Transcript of 157-10011-10078.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 157-10011-10078] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 Date:10/06/93 Page: 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY SSCIA RECORD NUMBER 157-10011-10078 RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR UnkNOWN FROM To TITLE TESTIMONY Of OSBORN HOWARD J DATE 02/17/75 PAGES 22 SUBJECTS MAJOR SUBJECTS To BE COVERED Im TESTIMNY OF OSBORN HOWARD DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION T RESTRICTIONS REFERRED CURRENT STATUS P 4 DATE OF LAST REVIEW 09/29/93 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS SSCI Box . 288 _ FoIder 9 [R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 1 Cia 3h/9y Send Claaahel Onne ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== SScI Box 288 , Fo lder 9 288.9 TQP SECRET (XGDS) Record Number 157-10011-10078 MATOB SQBJECTS TO BE_CQVERED N THE TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J_ OSBORN February 17_ 1975 Background of Mr. Osborn See the written statement submitted to the Commission Mr . Osborn dated February 1975_ by Activities 9f the_@ffice of Security Giving_Rise to Questions 1_ Taping Systers_in_Certain CIA Offices In the offices of the DCI, the Deputy DCI, the Executive Controller , the Deputy Directo:Pio: Supporth€dxefd ycidiseido), the Director of Security, and the Deputy Director of Security, 3 system of telephone taps and microphones has existed . This syster has made it pogsible to record covertly versation any telephone con or office conference place in those offices_ All CIA officials in whose offices such equipment was installed aware of its presence ad its capability of were fully Portiong of the system have been activated by ther_ disconnected in recent years 2. Covert Uses of Listening_Devices by the_Office of Security In each instance the installation of listening devices was apPproved by the Director of Cen tral Intelligence: expr 20 A conversation which occurred in a motel between Victoz and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deptey Dteceor oc Ceatrareneed telligence, 02s covertly recorded. This wa3 3 meeting ByAdmint} Iaylor for the puzpose 0f attempting teepezg ade Ked Marehettinot to sensitive information in 2 book which he wa then writing; b Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time; C With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, 2 telephone tap was placed on the telephone of a CIA employee who was alleged to be 3 sPy of 2 country; CIA No TQP SECRET (XGDS 5B(2) EO 41652 To Authority of:_ AS QE This AUs 94 HI 50955 Docpd{l3yb3846 Page 2 11, taking being only essly divulge foreign HAS OBJEctIOn= DECLASSIFICATION B RELEASE Andior DOCUMENT SANIT TIZeD ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== TOP SECRET 2 - d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely covertly recorded; The field 'offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with others where there was some reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such employees . 0 3 Physical Surveillance 1 Physical surveillance of individuals in this country hag been very rare 25 far as the Office of Secur is conc erned_ Circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following: 20 CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classi- fied information to unauthorized persons; b Vietog Magekedbiito find out if he Wa3 getting inforntiol current employees of the CIA; Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another_legmanto determine their sources of_classified information, and Micbeel @etee? a staff writer for the Weshiaguo@ PoBG for the same purpose; d A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her aggociates) who reported to the CIA the existen ce of 2 plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence. 4. Watergate_Contacts 2.' The McCord Letters ba The_Pennington_Matter Assistance to E Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg 5, Covert Informers Employed by_the Agency a. Within_the_Agency&nd_ Its Contractors The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential in- formers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency. Included here are plumbers , chauffeurs, guards telepkone main - tenance men, electricians members of the char force, etc. Thes e TOP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 3 ity fror ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 0 TOP SECRET 3 - employees are additional compensation to act as infomers and to report to the Office of Security on any potential security problers Ivhich they observe among their fellow employees at the Agency- A few outside employees_ i. e. non - employees of the Agency , are also retained for the same Purpose. This would inc hude employees of the telephone company and construction workers engaged in the construction of Agency buildings . In a]l instances however, the purpose is to maintain security among CIA employees and those working for CIA contractors Two proprieiesy Conaprnieg 0 called Andergo@ Securily Asgociates ad Genezal Perscnnel Tavegtigatioa@ 0 have keea uged "de d@ large Beale {uvescigationg @f the_pesgomel @E-conpandestbo Conbraci witk Eo @ b Qutside_theAgency In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for Anderson Security Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions of various organizationg thought to represent potential threats to CIA personnel or installations and to report on such threats. A list of organizations to be checked for indications of-8uch threats wa$ Pro - vided to Anderson Security Associates, wbich in turn provided regular reports to the Office of Security on the activities of the organization monitored, There was algo coordination between the Office of Security and local police departments to cover the game activity. An effort was made to determine the size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate what security forces would be necessary to cope with ther _ In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solici t or report information on anti- war and dissident elements The CIA wa3 concerned about the safety of its personnel, such as recruiters Dn college campuses , and it8 offices around the country. The field offices were directed at about that time to establish 3 clipping service on carpus and other newspapers to report on organi- zations and individuals Ivho might represent threats to CLA perconnel or offices. As 2 result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating to organizations and individuals who may represent such threats a substan tial number of files were accumulated on individuals and or - ganizations . TOP SECRET H# 50955 Docld:32203846 Page 4 paid ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== TOP SECRET 4 6 Mail Intercept Pregramsin Newv York and San Francisco 7 . Cover Operations_ Using Local Police_Cover Arrangements were made several years ago with Coliel Duzre? of the Fairfax County, Va. Police Department for the issuance of badges and other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. This involved about 15 sets of identification. These badges and other identification were never used by the CIA. were all returned to Goleael Dusseset Similar arrangernezts have been made with other police departments . Strict orders were issued that the use of identification a9 local police officers was to be limited strictly to situationg involving actual cover for surveillance purpoges_ 8 . Training of State and Local Police and Other Assistance Assistance was rendered to many local police departments , including those of the cities of New York and Chicago, aod to the Maryland and Virginia state during the period 1965 to 1972. He sta tes that this Prograr was vigorously and enthugiastically approved and s upported by Mr. Helms _ Asgistance consisted of tra of personnel, the loaning of equipment, and the declassification of materials and techoiques in such area 49 photo analysis, surveillance techoiques , metals detection } explosives detection, locks and picks_ hidden microphones , telephotography and covert photography, and the setting uP, handling, and or ganization of intelligence operations. This prograr wag terminated upon pagsage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which prohibited assigtance to local and state police departments by the CIA. 9 Break-Ins Without Warrants Mr . Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occurred to his kowledge by security personnel of the CIA have been those involvi:lg employees _ former employees , or CIA contact agents who were under investigation for suspected disclosure or classified information_ HI 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 5 They police ining ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== TOP SECRET 5 E 10. Counter-Audio Sweeps At the request of other departmnents and agencies, including Congres _ # sional Committees the Office of Security conducts "counter-audio sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone taps , hiden microphones and other intercepts of audible cormunications_ TOP SECRET H 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 6 ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== TOP SECRET (XCs) COMAIISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WTTHIN THE UNITED STATES Washington, DC 20500 Nelson A Rockefeller_ David W. Belin, Chairman Executive Director John T_ Connor February 13, 1975 C. Douglas Dillon Erwvin N_ Griswold Lane Kirklanc Lyman L Lemnitzer Ronald Reagan Edgar F. Shannon, Jr. MMORANDUM FOR THE FILE FROM: ROBERT OLSEN SUBJECT : Sumary of an Interview of Hoard Osborn, conducted on February 10 and 1l in the offices of the Cammission by M = Robert B Olsen Present throughout the interview 8 wich was conducted from 2:00 pm to apzroxi- mately 5:30 pm on February 10 and from 12 non until 2.45 pm and fram 4:45 pm to approximately 8:00 pm on February Ll, was the attorney for Mr. Osborn, Jack Deblius _ Mr Osborn apeared voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff_ At the outset, Mr _ Debelius raised a series of questions: 1 He asked uS to suply an outline of the authority of the Comission_ He was handed a cpY of the Executive Order creating the Comission and spelling out its duties and pOwers _ 2 He asked whether the Comission had subpoena powers,and he was advised that it did nta 3. He asked wether the Commission had power to grant imunity to witnesses, and he was advised that the Conmission does not have such power. 4 He asked wat liaison has been established , or will be established btween the Commission and the various Senate and House Comittees which will be investi- gating the CIA and other intelligence activities He was tola that the Com mission expects to establish such liaison, but that none of the ground rules Or arrangements have been agreed upon _ 5 He asked Ivhether M Osbrn Ivould have an opportunity to revierv the transcript of any recorded testimony that he may give to the Comission or to tha Com mission staff He was told that the Commission staff had agreed uon a policy of allowing any tness to examine the transcript of his Own testimony . He asked whether Mr _ Olsen had been cleared for security and Wether Mr . Osborn was free to reveal all levels of classified information in the curse of the interviciv_ He was advised that suc a clearance had been obtained for Mr = Olsen and that Mr Osborn was free to answer fully ay questions put to him within the scope of the responsibilitics of the Comission. TPSECTET_(XCDS_SB(2) bO 11652 BY Authorftv 01 H 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 7 yet wi ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== IP SECRET 2 Mr _ Debelius stated that he had carefully reviewed his Own situation as a former employee of the Office of Security within the CIA and that he had oncluded that there Ias no prospect that he would be called as a Witness either bv the Commission or by any Congressional or other comittee_ Hence , he did not feel that there wuld be conflict in his representation of Mr = Osborn under the canons of ethics applicable to the legal proEession_ Backgreund_of Mr _ Osborn Howard Osborn graduated from the Virginia Polvtechnic Institute in 1940 and shortlv thereafter entered the military service_ After World War II he was briefly with Firestone Tire & Rubber Corpanv and then joind che Central Intelligence Agency in late 1947. He served in various assignents within the United States and Europe prior to September 1963, including assignment as Assistant to the Inspector General and tions within the Directorate of Plans_ In September 1963 he was named Deputy Director of Security_ At that tim the Director of Securitv was Rob Bannerman On July 1, 1964 , he was named Director Of Security, and he continued in that tion until earlv March 1974 when he applied for disability retirement and went On sick leave _ He was retired on disability on Decenber 31_ 1974, having mt returned to work since going on sick leave on March 8 , 1974 . He states that he had no involvement whatever with Agencv activities after March 8 , 1974. Activities of the_Office of Security The Office of Security provides guards ad security personnel to protect thz phvsical facilities Of the Agency _ It has reszons ibility for Overall security measures for all CIA installations 8 both in the United States and in foreign ountries Counter-Audio_Stveeps At the request of other departuents and agencies of the United States Covernment it conducts 0 cunter-audio Sweeps 0 of their offices to protect against telephone taps } hidden microphones _ # and other irtercepts of audible communications In the case of Congressional cmittees and suboommittees_ 0 it onducts such Siveeps Of hearings rOOms on the occasion of classified presentations bv CIA personnel _ Mr _ Osborn further stated that there may have been Other Occasions when such S:eeps were made of Congressional cmittee rOOms _ at the cmittee request, where classified presentations were to be made. Mr _ Osborn does not, hovever = specifically recall such other occasions It also seems to Mr Osborn that the Office of Security has made similar Rdr Sweeps for one Or mre individual cngressmen Or senators Of their offices in tha Senate or House Office Buildings_ 0 but he again has no specific recollection- The OEfice of Security also makes such Sleeps of the homes of officials Of the CIA with their knowledge. TOOP SCCRET H# 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 8 any posi posi ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== TP SECRZT Fe knaws of no case in wich the CIA has made a Sweep of any other residences_ It does make Sweeps of private firms who have CTA cntracts but always with the kmowledge and cnsent 0f the firm: He states that his Office has never used equipment for cunter-audio sweeps for I 18 'positive intelligence_ ne sweeps cnducted included physical inspection, checking all telephones for taps, checkinq desks, walls, ceilings and floors for listening devices Or radio receivers and mav involve such sophistiaated Measures as counter-laser neasures and the use Of a Dodge mbile home equipped with sophisticated equirment capable of picking Up a radio transmission from nearby premises_ Taping_Systems in Certain CIA Offices Mr_ Ozborn stated thzt Mr= Helrs had authorized for use in his office, in the offic of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in the Office of the Executive Director-Controller_ in the office of the Deputy Director for Support (now Aainistration) in the officz OE the Director of Security and in the office of the Deputy Dictor of Security a system of telephone taps and secret mi crophones which made it pOssible to record overtly any telephone on- versation Or office cinference taking place in those offices The taping system could b activated Iith respect to telephones by depressing a button On the tele- phone in the office Or on the telephone at the Zesk Of the secretary in the adjacent office_ The taping system to record office conversations would be vated by depressing a buttan uder the carpet in the vicinity of the desk of the person occupying that office_ All CIA officiils in whose offices such equipent was installed were fully aware of its presencz and its capability of being acti I3 vated only by them: The rexorded conversations from all of these offices, except those in the Office of Security, [vere recorded in a central bank of recorders located in the base_ Tent of the building: Tnose emanating from the Office of the Director of Security Or Deputy Director of Security Were recrded on tvin recorders located dow the hall from those offices All recorded telephone &nd office conversations were transcribed. In sone in- stances the tapes were retained, and in sone instanczs they Ivere erased: It is not knomn whether the Agency retains any of the typed transcripts. From time to time= 7 particularly as an official has departed from the CIA, he has Oldered tapes erased and transcripts destroyed_ Mr _ Osbmn reports that Mr = Oblby directed the removal of the recrding ad tele- phone taping equipment from his office Ihen kz becai Executive Director_ Controller of the Agency &d Tvhen he became Director of Central Intelligence Mr _ Bannerman also had the equiprent talten out of his office When he became Deputy Director for Support (Administration) Apparently all other officials in whose offices such ecuipment was installed used it from time to Lie _ Positive Uses of Ounter-Audio Equipent Mr _ Osborn stated that he wishes to clarify his previous testimony that cuntcr audio had nt been usca in a psitive sense _ Muat he nant Ias that it had nt TOP SECTT HW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 9 acti- opiec again ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== TOP SECRET 4 t been used in the tive sense under ay of the circunstances referred to above _ There were, hovever, several situaticns in which telephone tapes and covert recording devices were erployed by the Office of Security: 1 A conversation which occurred in a motel between Wictor Wardhetti and Admiral Rufus Taylor former Deputy Director Of central Intelligence, was covertly recorded, This was a mee Ling_arranced by Admiral Taylor for the purpose of atterpting to persuade Mo Wareletti not to divulqe sensitive information in a book which he Ias ten writing; 2_ Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time; 3_ With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, 4 telephone tzp Ivas placed On the telephone of a CIA erplovee who was alleged to be a SpY Of a foreign country; Polygraphs of job applicants and sone contractors have been routinely covertly recorded; 5_ Tle field offices of the CIA have from tine to time installed cvert recording devices to record qersations of CIA employees with others where there Ias sane reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such emloyees _ In each instance the installation of such listening devices was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence . Mr _ Osbon recalls only three such instances: a In 1972-73 suci a device was installed in an effort to unoover details where an old defector was being forced to make kickbacks of his corpensa- tion fra CIA to his CIA case officer; ba At a date which culd not be recalled by Mr _ Osborn a device had been installed to record activity of a female employee of the CIA Ivho had becone closelv and intimately associated with persons believed to be dissidents; In about 1968 or 1969 at the request of Mr_ Frank Bartamo of the Depart- ment Of Defense the CIA planted listening devices at the apartnent of 3 serviceman doing highly sensitite cryptographic wrk_ This was dre Kith the full knowledge of Mr _ Willian Sullivan Of the FBI Mr. Osbor spec lates trat the CIA was called upon to accomplish this task for the De partment of Defense because Mr _ Sullivan believed that Je Edgar Flover _ Director Of the FBI 0 would not approme: Mr Osborn states that there may have been othr instances @nere such listenr; devices were installed within the United States_ but he des not recal] any others He is ephatic to the efEect that after President Johnson issued an Executive Order prohibiting telephone taps without the authority of the Attorey General_ the CIA never to his knwledge overtly tapped a telephone within the United States exacpt in the one incidence authorized hy Attorney Ceneral Katzenbach . Tp SFCRLT H 50955 DocId:32203846 Page_ 10 posi ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== TOE SECRET 5 : 3 } P: Physical_ Surveillance 1 Mr_ Osbrn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country Fee has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned He doubts that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security. 1 He describes those circustances under wnich surveillance has been conducted % as being limitea to the following: 1 CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified information to unauthorized persons; 2 Vlctor Macheuti/to find out if he Ias getting information from current erplOyzes of the CIA; 3 _ Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another_Legman to detemine their souICes Of classifiej inforation,and Micleel @ezterd a staff writer for {83 Washinguon Besi for the same purpose; 4 A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported_ to the CIA the existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence_ This surveillance was conducted under the supervision of Mr_ Ober _ 0 of the Directorate of Operations, with the full kowledge of the FBI_ Also included in this surveillance was sote of the contacts of this agent in Detroit Miami, and New York City. T.e agent involved here was Thelma King, and the surveillance took place in 1971_ (Mr . Osborn reports that a conversation between Miss King &d her case officer in a New York hotel was also covertly recorded.) Mr . Osborn is emhatic to the fact that every instance of phvsical surveillance in his experience Ias authorized by the Director of Cen*ral Intelligence except that Mr_ Branman the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the official to authorize the surveillance of enployees_ P but it is possible that these also were approved by Mr . Colby as DCI Mr_ Osbor is also emphatic to the effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance, has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly mnitored with respect to any cnversations or canmunications Or has ever had a security check performed on him by the CIA. Watergate Contacts 1 The McCord Letters: Mr _ Osborn states that a letter directed to Mir . Ielms in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the 10 crank mail" 6 ved that He recognized the signature On the letter as being that of a forer employee of the Office of Security Mr . Janes McCord _ Mr McCord had shortlv before that been arrested in connection Ivith the breakin at thc Demcratic National eadquarters on June 16 1972_ Mr Osborn states that he imediatcly brought this letter to the attention of Richard Ilelms , the DCI TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 11 recei- day - ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== TQ2 SECRET 6 - MCord Letters (cntinued) Mr = Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care Of it_ Thereafter a series of letters were received Erom Fic . McCord by Pzul Gaynor _ then the Chief of Secrity Fesearch Staff within the Office of Security- These letters were received Mr = Gaynor at his hone_ Each letter was promptlv to the attention of Mxr_ Helis The thrust of these letters was that brerzatmts the ttee to Re-elect the President &d high Officials within the Nixon Achinistration were planning to blamz the CIA for the Watergate break-in_ Mr _ Helms directed that thesz letters not be referred to the Justice Departient and that he wula take care of them. Mr _ Osborn recalls present wen the matter wvas discussed Ivith the General Counsel of the CIA Mr wbo advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these letters to the Departient. At a mch later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony Ivith respect to these McCord letters and the actions regarding ther to the Nedzi Subcomittee of House Appropriatians Committee and to the cunterpart Senate Suboomittee. 2 The_Pennington Matter: For many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former FBI agent, has been retained bv the CIA as a confidential informant. His copensation from the CIA has been S250 per month. Mr _ Osborn stated that he has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by Mi Pennington in exchange for the corpensation paid him. In Auqust 1972 Mr Osborn was On vacation during the time his deputy_ Exmal Geiss was in charge of the Office of Security- (The Office of Security had been designated by the DCI as the liaison Ivith all other goverental agencies and departrents relating to [Naterqate ratters. ) Ihile Mr = Osborn was On vacation anFBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted the Office of Security Znd requested infomation on a man simplv named "Pennington" 81 The request was directed to Steve Kuhn the Office of Security_ Mr = Kuhn S Zeputy _ Hollis Whitaker , took the request of agent Parham to Exmal Geiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the nanes of both Penningtons or just one Of them. Mr . Geiss instructed Whitaker that Parham should be supplied only with the nane of Cecil Pennington _ a retired employee of the CIA, who was not related in any wav to Lee Pennington_ Geiss instructed Ihitaker that Lee Pennington S name should not be given to Parham. Mr - Geiss muld have known that Janes McCord while he Ias erpployed in the Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Iee Pernington, that McCord Ias involved with the Watergate break- and that the FBI was really interested in Lee Pennington _ Mr _ Osborn states that all of the abowe information came to his attention in February 1974 and that he had ro knonledge ofE it until that tire _ TOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 12 by being Hoyseoustice of in, ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== TOP SF?FT Pennington_Matter_(cntinued) Lee Pennington and a man named Charles @ylie were the only tvo onfidential informants wo Osborn can think of who Kere erploveed 2s such by the Office of Security during his tenure with that office_ (This is in addition to CIA erplovees and the employees of propriety investigating companies wo have been used as informants.) Mr _ [ylie was a journalist and writer who was paid S1O, 000 per year plus certain travel extenses by the CIA to act as an informant, but Mr_ 'Osborn has no idea Ihat kind of information he provided to the Agency in recent years_ He does recall that many 1 years ago Wylie provided information regarding the Vienna, Austria, Youth Festival and also soe information gathered On the trip he made to Japan . Mr Osborn states that he has never mt Lee Pennington or Charles Wylie, nor has he ever talked with either of them in person Or by telephone_ (Mr _ Penninaton was apparentlv terminatr 1 as a CIA informant on Decerber 31 , 1973.) Mr _ Osborn states that he 01 started action" to terminate Wylie in about January Or February 1974_ He thouqht that Wvlie had never provided anything to the Office of Security and that it was 1 no time to have a domestic 01 informant_ Both Penninqton anc Wylie had been inforants for thz Office Of Security for many years had been retained in that capacity even before Mr Osborn became Deputy Director Of Security in 1963_ In February 1974 in cnnection Ivith 3 search of files in the Office of Security Some indication was turned up that Mr_ Osborn had been informad in January 1973 about the fact that Lee Pennington had entered the hane and the office of Janes McCord at the request Of Mrs_ McCord on January 22 _ 1972 , to locate and destroy records Ihich would kave revealed a 0 link" between Mr . McCord and the CTA. Mx Osborn denies that he received any such infomation The infora- tion was allegedly given to him by Paul Gaynor , Chief Of Security Research , in the Office of Security. Mr = Gaynor retired in 1973 at the request of Mr _ Osborn , who had been directed to cut a GS-l6 fram his staff in a personnel reduction mve _ states that Mr _ Gaynor accepted this request gracefully ad retired_ Osbor and Gaynor have never discussed wvith each other the subject of Lee Pennington or the deception practiced On the FBI in August 1972 _ Osbom does not think that Gavnor opened up the subject, but he does believe that Gaynor has testified before either one of the Congressional committees investigating Watergate or the Special Prosecutor s Office } Aeter Mr Gaynor retired Iou Vasaly of tha Office of Security has handled contacts with nylie ad Pennington_ In January or February 1974 Mr Osborn sent Sidney Steinbridge of the Office of Security to New Yark to terminate Mr Iylie. Lec Pennington died in the fall Oi' 1974 of natural causes He was in his middle 70's. TOP SECRET HM 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 13 They He ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== TOP SECRET Watergate_Cntacts_ (contineud) 3 Assistance to E= Howard Hunt re Ellsberg Break-In Mr _ Osbom states that the Office oE Securitv had no involvement whatever with the assistance rendered by the CIA to Nr _ Hunt in cnnection with the break-in of the offices of EllsbergF S psychiatrist ad that he had no knonledge of that matter prior to the break-ins He is now aqquainted with the White House request made to Ceneral Cushman for assistance to Mr. Hunt in 1971_ He is also naw familiar with the fact that the CIA provided to fir_ Hunt disguise equipment, false identification papers and a caera in respnse to the Rhite House request_ He also now knivs that Mr _ Hunt arranged for the develogrent of the photographs which he had apparently takon on the occasion of the break-in at the office of Mr = Elisberg'S psychiatrist. In 197l Mr. Osborn received a request from Mr _ Young at the White House for the psych logical profile on Daniel Ellsberg. He says that Mr _ Young stated that the White House had been very pleased with the profile which had been developed by the CIA on Fidel Castro and muld like the same kind of profile On Ellsberg. Osborn stated that he responded to Young that the CTA personnel had a areat deal of biographical material On Ellsberg. Young assured Osbom that the Wnite House would provide material on Ellsberg. Osborn re_ sponded that such a request would have to be approved by the DT Mr. Helms Osbor then took the matter to Mr Helrs who approved the project and told hin to provide the remuested assistance to Young. Young thereafter sent materials from tze to time to Osborn relating to Ellsberg. It was Osbor s imppression that these materials were very fragamentary and wuld not be sufficient to provide a meaningful psycho_ logical profile Nonetheless_ the reqjuest and the materials were turned over to the doctors at CIA and a draft of a profile Ivas ul timately worked up. Mr _ young did mt appear to be Very well nleased with the draft. Mr _ Osborn surmises that the break-in at the offices of Dr_ Fielding (Ellsberq S psychiatrist) Ias acconplished for the purpoe of gathering more information Iith which to develop a better psvchological profile_ L TOP S'CRET HW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 14 6 ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 9 T2_SZCEET Covert Inforers_Erleyed bY the_Agensy The Office of Security employs a Wide range of confidential informers fram the general roster of employees of the Agency Included here are { among chauffeurs, guards_ telephone maintenznce mn, electricians members 7 plumbers_ etc. These employees are additional corpensation to of the char force_ to the Office of Security on any r tential L act as inforers and to report security problems which they observe arng their fellon employees at the Agency . If an enplovee, for exarple , has been convicted of a crime or is thought to b engaging in any contact which would make hin susceptibie to blackmail, that matter is supposed to be reported to the Office of Security_ Likevise, if any enployee is observed conducting himself in a suspicious manler, such as request- information from files wich do not concer him, that is to be reported: A fev outside emplovees i e. non - erplovees of the Agency , are also retained for the same purpose_ This would include emloyees of the telephone copary In all instances hever, the purpose is to maintain security annq the CIA emplovees and those working for the CIA_ staff employees retained as inforers are those Ivho Iork in the records OfeicolofsthefDerectoreserof Operations Several staff emplovees in that office were recruited at the reauest of Mr_ Thomas Karamessines because of the extrerely high level of sensitivitz and the records maintained in that office_ When the CIA Headquarters was constructed in the late 1950's, the Office of Security recruited various members of_ the construction work force to maintain security aginst the installation of listening_devices telephore taps or Obler pnetrations of the premises AS & @uugpontn Or te Succass {n @ZE 92277 @Lfoiev the @BEian @L SeCualTy Oigoni 2 wholly @ed pioprletary Cowpwy kascn celled Zderson Sacil Aooclates and wic was @ployed (o @ larugaculi Was Investigei tond @F Ube Derconn; ] OE_companies Ubo Contrgcs Wth te CLI In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for the Anderson Security Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions of varios zations thought to represent potential threats to CIA personnel or installa- orqanis on such threats A list Of organizations to be checked for tions and to report to Anderson Security Associates_ which indications Of such threats was provided the activities of in tur proided regular reports to the Office of Security on the organization mnitored Security Associates was in reality rn bv Mr_ Ralph True, a CIA Head Anderson Officer who also ran a similar Iholly-Ored propriet ary corpany On quarters case the West Coast, Ceneral Personnel Investigations_ Inc. The Anderson cmpany has sinoe folded. Adleron and (oneral have been @xtensively Verlized to gecazlty cadv @sl thg @lpleyee3 OE Cl coneradtors @gagad u highly gensrEIve pigoleces: 350] blldber @2 Dbojests It k5s bcon Uboeghe Iperalve Uhat Uorc bs n adicanon Whatsoever O @lther Iedoral Coverent @r CUA Lboresit 0 Involvomonc f Jllu: | Tue ve OLvClg Cotogory @l pojaoit Was ts Uavalopnen "na manuractune OT Umrusra reconnauigsuee plenea Inotber @mple (ould bc @ @wazent projcct being Gondaccir} bby @ Calltornia @omoarya TOOP SECRET H# 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 15 paid ing only Ad 33 @ezbovsm ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== TOP SECRET ~lO- Surveillance of Dissident_Groups_and Activity 3 It has been mentioned above that Mr. Osborn informed us of thz activity of the Anderson Security Associates in Maintaining in the [ashington, D.C. area a E chzck on individuals and Organizations who would represent potential threats to CIA personnel or organizations _ There Ivas also cordination bettveen the Office Of Security and local police departrents to cover the same activity. An effort was made to deter ne the Size of anticipated dennstraticns and to anticipate Ihat security forces wuld be necessary to cope with then. In 1967 and 1958 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solicit Or report information on anti-war and dissident elenents Tne CIA was concerned about the safetv of its personnel such as recruiters on college campuses and its Offices around the ountry _ Its recrui office in Ann Arbor _ Michigan, had been bombed at about that time _ Mr = Osbrn also believes that the field offices were directed at about that time to establish a clipping service on canppuses and other newspapers to report on organizations and individuals who might represent threats to CIA personnel or Offices_ As a result of the information fed into the OEfice of Security relating to organizations and individuals Iho my represent such threats a substantial nuber of files Were accuulated on individuals &nd organizations _ Mail Intercepts N_ Osborn reprts that a mail intercept progrem in New York City began in about 1952 and ended in 1973 He learned of this program when he became Director of: the Soviet-Russian D.vision in the Operations Directorate. He states that the involved the identification of parties Iithin the United States sending 3nd pcrvingmaly with persons in the Soviet bloc cuntries and the identificticm cf the prsons in the Soviet bloc sending ad receiving such mail Selected items of mail were also opened &nd photographed, and then resealed and forwvarded. Mr . Osbom states that he cannot recall any specific use made bv the CIA of the infomation SO obtained_ The primary purpose of the projram as he understood it was to de information to the FBI He recalls several conferences regarding the program. It was his position that the three personnel from the Office Of Security who worked on the program were not performing any useful service _ for the Office of Security, that it Was a drain on the budget of his office, and that the CIA had business tapering Ivith the mail in the first place_ Mr = Colby , wen he was no Director-Controller of the Agengy supported Mr Osborn S position on the FatcetiveItivas opposed by Mr _ Angleton of the Directorate of Operations who matter that the information derived fxm the project was vitally neces - argued primarily Mr _ Helns elected to hv the progran continue_ It was finally salry i? the FBI that Air . Schlesinger was DCI in 1973_ terminated bv Mr . Colby during the time TO? SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 16 ting provic ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== TOP SECREi' 1l mr Mr _ Osborn also thought that continuation of the progra was too risky in the light of public &nd Congressional attitude tonard the CIA. He thinks tht the program Originatcd while Allen Dulles was DCI &nd that it was undertaken with the knowledge and consent OE the Postnaster Ceneral_ However, this is hearsay_ according to Mr _ Osbom- Mr Osborn is also acquinted with the fact that from 1969 to 1971 the project Of mail surveillance occurred from time to timf in San Francisco_ The Office of Security ade the arrangements th the Post Office Departient for this progrzm, but it was carried out by the Far East Division and the Technical Services of the Directorate Of Operations The Technical Services Division at that time Fas headed by Rod M. Kenner Iho is naw retired and living in Florida. The arrangements with the Po-:t Office Departient were made by Jack Turton of the Office Of Security. Mr_ Osborn has the vaguest knowledge Of the pur- pse Of this project and muld offer no further light than that it involved sone checking on the stamping and postmarking of mail from the Peoples Republic Of China. The project was orally okayed Mr _ Helms. Mr_ Osborn has no knvl - edge o: any otler mail underover projects in New Orleans or elseixhere_ Cover Operations Us_ Ipcal_Police_Cover Mr _ Osborn stated that arrangements here made several ye_ rs ago with @olonel Dgrer of the Faixfax County, Virginia, Police Departrent for the issuance Of aid other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. It is M_ Osborn S recllection that this involved abut 15 sets of identification. Tnese badges_&d other identification were never used bv the CTA. were all returned tozdolonol Dusiert 0X This arrangerent was inspired bY difficulties Ivhich had been encountered by security personnel in conducting a physical surveillance of Nigtoiz Ikuchestio It seens that @rcheti 1ived in 3 residential comunity and his norz was sitation on a cul-de-sac . This made it extremely difficult to cruise by his hare or station a security car anywere near his hane without attracting the attention of other residents in the neighborhood _ Security personnel Ivho may have been si in a car Within several blocks of the Mlaschelti residence muld hava attracted the curio sity of the residents and the operation wodld be threatened if such residents approached the car and asked wat the occupants Ivere ding there and if Iere qiven straigint-fortvard answers _ According" to Mr_ Osborn , it was highlv desirable that the security personnzl be able to respond to such inquiries by saying that Were police perforning official duties Mst citizens_ he savs , huld accept that as SUEficient, Ivhereas their curiasity would be even further aroused if the sccurity personnel identified themselves as th the CIA. Osborn states that he had issued strict ordcrs that the use of identification local plice officers Ivas to be limited strictly to situations invol- actual vcr [or surveillance purposes- TOP SECRFT HM 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 17 wi only by ing badges They tting they they being wi ving ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== TOP SECRET -12 - Osborn seens to rccall that the Offioe Of Security had similar arrangements B _ with the [ashington, D C; Metropolitan Police [partment, and he thinks that there Fer? instances in Iich such cover was actually used, but he does not recall fic cases_ He also states that it is possible that CIA Eield offices would have used similar cover of local plice departments, but he has no Iavleage of such instances_ Wire Taps N Osborn states that he has no acquaintance with the Iire taps made of the office and hoire phones of tTvo cated columists in Washington in 1962 and 1963, which wire taps are revealed in the file as having been authorized bv Attornev General Fbert Kennedv (The file reveals continuation of activity with respect to the surveillance of these olumists into the period Of wnen Mr = Osborn Was in the Office of Security as its Dputy Director The file dces howevr, show any indication of actual axareness On the part of Mr - Osborn thEt telephonestopping was involved. On the ontrary , there are indications in the file that these telephone taps were discontinued imediately prior to Mr _ Bannerman becoming the Director of Security in 1963, at Iich tim Mr.Osborn also becane the Deputy Director of Security.) #aining_ef State and Local Police and Other Assistance Mr _ Osborn states that assistance was rendered to many local police departients_ includi those of the cities of New YOrk aa Chicago, and t the Marvland and Vclyinig stote police during_ the period 1955 to 1972 He states that this was vigorously and enthusiasticallv aproved and supported by Mr _ Helms program Assistance consisted of training of personnel the loaning of equipment and the declassification of materials_ and techniques in such areas as analysis_ surveillance techniqus= metals detectinn, exolosives detection, locks &nd picks_ hidden microphones_ telephotography and cvert photography , and the setting U, handl and organization Of intelligence operations- nis was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement Dznceancta which prohibited assistance to local and state police departments Assistance by the CIA Mr _ Osbor feels verv stronglv that the program of coperating with and assisting police departients in improving their capability to fight crime was proper and that its termination is a serious disservice to the American people _ Referring prohibition on CIA "police and lalv en forcenent functions 0$ in the National to the Osborn is f the cpinion that th? CIA in sharing its Securitv Act of 1947, Mr = information ad technical developments with state and local police departents was not exercising any police Or law enforcenent functian_ TOP SBCREF HI 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 18 speci- syndic photo ing, ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== TP SECRET 13 Thz Huston Plan M _ Osbrn states emphatically that the Office of Security had no knowledge whatever 11 developing Or 2ssisting in the so-called "Huston Plan, relating to domestic security operations_ He states that he had never heard of it until it hit the papers at the time Of the [atergate investigation_ All relation- ships with the Inter-Acency Dmestic Intelligence unit was handled for the CIA bxz Mr Helms and Mr - Ober. ne Nosenko Affair 0 Nosenko Ias a KGB agent who defected to the United States in Switzerland in the early 1960' # _ His interrogation was handled unzzr the supervision Of the SR Division Of the Directorate of Operations_ especiallv by David Murphy and Peter Bagl-Y of the SR Division- N_ Osborn states that he repeatedly protested the treatent of Nosenko_ After mre than twwo years of solitairy confinement in a special facility for wich the Office of Security provided all security measures, Mr = Bruce Solie of the Security Office finally arranged Jr the release of Ncsenko and gradually increased his privileges and freeda. N _ Osborn states that Nosenko has proved to be the most valuable defector in the entire history of the CIA, He has been reszonsible for identifying nine Isoviet agents, including a major in the Pentzcan. Surveillznee_9f Justice_ Duglas N _ Osbom has no knoivledge of the alleged surveillance Of Justice Duglas (referred to in an article in The Washington Post on February 3 , 1975 , page D-ll) Contact_with_ ne White House Mr _ Jshr states that he was not involvez and has no information regarding anv request from the [hite House for files relating to the cup in which Premier Diem was overthrown in Vietnam, or regarding the of Pias operation in Cuba The CIA personnel who muld have been involved in such matters were Willian Nelson _ Deputv Director of Orerations_ on the Bay of Pigs matter; and Ceorge Carver, then Special Assistant to the DCI for Vietnam affairs, cith respect to the Diem cu_ The only other contact of any nature. with the hhite Houe recalled by Mr _ Osbor was one which he seems to remember occurring in about 1963 [vhen the Office of Security was consullted by the Secret Service vith respect to cunter-audio measures p to protect against buaging and wire taps i' t2 |hite House. He tinks this occurred during the Presidency of Lyndon Jahrson Ulauthorized Break-Ins tr _ Osbom states that the onlv break-ins which have @cured to his knowledge )V sccuritv personnel of the CIA have becn tixse inwlving employces_ formr cpployccse or CIA contact agents who werc Innder investigation for suspccted disclosure of classified infomation. (Det:ails are in the files provided to the Commaissian. ) TOP SECTET HM 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 19 Bay ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== TOP SFCRET 14 General Mr _ Osbom states categorically that the Office of Security has never to his Jnowlecge: oonducted zy audio surveillance, telephonz taps, physical surveillance or perscal investigation of any member of Congress Or public official; maintained ay file for political or other inproper purpose of anv such conaressmen or public official; pulled any file for examination for purpose of checking up on anv such member of Conress or public official Mr Osborn states that he does not recall any instance during his career with the CIA to wich anv particular activity of the Agency was examined in the specific liqht of Section 403 Of the National Security Act of 1947; i e._ he dc; ; not recall anv assessment of a proposed or ongoing activity from the M st dpoint of whether it was improper as a "plice law enforcement" or 11 internal securi function_ Ipression K. Osborn impresses the interviewer as being honest; intelligent, and dedicatcd to the interests Of the United States and its people_ His Iemory appeared t be in error in sore details, but considering the wide range Of the interview ard the time period involved, coupled with the 1ide breadth on responsibilities ara the nuber Of personnel under his supervision in the Office of Security, this is to be expected_ There is One area in which the interviewer was dubtful concerning the complete candor of Mr_ Osborn. That WAs the area of his knowledge concerning the Pennington matter. TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 20 ty" ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== 61 "0275 STATEMENT Mir Vice-President 9 Governor Reagan , distinguished members of this Conmission I am here willingly at your invitation; I shall answer all of your questions fully and candialy _ My federal service has extended over a 32 year period , 27 of those years Were spent Iith the Central Intelligence Agency I am proud of my service with the C.I.f., and I am proud of the thousands of dedicated men and women with Ihom I Torked in the C.I.A _ I retired from the C.I.A. on De cember 31 , 1974 , after having been on sick leave from March 8 , 1974 , until the date of my retirement My last ten years of active service with the C.I.A . were spent as the Director of Security. I was responsible to the Director C.I.A_ and to other senior C .I.A_ officials for personnel security and for the security and protection of classified information, data and installations 9 both in the United States and abroad During my tenure as Director of Security, I served successively under Mr . John A McC one , Adniral William Raborn , Mr Richard Helms , Mr James R Schlesinger and Mr William F Colby . I am aware of allegations g1ven recent prominence by the newS media that C.I.A conducted improper activities in the United States Since my departure from active status in March , 1974 , I have had no access to Agency files or records with Which to verify or refute such charges I can assure the members 0 f this Commission u:y full cooperation but it is possible that my recollection of dates and details may be imprecise or unclear without access to particular files and records of the C.I.A To 19'~ HI 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 21 8".1: ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== the best of my knowledge and belief , all 0f the actions and 2ctivities in which participated, or which I rected arr recorded and docunented in C.I.A. files. At all times , while serving as Director of Securit; I acted with the knowledge and approval and at the instruction of the Director of C.I.A. 9 and in many , if not most instances 9 with the knolledge and approval of other senior Agency officials in the chain of command _ I should like to emphasize that Security in the Agency is 3 service 2nd support function and its activitiez are not self-generated_ Among other services , the Office of Security provided guidance and assistance to employees with personal problems ; it provided support to other Agency components upon authorized request and perforred tasks and special inquiri assigned to it by the Director of C.I.A = The Director of C.I.a was empolvered and directed by the National Security Act of 1947 to "protect intelligence sources and methods" By virtue of 2nd extension of that authority , those actions and activities witiin my purview were designed to prevent potential penetration of th1e Agency by hostile intelligence services , afford protection to the Agency 's domestic installations and to determine the sources of unauthorized disclosure of classified and sensitive Intelligerce information to public media_ While I am not now privy to precise statistical data, I believe the United States Government Agencles involved in intelligence activities can document the fact that the number of hostile foreiCn intelligence representatlves in our country has increased Significantly in the last ten years = One of their prime tarcets is the United States Intelligence Community HW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 22 ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== -3- investisation and review of C.I.A . or any othe element Of inat community should be made Tithin that context _ After many years 0f service in the security field, I can fully understend the extreme sense of frustration among the United States Government officials regarding unauthorized disclosure of classified information It is devastating to read the contents of 3 highly classified document disseminated in the intelligence community and then a or two later 9 to read the same infornation ad literatun in the press _ I believe most firmly in freedom of the press , but I believe also that there should be a sense of responsibility accompanying such freedon; that sense of responsibility seems often tobe buried or absent in the publication of classified information which could endanger our national security . I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Commission and to assist it in acquiring facts relevant to its investigation In the course of developing such facts , I am hopeful the Commission will look at the possible consequences of the Agency' s failure to act even if the Commission should find fault with individual conclusions or judgments made by Agency officials I shall endeavor to answer al1 of your questions and I shall put aside my citizen' s schield against self-incrimination That decision is based on my desire to assist the Commission to the full extent of my ability and for the equally cogent reason that I d0 not believe that ay action I performed w2s unlawful or in derogation 0f my duties to the United States Government ai_-L_ HOWARD J OSBOjRN H# 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 23 Ay 0 ) day ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== TOP SECRET 2 # d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been 5 routinely covertly recorded; The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with others where there was some reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such employees. 3. Physical Surveillance I Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far 25 the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following: a, CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classi- fied information to unauthorized persons; -icton Manchettisto find out if he wag getting inforration from current employees of the CIA; C Jack Andef505 Leg Whitten and another_legman to determine their sources of classified information, and Michael Gerener}; 2 staff writer for the Washington Postz for the same purpose; d A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her a99ociates) who reported to the CIA the existen ce of 3 plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Itelligence. 4 Watergate_Contacts 20 The McCord Letters b The_Peonington_Mattef Assistance to E Howard Huotand White House re Ellsberg 5_ Covert Informers_Employed the_Agency Within_theAgency_and_ Its_Contractors The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential in- formers from among the general roster of erployees of the Agency. Included here are plumbers , chauffeurs, guards _ telephone main- tenance men, electricians members of the char force, etc_ Thes e TOP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 24 ba by 2. ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== TP SECRET t 5 1 A Physical_Surveillence 2 Mr Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned He doubts that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security. 1 He Zescribes those circustances under wich surveillance has been conducted 4 F as being limited to the following: 1_ CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified inforation to unauthorized persons; 2 ~VigtornMaliheeesato find out if he Ias getting information from current erployees of the CIA; 3 _ Jag Andersonrires Witte; &na another legman to detemmne their sources Of classifiez information,and Michael-ceetner; a staff writer for the Washinaton Post, for the same purpose; 4 A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CTA the existence Qf a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence- This surveillance was conducted under the supervision of Mx Ober of the Directorate of Operations, with the full kowledge of the FBI Also included in this surveillance was SOre of the contacts of this agent in Detroit, 0 Miami and New York City Tte agent involved here was Thelma King, and the surveillance took place in 1971 (Mr _ Osborn reports that a conversation betleen Miss King and her case Officer in a New York hotel was also covertly recordeda) Mr _ Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of phvsical surveillance in his experience was authorized by the Director of Cen"ral Intelligence except that Mr _ Bralwnman , the Deputy Director for Adninistration, may have been the Official to authorize the surveillance of enployees but it is possible that these also were approved by Mr = Colby as DCI Mr Osborn is also emphatic to the effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance , has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been cvertly monitored with respect to any conversations or comunications or has ever had a security check perforted on him by the CIA. Watergate Contacts 1 The McCord Letters: Mr _ Osbrn states that a letter directed to Mir _ Ielms in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the 0 crank mail" 0 ved that He recognized the signature On the letter as being that of a former employee of the Office oE Security_ Mr . James McCord. Mr McCord had shortlv before that been arrested in connection Ivith the breakin at the Demcratic National Ieadquarters on Jue 16 _ 1972_ Mr = Osborn states that he immediatcly brought: this letter to the attention of Richard Ielms , the DCI TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 25 day - recei ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== ECRET MCord Letters (ontinued) Mr = Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care Of it_ Thereafter a series of letters wiere received from M _ McCord by Pzul Gaynor , then the Chiei of Secrity Fesearch Staff within the Office of Security These letters were received by Mr . Gaynor at his hone Each letter was Promptlv to the attention of Mx Hels The thrust of these letters was that broucbtteteh the to Re-elect the President and high officials within the Nixon Acninistration were planning to blamz the CIA for the Watergate break-in. Mr _ Helms directed that these letters not be referred to the Justice Departent and that he wuld take care of them. Mr Osborn recalls being present when the matter Ivas discussed Ivith the General Counsel of the CIA Mr wbo advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these letters to the tice Departnt. At a much later date 0 Mr Osborn gave full testimny Ivith respect to these McCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subcomittee of House Appropriatians Comittee and to the cunterpart Senate Subcomittee- 2 The_Pennington_Matter: For Many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former FBI agent= has been retained bv the CIA as a confidential informant_ His copensation from the CIA has been $250 per month. Mr . Osborn stated that he has no idea what kind of information has ever ben supplied to the Agency by Mr_ Pennington in exchange for the ompensation paid him. In Auqust 1972 Mr_ Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy= Earalb {G2iss; was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governental agencies and departents relating to [aterqate matters.) While Mr _ Osborn was on vacation anEBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted the Office of Security &d requested information on a man simplv named "Pennington' The request was directed to Steve Kuhn the Office of Security- Mr _ Kuhn s Jeputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent Parham to Bgal Cewss and asked whether the FBI should be given the nanes of both Penningtons or just one of them . ~MEizCziss instructed Whitaker that Parham should be supplied only with the nane of Cecil Pennington, a retired erployee of the CIA, who was not related in any wav to Lee Pennington: cGeiss instructed Whitaker that Iee Pennington 5 nane should not ba given to Parham. Mizo(G2iss_muld have known that James McCord while he Ias employed in the Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Iee Perningtone that McCord Ias involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really interested in Lee Pennington . Mr _ Osborn states that all of the abole inforration came to his attention in February 1974 and that he had no knanleds? oE it until that time _ TOP SECRET MM 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 26 HoystoJus of

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