Transcript of 157-10002-10152.pdf
==================================================
Page 1
==================================================
157-10002-10152] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Date:10/05/93
Page : 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGEnCY SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER 157-10002-10152
RECORDS SERIES
INTERVIEW SUMMARY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR SSCIA
FROM
To
TITLE
INTERVIEW WITH SAM PAPICH
DATE 05/29/75
PAGES 21
SUBJECTS
PAPICH
FBI
CIA
OSWALD , LEE HARVEY
CUBA
CASTRO
DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION T
RESTRICTIONS REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 09/30/93
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
Box 256
Folder 4
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
H# 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 1
==================================================
Page 2
==================================================
ITERVIEX A@ CEETING SUMAR}
INTERVIEW 6IITH: Sam Papich
A1.L Nniformation contaned
HEREim Is UncLASSiFIED EXCEPL
REGARDING: WHERE_SHOWN QIHERWISE
DATE-TIME-LOCATION: May 29 1975;_9 a m.; Carroll Arns
PRESENT : morning: John ELLIFF Mlke Epstein John BayLy
afternoon: John ELLIFF Burt Wides John Bayly
HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:
FOLLOI UP REQUIRED:
Dpereer ;
2.3
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(s) :
FBI ~
ReviewE} BY
IASK_FARGE
ON 55s9
iFUL
IN PART
TOTAL
BXECUTIVE SESSION: YEs jb
"cdte7k& Bx: SuE_sslub
YL]
'eileleat REASON: 1.5 (6 46)
DECLASSYoNl;
FAC4 ToFk SECRET
HF 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 2 2
SECRET
FBINFK
RELEASE
RELEASE
DENIAL
7459t
==================================================
Page 3
==================================================
IERVTEN AND METTNG SUMMARY Lof 2L_
SECRET.
FILE:
Papich began with a brief summary of his e xperi-
ence in the FBI During World War II and there-
after he ran certain operations in Latin America
In 1945-47 _ he ran counterintelligence operations
in Brazil against the Communist Party of Brazil
and bloc intelligence agents In 1952 he became
FBI liaison with CIA charged with coordinating
and planning_
9
including the development of sources
He als0 had special assignments overseas for Hoover .
Papich presented the following overview of the
issues He has a high: respect and regard for the
Soviet intelligence service
9
its efficiency, and
effectiveness _ He must be shown that their
philosophy has changed since 1970 _ The pr
of the U S intelligence community re
KGB and GRU is very limited_ In 1954 ple_
the U_ S . intelligence community had be=
lieved was good information ructure
This had to be readily revi ne defectors
and new operations succeea bwing that the
premises were false Papi ed 2 they ' ve taken
us to the cleaners in the las few years 16 There
is no estimate of how many Soviet illegals are in
J
the United States The old view was that illegals
would aim at middle-class government and bus iness
positions _ It has been discovered that they take
jobs like dishwasher to develop an employment
background . There is no knowledge of Soviet
objectives Illegals may do nothing for years S0
2
they can be tapped for the future There may be
100 500 , or 5,000 of them _ Some were sent in as 6 2 2 eariy
33 the 20' 8 and 30' 8 _ They are the Rudolph
Abel-type _ His network was never identified.
Therefore
9
Papich 1s clearly unhappy with U_ S _
results in identifying Sovlet operat ions in the
United States 3
O Xo
Papich stated that he played a controversial
"devil' s advocate" role between the FBI and the
CIA_ He did not confer With Attorney General
Mitchell after Helms called his name to Mitchell's
attention Papich assumes He lns wanted Mitchell
to get a review of the history of PBI-CIA relations
Papich would not have gone to Mftchell without
checking with other FBI officials
C 1| *
'fctio !TJ
'X33
DCCUVENT
~2-c
Nev 13
SEGRET
H 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 3
:
Page
ARET
2
9 8
1
3
1
8
1
3 2
0
2I1
0?
==================================================
Page 4
==================================================
Page
Aot 2L
INERVIEW
AND MEETTNG SUMARY
SECRET
FTLE:
in or
1970 it is
To
understand decisions
World War II
}
according
necessary to
go back to the FBI into
to
Papich- President Goosieeat
in World War II_
the foreign intelligence
generate the capability
Ove rnight the FBI had to
the German
to move into Latin
Aneicrainciuded
business covers ,
espionage operation which inc
in Latin American
radio networks and innidencepreceaent
or
guidance _
governmentg The FBI had no conferred with
Assistant FBI Director Hugh Klegg
FBI agents
the British in London for
2881undece1
business covers ,
went into Latin America first
thin cover_ The
then in the embassies which was
liaison
attaches
esfablished_fficial_
legal
ies The FBI 8 role was
local authorit
but some positive ip
counterintellagoncethe
stability of
was
gathered about
the job _ Mo from
FBI agents learned on until
periences
headquarters was
ridiculous
were reported back.
6r
and Asia as well
The 0SS ran
operations
ran undercover
as Latin America- Inored Ste
tes See the book
ions in
the United close relation-
Donald Downs 0SS had 3 very
als0 ran by
with MI 5 and MI 6 The British
No ship the United States in
1939-41_
operations in
They saw the FBI as
neophytes
one knows how many business _ The British
knowing little about the
OSS than to FBI _
closer relations to
deve loped
and Hoover were friendly but
At first
9
Donovan
of 0SS operations in
Hoover received complaints the OSS bugging_
1R (FBi)
the_UnitedStatesp Sor e zample_
9 laints came from
of (like Spanlob Enbaagy: Other coeen
Hoover and
Latin America The friction hetwee
Hoover S view
Donovan is
inportant bod qceddui? pecgoes regard-
of the CIA
Donovanouoaldf
he thought they had
less of their
background
the access;
The OSS
the
capability to
Peneoratnethelic
of Hoover ,
use
of" Communists "shook
Moscow
of cooperation
as did OSS discussions woula
never work with
with the NKVD _ Hoover
CIA roots in OSS _ Papich
Communists Hoover saw extremely
stressed that OSS had some
OSS had an
eiement that
capable and dedicatedy but
would never buy _
Hoover
SECRET
J
H# 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 4 }*
1966
got
wi
prime
operat
out
people great
==================================================
Page 5
==================================================
INTERVIEW AND MEETTNG SUMARY
Pege S3 of 2/
FILESECRET
In 1943-45, the government began looking toward
a worldwide intelligence system_ The alternatives
were the military OSS , State, and FBI_ FDR
allegedly assured Hoover that he would be respon-
sible for setting up the post-war system_ Papich
never saw any documents showing that Hoover wanted
this job The Latin American operation was
successful but Hoover never understood or had a
feel for sthe problems He felt insecure He never
traveled outside the U S
9
and only saw things
from Washington , D. C _
Under President Truman, Hoover did not have a
"warm" relationship with the President When the
Central Intelligence group was formed and the 1947
Act drafted Hoover 8 attitute was mistrust and
lack of confidence in the group creating CIA
were 3 different type of people
9
not law-
oriented_ Ivy League students of fore
did not speak Hoover 8 language
Papich states it was 3 "ble did
not get the job _ Hoover omfortable" when
confronted with worldwid He did not under-
stand relationships and operations abroad In the
U S for instance if Hoover had a problem with
a
poiice
chief_ he just cut off relations He
couldn t do that with foreign police_ A foreign
intelligence service cannot operate like a domestic
intelligence agency =
In 1952
9
when Papich became FBI-CIA liaison, rela-
tionships between the agencies were 3 me3s Beedle
Smith was CIA dlrector There were many flaps
between FBI and CIA over CIA political and psycho-
logical warfare, especially regarding the funding
of labor groups , student groups and political
parties _ At the time of the
1947
Act these tech-
niques of "covert action" were the subject of
tremendously heated battles between CIA and State
There were fewer flaps in the counterintelligence
field_
In the field of political and psychological warfare
operations
9
the CIA didn t want stereotyped people_
The CIA was not disciplined and ignored jurisdictional
agreements _ It would contact a U_ S . newsman about a
HW 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 5
49
8co 4
SECREh
==================================================
Page 6
==================================================
INIERVTEW AND METING SUMARY
s o 2L
PSECRET
possible assignment the newsman would contact
the FBI to ask what was going this would g0
to Hoover, who would raise hell with the CIA
director But Beedle Smith was tough Communi_ T
cation between the FBI and CIA was almost non-
existent by 1952_
Papich had no CIA counterpart s ince the CIA is
S0 compartmented_ He had contact s at all levels ,
exchanging ideas for operations He would push
CIA ideas in the FBI Flaps would come up He
would stamp then out and say 01 get on with the job"
The FBI was easier to control since it was cen=
tralized_ Papich S relations with Hoover Wo=
g0 up and down _ He frequent ly asked to
field
m M
and somet imes Hoover consider
him there But by the 1950' s
9
most 8
foreign intelligence talent had di
No formal consideration was Ni n the FBI
to limiting its role to ement Tolson
probably thought it shoul oover never
expressed a desire to give his inte lligence
job _ Nobody inc luding Tolson, knew Hoover ' s
reasons for doing what he did_ He had his own
conversations and contacts in the White House ,
Congress
9
and his personal sources _ He knew what
he was doing and had "a nose and ear for the
political climate in Washington" This was true
M M for risky operations _
Papich believes it would be disastrous to give
both forelgn and domestic intelligence duties to
a CIA While there would be advantages in
coordinat ing fragmented sources , it 18 3 risk to
liberty, like 3 national police.
Papich did not recall any significant plan to
Improve coordination in 1958 when FBI Joined USIB _
FBI was part of the USIB predecessor group _
The CIA would suggest joint field operations but
Hoover would rarely buy lt_ Thls was like his
reluctance to join any operation With any other
agencies _ He thought the FBI should always have
control
9 a commanding role For_ example
2
Allan
Dulles discussed tba U@lted Nat Lo1g W ith Hoover
(S)
16 (FBi)
SECRET
H# 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 6
{
Page
on ,
==================================================
Page 7
==================================================
INTERVIEW AND METING SUMARY
of 21
FILE:
'SECRET
He kpew Soviet agents and other countries agent
werel In theSecretariat o (Dulles stressed that
2(S) (Fo)
there was littie coverage or penetrationlaz {he} (FBi
0aWg The FBI re Ligiously_ observed" the ban On
operatingEn the 0 .No conpound 'apich was present
(s) (FBI)
when Hoover and Dulles met When Hoover objected
I6
to the plan_
}
Dulles dropped it Another example
Angelton might be disturbed about our lack qf
information about KGB operations out of [the cmbassy (FBO)
He would discuss with Papich how to penezrate the
KGB
Friction would develop in "the gray area" of posi-
tive intelligence For example a top foreign
Adc I official came to the United States for medical
treatment _ The CIA knew he was coming to the U_ S .
and wanted to know his relationship with Communists
and wanted intelligence on the instability in the
country The CIA wants him surveilled to find out
his contacts what he 5 saying
9
and a wiretap or
bug_ The
FBf
would not do this since he was not
an intelligence agent and not within FBI Jurisdan
tion The CIA would be upset There were 5chs
cases like this
} one involvingll_Boliviar (clt
Over the years
9
Papich sold Hoover on
but it was always a gray area N oordina-
tion never worked with the FBI
pe
@(A
In summary the sources of
S2
riction were
(1) the OSS experience (2) cal and psychological
warfare by CIA, and
(35
the CIA desire for posit ive
intelligence gathering in the U S
There was no major issue regarding CIA ' s des ire to
develop "fntenda"_in the U.S Papich recalls no
more than three to six instances of disagreement
The FBI never helped the CIA create an organlzation
for deep cover It never needed FBI help because
it moved on its own _ The CIA Office of Security
advised Papich that they had 3 relationship with
the National Student Association This never gave
the FBI a problem _
The Katzenbach report would not g1ve the FBI prob-
lems but many good CIA contacts overseas went down
the drain when contacts through student groups were
curtailed . Papich believes that if these contacts
HW 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 7
SECRET
1 /
Page
(c
i40tzh
==================================================
Page 8
==================================================
INTERVTEN AND MEETTNG SUMMMARY Page
@o 2L
FIIE:
SECRET
had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence
community could have dealt with the New Left
later The CIA would have had assets to assess
the issues- Such questions involved New Left
travels overseas and relationships with foreign
agents _
The FBI and CIA did discuss_developing a cover
in the U_ S . to get intol Chinao Travelers
gained(s)
k(et) /B
very little The immediate prob Lem was the pro-
posal for a joint approach_ When Papich was there
9 it no further than discussion If the CIA did
set up cover in the U . S
9
the FBI provided no
support _ However , if the CIA desired to use 3
company it would ask for 3 check of FBI files _
Papich is not aware of any political organizadion
created by the CIA , although it may have be
in the 50 ' 8 or 60' s There was discussio
FBI about creating its own group aime-
Jts)
and discussion of whether or not to
know about it There had to be coo Itston with
CIA Papich does not know if oreate
organizations were implement ecision would
have been at Hoover 8 leve
FBI informant travel oversea was limited mainly
to CPUSA members The FBI woald not tell CIA
about informant trips to Moscow or Paris before-
hand The reason was that the CIA would have
notified its field agencIes that the informant ' s
life should be protected - Instead the FBI informed
the CIA of the results upon the Informant 8 return_
The FBI liaison section was made up" of six or seven
agents _ Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA
Creager dealt specifically with USIB the Security
Committee
9
the Interagency Defector
'Committee
and
the Office of Security Papich and Creager backed
each other up In their respective areas There
were several liaison agents at the Pentagon The
liaison at State wa3 Oren Bart lett The other
liaison agents were not So deeply involved in in-
telligence operations a3 was Papich_ FBI liaison
Kc5a "
at NSA was BLll although Papich was also
(FBi
involved withf NSA:
"olits911,
Qeu)
SECREL
FI 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 8
got
IFe) &
==================================================
Page 9
==================================================
INTERVTEN AND METTNG SUMMARY Page
Zo 24
FILE:
SECRET
Regarding FBI service and support to other agencies ,
Hoover was 11 goddamned careful" He was sensitive
to any "risks" and thus any request for FBI support
had to be established firmly_ Hoover never
responded M let them do it" within the United
States Hoover did not give other agencies any
blessing or approval for questionable domestic @)(e)
13
activities such as the case of thel BBozevizn
fficiels)
i6
ment ioned above
8 ,
(eg/e))
In both the FBI and the CIA, Papich st imulated
interest in covering and recruiting people in
the United States
9
for example @mbasby @ffloia1e
(FB(
The CIA wanted to use its source Tecrui
foreign officials ln the United States hefore the
officials went home These officials are not
spies therefore, when the CIA asked be BI to
recruit them, Hoover said no Thi had its
ups and downs depending on the Some-
tlmes Papich did convince Hoo the CIA
recruit a foreign official S
Hoover treated State Den requests dif-
ferently than CIA req' ince he considered
them to be requests Secretary
rather than the DC on (bugs
@r taps
Hoover was back-stop becaus tne issue went
to the Attorney General Ifllnsa askedE Ror_helr (^
Ii geVE nz c@xes Hoover sometimes refused He
UIA (FE
based his. evaluation on the feasibility of the
N
operation_ Neither] WSEJlnor State had their own
(s)
A Keulewn
capabilities and there ras no formal discussion
of their developing it Papichstressed that
Hoover treated State, CIA, andWNSA]each differently (S)o-
There were flaps in the 1950 ' s when the CIA
recruited without clearing with the FBI_ The CIA
asked for FBIpqtceteis Ino more than five or six
(syu) (Fbi)
times Papich Tas asked by FBI officials whether
the CIA ever went to the Attorney General direct ly
fonlwiretaj juthority_ Papich says this may have
4 (FBd
happered But not to his knowledge _ Few Attorneys
General would have stuck their neck out It was a
possibility with McCone and Robert Kennedy where
the relatLonship was unusually close Papich says
CIA W retapplng could only have happened once or
e)wl
twice since the FBI would have detected it most of
18 (FBI
the time If it wa: done it would be through CIA
SECRET
H# 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 9
15
Nav
LB 8aps-8g)
(Fsl)
(s)
(FBI)
==================================================
Page 10
==================================================
INTERVTEN AND MEETTNG SUMARY
Xof 2L
PIE-SECRET
0ffice of Security, although that office had an
excellent relationship with FBI Allan Dulles
would not have condoned it since he had great
respect for the FBI Papich believes the same
is true of Mc Cone and Helms Papich als0 con-
cedes the possibility of entries by the CIA ,
'1; citing the independent operation conducted regard= A
C (4
ing thelBolivlen @PEozal > Hoover opposed golng
toCIA Op NSA [op technieal Supporty in a jointu 5 heA~-NSA
survei lance bperation The FBI would on (FR (euals (6
Tor equlpmendffor its own operation6 FR(
Regarding the Wemerandum @ zuderbea nGweeli S
18 (8d)
CIA end FBIA the general problem W roping
sources in the United States amo
gn officials;
as many as 12,000 of them 3 year ned to the
United States CIA tried ta source in
the 50 ' s FBI involvement off and on" and
some thought a new FBI would be needed
for it The FBI as cons did not have
trained personnel or canib Ity to develop forelgn
targets_ The CIA had this capability_ Papich
proposed that FBI permit CIA to recruit in the
United States CIA would advise FBI of its interest
in a target
9
the purposes of the contact
9
and any
results If the FBI had no interest in the target ,
that is an interest in' a KGB contact for example
9
it would OK the CIA contact FBI required that
CIA furnish it any information relevant to its
needs that is regarding KGB contact s (the New Left
was handled separately from the memorandum of under_
standing procedures )
Alan Be lmont headed the FBI Intelligence Divislon
before Sullivan A capable administrator he
operated behind the scene , stayed out of politics ,
had good rapport with agents , and was able to
handle Hoover When Belmont retired , the FBI "lost
a rudder" This was a crucial point in FBI history,
with Hoover getting old_ Be lmont stressed to his
subordinates the need to develop a strong case for
any proposal going to Hoover_ Once that case was
ready
3
Belmont would push it hard but Papich and
Belmont did disagree on such matters as counter-
intelligence operations against the KGB _
SECRET
HY 50955 Docld:32281992 Page 10
Page
(4;4)
; i
'(fe)}
==================================================
Page 11
==================================================
INTERVTEW AND MEETTNG SUMMARY Zof ZL
FILE:
SECRET
Regarding the CIA and domestic dissidents , in
the 50 ' s the CIA S general attitude was not to
investigat e or surveil Americans overseas FBI-
CIA communications rarely involved U S citizen
targets unless they clearly involved 3 KGB agent
In the 1960' s
9
Papich recalls two early incidents
of FBI requests for CIA coverage overseas One
was the Republic of New Africa
9 a black group
with contacts with Communists and foreign radicals
(note by Elliff
tr ru
the individual was Robert
Williams? ) The second was Stokely Carnichael
9
who
traveled around the world_ The FBI asked the CIA
for coverage of Carmichael S contacts overseas
but there were no results since the CIA had no
capability In retrospect , Papich thinks his
importance was exaggerated .
Papich does not recall any case or interest of the
C IA regarding Dr_ King_ The FBI levied no request s
on the CIA regarding Dr _ King_ Papich recalls that
the FBI thought 3 black Communist Party men
contacts with King_ The assumpt ion wa ne
CPUSA was supported and financed oret Union_
This influenced the FBI' s view lem
There was no way the CIA @broad since
the CIA had no penetra the (Communist Party
in Russia The CIA had on the CPUSA links
to the Soviet Union pat little or no effort
abroad into developing information on this It
was not a CIA priority CIA was satfsfied with FBI
coverage of the Communist Party _ If the KGB was
using it for espionage or influence the FBI would
uncover it The FBI would inform CIA of CPUSA
activities Regarding CPUSA FBI deternined that
there was Soviet financ ial support into the 1960 ' s .
The FBI attitude as early a3 the 50' s was that the
CIA did not have the capability to discover CPUSA
links to the Soviet Unton There were no leads for
the CIA to e xplore in France
9
Czechos lovakia etc
If a_ Communist Party member went to Rome or London ,
then FBI would ask CIA coverage but the CIA gave
it low priority and produced ittle This led to
FBI dissatisfaction with CIA S0 FBI went through
its legal attaches , who would contact foreign
sec urity services Normally the C IA was informed
but sometimes the CIA was not not ffled if the FBI
96 called it internal security tatter_ Papich
SECRET
H# 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 11
3
Page
4p
"an
==================================================
Page 12
==================================================
INMERVTEW AND MEETTNG SUMMARY le_of
FILE:
SECRET
stresses that this is a problem _ What 1s the dif-
ference between "internal security" and "counter-
intelligence" and "positive intelligence" ? FBI
would use these distinctions as an excuse not to
notify CIA
Regarding the legal attaches Papich was in Rio
de Janerio after World War II The FBI had moved
out when the CIA moved but Hoover wanted to
have someone there anyway Papich stayed a year
but wanted out since he disliked do only
liaison work with local police and CIA The legal
attaches were never operations and dealt with
foreign security police and criminal police_ A
major exception wasi Meyieo Clty Iwhere
3
with CIA
(j4) (FBi
acquiescence the FBl was operational
age was through sources going back II
and may still exist The targe Inina18
and CPUSA officials and VaE apprehend=
fugitives _ The roverthe Sovlee8o
(ebl)
There were six or seven legal attache offices
from the 1950' s until Papich left in 1970 = Papich
feels that if the FBI has legal attaches they should
be closely coordinated with the CIA So that their
assets and sources do not duplicate the CIA A
FBI: man abroad can be useful to the intelligence
community through his liaison with local police _
Coveragein the field of 3
Soviet officor
jshouiterenteltheecie
be by the CIA Coverage of
IB Cesi
a CPUSAA memer should be joint FBI-CIA There
never has been such coordination = The legal
attache should be involved in operations through
his liaison contacts
Papich gave the following example: the CIA and
EEherErengn DSnave good lials0n for counterintel
(eC eA
Iigence coverage If & JointECzFrenchlcoverage
target is coming to the U S the FBI Tegal
attache should be involvedkln Erance]to prepare
(s (c(a
for the transfer of coverage to FBI In the U.S
Papich sees the implications of this for the need
to have a single counterintelligence agency _ There
would be advantages of centralizat ion , communication
9 and security.
HW 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 12
SECRET;
Page
in,
ing
18
ing
==================================================
Page 13
==================================================
INTERVTEW AND METING SUMARY Page LL of 2L
FILE:
SECRET
When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence
service for coverage of an F3I target , it asks for
any information rather than specifying the data_
This is because foreign services may be penetrated
by the KGB _
Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft
in France or the "17 wiretaps - 11
Regarding "leak" cases , over the years ba00
Eisenhower and Kennedy the White, Roue
through the roof _ Hoover te
these investigat ions a source
would be 3 top offic noth rg would be done
For example under P Kennedy the FBI did
identify
a source leaks
9
gave the informa-
tion to Kennedy and nothing was done The secu-
rity committee was created to deal with leaks
Each agency would handle its own , although the
President could still order the FBI to enter the
case
Papich did not recall anything about Anna
Chennault
9
but he did recall that during the
Korean War there was a request of a top American
citizen regarding those ne_ gotiations _ Papich
says he talked then out of it
Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens ,
Papich recalls beginning to request CIA coverage
0f New Left travel abroad about 1967 He does not
recall an FBI interest as early as
1965, at the
time of the Hoover meet ing at the White House on
antiwar protests _
Papich did not know of the 1967' White House request
to CIA nor did he know when Ober' s unit was set up
He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his
unit but he did know of its existence after it was
established . The FBI was asking CIA about particular
group leaders The Bureau wanted to know if there
was foreign money or guidance to ant iwar leaders
These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not
know CIA project codewords ) There was no CIA
capability to cover antiwar contacts T4[ Lanot 0p
(FBO)
Moacow . #The CIA' s attitude toward this new issue
(8)4)|
was similar to the old assumpt ions about the CPUSA
SECRET;
H# 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 13
38
top
cS
==================================================
Page 14
==================================================
INTERVTEW AND METTNG SUMARY
Page [2of 2/
Tad@ZancI
FILE:
SECREH
The accepted view at CIA was that it was impor-
tant to det ermine if there was foreign support or
sabotage training After 1967
9
FBI-CIA contacts
on this topic developed rapidly There were few
really valuable CIA results nor was much obtained
through the FBI
9
the legal attaches or informant s
going abroad_
Papich referred to the climate 0f press commentary ,
assassinations _
9
allegations of sabotage plans and
bombings There was "a potential for panic within
the intelligence community" s ince no one had the
coverage they thought they needed Trave 1 of U.S.
antiwar leaders to Communist nations seemed impor-
tant although sometimes after inquiry the individuals
were found not to be important Therefore time was
spent on targets who should not have been targets
but this was a new task
Hoover did not understand the issue He thought
New Left CPUSA links were most important Papich
never thought the CPUSA respons ib le for development
of the New Left or SDS CPUSA did try to use the
New Left Hoover assumed the Soviets controlled
CPUSA day to day_ Some of his assumpt ions had
been proved wrong In World War Ii days
}
yes
the Soviets used CPUSA for recruitment In the
late 40 ' s and 50 ' s , the Soviets C hanged their
policy
9 no longer using CPUSA for this purpose
Hoover was never convinced of tnis change Papich
recognized the possibility that there might be a
reversal of Soviet policy resarding CPUSA but
Papich' s top concern has always been KCB penetra-
tion of CIA
9
FBI NSA , etc as well as the quest ion
of how good the double agents are
Regarding the theory of KGB ains for using U . S .
dissidents , the main problem as lack 0 f knowledge _
In the 40 ' s and 50 's , the FBI was confident 0 f its
knowledge of CPUSA and could assess its use to
influence U S_ politics
9
but in the late 50 ' s
the Bureau S coverage of new srou?s was tremendously
weak The FBI recognized this The cIA stressed
it also for three reasons (1 ) -ne increase in FBI
requests for CIA information (2 } the White House
requests and (3 ) CIA officials cwn concern about
inadequate coverage The conc i:sion was that
intelligence regarding people 4ro went abroad was
inadequate_
SECRET
HI 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 14
==================================================
Page 15
==================================================
INERVTEW AND MEETTNG SUMMARY Page /Zof
FILE=
ESECRET
Papich had no personal involvement with White
House requests There was discussion both in the
FBI and between CIA and FBI on expanding coverage
and development of sources For example does
CIA have anybody who can have an entree into SDS?
The Katzenbach report had limited the CIA to
foreign sources or to U . S students recruited
abroad Papich dealt mainly with Ober on this
but also with Angleton and Tom
Karamenses (DDF)_
Papich believes anything Ober said and did
reflected CIA policy from the top = The operation
grew like Topsy = CIA compartmented it very
tightly and Ober was very security consc
the FBI
2
W C . Sullivan was concerned
by the assassinations , riots
2
and
put on the pressure to find out it
He pressed Papich to pressur he
Regarding assassinationa van was ultimately
convinced and Be lmont Wa Enced that Oswald
acted alone No one has nswered the question
of what Oswald did in the Soviet Union Did he
any guidance? Why did they permit him to
leave? Papich had frequent discussions with
Dulles and the CIA regarding the Warren Commission
although he thinks the formal FBI liaison was Jim
Malloy The quest ion as to whether Oswald was a
U S intelligence asset never arose Critics at
the time said the FBI should have surveilled
Oswald _ Papich recalls discuss lons of a plan to
have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow but no such
plan was ever implemented to his knowledge _ It was
not worth the risk. He does not know whether the
CIA dia lt He stresses that the FBI was not likely
01 to use nuts"
Regarding the Riha inc ident
9
Pap fch says this was
not the reason for his retirement Instead there
were problems with Hoover on operat lons and policy
decisions Papich wa8 an aggressive stand
KB
on coverage 0f] 89v1018
bes
Regarding McCone S proposal on expanded FBI cover-
age 0 Sovleta Papich stated that others in the
(1 (FBi
CIA influenced McCone to press Tor more coverage
McCone was aggressive Papich Fusned It too
This was the time of the Cuban Jssile crisis _
SECRET
HW 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 15
Geen5
get
(FBL )
==================================================
Page 16
==================================================
INTERVTEW AND METTNG SUMMARY Fage [Y of 2L
SECRET
FIIE:
Hoover would agree to expand on certain issues
but proposals for major new operations went to
PFIAB for support _ Clifford was chairman_ Papich
doesn t know what Hoover said to Clifford but the
answer on the proposal was negative The proposal
involved more extensive and sophisticated elec_
tronic surveillance _ This was at the time of dis-
covery 0f microphones in the U S . Embassy in
Moscow
9 as well as an increase in the number
KGB attempt s to recruit U S . citizens He
does not think COINTELPRO was develop
alternative to this
Hoover ' s rejection of McCon an did influence
C IA attitudes toward the FIA saw the FBI as
not being "a clandestine CIA ' s view was
that FBI had to reject CIA roposals as illegal
When Papich lectured to CIA recruits he attempted
to orient CIA to the FBI S limits On the other
hand
9
FBI did not understand CIA functions abroad
Returning to the Riha incident
)
Papich stressed
that he clashed with Hoover every year and that
their re lationship had declined steadily after
1966 By fall of he saw his value as nil_
In December '69
9
he decided to retire the follow-
ing. spring In February 1970 , whfle winding up
his normal business , the Riha incident arose
Professor Riha disappeared from the university
There was faculty and press interest in Boulder
Colorado , and 3 Congressional inquiry came to
FBI
But FBI opened no case or invest igat ion In March
of 1970 the president of the University of Colorado
came to 3 CIA man in domestic contact service in
Boulder to inqulre about the dlsappearance_ The
CIA man called two frlends in the Denver FBI office .
FBI agent agreed to contact Denver police and dis-
covered that marital problems had led to the dis_
appearance_ CIA man told the unlversity presIdent
what he learned from It reliable government sources"
The president told the press The local district
attorney called the president and asked his source
The president went back to his CIA source The CIA
source then prompt ly contacted the C IA officer in
Denver
9
who contacted the Denver FBI SAc The CIA
officer suggested that he and the SAc go to the
district attorney to say that the original source
was local police
9
but the SAc rejected the idea and
SECRET
H# 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 16
69 ,
==================================================
Page 17
==================================================
INTERVTEW AND METTNG SUMMARY Page [E of 2L
SECRET
FILE:
wanted to know the identity of the FBT agent
who gave the information The CIA officer
refused and there was a bitter c lash_ (Things
like this had happened in the past FBI field
agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always
told them to get on with the job ) The SAc sent
a teletype to Hoover Hoover said to Papich, g0
to Helms and the identity 0f the FBI souroe
Helms called in the CIA man who refused t
identify him. Helms sent Hoover a lett- ng
this and said he was "taking the ne- milis_
98 trative action Hoover noted on "dis-
continue liaison with CIA"
Papich then wrote 3 lon esignat ion to
Hoover instead of his rief resignation
note He strongly app Hoover to reconsIder
and keep communications pen_ He also raised
serious questions concerning Hoover' s past decisions _
Hoover was not happy Papich says there had been
dozens of incidents like this before He did
confer with anyone in the FBI about his letter
W . C Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring
things up (Papich says if it is OK with the FBI
it' s OK with him for the Committee to get the
letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover
The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations )
Regarding the 1966 cutbacks Papich thinks it
started with the Long Committee hearings on the
Internal Revenue Service After the Kennedy
Administration .
9
and especially under Attorney
General Clark
9
there were cutbacks in lactronte
Varepa, [Tbjo @arl@ttelv
5
@staatad CIA lnierest
1B
di Lbe G@Veprgs 0 (povlete:l CIA Woula prod tke
dbl On bhc GQVoraEc 0f @mbagbles Icza "ccknlcal (Fbi
saervlcea Dlvlezon @ly Joaned@qulpmant to FbiJg
Hle doez recall 3
Fowremoneh Jolnt Oxporlmenta [
tost @T egulpncntyle ele Wesblnglon zaEG
W C . Sullivan saw Angleton and CIA directors at
USIB meetings_ Papich would discuss FBI-CIA
problems WithSullLvan Papich stressed the need
forgmlerophone @@VCrage: Tkia waa "a rod {lag"
[to loovera Tbe_obstacle was tkat lentry operat_ons T
(FB))
Wero needed' ad eoula be dotected:
SECRET
F 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 17
get
R2EU
not
18 $
==================================================
Page 18
==================================================
IMERVTEN AND MEETTNG SUMMARY
Page ( @ of 2
FIIE:
SECRET
Regarding the CIA and Iocal police, the only thing
Papich recalls is discussion of the CIA ' s relation-
ship with New York City police The purpose was
not operations
9
but protection of CIA New York
facilities He was also aware of relationships
between Washington
3
D C
9
and suburban police for
protect ion of 'CIA facilities and personnel He
knew that some CIA employees joined questionable
groups and that the CIA was concerned about its
personnel associating with radicals and protesters .
The CIA office of Security informed the FBI in
1967-1970 that it had developed from two to six
sources to assess involvement of CIA personnel in
protest groups The information provided to the
FBI from these sources about such groups was "crap"
Papich was not involved in any meetings with CIA
sources He is not aware of any CIA activity re-
garding Women 3 Strike for Peace , nor was he aware
of any CIA intelligence operations for the purpose
of protecting CIA from violent demonstrations
CIA should have relied on FBI
Bill Creager was succeeded a3 liaison with Office
of Security by Fred Cassidy They provided memo -
randa to the FBI Intelligence Division on all trans_
actions with CIA Creager kept Papich advised,
especially of the potential for flaps and for
successful operations Papich believes Office of
Security was restricted both in number of personnel
and by CIA rules It could clain a need to protect
its own facilitles and personnel but it didn t
have significant capability _ If It did, it would
have been detected by the FBI
Regarding the Dominican Republic in 1965
9
Papich
recalls the fear of another Cuba by the President
and the National Security Council Johnson may
have asked the FBI for help An FBI agent from
the office in San Juan, Puerto Rico and possibly
from Mexico City, were sent to the
Dominican
Republic This was done with CIA approval and the
joint effort was successful There were no flaps _
The FBI agent had sources all over Central America
going back to World War II_ Other FBI activities
in the Caribbean grew out of the FBI' s role in
Havana before Castro , Jamaica , Mianl and San Juan .
In all these areas the FBI S capability was based
SECRET
HW 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 18
TotlaraDZ
==================================================
Page 19
==================================================
INERVIEW AND MEETTNGSUMMARX Page
of 22
PISECRET
on personal relationshlps going back to World
War II In the late
1960 's = the FBI went into
El Salvador and Papich thought this was a waste
of FBI manpower
Regarding Cubans in Miami there were many flaps
with CIA For example , CIA would attempt to
recruit an exile for an operation in Cuba , the
exile would ask the FBI about it , and Hoover would
mad _ The FBI would not be informed about CIA
cover companies screening exiles The FBI investi-
gated one cover company until it discovered the
CIA cover_ CIA tried to recruit FBI sources with-
10 out checking out FBI Papich is sure CIA must
have" used agents to cover local Miami Cubans
But FBI had excellent coverage and would protest
when CIA took an interest In somebody FBI was
investigating There would be general protests
to CIA to stay out of counterintelligence _ Some
problems were resolved locally with the FBI agent
(4)(4) in charge There was minimun FBI contact with
CIA operations Some names involved here are
[Freddy_Erohbose; deceased ; Bill Harvey ; and a
()
(ci4`
43 Fitzgerald_
Regarding CIA counterintelligence agalnst Cubans
Ya
in New York, Papich said the policy was no
counterintelligence CIA _ He has no recollection
of CIA implication in anti-Castro Cuban illegal
activities but Papich admits he would have learned
only if there was a flap.
Regarding CIA Domestic Operat ions Division, Papich
formulated the 1966 agreement to ease FBI relation-
ships _ The problem ,
9 as noted earlier, was CIA
desire to intervlew foreign officlals in the U_ S
Eoruat_the TUZN Hoover finally , reluctant
()
(cta)
8864 13 agreed to the 1966 understanding_ Papich warned
CIA that if there were cont inuing flaps
9
Hoover
01 would withdraw his agreement and It would be my Pe
butt" There were flaps from 1966 to 1970 where
Domestic Operations Division attempted to recrult
and failed to advise FBI If C IA was interested
in 3 Soviet bloc intelligence service recruitment
FBI- said no If either Domest ic Operat ions
Division
or the counterintelligence staff was interested in
Soviet in the U_ S they touched base with FBI .
But they felt that if FBI had allowed them to
recruit they could have succeeded
SECRET
HW 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 19
Kui
"S WIEL /
get
Nov
by
ly ,
any
==================================================
Page 20
==================================================
INERVTAN AND MEBTTNG SUMMARY
Page /X of 2L
Todecasez
FILE:
SECRET
Regarding postal intercept CIA came up
with €he
proposition, said they had entree
9
and desired it
for positive intelligence _ CIA did 211 the work
The focus was air mail to and from Ru88Ja. CIA
(FBc
gave FBI the products where FBI had stops on
persons of interest and also where other informa -
tion might be of interest to FBI _ It provided
some leads to intelligence agents _ Papich recalls
a brief mail intercept in the early 1950' s on the
West Coast regarding] Chinaa It was stopped after
() (FBt)
a new postmaster arrived Papich stated that the
New York operation was of greater benefit to the
CIA for intelligence regardin3 Wha Sovlet
Union
Papich recalls meetings with CIA and NSA OJal | LmoE@V-:
Iyr Ass(Fe)
Ing coveraee ibut not much worthwhlle resulted-
There Iwae[comrdin the Mianl area
@eiregtjiad (S)
(C (A
monitoring The FBI_would_ get leads for suspects
EzCms
Division D weresuhe COMINT_peoplez ch
()
(c(A)
(P recalls no other areas Fror DFj2g' in the U
Je
c(4
Regarding CIA Domestic Contact Service, FBI would
positive intelligence reports for example
on an alien coming to the United States . The FBI
was interested in his training in Russia as a
possible source regarding Soviet intelligence
activities The CIA Domestic Contact Service would
provide reports to FBI headquarters or the ffeld
on antiwar Black Power, and protest groups They
the information fron faculty and students regard -
ing future riots
The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities
were set by the intelligence community for
example , gather whatever they can about missiles_
The FBI would not task DCS If DCS went into opera-
tions
9
FBI itself was upset . But DCS had good
officers who would note potential for counter-
intelligence use_ There was no increase in DCS
traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969 .
The creation of DCS in 1947 worrled Hoover who
feared an internal security role It was set up
by NSCID Until the 1960 ' 8
9
there was no contact
between FBI and the DCS at the f1eld level The
procedure developed that if DCS warted to intervlew
SECRE}
HY 50955 Docld:32281992 Page 20
1k
(eP)ca , 88itive
(0) (8)
Ncv 33
QeA € (a
get
got
==================================================
Page 21
==================================================
INERVTEW AND MEETTNG SUMMARY
Iof 2L
TeRE
797
FILSECRET
an alien, a form was submitted by FBI "ciithen
FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice So
it could protect any operation _
Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence
agencies , if the FBI discovers any it evaluates
the potential for a double agent or the possibility
of recruitment FBI usually goes to the agency and
tells them the situation to prevent access to
sensitive information Also the agency can give
FBI assistance The CIA
office
of Security is
"paranoid" on this subject It is very concerned
if there is a report on 3 CIA employee assoc iating
with bloc nationals Before telling the FBI it
would do as much as it could on its own S0 there
would be something to discuss In one case the
CIA was absolutely convinced an employee was 3 spY ,
predicated on its analysts concluslons from a
photograph . FBI refused to move on the basis of
this alone There were other cases where FBI and
CIA had different evaluations of evidence It
depended on what CIA gave FBI _ CIA was "jumpier"
than FBI
If CIA did any electronic surveillance of its own
employees it never checked with FBI_ The same was
true for physical surveillance of its own employees _
If the FBI had known it would have raised he
but it never came to FBI attention and there was
no policy discussion of the subject _ If the CIA
wanted to do something with its own assets with
Attorney General or White House approval
9
it would
not check with FBI_ But it would coordinate with
FBI 1f it saw 3 risk that FBI would discover.
Papich recalls no CIA surveillance of newsmen
Papich adds his vlew that every newsman assigned
to Moscow is useful to the KGB_ A newman who may
have been recruited by KGB in Moscow may become a
target in the U. S .
Papich did not recall any problem of CIA activity
"tainting" a criminal case CIA would make sources
available for criminal prosecut ions
SECRET
HI 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 21
Page
got
11,
==================================================
Page 22
==================================================
INIERVTEW AND MEETTNG SUMMARY Pagezro of 2L
T87 CcCbet
FILE:
SECRET
Regarding CIA Far East Division Papich recalls
proposals for developing cover in the U 8 for
going overseas Ober advised Papich of the develop-
ment of sources in the U S. to cover overseas
targets Papich would write a memo on the situa-
tion and provide any relevant FBI information He
also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA
if they travel overseas Papich stresses that FBI
sources are sent overseas_ He encouraged working
through CIA but never very far _ Papich gives
the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and
reported back through CIA_
Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather
information on policy guidance
9
funding, and train-
ing of U = S . dissidents overseas There was a large
volume of communication covering names like
Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups
FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investiga -
tion regarding a possible W S . crime CIA must
recognize the evidentiary rules If there were
prosecut ions (very few)
9
it was never necessary to
disclose CIA data CIA sources were not in a
position to testify Papich does not recall ask-
ing CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might
have originated with electronic surveillance over-
seas
If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic
matters FBI would ask for everything CIA knew
about the sources CIA memos would be very brief _
Papich would insist on identification of the
sources , since the FBI might want to use it FBI
did get access to sources , somet imes working through
3 CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI
Papich recalls discussing creatL "notional" (FB )
groups targeted atLcllna @xd1 Ruasza The program
(s)
was not implemented berore he left In 1970_ It
could have been explored in the FBI Intelligence
Division but they would have come to Papich if
CIA was needed _ Papich discussed with Far East
Division in CIA
Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer
to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the
entire intelligence community , inc luding the White
'SECRET
HI 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 22
got
16
==================================================
Page 23
==================================================
INERVTEW AND METTING SUMMARY
PagezL o 2/
i77
SECRET
FILE:
Ni
House , toacquire Sovet calle_eraC?1a Hne 'moneye
(s)
(c( 6
was forLieal @ata1e @nd equipment The FBI would FRI
run the openaeton to provideL blo traffic produce c(a
Eo NSA,#Papich
was not directly involved , but ne
neard of it
Papich recalls discussion Wite Technlcal Bervlces
1 B(r8i
Dlvislon regard ng deeret Inks _ut he reca
instance where TSD provided aocuments to FBI and
he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of
CIA alias documentation or other document forging_
If this had been done, it would have had to go
through Papich.
Papich knew nothing about Vesco .
On Ober memos to FBI Papich recalls 3 code
designatio (po8s1bzy Ip1z") The purpose was S0
(s) (Fb))
that when inrormation came pack to C IA from FBI
it could be sent directly to Ober The counter-
intelligence staff had an office to communica-
tions The determination as to what FBI informa -
tion would go to Ober was first based on Ober' s
request for specifics and second based on FBI
criteria which considered whet her there would be
any poss ible CIA results FBI would alert Ober
regarding an individual and ask for any informa-
tion generally about his overseas activity_
Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and enter-
operations in the 1960 's _
Regarding CIA security research staff Papich
recalled that it concentrated on deve counter_
intelligence equipment It also was Angleton-
M type operation
9
doing research on penetration of
the CIA It also analyzed and evaluated the
exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might
have been Comunists or have had World War II
Communist contacts For example in Germany until
the mid-50 ' CIA was vulnerable co recruitment
by Communist intelligence CIA brought in brilllant
minds who might still have strong Identification
with their home countries in eastern and middle
Europe _
Finally
2
Papich and Creager felt chat "the guts of
liaison" was with DDP on counterintelllgence not
on their internal security problens With
Office
of Security there was a small nunber of Invest iga -
tions overlapping FBI _
SECRET
H 50955 DocId:32281992 Page 23
) &
10g
ing
ioping
"an
8 ,