlon of Cuesta
: 2 Va IJe ' 8 speciflc activitles with the CIA?
1
5 Mr _ Ha lley. No _ I would have to run traces on hlm and
1 take a look at what the information is.
5 Mr _ Daron . Nas Frank Sturgls connected with the JMWAVE
6 Station?
7 Mr _ Ialley . He wag nota
8 Mr . Baron . Not under the name of Frank Fiorino either?
9 Mr . Halley. No , ha was not. This Is agafn one of these
10 great myths . At this whole Cuba thing , Frank Sturglg was a
11 soldier of fortune was constantly involved on the periphery
12 of the Cuban exile community_ Ile was involved in free lance
13 operations against Cuba . He was somebody that the FBI
J
14 Customs CIA, everybody _ reported on . He was a household name
15 but he was not the CIA payroll during tha perlod that I was
16 involved in Cuban affairs, that is the payroll of the Miami
17 Station_ I remember name traces being run on this guy and S0
18 forth , and the Agency had no contact with him during that
19
period of time _
2
20 Ml"_ Baron _ Are You aware of his 'ever having been on thg
i
21 payroll of the CIA? 1
22 Mr _ Halley . I persona lly am not aware it:, and I think _
23 you know ,if had gone to the Agency that they must 'have ' given
1
24 you a]l sorts of traces on this Ecllow and.told you the same
25
thing .
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4
on
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ybu
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7
Mr _ Baron_ Ara You aware oE the AMOT program?
8
;
Mr. Halley . Yug I am.
1
Mr . Baron. How was that spelled?
1
Mr. Halley. AMOT _ 6
Mr _ Baron . Mhat was that program?
6 Mr. Halley . That was & program involvIng a Cuban emigre
group that was used as an operational support mechanism to
8 support the Miami Station .
9 Mr . Baron _ What kind of support dd provide?
10 Mr . Halley. were interviewers of refugees who came
11 out of Cuba _ They provided translator Personnel to translate
12 the' Spanish language publications that were of interest to us 3
C 13 They provided information on the various maInstream activities
1
14 that were going on in the Cuban exile community _
15 Mr _ Baron . Did they provide support for paramili
16 operations against Cuba ?
17 Mr _ Halley . They might havg identifled people whom they
18 thought We should interview or look to or See if they would
19 fit into other paramilitary programs In other words they
1
20 had the contacts in the Cuban community we had a require-
8
21 ment for a diesel engineer _ We woula say to the AMOT organiza - 1
22 tion , We would szy We are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel
4
23
engineer Who has a first engine ' 5 license, and they would go
1
24 through all of their contacts until they Iould come up with
1
8 25 one , a Ieek or ten days or wha tever_ having identif ied
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117
the fellow where ha w4g , what ha wag dofng_ We ' would then
8 2 send somebody around to talk to him Independent of them and
1
5 pick hlm up to work for 48 Ln our maritlmo activitles .
1
1 It was that kind of operational support.
5 Mr Baron _ People who were part of thlg program were
not used a5 paramflitery operatlves r at leagt insofir 49 they
operatad under the aegis of this program. There were some of
them who may have been in the paramlitary program and then
left it and were subsequently picked up in the AMOT organiza -
10 tion.
11 Could We go off the recora Eor a moment?
12 (Discussion off the record.)
tare
13 Mr Ilalley . We are now back on the record.
1
14 The AMOTs also worked with us on a common project, which
15 was monitoring Cuban naval trafflc, things like that, g0 they
16 were used across the board operational support tasks .
17 Mr _ Baron . One more general question .
Did the JMNAVE Station have an operational relationship
18
with the FBI? 19
2
Mr _ Halley _ I would not 20 8
Mr . Baron . Was the FDI Involved: in supporting Your 21 1
22
activities in any way?
4
Mr _ Halley . I would rather phrase that in my language ,
23 1
because I think
24
2 Mr _ Baron. Go right ahead .
25
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118
Mr _ Halley . I: do not know Lf your quostIon meang tho same
8 2 thlng to me, I would prefer to gay we had 4 lfafson relation-
1
3 ship with the FBI , that 1s , on matters deallng with counter-
1
Intelligence matterg . There was a regular exchange of data
5 with the FDI . There wag an exchange of name traces on people
6 that they were conducting investlgations on, for counterintelli
gence purposes We woula trace certain indlviduals and with the
FBI there Were a couple of counterintelligence cases that we
dlscovered that were turned over to the FAI_
10 So this is in the context o€ the norma 1 CIA-FBI Ifaison
11 that existed between the two aqencies_
12 Mr . Daron. But the FDI was not involved in gupporting
9
13 paramflitary commando raids to the shore of Cuba , is that
(
1
14 correct?
:
15 Mr . Halley I do not know what you are driving at:
16 there. I am having a little trouble with that- Are you saying
17 that the FBI dispatched paramilitary teams to Cuba as
18 an organization?
19 Mr Baron . Were they involved in paramilitary tralning
1
20 of any o€ the CIA operatives?
8
21 Mr . Halley. No The FBI did not train any CIA personnel |
22 during my tenure in the Miami Station_
4
23 Mr . Baron . Did the FBI at any point provide with you
1
24 links to people who had gambling interests inside Cuba ?
9 25 Mr Ila lley . No Ra covered the gambl ing thing previouslY .
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TORSETRET
119
1 The one Cage that I mantloned 19 thls:mah !who 'gave us the
8 2 lead of the two Sovfets from the missile eIte , and that did not
1
3 come the Miami Station through the FBI _
1
4 Mr . Baron. Were You ever made awara 0f a CIA attempt to
5 secure the ald of a pflot, a Cuban pflot, to arrange for an
6 "accident , to occur to Raul Castro when ha flew on a Cuban
plane?
Mr . Halley . I read this gomewhere Jn the record In post
Years , but I was not aware of ths at the tlme , at the tlme I
10 was in Mami.
11 Mr. Baron. Were You aware that serious consideretion had
12 becn given to the tactic of assassination at CIA lleadquarters
{
13 during your period of involvement :with Cuban a €fairs?
9
14 Mr. Halley _ No , that Is In the per iod 1962 to 65 when
15 I was the Station Chie€ in Miami I was not aware of any serious
16 you know , program operational effort towards assassinating
17 Castro_
18 Mr _ Baron . Nere you aware that Serious consideration had
19 been given to' the tactic or to the use o€ the tool of a9sassina-
2
20 tion at CIA Ieadquarters prior to your coming on as JMWA VE
8
21 Station Chief? 1
22 Mr. Ha lley . No I was not aware of any , You know planned
1
23 program effort at asgassina tion -
1
Baron . If we limit it 24 1
2 25 Mr _ diGenova . Ihat: do You mean when you say that?
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Mr .
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8
Mr . Halley . I went through thfs before before you came
8 2 In and explained to Mr _ Baron that the gubject of agga98inatlon
1
3 was congtantly belng discussed In the Cuban communfty and wa$ a
1
4 part of the fabric of the times .
5 Mr . diGenova. That I am aware of. You are not the only
6 one who has expressed that knowledge that they were all saying
7 let' s kill him, let' s together:
8 Mr . Halley _ There was a lot of discussfon of this kind o €
subject of assassination and that is why I keep trylng to be
10 precise that there wag no programmatlc operatlonal program that
11 I as aware of to assasgfnate Castro _
12 Mr . Beron _ Although the context In which we discussed the
4
13 talk that was in the air of assassinatIng Castro was coffee
4
14 In Miami and conversation among Cubans as opposed to conversa-
2
15 tions among high CIA officials back In Headquarters , were You
16 aware that there were at least serious discussions of the
17 use assassination against Castrc at CIA Headquarters?
18 Mr . Ia lley. No I was not. We are plowing the same groundl
that We covered before in this. 19
1
20 As I iudicated to you , People would come out of Cuba and
8
21 discuss these kinds of things. Some of these were reported 7
22 You know , traffic back to Wash= Ington. People would discuss
9
23 what are the prospects oE somebody assigned to assassinate
1
24 Castro. In that particular context, Yes , discussions on the
1
8 25 assassination of Castro took place. Tha t is I keep coming
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get
shop
of
in ,
why
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121
back, Jf you are gayng that 1f anybody outlIned an operatlonal
8 2 Plan to ma , did I help construct the plan , did I make a contri-
1
53 bution to a plan , my angwer 19 agafn no We talked earlier
1
4 you asked me about those explodIng sea shells o€ which I sa id
5 I had never heard of but I had heard dlgcussiong of Castro' s
6 vulnerabllity because he was a scuba diver. And You asked Me
about bacteria, I said I had never heard o € an Introductlon o€
bacteria , but I had heard agaln about Castro 8 vulnerability
In ths context. Where I heard It, a5 I told You before, I do
10 not remember.
11 Mr _ Baron . I realize We are plowing gome of the same
12 furroughs again . I am trying to be metlculous In the Ivay 8
13 were before. You just now said tha t the subject of assa8sina -
0
14 tion probably came up in the context of digcussing the contin-
15 gencies 0f Castro' s death _ Did It come up in terms of discus-
16 sing whether or not a plan should be put together to assassina
17 Castro, whether or not an operation should be mounted
18 Mr . Ialley . I cannot recall such discussion , but in
19 any state where there is a leadership domlnated by one man, it
2
20 is always a discussion of succesgion _ Tha t question has come i
21 up , You know , if some thing happened to Fidel Castro, if he is 7
22 thrown over, if he does something foolish himself or if somebody
4
23 is successEul in assassina him , som ebody who decides sudden-
1
24 ly to take his machetti ard just get out in tha sugar cane 1
25 field , again , the question was , who replaces Castro, and we
TOP SECRET
you
te
any
ting
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Page 124
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TOPSECRE
122
genarally focuged on Raul. There was talk of 4 collectIva
8 2 leadershlp.
1
3 These are a1l lnds of things that are 4lways done. agaLnst
4 that kind of a one-man state , whether it you know , a
5 Communist state or whatever you want to talk, call It 8
6 mflitary dictatorship
or 4 dIctatorship o€ the Bight or the
7 Lefta
8 Mr . Baron . Aga In , discussion of what to do upon the
9
contingency that Castro dles , by whatever meang
10 Mr _ Halley - Non-Agency Induced-
11 Baron . As opposed to thls , which 18 my Guasiion:
12 Were You aware any kind: of a discussion at CIA Headquarters
13 on whether or not the CIA should Induce the dea th of Fidel
c8
14 Castro?
15 Mr . Ha lley. I do not reca1l any such discussion _ That
16 is I have gone into a1l thls background to to axpla in
17 the mood of the times and that is why I keep referring In
18 my Sense o€ the word , as a professional intelligence off1cer _
19 of an operational plan , I was not a participant in any discus-
1
20
sion in which an operational plan th e assassination 0 €
8
21 Castro was discussed _ Tha t is , I think , the heart of the L
22 matter
4
Mr _ Baron . I no further questions 23 1
Joe, do You have
24 1
8 25 Mr_ diGenova . Mr _ Halley , who was your immediate superior
TOP SECRET
1
49 ,
Mr .
of
J
why try
to ,
for
have
any?
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Page 125
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123
1
1 In termg of reporting from Miami?
8 Mr . Halley . Coula we go off the record?
1
,
(DiscugsLon off the record.)
4 Mr . diGenova _ Halley , we have just had a brief
5 discussfon here about some of the thingg that Were covered
6 before I arrived by Mr Baron and ~You. I do not want to cover
any more o€ that ground _
It is my understanding in discussing the structure of
JMNNAVE " 9 relationship with Headquarters , General Lansdale' s
10 name came up , and that on ong occas ion , General Lansda le actually
11 came down to Miami to visit the Station to gat firsthand
12 knowledge o€ what was transpiricg. that correct?
{
13 Mr . Malley. Tha t is correct.
0
14 Mr . diGenova _ Do you have any idea when that was ?
15 Mr . Halley. No I stated earller it wag In 1962 . It
16 probably was in the sumer of 1962 because ft was after my
17 family arrived in Miami_ I do not remember the exact dates
18 It could be established probably from records o€ the Agency.
19 I do not recall It specifically.
2
20 Mr . diGenova _ To your knowledge , aid he travel by himse] f 9
21 or was he with compatriots or aides? |
22 Ha lley _ My recollection o€ that: was that he came down
1
23 on a speclal airplane_ There may have been other people on the 1
24 plane with him, I do- not recall, hut he landed at Homestead
2 25 Air Force Base. As I reca]l , we picked him up from therg.
TOP SECRET
Mr .
Is
Mr .
1
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124
1 Mr . dIGenova _ DLd Guneral Lansdale travel under hfs own
8 2 name or under a cover name?
1
3 Mr _ Ha lley - Throughout the tlme that he was in contact
1
4 with Me and the Station he' was opera ting 49 General Langdale .
5 Mr _ diGenova _ Did he have contact when ha was there with
6 some of the assets thenselves ?
7 Mr Ha lley_ Ie had no contact with any Cubang that I am
8 aware of _ He did spend the nlght that he came down with gome
C:
friends at Homestead Alr Force Dag e , but I do not recall, I ~
10 would have J0 way of knowlng what he did that evening.
C
11 Mr diGenova _ For the time that he was at JMINAVR he was
12 with officials such as yourself who had a supervisory capacity 9
13 at JJMWAVE Station?
J
14 Mr . Halley: That is correct.
15 Mr diGenova _ I have no further questions _
~
16 Mr . Daron _ On the record . I just want to thank you for
17 testimony here today. It has been a long and We
18 have gone over a lot of things guite care fully and it has been
19 most informative_
1
20 I would also like to ask You , 1f You would to pursuz for
8
21 us that one name of the Man who was connected with gambling 1
22 interests in Cuba and supplied some intelligence to JMWAVE
4
23 Station.
1
24 (Discussion o€ f the record . )
2 25 (Ihereupon , at 5:00 `0"'clock the hearinq wag conciuded. )
TOP SECRET
day Your
1
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Page 127
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SECRET-EVES QHLV:
Lxmi6 mT
Haccey
U.5. W:cl:ess;en with
belte ed he #s teiz supzorted "oy
ncedzd Cian;z: cnd Trzfficznte
finizciel 5 ta:es i7 Cuba Roselli
of e5
tablisuing contacts inside Cuba _
in te first a € 4 means
because he bad Varona
them i7 the secoad phase ,
He did
tha + Roselli dd not takc
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Ho-ver,
1n tae cate tzat he
tae precaution
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C
>a; vorkinz 17 a territor
c
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c
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~
the vere Given to Varoza
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r guested ars
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operatioz
tke chief of
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belp 02 Ted Shackley,
caliber sifles, tzenty 45 caliber 2
ves Ze tonators, tenty 30
ndar _ Hezvey says that tbe
t;o rdios, ani one jtooat
hacd 5un5,
that .could be obtained only frcC
included SOce items
soppinz
those Iteas, tecause Rosclli
Governrent Farvey oittzz
the U.5_
iatcrests, vould no :
sentative of busine
pos1z; Js 8 repre
Tre Cost of' tk2 ars equiznen+ ,
eccess :o such equizrczt_
he'e
a.01;t #5,003, Yas
to heecqierte-s_
trizk Lzer 2n JSSUzed czze ,
aud Siacbley rentcd 3 U-Haul
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ani i ~ in the Firinz lot
lozded it vith tle 43 equi -e:t)
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==================================================
Page 128
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Ser:7_E223 #XLY
delinr; eitr t0 {2e20, to Varo: 0f to Varc;? 7 sn-i"-lava
Eviden:ly lrry Jrdl Rselli iad not coze t0 t1~St ceen otcer_
Ferk:ps fcaring 0 double-czoss, cach cet ebout Ardependenily to
asure hinself thot the ecul_ent reacred the hajds _ After
rrking tbe truck, Warry and Saackley kept the Forkinz lo:; under
surveillance until tze ress *s completed_ Roselli, occoapinied by
0 'Conrell, did the sine Ileither rair Iew t.1t the other 's
vatching. Ercntually the truck was picked up end driven amy. It
was returned Zater, erptj, Jnd witb th2 keys ncer the seet J5
preztrezzed Warey re turred 1t ~0 the rental @5ency. !erey s2ys
tha + Shackley never kze :: *o Xcon} Zeli:ert was sad2 :Cr for vhat
Snackley w25 zerely called uron to funisn support for a purpose
headqua-ters oreration f-Co which b2 was otherise excluzed _
Mz" 1962
farvey &nd Roselll arranjed 2 systen 0f telephoze ccmmurication_
bj whicn @z-rej Las Kept posted Or crj Cevelorze:ts_ Earvey , usins 2
zcce, coula call Rose_li 2 1 tze Friers Club in Los Anzeles a + 1500
Fy
hours)_ Loj 12zles 6i3e RJseili could Fhoze @72 it itey 5 hcze
6k2 0e312. Roze 114 Fzo-tcd th2~ : pill€ werc i7 Ciba 222
in
tiwe Icseufzi F2Fc-tedlly regle-l: %j Cc:-o
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