Transcript of 157-10005-10236.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 157-10005-10236] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 Date:10/04/93 Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY SSCIA RECORD NUMBER 157-10005-10236 RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER R445 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR SSCIA FROM To TITLE REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/ TRANSCRIPT DATE 07 /08/75 PAGES 257 SUBJECTS TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS EXHIBITS ATTACHED In THE FORM OF MEMOS/ NEWS ARTICLES DOCUMENT TYPE TRANSCRIPT/EXHIBITS CLASSIFICATION T RESTRICTIONS REFERRED CURRENT STATUS P DATE OF LAST REVIEW 10/04/93 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS BOX 251-5 [R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED HI 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 1 ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== TOP SECRET 1 110 1 Mr Schwarz _ These are minutes of the 8 Special Group which 1 2 you attended _ 0 and it states: Harvey gave 3 rundown on 1 5 progress to date with agent teans and in the general field of 4 intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and- 5 th@ Wadria glendagelezitegnogalteiom @enegr He outlined various difficulties encountered and said that three agent teams had been infiltrated . 01 Now did Mr _ Harvey , at that meeting, state anything E do you recollect Mr Harvey making that report? 10 General Lansdale. In general terms , Yes . 11 Mr Schwarz . Did he state anything relating to the 1 12 passage of pills to persons to accomplish the 0 assassination of. 1 13 Fidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting? 14 General Lansdale. No . As a matter of fact, we were Very 15 proud that he had gotten these teams in, that had been 16 infiltrated, and So forth , and collecting intel rigence. 17 Mr _ Schwarz . Were the first teams? 18 General Lansdale. Yes, 1 19 Mr Schwarz . Did he say anything at that meeting that i 20 You recall about the subject of assassinations? L 21 General Lansdale. Nothing. 4 22 Mr Schwarz. Would you give the witness the 7th '62 1 23 memorandum of General Taylor 0 Subject , Report of Progress to 8 24 Higher Authority? 25 Now Senators , that is supposedly slipped in your notebooks H# 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 2 TOP SECRET Mr they they May 1 ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== SENSITIVE FIL TOP SECRET Ns B Program Review by SENSITIVE Gen. E. G. Lansdale Chief of Operations 18 January 1962 OBJEction To THE CUBA PROJECT CIA HAS N DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR B RELEASE OE THiS DOCUMENT I_ OBJECTIVE N: AS SANITIZED The U.Sa objective is to help the Cubans overthraw the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the YUnited States can live in peace_ II . CONCEPT OF QPERATION Qk Basically, the operation i9 to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people. The rcvolt will overthrow the Communist rcgime and institute (4 a new government with which the United States can Jive in peace. The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement cstablished within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction wards thc objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The political actions will be as6isted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist re gime to supply Cuba'$ economic needs Psychological operations to turn the peoples' resentmcnt increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives. The failure of the U. S. -sponsored operation in April 1961 S0 shook the faith of Cuban patriota in U.S_ competence and intentions in support - a revolt against Castro that a new effort to rate 2 revolt againgt the regime in Cuba must have active support {rom Latin American countrie8. Further, the forei S $ Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny impoged on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Herisphere to the of their anger and open actione [0 defend the Western Hemisphere 2 gainst guch foreign invasion. Such an anger will be generated, in pa rt, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba t0 other Latin Americans cspecially. The Preparation pha &e must result in 8 political action organization in being in key localitiee inaide Cuba, with its own mcans for internal communicatione, its own voice for Psychological operations, and it9 Own action arm (small guerrilla band8_ sabotage squads etc:). It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people: and make (hie {act known to the outside world. i8 reported that the majority ol Cuban& are not {or the present regime but are growing apathetic toward9 what aPpear 8 to be a hopelcgs future or the {utility of their 8tatu?. ) The climactic morent of revolt will come [rom an angry reaction 0( the people to 3 government action (sparkcd by an incident), or {rom {racturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major of the Project must be to bring thig about. ) The popular movemer" : 1 ZB203 DEPARTMENT OF Justice R 22 MAY 15 1962 2 Excluded from automatic This dodur] entfeenta a '#aNly 'J regrading: DOD Dir . Nd da 5200.10 doe? not aPply_= JY dh4 SENSITIVE TOP SECRET H 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 0) C K Brig- FILE Tch to- gene ing key gne deep point (It goal Copy Qa put ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== TOP SECRET SENSITIVE H. TV intrusion: Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts has been reactivated on a small vessel under CLA control CIA to attempt intrusion on ZZ January during Castro's forthcoming gpeech pa rade demonstrationg. IS_ Special sabotage_suppert Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship- ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA hag initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is int roducingc" ubzol "Ja corrosive additive to Guban locomotive diesel fuel oil tkrough commercial supplierstin BelgiuyE IEWW bera5 [nohths bef059 4he Ert lacomotiives bEeas dowc CIA expects to be able to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February attempt introduc - tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba . J Military actiong Status: Defense ha8 been tasked with prepa a contingency for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help when their revolt starts making headway. Thig contingency plan will permit obtaining & policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in 2 8 revolt, even more than a9 3 possible milil action. Defense al8o has been tasked with fully 268i8- State and CLA, a8 commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required: KS Major_elements_of_the_population Status; Both Statezand CIA are continuing to explore their capabilitiee (with resuite largej negative to date) for mounting special group operationg inside Cuba focisedqupon dynamic elements of the population, particularly operationg; through the Church to reach the women and families_ and through Labor contacts to reach the workers: Other elements include enlistment of. the youth and professional groupings: Special consideration 18 to be given to doing this through Latin-American operational contacts Thie i8 vital to the succe88 of our political action nucleu8 when CIA can it into place. La Qutlook Status: As reported to tbe Special Group last week, there bag been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and & subsequent start in "tooling upa 00 After this second look, CIA ba8 concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the jllugion of a popular movement, to win external support for to improve CLA operational capability, and to help create & climate which will permit provocative actions in 8upport of a shift to overt action. Thi8 outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CLA, is far short of the Cuba project'8 goals. CIA must take another hard look at ite potential capabilities, in the light of the following tagking: to determine i it cannot make the greater effort required. Qa SENSITIVE TOP SECRET HY 50955 DocId:32202426 Page plans and to plan ring people' tary ting put it, yet 02s Qfk ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== TOP SECRET SENSITIVE V TARGET SCHEDULE Ag Intelligence Task l: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CLA} Task 2: By 15 February; Opa Locka Interrogation an eflcctivc Operation for collection Center to be made with support 0f Defense, and procee of intelligence (CIA State, IkNS, FBI) . Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban Miami area. CIA to survcy other refugees elsewhere than etc. ) and on a priority basis to refugee points (Puerto Rico, Vongzueleo source points. 15 ensure maximum coverage of all such February target date_ Task 4: CIA to continue Its examination of with priority on agents inside Cuba, intelligence assets, ruarya Also included and repoft on capability by 15 Feb- sources, is coverage %f intelligence through third countey particularly those diplomatic relations with Cuba. B Political Task 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 Fcbruary for government officials, to fracture defection of Cuban must be the regime from within. Thig effort imaginative and bold enough to consider & "'name" be. worth at least a million U . S. dollars . defector to political action This can be the to our goal and must be mounted without project. a9 a major CIA Task 6: CIA: to complete plans by ] Februa for tion actions, to help fracturc the ry Cover and State and FBI are to Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, collaborate on this _ Tagkez; 1 Eebruary , CLA to submit operations ini populentovement within Cuba. schcdule for selected-ins de Cuba This must include localities tion, v asgessment of sclected Cubans their infiltra- activity 289 ginents; and polilical platlorm. One section deal withtthe:"underground; 19 assess its must true status and plans to use it: Task B: State to follow "p the OAS meeting Embas sies in Latin America by U.S exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase Communist regime in Cuba. State to gubmit hostility towards the a8signment by 13 Februa report on results of this ry , S0 {urther planning can be programmed. Task 9: 15 February, State to gubmit an assets in the Caribbcan inventory Of opcralional Or area, including capabilities of local governmenas groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve goals_ Plans early ube of such the Project' s capabilitie8 are due by 19 February: Task 1O: CIA to submit operalional gchedule Ior Caribbean area to achieve the using asset8 in the objective of Project's political action goalg. The working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such 36 workers, farmers) is underscored, Due 19 Februa ry. 5 SENSITIVE TOP SECRET HI 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 5 sing re- having top kex delay Decep- EBye tiating having By for Qale' RFK ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 10 0i Uluiili Oirilt Ui" 'HE RECEIVED OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C JAN 2 9 1962 27 RUAVNeY MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL pa N From: Gen. Lansdale Zd 9 0 Noting that will be away from the country most of the month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project To for which we should provide. Certain proposals should have CIA HAS NC AVD/OR evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to DECLASS Tris documeNT be made if our Project is to win its and the bureaucratic RELEASE @C machine has too people captive to it, one way or another. As SANITIZED It is my hope that will make someone specifically responsible to speak for your determined course and have the HAS NQ OBJECTIQH TO role of being "presence"' a8 far 45 possible. Thig demands CIA GEcSSiaC OnocDia 3 personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and QECEASSOE This DOcUMEN rea sonably direct access to the President_ Perhaps Dick Good- NE SANITIZED win could fulfill thi: role_ Secretary McNamara is an alternate FlL suggestion; he has s0 many irons in the fire that I hesitated men- 6a tioning him_ You might be conside General Taylor, but I do p ) not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine military bureaucrat at heart. As you know, I remain convinced that our can be won, Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U, S. agencies to work hard at it, the can be won through their cfforts. Yet, their efforts haven't been impreg sive to date, and I still feel that we might 3 uncork the touchdown Play independently of the institutional pro- gram we are spurring. It may be a special effort which professional labor operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups; Spain ha 5 an untapped action potential, It could be a warming-up of the always lively element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially used_ It could be with_the_families_through the Church, with families 42D?EZzZ DEPARtiEnT of JUSTICE 4 EICLUDZD [?0" 4'J7oeT[C < 22 JUN 6 1962 PECRAJL;G ; 0) D[R 5203.10 6 DCES KGT 7Li RECORDS BRANCK Thls docunent :ontains pages TOP SECRET 0 copies. Series J4 HI 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 6 'EZNERAY FILE exl_ FILE Brig. #Fl you goal many you Your 7r#X 24 94 (3 Traxl ring 1 (c goal goal 8 youth ATORNEX GENERAL CJPJ ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== TOP SECRET SENSETIVE F SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN ACTIVITY PURPOSE 1 Sabotage Cuban CQNSIDERATLONS supply of nickel To to Soviets. supply to Soviets and to hinder This can be an 5 Cuba' s ab to pay for Tloc early sabo tage action on the imports. Nicro Plant by & hit-and run team based outside Cuba_ Destruction of transformers, E coolant pumps and towers seers more feasible than blocking te channel_ Effect can be supported later by denial of Gamndlan spare parts. 2 Sabotage fuel suPBly. To cripple transportation. Effects of CLA program of lubricating oil additive is expected on locomotivesqin Juna Q@a Much more can be done with fuel contam inants, particularly on jet and diesel fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer 3 real opportunity for more vigorous Sabotage communications. program. To dramatize and encourage the spirit of resistance. Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio transmitter (believed now used to jam U. S. broadcasts). Attacks mounted only when operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave net should be dealt with when there are suf - ficient assets inside to make sa with a critical botage coincide 4 Sa need, in August-September_ power supply. To increase strain on regime and This should be a concerted atta daily business to a standstill, in ck, a5 feasible by dramatic action 2ll people will July-August, on power plants at Havana, note. Santiago Cinfuegas, Vicente = Santa Clara, Cuatro Caminos_ Matanzas. It is of 3 type requi) detailed planning and special equip- ment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba. [x CiA HAS NO OBJECTION To DECLASSIFICATION And/or 1 RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 11 A4 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Q ) ; 1 0 $ 1 1 6 deny ility 2 botage bring ring k@ ) Truch ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 8 1 CIA HAS NO ObJecTioN TO DECLASSIFICATION And/oR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT 7 As gantzed > 9 4 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 15_March 1962 (cont) ACTIVITY [ 1 PURPOSE CONSIDERA TIONS 4 # Caribbean Admission Center, To collect intelligence required for the This 1 C Locka, Florida, operation, in response to early recommendation fully operations to identify and earmark a5 essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at = activated by 15 March 1962. telligence assets as refugees arrive, utmost speed to be C come active by 15 March = with and to Provide security against Com_= a new building completed and occupied, anc with 3 munist agent operations. staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Centef. (CLA res ponsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State USLA: ) 5_ # Pe riodic intelligence esti To up-date NIE 85-62 , so that current As the mate S, as required by progress estimates can be conside operations develop = there will be both increased of red at national intelligence collection and a need for as current In - operations. policy levels. telligence Estimate as the U< S. can produce meaningfully. It i8 likely that & more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now the issuance of NIE' s) may have to be followed, CIA is now publi daily intelligence sum - maries on Cuba and is planning & bi-monthly or weekly report summing UP intelligence for this purpose_ (CIA res ponsibility, with support of others a$ required. ) OTHER QPERA TIONS 6 * Continue ne gotiating F3 To cripple Cuba : 5 rail transportation. Bsitigb bempin contaminating Bzitish 8@Bietanee is required to unde rtake 3 successful locomotive lubricants. sabotage of Cuban locomotives, throlgh contaminating lubricants. It i8 expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced. INTELLIGENCE 16 31 March 1962 0( 208 OPERA TIONS 7_ # Two teams of agents di8 - To collect intelligence. One patched to Cuba. team of 4 and one team of 3 agents, Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some pa st experience. Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 12{ Opa in- fully an rning gove shing ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 8 1 CIA HAS No OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION Andior RELEASE OF ThiS DOCUMENT AS SANitized 7 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 16 31 March 1962 (cont. ) 1 ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERA TIONS 3 6 ID 8, Establish 2 additional third - To collect intelligence- Pos sible future use in communications and country resident agents in support. [ Cuba. 1 9 31 March, have 105 agents To ready agent operations. Effectivene s $ and numbe rs are dependent 4 selected and 50 agents trained. upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions cont rolling these factors, If the recruitment and train- are for resistance activitie s, 'he task of recruit- ment and training will be much les8 difficult than if are limited to intelligence-collection purposeg 10 _ # Develop intelligence potential To the intelligence possi- There are "colonies" in Wzshington, D C. and 0 ther 0f Cuban "colonie: in U.S. bilities of former re sidents of U.S. cities which are "'little Cubas. M Family, Church, Cuba (including U.S_ citizens) now and busines8 interests provoke unusual personal ties in the United States. inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail- able_ (FBI support and coordination is basic in this efforta ) 11. # Develop additional interroga To collect intelligence in a Latin As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate tion centers in Other areas by atmo sphere, at different levels thai: other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible_ A 31 March 1962. now seem possible in the continental center is activated in S22in6 Negotiations with U.S. to spot additional intelligence local authorities are be undertaken to activate centers, 45 sets and to provide security if pos sible, in Werec Cllyo_Carac26 end A54p2 San against Communist agent operations. Juan, Puerto Rico, E2n02g0 Callec are sut- veyed fo possible centers, (CIA re sponsibility with sup - port by others as neces sary. ) OTHER OPERA TIONS 0(.209 None. Items marked by asterisk were 2pproved by Special Group (Augmented) , 5 March 1962_ TOP SECRFT SFNSTTTVR (44 3 ( a4 7 By ing they only- exploit s ' being ing 6223' being ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== TOp SECRET 33 OFFIce OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25,D.c 12 March 1962 SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale 7L Qahas ho OBJECTION:TO Subject: Policy Questions Operation Mongoose recussoFcHigoc andior THIS DOCUMENT 734 As Operation Mongoose 8 into the approved activities of Phage a number of policy questions have started to arise_ Current problems, necding resolution, are listed below _ It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency. 1. Use of U.S. militaryinstallations = CIA desires to train gmall groups of Cuban nationals IherUg S__Z4t Eireg Bonabing Avo@ 4Pazk Hlorida} immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area 1s adequate for thig training, but that such training of covert agents who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security probler and a departure from pagt security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees_ Capture and interrogation of any 0f these covert agents could result in exposure (in international newB media) of U.S. oificial involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination i8 needed &8 to whether Or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government inetallations . There are Other U.S military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which 'CIA would like to use for Bimilar training and operational purposes in the future_ The same policy determination could cover all u8e8 of identifiable U.S. Government properties {orstraining and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert infiltrationfinto Cuba: 2 Atmingeof Cuban guezrillag: CIA needs a policy determination on thettPpeyng 8C+us and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas , 2s are located; a8 Segged, and request help. Such requeste are starting to surface; 28 the Intelligence-collection effort i8 increased, and it is EXCLUDED FROM 4 TOWATIC RECIADING ; DoD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY SENSITIVE Thle dooudent containg 1_pageg TOP SECRET Copy Ho_ of copies. Sertes PROPERTY uf Thf White HOUSE OFFICE HW 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 10 Exh #a 94 1 goe Range <on they 0(199 ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== imnvl / 7 | CIA HAS NQ OBJVECTIQDTO 6 GExsEa7thnu 8274| 9 3 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RCCORD SUBJECT : Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Project Mongoose 3 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr _ Kennedy; Mr _ Johnson; Mr Gilpatric, General Decker General Lansdale and General Craig ; Mr McCone and Mr Harvey 1 General Lansdale gave an interim report on the Progress of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S . He said the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected The Attorney General comented that the President wishes to have a large number_ General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training of such Cubans are being looked into Ic was agreed that such 3 cadre of Cubans would be an asset co the U.S. which might be used In a number of ways General Lansdale supported by General Taylor pointed out chat in this connection the matter of hold the individuals and giving chem useful employment after they are trained is an inportant and 8 difficult one 2 Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on Progress to date wich agent teams and in the general field of intel ligence including the Opa -locka interrogation center and the Madaid clandestine interroga - tion center He outlined various difficulties encountered and said that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five WIt sets are in Place _ Approximately 72" actual or potential report sources are al80 in Place A significant development is that Major Duque has refused co allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely- intelligence-gathering missions (This sort of attitude had been forecast earlier as a Poss ibility, but it now assumes particular im- portance i0-view of Duque 8 stature.) Mr Harvey als0 commented on the two attempts made to intrude inCo Javana TV programs The Group asked that a check be made as soon 83 possible' on how effective these operations were They als0 asked ichat @ copy .of the scripts used be made available _ The Group feltethatzic 18 worchwhfle to check this capability out as is now being-done; but questioned whecher once proved effective ic should not Perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time. Thomas 8 [~afrotf Parrott cc: General Lansdale bsstuorg 4 #lel; mb PROPERTY Of The White HousE Office 8nsr HW 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 11 4+jw 9 4 L(e ) andoor Exh-#/? May May Army _ ing ing

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