Transcript of 157-10014-10018.pdf
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157-10014-10018] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Date 08/04/95
Page 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER 157-10014-10018
RECORDS SERIES HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER 05-H-02
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR SSCSGO
FROM BUNDY MCGEORGE
TO
TITLE
DATE 07/11/75
PAGES 168
SUBJECTS BUNDY , MCGEORGE
ROSTOW WALT
CASTRO , FIDEL
CIA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
DOCUMENT TYPE TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS 1B
CURRENT STATUS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS Box 2
[R] Oo ITEM IS RESTRICTED
H# 50955 DocId:32423406 Page 1
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1574
NIZONA SECURTA
SENZORMEZON
4
QRrarNID Unauthop3zed@ acloste GubJect
1sanet18n8
Vol: '1202 3
Ryq6
@1 Jlaited Statcn Sruate
Report o Proceedinga
ON_
Hearing held before
Comittee to study
Governmental
Senate Select Activitieb
With Respect to
Intelligence
Operatione
1
Friday , July 11,
Washington, D.C
Tepe and Waste turned over
(stelocyCenapcee
for des tructfon)
to che
WARD &
PAUL
STREET, S_ F_ 410 FIRST D. C. 20003 WASHINGTON,
(202) 544-6000
TOP SECRET
SECRET 0coxCrimltia
TCP
invcNTDRiED: 23
1975
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na
9,@ N EENI $
1 PAGE 8
2 TESTIMONY OF 1
1 5 McGcorge Bundy
4 E X ! [ @ [ z f
5 65
Bundy No _ 1
66
Bundy No 2A 67
Dundy No 2B 6 8
Bundy No 2C 69
Bundy No 2D 74
Bundy No 2
74
Bundy No 3
10 74
Bundy No 31
75
11
Bundy No 3B ;
12 91
Bundy No 4 9 3 1 13
Bundy No 5
14 130
Bundy No 6
15 131
€
Bundy No . 6-A
132
16
Bundy No - 6-B F 133
1 7
Bundy No 6-C
134
18
Bundy No 6-D 1
19
135
Bundy No 6-E 3
20
Bundy No . 6-F 7
21
137
Bundy No 6-G
138
4 2*
Bundy No . 6-II 1
23
139
1 Bundy No 6-I
144
24 8
Bundy No 7
25
ToP SECRET
136
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HOP SECRE
heibuzio
Taah
8 COMMITTEE MEETING
1
8
2 1
Friday , July
11, 1975
1 3
4 United Stateg Senate ,
5
ttee to' Study
Governmental
Select Commi"
6 with Regpect to Operationg
7 Intelligence Activities,
8 D. C Waghington ,
9 notice , at 8 : 4 0 a.m . ,
ttee met ,
pursuant to
Thc Commit
(Chairman)
Senator
Frank Church
in Room
S-407 The
11
1
12
presiding.
Hart of Michigan ,
Senators Church
(prcsiding)
1 13
Present :
Tower Baker , Mathias
Mart
of Colorado _
Mondale= Morgan ,
14
15
Schweiker _
Schwarz _ Jr.
Chief
Frederick A 0 .
Also present :
16 Minority
Counsel; Charles
Curtis R_
Smothers
17
Counsel ;
Robert
Kelley ,Frederick
Shca ,
David Aaron_
12
Lombard , Staff Members =
Madigan
Professionnl
Baron
Michael
19
3
20
L
2
22
1
23
1
24 8
25
TOP SECRET
10
Capitol
and
c
6
Patrick
1 and
1
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The hearing Will pleage come to order _
The Chairman .
8
2 Bundy _ would you pleage 'Btand and take the oath -
1 Mr .
3 swear that the testimony You will in thfs 1 Do
Will be the truth the whole truth and nothing but
hearing
the eruth, 80 help you God?
6 Mr Bundy I do _
7 The Chairman Mr Schwarz
[
8 TESTIMONY OF McGEORGE BUNDY
and address
9 Mr Schwarz Would you state Your full name
10 for the record please?
nane is McGeorge Bundy . I 1ive in New
11 Mr Bundy _ My
12 York _ My home address i5 1040 Fifth Avenue
currently the Chairman or the
8 13 Mr _ Schwarz And you are
{
14 President of the Ford Foundation?
The President of the Ford Foundation .
15 Mr . Bundy .
Schwarz . In the
Kennedy Administration what position
16 Mr
17 da hold?
Bundy . I was Special Assistant for National Secur-
18 Mr _
1
19 ity Affairs-
8
Schwarz_ And held that all the way through the
20 Mr
and for how many years in the Johnson
L
2 Kennedy Administration
22
Administration?
I held that office from the beginning of the 1
23 Mr . Bundy
1 Administration to the end of February 1966 =
24 Kennedy
8
to commencing with the Kennedy
Mr Schwarz . Prior
25
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give
you
you
you
4
work
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to
do' with the Central
1
Adminigtration ,
had you had anything
8
2
Intelligence Agency?
in
1
brother
who worked for many
I a
Mr . Bundy . with L 3
I
occasionally
4
the Central Intelligencc Agency.
fffties, both
during
the forties
5 membcrs of the Agency
about the
of what one thought
about gubstantive
algo
Soviet Union ,
occagionally
conditions In the talented
making to recruit
then
efforts that they
of colleges_
some- brother . To
Schwarz _ You
sentioned
Mr , 10 than we have
kind in the
3
11 thing of a
different
tion taken by
Allan Dulles
the 1
1
12
recently , You brother had in the
that
with the
in
connection
13
1950 ' $ . from 14 brother cane under
Mr Bundy - Well , my
15 waS , as I
And the Senator Joseph McCarthy .
of
16
been a
friend and
that he
1" it, in trusted in a place
to be therefore
Alger Hiss and
18 Intelligence Agency _
as
the Central
19 as is that this was
Dulles and my
inpression
8
20
Allan extremely firm
took an of him 7
2
ce
characteristic
cstimate that my brother wJs
by his
on
this matter ,
to the con-
4 22 risk, rather ,
no sense a
security
1
2
in fact in
ful and my
brother
defense was success
1 trary. Ana until the Kennedy
8 24 Intelligence Agcncy
continued in
Central
25 TOP SECRET
years
had
talked
the and
questions
about
and
were
graduates
put
your
gotten
record
pos recount would
Your problem
1
attack
recall
grou:d
supporter
had
general
not
was
sensitive
stand
gui
stood and
the
the
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Administration came in, at which time he moved over to the
8
1 2 Defense Department _
1 3 Mr . Schwarz we have indicated You that we are going
to discuss the countries of Cuba , the Dominican Republic and
5 Vietnam although not much on Vietnam. And the majority and
minorfty staff have ghown You some documents of that period,
gome 15 Years ago . Before I to those three countries ,
I would like to ask you some questions about a subject
called Executive Action. Have you ever heard of the subject
10 called Executive Action?
11 Mr . Bundy _ Yes , I have
5
12 Mr . Schwarz When did You first hear of it?
13 Mr . Bundy . Well_ as I have told your staff, that i9 a real 1
14 difficulty for me becausc I cannot pinpoint the time at
15 which I heard of it. My impression was that it was some time
16 in the early months of 1961 .
Mr Schwarz And do you have a recollection as to the
17
18 context in which you heard about it, the person from whom You
8
19 hear about it, and will You provide to the Comittee your
8
full recol .cction of the subject of Executive Action in the
20
|1
2] early 1961?
1 Mr Bundy _ Would it help if I try to describe in a
22
1
general way what I now understand of this matter the
23
1
part which is recollection and the part which 18 clarified
24 8
discusgions with the staff and what I now think about it?
25 by
TOP SECRET
to
get
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TOPSECRET
1 Mr Schwarz Would you distingufeh , though, the part
8
2 that 18 recollection and the part that 19 based upon other 1
1 matters?
1 Mr _ Bundy . That is exactly what I would like to do _
5 The part that i9 recollection 1s very vague And I
would say that I have no recollection of more than one conver-
gation on this subject And the impregsion that stick8 in
my mind i9 that I was told about it in a general way . And
it wag described to me as an effort to study through the
7
10 poggibilities by which one might act against an individual
11 in a context other than that of espionage and counter-espionage
C
n
12 a context more
political.
13 Mr Schwarz . When you act against an individual" 1
14 act in what fashion?
Mr . Bundy . Act in a variety of fashions_ I recollect
15 €
16 it, but up to and including killing the individual
The two things that I think are clear in my recollection
17
about that three one , that it was a concept presented
18
2 or described to me I was in effect being briefedl on it.
19
8
Two , that it wJs entirely an untargctted that it
20
7
was in no sense a to do anything to anyone
21
And third and I think quite important , that it was 4 22
1
not anoperation which had any specific target _
23
1
Mr Schwarz . You said you were in cffect briefed on it
24 8
25 By whom?
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say
a9
plan
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1
That 19 what I don t know I cannot
'Mr Dundy .
8
And I thlnk it Inapproprate to guess
2 recollect who it wa 9 . 1
1 3 when I have no
recollectlon.
time? I don ' t mean what time of
4 Mr Schwarz . Mhat
5 but what time?
sometime I think in the early
6 Mr Bundy . As I say ,
memory is an uncertain busi-
months of 1961 _ And searching
mind that I heard about it in the
nes? , but it gticks in my
Office Building _ And that
roomg
the Executive
I from the Executive
it in time _ because
10 would
of
the White Housc sometime
Building to the Nest Easement
11 office
; after the Bay
of' pigs , perhaps in May .
12
on that fact place it in
Mr Schwvarz .
So based
1 13
and somet ime after-_
sometime to the Bay of
14 time
arrival in Washington
Mr . Bundy After my
16 2
And when did arrive in Washington?
Mr Schwarz
16
N
About the 1oth of January _ I
Mr Bundy
17
it was after I in the
closely , because I think
18 it more
which , of course ,
occupied
f fice o the
Special Assistant,
8 until the 2th of January by others
20
the 20th of January ,
it after 7
2] Mr Schwarz . So you
which was April 14 or 17?
but before the Bay of Pigs ,
22
1 Mr Bundy That is right-
2:;
Did it come up in a context where
1
Mr Schwarz .
2 24
a
capacity be created?
that
25
TOp SECRET_
day ,
of
moved
place
you
Pigs prior
you
place would
was
was
1 9
place
4
you
such urgcd
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1
Mr Bundy . No
8
1
did it comc up in?
2 Mr Schwarz What context
1
context in which it was being
It came up in a
1 3 Mr Bundy .
about
else. Anc' that i9 really
described to me by someone
I can take it with
precision.
5 far a9
described to You by someone
Schwarz . WAs it
Mr
a
capacity in being?
and this 19
not gomething
Bundy . As a
capacity
8 Mr . recollec-
Mr Schwarz , but my
to be too certain about ,
I into belng
it was 2
capacity coming
10 tion be that
did
receiving
that information ,
Mr . Schwarz . Now ,
11 the person , whoever
to discourage or
dissuade
12 take any stcps
coming
to
the capacity
it was who was
describing
1 13
14
into being?
was
satisfied
recollect is that 1
Bundy . What I
Mr . 15
I
received on two
points .
16 the
description
activity ,
not an
operational
First, that this
17 tions : first, that
without two condi
would not become
18
a
guidance that there
desire or a
request
1
19 therc be 3 individual ;
some
specific
8
20
should be planning
an
be a
decision Lo movc |
21
that there
W 22
individual.
happen-
4 t these two things
Being satisfied tha 1
23 truction rather than
giving You a recons
1 and I am now
24 ing that what I did
8 I am
confident
a
recollection
25
TOP SECRET
49 elge
a9
want
would you
you
with
and
was
such
or
and
against
against
should
second _
not were
was
precisc
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TOp SECRET
notion,in the category of
hypotheticals , of
1 to place thls
0 to them , and In that gense
2 things with
current urgency
1
attention In the gense that
5 not a
qucgtion that cried for
1
make a
straightforward compari-
others did _ If I may
4 S0 many
before the inauguration , but
were, I think, even
5 son ,
very
heavily engaged In
6 certainly
very quickly thereafter ,
which wag the question of cholces
question of choice
a
with the
Cuban brigade which led
do what
a very
to the Bay of Pigg . And that
eventually
crisis in Berlin
and attention , as did the
large amount of time 0
10
the crisis in Laos
6 11
briefings on
contingency
there wcre
N> 1
12 In the same
and a other weapons
the uscs of
nuclear weapons ,
for 1 13
were reports that came
of , sort of , and here
14 whole swarm
also ~
S office , which was
turally to the
Special Assistant'=
15 na 2
16 being
reorganized.
this one
R what I did was s imply to
So , I think that
17 about it seriously ,
claim to have
thought
aside I cannot
18 that would come co thc
in the flow of business
1
J Q because it
8 Assistant s office.
20
Special
if wc can be more precise
I to see
Mr .
Schwarz
7
2 evidence have . Wc have
to check
what other
on dates 22
of this m?&ter were going
other evidence
that discussions
1
23
on the 25th 26th
1
on in
the Central Intelligence Agency
24 8
of
January 1961 _
25
TOP SECRET
no
we
real
would: You around
occupied
and
period
plans
put
was
want
we
on
4
and
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TopScRET
1 Now are You able to testify with reepect to the likeli-
8
2 hood of the conversation You have recounted taklng place 1
1 3 prior to the 25th or the 26th of January 1961 _
4 Mr Bundy _ I would rate it very , very unlikely.
5 Thi8 18 a matter I have thought about 8ince You did mentlon
those dates to me And I would say that the chance that_
within the first four days after belng sworn in I woula have
been drawn to congider this question 18 , from my sLde ,
near zero as I can it. I had been teaching international
27=
10 relatlons over 3 perlod of ten Years . I was deeply interested
7
11 in many of thc immediatc problems most notably the problem of 5
;
12 the crisis in Berlin andl the concomitant question of relations
13 with the Soviet Union And I was preoccupied with all of 1
16 the things that happened when You moved Lo Washington from
helping the Secretary to a house, working out a 15
2
staff, and I was under instruction fron the President to
R 16
reorganize the White House National Security staff _ This
1 7
subject was out of my mindl and I would not have brought
18
1
it up. I doubt that anyone wouldhave brought it to
19
3
20 me in those early days _
|
2] The Chairman_ I interrupt for a moment
As I understand tes timony_ Mr Bundy You were
V; 22
1
briefed on the concept of Executive capability sometime early
23
1
in 1961 , and You can t remember now who it was who briefed You
24 8
Do you recall whether or not You instructed anyone
25
Top SECRET
a3
Put
and buy
far
May
your
at
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TOR SEGRET
10
the CIA to develop 8uch 8 capabflity?
8
1 2 Mr . Bundy . I am 8ure I gave no instruction. But it i5
1 3 falr to add that I do not recall that I offered any
4 Impediment after I was briefed
5 The Chairman. But your best recollection 19 that gome-
body toldyou that such a capability was being developed?
7 Mr Bundy _ I don t want to be too firm on that, but that
would be my best recollection
The Chairman We received testimony from Mr Bissell
L" 10 Are You acquainted with Mr Dissell?
11 Mr Bundy . Yes , sir. I have known him a long time , and
1
12 he has been a' great friend of mine .
9 13 The Chairman _ Mr . Schwarz , since you are very familiar
}
14 with the record are you going to take Mr Bundy through the
15 record of Mr Bissell' s testimony?
16 Mr Schwarz . Mr Bissell testified
F
17 The Chairman And we have the transcript. If it would
16 pbe helpful for Mr Bundy to look directly at the transcript.
8
19 I think he should have it.
J
c Mr Schwarz Mr . Bissell' $ testimony was first, that 20) 1
2] in the first instance he said he did not reca]l any specific
3
conversation_ Then , however , he said , after having reviewed
22
1
23 certain notes by Mr _ Harvey he concluded that if Mr Harvey" 5
1
note indicated _ as they did, that he , Bissell, told Harvey
24 8
in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to set 25
TOP SECRET
only
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TOR SECRET
11
1
Action capability , then he had no reagon to
1 up
an Executive
8
And then he went on through a geries
2 doubt that testimony
1
that he have been
1 3 of comments to end up gaying
Ros tow or Bundy more likely Rostow
that urging by either
Rostow. Wa9 Rostow
involved in
First, let 8 focus on
the brfefing?
that I can t tell You of my
Mr Bundy No now ,
out of my knowledge the way the
recollection, but only
The first things we did , Walt Rostow
offfce was organized
work out an informal
bit nevertheless reagonably
3
10 and I, wag to
of
division of labor _ And the whole busincss
11 clear-cut
business, namely , matters
Co
12 what I thought of as group
action , and would_ if they came for
that elated to covert 1 13
fell 'on my side
come through the special group ,
14 division ,
c
recall that Mr . Rostow was ever
division . I don c
15 of that :
involved in any matter of this sort-
16
that this was Mr Rostow
Chairman It is fair to say
The 17
18
testimony
Bissel is ,_ as You say , a friend of
Mr Schwarz . Mr . 1
]
still is a friend of
8 of long ing ,
20 L
Mr Bundy. Yes , he is.
2
which, while it did
Schwarz Wehave his testimony
Mr . 22
within it, ended up saying that
1
23 have tions
him Eo up the
1 either or Mr . Rostow
24
he believed
8 And you have
testified that the
Executive Action capabili-
25
ToP SECRET
glven would
out
of
special
yours?
and stand yours
4
grada-
set urged
you
ty.
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TOPSECRET
12
1 fact 18 that You were given a brlefing , and you didn t urge it,
8
2 but on the other hand You didn t say It Bhould stop. 1
1 3 Mow can you explain , if You can the testimony of your
friend Mr_ Bissell = and the contrast between that and
your testimony?
Mr Bundy. Well as I understand Mr Bissell' $ testi-
and I should add , that there will-be no misunder-
mony
standing , that I have not only the advantage of discussions with
but I have talked with him about it as I understand
You ,
10 that testimony from that conversation, he was trying to ex-
1
11 plain a situation in which he had no rcason to question an Agency
1
12 history to the effect that he first gave instructions on this
8 1961 _ And in that context and he had
13 matter in February
{
14 no rcason to question the rcport that he had received
c
White House encouragement it is in that context that his
15 6
16 speculations about Mr Rostow and about me seem to fall.
I would be surprised _ if his memory were refreshed
1'
with respect to the dates of January which you have' des -
18
1
cribed to me , if he were to believe that any initiative in
19
would come in the first instance from the
20 this entcrprisc
17
21 Kennedy Administration -
The Chairman _ Mr Bundy , our transcript of the
4 22
1
Bissell testimony makes it clear that Mr . Bisgell himself
23
1 the documented record He said in effect,
24 does not dispute
8
that I told him that I had been twice instructed
25 if Harvey says
TOP SECRET
So
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ToP SECRET:
13
1
House to develop an
Executivo capability , I
by the White
8
on which to dispute that record
? have no basi9
1
well, who in the White
Then when asked him, very 1
when were told , he replied , 1t
House told
and I don t recall who me
5 must have been early in 1960 ,
have been either Rostow or Bundy
but it
that he had numerous
conversations
Ile then recounts
and concludes that the
wfth both of You during the
from You or from Mr Rostow
must have come either instruction
he never gave such an instruc-
E
10 Now Mr: Rostow tells
has no memory of every
having discussed
11 tion andl in fact
7 ;
12 such instruction .
in fact have had no
authority
Mr . Bundy . Me have 1?
1
an instruction.
14 to give
The Chairman . That is right_
15 €
16 And he pointed that out.
I wouldn t have the autority
Mr Bundy _ And in fact
and I would have been only
1e to give any
instruction
1
channel to such instruction
}
3 Who ~would have had the autho ity?
Senator Baker
2
were required out ide the 7
Mr . Bundy If the authority
2
have €o have been
the President hingelf .
22 AGency it
what I like to ask 1
2 The Chairman
with Senator Baker ' 5
Mr Bundy . Could I continue
21 8
25 question for one second
TOP SECRET
we
you and You
told
must
Period
u:
an
would
such
1 ''
such
give the
would
you would
1
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Page 17
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TRSECRET:
14
1
My Own impression a3 to this matter 6 m I have already
8
2 testified to the fact that I am relying on 2 recollection of
1
1
a meeting of which there ig no record i9 that had I been
briefed on this essentially hypothetical internal undirectedl
character, it did not appear to mc +o be a matter that required
further authority outside the CIA . That may or may not have
been right _ but that is the quick judgment I appear to have
reached _ Because I certainly did not raise the question th
others _
Senator Baker . Do You recall that, Mr Bundy , is that
10
1] surmise?
:
Mr Bundy . That is my reconstruction more than my
1
2 I know I did not raise it, I did not press the question , and
1
}
I did not feel_ therefore , that it was a question that needed
14
further analysis , ana it did not , S0 far as I know
1 5
1
1;;
further consideration inthe White House . My own recollection
is that I didn thear the words in any gerious con-
17
12 text that I can recall until this Year_
3
The Chairman And you cannot recall who it was who
1]
8
25; briefed You?
1
Mr Bundy _ I really cannot
Mr Schwarz Can You narrow the field?
W V 22
1
Mr Bundy . I can narrow the field It would have to havc
2:
1
been a senior officer at the Agency , or someone with previous
% <
in the White Mouse I have no reason to suppose
25, understanding
TOP SECRET
and
wi
or
your
get
again
==================================================
Page 18
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Top SzcrET
15
L
the latter, but I
cannot exclude that.
1 that it was
;
Might it have been
Biggell himself?
2
The Chafrman .
1
It surely might have been
3 Mr Bundy . 1
best
recollection of that
The Chairman Based upon Your
testified that you Interpose no
briefing , you have already
objectlon?
a9 to
I am pretty sure I satigfied
Mr Bundy
Rut I did not interpose an
the character of the
enterprige.
objection.
the
recall, then ,
having rcported
The Chairman Do You
10
7
11
briefing to
thc President?
Mr Bundy No I don 't.
0 1
12 before I ask that
rman . Did it strike You
The Chai : 13 recollection of the briefing ,
C question, based upon best
14 that was being
told that this a new capability
were
16
that the
Agency possessed
;
developed _ or were told s imply
16
such a
cy?
17 was working on
it that the Agency
Mr Bundy . I
sense precision
but without any
a
capability , 1
19
iven the impression at
Were g
The irman
20 authority or
that the Agency was
seeking your 7
2]
that briefing
of the White House?
the authority
22 reaction , as
think they were testing my
Mr Bundy . I 1
2: recall that they were
back on it. But I do
1
I now look
24
to me as 3 matter of White
; If ii had come
seeking authority .
25
ToP SECRET
mygelf
your
was
you
You
capabili_
put would
16 of great
such
you a Cha
4
not
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Page 19
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16
my own
concept
8
know
the context
authority , I
1 House
8
I have donc =
of my
job what
done? 1
What You have
The' Chairman.
matter co the 1
have had to take the
Mr Bundy . I
no
independent authority.
becausc I did President , testificd that
And have
The Chairman_
tter to the
President?
take the ma rman _ recall, Mr
far 2s I can
Mr Bundy - As as it
is a
subject dealing,
rman Well , this
The to
kill that
of a
capability
with the
development
for
10) does hadl been
that if You
of
the character
1] have been the
President?
have discussed
1
authority
That is right _
of
Mr Bundy .
a
subject
1 i9 it
And
furthermore ,
The Chairman =
very likely to
be
c
1.9 a
character that
for
authority I
If I had
been asked
Mr
Bundy . I
16 initiating or
deciding
If 1 were the
it_
1 "
that I
had had
3 recall It deals with
1 of it
of the
seriousness
coming You facts 1
One of
the sobering
to kill_ 3 capability
into a
itive
from outsidc
into che
5 on
which you
of thing
is the
22 like
to kills
Contingency
deal With the
capahility
the use of
1
28
which
contingency
for
ting West Berlin,
perhaps 1 for protec t remote ,
ei a 8 shelf
nuclear
25 TOP SECRET
from
would
would
would
had
not You
You
Chai
would Chai
asked
with
would You
not 1
recall? 14
would You would
6
agent ,
recall
role . that
would
speak about
position
sens
17 government briefedl are
number
plans one that
Y
plans
more shade plans ,
weapons
==================================================
Page 20
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TOp SECRET
17
7
for the use of different kind8 of gases an operational plan
8
2 the invaglon of Cuba these were uncertainties to
for 1
there would have co be military landings in Iaos . In 1 whether
of 1961 and I am not in any sense trying to un-
che context
the seriousness of the context of 1975-- this was a
5 derstate
kind of a thing with two strong locks between
hypothetical
it ana any decision_ And I simply :didn t pay it the attention
that we are paying to it now We are right to Pay
then
that attention now
c
The Chairman _ I understand that very well this
10
tee is endeavoring in every way it can Lo place this ~
11 Commit
1 issuc within the context the time. Nevertheless we
12 whole
real dilemma We know that at the very
13 are faced with a very 1
being briefed the Agency was not only interested
1/ time were
a capability , but was in fact engaged in a
15 in developing
to assassinate Castro , and had been in-
{
16 series of attempts
in other murder plots and murder attempts against the
1" volved
leaders certain foreign governments
18
tion we are endeavoring to answer i9 whether 2
The ques
1 had been authorized by the policy makers of the
2'
the AGency
in this activity , or whether it was 1
government to engage
and loose on a
wild gambit of its own in an
2%
operating fast
sensitivity that could have the most serious 1
area of extreme
the government of the U.$ and its
24 repercussiong upon
8
2'
reputation in the world _
TOp SECRET
ag
And
of
you
of
7
1
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Page 21
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ToP SECRET
18
who apparently wag not only 1
We are told by 'Mr . Bissell,
frfend of Mr
8
frfend of yours , but albo a very
2 very 1
Robtow S 1
Mr Bundy _ That 19 right.
0 credibillty a3 a witnesg
Chairman . a
man whoge
The 5
that he wa8 at least
geem to have to be respected
capability on
direct ingtructions
a engaged in developing
from the White House
for specifics , his testimony
But when we
him
9 who
can t rememher just who it
becomes very vague. He
10) that in effect:
~ the record _ which says
him, he t dispute
1
Mr . Harvey :o develop
Mr . Harvey when he engaged
he So
advised
else of high authority in
And everyone
8 1
the testifies
< we have
questioned 90 far
the Administration that
( 14 Administration to engage in
it was not the policy of
15
that authorized c
attempts were ever
assassination ,
16 occasion in the
R
with the of one
and indeed
1 'i surfaced for discussion
the subject never even
Group ,
1 } wJs quickly shot down
it did , if it did, it
And when
in fact embarked upon
the CIA was Nevertheless ,
under review_
attempts during the 1
conclude either that are not
Noiv we are led to
27 of the Acministratien,
concerning policy
the truth
1 being
the reputation
hard for mc to accept , 9iven
1 which i$ very
2k 45 for integrity and
8
that have conc before
the witnesses
25
)n TOP SECRET
good
good
would
such
pressed
was
can ' told
1
capabili- ty .
the
such and no
Special
exception
1
such
8
period
we
thc
told 0f
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Page 22
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19
1
the CIA wa 9 running wilde and acting on
truthfulness , or that
8 In murder plotg, murder attempts
its own
initiative, engaging
1
gecuring the authority from,
1 not informing , let alone
which in a way
in government who held the
responaibllity ,
those
5 is even more
frightening _
remember being briefed You
6 Now you tell 43 that You
ident. It didn t seem too
don t remember advising the Pres
follow up
whether such
at the time.Did you ever
important
had in fact been
perfected by the agency?
9 a
capability
the tter a 411 ,
Bundy . I don t
recall pursuing
10 Mr
than I would have pursued any her
11 Mr Chairman , any more
C: me
on which no question wag heing
~ 1
12
shclf capability
0
either from below or above
c
1
and comment on one Jspec t of
14 If I may. go back
C
and
impressive description of
1b I think, important
I am sure that if in the
~
16
difficulty the Committee faces
what I now Know i.n from
months of 1961 I known
1 '1 early
discussions with staff ,
in from
18
the newspapers
I would have had a very
what was really in train, 2
1 about
8
20;
different approach.
Mondale. Mr . Chairman 7
2 Senator
Chairman Senator Mondale.
2* The
Wa Rusk tes tified be-
Mondale. Yesterday_ Secretary
1
23 Senator
or
notes made following one
1 some of the minutes
24 fore us
Augmented at
least suggest
themeetings of the Special Group
25 of
ToP SECRET
Ina Fae
and
on
ma
Pushed
1;
your
the
part
had
your
part and
And
8
==================================================
Page 23
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20
1
of a89a98ination occurred_ And , Mr Rusk
L that
the question
8
bring that up at a town
2 8aid, did you think anyone
1
he meant that these meetings
1 meeting? by that I gather
from all different groups
and prinicples
had
large attendance
and S0 on , and a9 8 regult, if there
5 and staff agsistants
that was not the forum
were matters of exceedIng delicacy ,
which gucil matters would be digcugsed _
at
Would you comment on that?
impression would be that the
Mr Bundy . Yes . My
referring to
the much discussed meeting
10 Secretary was probably
:
1 of August 10 , 1962 _
P ;
Senator Mondale Right .
large meeting 16 or 18
Mr Bundy _ That was a
to be pertinent to that meeting _ The
14 And the comment seems
c
I would have had in
a5 such, the one which
15 Special Group
1961 _ was set up under a
national
;
16 mind for example , in early
whose number was 54/12 _
1 7
security regulation of some
Mondale_ That was
the Special Group.
1
Senator
the Special Group. And che Special
Mr Bundy That was
8 of itself was te a small group
Group in
volunteer to attencl 7
Senator Mondale But
Mr Bundy . No
v 22,
1 Senator Monda le They
2:
: meeting of August 10 is a very
Mr Bundy No The
24 8
variety of respects .
That included
meeting in a
25
TOP SECRET
would
And
people .
1
sort
1
qui
and
woulc people
not? would
special
==================================================
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21
L
1 The Chalrman; You were pregent at that meetlng?
8
2 Mr Bundy . I Wa3 present. My memory i9 entirely 1
1
8 refreshed memory on this , I had no recollection of the
meeting until recent months But I have found 8 scratch
that I apparently doodled on on that date , and It
shows who wag there not much else.
Mr Schwarz There were some beautiful drawings_
8 Mr Bundy . There were.
9 They were not very beautiful drawings _
1 0 The Special Group Augmented met in Augubt and this
11 does coincide with my general recollection the matter
€
6. 1
12 in response to concerns wihch were first, I think, and most
13 energetically pressed byY Mr McCone th respect to, what the
c
1
14 hell are the Russians doing in Cuba And that was the center
of that meeting , and the center of later meetings , and the cen-
15
1
16 ter of a national security action memorandun of considerable
complexity which wag put out toward the of August , most
17
of which dealt with this question , how do we know what they
18
2
are going to do , what do we do if they do it, and So forth ,
5
2' with respect to missiles in Cuba
7
It was therefore in a sense much more than an_ ordinary
2
MONGOOSE meeting , let alone a Special Group meeting And
22,
1
while I quite agree with the Secretary that that meeting as
2:
1
a planning session for anything as horrendous 39 assas8ina -
24 8
tion is implausible in the extreme Quite serious covert
25
TOP SECRET
pad
and
of
wi
end
19
5
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Page 25
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TOP SCRE
22
in the Special Group_ And 88
actiong were digcussed
of covert action it will find
Committee purgues
It9 studles
for policy decislons
that that group 18
the ;nodal
And that was quice a gmall
or
badly handled
or bad ,
group.
that fs that it seems
reason I a8k
Senator
Mondale.
pursueb the two
alternatives _
that the Chairman 8
question
to me
have
occurred was ordered at
what we now know to
efther
level Buch a9 the Special
or at a
very high
highest level,
in which case
on thefr own ,
Augmented ,
they operated
10 Group gome
or there
of
irresponsible,
they were formal struc-
tem that went the
extra
communications
for the S0n:
examining ,
and would account
that have been
ture
to when they
that these
operators testified
1^ of authority
15
were with uS said ,
not very
specific_ They
Now their testimony
16
we heard from
had authority, and think
17 we
thought
So
18
somebody , experience that
the changes baged upon
J 0
What
order i:{: extra official communicationg
there was
answers , I might say
Baker. Before Mr _ Bundy
Senator
I am struck by the first paragraph
to
Senator Mondale that
which we don c have here
General ' $ report,
23 of
the Inspector
it i9
I remember it, it says,
t believe, but as
now , I don becal:: 24 of a89a9gination plots,
difficult to
reconstruct history
25
TOP SECRET
H# 50955 DocId:32423406
your
good
point
well
The
the
or
was
and control out
around
sy3
we
was
we
we
on . and
your
are
pass anc]
such
==================================================
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tOP Hc2u
23
'of the "subject matter no wrltten
of the
high sensitivity
and It was
not discugged at open meetings .
records were kept,_
And It beems to me that is
That 19 generally what was 'gaid-
a matter of polfcy there wa3 no
implying , then , that 28
of this gort of communication.
formalization
I am borry to interrupta
Senator Mondale. Yes,
10 meeting two Or
three principals
And in that August
And in fact It 19
not reflected
testified that It did come up.
10 in the notes .
for me to begin at least
Perhaps the best way
Mr . Bundy -
guestion is to describe my
with an answer Lo Your
of the way
In which covert
own sense my own
understanding
13 And this was
of all types were brought forward=
operations
reiterated
important and the most constantly
perhaps the most
15
to when I began to
of the process that I was
exposed
16 fact
of . gubjects on coming to Washington_
consider this whole range
17 predecessor_ or
it was with Mr. Gordon Gray , my
And whether
18 and outgoing friends in
Allen Dulles , or with incoming
with
with Mr . Bissell, or with anyone
the Department of State, or
tters, what I
learned then and
concerned with these ma
elsc
tine there to the best of my
what I
throughout my
all covert
operations , whether intelligence
abilfty was that
23 activity
and clandestine
operations =
clandestine: political
24 subversion , or sabotage ,
activity,
clandestine
25
propaganda
TOP SECRET
HI 50955 DocId:32l23406 Fawe
14
applied
and
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24
3
which ala occur In the caae of Cuba _ all of .then took thefr
2 authority from and came for their authority to the 54/12
3 group
4 And when there was 8 question in such a meeting as to
5 whether the matter regulred further judgment , it wag the
respongibility of the Chairman of that group to, make sure that
that was checkea out.
8 The papers will usually say , authority, et cetera ,
9 et cetera , and the President 3 name will often not appear
10 any more than the precise character of the operation i8 likely
11 to appear in the minutes for the reasong that Senator Baker
12 has spoken of _
13 But I never knew of any operation of this kind of any
14 sort , with one exception , which is quite different , which did
15 not have that channel = The exception 18 the of Pigs ,
16 which was S0 30 complicated _ and overflowed in So many
17 directions and in which the President himgelf was involved in
18 s0 many ways , as he fully recognized and explained at the tine
19 that it did not go through this Committee proccss , it went
20 through a quite Presidential process and everybody involvecl
21 knew chat.
22 But with that one exception , I would have told You up
23 until the beginning of this current public discussion , that
24 was the way it went , and that nothing went outside and
25 that the Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agencies , with
TOP SECRET
HI 50955 Docld:3z 2
higher
Bay
big,
it,
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TO2 SI
25
3 1
their more: gensitive-inteiiigence: Operat1on8 were meticulous
8
2 in that respect. 1
Now I clearly am wrong But that 18 what I would have
1 3
4 told You.
Senator Mondale. Nell are you wrong?
5
In other words what testified co
6
Mr Bundy . Excuse me ,
I misstate mygelf. I beg your
7
pardon for interrupting.
in that thingg happened that didn't go through
I am wrong 9
10 that group.
Senator Mondale. Yes .
11
1 In other words that is the big question, either they wc:
12
authority, which apparently flowed around channels
acting on 1 13
The Chalrman . Covertly
14
Mondale. Covertly or they were acting on thei
Senator
15
attempts to find direct authority in these officia
own , our
16
meetings led us nowhere
17
And your testimony 18 that you find it very unlikely
18
that there was this covert way of communicating authority .
2
19
3 Bundy . My testimony was that I wouldn t
6 Mr
20
it existed _ I have to consider the same a1 - |
21
have believed
that. the Chairman has So
clearly pointed out. I
u ternative
22
agreeable to conclude that the Agency was a 1 don t find it
23
1 at a time when I strongly believe it was not
rogue elephant
24 8
Mondale. Me asked General Taylor that questioo_
Senator
25
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H# 50955 DocId:
You
and
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26 8
3 1 and he gefd he found ft incredible to belfeve that 8
2 would have gone around the Special Group Augmented with guch.
; 3 Mr . Bundy . General Taylor of course and this 19 an
4 important point wag a-pointed to this responsibility after
5 the of after 8 review of the' fallures that led to
the of and after 8 conclusion had been reached that
it would strengthen the White House to have a man with a parti-
cular respongibillty for the oversight oE intelligence opera-
tfons . He was called military representatlve to the President ,
10 but in the announcement of hig appointment
t I happened to
11 look it up the other President Kennedy made it clear tha
12 he would be his representative for intelligence matters .
13 And he did in fact take over the chairmanship during the time
14 that he was military representative of all of the Special
15 Groups , 54/12 , the Special Group Counterinsurgency ,
and the
16 Special Group Augmented _ MONGOOSE_ And when he said
17 if he has testified that his expectation would have been
18 that nothing was going to 9o around him, he 18 saying exactly
19 what I thought through the same period _
26 Senator Baker . Mr . Chairman , that respect
2] The Chairman Refore I forget the question , let
22 me ask since You were at the August 10 meeting , and since
23 we have received testimony buttressed by certain documentary
24 evidence that the subject of assassination of Castro did
25 come up at that meeting, do you have any recollection of
TOP SECRET
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they
1
Cr rn
Bay Pigs ,
Bay Pigg ,
day
in
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LOP SECRE
27
8
1
1 gubject coming up Or being alscussed?
3
1 2 Mr . Bundy . I don € recollect the meetIng _ And I
3 don € recollect the subject ever coming up In a meeting of
4 that gfze, or indeed in any 4 I don t have recollection
5 of It coming uP , although I do have 8 general recollection of
6 there belng times which this possibfllty Wab heard of , I
wouldn t want testify that I never heard anyone say ,
there 1g somebody thinking about this_ becauge that woula be
different fron my vague recollection.
10 But I have no recollection that meeting and there-
11 fore nonc of any specific statement made by anyone in it.
12 The Chairman _ Senator Baker?
13 Senator Daker . In that connection , before I go to the
14 question I had in mind , is it fair to say , Mr Bundy , that
15 all, or virtually all, of your testimony this morning _ about
16 MONGOOSE _ about the August 10 meeting_ and about the general
17 situation , is Erom reconstructed memory rather than first
18 impression memory?
19 Mr Bundy . I didn't want to go that far _ Senator Baker _
20
My knowledgc , my sense of what 54/12 and Special Group
21
Augmented wcre, and wherc thcy stood in the 1ne of authority ,
19 very clear , and 18 not recongtructed . I spent ffve 22
23 years except for the time when General Taylor was there ,
24 I was the chairman of these things.
Senator Baker _ Let' s take a piece at a time, then .
25
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any
at
to
of
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28
7
1 On the queetlon of the Executive Action capability, I
8
1 2 believe referred, to 88 the ZRRIFLE project
1 3 Mr Bundy . Imust 8ay that if I had known that wag its
4 name I have looked harder Senator Baker.
5 Senator Baker. It 1g a falrly plcturesque name a3
5 to Executive Action Capability, or ZRRIFLE , do You have a
beparate recollection?
Mr Bundy . I have a recollection of what I thlnk of
19 one , I don t want to say there wasn't more , but of
10 one digcussion of the matter And I know I wag informed of
11 it in some fashion the time .
~ 1
12 Senator Baker Do you remember by whom?
1 13 Mr _ Bundy _ That is my difficulty, as I said earlier,
14 I don t know
15 Senator Baker . The reason I ask i8 , from the other ~
16 documentation I have , which consists primarily of the
17 Inspector General of the CIA 8 report, and maybe other
12 material that I can 't think of at the moment , it is clear
3
19 and unmistakeable that they think of RZRIFLE or Executive Ac -
5
tion Capability as a White House initiative, or a Nhite House 20 1
21 request of considerable insistence from the White House that
22 they on with the job
1
23 Mr Bundy . That is totally inconsistent with my un-
1
reconstructed recollection.
24 8
Senator Baker _ Let me track that carefully.
25
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would
at
get
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ToR SCRTT
22
8
that there Wag
1 1 Do
recall
for
for myselt here = and
2 Mr _ Bunay .
ICan only
1 knowledge of
hi8 a88fgnments.
Rostow and my
1 3 my colleague
made It wildly out
have
4 I
recall that his ag9ignments
initiate a
for him to
and totally
of character ,
5 of place,
not . And I
I
recall that I did
6 matter of this
And,
of
of any
reaonstruction
7 recall that
independently
recent
limit this , then
I 1fke to
Senator Baker.
10 just to
yourasgignment.
of 30 -
to take care
Was Jt
general `a89ignment
11
1
12
called covert Operations?
I take a
minute
MP m may
It was
my assignment
Mr Bundy . 1 13
14 on
this?
Baker _ Yes , sir.
15
senator
I
become
were two wayg
in which
Mr Bundy . There
I. might have
thought up
three ways.
17
involved in covert recollec-
to
say that I have
I will have
18 an idea in which I had
It was not a subject_
that I
ever did . 1
19 tion So,there were
motivating interest.
3
20 an
independent
it. One was by
involved in
in which I could 7
21 two
or
the Defense Intelligence
from the Agency
5 22 a Special Group_
come to the
1
23
Services, which
had an interest-=
other was when
the President
7
24
And
time in these
9
44 & Erom time to
an
interest
and I did have
25 TOp SECRET
HI 50955 Doci
not?
you
8 speak
woula
out
kind _
guite
months _
would
your
could
16
no
myself _
Personal
get
ways
upward' Proposal
would
the
==================================================
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He hed 0 Interest a6 different points In
1 matters .
8
more about Cuba And of the more he
3 2 1961, 1962 , in doing
:
And he Bay 80 to me And
1 5 to do was covert=
I woula say 80 to gomebody else:
Senator Baker. Can you give examples of that?
5
I t, I Xcan only Bay that the. kina
6 Mr Bundy . No,
talking about was , why
do all these raids not
7 of thlngs he was
they can do something about the 0il
8 03
anywhere? They say
refinerleg , why don t they? These
are purely hypothetical,
Baker ,
but they woula be In a catcgory , gubversion
10 Senator
11 and sabotage.
5 Baker . WAg it Harvey that was spoken of a9 our
Senator 12
8 13 00 7?
Mr Schwarz . Once yesterday .
14
Baker Do you remember when Mr . Harvey was
SEnator 15
to gee
the President at the Oval Office?
16 brought
I have been about that, but I
Mr Bundy .
17
recollection. I don € know
am afraid that
18 non-refreshed
18
1
19
anything about it.
Would that have been the character of
8 Senator Baker
26
that the President was interested in, 007? 1
21
the things
I not going to try to repair the record
Mr Bundy _
5 22
stage and say that the President never 1
23
at this late
1
Ian Flening .
24 8
Or ever seen Ian Fleming?
Senator Baker
25
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HW 50955 Docic
great
Part
woula
wanted
49
can'
get
told
am
read
==================================================
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L
1 Mr Bundy . I don thifnk the: President ever acted Ian
8
1 2 Flening .
1 3 Senator Baker . I think that i9 right. But I think ft
4 18 important for 48 , Mr . Bundy , to try to egtablish, a8 the
5 Chalrman 8ald, the range of available Information or evf-
dence that sheds 'gone llght on the three alternative possf-
bflftles and the type of thfngs that the Pregident interested
hingelf in 19 terribly important in that regpect.
9 I believe that you said you had no informatlon or no
10 recollection of what particular 8ituation_ or what other
11 deals that were made he was interested in
) Mr Bundy _ I will it more concretely than that
12
0 The Pregident 8aid , can t we do something more about Cuba?
13
14 Why don t You ahold of these people who are dealing with
15 this and see if they can do better and pass the
16 that I am interested ,
0 that kind of thng_
Senator Baker . Do I understand that to mean that he never
17
18 of a
particular practice?
1
Mr . Bundy . I can t tell that , becaube I know, the
3
recora indeed reminds me , that particular actiong that are
20
related to Cuba that came up through the group of ten
21
went to him, and some were approved and some were not.
22
1
23 So , he clearly looked at them .
1
I woula have to have the documents there in order to
8 24
be precise, I don t have them with me .
25
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19
and
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1 Senator Baker whfch docuents?
8
2 Mr Bundy .
Documents which 'the Comittee staff
1
1 3 has provided _
4 Mr Schwarz. We have then
5 Senator Baker . Tell me what they are.
6 Mr Schwarz _ November 30 , 1961, Tab 4 4 18 that Tab H
or Tab 4 about the Novamber 30 , 1961, which authorizes
MONGOOSE?
9 Mr . Kelley. Tab 4 .
10 Mr Schwarz . 5 , 62 , Langdale Tab 21
7
11 Senator Baker Let 5 stop there, if I may .
~' {
12 Do You have a copy of this memorandum Mr Bundy?
0
Mr Kelley. He will have it in a moment.
3
1 13
Mr Bundy . One place these documents did not go is
c 14
15 into the memorabllia of former memberg . {
16 Mr Kelley. We are talking about Tab 4 ,
Senator Baker . Mine says , see Langdale Tab 4 .
17
13 Mr Kelley. Yes. November 30 , 1961 _
1
Senator Baker . I would really prefer if someone gave
19
8
Mr Bundy a copy of the same ma terial I am working on
20
1
21 Mr Kelley . All right , that is the chronology _
Wj 22 Mr Bundy . November 30 , 1961?
v
1
Senator Baker . Yes , sir. It is on page 3 , the third
23
1
24 item .
8
Mr _ Bundy . I have it,
25
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1
1 Senator Baker Preaident Kennedy # decislon to begin
0
2 MONGOOSE _ I8 Jt 'clear, Mr . Bundy , that President Kennedy made
1
1 3 the decision to initiate the MONGOOSE program?
4 Mr Bundy . No question.
5 Senator Baker . I notice in the gtaff interpretation
column Ibbues and Questions that they alleged
6 under the
7 that you
recall probably writing thig memorandum _
8 Mr _ Bundy That 18 really 0
logical Inference. The
would not himself have written a
long memorandu of
President
F
10 instructions of this kind. It 18 posgib]e that General
it. But I think it 1s more likely that_ I did
11 Taylor wrote
1 whichever of us dia 80 was doing it 38 a 1
12 But in any event,
0
staff officer for
the Prsident 5 convenience in recording
1 13
14
his decision _
Baker = So at least to thfs extent there 18
15 Senator ~
question about the chaln of command , or the chance to
16 no
control it,
the President authorized it?
17
Just to underline that point, as I recall
Mr Bundy .
18
which was shown to me , it is one from Mrs. Lincoln 1
19 the paper
8 General Taylor saying_ the President wants You to have
20 to
this as a
description of the decisions
1 2 1
Senator Baker . Would you repeat that?
22
I think the covering memorandum on that 1
23 Mr Bundy .
1
19 from Mrg Lincoln to General Taylor , and it say8 ,
24
document
8
to have this a9 a record of his
the President wants you
25
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1 decislons
8
2 Senator Baker _ Thank You, sir.
1
3 Do you have an
independent recollectlon of the meeting
4 Or the
encounter with President Kennedy In connection with
5 MONGOOSE?
Mr _ Bundy : Not 8
gpecific meeting, but of the process
which led to
this decision,
Baker . Describe for me , If you will, what
Senator
MONGOOSE was intended to be?
Mr Bundy . Well MONGOOSE in a general way wa3 the ~
10
set of thingg to be concerned with mostly , but not only ,
c 11 whole
A7}
1
covert
activities against the Communist regime in Cuba _
12
The chronology algo quotes the Memo as
Senator Baker. 1 13
we will use our available agsets to go ahead
14 saying , one ,
C
the digcussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow
15 with 3
16
the Communist
Can you elaborate on that?
17
Mr Bundy Not without documentary aggigtance beyond
18
said _ It was to be a fairly wide ranging
2 what I have just
19
5 I believe that what that really sort of implies
20 program .
is that all departments are to cooperate, that the 1
21 to
Committee is
to review possibilities, proposals , to geek
22
and that the thing is to be coordinated by the 1
23 them out,
1 whose chairman will be this summary doesn' €
24
Committee
recollection is that the chairman was to be
say 90 , but my
25
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yes
regime _
me
m
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35
General Taylor and- 1t doeb Bay that Genera1.. Lansdale
8
1 2 was to be the Chlet o2 Operations.
1 3 The ChaIruian I have "gome-questions at
thig point, please =
4 Item 4 of this memorandum read8 : "The NSC 54/12 Group
5 clogely Informed of activitiee , and 0i1l be
will be kept
6 available for
advice. and recommendation"
7 Doeg thfs buggest to You that the regular 'channel wa9
to operate with respect to MONGOOSE _ that 16 to say ,
gupposed
central role wes to be played by the Special Group in
a
10 connection with Its activities?
11 Mr Bundy . It is a puzzling sentence to me I read
;
12 And I can t You a precise angwer on that. 1
it now ,
6
answer has to be that the
54/12 Group continua:
1 13 think the general
this perfod _ General Taylor was the chairman of
c, 14 through
of membership wag extensive . And
15 both. The overlapping 2
woula a more precise answer a9 to the exact
16 I. think you
R
General Taylor than I am in 8
position to
17 relation from
18 You.
1
The Chairman . I have a very clear memory of General
19
8
tes timony. And his testimony was that the Special
20 Taylor 5
L
21 Group Augmented was the group that had charge of operation
was further his testimony that all plans all
22 MONGOOSE . It
v
1
operationg were to be brought to the Special Group Aug-
23
1
for Its approval_ And the approval of that Group
8 24 mented
necessary before any
such plans were actually implemented =
25 wa8
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give
get
give
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TRSET
6
1
Bundy f/woula: certainly bejclear on that , Mr
1 Mr
8
were abking whether there was .&
2 Chairman I thought You 1
ther
reguirement that It go from the Speclal Group
1 furt
Special. Group- And I have no
precise view
Augmented to the
5 on that.
6 The Chalrmen I see&
7 Now when refer to the NSC 54/12 Group
That 18 what I thlnk of 80 the Speclal Group
8 Mr . Bundy .
Chairman . That 19 what you think of as
the Speclal
9 The
10 Group.
the question becaube the language 18 a 1ittle
11 I asked
1
12 fuzzy .
0
Mr Bundy . It 19 1 13
that there is
The Chairman _ This
language might suggest
14
line of authority, and that the Special Group
15 an '
independent
the Special Group wa3 simply to be kept informed ,
16
Augmented or
recomendationg would be
taken under advise-
17
and its_advice and
18 ment.
I think myself , Mr _ Chairman , that 1
19 Mr Bundy .
8
t have a very
serious problem here because I
we don 20
General Taylor 9 recollection that the Special |
21
agree with
Group Augmented was the Cuba group
22
Special Group 1s simply the same people less
1
23 Now the
1 And the only
real operational value of this
two or three
24 8 the staff officer who serviced
paragraph is that perhaps
25
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You
would
4
the
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TORSC4
37
54/12 woula be avaflable In 8 decislon to the staff officer
8
2 gervicng the Special Group Augmented _ But the decision-maklng
1
3 persons are 4bimply a
smaller number oE the very people
1
both General' Taylor and I recollect a8 having the main
that
5 responbibility -
The Chafrman . So according to your best remembrance 0 6
would agree with the testimony we have received from
77 you
8 General Taylor?
9 Mr Bundy . Yes , I would.
The Chairman . Mr Smothers?
10
Smothers . Mr . Bundy , perhapg we could get gome help
11 Mr
in how the recollections come together here . I might pursue
12
for jugt a moment gone of the background regarding other
1 13
of information you may have had regarding the subject
14 sources
matter of his testimony _
15
indicated earlier that you had talked with Mr
16 You
Bisgell about his testimony_
17
Did you talk with persons other than Mr Bisgell?
18
2
19 Mr Bundy . Oh , yes .
8
Mr Smothers. Did you talk with Mr McNamara?
20 7
2 Mr Bundy . Yes , indeed
Mr Smothers _ Regarding these events?
4 22
1
Mr Bundy . Yes .
23
1
Mr Smothers . Have you spoken with Mr. Gilpatric?
24 8
NO , I t think I have .
Mr Bundy .
25
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738
1
1 Mr _ Smothero Mr Rusk?
8
1 2 Mr Bundy . Yes
1 3
Mr Snothers _ Mr McCone?
4 Mr _ Bundy . Yeg.
5 Mr . Smothers ._ Are there Other8?
6 Mr' _ Bundy . I am bure there are, Mr. Rostow_ Mr
7 Gooawin _ There may well be others_ Mr. Schlesinger and Mr _
Dungam who hag very 1fttle to do wlth lt, but I talked
to them because of my Own abgence of recollection about the
10 Dominican Republic.
11 Mr Smothers Let me just raige a few tions regard-
;
12 those discussions , and perhapg it will be gomewhat helpful
1 13 to 43 in trying to plece this together
14 Has any documentary evidence pagsed between You and
15 the persons previously. men tioned regarding the subject
:
16 matter of these hearlngs?
Mr Bundy . Not that I know of
17
Mr Smothers _ Did Mr McCone provide you any documentary
18
1
19 evidence?
8
Mr Bundy . No . 20 1
21 Mr Smother - Did you receive any documentary evidence
from any source other than the staff?
5 22
1
Mr _ Bundy . No 4 # I beg your pardon . When I testified
25
1
before the Rockefeller Comission I asked through that
24 8
Commission whether I could look at NCS files particularly in
25
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ing
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TOR SEcRE
8 order clarify my recollection `6f the 6th of August 1962
8
2 And I wag allowed to look at the NSAM ffle8 . And my memory was 1
1 3 refreshed by NSAM-1 , which I belleve the comittee has;
4 Mr Smothers . Have you' made 8 8imflar request to
5 persong now within the Agency :or on the White House Btaff?
6 Mr Bundy _ No _
7 Mr , Smothers : Coula we go back Into your convergation
with Mr , Biggell? Could you describe for the Comittee, pleasel
reactlon when Mr Biggell Indicated to You that he had
your
10 In testimony before thfb Comfttee told the Comfttee that
0 11 either you or Mr . Rostow had agked him to establish an Execu-
7 {
12 tive Action Capability?
0 3
13 Mr Bundy . He didn t report ft that way to me , He 1
14 reported it to me that the testimony that had been given by
15 other8 placed this event in February 1961. Testimony by
others indicated that he had said to chen that he had been
16
encouraged to do thlg by the White House and that in casting
17
around a5 to who might have encouraged _ he had given the
18
1
names of Rostow and Bundy . I think this is roughly what
19
5
he said to me , 20 1
The Chairman . That was the character of his testimony?
2
Mr Bundy . I told him that I thought he must
5 22
1
be about Rostow , becauge that wasn t the way it worked .
23 wrong
7
and that my own recollection was not that we had encouraged
8 24
him, but that I had at some stage been informed about ft_
25
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8
then went on €o 8 afscusson OE what It was And
We
8
whatever else It wab , It Wa0 not an
operation
2 We agreed that 1
3 plan , and It wab
targeted against anyone 1
What Was hlg reaction to your commment
4 Mr _ Smothers .
5 that he had been informed 88 oppoged to Initlating?
Bundy . I don t recall that we had a very
extended
6 Mr .
I don t recall hig reaction, I don' t
7
d1scussion on Jc,
recall exactly how I
the point.
8
Let me just a8k at that point, the way You
The Chairman.
Bissell' $
testimony correspnds with my
10
have characterized
It 18 hard for me, however to understand
11 menory of ite
Mr _ Bisgell would have directed Mr
1
12 how Mr Bissell 4 why
,such 0
capability ,
and apparently represented
13 Harvey to develop 1
believed , to Mr . Harvey that he had
if the documents are to be
14
to do this by che White House , if he
been
twice instructed
15 2
16 had in fact received such authority.
think that Mr . Bissell would have undertaken
Do You 1 7
initiative to develop such a
capability and
on his own
18
his subordinate that he was doing so
19
simply represented to
8 instructions from the White House?
20
I think there is a
question, Mr L
2
Mr Bundy .
of the witness from whom he
Chairman, which i8 the credibility
1 22
1 1s taking
this recollection.
23
1 The Chairman . That i9 fair.
24 8 Bisgell himself did not seem disposed
Though Mr
25
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ana
put
not
on
Prior
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8 1 Mr Bundy Mr 8lbsell May not recollect that I @ld
8
2 him this instruction bit I d0 , Mr . Chalrman
1 not glve
1 3 The Chalrman . pid Mr : Bissell at any time during the
under question; or at any later tIme, ever Inform
perlod
5 of CIA activitieb or' Involvement In a8ga88ination attempts
you
6 against any
foreign leader?
7 Mr_ Bundy No
8 Chafrman: Doesn € It strfke You 48 btrange , Bince
The
wag aware of Buch attempt8 , that he would not
Mr . Blgsell
2
10 have told hin?
C; Bundy . Well, I don t want , for reagons that I
11 Mr
P 1 explained , to speculate 89 to why he did or did
12 have already
working on
the aggumption that I
1 13 not . I was operating ,
would know that kind of ithing if It existed _
14
15 The Chalrman
Senator Mathias?
Mr . Chairman, I don t want to leave
16
Senator Mathias.
record , or Mr Bundy 9 mind , in the alternative , MY
17 the
confugion as to what exactly Mr . Bigsell' s
18 mind , Jn a state of
2 recollection was .
8 depending gomewhat on Mr . Harvey 3 recollec-
Now , he was 20
first instance_ But as I recallE he 1
21 tion and notes in the
clear 89 a matter
of independent recollection that
22 was very
1 horsed along a couple of times by the White House
22 he had been
1
wfth the development of the Executive Action
24 on proceeding
8
And that was a matter
of independent recollection
25
Capability.
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19
v
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1 Jt aldn € depend on anybody else 0 notes Or anybody elae' 8
8
2 refreshing hfg recollection: 1
3 Mr _ Bundy . Thae he didn't Bay_ to and I have no way
4 of commenting on It.
5 The Chalrman . I think we must carefully revfew the
6 recora on that Bcore .
7 Senator Baker . It may be necebsary to ask him to come
back for that purpose.
9 May I abk a question there?
10 Mr _ Bundy do you have any recollection of any specific
11 covert plans that woula involve song hypdermic syringes ,
12 or other potentially lethal devices in conjunction with acti-
9 13
vities against Cuba?
3
Mr Bundy _ I have no recollection of any specific plan.
14
I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection
15
that I heard the word poison at some polnt in connection with
16
a possibility of action in Cuba _ But that 18 a8 far a3 I
1'
have been able to take It in my Own memory.
18
1 Senator Baker. Can you remember who may have men-
19
8 tioned it to You and what the Purposes of the poison may have
20 1
21
been?
Mr Bundy Nothing at all about it in detail
v 22
1 Senator Baker A poison pen?
23
1
Mr _ Bundy . No some kind of poison about which one
2 24
thing that does stick in my mind i8 that it seens totally
25
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FORSLRRET
Impractlcal because Ic wab golng to kf1 0 large group of
8
2 In a headquirters me8s , Or Bomethlng of that bort. !
1 5 Senator Baker. Do you remember whether the was
4 declared non-feaslble or Infeasible by the Department of
5 Defense?
Mr _ Bundy . No , I have no such, recollectlon .
Senator Baker. Do you remember anything about 8 hypodermic
syringe to carry pofgona In 8 ballpoint pen?
Mr . Bundy . That 18 the sort of 'thing that I was asked
10 the other and I Bafd I remember it, and then it beems to
11 me about ten gecondg later wa8 that what I was remembering was
1
12 murder mysteries and nothing related to Cuba I have no
13 recollection of connecting anything like that to Cuba _ 1
Senator Baker . I have another question , but I will
14
15 waft, if you have something else
C
The Chairman . Go ahead , sir.
16
Senator Baker . Do You feel that you have a Insight
17
Into the relationship between the President and his brother
18
1
Robert Kennedy in this respect = that is having to do with
19
8 Cuba operations , and Robert, Kennedy and Richard Hlelms?
20 1
Mr _ Bundy I have a, pretty picture of the relation-
2]
ship between President Kennedy ana Robert Kennedy on Cuba
22
1
and on many other things . It is a recollection which grows
23
1
stronger as the administration goes on , because I to
24 8
know them better, and = of course, they to know me better ,
25
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People
Plan
day ,
good
good
got
got
==================================================
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ToR S RET
tenae €o become closor my relation with
1 and the relationshlp
8
them . I had known the President for many, many
2 both of !
General much more brlefly.
1 3 year8 , and the Attorney
I do -have
any clear picture of the relationghip
4
General and Mr = Helmb ; My curbstone
5 between the Attorney
have been that Jt was not cloge.
judgment
Based On inslght did the Preaf-
Senator Baker .
Robert Kennedy gubgtantlal agpects of Cuba
dent delegate to
during the peziod ~we are speaking of?
pollcy
I wouldn't Put ft that way , Senator
Mr Dundy
10
counted on the Attorney General to be
Baker He certainly
11
on a great many subject8 , of which Cuba
1
12 a kind of gingerman
were the two that came more
clogely with-
13
and counteringurgency 1
Jn my area of interest _
14
c
Senator Baker _
Counterinsurgency meaning what?
15
meaning all thoge efforts
Mr . Bundy . Counterinsurgency
16
Berets and organizing to be able to ag8f9t
R like the Green
17
by Communist subversion internally.
countries threatened
18
Baker . Are you speaking of counterinsurgency
1 Senator
9 it led to Cuba , or a9 a
general capability?
20
conmittee, the Special
Mr Bundy . There was a separate L
21
And the Attorney General
Committee on CI , counterinsurgency
22
of that. And I used to see him playing
1 was an active member
23
and prodding and why can' t
1 this very important role of poking
8 24
do better , and why aren t we
do more and can € You
25 You
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HW 50955
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woula
your
2
19
2s
5
why
==================================================
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JORdR
8
making moro progreba
8
Baker. who wab on that commfttee?
2 Senator 1
I am borry , I can't decide from recollection =
1 3 Mr Bundy .
the Chalrman , but the membershp was
General Taylor Was
5 different.
Baker . Do you have minuteb or records f that
6 Senator
group?
8 Mc . Schwarz No .
F Senator Baker Mr Chalrman I would 1fke to request
8 agigtance after thfg hearing that we iden
that with Mr . Bundy
3
10
can what that group 18 , and make a fomral
tffy a9 much a8 11
N 1
12 request for documentation.
0 We have reviewed bome of that material at
Mr Aaron. 1 13
Library. It i8 esgentially in fact the
the John F _ Kennedy
14
that reviewed paramilitary operations and potential
15 group €
insurgency situations in a number 6E countries . There was an
16
list. It did not geem to relate to the gubject
17
insurgency
of here So we did not request the documents _
we are speaking
18
1 But we could have gotten them .
19
8 Senator Baker . Will you do that, Please?
20 1
Is that agreeable , Mr . Chairman?
21
The Chairman _ What is your request?
22
Baker. I would like documentation or any records
1 Senator
23
1
to
the counterinsurgency group during the period in
relating
24 8
25
question.
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8 1 The Charman- Lee me Suggest that deslgnate 8 men-
8
1 ber of the committee staff to undertake that revlew and
1
report back to the committee
4 Woula that be gatfgfactory?
5 Senator Baker . That 18 fine . I Just want to know Jf
there 18 any 1orthwhile documentation.
7 The Chalrman Yes, Because It may be entirely ancillary
8 to this iggue .
Senator Baker : Let me agk Mr . Bundy this. Would that
10 group have been Important toward American policy during thls
11 period?
{
12 Mr _ Bundy _ The CI Group?
4
1 13 Senator Baker. Yes
14 Mr Bundy . I would think only most marginally ,
15 Senator Baker , simply becaube the existence of other groups ,
16 the gpecial Group Augmentea Or the MONGOOSE Group = was 90
~
17 clearly donlnant and was the Central Committee for that
18 ject_
1
19 Senator Baker The gingerbread man concept?
8
20 Mr . Bundy. The gingerman concept =
|
2 } Senator_ Baker _ The gingerman concept There 18 a
5 22 difference _
1
Do I directly infer from that description that the
23
1 President would authorize Robert Kennedy to urge and expedite
24 8
action to move from a8signment to assignment to push peoplc
25
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sub-
and
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1_ along to produce " 0 rebult? 8
! 2 Mr _ Bundy = In 8 general way that 40 rght. But the
3 form 1t took In the areas In which I 4a8 concerned wab In one
Benge guite Informal . I know of no Instance nwhere the Attorney
5 General tried to replace che norma l channel let 8 btay away
6 for the moment from the covert question and the Cuban queb-
tion, which I know you will want to talk about more precisely
but If he felt, a8 he ofter dld, that American pollcy In
Africa , for example, was Insufficiently Bensitive to the asplr- 3
10 ations of black people In Africa, he wouldn t fire off 2 kick , h
11 woula come in and say , why can t You People do some thing about
0 1
12 the State Department on news and stuff_
1
13 Senator Baker . There is some evidence we had direct
14 testimony that Mr . Helns who wab DDP at the time in ques -
15 tion, rather than DCI clearly thought that the authority of
6
16
the Agency was to overthrow the Castro regime by any means , in-
17 cluding asga8gination.
And when pressed on the source of that authority he de-
1
19 signed to gay that anyone specifically cold him that, but
8
20 that he talked to Robert Kennedy frequently about it_ Would
1
2] this be in the gingerman concept You are speaking of?
v 22 Mr . Bundy . Now we are right at the specific point I
1
23 would like to make. But everything I knew about Bobby Kennedy
1
24 when he was goading and spurring people on is that he never 8
25 took away from the existing channel of authority Its authority
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16
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[OFRSRDl
or responsibility_ 8
! 2 Senator Baker. Moula what I deacribe be conslstent
1 3 with whatyou describe?
4 Mr _ Bundy . Not IE Ic 18 interpreted a8 meaning that he
5 Was providing 2 geparate channel of' authority_
6 Senator Baker : What I meant waa Just what It wa?; and
that 19, Ielng described for 03 meeting With Kennedy apparently
8 to stimulate the Agency 9 activities to produce the overthrow
9 of the Castro regime= and that he met regularly With Kennedy
10 Jn this respect.
11 Mr Bundy . I don t know how often they met Or what wag
1
12 8aid , I know nothing about that. I would have said _ just in
1 13 passing , that the Attorney General ' 8 relationship to the Direc-
C 14 tor of Central Intelligence wag much closer and more impor-
C
15 tant than his relationship to Mr . Helns
16 Senator Baker _ I am correct, am I, that Helns at the
17 time was DDP and not DCI?
18 Schwarz That i8 right.
1
3.9 Senator Baker. Do you have any idea why he would have
8
20 met regularly with the DDP rather than the DCI?
1
21 Mr . Bundy . I have no idea that he did I know that he
Wj 22 met often and intlmately and easily 'with the Director of
M
1
23 Central Intelligence , who was a close personal friend of his .
1
24 Senator Baker _ You are speaking of Mr , McCone?
8
25 Mr _ Bundy . Mr . McCone .
TOP SECRET
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Mr .
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TOR SeE7
The Chaliman I think thit Sinc6 the point 12 Impor-
8
1 tant, that when the Commfttee- staff complete Its revlew of the
L 3 evidence It ought to be reminded to look clogely at that Helmg
4 testimony and Identify exactly what worde Helms might have
5 uged to describe his relationehip with Robert Kennedy .
6 Senator Baker . And the tine involved and what position
Helms occupled at the time
8 The Chairman . I have another question.
Mr Bundy we 2180 have t from Mr . Blsgell that at one
7 10 time he called In an officer 4 subordinate 0 Donnell,
11 that at one time Mr Bigsell called in a gubordinate whose
F 1
12 name was Mr 0'Donnell and asked_ Mr . 0 Donnell if he would
0
1 13 be willing to undercake the agsa9gination of Mr Lumumba
c 14 Mr 0'Connell testifieg that he gaid he would not be
15 willing to undertake the asgagsination of Mr_ Lumumba because ~
16 he had moral compunctions against killing.
R
17 Mr 0 Donnell further testifies that he was then or
18 thereafter dlspatched to the Congo = where he was informed that
1
19 some poison had been made available had come to the CIA
i
20 headquarters in the Congo.
1
21 Mr Bundy . I am sorry , I missed that lagt.
W 22 The Chairman. He wag informed that gome poison had
Mi
1
23 arrived at the CIA headquarters in the Congo .
Z
Mhen we asked Mr Bissell on what authority he had asked
24
7
25 0'Connell a9 to his willlngness to undertake the aggagsination
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3 Lunumba _ he coula not provide 00 Vith- that authorlty,
of 8
he have done It On hfe Own Initiatlve:
! except to say that may
1 3 Do you have any reaction to that?
4 Mr Bundy . Where 18 it In; tlme?
5 Church. It wag In the . fall of 1960 . It wag
Senator
6 during the
Kennedy Administration, It Preceded the Kennedy
But I asked you the questlon , becauge It
Adminfatration.
being 8 very disturbing plece of testimony , that
strikes me
80 poBftioned , In the CIA could not identify higher
any' Man ~
for an action, and would under oath gay that it
10 authority
11 might have been on his Own initiative_
1
Mr Bundy . I t add to your comment on that, Mr
12
1 13 Chairman _
14 The Chairman. Very well
Let me ask him 8 question or two, Mr
15 Senator Morgan .
1
16 halrman_
17 The Chairman . Senator Morgan?
Senator Morgan = Mr Bundy you rccall very vividly
18
2
with the President on many occasions about Cuba _
19 talking
8
20 19 that right?
vividly that I talked to him on many 1
21 Mr Bundy . I recall
on
remembering specific dis-
W 22 occasiong , I am not very
M
1
23 cussions
7 You told uS a few minutes ago that he was
24 Senator Morgan_
8
don € You do this, and why doesn' t
25
constantly prodding , and why
TOP SECRET
HY 50957
not
as
guch
can '
good
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'51
1 80 and 80 work? 8
1 2 Mr Bundy . If I mey correct that, I Bafd he prodded Me
3 from time to time not all the time_
4 Senator Morgan _ Qufte frequently?_
5 Mr Bundy . I wouldn € It that often. It might have
been three or four times .
Senator MOrgari . Mr Bundy , You were head of the Security
Council You were his asb18tant?
Mr Bundy = I am trying to give an accurate Plcture' of
10 the number of tines Senator.
11 Senator Morgan . You are trying to give such an accurate
1
12 picture that You are not giving much of 8 picture at all.
13 Are you telling thi8 committee that throughout the time
14 you assumed your duties , throughout the Cuban crisis , and all
15 the MONGOOSE operatlons _ that you might have talked to him Ewo ~
16 or three timeg about It?
17 Mr Bundy . No _
18 Could I separate and try and clarify my answer?
2
19 Senator Morgan . Yes ,
9
20 Mr Bundy . I talked to the President , I suppose , many ,
L
21 many times in the context of the events that led up to and
4 22 followed the of Pigs. I talked to him dozens of times ,
1
23 maybe even hundreds of times , in the context of the events that
24 led up and followed the Cuban mfssile crisis. Those are the 8
25 two great moments of Presidential concern over Cuba during the
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1
Put
Bay
1
to
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52
8
to hif moch 16b8 I €
1 time I.wab In' Mabhington I calkea
8 intervening -matters. And that 18
2 you 8 number-m on these
1
I trying to makea
1 3 the digtinction
You were Bomething between himgelf
4 Senator MOrgan .
Security Council were not?
5 the National
That Isn t
exactly the way It work8 .
6 Mr Bundy .
Just,tell me what aia
you do .
7 Senator Morgan_
Mr Bundy . I am
trying to.
8
I have been Ilstening all morning , Mr .
Senator Morgan _
I just don't it,
10 Bundy ,
question. Wa8 it true a while
Let me go to one other
c 11 prodding
gaid
that Robert Kennedy wa s constantly
7 1
12
ago when you
can E we do more?
Why
13
Yes , that 18 certainly true.
Mr Bundy .
14
I have no
other questions
Senator Morgan _
15
Could I. one , Mr . Chairman?
Senator Mondale. _
16
rman .
Senator Mondale
The Chai:
17
I don t like to ask thig question _
Senator Mondale.
18
but I think it i8 important _
19 involved during this
8 Have talked to others
20 before S and before the |
when You may have
been testifying
2]
in the last five months about
Rockefcller Commission, say ,
W 22
6
1 thfs testimony?
23
Yes , I have
1
Mr Bundy . I answered that question.
8 24
repeat it briefly for Senator Mondale. Would
25
TOP SECRET
HY 6095
can '
glve
aM
and
you
get and
people? 1
ask
1
period
You
us?
You
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TOR SeE
53
1 Mr Smothera I Vas about €o purbue that Ilne
8
1 2 Senator Mondale_
1 3 Senator Mondale _ Go' ahead _
4 Mr . Smother8 . I believe you Indlcated previously , Mr
5 Bundy , that you talked to Mr Blsgell, Mr MCNamara _ Mr McCone
6 Mr Rostow Mr Goodwin Mr_ Schleinger and otherg that may
7 not be on that ligt0 And ` you Indlcated that you had spoken to
8 Mr _ Blggell after hlg testImony. regerdlng executive actlon.
9 Mr Bundy . That 18 righta
10 Mr Smother8 . Had you spoken With him also before that
11 testimony?
1
12 Mr _ Bundy _ No .
0
13 Mr Smothers . Did he call you or did you call him? 1
Mr Bundy . I don t honestly recall I think I said the 14
other that he had called me, but I think actually what
15
~
16 happened that he called me , and mY' first words were, I needed
17 to call You.
Mr Smothers . Can we go to your convergationg with Mr
18
1
McNamara _ When did You first talk with him about these matters
19
1 being testified to?
20 |1
Mr Bundy . I think pretty much as soon as it hit the papers
2
Mr _ Smothers . Can you the Committee the sense of 4 22
1
your conversations with Mr. McNamara?
23
E
Mr _ Bundy . There have been a number of them . Mr
8 24
McNamara and I not only have been close frlend8 , but are very
25
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MY 50953
day
give
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54
ciosely; asrociatea Nov 8o I 866, hlm end talk wIth him fre-
0
1 2 quently - both aboue subgtance O€ matters of Internatlonal
1 3 development_ and about the businese of the Fora Foundation =
4 I have talkea to him' a number of times both On the
5 telephone. and face: to face, The ebbence of the convergation
18 the exploratlon' of questions raised Or doubts rafsed babout
the conviction we both' share, Ahich 18 that no one In the Kenned
Adminletratlon, In the Whfte House, Or; In the Capitol, ever
gave any authorization, approval , or ingtructlon of any kind
10 for any effort to aggagginate anyone by the CIA
end nash 11
2b fpls
12
11 13
c. 14
15
6
16
17
18
1
19
i
20 L
21]
5 22
1
23
1
8 24
25
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HW 509
So ,
<
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JORHx4
93
5aglu
210 81
0 Did; you atecu8s Git hlm Or dia he ralse
Mr. Smother
8
the fact that he' had recefved from
2 with you specifically,
1
3 Mr McCone a memorandum from Mr McCone In 19677
1
Mr Bundy Yes, he tola me that
4
Smotherb . Did you' d18Cu88 the gubstance of that
5 Mr
6 memorandum?
I
discusged It:loltially With Mr McCone
7 Mr . Bundy
Did di8cu8s It with Mr , McNamara?
8 Mr Smothers _
He mentloned It to me ,
I don't recall much
Mr Bundy .
10 about it
~
Mr Smothers Did You discus3 the meeting of August 10
11
t?? {
12 in Secretary Rusk $ office?
Was the ffrgt discussed beceuse the
13 Mr Bundy . That 1
there had beer a meeting of three four
14 newspapers said that
C
and the question wab whether there had been
15 or five of uS ,
{our,Or five _ And We were able
:
16 such a
meeting Iimited to three,
to
Batigfy ourgelves that that wrong .
17
That was wrong . What do you recall to
Mr Smotherg .
18
McNamara" 8 reaction of the August 10 meeting?
1
19 have been Mr
9 didn't seem to have any that I can recall_
Mr Bundy . He 20
t recall that he told me of any reaction of 1
21
at least I don
it. y 22
Smothers . Do you recall the substance of his
1
23
Mr
1 comment regarding the 1967 McCone report?
24
I don" € think he commented On it . He
Mr Bundy . No
25
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MY 50934
You
wab
8
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JO? Sta 4
56
told me Ghac It gal4 8
! 2 Mr Smothers With regard to Your convergation Wlth
1 3 Mr McCone_ When did thle occur; approximately?
4 Mr Bundy . That occurred earlfer? on
5 Mr Smotherg Before the, Rockefeller Commisglon Ingulry?
Mr Bundy . I don € know exactly; Vhen it wa8 But It
was within the context of the Rockefeller Commleslon
Ingulry. not thls Inqulry_
Mr Smotherg Are you talklng about more than One
10 conversation?
11 Mr Bundy . I think I talked to him on the phone
1
12 and then I had a meeting with hfm.
1 13 Mr Smothers . In either the phone convergation or the
14 meeting did you discuss Mr McCone 3 1967 report?
15 Mr Bundy _ He told me that he had heard of It. I don' €
16 think he had then Seen It.
17 Mr Smothers _ You don € think he had then Been it?
18 Mr Bundy = He had then seen it 83 of 1975 _ He obvlously
1
19 saw it in 1967
8
20 Mr . Smothers . Can You give uS a feeling for the approx-
|
21 imate tine when this converbation occurred?
W 22 Mr Bundy . I could 'probably work it out from my own
v
1
23 calendar, but I don t have it in my head
E
24 Mr Smothers . But at this tfme he haa not geen the
9
25 report?
TOP SECRET
HY 6098y
and
No,
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FO? SCRE:
8 Mr He haa_ not Been the report In 1975 _ But
! 2 Bfnce 1t.:8 0 report that 08 I understand it, I€ 10 8
3
report that he made In 1967 , an he had Been I6 then .
4 Mr Smothers _ Did he Indicate to You that he was
5 makingcan effort to get that report?
6 Mr _ Bundy - I thlnk he tola me that he had been In touch
7 with the Agency and woula be beeing the report, but I don' €
really recall_
9 Mr Smotherg To go Into Your convergation with Mr
10 Rostow woula you Indlcate to the Commfttee please _ the
:
11 substance of that conversation?
1
12 Mr Bundy Yes . I called hin after conversatlon
1
13 with Mr Bissell, because 1t seened to that he ought to
14 be Informed , and the two of them ought talke with each
15 other about that testimony _
16 Mr Smotherg _ At the time you called him It was your
17 Impression that Mr. Bisgell had not talked with Mr Rostow?
18 Mr But was planning to
7
19 Mr Smothers _ And this was after Mr , Bissell' 8 testi- 9
20 mony? |
21 Mr Bundy - That 1f right.
4 22 Mr Smothers Did you ana Mr Rostow discuss the fact
11
23 that both You and Mr Rostow had been naned as potential
1
8 24 gources for the Exective Action authorization?
25 Mr Bundy . My emphasis in talking about Mr Rostow Was
TOP SECRET
MY 609y
Bundy .
my
me
to
Bundy .
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VOPSFCRE
58
1 the fact tha€ he had been nentlonea becaube 1t seemed to Me
8
2 that In mY recoliection that must be wrongE and he would be !
1 3 interested in getting It atralghtened out
4 Mr Smothers Can we go to your conversation with Mr
5 Goodwin. Did you; call him or dia he call
Mr Bundy . I called him_ G
Mr Smothers And the nature of that conversation?
8 Mr Bundy . That corversation wag about the DomInlcan
Republic, becauge of My complete faflure of recollection 89
10 to who or what the White House lne of actlon,regponsibflty
L
c 11 and concern was with respect to the Dominican Republfc In
K 1
12 1961 And I called him, and I called Dungan, and I called
0
13 Schlesinger because they were the the who had been
C
1
much involved in things like the Alliance for Progre88 , and c: 14
new appointments to embassies in Latin America , and Latin
15
:
16
American Policy generally , except for the Bay of And
I wanted to gee if they had recollections about events in
17
that spring that were more extengive than mine I didn't learn
18
1
19 very much , but that was the purpose of the call-
8
Mr Smothers . And It It testimony that your first
20 L
21 exposure to che documentary evidence beyond these recollections
wj was when either the Rockefeller Commi88lon ataff or this
V 22
1 staff showed You documents pertalning to thfs inquiry _
23
1
Mr Bundy I want be precise about the Rockefeller
8 24
Commission staff _ They did not show me the documente , the
25
TOP SECRET
HY 50951
You?
very
Pigs
your
to
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TO? SRE7
59
8 Whfte House 8taf€ Ghowea the' docuents _
! 2" Mr Smothers The White House Staff showed the
1 3 documents?
4 Mr Bundy . Yes
5
Mr Smothers Under what circumgtance dia the Whlte House
staff provide these documents to you? Was It at your request
7
or thelr request?
Mr Bundy _ My request
Mr . Smothers When did it occur?
10 Mr Bundy . Ac the time of the Rockefeller hearings .
11 Mr Smothers At the time of the Rockefeller hearings?
12 Mr Bundy . Yes
11 13 Mr Smothers And prior to your testimony?
14 Mr Bundy Yes
15 Smothers Who provided these documents to you? F
16 Mr Bundy = I never have testified on 4 this 18 not a
17 serious matter, because there 18 no secret about ft. But I
18 have alwayg taken the position that White House decisions
1
19 are for the Nhfte House to discuss , and I pcrfer to hold to
i
20 that position now |
2 Mr Smothers Arc saying that you do not feel at
4 22 liberty
1
23 Mr . Bundy . No , I am not gaying , I am saying that I would
8 24 request the committee to address that; question with the White
25 Ilouse .
TOP SECRET
HW s09
Ta
you
Mr
You
1
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LOPHCRREI
60
The Chafrman What 18 the questfon?
8
1 2 Mr Smothere The 'questlon {9 who In the Whfte Houge
3 provided Mr _ Bundy with documents relevant to this investigatidn _
4 Ana I believe hfs posftion 1s thae he would prefer not to
5 disclose that matter Or that that 18 a matter for the
6 Commlttee 8 determlnation .
Mr Bundy _ Let me explain, Mr Chalrman, because you
were out of the room , that I have always taken the posftion
that decisions of the Whfte House are for the Whlte House
2
10 to discuss I always asked permiseion to 8ee documentatfon
C 11 and permission was given . I looked at the document , but I
C 1
12
would rather not discuss it, because I think it is for the
0
White House to discuss it. 1 13
14 The Chairman . What is the document?
15 Mr Bundy . I just described it; It 1g National Security
16
Action Memorandun No 1 we chowed 48 the National Security
.17
Action file, whfch I belfeve Your btaff hag .
Mr Schwarz We have it here
18
1
19
Mr Smothers My question was , who had the request been
9
made to, and Bhowed him the document?
23 6
21
Mr Dundy My point is that I have tried higtorically
4 not to discusg this kind of question when it i9 some thing
22
1
that concerns the White House _ but leave it to the White 23
1
House to discuss it, and I would prefer to hold to that
8 24
position
25
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1
to
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8 (Off: the recora-
1
8
2 Mr Smothers This guite frankly , Mr Bundy , thls
1
ancillary matter that 18 of concern to the
1 3 related to an
4 Commfttee.
You mentioned convergations with Mr SchlesInger Again,
5
6 were
those initiated by
The most recent one , he called Me And I
7 Mr Bundy .
earlfer ones but I don € know _ I can't be
think there were
I must say I don t know that I understand the line
9
precise.
These are very Important matters and
10
of questfoning
3
clogely Involved in them Bhould be trying to a
11 people
~ 1 clear sense of what each other rememberg after this many
12
6
seems to me thig would be entrely natural
1 13 Years , it
Smothers . I don t question the fact that it is
Mr 14
tural, Mr Bundy I think one of the difficult things
na 15
this Comnittee to do 13 to separate out, if you wf1l,
for 16
recollections from
the documentary evldence
the independent
17
have shown you and from convergations with others
we 18
You are quite right _ And I have tried
1
19 Mr Bundy _
8 te carefully to teil, you my recollection
20
We are merely trying now to establish |L
2}
Mr Smothers
S0 that when we
the. point in the
those relationships
22
bome
question regarding the nature of the
1
23
recora there 18
1 that might be of some assistance to US That
recollection
24 8
veracity , it 19 not an attempt to
is not an attack on
25
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You?
get
qui-
get
5
your
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TOp ECRET
6
3 Bee Lf there nag beer any Gfort 6€ Collusior Or whatever,
8
2 but merely to give u8 gome guldefnes In' looking at the
1
1 3 record _
4 Do you recall_ Mr Bundy from thege conversatlons that
5 we have just mentioned, any mattera whfch have been ralged
by the participants: that may be Inconsistent wIth the
docuentary record 88 You have been 1+? We know of courbe ,
that Mr McNamara" 8 recollection appeare to be inconsistent
with the documentary evidence regarding the August 10
10 mee ting _
[
Mr Bundy _ Well, 80 Was mIne And I have no guch
11
12
recollection .
6
Mr Smothers I am speaking now of the recollection of
1 13
c
others , if you will.
14
Mr Bundy . I can € really recite on that, because I
15
1
haven t made the kind of comparigon document by document
16
conversation convergation that woula allow me to make
17
and
clearcut and comprehensive answer But I don' t have any
8 18
1 recollection of sharp divergency of that sort
19
8
The Chairman Mr Schwarz_
20
Mr _ Schwarz . Mr Bundy , I want to pick up on one
L
2]
thing that you testiffed to that was left hanging and then
% 22
1
come back through your Involvement with Cuba and starting
23
1
from the beginning You testified that to your knowledge
8 24
authorization for an asgassination was given . I want to
no 25
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by
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TOP SD
3
8
1 cone at the subject from another directlon Were You ever
8
2 tola at any tlme by ' anybody that as8a881nation efforts- were !
1 3 actually under way with respect to Mr Castro?
4 Mr Bundy = Absolutely not =
5 Mr Schwarz . Vere you. ever told by anybody that the
Central Intelligence Agency haa hired the Mafla to essa89inate
Castro?
8 Mr Bundy _ No
9 Mr Schwarz . Were you ever told by anybody that during
10 the MONGOOSE program Mr . Harvey wag engaged in aggas9ination
:
11 efforts upon Fidel Castro?
12 Mr Bundy _ No
0
Mr Schwarz Were you ever told by anybody that in the 1 13
14 fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was pagsing
asgasgination deviceg to 8
Cuban milftary officer?
15
16 Mr Bundy _ No
Mr Schwarz . Were you ever by anybody that Ln:the
17
fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in
18
1
an
assa8sination effort with respect to Fidel Castro?
19
8
Mr Bundy _ No 20
1
Mr Schwarz Now after the Bay of was there a
21
reevaluation or reconsideration of what the policy toward Cuba
4 22
1
should be? And would You turn In that connection to Tab B,
23
1
of the Bundy Book 1 of 2 e # 24 8
Tower _ May I ralse a
purely technical point . I
Senator 25
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Pigs ,
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JOR H
it 18 not intentlonal bue think we use the term , the
knor
8
Maffa wae; hired' to abgaG81nate Castro I think chat was
2 !
because I 'don t think we have anything that
1 3 Inaccurate,
that we contacted the cate 88 such , and I think
4
Indicates
Jf we u30,
"Individuale l4kely; aggociated with the Mafle,
5
somethlng like that IE 18 8 llttle technical
6 Or
Schwarz . Let me restate the questlon to make bure
7 Mr
that there 18 not 8 problem with the scope of my question _
8
And Senator Tower 18 'correct=
Were ever told that the Agency had contacted 8 man
10
1
called John Rogelli?
6 11
; Mr Bundy No
12
0
Mr Schwarz _ A man called Sam Giancana?
1 13
Mr . Bundy . No
14 c
Schwarz . A man
called Santos Traficante?
Mr
15 7
16
Mr Bundy . No
Mr . Schwarz Any person who was a criminal or allegedly
17
a criminal for the purpose of agsassinating Mr Castro?
18
2 Mr Bundy . No _
19
9
Mr Schwarz _ Do you have
any recollection whatsoever
20
the subject we have been exploring in thac group 7
21
related to
of questions?
# 22
No # You are familiar with the fact chat 1 Mr . Bundy _
23
2
recollection of activitieg aggoclated with the
refreshed mY
24 8
enforcement context in Florida in 1964 .
Mafia in a law
25
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you
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TORJc 65
raiged 1€ let 8 Just" that
Mr Schwarz Since You
1 to the 8 What happened' In
vith respect
2 down right now
! recollection? And then
and Cuba , to the bebt Or
1 3 Mavla
we
will just mark bome documents _
4 recollection here is
Let me
be clear that my
Mr Bundy .
5 rather come back to
refreshed _ Perhaps would
entirely
it?
Jt in the record here, since
Schwarz . Let 8 Mr 8
have raised the gubject _
Exhibit 1 the- Ie lms meno to DCA
Let 8 mark a9 Bundy
10
dated June 10 , 1964 _ 5
on the Cuban exile
as 11 referred to 19 (Document
7
12
No 1 for
identificatidn.)
Bundy Exhibit
13
14
15
:
16
17
18
19
9
20
1
2
22
1
23
1
24 8
25
TOP SECRET
{ Pln
1964
Your
you
we
Put
plan
marked
4
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66 Top SEGRt
minttes' of the
3 Bundy} Exh BIE 23
Schwarz: As'
3 1 Mr
June 22 1964
ttee 'aated
8
2
meeting o2 the
to 18 88
{ (Document identificationl
1 3 Exhibit No , 2A for
Bundy
4
5
6
7
8
9
c;
10
5
11
I 12
1 13
C: 14
15
7
16
17
18
1
19
3
20
7
21
22
1
23
1
24
8
25 TOP SECRET
tha
Connl 303
marked
referred
4
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762 512m
67
19
{
Eihfbfe428 thet minutes of the
Mr Schwarz As;Bundy
8
Committee of 18 June 1964
1 2 30 3
to
18 marked a9 (Document referred
1 3
Exhiblt No. 28 for
Bundy
4
identification.)
:
7
8
9
10
3
11
K 1
12
0
13
C 14
15
7
16
17
18
1
19
i
20
L
21
y 22
1
23
1
24 e
25
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1
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ToPar
68
Exhikie ZC thoiminutes of_ the
Mr Schwiarz
And; Bundy
1
8 303 Committee. of July 31 1960
2 referred to 19 marked a3
(Document
1 3
Exhfblt No 2C for Bundy
4 Identlfication:)
5
6
7
8
9
10
2
11
F
12
1 13
14
15 6
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19
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24 8
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4
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Tops
69
5
Bundy; Exh1ble ,20 Ena
memorandum
Mr Schwarz- Ana 88
1
1ss stant to
1 Honorable Modeozge ; Bundy Speclal
2 for the Plans bY Cuban !
o8 PBI
Investigatlon re
3 the
President, "Status
1
Leadere , 0 dated:
to
Abba881nate Cuban Governnent
Exlles
5 Auguat 19 , 1964 .
a3 Document referred to 18
6
Exhfblt No . 2D for
Bundy
7
identification.)
8
9
10
L
11
1
12
0
13
c 15
16
17
18
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19
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|7
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4 22
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marked
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Page 73
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TOR Sc
70
Bunay
basea upon youf having had
Mr Schwarz . Mr
1 if_ You
to the testimony and now L
2
opportunity
recollection, will you recount for
to do 80,
to refresh Your
1 3
the
Bummer' of 1964 In connect-
the Committee what happened in
4
Ion with thig matter?
5 small matter In the
Well, it 18 8
relatively
Mr , Bundy
6 but what happened In the
context of what you
are discussing,
7 attention that there
1964 was that it came to our
gummer of
Cuban refugees In Cuba and
were relations between
Mafia . And thfs did not seem
asgoclated with the
10
apparently
in a
period in which
idea
And this wa9
L: to be a
11
ing for some time against
C sentiment had
been steadily grow_
5
1
12
that were
wholly outside the
0 activities by Cuban refugees
13 of the U.S . , and that
and not really in the interest
C 14
control
associated with a
criminal group
they should be
15
came to
the Special Group, the
;
And S0 when the matter
16
it to
the Department of Justice
decision wag made to refer
17 enforcement _ That Was
matter
of internal Anerican law
as a 18
19
done
it was
going after the
8 And the
Department said that
20
did, and
reported back ~
matter, which it then 1
21 conclugive picture of what
don € give any The reports
4 22 do show that the Bureau
was going on,
but they
1
23
really
these matters , and
asking' around about
1
to a
number of
24 8
I know it
then faded away ,
as far a3
25
TOP SECRET
an
seek again
prior
people
good
went
People
==================================================
Page 74
==================================================
To? Ar
In the context of
that aiacussion did
Mr Schwarz
8 Central Inteliigence Agency or anybody
2 anybody from the !
earller there had been
3 else Inform You that in 1
use Senator Tower 9 caution
with D to
4 a
relationship
Involved with the criminal syndicate
5
With persons alledgedly
lish the
ag8a89inatlon of Fidel Castor?
6 In order to accomp
7 Mr Bundy No
going back to
the post-Bay of Pigs
8 Mr Schwarz . Now ,
before the witne88 and mark 88 Exhibit
period, would you
of 8
meeting held May 5 , 1961_
10 2
the National Security minuteg
9 Book 1 of 2 . This reflects ,
V
It is at Tab B of the Senator
C:
11
of Cuba , held with the
1
a I correct , Mr Dundy , a discusaion
~ 12
who are all
officials of the government
13
President and high 1
c listed on the front page?
14
Mr Bundy = Correct _
;
15
And Cuba was digcugged , and it wag
Mr Schwarz
16
U.S _
policy toward Cuba
R following the digcus8ion that
17
agreed ,
the
downfall of Castro, and that since
shoula aim at the
18 to achieve this end ,
below are lfkely
19 measures
with a view to
3 matter should be reviewed at intervals
20 the
7
21
further action?
Mr Bundy Right
22
describe the measures
Schwarz . Now , can You 1
23 Mr
to at that
8 24
of dolng
that with any accuracy
Mr . Bundy My only way
25
TOP SECRET
years
Put
not agreed
4 agreed
point?
==================================================
Page 75
==================================================
2 ToR sH
summarize this docunent=
Irom ,Or
19 to
in effect to
8
2 Mr
Schwarz . then . ! document, speake
for Itself,
3 Mr Schwarz . The
1
to It?
4
can add nothing
Mr Bundy = No aia Or 5 that the measures
But You say
6 Mr Schwarz .
aid
Include asgas9nation?
and
1g nothing In my
recollection
Mr Bundy There
beems to me
to imply
in
the document that
nothing
10 ation . this Instruction
Now
following
Mr Schwarz _
11
in the fall of 1961?
12
Cuban policy reviexed
7
Yes
13 Mr Bundy . fall review
of the And ultimately
0
Mr
Schwarz .
that 14 MONGOOSE program; 18
c
15 In came
That
18 right.
2 Mr Bundy
the
MONGOOSE
16 to discussing upon
Now , R Mr Schwarz
17
a
lot of other
program,
did you consider
i9 a 18
I think we were
Mr Bundy _ working
19 doing
but I
what
i
20
question ,
take charge of the
be able to 7
21 an tmental kinds of
things involved
inter-depare
ted,
morning covert
4 22 concentrating this
Cuba _ We have been economic 1
23 in
there were also
1 actiong , but
0
number
24 In Miami,
8 and Cuban refugee
25 TOP SECRET
quote
And
You
can
not
ag8as81n-
was
again
1
out
correct?
so-called the 1961
prfor
options?
hard this and
toward 1
was were we think
woula that organization
varied
complica on
problems
propaganda
and
problems
problems _
==================================================
Page 76
==================================================
TO? S2t
73
that aid not' 61l Tall Wtnin One
jurledlction .
1 of othere
8 that kind of problem you have
organization
2 Anytime !
Bolution of 1961, which took sometime to
1 3 problem_ And the
of time suggest8 _ wa8
the creation
4 work out, a3 the pagsage
Committee under the Chairmanghlp of General
5 of a
Special
and
with General Langdale 89
It9 operating officer .
6 Taylor
Now , in the' course of the revlew that did
7 Mr Schwarz
establishment of that Special Committed
take place to the
MONGOOSE program, wag One oE the
whfch then called the
the agga88ination of Mr Castro?
10
matters whlch wag congidered
already said, I can not tell You
Mr Bundy As I have
11 C
came uP But I recall no sustained
F
1
12 that this question never
0
discussion of that matter in that period _
1 13
gustained discussion
c Schwarz . Whether you recall a
Mr 14
C.
15 or not
I don ' t recall a discussion that I can
;
16 Mr Bundy .
over
the period of 1961 to 1963 the
anywhere , but
17
from time to time
by different individ-
18
subject Was
mentioned
I can recall the President But
1 uals, never to me that
19
8 it did come up' =
20
And IE may have come up in this period in L
21 Mr _ Schwarz .
something to consider, i3 that correct?
the fall of 1961 as
4 22
something to talk about rather than to
1
Mr Bundy As
23
1 consider, be my answer
24 8 before the witness 33 Bundy
Mr Schwarz . Would you
25
TOP SECRET
an
get You
prior
got
pin-
point
by
would
put
==================================================
Page 77
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Joe;19H
70 No 100,
!
Security Action Memorandun
1 3 the
Nationai
Bundy Book 1.
C of
'the Senator'9
8 October 5 , 1961, Tab
Group
2 datea
minutes of the { Exhibit JA the
And 83 Bundy 2 1 3 1961, which 10 @€
Langdale
dated October 6 ;
49
4 meeting referred to 18
(Document
)
5 Exhibit No 2 for
Identificaticn-
Bundy
89 6 referred to 19
(Document
7
No 3 for
Identificatid
Bundy Exhibit
as 8 referred to 19
(Document
9 No 3A for
identificatin
Bundy Exhibit
10
2
11
7 12
1 13
14
C
16
17
18
19
3
20
L
21
22
1
23
:
24
25 TOP SECRET
Exhlbit
Speclal
Tab
marked
marked
marked
15 7
1
i
8
==================================================
Page 78
==================================================
TP SKDU
8
Schvarz woala 7ogiye CoPY oe che 6ther document .
3 Mr
8
Parrott document 'to 611 the Senators too?
2 the 1
finally a8 Bundy Exhibit 38 0
memorandum which
1 3
indietinctcoriginal dated October 5 ,
have retyped from an
For the Record" Subject: Cuba, B1gnea by Mr _ Parrott .
1961
And
the Indietinct original 18 attached
(Document referred to 10 marked a5
7
Bundy Exhiblt No. 3B
for identification)
8
9
10
11
*
1
12
1 13
c 14
15
2
16 R
17
18
2
19
9
20
1
21
22
1
23
1
24 8
25
TOP SECRET
we
And
4
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Page 79
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TOR Hd
76
Mr Schwarz Mr Bundy Co Junarfze before I ask
8
2 you the question In NSAM No 100' you gent to the Secretary
!
1 3 of State thc following note : "In conformation of Oral
4 instructlons conveyed to Assigtant Secretary of State
5 Woodward 8 Plan 18 desfred to the Indicated contIngency In
Cuba D you have an Independent recollectlon of what that
Indicated contingency_ 08s?
Mr Bundy - Before seelng this document?
Mr Schwarz Before ' geeing the documents _
10 Mr Bundy . No
L
Mr Schwarz . Having looked at not only Exhibit 3 , but
11
C? Exhibit 3A and 3B , do You agree that the contingency referred
12
to in 3A and the contingency referred to in 3B are related
11 13
C 14
to NSAM No 100?
15 Mr Bundy . Yes , I do 2
Mr Schwarz Now the contingency referred to in 3B ,
16 N
which 13 the earlier of the two following documents , is
17
said bY Mr Parrott to be 2
against the contingency that
18
1 Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban
19
8
scent And I am going to come to some of the other parts
20 1
of that document with respect to the President 3 interest or
21
not 4 22
1 And the contingency in 3A , which 19 the ninutes of the
23
1 Special Group, as characterized a3 follows: "Mr Parrott also
24 8
told the Group that two other exercises are in progress in
25
TOP SECRET
1
plan
==================================================
Page 80
==================================================
TOP Su
77
Cuba tho
preparation of:& contingency
1 connection Vith
8
th the: posBibie removal of Castro from the
2
in connection wi
!
updatirg of the overall plan for
3 Cuban scene an 1
4
covert operationsF
those documents and In the
Now
after having reviewed
5
that it 18 pO98fble chat the
6
lighti of your testimony
the
possibility of ag8as9ination which you
7
congideration of
occurred in
the fall of 1961,
say did occur at gome point;
8
that time the contingency
under consider-
do you that at
of the
ag8a88ination of Castro?
ation here was the
posgibility
10 The contin-
No , I ~would put It another way
Mr Bundy
11
would we do if Castro were no longer
;
12 gency here i8, what
6 of how
Castro ceased to be
there So that the question
1 13
Clearly one of
left out of this set of papers=
there is
14
tion, but only one of
possibilities would be assassina
the 15
I the docu-
talking about here , a9
them . What we are
16
that I am
reading
7 the contingency
ments , is a
17 the contingency that
from
the Parrott memorandum, against
18
other be removed from the Cuban
in way or 1
19
Castro
nonethelesg
100 , whoge language is indirect,
3 scene NSAM
20
rereading it, that
the President
indicates_ to me at least, 7
2 if Castro were no
know what was likely to happen
to
22
words, trying to a picture
there . Ile was, in other 1
23
lorger
and if SO , in
1 whether
that would realiy change things ,
of
24 8
what way .
25
TOP SECRET
1 plan
and
agree
read
not
against plan
gone would
wanted
4 get
==================================================
Page 81
==================================================
TOR SLCRE,
78
1 Mr Schwarz Jubt 'One detail that Mr Smothere guggested
1
! 2 to me , I NSAM 100 what the' Whlte Houee Bhowed You , or 1g
1 3 Jt another document?
4 Mr Bundy - 181 But let me be preclge _ I asked
5 to 8ee the documents relating to # # from the National Security
f1les relating to August 1962 And gave me the NSAM
7 {fle {dentlffed a3 the slgnfficant memorandum, NSAM 181
Schwarz . Now , the contingency to be examlnede
therefore, wag what would: happen Od D would 1t help the U.S . ,
10 that 19 the question, If Castro were to dfsappear?
11 Mr Bundy _ What would it be like if Castro were to
1
12 digappear? The question i8 open ended _
11
13 Mr Schwarz What was the conclusion?
14 Mr Bundy . I don t remember My unalded sense of the
15 matter is that intelligent political analysis woula have
16 suggested In 1961 or at any time later that the removal of a
17 single individual in a revolution"_ complex and general 83 this
18 would have quite unpredictable and not necessarily helpful
1
19
effects _
i
Mr Schwarz You said that while You were clear the 20 L
2]
assassination was not in fact authorized_ You believe that
at some point it was examined , 19 that a fair characterization
v 22
1
Mr Bundy That ign't the word I used . Talk about_
23
1
Mr Schwarz Talk about. And this exercise constitutes
8 24
an analysis of what Cuba/the 0.S . would be like if Castro were 25
TOP SECRET
No ,
they
Mr
==================================================
Page 82
==================================================
25
TOP SCRET
79
removed_
8
1 2 Mr . Bundy It constltutes 8 requeat for guch an analysis
1 3 Mr Schwarz. Was the analysi9 made?
4 Bundy I don t have any recollection
5 Mr Schwarz . Ie one were exploring the pogsibility of
6 a88a88ination, I take It thie kind of analysis 18 the sort
of analysfs one woula wish to make 1f one wag not 8imply
ruling assassination out as a matter of principle in the first
instance
10 Mr Bundy . Let me put it another way . If people were
11 suggesting this You , and you were curious about whether
1
12 it was worth exploring , one of getting more light on it
6
1
13 without going any further with that notion Itself would be
14 to political people, not intelligence people , what they
15
thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer
:
16 You will notice that thfg National Security Action
Memorandum is not addressed to the Central Intelligence 17
18
Agency , less still to the covert part of the Agency , but
1
19 rather to the Secretary of State_ And specifically clearly
c
the action of certain is Assistant Secretary Woodward 20 1
2
Schwarz. Now document 3B indicates and you
4 have had an opportunity to review this one before, I think 22
1
Mr Bundy _ Which one are we now talk about? 23
1
Mr Schwarz 3B , Mr . Parrott 5 memo
8 24
Mr Bundy . Yes I have a clearer copy now than I had
25
TOP SECRET
Mr
to
way
ask
Mr
ing
==================================================
Page 83
==================================================
Top SECRU
1
for ch I a Presidential
1
yesterday ,
that there 8
8 Schwarz. It
indicates
Mr
2 Mr Taylor
1
in
the matter And
or Mr
1 3 interest the State Department,
that
Parrott that he about the
be Department,
Woodward in the there a
5 matter. First,
in thc
Pres
idential interest
have no
to
You
in the interest
7
I take it.
was, and I
8 doubt reading a note,
I wag
I am sorry ,
Mr
Bundy .
of
didn" € hear
the last
tiong _
the first
10 really two
L:
Mr .
Schwarz . I
Pres
idential
11 there a C
of which is a
12
in the there was no interest
1 13
There a
Presidential
Mr
Bundy _ Security
14 I in a C'
doubt in my the desire i9
15 as
desired , that
a Memorandum
16
1 7
mine .
desire 19 in fact
And the
Mr
Schwarz =
18
Yes of
Mr
Bundy _ recollection
1
19 have you any
Now
8 Mr
Schwarz_
of 1969?
20 to
the fall
attention earlier L
2]
calling
I go
comment
Mr
Bundy
22
to tion there was 1
23
1 You
correctly of request,
24 of this
8 9
kecp thc
25 TOP SECRET
grateful
whfa
was
told
General then
Prefered
told not
state
was
reason
matter?
Presidential
there that
questlon _ the Part
ques =
asked
was question direct
matter?
wag
National
write when that not mind
{
Plan
Actlon
Presidents? the
other
your your on
and back
Could
4
concern
ques that out pointed
process
out name President
==================================================
Page 84
==================================================
TOP SECRE
81
1 although you correctly: point out' that the President Wa9 the 8
{ 2 one who wanted to know 'My Impresslon here 18 that Whatever
3 concern we have , General Taylor Or I, Jn the frame of this
language, it was precisely to ingulate che PresIdent Erom
5 any false Inference that what he wab asking about wag
6 aggassination. It 18 easy to confuse the questlon . What
7 are thingg going to be 1lke after Castro, with the other
8 ques tlon, and we were trying to focus attention on che
Information he' obvlously wanted, which what would happen
10 if we did do this sort of thing = and not one into the
c
11 frane of mind of thinking that he wag considcring doing it-
7 1
12 That is the distinction, I think
1 13 Mr Schwarz Do you have any further recollection of
c 14 discussion of this matter in this fall of 1961? And by this
15 matter I mean either the broader inquiry into what it would
{
16 be like if Castro disappeared , or a gcenario ariging of the
17 specific subject of assassinatlon
18 Mr Bundy . No , I don 't.
1
19 Mr Schwarz _ Had ever heard before I asked You
8
20 about the last night about a conversation ; an alledged conver-
1
21 sation , between the Pres ident and the: Journalist Theodore
22 Schwartz, and or Mr Goodwin in thig timeframe?
1
23 MI Bundy? I saw that in the newspapers
1
24 Mr Schwarz _ Or in Esquire magazine?
9
25 Mr Bundy Wherever I saw it, I saw it in print
TOP SECRET
1
18 ,
get
You
"
==================================================
Page 85
==================================================
TOpSTCRE
8
3
1 Mr Schwarz _ But you have no Independent recollection
8
2 of that or OE the fact that Mr . Schultz me € with the President? L
1 3 Mr Bundy . No But I will Bay thle E # and Jt 1s 8 randor
4 observation if I were plannlng an action of great sensitlvi
5 I: Kouldn't discuss ft with,any Journallat, I don € think_
6 Mr Schwarz . The record from Mr Schwartz 18 that the
President gafd he was oppoged to agga98fnation, but that he
brought it up in a conversatlon with Mr Schwartz, saying
that he was being encouraged to order aggagsination .
10 Now , You have said that you do recall that the subject
:
11 was talked about, your words , at some point, and that it
P 0
12 might have been in the fall of 1961 .
1 13 Mr Bundy I wculdn t want to say that it was only in
14 any given period _
15 Mr Schwarz But that one of the points in which it
16 might have been discussed was the fall of 1961.
1' Mr Bundy . Certafnly .
Mr Schwarz We are going to come to another iod
18
{
19 which relates to
5
20 Mr Bundy . May I interrupt one second
1
2 Could we go off the record for 3 moment?
v 22 The Chairman . Yes
1
23 (Discussion off the record .)
1
The Chairman . Let 8 put that on the record
24
Would You restate what I have just stated?
25
TOP SECRET
Per
you
==================================================
Page 86
==================================================
TO? SICRE
9
7 1 Mr _ Bundy Golng back to your: earlfer, queaeton
8
2 through the courteby of the Commlttee from the
have a mesgage 1
1 3 Whfte House that there 18 no
objection to answering the
4 89 to how the Whfte House came to Bhow me the NSC filel
question
5 When I learned of sone of the intereste of the Rockefeller
Commlgslon, It geemed to me that It would be useful If I
could refresh my recollection _ I telephonea Dr Rlssinger ,
who-it seemed to- me woula be the right person both In hls
capacity a3
Special Assistant and. the capacity 83 Secretary
of State, and he called me back to say that General Scocroft
10
would show me the documents I needed , and he did not
:
11
12 Mr Smothers Just one question.
0
This file contained what, now other than the NSAM?
C
1
The only file that I had time to go through
C 14 Mr Bundy _
recollect was the NSAM file, which 18 a relatively
15 that I can 2
16 short one
R
Mr Smothers For which time period?
17
Mr Bundy For the period surrounding August 1962 _
18
Mr Smothers _ It was given to u9 a8 an existing file, 1
19
:
or matterg that had been pulled , or organized
20
Bundy No they gave me the whole file, they were
L
2] Mr
that I have been involved with, it waa nothing
W 22 all documents
vj
1
to me But the ones I wag looking for were the ones
23
1
relating to this subject .
24 9
Mr . Smothers_ Were these only your docuents?
25
TOP SECRET
13
new
==================================================
Page 87
==================================================
TORR S cRE
Ob
L
Mr Bundy Ag far 88 I recoliece
1
1
Smothers . And by your 'documants_ I mean documents
Mr
2 !
3
81gned by 1
wouldn € be all sfgned by Je not
Mr Bundy . They
4
by me But they. would a1l be documents
every NSMA was g1gned
5
for which I
had respongibility .
6
Mr Smothers And the timeframe Wab
7
before and after to give me a
Mr Bundy - Sufficiently
8
political context of August 1962 In relation
picture of the
to Cuba .
Lf 10
do recall when You gaw this file?
Mr Smotherg _ And You
c 11
it was Ln the context of my
6 Mr Bundy . Well, a3 I gay , 1
12
Commission _ And that would
0 before the Rockeferrer
appearance
1 13
I don t have the dates _ and I don 't
be early thfs year
14
to make' a mistake on it.
15
trying to pin the date down . It
~
Mr Smothers . I not
16
remember But we can ask
would be helpful if You
17
Mr Schwarz _
18
sure that we have what we
Mr Schwarz . I want to make
1
19 summarized , and that you agree
8 have done s0
for accurately
20
with it.
7
21
of an aggasgination, will you
Can I uge discusgion
4 22
1 accept that?
23 seriousness and more
Z Mr Bundy It implies more
24 8 sustained arguent than I recollect _
25
TOP SECRET
You?
want
am
==================================================
Page 88
==================================================
ToRyu
85
6b 3
L
So your Eecorag are with to
1 Mr Schwarz
8
2 persong asking about
1
3 Mr Bundy . Or talking about
or
talking about asgassination, that
4 Mr Schwarz .
occurrea on more than one
occasion?]
5 did occur , that it probably
6 Mr , Bundy . Yes
And that one of the occaslong may have
7 Mr Schwarz .
8 been in the fall of 19612
recollect about the fall of 1961 18
9 Mr Bundy . What I
~
what would happen if he 19 not there?
10
this question,
would be a
relevant question to &k
Lc
Mr Schwarz. Which
11
12 if one was talking
about assassination
But I have no independent recollection
Mr Bundy. Yes 1 13
and I musn t lead
assassination, Mr Schwarz,
14 of talks about
by saying that I did
15
talking about or
In
any event, Passing from 2
16 Mr Schwarz.
to authorizations for action,
17
discussions or
contingencies,
on this concrete period, Was
and
fically focuging
18
thorized in the fall of 1961?
1
19
assassination au
3
Mr Bundy Absolutely not
20
thorized in the fall of
Schwarz . In fact what was au
L
21 Mr
5 22 1961?
I
we have a long document on that,
1
Mr Bundy Well,
23
1
think _
2 24
And that is
the MONGOOSE program?
Mr Schwarz
25
TOP: SECRET
regpect
1
you
speci:
==================================================
Page 89
==================================================
ToPSCLT
86
0b332
3
And that 18
the MONGOOSE 'programs
1 Mr Bundy .
8 'connection with
the MONGOOSE. Program_
2 Mr 8chwarz In 1
General which was
3 had gome. dlalogue about the Attorney
1
you additional question on
Let Me ask You" one te extensive
What was
the relationghip pergonally
5 that gubject -
General
and General Maxwell
fesgionally between the Attorney
7
cloge . I think that they first
8 Mr Bundy . It was very
were 0t ml I think they
hardworking sense when they
9 met in a
committee to look
into what happened
10 were both members of the
Lc
or if the
Attorney General not
11 after
the' Bay of Pigs ,
c
clogely interested
K
;
12 a member he was certainly
0 Schwarz . He was a member _
13 Mr
C
1
I am sure che
Attorney General was
Mr Bundy . Ana
c 14
the
appointment of General
of the
people strongly favoring
15 one
advisor They both
{
16 Taylor as
the President $ military
they liked each other= and
active
and ardent tennis Players,
17 Kennedy children
and forth - One of the
18
they visited back
I think There a relation
1
19 is
for General Taylor ,
them And the measure of
8 trust and
confidence between
20 survived later very
th i8 that I think it easily L
2] its streng
shart differences over Vietnam
22
what I am asking for
1
Mr Schwarz . Now
recognizing that,
23 under-
and not a fact, your
1
is a matter of
24 you
8 will you give u3 your
25
standing. of
that relationship,
TOP SECRET
qul-
and Pro-
Taylor?
was
were
of
was
named
real
4
given
opinion
opinion
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Page 90
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Tondqu
03
In the face
0f} Maxwell 1
likelihood that
Robert Rennedy
the ## was
8 rmanghip of the Group
Augmented
2
Taylor " 8 Chai
1
to be the
Chalrman of the
3
Maxwell Taylor understood
1
4 Group
Augmentea?
certainly {9 my
understanding
Mr Bundy It
5 Kennedy
In your opinion,
Schwarz .
Nould Robert
6 Mr
of the Special
8
Chairmanghip
in the fact of Maxwell
7 bach-channel relationship
ted , have
developed a
8
Group Augmen inating Fidel
for
the purpoge of ag9a89
with gomeone else
9
10
Castro?
L
Mr Bundy . No
c 11 connection with MONGOOSE,
Now , in
Mr Schwarz .
P 12 Augmented ,
0 Group
a member of the attender_ 1 13
I waan't 1t8 mobt faithful
6 Bundy . I was
Mr
14 C
a member
but I
15 that
did ;attend ,
Schwarz . To
the extent
Mr kind of items
16
of the meetlngs , what
describe the nature
17 process for
decision
what was were brought before
18
19
making?
to do that without
It i8
very difficult
8 Mr Bundy .
sense , I
20 But in
the broadest
L
2
documentary reconstruction _
thingg would
be Cuban exiles
do it.
The kinds of
think I can and
W 22 whose
the leader
4 uni are they,
training them, how
able to 1
23 the island are we
1 what of
seen it in
24 because I have
8 proposals , just
mount,
25 TOP SECRET
Speclal:
Special
Taylor
were you
you? were
Special
wag would : you
you
the
you,
1
ted
agalnst operations kind
specific
==================================================
Page 91
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TOR SEGREL
88
L the last two Or three daye" I 88w Babotage. program which
8
2 Involved , I think, 0il facilitifes trancportation facilities, 1
1 3 and a couple of other categorles exfiltration Wa? 8
4 frequent problem _ I don t recall that we worried 80 much
5 about getting the agents in, but there 8eemg always to be
6 a great problem about getting them out' And that sort of
thing that I mentloned _ propaganda_ there was the one island
enterprise was Florida doing much good , and how much
does it cost and things of that sort .
3
10 Mr . Schwarz . At any MONGOOSE meeting did Mr Harvey
11 state that he had taken steps to assassinate Fidel Castro?
N: ;
12 Mr Bundy . I never heard anything from Mr Harvey in
0
13 any context in any meeting at any time on that subject 1
C Mr Schwarz And it_ was clear that the President wag 14
15 the person basically in control perhaps not of the details , {
16 but of the general program; 1s that right?
Mr Bundy _ The President had worked it. The to
17
operations where in the hands of different departments
18
1
for different categories of programs The coordinator was
19
8
Gencral Lansdale, and' the Chairman of the Committee was General
20 7
21 Taylor
Mr Schwarz Would you turn to Lansdale Tab 38 , please?
5 22
1
Where is the August 8 document that transmits the new
23
1
guidclines for MONGOOSE?
24 8
Mr Kelley . That is Langdale Tab 20
25
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day
day
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Page 92
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ToP SECR0
89
05 85
6 1 Mr Schwarz The: nex gulaelines I Mean the August
1
! 2 gufdelines
3 Mr Kelley . 38 _
Mr Schwarz 38A . 4
5 Was there 4 change In Or about August between what was
6 characterized a8 Phage I of' Operation MONGOOSE and a step-up
activities under the MONGOOSE?
Mr Bundy It appeared to be 80 from the documents I have
been reviewlng . I couldn t You an independent recollectian
10 on that point _
7
11 Mr Schwarz You have no reason to doubt that there
{
12 was some step-up commencing in August?
6
Mr . Bundy . I think that sounds reasonable. I just
c
?'1 13
C. don t have any expertise other than as a reader many years
14
later 15
:
Mr Schwarz. Now with respect to the August 10 mee ting
16
have previously testified I a I am not sure You have
17
do you recall the subject of agsasginations being brought up?
18
1
Mr Bundy . In the August 10 meeting? No
19
i
Mr Schwarz . Specifically, do recall Mr McNamara
20
1
ever bringing the subject of assassinations up?
21
Mr Bundy . No 4 22
1
Mr Schwarz. We have shown You notes of Mr Harvey on
23
August 14 , and General Lansdale 8 menorandum of August 13
8 24
that refers to the liguidation of leaders and certain things
25
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1
give
got
you
You
1
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Page 93
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HOP SgRE
1 whlted Oue Do you; remember ! seelng tho8e?
8
1 2 Mr Bundy' Yes
3 Mr Schwarz. Do refresh your recollection?
4 Mr No They glve Me no do not persuade
5 me I s1mply don € from that suadenly have any flash, 80 and
6 80 eafd that, not at all
7 Mr , Schwarz . But you don € have any reagon to guestion
8 them , you Just don t have a recollection, 19 that falr?
9 Mr . Bundy _ I gimply tell You that I wag In a large
10 meeting In which a great many subjects were dfscussed , and
:
11 I have no recollection .of that -
1
12 Mr Schwarz. I will pasg around Mr Bundy 9 notes from
0
1
13 the mee ting . If someone thinks should be marked we can
14 do that.
15 Mr Bundy . If the Comittee 18 feeling charitable I hope
16 they may not go into then .
17 Mr Schwarz GI don t think will but I thought we
18 would pass them around in cage they were
1
19 The Chairman. Let the Senators see then _
9
20 Mr Schwarz We will make one obgervation, though Both
L
21 Mr Rusk ' s calendar and Mr Bundy S notes do not indicate
4 22 Mr Lansdale 8 being present at the meeting , although the
1
23 minutes of the meeting And I take it you have no
1
24 independent_ recollection of whether Or not he was not there
8
25 Mr Bundy . I have no objection to entering anything in
TOP SECRET
1
they
Bundy . they
they
they
do .
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Page 94
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TOR sdhn
andum' that the: Comm[€tee thlnka 18
anything that memor
8
illugtrates' what the hand will do
2 relevant . It s1mply
1
3 while the mind 18 elsewhere
1
identify what you meant by the
The Chairman _ Can
4
5 words _ "Wormg who were
opposing
# wab a Cuban word, anob , and it
6 Mr Bundy . "Wormg
thengelves , Cubang In oppogition to
7 was their Own for
8 Castor.
(Discusgion off the record .)
would you mark with 2 B Your
Mr Schwarz . Mr Bundy , 5
10
notes of the August 10 meeting =
I5: 11
that as
Bundy Exhibit 4
1 And Mr Reporter, will mark
C 12
Document referred to was marked as
1 13
Exhibit No. 4 for
identificatidn.)
Bundy
14
15
16
17
18
2
19
1
20 |7
2 1
5 22
1
23
1
24 8
25
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you
gus
word
you
;
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Page 95
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TOR ScRE
92
8
3 1 The Chalrman = Going back to the doodle sheet the 8
! 2 last item In your handwrftten underlined 098 do You have this?
1 3 Mr Bundy . The Langdale concept?
4 The Chairman Ig that concept?
5 Mr Bundy . Concept. I don t wonder you agk
6"
The Chairman Do recall what You meant,by that?
7 Mr Bundy _ My gues8 and this 18 8 reconstruction
really 1s thae that has to do with the Lansdale Plan which
we were referring to a minute ag0 , his long memorandun of
10 August 8 , outlining all the thlngs that might now be done
;
11 under the MONGOOSE
1
12 Mr Smothers Woula that have been planned plus?
0
1 13 Mr Bundy _ We argue about plans this 19/ again
14 reconstruction and I think I Saw it in some discussion
15 we argued about plans A and B and C, and settled on so-called
16 8 Plus, which I hope you have for the record , because that
1 7 would show what the declsion wa8
18 Mr . Schwarz. We do have It.
1
19 The Chairman . This was the 1oth of August 1962 . Ancl
8
20 that was about the tine that some concern was given be
1
2 expressed as to the possibility that the Russians were moving
4 22 into Cuba moving missiles into Cuba You have on the
1
23 memorandum, I think, "USSR will Put missiles Do you recall
1
24 what You meant by that?
8
25 Mr Bundy . I think what that a hand ' following
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yoi
day
to
is,
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Page 96
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1O? S R4i
1
1 eomeboay 61ses ana dho Gomekady 6160 Nouid #ost 1lkely to
8
2 be Mr _ McCone
1 3 The Chalrman 411 rlght
Where are We, Schwarz: 6
Mr _ Schwarz In NSAM .181 Which 0fll you pleage mark
6' 80 Exhiblt' 5 _ Yoi wiir find lt at" Langdale Tab 41
Document referred to wag marked
7
48 Langdale Exhlbit No . 5 for
8
identificatlon.)
9
10
L"'
c' 11
N 1
12
1 13
14
15 5
16
1 7
18
2
19
3
20
|
21
22
1
23
1
24 8
25
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Mr
5
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Page 97
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TOR SCRET
1
1 Mr Schwarz Do You have that in Eront of you, Mr
8
2 Bundy? 1
1 3 Mr Bundy . Yeg , I have .
Mr Schwarz _ This reflects a number of options or
4
5 study that the President called for In the light of the
6 evidence of new block activities_ Jn Cuba Was that evidence
7 connected with the misslles?
Mr Bundy Well, there was quite a buildup reported
8
Jn the press and in the Intelligence initfally of Soviet
military personnel E of Soviet surface-to-air missiles . And
10 E
the crucial question wag, what for and what 18 coming And
11
6 ;
the Director of Central Intelligence who was proved in
12
0
the end be right was almst alone in his belief that
1 13
this was going to lead to a nuclear capability in Cuba that
14
could hit the U.$ And he raiged these questiong in the
15
:
month of August Jn a number of alfferent wayg And the
16
National Security meeting from which this memorandu emerged
17
reviewed thoge problems and a9 the memorandum itself shows,
18
1 che heavy emphasis of the President' $ concern and of the
19
5
Group 8 concern on the likelihood that developed and what
20 1
should be done about it, or in preparation for it, in August
2
Mr Schwarz The memorandum has te a range of matters
22
1 to be considered_ And they range from , if I can uge the
23
0
on the goft side, Iten 1, which Wa3 consider
characterization,
24 8
o8 the U.S .: pulling It8 'misgfles near the Soviet Union oyt
ation
25
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to
qui-
==================================================
Page 98
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ToR gq207 95
8
side Items 7 and 8 which
1 of Turkey , two on the hard
8 Ibilities of invasion Or
gome Other military
2 are
military Pos8=
with Cuba" Now , 1s that 8
1 5
posbibilities in connection
White House
the President and
exercise that that
4
to look at a
number of optiona
5 yourself go through
the goft to the very tough?
6 ranging from
Mr Bundy . Yes 7
that there
wag nothing goft about
8 Let me say
in passing
missfleg of Cuba
Fi 9 the problem of getting the Jupiter
woula that be the word?
~
Mr Schwarz _ Conciliatory,
10 then out
of
actually getting 5
11 Mr Bundy = It
following year was one which
r { which we came to in the
12
finesse on the of
diplomatic energy and
0 13
demanded great
right A
Departments . But you are
the
State and Defense
14
would be discusged . And
wide range of
issues charactically
15
to look at problems from :
the President had a
habit of trying
16
17 many
with
the President
Nere you fully in touch
Mr Schwarz _
18 crisis
with what becane the migsile
1
19 in
connection
9 Mr _ Bundy Yes
20 discussion of assa88inating
Schwarz . Was there any 7
21 Mr
Fidel Castro during that
4 22
1 Mr Bundy - None
23 reached that as
1 Mc Schwarz Mas
there agreement
8 24 crisis that related to U.S .
of the solution to
the missfle
25
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1
1
typical
would
out
problem
part
angles _
period?
part
==================================================
Page 99
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TOR SdrH
96
{
3 actlon vis-a-vls_ Cuba There wa8 8 So-called no? invasfon
1
8
There was an undertaking on our side that 1f the
2
pledge _
1
capabilitles and there wag an argument on what
1 3 offensive
those were were removed, we on our 8fde would undertake
I don't want to present this language a8 If It 18 deeply
5 _
precise 0 but there Wab an undertaking .on our
mathmatically
side that there not be an asgagginatlon of Cuba
The Chairman Wag that ever publfehed?
8
Mr Bundy . Yes If my language i8 inconsigtent with
9
what was published, then what wag publfshed should take
10
precedence , because I am only try= to report that
9 11
Mr Schwarz Did this agreement exclude the sabotage 1
12
of Cuban facilities? 1 13
Mr Bundy Not in my view or in apyones view in the
14
Government. Just to You an example of things Jt
U.S _
15
~
did not exclude, it did not exclude continued gurveillance
16 R
which is not perfectly normal in relations between friendly
17
states , that you overfly and check out what they are doing _
13
surveillance was an
explicit and public part of the 1
19 But
9 concern for U.5 . satisfaction with the resolution
necessary
20 7
2
the Cuban missile crisis
Schwarz. Recognizing again that this i9 calling for
Mr v 22_
opinion, during the course of the missile crisis did 1
23 an
1 thing happen with respect to the attitudes and actions of
any
24 8
President or the Attorney General that in your
either the
25
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would
ing
give
of
==================================================
Page 100
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Lop5-RBI
97
opinion bear? UPoa Eho ilkelihood Chat Other €imes one
8
2 or the other 08 them ordered Che a38as Ination 6f:Ffdel
1
end_ cb 4f18 3 Castro?
fw
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 c
11
F: 1
12
0
1 13
14
2
15
16
17
18
2
19
8
20 L
2
3 22
1
23
1
24 8
25
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Page 101
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TO? HCH
HIRDT
Mr Bundy N61l Yeg Thare 8re 0 great many ` thingg that
1
8
Judgment about whether the President or the
2 enter Into IY 1
General woula:ever heve done that, and I woura like
1 3 Attorney
Mr . Chairman that the most important point I want to
4 to say , 8
from where I stend personally 10 that 1 flnd the
5 make , Just
notion that they separately; privately encouraged, ordered =
efforts
at a8948gination totally Inconsistent with
arranged
I knew of both of them . And a9 an example , I would cite
what
many Rl the role pleyed by the Attorney
and only One among very
in the Missil0 Crisfg, becauge it was he who , most
10 General
:
emphatically, argued against a
go-called gurgical air strike
11
~
other actlon that woula bring death upon many , in favor {
12 or ary
0 careful approach Which wag
eventually adopted by
of the more 1 13
the- Bresident' In the form of 0 quarrantine or 4 blockade_
14
Cha irman . Well, Mr . Bundy , let me what may be
The
15
F
the same question a 1ittle different way .
16
You came to know both the Prsident and the Attorney
17
rather intimately in the perlod of Your long aggocia-
General
18
3 tion with them, did You not?
19
9
Mr Bundy . Yes , Mr . Chairman _
20
The Chairman . Based upon
that acquaintanceship, do You L
21
circumstances that occurred during
believe under any of the
22
either one of them would have authorfzed
1
23
that whole period,
1
the
as8a89ination of Fizel Castro?
24 8
I nos € tically do not.
Mr Bundv
25
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put
empha -
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Page 102
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TOR SET
99
8
point that: donea at' ttfrom~r
1 Let ma make 4 more general
8
2 another way . 1
that there wag Pressure to do
1 3 If you
have heard testimony
There Wa? an affort, both from
something about Cuba , there was.
and from the
Attorney General In his
tha Prasident in hls
active In looklng for ways to
style to keep
the government
There was . But if.You, 89 I under-
weaken the Cuban regime.
those who presged the matter most closely
stand it, and not ever
inspired by the White House can tell
49
having esentially been
ever gaid to them , go and kill anyone .
10 you that anyone
about thege two men , and that id 3
11 Lat me gay one other thing
really done , they did
1 that there was gonething that they
12
doubt, S0 that on the on e hand , I would
13 not leave people in 1
their purpogeg and their nature and
say
about their character ,
14
affairs that I find it
the way
they confronted international
15
have ordered or
authorized explicitly
incredible that they
16
Castro. I also feel that 1f ,
or implicitly an
asgasgination of
17
that I know about their character thev
contrary to everything
18
decision and such a purpose, would not
1
had had such a
19
8
have been in any doubt about it.
20
have You any way to explain to the |
21
The Chairman _ Then
to give to the Committee , as
Committee , or any
explanation
22
was nder , or that he had
Ilelms testify that he 1
23 why Mr .
was
fully authorized to proceed to
1
no doubts that the Agency
8 24 In active attempts to
only dayelop schemes but to engage
not 25
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3
style
wanted
would
People
L0
4
would
==================================================
Page 103
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TOR? SCRE
100
3 3
1 esg88inate Castro?
8
2 Mr. Bundy . I have Ro explanation o2 that.
!
3 Senator Mondale. Pare of our #ttempt to solve thls riddle
1
4 of what would appear to be 8 record at
the highest level, Which
5 19 at least not directly an order of an agga88ination plot or
and square It with the fact that attempts were made , is
6 attempt=
to seek to understand the personalitieg and Mo tivations and
8 methods of operation of paople further down the chein of
command .
Wa have heard gulte a fBw evaluatione JoE Mr . Harvey
10
2
free-wheeling , James Bond kind of operator and it has been
11
r 1 suggested through some disquiet and apprehenslon at higher
12
about the nature of his conduct. And I would ct U I don
1 13 levels
6
know I am beginning to have doubts about Mr Helms whom I
14
admired _ There Ls, for example, a memorandum that
15 have always 2
is in the record to Mr _ Rugk in response to a Memo which tha
16
wrote Mr Helms following an
article appearing in
Secretary 17
charging that the Maffa had been hired ard
some Cuban newspaper
18
1 used by the CIA to agsassinate Castro, in which Helms specifi-
19
5 and categorically denies flat oue that any such relation-
20
cally
when in fact it aid when in fact Mr Helms was 1
2]
ship existed
part of it.
4 22
how do we sort this Ig Mr Helms gomeore who 1
23 Now ,
1 might have , on his Own ,
gone beyond the authority conferred
24 8
upon him bY persons higher up?
25
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out?
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Page 104
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TOP SCREt
101
Mr _ Bundy Mell If You; had aaked me that questlon 8 8
! 2 Year ag0 , Senator I mould heve sa14 In my experlence #wfth him
1 5 ha Was not such an officer but I have no wey of deallng with
4 the kind of thing have Juse described .
5 Senator Mondale . It shatters me bacause I have always
6 ragpected hin. Because w0 know that thege e89asginetlon attempts
7 occurred. We know that Mr Helms Wag 8 part of Ite We have
testlmony that Mr _ Kelng and Mr Harvey met and agreed not
tell Mr _ McCone What they were doing And then W0 have 4
10 document here well, that wag Cubella and then wo have a
11 memo from Helns Rusk which, in Minnesota language looks
1
12 1fke a lie I just don t know . Maybe there are other
0
1
13 explanationg _
14 The Chairman . The memo to Rusk had do with Cubella
15 rather than the Mafia . ;
16 Senator Mondale. Is that it? It wag not the Mafia?
17 Mr Schwarz. It was Cubella , except if you just substitute
18 Cubella for the word MaEia
1
19 The Chairman . Nhat You said otherwise is correct_
i
20 Senator Mondale. Dut he was involved personally with
1
21 Cubella , wasn't he? And he knew that, and this memo said no
4 22 Is there a plausible explanation?
1
23 Mr . Madigan_ Helns has one .
24 Senator Baker. Helms position 18 that he did not 1fe,
8
25 that he did not have anything to do with the Cubella incident ,
TOP SECRET
you
to
to
Now
to
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Page 105
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JOP ScE
102
5
1 {s that right?
8 think Helms cluimed that Cubella 18 In
2 Mr_ Madlgan . I
1
of the memog , operating on hls OwIz ,
1 3
the gtrict context
I believe rather thar
speculate, we
The ChaIrman. Well,
4
that ought, to be another
had better
look back carefully ,
5
for Mr Helmg wher he returng
6 subject
Well, then I
will istand corrected.
Senator Mondale.
7
Hart of Michlgan. Would you
Senator 8 the
the game record note that I su8pend
I want to make
9 I thought it was
I made about
that document yesterday.
10
comment
!
a flat-out 118.
C 11
I withdraw that, and I think
Hondale. I aid too . 1
12
Senator
7
0
would write u9 a little Memo_
it would be if the staff
1 13
like to know that yesterday I
2 Sunator Baker . Frftz might
c 14
29 a
combined staff operation, would
asked Counsel if they ,
15
to
do this, prepare
for 43 , ard I believe they
;
16
prepare
the testimony and the exhibit
for 43 two briefs , one clting
17 Inference that the authority
that
support an
18
evidence ,
the record the
ential;
and another brief= citing
19
wag Preside
it was not . There
citing
the inference that
6 exhibit evidence
20 So that we
{ o€ both, to be frank with
is an
abundance
1 21 side and make our own 8eparate
can
lay them dow side by
22
Wj
1
23
judgmert.
to do Jt? the gtaff 1s goinq
1 Do I und-
24 8
Chairman . That 1s right.
Tha
25
TOP SECRET
and
yield?
good
agreed
would
and
You .
erstand
==================================================
Page 106
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HopP SRE
103
62 Iteno 60 bugineas and You have
Now I have 0 coupra
8
or quite 0 long_ whfle I think you ought to
2
been testifying
!
be given 8 break , Mr Biindy
1 3
ant me to Come back, Mr_ Chairman?
Mr _ Bundy . Do you
4
Y0s;- Please= If:you want to take 8 break
The Chalrman .
5
minutes and,then be evaflable out In the
for about {1v0 Or ten
will give 48 , 8 chance to take care of thls
7
anteroom that
buginess .
(Pause)
at 1l.17 8.M , che #ltnesa left the hear
(Whereupon
10
E:
room )
8 11
C 1
12
0 13
C
C 14
15 :
16
17
18
2
19
8
20 7
21
22
1
23
1
24 8
25
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#
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Page 107
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JOR SCRD
104
The Chalrwen: He seen t have' 0
daveloping problem for
1
8
#ith_ tha Justice Department. I have
2 reasong unexplained
1
tioned One agpect of that problem In connection with
1 3 already man
failure of the Department to supply most of the material
4 the
requested , though that request was to the
5 that We have
two months ago, and it hag bean Adecided already by
6
Department
Committee that Mr . Levy and Mr _ Kelley ghould be brought
the
the Comittee in the hopes that these delayg can be
before
~ overcome.
before the Committee 1s when that can
10 The first questlon
;
be doue . It is suggegted that the Attorney General has Tuesdav
11
available. If it 19 all right with the Committee, I ;
12 morning
0 schedule his appearance , togethgr with that of
like to
c
1 13
Mr Kelley , for Tuesday morning.
C; 14
Mr Chairman , I don t mean to intrude my
Senator Baker .
15
2
convenience Into
this congideration unduly , but 1f
16 personal
could do it at Tuesday noon , say , it would
tha Attorney General
17
I have a commitment In Tennesgee Monday night. If
help me.
18
morning plane I can t get here until 11:50_
1
19
I catch the Tuesday
8 If that 9
not possible, I will cancel MondaY .
20
This is procedural in charactar, So it is L
2
Tha Chairman .
that every member be present. I thick
not altogether important
22
standpoint of this Committee schedule, Tuesday
1 that from the
23
1 Attorney General and Mr Kelley bg
morning , the
24 8
it
25
TOP SECRET
put
would
4
good = would
not? would
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Page 108
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TOP SECRE
105
1 Mr . Miller Yas. 8
! 2 Senator Daker . Well, why don € You Jeave It Tuegday
3 morning-
4 The Chairman_ We are informed that he Fhaa Tuegday
5 morning available.
6 Mr = Gitensteln- I ipoke to Doug Marvin, One of his
7 Executfve Assistants and , he sald Tuesday was a possIbllity,
Wednesday is a problem becauge he has a Cabinet meeting and
he wasn € guro about Tuegday and ha wag going to back to
10 u9 in tha next hour Or two
1
11 The Chairman. Nell, let 8 860 1f WB can t sat 1t up
12 Tuesday .
1
13 Senator Daker . If can gat it up Tuegday afternoon and
14 nobody objects , that would be better for ma .
15 The Chairman. Well , 1€ WB can, we 11 set it up Tuesday
{
16 afternoon .
17 Senator Mathias . What is tha t for?
18 The Chairman. That is for Levy and Kelley to appear for
2
19 the purpose of telling uS they can €, or why it has taken
8
20 two months and we still are waiting for the documents most 7
21 of the docuents We raquested =
y 22 Serator Mathias. Nell, I won t be here , but that' 9 no
11
23 reason
1
9 24 Serator Daker Are going to be here Tuesday
25 morning?
TOP SECRET
1
only
get
1
you
why
you
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Page 109
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TOR SECRET
706
1 Senator Mathlag, Don t worry ebout:lt.
8
2 The Chairman All right. L
1 3 The gecond thing I would like to bring up in thfs connec -
tion:19 that I was informed Yesterday by the 8taff that the
FBI hag undoubtedly recefved Instructlons that none of Its
agents are to be Interrogated Intervlewad by the staff of
thig Committee. I would like someone who knows the detalls and
can be very specific to tell the Comnittee the exact btatus of
that gftuation, how we havekbeen informed I€ we can rely or
10 that information a8 being authoritative.
Ec
Mr Elliff Yesterday morning at 9:00 0'clock or shortly
c 11
K {
thereafter, I received a phone call from the: F3I' $ liaigon With
12
this Committee with respect to a series of interviews that had
2
1 13
been arranged with the Bureau some relating to the Iuston Plan ,
14
some relating to Martin Luther King matterg . I wa8 inforned thdt
;
15
I had to address this request to the Justfce Department in order
16
to gecure approval for these gtaff irterviews .
17
I then called our liaison: in the Justice Department ,
18
Special Counsel Wflliam 0' Conner , he told me I might as 1
19
well submit these requests in writing because the Justice
20
L
Departnent would take at leage ter days to give us an anbwer
21
on these requests and he didn' & know what the answer wa9 going
22
1
23 to be.
1
I then explored with him what gome, 0€ the reabons might be
8 24
for thi8 delay and what the problems seemed to be , and the
25
TOp SECRET
or
and
and
5
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TOR ScRT
107
10
3
verbally twag that the fact that
explanation that ha gave me
1
8 notified the Department In Ita letter of
2 the Comittee had
1
cases thet We Wero
investigatlng were
5
June 27th that certain
1
intervlews that would be conducted
abuge cases that any
4
matterg be considered by the
In connection with those
5
demand Intervlews _ and therefore this brought
Department to be
provigiong of
tha Federal Regulations which
into play the
Attorney General" 8 approval_
require the
49 to whether the
Attorney General
Then
the question
Firgt was that since we
not involved two issues. 7
10
approve
of an abuse in a
particular area
had indicated the likelihood
c 11
have to
consider whether it
that the
Department itself would
~ 12
of that matter , and
inbtitute a
criminal investigation
should 1 13 Interview would interfere with that
then , 1f 50 , whether our 2
14
ongoing criminal investigation.
15 considered that any inter-
And second , that the Department
{
16
the Committee
in such cases might inadver-
views undertaken by
17
of the interview _ and he referred
tently immunize the subject
18
have attempted to do legal
o gome cages we 1
19
generally
this to be a very
shaky positic:
8 research on those cases and find
20
there and i€ they to cone
have lawyers Over 7
21
but they
that they could be
sophisticated argument, we expect
up with 2
v 22
able to do that- 1
23
make an
argument over anything
1 The Chafrman. Lawyers can
8 24
And So the
final conclusion is
That S 80 Mr 'Ellfffs
25
TOP SECRET
meant
would
would
or
ard
want
good
==================================================
Page 111
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TORSCRET
108
11
1 that he diduentlclpae tbat sbbpoenag:would be !required :! :
8
1 2 In every Ingtance and this position 18 very dffficult for 43 to
1 5 accept because interviews , the low-key Interview In the non-
4 pressure sltuation 19 an opportunity to elicit Informatlon that
18 not Ma tched by the formal subpoena sltuation , and to be
6 able to proceed InItlally by interview and then conEfrm, under
7 oath, via gubpoena 18 just absolutely eggential for an effective
investitation. So this is where we stand on this isbu8_
We later received 2 letter pertaining to an earlier
10 request for interviews relating to FBI COINTELPRO disruptive
2
11 activities where WB had asked for certain interviews and this
N: 1
12 letter did not go into specifics, but merely stated that there
0
1 13 were problemg that would have to be resolved , that the charac-
14 terization of an area of the Comittee inquiry a3 abuse night
15 significantly alter arrangements of acces: to witnesses who :
16 are present employees of the Department
17 The Chairnan . In other words the thrust of a1l of this
18 is that the more serious the nature of the inquiry , the more
1
19 difficult it will be to obtain the information that if we are
i
20 concerned aboue a possible illegality 'or 2buse, then the
|
21 Department will make It a5 difficult a 5 possible for uS to
7 22 secure the information .
1
23 Mr . Elliff. I might add 'that it seeng tC in the natur
1
24 of the documents als0 , the more serious the allegation , the' more
8
25 regigtance . there is to providing uS
TOP SECRET
be
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Page 112
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TOP SCRRET
'109
12
1 They :lave {glver :LEta ~many documente:' : cTrhepne# =
8
2 have not given u9 the docuents on the controversfal matterg,
1
1 5 They've given us plenty 0f documentation On 10g9 controversial
matters ,
The Chalrman. I think It 18 Ironlc , thet the reslstance We
from the Justice Department 18 80 much More gubstantial than
get
the resfstance WB have gotten from the CIA .
Senator Baker _ That 9 necesgarily 30 , I agree with
the resistance 1s ,unfortunate and: Inappropriate , but I
can think of 4 request for documentatlon from the CIA that is
10 L3,
IOw more than a month old and they haven € had tha grace
11 2
1
12 to tell 43 no They have told u9 nothing
The Chairman. But on the whole W# ve gotten a greater
1 13
14 measure of cooperation from the CIA .
Senator Schweiker I wonder does either counsel know
15
:
16 Mr _ Chairman, whether the Attorney General or the FBI Dfrector
initially confirmed whether they made any commitments to
17
about supplying documents or materials to the
18 Congress
1
19 Committee?
8
Mr Miller_ Senator Mathias can tell You , and Senator
20 1
21 Hart.
Senator Schweiker_ Might there be a statement in their
4 22
1
testimony in confirmation , in agreeing to furnish Congress with
23
1
materials of this rature?
24 8
Yeg, those statements were made , but 1e € Senator Mathias.
25
TOP SECRET
gdod
not
you
good
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Page 113
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TORAGRE
110
I
1 Me say , since By opinion hes been asked , that I had a mogt 8
! 2 dlgcouraging talk Vith the" Attorney General 8 couple of weeks
3 ago. I went down to talk to him aboue prlvacy leglalation and
the Department of Justlce #€ the moment 19 taking about a3 hard
5 8 line 43 any kind: that I know of In the lagt flfteen Years .
6 Its whole kind of attitude
7 Senator Tower I just wonder Lf w0 shouldn t take thls up
8 with them.
~
The Chairman. I think we should , but I think we should
10 also , In advance of that, In vfew of the kinds of gignalg we
5
11 are now getting from the Justice Department, indicate that We
R: 1
12 believe that these objections that they are raising, or questiors
1'1 13 that they are ralsing, are 8 Sarious impediment procedurally
14 to our Committee and that we have every Intention of interviewidg
15 such agents as may be necesgary, and that if necessary , wa will 2
16 subpoena them. A
17 Mr Elliffs Our feeling: is it is preferable not to
18 procead by subpoena _ but we do have a subpoena for one FBI
1
19 agent which We brought with uS today which we would like to
8
20 proceed wish_
1
21 The Chairman. Can You give us the facts of that case?
4 22 Mr Epstein. This 1s an agent who is presently in Atlarta
11
23 Georgia , ard the information Wa Ve received from other witnesse
1
24 was that in 1964 , I believe, he visited a newspaper editor
8
25 Atlanta , closed the door, put his hat on the desk, and sa id he
TOP SECRET
1
in
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Page 114
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TO3 SCRE
111
14 8
noted from reading Ehe Constitutlon thet we were" picturing
L
8
Dr _ King 48 2 moral leader and, gomethlng of 8 hero and then this
2 1
agent went on to talk In great detail about Dr . King 8 pergonal
1 3
life which he clained he had learned from a confidential source
and our interest In Interviewing, this agent obviously relates
5
to the circustances surrounding that vislt to 8 newspaperman ,
who directed him o do that, what the purpose of that visft
7
was , whether there was any 'docuentation
8
Sanator Baker _ Who w28 the newspaper man?
9
E Mr . Epstein . His name was Eugene Pattergon and he waJ
10
1: Atlanta Constitution at that time. He 9 now with a
with the
11
C,
1 newspaper in Flordda.
K 12
The Chairman . Do You believe the subpoena now to be
2 13
necessary becauge of what you have been' told by the Justice
14
15
Department?
Mr . Elliff. We have other agents which we woula like to
3
16
at the interview level, 80 we woula like to proceed
proceed with
17
at both levels to get their reaction to both types of requests_
18
What is thelr reaction to a subpoena going to be , what 18 1
19
their reaction to 8 renewed request to interview going to be?
20
So We
crystallize each issu2
1
21
I still think it might be for us to
Senator Tower
4 22
until we talk about it, since they are coming ir 1 hold that up
23
1 Tuesday morning or Tuesday sometime it' s not going to push
24 8
things too far
25
TOP SECRET
8
good
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Page 115
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TOD SRE
112
8 15
1 Senator Hart of Michigan . Wouia It be useful at least,
8
2 1E It 19 the feelfng of the Commlttee to authorlze you people ,
1
1 3 or Bill, today , to say that the Committee barely suppressed its
4 outrage and that ft woz ' € do , and we will s@e you Tuesday?
5 Don t walt till Tuesday .
6 The Chairman . I think gomething Bhould #be 8aid, actually_
7 Senator Hart of Michigan . Well, it prejudges the hell out
8 of it, but unless wB an extension to 1980 for this Comitte-
The Chairman. I think You re right. Something needs to be
10 publicly that the Committee 19 determined that Wo feel
c that not only has time 0d G we Ve already said, w0 ve already
11
~ {
made public the letter we have sent I think a follow-up needs
12
0
to be that we are concerned that impediments that are now being
1 13
which would interfere with the Committee' 8 right to
C 14 suggested
witnesses , we do not Intend to allow the Committee
15 interrogate 2
work to be obstructed if necessary Wb will be prepared to
16 ~
witnesses though we hope that that would
17 gubpoena
have to be the case. 18'
2
Senator Baker And WB are go to to work it out
19
5
20 Erom Tueday_
L
The Chairman . Ne re goirq to try to work it out Erom
2 1]
5 22 Tuesday
1
Senator Baker I have a business matter.
23
1
The Chairman. So does Senator Monda le.
24 8
Senator Mondale. Just one point.
25
TOP SECRET
get
sald
and
not woula
try ing
==================================================
Page 116
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TOR SECRET
113
1 There Ls thls troublesome dictum In U.S. V8, Nixon about 8
1 what might be nondlscoverable, 2ll of whlch 8eems to pear on
3 bort of forelgn policy matters.
4 Am I correct m # I think Wo re goIng to hear 4 lot about
that 44 m but am I correct in reading that decision that It
really almost 3gtanda} wholly that have the duty to
produce al1 of the documentatlon and that cage holds for that
proposition, 90 that In our CIA matters , while they mlght raise
[7
some of this dictum the FBI has no guch defense, unless we 're
1^
10 really tradding on those same grounds = c
11 Mr Epstein. oe course, there ig another ssue in the
7 1
12 Pureau materials , bacauae we 're the igsu0 of Investigative
1
13 files, which has never been really litlgated_ an that 6
c
14 1s tha propriety of Executive Privilege when ft comes to that.
15 I might add that the importance of the igsue of going
:
16 to gubpoena on these really raises that , because ff we go
17 subpoena on documents , then that 13 going to be worthless unles
18 We know in advanc e that we are goirg to win in court in a short
1
19
perlod of time , including whether we have jurisdiction to be
8
there. 20 |
2 Senator Mondale. In other words , you are saying they are
% 22 going to raise the Executive Privilege defense , but that wa $
1
23 the Nixon defense.
1
Mr Epstein . I think that thev would love for us to be ir
8 24
25 the position having to issu8 a subpoena documents
TOP SECRET
1
they
on
to
o€ for
==================================================
Page 117
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TR SCRET
1
17 114
1 becauge then It woula' be 8 Year 8
1 2 Mr . Schwarz. The problem I0 {Che iErvin Condtttee wab found
1
5 not :to :have 'Jurisdlctton #o *8de thd ;gubpoena _
4 The Chafrman. Well_ Wo know we re golng to do che next
5 on that.
6 Now , may I ralse One other polnt' 4 #
Senator Baker _ Tha + 9 not quite true: Ervin Committee
wasn € found to have no jurisdiction or 8tanding to seek the
9
documents or to isgue subpoenas _ but fafled to the carry 5
10 burden of proving that it was regulred under the mandate of
c 11
their inquiry.
p
12 Now , I another tter Frank.
0
1
13 The Chairman . Wa have two or three matters. Can I
14 recognize Senator Monda le ffrst, becauge he had asked it.
15 Sena- Mondale. A few days ago , when the White House
{
16 People were here, they showed uS 8 document which we have in
17 our files which disclosed that President Nixon in 1970 had
18
ordered the delivery of three machine guns to some People in
127
]
Chile and had So with instructions that that order should
20 go directly to some subordinate officials In CIA ard should he 1
21
done without advising the official channels _ And it 18 thought
" 22
that were directed against a General Schneider who was
1
23 a top official in the Chilean government opposed to a coup.
1
He was a Constitutionalist.
9 24
25
Schneider was killed and there was a machine gun in the
TOP SECRET
gtep
The
they
1
have ma"
tor
done
i
they
==================================================
Page 118
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TORSECRET
18 1115
1 possesson of thoge who dia- 80
8
2 Now what I woula Ilke 1s, ` While we Einfsh thle 'cycle on !
3 a9ga88lnatlons
0 that wB Include among our studles of alleged
4 assasginations thig mattervand: we requesei the dooumentatlon, of
5 all approprlate document8,'under; the: category of abbas81nation _
6 Mr _ Schwarz. Senator when that document came to our
7 attention , wO questioned 4 Perbon who expands upon the allega -
tions contained In the documents . I wrote a letter to the
Whlte House and the CIA . We wanted forthwith to recelve
E
10
copies of all such documents relating to the passag0 of weapons
6
Ne have had no response from the CIA .
P 1
Mr _ Hillg, We met with in the White Mouse a week ago 12
0
Tuesday or Wednesday , ana I safd wa must have the docuents ara 1 13
he said cannot have them until You have the briefing on 14
Chile , because we refuse to accept thfs 49 an aggasgination
15
~
plan.
16
The Chairman . May I make this suggestion , Senator
17
Mondale?
18
1 First of all, I believe that it is absolutely imperative
19
8
that the Committae complete its investigation the issu8 of
20 1
the agga3sination of foreign government leaders before the
21
racess and issue its report. That puts uS under grea t pressure
22
1 but if We don t do it, I am going to ask the Committee to stay
23
1
Or the job. I woulo like very much to 9o to China , that is my
8 24
first opportunity In forty Years to go to China and I have
25
TOP SECRET
1
11
You
on
4
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Page 119
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TOR SEcRET
19 116
1
such 8 trfp laid on , but I am' golng to Bet 1t eslde and a8k
8
2 the Committee to continue 168 work rlght Into the recess until
1
1 3 thls Is done . Otherwise, We ara In 8 hopeless sftuatlon.
4 Senator Schwelker. I think , Mr . Chalrman , If wa don' t
5 finfsh' ft by then WB never wIll.
tape 1b 6 The Cha irman. Ne never Wflll
I think We should look Into thls as8assInation, It i9 an
asgagsination . I think it'8 part of our responsibflity to
look into it. But it 13 not an assassination, whatever the
9
%
CIA input may have been , it 1s not an ag9aggination of 4 head
10
of state and So therefore I don t want It to further delay
:
11
1 the completion of this pha se of our inqufry .
12
Now with that in mind , I am In full accord with What 1 13
Senator Mondale says . 14'
Senator Schweiker _ Could we put lt to another phage and
15
{
16 not in thig phase?
The Chairman . Yes , wB are going to have a phase on Chile ,
17
anyway: It would fit into the Chilean case,
18
1 Senator Mondale. I~ is significant because 1f we accept
19
j their Interpretation that it 1s rot agga88ination , then we
20 |
avoid an understanding that We had that these docnments; 'a)1
21
supposed to be available then we into 'a' discovery problem _
22
1 In other words_ I know what we re getting at, and I would
23
1
guess that We should proceed as rapidly as possible , but we
8 24
shouldn t hold up the of mm
25
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4
cycle
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TOPSER
20 017
1 Sena tor Schwelker Nell Friez thera 18 another questlon 8
1 2 along the game liras thet 16 ' why I"don t want to 80e Jt
1 3 cloud this issu0, and that {s the Glomar Explorer stopped by
4 the NLRB proceed= Wag shown to have stopped In Chile just
5 about a week Or 90 before Allende wa9 kllled , Just by colncidence
for mechanlcal repalrs. I woula lik0 to EInd out that one ,
too.
But this 13 2 whole new thfng. Thlg Puts 49 Into the
Chile thing. Because I'm Just 88 Interested 89 you are: I
r7
10 don t 80e that it hurts anything to ft In a Phase II 5;
0 11 proposition with Chile.
P
{
12 Tha Cha irman . And Fritz , we can say. that the Committee
1
13 regarde it in the category of as8assination = but we can dffer-
14 entiate it from the initial report, which does dea 1 with
15 foreign leaderg _ :
16 Senator Hart of Michigan. Mr Chalrman, before You go to
17 a new subject and I am uneasy raising this a but your
18 reply reminds you say that we are going to canclude assassink
1
19 tions and issue our report before we go on recess. I think tha
8
20 disposes too readily of the problem that i8 going to confront 1
21 us in a very few weeks , and that is having heard a 11 oE this ,
4 22 now what do We do? I don t think we have decided yet how we
1
23 are goirg to present, once we open the doors, we Ve to know
1
24 how we are going to handle it. I don ' t think we ought to lock
25 ourselves 'in at the moment to 2 written report; as We leave towr
TOP SECRET
and'
'ing
Put
me,
got
8
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Page 121
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TOR SGRET
'118
71
1 the first of August.
8
2 Senator Baker . I agree with You 100 percent. 1
2 3 The Chalrman. This Committee hag got to es business
4 done and I know the purpose of the delay downtown 18 to make it
5 43 difficult 49 possIble for uS to cope with our work. We will
6
be engulfed completely If we cannot deal with this phase of
our work in the. time that Wo have given Jt and lt over unti
8 tha_ fall. Mhat I'0, buggesting:lgjnot juet:ialmply:'the Feport: *f
the Committee. We are going to complete our witnesse8 , 4..1
9
we have time to issue such a report.
10 5
I am also suggesting the recomendations the Committee wily
11
K 1 make with respect to this isgu8. Ne have to this behind
12
u8 . It is just folly not to do becauge we must on with 1 13
the other phases of the report and there 1g no reason we cannot c 14
do It. If We can € do It by the end of this: month , then we re
15
{
not going to be any more advantaged or any better advantaged
16
to then go on our recbss and come back and take it up anew
17
in the fall. It is a very clear-cut issue.
18
2 Senator llart of Michigan. But what is not clear-cut to
19
9
me is how we report to our peerg .
20 7
The Chairman. Ne will take that "P .
21
Senator Schweiker_ Ne discussed that at one meetlrg_ Me
v 22
6 hed a little informal meeting- Maybe You missed that, Phil-
23
The Chairnar: . There Is no thing that could be gained by
8 24
putting it off or defering it or postponing Jt. It 13 very
25
TOP SECRET
get
put
put
it, get
out
1
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Page 122
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LOR SHRET
119
22
1 clear that we ar# working et 8 highly Intengffled Pace in
8
2 order to get the necessary evIdence , and then there is no reason 1
1 3 why We can t eddresa ourgelves to thls quegtion.
4 Senator Hart of Michlgan. The only reagon that I raise
5 that Js that I ai 83 anxlous to conclude thls chapter but this
6 Committee, 28 a Committee then must declde the ultimate
question: do you have open hearinge? Do You go to a closed
Senate?
The Chafrman. Tha t will be 4 top Item of consideration for]
the Committee. I have only deferred thfg discugsion thinking
10
that w0 had best 2ll of the evidence firgt. That 19 all_ C 11
0 1
12 Then we will take it up at an appropriate time discuss it.
Serator Baker. Mr Chairman, do I understand the situatiod 1 13
to bu then it 19 your hope that wa will Einish our Executive
14
Session testimony before the August recess , but not a report
15
to the Senate? 16
The Chairman . No tha t is not my position. My position is
17
that We should complete the testimory and make our report 2nd
18
2 recommendation on this issue_
19
a Senator Bakur_ But without prejudice to a future determira
20
|
tion of whether Wb have public hearirgs?
21
The Chairman . Oh , Yes , tha * $ always open to uS But I
5 22
1 let me make it I @ let' 9 not have any misunderstand there.
23
It is always open to this Committee to decide whether
9 24
public hearings on thfs or any other issue should be arranged in
25
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get
and
in9
1
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TOP STCRET
120
23
the fall. Obvlously _ we candot'have tham until fall_ 8
1 2 My personal position 18 egaingt public hearings On the
1 5 Issu0 of a88as8inatior. But what I am propoging 18 that the
Committee make 1t8 report, and I think that 1s a question the
5 Committee will have to take up and dacide_
0 ard I think the
appropriate way to disclose these facts, and I personally believle
they must be discloged , 18 through a report of* the Comittee
that 1s made, public, and I think that report ghoula ba made
before the recess,
10 Senator Baker I don't think We can do that. :
11 Senator Tower . Mr Chairman , physically we have three
1
12 Weeks . Nhather We can hear all of these witnesges sit down
1
13 and prepare the report ana have the Committee agree on the
14 report, report it to the Senate and have the Senate act on it
15 in three weeks is questionable in my mind _ I, like You, want
{
16 to do it, but I wonder if we can do 3 workmanlike job and do
17 it in that time.
18 The Chairman. Well, iet me say this that the very reques
1
19 that Senator Baker has made , ard I hope we don t get into 2
9
20
prolonged liscussion on this issue because We cannot decide
L
2
it right now but the very report that Senator Baker has asked
5 22 for is now in the process of preparation. That report gives ,
1
23
by necessity , as much of tha meat, the briefs that Senator
24
Baker asked for 25 much of the report, laying out the 8
25 factual , the evidence that the Commictee has Seen. And I thin}
TOp SECRET
got
and
too
1
has
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121
24
3 1 this can be done. I know that We have to work very hard to do
8
2 it, but I know that our pogition will be much worge In every
1
1 5 way if We fail to do ita
4 Now without trying to decide that now let u9 proceed .
5 Senator Schwelker _ I make One commant on
that, Mr.
6 Chairman?
7 I have had vacillating feelings on public hearIngs , and I
think what I have come down on Ls this. I think we should 9o
ahead and issue a
preliminary report Without public hearings.
I think should the matter of publfc hearings In abeyarce
10
;
until We into the Chile thing and some of the other areas
11
; of so-callad assassinations that may not be Pregidentia l
12
0
assassinations Per Se and leave the Committee option that we 1 13
C
may well want to. elect to go into what happened in Chile
14
publicly' and bring up that agsagsination if that is what we
2 15
~
16
determined _
I have trouble determining at this point in time whether
17
should have public hearings , and I think we ought to keep
We. 18
1 that option open as We go 'alonq .
19
c
The Chairnan . I have no argument with the Senator or that
20
1
2 scor e.
Senator Schweiker I know As I say , it reconciles with
5 22
1
your views and it protects the rights of those who say they
23
1 want public hearings .
8 24
The Chairman . I have no argument with that.
25
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May
put we
get
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ToRSECE
122
8
25
1 Senator Baker has arother ma tter 8
1 2 Senator Baker _ It won € take but 8 brlef moment.
1 3 I think I Owb the Comttee 3; a report_- on the statement
4 tha t I made to the Press 4 few monents ago . I did not intend
5 to make a statement , but' tha t It becomes Impossible to avoid
when You step outsfde In these circumstances .
7 The Chairman . It 18 a good thing for you that Senator
Morgan is not present.
Senator Baker As some of You may know , the newg last
10 night and agaln this mornlng carried 3 story to the effect that
~'
11 a Colonel, 2 retired Colonel in the Air Force the nane c
1
12 Fletcher Prowdy _ has alleged by Alexander Dutterfield was an
0
11 13 associate or an employee or a plant of something of the sort of
C
14 the CIA when he was at the White House.
15 I was asked if I had any comment on that. I was asked if
1
16 I was surprised by that, and my reply wag I had heard that
1 7 story before: I had never commented on it bacause I had no
18 proof off it. And it' 8 really So , As You know in this town
12
19 if you don + hava confirmation of it You into
U
6
20 trouble.
1
2 1 Second , that I think it is worthy oE lookirg into I
4 22 said I thought che Prowdy statement added a new dimansion
1
23 the rumors I thought that it did warrant further Investiga-
24 tion , that I would recommend that to thig Committee at the
8
25 appropriate time.
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H
of by
deep get
ard
to
and
1
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TOP SE
123
26
The Chelrman- That r2n6 ena I have &l8o Baid that I 8
1 2 would ask the Commfttee for en Investigation of thls charge ,
5 and Bill Miller tells me wO have already rocefved from the
Agency a prelimlnary report tha € 18 not stfsfactory. we are
pursuing It ard getting further Information .
Senator Schwelker?
Senator Schweiker_ I have 0 brlef ma tter I ~ould: #ike to
seek the Committee 8 advice On
'Could: we' ga' "Off: the record 8 minute?
10 The Chairman . Yes. 5
11 (Discussion off the "record: )
~ 1
12 Senator Mart of Colorado . I m sorry, Mr Chairman , I have
0
1 13 an iten of business al30.
14 When I was in Europe last Week and pursuant to the
C
15 direction of the Chairman and staff I tried to contact our
16 friend QJNIN to try to.wrap UP that lihk of the chain with, I
17 must say , the complete cooperation of the CIA and Mr . Colby ,
18 who in fact sent a pergan over there to help uncover this
1
19 individual _ We know who he is and where he Is
9
20 The CIA American contact talked to him , largely for the
L
21 reason that he feels extreme loyalty still to the Agency to
v 22 one or two particular people that he worked with and through.
1
23 He opted not to meet with mg or anybody else. The feeling is,
1
24 both on my part and Mr . Colby S , that if we got his contact in
8
25 that chain to get In touch with him directly that he would talk
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1
and
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TOP S2E
12 1 27
3
1 to 49 , and I leave It to ' Eno, comlttee Whather thle 18
8
2 Important enough' Eor u8 to pursue and #t would: probably Involve 1
1 3 8 couple of people going back over ,
4 Senator Baker . What 18 recommendation?
5 Senator Hart of Colorado: My Owt feeling, based almost
6 purely on the princlple that no stone "Bhould be left unturned
7 19 that we should do Ita
8 There are some unangwered questions . Ke wa3 here In the
stateb in '63 , he wag not conflned to one operatlon and we
10 don t know what he wag doing _
E:
0
11 Senator Baker Mr Chairman, I would recommend that we
P 1
12 commiggon Senator Hart to do that for u9,
13 Sanator Hart of Colorado It would take the cooperation 0
of one of the witnesses we V0 had here before to do Ita
14
The Chairman. Wha t 19 your racomendation , Senator 6
15
16 Hart, I'm sorry?
R
Senator Hart of Colorado. Tha € we should do 1t, that we
17
should the 'cooperation of Mr . 0 Donnell_
18
!
The Cha irman. Tha t we should do what?
19
j
Senator Baker. Interview QJWIN in Europe.
20 |
Senator Mathias. Which means somebody has to do it and
21
take 0' Dornell with him.
22
1
Senator Baker _ Take Mathias and Hart.
23
1
The Chairman. It is a very sensitive matter , if his
8 24
cover well, one thing this Comittee must worry about
25
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H
Your
get
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Page 128
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TOR SECRET
20 125
1 Senator: Schwelker Wha€ woiild you hope to get out of 8
1 2 It, Gary?
1 3 Senator Hart.of Colorado. What hfg orders wero, wha € his
4 scope of authority wa?, what he was dolng over and above 4 well
5 what he W89 dolng In the: Congo , whet he wab do over and
above hlg Congo operations he Wes In Florida In 1963.
The Chalrman_ Well, when you told me thle You
told Me that thlb man had gald to the CIA go between who was
trying to arrange this Intervlew that ffrat of a1l he preferred
10 not to be questloned , and gacondly , 1 he were questloned he
V,
11 would lie. c
7 {
12 Senator Hart of Colorado. That was on the basis of the
1 13 appointment We were trying to arrange then , and that was purely
14 because of hls loyaltieg to the Agency . The case was not
15 presented well to him. What I am saying 19 if we took back his :
16 contact for whom he feels loyalty and the fellow should talk ,
17 I think the feeling of the person who had made the original
18 contact 1g that he woula talk.
1
19 It wag not presented to him in the way that the Agency
i
20 wanted him to do lt.
7
2 1 The Chairman. How valuable do You think this Information
4 22 i9 to the Commlttee? I'11 tell You my concern. My concarn is
1
23 the one thing I have feared more than anything else, In this
1
24 investigation is that wWe take gome actlon that allows them to
8
25 gay that wa have blown the cover of some valuable agent abroad =
TOP SECRET
HM
ing
why"
Gary,
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LORSECRET
126
{ 29
1 and thfs 13 what they feared: allralong end the whole intelli-
8
2 gence #pparatue woula be . gravely weakened and the Men In the 1
1 5 field would be Jeopardlzed by Invastigatlon of thlg klnd _
4 We take that charce wlth thia kind of m# and what do we
5 learn from Jt? Ig It worth that chence?
6 Sonator Hart of Colorado . Well, that queaton could be
7 a9ked of any 0itneg9 that WB hive In here. Number two the CIA
8 Mr Colby the Chief of Station
inJ6nd5azsm
have no doubts
9 that thf8 can be carried out without any security breach what-
10 soever . Now that' 9 the CIA . He has not worked for: them in
If
11 ten Years . F
12 The Chairman . And the CIA woula be the first to jup
1 13 upon the breach and gay , WB told you 30
c
Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, I leave it to the
14 {
15 Committee, I can t tell you what we re going to find out, it
16 may be Zero
P
Senator Mathias . The Station Chief does not ralse that a$
17
18 one of the dangers _
1
19 Senator Baker. Yas, they did_
9
Senator Hart of Colorado. Nor does Colby .
20
1
Mr Wides . Mr Chairman , excuse Me The paper that
suggests the possibility that Mr Win might have been in the
4 22
1
ted States In 1963 is a paper involv the activity records
23
1
of William Marvey who will be here thls aEterroon and that may
24 8
be that You can more testimony under oath from him that will
25
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and
ing Uni-
get
6g2
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TORSCRE
30 127
shed gome 1lght 89 to whether he wa? Jubt using QJWIN 88 4 cover
8
1 2 whlch 1s What he told me the designatlon for billing , or
1 3 whether he' 9 wflling to gIve out some more tastimony .
4 The Chafrman. Well lat u3 that addltlonal Informa ~
5 tion
6 Senator Baker . One further point, Mr _ Chalrman . that might
7 be of interest 1f my menory 18 correct, and I belleve it 18
8 correct , 19 that the major commercial cover for the Agency in
@msteraan Wag run bx ((thecZubuineconpany
Lr 10
15
Senator Hart of Colorado Frank , he 9 not worked for the
11 Agency in ten Years. He 9 not an active agent.
7
12 The Chairman. Suppose that he Were- to tell u9 gomething
9 13 that i8 of importance , then how do W0 crosg-examine him? Then
3
14 we have to bring him here for crosg-examination, then we have
15 blown his cover.
:
16 Senator Baker . Mr Chairman , may I say one other thing?
17 I Meant to say it, and I frankly forgot, just 80 mY colleagues
18 know what I'm about and not that I'm doing it behind their
1
19 back.
9
20 I got a call last night from one o€ the editors of Harper
|
21 magazine in Europe relaying to me that Bernard Barker wanted to
W 22 talk to me , and he thinks about the Butterfield situation, and
1
23 I Intended to call him, but I wanted You to know that.
7
The Chairman. That' $ Eine. 24: 8
Let 9 defer decision right now , on that declslon , Senetor
25
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get
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ToRST
128
31
1 Kart-
8
Let'8 our #itnese back
and complete his testimony this
2 1
1 3 mornlng .
4
5
6
7
8
9 3
10
C 11
r 1
12
6
1 13
14
15 c
16
17
18
1
19
9
20
1
2=
4 22
1
23
1
24 9
25
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get
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TOR SEdRET
129
2
32
Z 1 (Whereupon , at 12.00 noon the WItnese re-entered the 8
{ 2 hearing room.)
1 3 The Chairman . All right.
4 You understand that the oaeh 8t1l1 #Ppliee to thls part
5 of the testimony?
6 Mr _ Schwarz wlll ronew tha questioning.
7
Mr Schwarz _ Mr Bundy , I want to call your attentlon now
to 1963 , the Missile Crfei8 1s over ; Was there enother reassess
ment of Cuban policy in the winter and spring of 632
10 Mr Bundy . Yes , there was.
L;;
11 Mr Schwarz. Aga In, did that reasgegament of Cuban policy
1
12 involve a lot of reasgesSment of a lot of optlons?
1 13 Mr . Bundy - That i9 my refreshed recollection.
14 Mr Schwarz. All right.
C 15 We VB shown you a lotof documents , mostly by you In that
16 period , but Some to You 83 well, and was one of the options the
17 consideration of the possibility that Mr . Castro might defect
18 or might ba communicated to in 8 way that would bring hfm around
!
19 more closely to the United States?
5
20 Mr Bundy . The question of opening communicationg with
1
21 Fidel Castro arises in 1963 , I think at More than one time_
v 22 and without having my attention drawn to specific' documents , I
1
23 wouldn t be able to spell that out very much.
1
24 Mr Schwarz. But You agree that lt 19 in there, and ft 8
25 i8 in there?
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Top SECRE
130
33
1 Mr _ Bundy . Yeb.
8
2 Mr . Schwarz . Now 'did you also conelder In the sprlng of 1
1 3 1963 , 88 you had In the f2ll of 1961, what would happen i
4 Castro died or were kflled?
5 Mr _ Bundy . What w0 did, We cer talnly: poged the questlon ,
the precise form 1g not clear to me , but what;Itrow Know Erom the
docuent? you have show Me, 18 We posed to the Director of the
Office of National Estimates, & Dr Sherman Kent
9 Mr Schwarz . And what did Dr . Sherman Kent gay In response
F 10 to that Ingufry?
11 Mr Bundy . Well, I would have to look at his responge.
1
12 Mr Schwarz. All righta
1 13 I would like to then mark 8 strfng of docuents 90 you
14 can have that in front -of youa
All right, would you mark 83 Item 6 , Bundy Item 6 , the
15
16 Bundy memorandum to the Pregident dated January 4 , 1963, which
17 appears at Bundy Tab K.
(The document referred to
18
1
19 was marked Bundy Exhibit
i No . 6 for identification. )
20
1
2
4 22
1
23
24 8
25
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1
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VoRagdRD7
131
34
3 Mr Schwarz I 11 mark String Mr Bundy , and 18 Mr 8
{ 2 Kelley could it In front;of You we 11 then talk about
L 3 them _
4 As Bundy Exhibit 6-A, the memorandum for the record,
5 Meeting On Cuba , 3 Aprfl 63 _ between the Presldent, the Attorney
6 General youreelf and five Or' six other people.
7 Mr _ Bundy . RIghta
8 (The document referred to
9 was marked 43 Bundy Exhibit
R
10 No . 6-A for Identlfication _
L:
11 c
K
1
12
1 13
14
15 ;
16
17
18
2
19
8
20 L
21
4 22
1
23
1
8 24
25
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Put:
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TO? Sct
{ 132
3 35
8 Mr 8ohwarz Ag}Bundy 629 the: Speclal Group ninutes of
{ 2 Aprll 11, 1963;
1
3
(The document referred to
4
wab marked Bundy Exhfblt '5
No. 6-B for Identification.)
6
8
9 :
10
11
P 1
12
1
13
14
15
{
16
17
18
1
19
8
20 L
21
4 22
1
23
8 24
25
TOP SECRET
HWT
1
==================================================
Page 136
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ToP SCRH
36 133 1
1 Mr Schwarz 434 Bundy Exhiblt 6-C the meuorindud 21s0
8
2 dated Aprfl 11, 1963 from ' Mr" Gord6n Chege to youreelf, headed 1
1 3 Cuban-'Policy.
4 (The document referred
5 to Web marked Bundy :
6 Exhlblt 6-C for
7 . Identlficatlona )
8
9
:
10
11
Fr, 1
12
1 13
14
15
6
16
17
18
2
1 9
9
20 L
21
22
11
23
8 24
25
TOP SECRET
4
1
==================================================
Page 137
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JOP S
3
1 Mr Schwar? 4oiBundy 62D chot @inutes-of 4 noetlng o2
8
1 2 the Speclal: Groupg 10 AprIr 1963
L 3 (The 'docuent referred
4 Eo W4b marked Bundy
5 Exhlblt 6-D for
6 Identiflcatlon. )
8
9
5
10
C
11
c 1
12
1 13
C. 14
15
{
16
17
18
1
19
i
20
1
21
4 22
1
23
1
24 8
25
TOP SECRET
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Page 138
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Jop s u
'135
1
38
Aa Bundy 6-B the
Sumary Record `of NSC
1 Mr_ Schwarz
8
Meeting- AprIl 23,, 1963.
2 Standing Group 1
(The document referred
L 3
to Web Bundy
4
Exhiblt 6-€ for
5
Identificatlon. )
6
7
8
F
9
0
10
c: 11
0
12
1 13
14
15
:
16
1 7
18
19
9
20
7
2
4 22
1
23
{
24 8
25
TOP SECRET
marked
==================================================
Page 139
==================================================
Top yau
136
1
39 Bunay 67E
the :memorandum for Mr Bundy ,
1 Mc , Schwerz . Ae
8
Pollcy, dated_ 23, 1963 .
2 Subject, Cuba { (Tha document referred
1 3
to web Bundy
4
Exhfblt 6-F for
5
Identification. V
6
8
3
10 5
11 C
F
{
12
1 13
8
14 C
15 7
16
17
18
1
19
5
20
7
21
22
1
23
1
24 ;
25
TOP SECRET
AprIl
marked
Y
==================================================
Page 140
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TOp Srd
137
1
40
Bundy_ 636 the,Agende for the maeting of
1 Mr Schwarz Ao
8
meeting Tuegday Apr1l Joth , the document
2 tha Standing Group, 1
1 3 being dated April 9th and 91gned by
(The docunent reterred
4
to Wa8
narked Bundy
5
Exhibit .6-G for
6
identification. )
7
8
2_ 9
10
:
11
p 1
12
C
1 13
14
15 ;
16
17
18
2
19
9
20 7
21
4 22
1
23
1
24 8
25
TOP SECRET
You .
==================================================
Page 141
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1ra241
438
the nelrandun: for nember8 Of the
1 Mr Scnverza 6-8
{
2 Standing Group' dated;May: 2
1
(The
document referred
1 3
to Wab marked Bundy
4
Exhiblt 6-E; for
5
identification.)
6
7
8
9
10 c
11
N 1
12
4
1 13
C 14
15
{
16
17
18
1
19
8
20
7
21
22
1
23
1
24 8
25
TOP SECRET
{19632
5
==================================================
Page 142
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T9? Sxru
139
3
1 Mr Sohwerz Nnally 00 Buady; 6-I tho Central
8
2 Intelligence Agency _ Office Of;Natlonal Estlmates , 13th 1
L 5 1963 , draft memorardum Subject: Developments In Cuba and
Posslble U.S. Actlons in the Event of Castro' 8 Death.
5 (The docuent referred
to wad marked 89 Bundy 6
Exhiblt 6-I for
8 identfficatlona )
9
6
10
L~;
11 c
N? 12
6
1 13
14
15 ~
16
17
18
1
19
5
20
1
2 1
vi 22
1
23
2
8 24
25
Top SECRET
May
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ToP ScRET
140_
3
Now heve' you had 8 chance to read them
1 Mr _ Schwarz _
8
2 agaln, Mr Bundy? 1
1 3 Mr Bundy . Yeg.
In bumary , Mr , Bundy , 19 It 0 fafr cherac-
4 Mr Schwarz.
5 terization of these papers
that you were,iand' thd' Standing
the quastlon of what the Bftuation would
Group wa8 , exanining
be if Castro were to die?
That 13 Ore of the things wa
were examining
Mr Bundy .
cartainly.
That wab .'
gamut' of' matterg 'I'tried to:
10 Mr . Schwarz .
2:7,
at the beginning o€ this line of questioning?
c 11 pose
M {
12 Mr . Bundy . Yes .
was one of the things you were congider
Mr Schwarz . That 1 13
14 ing?
15 Mr Bundy . Right. :
Schwarz. This wag a iod of tIme , 49 the fall of
16 Mr
have beer , when
people agked about or talked
17 1961 may algo
means of causing Mr Castro' & dea th .
about asga8ginations a8 a
18
I am not aware of much conversaticn on that
2
19 Mr Bundy .
5 of '63, So I would have to take
subject in the spring
20 1
21 on that.
agking You, I have no on that.
Mr Schwarz. I am
22 4
I don t think there was much discussion in
1
Mr Bundy . No ,
23
1
the gpring of '63 on that gubject.
24 8
let 9 see I€ we can agree on some
Mr _ Schwarz. Well 8 25
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per
your
word
word
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ToR SRE
1
44 L
thinge firgt.
8
that
the ultimate conclusion was that
2 Can wB
further agree 1
desirable
for the United States?
1 3 Castro' 8 death would not be
recommendatlon, or
the asg0ssment, which
4 Mr Bundy . The
Office of National Estimates, makes It
5 comes back from the
would be that ,
upon Cagtro' 9 death, hig
clear that the odd8
other fIgure In_ the would , with
brother Raul or some
backing and
help take over control_
Soviet
that there might be divisiong and
Then it on to say
it was unlikely that antf-Comminnist forces
10 splits, but that
without extenslve U.S . help and 6
11 be able to take over
h
1
12 probably U.s.
military Intervention
13 Mr Schwarz . All right.
6
1
having to go through every
Now I 1ike to
14
15 single document- :
16 Mr Bundy . So would I.
And gee if I you
to agree with
17 Mr Schwarz _
were looking at a
You do that You
18
this statament_
exist a3 if Castro were killed?
1
19 situation that would
of the things we were looking at
i
Mr Bundy . That is one
20
connection with that, was his being 7
21 Mr Schwarz. And in
one of the wayg which You understood
22
'killed by assasgination
1
23 he might be killed?
recollection of that point,
1
Bundy . I don + have any
24 Mr _
8
25 of it belng on our minds .
TOP SECRET
regime
goes
would
avoid would
could get
agree
4
==================================================
Page 145
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TOP SCRE
142
45
1 Mr _ Schwarz. All right-
8
lookIng at
the questionofshis being
2 Then why Were You
1
3 killed? Was there
gomething known?
1
Independent of it.
I really don t have any
4 Mr Bundy .
in 1963 18 that the
Internal pressure from
5 My sense events
"do something about Cuba wa9
within the Admlnistration to
wag however
external pressure. There
much lower. There very
in the United Stateg, critics of the
8 wa9
political pressure
speaches about how enough was
Administration were making
rid
the Castro reglme= and I
being done and we must
10
said earlier 0 and I would lfke to say now ,
think I may have
11
for getting an egtimate of this kind
~ {
I think that one reason
12
0 from the point of view of those who
wa 8 to it on recora _
1 13
with questions of agga99ina-
think WB should be fusging
14
did not
C
it, that it was not a
sound policy!
tion or anything like
15 meaning
:
leaving agide its moral meanlng and
wider political
16 we had in Cuba
of view of the
narrow objectives
from the
17
Who 'wa9 taking the pogition that' asgas3ina-
Mr Schwarz.
1.8
1
i9
tion could' be
I have no recollection on that-
3 Mr Bundy .
20
Schwarz . But someone was? L
21
Mr
recollection on that.
Mr Bundy = I have
22
V recollection of any
position
Mr Schwarz. You have 11
21
1 being taken
8 24 recollection of any
specific
Mr Bundy . I have no
25
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of
not
as 'of get
get
point
no
no
con? or pro
==================================================
Page 146
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To6 S1E7
443
46
conversation Or pobition that triggered thie particular
1
8
2 ingufry.
!
Well, 18n
It perfectly plausible that
3
The Chalrman. 1
what the 8ituatlon be in
this inguiry sought to examine
4
8 death by whatever means
It might occur?
5 the event of Castro'
follow that because
the Administration
6 Does it necessarily
pleusible Inquiry against such a contingency
was making guch 8
time that therefore It wa8 within the
that might arise et ary
to kill Castro? I don € 880 the
mind of the
Adminfstration :
10
connection
Chairman. That'
Well_ you make my point, Mr
Mr _ Bundy . C. 11
1
12 just my point.
connection with that, you look
Mr Schwarz . Now in
0 13
19th meeting 6-G?
at Own Agenda forvthe 'April
14
item J item
Under item 1 5 +
you digtinguish between
15
uge of contingencies for the
:
2 . Item 1 i8 the possIble
16
item 2 is prograns
achievement of
wider political objectives;
17
initiated by the United States government
that might be
18
fact
that the reference to
I call
your attention to the 2
19
of the Itens under item
8 poggible death of Castro 18 One
the
20 1
1 and not under item 2 .
2
Mr Bundy . That is correct.
4 22
that 85 relevant to the
Mr _ Schwarza And do you regard
1
23
1 had with
the Chairman just now?
axchange You
24 out the Chairman 8
7 It 8eems to me it bears
Mr _ Bundy .
25
TOP SECRET
would
would
your
and
and
==================================================
Page 147
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ToRSecrT
145
1 polnt, that have 8 number of posslble things that might
8
1 2 happen , that You woula then have gomething to do gomething
5 abouf; or to act in the light of. #The other are the things
4 that you might do without waiting for Bome con tingency to
5 arise.
6 Mr . Schwarz. Now the only remalning question I have on
7 thls group of docuents 18, how was It that the subject of the
8 death of Castro do you investigata the pobglbilfties of the
9 death of forelgn leaderg a3 a regular matter?
10 Mr Bundy Well_ the question ,: After: Stalin; Nhat? was 6
11 tha staple of discusslons In the 1940'8, everywhere , academies
P 1
12 and I would asgume ingide the Unlted States government ; the
1 13 question after DeGaulle w2g a questlon about Nestern European
14 policy for a great mary Years . And one could sma ]ler
15 figures , more and 108s controversial and have the Same kInd of
~
16 qubstion coming up. in a gituation in which a particular
individua] 18 45 dominant a figure in a set of events which
17
it had the two, te contrasting but heaVy consequences of the
18
of and the Missile Crisis, it doesn € seem to me to
19
i
be an irrational question to ask, wfthout any relation 49 to 20
{
21 whether the United States itself would have any active advisory
role or any role whatever in having that event come to pass 4 22
1
23 Mr Schwarz. All right.
1
Would You mark a9 Exhibit 7 the september 20 document
24 8
which 1s the pege which states the assgasgination of Castro
25
TOp SECRET
47
you
1
pick
qui
Pigs Bay
==================================================
Page 148
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ToRS RH
48
L
excluded 1n' oraor
toravoid hfs nartyraon
1 wa?
8 (Tha document referred
2 1
to
wa8 marked Bundy
1 3
Exhibit No. 7 for
4
Identification. )
6
7
8
9
5
10
c 11
R 1
12
1 13
14
15
:
16
17
18
1
19
8
20
L
21
W 22
1
23
1
24 8
25
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XX0/4rr
ToRSi2t
take over the
1
Mr Schwarz = Mr _ Kelloy
Cha Irman , on
permission o€ the
the 8
tioning of Mr Bundy ,
at
the heading,
2 which is 1 gerles of documents ,
5 that 1
63 on the
chronology-
September 2oth
Mr Kelley. Y0s.
5 documents _
Mr Bundy the
Cet me ghow
U5 where the
6 will
Well , first,
7 Mr .
Schwarz
under
the heading
t find them
because I
are, documents
43 You gave
Mr Kelley. Yes dated
10 at Tab A the
2 , there is
7
11
In Bundy
Denney to Mr
Crimmins
from Mr George
TX 12
July 25th, of Action.
0 "Cuba
Possible Courses
September
13
entitled
8
memorandum dated
6'
1
B of
Bundy Book 2 19
memorandum
At Tab and thig
14 to Mr Bundy ,
C from Gordon Chase
15
20th, 1963 ,
of
July 25th.
c
summarizes the Denney memberg of
2
16
these documents
Mr Bundy , You
17 earlier this
the 18 I did.
Mr Bundy . Yes, recollection of
13 have any
independent
Mr Kelley. Do
8
20
these
documents? of this kind, which L
21 Well , as I a
document
Mr Bundy .
I am very often
22 of my own
staff,
to me from a
member document which
is 2 23 this case, that
I am in
I then 1 reminded as
24 it reflects his
that
I
review
25 TOp SECRET
146:
ques-
You woula
mith
particular
tell you
couldn
memorandum
Book
1963
memorandum
with
review dia
week?
staff
1
you
read
4
1 comes this
heard and
arguents
8 and
did
==================================================
Page 150
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TOR SERET
147
50
1 them.
8
1 2 Mr . Kelley. Who wag Mr . Gordon Chage?
1 3
Mr Bundy . Nell, he wa? an aggistant of mine at the time
4 with special responsibilities for Cuban affafrs, and perhapg
5 mor8 Widely in Latin Amerca He was at tha € tine 8 forefgn
gervice officer secunded to the White House.
Mr _ Kelley. Did he have any responslbility for covert
actions?
9 Mr _ Bundy . No .
10 Mr Kelley . Did he provide gtaff as8igtance to you with
e;
c: 11 respect to the Special Group or the Speclal Group (Augmented) ?
P 1
12 Mr . Bundy . Well he may have in some exceptional
8 13 case when I needed his opinion on 8 matter , but in ordinary
}
14 cases he would not have been party to Special Group work.
15 Mr . Kelley. Wha t kind of things did he do with the 3
16 special regponsibility for Cuba ? What did that' involve?
17 Mr Burdy . He would be keeping in touch with the Cuban
18 Task Force, which by this time was in the Department of State,
19 the MONGOOSE operation having been disbanded _ He would have
i
20 been respongible for keeping me alert to matters that were
1
21 proceed_ in that Tagk Force that might have an implicatlon for
5 22 the White House.
1
Mr Kellay. Who was the head of the Cuban Task Force?
23
1
Mr Bundy . Nell I don t want to get this wrong , but I
2 24
25 thiuk by this tine it wag Mr Crimmins.
TOp SECRET
done
ing
==================================================
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==================================================
To? TT
148
8 51
In
tha State Department
Mr Crimmins Va3
3 1_ Mr . Kelley.
8
a
foreign service officer?
2 he {
That 19 right_
3 Mr. Bundy . L
Force ,
what wag that?
The Cuban Tagk
4 Mr Kelley.
to
the MONGOOSE
Well_ It wag
the succesgor
5 Mr . Bundy . than oriented toward gecrat operations
6 group, but lesg
came back operationg then
of
MONGOOSE , and the
now , I
of the Special Group, by
under the
8
lineal successor
303 Commlttee which wag
think, called the
10 of 5412 _
to Mr Denney $ attention now
V:
Mr Kelley. I call
~ 11 2 , and it 18 true, 1s
is at Tab A In Book
7 12
memorandum which
18 to Mr . Crimmins?
that the
memorandum
13 it not
2x Bundy . Right.
14 Mr recollection
C have any
independent
Senator Tower . Do
15 7
16 of this
that I gaw it, and I
I have no
knowledge
17 Mr _ Bundy &
it
the other day.
when I looked at
did not find
it familiar
Chase= S memo 18
is it not, that Mr _
It is true, 1
19
Mr Kelley.
by Mr
Denney?
this longer
memorandum
3 to
you summarizes
20
that what it is?
Mr Bundy . Is Chase
7
21
do that, Mr _ Kelley , because
Schwarz _ Does it
Mr of Paul Sakwa S
4 22
here is a summary
1
memorandum starts by saying,
Chase 9 memo ,
23 error in Mr
I
think that is
1 Mr _ Kelley .
here is Mr
8 24
what Is
being summarized
it
1s clear that
25
because
TOP SECRET
and
Wa3
much
gecret review
control complete
your
you
um? memorand
ever
much
an
==================================================
Page 152
==================================================
TOP SCRET
52 149
1
Denney 8 memorandu .
8
2 Bundy . Let Me {uggebt' Ehatiyou: tocue 'on- Mr : Chase 9 1
1 memordndumF with regpect' ta my: recollectlon and rebponbtbllity ,
that 1s lclearly theroperative' 'docunent _
5 Mr . Kelley. Mith respect to Mr . Cha 88 9 memorandum , in
his summary of the rationale of proposale 8 he: gtates 48 second
the present importance of Castro a9 a nationallst gymbol makes
him the obvious operational target; assassinatlon i9 excluded
to avoid Castro 8 martyrdom _
10 Do you have any recollection of why he would exclude
11 asgasgination? Does that imply to you , Or do you recollect ,
1
12 whether Castro S assassination Was being conaidered and: here
8 13 i8 a staff paper excluding itv. because. goneone agked them to
}
C 14 consider it?
15 Mr_ Bundy . No , I thirk it' s a simple statanent of what
{
16 I would regard as a rationale agsessment of the situation by
17 whoever the original author was , certainly by the staff
18 Man with respect to a subject that emarges directly Erom the
1
19 notion that he is an operational target, whatever that means
8
and goes on to say , but we don t Mean assasgination because
20 1
2 it would make him' a martyr , what other reasons against: that
<
there may be . It doesn t seem me that you can read- the 4 22
1
23 statement that assassination is excluded as an inference that
somebody else 1s including it.
8 24
Mr _ Kelley. Tha t' s alls
25
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HA
Mr _
and
to
1
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Page 153
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TOP SRET
150
53 1
1 Mr Schwarz_ In' any; eveiit Mr Bundy , the 'document says
8
2 It 18 excluded. 1
L 5 Mr _ Kelley- That' 8 right.
Now-at that perfod o2 time In the fall of
4 Mr Schwarz .
aware
that through the offices of Ambagsador
1963 , were You
Atwood , 88 he may nhave then been called _ and
Atwood , or Mr
offices of a
French journallst called Jean Daniel
through the
was being made to establish contact With Mr
another effort
Castro?
I remember the Atwood effort, a3 I recollect:
10 Mr . Bundy .
to see me about it. I don t
recollect speclfically
11 that he camo
it strikes a chord 43
you mention it. 1
12 Jean Danfel- although
very briefly , of Mr .
Mr Schwarz. What the purpose , 11 13
Atwood' $ effort?
Well, as I understood 1t, he had been approached
15 Mr Bundy .
knew from Cuba and had been given to understand
16 by someone he
in, Castro had an
interest in, opening
that there was interest
17
exploring with us whether he could be
communication , and he Wi!
18
to undertake an explanation . {
19
encouraged
Schwarz. And _did you encourage him?
20
form of our message to him , or our 1
21 Mr _ Bundy . The exact
it,
the instruction to him , the President = S
22 if you to call
recollect, but my
impression i9 that
1 decision , I can no longer
23
1 and that we did want him to
it withdut
24 we were interested,
8
mor e than he help.
engaging the President any
25
TOP SECRET
1
14
such
8
Mr
want 7
explore
could
==================================================
Page 154
==================================================
TO? SERFT
151
54 1
1 Mr Schwarz . But We3 tha Pregident Jn fact Informed and
8
2 in fact approved the actions taken?
1
1 3 Mr . Bundy . That 19 my understana=
Mr Schwarz. Is it your understand or your recollectior?
4
5 Mr Bundy . It 18 my recollection , but It 18 8 recollection
that 18 refreshed bY what I have learned and hearing more about
6
7 it In the last few days.
Mr Schwarz. Now were you told , In the fall of 1963
8
that asgassinatlon devices had been requested by a Cuban for
of aggasginating Mr Castro, and that egga88ination
10' the purpose
2
devices were offered the Cuban in the fall of 1963?
11
P
{
12 Mr Bundy . No .
Mr . Schwarz. Now again , here, calling for a matter of
0 13
as a matter of opinion, do you belleve that at. the c
14 opinion,
time , at a
possible rapprochement with Mr _ Castro was heing
same 15 c
pursued , the President would have authorized or permitted the
16
of agsa9gination devices intended for their us0 on
17 passage
Mr Castro?
18
1 Mr Bundy . Absolutely not,
19
i
Mr Schwarz. I have nothing further on Castro.
20
1
21
The Chairman. Is there more?
Schwarz _ Well on
Trujillo and Diem , with respect to
Mr 4 22
1
23 Dfem
1
Mr Smothers . Well if You re going on to something else=
24 8
there are a couple of things_
25
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Ing .
ing
to
==================================================
Page 155
==================================================
Topa
152
55
Oarlior {memorandun Yhict I 80n 8 pelleve
1 Going back to en
8
materlele E
0
but It'hag baen ' talked about
2 1s In the Bundy
1
hearing , 8
memorandum which will be
1 3 previously In 8 Committee
Memorandum for the Racord , dated 16+October
4
identified 88 4
memorandum gigned Mr Richard Helng
5 1962 , 8
(The document referred
6
to wa8 marked Bundy
7
Exhibit No. 8 {or
8
Jdentification. )
9
10
2
11
7 12
1 13
14
1
16
1 7
18
2
19
8
20
L
21
22
1
23
1
24 8
25
TOP SECRET
by
4
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Page 156
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TOR SEcRET
153
8 565
1
1 Mr Smothers Mr : Dundy , I am golng to through this
8
2 memorandum and a8k You 8
couple of questions,about that: It'9
L
1 3 memorandum from Helms for the record on MONGOOSE .
Reading: from thi8 memorandum Mr. Bundy , reading from
4
General well, let- me read the
5 Paragraph 2 : "The Attorney
entire paragraph.
the meeting we re talking
The Attorney General opened
MONGOOSE meeting. #m . by expressing the general disgatis-
about a
3e # 'disgatisfaction of the President
faction 0f the President, 2
MONGOOSE .
10 in quotes "with Operation
c
Mr . Bunzy . What date are we at? The date?
11
1; 1 Smothers . The date of the memorandum 19 16 October
12
0
1 13 1962 .
inted out that the Operation had been underway for a
c 14 He po
were discouraging . that there had been
15 Year_ tha = the results :
acts of sabotage , and that even the one which had been
16 no
fafled twice. He indicated that there had been
17
attempted had
during the Year in the collection of
18
noticeable improvement
but that other actions had failed tocInfluence
2
19 intelligence
8 course of events in Cuba . He of the
20
sfgnificantly the
meetings of top officials on this problem , and 7
21 weekly
accomplishments , despite the fact that Secre-
the small
5 22
McNamara ,
General Taylor , McGeorge Bundy and he 1
23 taries Rusk ana
1
all been charged by the President with Einding
24
pergonally
8
the history o€ General Lansdale' 9 persora
4
solution. He traced
25
TOp SECRET
read
Mr
spoke
again
noted
had
==================================================
Page 157
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TOP SCRB7
454
7
appointment by the President 8 year ago
8
"The Attorney Gereral then stated that In vlew of ths
2 1
lack of progress , he Wag going to give Operatlon MONGOOSE more
3
personal attention. In order to do this, he hold a meetin}
4
every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational repregenta -
5
tves from the varloug agencies (Lansdale, Harvey , Hurwich ,
Ryan and General.-Johnson)
Now the best of our information_ Mr Bundy , 18 that these
meetings were in fact held on a dally bagis 49 indicated_ and
9
that they did involve Lansdale and these members of the working :
10
group noted_
11
~ 1 Were you aware such meetings?
12
Mr Bundy . I have no
independent recollectivn '0f them , buti 6
1 13
that does not sound implausible to me at all
14
Mr Smotherg . It doesn t gound implausible to me that the
15
c
Attorney General Lansdale and members of the working group
16
develop MONGOOSE activitieg with him?
17
Mr Bundy . To report to him how they were getting on , and
18
to S6e i€ he couldn t, by listening to those reports and keeping
1
19
6 a lively #
keeping his lively concern in their consciousness
20 7
move the thirg more rapidly.
2
Mr Smotherg . This is your interpretation of giving more
4 22
personal attention to 1t? 1
23
Mr . Bundy . Exactly.
24 8
Mr Smothers . You say you had no knowledge of these in
25
TOP SECRET
1
would
of
to
1
==================================================
Page 158
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TOR secr
38 155 7
1 19627 8
1 2 Mr Bundy . I didn t say that. I Baid I had no independent
3 recollection of them.
4 Smothers. did not come to your attention at that
5 point?
6 Mr _ Bundy . I didn" t say Bay that. I don t know that they
did , but I don't know that didn t.
Mr Smotherg But Your recollection at this point 1s that
they dia not come to your attention?
L"; 10 Mr Bundy . That 18 not my recollection: I don t recall
11 that one way or the other
12 Mr Smothers .
1
13 Let Me ask You then about your knowladge 0€ the Lansdale
14 situation.
:
15 Do You know General Lansdale?
16 Mr_ Bundy . Yes,
17 Mr. Smotherg . Do you know his reputation for truth and
18 honesty?
1
19 Mr Bundy . I don t think I have any his reputation for-
8
20 truth and honesty , if You ask mg the question as one asks it 1
2} about, know all kinds of People , I have no reason Eo
4 22 question it. I have doubts about some of the things I have
1
23 seen attributed to him in recent weeks
1
; 24 Mr Smothers _ Wall, let me put it this way. Would You
25 believe General Lansdale under oath?
TOP SECRET
Mr . They
they
1
Okay .
you
==================================================
Page 159
==================================================
1OR SGRE
156 8
3
8
1 Mr . Bundy _ It would deperd on What he 8a1d _
1 2
Mr Smothers. It would depend upon what he 'gaid .
1 3
I8 Your experience that General Langdale i9 trugtworthy
4
on a selective basis?
5
Mr . Bundy . You are agking me questiong about matterg
6 esgentially In Which h1g testimony ,
a3 I have Seen it reported_
Mr Smotherg . No , I am not asking You about hig testimony
I am asking You If You would believe him under oath, baged
your knowl-
10 Mr It would depend upon what he said, and if it
c 11 was a matter on which I had my own knowledge.
N 0
12 Smothers . Without regard to matterg that General
1
13 Lansdale has testiffed to before this Committee , based on your
14 knowledge of him , your working relationship with him,
your
15 knowledge of what other people know o€ General Langdale,
F
16 reputation in the communi if
his
You will would you believe him
17. under oath?
18 Bundy . I would currently have to say that I could no 1
19 give you a definite &ffirmative
answer to that 3 question.
20 Mr . Smothers That 9 fine_ 7
2 let 5 go back to the period of General Lansdale $
4 22 appolntment
1
23 General Lansdale wag appointed as the coordinator of the
9 24 Special Group, the Chief of Operations .
25 After General Taylor' $ efforts had been under effort for
TOP SECRET
only
on
edge .
Bundy .
Mr
ty ,
Mr _
Now
1
==================================================
Page 160
==================================================
TOP SzC267
157
40
1 some tlme six months , Seven months General Taylor comeg in,
8
2 I believe In July after he completes hle Bay of examina - 1
1 3 tlon , General Langdale 18 appolnted by the President at the end
4 of November _
5 Do You have any present recollectlon of the circustances
6 surrounding that appointment?
7 Mr . Bundy. None that goes beyond what I discugsed earlier
Mr _ Smothers To the best of your knowledge or recollection
did the appointment of this Chief of Staff Or Chief of Operations
10 reflect any lack of confidence in General Taylor on the of
either the Attorney General Or the President?
11
M ;
12 Mr = Bundy . the opposite. General Taylor had heavY
responsibilities in his general respong ibility a9 military 11 13
c:
representative of the Pregident_ He Wag made Chairman of the
C: 14
Committee to keep oversight on thig. It wag inappropriate
15 {
entirely in terms of his rank and his other duties that he
16
should be the to action officer
17
Mr _ Smothers. Are you familiar with the degree of General
18
1 Taylor S involvement with the development the Special
19
8 Group (Augmented) agendas? Was this done by General Taylor?
20 1
21 Was it really General Lansdale $ responsibility?
Mr . Bundy . I don t have any knowledge of the details of
22
1 the operations' of the staff _ It was clear to me, and I think
23
1
to everyone else , that the man in charge of that operation, of
2 24
that Committee, was General Taylor_
25
TOP SECRET
eigs
Part
No ,
day day
of
==================================================
Page 161
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TO? SCRET
158
1 Mr _ Smotherb . Okay.
8
1 2 Just one Einal serfes of questlong .
5 If We might, Mr _ Bundy , go back to our conversationg
4 regarding Your request to 380 documents pror to timony
5 before the Rockefeller Commission when You talked to Mr:
Kisginger _ precisely what did you request of him?
7 Mr Bundy . I 8aid to hin and again I cannot be precise
and I thought that there Were going to be questions with respect
to which it would be much easfer for me to give helpful mor&
2
10 accurate answers if I could have access to approprlate documents
11 since I have taken no documents of that character no official C,
r? 12 documents of that character from the Ihite House And he said
1
13
he entirely agreed and he made the appropriate arrangements _
2
14 Mr_ Smothers Did you ask for a timeframe for these
15 documents? c
16
Bundy . I don ' t recall that I did, but when I came
17
look more closely at what I needed to s0e, 43 I told You
18
earlier , it related specifically to the period around August
1
19 1962 _
8
20 Mr _ Smothers. Did the White House make the selection
L
21
documents You?
Lu 22 Mr Bundy _ No The White House handed me a file of
vi
1
23 documents which covered the period _
24
Smothers _ handed You a file of documents cover 'ing
7
25
roughly the August 1962 period?
TOP SECRET
L
tes your
and
Mr to
of
for
1
Mr They
==================================================
Page 162
==================================================
TORSecE
159
1 Mr Bundy . That 8 right:
8
1 2 Mr Smothers . Had You made 2 request for docuents
1 3 covering this August 62 timeframe?
4 Mr Bundy . I must have told him the rough perlod wlth
5 which I am concerned . Agaln , I don ' t understand the drift of
your question .
7 Mr Smotherg . Well the drift of my question i8, if indeed
you selected the August 1962 documents , why did You select
that?
10 Mr Bundy . Because Counael to the Rockefeller Commigsion
[
11 had directed my attention to the period _
{
12 Mr Smothers _ To August 1962?
1 13 Mr Bundy . Yes.
c:
14 Mr Smothers . In the file that centered roughly this
15 point in this timefrane included NSA memo 181, was the file
:
16 together by the White House pursuant to this guidance?
17 Mr Bundy . The file that came into my hands , Ihether
18
they put it together or whether it was a file draw off the
1
9
shelf, I can t tell You . You 11 have to ask them .
J
5
Mr Smothers . Did it appear to you to be an off-the-shelf 20
L
21
E1le?
Mr Bundy . I don t know what it was. 22
1
23 The Chairman. What ig the object of this serieb of
1
question8 , Curtis?
8 24
Mr Smothers . Well, I am trying to determine , Mr . Chairman;
25
TOP SECRET
on
Put
#
==================================================
Page 163
==================================================
TORSECRET
43 160 1
1 8 what Mr _ Kissinger wab requested to do and what actually
1 2 happened _
3 The Chairman . t we have that now in the record?
4 It just Seems to me like w8 re going over the same series of
5 questlons .
6 Mr Smotherg . Well since we don t know what Wa8 in the
7 file
8 Mr_ Well, I thought I gaid. the file wag a file of
Natlonal Security Action memoranda , a file which you alreadv 2
10 have here.
c: 11 Mr _ Smothers Relating to August, 1962?
K 1
12 Mr Bundy . Uh-huh.
1
13 Mr Smothers . That'9 all I have , Mr _ Chairman .
dape 2b 14 Mr Schwarz. On the Trujillo matter
15 Mr Bundy . Sure.
16 Mr Schwarz_ You know Mr Trujillo was killed_ Did You
17 know or do you know that the persons who killed him had
18 obtained some weapons from the United States?
17
] Mr _ Bundy _ I did not know , and do not now know, of my
j
20 own knowledge that that was the case_ 1
2 I did know , or at least I believe I must have been on
4 22 notice because of documents aga in that you have shown me , that
11
23 weapons by a decision of the Speclal Group in early January
1
8 24 had or were being passed to Dominican dissidents .
25 Mr _ Schwarz_ Were you involved In the gending of a telegram
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Don
Bundy .
been
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161 7
1 8 to the Domincan Republlc, efther two or three days prior Eo the
2 1 actual assa9gination of Mr:s Trujillo?
5 Mr _ Bundy . I have no recollection of and when I gaw
those telegramg in discussions with your Btaff gtirred no
5 recollectlon on my part.
Mr _ Schwarz . Is Jt fair to state that Mr . Richard Goodwin
is the best witness on those subjects from the White House for
that period of time?
Mr . Bundy . It appears that way to although that
~ 10 appears more from the fact that important documents seem to
c 11 have been addressed to him than because of my own recollectior
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12 that he was interested in the matters and because of my phone
1
13 conversation with him, he showed a considerable familiarity
C 14 with events in the Domincan Republic, political events during
15 that spring_
:
16 Mr . Schwarz. Well, you got a memo from Bigsell in
17 February , 17th February 61 _ It Tab R the Trujillo
18 Book 1 of 2 , in which you Were inforned that the dissidents
8
19 had been told by the United States that it was prepared Eo
5
2C provide them with a limited supply armg and equipnent_ 7
When such information , did it trigger in your mind
Y 28 anything to the effect of, let' s be concerned about how they re
1
2 going to use those weapons or did you just accept the informa
1
8 24 tion and do nothing about it?
25 Mr . Bundy . It is clear that the informa tion was sent to
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it,
they
me ,
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got you
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162 1
1 8 me and it Was clear in that sense that I had become rasponsi-
1 2 ble for knowing what wa8 in the document , but I hava to gay that
5 38 I reread it I have no recollection that I ever , in fact, did
read it at the: time_ Whether that was because of the flow , the
Very heavy flow of other docuents or because I passed it to
gomeone else or because I just gimply didn't get to It, I cannot
tell You, but I have no recollection' that I gaw it.
Mr_ Schwarz. You did make 8 request for a brief paper?
Bundy . It must have been done and It was either done
10 in my name or I did it.
11 Mr _ Schwarz . So you re not capable you don t remember
1 {
12 it. Are you capable of.making a coment my question _ which
1
13 was having received information that armg had been supplied
14 Mr Bundy . Ilaving that information my desk , anyway .
15 Mr Schwarz .
~
16 In the light o€ hindsight, should Persons In your position
17 when receive such information inquire into the purpose for
18 which the arms are to be used?
2
19 Mr Bundy . Yes, I would and my own guess on this and
9
20 it s not much batter than that , is that the decision Which had L
21 been taken a week befora the new Administration came in;
4 22 in the Special Group, was partly reviewed in 9ome fashion, with
1
23 the Special Group a9 reconstituted after the change in
1
2 24 Administration. So I would have to say that I suppose I knew
25 that weapons were being introduced into the Dominican Republic
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46
and I would have to add tha t I did not, Or I have no recollectio
8
1 2 ana I think I would recollect lt, 1f I had engaged In a careful
L inquiry to find out just what, who , when where and 80 on did
not do that, and I think you ask in hIndsight , I..ehink It
would clearly be important to have that kInd understanding
because 28 I understand the evidence that has now been developed},
there was a level of communication connection with the
plotters in the Dominican Republic which exceeded what politicalj
E;
9 authority appearg to have expectad or belleved wag golng on .
10 Schwarz. Nould You agree With ona further point,
:
11 that it ig very difficult for the Unlted States to control
N
1
12 events once it has made a decision to cooperate with dissident
1 13 elements , in particular once it' $ made a decision to
C
14 cooperate with dissident elements by providing them with arms? C
15 Bundy . I think that one thing, I don t want to €
16 generalize here, but I think I would agree with the ganerali-
R
17 zation , let me put it that way , if I could add that in the case
18 of the Dominican Republic, I think one has also to recognize
2
19 retrospectively that there was way to have any communication
a
20 with dissidents that would not involve recognition that, if You
7
21 propose to be an effective disgident in that country under that
22 ruler, you would probably be contemplating fairly vlolent
1
23 action.
[
Mr . Schwarz. I have no thing further on Trujillo
24 8
25 One question of Vietnam .
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and
Mr
and
Mr
no
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[Op SzRE0
16'4
Yon were Involvod ln Ehexquesgion 08 the' Fosgible coup In
8
Vletnam thatractually cookiRlace? 1
Mr Butayr Yes
4 Mr Schwarz And; you were Subs tantially, Involved in that
5 89 a matter of Pergonat
Mr Bundy I Was working_Closely: WIth the President and
Was probably tho draftsman under his ingtruction +of some of
the cablestthat went out
9 Mr . Schwarz Now Diem wi9 killed. It does not appear to
10 me from the, record that the United States wanted him killed::
2
11 that fair?
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12 Mr Bundy . That is correct_
9 Mr Schwarz. But the United States did want him deposed
13
}
if 8 :coup be. guccessful? Ig that correct?
14
c Mr Bundy . The:Urifted Gtate8 ,really had two views . Right
15
up toxthe end _ the United States hoped_
8
hoped against hope, as
16
it becane more and more difficult to communicate with Diem ,
17
that he woula ge0 the, or come to share the kindsg of argument ,
18
1 that wbre made to him, primarily by Ambasgador Lodge , and that
19
a change in his government and: & ;lower; much lower , role for
20 1
his brother and sister-in-law would asgist him in recapturing
21
public confidence_ That was a lways the preferred golution.
5 22
1 As prospects for that becane more and more dim, the United
23
7
States did come to take the view. that' there might be no alter_
24 8
native to a coup, and it certainly had the vlew that if there
25
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was golng; to ba 8 CAupAS erlevetttonangu2ge} Gonewhere 1n 8
1 One Of tne cablas 43 ehae Ie4wa5 47 tho Intereges o8 eo nunfted
1
states Ehat 18 ehoula Grccaed
Mr Schwarz Now On Eho Gf #hercoup Anbassador
5 Lodgo toia M ODlem Dha€ horould_ProvIdo torgeeihfn oue
Of Eha Counerytana d 8o byE1rplano pue noycouldneEjhave the
'plane for; twen four houra 4rzatdrybnzknoweoe theytwenty: foiir
8 hour;polnt?
Mr Bundy Ifdon € remombor that wO d1d
10 Mr Schwarz: B dori t You find It iiicomprehensibls that
11 the United; States was not able tossupply an a Irplare for
12' twenty-four hours?
2 13 Mr Bundy I don t really;know because it depend3 on
14 where the Plare wa9 goirg 'Eo go what Kind 'Sf,Plane Irdon t
15 think I m competent to answer that question
16 What occurs ma 1s thero were lotsjOf_ other ways of
6ffer asylun for a "twenty 'four hour; Period and I don
18 think I really fina_ that 8 yery signiffcant point
1
19 The Chairman further questiors
3
'20_ If there are no further quegtione I want to thank You |
2 for your testimony Ituhag bsen long very long morning and
4 22 it has beer' very helpful testImony We; aPpreclate ft very
1
23, much:
1
24_ Mr Bundy And I am thankful to you Mr Chairman
25: Mr Chiirman 18846439n31 Inappropriate and%ctere 18 no
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Thank You very Mpah;
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