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157-10008-10241 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
~ln)
7/28/98
Date:10/07/93
Page:1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMA TION
AGENCY SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER 157-10008-10241 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR
RECORDS SERIES 8 AELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
AGENCY FILE NUMBER R6o2 bhx/98
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR SSCIA
FROM
To
TITLE
INTERVIEW ANd MEETING SUMMARY
DATE 07/24/75
PAGES 7
SUBJECTS
INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE CHEEVER
ASSASSINATION INQUIRY
DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION T
RESTRICTIONS REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 10/07/93
OPENING CRITERIA 8
COMMENTS
BOX 438-3
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438-3
A#TERVIEW AH) CEETING SUMARY
R6o3_
INTERVIEW KITH: Bruce Cheever
Te?
_-1]
REGARDING : Assassination Inquiry
SSCI [z;
SSCLBOY 43 8 - 3
DATE-TIME-LOCATION: July 1975
qe4l
PRESENT : Paul WALLACH and Joe DiGenova
HAS OR SHOOULD BE DIGESTED:
FOLLOW UP REQUIRE:
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(s) :
EECUTIVE SESSION: YEs Jlo
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F,j0z
ITERVIEW AND MEETTNG SUMMARY of 6
6a2
TC? SECHIET
This morning Joe DiGenova and I interviewed
Bruce Cheever at the Carroll Arms We focused on
Cheever S tenure as deputy director of Task Force
W_
Background:
1938-43 Marine Corps
1943-44 OsS Parachute School
1944-46 Marine Corps
1950-53 Office Police Coordination; headed
Plans Section for Western European
Division 14-
1953-56 21 Cg Etation8 "akrdlen
1956-60 Deputy Chief European Division
1960-3/62 Headquarters, 0 S European Comand
(U_ S representative)
3/62-65 Deputy_Director
8 Task Force w
1965-71 rChief ef Stationd S@UEl ZZioas (2-I2
1971 Retired_ Erom Agency
3/64-2/65 Deputy Chief Special Operations
Branch (developing paramilitary
capabilities for Agency)
Apparently selected for Task Force W because
of extensive paramilitary background _ Not sure
whether slotted by Harvey or Helms .
Prior to his Task Force W assignment , Harvey
was known to Cheever by reputation only. He des -
cribea Harvey as one of the finest operatives the
Agency ever had _ citing Harvey S Berlin tunnel
Cheever understood that Task Force w was
Mongoose S instrument to get rid of the Castro
regime; that the Cuban operations had White House
backing; and that the Agency had been given an
operational carte blanche , with the caveat that CAHAS NO ObJECTION TO
each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval FDECEASSIFICATION ANDO}
prior to getting off the drawing board RELEASE OF THiS DOGUME
aS SANITIZED
Cheever told uS : "You don t pull in fast-rising 14 JQ 94
men like [Ted] Schakley unless you have solid back-
Cheever believes that Lansdale was RFK ' s
representative and that Task Force w would not
88
suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA with-
out Lansdale 5 approval_
UF
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INIERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
2 of
TAD
FIIE:
Cheever confirmed what we knew about Harvey_
Although Cheever worked closely with Harvey , he
told uS that Harvey was a loner and most surely
would not inform hin of operations unless he had
W # a must need to know In Cheever s opinion_
8 Harvey was one of the great believers in compart-
mentalization; Cheever "complained that Harvey
turned him into his staff man" (as compared to an
operational extension) Cheever also tola us that
Harvey was a two martini man at lunch with thyroid
problems ; this often 01 led to problems for Harvey
at early afternoon meetings"
Cheever believes he attended at least ten SGA
meetings _ Howeverache"does#not recall RFK ,
recalls briefing Bundy _ (Maybe Cheever attended
other than SGA meetings the minutes do not re-
flect his attendance_ 1
Cheever met weekly wiEh. designees of the SGA
principals in Lansdale 5 office (Messrs. . Califano ,
Haig_
8
Hurwitch, Craig, and Johnson) Cheever would
brief these designees on proposed operational
plans; discussion of the details woula ensue
Subsequent to the staff meetings _
8
the principals
would meet and decide whether or not the particular
plan woula be approved_ Cheever did state that the
Group often rejected proposals In one instance,
Max Taylor vetoed the maritime infiltration of a
small team Taylor felt that the chances of success
were small and attributability great. (Cheever
agreed with Taylor "but it was one of Lansdale' $
brain childs_ #)
Cheever told us that "around the Task Force W
shop it was known that the Kennedys wanted to
ria of the Castro regime_ EJ In order to get this
done , 0t the Kennedys built a fire under the Agency' s
tail and installed Lansdale as Chief of Operations"
According to Cheever Lansdale and the SGA were
"geared to keeping the Kennedys informea as to what
was happening"
However , after the Cuban missile crisis, Cuban
operations were not pursued with the same sense of
urgency _
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