Transcript of 157-10014-10017.pdf
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Date 08 / 04/95
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER 157-10014-10017
RECORDS SERIES HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER 05-H-01
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR SSCSGO
FROM
TO
TITLE
DATE 02/11/76
PAGES 106
SUBJECTS AMLASH
Released under the JohnF. Kennedy
CIA Assassination Records Collection Act of
992 (44 USC 2107 Note) Case#Nw
a608 Date; 03.18-2025 CASTRO , FIDEL
DOCUMENT TYPE TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS IA , IB
CURRENT STATUS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA
COMENTS Box 2
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 88608 Docld:32423405 Page 1
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057es U44 3T9 TTION
T9
Ou01Nri
VolioEd55++I [ubjec? {OP SEGaE!
Vol to Craan tatzoee
o2 3 R3574
Ulc Iuttcd Btatce Boruate
Report o Proocedinga
Hearing held belore
Senate SElect Commtttee to Study Govecnmental
Operationg with Regpect to Intelllgence Actlvltiee 3
1
Redneeday ;~February-11"-1976-
Weshingtoa D.C
(Stenocype Tape and Waece turned over
co che Comlttee for descruction)
WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, 9. E.
WASHINGTON, D C. 20008
(202)+ 544-6000
I8?
6
NI
EEu_i
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'0 2
Sc
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1
C @ n E En 2 g
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PAGE
2 TESTIMONY_QE !
1 3 AMLASH Cage OffIcer 3
4
5
6 E X E [ @ [ % 8
70
7 AMLASH Ca8e Officer Exhibit No . 1
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9
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10 ~
c. 11
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DEa61
TOp SECRET
1
2 EXECUTIVE SESSION
1 3 Wednesday , February 11, 1976
:
UnIted State8 Senate_
6
Select Committea to study Governmental
7
Operationg with Regpect to
8 Intelllgence ActivIties ,
9 Waehington , D C_
Fa 10 The Commlttee met , pursuant to notice , at 10:20 0 'clock
~
1] am , in Room 608 Carroll Armg Hotel, the Honorable Richard
12 S _ Schweiker presIding .
1 13 Present: Senator Schweiker (preglding)
14 Staff: Paul Wallach, Ed Grefssing , JIm Johngton , Dan Dwyer
C
15 and Frederick Baron , Profegglonal Staff Members . {
16
17
18
1
19
8
20
1
2!
2*
1
22
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ToR SEcRL
8
ERoc_EED LN G B
{8
WIIl stand and ralee rIght
2
Senator Schwelkor.
1
1 5 hand .
the tegtImony you are about to
4 DO b0lemnly gwear
truth, and nothing but the truth,
5 give 18 the truth_ the whole
6 30 help. you @od?
AMLASH Cage OffIcer. I do .
7
of all, s1r, we 11 start with bome
Mr _ Johngton . First
8
I'm not going to ask you to Btate your
procedural matters.
r . becauge we
have agreed before beginning
10 name for the
under an alfag 90 not to ~
1] here today that you woula tegtify
1
12
jeopardize
ongoing activities_
way you understand our agrccment?
Ig that 9 13
C
14
16
;
1 (
1
1
1
8
7
2
26".
J 2:
"2} :
28
TOP SECRET
NWi
your You
you
record
a9
your
the
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TOpST
1
TESTIMONYOF AMLASH CASE OFPICER
L
2 AMLASH Cabe Offiaor . Y0b
3 Mr . Johnston . I8 that Batefactory to
1
AMLASH Case Offlcer. Yob 4
Now You underetand that at any tIme we
5 Mr . Johngton
or
authorehip of-a-document or
6 refer to particlpation
of 4 document , we are prepared to gubbtantlate the
7
recelpt
that we are making, and we are tryIng to avofd
8
re ference
the fact that It 18 Indeed that were Involved In
provIng
becaube w0 were not able to uge
the Incfdent _ It L8 8Imply
10
:
11 name
{ AMLASH Case Officer. That' 8 right -
12
Now ve
previously tegtifled before this
Mr _ Johnston ,
c
1 13
ve had a copy of the Committee
Committee , and I aggume
c 14
avaflable In cage you want to
ruleg , and we have another copy
16
{
1 6 refer to them _
appearing here voluntarily today thout
And are you
17
a coungel?
18
AMLASH Case officer_ Yes , I am _ 1
19
that at any point during
8 Mr Johnston . Do understand
26;
are free to
stop answering any questions 7
2 '
this examination you
request the advice of Counsel?
22
AMLASH Case Officer. I do _ 1
22
as well that all your
{ Mr _ Johnston And do you understand
24 8
are intact here before the Committee
constitutlonal rights
25
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you?
your your
not
you
your
you
you
wi
you
and
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TODSECRE
8
FIfth Amondmont rIghts to romaIn BIlent , If You
IncludIng the
8
2 chooge . 1
3 AMLASH Cage Officer. I do _ 1
4 Mr _ Johnston All rIght .
that the purpo8e ot thfe Intervlew 18 to
5 Let me atato
refine and
clarify certain questlong about the AMLASH operatlon
6
understandIng that you were the cabe officer on
7 It 19 my
from the time perlod , Bay , of the first
8 the AMLASH operation
C on through , for all relevant purpo8e8 , December 61_
9
of September
10 and November 64 , 18 that correct? ~
AMLASH Case Officer _ That 8 right .
11
At thig time you were a member o€ what was
5 1
12 Mr Johnston _
0 Affalr8 Staff, 19 that correct?
13 called the Speclal
8
1
Offfcer. That 8 rIght _
AMLASH Case C 14
Mr Johnston _ And that 8 abbreviated SAS .
15
~
16
AMLASH Case officer. Right .
Would describe position in SAS
Mr Johnston_
1'7
to Mr _ Fitzgerald , who wa8 Chief of
18
and your relationghip
1
1 $ SAS?
3 officer. I was a special agsistant to Mr
AMLASH Case
20
with
the responsibility of attempting tov L
2 1
Fitzgerald charged
military
coup inside Cuba against Fidel Castro_
22
organize a
5i Did you report directly to Mr .
Fitzgerald
1
22 Mr Johnston
1
or your work?
24 8
officer. Yes , I did_
AMLASH Case
25
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your you
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TOPSTCRREV
5
L
Mr . Johnston . Rad thore anyone olsa knowledgeable Jn
8
2 SAS o: what you were dolng?
1
AMLASH Cabe Officer _ Only the other people who were 1
Involved workIng on the project -
5 Mr _ Johnston What wag tho relatlonghlp betwean SAS and
Hemfsphere Dvieion under , at that time I believe _
6 the Hestern
7 Mr . J, C_ KIng?
AMLASH Cage Offlcer. I don '€ recall exactly what the
8
relatlonghlp wag at that time . I do know that
9
organfzational
~:
on a gomewhat I wouldn" c say autonomou8 bag19
10 we operated
N
Division Itself _ but the chaIn of command was certainly
1} from the
~ from Mr . Fitzgerald , not necesgari ly through the Division
J : Chief , but up to the DDP at that tIme _ 0
Johnston _ Kho wag Mr _ Helms _
c 16
AMLASH Case offlcer. That 8 right _
39
7
Mr . Johnston _ In other words , there could be direct
16
from Mr . Fitzgerald to Mr . Helms _
1 '1 reporting
AMLASH Case Officer_ Oh ,
1
Mr . Johnston . Is: it necessary that Mr _ King was knowledgeable
1
19
3
2'; of all operations SAS?
Not necessarily. I don t know i f he 7
2= AMLASH Case Officer.
fully advised of all the operations or not
2"2, was kept
Did he know generally what You were doing? 1
2 Mr . Johnston _
AMLASH Cage officer. I presume he did, yes .
2 24
Johngton And how often did he and Mr . Fitzgerald
Mr _ 2'
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Mr .
yes .
of
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meet to coordInate . They do coordInat Son of thelr mork?
8
2 AMLASH Cabe Officor, I don t Xnow . I wabn ' t Involved !
1 3 In that part of It_
4 Johnston _ Wag SAS targeted dlrectly at Cuba , or
5 were there other countrles under Itb jurfodictIon?
6 AMLASH Cage OffIcer _ No . BAS Wa9 strictly 4 tagk force
7 B0t up to deal with the Cuban problem_
8 Mr . Johnston _ And fInally on thfe general matter , who
9 did who gave the counterIntelllgence upport for SAS operatidns?
10 AMLASH Cage Officer. We had a CounterIntelligence Branch
3
1] within SAS
1
12 Mr Johngton _ Who headed that in the Eall of 63?
8 13 AMLASH Cage Officer. I don't recall _ There wag a change _
} c
14 I don 't recall the name ,
15 Mr Johnston _ Let me a8 I stated earlier , of {
16 courge have testified before , and I have before me the
17 transcript and I'm not proposing really to trap In any nature
18 wIch this transcript _ However, there are some thingg that were
1
19 not asked before that I would lfke to clarify.
1
20 First all how and why wag AMLASH first contacted to
|1
2} set up
the September meeting that you attended?
22 AMLASH Cage officer He had been contacted the before
1
23 In Helginkl? and we found 'out at' that time that he wag coming
1
24 out to a sporting event In the Western Hemfsphere , 80 we went
2
25 down and contacted him.
TOP SECRET
Mr _
you
you
of
year
7
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TOR SECRRHT
8
revfew of the [Ile e and I don 't think
Mr Johngton _ In my
L
2 we have the document here today, but my notes IndIcate there
Langley to Rome on 19 June 1963 , chat 18 In
1 5 wag 4 cable trom
tho AMLASH {Ile .
5 AMLASH Cabe Offfcer_ Would repeat' = the questlon?
In my revlew of the AMLASH f1l0 , there 18
6 Mr . Johnston .
headquarter8 to Rome Oon 19 Juno 1963 which gtates
7 cable from
contact with AMLASH , had 8en€ ',a letter
8
that AXWIIIP ,, who wa8 your
of activatfon effort to reluctant dragon -
9 49
ask, do have
any recollection or any knowledge
10 I
3
thi8 wag a to AMLASH that CIA Wag back in contact
11 that
with him or wanted to go back in contact with him?
12
I can t coment on that because
AMLASH Case officer_
c
1 13
until September of 63 , and
I didn" t into the tion
C 14
I became involved in that part of the
15 thib took place before {
16 AMLASH operation _
word8 , re saying you don t
Mr Johnston _ So in other
17
know who made the contact wich AMLASH?
18
really
We had contact with AMLASH from the
AMLASH Cabe Officer _ 2 1
contacted by a CIA cage officer in
3 be fore. He had been
20
L
2
Helsinki _
Mr Johnston In July August , 1962 _
22,
AMLASH Cage Officer. Riqht _
2:,
Then he returned to Cuba .
Mr Johnston
2 26
And this was the first time , to
AMLASH Cage officer.
25
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you
"an Part
you
sign
opera get
you
year
and
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8
the best of my knowledge , that he had Como out trom Cuba
8
2 sInce the Heleinkl trlp.
!
3 Mr . Johngton _ m other worde _ you' ro not aware of any 1
4 prlor contact between CIA or an Intermediary and AMLASH?
5 AMLASH Cage officer. Not between that perlod ot time .
6 Mr _ Johnston . A1I rlght. You met wIth AMLASH In Brazil
7 on September Sth through 9th _ I don t mean you Bpecifically,
but the general meetInge with AMLASH wero In that tIme frame
8
9 Ib
that your recollection?
AMLASH Case Offfcer. That 9 rIght.
10
:
11 Mr Johnston . Do you recall Beelng a cable, or recelving
instructlons from headquarters to the ef fect and thlg 1s
12
gerles of meetIngg Instructlong to the effect
1 13 after
felt that AMLASH appeared hopele8s 48 an
that headquarters
C
performer , and bhould be approached a8 a chief
15 intelligence {
conspirator allowed to recrult his own cohorts _ He should
16
to recruit a few trusted friends to as9st him
17 be
Initially In FI and ops reporting and then progres8 to gabotage
18
1
more serious matters on a more orderly basis _
19
8
Do recall seeing something to that effect after Your
20
1
2 ]
Brazil meetings with him?
officer. I don t specifically recall the cable
AMLASH Case
22
that would be in line with the thinking
1
23
itself , but certainly
{
at that time
2 24
gtate, he wag not considered a controlled asset ,
If I may 25
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your
14
urged
and
you
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1o[SEq 4
Bhall Wa Bay, and It Vab somebody wLth whom Vo folt that wo
8
2 could collaborabe In organlalng the Internal group _ 1
1 Mr Johnston _ But my Bumuary of the cablo would Indlcate
thut on September 9th , or after meetInge In Brazfl, you
5
really didn t think of him 48 4 gatherer ot Information, but
6 43 bomoone who wanted to go on to other thIngo , 48 a
7 conopirator of some xInd .
8 AMLASH Cag0 Officer. That' 8 rlght.
9 Mr _ Johngton _ The fIle al8o ha8 . 4 -document In It, the
~
10 AMLASH fIle , dated 16 September , marked OFPA 72775 . I don ' t
1]
really know what an OFPA 18 .
1
12 AMLASH Cage Officer. It' 0 a diepatch .
13 Mr Johnston In any event, it reporto a transcrfpt of 1
14 the conversation , and to the begt of my abflIty to understand
1i
:
15 the document , it' $ a conversation of an Intercept in thek Cuban
Embagsycin Pazis The document gay 8 "Mary : I don t want to 16
imagine thinge , but this thing AMLASH uses his real
17
name I have Banitized this Moreno It is either a 18
1 tremendous secret or a secret matter_ And then there is an
5
unreadable prtion , and then a either treason or 2
1
"reagon I'm not sure what is referred to _ and then a partici-
2
pant whose name 18 Betty says , "I believe it is a top secret
v 22
1
22
matter _
My question to you is, did you , in September of '63 , kno
2;
about this intercept?
2:
MBr
TOP SECRET
your
IB
(Nsk)
of"
top
wora
4
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10
AMLASH Cabe OffIcer. I don 't BpecLfIcally recall 8 today
! 2 that I would have known about It. I prosume Jf w0 had It In
1 5 fIle , that I wab workIng wIth It, that I would have geen ft.
1 Mr . Johngton Do you have any Information about any recollec-
5 tfon about bome thlng on thlo order?
6 AMLASH Cage OffIcer.
7 Mr _ Johngton . And asgume that at leagt the portion I
8 quoted geema to reflect on the Cubang vlew of AMLASH ' 8
:
9
activfties in Paris .
~
10 AMLASH Case OffIcer. Yes , It may have . I recall_ I ~
J } think that he wag al80 at that time I may be wrong , and we
5 would have to go back to the files to check but he wa8 rather
8 13 outspoken some of hig closer frlends in the fact that he was
{
14 no longer happy with the revolution, with Castro :
15 Mr Johnston. I don t want to dwell on this , if you don t
16; have a recollection , but this conversatlon seems to indicate
IB 1" that the employees in the ICuban_embassy think that AMLASH 18
It there on a top secret mission .
1
AMLASH Case officer _ Probably So becauge of his independent
3
way of comportment _ He didn t answer to anybody_
L
Senator Schweiker _ What was his role in government at
5 22 that point?
1
AMLASH Case officer_ He wag excuse me this must have
26 been 6 3 . He was a personal repregentative of Castro to the 9
28 games , first in Brazil , and I don '€ think he had a specific
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NI
No
As
to
(NsA
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48 I recall . He had been Deputy MInister of
1 In 63 ,
{
milItary attacha In Spaln. I don 't thihk
2 Interlor. He had been 8
1
Bpoclfic pobt at that tIme
1 3 he had 4
one more point . Before that he
Excube me , 1f I may add Just
4
the Student Federatlon at
the Unfversity
5
had been Pregldent of
have been in that post , or about the
6 of Havana . He may 9till
of it, and thfe 18 , I think, where
time that he wag getting
thi8 particular fellow and the Castro
8 really the trouble between
more or les8 came to ahead ,
9 brothers
Jim Wave a c`
Johngton _ On the 19h of September ,
Mr . 10 ~
bagically warning, g1ving a warning ,
mesgage to headquarters
wab an
anti-Communigt group in
~ 1 making the statement that there
12
and it concludedl
AMLASH 18 of that group ,
Cuba _ the name 1 13
aware of both
the anti-Communist
saying that Fidel 19 allegedly
14 by
and that he acts a moderator
group and a
Communist group=
;
15
order to
maintain cohegion in the government of
between them in
16
Cuba _
recall receiving
that information?
Do you
] receivind
officer. I
don 't recall specifically
1 AMLASH Case
that at that
time Fidel
6 that information but I do
was concerned about 3 1
Castro himself was talking about
and he did meet with the
the revolution _
Communist takeover
27
his in order to prevent this_
subject and some other friends
;
Johnston When wag thig?
Mr
2 26
in the early
60s sometime
officer_ This was
AMLASII Case
2:
TOP SECRET
NI
post
out
sent
11
part
and
as
recall
of
of
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Top SEcR
Schwefker. Nhat year wero Jn?
Senator
1
{
2 Mr _ Johnston . 63 _
before '63 . Thlg muet have 1
AMLASH Cage Officer. Thlg wag
3
been In 62 .
18 'before hig trfp to
the Soviet
Mr , Wallach. Thfs
5
6 Unlon?
Be fore Castro 8 trip?
7 Mr . Johnston.
Mr . Wallach . RIght.
8
AMLASH Cage OffIcer. Yes =
9
question befng 19 after your
MR. Johnston _ The
:
10
with AMLASH , Jim
Wave cabled headquarters that
meeting in Brazil
11 anti-Communist Cuban
government
~ AMLASH was Part of a
group of
12
fact.
Castro was aware of that
leaders and that
1 13
answer to you 18 that he certainly
AMLASI
Case Officer. My
C 16
with these people , including
because he had been talking
wag 1 5
{
AMLASH a
be fore _ Yes
1 6
aware that he was
tor Schweiker_ Castro wag
Sena
17
Comunist?
1 that he was one of the
AMLASH Case Officer . Yes ,
1
]
: Communist group .
2 be so trusted and be the
1 Senator Schweiker. Why would he
in time if he known
representative at that
22
anti-Communist?
2: of
the relationship with
AMLASH Case
officer . Because
24 his Communist , more or
2 himgelf had not
declared
Castro _ castro
25
TOP SECRET
You
put
year
anti-
anti-
was point
special
a9
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TOPSCREL
13
1ese Intentlone , 48 ot that tme .
1
2 Senator Schmolkor. Walt, thle wa8 after the Cuban m1g8ile
3 criels . Thl8 wab 63 , and the Cuban mig8fle crigl8 Wab '62 .
4 I'm confuged here .
5 AMLASH Cabe Offfcer_ Let 8 go back to the dates here .
6 Senator Schwelker. The JIm Wave: date 18 September 1963 ,
and he knowb at thls polnt, allegedly now , that thfg AMLASH
8 wab a member of an ant-Communist group. I have trouble
9 reconcIllng that wIth not plnpointing AMLASH and hf8 pogsble
10 8ubverelve agent . I think that 19 what Jim 18 gettng to _
:
11 AMLASH Case officer. Agatn , my angwer 18 I don t know
{
12 gpecifically why or what the orlgin of the '63 J_ M. Wave
1 13 cable wa3 .
C
14 My angwer agafn to the question 19 that Castro from his
15 previoug knowledge , going back to 62 , did know and had consulted
:
16 with this group of people of which AMLASH wag one who were the
17 group of Anti-Communist officerg in the revolution _
18 Mr Johnston _ So
2
19 AMLASH Case officer. I don t know why in 6 3 this report
8
20 woula have come Out , but ft would confirm Castro 9 knowledge 6
21 of thi8 group _ yes _
5 22 Mr. Johngton. Let me move on into October. There wag a
1
23 meeting with AMLASH _
1
24 Senator Schweiker_ How long did he tolerate anti-Communist 8
25 officers in high psitions in his government? I've to
TOP SECRET
got
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TOFSE
cutoff hero , I roal[z0 the unquenes8 and
belleve there 8 gome
0
earlfer, but It vould Jubt beem to Me
2 broadne88 of his bupport
1
gome he really had to weed out , nottnecegsartly
3 that at
anti-Communigt officers who had too
weed out or be suspect of
would he not, Or am I
5 high declsion makIng Jn hig government ,
6 miesing gomething?
not really, becauge out of thfg
7 AMLASH Cage Offfcer. No
mentioned , and wIth whom
he himgelf dlgcussed
group that Wab
609 to keep, Bay ,
the Communiet8 out ,
? the need in the early
officers are 8t111 Jn hig goverment today
10 gom0 of choge
:
have changed , or Castro may have changed , but
11 Now they may
of officers _ Maybe he won them
3- 8
12 he didn't purge all this group
there , evidently he hag some
8 13 over, and 1f they are still
confidence in then.
14
the file, there was a meeting 0
Mr Johnston _ According to
15
Paris, and I'm not sure that you were
{
October Sth , apparently , in
meeting, and the cable from Paris
the case officer at that
17
meeting as
AMLASH apparently was trying
sets che tone of that
18
of € his chest in talking to 1
19 to things
8 the case officer at that meeting?
Were
{
20
I was the case officer during that
AMLASH Case Officer.
1 21
of time 1 22
we did talk about
a little of the detafl because 1
23 Go into
24
these problems
8
from che file two meetings
Mr Johnston There appeared
25
TOP SECRET
Polnt
16
you .
get
You
period
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TOR SERET:
15
}
1 In early October 1963 , the fIret meeting on dr about October
7
2 Sth that AMLASH come g In and Bay8 I want to thinge otf my
3 chest, and Beemg to exprese great disgaIafaction wIth the
CIA '8 posItlon _
5 Then there 9 a Becond meetIng on October 13th or 30 where
6 he specifIcally a8k8 to meot with Robert Kennedy , and you
7 previously testified about that second meetIng .
8 AMLASH Cage officer. Yes
9 Mr . Johnston _ Now , the ffle Indicateg there wag an
10 earlier meeting on October Sth , and AMLASH wa8 complainIng 6
11 apparently about the low level espionaqe matters that had been
~ 1
12 discussed In Brazil and implying that he had a more valuable
0 13 role to play , and the ffle sayg the case officer provided the
C 14 neceggary agsurances that his feelings were not in fact
15 true , and that his cage wag receiving the consideration at
:
16 the highest levels .
17 Mith thig problem which had undoub- tedly been bothering
18 AMLASH off hig chest , a much more relaxed AMLASH departed_
1
19 stating his degire to return to Cuba to undertake the big
8
20 job.
1
21 DO you recall that meeting?
1 22 AMLASH Case officer. I think you are getting thoge two
1
23 meetings mixed up In other words , the later one , I
1
was there and talking to him in the second meeting _ In the
8 24
25 first meeting I don ' t recall precIsely , but there could have
TOP SECRET
get
yes _
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ToDSEcT
16
baon 4 meetIng wIth 8 contact In Parlb , Jn other vords , not a
1
2 caje OffIcer but the contact we had Jn Parls. I don ' remember
3 who that 7a9 , one of the offcere there _
Mr . Johnston _ In addftlon to you he wab In contact with
4
5 AMLASH Cab0 Officer. Only for purpobe8 of contact_ I mean
6 to make contact With me , not to carry on the Cab0 . But
only
knew that tho other officer wa 8 a {rfend of mine , and he
he
8 wa8 Sn touch wfth him, and when he came to Parle he would
9 In touch with him. So I would be notfffed _
Johngton _ I think you have uged hl8 name In the
10 Mr
03 ~
11 pror trangcript [Ered seent] the case of ficer?
~
{
AMLASH Case officer. Yes , because he wab che one who
12
13 furnished the quarters where we had the meetings _ 1
In furnishing the quarters , did You have a
14 Mr Johnston _
golng 49 to the discussIong that would take place
15 taping system
;
AMLASH Cage OffIcer. No , I don 't believe we taped any of
16
17 those meetlngs?
Mr Johnston . Is it procedure to tape meetings with
18
1
19 Agents?
8 officer. Sometimes It i9 a 9tandard
20 AMLASH Case
L
21 procedure _ Some times it is
not physically possible.
Let me go back into this meeting of October
3 22 Mr . Johnston _
1 don t recall that were at this meeting , is
23 Sth, which you
24 that correct?
2
officer _ There probably could have been the
25 AMLASH Case
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17
arrIved In Parie , and the meetIng that he
meetIng when he {Iret
2 had I
don't recall 8peclflcally.
and
bogln I I do recall ehat he safd he wab
3 I do recall , ff may ,
of the re-jufrement& thc
Intelligzncc requirc-
unhappY becaube
hlm In Brazfl = and It 15 true that
5 ments that we
had levled on
time even In BrazIl and later In
6 his pOSItlon wa8 at that
not dispoged to cooperate Just to furnfeh
Pari8 , that he was
wordg , he felt that he to do
8 intelligence. In other
removal of Cagtro but wag not
jugt prepared
9 gomething about the
~ to what wa; going on He recognized that
10 to keep advised 49
needed operation , but he did not
11 thfs was certaInly of a
:
1
12 congider himgelf just a8 a
provider of information _
Let me go off the record for a minute
0 13 Mr_ Johnston.
14 because I want to use a code name .
15 (Discussion the record.)
mentioned the code name that 19
16 Mr Johngton _ Kaving
were at the 5 October
17 used in this cable , now recall You
18 meeting?
1
19 AMLASH Case officer. Yes
can look at it, indicates
8
Mr Johnston _ And the cable, You
20 7
21 that AMLASH was in a
confessional
after recal}_ that meeting , was
22 My question to You 19 ,
expressing his concern about
1
23 it bagically one where he was
1
24 the CIA role for him?
8
his concern for what?
Mr Johnston He was
expresging
25
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NVy
wanted
48
part
off
You
mood
ing
5
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Page 21
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578 7op5d @
Tho CIA !0 Plano tor uBIng him.
Mr . Johnston .
1
Ho wad concernad 48 to how and
|
2 AMLASH Cabe OffIcer. YBb ,
Le wIth CIA. He Vas 4180
Jn what way he wag to cooperate
3
thl9 , rIght from
the beginning, dubious
we must underline
4
follow through on Inftfating a
a3 to our regolve to really
6 coup agaInst Castro,
correct In stating that he was
Mr . Johnston . Ig the cable
7
receIving cons_deration at the
asgurod that he cage Wa 8
8
hfghest level8?
9
AMLASH Cabe Officer. Yes _
10
m level used , or was
Johngton Was the word highest
Mr
c 11
~
{
12
name uged?
levels , but that staqe
AMLASH Cage Officer_ Highest
0 13
talking to CIA , 80 hfghest levels
he knew he was
of the
c 14
at that particular time _
in CIA 19 what wa 9 meant
15
Johnston _ That' $ the You
{
16
Mr
You didn t say Director McCone?
17
I did not uge name 8 , no
AMLASI Cage OffIcer.
18 reassured him that his
Johnston _ On October Sth , you
Mr 1
19 receiving congideration at
that hig case was 8 consideration ,
20
of CIA , and
the cable reflects
least at the highest levels L
21 he seemed much more relaxed abouc
that when he left that meeting
1 22
1 the case
23 of the meeting?
1 Is that an
accurate portrayal
24 8 Officer. That " 8 right .
AMLASH Case
25
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1RS lEU
19
1 Mr _ Jobnston . Ab. I montIoned; thoro Vab anothor ReetIng
2 on or about October 13th , whera , 48 I undorstand It, AMLASH
1
5 made hlg demand Or hig request to meet with Robert Kennedy ,
4 he made that requebt to meet with Kennedy by name
5 I8 that correct?
6 AMLASH Cabe Officer. Yeb , he did
7
Well he Baid gomebody guch a9 , Bomebody hIgh In the
8 administratlon , agaln , to recelve the agburanceb that we were
prepared to S that we were gerlou8 about developIng and ~
10 organlzng a coup .
~
11 Mr . Johngton. After that meeting , You were recalled to
1
12 Langley for discuggiong , 19 that correct?
0 13 AMLASH Cage offlcer. I wag traveling back and forth
14 between Paris and Langley , yeb _ I don ' € recall if I wag
15 recalled at that particular tIme , but I would go there 2 I
1
16 was TDY
17 Mr Johnston. I want to set the 8tage There is a
18 message from the Director, 75683 , to London , directing you to
1
19 return to headquarters for discussion of a1l facets of the
8
20 case 1
2 This _ is after you reported that AMLASI wants to meet
5 22 wieh someone like Robert Kennedy.
1
23 Do you recall that flow of events?
1
AMLASH Case officer. Yes _
8 24
Mr . Johngton . What discu8slong did you have at Langley ,
25
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to? ST7
20
and I don 't want- to go"through our Provloue testLmony
agaln , 1
2 but: bablcally are wo correct In' understanding that out of the
3 dlscussfong at Langley came a decLsfon Co go to ParIs with
4 Mr. FItzgerald reprogenting hImbolt
4 Personal repregentative
5 o} Robert Kennedy?
6
AHLASH Caje Offlcer. That' 8 rIght.
7
Mr . Johngton _ Then you met on Octobor according- to
8 tho [Ile, wIth AMLASH , Mr. FItzgerald, In Paris .
9 Ig that correct?
:
10 AMLASH Case Officer. Excusa me Can I go off the
11 record?
~ 1
12 (Discusgion off the record. )
0
13 Mr . Wallach. I think you Btated that AMLASH 8a1d that he
c
14 would 1fke to meet with one of the U.S. leadere guch a8
15 Robert Kennedy?
6
16 AMLASH Cage Offfcer. A high representative In the U.S _
17 Government .
18 Mr _ Wallach. Did he mentlon any other name8 that you 1
19 recall?
20 AMLASH Case OffIcer. No , not that I reca]l _ L
21 Mr . Wallach. Just Robert Kennedy?
1 22 AMLASH Case Officer _ Such ag Robert Kennedy _
1
23 Mr . Wallach . Did AMLASH , to the beb t of your knowledge ,
1
8 24 from what he told you_ know about any prior a8sa88inatlon
25 attempts that had been run by the U,S .?
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29 ,
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21
AMLASH Caso OfEIcer. No.
1
2 Mr . Wallach. DLd he hava any reabon to bellove that Robert
3 Kennedy had been Inwolved wIth any of the Babotage operations
4 49 contrasted wIth any ab8a88Inatlon attempte?
5 AMLASH Cabe OffIcer. If he knew , he never mentloned ft to
6 me We never dlecueged that=
7 Mr . Wallach. In other word8 , you dIdn't Bay to hlm,
8 how did You know that Robert Kennedy or why did you
Robert Kennedy . :
10 AMLASH Cage Officer. No not at a11. I mean , Jt'8 &
11 perfectly, I think logical name to have been mentloned at
~ 1
12 that time, because by him , sInce he wab the PresIdent 8 brother
1 13 and since he wag the Attorney General _ he wanted gomebody high
14 In the Government; at one time he had mentloned the PresIdent ,
15 Xnow , I want to talk to the Presldent.
7
16 Mr . Wallach. It geem8 strange to me he didn't the
17 Secretary of State or someone like that.
18 AMLASH Case officer. No
1
19 Mr Wallach. What I'm trying to get at
8
20 AMLASI Case Officer . He wanted somebody directly to the 1
21 President _ In other words , he wanted the agsurances
4 22 from the hfghest authority, agaIn , from the President of
1
23 the United States _
1
24 Mr , Wa llach. What I'm trying to get at 18 we , from our 8
25 examination of the alleged a88a88Inatlon attempt8 , have also
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22
1 gono Into the sabotage attempto MONGOOSE , etc, and found out
2 that Bobby Kennedy did play a role In tha babotago attempte .
1
3 What I'm trying to get from you' 16 your understanding of
whether or not AMLASH , Erom hlg Cuban gIde, knew that ehe
Kennedy' 8 had played that role would neceosarIly Bay I want
6 to talk to Robert Kennedy for that reagon .
7 AMLASH Cabe OffIcer. No . He never mentfoned It, not at
8 411 Jn any way _
~ 9 Mr , Johnston. Let Me fInally go to the October 29th meeting _
and before we went on the record thfe mornIng, You were
10
2
11 explalning to u8 how you characterized the AMLASH operation .
{ Nould repeat in 8umma ry form what You told us before
12
13 went on the record? 1
AMLASH Case officer. The operation wag never concefved_
c 14
certainly, carrled out during the perlod I wa3 agsociated with
15 :
it, but was never concelved as an agga88ination plot. It was
16
concelved a9 a coup in order to organfze a mflitary group
17
within Cuba to overthrow Castro
18
Johngton . Did have the undergtanding that if 1
19 Mr _
8
necessary AMLASH was proposing to aggassinate the Castro
20 |
21
brothers?
AMLASH Case Officer. Assas8inatfon was not a subject of
9 22
1 discussIon that came up at every meeting or contact that we
23
1
with AMLASH _ It wab B0 stated by him that he felt that
24 had
8
to Initiate a coup in Cuba was to direct the
25 the only way
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You
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L@RSEcR
23
1 {Jret blow at tho Leadorohtp:
2 SInce wO wero ' not ' #IIIIng to
dIacuee OPdcIfically olloinating
1
3 Castro, thle wab never dlecugbed Jn tOI7ub of the oporation _
We certaInly had no doubt that Jn hlg mInd thlo wab the only
5 vay to go about It.
Mr . Johnston. And dealt wfth hlm on that ba8fe?
6
7 AMLASH Cabe Officer. Trylng to temporlze thf8 , and If
8 pob8Lble w0 wero not lookIng-or 4 bloody coup at that tIme ,
plannIng 4 bloody coup Ingldo Cuba , but we were tryIng to
9
c
zertaInly hlm to think In termg of much more than Juet the
10 2
11 eliminatlon oE the leadershlp.
0
Mr . Johnston And to broaden Jt.
12
AMLASH Cage Officer. To broaden It Into a coup. Our
13
interest wab the coup , not the 8peclflce ot how he Jt
14
15 started. 6
Mr . Johnston. You were concerned about whether hls
16
were realistic , weren t
17
AMLASH Case officer_ Very definitely ,
18
1 Senator Schweiker. Did you personally evaluate AMLASH
19
9 fully capable of leading a
coup and being able to Implement
20 a8
1
it and carry It out 1f support were given?
21
How did you evaluate AMLASH?
22
1
As I understand from the dialogue here , and al80 {rom
23
1
a sumary of thege , at Eirst the operationg talk was
24
reading
8
whIch he out of hand rejected , and
fafrly low level gabotage ,
25
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NE
you
get
1
got
you? plang
yes _
5
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Page 27
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TODISTED
ho' peturod: hfa8eft_ 88 loador 02 Jovel 0ffort on the
1
2 condItlon that It had 4b8urances Ot ' government]bupport and
3 level support here ,
Now , I gue88 my questIon to you 18, how , 48 cabe offfcer,
5 did you evaluate hfg capabflIty? DLd you evaluate hlm 48
6 bomeone who coula Iead a coup and who would, that our government]
7 could put trubt In, fafth In In termg of hfs abflIty to carry ft
8 out or not?
9 AMLASH Cage Offlcer. At that tIme we did not evaluate
10 him 49 the leader of a COuP. He wa9 not our candidate o be
11 the next ruler of Cuba . He wag only evaluated Jn our dealings
:
{
12 wIch him on the basfs of what he and his group could contribute
0 13 to a coup insfde Cuba _
C
14 So I don't recall at any time that he wa8 selected or that
15 anybody ever talked of him 48 the next leader In Cuba _
:
16 Mr . Baron. Wagn t there some thought that he would be a
17 rallylng point for strong leaders of a new government in
18 Cuba _ that he had an ability to attract good people to work with
2
19 him?
3
20 AMLASI Case officer. He had proven thfs because he had
6
21 been one of the two leaders , or the Ewo top leaders of the
# 22 Directorado Revolutionario , which 18 the Revolutionary Directorate
1
23 which 18 a group not of the 26th of July Movement , but a
which 19 he was one of che leader8 , and
8 24 separate group ,
25 became a military commander of that group' separate Erom the 26
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top
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25 TOR SCREL
o2 movomont,
2 8o ho had 4 group In the DR whIch wo knew about, and he
1
3 afforded hImselt very we11 In tha fIghtIng thlg was Jn the
provInce 0f LaBvIlla8, durIng the tIme that Casero wa8 he
5 vas In a separato area of the country.
6 Mr . Ba ron . I had 4 recollection whfch I havon t checked
7 agaInst our transcrIpts that when wB dlecusged thlo before ,
8 You had gald although AMLASH might not be congIdered the leader
9 of a new government , that he wag a potential candidate for that
10 Job. He mIght not be a mlItary leader but he would have 3
11 an abflity to brIng people together Jn a new government _
1
12 AMLASH Case Officer. of the people left In Cuba at that tidc
01 13 we didn t have much of a choice . I mean , you know, we weren t
c
14 In contact- He wa8 one of the few who could travel
15 Senator Schwelker. You him up near the top but not
:
16 necessarily at the
17 AMLASH Cage Officer. Tha t 0 right , a9 one belng able to
18 contribute.
1
19 Senator Schwefker. And you didn' have too many options
8
20 at that point.
1
21 AMLA SH Cage Officer. That s rIght.
1 22 Mr _ Johngton. One of the document8 that CIA previously
1
23 provided u8 In a sanftfzed version 18 a memorandum for the
1
record dated 19 November 1963 , and the subject 19 Planb for
8 24
AMLASH Contact, and let mo {Just ghow you that and ask you
25
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July
good
good
Put
top.
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TTd
26
8
necosearlly propared :that documont: bocause It 1s a
It You not |
2 sanItIzod document , but whather youproparod 8 document
3 that tbat" apparently came trom , the memorandum tor record of
November 19th.
5 AMLASH Cage Officer. Yeb , I recall_
6 Mr . Johnston . You prepared that document?
7 AMLASH Cage Offfcer. I belleve I prepared the memorandum
8 from whfch that extract wab made , yes .
9 Mr . Johnston _ When did you prepare that?
AMLASH Cage OffIcer. It had to be late October bometIme 2
10
Mr . Johngton_ November 19th 19 the date .
C 11
8 AMLASH Cage Offfcer. Early November , certainly after
12
meeting with him in Parlg , and before golng back ,
0 13 my October
c
19 November , that 9 probably it.
14
Mr Johnston. Is that the date you prepared it?
15
:
AMLASH Case Officer. That' 8 the date I prepared It. I
16
when I returned
from Parig after the October-
17 don t remember
18 meetings _
Johnston You prepared a
memorandum for the record
1
19 Mr .
9 before You went to the meeting in Paris on
20 on the contact
1
21 November 2 2nd?
AMLASH Cage Officer. Oh ,
4 22
Part of that document , Paragraph 3 , states 1
23 Mr _ Johnaton.
1
ghow AMLASH a copy of the President 9 speech in
24 that You would
8
25 Mlami_
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V9RAdT
27
0
ALASR ` Cajo Officor No I aldn € show hLm 8 copy Of the
2 sPeech at 411.' 1
3 Mr . Johnston . Let me Bhow You Paragraph 3 of that_
4 wero talking about leading
up to tho November 22nd
Ond t 1b 5 meeting with AMLASH .
6
7
8
9
10
11
{
12
1
13
C
14 :
15
16
17
18
1
19
8
20 |
21
1 22
1
23
1
9 24
25
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They
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Top Scra
28
0r9 GSR
35as62 'CzA
5014136 OEE1cor Ie aay havo baon Pianned Co bhow
'AMASH; Caec
1
but 48 I .recall 'It wab not Bhowm hlm _
hlm 4 copy of tho speech , 1
2
talked to him about It, but I
don 't recall having ehow: hlm
I
3 clear that I have taken
tho But Jt wa? probably
4
to hlm and Bhown It to him
coPY of that epeech
5
4 of
that document btates _=
Mr _ Johnston _ Paragraph
6
Juet It?
7
Officer _ "Chlef SA hae requested wrItten
AMLASH Case
8 AMLASII operation be kept to 4 mInImum _
reportb on
9 And
that'8 Desmond FItzgerald , 18 that
Mr Johneton _
:
10
correct?
6 11 Offfcer _ That 9 correct _
AMLASH Cabe
1
12 DId Mr . Fitzgerald tell You that on
Mr Johngton _
c
1 13
November 19th?
c 14 Officer_ It might not have been the first
AMLASI Case
15 because In other words_ on gensitive
time
he mentioned thfs
{
16
Jt was always a case of trying to 1imft the number
operations
17 of Beneitive operations and thf8 certalnly is
of aware
J8
congidered In that category .
] since I It In the memo at
Mc refterated , I presume
8
2 communications would be minimized _
that tIme that the written 1
2 And thig 1s a nemorandum for record _
Mr Johnston
22 Remember also thfs 18 primarily the
AMLASII Case Officer _
1
22 comunicate with headquarters and the
cables because I to
1
24 I didn 't have
my independent communications
8 gtatfon In Parls .
25
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NE
Rapa
could
speech _
read would you
People
put
had
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TORSECRE
29
1 Mr = Johneton _ Wharo Wero_ on November 19th?
geh_
Orficer. At headquartore _ Ho told Me thfs
2 AMLASH Cabo
F
3 pereonally .
4 Mr _ Johngton. Okay. Ib It norma] to prepare a memorandum
5 for the record about plan8 for contact"of an agent?
AMLASII Case Offlcer = Normally, ye8 . 6
7 Mr Johnston So there 8 nothIng unubual In preparing
8 thle memorandum for record , I8 that your testImony?
AMLASH Case OffIcer_ No , thare wabn t anything unugual
9
That 9 the ugua1 thing unlees advised to the contrary
10 about It.
3
Mr Johnston The last tlme you tegtifled before the
11
6 mentloned on November 22nd You had a pen-Ilke
12 Connfttee You
device wlth a
hypodermic needle on It. Thfs memorandum for
1 13
2
14 record of November 19th does not mention that _
Is there somc reason that It doesn t?
15
:
AMLASH Case Officer. No , I don t remember it would
16
mentloned _ I don t recall when I left for Paris
17 not have been
I have left for Paris on the 21st and
18 may
1
Mr Johnston I think that 9 correct _
1?
8 nfficer _ I don t knoi 1f the decision hac
2 AMLASII Case
1
been made that we would even show hlm something Iike this
2
22 that time_
;
1
Mr _ Johnston You re talking about the 19th?
22
1 Cabe Officer About the 19th when I wrote the
24
AMLASH
9
25 memorandum
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your
why
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Mio) SLTu
30
h 1 Mr _ Johnston . when You Jeft for Parlo my undorstandIng
8
2 1g that You carried the dovlce .
1 3 AMLASH Cage Officor _ That '9 rIght, I carrled It wIth me
Mr _ Johngton _ And you had approval to bhow Jt to hin? 5
AMLASH Cage Offlcer_ I had approval to show It to him .
6
Mr _ Johngton . The [Ile Indicates that AMLASH Wab contacted
7
on November 20th ; I belleve_ In order to bot 'uP the November
8 22nd meetIng and he Wab telephoned bY , I a88uma , bomebody In
Parig .
3
10 DId You arrange that or were you knowledgeable of that
11 fact?
{
12 AMLASH Case Officer _ Yeg I wag golng to go there to
1 13 see him _ We would have made arrangement8 to get the mee ting up
c
14 Mr Johnston The cable reporting the telephone ca1l on
15 November 2uth states that somebody apparently vas In the room
:
16 with AMLASH when he was telephoned , and that therefore there
17 had to be a telephone conversation by the CIA agent calling
18 him &nd the CIA agent
1
19 Pardon me AMLASH asked If the meeting would be of interest
8
20 to him, and the CIA agent safd, I don t know if Jt'8 going to 1
21 be of Interest to you but It'& the mee ting You requested , Andl
j 22 I ask you your understanding of what was meant by the meeting
1
23 that you requested?
24 AMJAASI Case Officer Probably to gIve him an answer on ;
25 the caches that he wanted Inside Cuba I understand that Was
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#
T@RSEE
tho prImary pont whlch had not been, ha had not been Intormed
2 of thlg at tha prevlous meeting with PItzgerald , 80 were Wo
7
3 gotng to glve hlm that materfal: In other wordg , It Wab gIven
4 to hlm later In tho cacheg , wab that materlal golng to be glven
5 to hm?
6 Mr _ Johneton _ Mhat about the pen devIce?
7 AMLASH Cae officer _ The pen devico wag BomethIng agaln _
8 Jt have been part of that package I don t thlnk he wag
9 speclfically asking about the pen device becauge we had boen :
10 80 reluctant to even discus9 some thIng llke thls wIth him and
he knew Jt that he was prImarily concerned wIth the caches _
11
1
Mr _ Johnston I8 It correct to that at the October
12
29th meeting AMLASH was happy with the U.S _ policy but asking
1 13
c
14
for equlpment to do the job?
c
AMLASII Case officer _ To inftlate the coup.
15
{
In other words , he didn t want a magsive amount of
16
equlpment but he sa1d we do need 8ome equLpment to the
17
18
thing started .
0 Mr Johnston And that that was in hlg mind on November
8
2cth _ 20
1
ALASH Case officer _ When he nade the call?
Mr Johnston When the call was made to him he was
22
1 told that ehe November 22nd mecting was the one that he had
22
requestec _
26 8
AMLASH Case officer. Probably 80
25
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say
get
19
and
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19Sd 4
Mr' Johngton And +hat31LABEE oula havo. underetood that
8
2 that Wab what You Kore' golng o 6O; Omo or' 411 of tho
3 thlnge dlscusged at tha Octobor 29th' medtIng _
NILASII Caga Offlcer, To beo what could be gIven to him_
5 not 1E Jt was or anythIng 11ke thle becaubo Parlo dldn '€ know
6 what we were prepared to tell,him at tho 22 November meetlng .
7 Mr Johnston _ A8 you Ba1d before , you were at Langley
8 on the 20th _ There 8 8 cable IndicatIng You loft Waghlngton
9 arrIving In Parlg on the mornIng of November 2 2nd _
10 I8 that your recollection?
11 ALASI Case Officer. Yea ,
1
12 Mr _ Johnston Did anyone go wIth you from NashIngton
1 13 to Par[s?
14 AMLASI Case Officer. No .
1
15 Mr _ Johnston Mr . PItzgerald wag where at the time?
AML;A SH Case Officer. At Langley _ He was present at the
16
17 reeting , at the late October meetIng , not at the 22 November
18 meeting .
1
"r _ Johnston Okay . Let' 9 go then to the November 223:
19
1
mecticg . You previously tegtified as You recall It was late
20 |
21 afternoon or evening hecause it was Zark when you came out
1 22 AMIA SH Case officer _ That ' s right _
1
Nr Johnston Where was it held? Ihat kInd of place
23
1
24 was ft held?
2
AMLASH Case Officer _ I don t recall that we used a s2f&
25
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1o DSId
33
houso Or I e3 dttaY 05 hono'
2 Mr Johneton' mo; Wab thero 4t tha naetIng? You and
1 3 AMLASH
4 AMLASH Cage Officer The October moetIng?
5 Mr = Johngton . I M borry November 22nd neoting .
AMLASH Cabe Officer AMLASH and mybelf . 6
Mr Johngton Nobody elae wa9 there?
8 AMLASH Cage Offlcer. If It wab Rog 882n8i0 home , It
9 may have been In arother part of the hougo but he wab not at
10 the meeting _
11 Mr _ Johnston DIa You have that meeting taped?
8
12 AMLASH Case Offlcer. No , not that I recall _
1 13 Mr _ Johnston . If you dia have It taped , where would the
14 tape be today?
1
15 AMLASH Case Officer In the ffle _
16 Mr 'Johngton. In thl8 file?
17 AMLASH Case Officer _ Yes _ I don t recall that that
18 mee ting was taped _ I don t think t wag possIble to tape it_
1
19 Mr _ Johnston Who was knowledgeable of that meetlng
i
20 outside yourself and ALASI? Cenerally , were the people at
1
21 the Paris station aware of it?
4 22 AMLASH Case officer _ Not generally , no It could have
03
1
23 been the Chfef of Station , naturally , and |[Red Scencz
1
24 Mr Johnston At 8 neeting like that did you have gome
8
25 kInd of back-up support, counter-gurvelllance , any kInd of
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back-up sopport 80 that You. could be' assured that were not
2 under eurvefllance at tha meetIng?
1 3 AMLA SI Cage Officer_ No, I took the necesgary precautiong
4 In golng to tho meeting to aggure myself I dJan & have somebod_
5 else follolng me to tell me 1f I had any burvefllance on me
6 Mr - Johngton What about AMLASH?
7 AMIA SI Cage OffIcer . We don t know I don t know If
8 he wag counter-gurvellled _
9 Senator Schwelker _ Coula AMLASII have been a double agent
10 AMLASH Case Offlcer _ That' 9 a good quebtion . I can only
~
11 glve you an opInlon _ I didn 't think 80 then and even wIth 2
6
22 everythIng that hag happened today , I don t think 90 today .
0 13 Agaln , that I8 8trictly my opInlon _
c:
Senator Schwelker In a nutshell, and I reallze thig is c 14
15 a
very difficult, complex area, why don t you think 80?
16 AMLA SH Case OffIcer _ Because of the power play that
R 17 wag takIng in Cuba at that time between certaInly the
18 26th of July people and Castro trying to consolidate his
1
19 posItion , this wag the early 609 now around hfs people and
9
hig movement, the fact that we had Information from several
20 1
21 sourceg that he was disillusLoned with the revolution _
Senator Schwelker _ He meaning AMLASH?
4 22
1
NLASH Case Officer. He AMLASH , was disillusioned _
23
Senator Schwelker And he wasn t in the 26th of July?
8 24
At4LASI Case officer Ile wa8 not in the 26th of July.
25
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nembar' or Cabero, July} 26th" movement
no wab DR _ S0 he; Wab not"
8 revoiutlonary gcoupa
Which had student
2 He wa? one of the other
and compared to Castro' 8
3
support prImarily and urban bupport
1
4
rural 8o-Called bupport.
golng on there . In othor words _
5 So there wa8 a
struggle
type Of thIng . The background that
6 thle Wa9 not Imaglnary
to the best of my
recollection at any
7 we could check aid not ,
our relation wIth him at that time
8 tlme lead 49 to belleve' 14 In
9 that he wag playing a
double game _
I felt that way at the tIme was that
The other reason that
10
return to Cuba to stay. fle was
11 we had to perguade him to
He didn t want to come to the
3 ready to defect , to leave
12
of Cubans who were here
8 United States wfth all the rest
13
he felt, too long with
the revolution _
because
he had stayed on ,
14
and to defect. He Was fed up
But he was ready to leave Cuba
6
15
A lot of the travel that he did was
with the way life was .
16
to off of the Island _
that he take any
opportunity
17
and thls was
also confirmec
Ile had told 48 me
personally , that
18
1
19
by other sources _
Wouldn t one of reasons also
3 Senator Schweiker
20
L
21 be that he 19 In now?
That would be a very rezson
AMLASII Case officer _
4 22 when I was
that thc last time certainly
1
23 I think I nentioned
1 about thls _ If he was taken back
24 talking
8 absolutely certain he 's in
Schwelker_ Are we Senator
25
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10 1 Jall now?
2 AMLASH Ca8o OffIcer No: checked that I bolLevo tho last
7
3 tIme , I thInk the last report wo had wae what, 4 couple of
Years 4g0?
5 Mr _ Baron . I wab gIven the nane of 4 CIA contact In
6 Florfda who had been on the Ieland Of 'PIdes at one poInt and
Ba1d 48 far 48 he knew , although ho hadn t been In Cuba for
8 bevera] Years , AMLASH wab 4 prleoner _ but he wagn t In' prison _
9 He wag dolng some sort of hobpItal work which wag congIdered
10 part of hlb rehabflftation program_
7
11 AMLA SH Cage Offlcer . He wag a doctor, wagn t he , for
~ {
12 the prIson?
1 13 Mr _ Baron . Yeg ,
AMLASH Case Officer _ He had more freedom because he
14
1
15 was beIng as 4 doctor for the prfgoner but he still was
still on the Isle of Pines .
16
Mr _ Baron . It 18 my undergtanding that he wag working
17
as a doctor even outside the prIgon and agaln , this 18 Just
18
1
hearsay of one contact that I called on the phone _
19
8
Mr _ Mallach _ Are you pobltive that bomeone Just not
20 7
using hfs name 1s there , that he switched over 4s an alias?
21
wouldn t have Intellgence of that type?
22
1 AMLA SII Case officer. No _
23
Mr Wallach _ I want to qulckly follow-up on gome thin;
8 24
that Jim and the Senator were getting at.
25
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Wero You not ~IIIlng to' d18cueo MIth AMLASH the
8
2 488a881natlon of Castro?.
3 AMLASH, Ca8o OffIcer _ Ne?
Mr _ Wallach _ You have told ug 4
5 AMLASI Cage Officer: We were very reluctant to dlgcuss
6 the subject.
7 Mr - Wallach. Why?
AMLASH Case Office . I guese we didn t want to get InvolvFd
8
9 In a88a88Inatlong _
Mr , Wallach _ But you had them before thls,
10
AMLASII Cage Officer I didn't know thls , and certaInly
11
{
In thig operatlon thc objective of thfs operation was not to
12
Jn and asgassinate Castro but a much blgger type of progran 1 13 go
C
Mr _ Wa Ilach _ But that wag the ffrst step, or at least
14
15 the potential fIrot step-
AMLASH Case officer _ He wag convinced that wag the only
16
AMLASI . Ne weren t convinced' that It had to be ,
17 ffrgt step.
that tIme that It had to be the ffrst step, and that' s why
18 at
1
we didn t want to discuss and we didn t discuss and we were
19
8
reluctant to discuss this subject with him_
20 1
Mr _ Iallach - At the late October meeting I think you
21
safd before that rat did you request that led to the giving
4 22
1
23 him of the pen ,
the hypodermic needle?
1
AMLASH Case Officer _ The pen he requested wag some thing
24 8
25 wIth which to protect himgelf now
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h 1 Mr _ Wa llach_ pon ' VIth 4 hypodermla heedlo yould ' protect
2 hlmgel<?
|
3 AMLASI Cabe offlcer. He hlmgelf In 4 sItuatlon and
4 agked ug the quegtIon . Ile 8a1d I may be confronted by Castro
5 or by Raoul or by one or the other of Cabtro' 8 peopla In 8
6 meetlng Jn whlch I am not armed , and I may b0 confronted 'wIth
7 an
accubatloni ot plotting agalnst the reglme _
8 And at that tlme he 8a1d thls would be betore we are
9 ready to movo Jn formentIng the coup , and ho -8aId , I would Jike 7
10 to hava sOme thlng wIth whIch I can protect mygelf at that time
11 In' fact, the wordg that I think I mentfoned here before was ,
{
12 1f I fa11, I don 't want to be thc only onc golng down _
1 13 So he was seeIng hlmself In a sItuatlon of golng back intp
14 Cuba , of beIng Jn a meeting In which he could have been , because ;
1
15 agaln , of the relationships _ Fidel Castro himself or Raoul
16 Castro could confront hin In their offlce, accuse him_
17 Hr _ Wa llach _ Couldn t he use that pen offensIvely and
18 not defensIve ly?
2
19 AMLASI Case officer. he could have Hc Ias not
8
20 at that time talking about using It offensIvely and we weren ' :
|
21 discussing the offensive use of that pen
22 Senator Schwefker _ Following up th? polnt that I
1
23 switched away from 2s t0 whethcr Cuban Intelllgence mlght have
1
24 been trailing him or following hio or observing what you werc
8
25 dolng with hlm_ we have some knowledge , I gather , from a sumar;
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13 hore that . AMLASH ono-EIme Cuban.#Istrose' was polieved €o be
8
2 MorKIng for Cuban ' Intolllgence And her brother w4} xnown to
1 3 ba Cuban Intelllgence _
4 IE thio 18 correct, wouldn 't that pretty mean that
5 wha tever he wab dolng over there mIght wel1 be obgerved by
6 Cuban IntellIgence even ` though he mIght have been 4 stralght
8Ingle agent In termg o1 workIng wlth 49 and not a double agent
8 that they may well have known or monftorcd what In fact he was
dolng wIth 492
10 AMIASH Case OffIcer. Thlg 18 possIble , Senator_ We
11 had no Jndication at the tIme that they were monftoring hls
8
12 activitles _ Agaln , he wag at guch' 4 levcl and the people
9 13 certaInly In Paris and the Cubang overgeas knew that he was
c 14 at such a leve 1 that wa never heard that they were ever given
15 this mfggfon _ 2
Senator Schweiker Have you heard that hls Cuban
16
17 mistress was worklng with Cuban Intelligence?
AMLASII Case Offlcer WhIch one of his mIstresses _
18
1
because he S had several_ Including his sister who worked for
19
9
the Presidency , his Own glster:
20
1
Mr _ Johnston . Ne extracted that from a file and I m
21
sorry but i2 the respect and the need to kcep that information
m 22
1 compartmented I did not take her name down and I don t think: Mc
23
3
have thc file that indicates that _
24 8
recollection Js that he had a mistress for a consiclcrah' €
25 My
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period of tlma who wab Who waa' Bugpacted o1 being tho GI ,
2 anc certalnly hor brother Waa actually know to be an employee
3 of the GI _
4 AMLASH Cage Officer. I don € recall tha specIfIc case ,
5 but let me remInd you that he wag the Deputy Minlster of
the Interlor, which did have tho BecurIty services at that time
under that ministry. So It wouldn t gurprIse me that there woulc]
8 be Bomebody he would know Jn that minlstry.
9 Mr _ Johngton_ AILASI was?
10 AMLASH Cage Officer _ AMLASI wab at one tIme before he
3
11 was Presdent of the Student Federation _
12 Mr _ Johnston Not Jn '63?
1 13 AMLASH Case Offlcer _ No _
14 Senator Schwelker And Cuban Intelllgence would have
15 come under hin?
1
16 AMLASI Case Offlcer _ Some of the security apparatus
17 was under the Minfstry of Interlor , but he was in that job,
18 I don t recall, a very ghort period of time _
1
19 Mr _ Ma llach . If Castro knew about the assassination
9
20 attempts, you would assume that ALASII woulc have %nown wculcn
|
21 You , from bcirg in that position?
1 22 AAJASH Case Officer Ve don t know if at that tine that
1
23 he knew that wc ll, he was saying , in other words _ he was 0n
1
24 the radfo every saying that the Yankees were making an
8
25 attenpt on his 1ffe but that he knew the specffics of operations
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1 5 don t thlnk w0 have that InformatIon or at Jeast I never
15
2 have geen It.
3 After the of Plgg ovcry occasLon that he had he would
4 accuse the Imperlallete of
mounting another operation agalnst
5 him.
6 Mr _ Baron . Just a couple more questlong on thl8 polnt_
7 DId you take any
epecial precautions 481de from the itandard
8 precautiong that you take In dealIng wIth any torelgn
9 contact?
~
10 Nere speclal precautiong taken In dealing wIth AMLASI
C - 11 to guard agalnst the prospect that he wag efther a double agent
{
12 or undcr surveillance by Cuban Intelllgencc?
AMLASII Case Officer. What you mean by speclal
1 13
14 precautlons?
1
15 Mr _ Baron You would have to tell me more about the
technlques that you could use than I could tell you ,
16
ALASH Case Officer _ What I would do 19 to make sure
17
that I wasn t under gurvelllance in golng to the meeting or
18
1
at the meeting , and we would certainly check the meeting places
19
8
to make sure that the meeting places werc not under gurveillanca
20
1
by them_ which would adso hopefully would have picked up 17
2 }
the surveillance that he would have had on him coming to the
4 22
1
23 meetings
1
I don t recall that we ever him under survefllancc
24 8
In Paris , which would have meant disclosing our interest in hin
25
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932 16 1 eIthar to our gurvelllanco team or the French polIce , Or whoever
8
2 So w0 naver' . dJd that- bocau8e , aga1n , of our Interest Jn
1 3 protectIng and mInlmlzIng the number of peoplo who knew we were
4 Jn cantact wIth hlm
5 Agaln , I refer you , I think, to what the senator ralged
6 before , that he wa9 arrested and Bentenced , and 48 I reca 11 ,
7 I may be wrong but 48 I reca1l the contacts that wB had wIth
8 hlm In Parlg never gurfaced In that trial_ He never, 48 far
9 48 the trangcript that wo have of the trlal, he never reported_ ;
10 he never tegtlfled about the contacts that he had wIth u8
11 It wag afterwards when he wag In contact with the exIlc
12 group_
1
13 Mr _ Baron So you never took any affirmatlve action
14 agalngt him or Investigated hlm or treated him In any way that
1
15 You would treat a person guspected of beIng a double agent
16 or belng closely watched by an Intelligence gervice ?
17 AMLASH Case Offfcer _ Not In mounting an Investlgation
18 agaInst him because In dolng that we would have to show our
1
19 interest in him to other people , so we did not do that_
8
20 What we could do with myself and with the other knowledga L
21 able people say In Paris,of we did do and did everything
5 22 we pogsibly could do _
1
23 In other words , to check where he was and who he was
24 seelng and through the telephone taps and to ensure that when 8
25 he cae to meet uS that that meeting was secure
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98 17 1 that We did. 7
2 Mr . Johnston _ Let Mo go back to tho November 22nd
1 3 meeting _
4 As you recall, aftedayqu met AMLASH there , did you
5 hm the newgpaper artlcle about the Kennedy opeech?
6 AMLASH Case Offlcer. I don € recall. I may have ghown
7 hlm the article . To the begt of my recollection, we talked about
8 tha epeech and he had , I thlnk , at that_ time the article had
9 already appeared Jn the French newspaper and he had read It.
10 Mr _ Johnston what aid you tell him about the article?
3
11 AMLASI Case Officer. Well, he 1iked the article . It
1
12 wag one in which I think the Administration, a3 I vaguely recall
1 13 wag takIng a rather positive stand .
0
14 Mr Johngton Nas this Kennedy' s speech before the
15 Inter-AmerIcan Press Association In Miami on November 18th?
:
16 AMLASI Case Officer I belleve so
17 Mr _ Johnston _ I have an extract from that _
18 AMLASI Case Officer. I'm not 100 percent certain, but
1
19 I think it was,
3
Mr Johnston There s 4n indication that you told hin
20 L
21 that Fitzgerald helped to Write the speech _
22 Do you recall doing that?
{ 23 NLASII Case Officer I could have .
24 Mr Johnston Do You recall speclfically?
2
ALASI Case Officer Speclfically, no but we did discus
25
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Bh tha ' epeech _ 0
End 2, b 28 Mr , Johngton You' hava tostIfiod 4' great' doal about the
1 3 polabn pen or the pen devIce and my only questlon 1s what 10
your best recollection about what happened to the DLd
5 he take It wIth him? DId you take ' It wIth You when you left
6 the meetIng?
7 AMLASH Case Offlcer Agaln, 493 I mentloned to You the
8 labt tIme , I don t remember speclflcally If I kept the and
threw Jt away or 1f he kept It.
10 Mhat I do remember wa 8 hle reaction when I showed him
11 the pen . I can 't today tell you for bure that hc kept the
{
12 pen .
1 13 Mr Johnston It Beemg to me that 9 rather compromfs_
c 14 evidence_ If he kept the and you recall that _ It' 8 also
15 such compromlglng evidence En D I have difficulty belleving You
{
16 would have thrown It away .
17 AMLASI Case Officer. Yes , because It was compromising
18 evIdencc I had carried It one wey _ I mean I wasn t going to
19 carry It back _ It was nothIng but a Papermate pen in which
i
20 a hypodcrmlc ncedle had peen inserted _
1
21 In other words , Jt wasn 't a $10,000 plece of egulpmcnt
4 22 or anything Iike thfs _
1
23 Mr _ Johnston I agree , but It's a very compromlsing
1
24 plece of evidence to have around .
8
25 AALASH Case Officer That 8 right _ But what I can't
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8h 19 1 recall BpecIfjcally_ 1s Whother Jt wad broken' thrown away, or
8
2 Mr _ WaIlach_ why do you belLave ho wouldn t havo taken
3 Jt wIth hIm?
4 AMLASII Cas0 officer _ [e ga84 he wouldn t. I speclflcally
5 remember thfs , He bay8 , and then later on he 84j8 , I'm not
6 golng to take any compromisIng materlal back wIth me .
7 Thlg would have been a plece of compromfsIngmaterial _
8 Ile did not 1fke the pen The only polnt probably that we made
9 wIth him 1g that we were willing to consIder, becauge he knew
10 our opposItlon to bomethIng Iike thle , that we were even wIlling
:
11 conglder showing him gomethIng that whether he could
~ {
12 defend himself
1 13 He did not think It wag a good Idea
0 14 Senator Schwefker _ Ihat klnd of weapon or gubgtance
15 could he get that would not compromlse him? I'm 4 little {
16 confused _ Ie wanted bomethIng to defend hImgelf , but he
17 doesn t want anythIng that wIll compromise him.
Unless have a dIsappearing weapon whaz could he
18
1
19 possbly that would not compromise him to take back?
8
AMLASH Cage Officer _ Well, we were talkIng also about
20) 1
cachcs Inside Cuba at that time S0 it could have been dropped
to him Ingide Cuba He didn t exactly have to take It back
22
{ 23 with him _
In other wordg here agaln , the whole Idea of thl8 was
8 24
25 not to glve him something there that he would be able to take
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20 1 back NIth him
1
2 Wa Ilach _ Nere arrangements made tor cacheg Inglde
3 Cuba If he wa9 worrled about defending himbelf?
4 AMLASII Cabe OffIcer. He had asked for caches Ingfde
5 Cuba .
6 Mr_ Johnston _ Can be pogftlve that he did not leave
7 the meeting wIth the pen In hl8 PpggessLon?
8 AMLASH Cage Offlcer . I cannot be PobitIve that he didn t
9 I'm almost sure that he dldn 't.
10 Mr . Johnston DId you ever ask hfm for the pen back?
3
11 Do you recall agking him to glve you the Pen back before the
1
12 mee tIng concluded or after the conclusion of the mectIng?
c 1 13 AMLASII Case Officer _ SInce I recollect hls reaction to
14 It that , you know , it'9 no good , I Just can t logically belfeve
15 that he would have kept the pen . Thls 18 the point But I
;
16 don t specifically recall what was done with It except that
17 it was probably destroyed _
18 In other words know , broken , throw the need lc out
1
19 of It and break the pen
8
20 Johnston Do Yqu recall asking him to gIve you the 1
2} pen back?
4 22 AMIASI Case officer No , but I don t recall that he
1
23 took lt in the ffrst place = because what I recall 19 , gee , is
1
24 that the best that vou can come up with type of thing _
8
25 So he wag not in any way enthused about what we had shown
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@LS D
h L him. 1
2 Mr _ Johngton Let me aak you , 10 It correct you dia
7
3 promlse hIm e€ thle meetlng that you would drop rIfleg with
4 telescoplc s1ghte for hLm In Cuba?
5 AMLASH Cage OffIcer. That 8 rIght.
6 Mr Johnston _ Wag there any mentlon of paylng him money
7 to gupport hfs coup plang?
8 AMLASII Case Offlcer _ Ile had never really asked for
9 moncy . In promfelng him full support {or the coup, If money
10 wag required I presume that could be conJecturc that he could
3
11 that als0, but he did not speclfically ask for money _
~ {
12 Mr _ Johnston Was there discussIon of hls escape in
13 the event he assasinated Castro or kflled Castro but did not
c
1
c 14 pull off the coup?
AMLASII Case officer. At the last meeting I don 't bclievc
15
{
16 that was discussed _
17 Mr _ Johnston _ At your prior meeting?
AMLASII Case offlcer _ If It was , It was touched upon
18
but as I recall, and thfs is fron reading the file afterwarcl .
19
8
where thfs Ias Jiscussed was a year latcr when he was in con:?:*
20 |
@ith the exile group. I think it was with thc exile group :
21
h? was then concerned about , how do I out if something
5 22
1
23 goes wrong and we can t the coup
1
But we did not at the 22 Novembcr meeting , I don t Sc. 1:: "
8 24
Wc discussed that _ In fact, I'm sure Wve Jidn ' discuss it.
25
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22 1 Mr _ Johnaton whon" ala Eo Mco Elng Ond? Aboue what
8
2 tIme? 7
3 Mhat time did the moetIng end?
AMIASII Case Officer. 'Approximately 10:00 In the evenlng _
4
5 Mr _ Johnston And we
bablcally dlocusged whfle we
6 were off the record the fact that the a88a88Ination occurred
7 at 12:30 Jn Dallas , whIch we thlnk would have been around 7:30
8 Jn Parls , and the meeting wag then over at 10 :00 0 'clock _
9 When you walked out of tho meetlng you testifled previousiy
10 that you heard about the asga88Inatlon _
11 Ig that correct?
1
12 AMLASH Case Offlcer That 9 correct_
Mr - Johnston. And that's the firgt word hoard about 1 13
14 the asgas9inatlon?
AMLASII Case Officer. Yeg .
1
15
Mr _ Johnston You prevlously sa1d that AMLASI made a
16
comment about that. Was there any other discussion of the
17
18
assas9ination by AMLASI?
1 ALASII Case officer Tha t was It, because I left hif;
19
8
20 at that time
1
Mr Johnston I don t understand _ If the meeting is
21
either in a house or somewhere else how leave togeti:er
7 22
1
and have access to a radio or some thing to hear the
23 you
1
24 report_
8
ALASII Case Officer If Jt was In the house , It coula
25
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1 have `baon the ' ' Occupant' or tha' hoube who told u8 In 'fact, I
{
2 a buro It Wab tha occupant o2 the house ; Iiad Seod8 who:told
3 49 he had Just haard on tha radio about the ab8a8Ination when
4 we came out of the meeting . We didn' go or coma together
5 to the house _ He lcft on hle own and then I left after he left _
6 Mr _ Johngton _ So In other words _ what you're BayIng 19
7 that you ro not walkIng out of the building but you re In the
8 hou8e and the mcetIng 18 over and [Rad 8cenglknowe that the
9 meeting 19 over and that he tellg
10 AMLASII Cage Officer We came out 0f the room , out of
C 11 the :study In whIch we were holding the neeting , and when we
1
12 cane out of that Into his Iving room he told 48 what he had
13 Just heard on the radio .
14 Mr _ Johnston And then AMLASII made this comment and
1
15 walked out of the door?
16 AMLASH Case Officer _ AMLASI Iade this coment and
17 shortly thereafter I don 't recall, we finished our business
18 He was I don t remember the exact quote _ You have It on
1
19 the record there like does It have to happen to somcbody
i
20 like that _
1
21 Xr Johnston _ Did you know who committed thc assa9ginatio:
4 22 at thls time?
1
23 AMLA SI Case officer No
1
Mr _ Johnston And evcn with that don t recall whether
24 8
25 ANLASII wa lked out the door with the poison pen?
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1
why
you
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50
24 AMLASH ' 'Cabe OEflcor; I don € bolJavo he did, I don 't
L
2 belleve he did and Jt Could vory we 11 be that what I would havc
3 done 18 the hypodermlc needle out of It, that' 8 very
8 Lmple , and then Jt'8 Just 4 pen , throw the pen away or kecp
5 the pen .
6 It'9 not 4 compllcated object, In other words . It Wag
very 8Imple to Just the hypodermlc noedle out ot It, and
that 8 probably what wag done _ But I don t recall gpeclfically
that I dld Jt.
10 Mr _ Johngton _ Did you do that after the meeting was ovcr
c
11 AMLASH Case Officer. No , It wag durlng the meeting , not
1
12 after.
22
1 13 Mr _ Johnston Now therc 8 an Indication that you got
14 Ingtructiong from Washington after the meetIng to break off :
15 contact wIth AMLASH ,
16 Do You recall recelvIng thoge Instructlons or Instructions
17 to that effect?
NILASI Case Officer _ Yes , there wag a cable , I
18
1
19 believe , as I recall - It wasn t necessarily to break off contact
8
wlth ALASH because cverybody knew that that was the last
20
1
21 meeting . He Ias preparing we %new thfs, hc had been prcpari: ;
4 22 and we had been talking to him since October since he was
1
23 about hfs return to Cuba_
1
Senator Schweiker Did the arns drop cache ever occur?
8 24
25 AMLASI Case Officer _ I had left, I wasn t involved in
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pull
Pull
to ,
out
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LoRRSECT
51
that part o2 Senator Agaln; only Erom tho record that I 1
2 read afterwardb_ I thInk 4 couple o: drope wero mada to him.
7
3 In fact, the next Year or somethng 1Jko that _
4 Mr Johnston I'm not buro exactly what wag left or
5 what he recelved or what wab avallable =
6 AMLASH Case OffIcer And I don t know Jf he ever pcked
them up = I don '€ think we know that _
8 Mr . Iallach why did he tell you he wanted the rlfles
9 wIth telegcoplc sIghts?
:
10 AMLASII Cabe offfcer We11, he wanted grenadeg and he
11 wanted dynamite too to storm the headquarters latcr on Ne
{
12 sald , we11, look; , could you expand thls gomewhat too, and he
1 13 was talkIng about, well, yes , and we should probably attack
14 the radio station at the same time It Was a matter of attackina
15 a bufldlng _ whether It wag a radlo station or whatever ft was , 2
16 In order to, in his mind , he wag probably thinkIng of attackinc
17 the headquarters , Castro 8 headquarters _
18 Mr Johnston Let me refresh your recollection_ In
2 19 Your previous testimony With the Select Conuittee on page 114
8
20 You statedl
L
21 When we cane out of that mce ting we heard the new?
4 22 of Pregident Rennedy 5 assassination and I received a cable
1
23 after that which I thought that thfs was probably the reason
24 the whole operation was being re-agsessed
NILASII Case Officer That was strictly my thought at trat
25
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1t,
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52
26 1 tlme _ gatd
2 Mr Johngton' And- on' page 115 ot Your.prior transcript
1 3 You 8a1d, "well, the whole Cuban operatlon, the way I Interpreted
4 It, Wab beIng called on _
5 DJa you recelve a cable to that effect?
6 AMLASH Caga Otflcer _ It wa8 .4 vary Cryptic cable sayIng
7 you know , return to WabhIngton , whIch I wa8 golng to do anyway _
8 90 thlg 18
9 Mr = Johnston , DId Jt gay to break off contact wIth
F
10 AMLASH?
11 AMLASI Cage Officer _ I don t recall that It did but
~ {
12 Jt didn t make any dlfference because headquarters knew that
0 13 that wag the lagt meetlng wlth him before he wa8 returnIng to
c
14 Cuba anyway _
15 So there wag no reabon to tell me to break off contact
1
16 with hin. Thls 19 what I'M trying to say .
17 Mr Johnston Supposedly the 1967 IG report, and I
18 don t know where they got thelr Information, said that wa $ an
1
19 OPIM cable _
8
20 AMLASH Case officer _ That S Operation Imnediate _ In
L
21 other words , It 8 an Immediate cable _ That set precedence
1 22 on the cable _
1
23 Mr _ Johnston And what does that mean for transmitting
1
24 AMLASHI Case officer _ It wag trangmftted before a routing
8
25 cable or a priorlty cable . It'8 Just the precedence
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53
h 1 Mr _ Johngton IE nag eha, hlghedt prlorlty next to LAGW?
1
2 AMLASn Caba OffIcer _ That'9 the ono bolow FLASII _
3 Mr Johngton _ And that telle:;you to break off tho meeting
4 Or to como back to WaghIngton?
5 ALASI Cage Offlcer _ That rIght.
Mr Johnston
Do you recall recelving that? 6
AMLASII Cage OffIcer. Yeg ,
8
Mr _ Johnston _ And you read that?
9 AMLASH Case Offlcer . Yes, or I was told about It becausc
10 I didn't go Into the embassy to read It, 80 I don t think they
6
brought the cable out to me but I was told to go on back to
11
1
12 Mashington
Mr _ Johnston Let me state that that cable 18 apparently 0 13
C
not In the AIIASII ffle and the 1967 Ingpector General could not
14
15 find that cable _
;
16 Does that surprige
AMLASH Case Offlcer . No , It doesn 't really becausc
17
I don t think there was that much importance given to that
18
1
19 Kind of cable at that time
9
Ihat you say about the Operation Inmediate , we handled
20 |
a11 of our trafflc, morc or lcss , In this case on an Imediate
21
basis because of the short periods of time that had with
4 22
1
23 AMIAASII ,
1
So Lf you are Implying that because of the OP AM cable
8 24
Ia $ something else behind thls , no , I don t think thalt
25 that there
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NI
'8
you?
we
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U6DSII
28 there: wad In any way It Wag 3uee You know return- to Nabmingten ,
1
2 and 48 I 488umad 4na I a8Bwnad at that ELmo that certalnly the
3 whole Cuban operatIon wab golng to be ro-abbesbed after what
happened to PresIdent Kennedy _
5 Mr _ Johngton , Now there Jo "n the fIle a cable reporting
from Parls to WabhIngton reportlng that you planned to depart
Parie that mornIng of November 23rd and arrive In Hashlngton
8 8 : 10 .
9 DIa you In fact take that flght?
<
10 AMIASII Cage OffIcer: DId You ever fInd that cable?
11 Mr _ Johngton I gaw the cable of your return to
3
12 Washington _
13 AMIASI Case OffIcer. If It referred to a cable, that 11
14 was the one tellIng Mc to come back. Thlg 18 a travel-type
15 of exchange . 2
16 Mr Johnston _ Did you In fact arrive back In Nashington
17 I said 8 : 10 . I'm sorry, It be 18 : 10 , whlch woula be
18 6.00 Nashngton tine _
1
19 AMIASY Case Officer. Yes .
8
Ar Johnston Iherc did {ou g0 when you arrived in
20 1
21 Nashington at 6 :10 in the cvening on Movember 23rd?
j ILA SII Case officer. I don 't recall specifically if
22
I stopped by my hone , whIch is en route to the office, whether
23
1
24 I went right back to the office before going hone
8
Mr - Johnston But you Jid go to the office sometime that
25
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g8h
would
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D6pSd 0
55
29 avenIng?
8
2 AMLASH Caso' Offlcer I May have , !
1 3 Mr _ Johngton DJd you go co the oEfJce on the 24ti1?
4 AMLASI Cage Offlcer. Oh , yes .
5 Mr Johngton That Wab a Sunday?
6 AMLASI Case Officer, It could have been _
7 Mr _ Nallach _ One questlon about the cable that we can t
8 fInd,
9 DId you have any other businegg Jn Paris besldes AMLASI?
10 AMLASII Cage Offlcer_ Not speclfIcally at that time
3
11 Mr _ Mallach. Mag there a date that intended to
{
12 return?
1 13 NIASH Case Officer. Yes
0 14 Mr Mallach _ when was that date officially?
AMIAASI Case Offfcer _ About the time that I returned _ 2
15
16 Mr _ Mallach _ why would they have sent you a cable
17 telling you to return 1f you Intended to return that day?
AMLASH Caee Offlcer _ I don t know _ This was probably
18
1
a reaction to what had happcned . Dut again , I want to point
19
8
out to You that travel cables of thfs type , even 1f your plans
20 1
such , the Iay I was travelling at that tine I was not
21
' travelling on a U5@4ema t 9 Rasspor r anything like that. Roi
22
1
don t even a regular passport to travel France It was
23
1
just to keep track and record of our personal travel _
24 9
In other words , It' s our security to make sure that
25
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NI
Gbh
you
and
need
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56
that headquartera xnowb bhat wO aro comIng ,back and I gent 4
{
2 cable BayLng I'm arriving on guch and guch 4 date , the game
3 way I sent 4 cable to Parle telllng them I'm arriving on such
4 and guch 4 date ,
5 Mr _ Johngton , Nould ou havo gent your cable wIthout
6 gettIng a cable fIrat Erom them?
7 ALASI Cage Offlcer_ I could have , gure ,
8 Mr Johnston I'm not gure I understand the purpoge
9 of tholr cable _ Nere you sayIng Jt'8 a regular thing that thcy
2
10 wIll send extra traffic?
C, 11 AMLASII Case Offlcer _ I can't tell you what the purposc
{
12 of thefr cable wag except what I'm trying to explaln to you
13 Is that keeplng headquarters Informed or hcadquarters inguiring
c
11
of you in such circumstances , it'9 not unugual to a cable ,
14
You know advise us when you re golng to return or please
15
;
16 return or uS sending a cable _
If there was any other reason for sending that cable ,
1'7
I can on ly conjecture , I don t know , that it was because of
18
Ena
2n
19 what had happened _
1x
3A Mr Johnston I 'd like the record Eo show that Senator
Beg 20
1
Schweiker has left and you are aware that without the Senator
21
be here You have the prerogative to stop your testimony _
22
1
23
Do You understand that?
1
AKLASI Casc Officer. Yes
9 24
Nr Johnston _ And that 1f we proceed , that you can conticue
25
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NV
g8h"
get
Ing
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VPPSTTE
57
31 1 to Btop at any, tlma dur Cho " EeseLmony and abk for It to
2 contInue when we have Sonator progent .
1
3 Do You understand that?
4 AMLA SII Cabe OEficer Rlght .
5 Mr - Johngton _ Are you wIIlIng to contInue under the
6 condItlons 02 not having 4 Senator here ?
7 AMASH Case Offcer_ Yeg , I am
8 Mr _ Johnston Ne have You back In NashIngton at 6 :10
9 on Novembcr 23rd , and You may or may not have to the office;
10 that and ga1d you defInftely did go to the office on 3
11 Novenber 24th , on Sunday
1
12 AMLASI Case officer _ Probably So . Scratch definitely .
1 13 I'm probably not that definite about It, but I'm sure I touched
c
14 bage wIth the office ag soon as I returned , ether telephonlcally
6
15 or physically golng there _ 2
16 Mr _ Johnston _ Let me refresh your recollection then and
K
17 remind that Oswald was killed on November 24th, Sunday.
18 Does that a1d You In recalling where were at that
1
19 time?
8
AMLASI Case Officer. No I mean I was hone certainly_
20 L
21 Mr Johnston You nean hone in Washington?
22 AMLASII Case officer _ In Nashington _
23 Mr _ Johnston But you don t know Ivhether you were at
1
24 the office or at home on that day?
8
AMLASH Case officer. It depends on the hour that we 25
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Ing g8h
gone
day you
you
You
"
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vOpSdr
1 may havo been worklng 1
2 If You re golng back So RekIng, aboue normal hourb that
3 NO kept durIng that perlod of tlme, ' Sunday Wab Juet another
4 workIng 80 you know It wagn t becaubo Jt wab Sunday that
5 We would not have been In the OKfice ,
6 Mr . Johnston But con t recall belng In the offfce?
7 AMLASII Case Offlcer _ I don t recall belng In the office
8 Ren we heard the Informatlon that Oswald wag Involved , I
9 could very we 1l have been home
3
10 Mr Johngton Do you recall belng Jn the offlce when
11 You heard that Oswa ld was shot?
{
12 AMIASI Case Officer _ No
0 13 Mr _ Johnston Dfd hold , when did You firgt talk
14 to the chief of the section about your meetIng?
15 AMLASH Case officer _ Specifically, I don 't recall when 2
16 What would have been ususual 18 for me to have called the officd
17 when I got in and whether I went there or not , I don t recall.
18 And then I either talked to Fitzgerald who would have been ,
1
19 he would have been the only person I would have talked to_ If
i
he was in on that Sunday and I went in , I would have talked to 20 |
21 him on Sunday , and if not, It wouid have been on Monday
5 22 Mr Jolnston Did you talk to Mr Ielas about the
1
23 November 22nd meeting?
1
AMIASIi Case Officer _ No , I dla not talk to He Ims
8 24
Mr Johnston _ Did you talk to Mr McCone about the
25
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you
you
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59
3h 33 November 22nd" meeIig?;
8
2 AMLASI Cape OffIcer . No .
1 3 Mr = Johngton DId you talk to anyone In technical
4 gervIce8 about the pen devIce or the meetIng?
5 AMLASH Case Offlcer Not at the tlme, no _
6 Mr Johngton _ So It wag Your recollectlon that the only
one you talked to In thlg tlme perlod of November 23rd and
8 November 24th , November 25th about the meeting In Parlg 19
9 Mr Fltzgerala?
10 AALASH Case officer To the begt of my recollectlon, ycs-
11 Mr Johnston And what 19 recollection of that
12 discussJon?
13 AMIMSI Case Offfcer The report, as to what had taken 0
14 place , reporting that he had not thought hlghly of the device
c
that Ie had provided him with, that he did not Intend to carry 15 2
16 It back , that he was pleased wIth the fact that we had decided
that we would caches down for him inside Cuba the
17
reaffirmation of U.S _ support for his novement inside of Cuba , 18
2
the fact that he had decided definitely to return and had
19
i
made hfs reservations to return, and his dfsmay and hs
20 1
21
reaction when- he had heard that Kcnnedy had been assas8inated
when we to the meeting _
4 22
1
Mr _ Johnston Was therc a discussion about any link
23
1
between AMLASI or Your Cuban operations and the Kennedy
8 24
25
asgassinatlon?
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put
got
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7onEarHt
60
1 Cabe OffIcer Nona Whateoavor that I can remember
AMASH |
2 Mr_ Johnston _ No discuselon betweon You
und Fltzgerald
3
at 411 about
any connectlon?
Case Officer No , not that I can recall_
4 AMLASII
5 Johnston When you Bay not that you can recall, are
Mx
6 1t'8 poseIble but you don t recall It, or are
you gayIng that
certaln, fafrly certaln to the best
of your recollection?
You
8 Offlcer I'm talrly cortaln to the begt
AMLASH Cage
that there was connection botween the AMLA SII
of my knowledge
10 that we alscueged 1t, w0 discussed the Kennedy
In other words _
I'm sure we dia I mean who wasn discussing
11 assa88ination _
8
12 assas8inatlon at that time 'Chat we tied the
the Kennedy
In with AMLASII , I don t recall any kind
9 13 Kennedy assa8sination
14 of conversation of that nature _
On November 23rd and November 24th and
15 Mr _ Johnston
5
16 November 25th?
17 AMLASII Case Officer. Right_
All right _ Let me polnt you to one of
18 Mr_ Johnston
1
we wanted to you about and it is a contact
19 the docunents
3
25 November and let me just show that to you .
20 report datcd
L
that a document L let me state for the record wha :
21 Is
1 22 it is .
1
It'g the original, apparently copy , of the November 25th
23
1
of the November 22nd meeting .
8 24 contact report
25 Did you prepare that contact report?
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ask
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35
1 AMLASR Case OIIces Yog; eh7
2 Mr - Johngton And 15 that tho docdant You Propared?
3 AMLASII Cabe Officer. Yeb ,
4 Mr Johngton I 'm askIng dIrectly 1o that the
5
very document propared? That' 9 a
very BpecIflc questlon .
6 AMLASII Cage Offlcer. Yeg
7
Mr _ Johngton Rhen dId you prepare that?
8
AMLASII Cage Offlcer. The date 19 25 November
9 Mr Johnston . Ig It your recollection that that'9 the
;
10 date you preparcd thut?
11 ALASI Cabe Officer. Probably 90
~ 1
12 Mr Johnston _ You have 4 recollection of dolng It
11 13 on that date?
14 ANLASH Case officer_ Not speclfically on the 25th , but
c
15 Lf the document 18 dated the 25th , I presume that'9 the
16 that I did the memorandum _
17 Mr Johnston _ Ilow how did you prepare It? Did you
18 dictate it to somebody who then typed Jt up, or dia You
yourseld
1
19 persona lly prepare Jt? And In asking you that questlon , is thenc
8
20 any way to tell from the document how Jt wag preparcd?
1
21 A'IAASH Case Officer. No , the secretary probably typec?
9 22 St. I mean I didn t type It myself _
1
23 Kr _ Johnston _ You did not type it yourself .
1
24 Is there any way t0 tell from the document? There arc
8
25 no Inftials on ft or anything that would Indicatc that it :a;
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You
Do
day
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ToRa
62
36 1 dictatod; and
OffIcer_ No . What aro
You abking me?
2
ALASH cage
1
I'm Jubt abklng I{ you're the one that
3 Mr - Johnston .
4
prepared that or how It got
prepared?
Yeg , It'9 a
contact report of my
5
AMLASH Cabe OffIcer .
6 meetIng wIth AMLASH _
Johnston _ And prepared that document?
7 Mr -
AMLASH - Case Offlcer. That' 8 right.
8
Johngton _ Dut you did not type Jt?
9 Mr_
I dJd not type It, 80 I could havc
AMLASII Case offlcer.
3
10
gecretary or wrote It out longhand and gave
dictated It to a 11
Jt to her and she typed Jt _
12
about the fact that on Novembcr 19t"1
Mr _ Johnston _ What
11 13
Indicated that Fitzgerald
nenoranclum for record You
14 In your
reports to be kept to a
mimimum?
:
15
written
a contract
Instructiong why did you preparc
Nith those
16
17
report?
Officer. Because I
probably contacted
ANIASII Case
18
thc one on
this nictit:
about it and he said prepare 1
19
Fitzgerald
8
#r Jonnston Do You recall that?
20
t recall that but that woui':
AMLASI Case Officer _ I don 7
21
be a norral thing _
22
That he would have In effcct
1 Xr Johnston _
23
this, ::
Officer. I bricfec '1n on 1 NLS" Case
24 8
a
contact report on &hat.
safc , let' s havc 2
menorandun _
25
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typed?'
you
you
wanted
5
and
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Top 57q30
'63
Ghon he Dala EInlmlza" wrItten
In other worde
8h 1" we t have any 1
the
operation; he didn t Bay
2
communlcationa on further
other memo8 on It or any 1
3 other
communicationg on any
memorandums on Jt_
4 wIthin the dates
11 thlngb
So what happen
5
and then It was by
agreement
I
had brfefed htm on thfs
6 here ,
a
contact repoFt=
that he told me to writc up
or maybe
hl8 order
7 to examine
Hlave
You had an
opportunity
Mr _
Johnston .
8 we ve came here? I'm not
that report either before
look at
It closely while here
ty to
10
now to look
at the docuentl
take that tine right
c 11
Maybe you
Casc Offlcer _ Yes ,
~
12
AMLASM
docunent _ Coparc
Look at page 3 of thc
Mr _ Johnston _
c
0 13
3 19 in a
much different type than
2 and pagc 3 _ Page
14
page
pagc 2 .
:
Do
notice that? It' 9
fainter _
16 fainter, and 1 don t
Case Officer_ Yes , it'$
MLASH
17 game but It' 8 fainter _
looks Ilke It'g the
know 1f the typc
18 explanation for that?
Do have any
Mr
Johnstor _ 1
19
8 AMIA SII Case Officer_ No _
20 on Novenbcr
Was page 3 what you 6
21
Mr Johnston
prepare it again, S0
Officer.1
didn't personally
ANLASH
somethin) 2*
my
long hand report,
the secretary
1
23 I have
and she it on
and then I finished it
1 could have
happened ,
explanatior:
24 I don t have any 8
That 19
a
second page _
25
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the
won
Put you would
by
gure
you
opportunf enough you gIven
could
15
much
you
you
preparea
5
given
could Put
possible _
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1on SE
It' lIghter; than tn6' othor one Tho eypa " appears to be the
38 1 why
2 Bame .
1
3 Mr _ Johngton Are you Baylng that tho way you prepared
1t'9 posgIble that the second page and third page were prepared
5 on different daye?
AMLASII Cage Offlcer. No , It could have been dlfferent
6
of the If I had wrIten out the fIrgt part of the
7 times
contact report and I hadn t finfghed It , the eecretary could
8
we11 have gtarted to type It, and then when I finfshed 1:
9 very
would have gIven her the lagt page to typo because Jt was a1l 2
10 I
11 on the 25th .
0 Mr _ Johnston Are you saying
12
Caee Officer. Because there 9 no date on the
AMLASH 9 13
8
14
gecond page _
Mr _ Johnston You re stating that recollectlon is
15
1
that that document was typed on one by one person _
16
AMLASH Case Officer Yes , probably ,s0 That the
17
case I have no reason to doubt why It would have been
18 usual
2
19 done any differently .
8
Xr Johnston _ Wha t about the informatlon on page' 3 ?
20
substance in fact? Is that exactly what wrotc 1
21 Is that the
on Novenber 25th about the contact?
22
AALASI Case officer _ Ye3 and In fact I draw your 1
23
1 attention to the part on the secret writing material because
24 8
concerned as to how we would contInue to communicat
we were very 25
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goh "
at
day ~
your
day
'
you
M
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TORSIR
65
9 = wIth"him_ In8laa 'Cuba and thio wa9 Ono o2 tha gubjecti that
8
2 were dlecuggod at the lapt meeting, communLcatong _ So that
1 3 Ig not 4 new subJect matter, That 19 defInitely part of the
gubject matter that wag dscusged at the labt meeting , whfch
5 wa9 communlcatlong wIth hfm,
6 Mr Johnston_ And It'8 your testImony that thls report
7 43 It exIsts In that ffle 1e exactly tke report that;you: prepareh
8 on November 25th?
9 AMIASH Cage OffIcer. Yeb ,
10 Mr _ Johnston , You 11 note that the report doeg: not
6
11 mentlon the pen devIce or AMLASH ' g reaction to your gIving ft
8
12 to him.
1 13 AMLASH Case Officer _ That'8 rlght.
14 Mr _ Johngton You left that out of your original report
15 You did not make a written report on c
16 AMLASI Case Officer . I did not make a written report
on that. 17
18 Mr Johnston _ Why was that?
1
19 ANLASI Case Officer_ Probably because Fitzgerald said
i
not to _ 20 7
21 Mr Johnston _ Do you recall Fitzgerald saying not to?
22 AMLASII Case Officer_ I don t recall 1t, but that" s
{ 23
certalnly what I 'dd have to assune
1
24 In other words , don t include that part of it_ 8
25 Mr Johnston Should It have gone Ic there in a norma ]
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66
10 report?
8
2 AMLASII Cabe Ofticer . In 8 normal report , But thls
1 3 certalnly wa8 4 rather , agaln, gengItlve eubJect that we werc
4 talkIng about _ He dld not accept It and I don 't thInk that at
5 that time Jt wab felt thatcanythtng elbe ghould be BaId about
6 Jt,
7 Mr _ Johnston why 18 that?
8 AMLASII Cabe fflcer. I don 't know why. Agaln , because
9 of the gensitivlty, I presume _ of the eubject -
c
10 Mr Johnston And agaln , 19 It your recollection that
11 FItzgerald , 18 It testimony that FItzgerala told you not
{
12 to a reference to the pen device In tho report?
AMLASI Case Officer_ I don t recall Jf he specifically 0 13
told me not to It In or 1f when I gave him the report he
14
:
15
was satisffed that It wag not Jn _
Mr _ Baron , Thy would a reference to the pen device be
16
any nore sensitive than referenceg to armg caches or guggestionf
17
of assassInatlons or a1l the other kinds of things that were 18
1
19 already In the ffle?
a
ANLASH Case officer Decause agaln , in conjunction wit
20 1
thfs particular operation It wvas not an assassination operatior
21
It was a coup operation _ This was one of the aberratlons of thj
4 22
1
23
operation which we Involvcd] in strictly to Provide bona
1
fJdes to the man that we were dcaling wIth and we were concerned
8 24
25 for hfs personal sccurity.
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gah "
Yeb _
Your
put
put
got
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T@R SECRLL
67
1 In other words` 1t wa9 not part' o2 tha' operatlonal Plan
2 to provlde hfm wIth any guch devlceb for the purpogeg of
7
3 asga88lnatlng Cagtro. The rIfleg and the grenades and 411 of
4 thlg wag somethIng that wag neceggary to Btart 4 coup .
5 In other worde , It was not' dlrected at one partlcular
6 person _
7 I think thls was probably the thinkIng a+ that tlme and
8 such polnts dld not get Into It because thlg was not part
9 of the AMIMSH of operation _ :
10 Mr _ Baron For the sake of the accuracy of the records
and the protectlon of the people who were Involved at the CIA ,
11
1
wouldn t even thc tender of such a devicc to AMLASI for whatcver
12
13
purporges normally be put into the records?
c
1
AMLASII Case officer _ Not In a contact report because in
14
a contact report thls goes into the regular ffle _ Plhether
1
15
FItzgerald would have made a note of thls sone place else I
16
don t know but In the regular contact report which into
17
the regular file in other words say the secretary would
18
1
know about It and this could have been the other part of it_
19
8
In other words to reduce the number of people , to contai;:
20 1
21 the number of people _
Mr . Baron Do you recall anything in your discussions
4 22
1 wIth Fitzgerald that led You to Jelieve that one of the
23
1
factors that was In his mind in assessing the sensitivity of
24 8
thfs tender of a pofson pen device was the on which it
25
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NI
vhy
Plan
goes
day
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TonSru
68
1 happoned 49 Oppogea Co: eLmply Cho- {ag0 Ehat oueh' aevICe: w4?
2 offered?
1
3 AMJASH Cage Offlcer, If It wa? Jn hfs mInd , he never
4 gtated Jt to me , I thnk Jt wab Just the overall Beneftfvfty
5 that the Agency had been , hag now , ana alwaye hag had on
6 ag8a88Inatlong .
7 I mean It'9 not the speciflc of what had happened that
tIme _ Agsas8Inatlong were not part of the routine buslness of
8
9 the Agency .
Mr _ Johnston Let me agk You , you have mentloned the
10
secre tary who prepared It. Do You recall the name of the
11
1
12 becretary who prepared this document?
AMLASI Case Officer. I don t.
2 1 13
c Mr Johnston DId you have a regular secretary?
14
AILASH Case Officer _ Yes
15
:
Mr Johnston Fha t was her name ?
16
AMLASH Case Officer _ She could have prepared it or
17
It could have been Fltzgerald 8 secretary because , agaln , 0f
18
1
19 the days , the Sunday _
8
I don t recall the nane
20
Mr . Johnaton _ You don t recall your secretary 5 nai e ?
L
21
AMLASII Case Officer. Mell, I don' t remenber. 1f a Jir}
4 22
1 by thc nane of Bobbje lernandez was still wfth me She was
23
my secretary during of that time She was probably ;;
2 24
secretary then .
25
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NV
geh "
No ,
part
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te Sid
69
3 name , ad Bhe
recall 7 ezgarald 9 secretary"
1 I don t
ah havo been one
of tho two
2 It, but Jt
have on
1
Johnston . Let me ghow you the report
3 Mr that
4t'8 paragraph 2 of that;
4 1 of
the report, I think
page
Kennedy
Paragraph
artiele , the
5 discusse8 the newbpaper
6 two:
returning to Cuba The
he wag
7 "AMLASII of
to a copy
8 of that L8 gubject wag
gentence
was even In Mfami
9 Kenncdy 9
18 November
President
had helped to prepare
10 to hear that Fitzgerald
more reftera" the
You the
casc officer
S 11 thc President'
1f a
of full U.$ _ support
; agguranceg by
Fitzgerald
1/ was successful=
the 1 13 rea] coup
Yes , that S right.
14
ANIASII Cage OffLcer.
about
Does that refresh
recollection
2
15 Mr
Johnston -
him the
N 16 whether or not you
Jt
because at that time
AHLASII Cage. Officer. No ,
17
in
the Paris ncwspaper
18
have already been
newspapa
It n one of
the Parisian
1
19 hc
very well have
of
a
newspaper clipping
a have had a copy
20 But aqain , I
7
21 the with me
refresh
in the least does that
Mr _ Johnston But
22 Fitzgerald helped prcnar:
A"LASII that
1
23
recollection that You
1
24 the me that we 8
Officer _ Yes
Fltzgerald
25 AMLASII Case
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N
gIrlg
woula
typed could and agaln
epecch ,
Becond
atated
read pleased
and
speech
pleagcd
ted
speech .
given 12
regime against
your
speech?
gave
and
printed
could f{
read
could
of
could
speech your
m
tcld
sneech?
told
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TonS4
h tell ffm
Nould' You ' reca1l' tho portion of the L
2 Mr = Johneton
3 spcech pointed out to AMIASH?
1
No
portion wab pointed out to him_
AMI,ASH Case Officer.
4
Fitzgerald had helped In preparation of the
5 It wa8 Just that
6 speech _
I coula ghow you 4 copy . Thfe 8 an
7 Mr _ Johnston _
from the November 19th, 1963 Wabhington
8 extract I have prepared
which carrleg an AP story of Novcmber 18th
Pogt , pagc 115 ,
10 sayIng:
19 the text of President Kennedy 5 addressl
C "Tho followlng
11
6,
the
Inter-Nerlcan Press Association .
:
12
tonfght before
thc only portions 4s arc relevant
And I have extracted
11 13
chance to read ft.
c to Cuba _ Now I'1l give You a
14
c I'd like to have thig marked as Cxhibi:
Incidentally ,
15
for the record _
{
16
(The
document referred to
17
wa8 marked for
Jdentification
18
as AIASII Case officer
1
19
Exhibit No. 1)
3
20
7
2]
4 22
1
23
1
24 8
25
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could
you
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ToR SiT
Johnaton I Point Out that 'In that 8peech , do you
88 45 Mr
8
recollection O thic being tha" part ot the speech or
2 have 4
1 3 you dIscusged Ehls a8pect of the
AMLASII Case Officer. Fle dia not diacu89 the speech
4
All we did wag 4 very gmall passIng
5
paragraph by paragraph _
6 renark about the gpeech _
Ile had probably to the best of my
recollection already
Parisian newopaper8 , or 1f I had a news -
8 read It In one of the
of the speech = he glanced at ft while we were
9
paper clipping
but I don 't reca 1l that. But hc wag
certainly gatisficd
10 there ,
c
with the tone of the speech _
11
Mr Johnston You must have read the speech bcfore
{
12
mentloned it to him _ Ig thls the portlon that you had In
1 13 You
6
mind that would satlsfy him about the tone of the speech?
14
officer _ Certainly this sets the tone for
AMIASH Case
:
15
The extracts that you have made here sets
16 the whole speech _
D
the
full speech and specifically the one in which
the tone for
17
barrier 1s removed , we will be ready and anxious
18 once the
work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive
1
19 to
9 which in a few short years stirred the hopes and the
20
throughout the entfre hemisphere 1
21
sympathy of nany
Nas It your intent by naking referencc to
Mr Johnston
4 22
in nee ting With ALASI to show that higher 1
23
the specch
1 authority was behind what you were doing?
24 8
AMIASI Casc officer Yeg , precIsely _
25
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speech?
goa18
people
your
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TOp SEchd
72
46 1 Mr = Johngton And felt that thle ppeech colnclded
8
! 2 wIth what were telling AMLASII?
1 3 AMLASH Cage Officer _ that the U.S _ Government was
prepared , che_ asgurances at flrst that Gerald had glven him
5 and I had been glvIng him that the U,5 . Government wag wflling
6 to support the Cuban people _
7 Mr _ Baron _ In the excerpt from the speech that we have
8 Just shown you Jt say8 :
9 "It Is Important to restate what now dfvide8 Cuba fron 1
10 my country and fram al1 the American countrles It 19 the
11 fact that a sma 11 band of conspiratorg has stripped the Cuban
~ 1
12 people of their frecdlom and handcd ovcr thc Independence and
1 13 soverIgnty of thc Cuban natlon to forces heyond the hemlspherc
c
14 Then ft continues : "This and this alone divides us
15 Ag long as this Is true , noth is possible Mithout it, {
16 everything Is possiile _ Once this barrier is removed _ we will
17 be ready and anxious to Ivor} with the Cuhan people _
That 5 the end the quote _
18
1
Is it understanding that thls reference to a sma 1 1
19
i
band of conspirators is a re ference to the Castro government?
20 |
21 NAI SII Case officer Prccisely _
Mr Baron And in report of Novenber 19th , or 22
{ 23 menorandum for the record of Movember 19th_ You had mentioned
that well , I 1fll simply quote from the report _ It says :
2 24
"Show AMLASII One copy of President S Miani speech (remark:
25
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you geh -
you
Yeg ,
ing
of
your
your your
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JpSdu
73
to AMA8H _ One
that Bianktheiped "IEh:Opadch) ;
8
2 AMLASK Case OzfIcer Fltzgorald
1
3 Mr _ Baron _ Blank 1a PItzgerala _
AMIA SII Cage Officer Yeb , Thlg momorandum wag wrItten
4
5 before I went to Paris , 80 , In effect, thege were my marching
6 orderg that I could ube Bhowing that tha U.5 _ Government , Indeed
7 Mr _ Daron . Would support a move agalnst the Castro
8 government =
AMIASII Cage officer. Nould gupport the move agaInst
9
10 Castro.
Mr _ Jaron _ And did you know for 4 fact that FItzgerald
11
1
12 helped with the preparation of the gpeech?
AMLASH Case Offlcer. Only Erom what Fitzgerald told
1 13
C 14 me
Mr . Daron What did Fitzgerald tell You?
15
{
AMLASH Case Offlcer _ I can t give You a specific quote
16
but I presume that he had had some Input into the speech _ This ,
17
again, wouldn t necesgarily be Fitzgerald himself _ It could
18
1 be but it could also be thc SAS the CIA Input into the speech
19
8
which 1s norma l In Pregidentlal gpeeches that there, are inputs
20 1
21
from different agencics _
Mr Baron: Did Fitzgerald say anything to you about
End 34 _ b 3B2
1 preparation of this speech that led you to believe that the
23
Presfdent or anyone close to him Iho had been involved in thc
24 8
preparation of the speech had been made knowledgeable of the
25
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4op Seb
48 AMLASn Oporatlon?
1
2 AMLASH Cabe OffIcer No FItzgerald nover ' told Jo
1 3 epeclfIcally that the ` Proeldent had been apprlued 61 thle ,
The general objectlve , I never had any doubtb Jn: my mInd that
5 the general objective of organlzIng 4 coup agalnet Castro did
6 not have the hIghest governmental approval - I mean thlg was
never a questIon , I don 't think , in my mInd . Agaln ,
8 speclfically 488a88lnation because what I mentloned before ,
9 I don '€ thlnk Fltzgerald or He lmg or anybody 0lge would
10 Rpecifically have brlefed anybody that the AMLASH operation was
c
0 11 an as8assInatfon because lt wasn't_
1
12 Mr Baron . So You had no basls for belleving that the
13 President Ia $ Inforned that a component of the AMLASII operation 1
c 14 was a8ga88Inatlon?
AMLASH Case Officer _ I have no reabon _ I don '€ 15
2
know _ Nobody told me that he had or he hadn t_ 16
Mr Baron _ Did Fitzgerald meke It clear to that
17
in providing Input to thls gpeech he had the specific purpose
18
1
In mind of gIving a public gignal to AMLASI that he would reccivt
19
8
support from the highest quarters of the U.S _ Government if Ge
20
1
2} would move for a coup?
AMJASI Case Officer Yes , thig was my understanding _
4 22
1
Mr _ Baron 'That the speech was to be a speclflc signal
22
1
to opponents of Castro inside Cuba as opposed to a genera l
24 8
statement of U.S _ policy?
25
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986:
not
plot
No ,
you
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TRSRL
75
AMLASH Caso OfIcor That 8 rIght _
49 1
Mr _ Baron _ Can You
anything about your conversatien
2
1
3
that produced that understanding?
AMILASII Cago Officer No, Just the general conversation
4
of the tIme and what we were trylng to do _
5
In other wordg , we were trylng to organize a coup: and
6
problemg that we had been through speclflcally wIth AMAIAASI
7 the
to persuade him that the U.S _ government Wag gerfous
8 In trylng
about supporting Cubans who were opposed to Castro.
9
So thls statement that appeared In the speech wag
10
certalnly publlc notice that ths was the case
11
{ Mr Iaron _
Did Fitzgerald or anyonc else 8ay anything
12
that led You to believe that the President had been
8 13 to You
informed that representationg ould be made such
14
speclfically
c
Octohcr 29th that Robert Kennedy or other high
a5 the oncg on 15
{
American officials would stand behind AMLASI?
16
Case officer _ No , he d1dn 't speclflcally tell me
NLASII
17
Mr _ Baron _
Did your conversations with Fitzgerald about
18
his input to this speech , lead you to belfeve that
1
19
this spcech _
3 the President had been specifically informed that a pofson
20
devIce was
being prepared to be tendered on November 22nd? 1
21
ALASII Casc officer_ Mo
4 22
Johnston Let me ask You in a different contezt
23
Mr _
1 there a decision after thc 4ssasgination to break of f
nowy , wa $
24 8
further contacts with ATASH?
25
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NV
gorE
recali
Pen
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tP S7
76
50 AMIMASI{ Cabo" Ofticer but that decielon evolved ,
8
2 It wasn ' t an automatia declsion ,rlght after tho 488498Inatlon _
1
3 In fact, 49 you recall from my previoug testlmony WB had
4 contact wIth AMLASII Jn late '64 when ho came out. I
5 think the only hesItancy at that time wad what 0 the new pollcy?
6 Doe g the new PresIdent want to contInue to , In our attempts
7 to organize a agaInst Castro, a coup agalngt Castro
8 That probably wag the hesltancy , not the fact that It
9 was Immedlately decided to stop contact , whfch, as I ga1d beforc'
10 It wasn t, because we saw him agaIn ,
Ar _ Johnston _ Wa8 thera a discugg lon at a11 Jn Nlovembcr
11
{
or Deccmbcr 1963 about the relatlonship hetwcen the AMLASI
12
13 operation and the as8a881nation of President Rennedy? 1
AAIASI Case Offfcer _ Not that I recall_
14
Mr _ Johnston Let me show you, we havc In several versicr)s
15
:
16 and the one that is most available 19 thls document here , and
I have got the document You re looking at 18 in Volume 12
17
I belleve , of the AMI.ASII ffle _
18
1
AMIM SII Case Officer Yes ,
19
8
Mr Johnston And It 15 a yellow legal sizc paper
20 |
AMIASI Case Officer _ Let me correct _ It' s not a docu:e::
21
1 It is evidently sonlehody 3 type-written notes of probahly the
22
1
23 recollection of what had happened _
1
Ar Johnston _ Okav , and 1t's on yellow legal-slze papcr
24 8
typedl . And 1 also have a document that I'm gure 19 Jn the Eile
25
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Y09 , geh _
agaln
plot
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JODSEI
51 1 but we don t hava It polnted: out: It tho s4n1tlzed vertIon
8
2 of 4 memorandum for the record datad 29 March , 1965 , subject
1 3 AMIAASII , and both of them convey the gane subject, the game
Informa tIon _ And on Lhe paragraph that hag the markIng at thc
5 left and the language of those documents , thobe documentb say
6 " 22 November , 63 , Mr . Fltzgerald and Mr Sanchez as8ured subject
7 that thls Agency vould him everythIng he needed. "
8 Io that the portion You re readIng?
9 AHIAA SII Cage Officer. Yes _
3
10 Mr _ Aohnston _ Ii (Telescoplc sIght , nflencer , a11 the
11 money hc wanted) Situation changed when Mr . Sanchez and
1
12 Mr _ FItzgerald lcft the meeting to discovcr that Pres Idlent
1 13 Kenredy had bcen assassinatlon_ Lecausc of this fact, plans
14 of' suhject changed and it was decided that this Agency coul :
15 have no part in the assassination of a government leader (inel
16 Castro) and It would not aid subject in his attempt _
Ii This included the following !e woule not furnish
17
18 the silencer, nor scope nor any money for (irect assas8ination}
2
19 furthermore_ wc vould not lift a finger to hely subject escav-
8
Trom Cula shoule he assassinate Castro_ M 20
L
21 cid You preparo this documcnt?
AXISI Case officer. I did not prepare this documant
22
1
I was not with the task force with SAS at the tlme this docurieat
23
1
was prcpared on 29 March , '65 . I had alreadv Jeft _
8 24
Aga In , the only thIng I can state for here On Xh%
25
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gah:
gIve
{ou
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TOR ScRhI
78
I knew of, the' operatlon_ that thle wad Bomabody trying to 1
2 together _ thle wag a Memo 'from Chlef PI prohably In the task {
1 3 force trylng to togethor by thfe time , 29 March , what had
happened . The other document 81nca It'9, It' 8 probably a later
5 date, the yellow document wag bomebody probably agaln trylng tc
6 reconstruct what had happened_ Tha factb are not 49 I' knew
them at the tIme _
8 Both paragraphs have condensed an evolution that took
9 place over 4 perlod of 4 year and the declslon probably was not
10 made untll '65 after I had left the operatlon, that we were
3
11 pullng out.
1
12 Dut the facts as stated here in thoge two documents are
1 13 Incorrect , and certainly the tinIng that they inginuate 1s
c
14 wrong _
15 Mr Johnston . I think we should develop that on the
:
16 record and 5f want to Point out what facts are Incorrect ,
17 don t you do s0?
11
18 MLASH Case Officer The situation changed when Mr
1
19 Sanche z and Mr Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that
i
President Kennedy had been asgassinated" That 8 Incorrect _
20 |
21 Pitzgerald wasn t with me on the 22nd of November mee ting
1 22 Mr Johnston Okay . What about the sentence before
1
23 that , that Mr_ Fitzgerald and Mr Sanchez assured subject that
1
this Agency would give him everything he needed _ wIth your
8 24
25 qualifier that Fftzgerald was not at the mecting?
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Put
put
You
why
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FoPSFEeRE
79
53 AMLASH Caso' QffIcer, Thlo wab at tha medting In October
2 and not at the Novembor meetlng: becauge that Js correct ,
5 provIded you It In the rIght context.
4 Mr Johnston Mhat about tho btatement , 411 the money
5 he wanted?
6 AMLASH Cage offIcer _ Inferred . I mean I don recall
that money wag ever dlscugged with thfs man at any time _ In
8 fact I wa8 a8ked thfo questfon befora and I couldn t really
9 recollect: when I had gIven hlm gome moncy _
10 It turng out that the record showe that I did hlm
11 $350 for hls expenses But money, speclflcally, again, that
1
12 18 somebody else interpreting _ I don t know 6f any other
1 13 document or certainly any memorandum for the record that I
c 14 prepared In which money specifically wag mentloned _
15 Mr Johnston _ But would you disagree with the statement
:
16 AMLASII Case Officer _ Nell, the statement a9 a whole ,
17 if You leave out the money , whfch again , anything that he needs
18 Mr . Johnston _ Mell, that 8 what we want to leave in_
1
19 the money
8
20 NAJASI Case Officer _ If he needs the money , I think it
1
21 was not excluded in the offer, But what I'm saying
5 22 Mr Johnston This makes a posftive statement, him
1
23 saying that vou and Mr _ Fitzgerald assured AMLASH that the
1
24 Agency would give him everything he needed , a11 the money he
8
25 wanted .
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goh-
Put
't
gIve
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HopShD
And I 'm &8k4ng;you, directly olthor on Octobor 29,+5;or
h 54
2 November 22nd d1d you mako that a88uranco: to hIm?
3 AMLASI Cage Offlcor. I can 't roca11 that Buch an Jggue
4 made of money because he never asked for money and we
wag
5 didn'€ have to respond to tolling hfm that wB epeclfIcally
6 would gIve him money . In telling hlm that the gupport necesgary|
necegsary for a coup, I thInk It 18 Implfed
411 of the gupport
that he get whatever he needed , which would mean supples
money , and the reagon I gtate thlg 18 that
9 but not speclflcally
:
10 money wag never a subject of contentlon bctween the Agency and
11 AMLASI _ He never asked for money , he never wag offered
6
12 specifically money _
Johnston Nas he assured that he would all the 1 13 Mr _
c 14 money he wanted?
AMLASII Case officer. A11 the 8upport he needed , not
15
{
16 the money that he wanted _ Ile never asked for money =
Joknston _ I'm not aaking You what he asked for
17 Mr
I'm asking you what you told him _ In this thing It saye
18
1
agsured him that you would givc him all the money that he
19 You
8
20 wanted _
1
21 Did you give that assurance to hin?
AMLASH Case Officer . I did not because I did not
' 22
1
this docunent _ And the person who wrote thlg document
23 write
that I know of didn't write It frOm any factual report any
24 8
25 time
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NI
would
get
at
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UopOd#
81
55 1 Thlo J8 not dooument Thia Ja aomebady: notes In
98
2
putting togather, Thago aro rough notes: typod on Yollow, legal
1
3 sIzed Paper of Bomebody trylng to reconstruct what happened
here probably two or three afterwardo .
Mr Johnston I gueg8 what I 'm a8kIng 1s 4 yeg or
5
no answer In October or November 1963 , dld you or Mr .
6
FItzgerald , to your knowledge , a8gure AMLASI that he would
7
8 receIve 41l the money he wanted?
AMLASH Cage Officer. No , and I must qualffy that. Unless
9
You want to Infer that In glving hlm the support that he neededl
10
6 he also receIve money . But money specffically, 411 he
11
5 { wanted, was ncver a part of the convergation8 , to the best of
12
2 1 13
my knowledge _
Mr Johnston We have talked about the next sentence
c 14
and It continues _
15
{
"Because of thi8 fact plang oE gubject changed and It was
16
decided the Agency have no part In the as9a88Inatlon of
17
a government leader , Including Castro _
18
Is that accurate? I'm giving you an opportunity to
19
i rebut the document
20
ANIAASH Case officer It' 8 accurate froma the point 0 € 1
21
vlew i 22
1 You have to it in the right time frame In the
23
1 right context Mhen he was met in late after having visi-c;;
24 8
Iived in Cuba for a year or almost' a year , he came back morc
and
25
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yearg
mould
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'64 ,
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1O? T4
82
56 convInced than botore_ that tha way 4 coup could be launched
8
2 In Cuba Was the 8liminatfon of Castro and when ha exprosged thls 1
3 convIction, not In '63 but Jn late 10 when tho Agency , ane
4 I pregume tho U.S _ Government at tiao felt Ive can 't
5 contInue that directly Involved wIth AMLASII ,
6 Mr _ Johngton . And the lagt Bentence of that:
7 "Thfs Included the following woula not furnish
the 8flencer, nor Bcope , nor any money for direct 488498Inatfon
9 Furthermore , we would not llft 4 {Inger to help the gubject
3
10 escape from Cuha should he a88888Inate Cabtro.
11 Wa 9 that the substance of the discus3lon Inmedlately
~ 1
12 after the agsas3nation of Presldent Kennedy?
0 13 AJASH Case Officer. No _ A year later In November of
c
14 '64 _
15 Mr _ Johnston And You re saying that thfs doeg not
1
16 describe the fall AMLASH meeting?
17 AMIAASH Case Officer. It does not. It 19 a mixture of
18 what happened over at least a two year perfod _
1
19 Ur Johnston _ It perplexes me somewhat that your
8
20 faflure to keep written records would so warp later thinkers
1
21 a9 to what was going on I mean take the March , 1965 document _
22 As of March , 1965 CIA 19 going on the asgumption that you
1
23 and Fitzgerald met AILASH in Paris , that asgured him that
24 he would get all the money he wanted and that your plans 8
25 changed after the Iee becauge of the Kennedy assa9sination
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anly
'64 ,
that, "
'Wo
4
You
1
ting
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TepA
83
57 1 AMLASH- Caco OffIcer I can t81t,hora 4nd: prebume to
8
2 You 4n explanation tor that 48 to whoro tha pargon who
1 3
prepared that particular memorandum that Informatlon _ The
fIle Itbelf Indicates , 49 are awaro , that FItzgerald
5 ald not travel to Parlg In November Hle travelled Jn October
6 Sa the perbon who prepared the 29 March , 1965 meno came
7 uP wIth this particular type of Informatlon , I don '€ know_
8 Mr , Johnston Tho 19 that memo addregged to agaln?
9 AMLASII Case OffIcer_ Thl8 18 to Chlef , PI from Chlef 3
10 Reporte _
11 Mr Johnston So your only explanation, your explanation
{
for the memo 19 that lt 19 Inaccurate but even 1f It 1g
12
Inaccurate , It indicates that In March , 1965 these people had
C
1 13
c It 41l wrong 48 to what the AMLASH operation was a11 aboutS
14
c AMIASH Case Officer If you want to Interpret exactly
15
~
what they wrote here _ ye , Jt wag wrong _ Now I'm not sayng
16
that It was wrong because 1t have been _ I don t know
17
I'm just saying It have been that they dldn t have access
18
1
to a1l the restricted files because thfs operation until It
19
8
recelved It5 recent publicity wab kept on a restricted
20 1
2 basisg _
So the Chlef of Reports I don t even know , well
4 22
1 probably the Chief of Reports In the division or maybe sone
23
1
place , probably did not have access to 411 of the operational
24 8
25 ffles .
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gIva
got
Kell You
could
could
very
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TOP SEaHT
8 4
You ~o Sying, that
the Information Itself
Kr 'Grefeelnig
758
way that It 1g developed?
2
149 Inaccurato only In 4
ehronological
CertaInly wrong Jn Its chronologica
3
AMLASII Cage Officer
Jt throw8 everything Into one
4
context, definitely becauge
time_ In reporting or trylng to report
5
very gmall period of
4 much longer of tIme
6 what took over
facts that are there over a
Mr _ GrefssIng . But the
7
of 4 year
be true?
8
Offfcer _ But not
In thi8 context:
9
AMLASII Case
over the of a
GrelasIng _ But I'm baylng
Mr 10
when actuall;
L November to
the following Novcmber
11 Year from
feelings that the
Agency had developed
{ Inforned ANIASI of the
12
I belleve it 18 the next gentence down
13 at that time, 1
Wyha t 19 wrong here , what 19 wrons
C AALASII Case Officer.
c:
14
meeting , which I presume they left
19 that after we left that
15
the 22 2
mectIng , I presume they" re talking about,
16 the
absolutely wrong , that when
C November, 63 meeting this is
17 President Kennedy had
nceting to discover that
we left that
18
know that thls was
assa8sinated , we had told hin, You 1
19 beer
9
off _
20
at that meeting that he
Zha t is wrong . It not |
21
after that meeting with the Idea
was told that _ Jle went back
22
1 of organizing a
coup Ingide Cuba
23 clarffles that later In
1
'r _ Gra csIng . I believe it
8 24
that thls Information was gIven
the next paragraph _ It gayg
25
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perlod
place
would Perlod
perlod
you
yes ,
all
was
5
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1@RSc Eut
85
1 to AMLA SII tho.Iollowing November Jn 1964 _ 1
2 AMLASH Caja Officer, Yeb . So I don " t know why we re
1 3 taklng that particular plece of Informatlon out of context
4 because In that game memorandum It does state that_
5 Mr Johngton _ Let me move off thege document8 The
6 E1l0 on AMLASII contalnb a flovember 27th report from Parls which
7 Indfcated a gource In the Cuban embasgy In Parig .
8 AMLASII Cage Officer _ Excuse me November 27th of
9 what year?
10 Mr Johnston 1963 _ 1 source in the Cuban embaggy
c
11 In Paris wag complalning about AMLASH 8 denlgrating the
1
12 revolution
2
1 13 Did You see that report on November 27th, 1963?
6
14 AMIAASH Case Officer _ I probably did _ I can 't
15 specifically recall that I did_
:
16 Mr _ Johnston And as I read the report, or my statement
17 to you of 1ts substance it would suggest to You that AMLASH
18 was *nown by given diplomatic personnel in Paris to be putting
1
19 down the Castro revolution _
8
20 AIASI Case Officer _ It depends on who _ In other words
1
21 who did he this to because he did have friendg In the
4 22 ditferent erbassies _
1
22 Mr 'ohnaton The Cuban embassy?
1
24 AMALASI Case officer _ Ile stayed at the Cuban embassy ~ He
8
25 was a Cuban official at that tme_ So he had frlendg who wvere
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say
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ToRHTr
{ o2 11ko mIna {Chaeino 7at woro not AIth tho , way the
2 revolutlon waj movlng.
3 Mr . Johngton _ So that ,fact would hava been
more broadly
known gay In tha Cuban embasgy?
5 AMLASH Cage QffIcer. Oh , yeb , Thls wa3 falrly we 11
End 38 6 known _
7
8
9
10
11
1
12
1
13
c 14
15
{
16
17
18
2
19
8
20 |
21
G 22
11
23
1
24
25
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NVI
They happy:
8
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BEARRIST
To S CE
8
Mr . Johnston Tho' cabla geem to Indlcate that tho bource 1
2 o1 the Inforatlon wad complatning about AMLASH' & denlgrating
3 Ehe revolution , and went on to Bay that she or he wIehed he
4 or Bhe had a tape recorder to record what AMLASH and another
6 pereon were bayIng, suggesting It 18 not 4 Erlendly
Bource Co
6 AMLASH -
7 AMLASH Cage Officer. Well, that guggest8 and agafn, I
8 can 't gIve you any definitive explanation
for It 89 / what that
9 suggests 18 that 8he overheard AMLASH talking
with bomebody
6 10 else of Ifke mind, and she dIdn't Ifke what she heard , I guess _
0
11 Mr = Johnston . Let 8 go now to agaln what you talked about, 1
12 any IInk In your mind or In Fitzgerald' $ mind In November and
c
1
13 December 1963 between what you shad been doing
with AMLASH and
14 the assas8ination of President Kennedy?
:
15 AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever , none whatsoever ,
16 and no dIscussion , and again, agaln, I go back and take you
17 back in time , if you can place yourself back in 1963 and not
18 1976 , after a1l of this hag taken place , after we have had 1
19 a11 the publlc theories expressed of the connections _ all built 8
20 on circustantial evidence of what and who were involved in 1
21 the Kennedy Assassination. I take you back and to place
1
22 yourself back within the context of this operation in 1963 1
23 when thfs happened _
1
8 24 Ffrst of all, I preface what I have say by
25 gayIng that this was not an asga8sination plot, s0 there would
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T90 SET
88
8 bo no reabon why Wo woula bo connecting Kennedy ' 8' a88a88Inatlon
2 WIth thto a88a88Ination plot.
ThLs wa8 not an 488a881nation
3 plot, It Wab not concefved
an a88a88Inatlon plot.
A8 a coup
against FIdel Castro ,
yeg . The fact that the U.8 . Government
5 wag not and wa 8 bupporting people
who were oppobed to
Castro , thg wag well known _ Thfg wa8 In the afternath, of
the of So there waa really In the context of che
8 tIme che fact that thi8 wag not an a88a88Ination plot concelved
9 48 an a88a98Ination: plot, there wag really
no reabon to
10 connect thfe one particular < operation WIth the tragedy of
11 Pregident Kennedy .
1
12 Mr _ Johnston_
1
13 We do know that on the 29th of October FItzgerald told
14 AMLASH that Robert Kennedy
wag behind the plot or behind
15 AMLASH 8 proposal is that correct?
{
16 AMLASH Case Officer _
What we told him wab that the U.S _
17 Government was prepared to support a coup against Fidel
18 Castro.
1
19 Mr . Johnston _ And AMLASH had 8 previously told you that
20 at least one of hig plans for a coup would require the as8assi -
L
21 nation of the Castro Brothers .
4
22 AMLASH Cage Officer. He had not exactly put it in those 1
23 termg , but he certainly felt that the first 1 move would have
9 24 to be against the leadership ,
yes . In other words _ we never
25 talked to him in termg of a8sas8ination ,
and I want this
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NV
48
happy
'63 ,
Bay PIgs _
Okay =
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OnSECDT
89
porfectly clear 1
Mr . Johnston . And ho told you boforo the 29th neetIng that
2 1
3 the {Iret step would probably have to bo tho agga88LnatIon of
the Castro8?
5 AMLASH Cage Offlcer. He never told me a8ga88Ination becausk
he dIdn't even 1lke to 480 the word "ae8489lnation .
6
7 Mr . Johnston, What word did he JIka to u80?
8 AMLASH Cage Officer. The neutralfzation , the ellmInation
If you WIll] of the leadershlp.
9
The ffrgt move in any coup attempt , In order for the
10
:
other offfcers to fall In line , would have to be the removal =
11
{ the removal Fldel Castro , becauge of the loyaltles that ke
12
st1ll had personally with some of the offfcers . 0 13
Mr . Johnston. And after he told you that on October c 14
29th , you gave hlm an aggurance that Robert Kennedy backed his
15
{
16
proposal generally.
AMLASH Case Offfcer. Yes , the U.S. Government and
17
FItzgerala 49 the representative of Robert Kennedy , supported
18
1
a
coup against Castro_
19
8 Mr Johnston. On the very of the aggassinatfon , you
20 1
referenced the speechof President Kennedy 5 talking about
21
an ouster of the current regime in Cuba .
1 22
1 AMLASH Case officer. That 9 right -
23
1 Mr . Johngton. Nere you aware of the September Tth
8 24
statement of Fidel Castro 9 , threatenIng the lves of U.S _
25
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UREd
leaders , and lot D0 I hava' Pof Fozox Copy but Obpeclally 1
2 8 portfon o2 that statomont by FIdel' Castro on " Soptember 7th
3 a€ 4 Party at the BrazIllan emba88y In Havana , he talked to a
reporter, Danlel Harker of AP and Ba1d, among other things ,
5 ar0 prepared to {Ight them and anbwer In kInd, The UnIted
6 States leadero~shoula think that It aro alding terrorfst
plans to @lIminate Cuban leader8 , themgelves WIll not be
8 bafe. n
9 I would thinkfrom your debcrIption of the AMLASH operatlor
7
10 that AMLASH had a plan to eliminate Cuban leaders , and that
C
11 It 18 very possIble
{
12 AMLASH Case OffIcer. So did everybody else. So did every
1 13 other Cuban exfle who wag plotting agalnst Cagtro.
c
c 14 Mr _ Johnston. But thfs 18 In the Brazillan Embagsy on
6
15 September 7th, and you started meeting with AMLASH on
16 September Sth In Brazil, and It may be coincdence , but Castro
17 does give a warning about United States leaders afding terrorig
18 plang eliminate Cuban leaders , and you were dolng that very
1
19 thing .
8
20 AMLASH Case officer. There 19 probably a coincidence |
21 there. I don ' t recall that I knew of this at that time I'
% 22 certainly heardf It since , but I don' t gee the point that You
1
23 are trying to make, because if Castro 18 behind or wag behind
1
8 24 AMLASH to Involve him In the a99as9ination of an American
25 leader , then are you proposing that he would also publicly
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"wB
they
they
to
ve
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TeD SEc
3
91
In tho Braz_Ilan' embaeoy stato' Chat thLe vab]golng to taka
2 Place?
7
3 In other words wag he telegraphlng thfs plan that he
4 had?
5 Mr . Johneton , {I "don 'tiknow: I a88u0 not,
6 AMLASH Case Offlcer. I would fInd It hlghly unugua] that
7 If he Wa 9 berjoug about beIng Involved In. 8omething IIke thfs ,
8 that he would publicly announce hl8 plan, but I may be vrong .
9 That' 9 Just my OpInlon.
10 Mr . Johnston - So w0 have thf8 Cabtro speech of September
11 7th, whatever that meang , ana we have the AMLASH operations
1
12 we talked about in November and October , and then almost
c 1
13 at the very moment of the Kennedy a88a88Inatlon we have your
14 reting with AMLASH and giving him the technical equlpment or
1
15 the assurances of technical equipment that he had requested at
16 the October 29th meeting.
17 You knew on November 24th, certainly November 25th, that
18 the alleged assassin of President Kennedy wag pro-Castro , Lee
1
19 Harvey Oswald Wao pro-Cestro_
8
20 AMLASH Cage Officer. I don' € even know that at this 1
21 time.
1 22 Mr _ Johnston. You don t know that at this time?
1
23 AMLASH Cage officer. where did you get that?
1
24 Mr . Johnston _ You don t know?
8
25 AMLASH Case officer. That he was pro-Castro?
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VoRSi
92
1 Mr . Baron , Ragn thae 8 Joglcal daduction Erom the fact 1
2 that ho wab Part O2 'the' Falr Play for Cuba CommIttee?
3 AMLASH Case OffIcer. It could have been , but I haven " t
4 g00n that.
5 Mr: Grel8Ing . He had come out Publlcly In Intervlewe
6 stating that he wab for Castro and would defend Cabtro 1f the
7 U.S, took actIon .
8 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, probably 80 , but I never had
9 Mr . Johngton . And In fact, Oswald had vigIted Mexlco Ad 3
10 on November 25th , the very you wrote your contact reporty
11 the Mexico chief of station cabled headquarters and remindedd
1
12 them about the Castro speech threat , and I aggume that our Inforna -
0 13 tfon 19 that Mr . was hanaling the actIvity In Mexico
14
15 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes _
:
16 Mr . Johnston , So on November 25th he wag aware of the
17 threat , reminded of the threat _
18 I think it is fair to gay that Mr King knew that Oswald
1
19 had visited the Cuban embassy in Mexico He knew that on
8
20 November 25th . 1
21 Another CIA document indicates that Chief of Station Wynn
1 22 Scott 3~ I don t know whether you knew him In Mexico City ,
1
23 on November 25th read a message to the President of Mexico
1
8 24 In which he gaid, Mr . Scott 9 memo says there are still some
25 Important questions concerning Oswald and hfg VIsit to Mexico
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city
day
city
King
Clty.
city.
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93
Ras the: 4884881natJon ,82_Prenidont Konnody Planned by
1
2 PIdol Castro, and wero tha {Inal detafle worked out Ingfde the
3 Cuban embaegy In Mexfco?
4 That"'8 :agalnron November 25th .
5
Thore 9 no reabon tor You to b00n the document .
6
AMLASH Case OffIce . I don t know that, but agaIn , I'11
7 Just question , thle Wa? Juet a guestlon that was abked . I
8 wouldn't report Jt a8 fact.
9 Mr _ Johngton . No , on November 25th that 18 a question
6 10 rafged .
C 11 Knowing now looking back at Mr . we have the Western
5 1
12 Kemigphere Division
on November 25th 18 Informed that Castro
c
1
13 ha8 made a threat aganst U,S, leader8 , that the chief of
14 station In Mexico i8 telling [6o Pzcouacng @g Mezsioo
:
15 that there 18 a Pos8Ibillty that Castro was behind
16 Oswald wag known to be pro-Cagtro and on November 22nd , you
17 In turn were meeting In Pari8 , giving a high level Cuban
18 assurances that his coup plot: that: might Include ab8a881nation 1
19 of Castro wa8 backed by the U,S , and that yet you made no
20 connection between thoge _ all those events , and there was no
|
21 discussion of any connection _
4 22 AMLASH Cage Officer. No there was no discussion between 1
23 the Y the connection between the assa9ination of 1 President
8 24 Kennedy and the AMLASH operation.
25 Mr . Johngton Was there an Investigation?
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NV
CIty.
have
being
King ,
city
ft,
8
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TOp 5TTT
1 8 AMLASH Cara Officor
Not; to MY ,
2
knowledgo:
I left the 1
oporation right after that,
80 I wouldn t *now Lf 3 thero wa9
or wagh t. But tho coIncidence that you are talking about ,
4 I: you are connectIng
or tryIng now to Imply that there
5 Wag 8 connection between AMLASH
and the fact
6
that It Was on the 22nd
ot November_ the Bame date 48
7
Presldent Kennedy' & a8sa88Ination_
must have had a very terrific
bystem of communlcation.
8 Mr _ Johnston. Although
you had Bet up the meeting
on the 20th of November _ 19 that right?
10 2 AMLASH Cage Offlcer.
but he dIdn't know
11 what we were
speclflcally
going to In fact , the 1 angwer that we could 12 have given hfm could have been reversed _
C
j
13 Mr _ Johnston. Weli,
you safd he requested It.
14 AMLASH Case Officer.
Well , he requested It before he left
1
15 but the assurances you can go back before
that_ You can go badk 16 to the October meeting when
the asgurances
of bupport were
17 to him.
glver
18 So I can t I fInd It 1 difficult to follow what you
19 are trying to imply or to relate AMLASH drectly
to the
20 a88a891nation
on 22 November _ This
1
19 what I fInd difficult
to 21 understand _
4 22 Mr . Johnston, Let me 1 show you a of a cable , no
23 Indication that the cable went to 1 SAS , cable 18 MexIco
8 24 7045 , dated 24 November 63 and by way of background
25 tell you that Immedlately
upon the asga99ination,
the personne l
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they
Yes ,
bay . 8
very
9
copy
The
City,
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T@RSIH
95
In MoxIco tben startod putting tho ontIre BovLot; apparatus 1
2 In Mexlco under survOLIIanca and pullIng the records , and I
3 don 't want to read thlg Into the record becauso It ub0s a
4 true name
5 Lat' 9 go off the record .
6 (DscussLon off the record. )
7
Mr . Johngton Let me read It, except for the true name
8 It Bayb "Provided below sufffclently definftive summary
0
9 o€ local contacts of Ivan Gavrflovich Alferfev. It gIves hfg
11
3
10 contactb , It say9 23 December 1961 wIth the Thfrd Secretary of
11 Cuban Cultural Attache naming her , and arranging a press
1
12 conference for AMLASH _ It' 8 a very tangential relationshp
2 0 13 with the AMLASH operation , but agaln , on November 24th , 1963 ,
14 Mexico CIty 18 reporting KGB or Alferfev' s contacts , and
1
15 It Includes a contact In 61 with AMLASH _
16 So I have difficulty belleving that they are, In hindsight _
17 not related _ and that on November 24th or November 25th no
18 one at CIA related the two events .
1
19 AMLASH Case Officer. What I'm telling you 19 Ene I'm not
8
20 telling You that no one at CIA relates the two events. You |
21 asked me the specific question , did you and FItzgeraldcdiscuss
5 22 any relatfonshfp. My angwer to you was that Fitzgerald and I
1
23 did not specifically discuss that_
1
24 Mr Johnston _ Do you know of anyone who discussed it? 8
25 AMLASH Case Offfcer. No .
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49pSd E"
96
Mr Johng D Yop knoi O1 32YAInveatIgation that wab
2 conducted?
3 AMLASH Caga' OffIcer. No.
(A brLef reces8 wa8 taken . )
6
Mr _ Johngton Let ne now talk and agaIn the groundwork
6 1o that you wero unaware of any Invegtlgaton Of a :connection
7 between the two. and You ware unarare of dIgcuselon about
8 connectlon between AMLASH and Kennedy'0
488488Ination .
9 I8 that a correct summary?
6
10 AMLASH Ca8e Officer . That 9 correct.
c 11 Mr . Johngton . I will show you 8 document. For the record 1
12 thlg 18 4 document appearIng in Volume IV of the AMLASH
1
13 fJle , and the ffrst page 0f-It hag AMLASH 8 name on but
14 I call your attention to the red handwrIting
In the upper right
15 hand corner of that, on that cover sheet , and It
:
gays , "not to
16 leave this office , per blank 8 "orders _
17 I8 that correct?
18 Thls docuent hag handwriting In the upper wrl hand 1
19 corner that it 18 not to leave thig offIce,
8 whatever that 1s.
20 AMLASH Cage Officer. Without gpecific clearance_
without 1
21 orders .
% 22 Mr . Johnston _ Do you have any recollection of such orders 1
23 given by any one, yourself , or Mr . Fitzgerald? 1
8 24 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes , what we have talked about before
25 that Mr. Fitzgerald gave orders to minimize the knowledgaability
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ton
any
1t,
tlng
being
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thfo Part cular OPerat1on becaude 8 Ite Bon8itivity . 1
2 Mr = Johnston, And that J6' the_ reabon ,that thts Inctzuctlon
3 Was gIven about the {Ile, thle partIcular [Ile or thle
partlcular document?
5 AMLASH Ca8e Officer. Yes_ I can t Beo at thfe tIme that
6 anything else would have been thought of at that time .
Mr _ Johngton . What guddenly required that order to be
8 glven?
9 AMLASH Cabe Offlcer. Well_ nothing epeclfsc except that
10 by December of 63, the man wIth whom we were dealIng, AMLASH I
11 wag golng back , or Wab probably back by that time already In
6
12 Cuba . It wag Primarfly probably I would gay 83 much to protect
1 13 hls securfty a8 anything elge.
14 Mr . Johnston , So that nobody else did this have the
15 effect of blocking knowledge of the AMLASH operatlon from other
16 people wIthin the Agency?
17 AMLASH Case Officer _ Probably from my office down _ Certainly
18 not Fitzgerald, not the Director or not anybody else who needed
1
19 to know about the operation, absolutely not. Thls was just
8
20 cIrculatlon within other components of SAS . That woula not L
21 Sn other words a note of thig type would only mean that I
4 22 would be , or whoever would clear the order would be asked
1
23 before thls ffle was allowed to circulate or wa8 g1ven to
1
8 24 anybody _
25 Mr . Johnston . And I don t want to indicate my question
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1 does not Lmply Intent Ortanyond purpobe but would thlo 1
2 notatIon have blocked anyono but Mr; Rolmo or Mr , FItzgerald
3 from gettIng acc088 to thfo {110?
4 AMLASH Cabe OffIcer. No. Thls 18 tuo Informal_ If you
6 want to block a fIle IJke thlg , there 1b 4 much mOro formal
6 procedure to go bY , to block the {1le {or, Bay , the DLrector 8
490 or even at that tIme , the Chlet of SAS . A_ note
8 IIko thio 10 strlctly, can be Interpreted to rebtrlct the
cIrculation of thle {110 for the other people, In SAS below my 6
10 offfce, not restrlcting Jt for anybody 0Ig0 .
c 11 Mr Johngton Upwards .
8
12 Wha t about laterally? What about to the other dIvisions?
0
13 AMLASH Case officer_ Laterally 6180 . In other words, they
C 14 would have to be checked out. It would have to be . We would
c
15 have to know who the ffle. It 19 a matter of control. This ~
16 18 what It amounts to , really. It 19 to know who the file
17 gc98 to. It Ls to control the file.
18 Mr . Johnston . But you do that anyway , rlght?
1
19 That 3 routine procedure. This geemg to be gome thlng more
8
20 than that, of saying don t let thfs leave wIthout my approva ] 1
21 AMLASH Case Officer. No , Jt Isn't anything more than that
5 22 and I think that you re really much more Into it than what it
1
23 19 .
1
8 24 I don t even recall giving telling the secretary this
25 particular thing. It probably came about from the miminized
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To[Sd D
GIrculatlon order that Fitzgorild had/gIven May bofore In 8
2 October, 43 I raca11. 1
3 Mr . Johnston. DId you expect thle Ingtruction to be carrled
4 out, that the ffle woula not leave the OffIco until had
5 gIven your pergonal approval or FItzgerald had approved It?
6 AMLASH Ca8e Offfcer. Yeg , I would have thought that my
7 secretary would not have permItted thfo fIle to leave unlegg
8 cleared.
9 Mr. Johngton. We prevlously dlecussed whether Mr . KIng
:
10 knew about the operatlon.
11 Did he speclflcally know, to your knowledge , about the
1
12 AMLASH operation In the fall of 1963?
1
13 AMLASH Case Officer. I don t know . I never briefed him
14 personally.
:
15 Mr; Johngton Did you have any reason to know that he
16 did know about AMLASH czeration?
17 MMLASH Case Officer. No .
18 Mr . Johnston Our noteb Indicate that on February 4th,
1
19 1964 , King sent a memo to you requirements for AMLASH , and
8
20 I'11 show You our notes . They basically detail questions , 1
21 intelligence information to be gathered from AMLASH _
4 22 AMLASH Cage Officer. I don t gpeclfically remember receiving
1
23 thlg, but if have certainly the fact that we have an
1
8 24 asset who can surface any Intelllgence requirements from the
25 community or anybody else in the Agency , it would be perfectly
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Mr .
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1 norzal tor anybody to B0nd tnazo' roqulronentd
2 Mr _ Johngton . Would you agree , at loabe . Erom that summary
1
3 of the document, that really he'0 a8kIng to Intelllgence_
4 type Information from AMLASH?
5 Ib that correct?
6 AMLASH Cage Offlcer. Yes .
7 Mr . Johngton, And gIven tha October Sth , 1963 meeting when
8 AMLASI gort of Indicated he dldn't want anything to do wIth
that, thfe would be very IncongIgtent for gomeone who wab
:
10 knowledable about AMLASH .
11 AMLASH Case Officer. What are the dates?
1
12 Mr _ Johnston. October Sth, 1963 , 19 when AMLASH complaine
c 1 13 about the low level espionage regulrements .
AMLASH Case Officer. He did not want Gt he did not say 14
1
15 that he would not surface Intelllgence requfrements . He did
not want to exclua:vely be that type of an asset. 16
So therefore it woula be perfectly normal regardlesg of 17
what he thought himself to be_ or what even we may have thought
18
1
for him to be , that ff he had acces 9 to information, we were 19
8
going to levy the requfrements on him.
20 |
Mr Johnston. My direct question is , then , having read
21
1 the summary apparently prepared by Mr. King, and sent on 22
1
February 2nd , 1964 , do you think that Mr . KIng knew about thc
23
1
AMLASII operation , the events of October and November?
8 24
AMLASH Cage Officer. If he gent us a memo giving us
25
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requlrementd {or AMLASH; at' MInLmum ho had to know that w0 had
1
2 an agent wIth 'thfe particular accebs . But he knew about the
3 oporatlon?- Not necesgarfly 80 .
4 Mr . Johnston. Do fInd thls confstent with tho
5 nature of the operation 49 of November 22nd , 1963?
6 AMLASH Cage Offlcer. Explaln that_ I don' € underetand _
7 What aro you what 19 your question?
8 Mr Johnston. Ag of November 2 2nd _ 1963 , you were now
9 Involved In coup plotting wIth AMLASH , and were delfverIng or
3
10 planned to dellver the equfpment , rffle8 , sIghts , explosIves
11 to a8919t hlm In that coup. It geem8 Inconslstent , guddenly In
~ 1
12 February , to go back to tryIng to esplonage Information
1 13 from him.
2
14 AMLA SH Case Officer _ First of a1l , I have to address
15 that questlon from this point. Receiving a memo from at
{
16 that time doesn t necessarily mean that we are going to levy
17 the reguirements on AMLASH .
18 Mr _ Johnston . Oh , I agree Aith that.
1
19 AMLASH Case Officer. to clarify the other part of your
9
20 guestion , that if we needed intelligence after the October 1
21 '63 meeting in whlch he said m not going to be strictly a
4 22 gource for intelligence , I want to do something more for my
1
23 country, Jt would not be in any way out of the orderinary to
1
8 24 aBk him to bend information that we felt was required on thc
25 outside _
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King
So ,
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Mr _ Johngton 80 you' aro saylng you would not Infer Erom
2 thfs documont- 4 zonclusfon ono way or the other about whether
1
3 Mr . xnew the detallo of tha AMLASH coup plotting.
4 AMLASH Cag0 Otflcer. No .
5
Mr = Johngton . Ab 4 fInal matter from my polnt , 88 w0 did
6 In your past meetInge , could you brlefly bumarize , were you
7 contacted prlor to today' 8 Bes8lon at the Agency , and dLd
8 dlecu88 your testImony or the ramlflcationg of Your teetlmony
~
9 wIth anyone at the Agency? :
10 AMLASH Cabe Offfcer. I wa 9 called yesterday mornIng ,
11 February IOth, by Mr . Walter Elder , and Informed that I wag
5
12 to come here at 10:00 0'clock to discugg the AMLASH operation ,
1 13 and that you would be over yesterday afternoon to mark those
0 14 portlong of the ffle that you wIghed to discus8 _
15 I picked up the files from the review staff last night and
{
16 came hcre this mornIng.
17 Mr _ Johnston. Did discuss the gubstance or propoged
18 substance of your testimony with anyone?
1
19 AMLASH Cabe officer. No _ I read the file and informed
8
20 myself as to thoge points that you wanted to talk about. 1
21 Mr . Johnston. That 9 all the questiong we have
4 22 I wan t to thank you very for spending the time with
1
23 us today .
1
9 24 Is there any other comment would like to make?
25 AMLASH Caso Officer. No , not at all.
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you
you
much
You
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1 You To qufte walcome 1
2 (Mhoreupon , at 1.15. 0 'clock Pam; tha hearIng In the above-
3 entItled matter wa9 concluded.)
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Bxkbft
An Extrect From Kennedy" 8 Addreg 8 co Pre 88
Washington_Pogt, Tuegday , November T9 T963 _ P= A15
(AP) Nov_ 18 The following L8 8 cexc of Pres[dent Kennedy" 8 addre88
confght be fore the Inicer-American Pres 8 Association :
Mie The genutne Cuban revolution because it wo8 against che cyran-
ny and corruption _ of the Past T E had the 8upport o € many whose aims and
concept8 were noble _
"But that hope for freedom and progresg wag destroyed,
"The goal8 proclalmed In ck? Sierra Maestra were betrayed In Havana _
Ic 18 Important co restace what now divide8 Cuba from my country
and from a11 che American countrtes Ic 18 the fact chat a small band
of conspirator8 has stripped the Cuban People of their freedom &nd hand -
ed over the independence and 8overeignty of the Cuban nation co forces
beyond the hemisphere_ They_have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperial-
Ism, an inscrument of the polfcy of others a weapon in an efforc dic-
tated by external Powers co subvert che other Amerlcan republics This _
and this alone divides uS As long as chis 18 crue nothing 18 possible.
Withouc it everything 18 Possible.
Ready and Anxious
"Once chis barrier 19 removed will be ready and anxious co work
with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which a few
short ag0 stirred their hopeg and the sympathy of many
:
the entire hemi sphere.
Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken prom-
Ises of forefgn ccuununism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere_
For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of
friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic insti-
1i cutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people.
* * X
we
People Ehzoughouts
"No