Transcript of 157-10014-10006.pdf
==================================================
Page 1
==================================================
157-10014-10006] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination Syster Date: 7/712015
Identification For
Agency Information
AGENCY SSCIA
RECORD NUMER 157-10014-10006
RECORD SERIES HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER 01-H-08
Document Information
ORIGINATOR SSCSGO
FROM: ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTY
TO
TITLE :
DATE : 01/22/1976
PAGES : 74
SUBJCTS
ANGLETON, JAMES
CIA, METHODOLOGY
MILER, SCOTTY
DEFECTORS
FBI
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT TYPE TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION Secret
RESTRICTIONS Consulted
CURRENT STATUS Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/1997
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS : Box
v9.1
HI 50955 DocId:32423394 Page 1
Top
==================================================
Page 2
==================================================
Date 07/31/95
Page 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY ~gese0 SSci^
RECORD NUMBER 157-10014-10006
RECORDS SERIES HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER 01-H-08
Tr Ooood
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR SSCSGO
FROM ANGLETON JAMES ; MILER , SCOTTY
TO
TITLE
DATE 01/22/76
PAGES 74
SUBJECTS ANGLETON JAMES
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
CIA METHODOLOGY
FBI
MILER , SCOTTY
DEFECTORS
DOCUMENT TYPE TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 06/24/97
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS Box 1
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
HM 50955 DocId:32423394 Page 2
==================================================
Page 3
==================================================
Orc7L
47617TZE "RE7zfoM T0? SECRET
%ecreio55enorhe 8 un ubJece
Vol T 92 3
COCr1ufnaliUinczione;
@lpr Jluitrd Etatrg Bruate
R3352
Report of ['roceedinga
Uts
2727_
8
Hearing held belore
;
Senate Select Comlttee to study Governmental
Operationg With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Thureday , January 22 , 1976
Washington, D.C
(Stenotype Tape and Waate turned over
Lo the Commfttee for destruct fon)
WARD PAUL
10 FIKST StRfKT_ S, "
WASHINGTON, D. ( 20003
(202) 644-m000
TC?
DvINtDalED
Jn ON_F
==================================================
Page 4
==================================================
Bian
7oDHITT
0 C @ n I En : 6
1 TESTIMONY OF PAGE
1 3 Jameg Angleton
~accompanfed
4 Scotty Miler
5
6
8
9
10
11
{
12
1 13
14
15
~
16
17
18
2
19
20 1
21
4 22
1
23
1
2 24
25
TOP SECRET
by--
3
==================================================
Page 5
==================================================
AHA / 871'
TORSEI
FOREIGN AND MILITARX SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING 8
2
!
3 Thursday , January 229 1976
4
5 Unfcod States Senate
6 Select Committee Lo study Governmental
7 Operat ions with Respect to
8 Intelligence Activities ,
9 Washington, D . C .
10 The Committee met , pursuant to notfce , at 2 :10 0' clock
11 p.m . , in Room S-407 , the Capitol_ the Honorable Gary Ilart
{
12 Presiding _
8 13 Present : Senators Hart Colorado (presiding) and
}
14 Schweiker
15 Also present : Wvilliam G Miller, Staff Director; and <
16 Joseph diGenova Charles Kirbow _ Jim Johnston Brict Snider _
17 Loch Johnson Elliot Maxwell Elizabeth Culbreath Bob Kellcy ,
18 Michael Epstein, Rick Inderfurth , Charles Lombard and Pat Shea
1
19 Professional Staff Members
20 1
2]
M 22
1
23
1
8 24
25
TOP SECRET
1
0 f
3
==================================================
Page 6
==================================================
TOR SCT
1
1 2 [ @ E E E @ { n @ €
1 2 Senator Iart of Colorado Gentlemer , let '$ go ahead and
3 be sworn and get under 1f way you don : mInd_
0 you swcar the testimony
You re about to give will be
the truth, che whole truth, and nothing but the cruth, 80 hclp
You God?
Mr Angleton _ I do .
8 Mr _ Milor. I do
9 Senator Hart of Colorado Thank you very much
10 Mr Angleton at least has been- be us before_ and
11 routinely
we remind a)1 witnesses that preserve all of {
12 their constitutional
rights , including thc 0 right to counsel
1
13 the right remain silent and So forth and So and to have
14 a member of the Committee present during all of the tes timony _
15 It i5 my understanding
we have no
{
prepared statements to
16 start with, So I think I 11 just open it up to staff questions
17 and interject some of my own , and I understand that the general
18 subject matter to be discusged here and we are interesdedl
12
19 in Your expertise regarding thc question 0f 8
counterintelligence_
20 So we 11 just havc the staff members start . 1
21
5 22
1
23
1
8 24
25
TOP SECRET
1
Do
fore
they
to
on ,
today
==================================================
Page 7
==================================================
4O 5KTTT
8
1 TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON 1
2 ACCOMPANIED BY ScOTTY MILER 1
3 Mr Johnson = I wonder If wa could begin by having both
4 of your gentlemen gIve u9 bome Information on your backgrounds_
5 beginning wch Mr , Angle
6 Angleton. I entered the OSS In 1943 from the
went Into training In Waghington and envfrons and then to
London_ and then eventually to and I took over 49
Chief, Counterintelligence In Italy , and eventually
took over
10 a5 Chie€ , OSS .
11 I returned In about '47 , and various jobs in both
{
12 espionage and counterintelligence .
At one time Chief of
8
13 Operations and eventually Chief of Counter 'intelligence _
$ and
14 that Was from about 1954 until 1974 _
15 Mr . Johnson _ Mr . Miler?
:
16 Miler I entered OsS in 1946 . I was sent to China
17 I was in China until 1949 , transferred to Japan , became involvee
18 in intelligence aspects of the Korean War . I served In Thaf lanq
2
19 the Philippines _ as I said, China . Japan , Ethiopia _ I travcludl
8
extens ively , was a Station chie f abroad _ and for the last ten 1
2] years I have been in Counterinte lligencc , first in the
7 22 Special Investigations , and subsequently as Chief of Operat ions
1
23 for Mr Angleton $ Counterintelligence Sta f € .
8 24 And when I left the Agency in December of that wJ';
25 Iny position
TOP SECRET
ton ,
Mr .
Army ,
Italy,
'48 ,
Mr .
1
'74 ,
==================================================
Page 8
==================================================
TORSIT
8
1 Mr . Johngon . So both of you .left the CIA In December , 1974
{ 2 Since that tine wo understand there have been bome changes
1 3 in how coun- terintelligence
18 conducted a€ the CIA
4 Could You give 43 gome understanding 0€
thoge changes ?
5
Angleton . I would like to defer to Mr Mfler on this ,
6 If I may?
7
Mr _ Miler. Yes
8 My understanding 1g there have been gome rather fundamenta
and substantive changes which are 8 continuation_ actually,
10 of changes that were made first in 1973 , in of July 1973
11 when many of the centralized counterintelllgence functions werc 1
12 decentralized and reallocated to different components of the
1
13 Directorate of Operations Such things a5 agent approvals and
14 security, operational gecurity reviews for intelligence
15 collection and covert action operations the oversight on ~
16 intelligence operations and oversight on counterintelligence
17 operations in the field were decentralized Research and
18 Analysis hag been curtailed F and the emphasis on it has changedl
1
19 There have been changes in the record procedures
8
20 Johnson Could you be more specific on these changes, 1
21 for example , in research?
5 22 Mr. Miler. In reeearch , che research 18 now as I undcr -
11
23 stand pretty much on a case by case basis , not in an 1
8 24 overall perception of worldwide or na Itional counterintclligence
25 problems There 18 m0 the application of historical cases
TOP SECRET
Mr.
Mr .
it,
==================================================
Page 9
==================================================
TOP SCRTZ
8
1 hfetorlcal problema 18 not belng applfed ,
80 I underetand It , 8
{ 2 to current Operatlonal efforte or Investigatlve needs _ There 1
1 3 an entfrely different philogophy being applied
43 to what
4 be required Jn termg of understanding the counterintelligence
5 threat to thig nation There 18 very Iftele emphagi8 , 1f
6 concern wIth guch things 88 deception and dsinformation _ Therd
1s little applcation of analytical and a88es8ment work to the
overall role o€ forelgn intclligence
and security gervices in
political action .
10 There have been some fundamental changes in operational
11 philosophies stemming from an application of what i9 termed
1
12 management by objectives as it is being applied in the CIA to
0
11 13 operations and there i9 a m 44 has been a distinct change in
14 some of the attention which has been previously placed on the
15 problem o€ penetration Erom foreign and particularly hostile
~
16 intelligence services into the American community
17 And there has been a very, very subgtantive change in
18 the perception and the conduct of counterintelligence in chat
1
19 therc has been what is in my view a scrious erosion
i
20
of security and compartmentation of operations leakage 1
21 information which has not becn to the best interests 0f
' 22 3 national counterin telligence effort
1
23 Mr. Johnson So , from going a rather centralizedl
8 24 apparatus to a decentralized ' situation , the dangers of penetrat:
25 have increased _
TOP SECRET
may
any ,
very
and
of
from
1
==================================================
Page 10
==================================================
TOR SEGRET
1 Mr . Miler The dangerg of penetration have Increaged
8
1 2 9fgnlficantly , and thlg extends al80 to the methode by which
1 3 relationg with foreign intelligence services are conducted _
Mr Johnson = But how do You respond to the criticfem that
during your tenure and Mr_ Angleton 8 tonure , too tight
roin wab kept on counterintelllgence Information , and Indlvicluals
In che ffeld at; the station level fafled to get cha Information
needed to conduct thefr counterintellfgence operatfon?
Mr . Miler. I would have to respond to that , Mr . Johnson ,
10 and I could only respond to ft in the context of speclfics .
11 To my knowledge , and as practiced from my position Chief
1
12 Operations , whenever there was information which was judged
1 13 to be of significance , importance Eo a field station , chat
14 field station wag advised , unless there was gome overriding
15 security source protection or other considerations and the {
16 decision then not to advise them was made at the Deputy
17 Director for Operations _ as it is now called , or the Director
18 level
1
19 There was, certainly , a very tight security , a very
8
20 tight compartmentation of counterintelligence information and
1
2] activities , which in my view was essential and still is
22 essential = and will be even more essential in the future if
1
23 we are to regain 3 counterintelligence initiative and do
1
24 our job in the future And I think this 19 the Eundamental
8
25 question that the management of the CIA and the Senate and the
TOP SECRET
they
0f a5
m
to
==================================================
Page 11
==================================================
TORTCRD
1 Executfve have Co declde , 18 do we want counterIntelllgence
8
2 effort, and Jf 80 , chen W0 have to get to It, and we have to !
1 3 put Dur best m{nds to Jt.
4 Mr Johngon _ Were there Instances .during perfod in
5 counterintelligence where the Counterintelligence Staff would
6 conduct Jcb Own counteresplonage activitles , wIthouc the knowledge
7 of che various geographic dfvislon chlef8?
Mr Miler . There were very few of them , with the chiefs .
There may have been bome
Mr Johnson In those cases where there were Buch
10
operations , were they cleared with the DDO? -
11
1 Mr . Miler. Every single one of them wag cleared with the
12
DDO and/or the Director and/or the Deputy Director. 1 13
Mr Johnson On important counterespionage operations ,
14
could you tell us in more detail what the approval and clearanc
15
;
16
process is?
We know that for covert action the 40 Commlttee frequently
17
becomeg involved_ What about for important counterespionage
18
1
19
operations?
i
Mr , Miler: We 11 Mr Angleton might want co qualify my
20 7
response, because Obviously he was involved more in this
21
than I was , but there would be the two primary considerations
1 22
1
Onc was a strfctly CIA, counterintelligence or counterespionaqe
23
1
activity. The derivation of the authority for this came from
24
the statutes which get up the CIA and from National Security
25
TOP SECRET
your
8
==================================================
Page 12
==================================================
TORECREI
s }
1
Councfl directiveg 53 , 55 and 80 forth . The authority rebted
2 In there . The approval would go to the Eher DDP now Deputy
1
3 Director for Operationg , the Deputy Dlractor and/or the
4 Director
5 The authoritics , 1f It were a sfgnfflcant counterintelligeiice
6 or counterespionage cage , the authorftfes_ 48 I understood it
7 then, might require the Director to go outside the Agency to
the White Iouse or the Attorney General and 90 forth_
8
Alternatively , we Jn the CI Staf f mlght be dlrected to
9
coordinate thfb wlth the FBI . We d go to the FBI, explain
10
the cabe and So forth. The FBI would then go to the Attorney
11
the Departnent of Justice and authorfties , whatever
12
authorities would require in order to pursue the invest i 1 13
gations conduct the case , and do it according to whatever
14
stipulations that the Department of Justice would on it
15
in order either neutralize the suspected SpY or agent , ama?/or ~
16
conclude the case by prosecution _
17
And I am talking now of primarily in termg of a serious
18
1 countcrespionage case involving an American citizen _
19
8 Mr Johnson Mr Angleton do you know of any instances
20
1
where che CI Staff or higher authority Kithin the CIA went
2]
outsidc the Agency for approval for important counterespionage
w 22
1
23
operatlons?
1
Mr . Angleton. I know of cuscs ,
24 8
Mr _ Joinson And what would the approval system be?
25
TOP SECRET
woul
get
they
pue
to
Yes
==================================================
Page 13
==================================================
TORSCRZI
{
1 Mr Angleton Well, It would be an ad hoc discusafon
0
2 between the Dlrector and the Secretary and probably others , 1
3 the Attorney Genoral
4 Mr . Johnson. Does this happen frequently? Is thfe a typidal
procedure for 8 major counter operatlon?
6 Mr Angleton If ft'9 a major mattor , It'8 on the basis
7 of need to know
You have another kind of case where a foreigner came to
Me and stated his government had a defector from the Bloc , an
10 excellent agent , and they would be prepared to give us the agent
11 i€ we would take it over lock , stock and barrel handle it
{
12 in such a Eashion that there would be no exposure, because 0f
1 13
the political consequences
to their government .
14 I would go to the Director and the Deputy Director, spe ] 1
out the matter and come to a determination with them whether 15
~
16 we wanted to take the case on . This particular case involved
17
not only a person who had been in the intelligence service of
the opposition a long tine but he had access Eo codes ana a)sd 18
1
a great deal of deciphered material So it was kicked back
19
9
and forth, and there was a determination made that we would 20
1
21 take It over , the staff would take it over in its entirety _
And therefore it meant that I called in Scotty and we % 22
11 pulled together our team, we sent them abroad Ie handled the 23
man in che field for a lonc time and then eventually brought 24 8
him back here _
25
TOP SECRET
1
==================================================
Page 14
==================================================
TOP SECRE
In 8 Ca80 of that bort & the Instructlon wab agreed upon 8
1 2 by all concerned , and the Dlrector 8 Instruction Wag that the
1 3 Division was not to be Informed , the Dlviglon where this
Individual came from, the Bloc area , should not be Informed ;
5 that the Bureau, two or three people Jn the Bureau by
name should be Informed , and that we would run the operatlon
7 and the Individual at the end _
8 ic went along
9 Mr Johnson _ Did you say che Indfvidual"?
10 Mr Angleton. I m not using it in your Committee terms
11 Mr . Kirbow You d better clear that up Eor the record _
1
12 Mr Miler . We; would integrate him in the Nerican
1 13 society in such 'a way that he would be non-identifiable .
14 Mr Angleton Ie would be buried _
15 Mr . Miler . May I just: add here also that the authoritie; 2
16 the; approval are very specific Jn ters of the agents and the
17 CIA ' $ responsibility to advige and get the approval of the
18 Attorney General in bringing someone 1ike this into the
1
19 United States
3
20 The Director this approval It was a formal lettcr 7
21 to the Attorney General a formal reply . There was a formal
4 22 but very limited advice to the Immigration . Al of the lega l
1
23 requirements required by the Attorney General Immigration ,
: 24 all other agencies , were done However in this instance , the:
25 were done on a narrow , gelect basis,/directly to Attorncy
TOP SECRET
only
bury
Now
"bury
to
got
very
==================================================
Page 15
==================================================
TOPISCRE?
11
General and 80 forth, rather than to go through the norma] 1L
2 bureaucratic chain of command oue of the CIA and It8 various
1 3 components ,
4 Mr _ Angleton . Mith the added fact that we dld not digclosc
5 all of the facts, nor Identity.
6 Now thig 19 important_ because the Indlvidual wab of
7 such prominence that the 'country concerned would be placed in
Jeopardy diplomatically , the place where he was rcsfding on
tour_ There would be Intenslve Investigatlong by his head -
10 quarters and therefore we had to have covers And 30 we
11 laid on in such a fashion that another service received infor-
12 mation regarding the target country that would induce them to
9 13 take certain observable actions and then to spread the word
14 that the fellow had actually defected to another coun So
15 chat their entire investigative thrust would be directed toward
1 16 that country .
bepin 2
17 Senator Hart of Colorado So we ve calked about
18 process , and I think we 11 going on it, and return to
1
19 it, but I would like to quantify some 0 f this if I can
8
20 First of all, terms of definition , 1s the phrase or 1
21 the term "counterintelligence interchangeable with counter-
4 22 espionage?
1
23 Mr _ Ang leton It can bc I think technically counter-
1
24 intelligence regarded to be all forms of inves tive
9
25 activity , cravel control Your data filc8 , your dossicrs , al1
TOP SECRET
cry,
ent'
far
keep
by
i9 tiga
==================================================
Page 16
==================================================
ToRSCT
o2 the syatema chat go Into counterintelllgonce 80 Buch_
1
Out of that emerge8 8 product, and One o2 the products 19
1
3 counteresplonage
Senator Mart of Colorado I s00 4
5 Bow blg Was the Counterintelllgenca Staff?
Mr . Angleton . When? Well when ft Wab in Its prime It
6
7 Wa8 around , Jt Wab 200 some odd people . After thie decentraliza
tion took place _ when wC lost internatlonal Communism , which in
8
no service in the world has It ever been dlvorced from
counterintelllgence ; logt our pollce division where we
10 30
trafn police from throughout the world; wo lost operation:
11
1 approval E which is approval of agents ; we lost our controls
12
over the Technical Services Division; we lost the geographic
1 13
representation; we lost liaison which was the liaigon was with
14
the FBI and 26 , other government agencies who do investigations
15 c
Mr . Miler . They took counterintelligence and liaison
16
away from the coun terintelligence component , if you can imagine
17
such 0 situation
18
1 Mr Angleton So that reduced u3 to less than 8 0 people,
19
8
and this comes to, Senator , 1f I can
just point to one of the
20 7
most important things in the legislation or in whatever the
21
Executive does , is chat You cannot have in my view a Director
5 22
1 of the FBI and a Director of CIA who are Independent o € one
23
1
another _ You have to have some higher authority :o whom you
24 8
can make an appea l when decisions of thig gort are made 50 tha:
25
TOP SECRET
16
2
we
==================================================
Page 17
==================================================
7ORS IR7T
It 1a alred, and It 10 not done without the knowledge of anyone 1
2 and then break8 , 48 I6 ald , In the New York Tlmeg and what not
3 Mr Johnson Yesterday we had the Bureau representatives
telling 49 that there wag really no problem or conflfct when
It came to questlona of thfs, and that there Wa8 no problem
wfth higher authority: {' Apparently YOu "wauld~e %o:
disagree with that .
Mr . Angleton. I disagree.iri 'fotal with:that: 'm baying
thc
decline In the Bureau over 20 yearb from when had very high
;
10 grade counterintelligence until today when there hag probably
~ 11 been well , it is least effective_
{
12 Senator Iart of Colorado 1s that?
11 13 Mr _ Angleton _ Well _ I think it has to do with the numbc r
14 of diversiong it had in the days of the Vietnam war, when
15 Internal security lost a tremendous number of men to other
~
16 a8signments and duties _
17 Second I don 't think that counterintelligence
or the
18 real thrust of Soviet Bloc Intellfgence
ever been brought
1
19 up to policy level , and more important any thing, that involves
8
20 penetration hag always been awept under the rug . In other 1
2] wordg the question penetration in this governnent or
m 22 penetration in any agency has never been brought Eo a responsible
1
23 level of finding out how it happened and what gone wrong
1
24 And let 9 take onc dlefcctor who said in this case he 8
25 spent 16 years in the Soviet Union in the KGB , Me gave us
TOP SECRET
they
Nhy
hasg
o f
has
==================================================
Page 18
==================================================
TORSZ
1 over 180 Jeads of penetration In France , end It occabloned my 8
2
drafting 8 letter fOr Mr McCone to give to President Kennedy {
le L
1 3 to give to DeGaul DeGaul secretly B0nt to this country one
of hlg highest trusted mflftary men . He was here Incognito _ Me
met with the defoctor for three days .
6 The French origlnal reaction to President Kennedy 8 letter
was , It wab Soviet provocation _ becauge thfs Wag at the stage
when France was making certain very sen8tive agreements In ^the
atomic ffeld and otherwise with the United States , and therefore
10 these allegationg of penetration had a very dlrect bcaring on
11
those negotiations And 30 the General who came over was
{
12
totally prepared to believe this was provocation_ but after
0
13
three days with the defector, in 3 mceting with Ielns and
14 mysel€ , he stated wvithout any question that this man was 100
15 percent bona fide, because he could ask him those guestions c
16 right on the nerve of their secrets , and he the responses K
17 Now , this defector also gave considerable data on the
18 status of penetration in the U.S . Governnent documents which
1
19 he had seen in Moscow cryptonyms of opera agents_ documents,
3
20
which could only have been Prepared by our organization , and]
1
21 many other cages going back into the early 50s going alnost
m 22 to Cabinet level So all of this information was made available
1
23 to the Dureau Dut in due course Mr . Hoover regarded or made
1
24 che pronouncemcnt and I won t say when he makes a pronounee: 8
25 that Jt 19 one that ha8 been recommended to him from higher
TOP SECRET
got
ting
==================================================
Page 19
==================================================
TOPAGE
15
level 08 that the defector In questlon wab probably
0 Provoca- |
2 tion , and the Bureau ceaged contace wlth that Indfvidual , and
3 I would gay have not had any contact wich him since 1965
4 Senator Hart of Colorado _ Why did loover make that
5 decfsfon?
6 Mr Angleton _ Well among other thingg , thfe defector
wanted to have accesg to ongolng and to past cases with the
view that he had a tremendou8 amount of data that he could not
K
relate to anything , but If he could gee things chat were going
10 on , chen ft woula be meaningful to him in term? of what he had
11 to contribute_ And I can take the example that , with another
1
12 allied service; immediately we brought them into t and he had
1 13 seen certain naval documents that dealt with infrastructure and
14 budget _ This happened to be British.
15 In time found the documents and when presented
{
16 then to him, he could identify those he had Seen and those he
17 had not geen This led to the apprehenslon of Vassil _ who
18 was In the admiralty. And this wag the quality of his
1
19 information _
8
20 All chrough the west agents were apprchended on che basis 1
21 of hig information But there is a tremendous bulk of it which
4 22 i8 made uP of fragments made up of documents he ' s seen wherc
1
23 we have not been able to identify the document; a great number
24 of cryptonyms of reporting source8 Whcre we cannot find che 8
25 body to fit the cryptonym. So this 18 the reality . And he i$
TOP SECRET
chey
they they
YaJ?f
1
==================================================
Page 20
==================================================
VORSECRRI
16
belng contacted perhape by nIne different Intelllgence borvices
2 Now , there 18 no one who hag gupported the question of
1
his mala fides In other words overyone to 8 man , hag
stated that he 18 bona ffde that they have never been able to
disprove 8 atatement of fact chat he hae given 89 a btatement
fact, although do not necegbarfly agree wfth his hypothesef
That 1s the offlcial statement .
8 Mr Miler . I Jubt add two thlngs on thfs?
Firgt, Mr Johngon , It goeg back to the busine8g of 7
10 compartmentatlon and not adviging gtatlong In the case Mr .
11 Angleton cited the Paris 8tation of the CIA was not told
12 anything about the information and I think this 1g 4 very good
1 13 example of you would not
14 The second point I would like to follow uP on is with
15 respect to this defector 8 information , there were five leads 2
16 which were passed to the FBI about penetratlon which involved
17 the CIA , for action _ And One case was solved _ but it was
18 solved only after the FBI officlally sent 48 a letter say ing
1
19 that they concluded that there was no substance to chis
8
information 20 |
2 They had to reopen the investigation
4 22 Mr Angleton . And they also said: send it to the Army
1
23 Mr . Miler Yes send it to the Army _
1
24 Now they had to reopen the investigation when their
8
25 survefllance gpotted a man coming out of the Soviet embassy , and
TOP SECRET
they
May
why
==================================================
Page 21
==================================================
1ORS-E
17
1 I6 weg bubgequently proved that he wad 0 Boviet BPY
2 Mr Angleton . Now that {ndlvldual had performed fOur
1
3 separate nlgsiong for Soviet Intelligenca snce about 1938 or
4 '39 One , he had been dropped Sn by the Sovfetg Into Germany
6 On a mfssion with the WT set, to be captured In order Eo be
played back and to penetrate the German' Intelllgence.
Second _ he had moved from that Into the penetration of
Viasev
the Vassflov movement whfch were the captured Russians' in the
Vlasov
German: In the Vassilov Army. :
10 Thfrd , he had penctrated the antf-Soviet forces in Germany
11 and then he wab taken on by 48 in 1948 or '51 18 when
1
12 sent to renew his inks .
So he was with uS from 51 to around 60 . 1 13
14 Well when the defection occurred it was 62 .
15 Mr . Johnson. And Mr _ Angleton , You uged a term that is
:
16 unfamiliar to us : his inkg .
Mr Miler Secret inks . 17
Mr Angleton Secret Inks In other words the Germans 18
1
19 had captured 2 Soviet agent who had the same kind of
3
inks , and so therefore the inks were compromised , 50 chey laid 20 7
21 on a large operation in Bcrlin and trained him in highly
5 sophisticated inks _ And he is now residing not too far
22
1
23
distant from 4S
1
But I might add that it is very important to note that whiie
8 24
we maintained that he 19 a Soviet agent , and the Bureau disagreed
25
TOP SECRET
they
==================================================
Page 22
==================================================
CORSeerEt;
18
1
and told 49 to bend thfs off, wo had 4 dovelopment occur which
0
2 lt 18 not necessary for me to go Into, ft' 8 still a relatively
1
1 live cage, In which proof positive came thae he was 8 Sovfet
agent , and it was in che face of that proof pOsItive that the
Bureau moved in and interrogated hlm. And thet 18 what Prompted
him to go to the Soviet embassy =
7 And after gome haurg there he came out, he wag abked
did go to the Soviet embassy , and ho gafd I went chere to
my personal history and particulars regarding my" family
10 since those are the questiong you have bcen asking Mo In
other words instead of Mrt4l in thig case the man had a wife
11
1
12 who wJs having an affalr off and on with a Japanese military
0
person here instead o€ recruiting the Japanese and the wife 1 13
to work in to him, because what we wanted was a confession ,
14
because the point I want to stress here i8 in a case of this
15
sort , a penetration there , he is not chere a9 a solo person
16
He is there as a spottcr. He is a person used for en trapment
17
abroad. He 18 a person who can originate an operation ,
18
1
induce You to go into the operation and bring in a weak
19
8
element and put then in a position for Further recruitment
20 1
21 And I can stretch this on and on
And the classfc example is the Philby case piilby
7 22
1
would have been Chie€ of British Intelligence . He was also
23
1 idcntified positively in thc end bY this defector . When the
24 8
defector first kner about it_ it was called the Ring of Five
25
TOP SECRET
wh;
You
get
F
==================================================
Page 23
==================================================
TORScT
19
Jn the Sovlet Intelllgence , {Lve people, Phflby belng one_
1
2 But from the cime he knew about It, In actual Eace I€
!
3 wa8 a ring that went into the twentles , beceube the Purpobe 1
of the penetration is 8 imply not co be 8 pa8sLve figure; Jt 1s
4
5 to be an aggresglve fIgure who creates 9ftuatlons for recruit-
ment. And that cabe hag never been prosecuted. The man has
never confessed _ He 8 never been broken . Am It was In
the heart of our SB , Sovfet Divfsion actfvitleb .
Senator Hart of Colorado Could you 48 , back to the
quantification, could You give 43 gome fIgure8 for nunbers of
10
counterintelligencc cases handled per year?
11
1
12 Mr _ Angleton _ Scotty, you can
Senator Mart of Colorado Just S0 we can have an idea 1 13
of the magnitude of Volume
14
Mr . Miler_ Well _ for example one_ program that we had
15 F
going was an attempt to record tration recruitment attempts
16
of U.S . , Amcrican officials abroad , strictly abroad _ And over
17
a ten year period the number of attempts to recruit and
18
1 penetrate hit close to 1200 _ So we were running around 250 0<
19
8
50 a ycar, just in that one small area of counterintelligenca
20 1
21 concern
Thc number 0f cases that we had would vary , but I would
9 22
1
say that Erom defectors in the last ten year, from Soviet
23
1
ana Soviet Wloc clefectors , wC averaged around 150 cases a
24 8
year. ~At one time I do knon' that at one time we had over
25
TOP SECRET
yet
glve
Pene-
==================================================
Page 24
==================================================
73RSCR.
20
1 500 active cabe8 which regulred Investigation.
8
{ 2 We were concerned wIth approxlmately 140 to 160 double H
1 3 agent operations a Year, We had Investigations which would
Probably have a range , 25 to 30 , sfgnfficant Investlgatlons
that wero going Jn addition to whfch we would have a
number of investigationg , leadg and operation8 with cooperative
forelgn intclligence and gecurity gervices which would probably
hit an average of about 50 , 1f You would _
9 There were other operatlons which were generated from other
10 investigations and S0 forth, leads from the FBI , leadg from
11 the military services , which would perhaps hit 30 or 40
12 a year
1 13 Senator Mart 0 f Colorado What about the number of cascs
14
involving penetration , successful or otherwise , of the Agency
15 itself? {
16 Mr _ Angleton . Well , the basic responsiblity would be
17 the ffice of Security. In other words we would work with
18 them , but it tends to be a one way street, 29 Jt should be
8
19 namely , they are responsiblc for personncl for installatiors _
6
20 But from the one defector alone I would say there were five
1
21 hard lcads
4 22 Senator Mart of Colorado Over what period of time?
1
23 Mr _ Angleton _ Of this one defector who came out in
24 December 0 € '61 But his leads were going back to 51 , 1951
9
25 Mr . JiGenova . Ig this the same defector with whom che
TOP SECRET
on ,
and
1
==================================================
Page 25
==================================================
TOR SECRLT
FBI ha8 had no contact #Ince . 19652
0
! 2 Mr Angleton. That 0 correct .
1 3 Mr. diGenova _ Nag the Agency had any contact wich him
since 1965?
5 Mr Angleton. Yes , we ve had it, but we ve had our
6 ups and downs
7 Mr diGenova And what have those upB and downs been
8 attributable to?
9 Mr . Angleton _ Well are baslc 4 O well , first, there
10 are two diffcrent attitudes In the Amerlcan intelligence
11 community regarding defectors _ One of them is Eo gfve them
1
12 the harsh treatment to creat then as second clasg citizens
8 13 and we actually have taken on more salvage cases in the
3
14 Counterintelligence Staff and rehabilitated these people_ In
15 fact, we came into that case basically because the fellow hac 3
16 gone sour And
17 Mr Kirbow Meaning he had failed to continue cooperat
18 or was not giving You the right information?
1
19 Mr Angleton That' s right Nell no , it was simply tkJt
8
20 he refuscd to cooperate any further, becausc one didn t appre - {
1 21 ciate the ideological reasons for his defection _
% 22 So these ups and downs would go on I mean , we would
1
23 havc to change case officers because would gimply have
1
breakdown in communication 24 8
25 Mr dicenova _ Did the failure of the FBI to utilize this
TOP SECRET
thcy
and
in
they
==================================================
Page 26
==================================================
TOP SdT
as8et Inhibft you In any way from uslng the abbe€ Or the Agency
8
2
from utflizing It? 1
3 Mr . Angleton . Absolutely , because 80 much of the Infor- 1
mation that we wanted to take uP with him Was 4l90 related to
4
5 FDI information
Mr diGenova . In other words needed aCce89 to
6
information the FBI had , and You couldn t It?
Mr Angleton. We could get Jt but they wouldn €
permigsion chat their information would be submitted to him_
Mr diGenova In other words you had a thfrd agency
10
rule blocking
11
1 Mr . Angleton. A third agency , als0 in the attitude
12
For instance in one session in which I participated, the 1 13
Bureau asked him to the name of a source He refused to
14
c:
it on the grounds that the man was in the KGB wag a
15
friend of his , and he didn €. want chat man 8 nane ever to
3
16
back to the KGB because ft would mean the man 8 life.
17
And therefore he had a dlrect confrontation, re fusing to
18
end
3
19
it, very understandable
8
Mr diCenova Was this lack 0 f cooperation directly
begin 20
L
attributable :o Mr . Hoover , to your knowledge?
21
Mr _ Angleton. no
4 22
1
Mr diGenova Was this problem ever brought to the
23
attention of the President of the United States at any tine?
24 8
Mr Angleton _ No but he rafsed it wich the Attorney
25
TOP SECRET
you
get
glve
you?
give
give
get
give
1
==================================================
Page 27
==================================================
TORSC2E
23
8
General Mr . Kennedy , he had 8 dfrect meeting wIth hlm .
8
{ 2 Mr dlGenova And what , 1f anything, happened?
1 3 Mr _ Angleton. Only encouragement _
4 Mr . diGenova Could You amplify on that?
5 Mr _ Angleton . Well the Attorney General handled him
very well indeed _ but nothing further came out of lt.
7 Mr _ diGenova But there wag no commitment on the part of
the Attorney General to see if he could Mr lloover to
assfst the Agency?
10 Mr Angleton . Well the issue didn t come up in hat
11 fashion just the general the general agreement that he was
1
12 prepared to work for the United States at the highest level _
8 13 because the intelligence he had went far beyond s imply KGD _
1
14 It went into Soviet policy. It went into Soviet reorientation_
15 It went into Soviet Bloc _ It went into Soviet defense matters
{
16 It went into some of the major secrets And therefore it wasn
17 simply counterintelligence . It had to do with policy or
18
political action
2
19 [e knew , for example, the identity a Prime Minigter
3
20 who was 3 Soviet agent , who at that tine was trying to uS
1
21 to 9o into several political arrangements , and he knew
5 22 exactly how he Was recruited and how he was being used aS an
1
23 agent of influence
1
24 So these were matters that went beyond simply intellieen:`
8
25 scope _
TOP SECRET
budge
of
get
==================================================
Page 28
==================================================
TOPSECRET
24
{
Mr. Klrbow Iow long 1e 8 Man Iike that good for_ Mr . 8
{ 2 Angleton? I mean , by thfs time , or 8 decade from now , a lot
1 5 of that information 1s of no longer any value to You_
1 Mr Ansl- *0l . :ui Lhal 6 not &u. It 19 a fact that thc
5 man 8 computer mind . In other word8 , Jf You took a11 of
hlg Interrogation reports , chey ran to Bome 20 f1l1ng cabinetg
try to have anyone retaln in thelr mind, apply that
game data against a now problem that comeb uP, It requlres an
individual who lived that to be able co look at 8 cabe thae
10 has arisen, hc knowg the case officer on the Soviet sidc ,
11 and can give an analysis that thig fcllow was on the Scandi
{
12 navian desk and that he was promoted to this, and that his
1
13 background 1s ciphers He had not told You that he: was ciphers
14 before because it wasn t relevant . So it'9 a new added
15 factor {
16 And then you find that someone is known
17 as a code clerk and therefore the pieces begin to fit
18 together_ that the man who Was sent to the field by the Soviets
2
19 to handle some unknown American is 3 cipher expert , and thercfor
8
20 look among who are the code clerks
1
21 Mr diGenova I'd like to
4 22 Mr Miller Could I intcrrupt just 3 moment?
1
23 You spoke in this instance of 20 file cabinets from chc
1
2 24 interrogation of one defector.
25 Mr _ Angleton Yes
TOP SECRET
ha 8
You to
and
he
you
==================================================
Page 29
==================================================
TORISECRET
25
Mr _ Mller . Wha € kind of volune dld You together Jn
1
2 In thfg activity? If thls 18 the product of one
1 3 Interrogatlon , what kind of volume did you put together to
make a workable 1ity?
5 Mr _ Angleton_ Well che ffrst thfng Wab to computerlze
6 everything_ and the gecond wag to break lt out case by cage,
7 Drftish cabes , Australfan cages , New Zealand cages, Dutch
cases , Finnish cages , French cases , Itallan case8 , a1l the
way on across che board ; American cageg; and then to take all
10 of the data , all the voluminous stuff that wag pertinent
to each of the leads including the unknowns in other words
11
;
12 Unknown 1 , Unknown 2 , Unknown 3 , etc
So you had the abilfty to Pick out a file on X subject or 1 13
X individual and there would be the direct quotation from the
C 14
interrogation , and then whatever traces there were of follow-ups
15 ;
16 action taken , disgemination , etc
Mr . Miller. Just to pregg that yes
17
Mr . Miler I think your question 1s the total volume of
18
2
19 che Eiles that were available to the Counterintelligence?
8
Mr , Miller . Yes I was impressed by the fact that one
20 7
interrogation yielded: 20 file cabinets and was wondering the
21
22 total volume
1
Mr Miler . What were the figureg on the cases to read?
23
1
Mr . Angleton _ Well I think I've already presented that
24 8
but when we were dealing with the new management and it
25 once
TOP SECRET'
Put
your yearg
capabi
of
5
==================================================
Page 30
==================================================
TORSCRE 96
1
#ag all chig bubine8s of Objectlves and management by objectlved
0
2 and the Idea of changing Counterintelligence personnel every
!
two and new faceg and open It a1l uP and the rest of ft,
1 3
Wo ran a basfc job on many , 1€ You took 20 cases that were
4
for a Counterintelllgence officer to read= what the
Imporative
statfstlcal side would be Thoge 20 Cabes would run Into enoug}
6
fnear footage , which according to the mathematicians In the
would take 22 man to read , or 1f they were 100
Agency
incorrect , 11 yearg to read _ Thoge would be the 20
percent
bagic counterintelligence cases .
10
And the purpose of it was simply to show that it wa8 a
11
profession and that there had to be longevity to build up
12
Counterintelligence officers 1 13
Mr Johnson. Generally speaking , within the counterintel l[
14
organizations it seemsi tol you perform four activities:
15
6
liaison, research = operations and securi
16
Could us an idea of your Own Priorities in
17
of distributing manpower acrosg choge four activities?
terns 18
2 Can you break it out that way?
19
5
Mr Angleton _ Inell , it is difficult to break out, but
20
thing of all is the question penetration in tln
1
21 the primary
U,S , Govcrnment , and chen in allicd governments That w
5 22
In other words , when we had a defector from he 1
23
my priority.
1 scrvicc who had infornation 0f an agrecnent made between
Cuban
9 24
and the DCI in Cuba to work against the U.S _ and H1ow'
the KGB 25
TOP SECRET
years
how
Years
gence
ty .
give you
of
woulal
==================================================
Page 31
==================================================
TORSECRD}
27
they would dffferentiete the prloritlee , and areae Where the 1
1 2 KGB wab oversurvellled , the DGI woula cako over the gurveillance
1 3 of our pergonnel and 80 on .
4 The moment this defector arrived in the Unfted States , I
5 gent Scotty to the airport immediately to 808 him becaube that
the number one prlorlty. Here Wab an Individual whose job
Wab to work on Nerlcans and who allegedly had geen Information
8 from one of our enbass1es Now that i9 the highest prlority,
9 and particularly becauge information of a counterlntelligence
10 nature 18 perlshable_ Some 18 and some isn t,
11 Thc moment there is 2 defector _ the opposition rung
12 daage report. So know certain information will be known
11 13 to them immediately that is compromised, and they will take
C 14 action to correct it. But there are certain secrets that the
15 man knows that their damage report will not turn Those
{
16 You on the back burner _ But the ones you reach for first
17 are those that are perishable , and this 19 the prlority is
18 egtablished by the fact that here 18 8 1ive , highly valuable
A(
19 force, and only have So much time to extract the cream off
9
20 of him and determine those things that would digappear _
L
21
Miler. Dut the whole thrust 0f all of our operations _
22 research , analysis, everything , was toward that goal _ And
1
23 the reagon for the security 0f the compartnentation for
1
24 thc CI activity was to protect that concern.
8
25 Mr _ Lombard _ I wonder 1f I could ask a question concerning
TOP SECRET
you
up .
put
we
Mr
much} 4
of
==================================================
Page 32
==================================================
TORISREt
20
the Bureau .
8
2 Nould lt today 1f there wa9 a beparate Bureau under 1
3 the Attorney General for counterintelligence , separate from the
4 FBI?
5 Mr , Angleton. You aro posing tho 8ame problem that the
RCMP In Canada had . In other wordg _ be€ UP , I might add
because of u3, because wo brought them counterintelllgence
in a way had never been brought we brought them
down when thfs first defector , thig major defector came out ,
10 and the cases that were revealed to them , cryptonyms telegrams
11 that werc taken from them , an ambassador who was recruited _
12 one of their ambassadorg and all this, led in time to the
1 13 Canadian Prime Minister desirlng to set up a special counter-
14
intelligence = And S0 had this problem of how You take
15 a law enforcement force and what do you do about it. And
2
16 their ultimate decision wes that You had to keep it within the
17 RCMP You created the separate office' and You created sort
18 of a director general of but the cadre your people came
1
19 Erom the regular force , even though they are separated from
8
20 the rest the RCMP , and are independent of the Commiss iojer
|
21 of the RCMP I mean , are there for rations and quarters
7 22 Mr Lombard I guess what I had in mind wag more the
1
23 British model of the Yard having
{
24 Mr . Angleton Ncll the British model is the most 8
25 overexaggeratedl model in the world_ I think I can gufte
TOP SECRET
help
thoy
into
they into Jt,
they
It,
of thcy
they
==================================================
Page 33
==================================================
TOSCRET
29
honestly Btate that sInce Norld War II the Brftleh have never 0
{ 2 caught an agent where the lead didn t come Erom u8 or somebody
1 3 elge . It wag never self-generated _
4 Now , In the last year Or S0 maybe caught an agent ,
5 but up until that time have never caught an agent .
Mr Lombard _ So Your answer In effect , would be that
che counterintelligence function should wfthin the Bureau
Mr Angleton, That 13 correct I mean , not that it'$
Ideal _ but In terg of the realfties , in termg of the realities
10 It should be kept within the Bureau . It Bhould, be greatly
11 enlarged , and the head o€ that should be , In my view , a Deputy
12 Director of the Bureau .
? 13 Mr Lombard All right
8
14 Now let me ask you this . In your experience were there
15 problems where the law enforcement impded the running of :
16 counterintelligence or counterespionage operations domestically?
17 In other words , were there times when you would have liked to
18 have run an agent domestically for a longer perlod of time
1
19 in order to the rest of the guys , but they said no we v@
a
20 to cake this fellow to court now?
1
21 Mr Angleton _ That used to be prcvalent back in che 50s
4 22 'Today I don t think ve many cases 1 mean , I don ' t
11
23 think that the job i8 being done not in che last ten years
1
24 Mr Johnson _ Mr _ Angleton , when I asked You earlier 8
25 what your priorities were , You mentioned making sure that
TOP SECRET
they
they
atay
get
got
thcy got
==================================================
Page 34
==================================================
TORHT
were not penetrated In conducting Inveetigations to 800 if
We
1
In fact we were , which geemg to the Impresslon that
2 !
oriented , and thac wab your main priority.
1 3 are defenslvely
Well I think that how could You have it
4 Mr. Angleton_
6 any other
If You V0 got 8
cryptonym of telegrams dlgappearing and
6
7 are In posge88lon of che opposition
Johngon - But isn t che aggresgivc dlmension even
Mr
important and trying to penetrate the hogtile gervlce?
more
Angleton. Those are all kind of theoretical arguments
Mr . 10
11 to my way thinking _
Miler_ You have to know what you re penetrating firs
12 Mr .
0 Imean , this idea
running operations is
13 Mr
Angleton 1
not really understood =
14
To run a
double agent operation requires a trenendous
15
;
amount of manpower It i8 a commitment that very few
16
to run a double , I mean , to start;
understand _ If are going
ve to be able to keep 8 diary .
from the beginning , You
18
is thc real life is the real life of the agent
1
19 Now one
8 his doublc life, becausc You can have a question
the ochcr i9
20
that says , that agent You had threc 1
21 from his headquarters
back co him. You ve to
ag0 , would you plcase go
1 22
a diary of the ffctional lif0 in order
1
23 be ablc to read into
1
to answer
that questlon .
24 9
You ve to have mcetings .
Now this takes manpower
25
TOP SECRET
we glve
way?
of
of
people
you
17
got
and
got
yearg
got
==================================================
Page 35
==================================================
T) Ticd
You ve to be able to satfsfy the questlonnaltes and you
0
2 can go 2ll the way on down the 1Ine . Thfe tleg up thousands of
!
1 3 man-hour8 ,
4 Mr Johnson & Could You explaln that "gatisfy the
6 questlonnalres?
6 What doea that phrage mean , ~0 batfbfy the questionnafres? "
0 Mr . Angleton. The oppogition wants Co know fInd out
from bources the following questlons _
Mr. Miler. In other worde the requfrements they
9
10 on the agent .
Mr . Angleton. Now , that agent 1s allegedly in the CIR
11
1 and there 18 a penetratlon, then You are just going through
12
games , and they will play guch an operation _ They could have
1 13
a very senior penetration into the `Agency and play along on
14
a double in order to lead You to believe that they do not have
15
6
a penetration And they can tie up your manpower and put
16
doubles underneath him and another agent , and they can
17
him a radfo set, and wfth the radlo set they can glve him
18
1 crystalg , and he needs other crystalg , and t involves more
19
8
and more o€ your own personnel and manpower And You can
20
1
tfe up NSA monttoring all the inks
21
And S0 this idea that has all 0 € a sudden been novel
22
1 newly discovered in the Agency chat Counterintelligence must
23
1
be aggressive is in my view a joke _ It' 9 a joke _
24 8
Mr . Miler. You have to know what you re dealing with
25
TOP SECRET
got
your
Put
give
and
5
==================================================
Page 36
==================================================
LORHCRET
2
You have to understand the enemy Intelligence service before
2 You re golng to penetrate it, and You have to be gecure from
1
3 penetration yourself, and You then have to run that penetration
very gecurely and on a very compartmented basl9
5 Mr Angleton . And there 18 one added proviso , then , that
6 You can run a firgt rate double agent Jf you have 8
7 source superior to him that he 1s unaware of = In the war,
when we broke the German code It was no problem co run German
double agents because we could read thefr messages back to
10 their headquarters , re-enciphered , and the headquarterg messaqe?
11 back to the control back to our double So questions of
1
12 danger signals , questions of alerting him that he was under
1 13 control and So on was taken care of because of communications
C 14 intelligence _
15 @hen You don t have communications intelligence, then
:
16 thc only other source that is superior 18 penetration, that is,
17 somcbody who can read back from their headquarters how they are
18 in fact, absorbing chc thrust of that double agent And thosc
1
19 conditions do not exist for che Dureau or for ourselves
i
20 Mr . Miler. Or for thc military scrvices, to run 3 lot
7
21 o€ double agents .
4 22 Mr Angleton. I mean , do not have thc superior
1
23 source of control over doublc agents _
1
Senator Hart of Colorado is that?
8 24
25 Mr Angleton. Bccause they arc onc , not breaking codes , or
TOP SECRET
only
they
Why
==================================================
Page 37
==================================================
Topz8
@ have the penetratlong In the
opposition againgt whom
they don
8
2 You run the double _
!
of Colorado. But what 18 the prescription?
3 Senator Hart 1
can t do that or we aren t, or what?
Doos chat mean we
Well we haven c succeeded _ I mean , we
Mr
Angleton _ 0
Penkosky , and both of them are dead . They:
have had Popov and
wore ghot _
It must be easier to penetrate the so-called
Mr Johngon,
World than ft 18
the 8o-called Soviet Bloc .
Third 3
10 Mr . Angleton = Abgolutely.
But that 9
not getting you exactly what you
Mr Miler.
11
can divert an awful lot of time
1 want or need either _ And
12 would eventuall:
to running what in essence
effort manpower 1 13
to operationg for operations '
boil down In a or two yearg
C 14
'statistics. It will justify
sake It will look in
15
{
request to the OMB
It will justify your counterintelli
16
budget
objectives because ve
effort in terms of management
17
operations to 46 last year, hut
Increasec from 22 double agent
18 effort S0 Eorth
result, and how much time
1 what is the net
19
log focus on
a actually using, and whcrc are
are you 20
the country in terms of |
what the
real problems are facing
21
in terms
of knowledge and in
counterintelligenze:
4 22
penetration
and Mr . Angleton:
The
picture which both you
Mr . diGenova .
from your 0 f
1 this new face of
counterintelligence
24
comments seem t0
1s a
rather gloomy ona because your
view
25
TOP SECRET
You
and
year
your
good
You
gence
and
ing You
and
23 point
paint
8
==================================================
Page 38
==================================================
TOR Tcl
L
that you belleve that thlg decentrallzatlon , lack of
indicate
0
tmentatlon and In general Bpreading the counterintelligercc
2 compar {
eventually going to lead to a breakdown in
1 3
function around 1s
We re not golng to be getting what we should
4 the end product _
getting bigger statistics _ and on the
5 be gctting. You may be
we re getting more , but in fact we re
fac0 16 may look like
7 not
Mr Miler. You re not golng to subgtance .
8
18
that decision made? That beems to
Mr diGenova Why
9
It? Surely
90
fundamentally apparent by the way You
10 be
have made that decislon for 2 reagon?
11 the Director must
12 Do know why?
0 Mr Miler has known him more than longer ;
13 Mr Angleton
11
than I have Nould
14
Yes ,
I'1] offer my
opinion on it.
Miler
15
{
Mr diGenova We like to have it=
16
basic reagon i8 that neither the current
Mr . Miler . The
17
DDO understand or
percelve of what
director nor
the Incumbent
18
actually is and what function it has ,
19
counterintelligence
is
for counterintelligence to
8 what the CIA 9
responsibility
20
opinion. They do noe m they 1
the nation That is my
personal
21
counterintelligence = They ve never
have
had experience in
7 22
frankly , they do nor
in
counterintelligence = And quite
1
23
1 tand the ems involved in
counterintelligence.
24
unders
8 articulated previously by the
Countcrintelligencc ,
25
TOP SECRET
get
explaln
you
You?
Mr .
would
and
not
worked
probl
a9
==================================================
Page 39
==================================================
T*
1 current DDO , Vag station ecurlty' and Iialbon
0
Mr _ Krbow Can You bee thle getting any better with
2 !
5 new selectee who 19 coming Erom the outside world?
1
Probably knows the term counterintelligence but knowg nothing
4
5 about the intelligence community basically?
Mr _ Miler I don ' t guite frankly , I couldn € comment
6
on Mr . Dush at al2 but Jf Mr . Bush 18 golng to have to rely
7
on tha current management and
the current management of counter
intelligence in the CIA , It 13 my view that he will
erroneous informatlon and not have the advantage
10 completely
counterintelligence and would be forced Eo
11 of understanding
1 make decisiong which ultimately will be tragic to thi?
12
counterintelllgence is concerned , Erom
13 country far as 1
c 14 ignorancc _
Senator Mart of Colorado Nhat kind of erroneous
15
{
16
information?
What counterintelligence i9, how it should
Mr _ Miler .
17
what the threat to the nation 18 that can be
18 be organized _
1 hopefully countcred by an
effectivc counterintelligence organi-
19
3 which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI_ the
20 zation
7
services , the Department of State, and all other
21 military
}
4 22
agencies concerned
to havc to have a
perception of the real 1
23 You are going
1 and what i5 involved in counterintelligence in ordler
24
problems
8
the CIA 5
counterintelligence effor:::,
Lo organize or
reorganize
25
TOP SECRET
your
get
as
==================================================
Page 40
==================================================
76T4
1 to promote the begt kInd of 0 natfonal program
8
Senator Hart of Colorado Aggume bomething about , Mr ,
2 !
Angleton mentioned: earlier , about the tendency to sweep
1 3
penetrations under the rug in thfe country.
Ias there been 8 pattern In the pabt that 8till prevailg
of reluctanca on
the part Of profe8sional Intellfgence
6
officfalg as well a9
adminigtration officlalg to admft that
7
8 we are gueceptible to that?
Mr Angleton_ Well I think there 18 no questlon that
been a
tremendou: dishonesty in facing up to hard
10 there has
facts an intelligencc
11
the Yom Kippur war 48 an example . As You know {
12 I'11 take
in terms of prediction. As I main-
9 13 it was a
complete failure
0 if cannot make a
proper estimate
tained in my testimony ,
14
area then God help you when come into the
in a
primitive
15 6
Bloc area, and I still hold by that conviction _
16
that case, a
few days prior to the Yom KIppur war ,
But in
17
disseminated a report to the President , the Secretary
18 the FBI
fense and the Director
of CIA which purported to 1
19 of State De
8 discussion between Gromyko and a very senior source
be a 20
that they had ' given up on the Arabs that thcy 1
2] to the effect
the
Arags , they would no longer give
no longer support
4 22
they were going to recognize Israel in
1
23 them arms , that
1 had thc draft notes ready for the recognition o f
24
'fact they
9
25 Israel
TOP SECRET
You
You
would
and
==================================================
Page 41
==================================================
TopRSq
Now , I have never Be0n the post mortom of che whole projec-
2 on the estImatlon, but I woula as3u0 thae any estimator who
1
3 recelved Information by letter or memorandum , hand-carried
quoting Gromyko , would tend to dscount tho fact that the Arahs
were about to attack Israel where thcy would have to depend on
Sovfet arms , and therefore the questlon of the Yom 'Kippur war
would be out of the questlon. In other words , that one report
I It a9 an example_
Now , Independently a study group of the Joint Chiefs came ~
10 uP with che whole questlon of Sovfet dfofnformation = strategic
11 disinformation to Put uS off balance on our estimating process
1
12 Now , in our Olyn Agency we were hcavily frowned upon for
13 raising thesc questions that there wJs 3 strong element 1
14 Sovict deception and disinformation that had been injected into.
15 the intelligence collecting program. c
16 Mr Miler. Prior Lo the Yom Kippur war,
~
Mr . Angleton . Prior to that. But the important thing
17
i8 that that source who provided the Bureau with that infor-
18
1
mation has been providing information over a number of years ,
19
8
but no one has nade a study of information in hindsight in
20 |
21 order to evaluate that source
j And I could go into many more sensftive cases o€ where
22
1
intention has come through 3
highly qucstionablc sourcc ,
23
1
and there has been no ro-exanination There has been nc
9r
8 24
grouping or forum in which there can be any disputation Eac:
25
TOP SECRET
give
0 {
again
Yet
==================================================
Page 42
==================================================
737ITI
Gnd 1 party goes along On hle Own
8
{ 2
1 3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11
{
12
0
1 13
14 C
15
{
16
17
18
1
19
8
20 1
21
1 22
1
23
1
8 24
25
TOP SECRET
==================================================
Page 43
==================================================
Ioidet#
TORSc
Ang1aton
1272/36
Tape 1 of Colorado = It 8cemb to Me that you r0
1 Sonator Hart
8
at the very least a,nalvete on tho of our
2 suggesting
1
and at tho worst, I_don t know what.
1 3 government
Nell, I do guggest that there 1s a naivete
4 Mr Angleton
countor-disinforation group There 9 no one who eve:
5 There 19 no
8tudfes mogt of the Information todey that goes Into [uch
scientiflc - The human part of ft 19 smal1
of n
It'$ mainly
Mow most of it i9 from overt bources
8
Mr Johnson What about tho
Inner-agency Comittce
9
Defectors? Doesn t that revlew?
10
It ha; nothing to do with it
Mr anglcton
11
Joanson What does that do? 1
12 Mr
That only allocates or handles the mechani
"r . Anglcton . 1 13
defector and what are the priorities anc
of who talks to the
14
questionnaires and Ihatnot
15
1
'r diGenova Tho order of interrogation_
16
It is 3 clearing house to the inforunation
Mr Miler
17
18
2isseninated_
Xr. Angleton , I m interestedl in 'oin;
1
19 Xr JiGenova
8 of your jost recent rcsponsc about the fact
bac: to one
20
CI Staff' ; concerns ahout thc
Israeli proble" 1
21 0 your or tho
alluded to was frowned upor within tha Asency_
whfch You 22
Jid that takc? I'd he interestedl *0 know t'at
11 Ihat for:n
22
1 leton Kell 1t tool; this forri that 4 Persoi:
8r Ar;
2 24
witl Scotty who takes hfs military duty ovcr there
working
25
TOP SECRET
part
Lt
on
get
nart
4
==================================================
Page 44
==================================================
TOR SECRET
40
8
1 two Ieeks every year and whatnot , and who 18 very hlgh On Set
8
2 Intelllgence arranged for thege Joint Chfefs and thlg group 1
5 to cone ovor and to address an audienco of hand-plcked peoplc _
4 So this covered both the overt side of the Ilouse
5 Mr Mfler The thrce dlrectorates Intellfgence ,
6 operatlons , and S6T
7 Mr Angleton . And they laid out thelr entire thesfs ,
and wc adeed to that to the FDI report to whfch I referred .
Afterwards I was severely criticized for having wasted everyhodyi s
10 time on that matter and told that 1f they realized It was
11 going to be that type of thing = Ic wouldl ncvor; have permittecl
1
12 it to have taken placc , et cetera, et cetera
9 13 Nr Firhow Nas this by the three Alrectorateg?
}
14 Xr #iler_ that was from the directorate 0f
15 operations The directorate of Sat Scientific and Technical :
16 was impressed by the presentatlon and subsequently said that
17
there was very great need for thought in thls And I think
18 also, Jin, that concurrently In the operationa I had an officcr
1
19 who was working on discernible or apparent dcception as rcflect:e
3
in CIA repor :rom the field] of Soviet disinformation
20r 1
2 concerning the sitmation in t o 'iedle Cast .
Anr wa didl a tremlen Ou? studly on this and which was # 22
1 comnletelv Jiscounted and thrown out it Wasn 't even 23
1
considered _
8 24
Mr _ Mfllcr _ Mcll, in the Yon Kippur 1f I'm not 25
TOP SECRET
g8h-
1
No,
ting
and
Mar,
==================================================
Page 45
==================================================
TOp GRL
3 mletaken, there Was a SIGINT alert @he NSA collection systemg
1
{
were of guch nature ehelr analyst8 sald It look? llke there ' 8
1
golng to he a war wlthin 24 hours . They:pradicted the time _
1
They sent Jt over It was Immedlately 841d , go back to bed_
5 I8 that correct?
Mr Angleton _ A1l I know about It 18 tho alleged part
6
of chat , I remembcr the Pike Report that caused a great deal
7
of comment I bhought that tho four words were that
8
NSA was not able to ma}e a contributlon becauso the Egyptians
had gone into a high SIGINT alort.
10
In other words , that through SIGINT they couldn € learn
11
thc intention _ I don t Jnow this fact that you are tabelling
12
Ar Miller. I think Mr . "iler i3
1 13
Nr , Miler The point that we re trying to make in chis
14
connection is part and parcel of Soviet espionage , Soviet
15
{
intelligence service activfty and Sovict hloc intelligence
16
service activity 1s in the polftlcal field It involves
17
deception and disinformation A properly coordina and run
18
counter-intclligcnce cffort will bring regcarch and analytica}
8 19
6 work to hear which Iould an analyais and an asscssment
20
0 2 che situation, which should be of valuo to policy-makers 1
2]
intclligencc dlirectorate thc CI:_
in thc governrent , to the
7 22
the Director of the CIAE and that what has happened in tw 1
23
to
1 CIn "iccc nid-1973 is that there has heen erosion of thls
24 5
which cannot bc divorced from coun ter-intelligence
facility
25
TOP SECRET
g8h;
maglc
ted
givc
of
==================================================
Page 46
==================================================
TOR SCRE
n becauge You focub and even 48 you focub on what the current
98
{
popular term; aggresgive counter-Intelligence operations , You
!
have to have gone knowledge of thl8 in order to ba able to 1
oquate 833089 avaluate your 8o-callcd penetration of
Sovlet or Sovfet bloc intelligence gervice to 3c0 If it Is
real _ You have to have .a lltmus paper to Judge your penetration'
And without that lftmug , You are completely at the mercy of
a system whfch 18 orchestrated and whlch 18 essentfally
dfrected and controlled_ 3
10 Nr . Miller So what re saying is from mid-1973 on
the countr , or at least tho CIA has lost a va luable assct
11
{ Mhat happened in 732 Mmhat was the rlecision?
12
Xr Anglcton_ That 8 the dlecentralization when a11 1 13
oE these conponents werc taken away fron us , includ the
14
1faison whatnot, including international communist parties
15
6
16 So this completely viscerated the counter-intelligence
as wC have !juilt it up since 1954 _
17
Pe were , I woulq say without question in the Nestorr
18
1 world , we the leadership - Pe crca ted a11 of the inter
19
8 govcrnnenta l committces we hrouyht services :ron tiny
20
1
fragmentedl units up into major conpcnents of their government
2
thc Sivc najor countries , which mcant wC reorientcd their
~ 22 V
1 scrviccs along priorities that mct our recuirements , I
23
:
don 't thirb thcrc was a3r question chat vc were the Jcknowle
24 9
leadcrs in the Wcstern world
25
TOP SECRET
a3
an
you
ing
and]
gave
and
==================================================
Page 47
==================================================
JORISECRE
5 By the gam6 tokon, It Induced people to brIng thelr casas shg
2 !
to 49 for analysig . They cama to 080 48 many tImes to 8ee
1 5
the defectors , the stable of defectorg that we had for
Interrogation
5
So that alone was a
tremendous acquigition of counter-
intellfgence data whfch would not havo otherwlbe have been
avaflable to thfg country _
Mr Kirbow_ And ft'8 not avallable today becauge of thfs
spreading of the
7
10
Mr Angleton _ Mell, that 9 what say . I mean I've
11
had One or morc chicf of Intelligcnce who have surreptitiously
12
seen ne since my dcparture And they will naturally work
1 13
35 far as they can with the agency .
14
Nr , Miller_ Nhen You 3ay uS , who do You mean?
15
Mr Angleton _ How did I use it?
{
16
Mr "iller You wera referring to
your capability prior
17
to 1973 _
18
Yr Miler The CI staff_
8
19
r Anglcton - The CI ataff .
5
20
Xr 'iller , The CI staff . Mell , what werc thc numhcrs
1
2 what wJs the capahility that_ You had translatec into ?eoilc,
22 into {iles?
1
23,
"r Angleton Iyc1]_ at the highcst point Ive hadl n lit:):
24
over 2j0 peoplc _ "at was clerical and officers _
25 'r 'iller ~hat seens a fafrly sma ]l grouj) .
TOP SECRET
they
%
==================================================
Page 48
==================================================
JOASGRET
csh 6
L
1 Mr _ Angleton _ Well, ware 8 hardworking group . Ne
8
wcre understaffed There wero many thfngs we could have 1
1 taken on and I'11 You one oxample because It 19 3.111
pending , and it gcts down the questlon of penetratlon
5 But whcn Phflby was statloned In Waghington, he was
given communications Intelligence clearance 90 If NSA broke
Into the Bulgarfan traffic, ha could go to hls Soviat control
and tell then that we Were reading Bulgarfan trafflc. 1 8ecret
of that sort permits them to make ube of the Bulgarlan 7
10 traffic 79 a rleception channe l the moment they know you are
11
reading it_ That hecomes a powerful Inscrument in their
{
12 kancs to deceive
8 13 'O1 my point is this: :o one has made an analysis frori
{
the that he was hriefed on that particular traffic of why 1 4
1
15 the traffic continued fo: Ewo more years and then gradually
petered out of what wjs into that traffic which, If You 16
took that and Identffied an Iten of deception that carie fron
17
the ornosition vou then look at Own agent reports and
18
1 {13d what awcrts at thc sanc tine perc fortif:ing that li0
1 $
6
or +t "ieee of deception _ And ft wonl roint a fingcr on 20
8
i agent? Iho , in fact, were under control 1 2 ].
:Oi this 1" jusl One s2ll exercise :ij: has preserve:
5 22
1 evcry simle niecc: of paper In other vords , there 5 litera)]:
23
{
hunrc: o: Kousan of vuos 62 available materinl for SUc
24
ail analysis, ana? I worked] very closely wit}; L,ou 'Tordella
25
TOP SECRET
they
give
to
day
Put
your
8
==================================================
Page 49
==================================================
JoP? SEeREN
45
sh 1 In fact, one of our effort or common @fforts wag I brought him
8
2 into counter-intellfgence I brought him In wich all these 1
1 5 foreign chlefs and whatnot in order to anlarge the scope of
NSA _ since thoy can study and frame these patterns , they
5 can into Illegal trafficg and Into many facets
6 It'9 one of the begt outfits, 88 far 48 I know In the
U.$ . govcrnment, but they had always been denied these facts
that I just stated such as Phflby 8 access , the clearancos ,
the varfous espionage cases that have happcned in the west
10 the pcople that have had comunications Intelligence clearance _
Senator Mart of Colorado Could Wc have a Philby level
11
12 penetration of our intelligence community?
Mr Angleton I m not stating that there Is one , but 1 1 13
have probahly dore more recruitment of higher level people in
14
ny vouth in the husiness and I have never been any respector
:
15
of rank I've dealt with prime ministers , and I ve dealt wieh
16
them at al1 levels
1'
Anr? therefore , my polnt {s ft 1$ concefvalle , lt'$
18
1 conccivalle i f You Ve enough information, spotting infor:i.}
19
5
tion, You can nut a person into 4 certain kind of situafic;
20
recardles; 0f his rank , You will find that he js recruital,l"
2]
It 'is 3 procems 0f a fingernail finger nancl arm and bod:
22
1 Senator iart 0f colorado Iut all of the grills that
22,
ac8 pconlc 0: the Agency 'mvc to 'o throurh1 = 1ie detoctor
24 8
So on, you re saying that they can get through that.
25
TOP SECRET
get get
got
an
7w:
==================================================
Page 50
==================================================
tOPSCEL
1
sh 8 Angleton I don't think anyona regards the lle
2 1
detector to be anything more than Just another Investigatfve
5
instrument It does help In the sense that there are certain
pcople susfeptible will in turn roveal 8ome thing o€ their
Past whfch should have revealed, whlch 1f You had
d1scovered Independently , would have glvon You groundg to believt:
they were penetration , but once the machino beging to find that
they re goggllng' on gomathingi" theh"they .come outtand
s3y , well there 9 a I haven t told You when I was In
10
Turkey , et cetera , et cetera, et cetera , and the sate
11
clean_
1
12
0 So it serves a Iseful Purpose But it'8 not I 1
13
wouldn' t give it 20 percent credibility . the Office of
C 14
Security probably gives it 70 or maybe higher
15
:
Bir _ diGenova Mr Angleton _ the polnt you mado of the
16
lack of ' study of traffic which follolved the deception in the
17
cahle traffic , as I understand you re gaying that there ' $
16
no analysis that you re aware of sincc that time done 2
19 of cverything since then 5
20;
'r Anzleton There $ never been any analysi: ever
1
2
Ar dliGenova Is the current research set-up which CI
4 22 Staff now has which is oriented tOward irstant studfes , 1 quote
2
nquotc to provide data for ongolng operations inconsistent
8 24
with wanting to achieve that sort of goal , like analyzing that
25
daca?
TOP SECRET
Mr .
1
They
they
gtory
wipeg
Now
It,
bcen
of
1
==================================================
Page 51
==================================================
TOPLL
8
gsh 1 Mr _ Angleton _ Nell, I don t know what that really means
8
2 Instant analysle I mean we 've alwaye done Inbtant analy81s . 1
1 3 Mr diGenova _ I know thet but It'8 our understanding
4 we ve learned from the Agency that there hag been a movement
5 away from In-depth higtorical rebearch toward more current
6 sort of analyaee .
7 Nhat you ro suggesting to me by Baying that there 8
been no analysle done of those cableg Js that WG vo lost 4
valuable CI tool since that study hagn t been done and I'a
10 like to know 1f your assessment of the current trend toward
11 research 1s a bad one?
12 Mr Angleton . I think J* makes no sense whatsoever.
12 Mr Miler It' s disastrous It will lead to complete 1'1
14 chaos within a very short time because You re trying to analysc 2
15 an Individual case without having the abflity to relate 40
~
16 other cases to that case
17 Mr _ diGenova There 8 no Integration Jn other wordo _
18 Mr . Mfler . That'9 right and you cannot operate In a
2
19 vacuum
8
Mr Ang leton . Me have learned from one defector, the 20 1
one of December '61 a complete new understanding of what
2 ]
happened from che dayg of Lenin.
% 22
1
That 19 not in the publlc record A complete new 23
1 picturc of the growth of the OGPU and of the Cheka And in
9 24
the rcorientation of KGB part of the deStalinlzatfon in
25
TOP SECRET
May
==================================================
Page 52
==================================================
TORHIU
gah 1 of 1959 , It Wab 0 roturn to the modug operandl o2 ehe Cheka
8
2 And chle J8 from an Indlvidual, fully , who had Be0n 011 of the !
1 documents , fully verged In It 80 that thle plunged 48 back Into
4 lt and we began then to Elnd leads And I g1ve Ono example _
5 Goneral Orlov,. who dled not long ago In the Unfted
State8 , Wa9 the Moat genlor NKVD KGD officer ovor to.defect ,
and he died last Ycar The Bureau had Intorrogated him In
1953 after the death of Stalin Ivfth lfttle or no buccess He
knew the code nane of Philby _ The Agency eried to contact hin ~
10 in 58 and had a very unhapPy handling problen . Ne went back
11 Into It shortly thereafter and we were ablc to go through his
12 book with him and he gave uS the true identities of 34 agents
1 13 in France
14 His uncle had been one of the genfor nen under Lenin ,
15 head of WKVD in the Ukrain but with tremendous operations _ 7
16 He himself was a senlor NKVD ?ian in Spaln during the civil war .
2
1' we spent up until his death Mr Roccp , who was my deputy ,
would travel to the Midwest and spend geveral weekends` wfth hin
18
1 of dredqing out ant recred ting thc operations and penetratfons
19
8
in British intelligence and the Brftish navy and whatnot ,
20
1
21
eventually qetting dlown , by recreating recons tructing ,
down to the idlenti Now thfs is research , anel thege are 7 22
1 cases wherc the Sovlets had everyy reagon to bclieve that those
23
1
agents vcrc safe and secure because nothing hadl happened .
8 24
And Ihen You make that type of Identification unbeknownst
25
TOP SECRET
and
ty-
==================================================
Page 53
==================================================
TO23 RD
8
1
ah 311 to them , then It glvee You tramendous leverage of how You want
2 1
to play lt, whether you move In Co take hlm On 00 0 double
1 3
or whether You move In to arrest hfm,
4
diGenova And that Isn € belng done today _
5
Mr . Angleton Well, can '€ do It because they don? t have
6
Mr _ Roaco and have fired Most Of the personnels One of
the begt mon we had was from the Library of Congress and
6
knowing where to fInd every piece of Information inithetgovern-
ment has Just been transferred to, or he 8 been relaaged or
10
hired back on con tract, and when are putting hin in the
11
Freedom of Information section a8 a contract agent _ {
12 BA /
And he has handled Ukraing, he 'g run agents , he speaks
3 13
8 Rugsian
14
Ar Johnson Ne are going down with a repres:':!!
1
15
of military intelligence later on this afternoon . Could you
16
tell us about the coordination hetween military CI and CIA
17
CI especially Jn the area of double agentFy .
18
Mr Ang leton Then I will just say one thing and then
1
19
Scotty will speak authoritatively to tt_ 6
20
Ne a11 came out of the war and therefore we are 1
strongly in favor of 4 very gtrong mflitary counter-intelliqjence
6
22
And thercfore _ we Vu alwayg given them highest priority of our 1
21
time _ Ne ve dlone the original training of the OSI' people _ 1
8 24
We trained teacherg who went out, who in turn trained
25 other people _ 'Chat wag a three monthg coursc , if I recall .
TOP SECRET
Mr
they
they
ehey
very
==================================================
Page 54
==================================================
TOPSD
50
sh 1 We rean 8 seminar uglng the hlghest talant that we had and 1
2 revealing 48 much Informatlon 88 We could concelvably revea] = 1
3 And 80 our whole mental attltude Wjb that counter-Intelli
gence , one of Its highest prlorftles 18 the defense of It8
6 Own forceg And I'm not golng to Justlfy the mafl program at
thlg time but some I 11 justlfy Jt In print or otherwlse
because It represents 001 percent of Aericang A 0 4
sma) 1 coterie of Aerlcans who wrote to the Sovlats when we
had troops Jn che ffeld On two occasiong and our primary
10 duty was the support of thoge troops _
1] So that background Scotty can tell You but the relationshi
{
12 we ve had with thc military _
8 13 Mr Miler Hell, the rclationships with the counter-
{
14
intelligence with the military have varied _ I would say that :
15 for the most part it has heen reasonably good , it has been
16 perhaps better in Waghington than it has been in the ffeld _
With few excertions CIA field representativcs have not been
17
18
terribly concerned wfth conducting countor-intelligence Thcy
2
1 ) have not cooperated to the extent that the military comman:lers
2 in thc ffcld have `Ianted_
1
Somc of this has t0 do with priorfties that are imposc: 1 21
on thc CIA representatives fron Washington _ Some of ft has
22
1
to do with lack of nanpower Some of it has to do Wfth the
23
:
fact that in the opinion of many of the CIA operatives , the
8 24
Armny in particular , to a l0gser extent the other services
25
TOP SECRET
1
day
only
3
==================================================
Page 55
==================================================
TOR S
51
813 1 have not undertaken counter-Intelllgence' activitles whlch aro
8
{ 2 of a high enough level to justlfy the tIme and attentlon,
1 3 particularly of senior CIA representatives abroad
4 It I think al30 4 bft of 8 problem becaube the
5 prlorfties of milltary counter-Intelllgence In many Instances
do not parallel or gupport CIA '8 prloritiee _ have the
responsibflty for the protectlon of thelr Installatlong and
there have also been Impoged on the milltary the requirement
to bufld agsets , what we term double agents whlch the mflftary
10 term controlled forelgn ags0t9, 43 4 contingency for Posbible
11 deception use
12 Traditionally, also , the CIA, and in recent years thi:
11 13 has been qufte true , the CIA ffeld operatives have wanted to
14
exploit military counter-intelllgence assets for what Is 1
15 termad aggressive positive intelligence or recrultment atcempts
16 of the enemy agent or officer who Was controlling the double
17 agent of the controlled foreign asset
18 There has been traditionally a problem of coordinacion
1
13 between the military services , the CIA , and the FBI on doubile
J
0 26
agent operations
0
I think overall this ha8 Iorked reasonably Icll given
1
22 the fact that In particular , for example , the system
1 chain of command in the Army is a very confused one and 19 not
ea9y to Dut your finger on There are varioug echelons an
8 24
25
reporting procedures and 30 forth _
TOP SECRET
gah:
19,
They
of
22
==================================================
Page 56
==================================================
TOpScRL
52
14 1 Prom the counter-Intelligence @taff etandpolnt, In
0
particular what I wab concerned wlth wa8 an attempt to make {
8ure that there was a full Integration _ You see, under the 1
operating procedures and the responeibilltles , tho mflltary
gervice8 are regulred to advise the CIA o2 Its activftles ,
counter-Intelligence 80 forth abroad . In turn,
advlso the FDI of thelr counter-intellfgence activitles and
90 forth here in the United States
So You have_ when an activity here In the United States
che individual Involved , the double agont , the controlled
10
foreign asset transfers abroad then there 18 a transfer of
11
{
12
coordination and vice versa
Mr Angleton . I'd like to Inject this_ There 18 0 13
concurrent jurisdiction sinca the double 18 usually an American
C 14
citizen So regardless of where he Is we would always persuade
15
{
the Army r whoever it is, to notify the Bureau through their
16
own channel hecause you re dealing with Americans 90
17
geography 19 not really the important elemant
18
1 Mr Miler _ From 2 counter-intelligence standpoint ,
19
5 ft has had therc have been 9ome problems 43 a result of that
20
1
in termg of the regular CIA representation ahroad _ There is
21
3 means of working together with the military services and
Y 22
1
So forth in terms of notffying each of the services , each of
22
1
the agencics of the potentlal for deception feeding and
24 9
30 forth
25
TOP SECRET
g8h;_
they and
==================================================
Page 57
==================================================
FOpPSScET
53
1
ah 85 Mr Johngon Doeg the CIA have veto powerb Ovor mflftary
! 2
proposed double-agente?
1 3
Mr . Mfler . not the veto power
4
Mr Ang leton Well_ lt never really comeg uP to a veto .
5
Dut 1€ we took 8 stand agalnst It and supplled reaboning that
made gense , would go along the way that wo wanted , Ne
never had a head-on colllslon.
8
Mr Miler There woula oftentlmes be dlfferences In the
ffeld , that would be presented through the proper channels ,
10
say from the Army back to the Acst from our ffeld station
11
to headquarters And then there would be 2 dlscussion and a 1
12
resolution at the Washington level
0 13
iow obviously , in any kind of a situation like that,
14
there have been instances where you; know there was bad
c
15
feelings &nd nisunderstandings and So forth But I think that ~
16
N overall, at least In my experlence In the way we try to
17
conduct the businesg wag that 1t was mutually beneficlal
1E
Now the nilitary scrvices have complaincd to me becausc 1
12
I represented and a couple of my pcople represented the 9
20
Acency on rlouble agents to the military services and S0 forth_ 1
2
that We were not 3s forthcoming in providing then information
3 22
about our nogsihle assets and So forth a5 vere
1
23
Their system was different They had 2 clearinghousc
1
24 8 systcm wherc this was available and 80 forth Qur position
25
on it Wa8 that if we had a requfrement, we would perhaps fin:l
TOP SECRET
No,
they 've
they
==================================================
Page 58
==================================================
ZOPP SR
54
16 1 bource Or an as8et In whlch to fulfill the regulrement_
8
2 But for becurity and compartmentatlon raasbonb , not exclusively I
1 due to the counter-Intelligence concerns but als0 to the
general security and operatlona procedures of the Agency as
5 4 whole , there Was a reluctance to put thle informatlon forward
End Tape 48 except when and 28 needed _
Begln 4D Mr Ang loton _ And there 8 another point that hab to be
ralsed here That 18 when You get Into the field of deception
You are bound by certaln charterg Thoge chartere have not
10 been approved at the highest policy level So there 9 been
11 a great deal of tactical military cover and deception
;
12 Our Interest 18 more on the strategic deception, and
13 that paper has been resting With Dr Kisginger for some 2 1/2 1
14 years or more for approval_
15 Mr Mfler Three_
;
16 Mr _ Angleton _ Three Years .
So that Is bogged down a great dea} of the whole overall 17
12 deception program_
2
Mr Maxwell The paper that is in front of Dr Fissinger
19
8
rolv make8 what decentlons?
20 1
2} Mr Angleton It was a paper that was pulled together
by the Joint Chfefs , ourselves and the FBI
5 22
1
Mr Maxwell And it propoges what?
22
1
Mr Ang leton . It outlines procedures for strategic
2 24
dcceptions political deception and other deception _
25
TOP SECRET
gah:
==================================================
Page 59
==================================================
TOR ScRHT
55
817 1 Mr Johnson _ Could you glva 8 brlef example o2 the CIA
8
2 role In strategic decoption, 4 specific example? 1
5 Mr Angleton I can'€. I mean I could get Into
4 cases hut lt 8 too vague . It'9 alwayg been some thlng that
5 ha8 been arrived at ad hoc and Jt Berved tha purpoge , but I
6 wouldn t call 1t strateglc .
7 Mr . Miler No program In other wordg
8 Mr Angleton . In other words the proper strategic decep
tion would be the President calls in:the Director:and; Bay8w' no
10 one knowg that In three monthg I M going on the following crip_
1] I wfll have meetings wich the following peoplo I'M not
1
12 going to announce it until a week before I leave
So #t gives 2 time span of two nonths to use all of 1 13
sources to put across disinformation or information,
14
letter in the mailbox to the proper addressee that, you know 15
:
Eavor his role or favor his mission and helps him out And
16
that's what wc are trying to seek and have becn trying to seck
17
for a long tine Rut there ha8 to be a way of knowing what
18
2
are gone of the intentlons of the governricnt in order to
19
8
advance it through disinfornation or deception _
20
1
Mlr Ailer With respect to the military , if I may
2 1
return to that, I think that one of thc probably thc greatert
22
1
difference Eailure wieh respect to CIA counter-intelliqence
2:
1
relationships with the nilitary wa; with respect to thc
24 8
situation in Vietnam hecauBe CIA did not perform 3 counter-
25
TOP SECRET
gah
1 No,
you
your
"
and
==================================================
Page 60
==================================================
ToRAcRE
56
8
h Intelllgence functlon o2 any responbibillty or 8lgniflcance
1
2
Jn Vietnam . Tha t was 4 traglc faflure on the part oE CIA
1 5
and It goes hack to the basic lem of the present management
to answcr Your earlier questlon, the present management becausc
6
management of the CIA wab Involved Jn the decisions the pregent
which prohlbltea a counter-intelllgence effort In Vietnam
7
Mr Shea In that paper that 18 before Dr Kfselnger ,
are there
any propoged control mechanism8 that act a9
fflter 90 that che misinformatlon In a gense coula not flow
10
back Into the policy clrcles Within the Unfted States?
13
'r Angleton _ Mell, there wouldn € be The kind of
12
channels usec] , there Ivouldn t be any of that happening _ This
1 13
would be information given to an agent who was reporting ,
14
sa; to the KGB back = say It would never hit the light of 6
15
Mr Shea So the process of misinformiation a8 it
16
norma lly relates to the intelligence ffeld i8 totally separate
17
In torms of the active process of misinforma tion a9 It gocs
18
on
in counter-intelligencc?
1
1 9
Mr Angleton Ne are not dealing in overt _ here m3y
8
20
h? sone overt things out that support 0 documcnt that waf
1
2 to 3 doublc 1ho Iould nass it to KGp But if thc Ga; Jiven
4 22
to bc an agent of the KGD , the RGB 19 not going to is regardcd
1
23 Jubliclze that document without hav blown the allegedl aynlS
; 24
'r Slea But they coul] work on it i3 thelr proccss
25 of dlsinformatlon to como hack and you would be caught-
TOP SECRET
prob_
good
would
day .
Put
ing
1
==================================================
Page 61
==================================================
TORSrE
57
819 1 Mr . Mfler No . To be buccebaful You would have Co have
{
2 meanb of monltoring You would have to have your penetration !
1 3 of , you would have to have your Own 1ltmug to bee where lt
4 19 played back or what reflectlons or what requirements are
5 put on othor double agents on the basle o2 the informatlon from
6 thls agent .
7 That rezulres a centralized screening and control of
8 double agents _
9 "r Angleton _ If You sent the Information through Agent
to KGB headquarters in Moscow part; of your testing wouild be to SCe 10
11 whether your other dlouble agents recelved questionnaires
12 which you knew related to that document
Mr Shea But it secns like In order to aake strategic 1 13
14 misinformation Eunctional, You would have to have the same
15
requirements that had when You were talking about having 2
a double arjent namely, somebody in a superlor polnt of
16
infornation penetrated into that organizatlon to Rake sure 17
that they are getting that information you re sending out
18
2
19 1s nisinformation
8
Mr miler Not necessarily.
20 1
2 Xr Ang leton = It' 9 not qufte the same
Mr Miler _ It' 8 not qufte that slmple becausc coula
4 22
1
see rcflections of ft perhaps in othcr arcas in polftlcal
23
1
actions _ in failure to act _
21 8
Mr Angleton . Thcre are other ways of doing it. You
25
TOP SECRET
gbh
You
You
==================================================
Page 62
==================================================
TOR Eq
58
8
gah' 1 can go to 0 d1plomat who haa a weak cipher ybtom and You 8
1 2 yourbelf can tell that diplomat In great confidence a whole
1 3 serles of things _ know the Sovfeta aro golng to break the
4 code and read that mesgage
5 That woula be one way of dolng It. There are other ways
6 of having _ telllng 8,| Erlendly forelgn gervice _ whom You
7 know 1s penetrated _
8 I mean it'8 211 cabo by cage But once you are glven the
task, that 9 when you begin to look at a1l of your assets and
10 you begin to do the creative side of running a double , or how
11 are you going to put thls acros8 And there are ways of
1
12
doing it without bringing many people in
1 13 Nr diGenova I 'd] like to change the subject matter just
14 brie€ ly . Part of the respons ibility of the CI research personnel
1: is to produce reports on various subjects which include current
6
16 ana lyses on proprie companfes used by forelgn intelligence
services 17
12 I would like to knor whether or not efther of You coula
1
19 shcd any light on the questlon of whether or not we have any
8
2'
cvidlence that foreign intelligencc services have cstablished
1
2:
and rroprictary companies in the Unfted States?
22 Mr Angleton Ne 11 there S one casc that come $ to 5in/ .
4
1
22
I can 't remember tho detalls but I think that a5 4 result of
24 It, one 0f Our deputy dfrcctors had a hig project with this
8
25 compan thcy dropped ft hecause the Foreign Intelligencc
TOP SECRET
You
many
tary
ueed
and
==================================================
Page 63
==================================================
192SxL
59
gsh Service had gulte 8 penetratlon Into lt_ 721
{ 2 Mr diGenova _ Would that be the Inbtance of which
1
You are famfllar that there wab In fact knowledge of an operatin
proprietary company run by a forefgn Intelllgence gervice
5 wfthin the continental Unfted States?
6 Mr Angleton _ offhand I can t Bay because the Orflc0 of
Security wou ld be working with the Bureau, ugually. I mean to
say that S6T are the most Ilkely people to have contractb with
a number of contractors and companles It would be Orfice
10 of Security 5 joh .
11 Mr _ diGenova Mayhe I M not making my point clear I
12 just thought that maybe in the course your counter-intellicell *2
1 13 function you may have discovered by whatever means that there
14 was in fact such 3 company operating Jn the Unfted States
15 which was being used _ not to contract with the Agency but to
:
16 contract or just do anything , whether lt was a bookkeeping
17 Eirm or a law firm or anything and was in fact engaged Jn
18 espionage_
2
19 Mr miler . Ncll, wo Ve had a nunber in the past . Ve Vc
8
20 nad a number of leads which were to the effect that Soviet
7
21 Intclligenc? noney was in such and such 2 conipany or somcthin:
v 22 73 that . That Was turned over to the DI And whether
1
23 or wC ever hcard anything hack or dia anything further on
1
8 24 it, no
25 other worda , unless there wag an investigative angle
TOP SECRET
only
of
such
not
In
==================================================
Page 64
==================================================
TOP H4
60
8
Bh 1 whlch we could pursue abroad Or bome- thing, I'm 8 1lttle blt 8
1 2 confused by the questlon baceuse Jt'9 outside a 4 the Investigatipr
1 3 of such 8 thing 18 outside the purvlew of the CIA unlegs It is
abroad, unless lt would be funded through Swltzerland Or Luxem-
5 bourg or unles8;.there: wae a Messagerie Marftlme connectlonwwhere
Sovlet money wa8 belng put In and had representation here
7 'ir diGenova Mell_ the staff has becn given information
that these analyses are done by CI rescarch personnel or
proprietary companles of foreign Intelligence servces ,
10 efther that infornatlon Is Ivrong or wa just do not understanl
11 each other
1
12 "r Angleton _ `ell I mean it' 8 trme that there have
1 13 been analyses donc But the one that comcs to mind is the
14 one I mentioned _ was the one where in this case it was Frenc:)
15 had 2 heavy penetration of a company and that company was
6
16 contracting with our STT therefore_ our qucstion
17 was rather 3 project Eor large Suns of money of using this
18; company would ' proceed= the decision based on our counter-
{
19 intcllicence analyses mas to drop thc project _
3
20 r _ aiGenova I 'd 1fke to ask the qquestion
1
2 } :c Vc bcen told that One of the bcnefits Ihich occurs
7 22 to V.$_ counter-intelliqcncc Ivhen focuses on hloc countric?
1
23 1s chc Fact that these totalitarian regimes have a hahit
1
24 acculring areat amnounts of inforation ahout their citizenr;
8
25 and
storing 1t_
and tht chfs on occasion , accessih]c E0 ::
TOP SECRET
they
and
people and
and
it
0f
1s ,
==================================================
Page 65
==================================================
YORad3T
gsh: 23 1 ana makes them aomawhat vulnerable 08 a robult of that. 8
! 2 Turning the coin around a llttle blt and looking at our-
1
selves , are the computerized gystemg whfch we now have In our
country which Jn a central locaton large bounts of
5 information about Indfvidual citizeng and large groups of
citizens , making u9 vulnerahle to penetratlon In termg of
Information, Iore vulnerable Jn terms of penetration by
foreign counter- Intelligence gervices?
Mr _ Angleton Vulnerable In what senge?
10 Mr diGenova_ Getting informatlon about 48 perlod ,
11 which I understand ig one of the goa l8 of counter-intelliqcnfe
1
12 fInding out Ihat the other side 1s doing.
0
1 13 Mr Angleton You mean surreptitiously getting it From
14 us or officially getting it from us? {
15 Mr diGenova Both The fact of the matter is the
16 information exists and it 9 vulnerable for them to have it, N
17 is it vulnerable for us to have It?
18 Kr Ang leton _ Mell, I wouldn € Dut it down a3 vulneralle
1
19 hecause Ihen anyone makes a request or You for information,
8
20 the first question is why So ehe hurden 15 on them to justifv
7
2 ] ehat thev have a counter-espionage reason for asking Eor that
4 22 Information _ Andl in the bulk o€ the cases You 11 Efnd that te'
1
23 arc doin? Your work for
1
24 In Other ords they Ve come across a telephonc tap 0 8
25 somc American wlio ' 3 arrived he $ made 4 call to the Bulgario:
TOP SECRET
Put
key
vou
==================================================
Page 66
==================================================
TOR ESR
2
2 1 embassy and It Jooke 88 though there 8 0 meeting being Bet
! 2 80 immediately you get 8 flash And aBk that gervlce for
1
traces on the individua ) end You COe back with tha whY,` :
and they tell you about the entire Bulgarlan business _ And
5 80 we start an Investigatlon a8 to Bulgarfan antecedents or
anything dealing with Bulgarfa , et cotera And If It'8
7 justffled we gfve then the information _
8 Mr . diCenova . Nell, I don't think, Mr Angleton , that' s
not what I'm getting at . ~
10 Te as a coun are amassing properly , quote, unquote ,
11 large amounts of Information about ourselvcs through cha use
1
12 of computcr systems
1 13 'ir Angleton That 8 right.
14 Mr dicenova The CIA tells us that that is one of the
15 things like So much about foreign countries , because the
{
16 totalitarian regimes have the tendency to amass large amounts
17 of information about their citizenry and when we penetrata
18 and qct that information, that helps u3
2
19 My question 1s when wc do that, when we centralize the
8
20 information "sing our Own computer systenns _ no matter whcre 1
21 it 1s, do Xe help them?
4 22 Ancl in this regard I woulq note that in 1070 the Inspecto
1
22 Cenera] ' $ renort on the question of covcr noted that tha fact
24 that crelit hurcaus In this country were amassing so much 8
25 informatlon ahout people , includling CIA pergonnel , that it
TOP SECRET
up,
thoy
try
they
NY
1
==================================================
Page 67
==================================================
TOR S2
63
ah 1 posed a major threet to mantaln covar , both In the Unlted 75
1 2 States and abroad for CIA agonte
1 3 Now the question I ralbe J0 are wo cutting off our nose
4 to spfte Our face by using computers to really marshall together
5 largo amounte of evidence which can be made acce8sIble to
6 forefgn powere elther by surreptitlously or by sImply openly
gettlng it?
8 Mr . Mfler . Yes tho answer 18 yes .
9 Mr _ dGenova Good _
10 'r 'ler. Recausc 1t 9 easy to this informationi-
11 And , for example the Soviets have had , You can confirm this
{
12 Eron the Cureau, have had a systematic system of purchasing
0
1 13 Erom the State of Maryland F the District of Columbia , the
14 State of Virginia , the business directorles_ residence
15 Jirectories , license directories for less chan 4J5) apiece
:
16 #r. Johnson If we re going to keep on our schedule ,
17 we ve a witness wko' $ supposed to be here at J:Jo , 80
18 is there a final qquestion?
1
19 Xr Kirbow . I have two questions Isecaua of che
8
20 vast yeara of experiencc Mr Chairman , that we should ask
7
2] ther to comment on , and efther one of a11 should ansier
4 22 #mat dlo all consider today to he the major threats
1
23 to this country? And the gecond question what has been
9
1
24 the major foreign covert action program directed against this
25 country in your lifctime and experience In the Acency?
TOP SECRET
get very
got
You
You
is,
==================================================
Page 68
==================================================
TopSECRIT
64
2
1
Mr . Angleton . Well, I thlnk , no question, It'8 the ! 2 Soviet bloc gervices that
represent the major threat becauge
aro really
a small,
are directly subordinated
to the
central comnfttee and to the hagic objectives ,
a3 I seen thc:
5 a11 my Iife to tha change and balance of mflitary
power
6 Further , that practically a1l Intelligence
operations morel
and more have political objectives =
and I ehink It I9 the fact
8 that since '59 have elevated the Cuban intelligence
and
a11 of the other bloc services to a very hlgh degree of
10 efficiency , that are coordinated and work 48 equals _
11 And I think that 18 the major thrcat, that the 1
12 inability oE the FBI by lack of personne] and manpower to be 11 13 able cover thege pcoplc _ There isn - t thc minimal coverage _
14 The people
cover are people who have "identified ,
;
15 and I defy anyone to have a list of Identified
agents in this
16 coun
17 Now that is the legal sidle of It Yow the larger Part
18 of it is the Illegal, where there 8 been little
or no success _ 2
19 Thc One that has, really come out 1s the Abel caso , which
20 we hardled
Hoyhare h
through Ilahannan And thcn tkcre
wa: one or two
7
2 : ainor ones
4 22 But that is a Whole procram of bloc activity, and 11
22 accordingg to one of che best sources 1 we had _ his vfew was that
8 24 thc illegals '~ouldl he nlaced Drimarfly in airports , docks .
25 factcries , and qivc a whole listing _ And these are the
TOP SECRET
1
chey
chey
've
they
they
they
i9
to
they
been
try.
only
5
they
==================================================
Page 69
==================================================
TORSCRE
65
sh [27 area8 wheeryou- have:gabotage ypu have exploslong:you:can '€'
! identify, et cetera.
1 5 Now the Illegal dlrectorate represents a very major part
4 of Sovfet Intelligence and bloc intelligencc and we just
5 there are not successes , It' $ Just happenstance
6 Mr _ Epsteln . It'8 dforuptlon of our defense effort?
7
Is that what You re gpeakIng of now? Thelr goal being
disruptlon of this country- 3 defense effort?
L?
9 Mr _ Angleton _ Nell, they have many assIgnments _ Dut
10 the point 18 have also the salotago-assas3Ination part,
11 which is totally apart Erom the body polftic of the RGB ,
1
42 it raises qjuestions in everysody 5 nind] when there is sabota:
1 13 and al1 other kinds of activities and you cannot find the
14 cu]prits _ 6
15 One defector stated that he helleved that the computer
16 fire they had in the Pentagon several years ago wag KGB _ Ie
17 was KGI Dut he stated in effect that he thought that was
18 one 0f their operationg
1
19 Scottv?-
8
20 Mr _ 'iler Thc major threat to thc U.$ . , I think i$ 7
2} bas0] on thc fact, JS we referre] to earlier , this skoul.!
22 Jffect countcr-ictelligence_ thc national counter -intelligcrse
1
22 effort , is Fo havc national countcr-intclligence focw"c
{
9 24 O; the fact that che Soviets and] the Soviet hxlocs , gince 4a'
25 of 1959 have reedicatedl themselves to the principles of
TOP SECRET
they
and
45
4
Your
==================================================
Page 70
==================================================
TORSCru
66
gsh} 28 1 Leninfem They have rededlcated themgelves
to the enfft In
2 ! the mflitary ba lance of power have relnsttuted_
$ Jn
1 3 ef fect , what was the pollcy of the NEP perlod , the New Economic
Polfcy, the attraction of Western businesB _ the attraction of
Hestern capital into the Sovlet Unfon to bolster the Soviet
Unfon , che dlsruption of the economles of other nations , whfch
would have an adverge effect on the economy of thig natlon
all off this centrally controlled and directed F used through
such countries as Romanfa , where we have for several years now
10 deluded ourselves that Romanla 19 Independent , through Bulgaria
11 through llungary, through Poland 411 the rest of it.
1
12 'rhis the major threat to thc Unitcd States Counter-
1 13 Intelligence is prohably , in ny viel , at least , one of the
14 najor ways that You re golng to be able to counter this
15 at least get the information brought to the attention of the
{
16 people who are making the decisions and mlaking the policy
17 for this country _
18 'r Kpstein Has our penetration cffort hcen good enouh
2
19 to estallish #hether or not the Soviet Unic? has becn involve
8
20 in 4irect covert action against ehc Unitce States sich as 1
21 to unlerninc our econoiy not using othcr couneries hut
22 4ircctly?
1
23 Mr Angleton There 8 bean 8 tremendous amount of
{
8 24 irforration on this_ I mcan, for example . tolay the secona
25 ncad of the Chamber of Commerce in Moscow is General Pitovranov.
TOP SECRET
They
is
and
==================================================
Page 71
==================================================
TORSGRD
8
gsh Prlor, he wa3 Deputy Chlef of the NKVD , He wa9 the resident _ 8
1 2 KGD resident In Peking _ Ie 8 the one who with 'Mao B0t uP the
1 3 underground that took over China He wab the head of Karlshorst
4 the largest KGI
1h Germany _
Jle operated pcople IIke George
5 Blake Ilc organized the kldnapping of Otto John , the head
6 of Security , West Germany .
7 Ie has now been Placed 83 the Deputy Chlef , or Deputy
8 Chairman , of the Moscow Chamber of Commerca, the same role that
pzitezhinsy
9 Lenin had 'Derjenaky: In the NEP That 18 the role to he
5
10 able to deal with Western capitalists with the vfew of abroad
11 recruftments and Wvith the View of using them as ajents of
~ 1
12 influcnce
1 13 Wow there 8 a tremendous amount of dlata Now thfs i9
14 what I'm trying to say , that counter-intelligence has always
15 been kept at a very low level a3 far a3 its ahility to submi-
16 such studies or whatnot to the Iational Security Council or E0
17 a forum where they arc dlebated _ Dut happen to be the
18 only hard intellfgence because they are coning fron men who
1
19 were 16 Yearg in thfs one case, a part oE that mechanism and
8
20 who rcad a1l the files 7
21 Mr Epstein _ Nhat happens to a1l that?
4 22 Mr Angleton Iell , that's been used by directors
1
23 briefings but there S nevcr Yc t heen a forum wherc 'ou can
1
8 24 actually have a confrontation with people who hold contrary
25 viewg .
TOP SECRET
they
in
==================================================
Page 72
==================================================
TOAT
68
8 Mr _ Mfler. In other worde, how: 8lgnificant
19 the fact
2 1 then , how slgnlficant would It be 12 Our Congress ; Our Executive
3 and our busines8 people knew that 88 of 1974 the last fIgures
I have of 18 7 Soviets Identlfied wfth the USSR all unlon
chamber of commerce , the people that are a11 of the
business wlth our businesgmen who are coming here
to the Unlted
States, work them and 90 forth, whon 47 of thosc were appointecl
8 to that from the KGB _
9 I mean , what significance does thig have to the United
10 States ? ~
11 Senator Schweiker _ 47 out of how man?
1
12 'r Miler _ About 182 _
1 13 Ar Ang leton _ Let 9 7o to the scientffic side on this _
14 The scientific side, in of 1969 the central comittee
2 15 ordered that there be added 2 ,000 gtaff officers to KGB from
16 the Academy of Sciences in order to exploit the opening to ehe
17 Mest and the sclentific levels _
18 Xr Tpstein _ And how would that exploitation be
1
19 accomplished?
3
20 Mr _ Angleton For recruitnent and exploitation of 1
21 contacts in; the Nest in the scientific exchanges _
m 22 Mr Epsteln_ The goal helng espionage
or some thing clso:? 1
23 Mr Angleton Espionagc _
1
2 24 Mr Miler _ Esplonage and influence = Iow RGD
25 officers?
TOP SECRET
g8h
1
dolng
May
many
==================================================
Page 73
==================================================
TOR SER01
69
gsh 1 1 Mr Angloton _ In 1961, 1000 o2 thoge had been pulled
2 ! together_ There was 0 brleflng glven by the general Btaff to
1
hfgh RGn people regarding the fleld of military electronics ,
and during that brfefing it was polnted out that were 14
6 Ycars behind 43 , but would overcomo and gurpa88 u8 through
throe mcans : Dumber one was the Central Committee addlng thc
2 , 000 staff officorg for espionage ; Second would be disinfor-
mation lcading our sclentific efforts In the wrong directlons ;
And third was to enter Into those kind of treatles whlch wouldl
10 bind our Own sclentific progress In milltary fields
11 Nhen I left the Agency , I read a report by a man who
0
12 knew nothing of this lecture and this Wag 3 group of American
1 13 electronic experts who had made a very sengitlve _ Secret
14 study which stated that in this ffeld the Sovlets were four
15 Years pehind us
{
16 This was In 1974 _
17 Xr _ Epsteln _ 1 final question . In the last 10 or 15
18 years have vou experienced any situations Where any hostile
1
19 Dowers were involved in covert action agalnst the election
8
20 process In this country? 1
2} Mr Angleton Well_ I think thero S no question that
4 22 influence has heen hroucht to hcar
1
2:, Kr Inderfurth [low?
8 24 'r. Rpstein . 'leaning Ihat?
25 Xr Anjleton Propaganda among other things .
TOP SECRET
they
they
Top
==================================================
Page 74
==================================================
TOR SCRD
0 70
sh
1 1 For example one of the most famoub o2 the dlsnformatlon
! agents , I mean had establlshed contact at polftlcal lcvels
3 In thls country.
4 Mr . Epsteln Iow about campalgn fInanclng?
5
Mr _ Angleton I don 't think It figuros unless Jt would
6 ba the_ CP
Dut just to add one last point to thfe question of the
threat, lt 18 my view , seeing Angola and Jee the unwilling-
ness of thfs country to resist or to define Its purpose or
10 to deal falrly with Its allies , that within a perlod of four
11 Years there 1ill be a form of confrontation on an unpopular
1
12 issue betwcen the Soviet bJloc and the United States in which
13 We 1ill hack will then go into our supreic isolation_
}
14 because in Decenber of Ivhen this Sovict defected and he :
15 had read the political action prograns , he spelled out in
A 16 detail that one of tha primary Purposes of the rcorientations
17 Was that all intelligence operationg or political objectives,
18 and tke main political oljective was to reaffirn the United
1
19 States a9 the main enemy , to achicve Its isolation and to achievc
3
20 political hegemony over most of Afcica and Latin America _ 1
2] Nc pointed out that the two largest ancl ncwest divisiors
22 crcated in KGD were Africa and Jtin Anerica
1
23 "ow this was not spcculative . This wjs reading actual
2 24 docunents of 0 Top Secret nature in which vou had to 7
25 communications intelligence clearance to even have access tc
TOP SECRET
they
1
Ing
8
down Wc
'61,
1
have
==================================================
Page 75
==================================================
TOpScH
71
g8h3 733 them, and I think what he has gpelled
Out, and I mlght add that
{ when I took him to mahy: countrieg we talked on higher . levels
5 than wo could talk in the Unfted Statee And I took him to
4 sone countries that we could talk to Primo Minfsters _ I have
5 geen Prime Mlnfsters and have been able Eo expobe thfa. Dut
6 the machinery here 18 not of such 4 nature that You can get
Into these matterg
8 Pir Epsteln _ Are dlaseminated?
Mr _ Angleton . Ne ro no: going to dlsseninate _ These
10 are matters that should go to the Secre of State
11 shouldn € he going up. through people becauge many of the 1
12 secrets are within that.
1
13 "r_ Epstein Do go to the Secretary of State?
14 Mr Angleton _ No
15 Mr _ Epstein_ Why not?
:
16 'r Angleton . I don € think the Secre of state has
17 ever been much interested in asking for opinions On Ronania
18 we sent some thing to the President prior to our 2
19 Wr Epsteln But the documents
8 re talking about ,
20 thc Secret dlocunents 1
21 Kr leton We don t have the document . I'm stating
7 22 he read those dlocuments in Moscow
1
23 Mr _ Instein _ Iut the report that he read , was that
2 24 disseninatedl?
25 Angleton I dlon t krow _ It went to the Director and
TOP SECRET
75
1
they
tary They
they
tary
trip.
You
Top
Ang
1
Mr
==================================================
Page 76
==================================================
TOR SGRTT
72
gsh: 1 It went to many other People = But .whether
! 2 the
ft actually got
to Secretary of State, I do not know
3
Mfler _ I think one important polnt here
that I
would like to make 18 that what
5
has happenod , In my opinion
what hab happened
in counter- Intelligence
In the Agency and the 8o-called aggresglve operations , the Increase In double
agent operationg and 80 forth and the dispersal
of the centrali:e- counter-intelligence
18 not golng to prodluce
8 counter-
;
Intelligence program within
the CIA which
10
going to
on attempting
to provide the
J
government, pollcy-makers
and 11 0 {orth, with the kind 1 of Information
and analytical
12 that is
Product
necessary if we re going to have a successful 1
13 Intelligence _ counter-
14 Mr Johnson
I woald like to thank the witnesses
15 an
2
unless tor Schweiker has
questions
we Will adjourn
16 for five minutes
17 that acceptable?
18 Thank you nuch 1
19 Scnator
8 Schwe_ Thank You very mnuch
20 ({ncreupon,
2t 4:10 0'clock: P.7. , the haaring in the 21 ahove-nentione matter
was concluded . )
5 22
1
23
9 24
25
TOP SECRET
1
1
Mr
18 focus
Sena
any
Is
very
ikcr _
1
1