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157-10005-10297| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
7294
1S4
A970 8/3(p Date:10/05/93
N 614 JFK ASSASSINATION SySTEM
Fage: 1
N 965
IDENTIFICATION FiRM
AGENCY INFORMA ; : Of'
AGENCY SSCIA
RECORD MUMBER 157-10005-10297 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR
RECORDS SERIES RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
MTIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
DOCUMENT ImFORMATION
ORIGINATOR SSCIA
FROM
To
TITLE
SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT (UPDATED OCT 16 , 1975)
DATE 09/01/75
PAGES 678
SUBJECTS
SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT (CLASSIFIED) TABS A-J
~AB A: PROLOGUE
TAB B: INTRODUCTION And SUMMARY
TAB C: COVERT ACTION
TAB D: CUBA
TAB E: conGo
TAB F: EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY
TAB G: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
TAB H: CHILE
TAB I: South VIETNAM
TAB J: FINDINGS And CONCLUSIONS
TAB K: RECOMMENDATIOMS
TAB L: EPILOGUE
DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCuMENT
CLASSIFICATION T
RESTRICTIONS REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 10/05/93
OPEMING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
COMMITTEE S DRAFT REPORT
(UPOATED OCTOBER 16 1975)
[R] ITEM IS Rfstricted
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JFK ASSASSINATIOM SYSTEM
IDEMTIFICATION FORM
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(pdare
Occober 16 _ 1975
(
SENATE SELECT_COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT
TABLE OF_CONTENTS
TAB 4 : Prologue
TAB B : Introduction and Sunmary
TAB C : Covert Action as Vehicle Foreign Policy Implementation
TAB D: Cuba
1 Introduction
2 Ac What Level Were the Castro Plocs Authorized or
Known About Within the CIA
3 _ The Question of Authorization Outside the Central Intelligence Agency
in che Eisenhower Administracion
4_ The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy
Administration Pre of
5 _ The Question of Authorization, During the Kennedy
Administration Post-Bay of
6 _ 1 dushn ltornsti A h /9L3
Are ru
7 _ The Question of Authorization in che Johnson Administrat ic:
TAB E : Congo
TAB F : Executive Action Capability
TAB G: Dominican Republic
TAB H: Chile
TAB I: Souch Vietnan
TAB J: Findings and Conclus ions
TAB K: Recommendations (6 F
TAB L: Epilogue (0) (4)
88
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for
~Bay Pigs
Pigs
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29
taken during the of Pigs operetion} present Castro with a
contamineted diving suit# (Colby, 5/21,
PP . 38-39) _
The Inspector General '8 Report dates this
operation in Jaruary 1963 , when Fitzgerald repleced Hervey
85
Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or
Fitzgerald conceived of the (I.G., P. 75) It is likely
that the activity took place earlier , since Donovan had conpleted
bis negotietions by the middle of January 1963 . Helns characterized
the plan a3 "cockeyed" 18 Helns 6/13, Pa 135)
TSD bought 8 suit , dusted the inside
with 1 fungus that would produce 8 chronic skin disease Medura
foot ) , and contanlneted the breathing epparetus with a tubercule
bacillus (I.G., P. 75) The Inspector Generel S Report states
that the plen was abandoned because Donovan gave Cestro 8 different
diving suit on bis Ot initietive (I.G., P. 75) . Helns testified
that the diving suit never left the laboretory (Helns 6/13 ,
Pa 135)_
(e) AMLASH
(1) Origin of the_Project
In Merch 1961, en officer of the Mexico
CIA station met vith 8 highly-placed Cuban official to determine
if he vould cooperete in efforts egainst the Castro regime (I.G.
P. 78) The Cuban , referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-l _ had been
#Donovan wes not; avare of the plan .
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39
(
Tap
A CIA
SE4DSI
'cabldsateat uiz
1965 , stated
that B-l had given AMLASH-l
a silencer and that AMASH-l had
"small_ highly concentrated explosives m On February 11, 1965
the Medzid Station cebled that AMLASH-l would soon receive
pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l' S
6t secretary" (I.G., P. 103)_ A subsequent cable reported that
"B-l had three packages of special items made up by his technical
people and delivered to AMLASH-l in Madrid" (I.G., P. 103
In June 1965, CI# terninated all contact with
AMLASH-l and his associates because of reports that his activities
were widely known (I.G .
9
Pp . 104-1O5)
"4_ B-l is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination
of Fidel_ but no one, including AM/LASH-l vill know
B-l' s location.
"5_ B-l is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin
Anerican countries 8s soon as Fidel is neutralized and
3 junta is forned This junta will be established even
though Raul Cestro and Che Guevera may still be alive
and may still be in control of the part of the country_
This is the reason AM/LASH-l requested that B-l be eble
to establish some control over one of the provinces 80
that the junta can be formed in thet location
"6_ One month the before the neutralization of Fidel,
B-l will increase the number of commando ttacks to 8 naximnu in order to raise the spirit and morale of the
people inside Cuba In all comuniques in all radio
messages
9
in all propeganda out by B-l he must relete
thet the reid was possible thanks to the information
received fron clandestine sources inside Cuba and from
the clandestine underground apperatus directed
by "P"
This vill be AM/LASH-l 3 war nane 'f
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45 Ll D JJulU1 J~CF 1Ji 101 ( - Fending (1) Rewrite
Per Subcomnitte:
Edi and (2) Insertion of
Gotclieb and Tweedy Testimony
TABLE OF CONTENTS
D CONGO
1
1 Introduction
1
2 _ Dulles Cablei Leopoldville That "Removal"
of Lunumba is an Urgent Objective in "High
0 } Quarters"
3
3 CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"
Lumumba Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger". Even
After Deposed and Placed in U.N Protective
Cus
8
The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba 14
(a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination"
of Lumumba and a Messenger Was Sent to
Congo With a Highly Sensitive
Agsignment
15
(b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to 'Hedgman
in the Congo Eor the Assassi-
nation of Lumumba : tember 1960 18
(c) Iedgman Testified That Gottliebl Told
Him That President Eisenhower Kad
Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba 22
(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination
Plot "Highest Priority' and Authorizes
Steps in Furtherance of It 24
(e) The lChief oEJstation Moves
Forward
Wich Assassination Plot 31
(1) The 'Chief of]station Testified
That He Requested and Received
Confirmation of che Assassination
Plan from Headquarters
31
(ii) The (Chief of]station Took "Explora-
M tory Steps in Furtherance of the
Assassination Plot and Testified
That He Destroyed Cable Traffic
Related to the Plot
34
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(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About che
Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the
Assassination Plot
41
(1) Tweedy Had No Recollection of che Operation
To Poison Lumumba 41
(ii) Tweedy Testified That
He Discussed With
Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating
Lunumba and Ile Cabled Hedgman About Gaining
Access to Lunumba for the: Purpose of
Assassination
44
(iii) Bissell Testified That Ile Did Not Recall
Nhether che Assassination Operation Had
Moved from Planning co Implementation
But it Was Not Against Agency Policy
co
Send Poisons to the Congo 48
5 _ The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination
Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives
in the Congo
52
(a) 0 ' Donnell 5 )operations in the Congo 53
(i) Tweedy and the (Chief of)Station Agreed That
a Senior Case Okficer Should be Sent to
the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi -
nation Operation
53
(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of
Lumumba With (0 ' Donnell)and Sent Him
to Congo : October-November 1960 54
(iii) Bissell Testified That He Asked (0 'Donnell)
to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination
Operation
59
(iv) (0 ' Donnell, Arrived in the Congo and
Learned That a Virus Was in the
Station Safe 60
(v) (0 'Donnell
Planned to "Neutralize" ( 0
Lumumba by Turning Him Over to
Congolese Authorities and Requested
the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to
Leopoldville as His Alter 65
(b) Agent QJWIN S Mission in the Congo : November-
Decenber 1960
67
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DRAFT : OCTOBER 6 1975 TQP_SZCRET
Frederick D Baron For Internal Comi ttee
Use
D CONGO
1 Introduction
The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA
plot co assassinate Patrice Lumumba _ The plot proceeded
to
the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically
intended for use in an assassination were
Placed in the hands
of che CIA IChief of Station in Leopoldville by
an Agency
scientist_
Altnough these instruments of assassination were never
used ,
a number of questions are Presented by the Lumumba case
which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee 8
assassination inquiry First , did CIA officers ard operatives
in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?
Second how high in the United States government was the
source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally ,
was the CIA connected in any way co the events that actually led
to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese cus tody?
A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these
broad questions together with the documents and tes timony re-
ceived by the Committee _
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Stanleyville and he was imprisoned _ The central government of
the Congo transferred Lumumba
on January 17 1961 to the cus
of authorities in the province of Katanga , which was asserting its
own independence at that time Several weeks later, the Katangese
authorities announced Lumumba s death_
There are various accounts of che circustances and timing
of Lumumba S death The United Nations inves 'tigation of the inci-
dent concluded that Lumumba
was killed on January 17.*
2 DullesCables Leopoldville
That "Removal" of Lumumba
is an UrgenE @bjectTve in "igh Quarters
Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence
from Belgium
on June 30 , 1960_ the CIA assigned a new
Ehief
of
Station to the Congo _ The |Chief of| Station said that the briefings
he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure
contained no discussion of the possibility of a88a8sinating Patrice
Luumba (Hedgman _
2
8/21/75 ,
P . 8) On his brief return to head-
quarters in connection with Lumumba S visit to Washington
in late
the
Ehief of]station again
heard no discussion of assassi -
nating Lumuba (Hedgman_
8/21/75 _
P. 9) .
During August _ great concern about Lumumba 5 political
strength in the Congo was growing among che foreign policy-makers
of the Eisenhower Administration . Xx This concern was nurtured
$ Report of the Commission of Investigation 11/61 UN Security Councii Official Records
November , and December
Supplement for October_
X* See Section 5 , infra_ for full discussion' of the anti-Lunumba attitude in the United States
prevailing
minutes of the National Security Councii government as shown by
testimony of high Adinisecufior Celicilland Special and the
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by intelligence reports such as that cabled co CIA headquarters
by the new Fhief of Station:
EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONCO EXPERIENCING
CLASSIC COFMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNNMENT
MANY FORCES AT WORK KERE SOVIETS COMUNIST
PARTY ETC ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR
INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE
FOR POWER DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF WHETHER
OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING
COMIE GANE TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER ANTI
WEST FORCES RAPLDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND
THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIM LEFT In WHICH TAKE ACTION
TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA (CIA Cable IN 39706_
Leopoldville to Director 8/18/60 .)
This cable also stated the (Chief ofl Station
S operational "OBJECTIVE
{OF ] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable 8/18/60)
Bronson Tweedy , then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA S clan -
destine services replied the same that he was
seeking State
Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR
BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable (Out 59741,
Tweedy co Leopoldville, 8/18/60) On August 19 Richard Bissell
Director of CIA S covert operations branch , signed a follow-up
cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION' S
(CIA Cable OUT 59959 Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60)
Several later , the khief of] Station
reported that a plan
to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu
Congolese leaders :
ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU
WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA KASAVUBU
REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT
VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT
STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA (CIA Cable 'IN 4276Y
Leopoldville to Director 8/24/60 .)
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The next Allen Dulles personally signed
a cable* to
the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed che" urgency of
"removing' Lumumba :
IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-
CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA ] CON
TINUES TO HOLD MIGH OFFICE THE INEVITABLE
RESULT WILL AT BEST BC CHAOS AND AT WORST
PAVE THE WAY TO COMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE
CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF
THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY CONSEQUENTLY
WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN
URGENT AND PRIM OBJECTIVE TIAT UNDER EXISTING
CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF
OUR COVERT ACTION (CIA Cable OUT 62966,
Director to Leopoldville_ 8/26/60 . )
Dulles cabled thac the (Chief of] Station
was co be given "WIDER
AUTHORITY" along che: lines of the previously authorized opera-
tion to replace Lumumba with 3 pro-Western group 2
"INCLUDING
EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable
8/26/60) "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT
THEMSELVES TO YOU the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60)
+ Cables issued under the Personal signature of the DCI are
a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed
** As discussed in Section 5 (c) infra, Richard Bisell testified
that Allen Dulles would have used che Phrase 'higher quarters 1 to refer co the President (Bissell
1
9/10/15
P . 48).
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Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to S100,000 "TO
CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR -
TUNITY To CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable 8/26/60) He assured the
Ichief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT
COMPETENT LEVEL M in the State Departuent (CIA Cable, 8/26/60)
But the Director of Cencral Intelligence
made a special point
of assuring the IChief ofl Stacion that he was authorized co act
unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the
Congo would prefer to remain uninforred :
TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE
TO BE CONSULTED YOU SHOULD SEEK. HIS CON -
CURRENCE IF IN ANX PARTICULAR CASE HE
DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT
ON YOUR ONN AUTHORITY WHERE TIM DOES NOT
PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable 8 /26/60)
This mandate raises a question 2s co whether the DCI was contem-
plating a Particular form of action against Lumumba which the
Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny"
United States involvenent _ DDP Richard Bissell testified that he
was "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable
shortly after
its transmission and that it was his "belief" that
the cable wa3 a circulocutious means of indicating that the
President wanted Lumuba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75 ,
PP . 33
64-65) . *
+ See Section 5 (c) infra for addicional testimony by Bissell
on the question of authorization for the assassination effort
against Lumumba
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to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might
assassinate Lumumba :
TO COS COMENT THAT LUMUMBA In OPPOSITION IS
ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE [THE
CONGOLESE POLITICIAN INDICATED UDERSTOOD
AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE
LUMUMBA (CIA Cable IN 49679 Leopoldville
to Director 9/7/60.)
The cable continued to report that che Chief of Station had offered
to assist this politician T IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM"
and assured hin that the United States would supply technicians
(CIA Cable , 9/7/60)
As the chaotic struggle for power raged , the Chief of
the Africa Division succinctly sumarized the prevalent U_ S _
apprehension about Lumumba S ability
to influence events in the
Congo by virtue of personalicy , irrespective of his official
position:
LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER -
RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION
EACH TIME It SEEMS HALF LOST IN OTHER WORDS
EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST
WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE
(CIA Cable (OUT 69233 Director to Leopoldville ,
9/13/60)
The after Mobutu S coup , the Chief of Station reported
that he was serving
a3 an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-
16 nate Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might in fact, have
been strengthened placing himself in UN custody , which afforded
2 safe base of operations :
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STILL DIFFICULT DETERMLIE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS
SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECTSIONS
ANNOUNCED NIGIIT 14 SEPTEMBER STATION ADVISED
TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS ] TRY WORK
WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-
NATE LUNUMBA FEAR Uiv PROTECTION WILL GIVE
LUMUIBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK
OMLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST
(CIA Cable (In 13374,) Leopoldville to Director
9/15/60 .)
On tember 17 another CIA operative in the Congo met
with a
leading Congolese
senator At this meeting , the senator
requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some
Congolese Army troops The cable to CIA headquarters concerning
the meeting reported:
[CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE
SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP TROOPS
RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP [OLDVILLE ] AREA
[THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE
ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT
ACTION [SENATOR RELUCTANTLY AGREES
LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY DISTRUSTS
[ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER} BUT WILLING MAKE
PEACE NITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION
LUMUMBA (CIA Cable IN 14228 Leopoldville.
co Director 9/17/60 .}
The CIA operative told che Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE
POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recomended to CIA headquarters
that they should
HAVE (ARMS ] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT
NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES }
DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES -
SARY (CIA Cable _ 9/17/60) +
* This recomendation proved to be in line with large scale planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paranilitary
support
co anti-Lumumba elements On October 6 1960 , Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed
a cable concerning plans which the IChief of
Station was instructed not co discuss wich State Department repre -
sentatives or operational contacts :
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Several days later while warning
a Congolese
leader about coup Plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters
the Chief of Station
URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL
OF LUMUMBA GIZENGA AND MULELE (CIA Cable
IN 15643 Leopoldville co Director 9/20761)
Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba 5 lieutenants who were
leading his
supporters while Lumumba was in UN cus
(Footnoce continued from previous page)
[IN] VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP
MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING
FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS THIS
PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION
IN WAY [UNITED STATES ] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN-
m DESTINE ` SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED
OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA
CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS
SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI -
LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS
(CIA CablelOUT 04697 Director to Leopoldville
10/6/60,)
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4 The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba
In che Eall of 1960 _
a scientist from CIA headquarters
delivered co the Fhief oflstation
in Leopoldville lethal bio-
logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba _
The Chief of Station testified that after reques and receiving
confirmation from CIA headquarters
that he was co carry out the
scientist' s instructions he proceeded to take loratory steps"
in furtherance of the assa8sination ploc. The IChief of Station
testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA
scientist, kSidney Gottlieb
he was informed that President Eisenhower
had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba _
4 lGoctlieb $ mission co the Congo was both preceded and followed by
general cables urging the "elimination"
T8 of Lumumba sent from CIA
headquarters
in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves
Only" channel
including
two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles_
The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of
Station But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed hinself in
the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly
before the poisons were delivered to Ehe Chief of Scation there
is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi-
nated before Lumumba S deach There however no direct evidence
of a connection between che CIA assassination plot and the events
which actually led
to Lumumba' $ death.*
X See Section 6 infra, for a discussion of che evidence the circumstances that Ted to Lumuba 5 death in
about
Katanga _
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(a) Dulles Cables Again for Elimination" of Lumumba _
and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a
Highly
Sensitive Assignment
On September 19_ 1960 several days after Lumumba placed hin-
self in the Protective cus tody of the United Nations peacekeeping
force in Leopoldville Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed
3 cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting
between che Chief of) Station and "Gidney) Braun who was craveling
to the Congo on an
unspecified assignment
["ISId"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT WILL
ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS (SID FROM PARIS" IT
URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ['(SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE
AFTER HE PHONES YoU _ HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY
HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGMMENT TO YOU
(CIA Cable (OUT Bissell/Ttveedy to Chief
of Station 9/19/60 ,)
The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator
"PROP" that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters
to the
Chief of the Africa Division +
% In a letcer of Septenber 23 1975 the Chief of the CIA Review
Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used 10 co
M denote sensicive personnel matters (Seymour R Bolton to Frederick
A 0 Schwarz and Frederick D Baron 9/23/75 _ Ic appears that this
sensitivity indicator while created for other purposes was utilized
Bissell Tweedy and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution
of their comunications about an assassination operation _ The cable
traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel
did not touch upon Personnel matters except in terms of recruitin?
additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation
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The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the
Chief of)station
that
he was co continue co use this indicator for
ALL (CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP WHICH YOU
ILSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF
(CIA Cable 9/19/60 .)
The (Chief of Station referred to herein a5 "Hedgman "+
testified to a clear independent recollection of receiving such
a cable Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a
"most unusual" cable 'Erom CIA headquarters (Hedgman_ 8/21/75 ,
PP . 11,
43) The cable advised in his words that;
someone who I would have recognized would
arrive with instructions for me I
believe the message was also marked Eor my
eyes only and contained instructions
that I was not to discuss the message with
anyone (Hedgman , 8/21/.75 PP 12-13.)
Hedguan said that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-
tions he was to receive , and it "did not refer co Lumumba in any
way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75 ,
P. 12)
Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was
to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville , Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensi-
tivity indicator
on a cable sent to Hedgman
on an Only"
basis (CIA Cable , (OUT 74837 Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60)
* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba $ followers che Chief
of )Station for the Congo fron mid-sumer 1960 through-1961
testi-
fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman , 8/21/75 , P. 2; 8/25/75
P. 4) _
N 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 18
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Tweedy S cable indicated that 3 third country national would be
required as an agent in the PROP operation :
IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTTVES
BEL IEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH
THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]
ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED (CIA Cable
9/22/60 .)
Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station
was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A
THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT
FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable 9/22/60) Despite Tweedy "
S concern about
the two existing station contacts he indicated that the (Chief of
station and his "colleague 10 presumably the man identified
as
"Sid" who was co arrive in che Congo shortly
to explain the PROP
operation to Hedgman
0 ~ were to be afforded considerable latitude
in exercising their' judguent
on the conduct of the operation:
YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ
OVER YOUR SHIOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS
OPPORTUNITIES OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE
CONCEALMNT ANERICAN] ROLE UNLESS OUT -
STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES
CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET READY
ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE
BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENTS (CIA Cable 9/22/60.)
X This is probably
a reference co agent QJWIN who was later
dispatched co the Congo _ His mission is discussed in Sections
and infra
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On September 24 , Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to
Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate"
Lumunba:
WE WISH GIVE LVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN
ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY
RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE
FAILS IN LEOP [OLDVILLE] SETTING HIMSELF
IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE (CIA Cable
OUT 73573)_ Dulles to Leopoldville 9/24/60.)
Dulles had expressed 3 similar view three days before in the
Presence of the President at an NSC mee stating:
Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in
the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not
yet disposed of and remained a grave danger
as long as he was not disposed of (NSC
Minutes 9/21/60)
(b) Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the (Chief of
SEaETon in Ehe_CongoEor che Assa3sinacion of Lumumba
The Chief of) Scacion reported through the PROP channel to Bronson
Tweedy chat he had made contact wich the man dispatched to Leopoldville
with 3 highly sensitive assignment on September 26 _ (CIA Cable
IN 18989), Leopoldville to Tweedy , 9/27/60) This was the same
week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination M of Lumumba
and made his statement to the NSC about the N grave danger" chac
exisced as a8 Lumumba was not "disposed of"
Hedgman testified about che identity of "SID" che messenger
referred to in the first cable through che PROP channel :
Q: Who was the messenger who arrived?
Hedgman: Mr (Sidney Gottlieb
HW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 20
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1ong
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19
Q And at that time you knew who he was?
Hedgman I recognized him as an officer of the
Agency I believe he referred to the
fact that I had received a message and that he
was the person concerned. (Hedgman 8/21/75
PP 15-16)
The message carried by(Coctlieb_ then Science Advisor to
DDP Richard Bissell was unmi stakeably clear according to Hedgman
:
Hedgman It is my recollection that he advised me or
my Instructions were to elininate Lumumba
Q By eliminate do you mean assassinate?
Hedgman Yes . 1 would say that was my under-
s Eanding of che primary means I don ' t think it was
Probably limited to that if there was some Other way
of doing it
Q:_ Of doing what?
Hedgman Of removing him from a position of political
threat (Hedgman 8721/75 PP . 17-18 .)
Hedgman 8aid that he and Gottlieb als0 may have discussed non-
lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat" but
he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman
8/21/75 _ P 28)
He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination
however:
Q: And what did Mr
Gottlieb) indicate with regard to
the possibility of physically e
liminating him?
Hedgman : It was my understanding that that was
probabTy expected of me (Hedgman 8/21/75 , P . 18 . )
And
:
Q: I take it that once you started discussing these
Tethal agents there was no doubt in your . mind that
the kind of elimination
he was there particularly to
discuss was
killing Lumumba?
N 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 21
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Hedgman There was no doubt in Dy mind that
this was one of the way [ s ] and probably what
they thought
was the way that would work (Hedgman 8/21/75 ,
P . 25)
Hedgman explained (Gotelieb )provided him with
poisons a8 a neans
of assassination:
Q: And what did he tell you with regard to
how that might be accomplished?
Hedgman He broughc some biological agents_
I assume that thac' s the correct word But in
any case poisonous agenc with hin which he
passed to me
Q These were lethal biological substances?
Hedgwan : Yes _ That was my understanding
as, a non-expert_ (lledgman
9
8/21/75 ,
PP . 18-19.)
Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves
3 mask and a
syringe" along with the poisons and that (Gottlieb linstructed him
in their use (Hedgman 8/21/75 , PP . 20-21) Hedgman indicated that
this paraphernalia
was for administering the poisons to Lumumba :
Q [WJhen he ([Gottlieb]
came to the Congo
to you lethal biological agents for
the assassination of Lumumba was it clear
at that time that the means for,administering
those biological agents was to inject them
into 3 substance thac was to be ingested by
Lumumba whether it be food or drink or toothpaste
or any other substance thac was
to be ingesced?
Hedgman: That S my recollection yes (Hedguan
0
8721/75 ,
P. 82 ; accord P .
24.)
Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted
to use of the poisons provided (Goctiet=
This was not a sine 942 non that I employ this
If there were another method another way it
would have been acceptable _ (Hedgman 8121775 ,
P. 19.)
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give
by
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-21-
For example Iedgman testified
that he may have "suggesced"
shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb)
as an alternative to poisoning
(Hedgman 8/21/75 = PP 27-29) _
There was 3 firm requirement however _ that the means of assassi-
nation should noc be craceable to the United States :
The biological substance or specimens what
have you I think ic was up co my judgment
and if there was a better way certainly _
[TJhe point I now recall was in no way , if I
lemented these instructions no way could
it be traced back to the United States Ic
had to be 3 way which could not be traced
back either to an American or the Uniced
Staces government _ (Iledgman 8/21/75 ,
P _ 19.)
Hedgman said (Gottlieb assured hin that the poisons were Pro-
duced co meet chis requirement :
I believe I raised the point that poisons lefc
traces in the human which could be found
On autopsy I believe that I was assured
that these lethal agents would (leave]
normal craces found in People that die of
certain diseases (Hedgman 8/21/75 _
P . 23.)
Hedgman said that he had an 8i emotional reaction of great sur-
10 prise' when it first became clear thac (Gottlieb was chere to discuss
an assas8ination plan (Hedgman , 8/21/75 _
P 30) But the ( Chief of
Scacion said that he did not give any indication that he would not
carry Qut the instructions (Hedgman _ 8/21/75 ,
P 46) Instead he
told (Gottlieb Jhe 10 'would explore this" (Hedgwan _ 8/21/75 ,
P . 46)
and left him with the following impression:
I think it would be a fair impression thac he would take away the thought that I was going to look into it and cry and figure if there was 2 way I believe.I
HY 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 23
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body ,
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( stressed the difficulty
of trying to carty
out such an operation (Hedgman 8/21/75
P 47.)
The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his
initial concact with (Gottiieb
was clearly
an affirmative response
to the assignment The( Chief of)Station said that he and (Gottlieb)
were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH Mi (CIA Cable In 18989 , Leopoldville to
Tweedy , 9/27/60 .) Hedgman" was "afraid" that iobutu 8 government
was M
'weakening under
N foreign
pressure to effect
a reconciliation
with Luumba and said:
HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT
WITH SECURITY INDICATED . (CIA Cable , 9/27/60.)
(c) Hedgman_Testified That (Gottlieb) Told Him
EresidenE Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assa88ination
of Lumumba
Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in
Leopoldville Dr Gottlieb) inforued hin that President Eisenhower
had authorized the assassination of Lumumba :
Q: Did you raise with him che question of authori-
zation of such instructions to you?
Hedgman : Yes , I did_ That S my quite strong
recoITection that I did_
Q What do you recall in essence was what you said to hin?
Hedguan =
:
In essence I think I must have pointed
ouc Zhat this wa8 not a comon or usual Agency tactic
and I may have probably said that I never heard of 0
it being done which I had not , never in my training
or Previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any references to such in my recollection at least_ such
methods And it is my recollection I asked on whose authority these instructions were issued
9 And what did Mr (Goctlieb reply?
HY 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 24
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Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling
events past :
Eed%aa ; Gentlemen after fifteen years I cannot Fe per cent certain but I have always since
that date had the impression in my mind that these
orders had come from the President (Hedgman
8/21/75 ,
P 34.)
But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression 1t
You have a very firm recollection that he
YGocEoleb]
represented to you that the President
of the Uniced States directed the assassination of
Patrice Lumumba is that cortect?
Idf73g;, That 5 my recollection Yes _ (Hedgman ,
P. 102 ; accord_ P 34.)
(d) Headquarters Makes the_Assassination Plet "Highest
ErTority and Hughorizes SEeps in Eurtherance QE Tt
On the basis of his talks with "Sid_ Hedgman listed a
number of "possibilities= 8I for covert action against Lumumba . At
the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent
be used in the following manner :
HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER _
WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP
DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE (CIA Cable,' 9/27/60.)
Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-
calling the agent to Leopoldville_ (CIA Cable 9/27/60 . ) He in-
formed headquarters : "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED
ABOVE UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60)
On September 30 the Chief of)scation urged
that head -
quarters authorize "exploratory
conversations" 01 wich this agent So
HM 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 25
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The same through the PROP channel Hedgman received
authorization from headquarters
to proceed with his top priority
plan:
al
YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS
WITH (ScDO ROitl TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE
TOWARD POSSTBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE
APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR_APPRQACH
TO PROBLEM (CIA Cable (OUT 75900 Fields to Leopoldville 9/30/60_ 9
In this cable Glenn Fields Assistant Chief of the Africa Division
expressed a "HOPE FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable (OUT 75900_
Fields to Leopoldville 9/30/60 .)
According
to the report of the (Chief of) Station Gottlieb
left the Congo to return to headquarters
on October 5 in view of
the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable (I 24171 Leopold-
ville to Iweedy, 10/7/60) The "expiration" of (Gottlieb
s
"materials" probably refers
co the date beyond which the substances
would no longer have lethal strength Although the relation of
the "expiration dateF
8} to iGottlieb 8 departure is unclear from the
cables it probably signifies that some of che biological subs tances
had lost their toxicity_ Nonetheless , the Chief
of Station indi-
caced- that (Gottlieb left some biological substances that were still
lethal and thac he intended co proceed with che assassination
operation :
[SIDV LEFT, CERTAIN ITEMS OF' CONTINUING USE-
FULNESS (CIIIEF OF STATION) PLANS CONTINUE
TRY IMPLEMENT OP (CIA Cable IN 24171 _
Leopoldville to 10/7/60.)
0 elru
65 DocId:32202487 Page 26
day ,
Tweedy
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~-27 -
By this point = Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory
con-
versation" wich the agent who was his best candidate for gaining
access co Lunumba (Hedgman_ 8/21/75 _ P. 60) Iledgman testified
that the subject he "explored"
was the agent S ability to find
a
means to inject poison into Lumumba S food or toothpaste (lledgman _
8/21/75 ,
P . 60) :
I believe that I queried the agent who had
access to Lumumba and his entourage_ in
detail about just what that access what
access he actually had as opposed co speak -
ing to People _ In other words did he have
access to the bathroom did he have access
Lo the kitchen things of that sorc
I have a recollection of having_ queried him
on that without specifying why I wanted to
know this (Hedgman 8/21/75 ,
P . 48 .)
On October 7 , the Chief of |Station reported to headquarters
on this meeting :
CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION
WITH
(AGENT AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES
(AGENT SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED
BY
HQS ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL BELIEVE
HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN
LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE
Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left
hin with
doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the a8sassination plot:
[C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild
scheme professionally_ I did not think that
it was practical professionally
Certainly
to the U.S out of it_
I explored it but I doubt that I ever
really
expected to carry it out (Hedgman , 8/21/75 ,
P . 1ll.)
H 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 27
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However his cables indicate that he Was plarining to con -
tinue to implement the operation and sought the
resources to do
it successfully . He urged headquarters
to send him an alternate
operative for the assassination mission in the event that
found his first choice unacceptable :
IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT S CIRCUMSTANCES ]
BAR HIS PARTICIPATION WISH STRESS NECES -
SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD
COUITTRY NATIONAL (CIA Cable IN 24171
Leopoldville to Iweedy _ 10/7/60.)
Tweedy cabled the (Chief of station
the same that he "HAD
GOOD DISCUSSION: YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" presuably referring
to
2
de-briefing of(Gottlieb
upon his return co the United States _
(CIA Cable (QUT 78336), Tweedy
to Leopoldville , 10/7/60.) Tweedy
indicated that he was
CONS IDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY
NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO WHEN KE ARRIVES
SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER
PERIOD TO SEE WEETHER HE MIGHT PLAY
ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS
(CIA Cable OUT 78336 Tweedy to (Chief of
Station , 10/7/60 .)
This expression of support for the operation was followed by
an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters
on October 15_
1960 One of chese cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA ' s
Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy "
5 signature _
as
Division Chief and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA
channels which would allow for distribution of the message to
HI# 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 28
they
day
==================================================
Page 29
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29_
appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States
embassy _ This cable generally discussed the possibility of
covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and
milicary aid (CIA Cable
pui 81476
Director to Leopoldville
10/15/60) This cable also delimited the kind of action aginst
Lumumba that would be authorized:
ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND
IS TO SUPPORT IMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING
[LUMUMBA ] DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE
ACTION MIGHT BE ANY ACTION TAKEN [OULD
HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE (CIA Cable
(OUT 81476 Director to Leopoldville
10/15/60 )
On the same chat this message was dispatched _ 3 second
cable was sent to Leopoldville This cable was issued personally
by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for
Hedguan S "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable
bUT 81396
Tweedy to (Chief of
Station , 10/15/60)
YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL
CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED 4 PARA [ GRAPH]
ON PROP TYPE SUCGESTTONS YoU WILL PROBABLY RE-
CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC
[LUMUMBA ] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL
STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS
POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER
ONE CON -
SIDERATICM
RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY
APPARENT DUPLICATION THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGHZ AID
ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIQRITY (CIA Cable lOUT
81396 Iweedy
to Chief of) Station 10/15/6d)
Thus Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi-
cating that communications about the assassination mission were
M 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 29
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restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination
mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman S
reaction co the prospect of sending
a senior CIA case officer to
the Congo on 3 "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT To CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY
THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable (QUT 81396 Tweedy
to
(hief
of) Station
10/15/60) This referred to CIA officer Justin 0 ' Donnell who
testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to
undertake che mission of ass2ssinating Lumumba _
In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional
officer: to the Congo , the cable provided insight into the reason
that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly
under the Chief of )Station:
SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY
GIVE NECESSARY CONCEMTRATIOV PROP (CIA
Cable (UT 81396) Iweedy to (Chief of Station
10/15/60 .)
Again , in contradiction of the limitations
on anti-Lumumba
activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels
Tweedy' s cable also proposed a Plan to kidnap Lumumba :
POSSIBILITY USE COMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR
ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA ] EITHER VIA ASSAULT
ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR MORE
PROBABLY IF (LUMUMBA ] ATTEPTS ANOTHER
BREAKOUT' INTO TOWN REQUEST YOUR VIEWS
(CIA Cable @OUT 81398, Tweedy to (Chief of
Station 10/15/60.)
+ For a full account of the meeting between Bissell
and 0 ' Donnell and 0 ' Donnell S subsequent activities in the Congo , see gection 5 (a)
1
infra
WM 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 30
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This series of cables sent during _ and after
Gottlieb) s visit o the Congo demonscrated a clear intent at CIA
headquarters
co authorize and support rapid progress
on the assassi-
nation mission The cables also show an intent to severely re-
strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in
CIA 8 Africa Division and among Uniced Staces Personnel in the
Congo , including those who were aware of and involved in other
covert accivities
(e) The (Chief of)Scation_Moves Forward Wich Assassination
PTOz
The testimony of che (hief of) Station ,
taken fifteen
years after the events in question and without benefit of review
of the cables discussed above was compatible wich the Picture
derived from the cables of a authorized and tightly restricted
assassination operation Hedgman
S testimony is at variance from
the cables with respect to the lack of vigor with which he
claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an
affirmative , aggressive manner in the cables
(1) The Chief_oflstation Testified
That He_Requested
an Recezved' Confizmation or 26e Asgassinatzon
Pan Ezom Headquartezs
Hedgman testified that_ after receiving (Gottlieb)-
S
instructions he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that
he was to carry out (Goctlieb)
S instructions (Hedgman , 8/21/75 _
P_ 36) _ Hedgman did not recall whether he identified (Gottlieb) by
nane and he doubted that he "would have Ri mentioned the President
in such a cable (Hedgman _ 8/21/75 ,
PP . 36 43)
H 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 31
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Iledgman described the extraordinary security precautions
he
took cab his request for conEirmation of the assas8ination in-
structions
There was some special channel because
it was handled differently
than any other
normal message For example it was not Put
on a regular cable form _ which you know
you have several copies for your various files_
And it was my recollection that I personally
carried the message to the couunicator to
encrypt and that was worded in a doublt-talk
way that even the communicator would not necessarily know what it was about M
(Hedgman_ 8/21/75 _ PP 42-43.)
This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for
all cables relating
to the assassination mission
Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con-
firmation that he was to carry ouc the assassination assignent ,
he received an affirmative reply from headquarters
I believe I received a reply which I interpreted
to mean yes that he was the messenger and his
instructions were authorized
(Hedgman 8/21/75 _
PP 37-38.)
Despite the cryptic nature of the cables Hedgman said "I was con-
vinced that yes , it was right . T8 (Hedgman , 8/21/75 ,
PP _ 44, 50.)
Hedgman did not recall receiving
any indication either from
Gottlieb or by cable , that he was to await further authorization
before using the poigons (Hledgman_ 8/21/75 ,
P. 38) Hedgman
ex-
pressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free
hand" to proceed with an assa8sination attempt without receiving
"final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75 ,
PP . 38 , 47 , 53)
M 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 32
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Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his
second appearance :
I probably had authority to act on ny own
but it was possible that I had to g0
back and get clearance for my action
(Hedgman_ 8/25/75 _
P . 11; see alse 8/21/75 ,
P 39 . )
Hedgman testified,
however that a "policy decision" 18 had been
made that assassination had been 0 approved" as "one means 1 { of
eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman_ 8/21/75 ,
P 52)
I thought the policy decision had been made
in the White House not in the Agency and
that the Agency had been selected as the
Executive Agent if you will to carry out
a political decision (Hedgman 8/21/75 ,
P. 52 .)
Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally
selected the means of assassination , he testified that he was under
the impression that che President had authorized the CIA to do So
and to proceed to take action:
Kedgqan :
8 I doubt that I thought the
President had said you use this system
But "my understanding is the President had
made a decision thac an act should take
Place but then Put that into the hands of
the Agency to carry out his decision
Sieacbat Whatever that act was to be it was
co be assassination or the death
of the foreign political leader?
Hedgman =
: Yes
Q: Instigated by the initiated by the CIA?
Hedgman Certainly if those if Dr Gottlieb]' g
Tethal agents
were employed = that wouid
have been
the result ,
yes (Hedgman , 8/21/75 _
P . 104.)
H# 509ss Docld:32202487 Page 33
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-34-
Nonetheless Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out
6I these instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75 , P. 106) Whether or not
he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination wichout
seeking final confirmation he said that he would have checked
with headquarters before caking action:
I think probably that I would have gone back
and advised that I intended to carry out and
sought final approval before carrying it out
had I been to do it had there been a
way to do ic did not see it as a
matter which could be accomplished Practically ,
cer tainly_ (Hedgman 8/21775 ,
PP . 51-52.)
He proceeded co affirm chac his reason for seeking
a final approval
would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the
specific mode of assassination that he planned
to use (Hedgman
8/21/75 ,
P . 53)
(ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps"' in
Furtherance Jf EheAss2ssnacion PTot and TesEified
That He Destroyed Cable Traffic ReTazed co Ze PToc
Hedgman testified that after (Gottlieb s) visit, he locked
the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, M 'probably"
sealed in an
envelope marked Only' with his name on it
(Hedgman_ 8/21/75 ,
PP
48-49) He said thac his secretary was
the only other person with access to the safe and that she would
not have examined 2 Package marked in this fashion (Hledgman_ 3/21/7"; ,
P_ 49)
Hedgman testified that it was 7$ 'possible' I8 that he pre-
served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba S death; at any
H 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 34
goinE
"Eyes
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-36 -
The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman
S recollection For
two months after (Gottlieb' s, arrival in the Congo ,
a regular stream
of messages flowed between the Leopoldville (hief 0f Station
and
headquarters through the PROP channel In late September and early
October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman S top priority
recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have
sufficient
access to Luumba ' $ entourage co be able to poison
Lumunba _ + In mid-October , Tweedy notified the Chief of) Station
that the assassination mission remained "'HIGHEST PRIORITY" and
he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-
tensify "CONCENTRATION"
on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396 , Tweedy
to (Chief of Station 10/15/60) xx
These cables were followed by Hedgman
8 report to
Iweedy
on
October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission
* CIA Cable IN 18989 Chief of )station to 9/27/60 ;
CIA Cable IN 20857 , (Chief
of) Station co Tweedy
Iye;d76o?
CIA Cable
OUT 75900 Fields to(Chief cE) Station 9/30/60 CIA Cable (N 24171
Chief of)Station to Iweedy _ 10/7/60 See Section supra for
full crelatment of these cables
X* See Section supra , for more complete text of this
cable
N 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 35
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HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE
THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS
INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB (CIA Cable
IN 28936 ,)(Chief of) Station co
10/17/60 .
Hedgman cestiEied that this operative left Leopoldville time
in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access
to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman
8/.21/75 _
P 61) The (Chief of) Station continued to communicate with head -
quarters about finding
a means to move forward with che assassina-
tion operation and securing the necessary manpower
to do So _
Iedgman confirmed Tweedy "
S view that although the assassination
operation was still his highest priority ,
he was overburdened with
respons ibility for
other operations So that he could not concentrate
on the progress of the assassination mission:
ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST
THIS
OP ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME
VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS
(CIA Cabie
In 28936 10/17/60.)
Due to his workload , the (Chief of)Station
responded en thusiastically
to Tweedy ' s suggestion of an additional
case officer:
BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNNENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA IF CASE
QFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF) STATION] WOULD
DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING
AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS (CIA Cable
IN 28936 10/17/60.)
N 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 36
Tweedy ,
"some
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The (Chief of)Station concluded this cable with the Eollowing
cryptic recomendation_ reminiscent of his, testimony that he
1 | may have suggested" shooting Lumumba to (Gottliel
as an alternative
to poisoning (lledgman , 8/21/75 PP . 27-29)
8
IF CASE OFFICER SENT RECOMMEND IQS
POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE
RIFLE WITM TELCSCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER .
HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT
HONEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN
[OULD KEEP RIFLE In OFFICE PENDING OPENING
OF HUNTING SEASON _ (CIA Cable TI 28936 _
10/17/60 .)
The first sentence of Hedgman
S recomendation clearly refers
to sending
a sniper rifle
to the Congo via diplomatic pouch _ The
rest of the message is probably
an
oblique reference
to the
possibility of shooting Lumumba
at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON"
in other words at the first opportunity
to find Lumumba outside
the residence where he remained in UN protective cus This
interpretation i8 bolstered by a report sent che nexc month by
the (Chief of)Station through
the PROP channel for Tweedy ' s "EYES
ALONE Hedgman
S cable described the stalemate' which prevailed
Eron
mid-September until Lumumba 5 departure for Stanleyville
On
Novenber 27 ; Lunumba was virtually
a prisoner in UN cus but
inaccessible co CIA agents and the Congolese:
TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL
WEEKS HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY
CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP CONGOLESE
TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET S
ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS
UN TROOPS THERE TO, PREVENT STORMING OF
PALACE BY CONGOLESE CONCENTRIC RINGS
OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-
VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE ATTEMPTING GET
Nt 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 37
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tody ,
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COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMEEIT INTO OR OUT OF
HOUSE BY CONGOLESE TARGET HAS DISMISSED
MOST OF SERVANTS so ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS
REMOTE '(CIA Cable (IN 42478 (Chief of
Station to Tweedy )
Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about che
assassination question would have been sent wich the same
extraordinarily
S tringent security precautions presumably re-
ferring
to the PROP channel
4
which concerned (Gottlieb ' s visit
and the confiruation of authorization for his instructions
8
I would have sent in a special channel
anything_dealing with Lumumba at least
that would touch upon his removal- in one
way or another (Hedgman,_ 8/21/75 _
P. 62 .)
The (Chief of Jstation also testified that sometime before
leaving the Stacion, he destroyed all cable traffic relating
to
the assassination mission (Hedgman_ 8/21/75 ,
P. 89) Hedgman
S
best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy
those cables (Hedgman 8/21/75 _ p . 96) Hedgman said he had never
before in his tenure 2s Chief of)station in the . Congo destroyed
cable traffic because of its gensitivity (Hedgman , 8/21/75 , P. 91)
But he stated that the cables relating
to assassination were
destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature: * He said
# It is possible that,copies of cables dealing with
such 3 sensitive operation
were also destroyed at CIA headquarters
HM 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 38
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Page 39
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-Lo-
that eventually
I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because
the Congo was a highly sensitive area in
which at one period I recall we had all
of our files in the burn barrels I mean
when you wanted a file you went over and
it ouc of the burn barrell (Hedgman
8/21/75 ,
P . 91.)
At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination
plot the (hief of) station
was asked to give a general characteri-
zation of che advisability
of the Plot and the tenor of the times
in which it cook place _ His response indicated thac although he
was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized
order , he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating
Lumumba :
I looked upon the Agency as an executive
arm of the Presidency Therefore_ I
suppose I thought that it was an order
issued in due form from an authorized
authoricy_
On the other hand I looked at. i as a
kind of operation that I could do without ,
that I thought that the Agency-
and the U.S government
@obabliathetAgio.g
without I didn t regard Lumumba a3 the
kind of Person who was going to bring
on
World War III or some ching_
I might have had a somewhat different
attitude if I thought that one man could
on World War III and result in the
deaths of millions of people or some
but I didn t see hin in that light _ I saw hin as a danger to the political position
of che United States in Africa but
nothing
more than that (Hedgman , 8/21/75 ,
PP 110-111.)
HM 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 39
dug
bring
thing .
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-l+1
(
(f) Testimony_ of Bissell and Tweedy_ About the_Degree
OH_Support for andFerpeEration of the Assas sination
PTot
Tnere is a great variance between the testimony of Richard
Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination
Plot presented by the (Chief of Station and the cable traffic from
the period While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that
the assassination effort was the "highest Priority" at CIA head -
quarters among operations in the Congo Bissell has no direct
recollection of Gottlieb
5 mission to the Congo and Tweedy can
recall nothing
more than consideration of the feasibility of an
assassination attempt _
(i) Tweedy_Had No Recollection of the Operation
To Poison Lumunba
As Chief of the Africa Division Bronson Tweedy
was the principal
liaison at CIA headquarters with the
Fhief of)station
in Leopoldville
for all instructions plans and Progress reports concerning the
effort to assassinate Lumumba which were comunicated through the
special PROP channel Most of the reports and recomendations
cabled to headquarters by the (Chief of) Station
on the assassination
operation were marked for Tweedy S 'Eyes 0}
Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed
the
thief
of) Station that("SID") would arrive in Leopoldville , with
an assignment (CIA Cable (UT 71464, Bissell/Tweedv co (Chief of
HI# 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 40
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Station 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he
had debriefed (Gottlieb) upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable
OUT 78336), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station , 10/7/60) Tweedy
was also
the "Eyes recipient of Hedgman S reports on (Gottlieb' s
arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989} of)Station to
Tweedy , 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan
which emerged from the discussions becween (Gottlieb) and Hedgman
a5 the priority
4
infiltration of an agent into Lumumba ' s en -
tourage to administer a lethal Poison to che Congolese leader (CIA
Cable (N 20857
Chief of) Station co Tweedy , 9/30/60 ; CIA Cable
fChief of) Station to Tweedy , 10/7/60; CIA Cable (Chief of Station
co
Tweedy , 10/17/60)
Tweedy testified however without benefit of reviewing these
cables _ that he had no
knowledge of the plot to Poison Lumumba :
Do you have any
knowledge of a messenger
from CIA headquarters having to g0 to the Congo
to provide the Chief of) Station in the Congo
with instructions to carry out the assassination
of Lumumba if possible and also provide him
with the tools to carry out such an assassination
namely . poisons and medical equipment for admin-
istering them?
Mr Tweedy : No I do not
(Tweedy , 9/9/75 , Pp 30-31)
See Sections 4(a) 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent
in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the (Chief of) Station in
Leopoldville
H# 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 41
Only'
(Chief
cop
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-43
When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received
by the Comittee that poisons were delivered to the Congo
(Gottlieb),
who carried instructions that were to be used in
the assassination of Lumumba Tweedy replied:
There is nothing in my_ experience with the
Agency which would really bear on that
point whatsoever (Tweedy , 9/9 PP_ 39-39)
Tweedy added that if GGottlieb) went
to the Congo as a courier ,
"I will bet I knew it but I don c recall it" (Tweedy , 9/9 , P _ 35)
Tweedy testified that it was 1$ 'perfectly possible" for lethal bio-
logical substances to have been sent to the Congo "but I don 't
recall it" (Tweedy , 9/9 , P _ 30)
In response to a question about whether he knew about 3 cable
from headquarters informing Hedgman
that a messenger was to come to
the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be
surprised if I didn t [know] but I certainly have no recoll-
ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy , 9/9 , P 31) .
Tweedy said chat he "was not going to gainsay 81 the testimony of
the (hief of) scation
chat a cable was sent to headquarters through
a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions
were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy , 9/9 , PP
32-33)
Tweedy
comented chat rather than questioning the truth of the
tes timony of the (Chief of) Station_ * the discrepancies in their
Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the
Chief of) Station Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt 'Hedgman
S veracity or integrity, , adding "I would trust his nemory
and I certainly trust his Integrity _ 1{ (Tweedy , 9/9 P 36)
WWW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 42
by
they
"very
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Page 43
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7 44_
4
testimony could be attributed co his own lack of recall:
I really
am
having trouble with this I had to
be reminded of S0 nany things _ [Thhe_things
that I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences were the things I was
basi cally concerned with' ail
the time which was
Put this division together and the rest of
it_ When it comes to operational detail I start
fuzzy and you would have thought with some thing
like thinking about Mr Lumumba in these terms
that I would have gone to bed and got up
thinking
about Lumumba I can assure you this wasn t the
case (Tweedy , 9/9 P 34)
Tweedy
was firo however in his disbelief that ""{Gottlieb would
have left instructions with the
Fhief of) Station
which would have
empowered [him] to g0 out and assassinate Lumumba without any
further recourse or reference to headquarters 1 (Tweedy , 9/9 PP . 32
36) Tweedy said:
In such a matter of this kind; headquarters would
have wanted to have a last word up to the last
minute (Tweedy , 9/9 P 36)
(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell
the FeasibilTty of Assassinating Lumumba and He
cabled Hedguan About Gaining Access
to Lumuba
For the Purpose of Assassination
Despite Tweedy'
S lack of recollection about the actual plot co
Poison Lumumba he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass -
ination attempt _
Tweedy testified
that he had discussed the subject of assassinn!
Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960
(Tweedy , 9/9 , PP .
14-15) Iweedy stated that he did not know
H# 509ss DocId:32202487 Page 43
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i{):'
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86
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whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority T about
exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy ,
9/9 , p
28) _ Generally, Tweedy
said_ when he received an instruc-
tion Erom Bissell he would proceed to implement it on che assump -
tion that it vas fully authorized above the level of DDP :
1 would proceed with it on the basis that he
was authorized to ne instructions and it
was up to him to bloody well know what he was
empowered to tell me to do (Tweedy , 9/9 P . 13)
Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass -
inating Lumumba as "contingency planning (Tweedy _ 9/9/75 ,
P 28)
Tweedy _ I think it came up in the sense that
Dick
would
have said we probably better be
thinking about whether it might ever be necessary
or desirable to get rid of Lumumba in which case
we presumably should be in position to assess
whether We could do it or not successfully_
Q Do it meaning carry off an assassination?
Tweedy . Yes but it was never discussed with hin
in any other sense but a planning exercise
never were we instructed to do anything of chis
kind We were instructed to ask whether_ such a thing would be feasible and to have the (Chief of
Station be thinking along those lines as well
(Tweedy , 9/9 P 15)
Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook Pursuant to his con-
versation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers
sending to the (Chief 0f) Station asking him
to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever
have had to Lumumba [in] the even tuality thac
we might wish to get rid of Mr Lumumbe Personally
(Tweedy , 9/9 PP . 19-21)
WWW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 44
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-46-
Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumunba for
the purpose of abduc him from UN cus tody (Tweedy , 9/9 , P.. 24) ;
rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were
explored :
0 Would this be access to shoot him or would this
be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?
Tweedy _ I suppose al1 those types of things might
have been considered (Tweedy 9/9 P 23)
Q In your discussions with Bissell about the
feasibility of an assassination operation did
poisons come up as one means that was being
con-
sidered and which the (Chief 0f) Station should explore?
Tweedy I am sure it must have After 2ll there
are not many ways of it Shoot a man poison
him of course you could I suppose stab him or
some thing like chat But basically
you are talking
about 3 con ency plan which I assume has the best
possibilicy of Protecting the involvenent of the U.$
Government and if you want co do it in a manner which
would be as distant if that is the right word as
possible _ I think Poison would then stand high on
the list of possibilities
Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the Chief
of )station_ but said he was 10 sure" that he received serious
answer a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters 01
(Tweedy , 9/9 PP 23 ,27)
Although Tweedy did
not recall sending or receiving cables in a
special channel concerning the 'messenger" to the Congo or confirm-
ation of his instructions he acknowledged that che cables exploring
access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been
H# 509ss Docld:32202487 Page 45
ting
being
doing
ting
"a
==================================================
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-47 -
sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the
normal CIA cable traffic (Tweedy , 9/9 , PP 22 32-33) Tweedy
said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the
discretion of che (Chief of) Station
and he did not know whether
Hedgman destroyed
the Station S copies (Tweedy , 9/9 ,
P _ 22)
Tweedy said I Ivould be surprised if I didn 't" have 3 conver-
sation with (Sidney Gottlieb about "anything in his inventory that
could possibly be used including lethal biological substances
(Tweedy , 9/9 PP 68-69) Tweedy suspected" that the first
conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held
between Dick Bissell and (Sidney Gottlieb); which Tweedy then would
have "followed-up (Tweedy , 9/9 P _ 69)
Tweedy raintained that the period in which he explored the
means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning
interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was im-
minent that somebody would say (Tweedy , 9/9 PP 18-19)
8
Tweedy _ It was always my assumption that at the
time: anything like this should occur there would
have been some kind of real focus on the problem
at Probably
a very considerable policy level with-
in the Agency _ and it never occurred to me that
I would get 3
cali
or Bissell would ask me to come
down co his office and sya g0 to it Nor were we
ever in 3 Position where he said that I would
merely implement so-and-s0 He never got
that far
Q _ You didn t have any action plans for the
assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or
were aware of?
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Plan
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48 -
Tweedy _ No _ Planning yes but nothing that
ever got anywhere (Tweedy 9 /9 P 19)
It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy S
tes timony chat no action plans were launched and that no authoriz-
ation for implementing the assa88ination operation authorization
for Hedgman S approach to his agent to explore
access to Lumumba S
entourage is in accord with Tweedy' $ description of his inquiries
about gaining access to Lumumba _
However the fact that Tweedy was personnaly inforned that the
Chief of) Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable IN
24171} Chief
of Station to Tweedy , 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile
with his statements that a T go ahead" on the operation was never
imminent especially in lighc of Tweedy' s PROP cable the next week_
which told the Chief of Station chat Lumumba S
DISPOSJTION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE
CONSIDERATION THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
SPECIFIC PURPOSE. YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE
AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable
'OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of)Station 10/15/60)
(iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not_Recall
Mhether The As sassination OperazTon Had
Moved From PTanning To IpTenenacion
BuE Tc Was Not Agains Agency PoZicy to
Send Posons to The_Cong2
Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing
the feasibility of assassinating
Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy but it
seemed "entirely probable' to him that such discussions took place
(Bissell _ 9/10 ,
PP 3-4) .
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Bissell said he have given Tweedy specific instructions about
steps he was to take to further an assassination plan but he did
not remember to do S0 (Bissell 9/10 ,P. 4) _ Bissell said that
exploring access to Lumumba "almost certainly" seeking information
from the
(hief of) Station
about access for poisoning
I
would have
been a part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but
he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this
subject (Bissell , 9 /10 , PP . 6-8) Bissell remembered that he was
aware that the: (Chief of) Station had an agent thought to have direct
access to Lumumba (Bissell 9/10 , P_ 80)
Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables
that Tweedy
sent co che
IChief of) station seeking
information about
gaining access to Lumumba but it was S0 sensitive a matter (Bissell
9/10 , P . 8 ) Bissell added :
I think Mr Tweedy , on the basis of an oral author -
ization from me would have had the authority to
send such a
cabie
without My signing off on it
(Bissell 9/10 P . 8 )
Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of Cottlieb)
S
to the Congo although it was possible that Tweedy
was "cut ouc of
knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell 9/10 , P 21)
Bissell' s lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to
Justin 0' Donnellxwith Tweedy
was the reason for his speculation that
X Bissell' s assignment to 0 'Donnely is: discussed in Sections 5 (a)
(1) and 5 (a) (11) infra
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"key
trip
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Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of {Gottlieb')s
visit (Bissell , 9/10 , PP 20-22)
Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a
messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were
to be followed but he said "This sounds highly likely . I
would expect _ given the background , that the confirmation would
have been forthcoming (Bissell 9/10 _ P 43) _
1 1 It was "very probable _ according to Bissell that he discussed
the assassination of Lumumba with
(Sidney Gottlieb_
who was then
his Science Advisor (Bissell _ 9/10 , P_ 14) Bissell said that on a
number of occasions he discussed with (Gottlieb) "the availability
of means of incapacitation including assassination" (Bissell_ 9/10 ,
P 60)
Although he had no "specific recollection_ Bissell assumed
chat if (Gottlieb) went to the Congo , he had approved the mission
(which "night very well" have dealt with the assassination of
Lumumba) (Bissell 9/10 , PP 18 20 44) Despite his absence of
specific recollection of these events Bissell said "There is
nothing in mind chat I remember that would be in conflict" with the
testimony of the (Chief of) Station that (Gottlieb) carried poisons to
the Congo (Bissell 9/10 ,
P . 35)
Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy
in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell 9/10 , P . 35)
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He classified "the act of taking che kit to the Congo
as still
in the planning stage" (Bissell_ 9/10 , P . 49) Bissell acknowledged _
however that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which
to administer them was an extraordinary
event :
It would indeed have been rather unusual co send
such materials 3 specific kit of this
sort out to a relatively small station unless
Planning for their use were quite far
(Bisseli 9/10 , . P_ 37)
Nonetheless _ Bissell said that he 'probably believed" that he
had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to
move from the stage of planning co lementation (Bissell , 9/10 ,
PP 60-61) In light of his absence of a specific recollection of
these events he stated that "if it be taken as established thac Mr
IGottlieb took specific instructions to implenent_ (Gottliet)
would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by
Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed
into an implementation phase" 3 and that "authorizazion was given M
(Bissell , 9/10/ PP . 39 41, 49)
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imp
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3 52
5 The_Question of a Connection_Between the Assassination
PTot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives
in Ehe_Congo
Justin 0 ' Donnely a senior CIA officer in the clandestine
operations division in 1960_ testified that during this period he
had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to g0 to the Congo to carry
ouc the assassination of Lumuimba Donnely 6/9/75 ,
PP . 1l-12) _
0 ' Donnell) said that he refused to participace in an assassination
operation_ but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Luumba
away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place hin in
che hands of Congolese authorities Donnell 6/9/75 , Pp 13-14)
Shortly after (0 'Donnel]
$ arrival in the Congo he was
joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the
following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop
a stand-by
a8sassination capability. Late in 1960 ,
one of the operatives of
the
(Chief of)station
in Leopoldville approached this
agent of
(0 Donnelly s with a proposition to join an T6 execution squad" (CIA
Cable IN 18739. Leopoldville to Director _ 12/7/60)
Despite the fact that
('Donnell) was initially approached
to be part of the plot to assa8sinate Patrice Lumumba _ it is un -
likely that ( 'Donnel)
was actually involved in the implementation
of that plot by the Chief of) Station Whether there is any connec -
tion between the assassination' ploc and either of the two operatives
QJWIN and WIROGUE is less clear
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(a) (0'Donnell
5 Operations in the_Congg
(i) Tweedy_and the (Chief of Station Agreed That
a Senior Case_OEffcer_Shoxid Fe Sent to the Conge
to Concentrate on the Asgassination_Operation
In early October 1960 several cables sent in che
specially restricted PROP channel dealt with
3 plan to send a "senior
case officer" to the Congo to aid the
Chief
of) Station with the
assassination operation * On October .7 Bronson Tweedy informed
Hedgman thac he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR
CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" supervising a third country national
operative (CIA Cable (OUT 78336), Tweedy to Chief of] Station 10/7/60)
On October 15 , Tweedy requested Hedgman
S reaction to the sugges -
tion oE dispacching the senior case officer
as soon as possible to
concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable (OUT 81396),
Tweedy to (hief of) Station_ 10/15/60) Two later the Chief
of) Station replied affirmatively:
BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
FANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA (CIA Cable
IN 28936), (Chief of Station to Tweedy)
The (Chief 0f Station advised that his responsibilities Eor "MULTIPLE
OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able o devote to the
assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60)
See Section 4(e) Eupra, for full treatment of these cables
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(ii) Bissell Discussed_Assas8ination of Lumumba With (
0DonneTD)and Sent Him to Congoz OcEober_November_1960
Probably shortly after the (Chief
of Station S cable of
October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer co
concentrate on the assassination operation Richard Bissell broached
the subject with CIA officer (Justin 0 ' Donnell)
At that time (0 ' Donnelu was the Deputy Chief of 3 com-
ponent of the Directorate of Plans
~ 4 che CIA ' s covert action arm
0 ' Donnell} 6/9/75 ,
P_ 8) .
Justin 0 Donnell) testified that in October of 1960 , he
was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi-
nating Patrice Luumba (p'Donnel)), 6/9/15_
PP . 1l-12; 9/11/75 ,
PP . 19 43) :
0 'Donnell: Ile called nie in and he told ne
Fe Tanted to 8o down to the Belgian Congo ,
the Eormer Belgian Congo , and co eliminace
Luumba
2: What did you understand him to mean by
eliminate?
0 ' Donnell To kill him and thereby eliminate
6is InfTuence_
Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his
renarks Ivhatever his Precise languase as meaning that he was talking about 2ssassination
rather than merely neutralizing him through
sone other means ?
0 Donnell}: It was not neutralization
'CTearly Ehe context of our talk was to
kili
him "cp Donnell) 6/9/75 , PP . 11-12.);
p'Donnell
reacted strongly to Bissell' s instruction:
I told him that I would absolutely
not
have any part of killing Lurunba He said
I want you to g0 over and talk to
(Sidney
'Gottlieb) (0 'Donnell, 6/9/75 P 12.)
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(Gottlieb)
was a CIA scientist who was at that time che Science
Advisorito Bissell (Bissell 9/10/75 ,
P 14) .
Donnell) said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct
such a mission without the Personal permission of Allen Dulles 0
(0 ' Donnell 9/11/75 ,
P. 44) But the question of authorization
was never raised by Bissell:
I assumed that he had authority from Mr Dulles
in such an important issue ; but it was not dis -
cussed nor did he to have
authority
co do ic
Put8 Eonnelkave/8455e: F
P . 15,)
0 Donnel} promptly met with (Gottlieb) and testified that he was
8 6 sure that Mr Bissell had called (Gottlieb and told hin
I was coming
over" (0 ' Donnelf_ 6/9/75 , Pa 13; 9/11/75 ,
P . 7) _ Donnel] said
that Gottlieb) told him "that chere were four or five lethal
neans of disposing of Lumumba" (6 'Donnell, 6/9/75 ,
P . 13) '0 'Donneli
recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-
cluded poison 00
(6 ' Donnell 6/9/75 ,
P 12; 9/11/75 ,
P 7) (0 'Donnell)
said thac (Gottlieb "didn'€ even hint that he had been in the
Congo and that he had cransported any lethal agent co the Congo"
b 'Donnell, 9/11/75,
P. 7-4)
After speaking with (Gottlieb} 0 ' Donnell) said:
I then left his office and I went back to
Mr Bissell 0 S office and I told him in no
way would I have any part in the assassina-
tion of Lumumba and reasserted in
absolute terms that I would not be involved
in a murder attempt _ 0 Donnell) 9/11/75 , P. 43.)
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#
0 ' Donnell) said that in one oE his two conversations with
Bissell about Lumumba he raised the Prospect M 'that conspiracy
to comit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be
in violation 0E federal law" '( 'Donnell),
6/9/75 , P 14) . He said
that Bissell "airily
dismissed" this prospect Donnely_ 6/9/75 ,
P . 14) .
Despite his refusal to participate in asga8sination, (0 'Donnell)
agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize"
Lumumba a Political factor" (0 'Donnel)); 9/11/75 ,
PP . 43-44) :
I said I would g0 down and I would have no
compunction about %perating to draw Luumba
out [of UN custody] to run an operation to
neutralize his operations which were against
Western interests , against , I thought
American interests (p Donnell);
679715 ,
P. 13.)
Donnell) added that his objective
was to
neutralize Lumumba S influence and his
activities againsc [a Congolese leader]
whom at thac cime you mighc say was our close
instrunent , he was che man we had Puc our
on (0 'Donnell); 9/11/15 _
P 20.)
Bissell also recalled that ; after their discussions about assassi-
nation 0 ' Donnell went to the Congo "with the assignment of
looking
at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell 9/10/75 ,
P. 53)
Although 0 ' Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he
reached the he discussed 3 general strategy wich Bissell:
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Mr lo 'Donnel):
I told Mr Bissell thac I wouTd Fe wilTing'
to go down to neutralize
his activities and operations and try co bring
him out [of UN custody] and turn him over to the Congolese authorities_
1
that is correct _
Senator_Mondale : Tas it discussed then that 6is TIEe might be taken by the Congolese
authorities?
Mr
(0'Donnel):
It was I think considered
in the not to have hin killed but then
it would have been a Congolese being_judged
by Congolese for Congolese crimes Yes I think it was discussed (6'Donnei1; 679/75 ,
P . 38 . )
There was a very high probabilicy" that Lumunba would re-
ceive capital punishment
at the hands of the Congolese authorities
according
to (0 ' Donnell (0 ' Donnell) 9/11/75 ,
P . 24) But (0 'Donnell
"had no compunction about bringing him
out and then having him
{nor
tried by a jury of his 'peers 4t (0 'Donnell) 6/9/75 ,
P 14)
Although Donnell had
expressed his aversion to assassination
to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission co "neutralize"
Lumumba S influence it was clear to hin that Bissell
was still
interested in che assassination of Lumumba
8
in leaving
at the conclusion of our second discussion he said well I wouldn t rule ouc that possibility meaning the Possibility of the elimination
or the killing
of Lumumba I wouldn t rule it_ In other
words even though
You have said this_ don t rule it
out There is no question about
it_ he said I wouldn t rule this other out meaning the elimination
Or the assassination (0 'Donnell) 9/11775 ,
P 45)
0 ' Donnell] had
3 distinctive recollection
that after his second dis-
cussion of Lumumba with Bissell he met with Richard Helms
in order
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to make his opposition to assassinating Lumuuba a matter of
record Donnell) 9/11/75 , PP .
44-45) :
[I]n the Agency since you don t have
documents You have to be awfully canny
and you have to get things
on record_ and
I went into Mr Helms office and I
said Dick here is what Mr Bissell
proposed to me and I told hin that I
would under no conditions do it and Helms
said you re absolutely right_ {6 'Donnell
6/9/75 PP 15-16)
Richard Helms testified that it was "likely' that he had such a
conversation with (0 'Donnell and he assued that (0 'Donnel)'s
version
of their conversation was correct (Helms 9/16/75 _
Pp . 22-23) *
Willia Harvey testified that ( 'Donnell) had
informed him
about the conversations with Bissell :
Mr (0 ' Donnell came co me and said that he
had (been approached by Richard
Bissell
co undertake an operation in the Conge one
of the objectives of which was the elimina-
cion of Patrice Lumumba _ Ie also told me
that he had declined to undertake this
assignment _ (Harvey , 6/25/75 , P_ 9 .)
Harvey said thac in a later conversation with Bissell_ Bissell told
him that he had asked (0 'Donnell
to undertake such an operation
(Harvey , 6/25/75 , P . 9) ,
(0 'Donnell) said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis -
cussion with Bissell he departed, for the Congo (0 Donnel1 9/11/75 _
PP . 45-46)
+ Helos testified that he did not follow-up
on this conversa- tion in any way He did not recall why 0 'Donnell had gone
to the Congo or what his mission was (Ilelms 9/16/75 _ Pp 32-33)
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(iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked 0_'Donrell) to Plan
and Prepare ror an Assassination Operation
Bissell renembered clearly" chat he and 0'Donnell)
discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell
6/9/75 , P 75) and that 0 ' Donnelu reacted negatively (Bissell ,
9/11/75 ,
P . 18) According
to Bissell 6'Donnelw)
said thac he
thought that assassination an inappropriate action and that
the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways 06
(Bissell , 6/11/75 ,
'P_ 54)
Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked
Donnell to see (Sidney Gottlieb; (Bissell 9/10/75 ,
P. 44)
Bissell differs with '0' 'Donnell)' $
account on only one
important point the degree to which Bissell' s initial assign -
ment co 0 ' 'Donnell)contemplated
che moun of an operation as
opposed to contingency planning
0 Donnell) Elatly testified
that
Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba _ In his first
testimony
on the subject , Bissell said that he asked p 'Donnell
T to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell
6/11/75 ,
P . 54; see also
PP_ 55 , 75) In 3 later appearance
however Bissell stated that p 'Donnell) "had been asked co plan
and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell , 9/10/75 _
P . 24) .
Bissell said that after his conversations with (0 ' Donnell) he
felt that it would be necessary to I postpone" che assassination
operation because_ 01 'given (0 'Donnell)'s reaction,
there was a risk
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"was
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60 ~
that the Planning of such an operation would be blown (Bissell
9/10/75 , P . 25) Despite his impression that he might have de
d
activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that tine
Bissell could not preclude the possibilicy that the Iledgman/
(Gobblieb) poison plot continued to move foward
[TJhis had been in my mind a very sensitive
assiEnment to him limited
2
With the
knowledge of it limited very narrowly even
within the Apency And it is difficult to
separate recollection fron inference on
occasion But I seem to recollect that
after this conversation with him I wanted
this put very much on the back burner and
inactivated for quite some time Now that
doesn t rule out the possibility that some
action through completely different channels
might have gone forward But the best of
my recollection is _ I viewed this not
as terminating the assignment for hin but
also as reason for at least postponing any -
thing further along that line (Bissell
9/10775 PP 25-26)
In Tweedy "
$ mind (0 ' Donnell) $ eventual mission co the Congo was
linked to assessing the possibility for asgassinating Lumumba
rather than co a general Plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody
(Tweedy , 9/9/75 ,
P , 26)
(iv) 0 ' Donnell Arrived in the_Congo and Learned That
a Virus Was In the SEation Safe
On Occober 29 the khief of Station was informed' through
the PROP channel that (Justin 0 ' Donnely was soon to arrive in Leo -
poldville T IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT"' (CIA Cable QUT 86798 Fields
to
(Chief of) Station _ 10/29/60) On Novenber 3 , 0 ' Donnell arrived
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in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 38052), Leopoldville to Director
11/4/60) (chief of) station iledgman
testified that: he had been
made aware by cable that (0 ' Donnell
was coming to the Congo
(ledgman _ 8/21/75 , P . 49) Hedgman said it was possible"
that as 3 new
Fhief of) Station
he took the dispatch to the Congo
of a senior officer like (0 'Donnell
as a signal that CIA headquarters
was "dissatisfied with my
handling' of (Gottlieb)' 8 instructions
(Hledgman ,_ 8/21/75 ,
P 42)
Iledgman had
a general picture of (0 ' Donnell' s mission:
I understood it to be that similar to
mine that the removal 'or neutrali-
zation of Lumumba I have no clear
recollection of his discussing the assassi-
nation (lledgman 8/21/75 _
P. 54.)
Hedgman said that he had no recollection of ( 'Donnel) indicating
one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as
3 means of "neutralizing Lumuba (Hedgman_ 8/21/75 ,
P . 55)
Iedgman said "in view of my instructions I may have assumed that
I8 he was considering assassination (Hedgman _ 8/21/75 ,
P . 55) Gen-
erally , however Hedgman Perceived ( 'Donnel)
2s being unenthusiastic
about his mission (Hedgman _ 8/21/75 _
PP . 56 , 88-89)
When /0 ' Donnel1 arrived in the Congo , he met with the (Chief of
Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe"
Donnell 9/11/75 ,
P. 7-A; 6/9/75 ,
P. 16) (0 ' Donnel}
said he
assumed it was a "lethal agent" (0 ' Donnell} 6/9/75 ,
P. 37) , although
Hedgman
was not explicit:
I knew it wasn t for somebody to get his polio
shot up to date (0 Donnell) 6/9775 ,
P 16.)
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He added that if the virus was to be used for medical Purposes
"it would have been in the custody of the State Department"
personnel , not the CIA station 0 ' Donnell} 6/9/75 _ P. 36)
0 Donnell} said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned
the source of the virus (0 'Donnelz), 9/11/75 _
P _ 8) . * But (0 'Donnell)
ass umned that ic had come from (Sidriey Gottlieb' $ office:
Ic would have had to have come Erom Washington_
in my estimation , and I would think since it
had been discussed with (Gottliel that it
probably would have emanated from his office
( Donnelv 6/9/75 , P 28 , )
Hedgman did not recall discussing (Gottlieb)' s
to the Congo
with (0' Donnely; but T assumed" that he did So
(Hedgman 8/21/75 _
Pp . 60-61)
Donneld
was "certain 26 that the virus had arrived before he
did (0 Donnell 6/9/75 , P _ 24) He was surprised to learn that
such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because
he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the
Congo (0 'Donnell 6/9/75 , P 17) _
Donnell)stated that he knew of no other instance where a
lethal biological substance was in the possession of 3 CIA station
Donnelye 9/11/75 ,
P . 50) He assued that its Purpose was
assassination:
7 When Donnell was informed about Iedguan S testimony on the visit of (Gottlieb) to theCongo and the Plot to Poison Lumumba
he said "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (0 Donnelu_
9/11/75 ,
P 53) 0 Donnell) found nothing in the facts as he knew
them nor in Hedgman_
S character to raise a question about that
tes timony _ 0 Donnell) regarded Hedgman
as 1F an honest and a decent
0 | man (0 'Donnel) 9/11/75 . P 19) I a tocally truthful man"
(0' Donnell 9/11/75 P . 56)
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My Eeeling definitely
is that ic was for a specific purpose and was just not an all-
purpose capability there begin held for tar-
gets of opportunity unspecified targets
(0 ' Donneli} 9/11/75
P 49 . )
At several points 0 Donnell scated that he did not think that
Lumunba was the 'target specified for the use of the virus (0 ' Donnel1),
6/9/75 , P . 17; 9/11/75 ,
P 48) But he allowed for that possibilicy:
I supposed it was for a lethal operation very
possibly Lumumba _ but very_Possib ly in connec -
tion wich other People _ (0 Donnell), 6/9/75 _
P 24; accord 619/15 _ P . 17.)
His final word on the subject
was that he assumed that the "specific
I6 Purpose of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba 'Donnell;
9/11/75 _ P . 50)
0 ' Donnell said that the (Chief of) Station never indicated that
(o Donnell was to employ the virus (0 'Donnell;, 9/11/75 ,
P . 52) In
Eact 0 ' Donnell testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi-
nation effort , he never even indicated that this
was one Donnell}
9/11/75 = P, 54.)
While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his
assassination operation with-(0 'Donnely_ he "assumed" chat he had
at least discussed wich 0 ' Donnely che problem of gaining access to
Lumumba for the Purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman _ 8/21/75 _
PP . 55 , 60) (0 'Donnell testified_ however = that because he was
"morally opposed
to assassination N he would "absolutely
not" have
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explored the means by which such access could be gained nor would
he have undertaken 3 mission to the Congo if it involved assess -
ment of che situation for an assassination operation by someone
else Donnely; 9/11/75 ,
P 26) _
0 Donnelly was "sure" that he "related everything" f to Hedgman
about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination
of Lumumba (0 ' Donnely_ 9/11/75 ,
P_ 46) Hedgman _ however had no
recollection of learning this from Donnell) (liedgman 8/21/75 _
P 56)
Beyond this Donnell said that his discussions of assassi-
nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical _ dealing wich
the morality of assassinations 01 Donnell); 9/11/75 . PP . 46 , 54) :
From my point of view I told hin I had
moral objections to it not just qualrs
but objections I didn c think ic was
theright thing co do 'Donnely},
9/11/75_ P 9)
Mhen asked co characterize Hedgman
S attitude toward assassination
based on those discussions 0 ' Donnell) said:
I will answer your question just as
fairly
and as scrupulously as I can I have 3
great deal of respect for Hedgman _ And if
he said some I would believe him Eo
be speaking the truth as he knew it without
shading it The best I could I
think wouid be this that he would not have
Been opposed in principle to assassination in
the interests of national security_ I
know that he is a man of sreat moral per-
ception and decency and honor and so forth_
And that it would disturb him co be engaged in
some thing like that But I think I would
have co say that in our conversations my
memory of those at no time would he rule it
ouc as
being
a
Possibilicy.
((0 Donnell
9/11/75_ P . 18
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(v) 0 'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize Lumumba_by Turning
im Over to CongcTese Authorities and RequesEed the
Asgignmenz @EZgentQIIT to Leopo[dviTTe as His
Alter
After (Justin 0 ' Donnell arrived in the Congo he formu-
lated a
for "neutralizing" 1' Luumba by drawing him away from
the cus tody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:
0 'Donnell: [WJhat I wanted to do was to
get hin out to trick hin out_ if I could
and then turn him over to the legal
authorities and let hin stand trial Be -
cause he had atrocity attributed to him for
which he could very well stand crial
2 And for which he could very well have
received capital punishment?
0 'Donnell Yes _ And I am not_opposed to
capiEal punishment _ (0 ' Donnel}_ 9/11/75 _
Pp 20-21.) *
To implement his plan _ p
Donnell made arrangements to rent Mf an ob -
servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was
safely ensconced"
X According
to an earlier report from the (Chief of) Station it
was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General
of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST
4 TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA 0 (CIA Cable Leop Chief
of)Station co Director 10/11/60) The (Chief of)Station proceeded
to recomend Luumba S arrest in the same cable
STATION IAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE ] LEADERS
ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE
THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM
SCENE (CIA Cable _ 10/11/60)
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Donnell} 6/9/75 _
P
20) _ * (0 ' Donnell also 'spotted" a member
of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an
attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody Donnell)
6/9/75 _ P _ 20; 9/11/75 ,
P . 21)
Donnelw said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to
CIA headquarters (0 'Donnel), 9/11/75 _ P_ 26) Ile also said that
he informed the (Chief o& Station about his plan Donnell), 9/11/75 ,
P_
56)
In connection with his effort to draw Lunumba out of UN cus -
(o Donnell arranged for 2 CIA agent , whose code nane was
QJWIN to core co the Congo to work with him (0 ' Donnell}, 9/11/75
P . 19)
:
What I wanted to use hin for was
counter-espionage[ _ 1 I had to screen
the U.$ Participation in this by
3 foreign national whom we knew
trusted , and had worked with the
idea was for me to use him as an alter
ego (0 Donne 11) Tr .
4
PP . 19-20.)
In mid-November two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA head -
quarters co send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable @N 41261),
Leopoldville Co Director _ 11/11/60) with this message :
LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE
IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO
LEOPOLDVILLE (CIA Cable (iN 41556),
Leopoldville to Director 11/13/60 .)
* 4 cable from the (hief ofl Station to
Tweedy in mid-Novenber
reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese
troops around Lumumba 3 residence thwarted this plan "CONCENTRIC
RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE
I6 (CIA Cable IN 42478), (Chief of) Station
to Tweedy , 11/14/60)
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The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about
the "operational circumstances 4
(b) Agent QJNIN S Mission in the_Congo: November-December
T960
QJWIN was a
Eoreign citizen with
a criminal background,
recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division Re
Payments to QJWIN 1/31/61) and supervised by CIA officer(Asnold
Sllver In November 1960 ,
at
(0'Donnell' s
request (0 Donnell), 6/9/75 _
P . 19) , agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by (Bilvea to under -
take 3 mission that "might involve a large elenent of personal risk fR
(CIA Cable IN 36814 11/2/60.) *
A dispacch from the CIA headquarters
on his pending
to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded co
his mission:
In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob -
jective for which we want hin to Perform his
task he was not told precisely what we want
him co do Instead he was told that
we would iike
to have him spot assess and
recomend some dependable quick-witted
persons for our use It was thought best
to withhold our true specific requifements
Pending the final decision co use [him]
(CIA Dispacch (aweide 167 11/2/60.)
2
$ Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was co send him from the_Congo to another African country for an unspeci- fied mission QJWIN 8 mission to this country is not explained
in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters
and the various sta- tions that dealt with hin
There is no indication in CIA files as co whether OJWIN com - Pleted this mission 0 ' Donnell) said he had no
knowledge of any mission that would have taken QJWIN co this country (6'Donnell
9/11/75 ,
PP . 32-33)
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This message itself was deened too sensitive to be retained
1 $ at the station: this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic
necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading_ 0t (CIA
22
Dispatch {UNuue 147 11/2/60.)
QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville
on November 21 , 1960 (CIA Cable
In 49486 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960
(CIA Cable (OUT 54710), Director to Leopoldville_ 12/9/60)
The CIA Inspector General ' s Report said that QJWIN
had been recruited earlier by(Disnln] S11ve5
for use in a special operation in Che , Congo
[the assassination of Batrice Lumumba] to be
run by Justin 0 ' Donnelly (I.G Report , P 38 . )
However both (0 'Donnell) and Bissell testified that (0 ' Donnell re-
fused to be associated with an assassination operation Instead ,
0 Donnell) said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba
from the protective cus of the U;N guard and place hin in
the hands of the Congolese arwy _ Donnell 6/9/75 ,
PP . 13-14
37.)
According
to
(0 'Donnell_ QJWIN was a man who was capable of
undertaking
an assassination mission :
0 ' Donnell I would say that he would not
Fe a man of many scruples _
Q: So he was a man capable of anything?
'9_'Donneli}: I would think S0 , yes
And that would include assassination?
'0'Donnelu: I would think So .
(0 ' Donnell), 9/.11/75 , PP_ 35-36 .)
X See Sections 5 (a) (ii) and 5 (a) (iii) above U
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But (0 ' Donnell had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an
assassination mission
(6 'Donnel)_
9/11/75 , PP . 36 42)
(0 ' Donnell) said that, as far as he knew , he was the CIA
officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJIIN did
not report independently
co anyone else (0 ' Donnell, 9/11/75 ,
P. 28)
When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent
of that he was performing for
6 'Donnell),
he said;
0 'Donnelz Yes that is possible or
IE couTd have been that somebody contacted
hin after he got down there that
wanted him to do some thing along che lines
of assassination I don t know (0 ' Donnell)_
9/11/75 _ P 29 .)
But he discounted this possibility
as "highly unlikely" because
it
would be a departure from standard CIA practice placing an agent
in a
position of knowledge superior
to that of his supervising
officer (0 ' Donnell} 9/11/75 ,
P. 29)
Despite 0 Donnell
S doubt that QJWIN had an independent line
of responsibility co the Chief of) Station_
a cable of November 29
shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN s' activities
In that cable , the (Chief of)Station reported through the PROP
channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a to
"PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba S residence
and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDECE' (CIA Cable IN 49486}, (Chief
of] Station co
Tweedy , 11/29/60)
0 ' Donnell) said that he had direcced
QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force
whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN cus tody
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they
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0 Donnell 9/11/75 ,
P . 21) But Lumumba had left UN cus at
this point to cravel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville . This
did not deter QJWIN
8
VIEN CHA:GE IN LOCATION TARGET QJWIN
ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED
DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY [IMSELF WITHOUT
USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60)
It is unclear whether this latter M 'plan" contemplated assassina -
tion as well 2s abduction An affirmative reply Erom headquarters
came through the PROP channel the next which was also suscep -
tible of interpretation as an assassination order :
CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE WE ARE
PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJWIN
BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING Oiv SECURITY
FACTORS HOW CLOSE: WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED
STATES ] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable (OUT 98314),
Chief of Africa Division co Chief of) Station
11/30/60.)
(0 'Donnell) said that agent QJWIN S stay in the Congo was
extensive with my
own , allowing for the fact that he cane after I
did. 0I
(6' Donneli) 6/9/75 ,
P. 19 .) (0 'Donnely said he left the
Congo around the cime of Lumumba S death in Katanga at the hands
of Congolese authorities 6'Donnell}
P_ 20 .) QJWIN left in
December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army
In a menorandum co arrange the accounting for QJWIN
$ activities
in the Congo , William K_ Harvey under whom Donnel) had
worked
before being detached for assignment to the Congo
4
noted the
success of QJWIN 5 mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a
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specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been
completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K_ Harvey ,
1/11/61) ( 'Donnell) explained Harvey =
S reference to the fact that
QJWIN S mission had been 0 completed" by saying that once Lumumba
was in che hands of the Congolese authorities I6 the reason for
the mounting of the project had become moot" (p 'Donnell),
9/11/75 ,
P . 35) When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for
Lumumba ' $ departure Erom UN cus
tody &nd subsequent capture, (0 ' Donnell
said: "Absolutely not 10 'Donnely, 9/11/75 ,
P. 35) Harvey did not
recall the meaning of che memorandum but he assumed that ( 'Donnell) s
return Erom the Congo constituted the "copletion" of QJWIN S
mission (Ilarvey , affidavit ,
P. )
Despite the indication in the Inspector General S Report that
QJWIN may have been recruited initially for
an assassination mission
and the suggestive language of che cables at the end of November
there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any
assassination plan
or attempt _ The CIA officers who were involved
in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave
no tes timony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot .
The (Chief of)station had a "vague recollection" thac QJWIN
was in the Congo working for (Justin 0 ' Donnell} (Hedgman 8/21/75 ,
P . 95 . ) Buc Hedgman did not recall QJWIN was in the Congo _
(Hedgman_ 8/21/75 _ P. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of
Hedgman
S . (Hedgman , 8/21/75 ,
P . 95 . ) Richard Bissell and Bronson
Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN
S mission in the Congo
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( (Bissell 9/10/75 ,
PP . 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75 ,
PP . 54 , 61)
Willia Harvey = from whose division QJWIN was on loan for"
his Congo &s8ignent_
}
had no specific knowledge of WIN S activities
in the Congo:
I was kept informed of the arrangements for
QJWIN S co the Congo and subsequently
of his presence in the_Congo I do not know specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo I
do not think that I ever had such knowledge _
If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination
mission, it would have been cleared with me I was never informed that he was co be used
for such a mission (Harvey affidavit,
8 P )
03
He stated that Gzold Eilvedprobably
wrote the memoranda con -
cerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY 8 signature (Iarvey
affidavit ,
P . ) _
(c) QJWIN 5 Connection to Project ZRRIFLE
After leaving the Congo in early 1961 , 'QJWIN was used by
CIA officer William Harvey
as the principal
asset in Project ZRRIFLE
a project which included research into a capability to assassinate
foreign leaders _
X QJWIN S role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT"
figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents
by the CIA if required _ Harvey stated that before the formation
of Project ZRRIFLE
:
* For a full treatuent of Project ZRRIFLE _
see Section infra;
on the "Executive Action Capability
8T
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4muold Silzee)had
not Previously used
QJwIN as an assassination capability or
even viewed him as such (Harvey affi-
davit P _
Although Harvey also had discussions with (Sidney Gottlieb in connec-
tion with Project ZRRIFLE he believed that (Gottlieb) never
mentioned
to him either QJWIN S activities in the Congo or (Gottlieb)' $
own
trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit_
P_ ) Harvey had
con-
sulted with ( uold Silved about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE
(Harvey , 6/25/75 , P 52)
The (Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he had
never heard of Project ZRRIFLE nor was he aware of any CIA project
co develop the capability of assa8sinating foreign leaders _
(Hedgman 8/21/75 _ P. 93.) Furthermore Hedgman said that he was
"quite certain" that he never discussed assagsination capabilities
or assets with Harvey at any time (Hedgman 8/21/75 ,
P . 95 . )
Hedgman testified that- (Amld Silver
came co the Congo on 3 counter-
intelligence mission during his
cenure but did not discuss
the plan co assassinate Lumunba _ (Hedgman_ 8/21/75 ,
P . 92.)
An interes note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIA
and the inherent predicanent for an intelligence
agency that emp
hoodlums is found in 4 cable from CIA headquarters to(ibueld Silve
in 1962 The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to g0 on trial
in Europe on smUgg charges _ The cable suggested:
IF IIFOR TRUE WE MAY WISIL ATTEMPT QUASII
CHARGES
OR ARRANGE SOMEHIOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR
OUR PURPOSES (CIA Cable (OUT 73943), 4/18/62.)
5 DocId:32202487 Page 72
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ting
loys
ling
Jeh
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(d) Agent_QJWIN Has Asked Bv Hedgman
5 Qperative_WIROGUE
to Join an Execution squad" December T960
The one incident where there is an explicit reference to
assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with
WIROGUE another asset of the Congo station
WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" (European) who was
1J a Eorger and former bank robber" and hade fought with the French
Foreign Legion (Inspector General Memorandum 3/14/75 .) He was
sent co :he Congo after being given plastic
surgery and a toupee
by the CIA So that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling
through the Congo _ (I.G_ Memorandum 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was
assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT
ANY ASSIGEENT WITIIOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable (OUT 86554_
Africa Division to Leopoldville 10/27/60)
The
Chief of} Station
described WIROGE as man with a
rather unsavory reputation _ who would try anything once , at least . 10
(Hedgman _ 8/21/75 , P. 96.) Hedgman used hin as 01 a general utilicy
agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability , develop-
new contacts, various things _ (Hedgman_ 8/21/75 , P . 96 . )
ledgman supervised WIROGUE directly: and
did not put WIROGUE in
touch with (Justin 0 'Donnely: (Hedgman 8/21/75 ,
P _ 97 . )
A report on agent WIROGUE Prepared for the CIA Inspector
General ' s office in 1975 _ described the training and tasking he
received:
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On 19 tember 1960 two members of Africa
Division met with him to discuss 0 an opera-
tional assignment in Africa Division In
connection with this assignment WIROGUE / 1
was to be trained in demolitions small arms
and medical immunization In October 1966
a cable to Leopoldville stated that
Headquarters [had] intent to use him as utili agent in order to "(a) organize and
conduct a surveillance team; (6) intercept
packages
8
(c) blow up
bridges;
and (d) execute
other assignments requiring positive action
His utilization is not co be restricted to
I Leopoldville (I G Memorandu 3/14/75.)
MIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman
in Leopoldville on
Decenber 2 , 1960 (CIA Cable IN 18739 12/17/60) He was given two
instructions by Hedgman (1) to "build cover during inicial Period;
and (2) to 'spot persons for [a] surveillance team 1F of intelligence
assets in the province where Lumumba S support was strongest _ (CIA
Cable IIM 18739} 12/17/60 .)
Soon after receiving these instructions agent WIROGUE approached
QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad _ M This incident is
described by Leopoldville (Chief of) Station' Hedgman
in a ` cable to
CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75 ,
P . 99) :
QJIIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTCD
LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA JAPAN SOUTH
AMERICA GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE _ QJWIN
SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH RE IN INTEL BUSINESS
STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE 14 DEC QJWIN
REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUITDRED DOLLARS
PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER
"EXECUTION SQUAD WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED_
WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS
UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK -
INF FOR [AMERICAN] SERVICE
IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS WIROGUE MENTIONED
QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM _
THEN [{CHIEF OF )STATION] TRIED LEARI WHETHER WIROGUE
HAD MADE APPROACI LATTER CLAIMEED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS
[{CHTEF OE) STATION] NAS UNABLE CONTRADICT AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN" CONNECTION [CIA] (CIA Cable
H# 50955 DocId:32202eppelgville to Director 12417 60.)
Sep
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The cable also expressed Hedgman S concern about WIROGUE S
actions :
LEOP CONCERNED BY MIROGUE FREE WFIEELING
AND LACK SECURITY STATION IAS ENOUGH HEAD-
ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO IOT
ABLE HAIIDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING
FOLLOW IZSTRUCTIONS IF IlQS DESIRES WILLING
KEEP HIM ON PROBATION BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE
DIFFICULTIES BEL IEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST
SOLUTION (CIA Cable Leopoldville to Director
12/17/60.)
WIROGUE S attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is
explained by Iledgman
as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as
an unauthorized unexpected contact which he did not initiate_
The
Chief of) station
testified that he had not instructed
WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else
(Hedgman_ 8/21/75 ,
P . 100 . ) He added:
I would like to stress that I don t know what
WIROGUE was talking about as a [n] "execution
I squad_ and I am sure he was never tasked to
g0 out and execute anyone (Zledgman, 8/21/75 ,
P. 100 .)
Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an
execution squad:
His idea of what an incelligence operative
should do I chink had been gathered
reading 3
few noveis
or some thing of the
sort (Hedgman 8/21/75 ,
P 100 . )
Justin 0 Donnel1 had no
knowledge of an attempt by anyone
connected to che CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-
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tion of WIROGUE (0 Donnell 9/11/75; PP : 39-42) (o ' Donnell
men -
tioned that agent QJIIN Ias considered for use on a 1 strong arm
squad , but said that this was for purposes more general than
assassinations :
surveillance teams where you have Eo &o
into crime areas where you need 8
fellow thac if he get; in a box can Eight
his way out of it ( Donnell 9/11/75
P 36)
Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to
QJWIN (Bissell; 9/11/75 ,
P . 71) Bronson Tweedy did recall that
WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" I0 to the Congo
(Tweedy , 9/9/75 ,
P 63) But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would
"absolucely have been used on an assassination mission against
Lumumba because "he was
basically dispatched
assessed and dealt
with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the cwo People
in the Africa Division
L
Iweedy hingelf and his deputy Glenn
Fields who would have known chac the assassination of Lumumba
was
being considered (Tweedy , 9/9/75_ PP _ 64-65)
The (Chief of)Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was
connected to an actual assassination plan = he would have cransmitted
3 message in 2 more narrowly restricted channel than that in which
this cable was sent His cable on WIROGUE S approach to QJWIN was
sent to headquarters with
3 security designation that allowed much
wider distribution than the PROP cables thac he 'sent and received
concerning the (Gottlieb)
assassination ass ignment (Hedgman
}
8/21/75 _
P . 102.) In contrast he limited distribution oE the cable about
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WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would 0} 'normally do when you
speak in a derogatory manner of an asset . 6b (Hedgman 8/21/75 =
P 101)
The Chief of )Station maintained that WIROGUE S proposition
to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to
WIROGUE S M 'Ereewheeling'
nature Hedgman said:
I had difficulty controlling
him in that he
was not 3 professional intelligence officer
a5 such [e seemed Co acc on his Ovm without
seeking Guidance
or authority I found
he Vas rather an
unguided missiie
the
kind of man that could get you in trouble: be-
fore you knew you were in trouble
(Hedgman _ 8 /21/75_
PP . 96-97)
But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE S actions
;
(I]f you &ive a man an order and he carries ic
out and causes a_ problem for the Station why
then as (Chief of Station _ well you accept
responsibilicy (Hedgman _
1
8721/75 ,
P 97. )
In sum , the (Chief of) Station testified that despite che fact
that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during
this period_ agent WIROGUE S attempt to form an 10 execution squad"
was an unauthorized maverick action unconnected to the CIA assassi-
nation plan _
Nonetheless the fact that WIROGUE was to be crained in 'medical
immunization" (I.G. Memorandum_ 3/14/75) raises the possibility
that he was connected co the plot
to assassinate Luiuba by means
of lethal biological subscances The 1975 report on WIROGUE S case
H# 509ss DocId:32202487 Page 77
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by the Inspector General' s office leaves this question open The
report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/ 1 spent most of
his time trying to develop
contacts and was not directly involved
in any particular operation_ (I.G. Memorandum 3/14/75.) But ,
when the report was circulated in the Inspector General 5 office,
the following
coment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge ,
one
of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvenent in
assassination attempts "ROGUE 5 pitch is too clear to be dis-
carded out of hand a5 exceeding instructions 1 M9 (I.G . Menorandum
3/14/75)
6 _ The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing
About Luumba S Deach in KaEanga
There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring -
about Lumumba S death in Katanga _ The CIA officers most closely
connected to the Plot to Poison Lumumba testified uniformly that
knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba S death
(a) Lunumba s_Escape_ from UN Custody, Capture
Congolese and Imprisonment at
Reyebfe
Tovenber ZTDecember 3 T9GO
The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved
in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu S troops after his departure
from UN cus tody on November 27 was contained in a PROP cable from
the khief of Station to Iweedy
on Vovember 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478
(Chief of) Station to
Tweedy, 11/14/60)
In the cable Hedgman
re-
ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba S
POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT
HE BREAK OUT OF FIIS CONFINENENT AND PROCEED TO
THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE In POLITICAL ACTIVITY _
(CIA Cable , 11/14/60.)
H# 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 78
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The (Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge
of Lumumba S departure and that action plans were prepared for that
even tuality:
DECISION Oit BREAKOUT [ILL PROBABLY BE MADE
SIIORTLY STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY
[AGENT] OF DECISION WHEI MADE STATIOIT
HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS To ` USE IN EVENT
OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLAiTS OF
ACTION (CIA Cable 11/14/60.)
There is no ocher evidence however that the CIA accually
gained prior knowledge of Lumumba 5 Plan to depart for Stanleyville
In fact , a cable Erom Leopoldville on the after Lumumba 8
escape betrays the station S complete ignorance about the circun-
stances of Lumumba S departure (CIA Cable IN 48484, Leopoldville
to Director , 11/28/60) `
But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether
the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese
troops :
[STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERMMENT )
TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED
[BLOCK POSSIBLE. ESCAPE ROUTE (CIA Cable
i1/28/60.)
A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba S capture milicates
against CIA involvement however because it portrays the Congolese
forces as the source of the station' s information (CIA Cable IV
Leopoldville to Director , 12/3/60)
The (Chief of] Station testified that he was "quite certain that
there was no Agency involvenent in any in Lumumba 5 departure
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Erom U custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lurumba S
(liedgman_ 8/21/75 _
0
Pp . 63-64) He stated that he consulted
with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumunba might
take to Stanleyville_ buc he was 1i_ not a major assistance" 18 in track-
ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (Iledgman 8/21/75 _ P_ 65)
Despite the fact chat (0 'Donnell) had planned to draw Lumumba
out of UN cus and turn hin over to Congolese authorities he
2
insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and- was not tricked
the CIA (0 ' Donnely_ 9/11/75 ,
P. 22)
(b) Transfer of Lumumba to_Katanga_[here He_Was_Killed:
January IT T960
The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was
kept inforned of Lumumba S condition and movenents in January of
1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba
a
serious political threat _ But there is no direct evidence of
CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba s death in Katanga
x Excerpts fror cable traffic of January 1961 and from the
tes timony of CIA officers Hedgman Tweedy_ Donnell,) and
Helns
(investigative report) should be inserted
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Group
agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily
81 61 rule out consideration of any particular kind of ac-
tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba_
(Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)
The next CIA Director Allen Dulles , who had attended the Special
Group mee ting, personally cabled to che (Chief of} Station in Leopold-
ville that Lumumba ' s "'REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable (QUT 62966
Dulles to Leopoldville , 8/26/60) Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON
YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIM DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE 41
Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassina-
tion Richard Bissell the CIA official under whose aegis the as-
sassination effort against Lumumba took place testified that , in
his opinion this cable was a direct oucgrowth of the Special Croup
meeting and s ignaled to him that the President had authorized assas
Sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell 9/10/75 ,
PP . 33 -
34 , 61-62 ; see Section: 7(c) infra) Bronson Tweedy , who bore the
primary administrative responsibilicy for activities against Lumumba
testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy chat no measure
including assassination was to be overlooked in the attempt to re-
move Lumumba from a pogition of influence (Tweedy , 10/9/75 _ Pp 4-5)
On September 19 , 1960 , Bissell and Tweedy cabled the (Chief of)
Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters Two days later,
in the presence of the President at a
meeting of the National Security
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Council Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain 3 grave
danger as as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum 460th
NSC Meeting , 9/21/60) Five days after this meeting,
a CIA scien-
tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the (Chief of) Station
with lethal biological substances_ instructed him to assassinate
Lumumba = and informed him that the President had authorized this
operation_
Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough S0 that
it will not support an
absolute finding of Pres idential authoriza-
tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba .
First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-
sponsible to the President for national security affairs testified
that they knew of no Presidential approval for , or
knowledge of_ an
assassination plot _
Second _ the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National
Securicy Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit
Presidential order for the a8sa8sination of Lumumba _ The 'Secretary
of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac-
tual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism
for extreme sensitive statements (Parrott , 7/10/75 PP . 18-19)
NSC staff executives stated, however , that there was a' strong pos -
sibility chat a statement as sensitive as an assassination order
would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe-
mism_ Several high Government officials involved in policy-making
H 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 82
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7/21/60) Nonetheless the attitude toward Lumumba even at these
early
mee tings was vehement:
Mr _ Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a
person who was a Castro or worse Mr Dulles went
on to describe Mr Lumumba ' s background which he de
scribed as "harrowing It is safe to go on the
assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun
ists ; this also _ however fits with his own orienta-
tion (NSC Minutes 7/21/60)
The President presided over the other two NSC mee tings , After look -
at the records of those meetings _ Johnson was unable to deter-
mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the
President' s statement (Johnson 9/13/75 ,
P 16) .
However , the chronology of meetings _ cables _ and events in the
Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson S _ testi-
mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18 _ 1960 _
The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series
of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-
ville wich poisons for the assassination of Lumumba _ X The Septem-
ber 7 meeting took Place in the midst of this series of events
% The major events in the series each of which is discussed in de - cail in other sections of the report may be summarized as follows
; The week Eollowing che NSC meeting of August 18 the Special Group
was inforned of the President S "extreme lx strong feelings about the
nece ssity for very straightforward action and the Group agreed to consider 'any Particular kind of acti which might contribute co getting rid of Lumumba 6 (Special Minutes 8 /25/60) Ac this
mee ting DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the coments referred to seriously and had every intention of Proceeding as orously as the 5 ituation permits 10 (Special Group Minuces_ 8/25/60;
see Section 7 (a) (iii) infra) The next Du] les sent an "Eyes Only" cable under his personal signacure
to the Chief of )station in
M 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 83
ing
vity
Group
vig-
day
==================================================
Page 84
==================================================
-95 -
The NSC meeting 0 f August 18_ 1960
was held three weeks
the 'quasi-coup" in the
before
the dismissal
of
which Johnson
Lumumba by Kasavubu
remembers
as place "not
the President'
after" he heard
S statement The other meeting
at which Johnson
could have heard the statement by the President
was held
on ber 7 two after this event _
Robert Johnson
S memorandun of the meeting of August 18 , 1960 ,_
indicates that Secretary of State C . Douglas Dillon* introduced
TERSeopoadville
16 that
'iuembindicREMOBAthar
it had been_concluded
AND THAT S "REMO AL MUST
BE AN URGENT
in "HIGH QUAR-
(CIA Cable OUT
THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIQRITY
'8FAQURPCOVE OBJECTIVE
les cable
62966_ Dulles to(Chief RE98EatiOn, OUR2GO6ER1
ACTION"
added: 8/26 /60)
The Dul -
WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY
AGGRESSIVE ACTION
IF It
CAHORETXIN COVERNCLUDINGYOVEN
MORE
ACT ON YOUR OWN _ AUTHORITY WHERE YOU CAN
FERRAL HERE
(CIA Cable 8/26/_
TIME DOES NOT PERMIT` RE-
for more complete treatment
'60) (See Section 2 supra of this cable. )
On September 19 a CIA scientist
to the, Congo
on an excraordinarily was diseaEsbed fron headquarters
OUT 71464 _ Bissell/Tweedy
to (Chief
sensitive assignment (CIA Cable 4 (a) supra) On September 21
in
of)Station 9/i9/60;
see Section
an NSC mee Allen Dulles the presence of the. President
danger
as as he
stated that Lumumba
Y [ remained
at
Section 7(a) (iv)
was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes a grave
tist arrived in
the"€ongc Finally
on September 26 _
'Ehe9CZ4/&83
see
biological
substances ins
provided Ghedchie? # )seattoe CIth Sieehal
Eormed him that Eheegresideructed him to assassinate Lumumba
and sassination effort (see:
had ordered the DCI to undertake
in-
Station
stated thac 6e
Sections 4(a) -G(c)
supra) The (Chief
an as -
that he was to follow
received confirmation from CIA
of )
4(e) (1)
supra)
the tructions he had been given
eeadguetfece
Section
** In 1960 Dillon
served as position in the State
cment
Undersecrecary
60
of State _ the "number two changed
to Deputy Secretary
of
the name of which subsequently
State _ In this Position he Erequently
(Continued)
H 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 84
Congo
taking
long
only
Septem-
days
Acting
Eing,
1ong
Congo
ins
Depar
==================================================
Page 85
==================================================
~ 107 -
on September 21 1960 Allen Dulles
stressed the danger of
Soviet influence
in the Despite the fact that Lumumba
had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN
cus Dulles continued to regard him as a threat
in light of reports of
especially
an impending reconciliation
between
Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese
government :
Mobutu appeared co be theeffective
Congo for the monent but
Power in the
disposed of and
renzibed Euntabe
was not yet
as he was not
a grave danger
as
9/21/60.)
disposed of (NSC Minutes
Three after this NSC meeting , Allen Dulles
sent a
Personal cable to thef Chief of Station in Leopoldville which
included the following
message :
UUMUKSH GIVE EVRY POSSIBLE SUPPORT
LUMUMBA FROM ANY_POSSIBILITY
In ELIMINATING
POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN
LERESOEDVGLGOVERNENIA
HIMSELF In STANLEYVILLE OR
[OLDVILLE SETTING
OUT 73573), Dulles to
ELSEWHERE (CIA Cable
Leopoldville 9/24/60 . )
On September 26 (Sidney Gottlieb)
under assignment from
CIA headquarters
arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable In
Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60)
provided the(Chief of)
Station with poisons instructed him
to assa8sinate Lumumba _
and assured him that there was Presidential authorization
for
this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c)_
supra)
Marion NSC Deputy Executive
Secretary _ who wrote
the memorandum of the discussion of September did not
interpret Dulles
remark as referring
to assassination
>
H# 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 85
Congo _
tody =
long
days
18989
Boggs _
21 ,
==================================================
Page 86
==================================================
-114-
Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active
in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of
De fense John V_ Irwin II Undersecretary of State Eor Political
Affairs Livingston Merchert and Deputy Secretary of Defense
James Douglas--stated that did not recall any discussion
about assas8inating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75 _ PP _ 1-2;
Merchant atfidavit, 9/8/75 , P. 1 ; Doug Las affidavit , 9/5/75)
(c) Richard Bissell Testified_That Despite His Lack of
a Specific RecolTection He "StrongLy Inferred
That the Assass ination Effort Against Lumumba Was
Authorized Fregident Eisenhower and ATTen DulTes
Richard Bissell' s testimony
on the question of high-level
authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-
lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection
of receiving such authorization and that all of his testimony
on chis subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell
9/10/75 ,
P. 48) Bissell began his testimony on the subject
by asserting thac it was on his own initiative that he instructed
Justin 0 ' Donnel1 to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell
6/11/75 _ PP _ 54-55) Nevertheless Bissell' s conclusion--based
on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating
co the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an
assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels:
of the government (Bissell , 9/10/75 _ PP _ 32-33 47-49 , 60-62
65)
H# 509ss Docld:32202487 Page 86
they
Bx
==================================================
Page 87
==================================================
-115 -
As discussed above Bissell cestified that the minutes
of mee tings of the Special Group on August 25 1960 and the
NSC on September 21 1960 indicate that assassination was con -
templaced at the Presidential level as one acceptable means
16 of 'getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5 (2) (ii) and 5 (a) (1ii)
supra)
I There was no question" according
to Bissell that the
cable from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Jstation in Leopoldville
on August 26 , which called for Lumumba' s removal and authorized
Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters
was a
direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had
attended the Previous (Bissell , 9/10/75 ,
Pp 31-32) Bissell
16 was almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles
cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell , 9/10/75 , P. 12)
Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of
the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated
within the language of Dulles cable (Bissell , 9/10/75 P . 32) :
It is my belief on che basis of the cable drafted
by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of
the Special Group as authorizing lementation
[of an assassination] if favorable circunstances
presented thenselves if it could be done covertly:
(Bissell 9/10/75 _ PP 64-65 . )
Dulles cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi-
dential authorization for hin to order action to assassinate
Lumumba (Bissell , 9/10/75 ,
PP .
61-62) :
H 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 87
day
imp
==================================================
Page 88
==================================================
-[l6-
Q: Did Mr Dulles tell
wanted Lumumba killed? you that President Eisenhower
Mr _ Bissell I am sure he didn t
Q: Did he ever tell you even through this kind of cable?
circumlocutiously
Bissell Yes , I think his cable it (BisselT 79/10/75
P 33 . )
says in effect .
As for discussions with Dulles about the source of autho-
rization for an assassination effort
agains t Lumumba Bissell
stated:
I think it is Probably unlikely that Allen
would have said either the President
Dulles
Eisenhower
even to me I think he
or President
this is authorized in the
would have said ,
would have known what he
highesE
quarters and I
P_ 48 . ) meant (Bissell _ 9/10/75 _
When asked if he had sufficient authority
to move beyond the
cons ideration
or Planning of assassination
to order implementa-
tion of a Plan Bissell said, "I probably did think I had [such]
authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75 ,
PP . 61-62) _
When informed about the (Chief of Jstation
S testimony
about the instructions he received from (Gottlied_ Bissell said
that despice his absence of a specific recollection:
I would strongly infer
in this case that such authorization did Pass through me as ic
an
if (Sid Gottlieb
gave that firm
were
Station( Chief Bissell
instruction co the
9/10/75 ,
P . 40 .)
Bissell said that the DCL would have been che source of this
authorization (Bissell 9/10/75 ,
P. 40)
H# 509ss DocId:32202487 Page 88
Mr _
==================================================
Page 89
==================================================
-117-
Bissell did not recall informed by (Gottlieb) that
IGottlieb had represented co the Chief
of Station that there
was Presidential
authorization for the a8sassination
of Lumumba
(Bissell , 9/10/75 ,
P But Bissell
said that assuming
he had instructed (Gottlieb
to carry poison
to the 81 there
was no possibilicy"
that he would have issued such an instruc-
tion without authorization from Dulles
(Bissell , 9/10/75 ,
P, 47) . Likewise Bissell
said he "probably
did" tell (Gottlieb
that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower
(Bissell, 9/10/75 ,
P . 47). This led to Bissell' s conclusion
that if in fact , the testimony
of the( Chief of)station about
'Gottlieb)'
S actions is accurate then (Gottlieb}'s
actions were
authorized:
Q: In light of the
entire
and the policy
at che
atmosphere at the Agency
'Gottlieb) s
represen
Agency
at the time Mr _
that the President
tation to the,Chief %f Station
carry out this
had instructed the DCI to
the Pale of
is MGscior
would not have been beyond
point?
(Gettlieb) s authority
at that
Bissell:
it would not _ (Bissell ,
P 65) 9/10/75 _
Bissell further
stated:
Knowing Mr _ Gottlieb)
it is literally
to me that he would 'have
inconceivable
tions_ (Bissell
9/107f5acFedGbeyond his
instruc-
P 41.)
With respect to his a88ignment
co Justin 0 'Donnell) to
"plan
and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell _ 9/10/15 ,
P 24) Bissell testified that "it
was my own idea to give
M 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 89
being:
46)
Congo ,
fully
No ,
==================================================
Page 90
==================================================
-118 -
0 ' Donnell this ass ignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75 , (
P _ 50) _ But he
said that this specific as8ignment
was made in the context
that an assa89ination mission against
Lumumba already had
autho-
rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75 ,
P 50 ; see
also PP 32-33 47-48 , 60-62)
HI# 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 90
==================================================
Page 91
==================================================
that_ while he could have created the capability
on his own urgings would have come fron
any
or Walt Rostow_ In 3 later
appearance however , Bissell said he merely informed
of
the capability
and that the context was a
brieEing by
hin and
not urging by
said he received
a
briefing
and
gave no urging, though
he raised no objections Rostow said he
never heard of the project _
William Harvey
testified that he was "almost certain"
that on January 25 and 26 1961 , he met with CIA officials
Gottlieb the new Chief of CIA' s Technical Services Division ,
and Anold Slivea
a CIA recrui officer to discuss the feasibility
of creating
a capability within
the Agency for "executive
action 6 (Harvey , 6/25/75 _
P_ 52) After reviewing
his notes of those
mee Harvey testified that took place after his initial
As Lo che date_of these otes Eations "25/1 (Sid G4 and "26/1
Harvey
was asked whether his no - SoctliebZnd (iold Silvcs)
in 1961
19ryyindicatc
that he spoke co [idney
fied
Js follows : as opposed to 1962 larvey testi-
Q: And is it your judgment that
is about the subject of
that is January 26 , 1961 and Executive Action?
Harvey : ic is
Q: And it followed
you have recounted?
your conversation wich Mr Bissell chat
Ehiyey :
well
chiSWhesl
when I Eirst looked
at this [
now that it is
has got co be '62 _ but I an almost
thoughc
first not If this is true chis
certain
discussion that I had with Dick
might Place
the
January and this is difficult Bissell in early
several such discussions
in
to pinpoint because
there were the Period in the spring and
varying degrees
o f detail
of 61 period, but I did find in 6 1 to the Lall
out
on that (Bilver
05
00955 DocId:32202487 Page 91
Bundy
Bundy
Bundy . Bundy
Sidney
ting
tings _
they
Yes ,
during
very early
fairly early
==================================================
Page 92
==================================================
~-5-
discussion of executive action with Bissell Ihich he said
might have transpired in January" 'Harvey , 6/25/75 _
P
52) When Bissell
was shown these notes he agreed with Harvey
about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell , 7/17/75 ,
P_
had or
thato3issell
had discussed nation with Guold Sziver the question o f assassi-
least _ had Lo take pface
JEE0d this discussion
at che vcry
discussed the matter
acch GEivel knoarVesse5i2515eady
had Mllarvey , 6/25/75 _
P . 52)
Ilarvey had also testified that after structions to estab lish
an executive
receiving Bissell '$
initial in- action Gapabilicy:
the first
I did
terms wich 3 Eew officers
was discuss in chcoretical
the whole subject of
Ivhom I trusted Juitc,implicitly
our posture going
Eacksassivation
OiilouE possible assets
mental questions of 4 is
you even to the funda-
of an American in
assassination
a proper wcapon
assune that it is is it
service_ and B even if you
the framework of this
within our cpabiiity wichiy
and Properly
secureiygoncrucat Lo do it cfEectively
PP 37-A 38) and discreecly _
(Ilarvey , 6125/75 ,
The Inspector General
5
stages of
'Ece execleroet connected (Gilved
Jnd Gottliebl
to the action Project as Eollows
; Harvey says that Bissell badeLready
aspects_of the Problem' with
{@oeadgidiesHasad
cercain
Goctliebl Since (Silven was and with Eidney
him in develcping
Ehe
already
cut In Hlarvey used
5 mention of
"@ig fGative tion Capabilicy
may explain
a notation
[Gottlieb]
in this connection
Gunn to
d#scussoEcchoiqbes Dv that ]larvcy instructcd
the discussion with the
eith]FoctlicblwichoucnsssocEad
Report , PP 37-38) Castro operation (I G6 .
Ic is evident Erom
the tes
over to Harvey of the Roselli
of and Bissell tlat the
as Part of ZRRIFLE (see
contact in Novembcer 196 1
turn-
discussion of
Section (d) inEra) Thus
was discussed
November 1961
executive action can at the icast, 'bechcicc initial
refer and the "25/1" and dated before
co January 1961 _ notations would have
Lo
9p8
055 DocId:32202487 Page 92
"early
10)
thing
telligence
early
Ac Harvey
by Guun
ting
timony Harvey
{26/1"
==================================================
Page 93
==================================================
3 18 -
a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell 6/11/75 ,
PP _ 19-20) _
did not recall any mention of the
Whice House or any higher authority
chan the DDP in his Novenber
meeting with
Bissell (Harvey , 7/11/75 _
PP . 60-61) _
Although Richard
Helms was briefed
and given
administracive responsibility
(as DDP) for Project ZR/ RIFLE three
months later he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE
was ever
as a capability
to
contemplated
assassinate Castro (Helms 6/13/75
P 55) _
Asked whecher the actual assassination efforts against Castro were related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action) Helms testified:
In
mind those lines never
my
crossed" (Helms 6/13/75 ,
P_ 52) . However _
Bissell' s tes leaves
more 0
ambiguity:
the contact with the
syndicate which had
Castro
as its target folded into the
ZR/ RIFLE project
and becamne one" (Bissell 6/11/75 ,
P. 47) . When asked by Senator
Baker whether che executive action
"capabilicy
for &ssa88ination"
was used against Castro"
Bissell replied that it was "in the later
Tt phase (Bissell , 6/11/75 _
P 47) . The instruction Erom Bissell
to on Novenber 15;
1961 , however _ Preceded the reactivation
of the CIA-syndicate
assa5 - ination operation against Castro by approximately five months_
(ii1) Use of Agent QJIWIN inAfrica
QJIWIN
was a citizen with a criminal back -
ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive
programs involving surreptitious
entries which
pre-dated Project
H# 509ss DocId:32202487 Page 93
bring
Harvey
timony
they
Harvey
foreign
==================================================
Page 94
==================================================
19
ZR/ RIFLE Harvey testified that QJ/WIN
5 function after
the advent
of Project ZR/RIFLE
in 1961
was restricted to the 10 'spotting"
of.
Potential assets for 06 'mulci-purpose"
covert use_
However in the Fall of 1960--be fore Harvey
was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE
by Richard Bissell--agent
QJ[WIN had been dispatched
to the by (@nold Silver}
his
supervising CIA
case officer in Europe _ William
as the Chief of the CIA 03 Incelligence
staff on which Gilver)worked_
had ordered QJ/WIN
S mission to the (CIA Dispacch (A@I) 147 _
11/2/60)
and arranged che financial accounting for
the mission
afterward (Memorandum
to Finance Division
from William
K. 1/11/61)
[QJ/WIN
5 activities in che
are treated in detail
in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section
supra
There are two factors which
may raise
a question as to whether QJ/WIN was used in an ad hoc capacity
co
an assassination capabilicy before ZR/RIFLE
was formally initiated_
First , there is a similarity
in the cast of characters :
QJ/WIN_ (lues and |Gottlieb
were connected with the Lumumba matter and reappear in connection with the subsequent development
of ZR/RIFLE _ Second Bissell informed
that the development
of
an assassination capabilicy had already been
discussed with Gilwer
and Gottlieb{before Harvey
S as8ignment
to ZR/ RIFLE (Harvey , 6/25/75
P 52; I_ G . Report =
2 PP . 37-38)_
Nevertheless _ there does not appear to be any firm
evidence of a connection becween
QJ/ WIN and the plot to assassinate
Lumumba_
Gip8
HA 0955 DocId:32202487 Page 94
Congo
Harvey
Foreign
Congo
Harvey ,
Congo
being
develop
Harvey ,
Harvey
==================================================
Page 95
==================================================
4-
(
Documents indicate that consideration was given within
the CIA co airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic _
07 At a June 21 1960 ,
mee wi thGed Holumllo €
the CIA
Western Hemisphere Division Ambassador Farland repor tedly
suggested possible sites for the drops
(CIA memo 6/21/60)
Documents als0 indicate that a meeting
was held
around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs R Rubottom and
Col J. C . Chief of CIA ' s Western Hemisphere Division
Apparently sought to learn the Assistant Secretary
S view
regarding what extent will the U.S _ government participate
in the overthrow of Trujillo. Jb A nuber of questions were
raised bY among them :
E C. Would it provide a small number of
or other devices for the removal of
rifles
from the scene?"
Trujillo People
S handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom S response to
that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; Kinq aEfidavit)
On July .1, 1960 , a memrandum directed to General Cabell the Acting
Director of Central Intelligence;
was prepared Eor Colonel King ' $
signature and , in his absence _
0
signed his principal deputy ,
Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report , P . 26) The menorandum stated that
a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo
opposition had asked
Ambassador Farland for a limited number
of arns to precipitate
Trujillo' s overthrow_ and recognized that such Arns
* Neither
either recall
nor Rubotton recalls such a meeting
nor does any proposal Eor supplying sniper rifles_
9py (Rubottom affidavit,
affidavit.)
5 DocId:32202487 Page 95
ting
Roy
King,
King
"To
King,
shiper
key
King
by
King
King
==================================================
Page 96
==================================================
Teef
A
Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved
Trujillo'9 assassination
He communicated this opinion to both the State tment and
the CIA_ In 1960 , he advised Assis tant Secretary Rubottom
that the dissiden+s were
in nc ready to carry on activity in the foreseeable
any type of revolutionary
assassination of their
future except the
(Dearborn
principal enemy _ TI to Rubottan letter
8
7/14/60)
It is uncertain what portion of the informa- tion provided
Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary
level Tnrough August of 1960 , Assistant Secre Rubottom
his Deputy , Lester Mallory , and Staff Assistant
[Erank Devine
were, within the Latin Anerican Division of the Department ,
aware of Dearborn ' s
I current {0 projects (pevinel to Dearborn
$ letter , 8/15/60)
September 1960 , Thomas Mann had replaced Rubottom
as Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs, and [Frank
Devine had become a Special Assistant
to Mr . Mann While
serving
as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary , Devine
reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State
activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that
Devine maintained almost daily comunication
with Ied Mlelnew
and other officials of the CIA ' s Western Hemisphere Division
(Devine P.7)
#Dearborn
S candid reporting
to seate during the raised concern with the suer 6f 1960
specific information
Department and ne xas advised that certain
other channel"
shoula more appropriately
come through I1 tne
advised that
hisprableabto'
CIA communications)
Dearborn was dfffeeenthrechjiesabJez_ to State were distributed to at least 19 offices (Id. )
8
55 DocId:32202487 Page 966
Depar
July
way
by
only
tary
BY
Roy
YN4
==================================================
Page 97
==================================================
2 Ldwoh
have asked us for a3 Eew sandwiches _
more and we are not prepared to
hardly
available Last Iveek
make then
three
we were asked to furnish
or four pineapples For a party in the near future, but I could remezber nothing
in structions that would have allowed
my in-
bute this me to contri- ingredient _ [on t think I wasn t tenpted I have rather specific guidelines
to the effect that salad ingredients
delivered outside the picnic
Will be
be brought to the
grounds and will
area by another club (Dearborn letter to Devine] 3/16/61)
After reviewing his "picnic" letter together Trith the requests
in the Marcn 14 and 15 cables discussed above
1
Dearborn con-
cluded during his testimony before the Conmittee that the
"pineapples'
were Probably the requested Eragmentation
grenades and the restriction
on delivering
salad ingredients
outside of the picnic grounds Ivas , almost certainly ,
neant to
refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group
orcer that arms be delivered outside
the Dominican Republic_
(Dearborn 7/29 , PP . 25-27)
2 _ The_Passage of Bistols
a Bouching to the Dominican_Republic
In a March 15 , 1961 cable
8
Ichief of] station (owen] reported
that Dearborn had asked for three 38 caliber pistols for issue
to several dissidents . In reply , Headquarters cabled: Regret
no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against
shipment of arms M1 and indicated that their reply had been coor-
dinated with State _ (HQS to Station cable , 3/17/61) The
Station |chief then asked Headquarters
to seek the necessary
authorization and noted that at his ast two psts , he had
received pistols Via the pouch for "worthy
purposes" and ,
G
55 DocId:32202487 Page 91 i ,
==================================================
Page 98
==================================================
@
-17-
therefore , he knew it could be done. (Sta tion to cable ,
3/21/61) Two later, Headquarters
cabled that the pistols
and ammunition were pouched _ However _
1
the Station
Chief was instructed net to advise Dearborn . (Hqs _ to Station
cable , 3/24/61) *
b Reason for the CIA Instruction
Not to Tell Dearborn
loueli testified that he believed the "don t tell Dear -
born the pistol is pouched" language simply
meant that
the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not
some thing
to be unnecessarily 03_
discussed .
pP . 78 , 79)
Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used since he knew
[weu had no other means of receiving
weapons _ (Dearborn ,
7/29 ,
P . 33)
C Were the Pistols Related to Assassina tion?
Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol
for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination
con-
sideration_ (Dearborn , 7/29 , PP . 29-31)
He said he had been
approached a Dominican contact who lived in 3 remote area
and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event
of political reprisals_ Dearborn testified that he had believed
a
The Inspector General"s Report ,
issued in connection review of these events
1 concludes that:
with
"There is no indication in the EMDEED
that the pistols were actually
operational files
for pistols
pouched The request
appears to have been overtaken by
a sub- sequent request for submachine guns 0 (I.G_ Report, P. 60)
This conclusion is difficult
to understand 24 , 1961 Headquarters to
in light of the March Station cable , which provides :
# "C. Pouching: revolvers
and ammo
(in 20040)
on 28 March_
requested TRUJ 0462
#bzulaba
Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted)
DocId: tesjabsbeing pouched Explanation follows_ 9
69
Hgs
days
being
being
by
==================================================
Page 99
==================================================
18
96
the man 5 fears were well-founded and had promised to seek
* a pistol
Although there is no direct evidence linking any
of these
pistols to the assassination of Trujillo ,
a June 7 , 1961 , CIA
memorandum , unsigned and with no attribution
as to source
states that two of the three pistols were passed bY Owen to
orenzo "Wimdi"_Wariy
a United States citizen who was in direct
contact with the action element of the dissident group It
should also be noted that the assassination
was apparently
con -
ductea with almost complete reliance
upon nand weapons _ Nhether
one or more of these 38 caliber Smith E Wesson pistols
eventuallv came into the hands of the assa8sins
and , if whether were used in connection with the
assassination_ remain open questions _
Both Dearborn and @wen testified that they regarded the pistols
as weadons self-defense
Purposes and they never
considered them in any way connected with the then-current
assassination plans _
Dearborn 7/29 ,
93
P . PP. 38 , 73)
However , none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the
purpose for which the handguns
were
63
sought and (oret 5 cable
stated that Dearborn
wanted them for passage to dissidents _
(Station to HQS cable , 3/15/61) Indeed _ the March 24 , 1961 ,
#Dearborn is clear in his recollection 03_
request one pistol_
that ne asked owan to
On the other hand
tesrifieeathorn 7/29 , PP . 30 , 31) lfwer 0}
that if his cables pistols Dearborn then Dearborn
requested three
pistols.03wer P. 72)
must have asked for three
'The pistols were however
(HQs to Station
cebleowev25/6iPeazentza sent in one package
fied that, what he believed
and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-
up" 4 and
to be the one gun came that he passed it (Dearborn
mrarped
-/29 , P.30)
DocId:32202487 Page 99
S0 , they
0*
for
Torzd 70 ;
only
only
for
==================================================
Page 100
==================================================
6d-Ueylak'U
cable advising that the pistols were pouched is the
very cable which was sent in response to a request bY the
dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination
effort which had been previously described to Headquarters _
As Wvith the carbines discussed below it appears that little
if any , concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these
weapons to would-be assassins _
3 _ Passing of the_Carbines
a_ Request by_(wen]
and Dearborn and Approval by CIA
In 2 March 26 , 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters ,
Ipwed asked
for permission
to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber MI
carbines_ The guns had been left behind
in the Consulate by
Vavy personnel after the U.S_ broke forrial diplomatic relations
in Auyust 1960 _
Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred
in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents.
(Dearborn 7/29 ,
PP . 43) On March 31 , 1961 CIA Headquarters
cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines .
to
Station cable , 3/31/61)
b 'ere the Carbines Related to Assassination?
The carbines were passed
to tne action 03
group concact Bataow) on April 7,_
1961 - (Station to HQS cable , 4/8/61) Eventually ,
found
their way into the hands of one of the assassins
8
Antonio
de la Maza . (Station to HQS cable , 4/26/61; I.G . Report
Pp . 49) Both Dearborn and (gwedhtestified that the
carbines were at 'il times
viewed 3,
as strictly
a token show
#u
5 DocId:32202487 Page 100
being
5703
42 ,
(Aqs
(Nimpy
they
46 ,
==================================================
Page 101
==================================================
Wi- RStsa1k'
of support , indicating
U.S _ support of the dissiden ts efforts
to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 0}
7/29 ,
PP . 46-48 ; (@wealp _
39)
c Failure to Disclose to State
QEficials in Nasiiugton
Department
There is no indication that the request or the passage
of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials
in
Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact , on
April 5 , leadquarters
requested its station to ask Dearborn
not to conment in correspondence with State that the carbines
and ammunition were being passed to tae dissidents
03
This cable
was sent while @wad was in Washington_
and it indicated that
upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain
the request_ The Station replied that Dearborn had not com -
mented on the carbines and ainmunition in his correspondence
with State and he realized the necessity
not to do So . (Station
to HQS cable , 4/6/61)
Dearborn testified, however , that he believed , at che
time of his April 6 cable , that someone in che State De -
partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the
Passage of che carbines (Dearborn 7/29 ,
P_ 44)
C: L1
2kd
DocId:32202487 Page 101
==================================================
Page 102
==================================================
3 Requests and Pouching of the Machine_Guns
03
a @wejl Requests Machine
Guns for Us e
In Assa8sination
The Station (Chie
suggested that Headquarters consider
pouching
an M3 machine 70}
gun on February 10 1961 @owed PP 63 ,64 ;
Station to HQS cable _ 3/15/61)
The request was raised again
in March but no action was taken_ On March 20 , 1961 _ Jcabled
a dissident reques t
for five M3 or comparable machine guns
specifying
their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic
Pouch or similar means The dissidents were said to feel that
delivery by air or transfer at sea would overly-tax their
resources (Station co HQS cable , 3/20/61)
The machine guns sought by the dissidents
were clearly
identified,
in {Owaie S cable as sought for use in connec-
tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo This Plan
was co
kill Trujillo in the apartment of his
07
mistress and according
to %wan cable:
"4_ To dothey need five M3 or
guns and 1500 rounds ammo for
comparable machine-
event fire fight. Will
Personal defense in
job_ 1| (Id.)
use quiet weapons for basic
In essence, CIA' & response was that the for an
ass2ssination
was
03
wrong_ was told that precipitious
or
uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of 3 leftist ,
Castro-type regime
and the "mere disposal
of Trujillo may create
more problems than solutions 46 It was Headquarters
position
that:
we should actempt
to avoid precipitous
action by the internal dissidents until
and HQS are better
opposition group
effect
a change in
Bhepzeed co support [assassinationT* ,
ma th_ 91 (HQS to Station
regime and cope with the after-
cable 3/24/61)
Word suppTTed CIA in previously sanitized cable. G
55 DocId:32202487 Page 102
For
Owely
drop
being
timing
(oneg
By
==================================================
Page 103
==================================================
-22 -
The cable also stated that
ters was Prepared
to deliver machine
guns and ammunition to the dissidents
when
developed
a capability
to received them but that security
considerations
precluded use of U.S . facilities
as a carrier_
Soon thereafter
on April 6 , 1961 _ while [@uam) was in Washington
for consultation with Headquarters ,
he reported on events in
the Dominican Republic
and
'especially
on the insistence
of the leaders that be provided
EMOTH [dissident]
of small arms for their
with a limited number
five M3 caliber
857sRGosection
10
(specifi-
for the record 4/11/61)
s) (CIA memo
b _ Pouching the Machine Guns
is Bissell Approved
Accordingly ,
on April 7 , 1961,
a Pouch Restriction Waiver
Request and Certification
was submi tted permission to
1 Pouch four M3 machine
guns and 240 rounds of amunition
on a Priority basis for issuance
to a small action group to be used
for self Protection (Pouch Restriction
Waiver Request 4/7/61)
The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief , Vestern
Hemisphere Division further provided :
A determination has been made that the of this equipment
to the action
issuance
if for no other reason
group is desirable
than to assure this important
group S continued cooperation
with and confidence this, Agency
S aetermination
to live
in
commitments to the up to its earlier
group. These commitnents took
* This sane cable of March 24 196I
that tne revolvers and 1 1s tne one which advised ammunition were pouched_
Relpb;
5 DocId:32202487 Page 31 c
3 #
Headquar
they
they
cally _
by
seeking
"B .
being
==================================================
Page 104
==================================================
31
in cables Erom Dearborn
and owert
(Station HQS" cables
4/25/61) On April 25 , 1961 (Quncti advised Hleadquarters
tnat (@Impy Jen5}
had inforned him that Antonio de la Maza was
yoing to attenpt the assassination between April 29 and 2
also reported that this attempt would use the three
carbines passed fron the American Consulate together with
whatever else was available_ (Id.)
In response to the April 26 cable , Ieadquarters
restated
that there was no approval to
67
pass any additional
arms to the
dissidents and reguested(owcn)
to advise the dissidents tnat the
United States
was simply
not prepared at that time to cope with
the aftermath of the assassination_
(See c/s commen
Station to HQS cable , 4/27/61) The Eollowing
April 27 ,
1961 , (Owci replied that , based
upon further discussions
with
the dissidents
1 We doubt statement U.S _ government not now
prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade then Erom
06 attempt . (station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)
Dearborn recalls receiving instructions
that
an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and
testified that efforts to carry out the instructions
were
unsuccessful_ In effect , che dissidents informed him
that
this was their affair and it could not be curned off to suit
the convenience of the U.$ . government .
Dearborn , 7/29 ,
P.52)
Ek;
HY Docld:32202487 Page 104
to
May
(Qwel
ts,
day ,
==================================================
Page 105
==================================================
33
D
addt tional support coupled with fact ref tems [the carbines] already made available
to them for Personal defense ; station zed pass ref 4 itens [the machine
authori-
opposition member for their
guns] to
tection on their
additional
pro-
Station
Proposed endeavor "1 (Draft of [QS
The cable
cable , 5/2/61)
was never sent
In his testimony before
the Comnittee Bissell characteri-
zed his reasoning for recommending
release of the machine
guns
as;
made already
a considerable
investment in this dissident
plans that we might as well
group and its
tional inves 46
make the addi-
tment_ (Bissell, 7/22 , P.127)
The following
3 , 1961 , Herbert , Deputy Chief
or the [estern Hemisphere Division
oE CIA who frequen
acted
as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning
covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolpn
Berle Chairman of the State Department '
S Interagency Task Force
on Latin America
A Berle memorandun of the meeting
states that Jlerbert
informed Berle that a local group in the Domini can Pepublic
wished to overthrow Trujillo
and sought arms for that purpose
The memorandum continued:
cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate
wanted guns for that
Trujillo and
to know what the
purpose Llerbert wanted policy should be
"I told him I could not
and that this
care less for Trujillo
we did
was the general sentiment_ But not wish to have any to do assassination plots anywhere
with any
said he felt the sane
any time Herbert
Conversation
Wvay . (Berle Meno of
0
5/3/61)
HM 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 105
to
having
day , May Ray
Lly
"On
they
thing
==================================================
Page 106
==================================================
34
Copies of Berle' s memorandum
were sent to Wymberly Coerr ;
the Acting Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs_
and to Special Assistant Frank Devinel
Both Herbert and Devinel who had been in almost
contact with each other since August of 1960 , had Jbeen advised
of the as3a3sination plans of the dissident sroup. In Eact ,
lilerbertl with Bissell_ had signed off '0il the proposed
cable 0E May 2 , releasing the nachine
suns for passage_
C Special_Group Meetings QE_ lax 4 and 18__1961
Un tine following
the Berle-ilerbert meeting , the
Special Group met and, according
to the minutes:
"The DCI referred to recent anti-Trujillo plot_ reports of a new
He said we never know if one of these is going to work or not and what is the status of con
asked
the plot comne off Mr _
GtnayegaiaPEnatit?
should
is covered in the
said that this point
at a high level
e,Cube paper which will be , discussecl
Group Minutes , very near future_ t (Special 5/4/61)
Once again the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes
makes subsequent analysis
as to the scope of matters discussed
speculative It is not known to what extent and in what detail
Allen Dulles referred to 1I recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo
plot. Certainly ,
the nost recent report of such a plot was
Dearborn 5 April 30 cable
Ir
disclosing
an iminent assassination
attempt potentially utilizing
U.S.-supplied weapons _
On 18 , 1961 , the Special Group
again considered the
situation in the Dominican Republic
and according
to the
H# 50955 Docld:32202487 page 106
daily
alony
Mlay
day
May
==================================================
Page 107
==================================================
36_
to continue to take the same line until he received con
instructions wlich clearly indicated
had been cleared
in
advance by the State Department itself.
This cable frnm State 1as
approved bY Under Secretary Bowles .
(Department
to Dearborn, 5/16/61)
Ray EerbertJreferred
to Dearborn s 16 request in a
memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be
advised as to the Department' s policy conce passage of
the nachine guns Herbertl noted that when this request was
last taken to the Department ;
Berle made the decision that the
weapons not be passed _ (Memo to ARA from 5/16/61)
Devine responded to Herbert S menorandun on the same
advising [terbert
that the Department ' s policy continued to be
negative on the matter of passing the machine
guns Herbert' s
attention was directed to the January 1961 Special Group
limitation concerning
the passage of arms outside of the
Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine 5 menorandun to
ferbert_
was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secre of State
to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.
(Devine
to Ferbert memo , 5/16/61)
E _ Dearborn in Washington
for Consultation
Drafting of Contingency Plans
At 2 neeting
of the National Security Council on 5 , 1961 ,
the question of U.S _ policy toward the Dominican Republic was
considered and it was :
"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare_promptly both emergency
and range plans for anti-comunist intervention
in the event of crises in Haiti or the
27
0
1961 Dearborn was advising the the roup was no longer requesting State Department that
fact that it nust make do with
the arns and nad accepted the
WM 50955
niehde226zu8h/ 61age
107
what it had (Dearborn to State
trary
they
'Jay
rning
CIA ,
day ,
12 ,
tary
May
long-
By May
==================================================
Page 108
==================================================
45 -
fact, we feel that the transfer of
serve very little arms would
States to
purpose and expose the United
great danger 0f association with assassination attempt_
The cable as revised by Goodwin and approved by President
Kennedy ,
Ias sent to Dearborn on 29 1961 . (State Dept _
to Dearborn cable 5/29/61)
May 30 1961 and Imediately_Thereafter:
A Trujillo_Assassinated
Late in the evening of 30_ 1961 , Trujillo was ambusned
and assassinated near San Cristobal
8
Dominican Republic_ The
assassination closely
paralleled the plan disclosed by the
action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic
and passed on to officials in Nashington
at both the CIA and
thne State Department . (Dearborn cable to State 5/30/61) The
assassination
was conducted by members of the action grou? , to
whon the American carbines had been passed , and such sketchy
information a5 is available indicates that one or more of the
carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when
Trujillo was killed_ (I_ G Report, pP . 60-61) This evidence indicata
however , that the actual assassination
was accomplished by
handguns and shotguris _ (I.G. Report , P.61)
B Cables to Washington
After recei the May 29 cable from Washington
both Consul
03
General Dearborn and Station |chieE [owey
sent replies _ According
to Dearborn S testimony , he did not regard the 29 cable
as a change in U.S . policy conce support for assassinations_
JJs (Dearborn 7/29/75 ; P.
nh:
H# 50935 DocId:32202487 Page 108
May
VII,
Nay
ving
May
rning
74)
==================================================
Page 109
==================================================
(
-46
He interpreted
the 29 cable
a8 saying:
0 we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate Trujillo , that is all right But we don't want anything to pin this on us because we aren t
tf
it it 1s the Dominicans who are doing
it (Dearborn, 7/29 ,
p . 104 )
Dearborn testified chat this accorded with what he said had
been his Personal belief;
thae che U.S . should not be
involved in an assassination and that if an assassination
occurred it would be strictly
a Dominican affair, (Dearborn
7/29 ,
PP _ 100 , 101)
contrast the CIA Station|Chief @wen" did regard the
cable as manifesting
a change in U.S . policy
9
particularly
on
the questionof supplying
arns (pucr P . 120 ) He believed the
29 cable was the final word in U.S_ policy on this matter
and consequently felt that the government had retreated from
its prior position, of offering material support to the dissi-
dents and had adopted
a new position of withholding
such support _
Qwel responsIve cable to Headquarters stated:
"HQS aware extent to which U,S_ government associated with assassination If we are to
alzeade
least cover up tracks
9
CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn_ m1 (Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)
3 v
55 DocId:32202487 Page 109
May
doing
always
In
May
==================================================
Page 110
==================================================
0 8A04 6nnt?
SCHNEIDER REPORT
I
1
II_ The_President" S Initial_General
and_Background
Instruction 6
A. tember 15 White House Meeting
6
B. Background: Tracks I and II 8
C CIA Views of Difficulcy of Project
15
III. CIA S Implementation of Track II 17
4. Evolution of CIA Strategy
17
1 The titutional Coup' 08 Approach 17
2 . Military Solution
18
B. The Chile Task Force
19
C. The Use of ther JAttache and
Relations
Interagency 20
D. The(False Base
26
E Chief of Stacion
27
IV_ CIA Efforts_ to_Promote 3 29
A. The Chilean Conspirators
29
B. Contacts Prior to October 15 30
C October 15 Decision
34
D_ Planning and Attempts After October 15 36
EJ The Killing of General Schneider 39
F Post October 22 Events
61
V_ CIAWhite_House_Comunication_During_Irack II
43
4 September
45
B_ October
46
R
C. Decenber
5
D_ Did Track II End?
54
Page
Sumarx
Sep
"Cons
Army
Flag
Coup
Coup
==================================================
Page 111
==================================================
-17-
III {CIA 8 lementatien of Track II
A Evolution of CIA_Stra tegx
The President
S instruction to the CIA on September 15 to pPrevent
Allende 5 assumption of power was given in the context of 3 broad U.S_
Government e ffort to achieve that end . The tember 15 instruction
to the CIA involved from the beginning the Promotion of 2 military
coup
d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military
circles, there was little indication that
it would ac tually take place
without active U.S_ encouragement and support.
There was much talk among Chilean officers
the possibility of some kind of
about
was not the kind of talk
but this
that was backed
you serious organizational
planning.
(Karamessines
tes 6 , P. 32)
1 The titutional Ti Aperoach
Although efforts to achieve
a political solution to the Allende
victory continued
simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its
activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end
On September 21 CIA ters cabled its Station in
Purpose of exercise i8 to prevent Allende tion of power Paramilitary
assump-
discarded Military
legerdemain has been
solution i8 objective_
21 1970 , para. 3)
The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promo
2 coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years . The Agency
decided to promise lp in any election which
was an outgrowth of a
successful military takeover_
(Nov . 18 , 1970 Helns memo to Kissinger)
Under this plan
Frei would invite the military to
take over dissolve the
Congress, and proclaim 3 new election. A private #or U,S_ citizen who had
been a conduit for CIA funds o Fref' s 1964 campaign was sent to see him
Img
Sep:
coup.
being by , know ,
timony , Auga 1963 ,
"Cons Coup
Headquar
Santiago :
(Hqs _ 236 , Sept.
ting
"he
==================================================
Page 112
==================================================
-18 -
with this message on tember 24 _ (Task Force tember 23)
Thomas ` Karamessines , the Deputy Director for Plans , testified: (
Vn)
So this was in a sense not Track II, but in 8
sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully
non-violent military coup _ This was abandoned
when the military were reluctant to push Frei
publicly. and number two Frei was reluctant
to leave on his ow in the absence of Pressure
from the military. There was left as the only
chance of success a straight military
(Karamessines testimony , 6, 1975 ,
P. 6)
At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported :
Strong reasons Eor thinking neither Frei nor
Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario
in which either has to play an active role now
appears utterly unrealistic_ Overtures to lower
echelon officers (e.g. Valenzueka) can of course
be made _ This involves promoting split _
(S to 424 September 23 , 1970)
2 _ Military_Solution
President Frei' s failure even to attempt to Persuade his Own Parey
convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended
all of using him` to Prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18
memo , Helms to Kissinger , page 16) Thus , by the beginning of October ,
it was clear thac a vehicle for a military solution would have to be
found in the second echelon of Chilean officers , and that the leader-
of the Armed Services particularly General Rene Schneider consti-
tuted a stumb block. (Santiago 424 tember 23 , 1970; San
September 30, 1970) The Agency S task was to cause a coup in a highly
unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented
by Frei' 8 inaction, Schnelder S cons titutionalism, and the absence
of organization and enthusiasm those officers who were interested
in 1 coup. &
4 three-fold Program was set into motion:
9
P
622
Sep Log, Sep
coup .
Aug .
Army
tn . Hqs .
hope
top
ship
ling Sep: tiago 639 ,
strong
among
ne:'
==================================================
Page 113
==================================================
-20-
David A. Phillips , Fhief of Staton in Rio de Janeiro was summoned
back to Washington Lo head the operation . Wich the exception of che
Division Chief William Broe, his deputy James Flannery
and the head
7t
of the Chile Branch,
no other officers in che Division were aware of the
task force S activities,
not even those officers who normally had respon-
sibility for Chile. The task force had a special comnunications channel co
Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartuent cable traffic about Track II_
(November 18 , Helms to Kissinger
page 3) Most of che
significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and
Karamessines , who met on 3 basis
It should be noted chat all those involved with the task force des-
cribed the pressure from the White House as incense_ Indeed Karamessines
has said that Kissinger "left
no doubt in my mind that he was under the
heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was Plac -
uS under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished . M (Kara_
messines tes timony , August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of che
Western Hemisphere Division)
James Flannery , testified that Pressure was
8 as tough as I ever saw it in my tine there, extreme. (Flannery) cesti-
mony , July 15, [975 , Page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone
through a period as we did on the Chilean I mean it was just
constant, constant.
0 ?
'Just continual Pressure. Ic was coming from the
White House. U (Broe tes timony , Augus t 4 , 1975 ,
Page 55)
C The Use of the Attache and Interagency_Relations
The CIA Station in San had inadequate
contacts wichin the
Chilean military to carry out ics task_ However the U.S . At-
6F
tache in San Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean 7
military
1970 ,
weno ,
daily
ing
7t
As
thing-
Arpx
tiago
Army
tiago
==================================================
Page 114
==================================================
very well due :o his |five years of service there and his broad personal
contacts the Chilean.officers _ Following
a proposal by the Chief
of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting
in-
telligence concerning
the possibility of a coup and to use him as a
channel to let the interested Chilean
mili know of U S , support
for 3 coup . Karanessines described
this procedure for the Committee:
We also needed contact with a wider
the senior mili
segment of the mili tary which we had not maintained and did but which we felt confident that not
tative in Chile had And
our military represen-
enlist che
we got the approval of the DIA to cooperation of fcolonel Wimert in our effort cure intelligence. to pro-
(Karamessines
tes timony , `August 6 , P. 6 )
To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials Prepared a suggested mes-
sage for the Director of DIA to send to thel Attache in Santiago
through CIA communications channels _ Because the DIA Director, General
Donald V_ Bennett, was in Europe on official business , the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman _
invited DIA Deputy
Director Lt. General Jamie M. Philpott to his office on September 28
1970_ * that meeting, General
Cushnan requested the assistance of
the Attache, and General Philpott Signed
a letter which authorized
transmission of a message directing
the Attache:
to work closely with the CAS chief or in his deputy, in contacting
and
his absence
tary figures who might
advising the Principal
mili-
might,
Play a decisive role in any move which eventually ,
the presidency to Allende _
Do not, repeat advise the Ambassador
cache of this or the Defense At- message _ or give them any indication
of its portent _ In the course of
accordance with the
your routine activities;
act in
I wish-~and
Ambassador S instructions_ Simulcaneously ,
now authorize
you--to act in a concerted with the CAS chief _ Eashion
2
General Bennett
returned to the_United States 10 , 1970. General Philpott
Vug
on the evering of October
Director in Bennett $ absence _
among
( i
tary
tary ,
have .
1975 ,
Army
During
JArmy
AArmy =
deny
not ,
Acting
==================================================
Page 115
==================================================
-22 -
This message 15 for your eyes and should cussed wich any Person ocher chan
ot be dis-
be knowledgeable. CAS
those CAS officers who will
(
to Santiago)
will identify them_ (Headquarters 380
For this and all subsequent messages intended for che Attache,
the secret CIA communications channel #as used
Both General Philpott
and Thomas Karamessines
testified that ini-
tially che Attache would be used to "obtain
or procure" in-
telligence
on Chilean military oEficers_
* (Philpott,
P. 1l; Karamessines,
P. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Attache, however _
did
in trigger his involvement In the coup attempt _ According to
che Atcache 5 testimony , he received day-to-day ins tructions from the
Chief of Station, and on occasion, che CoS would show him messages
ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him
to
take certain actions_ The COS also transmi tted messages from the
Attache to these Generals _
General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II
and that he never received any comunication relating thereto,
nor did
he ever authorize the transnission of any messages to the Attache_
General Philpoct also testffied that he had no recollection oE anything
connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman
on Septenber 28 _ (Philpott,
P. 16)
U . S Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970
was the Chief of the Human Resources Division,
Director of Colleccion, DI4,
In this connection It should be noted thac when
this letter General Philpott testified
questioned about
an authorization such
that he recalled,sigping
as that contained in the Eirst paragraph of
F
Headquarters 380 buc that he did not recall che authoriza instructions In Paragraphs tworand
tions and
chree.
AwP
only ,
Army
Army
only
Army
fact deep
Arwy
lArmy_
Army
==================================================
Page 116
==================================================
23
testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott On
01 a Priority requirement co identify Chilean Personalities who might be
helpful in Preventing the election of Allende as President
FF of Chile .
(Roch, Vol I, Pa 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such ,
the goal of this mission i8 identical to that described in the message
of September 28 bearing Philpoct'$ signature.
Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities
connected with Chile_ This chronology reflects
that there was a meeting
F
on October 21 regarding the Preparation of biographic material on Chilean
generals which focused on their willingness
to Participate in a military
coup . Generals Bennett, Philpott,
and 3 CIA representative attended _
The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered
a message co
Mr _ Broe co be sent by CIA channels * A message was sent to Col_ Winert
that same ostensibly from General Bennett, which
authorized:
FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed
on MAP and FMS been rescinded, This action does not change in our estimate of situation _
repeat not imply
it 18 intended
On the con to place us in a posture in which we can formally
cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-
2
tion develops
as we anticipate. Request up date on situa- 93on. (Santiago Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters
21 October 1970)
Roth testified that this DIA Project ended on Occober 23 when he
2
followed Philpott' $ instructions to deliver biographic information
on
Chilean figures
to Mr . Broe at CIA. Philpott also ins=
tructed him that
Roth believes that General Philpott directed
him message and also pressed him on
to deliver this
sponse from Broe
several occasions to seek 3 re-
Vol. II P. )
to an earlier message tofColonel Wimert] (Roth,
5
TOP SE3REU
day,
has
trary
446;
F
==================================================
Page 117
==================================================
23a
{ any further action on the subject would henceforth be the
of the CIA and that DIA
responsibility
would perform normal support functions (Roth,
P. 8) *
Both Bennett and Philpott testified
that the activities described
by Roth were routine .DIA activities _
However Colonel Roth tes tified:
I believe my impression at the cime that I was informed that
or my recollection,
is
U .S Governmental
there was concern at the highest
that DIA then had
level over the possible election of Allende ,
the
a priority responsibility of
identities of Chilean personali
up with
ful- and So forth. I have
ties that would be
the instructions
or the
nothing specific as to the nature of channels through which
came
Q It was your sense at the time that
Project that if it had not been
you were working
a
the attention of or
initiated by at least had
concern of , the highest level?
5
* Roth S
be
chronology also indicates
that Philpott had
asked queried on two or three occasions that Broe_
and that Philpott instructed
that
regarding
a report Wimert
cate with Cushman if the reed
he (Philpott) would communi
6
fied that Philpott arose. (Roth P~ 11) Roth also testi-
be by
Cif chaldefs advksed, hin that communications
with Wimert would
6
P. 41)
ECD cn)
coming
key
help-
chey
on
from
only
==================================================
Page 118
==================================================
-24-
Colonel Roth_ That was my impression at che time
Q You understand Erom your work in the DeEense
that the highest level of government usually
Departmenc
President of the United States?
indicated the
Colonel Roth. I would assume that _
The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify
Generals Bennett and Philpott
as either the sender or recipient
these documents is a message relacing to Track II which bears Philpoct' $
purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General
Philpott admitted
that che ture appears be his but doubted that
i was and he could not recall signing or having
seen it. (Fhilpott,
P CIA also produced messages of October
14 (Headquarters 762)
and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying
ins tructions from General
Bennett to che Attache_ General Bennett testified he did not
authorize these messages:
It is. beyond the responsibilities which I had in assistance area. Ic goes beyond the
the military
had in terms that I would have
responsibility which
I
approval of the
to get the authority
or the
action of
Secretary through the Chairman for covert this magnitude This message would
not have been signed by me (Bennett testimony,
Pa 21)
2
According
to Karamessines the White House had the authority to
issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines
testi-
mony , P. 84 )
The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear-
on che issue of WWimertk s Track II instructions or responses . A
DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0 . Graham, the
present Direccor of Produced no copies of communication
5
documents
for the September-October 1970 period . (Graham,
P. 6) However, Roth
6
testified that detailed
memoranda for the record which he prepared on
his activities
are missing ; Erom the files . (Roch II, P.
Among
signa to
it,
Arny
only
ing
DIA,
'Vol:
==================================================
Page 119
==================================================
72J-
CIA officials maintain that
acted fai in transmi
messages to Generals Bennett and/or
Philpott
and in never
a message without proper authorization_
Mr Karamessines
was forceful in this
particularly
regard:
I can recall no Intelligence tance in my experience at the
individual
Agency in which a message was
Central
an officer of the
received for an
ever department, which
was
government anywhere in what-
and and
not Eaithfully,
dudyfauthorndedccerteeent delivered
to that
promptly
representative _ or Lo" his
(Karamessines testimony ,
P. 79)
We may played tricks
water S and We
overseas but it stopped at the
among our
didn t play tricks colleagues
within the
ourselves
or
or in other agencies (Karamessines
tes
P. 79)
We could not remain in
the practice of the
business for
a if this had been
all before
we would
It would have been
no tine at
6
of the kind of
been found out,
a Single instance
€
place would have
you are Suggesting might have taken
put uS out of business_
(Karamessines
tes P. 80)
Dr _ denied he was ever informed of che Attache S role or that he authorized
messages to be sent to the (Kissinger cestinony ,
P. 22)
Attache _
The investigation
'to has not resolved the conflict
statements of che
between the
senior CIA, DIA and White House
four
officials, There
are possibilities that could
explain the conflict _
Generals Bennett and Philpott
were cognizant of Track II and communicated their
general instructions
to che Attache_ This possibility
would be contrary to their sworn
tes General Bennett was
not aware of Track II but General Philpott was
and communicated
general instractions
to n the Attache _ This 084 possibility is supported by Roth 5 test
would be contrary to Philpott
5 sworn tes and his
to General Bennett inforned_
Third thc CIA acted on its
after own and receiving initial aythority frou General
co-opted and ordured
7404 #E
chey thfully
tting
sending
ins
fully directly,
officer,
have
edge =
among
Agency
timony ,
day .
Agency .
have
thing
cimony ,
Kissinger
Army
any
IArmy
dace
First,
Army
timony . Second,
Army
imony but
timony duty
keep
Philpott,
==================================================
Page 120
==================================================
~26-
the IAttache without further informing any member of che Department
of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to
the sworn tes timony ofl David Phillips William Broe, Thomas Karamessines ,
and William Colby. Fourth menbers of the White House staff authorized
the CIA to convey orders to the ErmyL Attache on the basis of high or
highest government authority. Further , that the White House staff
directed chat the Attache S superiors in the Pentagon not be in-
formed _ This possibility would contradict che sworn testimony oE Dr
Kissinger and General Alexander
D , The [False_Flag_Base
In order co minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident
Chilean officers, the task force decided in late Sepcember to set up a
""False Base , i,e. to send four staff officers to Chile posing as
nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert S contacts
wich Chilean milicary officers_ Given the limitations of the Station' 5
resources and (Colonel Wimert 8 }visibility, Headquarters Eelt the use of
"False Officers was necessary because don t want to miss a
0 chance_ One of these officers posed as a Brazilmanintelligence officer
90 18 So chat any would be a BrazfTfambone _ (Headquarters 363 ,
Sepcember 27 , 1970)
use of "False Officers" is not , according to David Phillips ,`
66 unusual practice, either by the CIA or Eqreign. intelligence
services. (Phillips testimony ,
PP . 47-48)
F
7
H 4T7 Tawe
IArmy
Army
Haig.
Flag
Flag "We
flap
#The Flag
"an
==================================================
Page 121
==================================================
~27-
The False Flaggers were compartmented Erom each 0 ther and reported
separately on their contacts to a cover" CIA officer in Santiago
who in turn reported to the Station. According co the testimony of the
Chief of Station, received their instructions from Washington and
not from hin. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix) August 1, 1975 , Pa 27)
E Chief of_Station
Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of
Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief oE Station were knowledgeable and
che Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers .
The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:
I had left n0 doubt in the minds #f my colleagues
and superiors that I did not consider any kind of
intervention in chose constitucional processes
desirable And one of che reasons cer tainly for My
last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot
act__which was done in a very pleasant but very
intelligible manner. Specifically , I was told at
that time that the Agency was not too interested in
continuously being told by me that certain Proposals
which had been made could not be executed or would
be counterproductive. (Chfef oE Station (Felix)
:es timony , August 1 , 1975 , P. 10)
The Chief of Stacion S objection co Track II did noc go unnoticed.
The following instruccion to the COS was sent on October 7 : "Report
should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on
6 action taken. (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Simply ; Headquarters
wanted che Stacion Eo take orders quietly as was the Agency itself .
7
TOD
"deep
they
Very
==================================================
Page 122
==================================================
~29-
IV_ CIA Efforts to Pronote a
A The_Chilean Conspirators
Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several
individuals _ One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General
* who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. Following the
"Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Viaux retained che
support of many non-commissioned and junior ofEicers as well 25 being
the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups . (CIA
Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," 01 July
15, 1975)
Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo
Valenzuela, Comander of che Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was
06.65
in league with several other (active officers including (Adhuiisal
06 0 Hizaddo Navy Commandez @ @hleg) Icenesel Wcante tuenGa , @imector
OL m
Cenezl @f @e Garabinazo (QOLtc@) Cosps Eeneal Canaile8, Obzectoz @8
0 06
@he [llicany Acadam and Ceazl Jenqin Gancie
3to1d
Jn @Qndo
Air Bozca (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities , November 18 _
1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of @@xnaied
**
were in contact with Viaux as well_
#This revole was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-
tizing the military 3 denand for higher Pay , was widely interpreced as
an abortive coup.
##The record of mee tings between Viaux and the active duty militaryofficers
is incomplete. The record does show however that Viaux met with_ (duneualob
ieeanaround October 7 (Chile Task Force Occober 7) On October 12
Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force 16 October)_ One
cable from Santiago indicates that (Adiual Tidaddvuay have been a nember
of Viaux $ inner circle of conspirators O6 (Station 545 , 16 October 1970)_
At the very least , (#auadblwas in contact with Viaux.
Although a digtinction can be made between the' VLaux and Valenzuela groups ,
as CIA witnesses did throughout their est imony before the Comnittee the
principal distinction becween the cwo was that the latter was led by active duty
military officers _ The two groups were in contact with each other The
record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three
Schneider kidnap attempts
%'
~lch
Coup
key
Army ,
duty)
dtgo
but
Log,
Log,
==================================================
Page 123
==================================================
5 Ju-
There was considerable communication among the various plotting
elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:
I might add here that it seemed that a
dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers
were privy to whac was going on in addition to
President Frei Jnd)they were all talking to one
another exchanging views and trying co see how
best to mount the kind of coup that wanted
to see take place. (Karamessines tes cimony, P. 10)
B . Contacts Prior to_October 15
The CIA' s initial cask in Chile was to assess the potential within
the Chilean military to stage a coup _ It recognized quickly that anti-
Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police)
but were immobilized by tradition of military respect for the
90 Constitution and the public and private stance of General Schneider ,
Commander in Chief of the who advocated strict adherence to the
Constitucion. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities , 18 Novem-
ber 1970 , P. 17) The Agency 5 task, then, was :o overcome 90 the apolitical,
constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military. 01 (Ibid , P. 2)
Since the very of the Chilean military, embodied by General
Schneider and his gecond-in-comand, General Prat , were hostile to the
idea of a coup against Allende , discreet approaches were made to the
second level of general officers. were to be informed that the U.S_
* Government would support a coup both before and after it took place _
(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in
earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an General
("Station S prlority contact") an an Air Force GeneFal of the Pro-coup
mllitary officers were told, for example chac should Allende be
F
prevented Erom taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra-
cized, but rather can continue co count on uS for MAP support and main-
tenance of our close relationship . Mf 075517, 7 October 1970)
H
good
they
"the
Army ,
top
They
Army
#The
(Hqs _
==================================================
Page 124
==================================================
-3l-
* U.S Policy _ (Santiago October 5; Santiago 413 , October 6 )
5605
Three later the Chief of Scation cold (Gencol lbenea Idzia
of the Carabineros that "the U.S_ Government favors a military solu-
tion is willing to support ic in any manner short of outright
01 military intervention. (Task Force 9 October) (enoral #ezta
informed the COS that there was no chance oE a coup by the Chilean
Army high command (Task Force 10 October)
On October 7, (Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy
in Santiago who in curn asked hin :o provide light weapons . This was
Colonel Wimert} s first contact with the @o Colnal co whom he
#$
would ultimately Pass three submachine gunsaon October 22 At this
mee the (Lio @lonalhtold Colonel Wimert chat. he and his colleagues
were
trying co exert force on Frei co eliminate
Schneider to either replace him, send
hin out of the country had even stud-
ied plans to kidnap him, Schneider is the
main barrier co all plans for the military
to take over the government to prevent an
Allende presidency. (Santiago 483 , 8 October)
* According- to the CIA 8 wrap-up report on Track II between October 5
and October 20 the CIA Station and che(Army Atcache--for the most Part
the latter-~made 21 contacts vith key military and Carabinero officials.
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities 8 Novenber 1970)
**
In his testimony, (Colonel Wimert indicated that the iG0 @olonel was
affiliated wich General (Cumlasob (Winert Yestimony P. 52 a cable
sent to Headquarters on Ockober 18 , in which the @Eo Coloneljgrequest
for three submachine guns was made , the Station indicated thac Wimert
believed the Army officer and his companion_ a (Caplald) iGere in
league with Aduiral (uad06 (Station
October 18 At another point
in his testimony Wimert)stated "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy
Captain and the Army (Lt_ Colonel and the Air Force General over here_ 11
(Winert testimony , P. 107) The Coumittee has been unable to deternlne 7
the exact affiliation of the Aruy (Lt Coloneleb However
a5 previously
stated both Ceneral (Genalesxind @dinell Blrda)were affiliated with
General Valenzuela and Aduiral radYwas in contact wich General Viaux _
Htf
469 ,
days
and
Log,
Log,
Army
ting,
Gen .
They
Navy
562 ,
==================================================
Page 125
==================================================
-32-
The next Occober 8 , Headquarters cabled che Station in response
~65
o the Wimert- t Colonaiimeeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider S
resistance to coup plans and stated:
This would make it more important than
ever to remove him and to chis new
state of events anything we or Station
can do to effect removal of Schneider? We
this rhetorical question, but wish
inspire thought on boch ends on this matter.
(Hqs _ 628 , 8 October)
During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success
looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force commented :
President Frei and the highest levels of the
armed forces unable to themselves together
co block Allende The Chilean mflitary $ tradi-
tion of non-intervention, Frei s re luctance to
tarnish his historical image , General Schneider 5
firm constitutional stand and most importantly ,
the lack of leadership within che government and
mili are working against
3 military takeover.
(Task Force 8 October)
The following the Station made reference co the "rapid(ly) waning
chances for success." (Santiago 487 9 October) This pessimism was not
dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux
solution by process of elimination. M1 (Santiago 504 10 October) Three
later the Task Force agreed: continue co focus our attention
on General Viaux who now appears to be the military leader willing
00 to block Allende. (Task Force 13 October)
If Viaux was the CIA 3 of staging a coup, things were bleak
indeed His own colleagues , Generals((Hueteland )valenzuela described him
as General without an ariy . 00 (San 495 , 9 October) Yet in the
first cwo weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for
carrying out the CIA' g Track II mandate.
day ;
bring
know
Log
pull
tary
Log,
day
days "We
only
Log,
only hope
0a tiago
==================================================
Page 126
==================================================
-33-
Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve hinself with
Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461 5 October) he
served initially as a contact to Viaux through an
@zin military
At tache The lezggzig}reported
on October 5 that Viaux wanted several
hundred paralyzing grenades to launch a coup on October 9_ (San
476 , 6 October) Headquarters curned down the request, conclud that
P6 3 "mini-coup at this juncture would be coun terproductive Viaux
should postpone his plans "while encouraging him in a suitable manner
to maintain his posture SO that he may join larger movement later if
it materializes. T (Headquarters 585 _ 6 October)
The primary purpose of the ("False Base was to contact Viaux,
and it very rapidly relieved (Wimert and the
(@EeaekyAttache)
of that
cask. Viaux reiterated his denand for an air of weapons to the
"False Flagger} and again the response was che same : reject the demand
for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency
was buying time with Viaux: wish to encourage Viaux to expand and
refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions.
(Headquarters 689 , 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-
quarters authorized passing s20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000
in life insurance to Viaux and his associates , a5 a demonstration of
U.S. support. (Headquarters: 729 13 October)
On October 13, Headquarters indicated its concern over Schneider
by asking: "what is to keep Schneider from making statement in early
hours which will freeze those mllicary leaders who might otherwise join
Viaux?" (Headquarters 729 13 October) The Station S response later chat
same was intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats wichin
F
the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup. 0 (Santiago 527
RM Eage
ciago gas
ing
and
Flag
drop
"He
again
"Viaux day
==================================================
Page 127
==================================================
4
-Ju-
U'43 October)
This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-
I tion as part of a coup rhat included Valenzuela. 4t (Station 13 October)
Ac about this cime che Station began to receive encouragement from its
other contacts. On October 14 , ten before the Chilean Congress was
to vote, the Task Force concluded :
Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing
coup activity from other military quarters_
specificallysban General (name deleted) _
Admiral "izai che forces in Concepciqn and
Valdivis and Perhaps even Frei and(@usal Je6
(Task Force 14 Occober)
C October 15_Decision
To summarize . by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-
tact a desire to proceed with a coup , had indicated he would deal with
the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping had Met at least once with Gen-
eraks (UeGGand WValenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans _ *
On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander
C
at the Whice House to discuss the situation in Chile. According
:o the Agency 5 record of this mee Karamessines "provided a run-
down on Viaux, the @malebVmeeting withfBleaaa and , in sowe detail,
the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint Ti
(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger Karamessines and 15 October
1970) 4 decision was made at the meeting 1t to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,
at least temporarily:" 8 8
# The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of 3 cable
from Santiago to Headquarters :
We discount Viaux 5 statement that he had called off his coup at-
tempt because of (False Officery' s impending visit Other re-
porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this
weekend _ (Santiago 499, 10 October)
There is also reason co believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental
7
in persuad Viaux co postpone. Accord to che Chile Task Force Baa
Station reported chat on 12 October General Va lenzuela met
wich General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-
16 tempt a coup. (Chile Task Force 14 October)
H 23208487 #76
529 ,
days
Log
Arny
Log,
hin,
Haig
cing,
Haig,
Flag
ing ing Log:
Log,
de
==================================================
Page 128
==================================================
-35-
It was decided by those present that the
must a message co Viaux warning
hiheaggensr
any precipitate action _ In essence the message
should state: have reviewed your plans and
based on your information and ours , we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at
this time cannot succeed _ Failing_
may re-
your capabilities in the future_ Preserve
your assets We will stay in touch The time
will come when you with all your other friends
can do some thing _ You will continue to have
11 our support_ (15 October Memorandum of Conver-
sation, Kissinger, Karamessines_
Haig)
The mee concluded, according
to the Agency S record , 8R on Dr _
Kissinger S note that the Agency should continue keeping the Pressure
on every Allende weak spot in sight--now after the 24th of October
after 5 November , and into the future until such time as new marching
orders are given . Mr Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."#
The following CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
House meeting to the Station in Santiago:
2 . It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by 3 coup _ We are to continue to
generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz-
every appropriate resource.
3 . After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out
by him alone with che forces now at his disposal
would Eail_ Thus it would be counterproductive
to our Track Two objectives _ It was decided that
CIA a message to Viaux warning hin against
precipitate action. (Headquarters 802 , 16 Octo-
ber)
The message was supplenented by orders to "continue to encourage him
(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other
coup planners _ (Headquarters 802 , 16 October) The message concluded:
"There is great and continuing interest in the activities o f((U zadoa
4nlag Valenzuela et &l and we wish ther optinun good fortune. 88 (Ibid.)
E
Secretary Kissinger' & recollection of the October 15 meeting is not in accord with that of Mr _ Karamessines or the cable that was sent the following
(Headquarters 802)
to the Station in San This mat- cer will be discussed in Part V of this report.
get
"Ne
they
duce
ting
day
ing
get
day tiago.
==================================================
Page 129
==================================================
~ 36~
D Coup_Planning and Attenpts_After_Qctober 15
48 The decision to "de-fuse General Viaux was passed co Viaux $
07
Bather do-1e pn October 17 Theldrr ld responded that it did not
matter because had decided to proceed with the coup in any case
(Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final mee of the CIA "False
Flagger' and Viaux S atez #n-lo on October 18 , the Agency was in-
forwed that the coup would proceed on October 22 , 8 and that the abduc-
tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come {1
(Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication
with Viaux was maintained _ (Report on CIA Chilean Task .Force Activities ,
18 November 1970 , page 21)
As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter
* for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military concacts
Ag a CIA overview statement in Track II stated :
possibilities afforded by the active
mili
ta5zZgroup
led by General Valenzuela
and Admiral
(unado had always
seemed more
promising than Ehe capabilities of the Viaux
group These military officers had the abil-
ity and resources to act, providing de-
cided co move and organized themselves ac-
cordingly_
(CIA Briefing Paper "Special Mandate from
the President on Chile, 06 July 15 , 1975, P. 5)
By #id-October those military officers appeared to be moving in
this direction.
On the evening of October 17 Colonel Wimer met with the Arwy ((1go
@laelyand the Navy Cepezln requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,
bL
coup plotters Generals (Canalag) and (carin made one last attempt to
Persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup Position On October 15 _
The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a 0 'complete Elasco_
Schneider refused to llsten to General (@Galesxbeloquent presentation of
Communist action in Chile and adament in main taining his non-involvement
## stance (Santiago 16 October)
440
they
ting
Coup
ducy
they
They
#Two
548 ,
==================================================
Page 130
==================================================
-37-
three `4S-calfber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition The
( (oapeedm)said he had three machine guns himself can be identified
by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to
6 use them _ (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert Jand the Chief
of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns
for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were
intended for use, or were used in the kidnapping of General Schneider _
06
The fact that the weapons were Provided thefHEo colaal)and the
@plain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing
suggests that the guns were not involved
The machine guns and ammunition were sert frou Washington by diplo-
matic pouch on the morning of October 19 although Headquarters was
puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them
but find our credulicy stretched by Navy(@aeadd leading his troops
wich sterile guns What 1s special purpose for these guns? We will
try send them whether you can provide explanation ornot. I (Headquarters
18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Arny @
chlong and the Navy @acced late in the evening of October 18 and con-
sisted of che six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux . *
# As previously stated after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in
Chile focussed on che active duty military officers-~Valenzuela; el. al. ~e
rather than Viaux An_example of this shift i focus was che decision to
provide the Army @plondi and che
Aray @Gaptalm)
che tear gas grenades
originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Sant explained the Purpose of
chis action:
Station Plans six tear gas grenades co
(Colonel Wimert) for delivery to Armed Forces
officers (deletion) instead of having (False
Officer) deliver them to Viaux group
Our reasoning is chat Wimerc)dealing with
active duty officers_ Also 'False Flagger
leaving evening 18 October and will not be
replaced but(Wimert) will stay here_ Hence
important that(Wimert} credibility with Armed
Forces offficers be strengthened _
(Santiago 562 , 18 Occober)
Navy
"but
Navy
854 ,
iag0
give
Flag
==================================================
Page 131
==================================================
a 38-
That sane General Valenzuela informed 'Colonel Wimer that he
General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General
were prepared
co sponsor a coup . (CIA Report on Chilean Task Activi ties, 18
November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the of General
Schneider on the following evening, October
19 , at a military
dinner be given for Schneider after which Schneider would be flown
to Argentina, Frei would and leave Chile Admiral Tirado Iwould
head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the
kidnapping of Schneider , the cable reports:
General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation
but not directly involved Ke has been sent to
Vina to stay with prominent physfcian. Will be
seen in public places during 19 and 20 October
to demonstrate fact that above operation not his
Will be allowed to return to Santiago at
end of week Military will not admit involve-
ment in Schneider S abduction which is to be
blaned on leftists_ (Santiago 566 , 19 October)
The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider
left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official and his police guard
failed to be withdrawn, but che luboCaloui)fassured Colonel Wimert hat an-
other attempt would be made on October 20 . (San 582 , 20 October)
Colonel Winer was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which
was the Price
agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors . If
The("False Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the cime
the Valenzuela plan was given tq Colonel Wimert)apparently understood
that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt . He stated:
Q. you told any of the details of how
the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried ouc?
Mr . Sarno _ indicated it was going to be
2
at some sort of 3 banquet which the General
(Schneider) would be attending-
(Sarno tes timony , P. 37)
day ,
Force
kidnapp- ing
ing
resign
doing -
car,
Army
tiago
Flag
Were
They
Vgu
==================================================
Page 132
==================================================
-39-
bucf Winert insisted thac the kidnapping be completed before he paid the
money. (Task Force 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela
assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move . (Task
Force 20 October) The second abduction attempt On the 20ch also
failed and the Task Force concluded
Since Valenzuela 's group is apparently having
considerable difficulty executing
even the first
step of its coup plan , the Prospects Eor a coup
succeeding or even occurring before 24 October
now appears remote. (Task Force 22 October)
E_ The Killing of General Schneider
In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am) Colonel Wimert
delivered the three submachine guns with amunition co the Arny (Ue
Colonel )in an isolated section of Santiago.*
% Although (Colonel Wimerd 5 testimony and the cable . traffic do_not
clearly establish the identity of the group to which thelleo Calona}}
was affiliated (see page 31 tWQ CLA statements on Track Ii tie the
weapons_ and therefore the (ea @oloney
co the Valenzuela group:
The only assistance requested by Valenzuela
to set the plan Lof October 197 into motion
through Schneider S abuction was several sub-
machine guns
}
ammunition, 3 Eew tear gas grenades
and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus
s50,000 for expenses (which was co be passed upon
denand .
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities ,
18 November 1970 , P. 22)
Three sub-machine guns together with six gas
cannisters and masks were passed to the Valen -
zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason
still wanted the weapons was because
there were two remaining before the Congress
decided the Presidential election and' the Valen-
zuela group maintained some could still
carry out their plans _
(CIA Briefing Paper "Special Mandate from the
I1 Presidenc on Chile, P. 7 , 15, 1975)
7eedd2
Log,
Log,
Log,
why they
days
hope they
July
==================================================
Page 133
==================================================
~LU-
At about 7 am chac the group that incended to kidnap General
C Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions _ According to the
findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider
killing, neither the (Leo Colonatynor the @eptar were there.
Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider $ car was intercepted , on his
way to work, by che abductorsand he was mor tally wounded when he drew
his handgun in self-defense. The Military Ccurt deternined that hand
gurs had been used to kill General Schneider , although it also found
that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.
The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said
"Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on
way to work" (San 587 22 Occober) and 01 Assailants used grease
11 guns _ (Santiago 589 22 October) The submachine guns had previously
0 f been described as 'grease guns _ Thus the initial reaction of the Station
was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered
several hours earller to the Aruy Wo Colouel Santiago then informed
Headquarters "Station has instructed Col Winer to hand over s50,000
if Gen_ Valenzuela requests 10 (Santiago 592 , 22 October) thus indica
chat che Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen -
zuela' s paid abductors . Later chat the Stacion cabled Headquarters :
The Military Court deteruined that those who participated in che
shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led
conspiracy_ The Court also found that this sane group had Participated
in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.
In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicicy in the plot
7
culmina in the death of General Schneider _ He received 3 20-year
T Prison sentence for being author of the crime of kidnapping which re- #
sulced In serious Injury co the victim 11 and a five-year exile for con-
spiring to cause a military cqup Also convicted on the latter charge
were) Generals Valenzuela (and (Hiida recefved sentences of three
years in exile.
0955 DocIdi 32202482 Page 133
744k#
day
Arwy Navy
tiago
ting
day,
ting
They
Qn
==================================================
Page 134
==================================================
-4l-
Station unaware if assassination was Pre-
meditated or whether it constituted bungled
abduction attempt . In any case , ic important
to bear in mind that move against Schneider
was conceived by and executed at behest of
senior Armed Forces officers_ We know that
General Valenzuela was involved We also
near certain that Admiral (4uzado Army
Calonazh and Navy (C ptadzb Ttting and involved .
We have reason for believe that General
Viaux and numerous associates clued
cannot prove or disprove that execution
or attempt agalnst Schneider was entrusted to
elements linked wich Viaux Important factor
to bear in mind is that Armed Forces and noc
retired officers or extreme rightests_ set
Schneider uP for execution or abduction
All we can say is that attempt against Schneider
is affording Arued Forces one last opportunity
to prevent Allende" S election if are willing
to follow' Valenzuela S scenario
(Santiago 598, 22 October)
P Post October 22 Events
The shoocing of General Schneider resulted imediately in 3 declara -
tion of martial law che appointment of General Prats co succeed Schneider
as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief
of Santiago Province. These measures , and others taken _ caused the Chile
Task Force co make the following initial judgment :
With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional
runoff , a coup climate exists in Chile The attack
on General Schneider has Produced developnents vhich
closely follow Valenzuela S Plan Consequently the
plotters posicions have been enhanced
(Chile Task Force 22 October)
On October 23, Director Helas reviewed and discussed Track II:
It Was agreed _ that a maximum effort has been achieved
and that now the Chileans thenselves can manage 3
successful coup_ The Chileans have been guided to a point where a military solution is at least open to
them. (Task Force 24' October)
@Gea5
ing
fully in ,
buc
they
Log,
only
Log,
Z
==================================================
Page 135
==================================================
4 September
Eem
CrCrft
September_ 18
Helms and Karamessines met wich Kissinger at the Whlte House _ As
Helms notes of the tenber 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger
wanted a
Plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 8th, according to CIA
records , there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the
conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in
the Chilean situation. FF (Memorandum/Mee with DDP 18 Sepcember)
The efficacy of economic pressure continued co be a subject of con-
cern during the last of September_ Apparently that pressure was
viewed as another, inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit. It
September 21
The 40 Committee met. The Select Comittee has
no confirmation
chat Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines calendar
confires thac he attended; presumably Kissinger the 40 Committee chair-
also attended , although che Committee has not been able co review
his calendar All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings
of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger &lso chaired--is that the
meetings afforded Karanessines and Kissinger
an opportunicy co meet
privately and discuss Track II if desired _ In all these instances
save the 40 Committee mee on September 22 the Comfttee has no
evidence co confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines
mee
accually took place. That the CIA prepared 3 memorandum of conversa-
tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none
for other meetings may provide
some support the argument that no
other such private meetings occurred _
September 22
F
Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind_ a
40 "Comitee& Kke
meeting called to discuss Track I The two tiecussed 'Track' II actions
especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei According to
Sep:
ting
days
man,
chey
ting
ting
for
Xtt
Qep
==================================================
Page 136
==================================================
TOA Sech+ J
told Karamessines
that 11 our
hand of the prob lem the ear lier had perfect
and he added we Vere fine and it 19 UP_ (Memorandum for
the Record/Chile _ 22 September 1970, by Thomas
Karamessines)
BOstober
October 5
A cable sent to Santiago , released by Karamessines_ requested a
report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals
Prats_ Valenzuela (and [asto
~named in 3 cable of September 30_
(Headquarters 449)
The October 5 cable indicated that the report was
needed for a discussion with Kissinger
on October 6 (Santiago 556 ,
5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such + meeting had taken place,
although he had no specific memory oE it.
(Karanessines testimony ,
PP . 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40
Comittee mee On Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger
chaired the 40 Comittee _
October 6
The Station reported that General Viaux was
Ii ready to launch golpe
evening 9 October , or morning 10 October _ #p (Santiago 6 October_
1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective one
"with scant chance of success which Wwill vitiate any further more seri-
ous action. 1 The Station was directed co to ill-considered
action at this time_ M (Headquarters 585 ,
6 October 1970)
Kissinger testified
he had noc been informed of che Viaux Plan,
suppor- his recollection with the fact that the CIA temorandum of
an October 10 conversation between Karanessines
and
0
(see below)
makes no mention of any prevloug' plots . (Kigsinger testimony ,
F
P. 24)
eAu
Kissinger
ling during meeting been
doing
keep
ting
472 ,
coup
"stop tty
cing
Haig
==================================================
Page 137
==================================================
47a
Te? %
It seems to me , although the records don t flect that there was 8 meeting in
re-
a very brief in which I
September ,
must have been
told that there was a specific
underway _ That probably would
pverbeerobns
been by
(Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines
there_ I am not sure (Haig testimony , 12)
October 10
Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by
telephone with General
He indicated that the Station had "made direct
contact with a number
of the senior military officers ,
especially those who had been reportedly
very activist-minded and had received Pessimistic reactions 2ll I( 02
(Memorandum IUBELT ,
by William 10 October 1970)
Haig recalled the.telephone conversation with
Karamessines the 1Oth .
His recollection
accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.
I do know and I know that from
record this
looking
at the morning, that Karamessines made a telephone cali to me in which he gave a report. I recall that_ Ic was
igaeffecProgregs
tive progress a nega -
report, that were just not con ~ up with it. (Haig testimony ,
P. 12)
TOP SEORET
6
2
321
ic,
one,
Henry
P;
Haig.
from
Broe ,
on
they
ing
==================================================
Page 138
==================================================
~48 -
indicated co the Committee that he would have passed
the
substance of that conversation
to and that in general his
role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:
I am quice confident
tion of
that, given
my own
my role at that time, that I would conveyed that information
to
have
(Haig testimony,
P . 13)
***
Q. If Mr . Karamessines
was unable Kissinger,
and
to see Dr _
talked to you, what of latitude did you have concerning what
Pass on to Dr Kissinger? you would
General At chat time I would consider I had no degree of lati other than
to him what had been
to convey
given co me (Ibid_ P 15)
October 14
4 cable co Santiago for (Colonel Wimert ostensibly from General
Bennett, authorized(Wimert= to select two Chilean general officers and
co them the following message:
"High authority
in Washington
has authorized
you co offer material support short of armed interven-
tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors may undertake co
prevent the election of Allende
on Occober 24 " (Headquarters
to
Station cable 762 ,
October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified
that in
this case "high authority"
would have Kissinger
or the President,
for no one else could have given Wimert such broad authorization.
Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted
or at
least cleared with, the White House_ (Karamessines
ces P. 91)
However, Kissinger did
not recall authorized the October I4th
cab le. He Found the sequence of: events puzzling: having been told on
the 10ch that little was happening, he would have expected
In the
7
Haig
along
Kissinger _
concep-
Henry,
degree
Haig.
tude,
convey
they
been
in,
cimony ,
having
==================================================
Page 139
==================================================
49a
October 15
Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-
cuss Track II_ According to the CIA memorandun of conversation Karamessines
gave a run-down on Viaux, @unley and Wulfand
the general situation in
Chile from che coup-possibility Viewpoint .
89 It was concluded that Viaux
did not more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less_-to launch 3
successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions
from an unsuccessful The CIA record of the mee continues:
5 _ It was decided by those Present that the
Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him
against any precipitate action. In essence our
message was co state: have reviewed your Plans and based on your information and ours ,
we come to the conclusion that your plans for a
coup at this time cannot succeed _ Failing =
may reduce your capabilities for the future.
Preserve your assets. We will in touch
The cime will cone when wich all your other
friends can do some thing. You will continue to have our support. 4a
6 After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup
plot at least temporarily , Dr Kissinger instruc-
ced Mr . Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in
2
Chile, wo clandestinely and securely to main-
tain the capabilicy for Agency operations against
Allende in the future.
8 _ The mee concluded on Dr .
h
Kissinger S note
that the Agency should continue keeping the Pres -
sure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now
after the 24th of October after 5 November and
into the future until such time as new marching
orders are given Mr Karamessines stated that
the Agency would comply _
(Memorandun of Conversation/Dr _ Kissinger, Mr
Karamessines , Gen. at the White 15 October 1970)
ZAN|
TOp SECERET
have
coup. ting
"We
they
stay
you
rking
ting
Haig
House ,
==================================================
Page 140
==================================================
49 }
mee on the LSth_-(see below)
co have discussed the results of the
October llth message.
the CIA record makes no nention of any
such 'discussion. (Kissinger
tes P. 53)
October 14
The Senior Review
met discuss Chile. (Karamessines calendar)
Qctober 15
Karamessines met with Kissinger and at che White House to dis-
cuss Track II_ According
to the CIA memorandum of conversation Karamessines
gave a run-down on Viaux , (@nulas
and MJ (Einadaland the general situation in
Chile from the coup-possibility
01 viewpoint. It was concluded that Viaux
did not more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch
a
successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions
from an unsuccessful The CIA record of the mee continues:
5 _ It was decided by those Present that the Agency must get a message co Viaux waring him
against any precipitate ection. In essence our message was to state: have reviewed
plans and based on your information
your
and
we come co the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed
may reduce your capabilities for
SaiLhebz_
Preserve your assets. We will in
future.
The time will come when with
touch_
Eriends you all your other
can do some You will continue have our 80 to support.
6 _ After the decision Eo de-fuse the Viaux
plot
2 at least temporarily ,
Dr
coup
ted Mr. Karamessines Lo
Kissinger instruc-
Chile, working preserve Agency assets in
tain che
clandestinely
and securely to main-
capab- Eor Agency operations
against Allende in the future.
8 _ The mee concluded on Dr
that che
Kissinger S note Agency should continue keeping
the pres - sure on every Allende weak spot in after the 24th of October, after 5
sight--now
into the future until Such
November and
orders are
time as new marching
7
given . Mr Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply .
(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr _
Kissinger,
Mr _ Karamess-
at the White House 15 October 1970)
H 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 140
ting
But
timony ,
Group to
Haig
have
coup.
ting
"We
ours ,
chey
stay
thing-
ility
ting
ines , Gen . Haig
==================================================
Page 141
==================================================
B 50-
Klssinger; In his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA
menorandum of conversation as substantially
correct although somewhat (
more detailed than he would have remembered (Kissinger test imony , P. 52)
He believed the Agency had been cold to 'stand down and preserve
your
19 assets
Kissinger believed chat the gist of the October 1Sth meeting
as
recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA
issued to its Station the next an order ostensibly based on the
October 1Sth mee And , he no ted , in writing ics
memorandum of the
mee of the 1Sth, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve che maxi-
mum degree of authority. 11 (Ibid_ PP. 55-56) The October 16th order
indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous
and stated:
2 ,_ It is Eirm and continuing policy that Allende
be over 'thrown by a coup. It would be much prefer-
able to have this transpire prior to 24 October
but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously
beyond this date.
4 There is 'and "continuing interest In the
activities of @Iuuddl @uoles} } Valenzuela
et al
and we wish then optimum good Eortune
(Headquarters 802 , 16 October 1970)
Kissinger recalled the October 1Sth conversation as 'turning off
the coup plans rather than giving 4 new order to do them. 08 (Kissinger
testinony , Pa 56) Halg agreed in his testimony _
The conclusions of that {ee were that we had
better not do anything rather than some thing that
was not going to succeed. My ` general feeling
was , I left that meeting with the impression that
there was nothing authorized_
(Halg testimony , Pa 13)
2l@
Loage rurther warned that 0 the US must not appear publicly in
the matter , thus giving the kiss of death to its Eriends"
(Cable Lodse to !arriman , 8/ 26 /63)
NM-60055 DocId:32202487 Fage 141
day ,
ting:
cing
day,
greaty2
ting
F
==================================================
Page 142
==================================================
-5 -
In 3 cable on August 25 CIA IChief of Station John Richardson
reported the result of a conference among hinself
True
3 heart _ Ceneral Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance
Command
Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff MACV)
accepted Deptel 243 0 as 2 basic decision from Washington
and
would Proceed to do their best to carry out instructions" (I.G_
48 C, PP 7 -8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his
brother from his position
in the government .
Early in the morning of August 26 1963 the Voice of America
in Souch Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids:
and absolved the army _ The broadcast also reported speculation
that the United States contemplated suspending aid
to the Souch
Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers _
P. * Later on that
same Lodge presented his credentials to Diem _ CIA officers
Conein and [Spera
were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh
respectively , and to convey to then the substance of Deptel 243 ,
but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial
action of assuing
power of state Entirely their Own accion ,
win or lose" (BAIG 0304 8/26/63)
message from the White House on August 29 authorized
Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the Uniced
States would support a coup if it had 4 good chance of succeeding ,
but did not involve United States armed forces _
was autho-
rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272 ,
8/29/63 . ) A cable fron the President Eo on the same stated:
TIn a cable to Harriman conipTained that the VOA broadcast
0 had complicated our already difficult problem "9 by eliminating
0 the possibility of the generals effort achieving. surprise
10 Loage Eurther warned that the US must not appear publicly in
the matter thus siving the kiss of death to its Eriends { (Cable Lodce to Earriman 8/26/63)
H# 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 142
Lodge
They
212)
day
Lodge
Lodge day
Lodge
==================================================
Page 143
==================================================
-8 -
against 4 coup , but suggested that alternative leadership
should be
identified and cultivated _ The recommendations
were promptly
approved the President _ (Pentagon Papers PP . 215-116)
On October 3 Conein contacted Minh _ Minh explained that a
coup was be planned ana requested assurances of American
support if it were successful_ Minh outlined three courses of
action onc of which was the assassination of Dien' $ brothers_
Nhu and Can (Conein , P. 25 ; cable Saigon to Director , 10/5/63)
The |Actiny Chief of the CIA Station (@avia
03
Ro Sulieh cabled on
October 5 that he had recommended to that V Fe do not set
ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot , since the
other two alternatives nean either J blood bath in or a
protractea struggle 1 (Cable Saigon to Director, 10/5/63)
A cable from the Director , CIA to responded that:
0 certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,
approving or supporting as3as8ination,
but on the other hand we are in no way responsible for stopping
such threat of which we might receive even
every
@e certainly would not favor
partial knor -
We believe engaging ourselves
assassination of Dien.
matter
by taking position
on this
opens door too easily for probes of our position
re othera , re support of regime et cetera_ believe best approach is hands off
ccnever, Coesagterali
interested in intelligence
on an; such plan
#Ne naturaliy
The other courses of action were the encirclement of various_military units and direct confrontation between units involved in the coup and loyalist units
military
% who was then Chief Far Eastern Division drafted this cable for McCone testified:
"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Personaliy opposed any involvement by the CIA in an
Disestor
4 sination?`
"Colby: I certainly
was (Colby , P 57)
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ing
Lodge
Saigon
Saigon
i (w)
ledge
Saigon by
Colby ,
Colby
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9
McCone testified that he met Privately with the President
and
the Attorney General _
the position that role was
to assemble all information
on
intelligence
as co what was
going on and co report it to the appropriate authorities but
to not attempt to direct ic" (McCone _
P_ 62) He believed the
United States should maintain
3 "hands off 10 attitude (McCone ,
P 62) McCone testified:
"I felt that the President
pite the fact that he had
agreed with my position des -
Diem and his conduct_ I
Ereathreservations concerning
the pressure
urged him to co all we could on Diem co change his
encourage more support throughout the
ways to
words co the President _
and I
country _ My precise
was that Mr President if I
remember them very clear
team I had one Pitcher
was manager of 3 baseball
he was a
I'd him in the box whether
if Diem
good pitcher
or not By that I was saying that ,
was removed we would have not one buc would have a succession of coup we
in Vietnam and it
coups and political disorder
it did M
might last several years and indeed (McCone PP_ 62-63 _ )
McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with
the President , but rather "whether
we should let the coup go
or use our influences
not to" He left the meeting believing
that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation
(McCone PP . 62-63)_ McCone cabled sich
on October 6 :
"McCone directs that You withdraw recornendation
to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under HcCone instructions as we cannot be in position doning such course of action and thereby
actively
con -
responsibility therefore 0 (CIA to
engaging our
DIR 73661 10/6/63)
In response , the CIA Station in cabled headquarters :
"Action taken as directed_ In addition since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation
was made specific Withdrawal of recommendation
Instruction
was also at McCone s conveyed to Trueheart_ Ambassador Loclcje cOgulented that he shares McCone' s opinion 6J6 to CIa SAIC 1463 10/7/63)
(Saigon
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"our
try bring
ly ,
keep
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Saigon
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None of the informed sources any indication of direct or
indirect involvement of the United Scates X
It must be noted that on October 30 1963 _ Ambassador
nocified Washingcon that chere might be a request by ked leaders
for evacuation and_ suggested Saipan as a
point for evacuation
(Saigon Station Cable No 2036, 10/30/63) Conein was charged
With obraining the lane Between 6 :00 and 7 :00 on the
morning of Novenber 2 Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an
aircraft_ Conein relayed che request co [@David Snick;z Acting
Chief of Station at the Embassy who replied that ic would not
be possible to an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours
since it would have to be flown from Guam Conein testified
that Smith told him that Diem could be flown to a country
that offered hin asylum and that the Plane could not land in
any other country_ There were no aircraft imediately avail-
able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country
of um (Conein P. 54)
9uu|
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airp_
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United Scates "as [a] matter of general Policy cannot condone
a8sassination" although he did state that if the coup succeeded;
the Uniced States would support the plotters _
d Lumumba
The chain of events revealed by the documents and
testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference
that che assassination was authorized by the President _
It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot _
The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "dispos of"
Lumumba and taking 01
'straightforward action" against him at NSC
and Special Group meetings with Dulles cable to the Congo ,
Bissell' s representation to Jcottlieb about "highest authority"
and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support
an inference that the President and the Special Group urged
the assassination of Lumumba _
Robert Johnson 5 testimony chat he understood the President
to have ordered Lunumba S assassination at an NSC meeting does
as he said_ offer a
"clue" abouc Presidential authorization
which however , should be read in light of the uncertain record
of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary tes timony of
others in attendance at the meetings including the President' s
national security advisors The fact that both the Chief of
( m
Stacion and ) Gottlieb were under che impress ion that there was
Fresidential authorization for the a8sa6sination of Lumumba
is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because
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#m
this impression was derived solely Erom] Gottlieb:' s meetings
with Bissell and Tweedy . Neither (Gottlieb nor the Chief of
Station had Eirst-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles statements
about Presidential authorization Richard Bissell as sumed
that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles
but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when
this occurred.
The evidence leads uS to conclude tnat DDP Bissell and
DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinace
Lumumba _ However we are unable to make a
finding that
President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination
effort against Lunumba becatse of the lack of absolute certainty
in the evidence
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First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots_ a
matter which is not certain Second _ it assumes that Dulles
went Privately to the two Presidents--a course oE action
which He lms who had Far more covert action experience than
Bissell testified was precisely what the doctrine of
plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing_ Third ,
it necessarily
assues that the Presidents would understand
I B from a "circumlocutious description that assassination was
being discussed_
The chain of assumptions 1s far too speculative for the
Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not
able to speak for themselves Moreover _ it is inconsistent
with Bissell' s other testimony chat "formal and explicit"
approval would be required for assassination * and contrary
to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors the men
closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy _
* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower S order
co assassinate Lumumba is correct it should be weighed against
Bissell' s tescimony concerning circuulocutious briefings of the
Presidents in the Castro case First the Lumumba case would
imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such
matters blun and not circumlocutiously Second , the Lumumba
example indicates that the President would discuss such matters
openly in an appropriace forum and would not need to be
approached privately Third , it can be inferred from Bissell' $
testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had
told Dulles that he approved of the lot Dulles would not have
told anyone else of that fact _ Yet
EcEiieb"]
testimony in che
Lumumba case states chat he had been told '8f Presidential autho-
rization for assassination by Bissell , who in turn assuned he
was told by Dulles
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