Transcript of 135-10001-10297.pdf
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Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification
AGENCY HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER 135-10001-10297
RECORD SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
September 25,1998
Status of Document: Postponed in Part
Number of Postponements: 8
The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
The number within the brackets is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list
below.
Board Review Completed: 08/25/98
2U25Relbaseunder the
John F. Kennedy
ssassination Records
Eollection Act of 1992
01 12 CIA Installation in Africa_ Near East* 22 Dispatch Prefix
02 Digraph 23 File Number 13 CIA Installation in East Asia / Pacific*
03 CIA Employee 24 Operational Details 14 CIA Installation in Northern Europe* 04 Asset 25 None 15 CIA Installation in Western Europe*
05 Source
16 CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere* 26 Scelso (The information is the true name of the
06 Name of Person individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso ) 17 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Africa / Near Eastt
07 'Pseudonym 27 CIA Job Title 18 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in East Asia / Pacific* 08 Identifying Information 28 CIA 19 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Northern Europe*
09 Date 29 Name of Organization 20 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Europe*
10 Location 30 Social Security Number 21 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere" 11 Country 31 Alias Documentation
The number after the hyphen tracks of individual locations. 32 Official Cover (Details of Official Cover)
98 Information not believed relevant to JFK assassination
99 See the substitute language above
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Date : 09/28 /94
Bi1)
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
5i1q p6
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION Kpizlm97
AGENCY HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER 135-10001-10297 CHAHASN? / ECTICN
DECLASSFK AUe#ec
RECORDS SERIES RELEASE UF(i
dnkx
#LHIS DOCUMENT A3 SANEZED,
2370,3122 376,2372,
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
ZaxPoaze_
2385_- -33.9Q
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR ROCK
FROM
TO
TITLE
DATE 04/21/75
PAGES 210
SUBJECTS
PRESIDENT S COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES _ 1 OF
TRANSCRIPT VOL 17 _
GRAY _ RICHARD M_ BISSELL , JR _
1
PAUL
2 TESTIMONY OF DEAN RUSK , GORDON
1
0' NEILL _ ARNOLD E DONOHUE
DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER .
1
TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION T
RESTRICTIONS OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS
YofirrL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 309/28 / 94
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
Contained in file entitled, "April 21 , 1995 _ 3 . "
Kuz5Relbase under the John F Kennedy
Rsassnation Recoid: Colection Actof 1993
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 12_ 1994
Dear Mr
Sheehy:
This is in response to your request, pursuant to the JFK
Assassination Records Collection Act, for NSC staff review of the
transcript of
testimony given April 21, 1975 _ to the President' s
Commission on CIA Activities by Dean Rusk, Gordon Gray, Richard
Bissell, Paul 0' Neill, and Arnold Donohue The NSC staff has no
objection to declassification and release of the document subject
to the determinations of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Department of State
Sincerely,
L-I4A ?
David S _ Van Tassel
Director
Access Management
Mike Sheehy
House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence
Roon H405
The Capitol
Washington , D. C . 20515
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407 #0Rf ORIGHNAL
Vol 17
PPESIDENI 6 COMMISSION ON
CIA ACTIVITIES
OF 2
Washington, D C.
Monday
#
April 21, 1975
JpauL
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WASHINGTON,D.C Tc
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
410 First Street, S.E. 20003 4055 Chain Bridge Rd,,22030
Phone Phone
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(703) 273-2400
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8
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C 0 N % E N $ 8
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TESTIMQNY OF PAGE
2 1
Dean Rusk 2190
1
Gordon Gray 2263
(AFTERNOON SESSION 2295)
Richard M_ Bissell Jr 2295
Paul 0 Neill
2352
Arnold E, Donohue 2365
10
11
1
12
4
1
13
14
15
16
17
18
1
19 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
8
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
20
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
7
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1 VOLUME 17
8 2 PRESIDENT S COMMISSION
3
3 ON CIA ACTIVITIES
1
6
Washington_ D.C _
6 Monday , April 21 _ 1975
7 The President S Commission met , pursuant to recess ,
at 10 :07 0 'clock a.m . , in R oom 272 , Old Executive Office
Building , l7th and Pennsylvania Avenues , N.W., Washington,
D.C .
10 Vice President Nelson A= Rockefeller , Chairman of the' Commission
11
presiding.
12 PRESENT :
;
8
13 NELSON A_ ROCKEFELLER , Chairman
1
14 JOHN T CONNOR , Member
15 JOSEPH LANE KIRKLAND , Member
16 LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, Member
17
EDWIN N GRISWOLD Member
18
EDWARD HS SHANNON_ JR. Member
19
STAFF
3
20
DAVID W BELIN_
1
Executive Director
i
21
ROBERT WALLISON _
1
Staff Member |
22
MARVIN GRAY . Staff Member
23
SOL CORBIN ,
1
Special Assistant to the Vice President
1
2 24
8
25
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1 E R Q @ E E D I N G 8
8 2 MR _ BELIN: Secretary Rusk, if you would stand
3
35 raise your right hand and be sworn , this is Ruth Johnson who is
1
4 a Notary Public the District of Columbia _
5 MRS _ JOHNSON Do you swear to tell the truth; the
whole truth , and nothing but the truth, SO
help you God?
7 MR - RUSK: I do
8 TESTIMONY OF DEAN RUSK
9 MR . BELIN: Could you please state your name for
10 the record?
11 MR . RUSK: Dean Rusk .
12 MR . BELIN: And you served as
Secretary of State, sir,
;
d
13 in the Administrations 0f John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson _
1
is
1
14 that correct?
15 MR _ RUSK : Yes _
16 Secretary Udall
1
Secretary Freeman and I were the
17 only three who served throughout the terms of both Presidents _
18 MR . BEL IN : Secretary Rusk , what is your present
19 occupation?
2
20 MR _ RUSK : I am Professor of International Law in the
8
21 School of Law in the University of Georgia _ L
22 MR - BELIN : And prior to your service as Secretary of
4
23 State with the Kennedy Administration, could you give us a little
11
24 bit of a summary of your background?
2
8
25 MR _ RUSK: Well, I was President of the Rockefeller
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ant 3
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Foundation and General Education Board for about eight Years
8 2 during the 1950's _ During the Truman Administration, with the
1
exception of a few months when I was Special Assistant to the
82
Secretary of War, Robert Patterson , I was in the State Department
5 under Secretaries Marshall and Acheson _
1
first in charge of
United Nations Affairs, then Deputy Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, and then Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern
Affairs.
Prior to that , I had over five years of active duty
10
during Worla War II_ and prior to that, teaching at Mills
11
College in California while studying law at Berkeley.
12 And I can go back even further if you wish.
1
8
13 MR _ BELIN: During World War II, you were involved
1
14 somewhat with intelligence, is that correct?
15 MR . RUSK: Yes , I was _ I was in G-2 from October in
16
1941 until the sumer of 43 when I went out to the China,
17
Burma, India theatre _ There I was Chief of War Plans _ and had
18 a relation with the operations of OSS of the China, Burma , India
19
theatre-
1
20 MR_ BELIN: Coula you briefly give
us an overview from
8
21
your personal experience
as to what kind of intelligence the L
22
United States government had during Worla War II?
v
23 MR - RUSK: Well , I think it is important for 4S to
1
24
realize that in the background of CIA was a
shocking ignorance
Z
9
25
of world affairs and situations in other parts of the worla at
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the outbreak of World War II_ As a Captain in the Army , I was
8 2 called back to G-2 in October , 1941_
1
two months before Pearl
{
5 Harbor , to organize
a new section of G-2 to cover everything
1
from Afghanistan through the India Subcontinent , Burma
0
Ceylon,
5 Malaya, Australia, New gealand and the British Pacific Islands _
They had no section in G- 2 interested in that part of the world
up to that point_
When I got there I asked to see what materials we
had on hand as a start, and I was shown one file drawer by an
10 old lady named Mrs . North_ In that file drawer was one copy of
11 Murphy s Tourist Handbook to India ana Ceylon which had been
12 stamped Confidential because it was the only copy in town , and
1
4
13 they wanted to keep track 0f it; one
1925 military attache
1
14 report from London 0n the British Army in India; and then a
15
considerable number of clippings from the New York Times that
16 this old lady , Mrs. North, had been clipping since World War I,
17 and that was it.
18 Well_
1
I passed my first test, because on the second
19 that I was there, a Colonel from the great War Plans Division
2
20
of the General Staff called down and said, Rusk , I can t remembey
9
21
is Indochina in South China or North China, and when I located
|
22
Indochina for him he hung up in-great satisfaction and feeling
4
23 that he had great intelligence support
from G-2 _
1
24 Now there is no way to describe. how deficient we were 2
8
25 and we had to scramble around and to find a
missionary here
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1 or a businessman there, or anybody who knew anything about some
8 2 of these vast areas and , 0f course , we could get a good deal of
1
3 information from the British, but you couldn t overload those
L
lires all of the time, because we were starting from scratch_
5 We flew the hump with maps that were supposed to be
on a scale of 1 to 1 million, but much of the material on those
maps was purelyhonorary. I mean , I didn t even have maps that
would show us the scale of 1 to 1 million the terrain in which
we were operating . We tried to organize
a Burmese language
10 program in our Army and we looked around the United States for
11 a native Burman We asked the Census Bureau for a list of the
12 people living here who had been born in Burma and they came up
1
0
13 with about twelve names but most of them were McDougall or
1
14 McLanahan , the children of British soldiers who were born in
15 Burma We finally found one and we looked him up and he Was in
16 an
insane asylum_
17 Well_
1
we fished him out 0f the insane asylum and made
18 a Burmese language instructor out of him_
19 The impact of this on the need for information after
387
20 World War II cannot be exaggerated , because we just ran all the
i
21
time, we were running into this factor of ignorance, and SO I
L
22
think it is important to bear that in mind _ And I hope we will
W
U;
23 never caught in that situation again_
1
24 MR _ BELIN: Subsequent to World War II, with the 7
8
25
build-up of the CIA and other intelligence agencies , of course ,
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1 the information gathering facilities of the U.S . government
8 2 became much greater_ And I wonder if you have any opinion
as
3
5 to whether or not we might have at times gone to the other
1
4 extreme SO as the storage of information?
5 MR . RUSK : I think partly because of this absence 0f
information earlier that we tended to let intelligence become
a
thing in itself. I had the impression , for example, that in
the intelligence community , and I don t point the finger at any
9 particular agency , there developed a kind of a
catalogue of
10 desirable information _ almost as a Sears , Roabuck catalogue, and
11 it was the duty of the intelligence community
to fill in al1 of
Aisratrem
12 the blanks _ I hope the Commission will us2 disgression in what
1
8
13 it does with some of the examples I might give here today,
1
14 because I don t want to cause difficulty, but for example,
15 Ambassador David Bruce in London told me that a member of the
16 British Government had cone to him and said , David , don t have
17
your military attache planes flying over our factories at low
18
level taking pictures.
If you want pictures of our plants
1
we
19
will give them to you, but all of this kind of business makes
2
20 our workers nervous and people don t know what S going on 9
21 All were doing
was
filling in the blanks , and we tended to
1
22 go at it without
a direct relationship to what might be called
5
23 policy needs _ And I think this was one of the inherent senses 1
24 of one S ignorance of pre-World War II times _ Z
9
25 MR _ BEL IN : I think you also mentioned during
our
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7 at
interview last night that you thought the syndrome of avoiding
$
8 2 another Pearl Harbor might have contributed to trying to collect
1
3 a tremendous amount of information,
1
you gave as an example
1L
4 the attack on South Korea by North Korea_
5 MR - RUSK: Yes _
6 Our intelligence did not predict Pearl Harbor, but
certainly predicted the Roberts Commission_ And I think
that that experience has infected to some extent the intelligence
community-
10 Now
Un
I once wrote Mr Schlesinger
a little note about
11 this and one or two other matters when he became Director of
12 CIA One 0f the nightmares of people in the intelligence
1
0
13 community is to
have something serious happen which they have
1
14 not predicted_ and SO one of the results of that is that
15 policy offices a continual flow of possibilities, 90 or 95
16 percent of which never happen at all, and the policy officer
17 has the problem then of trying to sort out which is for real and
18 which is not _ And that is, sometimes
7
very difficult.
19 In tha case of Korea , after the North Korean attack
2
20 was launched _
1
people went back through thousands of bits of
9
21 information_ came out with a handful
1
six or eight pieces L
22 on the basis of which some of them said oh , yes , you see, we
5
23 knew this was coming . Well
no one picked
up the phone and 11
24
called me. I was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 2
8
25 Affairs at that time, and no one
picked
up the phone ana called
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8 FF
1 me and said the North Koreans are going to attack_ On that
8 2 evening , I was having dinner with Judge Alsop and Mx pace and
1
3 Justice Frankfurter_ and I certainly woula not have been out
1
4 having dinner if I knew that an attack was imminent_
5 Indeed , Mr . John Foster Dulles _ who was in Tokyo at
5 the time =
1
said it was not until the Tuesday after the Sunday
of the attack that the MacArthur Headquarters accepted that it
was
anything
more than a border incident, and so I think we tend
to multiply alleged predictions _
1
partly to cover your trail in
10 case
something happens , and I think this is something that
11 policy officers: have to used to , and on which they have to
12 make some
discriminating judgments _
1
4
13 And it emphasizes the importance of multiple
sources
1
14 of information_
15 Now when I was a Special Assistant to Judge Patterson
16 the Secretary of I personally supported his efforts to
17 combine all of the intelligence agencies into a single agency
18 and put them altogether in one organizations I since have
19 changed my mind radically
on that because I think it is very
2
9
20 important that you have not competitive
sources of information
21 but diverse sources of information . One of the several reasons
L
22 for the tragic mistake in the Bay of Pigs
was that those who
v
23 proposing the operation were the same people who were furnishing
10
E 24 the information on which judgments were to be made . And I had
8
25 a specific directive from the President not to consult my own
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1 Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State
8 2 to their judgment on the situation inside Cuba .
3
3 So I think it is very important that we: maintain
1
4
diverse sources of information as a kind of check against each
5 other , among other things , and also because that way you
6 some insights and some guesses that might not come through a
single channel _
MR - BELIN: And so what you are saying is that some
duplication , perhaps , SO far as the sources on a particular
10 problem , might not be adverse to the best interests of the
11
country?
12 MR _ RUSK: Well_
1
I think there should be a very full
1
13
exchange of information among the different elements of the
0
;
14
intelligence community.
But I think we ought to , that we
15
ought to have diverse sources of judgment , of analysis,
1
16
matters of that sort.
17
MR . BELIN : Now to go back to your previous comment
18
concerning the Pearl Harbor syndrome and to cover all bases , is
19
it a fair statement that perhaps the inundation of thousands
1
20
of pieces of information to cover all possibilities does not
8
21
necessarily lead the best kinds of intelligence? |
22
MR _ RUSK : Well_
0
we are faced , the intelligence
5
23
community is faced , with an
inherently difficult problem because
1
of the blizzard of information that has fallen in on the world _
24 E
8
25
Now , a very large part of the CIA' s information
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gathering has to do with getting materials that 'are in the
8 2 public sector publications from all
over the world including
8
3 the Soviet Union and the People S Republic of China, and the
1
sheer management analysis of the information that is available
5 in the public sector is a massive problem _
6 NOw_ the processes by which that mass is reduced to
7 some estimates
or judgments are very important. To some extent,
policy officers are the prisoners of the information have
available to them, and policy officers
should be in a pretty
10
sceptical frame of mind about decisions. I mean about judgments
11
of that sort.
12
Very often we try to get information that is not
1
4
13
present in the real world, and we ought to, I think, be a little
1
14 more candid in saying to ourselves that we don t know but if
15
you want our guess , here S our guess _
16
For example, on a certain Tuesday evenining
in August,
17
1968 , Russian forces went into Czechoslovakia_ We thought later
18
that we had learned that the Russians had made that decision on
19
the preceeding Saturday night,
three days earlier
1
Sunday _
1
20
Monday, Tuesday _
a
21
if we had asked our
intelligence community before L
22
that Saturday night
whether or not the Russians were going into
23
Czechoslovakia, there is no way could know
8
because the
1
24
Russians didn't know . I mean , I used to smile occasionally
at 2
8
25
the enormous effort made by foreign people, foreign
governments _
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v
they
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L
to ascertain our intentions when I knew we didn t have any
8 2 intentions , and So I think we ought to distinguish
more clearly
3
3 between information that is real and information
or estimates
1
that are rather speculative in character
5 MR _ BELIN: I am going to change the subject now
the statutes which were adopted by the Congress and which
formed the charter of the CIA
Last night_
1
you had some comments concerning' your
observation of these statutes on the relationship
to what has
10
actually happened since the enactment of the statutes _
11 MR _ RUSK : Well, I think one must bear in mind that
12 these statutes are the public expressions of the will of the
1
0
13 Congress , and there are some things that you don t say publicly.
2
14 You don t out in the statute a
capability,
say , for political
15
observations in a particular situation_ You don" t out in
16
the statute,
a public statute, the complete functions of the
17
National Security Agency ,
for example.
18 Now I don '& think there was any doubt in the minds of
19
the Congress over these past twenty-eight
years that CIA had
I
20
certain capabilities in the political action field
as well as in
8
21
the espionage , counter-espionage field , or any doubt about the
L
22 real purposes and functions of the National Security Agency_
4
23
And So although as a matter of law this may raise some curious
1
24
questions_ I don " t think that one can
honestly
say that the 1
8
25
(Congress was in any way misled about what kind of an organization
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CIA was
3
or what kind of an organization NSA is.
8 2 There was a kind 0f a common law of the matter behind
1
3 the written word
1
or there was whatever you want call it, I
1
4 will leave that to the distinguished members of your Commission
5 But some of these things that have been criticized lately
as a
6 part of the attack on the CIA I do. not think can be measured by
77
reading the exact wording of the public aspects of the CIA
charter.
9 MR . BEL IN : Is it your understanding that at least
10 the Oversight Committee leaders of Congress did basically know
11 major areas of policy determination by the CIA?
12 MR RUSK: Yes.
1
4
13 To what extent , I don t know I do know that the
1
14 Director of CIA consulted frequently with Senator Russell, for
15 example_ He was the one who had basically handled CIA S budget
16 since he was chairman of the Armed Services Committee and
17
practically chairman of the Appropriations Committee because 0f
18 the chairman S age , and I know that there wera pretty frequent
19
discussions between the two them .
1
20 I never sat in on any of those , so I can t testify
i
21
directly
as to what was said_ But I had a good many discussions L
22
myself with Senator Russell on a
good many foreign policy
Lj
6j
23
matters, and I never heard him complain about feeling that he
6
24
needed to be better informed_
Z
8
25 MR . BEL IN: Now
1
we also discussed the practical fact
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1
of how CIA in your phrase was drawn into things that other
8 2 agencies might not, or might have done if they had had the
3
3 money
available overtly , but they did not have , and the CIA was
L
drawn in because CIA had the money.
5 Is that a fair summary of our discussion?
6 MR . RUSK: Yes _
A good many things that CIA has done over the years
could have been done directly, and overtly by the {Department 0f
State if the Department of State could have gotten the
10 appropriations_
11 For example, support to the National Student Associ-
12 ation to send delegations to international conferences and
1
8
13 things of that sort, activities similar to the activities of
1
14 the British Council in Great Britain. But the chairman of our
15
Appropriations Subcommittee in the House, Mr _ John Rooney,
16
didn t care very much about things cultural and scientific
17
exchanges and U.S.I.D_ and the Bureau of Cultural Affairs, and
18
things of that sort , and now here was CIA who was able to come
19
up with the money a nd SO I think soma activities sort of
3
20
gravitated towards CIA because Dick Russell got their money
i
21
which coula have just as well or better been done overtly. L
22 I don t know whether the situation can significantly
4
23 change in that respect, but support of things like Radio Liberty
1
24 and Radio Free Europe could just as well have been done overtly
2
8
25 by the Department of State as
they were attempted on a covert
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2202
7
basis by CIA _ A good many things of that sort happened because
8 2 they had the money .
3
3 MR _ BEL IN Secretary Rusk , we also talked about
1
4 internal executive oversight about CIA and the role 0f the
5 Director of Central Intelligence ,
the DCI as the head of the
intelligence community
Do you have any observations concerning tHe question
of executive oversight of the Agency,
or any suggestions in that
9 area?
10 MR RUSK : Well
0
as I look back on it, I do have
11 one specific and potentially important suggestion.
CIA by
12 statute reports to the National Security Council_ Of course,
0
13
the President is the Chairman and his decisions in the National
1
14
Security Council are the; decisions _ There is no
voting pro-
15 cedure there_ But the statutory members of the National
16
Security Council
1
in my recollection,
never once sat down and
17 looked at the major tables and the budget of the CIA We were
18 sort of in the intelligence and operational chain of command
19
in a sense, but not in the administration chain of commana
3
20 I would assume that what happened was that the; CIA
5
21
would take their budget tc: maybe two or three members of the
L
22
Bureau of the Budget , and then it would be discussed briefly
ui
+; 23
with the President _ and then it wauld be taken down and 11
24
discussed with
Senator Russell and that was about the end of 2
8
25
it.
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7
1 In retrospect, I think it woula have been helpful if
8 2 the statutory members of the National Security Council had at
3
3 least once a year taken a look at the organizational structure
L
4 and the manning tables and the budget of CIA in order to have
5 a little bit better feel of not only what was going on but what
6
might be going on that would not normally bump into_
So I think that that would be a step, that would be
8 an improvement that would be desirable.
9 MR . BELIN : Now I want to turn to the area of
10 possible CIA involvement in coup d 'etats abroad _ Perhaps it is
11 not within our charter specifically, but made a comment
12
last night concerning
your eight years as Secretary of State.
;
4
13 MR _ RUSK: Well_ I have stated publicly, and I have
1
14
been continuing
to scratch my mind for exceptions I have
15
stated publicly that there was some 82 or SO in the worla
16
somewhere during the eight years in which I was Secretary of
17
State. That is unconstitutional changes of government
18 There were
substantially larger changes through
19
elections and things of that sort. I don t remembar a single one
1
20
of those that_ was triggered by or caused by the CIA
8
21 MR _ BELIN And by those , you mean coup d'etats? L
22 MR . RUSK: Coup d ' etat. The coup d etate
4
23 Now I think one
thing that requires
a rather careful
1
24
look , and some rather careful distinctions the CIA people
2
8
25
consider that ore of their jobs is to keep in touch with
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7
1 different elements within a population , and do have
8 2 contacts with dissident groups here and there _ Sometimes
3
3 people in our embassies, mostly CIA people,
but sometimes on
1
the diplomatic side, get inquiries from dissident groups and
5 various countries as to what the attitude towards the United
6 States would be in the event of a coup d' etat
I tried to get the word established that we would not
respona to any such inquiries , partly as a practical matter_
because I suspectea that many of these were from provacateurs
10 of, the governments involved and were trying to find out
11 what our answer would be to such a question But I had no
12 doubts the CIA was in touch with dissident
groups _
8
and may have
1
0
13 at times been buying information from them. But that does not
1
14 translate in my mind to their calling the shots of it or
15
becoming the boss or
directing
a coup a ' etat-
16 MR - BELIN In your experience as Secretary of State,
17
were you aware of the practices of other governments and their
18
intelligence both in this country and abroad?
19
MR - RUSK: To a very considerable extent_
1
20
Of course, you always suspect there are practices that you
i
21
haven t caught up with, but there is a mean ,' dirty, unsavory , |
22
back alley struggle going on in the world in which
a good many
v
23
governments particpate
1
some 0f them close friends of ours ,
1
24
and most of them, including
targets in the United States , becausel
Z
8
25
the position of the United States in world affairs is such that
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they
Yes.
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2205
am 17 7
influencing American policy is a major effort on the part of
8 2 almost every foreign office in the world_ Wherever a dispute
3
5 develops _ the parties will each come in to and get the
4 United States to take their side, and sO we are the target Of
5 a great deal of effort to find out what we are
thinking,
to
influence our decisions and judgments _
1
a struggle to
undermine some of the things that we are trying to accomplish
in the world_
MR _ BELIN: Were you ever aware, for instance , of
10 forged documents being used to try and the blame on the
11 CIA for things?
12 MR _ RUSK : Well, I think there were two or three
1
0
13 instances that I recall- The exact timing and countries I
1
14 don t recall at this point_ It is somewhere in the records
15 where forged documents were planted on African leaders to try
16 to persuade them that CIA was trying to overthrow them -
17 Fortunately, these forgeries were SO crude that it was very
18 easy to demonstrate that they were , in fact, forgeries_ and I
19 think we were able to satisfy the local chiefs 0f state that
1
20 CIA was not trying to overthrow then.
i
21 But there were all sorts of things . If I could L
22 go off the record for a moment?
v
23 (Discussion off the record.)
1
24 MR _ RUSK : I must confess I am worried about a kind Z
8
25
of euphoric and unilateral repeal of the Cold War this country
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try
and
put
in
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TOPseerET _
2206
a 18 1
1 these days , because there are those who are out to bring the
8 2
United States down , and they are working
away at it, not only
3
3
in this country= but in other parts of the world _ Whether or
L
not we
ought to make that more public, that information public_
5
I think is a major policy question that you gentlemen and those
who are carrying present responsibility might want to think
about , because there is no question about the fact that these
people are conducting such operations both here and abroad _
We did make a
decision during the Vietnam affair not
10
to make public what we knew about the activities of certain
11 governments in this country because
we_ knew that there were a
12 lot of opponents to Vietnam,
1
most of them who had no connection [
0
13 with outside governments , who were opposing it for perfectly
1
14 reasonable, valid considerations _ and we did not wish to start
15 another wave of McCarthyism in this country_
16 But anyone Iho thinks that the Communixs
were not
17 making every effort to influence American public opinion is just
18 out of his head .
19 MR- GRAY: Sir
1
did you receive specific informa-
3
8 20 tion of such attempts to influence the young people that were
21 demonstrating against the war, and SO on?
1
22 MR . RUSK: There were bits and pieces occasionally ,
v
23 but at the moment I can t cite one of them in terms of chapter 1
Z 24 and verse_
8
25 MR . GRAY: Do you recall whether the CIA had an
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ant 19
7
1 estimate as to the extent of any such involvement?
8 2 MR _ RUSK : No _
1
3 Before we left office in 1969 there had been put
1
4 together a world , a study of youth movements worldwide
0
and
5 one of the interesting conclusions of the study was about the
thing these various youth movements had in common was
technique
1
that their objectives varied widely_
8 For example_ the young people in Eastern Europe
appeared to be reaching out for what could be called the
10 establishment values in the United States _ But that study
11 might throw some 1ight on your question, if you can ahola
12 of it.
1
6
13 MR _ BELIN : You also mentioned that you thought that
1
14 attacking the CIA is a built-in process that certain groups
15 including even the Russian intelligence agency might be
16 involved in. Is that an accurate summary of your conversation
17 last night?
18 MR. RUSK : Yes .
19 I think there is a
substantial variety of motivations
{
20 behind attacks on the CIA_ I would say first that there have
8
21 been some failures , and there have been some mistakes on the |
22 part of the CIA: Those
things Will happen among frail human
y
23 beings _ And I cite the Bay of Pigs
as one notable and public
10
24 example, and that has exposed the CIA to some criticism. I
E
8
25 think there are interests who are hostile to the United States
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ant 20
1
1 that are at work in this field,
8 2 Anti-CIA propoganda is good propoganda in many parts
1
3
of the world_ and among sections of this country-
1
4 And then I think there are some personal motivations
5 that I don t care much about
1
such things
as desire to win a
Pulitzer Prize or money or a sense of revenge But I think
more broadly, I think this is partly a reaction coming from a
swing towards isolationism in this country, which I think is
reale
1
as I travel around this country in small and large cities ,
10 and again , this is sort of decisions on the part of a lot of
11 people here that somehow the Cola War is over , despite the
12 fact when you look through the world from Southeast Asia through
[
0
13 Portugal _ Spain , Italy, Greece , Turkey , the Middle East , the
1
14 Cold War is very much alive, at least from the point of view
15 of the other side _
lb 16 MR BEL IN : In this connection
1
do you have any
17 specific recommendations as to whether or not this government
18 should make available to the public more information about what
19 other governments are
doing, both in this country and abroad _
1
20 to influence world affairs?
i
21 MR _ RUSK : I think we probably ought to find some way
1
22 to alert people to the fact that detente does not mean tbat a
5
23 new Heaven and earth has bezn accomplished here on earth, and
1
2 24 for example, I object to the use of the term domino theory,
8
25
and I never used it myself _ although President Kennedy seemed
TOr SECre}
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amt 21
TOPSECRET
2209
1
1 to embrace it on two or three Occasions in Press conferences ,
8 2 and originally I believe it was President Eisenhower
3
3 To me , the domino theory is a euphenism for something
1
else. The theoretical basis for it is the Marxist doctrine of
5 the world revolution =
1
and we at least ought to talk_ about it
in those terms Is it there, what are
doing about it, is
this still a real matter in the real world , and not obscure it
by talking about a power game?
And I think that Wa could do more in that direction_
10 We could be more frank and candid about the differences that
11 still separate us even though it remains important that we
12 to find points of agreement between ourselves and those who
1
0
13 might become our adversaries . I think the process of trying
1
14 to find points of agrezment like the Test Ban Treaty and the
15 Nonproliferation Treaty, the Ars Limitation
7
the SALT talks
16 and things of that sort, those are absolutely essential
1
but
17 we ought not to be under an illusion about it, and I am afraid
18 there has been: .s0 much illusion around what we are up against,
19 and this is why I feel that the CIA and its capabilities
are
3
20
absolutely vital to the safety of the United States _
a
21 And I think one of our problems now is how to
L
22 maintain some capabilities in the present atmosphere and
v
23 discuss these, and in the face of the various investigations
1
24 which we anticipate_
1
and the investigative reporting and all 1
8
25 of the rest that goes along with it_
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YOpSeeret
2210
7
1 MR . BELIN : Secretary Rusk , I want to turn to another
8 2
area now
concerning the allegations of assasination of foreign
1
5 leaders _
1
4 Were you ever aware of any plans or proposals to
5 assassinate any foreign leaders?
MR _ RUSK: No proposal ever came to me seeking my
approval for a
plan to kill anybody . NOw , those are not chosen
words . I mean , no proposal ever came before me period ,
involving the assassination of a
foreign leader _
9
period. Excusa
10 me
11 MR . BEL IN Go ahead _
12 MR . RUSK: On one occasion, the late great Ambassador
1
4
13 Llewellyn Thompson , who Was then , I believe our representative
1
14 on tha 303 Committee
1
I think it was
named during that period
15 came in and more or less in a jocular frame of mind said that
16 he had heard that somebody down the line, and he had rot
17 identified the person or the agency , was
talking about the
18 possible assassination effort, and I made it absolutely clear
19 to him, and he fully agreed , that political assassination was
1
20 contrary to the most elementary notions of American foreign
i
21 policy, and that if we go down that traile
0 We are in the law
L
22 of the jungle
1
and it would be out of control That was my
v
23 personal attitude throughout the period.
1
24 On one other occasion the matter came up in an 1
8
25 indirect form which could be , I think, coverted by gossip into
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L
1
meaning something else. I had heard that Trujillo had been
8 2 assassinated before the Dominicans had announced it_ President
3
5
Kennedy
was then in Paris_
1
I called and Pierre Salinger on the scene , and
5 he tells about this in his book , by the way.
MR . BEL IN : He was President Kennedy' s Press
Secretary?
MR _ RUSK : He was
President Kennedy
s Press
Secretary, and I told him Trujillo had been assassinated ana
10
to keep his mouth shut , because it had not heen , it had not
11
been announced .
12
Well, he stubbed his toe and announced it, or
1
13
referred to it in one of those glancing remarks at a Press
$
11
14
conference _ My concern was that Trujillo S son was in Paris,
15
that if Trynillo s son heard this announcement first from an
16
American source that he would think that we had something to
17
do with the assassination of Trujillo and might take it out
on President Kennedy personally in Paris, and I was concerned
18
19
about Kennedy"
S personal safety under those circunstances _
17
But those were the only two things that I remember
20
8
in the assassination field_
21
7
22
MR. BELIN: When Mr - Thompson talk to you about
v
dia he indicate what potential foreign leader was involved?
23
1
MR _ RUSK: If he did , I just don t remember it.
24 7
8
25
I don t remember it.
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amt 24
1
1 MR . BEL IN: With particular re ference to the Trujillo
8 2 assassination , do you know of any approval that was ever
given
3
3
by the State Department for American participation with any
2
group that might be involved in overthrowing the government and
5 assassinating Trujillo in the process?
6 MR RUSK : Well I knew that our
intelligence people
were in touch with a
variety of Dominican_ groups _ both in the
Dominican Republic and abroad _ and any one of them would have
been glad , I think to assassinate Trujillo _ But I was not
10 aware of any operational involvament of the United States
11 government in his assassination _
12 MR _ BELIN If records were to show any cables going
1
6
13 from the State Department under your name to any Ambassador in
2
14 the Dominican Republic , would you state that those indicated
15 personal knowledge on your part?
16 MR _ RUSK ; Well
17 MR BEL IN And I don t know, by the way , whether or
18 not such cables existed. I am using it as a hypothetical
19 example _
2
20 MR: RUSK : During my
years over 2,100 , 000 cables
8
21 went out of the' Department of State with my name signed to them _ L
22 and I had seen only a
tiny fraction of 1 percent of them before
y
23 they went out: Now I am responsible, I mean I cannot avoid
1
24 the responsibility for what was done in a Department of which 2
8
25 I was Chief_
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amt 25
TOP Seeret
2213
L
1 In terms of my personal involvement , in the first
8 2 place I don 't recall such cables , but if you could ahold
1
3 of the green copies, the original greens of the outgoing
1
cables , if I had seen and approved any of those , would
5 carry my initials. I always put my initials, small dr , on
the cables that I personally approved , and it may be for
cryptographic reasons that the State Department doesn t maintain
the green copies _ I just don t know _ But if have then
then you can find out whether I was , in fact, aware of any of
10 those cables_
11 MR . BEL IN Did you have any knowledge concerning the
12 death of President Diem in Vietnam , or did you give any 1
4
13 directions?
1
14 MR RUSK : No
1
no directions at all_ There was a
15 cable that went out in August , 1963 , sent out at a time when
16 President Kennedy_ Secretary McNamara, and I, all three , wera
17 out of town , and this cable was "cleared" with us on an open
18 telephone_ And when George Ball called me , he spoke in very
19 guarded terms and told me that President Kennedy had already
170
20 approved it
i
21 Well this was on an open telephone and with that 1
22 kind of information I said use your Own judgment
0
go ahead as
v
23 far as I am concerned .
1
24 When the three of us got back to town , we looked at Z
8
25 the cable in detail and felt that it went further than we
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they
they
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mn l fls
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2214
amt
]
1 wanted to go in the direction of Diem must go kind of thinking,
8 2 and we pulled back on it_ Now we did make an effort in the
3
5 months immediately following that ,
to to persuade President
16
Diem to his brother Nhu, and Madame Nhu, out of the country_
5 We told the President to send him as Ambassador to
Washington,
Paris , or give him any kind of a job that would get him out f
the country , because it was his brother ,
we felt, who was the
principal motivator and executor of policies which were rapidly
alienating the Buddhists , the military, and the students , and
10 we felt that Brother Nhu was going to
bring President Diem down _
11 I do recall very specifically that Ambassador Henry
12 Cabot Lodge had instructions that if a coup should develop ,
1
0
13 that he should do his best to insure President Diem 5 personal
1
14
safety , and _ indeed , I understand that on
the morning of the
15 that it was clear that the military
we
moving, he called up
16 Diem and suggested some arrangements to Dien that would insure
17 his personal safety_ Diem refused those suggestions ana tried
18 to off another part of the country where he thought he
19
had some forces that might be loyal to him, and on the way was
I
20
captured and killed_
i
21 MR - BELIN : Is it your testimony, then , that you don t L
22 know of any action by this government , or any agency of the
23 government which contributed, directly contributed to the death
1
24
of Diem?
E
8
25 MR _ RUSK: It was not the policy of the United States
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get
day
into get
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smn 2 TOp SeerET
2215
]
1 Government to see that President Diem was assassinated _ We
8 2 had some pressure on him trying to bring about some changes
3
3 in his policy, and to separate him from his brother _ Nhu _ For
1
4 example , we had made some adjustments in our aid program. We
5 cut back on our aid program . I think you will remember that,
6 General Lemnitzer And some 0f that was interpreted by the press
some of whom , the way , were among the Diem must go group ,
by the press and by some of the people in South Vietnam , undoubtedly
9 as being indeed , as it was pressure on President Dien , but
10 mayba even they might have read it as a signal that we would
11 be in favor of a coup .
12 MR . BEL IN : Secretary Rusk, during
your service with
1
8
13 the Government , did
you ever hear any discussion of the phrase
1
14 known or called Executive Action Capability, which was defined
15 as a built-in capability to be able to assassinate foreign
16 leaders if it became a policy of this government to do so?
17 MR - RUSK: I don t recall no
18 MR _ BELIN: Is there any remembrance on your part of
19 any plan or direction to have a plan to assassinate any Cuban
1
20
leaders which might include, among others , Fidel Castro?
i
21 MR . RUSK: I assume that there Were a
good many Cubans L
22 who would have bzen glad to assassinate Castro ,
1
and I also am
4
23 aware of the fact that the State Department and CIA both were
11
24 in touch with various dissident Cuban groups _ We had been since
2
8
25 the Eisenhower administration _ But , the specific point of the
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7
assssination of Castro , to my recollection, did not come to me
8 2 for my attention_ I cannot testify that down the line there miglt
1
3 not have been some talk of this , but it never came to an action,
1
4 a policy action judgment or a decision.
5 MR. BEL IN: By that you mean the decision to go ahead
with the plan?
7 MR _ RUSK: That 5 right.
MR _ BEL IN There are some docuents which the Commissfon
staff has seen which indicate that at a
meeting at the State
10 Department on August 10 , 1962 , which memoranda say that you were
11 present , a meeting of a group known as the Special Operations
12 Group, or the MONGOOSE group , that there was some discussion
1
8
13 about the development of a possible plan to assassinate Castro .
1
14
Do you have any recollection of such a
meeting
or such
15
discussion?
16
MR . RUSK: I don 't, but that doesn t prove very much
17
at this point. I do have an 1l:00 0 'clock telephone date with
18
my appointment books at the LBJ library to determine whether , in
19
fact, I was at that meeting, and I will report back to as
{
20 soon as I can find that out. It is entirely possible_ You know
8 8
21 my own personal practice was to do a lot of listening in such L
22 groups , but not to into the decision phase until the President
5
23
and Secretary McNamara and I were ready to face a decision on the
1
24
matter, because otherwise you woula discourage the considerations
2
8
25
of the widest range
of possibilities
or options that might be
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get
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smn 4 TOp Se6r27
2217
7
1 available.
8 2 Mr Arthur Schlesinger in his book , Thousand Days onct
3
5 referred to the fact that I used to sit there in the Cabinet
1
4 room silent like an old Buddha _ Well, that' s right, quite
5 right , because in most of those meetings with 30 or 40 people
around the room , I did remain silent , and I would see the
President either before the meeting
or after the meeting and
have my talk with him on the subject matter, because I had the
feeling that if I sounded off debated my President in front
10 of these 30 or 35 people, that we would read about it in the
11 York Times or the Washington
Post the next morning . So
12 typically I would sit in a
good many meetings without saying
1
0
13 very much , but when we to the point of decision, that was
1
14 a different matter _
15 MR _ BELIN: We also discussed the. question of well_
1
16 let me strike that and go back with one other question in this
17 area_ As I understand your statement , you have no specific
18 recollection of any such discussions at any meetings_
What You
19 do say though is that might have occurred So far as
discussing
1
20
the possibility, but they did not occur so far as an operacional
8
21 plan approval is concerned? L
22 MR . RUSK: Yes _ Yes _ I am genuinely not trying in any
uj
6
23 way to be evasive_ I do want to say that when I left the
1
24 Department of State, I took no papers , files , records or memoranda
Z
8
25
of any sort- I took away my appointments books , which are available
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New
got
they
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Smr 5
TOp seeret
2218
1 to anyone who wants to see them at the LBJ library, and copies
8 2
of my income tax returns , and that S it_ Everything else was
3
3 left there. I have had mary interviews and discussions with
1
people writing articles , dissertations books on
things , in which
5 I was involved , and I have long since learned , because of the
mass
of things that happened during those eight yYears , that my
recollection on matters of detail:simply isn t all that reliable
8 The record is there, and as far as I'm concerned , you are welcome
9 to it now over in the State Department or wherever it might be.
10 But, it just means that I just cannot remember every
11 detail of everything that happened _ I averaged seeing 25 to 30
12 people for every for eight years , and that is a way to
1
0
13 help you not to remember a lot of details that you are trying to
1
14 recapture_
15 MR - BELIN : And I want to now turn to the area of
16 possible oversight of the Agency - One of the concerns of this
17 Commission is recommendations that it might make, and I woula like
18 to know whether or not you have any specific recommendations
19 concerning the oversight of the Agency to make it a more responsive
1
20 and a more effective agency?
i
21 MR - RUSK: Well, I think the National Security Council 1
22 could give it more oversight along the lines that I have talked
W
5 23 about _ I m not now talking about oversight of "operations_
1
24 because I think that that on the whole worked pretty well through
2
8
25 the 303 Committee, and the discussions that each of the principals
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2219
1
had with his representative on the 303 Committee_ I almost
8 2 always had a talk=
6
sometimes short.
1
sometimes longer _ with my
1
3 representative on the 303 Committee before
a
meeting ,
to take
L
a look at what was on the agenda and to express views on it.
5 But I think that the statutory members of the NSC might take a
little closer look at the total operations
1
the structure, the
budget of the CIA , than they have done in the past _
MR GRAY : Sir , for the record, could you state who
the statutory members are that You are referring to?
10 MR _ RUSK : Well, the President, the Vice President ,
11 the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director
12 of the CIA _ and then such other officials _
0
such as Cabinet
;
6
13 officers who might be called in ad hoc because of the subject
1
14 matter being discussed . The Secretary of the Treasury was
15 frequently there during
my and the Attorney General
was
16 frequently there during my
17 MR = GRAY During your tenure_
1
how many people beyond
18 the statutory members
were normally at NSC meetings, approximately?
19 MR _ RUSK : I would think at an
NSC meeting there might
1
20 be as many as 20 to 25 people in the Cabinet room _ 8
21 MR . GRAY : Do you think it would be preferable to
L
22 cut it down to something
more
closely approximating the statutory
v
23
membership
as a general matter?
1
2 24 MR . RUSK: Not necessarily, provided those 20 or 25
8
25 people in the room are people who know how to keep their mouth
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day .
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1
shut _ Now that is some doing in our kind of government, because
8 2 I do think that there is danger in considering problems
of this
3
5 sort in too small a group I mentioned ona of the reasons for
L
the mistake of the of Another reason was that it was
5 held in such a small circle that the talents and resources of
the government were not brought to bear upon the problem _
0
and I
am a little concerned about holding these things too closely.
8 For example , in the famous Tuesday luncheon sessions
9 that President Johnson had on
Vietnam , there were
usually five
10 or six people, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense , the
11 Chairman Of the Joint Chiefs , the Director of the CIA,
a note-
12 taker
1
plus the President. Occasionally
there would be one or twa 1
0
13 others there-
1
14 Now however
1
each one 0f uS knew what the agenda was
15 going to and I would take over with me notes and suggestions
16
from my Department that had been worked on ahead 0f time for
17
those Tuesday luncheon sessions _
1
and there we did not close off
18
other input And the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs undoubtedly
19
had talked to the Joint Chiefs, for example, about the items
3
20
that were coming
up , see.
i
21 MR . BELIN: General Lemnitzer is nodding his head in
|
22 agreement , I see , for the record_
Wj
6;
23 With regard to this oversight _
I think one of the thing
1
2 24 we talked about last night was the ` fact that because of the busy
8
25 job that each of these members of the NSC had , and their Own work
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you
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1
that the oversight shoula be done perhaps chiefly through deputids
8 2 Was that an accurate summary?
3
3 MR . RUSK: Well, I think
a week by week oversight should
1
4 be exercised by the kind of interdepartmental comittee in which
5 senior and trusted deputies would-norially be those who:` would
attend: meetings,' and in the State Department such people as
Alexis Johnson and Ilewellyn Thompson ,
people of that seniority
and integrity, but I do think the statutory menbers themselves
ought to take a
periodic look at the total intelligence communi
10 situation, including CIA
as well-
11 I an concerned about Congressional oversight. If
12 this isn t handled carefully, it could destroy the CIA and its
1
6
13 capabilities _ Members 0f Congress operat? under a Constitutiona
1
14
immunity provided by the First Amendmert. What they say in
15 Congress is not subject to question in any other place _
1
sO
16
basically
are subject to the possibility of being
17
expelled by the necessary what is it, two thirds vote of their
18
particular houses _
19 Now
1
that is a most unlikely sanction . There_ is a
20
precedent in the Congress which I think has worked very well, if
9
21
the Congress would agree that that is the way should do it,
L
22 and that is the Joint Atomic Energy Committee_ That Committee
5
23
is carefully selected , it has facilities and staff which are 1
24
highly secure, and do receive the most sensitive kind of E
8
25
information in the nuclear field_ I think there are very few
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they
they
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8
nuclear secrets which that Joint Committee has not had discussed
$
8 2 with then . And I do not recall at the moment any significant
1
3 leak that ever came out of that Committee_
L
4 Now , if the Congress itself would approach this matter
5 of oversight of the CIA in that mood and spirit, and recognize
that you cannot have a CIA involved in espionage and counter-
espionage and an occasional political operation somewhere
1
and
have it shouted from the rooftops , then I think some Congressional
oversight could be useful
10 I personally, but I am biased because I am an Executive
11 Branch man , I personally would prefer ex post facto assessment
12 rather than pre-consultation with regard to whether or not a 1
6
13
particular thing should be done =
1
because that could raise the
8
: 14 question of who makes the decision_ You might get, you might
15 a
steady stream of alleged confrontations between
a
Presiden
16 and some group in the Congress that could cause great difficulty_
17 Could I go off the record just a second?
18 (Discussion off the record.)
19 MR . RUSK: The Congress is the representative branch
17
20 of the government for those functions given to tha Congress
8
21 under the Constitution _ The President is the representative L
22 branch of the government with respect to the duties assigned to
5
23 the: President , and SO I see nO particular reason why we have to 1
24 say that the Congress has to participate in everything,
nor is E
8
25 the Congress particularly willing to do it. For example, on
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only
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]
the question of amnesty , vitally affected ona of the most important
8 2 powers of the Congress _ the power to raise armies , and in a perida
3
3 when the Congress was
asserting its desire to re-establish its
1
4
authority under the Constitution , did anyone in the Congress say
5
that:they ought to have participated in the amnesty decision?
6 Not at all because it was a no win situation_ Whatever the
decision was , you were going to come out behind _
So I don t know whether the Congress
~a > on one occasion
I invited a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee to come
10 down to the State Department on a very private basis to take a
11 look at some of the technology of the espionage and counter-
12
espionage = and we showed them a good many gadgets_
1
and
1
0
13
various things operate, and it was pretty startling to, them .
1
14
afterwards _ at least two of them said to me , we appreciate your
15
motivation in inviting
uS down here, but I'm sorry you did it
16
because W2 t want to know_
17
Now how much of this kind of thing does the Congress
18
really want to know when you start to peel the peeling off the
19
banana? My guess is most of them would prefer not to know some f
1
20
these things and have a chance to quarrel about it later if
8
want to 21
|
22
MR _ CONNOR: I ask one question in this connection?
ui
23
Even . though generally speaking think that a joint Congressioral
1
24
committee with oversight functions with respect to the CIA should
2
8
25
have only a post-audit regponsibility,
are there some situations
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An
don
they
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you
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such as the covert operations in the United States and elsewhere
8 2 that preceded the of actions , where because of the
3
3 magnitude and because of the foreign policy
implications
{
and
1
4 because of the possible direct war involvement , that there shoul
5 be a preclearance?
6 MR = RUSK: Yes_ I think there would be situations whexe
prior consultation woula be important- My guess is that had there
been prior consultation on the of that that might have
helped us avoid a very serious mistake. President Kennedy dia
10 talk to Senator Fulbright about it, and also talked to the
11 Vice President Lyndon Johnson about it, both of whom were opposec
12 to the of And so I think there are some , there would
1
8 13 be some
things where preconsultation woula be very , much
2
14
in point. I was concerned about the notion that somehow you coula
15 not do anything without prior consultation and the consent of
16 representatives of the Congress, because very often you just
17 don t have time _
18 MR. GRAY : It's 11.00 . 0 'clock , sir
19 MR . RUSK : I wonder if we could pause for two minutes
{
20 while I to establish the point of where I was on August loth 9
21 (A brief recess was taken. )
L
22 MR _ RUSK: I can confirm that there was a
meeting in
5
23 my conference
room on the afternoon of August 1Oth, 1962 , at whic]
1
24 I was present_ There were about a dozen people there ana my Z
8
25
lappointment book shows names of those who Were there _ I have
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very
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1
1 asked them to photostat; that page , and I will get it to you as
8 2 quickly as possible_ It does not show that General Lansdale
1
3 Was there, but he might have been . The list might have been
1
4 incomplete.
5 MR _ BELIN : Your appointment book will show the member
present on that?
7 MR _ RUSK : McNamara_ McCone_
1
George Ball_
1
and there
were about ten or twelve there _
MR - BELIN: Secretary Rusk , we were talking about
10 oversight, and I would like to ask you to discuss with the
11
Commission
a summary of what we talked about last night concerning
12
your observations of the kind of a person that should be the
1
0
13
Director of Central Intelligence , with a particular reference
1
14 to internal oversight_
15 MR . RUSK: Well, I do believe that any agency which
16
is involved with what I would call raw power must be a
highly
17
disciplined
agency and from the President
on down _ I think the
18
quality and character of the persons who are directors of CIA
19
and directors of FBI are very important indeed _ However , I woul-
{
20
not entirely
on that _ I would myself urge that be
8
21
put on terms of office of not more than say eight years _
1
but, L
22
of course, subject to the pleasure of the President for periods
%
23
shorter than that, because I think it is very important that
1
24
there not be individuals who are in a position to develop
power 7
8
25
that somehow is not subject to the normal controls of the people
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they
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si 13 TOpSEERET _
2226
1 who are elected _ the President and the Congress .
8 2 I don't want to speak unduly badly of the dead _
1
but
3
3 I think we allowed Mr _ J _ Edgar Hoover to develop just too much
L
power, and we ought to rotate those offices , and that thati-would
have a wholesome influence
on the way they conduct their offices
I don t see any way in which one can through organizational
7 structure or mechanics get complete protection against
an
8 accasional incidentof pure indiscipline down the line _ That
9 is present in every large organization in our
society, public
10 and private, and So
occasionally things like that will happen
11 But I think the quality is of great importance _
0
and I think that
12
during the period that I was there, I felt myself very fortunate
1
lb 13 in the men that were serving
as Director of CIA.
1
14
15
16
17
18
19
2
20
i
21
L
22
5
23
1
24 Z
8
25
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amt
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1
1 MR _ BELIN: men tioned that among the restrictions
8 2 would include . in addition to a maximum number of years
8
3 that a person could serve in a position of this" kind was the
L
4 question of whether or not the DCI should be the brother of
5 the Secretary 0f State, or for that matter the Attorney
6 General should be: the brother of the President_
7 Do you have observations along those lines?
8
MR - RUSK : Yes , I have , for what they
are worth _
I may be wrong , but I am clear _ I think that the members of
10 the National Security Council ought , in personal terns , to be
11 at arns length with the Director of the CIA and the Director
12 of the FBI _ I don t think that it was a particularly good
1
0
13 idea to have the Director of CIA and the Secretary State
1
14 as brothers . This is something George Marshall taught most
15 of those who worked with him, to keep a kind of an arm S
16 length from people above you and below you, because you don t
17 want personal relationships
to interfere with public
18 And he is special on
that particular point_
19 I am sorry I didn' t
1
20 MR . BELIN: The other aspect was Iith regard to the 8
21 Department of Justice, the Attorney General and the President _
6
22 MR . RUSK: Oh , Yes _ You know it is kind of
4
23 traditional in this post-War period that the Secretary of
1
24 State , the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Treasury 2
8
25_ remove themselves from party politics because the issues they
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you
any
of
duty _
very
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TOP SECRET
2228
1
]
deal with are supposed to be and expected to be largely
8 2
nonpartisan in character. I think our recent experience has
1
3
indicated that it would be a idea for the Attorney
1
4
General to be added to_ that group , that the Attorney
5
General be someone who is actively involved in party
6 politics as the principal law officer of this government_
7
MR . CONNOR: Or a member 0f the family of the
President, say?
MR RUSK: I would think almost any other Cabinet
10
job would be more appropriate for a member 0f the family of
11 the President than the Attorney General or the Secretary of
12 State and Secretary of Defense
1
0
13 MR _ KIRKLAND : How do you feel, Mr _ Secretary, about
1
14 the question 0f whether the DCI should be a career
intelligence
15 officer= perhaps?
16 MR _ RUSK: My feeling on that is a little bit like
17
my attitude to what extent Ambassadors should be drawn from
18 career menbers of the foreign service , that you ought to try
19 and find the best man that can There may be times when
1
20 that person would be a career man , there may be other times
i
21 When he woula come from the outside_
1
and I would a little bit
|
22 rather not try to generalize on
that particular point, because
4
23 you
really ought to find the best man you can get for the
11
E 24 job _
8
25 MR. KIRKLAND: If one of the problems confronting
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and
not
you
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TOPSEcRET
2229
7
1
the Director is substantial White House pressure to do things
8 2
that might not be prudent ,
0
do you think someone Who had an
{
3
independent reputation or means of livelihood Iight be in a
L
4 better position to protect the Agency?
5
MR RUSK : I doubt that it would turn on money_ At
6
one period
Ln E I don t know whether still do it but at
7
the moment anyone enters the Dutch Cabinet, from that moment
8
on are guaranteed a full year S salary Ivhen leave
the Cabinet, and one Of my Dutch friends referred to this as
10
the Go to Hell fund , and one reason Wvas to to increase the
11
sense of independence of the Cabinet members _
12 I doubt that Iould make all that much difference in 1
8
13 the face of the Director of the CIA _ I do believe that it is
1
14
very important that we distinguish between the White House and
15 the President _ During my period, I tried to my colleagues
16 into the frame of mind SO that if some staff person from the
17 White House called over there and said that the White House
18 would like for you to do this , then were supposed to go
19 back say who at the White House. It is one thing if they
1
a
20 were
literally conveying
a message from the President and quite
21 another thing if were not, because I was old-fashioned
1
22 enough to believe that if it was not a President speaking on
y
23 foreign policy that I was
the spokesman for foreign policy_
1
2 24 And S0 I think we ought to be careful about people
8
25 in the White House junior to the President asser ting any kind
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they they
try
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they
and
they
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L
of command role , or supervisory role, or directive role, with
8 2
regard either the CIA or the FBI _
{
3
Now , I do not think we should to remove a
L
President from that role , but my guess is that office has been
5
imunized for at least another century against abuse of that
cormand ,
MR _ CONNOR: Mx Secretary , along those lines _ do
think that it is wise for the same person to hold the
position of Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
10
for International or for National Security matters?
11
MR . RUSK: Well, that woudd not be my choice _ I have
12
taken the liberty of reminding
Mr Kissinger that he had ;
0
13
learned while he was at the White House that a
Secretary of
11
14
State must not permit
a
Henry Kissinger to be in the White
15
House_ and I suspect that that has something to do with his
16
present arrangements We had
a very personal working
17 relationship in that three-corned arrangement , the President ,
18 McGeorge Bundy and myself
as far as
foreign policy matters
19
was concerned , and later with President Johnson and Walt 1
20 Rostow i
21 Well _
1
it is important _ Dean Acheson once said in the
|
22 relations with the President and the Secretary of State that
5
23 it was of the utmost importance that both of them understand 1
2 24 at all times which one of them is President . If that adviser
8
25
on National Security Affairs_ in the White House , and the
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ant 5
]
Secretary of State and the President , all three , have an
8 2 adequate and an honorable working relationship
on a basis of
1
3 integrity in dealing with each other, there should not be any
L
problems developing _
5 MR. CONNOR : Going back to a related question of the
role of the Attorney General
1
was Attorney General Robert
Kennedy present at that meeting in your office to which you
referred?
MR _ RUSK : I don t think he was . I don t recall him
10 as being on the list, but I will have the list, and I will
11 it to the Commission _
12 MR . CONNOR: Was he personally involved in many of
1
0
13 these policy questions having to do with the Cuban situation?
11
14 MR . RUSK: He would sit from time to time with the
15 303 Committee, and occasionally would make suggestions _ some
16 of then good, and some of them that I vetoed But he was
17 sort of interested know counterinsurgency and that
18 kind of thing, and President Kennedy asked
me to let him serve
19 on the 303 Committee_ But I always felt free to take up any
1
20 problems if I needed to Ivith President Kennedy himself .
i
21 MR. KIRKLAND : Are you aware of independent |
22 contacts or relationships that he had with the CIA?
4
23 MR RUSK: and it is very hard for me dig into
1
24
that particular point, because the three people who woula
2
8
25 know about that are dead, President Kennedy , Robert Kennedy and
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in, you
any
to NO ,
key
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7
Allen Dulles _ But I would be surprised and disappointed if
8 2
President Kennedy , for example, had any kind of understanding
1
3
with Mr Dulles that much affected our
foreign policy
1
without the knowledge of the Secretary of State_ I can 't
5
swear that that was not SO ,
obviously , because we are talking_
about a
negative here But I didn't the impression that
such a channel was operating _
MR. BELIN Were there some mee tings that Allen
Dulles might have had with President Kennedy that you did not
10
know about?
11
MR _ RUSK: Oh , I am sure he dropped in on him
12 occasionally for some
additional briefings
on different 1
0
13
situations , and I am sure, I kno that J _ Edgar Hoover used
1
14
go into see the President, or the two Presidents that I served ,
15 occasionally
on his Own to report on
various things_ So the
16
answer to that is
17
MR. BELIN: To follow up with J_ Edgar Hoover ,
one
18
comment you made concerning
a maximum term of service, I
19
believe in our discussions last night You said that one of the
a
20
major concerns you had was the possibility that if an agency
21 like the FBI or CIA would be able to terrorize others
|
22 including possibly members of Congress _
5
23
MR - RUSK: Well_
1
again I am not sure I am right on 1
E 24 this, but I have developed over the Years
a strong aversion to
8
25 monopoly of sources of information on important matters _ And I
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TOPSECRET
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1
1
am a little concerned to have all information in the Federal
8 2
government on internal security matters come through one agency
1
3
and one head of that agency _ I am just a little worried about
L
4 the need for a little more
diversity_
I don t te know how
5
to Work this out, but I would be reluctant to have one man
play a decisive role in making judgments about internal
security problems in this country_
Now one answer to that might be , I defer to a
member of your Commission , might be closer and more effective
10 supervision by the Attorney General of the FBI and closer and
11
more
effective supervision by the CIA by the statutory members
12
of the National Security Council_
1
8 13
MR . BELIN: Secretary Rusk , last night we talked
1
14 about your concern that the intelligence community must be
15 urged to have priorities in its job to reflect the regional
16 trends of American foreign policy
So that they don t always
17 develop
an insatiable appetite for information on everything thal
18 might be relevant to American foreign policy_
19 MR_ RUSK : Well_
1
I am aware of the fact that there
1
i
20 has been discussion of priorities from time to time_ and we do _
1
21 in fact, use the concept of priorities in ters of the
|
22 expenditures of resources both in people and money - But I
v
23 think we might , we might press that further and be somewhat 11
E 24 more restrictive in the types of activities that are conducted
8
25 in particular countries _ I mean , it doesn t make much differenc
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and
not
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ant 8
1
to the United States _ for example_
1
as to what happens in
2 Burundi I do not know how much effort are putting into 8
1
5 Burundi_
1
but shouldn t be doing it because it's there and
1
4 we need a book full of information on Burundi_ We ought to do
5 it as a direct instrument of foreign policy rather than some
6 momentum of the intelligence community working
on its own
7 (Discussion off the record.)
MR _ RUSK: I think there is a need for supervision of
intelligence activities by policy officers who thenselves ought
10 to make some policy judgments about the kinds of intelligence
11 that are useful rather than leave this question to the
12
insatiability of an
intelligence community for whom no amount
1
13
of information is superfluous _
6
1
14 So I think every or so there ought to be careful
15
thought to priorities and directions and maybe types of
16
activities .
17 MR BELIN Now Secretary Rusk
1
one comment you made
18
last night concerned your observations about the very fact that
19
in our
country people write books about the CIA
1
MR . RUSK : Well
1
I would not wish to be pressed to 20
8
21
name individual countries , but I think one of the tributes to |
22
the constitutionality of our system is that people can work in
4
these agencies and then go out and write books about them and
23
1
survive In Iost countries I know if that happened would
24
2
8
25
be struck down by a truck , run over in the countryside and
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they
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they
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TOp seeRET
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L
that would be the ena of it.
8 2 But they do that here, they write best sellers Well
1
5
it is a very troublesome thing when You into this kind of
L
4 kiss and tell writing in this particular field, and it is a
5 danger to which the intelligence community ,
I suppose , is
inevitably exposed to_
MR : BEL IN: Do you feel there should be: greater
restrictions on the contractual enforcement of Agency contracts
with employees not' to
divulge such information?
10
MR _ RUSK: Well, I have suggested that you ahold
11 of the departure statement which I signed with the Department
12 of State_ It is very far-reaching in terms of my pledge with
1
13 respect to the kinds of information that I in the first place
1
14 woula not take away with me , and secondly would not reveal
15 it cites about twenty sections of the U.S _ Code which
16 purport to provide the statutory back-up for the requirements
17 that they cited in that statenent Whether still use it
18 after the Freedom of Information Act, I just don t know _
19 But I do thihk there is a very important problem here about
1
20 whose information it is when people cone in and work in i
21 sensitive jobs in government_ There is still confusion, as I
L
22 understand it, about whose it is. I mean, what about people
v
23 who squirrel away in their attics classified material take 1
Z 24 them off with them , and I gather now when die those papers
8
25 become the properties of their families. I think my Own
feeling
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and
they
they
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FOp SECRET
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L
1
is that if it is not clear, if it is clear in the statutes
8 2
they to be forced , and if it is not clear, then it ought
1
5
to be clarified by statute as to whose information it is when
L
4
one is working in a government department , particularly in
5
sensitive departments , and obtain such material- This is one
6
of the messy fringes
on our situation which I think we haven t
7
straightened out carefully enough _
8
MR = BELIN: Another comment You had from an overall
basis about the CIA was that because of its origin With the
10
OSS , that might have affected the type. of activities to which
11
the Agency addressed itself in peacetime_ Do you have any
12
comnents on that? 1
8
13
MR RUSK: Well, this has
a
bearing , I think, not
1
14
only on what people thought at the time that the National
15 Security Act of 1947 , as enacted;, was , but also a good many of
16 the personnel in CIA were brought over from oss _ and it may
17 well be that some of the activities that conducted during
18
war time appeared to be entirely appropriate in a 'Cold War
19 situation_ But I think also that they were even more influenced 1
8
20
by the events 0f the immediate post-War period.
21
We had reduced our armed forces to a point where the
6
22 Joint Chiefs of Staff told me in 1946 that we did not have a
y
23 division in our Army , not a group in our Air Force , that could 1
2 24 be rated ready for combat Our ships Were
being put in moth-
8
25 balls as fast as we could find berths for them_ and those that
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1
remained afloat were manned by skeleton crews Our Defense
8 2
Budget in '47 , '48 was coming down
1
came down to almost s11
3
5
billion , $1l.3 billion , on its way down to a target of s10
L
4 billion _ During that period Joseph Stalin, looking out across
5
the West, and not seeing
any divisions _ tried to keep the
northwest province of Iran, demanded the two eastern provinces
of Turkey, he ignored the peace treaty with the countries of
Eastern Europe with respect to free elections and their political
9
future, and he gave support to the guerrilas going to Greece,
10
he pulled the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, he barricaded
11
Berlin, and he gave the principal go ahead light for the North
12
Koreans to go after South Koreans 1
8
13
NOw that was the origin of the Cold War , but all of
1
14
the revisions of historians are to the contrary , but that's
15
another story_ But in that kind of an a tmosphere it is
16 understandable that the United States government and the CIA
17 consider that we were in a pretty embattled situation. It was
18
not until about 1950 under the leadership of the Secretary of
19 State, and against the opposition: of the then-Secretary of 3
8
20 Defense that we began to build up our armed forces again _
21 Now , this still is a pretty rough world situation and
|
22 if there are ways in which we can do things by covert means that
4
23 would hold off the time when we might have consider whether 1
2 24
you use major military means , I think We ought to maintain
8
25 that capability. And I can never
generalize against CIA-type
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1
1
activities, because I was a student in Germany and watched the
8 2
storm troopers take the public platforms and the streets away
3
3
from the ~democratic parties of Germany And I would have
L
4
been delighted in those if there had been CIA 1 S in
5
Britain and France and the United States that could have come
6
in there and found ways to the democratic parties of
Germany , and the failure to do so resulted in 50 million
people being killed _
So I feel very S trongly that although we ought to,
10
that a President, Secretary of State_ and Secretary of Defense
11
must keep this sort of thing very
much under control and take
12 responsibility for it, that we must have this capability_ ;
0
13
MR _ BELIN: Do you have any
observations concerning
1
14
the' effectiveness or possible changes in the President' s
15 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as an
oversight vehicle
or
16
a related vehicle to CIA?
17
MR _ RUSK: Well_
1
I don t want to do a disservice to
18 people who have rendered dedicated service I have had the
19 impression over the years
the Foreign Intelligence Advisory
1
8
20 Board gets to be more gung-ho than anybody else , and that
21 sometimes some of these things
are urged by the Foreign
|
22 Intelligence Advisory
Board which operationally may not make
5
23 much sense _ So I think that it is all right to have then 0
2 24 advise, but they should not be permitted to' make the decisions
8
25
or to influence the decisions unduly .
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1
1 MR. BELIN: In your opinion , are they an effective
8 2 oversight agency at the present time?
1
3 MR. RUSK: Oh , I don 't think they are effective _
1
4 at least in my experience have not been effective in the
5 kind of oversight that is really needed Ana I think the
oversight should be given those who are in positions
established by our Constitution and statutes the President,
and the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense _
MR . BELIN: Secretary Rusk , there have been recent
10 allegations that the CIA was in some way involved With Lee
11 Harvey Oswald There have been also allegations that perhaps
12 the State Department did not send over to the Warren Commission
1
8
13 all of its files concerning Oswald and particularly about his
14
trips abroad _
15
Do you have any comments concerning either of these
16
allegations?
17 MR - RUSK: Well I never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald
18
until the assassination, and we went through what I thought
19 was a very intensive and thorough examination of the question
1
20 as to whether foreign government might have been involved
a
21
with Lee Harvey Oswald , because that could have been an issue |
22
of war and peace _
5
23 Now
1
I personally was convinced that there was no
1
24
indication that any foreign government was involved, and SO 2
8
25
testified to the Warren Commission , and my testimony is
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by
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1
available to you _
8 2
I have never had any , the slightest
reason to believe
3
3 that Lee Harvey Oswald was
working for or pursuant to anything
1
that came of CIA whatever and I must say , I really believe
5 that anyone who charges that anyone in the United States
government was involved in the assassination of Kennedy without
hard proof is guilty of just sheer evil.
MR _ BELIN: Did ever come across any information
in. any manner whatsoever that indicated that Oswald was in
10
any way connected with the FBI?
11 MR . RUSK: No _
12 Let me say that we did know of his travels and things
1
0
13 of that sort_ I am a little shocked to hear that there were
2
14 materials in the State Department that Were not turned over
15 to the Warren Commission , because the order was to turn them
16 all over
17 MR BELIN: When you say you were shocked to
18 you mean shocked that the allegation is that?
19 MR - RUSK: Shocked by the allegations _
1
yes 3
8
20 MR - BELIN = To your knowledge _
was there any
21 materials that were ever in the State Department files or
|
22 other government files that you know of that were not turned
4
23 over?
11
2 24 MR. RUSK: Not to my knowledge _ but sometimes when
8
25 you are desperately looking for a piece of paper, it is often
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you
hear ,
any
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1
1
very hard to find it, and it is entirely possible that whatever
8 2
the instructions might have been that there might have been
1
5
some- thing lying around and somebody didn t transmit it_
L
Whether this was simply through bureaucratic clumsiness or
5
whether it was through indiscipline I just can t say
MR . GRAY : Mr _ Secretary, one
point that came up last
night was the question of oversight of CIA collectionfefforts _
Now the covert action is supervised by what was then the 303
Committee, and you testified that sone sensitive or potentially
10
risky types of collections were presented to and ather
11 members of the Administration _
12
What about the to overseas collection by 0
0
clandestine techniques is there any supervision outside of the
1
14
CIA of that?
15
MR _ RUSK: I don t believe that it is necessary for
16
the President and Cabinet officers to into the details of
17 collection .
1
unless involve methods and techniques which
18 could raise major issues of policy
19 In other words _ I don t think we need to know who are 3
8
20 the agents and things of that sort_ I do think that the
21 Director of the CIA ought to be in charge of his own shop , and
|
22 I ought to think that each one of our Ambassadors abroad ought
v
23 to have complete
access to whatever is being done in the country 1
E 24 to which they are assigned by any representative of the United
8
25 States government _
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13
get
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amt 16
L
1 President Kennedy wrote a letter to all Ambassadors
8 2
on
that particular subject . Now , as I checked around among
1
3 different Ambassadors
1`
a good of them exercised that
1
4 right under that letter_ There were others who simply didn'+
5 because they didn t think it was worthwhile or necessary, or
things of that sort.
7 (Discussion the record.)
8
MR - GRAY : NOw , when the CIA has agents or sources
9 of information in this country, whether because are, let
10 uS
say foreign diplomats _
1
or in situations such as you had in
11 the Miami area with the Cuban emigre communi is there
12 anyone in a
position comparable to that of the Ambassador
1
4
13 overseas who is outside of CIA and can monitor this to
1
14 activity, to your knowledge?
15 MR RUSK: I think in detail_
16 MR GRAY: Would you think that there should be?
17 MR- RUSK: No more than anyone outside of the
18 Department monitored these thousands of cables a that go
19 out of the Department of State
1
20 MR GRAY : Would you think that there should be sone
i
21 need for supervision of that kind of activity? L
22 MR _ RUSK: Well, it would require one man couldn t
5
23 do it_ It would require substantial staff and , well who is
1
24 that staff? To whom is he going to report? I just don t
E
8
25 think that is too much of a
problem_ actually
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off
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not
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L
1
MR . BELIN: With regards to the question' of staff ,
8 2
do you think a Joint Committee of Congress might have too
3
3
powerful
a staff So far as the effective operation of the
1
4
Agency is concerned if we were to adopt that approach of
5
Congressional' oversight?
6
MR _ RUSK : Well_
1
if they approach it on the same
basis as approached the Joint Atomic Energy Committee , I
think that would not be al1 that much of a problem _
9
MR - BELIN: You mentioned the Miami area To your
10 knowledge , did Castro had penetration of Ihat pent on in
11
the Cuban exile community in Miami?
12
MR . RUSK: I forget the detailed evidence, but I 1
0
13 always assumed that he did have then penetrated .
2
14
MR BELIN: Are there any questions any members
15 the Commission?
16 MR . GRISWOLD : One_ of the things that has come to us
17 is the explanation for some of the things which the CIA did
18 from 1966 to 1973 domestically which had caused concern with
19 a result of pressures from the 'President _
1
i
20 Now
1
how can the CIA be guarded against
pressures
21 from the President? I recognize this is an
extraordinarily 1
22 difficult question _
5
23 MR _ RUSK : It is a difficult question , and in trying 1
2 24 to find the right answer to that question you don t want to
8
25 create a situation where CIA is independent of the President _
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7
2
MR _ GRISWOLD: Right .
8
MR _ RUSK: So you have start with 'the kind of man
3
3
You have as President _ Hovever , I think that
L
4
MR GRISWOLD: And I took the time period in to
5
indicate both Presidents sO that it is a
political question
6
MR _ RUSK : Right _
I would think that the key that would be that
8
such questions should be discussed by the statutory members
9 of the National Security Council_ It would be very difficult
10
for a President to abuse his powers
with people sitting there
11
who have a sense of the tradition of their office and who'
12
can pull a President up by the coattails and say nOwv , wait 1
6
13
a minute , nOw this is out of bounds let s don 't go down that
1
14 trail.
15
MR . GRISWOLD : What about the of operation?
16 MR RUSK : Well some of us did not serve President
17 Kennedy did not serve President Kennedy very well on that
18 because of just that factor _ For example
Ta
well_
1
we were all
19
new in our relations with each other , but in retrospect I should
3
i
20 have insisted that a
crucial question be asked of the Joint
21 Chiefs of Staff and that is , if you were going to do this
|
22 operation with American forces , what would You consider your
4
23 requirements to be? And that is, ask the Joint Chiefs to come 0
2 24 up with a plan to do this same operation with American forces
8
25 And I can guarantee that what they would say would have
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not
7
to
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You
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]
1 been necessary for the job would have been in such sharp
8 2 contrast to the capabilities of this brigade that that itself
3
3 might well have squashed the whole thing. Since this was a
L
4 CIA operation, I think the Joint Chiefs were perhaps a little
5 timid
Tc De
well, no , let S it the other way They were not
6 asked for the' kind of professional military judgment to which
77 the President should have been exposed_ did comment on
8 it but in a rather, I thought at the time a somewhat casual
9 way , because it was
not strictly their business , you see.
10 Now_
1
I think we learn a lot of mistakes in a very
11 hard way with the of and I think that some of those,
12 some of the reasons for that mistake ought to be impressed
0
0
13 upon people' s minds just as the mistakes made under the general
1
14
situation called Watergate_
15
MR _ BELIN: Do you mean to imply that the military
16
~should have taken over the operation?
17
MR ._ RUSK: No_
1
no , No , no , But a_ seasoned ,
18
professional military judgment on
the point as to whether such
19 a brigade had the chance of a snowflake in hell_
20
MR _ KIRKLAND : Do you think there is a built-in
i
21
tendency in the CIA with the background of the way this was L
22
evolved _
0
toward a degree of adventurism which needs fairly
4
23 severe checking?
11
24
MR _ RUSK : It is possible that at different periods
2
8
25
therer might have been those who were too much the eager
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They
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2246
1
beavers , but my concern now is that they have had the
8 2 daylights scared out of them and they will crawl off under
1
3 their shells and will be too timid_
1
4 MR - BEL IN: Dr . Shannon , I believe you had a
5 question?
6 DR _ SHANNON : Yes _
7
I wondered ,
1
you said that this is on covert activities]
and again, this is only partially
a responsibility of this
Committee , but it does affect our concerns because the
10
back-up for the covert activities very often has domestic
11
implications _ So I wonder _ you say we should keep this
12
capability, yet apparently originally it resided , right after
1
0
13
the Second World War
1
in the State Department, and the
2
14
suggestion has been made that perhaps a small
{
covert capability
15
could be in the Stata 'Department , and that this would perhaps
16
help the CIA if it were rid of covert business to concentrate
17
or
intelligence.
18
Do you have any views on this?
lb
19
MR - RUSK: Well, it is very hard for uS to lose an
1
20
organization in our governmertal structure, to tuck it away
8
21
where nobody hears about it and it doesn t come before |
22
parliamentary review and things of that sort_ And maybe we
4
23
should have tried that at the beginning , because SO much of
1
24
CIA s activities are all practical purposes overt, and
2
8
25
maybe We might have had something called
a Central Information
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amt 21
]
Agency , and ther tucked something away somewhere that would
8 2 be as secret as some of those agencies in other governments
8
3 that operate in this field_ But I just don t know whether
1
4 that would work in our particular complicated , Constitutional
5 system where the powers of Congress are always involved , and
6 it i8 difficult for uS to hide things
away
7 MR _ SHANNON I have a couple of more questions , 1f
8 I may .
9 MR . BEL IN : Go ahead, and then General Lemnitzer has
10 some
11 MR - SHANNON Do you have any views as to the general
12 without going into specifics , the general aspect of domestic
1
$
13 activities of the CIA? And clearly , one 0f the problems with
1
14 this Commission is the clear and conflicting, well, clear , clear
15
necessity 6f intelligence and secrecy on the one hand, but
16
conflicting claims of constitutional rights and civil rights
17
for individual citizens 0f the United States.
18 MR . RUSK: It seems to me , sir, that they are two
19
differert questiors_ One is the bureaucratic question as to
2
20
whether one agency
is intruding
onto the proper responsibilities
i
21
of another agency . To me, that is not all that much of a big L
22
deal,
1
and that occurs all of the time all over government, and
y
23 I am sure that the FBI has; stepped outside of its assignment
1
24
occasionally.
2
8
25 But the other question you have mentioned , the
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1
1 question .of the Constitutional rights of American citizens _
8 2 from whatever source, I think is very important Last Year I
1
3 testified before Senator Muskie' s Committee in which I
L
4 expressed some doubt about subjecting all surveillance type
5 activities of the unusual type to the supervision of the
courts in this country on the ground that I was a little trouble
about the idea of getting the judges into this kind of
business , because it is a mean
and dirty business.
Since then, I have rather changed my mind , and I
10 am inclined to think that where the government feels that there}
11 must be the types of surveillance which could intrude on
12
constitutional rights , that for whatever it might be, foreign
1
6
13 policy, national security
or otherwise for American citizens
11
14
and resident aliens, that that should be done under the
15
supervision of a court_
16
Now , it is going to be difficult to state that in
17
such a way as to exclude the diplomatic community, and I do
18
not think We want to extend constitutional rights to the
19
diplomatic community, because do not have the duties of
1
20
citizenship to go along with it_
8
21
MR _ SHANNON : One other quick one here. I don 't L
22
ant to pre-empt the General who
has something , but you
y
23
mentioned the CIA sometimes you believe, got into some
0
24
activities that were questionable because they had the money _
2
8
25
They are
exempted," essentially , frcm a number of the accounting
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7
1 responsibilities of other Federal agencies _
8 2 Is this essential to their functions, or do you
3
3 believe that some
regular appropriation control over them
L
similar to the State Department and other woula be possible
5 without destroying their role?
6 MR . RUSK: I am inclined to think that at least part
7 of the CIA budget ought not to be on the public record . It
ma} be that there is a part of it that can but I think therel
to be some covert money that is available to the CIA
10 handled by people in the Congress who understand what is being
11 done and the need for this for covert funds .
12 I personally would not like to see this handled in
1
0
13 the normal budgetary processes of the government_ And for
1
14 example, we give away an enormous amount of information every
15 year in these large budget presentations of the Department of
16 Defense to the Congress , and I think certainly in the
17
sensitive agencies we
overdo public knowledge to some extent-
18 MR . LEMNITZER: We have had a
suggestion that if the
19 government continues to support covert operations that the
2
20
covert operations should be removed from the CIA and in:.a
i
21 central intelligence group , which was the arrangement in the 6
22
early days between the transition from osS to CIA_
4
23 Do you think such an arrangement would solve any of
1
24
the problems that are involved in carrying out effective covert
2
8
25
operations?
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7
1 MR _ RUSK: I can imagine there could' be some
8 2 advantage to a
reorganization that would change the names all
8
5 arourd , because CIA has gotten to be a kind 'of a slogan for
1L15
4 propoganda , both overseas and at home _ And sometimes a fresh
5 start might help in that regard_
6 But I don " t believe that you would divert energetic
7 and opposition Congressmen or investigative reporters or any
8 people of that sort from trying to locate whatever it is we
9 are talking about , ard I am sure they would discover it. The
10 simple fact is that we are a government that just doesn t know
11 how to keep our mouths shut , and SO I don "t think you are going
12 to succeed in hiding
some such agency. But I can see that it
1
0
13 might be desirable at some point to start over and change the
2
14 names .
15 As you recall, in the foreign aid business we have
16 changed the name about every four or five Years, when it runs
17 out of gas and needs a fresh start And SO I think we could
18 do it again.
19 MR - BEL IN : Secretary Connor do you have any other
{
20
question?
a
21 Do you have more, General? |
22 MR LEMNITZER: No
4
23 MR CONNOR: Mr _ Secretary, we have received evidence
1
24 about a feud that developed between the FBI and the CIA when E
8
25 J. Edgar Hoover was the FBI Director_ And the testimony
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TOp SeeRET _
2251
1
indicates that under his instructions there
was a lack of
8 2 effective cooperation between the FBI and the CIA , at least
1
3 in certain respects during
a
period of time, and , therefore_
1
1
there was pressure on the CIA to do some things in the domestic
5 field that otherwise would have been done bY the FBI or by
5 joint action.
7 I wonder if in light of that experience , of Which I
am sure you are aware, you would have any recommendations for
a clear delineation of responsibilities as between the FBI and
10 the CIA , and particularly with respect to what is done in the
11 United Seates?
12 MR. RUSK: Well, I can understand some confusion
1
0
13 might have arisen because the Director of Central Intelligence
1
14 is also the Director of Central Intelligence for the community
15 as a whole , and we used to daily reports from the CIA which
16 were all source reports _ I mean , I could recogniza a good many
17 of these reports as
coming out of State Department cables _
1
for
18 example, and I knew others probably came from the FBI _
19 Now _
1
it may well be that that coordinating function of
{
20 DCI led to some staff support in his own agency on some of
8
21 these , what some people might call internal security questions 7
22 But I think a more important point is if you to assign
5
23
functions , it is very hard to do it in terms of geography ,
1
24
because espionage and counterespiorage is a problem that exists
2
9
25
in the United States as well as abroad . It is very hard to say
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7
1 that as soon as you hit the boundary of the United States you
8 2 transfer the whole business fron one operation to another
3
3 because I think you run into a good deal of trouble that way .
1
4 It is true that there was some lack of effective
5 cooperation between the CIA ana the FBI at times , and this is
6 partly a matter of personality, and is one of the reasons that
I feel that these people ought to be 0n terms not to exceed
8 eight years. I testified to Senator Muskie S Subcommittee that
9
talking to J _ Edgar Hoover was about like talking to President
10 DeGaulle , and , you know , there is only one DeGaulle and there
11 is only one J Edgar Hoover , sO I anticipate this problem is
12 not going to be repeated any time soon _
{
6
13 But, I do think that there ought to be a close
1
14
working relationship _
15 Now bear in mind ,
1
gentlemen , that there is a very
16
lively and active exchange of information between different
17 elements of the intelligence community, and I have no doubt
18
that other agencies have built up files which include a lot of
19 raw data from the FBI , even though it was not in that agency' s
2
20
principal charter to have, or to collect, that kind of
8
21
information _ For example, in the State Department where 95 7
22 percent of our jobs , at least , are rated as sensitive , there
4
23
is investigation of applicants , many of whom are not hired.
1
24
There 18 investigation of officers on the job_ That is
2
8
25
renewed , I think , every five years to bring their security
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l clearances up to date. Every time you move from one security
8 2 clearance to another, another investigation _ There
3
3 must be tens 0f thousands of files on individuals in the State
1
4 Department, but a lot of that material is from the :FBI _
5 I think, if we could
~ M I think we hava an
6 opportunity now to develop
a more cooperative working relation-
ship within the intelligence community, and make it clear that:
8 CIA is not responsible for what would normally be interpreted
9 to be internal security, but I would not exclude CIA from a
10
lively interest in the operations of foreign governments in this
11
country, because You cannot separate those from their activitiesl
12 abroad.
1
0
13 MR _ BELIN Dean Griswold?
2
14 MR. GRISWOLD : Were you familiar with the fact that
15 mail between the Soviet Union and the United States was
being
16
intercepted and opened during all of the time you were
17
Secretary of State?
18 MR. RUSK: I think I was of the fact. I didn t know
19
to what extent, and I think we did make some adjustments there
1
20
to relax on a
good many publications and things of that sort
a
21
where there was no particular _
1
seemed to be no particular, 6
22
problem _ I was curious the other to read a
manuscript that
4
23 came the other to the University of Georgia Press that at
1
24
the beginning of the Republic there was a
rigorous scrutiny
2
8
25
of the mails for quite
a long time before people began to move
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So
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2254
7
in to institute some privacy in the mails_ I will try and get
8 2 some citations on that for the staff to look at But this is
1
3 not new in our
history _
1
4 MR _ GRISWOLD: I was not thinking of publications , but
5 of letters. Did copies of such letters ever come to you in
6 intelligence reports?
7 MR = RUSK: No It wouldn t come to me in that form,
sir. Normally it woula come to me as a piece of information,
and it would normally have some introductory phrase , and this
10 was for the purpose
1
I suppose, of protecting sources , some
11
introductory phrase saying usually reliable sources , or something
12 that sort_
1
8
13
Then if I wanted to prick
up my ears and ask about
1
14
the source for a particular item , I could do so and I would be
15
told. I don t recall any instance , any information that came
16 out of this mail that aver caused me to ask for a source, and
17
it turned out be opening mail_
18 MR BELIN : Mr Kirkland , do you have any questions?
19
MR _ KIRKLAND : I have a couple, Mr Secretary_
1
20
Do you recall any constant, repeated concern by
i
21
President Johnson to find out foreign
sources of support for |
22
the domestic dissident groups _
1
that this was an issue that he
5
23 was continually concerned with?
11
24
MR . RUSK: Well, we were interested in that point. I
E
9
25
think that we ware inclined to assume that it was
occurring,
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FOP SEGRET
2255
L
because it would be a perfectly normal and natural thing
to
8 2 occur under the circumstances of that period.
3
3 I didn t have any real doubt in my mind, although I
L
4 don 't have in my mind a
list of citations I can give
you for
5 hard proof , but I am sure it occurred , and there were in terns
6 of movement of money and movement of people and things of that
7 sort.
8
Off the record .
9
(Discussion off the record.)
10 MR_ RUSK: There Were black operations going
on all
11 of the time in this country.
12 MR - KIRKLAND : Do you see any apparent reason why
1
0
13 the CIA should not properly attempt to try to find out what
1
14 those sources were?
15 MR _ RUSK : No , I think somebody has got to.
16 MR. KIRKLAND: Do you have any doubts about that
17
being
a proper operation of the CIA?
18 MR - RUSK: I don t think SO . I think that in terms
19 of action that it shoula not be CIA S action in the sense of
2
20
breaking and entering and things of that sort- I think that
8
21
the FBI ought to be the action responsive
agency in this L
22
country , as I have said.
y
23 MR . KIRKLAND : Domestic in terms of working
overseas?
1
24 MR. RU SK : Oh _
1
overseas , I think it is essential for 2
8
25
CIA to try to run down that kind of thing because we are the
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|
1 targets of a many political systems .
8 2
MR _ BELIN : Secretary Rusk, as a general overview _
1
3
3 you might relate to the Commission the comment you had last
L
night concerning the fact that there is no real substitute for
5 the getting of people of character and quality
on the job, and
6 sometimes mistakes are made by the frailties of human nature_
7 MR - RUSK : Well, now that I am permanently
a
private
citizen and think back on the years during and since World War
II, I just don t believe that there is any way in which you
10 can guarantee through organizational devices or arrangements
11 that you escape the frailties of human nature_ There are going
12 to be mistakes, mistakes of judgment.
of us who have
1
0
13 served in government have had our share of them. I have had
1
14 mine . And therefore,
1
the greatest importance has to be assigned
15 to the character of those who are carrying the responsibility
16 as well as insistence upon adherence through all ranks of the
17
policies established by the President and through his delegated
18 deputies_ I happen to believe that in the Executive Branch of
the government that those in civilaan clothes are as responsible
3
20 to the President as are people in uniform_ and that otherwise 8
21 our system of democracy would break because nobody
L
22 elected these people in civilian clothes to make policy or
v
23 appeal to a higher law and defy the President _
1
24 elected the President and the Congress to 2
8
25 determine the policies of the government , and SO I think we
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Any
19
down ,
They
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L
l ought to look for people of the highest competence and the
8 2 strongest characters to take these jobs of responsibility.
1
5 and then we will have to upon them. I do not see any way
L
in which can guarantee that there would not be mistakes
5 and failures and occasional stepping across the bounds
6 MR . CONNOR: Mr_ Secretary, would you comment on the
obedience of a Cabinet official or
highly placed Federal
8 official who was ordered by the President to do some thing that
violates the law clearly
or is unconstitutional?
10 MR - RUSK: No _
1
no I was once instructed by
11
President Kennedy to make an expenditure which my _ lawyers told
12 me was unlawful_
1
that the money was not for that kind of
1
4
13 purpose, and I spoke to the Attorney General about it said
1
14 what do I do . And I think his reply was well
1
if you go to
15 prison , your salary will continue while you
are in prison_
16 Well, that was not very helpful- But anyhow _
(
I
17 refused to make the expenditure and told the President and
18 he did not pursua it_
19
No, I think that there can come a
time when if a
1
20
President persisted then the Cabinet officer would have to
8
21
resign , if that is what the President wanted to do _ |
22 MR - CONNOR: I agree With that interpretation_
v
23 MR - BEL IN: I also think you commented that things
1
24
sometimes don t go right anywhere else either, including the 2
8
25
law as well as business and labor, and sO we can t always expect
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you
and
why ,
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2258
1
1 to go right in government. Is that a fair summary?
8 2
MR _ RUSK: institution is going to have its
1
3 problems because we are all people with feet of clay , and
L
those feet of clay are going to show once in awhile _
5 MR . BELIN: Do you have any other comments you want
5 to make to the Commission in closing?
MR . RUSK: I think my strongest concern, gentlemen ,
1
is that during this present period of nervousness and Sensa-
tinalism and investigation and reassessment that we not come
10 out of this period with
a serious crippling of our
intelligence
11 community and of our capability to engage in certain operations
12 which are in lieu of war
1
0
13 NOw
1
at the present time there is a strong mood of
1
14 withdrawal from world affairs among the American people- You
15 can look at a lot of polls and investigations and get impres-
16 sions around the country, and one gets the feeling
t the
17 present time that the American people would not support the
18 use of American armed forces anywhere in the world unless
19 there were a direct attack upon a territory of the United
3
20 States itself_
i
21 Now that could mean that there could be steady 1
22 inroads on what we would think of was the Free Worla by those
4
23 who were committed to impose something else on the Free World _ 1
24 And we can find ourselves in a situation Where little by Z
8
25 little a situation builds up where we are in such a desparate
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amt 33 2259
8
1 situation then that we have to face the agony of a nuclear
3
8 2 decision
1
and then We are all dead _
1
3 And I would hope that we would maintain a capability
1
4 of trying to deal with some of these situations at an early
5 stage through careful and sophisticated political activity that
6 would help 4s avoid the horrendous decisions that might lie
at the end of the trail if the present trends continue too far
into the future_
MR . BELIN: Are there any other questions bY the
10 members of the Commission?
11 MR _ SCHWARZER: Dave , do you have a minute for a
12 question?
1
0
13 MR. BELIN : Yes
1
14 MR . SCHWARZER: I wanted to ask you , Secretary Rusk ,
15 whether you thought in line with your suggestion that we should
16 attract the best possible
men for the job of DCI, whether it
17 would help to assign Cabinet level status to that position and
18 whether that would perhaps make him a more effective person
19 in the efforts to coordinate the activities of the intelligence
2
20 community and how that would work?
8
21 MR RUSK: I am not sure that that is very important_ L
22
quite frankly, because the Cabinet is not that important as a
4
23 corporate body . In our system, the Cabinet 'really is not a
1
24 policymaking group _ The chain of comand goes from individual
2
8
25 Cabinet officer to the President, and the Cabinet is usually
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ant 34
TOPseerET_
2260
1
an
information exchanging body.
8 2 And secondly, I' just don't believe we
improve things
1
5 very much by the continual inflation of titles_ When I became
L
4
Assistant Secretary of State, there were three.
0 I think now
5 there must be eighteen people in the State Department that
6 either carry the title or have the equivalent rank -
7 I remember once one of our experienced former
Ambassadors was
cautioning
on this and he said, baar in mind
that the term Madam started as the address for a Quzer _ Now ,
10 sO I really don t believe that changes in title make
any
11 difference , and I don t believe adding him to the Cabinet
12 will_ I think it is much Iore important that ke be closely
1
0
13 with and always present at the meetings of the National Security)
1
14 Council because that is where the real decisions havz to be
15 made .
16 MR . KIRKLAND : Mr Secretary, I have the impression
17 that in the Foreign Service , the Office of the Inspector
18 General is a
fairly critical
one and has a substantial amount
19
of authority and
an important role in the administration _ Do
1
20 you feel that a strengthening of that operation inside of the
5
21 CIA would be desirable to help? |
22 MR RUSK : Of an Inspector General type operation
v
23
inside of the CIA?
1
24 MR - KIRKLAND : Yes _
2
8
25 MR . RUSK : I think that would be very useful_ I also
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2261
think it might be well
8 2 MR . KIRKLAND : It is true that it is a
very important
{
3 operation.
1
4 MR _ RUSK: It and I tried to strengthen it in
5 some respects when I was there I think also the Inspector
6 General of it or the Inspectors of the State Department ought
to check when they make their visits to Embassies , check with
the Ambassadors on the extent to which he is fully in charge
of all activities by all officials of, the American government,
10 whatever their agency or department in his own Embassy in the
11 country to which he is assigned and that this letter of
12 President Kennedy S , which is a matter of public record , shoula
{
0 13 ba emphasized So that if anything does go wrong , it is the
2
14 Ambassador who is held responsible in the first instance.
15 MR _ BELIN : That assumes the Ambassador will be
16 tight-lipped
on all occasions , I assume?
17 MR _ RUSK: Would be what?
18 MR _ BELIN : Tight-lipped at all times?
19 MR - RUSK : but I think on matters of this
{
20 sort he is likely to be , because of the consequences of his
8
21
not being , at least in the country Where he is assigned . 7
22 MR . BEL IN : Any other comments that you woula like
4
23 to make for the Commission , sir?
1
24 MR . RUSK: I don t think So 2
8
25 MR . BELIN: Thank you very much for coming up here
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Yes ,
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1
1 and bearing with
uS last night. Thank You , very much .
8 2
Now we have one more witness this morning.
1
3
If you would raise your right hand to be sworn , please
1
4 this is Mrs _ Sammie Newman , a Notary Public for the District
5 of Columbia.
6
MRS _ NEWMAN : Do you swear to tell the truth, the
7
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, s0 you God?
8
MR _ GRAY: I do_
9
MR , BELIN : Thank' you very much.
10 TESTIMONY OF GORDON GRAY
11 MR _ BELIN : I wonder if you woula state your name
12 for the record , sir.
1
8
13 MR _ GRAY : My name is Gordon no middle
2
14 initial
15 MR - BELIN: Mr. you have had quite extensive
16 service with the government of this country, and I wonder if
17 you could brie summarize that for the Commission?
18 MR _ GRAY : It would be easier, sir, if I use a few
19 notes_ I think we can do it more quickly.
1
8 20 Well_
1
I served in the United States Army from 1942
21 to 1945 , first as a
private, being released as a Captain_
1
22 This Was near the close of the War.
v
23 I came back . I came to Washington,
I served overseas 1
2 24 I might say in General Bradley S Advanced Headquarters while
8
25 I was overseas as a juniormost officer in his Advanced
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
STOp Seeret
DECLASSIFICATION ANDIQR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT )
M
dhs_'~R Ait.
Pnsz &7
7+4
8E3R44
2( #fk 75
2262~2294)
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help
Gray ,
Gray,
flY
6185 )
8)
(r
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2263
1
1
Headquarters . I cama back out of the Army in 1947 and became
8 2 an Assistant Secretary of the Army in 1949, and became Under
3
3 Secretary of the Army and then Secretary of the Army _ Ihich
1
4
post I held until some time before the Korean War broke out_
5 I then became a Special Assistant President
Truman for the purpose
of writing
a report on
foreign economic
policy which was published in November , I guess , of that year.
After the election _
1
in 1951, I came back to Washington at
President Truman S request to organize an organizatior which
10 was somewhat abortive _ known as the Psychological Strategy
11
Board , but which me in very close contact, in contact,
12
with the intelligence matters , obviously_
1
6 13
MR . BEL IN Where physically did that Board meet?
1
14
MR _ GRAY : That Board physically met in 712 Jackson
15
Place . As a matter of fact, that is where it Was organized
and created _
16
17
MR . BELIN : Pardon me Go ahead _
18
When you and I met this morning at 712 Jacksor Place
19
at our Headquarters , it was like going home to you in a sense,
270
wasn t it?
20
8
21
MR _ GRAY : It was , and that S not the end of as 7
22
you will
see in a moment
4
23
In 1953 I was a member of the so-called Jackson
1
24
Committee = and I think it was called the President" S Committee
2
8
25
on International Information Activities headed up by William
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1
Harding Jackson , and C.D_ Jackson was a member of the Committee
8 2 and one of the principal staff members was Wayne Jackson , and
1
3 sO it to be known as the Jackson Committee, but it was a
L
4 Comittee set up to study the Cold War, and what we should do
5 about it by President Eisenhower.
6 In 1955
G
well _
0
in the meantime_
1
in 1950 , I had gone
7 to the University of North Carolina to preside there. I came
back here in 1955 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs_ In 1956 , I became a Director
10 of the Office of Defense Mobilization_ In 1958 , I became
11 Special Assistant to the President for National Security
12 Affairs _
1
0
13 And I may say that when this was done , this was my
1
14
office.
15
MR _ BELIN: This was in' 1956 as Director of ODM
or 1958-592
16
17
MR . GRAY : In 1958 , my office, I had to go down to
18
the corner of the building, and I have forgotten which floor_
F
19
and I have been into this building
So many times _
1
20 MR _ BELIN : So the Vice President S Conference Room
8
21
is where you once sat? L
22
MR = GRAY : That' s right_
5
23
And then in 1961 I became a member of the President S
1
24
Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board _ appointed by President
2
8
25
Kennedy and reappointed by successive 'Presidents , although I
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L
1 think it is fair to say that the present President has taken
8 2 no action with respect to this Board _
1
3 MR _ BELIN: Basically
you have been a member of the
1
4 PFIA since 1961 , is that correct?
5 MR _ GRAY : Yes since I looked it up this
6 morning and I thought it was earlier, but it turrs out to have
been May 6 , 1961_
8 MR . BELIN : And you were a member of the National
Security
10 MR . GRAY : 16 excuse me
11 MR . BELIN: And you were a member of the National
12
Security Council until the 1949 amendments to the Act, I
1
0 13 believe: Is that accurate?
end
2
b 14
15
16
17
18
19
I
20
i
21 L
22
4
23
1
24 2
8
25
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May ,
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1
1 MR - GRAY : That is right, and the first act which
8 2 created
~
well, it was in the national military establishment _
1
3 not the Defense Department and the Service Secretaries were all
1
4 members of the National Security Council
And I briefly
5 served when I became Secretary. Then in 49 the Act was changed _
and the Defense Department
was created , and various other changes
were made , and the Service Secretaries were dropped ,
1
and I often
say that Stuart Symington and I are the only two_ people who
have ever been kicked off of the National Security Council
10 are still alive.
11 Later, Qf course , as Assistant Secretary of Defense ,
12 ISA, I was the backup to the Secretary of Defense , and attended
1
0
13
the National Security Council meetings with him,
briefed him
1
14 on the meetings , and my next assignment , ODM , I was a member,
15
statutory member of the Council and then beginning in
16
58 until the end of the Administration,
I helped the President
17 run the Council_
18 MR BELIN : Did You in your work, either on the Nationd1
19
Security Council
or as backup representative, did you ever feel
2
20
the Natioral Security Council
undertook very much oversight of
8
21
the CIA? 1
22
MR - GRAY : Well, I would know more clearly in the years
5
23
from 58 to
early
because I was
really
a part of the machineFy
0
24
of the Council_ There was not much continuing oversight in the 2
8
25 sense of the Council members examining what the various intelligefice
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L
agencies Were doing . There Ias an annual review of the activiti S
8 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency < and of course, every meeting}
1
3 of the NSC began with a
briefing by the DCI , which necessarily
1
kept the members informed about certain or many aspects of
5
intelligence. But I think it fair to say that the Council
6 itself did not specifically spend
much time reviewing intelligente
activities . The Ccuncil did, of cours?, in
a paper Rt D
this
is perhaps known to the members , and I don t want to cover a
lot of ground which you have covered the Council had as the
10 Chairmar well remembers , adopted
a paper called NSC 54/12 , whic
11
really authorized the covert, the beginning of the covert
12
activities of the Agency. That Committez, I think the Chairman
1
0
13
of this Commission served as the President' s representative on
1
14
it for awhile, and of coursz , I did later when I was a special
15
assistant_
16
But it underwent several changes in name I changed
17
it from 54/12 the Special Committee, because the press by
18
that time had gotten wind of it, and my own theory, and this is n
19
aside, gentlemen, but in your recommendations , if you want to
1
20
change sone
things that will get some things less visibility,
i
21
one way to do it I believe is to change the name of things _ It
6
22
takes the press
a ittle longer to catch on after you have given
v
23
it a brand new name Call it the Cavinaugh club or arything You
1
like.
24 1
8
25
MR_ BELIN : Now , You have served on the President' s
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Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board since 1961?
8 2 MR _ GRAY : 61_
1
3 MR _ BELIN: Do you have, any opinion
as to the viabilit
1
4 of that board in general and also with specific reference to
5 oversight functions it might have performed with the CIA?
6 MR - GRAY: Yes , I do _ My own
strong feeling is that
if the President does not have this board, he must have somethin
like it_ It is the only agency in government that I know of whiph
on behalf 0f the President can oversee and interpret and
10 understand the intelligence activities of all of the agencies
11
of the government engaged in intelligence , which includes not
12
only the CIA
1
but the DIA, to soma extent the AEC , to some
8
1
13
extent the FBI , and other government agencies from ime to time
1
14
who find themselves involved purposefully or not in foreign
15
intelligence activities _ 'This board , I feel, should have the
16
confidence of the President_ He should be _
1
feel comfortable
17
with its membership_ If any President inherits such a board
18
and is not comfortable, then he ought to make his Own board_
19
I am saying such a board is extremely important ,
3
20
especially if the recommendations of the Board get to the
8
21
President, and there have been times in the past .when have |
22
not gotten to the President soon enough , and in some cases
4
I am afraid not at all
23
0
24
MR _ BELIN : What particular types in the past are you 2
8
25
referring to?
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1
1 MR _ GRAY : Well, I can speak very frankly. I think that
8 2 it was more difficult at the beginning of the Nixon Administratibn
8
3 than it had been in earlier days in having the reports , the
L
4
written reports get to the Board , although I think it fair to
5 say also that Mr _ "Nixon met fairly frequently with the Board _
6 MR BELIN : Did Mr _ Johnson meet fairly Erequently
7 with the Board?
8 MR = GRAY: Mr Johnson , as I recall it, I am going
back some years now , and I have not checked the records , I think
10
Mr Johnson met twice with the Board , once for ceremonial
11 purposes; that is, picture-taking , and once for substance _ And
12
General Eisenhower for whom I was a liaison to the Board , met
1
13
with the Board every three months for two or three hours _
8
1
14
President Kennedy met almost every time the Board met, which
15
was every other month _ President Johnson practically not at
16
all, and President Nixon quite
a good deal- And we have had
17
understandably only one with a President trying to get on
18
a new President trying to get or top of his job _ We did meet
with hin once or twice , I think, as Vice President
19
1
Well, back to the Board _ I think it is true, I think
20
i
it is fair to say that either the Board or the members of the
21
6
22
Board have been responsible for many of the innovations in the
v Intelligence field which have been vital to our national security
23
1
I have ir mind the U-2 , the reconnaissance satellite program
24 2
8
25
and at least the members of the Board had a good deal to do
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TOp SEERET
2270
1
1 with that. The introduction of data processing in the intelligerce
8 2 community , for which the Board has fought years with only
8
5 I would say limited success So far _
1
and the Board has very strond
1
4 scientific expertise, and it has other expertise
as we ara now
5 constituted _
1
and as any board should have_
6 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Economic activities , economic
intelligence_
MR _ GRAY That S another thing. Thank you, Mr _
Chairman_ Mr _ Vice President _
10
Actually, when I say it has been innovative , the
11
current activity in the United States Government , and interests
12 in and reliance upon in the field of economic intelligence is
1
0
13 larger than this board in the recommendations made to the
1
14
President
a couple of years ago , and I think the Board can be
15
credited with that-
16
You asked me
about oversight_ We have tried to monitox
17
the various agencies in the foreign intelligence field,
the
18
CIA , the DIA and to some extent the others that I have mentioned,
19
and I think we have been kept well informed _ This Board has
1
20
had all of the clearances that anybody in Government has _ And
i
21
I might
say , Mr_ Chairman , that to my knowledge in the years sinde L
22
1956 when' the first board was created , there has never been a
v
leak from this board _
23
1
24
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: That S right.
2
8
25
MR. GRAY : And that is a record that is hard to match
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2271
L
1 in this towr I must say , either in the Executive agencies;
8 2 especially on the Hill_ That is one reason I think that this is
!
3 a reliable mechanism , because the members are loyal, it is a
1
4 small and lean staff_
'
and it undertakes studies in addition to
5 its general monitoring responsibilities_
It undertook
6 studies on its own
initiative,
or some at the request of the
President or a representative of the President, and some of these
have been very important_ Again, sometimes nothing
seems to happen
to then - The Board made a very important study about
our naval
10 forces , now quite some time ago and it has gone nowhere_
11 The Board made a rather important study I think about
12 human intelligence, the
most comprehensive study that has ever
1
0
13 been made in the government, and the first one that has been mad
1
14 at all in many Years . I have to credit the atmosphere for the
15 failure of that report to go very far,
1
because obviously when
16 you are
talking about human
intelligence,
you raise questions
17 which are involved in Watergate and this kind of phobia that
18 people have _
19 On the other hand _ the Presidents have by and large
3
20 accepted the very many recommendations of the Board over the
8
21 years which I believe have tended to strengthen the intelligence 6
22
community , and without which it would not be as mature
v
23
sophisticated as it is today-
0
24 MR _ BELIN: Mr _ Gray, you mentioned that you were the 2
8
25
advisor for National Security Affairs for President Eisenhower_
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and
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1
During the Eisenhower Administration did you ever hear any
8 2 discussion of what was known as an Executive Action Capability
!
3 which might be defined as a capability to assassinate foreign
4 political leaders?
5
Have you ever heard that expression?
6
MR _ GRAY : I don t remember 2ver
hearing that expressipn
until we talked this morning. I mean , I don t remember while
I was in government hearing this expression _
MR. BELIN : You never heard the phrase until I asked
10
you the first question in our interview this morning, is that
11 correct?
12 MR . GRAY : That is correct_
1
0
13 MR . BELIN: While you were
working with President
1
14 Eisenhower , did you ever hear any discussion of any operational
15 plan to try and assassinate any foreign leaders, and specificall
16 Castro or Trujillo?
17 MR _ GRAY: I would like if I may , Mr Chairman_
0
to not
18 answer that Yes or no because it is 3
complicated question . I
19 would suppose if one were serving in government , and he would
2
20 the national security interests ahead of most everything
5
21 else, he would not fail to think about assassination if this
L
22 were a vital necessity to the national security_
I think you
vi
23 would consider anything , and I have no doubt that at various 1
2 24 times and at all levels , without the knowledge of any President _
8
25 people have talked about assassination_ But I know of no plan ?
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L
plot, operational organization that ever came to President
8 2 Cisenhower with respect to any assassinations , and specifically
1
3 including those that you have mentioned.
1
4 Now it is Iy impression that there was I would
5 be surprised if there was any American discussion even of the
6
question of the assassination of Trujillo _ But you asked about
Castro_ I don t know how much detail I should go into _
?
but I
8 can say I am
Willing
to go into detail if the members are
interested _ There is a memorandu covering every discussion
10 President Eisenhower had with respect to Cuba , beginning in the
11 winter of 1960 , which ultimately culminated in the Bay of
12
operation in 1961 , he having approved
a four point program ,
1
0
13 sabotage , stepped up economic sanctions
1
propaganda , and the
1
14
training of Cuban refugees _
15 I am
reasonably
sure that if Truman had ever G G I
16 mean that if Castro had ever been a target of the President
17 or the top people Fho were engaged in this program which he
18
had authorized , certainly there would have been talk of assassi-
19
nation at that time, and I never heard it even hinted at_
1
20
specifically, I had a chance to see if the plans , or at least
8
21
the training and other activities which would lead perhaps to 6
22 a change in governments in other places , in another place , and
v
23
I never heard the word assassination or anything of the equivalelt
1
24
mentioned once:
1
8
25
MR - BELIN : While you were serving on the President' s
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Pigs
~so
==================================================
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smn 2274 TOp SeeRET
Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board , did you ever hear that
8 2 discussed?
8
3 MR - GRAY : Well_
1
I never heard it discussed in the
L
4 sense that the Board ever
seriously discussed
it. There was
5 a member of the Board who is a well known individual- He is no
6
longer on the Board , who practically every time the Agency
people came before uS and briefed us on Vietnam, he said have
you considered trying to off some of the leaders in North
Vietnam _ and the CIA would shrug, and then the next time they
10 would come back a couple of months later, and he would say have
11
you thought of trying to bump 0ff some of the leaders in North
12
Vietnam _
1
and I heard that kina of discussion _ But you never
1
0
13
had any taker from the CIA _ And , indeed , that has been my
1
14
understanding beginning with Allen Dulles and with all DCI's
15
since, that Agency policy
was against assassination on the ground
16
that it didn t accomplish anything when
you get right down to
it.
17
18
But I might volunteer one other thing, Mr Belin_ Whex
19
I was a special assistant to the President and presided over
2
20
the planning board , which in those days , in the Eisenhower
8
21
prepared all the papers which went to the National Security L
22
Council _
8
we were
doing
a paper on the Near and Middle East.
v
23
This was within
was at the time When Colonel Nasser was
1
24
riding very high in the saddle , ana the big issue in this paper 2
8
25
was what were going to be the relationships of this government
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bump
days ,
of
to
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smn TOp SECREF
2275
1
1 Colonel Nasser _ and the opinions ranged
everywhere from assassin
8 2 tion on the one hand , suggested by somebody _
to the other extrem
1
3 and that was that we get in bed with Nasser because he was
15
4
considered to be the wave of the future_
5 Well, when the paper Iritten, there was no mention
6 of assassination and no consideration
even given to it. In fact
7 the paper came down about the middle of this thing, which was
where it should have come But I am saying that that is why I
wanted to. not say yes or no I have heard the word assassination_
10
mentioned , but I know of no plan or operational capability that
11
has ever been authorized at any high level of government _
12 MR _ 'BELIN : You are saying you might have heard on
6
4
13
occasion one person discuss it, but that Ivas never in any way
0
14
adopted as a policy, to the best your
knowledge , during
the
15
Eisenhower administration?
16
MR _ GRAY : That is correct=
17
Now , how many other times it might have been discussed
18
down in the bowels of some agency , I would have no way of knowing-
19 MR BEL IN You mentioned to me
early this morning
2
20
that President Eisenhower talked to you about having the '54/12
8
21
Committee looking
over activities 0f the Agency with regard to 1
22 an
oversight function.
y
23
Do you want discuss that with the Commission?
0
24
MR _ GRAY : Yes_ Well, I really had forgotten what
E
8
25
we discussed _
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to
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TO SEGREF
2276
L
1 MR _ BELIN: You talked about it particularly with
8 2 reference to activities which might impinge
upon governments .
8
3 MR _ GRAY : Yes , indeed _ When I became Special Assistant
L
4 the President called me in with Allen Dulles, then DCI
2
and
5 well, I think of Allen Dulles , but anyway , if it wasn t
Allen Dulles , I then commuricated this message to Allen Dulles .
This I think was soon after the disclosure of the Berlin Tunnel
which some of you will remember as a very successful intelligenc
operation , and the President told me that he wanted the 54/12
10 group to pass upon all activities of this government which
11 impinged upon the sovereignty
or the people of some other
12 nation _ For example , the Berlin Tunnel_
1
this was after the
1
0
13 fact, would have been such , and overflights would have been
8
14 such , and the 54/12 has ' always concerned itself in its
15 successive incarnations Ivith the overflight problem_ President
16 Eisenhower was very sensitive to the necessity of having the
17 top people in government from the appropriate agencies
pass upon
18 the wisdom, and in some cases , feasibility of those kinds of
19 operations _ There were times when in the covert action field I
2
20 would , in effect, appeal a decision of the 54/12 or the Special
8
21 Group because I wondered whether it was in the national interest
|
22 and when I took it back to the President from the Committee, I
Y
23 think at least on two occasions or on both occasions he over- 1
24 ruled me in support of the Committee_ But at least the matter 2
8
25 the attention of the President. There were not assassinatios
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2277
1
L I should say , but covert actions_
8 2 MR . BELIN : also mentioned , though , that if there
1
3 would have been discussion of assassinations with the President_
1
that he was a staff man _ and you feel that as a person on
5 the staff you would have been advised _
6 Is that a fair summary?
7 MR _ GRAY: Let me say that in the time I served ,
8 Andrew Goodpasture, lately General Lemnitzer s eloquent
9 successor as Commander of NATO , General Goodpasture
was called
10
Staff Secretary in the White House, and he was a good deal more
11 than that. He was the President s right hand man support
12 matters in relationships with the Joint Chiefs , imediate
1
13
relationships with all kinds of entities in Government , whereas
6
1
14 my job was more in the long range field and the planning field_
15
Well _
1
it is obvious that if We had not been men of
16
good will and loyalty, this coula have caused a lot of trouble,
17 sO we
kept each other mutually informed _ I told him about what
18 was going on in the Special Group field, and he tola me of all
19
of the things that the President was
asking him to do _ And then
I
20
when Eisenhower
1
General Eisenhower went out of office, these
i
21
functions were sort of combined , first into McBurdy, and then L
22
Walt Rostow , and what every other special assistant there had
4
23
been _ In other words , there was not Gray and Goodpasture, therel
1
Was Bundy This is clear? So now in response to your
24 2
8
25
question , I have recently been in communication with Andrew
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You
key
for
==================================================
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==================================================
smn
TOPSECRET_ 2278
L
Goodpasture, and I am able to say to You that neither of uS ,
8 2 now back to assassination , remembers anything coming to the
8
3 White House , and I cannot believe that anything coula get to
L
4 the President without going through one of uS .
5 MR _ BELIN: Is it a fair summary that he did believe
6 strongly in staff?
7 MR = GRAY : He was the most staff minded
D I
well, that
8 is a big staterent. He was 3 very staff minded president _
9 MR _ BELIN : We also talked this morning about the
10
question of Congressional oversight , and some people have
11
suggested the possibility of having
a Joint Committee of
12
Congress akin to the Atomic Energy Committee perhaps _
1
performin
1
0
13
Congressional oversight in lieu of the present Congressional
1
14
structure
15
Do you have any comments on that?
16 MR . GRAY : I do , yes. In the first place, I think th
17
present situation where, if I understand it correctly, if the
18
Agercy seeks to undertake or does undertake a covert action,
mus
19
not only be reported to the appropriate Congressional Committees
1
20
whatever they are, but approved by the President, and someone
i
21
tola me this means that about 80 people up on the Hill would 1
22
know about this _ I personally happen to think that there are
v
23
many agents that have influence on Capitol Hill , and I think
1
24
that there is a greater need for a tighter rein on
security
2
8
25
information going just like a shotgun to the Congress . I woula
TOP SECRET
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Page 97
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smn #OpSECRET
2279
worry then , about a Joint Committee such as you suggest , not
8 2 because of the Committee itself_ but because Joint Committees
8
3 tena to generate large staffs , and are frequently, not always
L
4 the Committee becomes the captor of the staff. But I would worr
5 most about leaks out of such a large staff, and there is not
any question that much of this stuff that is appearing in the
press , which in my judgment should not appear in the press , is
8
coming right from Capitol Hill_ So I would think that oversighth
Committees are appropriate in the Congress , and obviously the
10 Congress should have the authority and the power to oversee
11
what they want to oversee, ard perhaps their oversight Committeels_
12
have not been as active as
they might have been , or as aggressiv
1
6
13 That is easily corrected _
8
8 14 I can visualize some situations when a Congressman
15
would not want to know some of the things that the Agency is
16
doing .
17
MR _ BELIN We also discussed this morning
your concer
18
about leaks from people who have worked within the Agency and
19
then have left the Agency .
2
20
Do you have any comments about that?
8
21
MR _ GRAY : Yes, I do _ I feel very strongly
that the L
22
Congress should be encouraged to enact legislation which would
5
23
give the Agency at least the same
protection that the IRS
0
24
has or the Agricultural Department has _
1
8
25
Now _
1
it does not even have the protection of its
FOPSeeRET
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smn TOpSeeret
2280
7
information that the Internal Revenue Service has and this to
8 2 ma is just nonsense I belizve in the right of privacy. I am
8
3 for keeping the Internal Revenue records privates But I am not
L
4
telling the whole world about what is going on in the
5
intelligence community. And right now there seems to be no way
6 to this procass
1
and it is not that one worries about so
7
much having people know what the Agency is doing, but people' s
lives are
being in jeopardy, and people S lives are going to
be lost as a result of some of these disclosures _ The DCI
10
is by statute charged with the protection of sources and methods
11
of intelligence gathering. This absolutely destroys his statutoky
12
authority_ He cannot protect sources and methods if anybody _
1
0
13
any disgruntled former employee can write a book _
1
14
So without being specifically familiar,
I think there
15
is legislation pending,
or I know Director Colby has proposed
16
specific legislation_ to help alleviate this situation_ I don t
17
hope for although I would welcome , an official Secrets Act
18
such as we have in Britain_ but then that is breaking down the
19
old system , it 5 not working
SO well anymore , but I do believe
3
that we ought to have some way to deter and punish those who
20 8
21
deal lightly with the national security. 7
22
MR . BEL IN : On the subject of the DCI, do you have
5
23
any opinion of the problems that the DCI has as the Chief
1
intelligence officer?
24 E
8
25
MR . GRAY : Yes _ We have wrestled with this problem
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put
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==================================================
smn
TOp SEGRET
2281
L
of leadership in the community_ When I say we , I am speaking
8 2
now not as a
former Special Assistant, but if it is all right fo
1
3
me to speak as a member of the President S
Board _
1
how the
L
4 community could be organized,
1
and one of the problems has always]
5 been what I would describe as a constitutional problem _ If
X Agency has 60 percent of the dollars and the head of 2
Agency wants or is told to give guidance and leadership, he
simply cannot under our system give orders to a constitutional
officer in another branch of government , specifically the Secrethry
10 of Defense_ And at the same time_
1
I feel there should be a
11 chief intelligence officer of the Government_ I think he must
12 have the confidence of the President and a rapport with the
1
0
13 President and if he has that , his job is easier , and if he has
1
14 to persuade and request , but if your Committee is going
15 to make recommendations about this , it seems to me that you migh;
16 want to recommend that there be someone Who is considered a
17 chief intelligence officer , and that if you wish, it can be the
18 DCI , or a new thought that we did not discuss this morning, therz
19 might be a special assistant to the President for intelligence
1
20 affairs_
1
and he could then represent the President across the 8
21 board , and perhaps have greater success leadership_ L
22 But I urge that you bear in mind the realities 0f the
y
23 situation where one Agency simply canrot instruct another Agency
0
24 under certain circumstances _
2
8
25 MR . BELIN : Do you have any opinion
as whether or
TOPSECRET
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to
only
and
to
==================================================
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==================================================
smn
TOP SECRET
2282
1
1 not it is important to have an
intelligence agency under civiliar
8 2 control?
8
3 MR _ GRAY : Yes _ I think it vitally important that it
1
4 be under civilian control and as a matter of fact , I would almost,
5 I would almost think that would be axiomatic , although I think
6 under the statute a
military officer could, be
1
and indeed , the
first DCI I think, Hillenkoetter _ Admiral Hillenkoetter, was
indeed military _ But I feel it should be under civilian control
and the issue we did not discuss this morning is one which I
10
think this Commission must address itself to and that is whethe
11
it is to be a careerist , or should it be an
appointment of a
12
citizen from private life.
1
Let me make the distinction clear. Richard Helms
0
13
11
14
was a
careerist , and John McCone was
appointed from public
life_
15
MR - BEL IN: Do you have any opinion on that?
16
MR _ GRAY : Yes. My own
preference would be I think
17
for a careerist, but if pressed now to name or give you some
18
names of people in the. Agency whom I would , and I think I know
19
1
most of the top people , I would find it difficult to say to a
20
i
President in good conscience, that I would recommend that you
21
L
stick to a careerist_ So that I have come down on a waffle
22
4
there _
23
1
I have to say generally speaking I prefer
a careerist',
24 2
8 but in some cases I can see a very intelligence officer
25
FOP SECRE
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good
==================================================
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==================================================
TOp SEerET
2283
smn
L
l who is note I know I.happen to personally think that Allen
8 2 Dulles was a
fine intelligence officer _ It was not his career
3
5 but he had been in it during the war,
and successfully in it_
L
4 He was more
intelligence officer than administrator, but all
5 in all, he served his country well in that post. But this is
6 an issue which I don t really think there is any question
about whether it be a civilian_ The real question is whether
8 you ara going to have a policy or sort of play it by ear when
9 the time comes to make a change .
10 MR = BEL IN : Do you have an
opinion concerning whether
11 or not there should be amendments to the statutory charter of
12 the Agency?
1
6
13 MR _ GRAY : The statutory charter, as I understand it, and
1
14 that was written before I came
to Washington sO I was not
15 involved, but as I understand it, it was purposely written in
16 somewhat vague terms to take care of situations that necessarily
17 would be vague in and of themselves _ I would see no objection
18
to making it crystal clear if people find it necessary, that thy
19
responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency are not in
2
20 the domestic field , do not involve domestic institutions or
8
21 American citizens except insofar as the question of foreign |
22
intelligence activities becomes involved .
4
23 The trouble with trying to spell out the precise
1
24 functions of the CIA and FBI , for example , this problem gets to
2
8
25 be a very
complicated
one because there are a lot of grey areas ,
TOp seeref_
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and
==================================================
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==================================================
smn TOp SEeRe]
2284
]
and to say that the CIA cannot have any personnel, and cannot
8 2 be involved in this country, of course, is sort of silly. I am
1
3 speaking now of not the intelligence analysis and publications _
8
1
4 but I am
talking about the acquisition of intelligence
and
5 counterintelligence and counterespionage _ If you are too precis-
then some matters are going to lost between abroad and at
homa
8 there' s got to be some way for the flow ana
9
transfer back and forth from the CIA and the FBI , sO I would
10
myself find it very difficult to see holv the Congress could
end la 11
precisely define the functions of the Agency _
begin lb
12 But I would see no objection to making it clear that
1
6
13 the American people need not fear that we are going to have a
1
14
national police force under the name of the CIA, and this is
15
what we are talking about ,
or the FBI , for that matter
MR _ BELIN : Did any members of the Commission have
17
questions?
18
Yes , Connor
19
MR. CONNOR: Mr _ Gray, you were talking about the
1
20
qualifications for the position of Director of Central Intelligerce
a
21
Based on your experience, would you limit the term of the DCI L
22
to any fixed period of time?
y
23
MR . GRAY : I would not_
1
24
MR . CONNOR: You would leave it at the pleasure of 2
8
25
the President who appoints the person and subsequent Presidents?
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get
Now ,
16
Mr
==================================================
Page 103
==================================================
smn FOpSeeRET
'2285
]
1 MR . GRAY : That 5 right.
8 2 MR _ CONNOR: Going back to Your earlier testimony
8
3 about your experience as assistant to the President for security
L
4 matters do think it is wise the same person to occupy
5 that position and Secretary of State?
6 MR _ GRAY: No , sir.
7
MR _ BELIN particular reason why you feel that
8 way?
MR GRAY : Yes I think that the Secretary of State,
10 the responsibilities of the Secretary of State are very clear_
11 I think the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense are
12 very clear I think the responsibilities of other executive
1
0
13 agency heads are very clear_ And I have a
Strong feeling that
1
14 the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs should not
15 be tied to any other agencies. I thirk he should be not a
16
Secretary of Defense and a special assistant either_ I think the
17
special assistant should have his loyalty only to the President
18 and not any one department, and my Own
feeling is that the
19 present situation creates some bottlenecks ,' administrative
3
20
bottlenecks that should not exist.
i
21 MR _ BELIN: Does that relate to your earlier testimony |
22
of actions by the Advisory Board perhaps not getting through to
4
23
the President?
1
24 MR . GRAY : It relates in good measure that_ My 2
9
25 own
feeling is We have made recommendations to the President
FOP SECRET
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for you
Any
to
to
==================================================
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==================================================
smn TOpseeRET
2286
1
which have gone to the Special Assistant to the President , and
8 2 then been bucked down to more junior people in the NSC staff,
1
3 and which to the President later or perhaps not at all_ Ana
L
~4 my observation to you this morning,
Mr . Belin, was that this
5 Board is composed of boys and so if the President does
6 not consider them big boys ,
1
he ought to get some big boys ,
and their studied conclusions should not be staffed out by
junior people in the NSC staff.
9 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: I make a comment there?
10 The procedure which Gordon has just described is
11 not limited to papers coming through
NSC . This is a White House
12 procedure established by President Nixon which involved all
1
0
13
papers coming to the President, all of the staff work in this
1
14 way , all 0f it was bucked down and staffed out so-called , in
15 quates _
0
with the alternative recommendations _
1
and it makes its
16 way across the board So very little gets through to him without
17
this staffing process _
18 So I think just to put it in perspective _
L
this is
19 a procedure which was developed by the Nixon Administration for
20
staffing that involves all material
i
21 MR. GRAY : I think it is fair to say , Mr _ Vice Presidenlt , |
22
that the fact remains that it does frustrate, I guess across the
4
23
board , but it does frustrates
1
24 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: That is right.
1
8
25 MR . GRAY : And we;, the Board ,
or the staff on the Board
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big
May
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has had the unusual experience , at least on one occasion, of
8 2 saying
YOu sent this paper over to the President for his recomme
1
3 dations _
1
and would you please write for uS the response that the
2
4 President ought to make to it. So it is somewhat discouraging-
5 Now , if I coula volunteer a couple of things?
6 MR _ BELIN : Please fezl free to volunteer whatever
7 you would like to for this Commission .
8 MR _ GRAY : All right _
9 Let me say , Mr Chairman , just a few observations _ I
10 wish we in this country , and I wish this Commission, perhaps ,
11 would Iorry more about the KGB and the GRU than the CIA_ By Goal
12 I think that here are operating in this country, we know
1
0
13 they are
operating freely here, and in New York there has been
1
14 a recent incident when
a Soviet agent was caught red-handed ,
0
and
15 he was not declared personna non grata because of detente, and
16 this worries the very 5
this worries me very much. are
17
operating , and as far as are concerned , the Cold War has
18 not abated one bit, and the Cold War I describe is that war
19 below the
public, diplomatic talks _
3
20 NOw they have hundreds of agents in this country,
8
21 and I have indicated that my guess is that they have agents of |
22
influence , if not precise agents , up on Capitol Hill_ I know
4
23
this , almost know this to be the fact _ They are operating
1
24 freely in this country, and here aur rewspapers are trying to
7
8
25 tear apart one
basic ; absolutely basic element of our national
tOp SBERET
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They
they
got
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smr TOP SeCrE7 _
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7
security and anything the Soviets do, it' $ fine_ So that is
8 2 from the hearts
1
3 I did want to say a couple of things , that I think
1
4 if there is to be a
Presidertial Foreign Intelligence Advisory
5 Board , one of its principal functions has got to be for the
6 President to seek to avoid subjective judgments in the
intelligence community , and this is very difficult to do _ I wil
give you three
or four examples , if I may , or three examples _
The Cuban missile crisis. You will recall that there was a
10 Congressional election in progress. You will recall that we
11 were getting all kinds of refugee reports_ You will recall that
12 Senator Keating
was
sounding , and was almost ridiculed by the
1
0 13 Administration at the time and then you will recall finally
14 the U-2 flight vhich disclosed the existence of these missiles,
15 and thereafter wa had constant surveillance and knew about it_
16
Well, now , I have talked then , I have conducted a
17 post mortem of that crisie, and in my judgment , the intelligence
18
failure, or it almost was a failure because another three or
19
four days , and these missiles would have been camouflaged , and
2
20 We might not have known about them , was the fact that nobody
i
21 wanted to find those missiles there. They knew the President 6
22
didn t want to find missiles _ The last thing he wanted in this
4
23
campaign
~ter
this is no criticism of President Kennedy. No
1
24
President would want to find Soviet Missiles in Cuba So that Z
8
25
the ther DCI, the Director of Current Intelligence ,
whom later,
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1 he carried in his briefcase for three weeks a cable on an
8 2 agent report from Cuba which turned. out to be an accurate
1
3 description of these missiles and he was then personally
4 briefing the President, and he said I was never Sure enough _
5 There were so many other reports , and we knew they
were false,
that the weight of my feeling fell
on the side of new missiles
Well, this is a subjective judgment which
was dictated in part
8 by what people wanted to hear _
9 the Chairman of this Commission will remember in
10 recent years the Board had been able to get out of the national
11
intelligence estimates
of offensive military capabilities
of
12 the Soviet Union, language
to the effect that by no stretch
1
0
13 of the imagination , ard I am paraphrasing , can the Soviet Union
1
14 be a threat in this area for ten years , this type of statement
15 used to have
a statement that there is no way to conclude
16 that the Soviets Iould ever take action against
ar American
17 reconnaissance satellite. Well,
we got that changed < These
18 are subjective.
19 When the missiles _
1
it was a question of MIRVing.
1
20
the missiles, the Agency Wvas about the last place in the government i
21 to believe that the Soviets were
MIRVing missiles ,
ana for some
L
22 reason didn t want to find missiles being MIRVed _
So
5
23
somebody
on behalf of the President has got to watch this
0
2 24
business of subjective judgnents ,
passed forward as unfinished
8
25
intelligence.
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Now ,
They
they
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FOpSECRET
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I did want to say , and I am afraid I have not said it
1
2
here, and if I have, I hope will stop
me , I talked twice 8
1
3
this morning, and I can t renember about the innovative role
1
4
that the PFIA has played in terms of its numbers or the board,
5
and I guess I mentioned the U-2 reconnaissance and the satellite
6
and etc. and the economic_reports of the Government_ That
reminds me
7
8
Now,
n
finally,
one
thing that might be considered , ana
I have suggested this in the Board from time to time_ but it
has never gone very far, and I'm not sure about its wisdom mysel
10
one solution ,
one action that might be taken in connection with
11
the covert activities of the Agency would be to move them to 12
1
a warehouse in Philadelphia,
or a music store in
Dallas
or
0 13
1 something and get them out of Washington
so that are not
14
on the cocktail circuit, although in fairness , I think that the
15
Agency personnel through the years have done very damn well in
16
not leaking_
But if there is to be a reorganization , one thing
17
that might be considered woula be to keep the completely
18
overt activities, which comprise, as you know , the majority of
19
3
the CIA functions , or involve a
majority of their personnzl, and
20
8
move the covert stuff outside, and just get it out of the nation
21 1
capital_ I would not eliminate it because I think it is necessary-
22
u But this is a consideration which parhaps may not have been
23
1
presented_
2 24
8 MR _ BELIN : Are there any other questions by members
25
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they
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7
1 of the Commission?
8 2 MR LEMNITZER: Under whose direction would this new
1
3 function outside be?
1
4 MR GRAY : I would leave it under the Director of the
5 Central
Intelligence Agency
6 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Could I ask , Mr Gray, whether
7
When he analyzed some of the statements that the FIAB had
8 corrected _ that were
misleading , that came from CIA to the
9
President , whether he ever given consideration 0f whether
10
FIAB has ever investigated the possibility of double agents
11 in CIA being responsible for misleading information?
12
MR _ GRAY : You mean whether I feel that some of these
1
13
things
0
1
14
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Were intentionally done to mis-
15
lead , or whether it was just caution?
16
MR _ GRAY : I think the latter_ Mr Chairman . I think
17
We would be very foolish to assume that the Agency has not been
18
penetrated . I think it would be a foolish assumption_ After
19
all, they
are the number ore target for the Soviet Union. But
3
20
my guess is that they have not penetrated at the among the
8
21
people who actually have been writing these estimates _ L
22
Are you asking for my opinion? That is my opinion:
v
23
But I think you would be making
a mistake to assume that the
1
24
great preoccupation of Mr _ Angleton , who left the Agency, about
1
8
25
penetration of the Agency ; his preoccupation I think was not
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]
misplaced _ It is entirely possible that We are penetrated _
8 2 MR _ BELIN : Mr _ Gray.
{
3 MR _ MARVIN GRAY : Mr . Gray , I have one or two questions
L
4 on the Dominican Republic_ and the U.S . relations there in
5
1960 . I believe the government from during 1960 , moved from
a large degree. a policy of non-intervention , to a more active
role of trying to topple the Trujillo regime- And in May
1960 , Ambassador Farland returned to Washington for consultation
and reported that among the dissidents with whom he had contacts
10
that reportedly wanted support , and one of the things that
11
they needed was high powered rifles With telescopic scopes .
12
Subsequently he was
given clearance , or subsequently, I'm sorry,
1
13
the Director of Central Intelligence
was authorized by the
6
1
14
Assistant Secretary of State to provide that assistance .
15
Did you know anything about that, do you recall any
16
discussions of providing rifles to internal dissidents?
MR . GRAY : Was this in '60 or 612
17
18
MR _ MARVIN GRAY: 1960 , sir, May and June of 1960 :
19
MR - GRAY : I recall there was concern in this govern -
3
20
ment about developments in the Dominican Republic_ To the best
a
21
of my recollection , I did not know about the military equipment 6
22
that you were speaking of _
y
23
MR _ MARVIN GRAY : At the very end of the Eisenhower
6
24
Administration , November 29th , January I2th , the matter of the
2
8
25
Dominican Republic was taken up at the Special Group and discussions
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they
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were had to work with the internal dissidents and exiles , and
8 2 also to furnish arms to the internal dissidents?
1
3
Do recall those meetings particularly?
1
4 MR GRAY : I don t recall those meetings particularly,
5 but if you say that the Special Group did indeed do this, I will
6 not say it didn't. I just don t remember this specific instance
7 MR . MARVIN GRAY : If you can recall , who would it have
been , or if you can speculate any , would it have been your
understanding that such arms which were furnished were for the
10 purposes of an internal uprising and something of that nature
11 and not
specifically for doing away with the leadership?
12 MR _ GRAY : Well, as far as I am concerned , I would be
1
8
13 shocked to be reminded of anything that had to do with doing
9
14 with the leadership. No , I would think our concern was,
15 if we had that kind: of concern , was
with being of assistance
16 to the dissidents
1
and not assassination , or that kind of
17 activity.
18 MR _ MARVIN GRAY : Thank you _
19 MR - BEL IN other coments that you Iant to make
1
20 to the Commission _
1
sir?
8
21 MR _ GRAY : No . You have been very patient , and I 6
22 am afraid that I have been somewhat longwinded .
u
23 MR _ BEL IN : were patient to wait, and we are
1
24 sorry you had to wait SO long _
2
8
25 other questions by the Commission?
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away
Any
You
Any
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Sman SOp SEeRET
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L
1 Thank you , sir.
8 2 MR _ GRAY : Right .
1
3 (Whereupon , at 1.12 0'clock
p .m ., the hearing
was
1
4 recessed to reconvene at 2.30,0 'clock the same day . )
5
10
11
12
1
8
13
1
14
15
16
17
18
19
3
20
9
21
7
22
4
23
1
24 E
8
25
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2295
1
1 AFTERNOON SESSION
8 2
(3:50 p.m. )
1
3 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER : If you Will raise your right
L
4 hand , do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
5 nothing but the truth , sO help you God?
6 MR - BISSELL : I do _
7
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER : We appreciate your coming.
8
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL , JR_
9 MR . BISSELL : I am glad to be of any I can.
10 MR _ BELIN: Do want to state your name before
11 the Commission?
12 MR . BISSELL : Richard M. Bissell
?
Jr _
1
0 13 MR. BELIN : And Mr _ Bissell, what is your educational
1
14 background?
15 MR . BISSELL : Yale undergraduate education, and later
16 a Yale Ph.D . in economics , and a year at the London School of
17 Economics
18 MR _ BELIN: And you your Ph . D . in 1939?
19 MR - BISSELL : I think it was 39 , Yes _
2
20 MR_ BELIN : And then during WNorld War II were you here
9
21
in Washington? |
22 MR _ BISSELL : I was . I was in_ the War Shipping
5
23 Administration
1
and later at the end of the war in the Office
11
24
of War Mobilization and reconversion _
2
8
25 MR _ BELIN : And after World War II_
1
then what did you
TOP SECRET
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATiONAND/oEN
RECEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
7 toztus
2-kok
6x
ArcAQodso
cic ,
2( Apr
7
Cxnh En~m~ )
(4 2215-2351_
16
4'+0 14
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you
got
RZasQ
Dk#bme
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L
1 do?
8 2 MR _ BISSELL : I returned to MIT where I was then a
1
3 member of the faculty for about two years _ Then I came
1
4 Washington
as Chief of Staff of something called the Harriman
5 Committee, which was one of the planning committees for the
6 Marshall-Plan , I then was recruited by Paul Hoffman to
serve in the ECA from almost the beginning of the Marshall Plan _
and did Serve for three years
1
and then became Deputy Director
9 of the ECA, and finally Acting Director . After that, two years
10 in the Ford Foundation organization _
1
but I still had my office
11 here , ard then I think it was in 1954 , but I am a little vague,
12 a year plus or minus on dates, to the Central Intelligence
1
0
13 Agency .
1
14 MR _ BELIN And who asked you to come to the Central
15 Intelligence Agency?
16 MR . BISSELL : Allen Dulles_
17 MR _ BELIN When he asked you to come to the CIA _
1
18 in what capacity did you come?
19 MR = BISSELL : I had the title of Assistant to the
1
20 Director oh , for about five years, as ,a matter of fact.
i
21 MR - BELIN : And then what? |
22 MR - BISSELL : Then I became the Deputy Director of
4
23 Plans , in I think the fall of or toward the end of 58 , or the 1
24 very beginning of 59 _ E
8
25 MR . BELIN : And how long did you with the Agency?
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and
stay
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2297
1
1 MR _ BISSELL : Until February of 1962 , if memory serves
8 2
MR. BELIN : And after leaving the Agency , then what
1
5 did you do?
1
4 MR - BISSELL : I joined the staff of United Aircraft
5 Corporation in East Hartford ,
1
where I had a very unrevealing
6 title of Director of Marketing and Economic Planning_ It really
7 was a corporate planning responsibility_
8
MR - BEI;IN : Wasn t that 19642
9
MR _ BISSELL Yes _
10 MR - BELIN: Before that you worked for the Institute
11 MR . BISSELL : m sorry. I skipped over two
12 years a5 President of the Institute for Defense Analysis _ It
1
0
13 is to that that I moved directly from the CIA_
1
14 MR _ BELIN: And you retired from the United Aircraft
15 in 1974?
16 MR . BISSELL : That S correct.
17 MR _ BEL IN Mr Bissell , during the time that you
18 were with the Agency , did you ever have any discussions with
19 anyone in the White House concerning the planning of what was
2
20
called an Executive Action Capability, Thich was defined in
i
21
substance as a capability of the Agency carrying out assassina- 7
22 tions , if required?
4
23 MR _ BISSELL: My recollection of this is far from
0
24
clear_ But I am satisfied that very early in the Kennedy
Z
8
25 Administration I did participate in such conversations
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1 MR _ BELIN And do You have any recollection of with
8 2 whom might have participated?
1
3 MR BISSELL: I am almost certain it was either
L
4
Walt Rostow or
McGeorge Bundy , .
or probably the former and
5
possibly both .
6 MR _ BELIN : Do you remember specifically what, if
7 anything , was discussed in any of those conversations?
8 MR _ BISSELL : My recollection, which isn t too specifip
is that this was a
discussion of the desirability of developing
10
such a
capability within the CIA that presumably would be a
11
small, special unit, and highly compartmented from the rest
12
of the organization.
1
13
MR - BELIN : Did you have any feeling
as to whether
0
2
14 or not this was done with or without the knowledge
or consent
of the President?
15
16
MR . BISSELL : I had no
specific feeling
on that point,
but I had a great deal' of confidence that the two gentlemen
17
whose names I have mentioned ,
1
would not have discussed this,
18
19
discussed with me or encouraged any course of action that they
3
were not confident the President would approve _
20
i
MR - BELIN Did you ever have any such discussions
21
6
22
with any official in the Eisenkower Administration?
v
MR _ BISSELL : Not to my
recollection, and I think I 23
1
am almost sure that I did not_
24 E
8 MR BELIN : Now apart from discussions of an executive
25
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smn TOp SeCRET
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L
1 action capability, did you ever or were You ever aware of any
8 2 development of plans inside of the Agency with a
specific plan
1
3 or goal of the assassination of any particular foreign leader?
1
4 MR - BISSELL : Yes , I was aware of investigation and
5 planning to that end _
6 MR . BELIN Will you please enumerate before the
7 Commission which foreign leader or leaders were involved?
8 MR _ BISSELL : There Were chree cases I remember One
9 of them would have involved Sukarno
1
the second would have
10 involved Lumumba
1
and the third did involve Castro I am not
11 giving that order chronologically, I don t remember what the
12 chronology
was, but those are the three cases I remember.
1
4 13 MR_ BELIN : Could you please state for the Commission
11
14 your entire knowledge with regard to the Sukarno matter?
15 MR _ BISSELL : There was planning of such a
possibilityl
16 I beliave this was initiated in the Far Eastern Division of tha
17 CIA_ The planning progressed as far as the identification of
18 an asset whom it Ias felt might be recruited for this purpose.
19 The plan was never reached , was never perfected to the point
1
20
where it seemed feasible_ The difficulty concerned the possibility
i
21
of creating
a situation in which the potential agent would have L
22 access to the target , and because the plan never reached that
v
23 stage , it was never, SO far as I am aware, discussed outside
1
24
of the Agency with a view to obtaining approval or authorization E
8
25 MR . BELIN : So far as your concern' with the Agency _
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14
smn
TOP SEeRET 2300
L
this would have required such approval
or authorization before
8 2 would have undertaken such a plan?
1
3 MR_ BISSELL: would.
1
4 MR - BELIN : Does that relate not just to Sukarno , but
5 with any other target?
MR_ BISSELL : That is correct
8
MR _ BELIN Now what about Lunumba?
8
MR _ BISSELL The Lumumba case planning began , was
9 initiated Within the Agency, and in that case , on my initiative
10 a case officer was directed to look into the possibilities _
11 He reported back in a matter of weeks and convinced me that thi
12 was probably unfeasible , and probably an undesirable course of
1
4
13 action
1
and he recommended instead that a quite different
1
14 kind of operation, somewhat larger in scale, be attempted for
15 the purpose of discrediting Lumumba and undermining his
16
authority-
17 MR. BELIN: To the best of your knowledge, did the
18 Agency in any manner whatsoever , have anything to do with the
19 death of Sukarno?
1
20 MR . BISSELL: Absolutely nothing.
8
21 MR . BELIN : Did the Agency have anything whatsoever |
22 to do with the death of Lumumba?
y
23 MR. BISSELL : Nothing.
11
24 MR - BELIN : All right, now , you said there was a third
2
8
25 MR _ BISSELL : The Castro case.
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L
1 MR - BELIN : All right.
8 2 Could you' tell the Commission the background of the
8
3 Castro case?
L
4 First, before you answer that, I will ask you the
5 same question about Lumumba that I asked you with regard to
Sukarno _ Would there' have been any operational plan into
pffect without approval from the White House on that kind of a
8 situation?
9 MR _ BISSELL: No
1
there would not.
10 MR _ BEL IN All right.
11 Now let' s turn to Castro
12 Coula you tell the Commission about the Castro
1
0
13 situation?
1
14 MR_ BISSELL : I became aware and the timing of this
15 I believe was the very beginning of 1961, ,f the possibility
16 that an assassination attempt might be planned using Mafia
17 resources, or
syndicate resources My very uncertain recollection
18
is that I first heard of this possibility from Shef Edwards , who
19 I think has testified here _
3
20 MR BELIN: He has been interviewed by m2
8
21 MR - BISSELL : I see |
22
MR. BEL IN: And for the record , he Was' the head of
4
23 the Office of Security?
1
24 MR _ BISSELL : That S correct.
E
8
25 MR _ BELIN : During this period of time in the Agency ,
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1 is that correct?
8 2 MR _ BISSELL: That is corract You should , the
1
3 Commission should also understand that this would have been a
1
very different kind of an operation than anything that the Agenc
5
normally undertook in-that it would not have been carried out
6
through DDP ; that is, Agency operational channels , or through an
7 case officer in the clandestine service _ The possibility that
8
seemed to exist was that through several intermediaries , the
9
Office of Security
or the Director of Security could be , and
10
indeed ,
1
was in touch with individuals in Las Vegas _
1
who claimed
11
could make such an attempt using their own personnel
12
This possibility was discussed by me , again I think probably
1
13
with Walt Rostow_ It may possibly have been discussed directly
6
1
14
with McGeorge Bundy , but I suspect that it was through Rostow
Fho was
then Bundy"
S assistant and on his staff. My impression
15
but I must emphasize that this is an uncertain impression=
16
is that I was encouraged:to go ahead with the investigation and
17
planning of this operation _ and by investigation I mean
18
simply to find out what would be involved to make some assessmen
19
1
of the likelihood of success , and other aspects of the matter
20
8
Under the circumstances, this had to be and was the
21
end
L
b responsibility of Shef Edwards _
22
4
23
1
24 E
8
25
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again
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Tap?
hegin
TOR SECRET
2303
1
MIR BELIN : Again, 1 Iill ask with regard to this
8 2
aspect of your testinony the Sare ques-ion I asked you concerninc
1
3
the executive action capahilities _ Did you have an on as
1
4
to wihther or not what You refer to as this encouragenent had
5
any authorization from the President or that thz President in
6
any manner knew about this?
7
MR _ BISSELL : I had no direct reason to believe that
8 he did but I Will naka the sanje answer, that I had a
high degrec
of confidence that the gentlemen I was
talking to in the White
10 House whon I have identified, would not have given such encourag
11 ment unless were confident that it would' meet with the
12 President S approval_
1
8
13 MR. BELIN: Did you ever have any discussions with
2
14 anyone in the Eisenhower Administration concerning possible
15 to assassinate Castro?
16 MR - BISSELL: I have no clear recollection of such a
17 discussion , but there could have been .
18 MIR _ BELIIT: Do You have any recollection , if it could
19 have bzen , with whom that discussion might have taken place?
8
20 MR. BISSELL: I sould suppose shat it would have been
i
21 with Gordon Gray. 1
22 MR BELIIT: If it occurred?
5
23 MR _ BISSELL : If it occurred_ but the balance of my
1
24 recollection is that it' did occur 2
9
25 MR. BELIN : Do You know whether or
not during the las
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opini
they
any
plan,
n0+
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cb 2
TOPSEGRET
2304
7
few months of 1960 , Tvhich would have been in the Eisenhover
8 2 Administration
P
any plans were developed within the Technical
1
5 Services Branch the Agency to develop
any kind poison
1
4
pills that might be used to assassinate Castro?
5 MR. BISSELL: I very nuch doubt if any such ' develop-
6 ment was attempted With this or any
other specific operation
7 in view but the Agency did have and does have an on-going
8 ReD progran, and I am
quite certain that products of this
9 sort Were among those that it had available_
10 MR . BELIN Do you have any other recollections
11 concern the Castro matter at this time?
12 MR . BISSELL: I am vague as to the final outcome of
1
13
that attenpt. I do not recollect, I havz no recollection of a
0
11
14
specific authorization that it should go forward_ I believe,
15
hovever, that we . probably did move to be in a
position t0 carry
16
it oub , or to authorize it if authorization were received _ One
of the reasons [ere, I believe that IY own
recollaction of the
17
final stages of that plzn is vague is that , 2s I have already
18
19
explained_ what it conterplated Ias
furnishing probably_
1
furnish
2
probably Some money and such items as
pills
or other device
20
8
through a number of cut-oues or internediaries to a group which
21
L
ourselves , of course, did not in any direct sense control
22
v
This W2s not an operation of such a character that the communi-
23
1
cations Ivould run through Aqency channels , or that authorization
24 2
8 on the spot would be by Agency personnel, or that the Agency
25
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ing
ing
We
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1 could precisely and tightly control it_
8 2 MP. BESLIRT : Did You ever call Mr _ William Harvey, Tvho
8
3 was a CIA man
to eventually
take ovcr this operation Within the
1
4 latter part of 61 Or early '62?
5 NR . BTSSELL: Wow , I did ask Nr Harvey to taka over
6 a part of our
reviving efforts against Castro and the Castro
Administration . I probably urged hin to look: into this plan
that was by that that had been active or that had been the
9
subject of active attention nearly
a year before I havz no
10
recollection of authorizing hir t0 revive it, except *o look
11
at it as a plan , or to proceed with any action along those
lines.
12
1
IR . BELIN Do you any personal recollection
0
13
1
14
as to whether or not the pills
or
pills of any kind, poison
pills
Ware ever delivered into Cuba?
15
MP. BISSELL: I do not have any recollection of shat.
16
MR _ BELIN: One Way or the other?
17
MR BIS;ZLL: One Tay or the other_
18
MR . BETIN Do you have any recollection on any other
19
1
facts relating *0 this matter?
20
i
MR _ BISSEIL: I don 2 believe SO 8 21
1
MR BELI:: Now I want to turn to the question of
22
v Trujilloa Do You Ivant to take over the questioning on Trujillo,
23
1
Mx _ Gray.
24 Z
8 MR . CRA< : Yes , if 1+'s all rights
25
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L
1 MR _ CONNOR : Well, will we be coming back to the Castr
8 2 matter?
{
3 MR _ BEJIN Before We go to Trujillo, let S stop with
1
4 Castro right
nOw and find out if the commissioners have any
5 questions
6 [R . CONJIJOR: Well, I would have a
question At "the
7
tine You had these discussions with either Mr Walt' Rostowv or
8
McGeorge Bundy or both_
1
as You recall then , to Fvhom in the
Agency did you report?
10 MR . BISSELL: Allen Dulles _
1
and well
1
or Mr _ Cabell
11
his Deputy.
MR. BCLIN: And did you ever have any discussions
12
;
with then about this matter before you talked to thz Director
8
13
1
14
of Security?
MR . BISSELL: Well, as I have already testified my
15
impression is that the first time I heard about this was in my
16
first conversation at least with the Director of Security, So
17
that would have preceded any conversation with the Director.
18
And ny Own belief is that matters took that cause I believe the
19
1
original approach was made to the Agency , that this Wvas not
20
8
a matter of the Agency seeking out the individuals with whom
21
6
22
subsequently messages were exchanged _
4 CHAIRIAN ROCKEFELLER : You mean approached by the
23
1
White House?
24 2
8 MR. BISSELL : No, approached by the syndicate interests
25
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1 that had their Own very strong motivations for carrying out
8 2 this _
3
3 MR . KIRKLAND: What Was their price if would
L
4 cooperate?
5 MR BISSELL: Vell, had , as I say , very strong
6 motivations on their Own. You remember that Castro had fairly
7
recently
come to power_ They had been powerful under Batista
8 in Cuba, and they had
a very lucrative set of interests for the
9
syndicates , and had been in effect been thrown out There
10 was still, of course, reas
onably free travel, and So had
11 the strongest sort of reasons for anti-Castro sentiment on their
12 Own.
0
0
13 MR _ KIRKLAND : But did want any specific quid
11
14
pro quo from the Aqency?
15
MR _ BISSELL : I'm sure wanted S Ome money as
well as technical but I don t remember exactly what.
16
MR. CONIJOR : Well, after You did learn about this from
17
the CIA Director of Security, and then had some White House
18
discussion , did you thereafter have any discussions about it
19
2
with Mr Dulles or his deputy?
20
9
MR BISSELL : Yes I am sure I did with Allen Dulles ,
21
|
22
simply that should be aware that the planning was going forwata_
4
As a
matter f fact, I believe the Director of Security had talked
23
1
to Allen before I did on the matter_
24 2
8 MR . COINOR: So that the subsequent activity ana
25
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Lhey
they
they
they
they
they
they
help ,
he
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cb 0
tOp SEGRET _
2308
L
1
planning was with his, at least his tacet understanding?
8 2 MR . BISSELL : Correct
1
3 CIAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Through previous tes timony I
1
4
the impression that there Were two attempts , one through
5
this syndicate, and then another one
directly through agents _
6 MR - BELIN: I think that the record basically is that
in the first stage it Tas through the syndicate, and that in
the second, stage basically used Cubian exiles but CIA
9
agents but the exiles_ who were being used were not necessarily
10
CIA agents at the tine so far as regular full-time employees
11
of the Agency.
MR BISSELL: I don t have a recollection of that
12
1
second one,
0
13
1
MR _ GRAY : You left the Agency when , sir?
14
MR _ BISSELL : In February of 1962 _
15
MR. KIRKLAND : During this time that You were 16
interested or this operation was under consideration ,
no one
17
in a
position of authority
ever said Elatly n0 , kill i+2
18
MR . BISSELL: To the best of my knowledge , that is
19
1
correct
20
8
MR. CONMOR : Did you ever discuss Tith the Attorney
21
0
General,Robert Kennedy?
22
5
MR. BISSELL: I have no recollection of discussing it
23
1
with hin.
24 2
8 MR. BELIN: But you do have a recollection of discussing
25
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they
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cb7
~TOpSeerET
2309
1
1 it with Allen Du lles?
8 2
MR BISSCLL: Yes.
{
3
MR _ BELIN If the records Were to show
8
or if Mr _
L
4 ECwards were to say that rather than he contacting you that
5
YOu contacted him concerning the Mafia, would you say that
6 are wrong
0
or would you say that perhaps your recollection is
7 Wrong?
8 BISSELL Mell, it is possible that my recollection is
9 w rong , but I will I think I will stand on that as my
10 recollection and it may be that Edwards and I simply have
11 inconsistent recollections _ But I seen to remember rather
12 clearly that it Gas fron him that I first learned of the
1
6
13 possibility this operation and that he came to s29 me for
1
14 this purpose rather than IY sending for him. NOw could I just
15 say that I had several conversations Tith Shef Edwards on this
16 tatter 2nd it is very
possible that I, that in a subsequent
17 conversation I did take the initiative and send for and discuss
18 it With' him. But there nay be an inconsistency here.
19
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER : Was there ever any question
1
20
raised 25 t0 whether this violated any of the domestic
8
21 statutes limiting CIA' s activities within the United States? |
22 MR . BISSELL: That question was never raised to nY
3
23 know ledge _
1
24 IR. BELIN : Are there any other questions by members
2
8
25
of tha Commission?
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they
of
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b 8
TOR SeerE}
2310;
7
1 Mr . CORBIN May I ask 3 guestion? You said that
8 2 you did not discuss it with Attorney General Kennedy . So far
3
3
as You know did You have any information or believe that he
L
4 was ever aware of the proposed plans here?
5 MR . BISSELL : I don ' t remember any conversations or
incident. that would have constituted evidence to me that he
was aware, but I would not have been in the least surprised if
8 he were. He could have been aware from Bundy or Ros tOw and
9
conceivably in other ways . If the President knew of this,
10 then I think it highly likely that the Attorney General did,
11 because the President was in the habit of talking
over matters
12 of concern to hin with the Attorney General_
1
0
13 CIIAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Do you remember any letter
1
14 fron the Attorney General saying that all activities of this
15 character relating assassination of Castro should stop?
16 MR BISSELL : No , I do not remenber that, Mr Chairmanl
17 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER : That was alleged by some of
18
his associates in the press?
19
MR BISSELL : No ,
3
MR. WALLISON : Mr _ Bissell, after the assassination
20 8
21
of President Kennedy in November of '63 you were no longer with 1
22
the Agency I understand?
v
MR. BISSELL: That is correct.
23
1
MR WALLISON : But knowving what you do about the
24 2
8
25 events here concerning Castro, at least the planning , did you
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TOp SECRET
2311
7
1 relevant Eo the [arren Commission S inquiry?
8 2 MR _ BISSELL : I really did not, no.
1
3 MR NALLISON And Youl had no discussions with anyone
1
4 who is also involved in this matter about that?
5 MR . BISSELL: Ione_
6 MR. BELIN: other questions by members of the
Comnission concerning the Castro situation?
8 CHAIRHAN ROCKEFELLER: Yes Was there evidence to
your know ledge that Castro was aware of this attempt or became
10 aware of it?
11 MR. BISSELL: I don t remenber evidence to that
12
effect. I don t think that the actual attempt was ever made,
1
13
although it is physically possible that the devices to be used ,
0
1
14
the poison pills did reach Cuba and it is perfectly possible
that Fith SOmc time Castro would have come on SOIe evidence
15
of this operation. But I don ' t renerber ever
seeing
any report
16
to that effect.
17
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: The operation wasn t under
18
your direct management?
19
3
MR . BISSELL : Not really, indirectly , but not
directly
20
8
[ithin the Agency the individual was She € Edwards yes _
21
|
MR . KIRELAND : Mere there efforts during the period
22
v following the of 20 land agents on the island?
23
1
MR _ BISSCLL: Excuse Iaz , sir?
24 1
8 MR. KIRKLAITD : Mere there efforts post-Bay of to
25
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any
lag
key
Bay Pigs
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L
land agents on the island?
2 FR. BISSELL : Well, there [ere none for a
Thile, and I 8
8
3 t know _
1
I would assure that such efforts have been Iade
1
4
since then - But I tlink for a good many months after that it
5 Tv2s not, would not have been 2asy to recruit agents
1
and also
there was
absol-tely
no internal underground or resistance
that could give any infiltrated agent support_ So my guess is
8 that no such efforts were nade for at least a year or mnore
9 MR _ BELIN : Mr . Bissell, you Were in charge in a
10 sense of the Bay of operation with the Agency , Were you
11
not?
MR_ BISSELL : I was . 12
1
MR. BELIN: Could this have been part of an ,overall
0
13
1
of operation
as opposed from in any way being
a
14
direction fron the White House? In other words
1
could this
15
have been Somz thing that the Agency just &eveloped internally
16
as its overall of operation?
17
MR _ BISSELL : I don' t think this
Dt]
well, in fact I
18
ar
quite clear thaz this Was not developed in that , this
19
I
was not developed in that Tay . I don t think it was even known
20
8
to many if any of the individuals within the Agency that were
21
L
concerned with the planning and preparation for the of Pigs .
22
5
MR _ KIRKLAND : Mr. Edwards Tvas not involved in the
23
1
Bay of Pigs?
24 2
8 MR . RISSELL : No , he was not
25
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Pigs
Pigs Bay
Pigs Bay
plan
Bay
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L
1 MR . CORRIN I believz you testifiad that you discusse
8 2 the es
tablishnent of tha executive action capability with either
1
3 Mr Bundy or Mx_ RostOw Did I understand that correctly?
2
4 MR . BISSELL : Correct
5 MR CORBIN Who Was it that first raised this subject
6 as you recall it?
7 MR. BISSELL : I can 't 5 3= I have no recollection of
8 who firs: raised it. My belief is that this would have come
9 up as a subject very probably in conversations between myself
10 and Mr. Rostow and the reason I give that as my belief is that
11 I had on a number of occasions discussed with Mr . Ros +OW the
12
various kinds
8
various kinds of capabilities , and especially
1
13
unconventional ones that the Agency should or might develop.
0
2
14
At a sonewhat later stage , for instance , he asked me and I
15
asked a
small interdepartmental group to exanine the ways
improving our
military capabilities , and his thinking ran
16
along the lines of developing these tools of action _ And I
17
think _
0
therefore , that it is very probable that this came up
18
in conversations with hin, but which one of uS would have
19
1
coined the phrase, for instance, I don t knolv _
20
8
MR CORBII : So far a5 you recall it, were there any
21 L
plans for such a
capability being developed at the Agency Fvhen
22
5
You had your first conversation with him?
23
1
MR . BISSELL : Oh , I'm reasonably certain the answer
24 2
8
is negative to thata
25
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of
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L
1 MR KIRKLAND : Ther? was no such capability in the
8 2 Agency prior t0 that?
3
3 MR _ BISSELL: There was no separated organization ,
1
4
identified capability of that sort_
5 MR . BELIN : Did you have any discussions with any
6
people in the White Iouse during either the Eisenhower Adminis -
7
tration or
the Kennedy Adninistration to the effect of why can t
8 you do some thing about Castro?
9 MR BISSELL: Well, it s possible _ I don t remember
10 a specific case, if there were any When You asked earlier
11
if there had bezn any discussions of this during the Eisenhover
12
Administration, the reason I said that there could have been
1
13 was just that sort Of, remark might easily have been made in a
0
11
14
meeting. You knor couldn * You , is there any way that you
15
could remove Castro and do something
much simpler than the
of operation , that sort of remark could have been made
16
17
in , for instance, a meeting of the Special Group_ I don t happem
to renzmber such renark having been made in the Eisenhower
18
Adninistration.
19
1
MR _ BISLIN : Would President Eisenhower himself have
20
8
made such a remark , or was he not a nember Of it?
21
|
MR - BISSELL: Ie did not attend the Special Groups_
22
4
MR. CONNOR: This small group that was formed by [r
23
1
Edwards after Your discussions how many people were involved
24 E
8 within the Agency?
25
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cb 13
TOp SECREF_
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L
1 HR BISSELL [ell, I don t knor that he forned a
8 2 group. I think he conducted probably with the help of onz other
1
3 man in the Security Office such communications as there were_
1
4 MR . BELIN : Mx Olsen I think has several additional
5 questions in this area.
6 MR - OLSEN Howard Hunt has stated in several of his
writings that in connection with his work in preparation for
the of he recommended an assassination of Premier
Castro be undertaken either to precede or to be contemporaneous
10 with the Bay of operation. Now _
{
Mr Hunt was
working under
11 direction?
12 MR _ BISSELL : Right.
1
0 13 MR. OLSEN : At that time , was he ?
11
14 MR BISSELL: Yes
1
he was
15 MR. OLSEN Did such a recommendation from E _ Howard
16 Funt ever come to your attention?
17
MR _ BISSELL : I wouldn t be at all surprised. I don t
18
have a
specific recollection It is the kind of thing he could
19
have said in a
neeting orally and I don t renember any written
270
20
proposal to that effect originating from Headquarters _
8
21 MR. OLSEN: Is it your testinony that you have absolutply
L
22 no recollection of an oral recommendation from Mr _ Iunt to that
5
effect?
23
0
MR BISSCLL : I don t have any specific recollection_
1 24 E
8
25
but that doesn t mean that it coulen t have happened .
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Pigs
Your
not
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~TOp SECRET
2316
1
1 MR . OLSFN: Do You have a general inpression that
8 2 it happened?
1
3 MR . BISSELL : I would suspect that he is telling the
L
4 truth Ihen he said that he made this recornnendation. Whether
5 he Iould have made it in ny presence or to me , or to Colonel
or others
a
I don t knov
7 MR =
0
OLSEN : Mr Bissell _
1
there has also been testimony
that has bezn taken by the staff of the Commission to the effect
that a Bernard Barker, a contract agent of the CIA , or enployee
10 Of the CIA , I believe it was at that tine made contact with
11 the person acting' in the Cubian community down in the Miani
12 area and asked hin about this tine whether he would be willing
1
6
13 to undertake an assassination. Do you have any knoledge of
11
14 that?
15 MR BISSELL I don : remenber that.
16 MR . OLSEN Were you aware, Mr Bissell, in the
17
period' 1961 early 1962 of there being
a great deal of talk
18
among Cuban exiles in this country of desire to kill Fidel Castrp?
19 HR _ BISSELL Again , I have t0 say I have no
specific
1
20
recollection of reading newspaper stories to this effect, or
8
21
hearing reports through CIA channels but it seens to me highly L
22
likely, given the nature of the situation, that there would have
v
bzen talk of that sort_
23
11
MR . OLSEN : A great many of the Cuban exiles in
24 2
8
25
Florida in particular and elsewherz in the southern part of the
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L
United States at that tine wera
being in effect utilized
8 2 through front organizations that were being sponsored by the
8
3 Age my =
1
Were not?
1
4 MR. BISSELL: Uh-huh_ I think that is true. Yes_
5
MR . KIRKLAND: Was there discussion of targets there
6 confined to Fidel Castro, or would it include Guevara and
7 others?
8 MR. BISSELL: Exclusively Castro.
9 CHIAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Were not most of those Cuban
10 organizations penetrated by Castro representatives?
11 MR . BISSELL : Were, indeed =
12 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: So that it would be easy
1
0
13 for double agents to report back to Castro what was going on?
11
14 MR RISSELL : That' s right. Exactly. I think our
15 judgnent at the time, as a matter of intelligence , and I am nOlv
16
talking about after the of Pigs operation in particular ,
17 but the same
applies by the Fay , to most of the preparation ,
18 I think our belief was that Castro was extremely well informed
19 on what was going on , I don t think that he penetrated _
1 S0
far
1
20 as we knew parts of that preparatory activity that were
under
i
21 the Aqency" s direct control , but all of the exile groups in 6
22 Miami
8
including the political
groups that we attempted to
5
23 form and did forn as front organizations , I'm quite sure he
1
24 knew what was going on.
E
8
25
CHIAIRLIAN ROCKEFELLER: Dia CIA kno
1
have any informat_ on
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They
very
Bay
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2318
1 to the 2ffect that Oswald was trying to penetrate sora of
L
2 those groups? 8
1
3 MR BISSELL : I don t renenber that, Mr _ Chairnan
1
4 MR CONTNOR: Did it ever cone to your attention in
5 any that Oswald have any interest in the Cubian situation
6 or was associated with it in any way?
7 MR. BISSELL: Never. I don t evar
remember hearing
8 any association, in anything that associated him with that.
9
MR . RIRKLAND: You mean prior to the assassination?
MR _ BISSELL: Prior to the assassination
10
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLCR: Did 3il1 Pauli work for you 11
12
during that period?
1
[R _ BISSELL: Well, Yes , in a Sense. I mean , hs serve
0
13
1
as a messenger, but for the most part that was in the Einal days
14
of the Batista regime and he Was used in an effort to persuade
15
Batista to leavc the country _
16
MR _ BELIN : Mx Olsen?
17
MR. OLSEN After the assassination of President
18
Kennedy when i2 became well known that Le? Harvey Oswald had
19
bzen active in atterpting t0 penetrate anti-Castro groups and
20
8
had engaged in kind of a one-nan operation for the Fair Plan
21
L
For Cuba Committee, did it not occur to You , Mr. Bissell, that
22
v there night have been sone
relationship between the assassination
23
1
of President Kennedy , in attitude_
1
at least , that Oswald might
24 2
8 have developed in connection with his Cuban contacts in Ne1 Orledns
25
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cb 17 2319
1
MR _ BISSELL : ell
(
I think I can
honestly
saY it 1
2
didn t particularly occur to me at that tine = I read the 8
8
3
usual nerspaper accounts of the assassination
1
but it wasn'+
1
4
until 2 deal later that these facts about Oswala surfaced
5
and I Mill honestly say that really didn't
occur to that
there was 2 connection
6
7 MR. BELIN: other questions by the Commissioners
8 on this particular area?
Now let S turn to the question of Trujillo, and I ar
9
going to ask Mr . Gray to interrogate you in that area.
10
MR - GRAY : Mr. Bissell, We have gone over the circum-
11
stances surrounding the death of Trujillo just before you
12
1
testified,
1
is that correct?
0
13
1'
MR _ BISSELL: Correct.
14
MR _ GRAY : Incidentally , in the 13 Years or So since
15
you left the Agency - have You had occasion to review the docu-
16
ments dealing with that?
17
MR. BISSELL: I have not , no.
18
MR _ GRAY : Ncw in early 1960 the records I reviewed
19
1
indicate that the government was
maintaining
a
policy of non-
20 8
intervention tomard the Trujillo regime_
1
and that in the early
21 |
ronths of that year Ambassador Farland , who was then our
22
9
Ambassador in the Dominican Republic, suggested that that
23
1
policy be changed _ Do You recall Ambassador Farland?
24
MR BISSELL : I don t remember whether I 2ver met him
8
25
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me ,
Any
0
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]
1 personally , but I do have sone recollection of this recoramen-
2 dation of his . 8
{
3 MR . GRAY : And do you recall anything about his back-
1
4 ground?
5 MR_ BISSELL: He had been I believe in the FBI at
6 one tina and he had an intense interest in intelligence
7
matters and I think he had worked very closely with the CIA
8
station , Chief of Station in the Dominican Republic.
9 MR. GRAY : Incidentally ,
was that station declared
10 to the Dominican Government?
11
MR _ BISSELL : I believe it was _
12
MR . GRAY : That would mean that the governmant , even
{
though the people were under cover, would know who they were
0
13
0
14
and what were?
MR . BISSELL
: At least who some of then were_
15
MR GPAY: IJow
?
the records reflect that when Mr _
16
Farland returned to [ashington tor consultations in of 1960
17
he stated that he had bzen in contact with some internal dissi-
18
dents in the Dorinican Republic, that they needed support from
19
2
the United States and in particular that needed a number
20
8
of higl-powered rifles with telescopic scopes and the Agency
21 |
records reflect in conversations at the Agency he further Ient
22
4
on to say that the Dominicans planned to remove Trujillo from
23
11
the scene through us2 of some sort of explosive device. Do
24 2
8 You recall conversations along these lines?
25
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cb 19
TOp SECREF
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1
1 MR _ BISSELL = My recollection is that on the occasion
8
2
of this visit 0f his to Washingon he did urge that soma mili
1
3
or equipment or guns or other devices be made available to
L
4 the internal dissidents I have a dim recollection that this
5
Was t0 include one or more rifles With telescopic sights _ I
6 Iouldn'+ have remenbered the number unless You had mentioned it
7 from the records
8 MR _ GRAY : The records also reflect that at the end
9 of June or the beginning of July you approved of the furnishing
10 of such rifles to the Dominican dissidents on the basis of
11 a mamorandum from Colonel who was then Chief of the
12 Festern Hemisphere Division , stating he had received authori-
1
4
13 zation from Mr . Rubottom , who was then Assistant Secretary 0f
1
14 State_ Do You recall such approval?
15 MR _ BISSELL : This is all consistent with my recolle-
16 ctiona
17 MR = GRAY : Vould you yourself be involved in any
18
negotiations with the Department of state as a normal matter?
19 MR - BISSELL As a normal matter I would have
1
20 been involved with meetings at the Assistant Secretary of State
8
21 level . I would have been involved if and when this matter was |
22 discussed in the Special Group.
4
23 MR . GRAY : And do you recall, do YOU have any recollectio
1
24
of whether or not You Tere involved in any discussions involving
2
8
25
the furnishing of these rifles?
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King ,
not
==================================================
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cb 20
Top Seeret
2322_
L
1 MR . BISSELL: I don t renember thata
8 2
MR _ GRAY NOVI the records pretty much petered
1
3 at this point. They don t show that either this plan was killed
1
4 or that the rifles Were actually sent It could not be
5 developed whethzr Were or not Do you have any recollectio
6 why that change of course might have taken place?
7
MIR . BISSELL: None whatsoever.
8 MR . GRAY : At the beginning of 60 and 61 you pre-
9 sented a proposal the Special: Group work with the
10 internal dissidents , and at the s ame time work with exile groups]
11 for paramilitary capability and things of that sort, an I
12 correct?
1
0 13 MR _ BISSELL Correct
1
14 MR GRAY : At the January 12 , 1961 meeting , at the
15 instance of Department of State, the Special Group, Thich
16 approved these covert operations , approved the provisions to
17 the Doninican internal dissidents of limited supplies of small
18 arms and somz explosive devices som explosives_
1
I believe,
19
do You have recollection on that ?
1
MR BISSCLL Such as it it would confirm what
20
i
21 You state; L
22 MR . GRAY : In Your opinion , when approved the
4
23
provision of small arms were talking about assassination
1
24 weapons or were they talking about guerrilla supplies and thing
2
8
25 of that nature?
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they
t0 to
any
is ,
they
they
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cb 21
TOp SECRET
2323
L
1 MR . BISSELL : I would have said definitely the latter
8 2 However I think it Was the understanding of everybody in
1
3 Washington that if Jou provided
weapons to internal dissidents
1
4 and especially in fairly small numbers
1
and Iere
contemplating
5 truly guerrilla-like activities as distinguished from some thing)
6 0 n th? scale of the of that these night well include
7 assassination attenpts _ But the concept that I saem to remember
8 was that this was a plan for, in effect, the logistic support
9 of the internal dissidents_
1
and it dia not contemplate that
10 the Agency or the Station would be planning specific operations
11 for them to carry out
12 MR. GRAY : So , it would be their operations and the
1
6
13 Agency furnishing of the equipment?
1
14 MR. BISSELL: Right.
15 MR _ GRAY : And you draw a
distinction there, do you?
16 MR _ BISSELL : I do partly because in situations like
17 that the Agency really has very little effective control over
18 the group that is supported once the support has been granted.
19 MRa GRAY : And with respect to the explosives which
2
20 were authorized, the Agency had been in contact with these
8
21
internal dissidents and was aware that they did plan to use a L
22
borb +o kill Trujillo?
5
MR. BISSELL : I inagine that s the case, I don 't
23
1
specifically renember.
24 Z
8 MR _ GRAY : And you then , if you don + recall of your
25
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yes
==================================================
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cb 22
#OPSECREF
2324
1
1 Own state of mind, do you have any recollection as to whether
8 2 other members of the Special Group knerv what the purpose of the
1
3 explosives Iight be?
L
4 MR = BISSELL : I believe that would have,
yes.
5
MR. GRAY : You think would have?
6 MR. BISSELL: I think would have , Yeah.
7
MR. GRAY : NOw , the dissidents had difficulty coming
8 up Ivith
a workable important _ the Special Group
attach the condition that these weapons and explosives be
10 delivered to the representatives of the dissidents outside of
11 the Dominican 'Republic, is that correct?
12 MR _ BISSELL: Correct _
1
6
13 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLKR: Did this the approval
1
14 of the [hite House?
15 MR _ GRAY : The records that I have reviewed show it
16 was approved by the Special Group. There was ~
17 MR - BISSELL : There Was also a White Ilouse Represen
3
18
tative on the Speical Group.
19
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: And You said earlier that any
1
20
assassination or assassination atterpt would have to have the
8
21
highest approval? |
22
MR BISSELL : That' $ correct
y
23
CHAIRMA: ROCEEFELLER: Fron the President?
1
MR BISSELL That is correct
24 2
8
25
MR. GRAY : Would include this sort of instance of
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they
they
they
oh , very
get
==================================================
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b 23
#OPSECRET
2325
]
furnishing material to people knowing Ihat
are going to
8 2 use it for
1
but where the Agency itself is not directing the
1
3 oparation?
L
4 MR = BISSELL: 11, let nz answer that question this
5 vay:
this clearly required and received the Special Group
approval_ The procedure always in the Special Group was that
the Mhite House Representative was presuned +o inforn the
8 President of whatever was brought up in that Group that in
his opinion should be brought to the President s attention _
10
And furthermore , it was presumzd to obtain presidential assent
11
t0 action in those cases where he believed the presidential,
12
personal assent of the President was called for _
1
13
MR . COZNOR: And who was the [hite House Representative
0
1
14
sitting on the Special Group at that time?
15
MR - BISSELL: Gordon And frequently, given that
procedure, it Was frequently the case that a proposal would be
16
made at one neeting of the Special Group , it would be discussed
17
but no action taken until the naxt
neeting, in part to provide
18
this opportunity for the Khite Housa Representative to consult
19
1
With the Presiden: to the extent he believed necessary.
20
8
21
MR _ GRAY : TJow th? dissidents Were never able to
1
22
develop
a capability to receive these goods _ nor did ever
4
23
1 provide any persons to be trained in the techniques of explos -
24 2
ives and detonators and s0 forth?
8
25
MR. BISSELH,: , (Mitness nodded in the affirmative.)
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We
Gray -
thsy
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1 MR GPAY : In March the station cabled the request
8 2 of Mr. Dearborn
1
who was then Counsel General_ that Trujillo' s
1
3 relations having been severed , cabled his request for three
L
4 :38 ce
specials to be turned over to the dissidents as a
5 show of faith and materal support_ NOw do you recall
6 a discussion of the pistols and sending pistols by pouch and
7 so forth?
8 MR BISSELL : Yes I think I do renember that dis-
cussion , and for that purpose you have identified.
10
MR. GRAY : The record also reflects that the firsz
11
couple of occasions such requests were made by the station the
12 Agency refused then stating that it Was inconsistent with
1
13
the limitations irposed by the Special Group . The last request
0
1
was not responded to for a
period of some week approximately
14
a Ieek , following which you approved it It appears there was
15
a
meeting in the State Department between some State Department
16
officials and Aqency officials and the State Department menorandum
17
of that meeting is not in their files. Based on that statement
18
of docunents _ would you say whether or not you think there
19
1
would have been State Department approval of pouching those
20 8
21
pistols?
|
MR. BISSELL : I think there almost certainly would
22
4
have bezn State Department approvale
1
because there had been
23
1
a
specific prohibition imposed by the Special Group, and the
24 2
9 Agency would not on its Own authority have considered it possibl
25
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good
on
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FOPSeerET
2327
7
violate that prohibition unless and until there had been
8 2 consultation With the State Department and concurrenc? the
3
3 Stata Departnent.
1
4 MR. GPAY : Would such consultation normally have been
5 at level or on Colonel Kings?
6 MR. BISSELL : I think probably Colonel
7 MR. GRAY : Assuming the State Department ' agreed to
8
waive the Special Group restrictions and the Agency felt this
9 was appropriate, would you have felt it necessary to go back
10
to the Special Group in any formal fashion?
11
MR. BISSELL: I think probably not , but I think the
12
Special Group menbers would have been informed of this action
1
at the next meeting.
0
13
1
14
MR . GRAY : As I stated, the record reflects that the
pistols were sent to the. Doninican Republic and Were passed
15
to the dissidents _
16
MR. BELIN : When , Mr. Gray, does the record reflect
17
that?
18
MR - GRAY : I believe it Ivas March 25th . I don t have
19
my notes With Ie
20
i
MR . BELIN : Of what year?
21
L
MR. GRAY : 1961_
22
4
MR _ BELIN : When dozs the record reflect the rifles
23
11
were shipped?
24 2
8 MR GRAY : The Springfield rifles , the ones that
25
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your
Kings _
==================================================
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#OR Se6REF-
2328
L
1 Anbassador Farland talked about?
8 2
MR. BELIN: The first rifles that went dovn _
{
3
MR. GRAY : As near as I can tell on the rifles that
1
4 I spoke about earlier, never went to the Dominican
5 Republic.
6
MR - BELIN : In other words the early rifles that
7
Were talked about never were shipped _
7
is that correct , according
8 to the records?
9 MR . GRAY : The records no longer discuss the matter
10
once approval ship them was given There is no transmission
11 no further reference to receipt of then , nothing of that
12 sort_
1
0
13 HR BELIN : 411 right, 9o ahead_
2
14 CHAIRMA ROCKEFELLER: I would like to ask Mr
15 Bissell whether there was
any question of violations of
16 statutes by sending these weapons to a group through the use
17 of the pouch , diplonatic pouch in relation to either a direct
18 assassination attenpt , or implied or possible?
19 MR. BISSELL: Well I am not aware of any . In any
1
20 case, I think that consideration did not arise at the time, and
8
21
it obviously didn t arise in the ninds of the State Department 1
22 or the Special Group members or the Agency _
4
23 MR GRAY : NOv
1
following the shipment of the pistols
1
24 the station cabled back that had discovered in the
2
8
25 Consulate threz Carbines that had been left behind by departing
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to
they
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cb 27
tOp seerEt
2329
L
Vaval personnel and requestad authority to pass those Again ,
8 2 Ieadquarters delayed, and again there was 3
meeting With the
1
3 State Departnent _ There is a memorandum of this meeting and
1
4 it doesn t reflect this subject came up , but the samne your
5 Deputy , Mr. Barnes , approved the passage of the Carbines .
Would You say that this would
7 MR _ BISSELL : I think almost certainly that the
8 State Departnent would have been consulted .
9 MR . GRAY : NOrv following this the station the
10 Consul requestad
0
the Consul requssted some more or relayed
11 tha request to the dissidents for some so-called grease guns
12 M-3 submachines , and three or four such weapons were pouched
1
13 to the Dominican Republic. But with the of and un-
0
2
14
settled conditions in the Caribbean area Were never passed_
15
Do You have any Eurthar recollection of the events preceding
16
the death of Generalissimo Trujillo?
17
MR. BISSELL: I really have none , no
18
MR . GRAY : Do you recall discussing these nlatters
with anyone , let say of your superiors or anyone outside of the
19
2
CIA?
20
i
21
MR BISSELL: Io special discussions , nothing other
|
than those that would routinely
occur in review_ projects with
22
4
Allen Dulles internally any
special reports to the Speical
23
1
Group_
24 2
8 MR - BELIN: Did the Special Group give
or reaffirm its
25
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and
Pigs Bay
they
ing
and
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2330
L
1 position to pouch the weapons that were
actually shipped in
8 2 the spring of 1961?
1
3 MR - BISSELL : I don t know whether they did or not.
1
4 As You have just heard , there is the indication that this Was
5 cleared with the State Department , and I have said that the
6 normal procedure would be that everything cleared with the
7 State Department and the Special Group at least would have
8 b een informed of this at its next meeting, and presumably ,
9
therefore, it accepted that, or at any rate did reverse
10
the agreed upon tion between the Agency and the State
11 Department_
12 MR. BELIN : Who were the members of the Special
1
0
13
Group , in sunary , if You remember?
11
14 MR . BISSELL: I will have to have the Zate again_
15
MR - BELIN Into the spring of '61
16 MR . BISSELL : Nell, by this time the Special Group
17
would normally have included Bundy or RostOw and at the beginn-
at somz date about nid-' 61 I believe that General Maxwell
18
19
Taylor , as the President 5 Military Adviser, sat in on most of
1
the meetings . It would have included probably the Undersecre-
20 8
tary State , and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
21
|
22
Direcsor of CIA.
4
MR. BELIN: And mention the fact that in the fall
23
1
of 1960 Tvhen this was first discussed , that at that tine Mr
24 2
8
25
Gray was on the Special Group?
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posi
ing ,
of
you
==================================================
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ch 29
TOp szeret
2331
1
1 MR _ BISSELL : Right Correct_
8
2 MR . BCLIN: And Ivho was the Special Group at that
{
3 time Tho elsz?
1
4 MR. BISSCLL: Well, i+ Mould havz been , with the
5 exception of the White House representation , it Iould have been
6 the same individuals ex officio. It was suppose to be the
7
Deputy Secretary of State , I mean the Undersecretary of State;
8
the senior Undersecretary Later, at certain stages in the
9
organization of th Departrznt it Ias the Undersecretary for
10
Polisical Affairs in the State Department_ The Deputy Secre-
11
tary of Defense was a renber , although there Was sonetimes
a
12
substitute for hin. And she Director of Central Intelligence
1
was the other person.
0
13
1
14 MR KIRXLAND: Was that representative to the OAS
involved in these discussions?
15
MR BISSELL : I believ? not, sir. I believs it is
16
17
unlikely.
MR . GRAY: Mr Bissell_
1
one other aspzct of the cable
18
traffic I should call to your attention is that shortly after
19
2
the shipment of the pistols and the authorization to pass the
20
8
Carbines , there is several cables betwzen the station ana the
21
1
Agency 'leadquarters reflecting
sone concern whether Counsul
22
4
Dearhorn is going +o nentioned thes? matters in his corresponden 2
23
1
with the Department of State_ Now I suppose there could be
24 1
8 EWO reasons for that, either nobody in the State Departmznt knew
25
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TOP SEGRET
2332
L
1 it, or very fewv people in the State Department knew it_ [Yould
8 2 You hava opinion as to' Thich of those situations existed?
1
3 MR BISSELL : Yes . I am almost certain it Would have
1
4 bezn the latter. Operational infornation of this sort was
5 suppose be confined to the Assistant Secretary
con cerned and
6 his Deputy. Quite often , for matters of sonewhat lasser
7
sensivity involve the station desk officer in the State Depart-
8 ment, but it was suppose to be limited to two or three below
9 the level of the Undersecretary and the Secretary_
10 MR - KIRKLAND: Was the Arbassador back in the country?
11 MR_ BISSELL: I believe the Ambassador was back in
12 the country but in this particular
case where Farland had
1
13 been the Arpbassador and was succeeded by Dearborn , were
0
1
14
both kept completely informed of what was going on at all timzs
15
The rsason I say in this particular case is that these were
two men who I mentioned earlier, were intensely interested
16
in intelligence and covert activity
or
operations of this sort
17
It was
Farland,
as You have heard , who really initiated the
18
policy of supporting the dissidents and they were, to my
19
1
recollection , very fully inforned of what vras done
20 8
MR . BEIIN Again , You mentioned earlier that You
21
7
felt that the Special Operations Group approved possibly a ship-
22
4
ment of rifles in 1960 Tvlich evidently
Were not shipped_
23
1
You have any specific recollection of that approval_ or do you
24 2
8 have any
specific recollection that it was approved or not?
25
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any
to
they
Do
==================================================
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31
FOp SEeRET
2333
7
1 MR. BISSELL: I don t a specific recollection
8 2 but I take it there is a record of that_
1
3 MR . BELIN: Are you assuming that if were shipped
1
4 were approved , and if were not shipped you don t know
5 whethex it was approved?
6 MR BISSELL : I think that is what I am
saying, yes
8
7
as you
are stating,
yes_
8 MR . BELIN And if the record shows there were
9 weapons shipped in the March or April of 1961: Then is it your
10
specific recollection or just that You ara assuming that tha
11
Special Operations Group approved that?
12
MR _ BISSELL : No . I have some recollection of that
1
13 one the shipnent involving the three revolvers , and I partic-
6
1
14
ularly remember the case that Was nade by Dearborn for doing
15
it, which mas be able to give, to issue sone weapons to
the dissidents as evidence of our continued interest and
16
faith.
17
MR . BELIN And would that approval of the Operations
18
Group then have been in the spring of 1961 or the first part of
19
37
1961 , or still going back?
20
i
MR . BISSELL: I'm quite certain it would have been
21 1
22
the first part of 1961 _
4
MR. KIRKLAND : Following the death of Trujillo, did
23
1
the Agency give
any help or aid to the surviving executioners?
24 2
8 MR _ BISSELL : I don t renenber that specifically. It
25
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have
they
they they
to
good
==================================================
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==================================================
tOp seeret
32 cb 2334 -
1
1 Ias a
confused period ,
1
of course, and the Agency was very active
8 2 there in the next few months attempting to, in making contact
1
3 with the various political
groups and individuals that emerged ,
L
4 but I do not remember anything specific of the sort you speak
5 of _
6 MR . BELII: The records 0f the Agency show that Mr
7 [cCone was not briefed about either the Castro plan or the
8 so-called executive action capability until some period after
he becane DCI
0
which would have been in 1963 or So Do you
10 know any reason why he was not briefed about this?
11 MR . BISSELL: Well_
8
I think by the tima he took office
12
which as I remember it it Ias late in 1961 , I think it was about
0
0 13
the first 0f Deceniber in 1961, any plan to develop
an executive
11
14
action capability internally
Was in abeyance. I don t know
15
whether 1+ ever was revived_ certainly not Ihile I was there ,
and I think that' s the reason that he was not briefed on that.
16
17
The possible plan of 3
possible Castro assassination had aborted
18
and although an individual was designated by ne just about that
time to begin to look at the potential operations against the
19
2
Castro regime that designation would have occurred a few
20 9
wezks before I left, and I think, I don t think anything ever
21
|
came of that. Bill Harvey , who was put into that position _
1
was
22
5
activz in planning for a tine, but I kno that after a
fairly
23
1
short tour cf duty he was renoved and 50 I am ass
uming thz
1 24
8 reason McCone Mas not briefed about these was
that really nothing
25
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FTOPSECRET
2335
1
1 Was happening that worth bringing to his attention _
8 2 MR_ BELIN : other questions on the assassinations
3
3 before W2 turn to one final area?
1
4 MR. GRAY : I do have one other question Mr . Helms
5 Tvas your Deputy for a portion of this time?
6 MR - BISSELL : He was .
7
MR . GRAY; And ultimately
Your successor?
8 MR _ BISSELL: Rights
9 MR GRAY : [as he involved in any of these operations
10 or planning that you have described?
11
MR . BISSELL: Well, he was generally informed about
12
them because he saw
copies of all of the cable traffic that
1
cane through , and sat in neetings with the Director and things
6
13
2
14
of this kind_ He was not
actively involved in' the Bay of
preparations vhen that was going on It was nearly
a fulltime
15
job for and I was handling much of the rest of the business
16
the CS _ I believe thaz [oulc have been there's a
17
chance that he would have been involved in the Dominican
18
activities , but *o just what extent I don 2 remember.
19
{
MR = KIRKLAND: I have one question _ This group that
20 8
carried out the assassination in the Dominican Republic were
21
|
not initially sponsored by the CIA?
22
y
MR . BISSELL That S correct, sir. They camz into
23
1
existence on their Owin , and as you have heard , it was Ambassador
24 2
8 Farland' s recommendation that they be supported, and I' do want
25
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Any
Pigs
ne ,
of he
==================================================
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cb 34
TOp SeeREF =
2336
1
1 emphasize, as I have said, that this was regarded by the
8 2
Agency as a
logistics support operation , in full know ledge that
1
3
it was giving then the capability for violence. But nevertheles
L
4 there is quite
a distinction ,
or at least there was in our mind:
5
between supporting an operation either initiating it, orgah-
6 it, running, it and controlling it_
7
MR . KIRKLAND: And this was not too long after the
8 Trujillo assassination 0f a
president of
a friendly state?
9
MR BISSELL Exactly .
10 MR . GRISWOLD : Did anyone consideration as to
11 whether this was a
wise thing to do or a
legal thing to do?
12 MR- BISSELL: Well, I Tould presumz , sir, that
1
0
13 consideration was given in the State Departnent_ Ana as You
11
14 have heard , it was the Ambassador who first recommended that
15 this support operation be undertaken. This was then approved
16 by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State= Ile is the approver
17 of record, but this Tlust have also included Tom Mann_ who Ivas
18 the Assistant Secretary Of State. It was discussed in the
19 Special Group where it was approved at the undersecretary leve] ,
2
20 and by a White Ilouse Representative, and the general presumption
8
21 in the way the Agency" S covert action operations Wvere run was
|
22 that the policy considerations of +he wisdon of the action was
3
23 a
matter for the State Department , the White Iouse in a
1
24 sensa the Iational Security Council and the Pentagon wherever
2
8
25 its interests Were relevant, Ihich was in many of these_
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1
'1 HR. GRISMOLD: But the CIA didn t regard itself as
8 2 having any responsibility for either wisdom or legality?
1
3 MR . BISSELL I wouldn t say that . I Tould not
1
4
that it had no responsibility for wisdon _ The CIA obviously
5 Was represented both at the Special Group and on occasion with
6 the ad hoc meetings when operations of this kina Were discussed_
7
CIA representatives Were
quite often not backward in giving
8 their viaws about wisdom _ But this was not the part of the
9
Agency S charter. I think that was
recognized a+ the tine,
10
and it was one of the Allen Dulles repeated exertation , that
11
the CIA dozs not nake policy. It is there as an agency in this
12
capacity, it is there to carry out policy decisions
1
Now
1
as to legality , I think there was 3 real effort
0
13
1
14
in tha Years tha: I was in the Agency' to restrict the Agency s
operation wi-hin 1zhat was believed t0 be its charter_ And in
15
tha: sense, at least there Bas a concern a
legality- I am
16
not I have to that I am unclear myself
as to how the
17
concept of legality can be applied to
many covert activities .
18
MR . COMNOR : Who0 was the Undersecretary of State in
19
3
the Special Group at that tire?
20
8
MR _ BISSELL: Well_
0
back in 60 it was Mr . Murphy ,
21
6
and in 61 it Tas Chester Borles Tho was the Undersecretary- He
22
9
Zia not represent tha Department very 0; on the Special Group
23
1
and I don t renenber Ihor hs used for tha: purpose _
24 Z
8 MR . GRAY : Mr Merchant was therz at that tima.
25
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1 MR . BISSELL: Yes
1
I think he was
8 2
MR SHANTNOLT staying on this natter of approval as
3
3 to the wisdom,
yol assuned the State Dapartment had covered
1
4 this , and that would mean You assumed the Secretary of State
5 was informed?
6 MR . BISSELL : Yes , sir.
7
CLAIRMAN ROCKCFCLLER: Was Goodwin involved in any
8 of this stuff?
9 MR. BISSELL : Dick Goodivin became somewhat involved
10 in sh? of operation , but very late in the garae . For
11 the most part,only after it was over in the business of picking
12 up the pieces. I suspect that he was involved a bit in the
1
3
13 Doninican operation
1 '
and I belisve that he would have been one
11
14
of its supporters and very sympathetic to it_
15 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: JIow about the Castro assassin-
16
ation attenpt?
17
MR _ BISSELL: No , I an almost certain that he knew
18
nothing of thata
19 MR BELIN At least not during the time what You were
2
Iith the Agency?
20 i
MR . BISSELL : That is correct , yes 21
L
22
MR . KIRKLAND: Was John Iill_
1
do you recall, was John
"
Hill in the D.R. at the tima ?
23
1
MR . BISSELL : I saem to remember hin being there at
2 24
8 Some point , but I don t rcmember when it was . I think during
25
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1 the period T7e ara talking about in the DaR. it was Farland
8 2 folloved by Dearborn.
3
3 MR KIRKLAND : He was the charge d' affaires I think
2
4 afterwards?
5 MR . BISSELL: Yes
6 MR GRAY : Dearborn along with the members of the
7 sation were reroved quickly after the death of Trujillo?
8 MR = BELII : The final area of inquiry that I want "
9 to Go into pertains to recommendations You' might have concerning
10 Agency operations or based upon your experience in the Agency
11 and experience both before in government and after in the
12 business world_ Do you have any specific recommendations as to
1
0
13 how inprove the operations of the Agency?
1
14 MR _ BISSELI; ; Well
1
as I have mentioned to You , Mr
15
Belin , I had a fzw that are rather scattered , and to which I
16 do no: attach any very great importance. I had occasion a few
17
years ago to do 2 paper on
this , and I am going to supply Mr
18
Belin a copy this if it is of interest to nim . The main
19
thrust of that, I will it this way , is that the Agency , mos
2
Of, the Agency s so-called failures and especially its more
20
i
massive ones have taken the form of a conpronise of operations
21
6
22 or operations havz been deened to be failures largely because
y
23 Were compromised . That is not true in al1 cases , by
6
manner of Ieans I mean the is a
notable exception _
24 2
8 But in general that is true, and that had lead me to argue, or 25
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your
to
of
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L
1 really to renind any readers of this essay to Ivhich I hava
8 2 referred that the prine expertise the nation should s2ek in
1
3
the clandestine service
8
in a
foreign clandestine service is an
1
4 ability to keep things secret, and to perform operations in secre
5 and thout conpromise_ And in part because of my Olvn
failings
6 and shortconings by the late 60 's the Agency already had I
7 thought 2' rather lamentable record not being able to do this
8 Now in reviewing the whole range of different kinds
9 of covert operations
7
they involved progaganda operations _
1
10 pararilitary operations_
0
political action operations and the
11 whole range. Znd with respect to each of these
1
the clandestine
12 service is not the place There one would expect to, where one
1
0
13 would look for professional competence, military conipetence
2
14 One would look to the Pentagon. Competence in political
15 analysis and political science he would expect that the most
16
corpetent people in the nation Ivould be elsewhere , and he would
17 not look there for competent econonists as such. The pro-
18 fessional competence that the clandestine service should have
19 is as I said , the ahility to
and organize and carryout
2
20
operations
1
both intelligence collection and such' covert action
8
21
operations as are authorized with high security
1
and hopefully 1
22
compronise _
5
23
Given that as its role, given its poor record , I
1
24 suppos? the thrust of this paper was that every 8 ffort should
2
8
25
be made to improve this aspect of the Agency ' s operations _ I
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of
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avoi ding
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;
1
made one
organizational reconmendation . It is just ong way
8 2
of doing it_ It was to propose that there be a small internal
{
3 staff in the Agency , in the clandestine service, but with the
L
4
direct line *o the DCI that should scrutinize every proposed:
5 nan operation before it is initiated, and at laast once a Year
6
should scrutinize every on-going operation fron one standpoint
7
soley that Wvas the prospects of compromise , and their change
8 from year t0 year
Iiy feeling is that in the years that I was
9
in Lhe , it as the DDP in particular that lacking this or any
10
sinilar nechanisn
1
a numher of; our mistakes occurred because
11
there was not a strong enough voice raised internally in the
12
councils of the Agency in favor or the precautions that would
5
4
13
be required to maintain sacrets
4
11
14
15
16
17
18
19
1
20
8
21
1
22
4
23
1
24 2
8
25
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sin
begin t.5a
TOpSEerEF
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1
1 MR _ KIRKLAND : Would that not be a function of the
8 2 Counterintelligence Division?
1
5 MR - BISSELL : Well_
1
it could be . but actually the
1
4
CI staff or Division did not function in that Fay and did not
5
really attempt to perform that role _ It was
attempting really
to protect the Agency ana other parts of the Government from
penetration, and I really had in mind not the compromise by
8
classic penetration , but if you stop to think of it, it hasn t
9
produced the great , dramatic revelations of recent years It
10 is the compromise from letting too many people become knowledgeaple
11 of an operation and still letting the operation go on , of having
12
inadequate cutouts
7
and having inadequat? compartmentation both
1
0
13 within the Agency and elsewhere in tha Government_
1
14 MR . BELIN: Now
1
you contrasted that with the
15 Inspector General S review _ which was a review of operations
16
that had already been completed as opposea to current operationsh
17
MR . BISSELL That is correct. I am talking about
18
before the fact review _ and for this , the sole purpose really
19
of what I have identified
as
security.
1
20 MR. BEL IN: also had a recommendation
8
21
MR - CONNOR: Excuse me You made an
exception € or the 6
22
of in that. Now, would you say that that operation
4
failed?
23
1
24
MR. BISSELL : Well, that operation not was 2
8
25
dramatically compromised, and indeed , it is questionable whether
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that could have been avoided under circumstances , but it
8 2 was also a
military failure, it seems to me perfectly clearcht
1
3 that that is the case_
1
4 My reference to that was to contrast this with, for
5 instance , the by now
much publicized support to the Student
6
Association and support to labor groups overseas. These operatipns
7
in my opinion , were tested by What they accomplished
up to the
point of compromise, and could perhaps still have accomplished =
9 were brilliant ly successful and what destroyed those operationl
10 was purely and simply compromise
11 I also happen to think that they became
1
that are
12
examples , although perhaps I have not looked into 'them enough
1
13 to be confident of this opinion , but I am afraid I think they
6
11
14
became examples of very sloppy procedures. I think that anyone
15
who had looked by tha early '60s at that set of operations
16
coldly, and somewhat at arm S length from the standpoint of
17
security would have said that they are
absolutely doomed to
18
compromise , and te soon if major changes were not made .
19
After all
1
the very fact that _
1
for instance, in the
1
Student Organization you had new officers every year and most
20
i
of the officers Tvere knowledgeable 0f the source of funding ,
21
L
22
well, it was
absolutely inevitable that that would be brought
9
up before long
1
and indeed , a state of mind had developed , I
23
1
think , that it really would not do much harm if it Wera blown _
24 E
8
25
I think that state of mind was perhaps perfectly proper with
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and
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1 regard to the radios because really had been blown before,
8 2 but there are instances in my view of operations that did achiev
8
3 notable results
1
and which eventually failed and had to be
L
4 ended for the reason of compromise.
5 MR _ BEL IN : You have also had some recommendations
6 concerning the type of personnel that the Agency ougkt to
7 recruit
8 MR _ BISSELL : I will mention before touching
on that ,
I had one other specific
one which is really the subject of
10 longstanding discussion inside of the clandestine service. I
11 felt the Agency had come to much too heavily
on official
12 cover and was using its official cover again somewhat carelessly
1
0
13 and it is a very difficult job to build up unofficial cover
1
14 either governmental or nongovernmental. But I felt that far
15 too little was
being done
about that_ Mr _ Belin refers to
16 a
quite unrelated recommendation of mind _ I was fearful that
17 the course the Agency was on was placing more and more reliance
18 on
staffing,
on men and women brought in fairly young , in many
19 cases right out of college,
or soon after college , trained
1
20 in the Agency and then spending or planning to make life careers 8
21 there
1
somewhat in the fashion of the military services , and of
|
22
the Foreign Service-
I think that that is a perfectly appropriat
4
23 pattern for those other services , but my own belief is that one 1
24 of the great strengths of the Agency as a corps of individuals
2
8
25 in say the mid-5os under Allen Dulles was that it attracted
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1 men from all walks of life, and because it was such a new
8 2 organization at that time most of its officers and all of its
1
3 senior people had had some other kind of professional experience
1
4
and accomplishment before
came into the organization.
5 It had quite a
scattering of men who had had military
experience, it had some
professionals like myself, it had
lawyers , and Helms himself_ before his OSS period , had been a
journalist , and it had a wide range of skills . I do not mean
those skills were important to be used - I never used economics
10 in the Agency and Helms I don t think ever used journalism , but
11
my point is I think when it is engaging in the kind of business
12
it is , it is better to have a
variety of backgrounds _ and not
1
0
13 to have more than perhaps half of its personnel men who were
8
14
in there for lifelong careers.
15
This relates to my remarks about official cover and
16
its overuse The pattern that I think was developing by the
17
end 0f , by the beginning of the '60s in the clandestine service
18 was that people more and more its members thought of their
19 careers as a little different in kind , and a little removed
3
20
from Foreign Service
careers They expected to spend a life
8
21
doing tours of duty in every casa under official cover, and 6
22
usually identified to the host government_ And in short, to
4
23
follow much the same career pattern as
the Foreign Service_
1
24
I believe that this is not consistent really with the
2
8
25
maintenance of the state of mina that ought to animate the
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TOP SECRET_ 2346
1
clandestine service.
8 2 MR . BELIN : other questions by members of the
1
3` Commission?
1
Thank for coming _
6
MR = OLSEN : I have one that I would like tw get kind
6 of On} the record_
7 Mr _ Bissell, there have been people responsible
or
8
irresponsible who have suggested that because you and Allen
Dulles General Cabell ware all terminated from the: Agency
10
in effect by President Kenredy within a fair period of time
11
after the failure of the of that the three of you
12
and other people in the Agency Iould have had a motive to
1
0
13
retaliate against President Kennedy.
11
14
Could You describe for uS what you know of your
15
relationship and that of General Cabell and Allen Dulles with
16
President Kennedy after the termination of your respective periods
17
of service with the Agency?
18
MR- BISSELL : I can t say very much about the other
19
two gentlemen _ I am sure that Allen on occasion saw the President ,
3
20
and I have every reason to believe that it was a
friendly
i
21
relationship_ I rather doubt whether General Cabell had any |
22
direct contact with him after that.
5
23
I did have contact with him on perhaps two or three
1
occasions _ He asked me quite soon after I left the Agency to 24 E
8
25
lend a
helping hand to the then head of the rather new Alliance
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you
and
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TOPSECRET _
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]
1 for Progress , and he also asked me to do a paper for him, that
8 2 is , for the President , which I did do_
1
on the question of what
1
5 lessons from the Marshall Plan might have been applicable to the
1
Alliance for Progress _
5 On another more lighthearted occasion, he me to
6 come over to the White House to give him some advice on
cruising]
7 on the Maine coast. And the final time, I think_
1
I suppose the
final tima I saw him, which couldn t have been but very shortly
before his death , was the award of a medal _ I think I can
10
honestly
say that the relationship
was an
extremely friendly
11 one in my case , and as far as I could judge , mutually
SO . I had
12
quite
a number of contacts with him in the roughly eight months
1
6
13 that I was still in the Agency after the Bay of and I can
1
14 say the same of that period_
15
And finally, for the record , I perhaps should say
16 that shortly before I did finally leave the Agency, John McCone_
17
with the President s
knowledge and concurrence , and also that
18
of the then Attorney General asked ma to stay on in the Agency =
19
but in a somewhat different position than that of the DDP _ I
20
thought it was wiser for me to leave _
i
21
MR - LEMNITZER: I have a question. Don t you believe L
22
that in carrying on the covert operation of the magnitude of
4
23
the of that compartmentation was one of the weaknesses
11
24
compartmentation in a clandestine operation to maintain cover
2
8
25
and security was absolutely essential, but on the other hand , on
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smn TOR SEeret
2348
1
an operation of that size With military aspects involved , it
8 2 seemed to me that compartmentation was a weakness in tbe
1
3 preparation of carrying out of the operation , not to mention the
1
changing decisions that took place along the line as the
5 operation unfolded?
6 MR _ BISSELL: Well, I certainly agree with you,
7 General Lemnitzer , in the change in decisions
2
and I agree
8 with you , I probably would agree with you if you and I discuss
specific examples of the compartmentation . I will say , however _
10 that some of the compartmentation I think to this was
11 absolutely
essen tial, and I will give you an example_ We
12 really could not allow the Cuban politicals in Miami, the
1
0
13 exile members of the political parties , to visit the brigades
11
14 in training in Guatemala, the reason that was that the
15 brigade was shaping into a disciplined and unified force , and
16 the politicians were
totally insecure, and at odds with ore
17 another on almost everything. There was a great deal of
18 intriguing in Miami, because if one politician could become
19 identified in the eyes of the brigade , and if the operation
Was 1
20 then successful he would have been the leader _ i
21 So there is an example of where I think we were right
6
22 to enforce compartmentation _ But I don 't think that the kind
4
23 of thing
you have in mind, ard I think I would agree with what
1
24 you have in mind . 2
8
25 MR _ LCMNITZER: Well specifically I have in mind that
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and for
is
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within the Joint Chiefs 0f Staff at the time we could not find
8 2 out what the diplomatic estimate of the situation was , that if
3
3 this force did get ashore _ and up in an accessible place , that
L
4 the Cuban people would rally to it, and as a matter of fact,
5 I have not found out what the diplomatic estimate of the
6 situation
was_
7
MR . BISSELL: Yes , I agree with you. That an
8 unfortunate example
9 MR _ GRISWOLD Let me ask you , did the of
10 operation have anything to do with the gathering of intelligence
11 MR _ BISSELL No , sir. It was somawhat dependent on
12 it, but it didn t have anything to do with it_
1
0 13 MR _ GRISWOLD: Then what business is it of the CIA
0
14 to engage in operations which have nothing
to do with the
15 gathering of intelligence?
16 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Covert_
17 MR . BISSELL : Well, the category that
came to be
18 called covert action operations_
are justified under
a much quoted
19 clause in the CIA S charter Ihich refers to such other activities
3
20 as the National Security Council directs_
8
21 MR _ GRISWOLD : Is there any evidence that the National
1
22 Security Council" directed this operation?
y
23 MR . BISSELL Well, there is a question of definition 0
2 24 lof exactly what constituted the National Security Council
at the
8
25 time of that operation , but I wiil say that the plans for the
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is
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7
operation were repeatedly reviewed by a group that included the
8 2 President of the United states , the Secretaries of State and
!
3 Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of State who was involved ,
1
1
4 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs , or the Acting Chairman of the
5 Joint Chiefs _ and then Army Colonel = now General I believe , who
had been designated the Chairman of a group of three officers
7 by the JCS to review plans and preparations _
8 So I would say that rarely has what started out as
9 a
clandestine operation been more
intimately directed by a
10 group , by those individuals who are, I believe , the members of
11 the NSC _
12 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Was that both President Eisenhower
1
4
13 and President Kennedy?
1
14 MR . BISSELL : No , this was
President Kennedy , and this
15 began with the new administration_
16 CHA IRMAN ROCKEFELLER: And dia the brigades have reason
17
to. expect that if they were successful, they would get support
18 from the U.S , military forces?
19 MR. BISSELL : No , it had no raason to believz that.
2
20 MR . LEMNITZER: Isn t a part of the answs) to this
8
21
question the comment made by President Kennedy after the oper- L
22
ation failed that he was responsible, that it was at his directipn
5
23 that this operation
was carried out?
1
24 MR - BISSELL : Yes , I think that' s true , General
E
8
25
Lemnitzer but remember I am sure just as I do , the degree
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L
1 to which the group I have identified was repeatedly involved
8 2 in review of plans and whatnot_
3
3
MR BELIN: Any other questions from the Commission?
L
Thank you very much , sir, for coming.
6
MR _ BISSELL : You are welcome
6 CHA IRMAN ROCKEFELLER: We are very grateful to YoU,
7
Mr _ Bissell _
8 Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
9 nothing but the truth, sO help you God?
10 MR DONOHUE : I d0 .
11 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER : Paul , do you swear to tell the
12 truth, the wbole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
1
0
13 God?
1
14 MR _ 0 NEILL : I do indeed _
15 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER:
16 MR. BEL IN Mr _ Donohue
1
we have generally had just
17
one Witness at a time in the roOml , so perhaps you had better
18 leave the room while your boss testifies , and then we will call
19 you back here.
3
20 MR - DONOHUE : Okay-
8
21 MR CARGILL Mr _ Chairman , we thought We would begin 7
22
the session on OMB with Mr _ 0 Neill giving a short background
4
23
of OMB s role in Government and then We will' proceed to some
11
24 more specific questions in dealing with the CIA with Mr
2
8
25
Donohue _
HAS NQ
To
CIA AND/OR
OF THIS
TOPSECREF
Qanl
~zxn
d
2NsiX _ tk Rrkklby
SmG ,
'ek
2(
75
( 235(-2365 )
I6 A sca 94
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Okay-
OBJECTION -
DECLASSIFICATION
DOCUMENT
RELEASE
Dies
APr
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7
1 TESTIMONY OF PAUL 0 NEILL
8 2 MR 0 NEILL: Very quickly, Mr Vice President and
1
5 members , I think it would be useful if I woula to give
L
4 you some perspective about OMB does its work with other
5 agencies of government; that is to say , with agencies outside
6 of the intelligence area , and specifically outside of the CIA
7 area , SO that as you come to the direct testimony from my staff
8 member Mr _ Donohue_
1
you will have a background in mind _
I know many of you have had lots of business dealings
10 with the government , and you have some appreciation of how
11 OMB works , SO I will indeed be brief _ I think I was just
12
looking at some testimony that I am going to be giving in the
1
0
13
next couple of days on OMB s budget, I was
looking at the
1
14 historical members that show many staff people are in OMB _
15 And I think maybe that is a useful way to come to the subject-
16 In 1947 OMB had about 550 total staff people_ Today
17 we have 580 total staff people, including 380 professional staff]
18 people who examine the budgets and the programs and activities
19
of everything in the Federal Government_ And that means this
2
20 year , as you know , over 8350 billion worth of expenditures _
8
21 I think the budgzt function is a familiar one We 6
22 look at the amount of dollars that we are spending and compare
4
23 it to what we have spent in the past. We look at equity
1
24
considerations between groups that are served by Federal
2
8
25 programs _ We to look at efficiencies , Ive try to look at
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try
how
and
how
try
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1
1
geographic distribution questions and all of the other prospects
8 2 that you might expect in a budget operation.
1
3 Now , in addition to that budget examination function ,
1
4 of course , we together each year the President S budget
5 for the approval of the Congress , and those same people
6
who do the review and the analysis do that preparation function_
7 That is rot to say that We print it, but We do everything short
8 of printing the President' s budget.
In addition to those budget functions which are ongoing
10 through the Year, we
also perform
a
legislative clearance
11
function or a
legislative review function for the President.
12
Every piece of legislation that is introduced by the President
1
13 goes through the Office of OMB so that it can be' coordinated
0
8
14
with the program of the President , and So that every department
15
and agency of government that has any kind of an interest in
16
that legislative proposal from the President has the advantage
17 a
crosscutting analysis from interested party within the
18
Executive Branch _ In addition to doing that kind of process
19
with Presidential legislation , all legislation that is introducet
1
in the Congress by either House, by a member of either House_
20
i
comes to OMB when a member makes an appropriate request for that
21 L
22 same kind of a review
I
and a report on the Administration S
5
23
position on
the provisions of that legislation just as though
1
it were a
piece of Presidential legislation-
24 2
8
25
There are two times during tha year when the Director
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put
any
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2354 TOp seerEF
1
deeply involved in the program activities and budget of all
8 2 of the Departments agencies of government , once in the
3
3 spring and secondly in the fall as we are doing the final
1
preparation of the President S budget , ana the Director and
5 Deputy sit down with examiners who have the responsibility, and
their stram' bosses and foremen and go through with them their
examination of the programs , the recommendations that are made
by the Department and agency heads the insights that our own
staff have about how resources can best be distributed in
10 preparation- for a series of meetings that
we have With the
11 President to in turn discuss with him at somewhat higher levels
12 of abstraction the alternatives that We see he has in making
1
0
13 the judgments for the upcoming year _
1
14 In addition, we have , of course, some responsibility
15
for efficiency
as indicated earlier , and we do spend some time
16 trying to ferret out programs that are not working well
1
17 proposing legislative changes , management changes _
1
on occasion
18 personnel changes to to accomplish ard accommodate better
19
public performance_
1
20 I think maybe just by way of an example, to give
you
i
21 a more detailed feeling
as to how the resources that are invested |
22 in the CIA area, or in the intelligence
area, or the Defense
3
23 area as compared to other areas , I might take an example in
1
24
another area that we examine, and let me say Social Security
as 2
8
25 an example_
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and
try
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smn 2355 HTOPSECRET
1
1 This year
Social Security spending Will be $70
8 2 billion_ We have one full time individual who examines the
8
5 program of the Social Security Administration. Now , we do have
L
4 on call some people who are not directly responsible for
5 examining the budget in our management divisions to help out
with examination of important management questions _ We do call
upon financial system experts in our
budget review divisions
8 to help support that one individual -
But what I am saying to You is we have one individual
10 that examines on a full time basis the activities of, the Social
11
Security Administration. At the same time , we have one indi-
12 vidual who examines the activities of the CIA, which in budgetarjy
1
4
13 terms is a much , much smaller agency -
1
14 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: One individual?
15 MR . 0 NEILL : Yes, sir_ We have one full time examiner
16
looking at the Central Intelligence Agency _ He is backed up
17
by a so-callzd branch chief who in turn reports to a division
18
chief that is responsible for all of the international affairs
19 programs of the government, who in turn reports to myself and
!
20
Jim Lynn_ So we are not performing an audit function for the
i
21
programs and activities of the government, not by the furtheresti L
22
stretch 0f the imagination are we performing an audit furction _
4
23
If you think back over what has happened with the explosion 0f
1
24
government programs in the last 20 years , it is apparent on the
28
8
25
face of it that as that explosion has taken place , OMB s role
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Smn 2356 TOp SECRET
L
1 has changed in a
fairly marked way- In looking at the historica
8 2 files of OMB _ it is interesting to note that back in the 1950s
1
3 there were some 45 people examining the programs of the Veteran
1
Administration , and were
examining them then in a way that
5 was more like an audit function _ because it Was possible to do
6 that because we did not have the great number of programs we have
7 now .
8 But that was all changed , and we are not examining
9 programs in anything approaching
an audit fashion in any
10
activity of Government _ not a single one
11 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Paul , would it be fair to
12
ask, since you gave the figures
on the comparison between '47
1
0
13
and '75 , as to whether you are not grossly understaffed in
9
14
relation to the responsibilities that ware then carried out in
15 terms of the size of the budget,
or that is now carried out in
16 terms of the size of the budget? It must be what, about ten times
17 as big?
18
MR _ 0 NEILL : I think it is probably a lot more than
19
ten times as It has really grown by leaps and bounds . I
3
20
guess I do not think SO , but it depends very much on one' 8
8
21
philosophical view as to what can bz done at the center when L
22
you have an explosion of governmental function.
4
23
My Own
feeling is that an audit function, ard
0
24
inspector gereral function that could hope to deliver real
1
8
25
results would be SO big that if it were in the Executive Office,
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they
big .
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smn TOPSEeRE1
2357
L
that it would overwhelm the Executive office _ That is what
8 2 happened in the OMB as the character what Federal Government
1
5 is doing has changed , which is that we have moved away from
1
4 45.
people looking at 170 VA hospitals trying to know ourselves
5 whether what they were doing in each of those hospitals was righ
6 or not_ We have moved back into a
position where we are
really
7
testing,
Ee are
testing the general concept of a Veterans
health care program against the general concept of health
insurance, or we are
looking at What is going on in the private
10 sector, and we are
dealing
at a much more abstract level than
11 we were 25 or 30 years ago ,
by necessity_
12 Our office would have to be , I would say 2000 , if we
1
8
13 were to begin to approach a more detailed audit kind of an
1
14 approach to our work
15 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: And is GAO moving into that
16 vacuum?
17
MR _ 0 NEILL: Somewhat, yes , although the character
18
of their operation from my point of view has changed quite
a
19
bit in the last ten or fifteen years _ Ter or fifteen
years
1
20 ago were very much of an accounting mind _
0
made sure
8
21
that the numbers all added
up , and that people had not defrauded L
22
the Federal Government. I do not think they ever told anybody
4
23
much interesting about what was going on about wkether it
0
24 was useful or not , but over the last especially five years , I
1
8
25
think they have changed their focus So that they have become
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of
and
they They
very
==================================================
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smn 2358 4ORSECRET _
1
less accounting focused , and less, spending less of their time
8 2 making
sure that the numbers add up , and more of their time
1
3 in trying to inform both the Executive branch and the government
L
4 as to the value of those; things that are
being done Iith public
5 monies _
6 So that they have changed their focus some also _ in
7 part by necessity-
8 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER : Have Wve not got a former head
9 of the Bureau of the Budget- there?
10 MR_ 0 'NEILL : sir_ did, the former deputy
11 director , as a matter of fact , two former deputy directors ,
12 Mr _ Hughes and Mr Staats
1
0
13 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: That is very interesting.
1
14 MR _ GRAY : HOw is GAO , big a staff do
15 have?
16' MR = 0 NEILL: I t havc a number in my head , but I
17
could give it to you if had a budget here. It is much
18
larger than our operation , and my guess would be off the
19 of my head about 4000 _
2
20 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: GAO?
8
21 MR . 0 'NEILL : Yes , sir_ 6
22 MR _ KIRKLAND : In these areas where there has been
4
23 some
episodes of misuse of funds , as in some of the poverty
11
24 programs and in the housing area , where do they uncovered? 2
8
25
Do they uncovered in the internal audits of the agency , or
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Yes , They
big how they
don
you
top
get
get
==================================================
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smn
TO? SECrE1
2359
L
1 at the OMB Ievel , or do these things
comz to light?
8 2 MR _ 0 NEILL: Let uS take housing
as an example _ I
1
5 think the uncovering of fraud problems in those programs has
1
taken place at the local level ,
1
ara it has taken place with
5 GAO identifying
a program
1
and the Inspector General of HIUD
has identified problems in those programs _ And I think a similaf
finding
on the OEO programs came out of those sorts of things
OMB S problem with the housing
programs really recognized what
had been found in the way of fraud _ but our focus was more
10 on the equity considerations , what was rong with the program
11 from
an
equity point of view _ That the Federal Government
12 was providing huge subsidies
to a very small set of theoreticall
1
8
13 eligible population , and as We talked to the President
as to
2
14 what we saw wrong With those
programs that is the point we
15 stressed , that there was no way in the world that we coula
16 ever equitably provide
the same level of housing benefits
to
17 the set that was eligible under the current terms and conditions
18 of the programs and that combined with the cases of fraud that
19 were identified by GAO and the HUD inspector general led us to I
20 a recommendation
to the Rresident that We stop those 235 and 236 8
21
subsidized housing programs _ |
22 MR _ KIRKLAND : But the rural line of defense
was
4
23
lactually in the control of the Agency , that is , your surveillance
1
24 MR . 0 ' NEILL: That is exactly right_ Prevention 0f 2
8
25
[Eraud really begins
and ends , or almost ends , Wvith the assigned
#Op seeret
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is,
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smr 2360 tOpsEerE]
1
1 responsible officials in those departments and agencies ,
8 2 I guess my own
feeling is that Government has gotten So big
1
3 that if we can t depend on surveillance and prevention of
L
4 fraud by the Cabinet secretary and his officials , that we are
5 going we have to depend on public oversight , and I guess I
6 don t think that that works as well as it should_ And therefore
7 indeed , We do have to depend on those cabinet and agency
8 officials to see that we don t use the public 8 money in an
9 unauthorized way.
10 MR _ LEMNITZER: With the fiscal 76 budget being
11 defended before the Congress , I presume you are now
starting
12 on the '77 year S bdget:
1
13 MR_ 0 'NEILL: Yes , sir, we are.
0
1
14 MR _ LEMNITZER: Within your agency . How will CIA
15
approach the problem and present it to you , to your office for
16
19772 Just what are the mecharics of it?
17
MR _ 0 'NEILL: Well, will receive the so-called
18
budget calling, all of the departments and agencies in about
19
June _
3
20
MR - LEMNITZER: Do they any guidelines?
i
21
MR _ NEILL : Yes
8
will_ Right now we are begin- L
22
ning to tune up for the 77 process, and over the month of
4
23
the' Director and I will sit down with all of our
1
24
examiners and our division heads and go through the prospects
E
8
25
for fiscal Year 1977. that our intelligence tells us will be
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and
good
they
get
they
May
==================================================
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==================================================
4OP SECRET
2361
1
coming in as requests to the President , and we Iill be looking L
2
at that against the backdrop of expected revenues based on 8
1
3
anticipation of performance of the economy for fiscal year 1977 _
1
We will take all of that assessment of what the agencies
are
4
5
to be asking for, separating it out between those, things
6
that are new
things , and those things that are driven
7
current authorizations and appropriations
1
and taking that
whole package to the President along with his other 2conomic
8
advisors , Allen Greenspar ,
1
and Bill Siedman ana giving a
9
judgment , getting a judgment from him as to how many dollars
10
in broad blocks he wants to tell the Cabinet secretaries and the
11
Agency heads they should us? as a
planning figure for their
12
e_
5
work over the next several months _
Sb 0
13
1
In June , those numbers from the President will go
14
out as
guidance to the Departments and agencies, and over the
15
months , July , August , Septembar they will be within the limits
16
provided by the President, deciding what kind of a
specific
17
program_ detailed recommendation they want to make to him, and
18
then in September these requests will begin to come in, and in
19
3
September , Octobzr_ and November , we will go through our regular
20
8
budget process , evaluating what it is that' is in the base that
21 L
we must do that wa think it is desirable to keep those
22
v things which
we think should be taken out,f evaluatior of new
23
1
things that are being proposed, and then through a series of
24 E
sessions with the President, going through and getting his
8
25
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likely
by
doing ,
==================================================
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TOP seeret_
2362
1
judgments on all of the numbers for fiscal year 1977 _
8 2 MR _ WALLISON: Do you in the course of your activities
1
3 evaluate the activities of the various agencies in relation to
1
4 their statutory charters
or restrictions?
5 MR . 0 'NEILL Well, yes , within the limitations of our
6 staff reach _
7 MR . WALLISON: In the case we have here, assumirg
8 there were no Commission and there were no Congressional inquiries ,
9 would y ou consider it your responsibility to review what the
10 Agency has done to determine whether it complied with the statutory
11 charter?
12 MR = 0 NEILL: Well, I don t think SO , Peter_ I guess
1
0
13 because I think it is beyona our reach to assure ourselves or
1
14 the President that 'everything that is done in the Federal Governmen
15 is within the statutory authority provided
by the Congress. It
16 is just a
human impossibility that 380 professional staff people
17 could ensure that everything that is done by a public, governmen
18 official=
8 a Federal official, is within the limits the
19 statute_
1
20 MR _ GRAY : I think Mr. Donohue who was the CIA
i
21
examiner five years, can probably answer some of the detailed |
22
questions _
4
23 MR. 0 NEILL: Right _ Right.
61
24 MR _ BEL IN: more questions of this Witness?
2
8
25 MR _ KIRKLAND : I take it from what you said earlier
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"of
for
Any
==================================================
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smn
HOP SEGRET
2363
]
that say if it were
possible useful to put another ten people
8 2
on to protect against any real misapplication of funds by an
1
3 Agency like the CIA that you fzel that they woula be more
1
4 usefully in the auditing section under the comptroller 0f
5 the agency rather than the OMB?
6 MR _ 0 NEILL: Well
8
I think it would depend in part
7 on whether or not you look at that kind of a change in OMB
vis-a-vis CIA only , or whether there was a broad precedent for
OMB S role and function.
I suppose such a function could be
10 lodged in the OMB_
1
although I must say to you , with the number
11 of people you are
talking about , ter peopler
I would be highly
12 skeptical that you can ensure
that things do not want to
1
0
13 happen will not happen _ Bureaucracy is so big , even in the
1
14 case of CIA , that I an skeptical that ten good people can ensure
15 that there would not be any examples or cases of operations outside
16 of the law. I think that has to start at the top with a tone,
17 and direction ,
a sense of responsibility that the key officials
18 bring to their job _ So I guess I am not saying that you can
19 cut off problems by having ten more people. might make
3
20 some difference because it would be a signal that somebody is
8
21 going to pay closer attention than they have in the past _ |
22 MR' = KIRKLAND : I just tcok the figure out of the air
y
23 You are saying that if that were commensurately multiplied through
1
24 all of the oversight functions , it would create an agency the
2
8
25 size of which you do not want in OMB Eo be useful
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and
put
You
and
You
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smn 2364 HO SEERET
L
1 MR _ 0 NEILL I think that is right.
8 2 MR - KIRKLAND : An element of strengthening would be
1
5 more in terms 0f pure misapplication of funds , it would be better
1
4 done by strengthening the audit arrangements in the Agency?
5 MR . 0 NEILL : and perhaps protecting that inspector
6 general or auditing function from too close an association with
7 the Agency that it is involved in SO that it has a separate ,
8 clearly defined function_ and a
supporting relationship that
9 makes it clear that it is expected to be independent of the
10 agency that it is looking
at
11 MR . KIRKLAND : Do you and Jim Lynn , let uS say , have
12 a
direct relationship with the Comptrollers of the different
1
0 13
agencies independent of tha director?
1
14 MR . 0 NEILL : You mean with the inspectors general or
15 with the comptrollers?
16 MR - KIRKLAND :
1
whatever _
17 MR . 0 NEILL It is uneven _ It depends on , I think _
2
18
in both Jim' s case and mine, on our previous association with
19
individuals in the government . I Zm sure he knows the inspectors
1
20
general _
8
21
MR _ KIRKLAND : Well
1
where does ar inspector general 6
22
go beyond his boss if he has a problem?
4
23
MR . 0 NEILL : I frankly
cannot think of a case and
1
24
time that I have been in OMB Tvhen an inspector general came to
1
8
25 me and said here 5 a problem you should know about , no But
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Yes ,
Yes
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smn 2365
TOR Seere1
1
there have been occasions when a Secretary or a comptroller woulc
2 cOme to me and say Wa think we have got a problem here that 8
1
5 you shoula know about _ I carnot think of fraud problems_ but
1
4
undesirable' practices problems _
for example, yes _
5
MR _ BELIN : other questions of this witness before
6 we go to Mr Donohue?
7 Thank you very much , sir
8 MR _ 0 NEILL:
'9 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER : Thanks 3 lot , Paul _
10
TESTIMONY OF ARNOLD E_ DONOHUE
11
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Are you the one gentleman who
is responsible for CIA in OMB?
12
0
1
13
MR _ DONOHUE No Mr Vice President. I head a staff
2
14
of five professionals who review the budgets of the intelligence
community,
one of which
15
16
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER; The whole community?
17
MR . DONOHUE : Right,
one of which individuals is assignked
18
to the Central Intelligence Agency ,
and that has been practiced
for I believe the last 13 years.
19
2
MR _ GRISWOLD : Car you speak up , please?
8
20
MR _ DONOHUE : Sure _ Excuse me 21
L
22
MR _ BEL IN: Could you please state your name for the
v record?
23
1
MR . DONOHUE : Arnold E Donohue =
24 E
8 MR _ BELIN : You are with OMB?
25
TOP SECrET
Ciahas no OBJECTION IO
DECLASSIFICATON ZndoR_
RELEASE OF ThiS DOCWMEN
Istvzed /L 8-94
'Ztk ttz_s~)
4nwet
dn8 6
&ko ttRv
Qa> 2( Ap r 75
NW 78141 Docld:32201382
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Any
Okay.
~izzl #ty}
Dzna
Juti 278
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smr 2366 FO- SeeRET
L
1 MR - DONOHUE That S right , the international affairs
8 2 division _
1
the intelligence branch , I am the Chief thereof _
1
3 MR _ BEL IN : And what is your educational background?
1
4 MR _ DONOHUE : I graduated from Georgetown University
5 in 1960 , and from Princeton, the [oodrow Wilson School in 1962 _
1
6 and worked five years in the Central Intelligence Agency , primartly
7 as an analyst, political_
0
economic _
1
and joined the Office of
Management and Budget in 1967 , and have been in the Intelligence
9 Unit of the Office of Management and Budget since that time_ I
10 became chief of that branch in 1973 _
11 MR . BEL IN Could you describe OMB S activities with
12 the CIA in preparation of its program budget?
1
0
13 MR _ DONOFUE : Let me give you
a very broad arswer to
1
14 that because it probably is the primary work that the unit is
15 involved in during the first nine months of any calendar Year,
16 generally from January through the October budget submission of
17 the Agency. The examiner will be involved directly with the
18 Agency , CIA or ary other intelligence
agency in preparation ,
19
looking forward to developing
a budget recommendation for the
1
20
director of the Office of Maragement and Budget and ultimately
i
21 to the President as far as the budget those agencies goes
L
22 So generally the first nine months would b? a period
4
23 where the examiner would undertake a work program looking at
1
24 various aspects which for one reason or another would be important 2
8
25
for making budgetary
recommendations This would be done
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of
==================================================
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==================================================
snin 2367
+Op SECRET_
7
sometimes in conjunction with the Agency , attempting to have the
8 2 Agency analyze
a particular aspect of its program or
activity,
3
3
or done independently by the budget examiner as something he
L
4 felt he had to take the lead in and develop
an analysis of his
5
Own on , in which context he would then review the official
budget submission coming in October lst, comirg in on October
77 lst.
8 That is 2 very important phase of the work because it
9 really involves the nine month preparation whereby the examiner
10 puts hinself in line to reviei the rather detailed dollars and
11 numbers , personnel data that Will come in to him during the
12 course 0f a budget examination beginning in October
1
6
13 MR _ BELIN : Do you have any more specific examples
1
14 of the level of detail and the type of justification material?
15 MR _ DONOHUE : Well_
1
this preliminary phase Ivoula be
16 some
thing that would be interactive with the Agency - October
17 lst, tke Central Intelligence Agency, and that s the one I will
18 illustrate with, Will come in with a
fairly detailed budget
19 submission _
3
20 MR BELIN : And you are
holding
8
21 MR _ DONOHUE : And I am
holding that in my hand right
1
22 now for you to s22 the amount of material in it. It is a very
4
23 detailed submission in traditional terns of the Office of
1
24_ Management and Budget-
Z
8
25 MR _ BELIN : About how many pages there?
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On
==================================================
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FOp SECRET 2368
L
1 MR DONOHUE : 250 approximately, 250 pages , with detai
8 2 really on very office of the Central Intelligence Agency down
1
3 to division levels , and the examiner would use this as a base
4 of information _
5 MR _ LEMNITZER: Would it include proposed covert
6 operatiors specifically?
7 MR . DONOHUE : It would include in most cases a covert
8 action operation that would be continuirg during the coming
9 fiscal year_
10 MR = LEMNITZER: New ones?
11 MR = DONOHUE Generally it would not include new ones ,
12 because it would be nine months in advance at least of the
1
0
13 beginning of the fiscal year_ and it would be doubtful that
1
14 new ones woula be known that much in advance _ In most cases
15 the covert action projects would begin in a shorter time frame
16 than that, and would not be budgeted for in advance _
17 MR _ CONNOR: Is that document classified?
18 MR _ DONOHUE : Yes , that document is classified top
19 secret, I can give a brief rundown of the sort of informatio
1
20 it contains _
i
2 MR _ GRISWOLD : Does it include a category for 1
22 prospective covert operations?
4
23 MR. DONOHUE : No , it does not_ It would include
1
24
funding of continuing covert action projects~
2
8
25 MR . GRISVIOLD : I understand . But how is the Agency
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and
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#Op Seeret _
2369
L
going to carry out when it suddenly gets= some situation where
8 2 it seems to the Agency wise to move immediately into a covert
3
3 operation?
L
4 MR _ KIRKLAND: The contingency
or discretionary funds?
5 MR _ DONOHUE : Let' s move irto that area, and I think
6 that probably ~Will help.
7
MR _ GRISWOLD : That S what I meant.
8 MR _ DONOHUE : I will answer it_ CIA does have a
uniqu
9
contingency
reserve Which is provided for the purposes of meetind
10
basically extraordinary
experses that the Administration, that
11 the ' Executive branch would not wart to propose a
Supplemental
12 to the Congress for This contingency would then be used for
1
0
13 purposes that came up during the course of the year any
2
14
supplemental purpose_
1
whether that be covert action, whether
15 it be the increased pay costs for employees, and it has bzen
16
used for that in the past , or
for emergency intelligence needs
17
Some new project would begin_
1
and supplemental needs would be
18
identified _ and the contingency
reserve would be used for that
19 purpose _
1
20 MR . GRISWOLD : And there is a
figure for that in the
8
21
budget? 6
22 MR . DONOHUE : Yes there is.
3
23 MR - GRISWOLD : 1s that figure determined?
1
24 MR DONOHUE : The figure is determined _ as with any 2
8
25
budget figure , with
3 recommendation or a request by the
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2370
SFOpSECRET_
Agency for a level of what it anticipates ,
or some level of
8 2 funding that it would anticipate being available for the supple-
8
3 mental purposes during the coming fiscal year It would be re-
1
viewed by the Office of Management ana Budget , and it would be
5 referred to the Congress through the Chairman of the Appropriations
Committees , and they would be informed of the amount of that
reserve that we anticipated [ould be available during the coming
fiscal year, and that program and financing schedule ,
which is
included in the budget , and Fould have the opportunity to
10 write back and to identify , if the Chairmen of the Committees ,
11 the Appropriations Committees , would have the opportunity to
12 write back and indicate whether that was reasonable, basically
1
&
13 through their appropriatiors action, and [vhether there was a
2
14 reduction involved _
15 In some cases the Congress for example , has made
16
reductions in the amount of that contingency reserve , and in
17
other cases have rot.
18 MR - KIRKLAND: Is it not maintained on a historical
19
basis and just replenished up to a czrtain level?
1
20 MR . DONOHUE : is generally replenished up to the
8
21
level of approximately ($50 million
3 year That has historically L
22
been , I do not have the exact numbers in front of me, but
2
v
23
historically it has been somewhere around s50)million
a year
5
24
which has been judged adequate in recent years There were
25
occasiors in the past Ihen I think it was over
that, and there
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they
they
It
and
~ni
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TOpSEGRET 2371
1
1 are occasions when it has gone belor that for any period of time
8 2 MR _ BELIN : Whose approval is necessary to allow the
1
3 CIA to use this contingency fund?
1
4 MR _ DONOHUE : As I stated, the basic function of the
5 contingency fund is in lieu of supplemental appropriations
6 requests identified for CIA because of the hidden nature of its
7
budget. Therefore , depending upon the type of activity involved
8 the approval for the contingency has to come from the office,
9 the use of the contingency funds comes from the Office of
10 Management and Budget, but We would on a number of checks
11 on that system. If it was pay supplenent or
something, that
12 could be easily calculated based on past experience , and our
1
0
13 office would take action by itself. If it was a supplemental
1
14 request for some
special intelligence project,
we might review
15 that, determine that, in fact , it was a priority need
1
meeting
16
the needs that the Office of Management and Budget and the
17
President has established for supplementals during that year,
18 or
particul= if it was a covert action project , we would
19
attempt to determine
1
and usually have been successful ir:
2
20
determining that 40 committez approval had been given for that
8
21
project , and hopefully Presidential approval had been given |
22
for that project
4
23
MR _ KIRKLAND : You would not make an independent judgment
1
24
on its merits ,
you would look to the authorization?
E
8
25 MR . DONOHUE : As far as the merits of the project
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rely
arly
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2372 TOP Seeret
1 itself, We would look in terms of covert action projects
8 2 to the 40 Committee, with an indication of Presidential approval
1
3 and since I have been head of the unit in 1973 , I think we have
1
4 had indications in every covert action project of Presidential
5 approval of that covert action project_ We would make an
independent financial assessment as to whether the dollar amount
7 requested by the Agency to carry out that covert action
project was reasonable
1
and that would amount to a fair amount
of detailed review of each request to us2 the contingency
10 reserva for covert action projects . We would hola a
hearing,
11 based at the time of the request or the facts ana information as
12 to the financial cost of that particular project , and do that in
1
0
13 a fair amount of detail_
1
14 That does not mear getting down to every last dollar
15 or person involved
1
but it does amount to looking on an aggregat
16 basis as to whether this is a reasonable amount , and car they
17 provide, just can
the Agency provide justification for that
18 need?
19 MR . KIRKLAND : Well, in point of fact, since future
1
20
contingency or future covert operations by their nature cannot
8
21 be budgeted in advance , and usually must be initiated out of L
22
the contingency fund_
,
in the OMB _ you would get a look at each
4
23 of these projects for all practical purposes at their inception,
1
24 wouldn t
E
8
25 MR _ DONOHUE : Yes , sir. We would_
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You?
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FOPSECRET _
2373
1 MR . LEMNITZER : I had in mind particularly the recover
8 2 0f the Russian submarine and the large expenditure that was
1
3 involved . How was that handled _
1
for example?
1
4 MR DONOHUE : Do you want me to answer David?
5 MR BEL IN I will ask you this guestion because the
Witness 1s concerned about secrecy agreements that he has
signed pertaining to certain projects _
8 Is there any large project that involved an expenditur=
of mora than S1o million by the Agency in any one year that was
10 not audited or reviewed by OMB?
11 MR DONOHUE : It would not be audited _
12 MR . BEL IN: I used the audit incorrectly
because
;
0
13 you do not audit_ That was not carefully reviewed by the OMB ?
1
14 MR - DONOHUE : I do not know 0f any large project of
15
that magnitude that we would rot be aware of _ I will be glad
16
to go off the record and answer the question _
17 MR GRISIOLD couldn t chat out of a s50}
18
million contingency fund _
19
MR - DONOHUE : That is correct_
8
20 MR _ BELIN: don t We go off the record because
8
21
of your concerr with regard to the secrecy agreements that you
L
22
yourself are signing , Mr Donohue.
v
23
Can Iva go off the record for
a minute?
0
24
(Discussion off the record . )
i
8
25
MR _ BELIN : Lzt Ina back on thz record here_
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SIIi
word
You get
Why
get
fv
==================================================
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==================================================
~Op SEErEF
2374
1
1 Can I return to the review aspects of your work at
8 2 OMB?
8
3 MR _ SHANNON Before we to that, could I just
L
4 follow on right here where he was talking about approval by the
5 40 Committee? This is nothing to do Ivith his immediately
preceding comments but just in general I take it if the 40
7 Committee, if You thought you had approval from the 40 Committee
8 or from the President, then you would not look into the question
9 of whether it was , whether it seemed to to comply with
10 statutory provisions
or the Act as far as the Agency was
11 concerned?
12 MR . DONOHUE : I am not sure of that. I have not found
1
0
13 an instance where I would challenge it on a legal basi8 . I
1
14
have found ona project for example, a covert action project,
15 that I would challenge on maybe a roles and missions , proper
16 emphasis , priorities basis, ard I would review that ana send it
17 up the chain of command in OMB to determine if in fact
18 feel strongly enough about it to reopen the issue Iith the
19 President _ I think We would do it in that context and have to
1
20
inform my superiors that, in fact, the President had indicated
8
21
approval or the 40 Committee had indicated approval
1
and if he |
22
wished to reopen it with the President , that would be his
4
decision _
23
1
24
MR. SHANNON: I just thought that came in under where
2
8
25 we were discussing
more appropriately, and if were starting
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get
you
they
you
==================================================
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smn 2375
2375
TOP SeeRET
L
1 a new line
8 2
MR BELIN : I am going now to the question 0f review
1
3 by OMB _
1
4 Would you care to discuss that as to the number of
5 examiners , the choice of portions of the budget that are reviewed
6 and any pertinent questions
or hearings
or recommendations?
7 MR DONOHUE : Certainly.
I have already explained
the nine month preparatory. Here on October 1, and almost ,
usually always
on that date , this column will cOI? in and the
10 examiner will usually, the examiner , and there is one examiner
11 for CIA_ Will usually review this document in detail, going through
12 marking it up , seeing what areas he does not feel are adequately
1
0
13 addressed , or in which he wants more information to address them
1
14 in terns of a
budget recommendation_
15 The things he woula look for there are the criteria
16 he would us2, which would be for one thing incremental change
17 from year to year what it Tas in 1974 versus what they
are
18 proposirg for 1976 _ He would look at the magnitude of resources
19 involved here , and if it is a 850 , 000 project , he obviously
2
20 would not have tima to look over every s50 ,000 project, but if 9
21 it is a 8500 million project , he might very well look into it.
L
22 He would look into critical areas , critical
areas where we
v
23 felt, or the Administration felt, or
somebody had expressed a 1
24
liview that this was a critical area that needed be addressed , Z
8
25
and he might look
at that area very closely. A new project
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to
==================================================
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2376
TO? SECRET
7
coming along in the satellite field where the CIA had a
8 2 responsibility , for example might be looked at very closely,
1
3 and he might look at something just to refamiliarize himself
1
with the activities of a
particular officz.
5 He would , the present examiner at least, and there is
6 no
form guide here that an examiner would us2, but the presen
examiner for example then prepared a list of written questions
for the comptroller of the CIA for him to respond to based on
his review of this document _ In this case it was six pages Iort
10 of questiors 33 questions in all asking specifically
about a
11 number of items and I can
give
you some illustrations if you
12 like of the type of detail that he would go into.
1
4
13 MR GRAY : Why don t you read one or two and give us
2
14 an idea?
15 MR _ DONOHUE : All right.
16 Hearing to discuss the totality ofl KENNEN related
17 costs to the Agency covering
as a minimum 1974 , 75 , and '76 _
18 The discussion should include by compozent the costs of R&D ,
19 computer and personnel distributions made by the Agency, and how 3
20
this distribution is integrated into the United States overall i
21 classified photo interpretation effort_ That may not mean
L
22 much to you _
W
Uj
23 MR BELIN : I Tvonder if We could include
a copy of
1
24
this as an exhibit to your tes timony here? E
8
25 Is thera any particular
reason that this cannot be
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tOpSecrET
2377
included as an exhibit? This is all theoretically
secret? Or
8 2 do you fzel you might not bz able to?
1
3 MR. DONOHUE : Well
1
whe code word I just mentioned ,
1
4 KENNEN as a
working
paper was not fully classified,
so if I
5 could check that out_
6 MR. BELIN : All right-
7 MR - DONOHUE : Lct me
give
You one other example
8 because it relates to one other aspect OMB has with respect
9 to CIA , which is somewhat unique_ Hearings with Office of
10 Personnel to cover a
justification of the 1976 request , in
11 general persornel management for the Agency supergrades and
12 average grade requirements_ and the status of the CIA retirementl
;
0
13
and disability system_
1
14 Prior to this meetirg the examiner would like the
15
following information: supergrade positions nane of
16
position
as of the end of FY 74 and an ticipated for the end
17
of FY '75 . Lists should include whether occupied on June
18
1974 , and planned occupancy rate the end of fiscal year
19
75 _ Overall accession_
1
termination
1
trends and plans , 1970
170
20
through 1976 , ard average grade and average salary for these
8
2 years _ A paper indicating the Agency 5 long range plans for
L
22
the financing of the CIA retirement and disability system
fund
4
23
in the light of the declining balance budget hearings in 1976 .
1
24
Those are very detailed questions in terms of a Z
8
25
budget examiner and it is part of Ivhat I might say is a very
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and
by
30 ,
for
==================================================
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==================================================
2378 TOp S:Cret_
1
intensive, review Or
th? part of OMB of the budget of CIA ard 1
2 in this particular case , fulfilling of a function somawhat
8
3
5 beyond the scope of the normal budget examiner Ihile looking at
1
4
the personnel structure of the Agercy , the rates of promotion ,
5 the average .grade structure, the number of supergrades, the number
of executive pay
levels involved, the financirg the retiremen-
system primarily here , because the Central Intelligence Agency:
system is not part of the Civil service Commission and is now
revizwed by thz Civil Service Commission as a government
10
persornel system, so OMB does perfcrm somewhat an additional rol
11 there.
Let me mention one
other question here just to show
12
1
you the amount of detail_ Breakdown of personnel; full-time
0
13,
1
14
permanent temporary part-time_
i
and indigenous or local by
station overseas for 1974 and 1975 and 1976 _
15
MR: BEL IN What number: of examiners or
analysts
16
do you' have in connection with review?
17
MR _ DONOHUE : One examiner , full time_
1
plus my
18
own staff time that I would us? in supcrvision of that exam
19
2
MR KIRKLAND : He works exclusively
or CIA?
20
i
MR _ DONOHUE : That " S correct.
21 1
ZIR . BELIN: What choice of portions of the budget or
22
v offices is made for the closest scrutiny apart from the siz2?
23
1
MR DONOHUE: Well , I gave you some criteria earlier
24 E
8 for what his choice might be motivatzd by . H? in this particula=
25
#Op SECRE1
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of
not
your
==================================================
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==================================================
2379 TOpSEcre7_
]
cas? I think looked at approximately 20 of the offices: in some
8 2 more detail out of approximately 50 offices, and that means that;
1
3 30 were rot looked at in closer detail other than what was
1
4 in the written material. But he Tculd give in to a fair amount
5 of detail to a lot of the offices Ivhich. ould be rclatively
6 uncontroversial in terms of the resource requirements._
7 MR. BELIN Are the hearings held on these areas ,
or are the written questions relied on exclusively?
9 MR DONOHUE : No the written questions Ivoula serve
10 as a base for then holding a
hearing, and I think in the case
11 last Year, the examiner indicated he spent approximatzly 75
12 8 0 hours in oral hearings , usirg the response he got in
1
6
13 the Written questions plus the budget material
1
to elicit
1
14
further information to szrve as a basis his recommendation
15
to ma and ultimately
to the Director on the level, of resourcas
15
that the CIA would require for 1976 _
17 MR. SHANNON : Of the people participating in thesz
18
hearings _
1, would be representatives fron the admiristrative
19
part of the CIA and perhaps the Deputy Director or one of the
2
20
top level officials?
8
21
MR . DONOHUE : Particularly in the case of 1976 , in 1
22
fact, I accompanied the examiner for an initial sassion with thre
v
23
of the four major directorates in the CIA , and I think each
1
24
of those sessions ran about two hours with Mr Procter
1
Mr _
0
L
8
25
Nelson , ard Mr Duckett. There vas an additional session held wi
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to
for
they
==================================================
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TOpSEere} 2380
1
1 Mr _ Blake , who is in charge 0f the administrativ? side , but
8 2 these Tere
really introductory to provide
a total scope of each
3
5 directorate s activities , followed by the 30 hours of hearings
1
4 that he had , with usually representatives from thz individual
5 offices , whatever side they be in , operations side
1
or the
intelligence production side or support side , and would request,
or
those people would be present for testimony,
or
not testimony
2nd 5b hearirgs on
justifications for the budget_
10
11
12
1
4
13
1
14
15
16
17
18
19
1
20
i
21
|
22
y
23
1
24 2
8
25
FOPSeCRET
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==================================================
Page 199
==================================================
Zapz
#OpSECRET
2381
:hl
1
1 XR . GI7: `o. 713" +ha Ct 72a1? Pnracn 2
8 2 *i?- S7nin;: 1' -> S+i]l Jo1 cleax or: #C ~1713 9x02n +
1
3 ih3 Ji-ctor x3 3?nc ~ricipates ii: -is Kin: 3 rswie;
1
4 Is h? involvzz in -his 2 - 1f'? : kno.: sbis is coin;
5 WRa 0n.in; Fhc Jirector 9€ Cantral Tnttllicance?
6 4IR- SIAIJo T: Ves_
77
'IR . Do Wt: 7h= irzctor, 3€ cow:s? Tollc Jiave
8 hlesse shis bud?rz- Sibrission OB Wic intarna] cl:
9 cal]s Eox developcnt 0f a nrocz?7 in :h2 J.icz_ Tly cifsfrana
10 Prior +o tha Octoher 1 swhnission, chz tivz 32t22n June-July
11 Jhere n?; as I "derstand i-_ woul? Persorally reviev 1t in
12 che Jins-July tinsfrane woulc shzn be put into 3 budgat docunzn-
;
8
13 for Octobef lst, genazallg xa KOrlc bs acqain-?c with whaz
1
14 Vas
going
on , th: nagnitua o€ the rzsourc?s , 5l12 rcjcr i+Zns
15 shaf nigt influsrc? cha siz8 0f sh? budcst 1 . 2n2 Tune-_ly
16 timefrare
17 MRS S}iAIO| 3E an you co 'nck
IR _ DO:TOFUE : Then [2 Co back
18
MR . SfA Jio ; : Fc chac on this, na is not sittin in
19
1
20 on Lhese things
}
You are Goin: i' {urther G3: -2 Linz?
i
R DoO.EE: ?3'5 corrzcr. Is [olc bz 32Aff offices
21
L
chronc;hou- CIA not 'hs nir?sior Jirsslf. If 1her? 7S 3 4eg3 fox
22
v
a casz 10 , in fzct , nav? 2 sessicr vi-h sha irczor , 1? :3
23
1
f0l1 1t ~as inpcr-ant , I 'uP?cs = 72 co:lc r? -S5 :h;: 1t in
24
1
8 ~os+ C_6 S '12 J~ncy a-+1t.142 =inl 3 V i ~ cocn j ati[? here.
25
#OPsecret _
NW 78141 Docld:32201382
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or 31
or?
t0
and
==================================================
Page 200
==================================================
cb 2 2382 #OPSECRET
1 and if +1: irforetior can "rcvij- : 21 ~lVer lavzl it
1
2 is rot 2
Tu2sti0: 3f ~hc ir 'viduzl Jircczcr sirc present_ 8
3
3 MR. (?Jt: Mr. conokus
L
MR_ Do"w?r: Apnz4ls? 4
5 AR GC: : Appeals , sha+' c righ-.
6 MR_ DO.2ij: : 'Thc brocess a+ that point Ivoilc Ji CIA,
77 2he exainer 0f 1b2 CIA bucr;zt #ing rescrancation +O) 32
8
with F rzviem tc 2 Jivisicr chief and sh2 Officz 0= 'anjztant
9
and Bucc:+ , pren-2:nt 2 Eor .] 51is+2n prenara-ion , suouission
10 02 our
ficonencatton ovr 3+3ff reccr-anca-ion +9 2h2 'irzctos
of 0NB in providing that i7 3: sessicn ~0 shs Associ?- nirecEcr ,
11
th? 'irsctor 7 1J ~he TJerut Jirsctcr, revisw Of :h21
12
1
budgzt Vith a recc 7- endaticr: 28 f2r as 212 +0*0] a;o uts ko he
0
13
1
iavolvz , ar7 6h2 3-2cific 120-13 {haf 72 Joul ` r-ccy 17
14
&alstion_ 12 that [ oint L3} !wr'7c+ V"cCse provizs ar
15
37221 JJ; :il? J;enc' head ` :2/1 cn th2< Girzctor 0F O;' < Azcisio
16
E car ~ppzal or ~ cinnc- _ In +1 2 129- fiv2 Z2erc h: I1as
17
cPpealc? +r2 las 10 ?2efs. "< 4if ac} 7po= ?1 th2 prcious
18
:1rz? ~S arn??! 20 J1- 'ssi ?; 2nc c 2'-cisior:
19
3
oule 3 ~242 k ~ :^ "r?si 25t
20
i
~- G2"- : J- th: 1-35 fi"- 782rs, Scn at< 2O1
21
L
cui_in: ';1.; req:? "ppro: i :-3lz? 32242 s":cific figurzk
22
v
1R Do ;: Ar? "cl +2lkin" ir 5257 '2 034 s*aef
23
1
I~CC:" a+icn +_ :6JEf O ~0'3 resazenJa2ion3 ~r s12 Jirecso
24 2
8
25
:ccisi-?
#Op5z6357
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J ?`
and
Ecr
for
:t%"
ho
60-
0 =
==================================================
Page 201
==================================================
TOP s:eret
2383
1 ;?. 6"4 " : 775' g 6X: abc' th ~ ni-clor' 5 J-cision_
1
2 3it Do; , It iw ~ri2 60 fj 6tC ?t. 8
1
3 P!R 3;'tt7 :o:' ~;22 212 CI]' $ o328- 8 b10+3/ +0
L
4 congrzss?
5 3R. IO) .7 !"C : Ry 442 provisionz 0 f 5 ; !SC-^7 ? which
6 is shc b35ic CI? 3ta-U22_ 22 2irector of 2. js Jui orize: L0
7 trans:37 fiinds 5x3 Agenc; Src- othzr 2039355 : -raditio
8 sh? nathoc 02 idatifinc 5'12 2ccounis in 30 '19 ci: bujcet
9 is car-i:? 20 2":7 Confrzss :3 '1 2 l2s.r {~07 ihs Jir-cror of
053 t0 22 Chjirren 0f 21? wpropriatis-- Co iftcs 10 -he
10
11
Iouse a< Lhe Sinar? iden-if-ing 6h12 erpronriation 3n-o1n-, i25
locztic.' Ln 2h12 Bet, +8 :inaciv sch: ula iJcl iin;
12
1
th2 arous of cortingants or cesert- Jhi2 +12 1n4nc; woul?
0
13
1
H12v? owailzble Curi-? 2h1? ccrin- %2r_ {nos : 13 -19-5 3u1J 70
14
in 17 249 las- :: +0 Tl . 'cClellan
{3 Yalon , th29
15
icul: ~Esnon?c: Lo 2 + 42 conlctiou 3f +h2 Jpproprintions
16
nrccess '% ~ir . ~ancn and ". "cClellar Tanator Mcclellan
17
Congresjonn Kahor -C 2h2 Tircctcr c f C" j entiayin: +'12 arount
18
19
=h:1 aonropriated.
{
{R, ~ZLT: An tha- is in Jscarinent 0? 'efans:
20
8
hurq2+ aan-rali;. that r: 1+?
21
|
RR_ Inin "T: Yss. {i i1a5 X?n_
22
4
~7 3LI.7" : Ana :Fwer -72 3-pronriations Jill is passsc
23
1
'103 2r0 c: fun ls 77/: a"?j -3hl9 s: ~IA?
24 1
i)"c,; ; Fhonn
corpletic? 2= t13 appro?r c-ions
8
25
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?nr
0f
ana
13~
anri
1w'
Lh?
13
L0
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cb
#OPSEeREF
2384
1
bijl, 11, thsv 1x3 opfrating under 3
continuing resolucicn 7
2 prio: 20 th? co;n 2*ion 1h? 2prcntiatic? :ction but thcy
8
3
5
woulc n sransf-rred First {ro shs 2o0) acconnt 20 2 3zaratz
2
accouz in th: "rcasury, seconaly 7n anportionr -hE of 'hosz
5
funds +0 she CIA actual expendlitur?; Zhose numbzrs riqht
Jiffor prinarily on sh hasis 0= if f&rirs wsre iden-ified for
6
con-ir ncy res?rt?
+hc appropriation anount +hat 2rount trans-
8
ferrzz_ ~re apnortioned,
J
2n9 a-unt aopronriated woulc always
b= trarcfsrred in+o this seciel Qreasuru account , and {.12
9
amount Jpportiose nicht var aep:ndin? upon 2h2 ano:n:
10
identizied for hcldling VJitkin
?
contingancv and subseguznfly
11
release .
12
1
ViR. 3EV,I: Is thera any other wav in which funds
0
13
1
2r2 2 2vailale to the Arencv?
14
:R DOTO:IF : Yes_ Ghz najor othsr ceditional WaT ,
15
of course, is sra.l5f2rs under 2412 Econory Act provisions
16
Vell, I an no: an expert on sha Econcry Act , hut it ees2ntially
17
proviczs the funca :0 he "ransferred +0 af agenc where it can
18
perfcr: 4 servic: ~ith ccono; +o anosher governrent eyencv ,
19
1
and ha3 3
unique capabilit: , Or 3
uni-ue ability
or ca
provide
20
i
conmor S-rtics :0 a nunb?r of :ojcrnrent cencics, 3n0 thosz
2
6
transf-rs ~o11lq} 9 nads in shis case E0 CI? On= 229
22
v larccs- 23 citzi. !ers woulal be those sh? {awicnal Feconniss
23
1
Offics :01 charcz of satcllit2 developriert phers CIA acts as a
24 7
deva -. 2nc droerer scnz of +hat ~Iuio:nt, &n fairly
8
25
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EzOm
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cb 5
#Op SecreT
2385
1
1 large S1.nS have 210)'17 11, heen providled 10 ~Xle cIA through shat
8 2 nechanism. I woul(? point ou+ shat chos? Funds 2r2 revie:s?
1
3 tha intzlligence inj t of O:1; jn Lhe con-?x: +hz 'Jational
1
4 Reconnissance O€fics andl th2 total safzlli+c programs
5
A{P BELIi 'hat is she larcest amount transferred in
6 such nannsr?
7
"R. DO:JOTI!; : I can t 4ive
You 2x datailed answsr there
8 but I think the transfer by :O has historically
run in sh2
2
9 last few years at ahouk $300)rillion
a Year
10 :I , IBIT,TSJ : Are Io;; + F unds -vz!eually trans Ecrred 20 the
11 Agency un)de:r th? seonoy Ac identified: a5 such in tha budget
12 Submissicns of th? Eans ferring 2gencizs?
;
0
13 TrS DJO:O:U? : Io , L Jon t bclisv? thcy woulo h2
1
14 identifi:: as transfer itens in th2 bi '32 + subnissions bI the
15 arencies . 02 cours , in nost c3525 laraa it3) & hers Toula }n2
16 the satallite activities_ anc al50 ths oth?r problem
ITC, discussed
17
2arlier; shs oth-r arEJ that wa Ciscuss:l earlier, Lhose wou lc
18 not ba idcntified, hut Toula ~2 knon aenerally
35 thoe pro-
19 cirans in ~hich CIA had an interest) 12d 541? responsibility
1
20 for carrring out +ha resserch devalop:-n+ , procnrement , engin-
8
21
esring the project. |
22 MP BRII V: Is OIB epproval rouiran th2 :ia
4
23
+0 shif' funds fror onc procra +o anoshn.r?
11
24 MR. DOiTOWIT} : Inte rally Mithin CIA_ CTA does have a 1
8
25
fleribili:V +0 repru:ran within ~h2 tos? bud?t ano'mt agproved
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222
{or
Jov
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TOP SECRET
2386
1
1 by the Prasident. 0f course, shat is sonethind that would
8 2 generally not ha t12 Misest +h for an acency to esp2cially
1
3 if it was a prosran that had not been approved Eor sore reason
5
1
4 or had been deletedl in Lhe previous budget sunission; hzcause
5 it would entail, therefore ,
a furwher Jook at it by the QPF
6 exaniner, and an additional justification
{
buz technically
7
could reprogran tkeir funds GJishin hair total avzilability to
cover their needs 2s thsy sav thena Obviousl] working nine
nonths ahcad of +he fiscal Jc3r in terns of preparation of shs
10
budmjet th2re Mould be itens shat woula increase, and wou]d
11
have +0 cover th2s?, and they would not require our approval
the reprograning as suci:
12
1
MIR, GRISTIOI,D: FJhat is AJRO?
0
13
1
MR DONO:U: : Jational Teconnissanc? Offic?. That
14
offic? which is responsibla for chs developnent, procurenen -,
15
launch 3n8 opration of sat?llite reconnissance ve icles_
16
#Ra Bt_I3_ owl oi3 does no+ have any responsibility
17
for any aJdi- or inspector csnsral duties Oter a1 te CIA,
18
doas 1+?
19
3
iR_ DO:o;:J : io_
P
i# 2ozs not Obviously
our interest
20
a
in prior ysar fundind is prinarily an intercst in vich to
21 L
dsvelor n 'base of infcration cn
historical erperdituras for
22
5
shc p1fpos: of Ev? luefinq f1ter? year renuirsnents Lha budcets ,
23
61
fiscal ycex Judgz+ vear requirenents 'hat have been identified.
24 Z
8 Tt is no'- for purnos:s 0} oing back +0 522 chat funds Wer?
25
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tkey
thsy
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Xcb 7 TOP Seeret 2387
1
1 actually spent for ths intendc - purpos? , although i2 is
3 2 conceivahle shat w? aight run across 2
cusstion along that
1
5 Jina- Ih is not 3 Eunction shat Jv9 5ould norra lly parforn.
1
4 The inspzctor general role, of course, is ong shat we also do
5 not pertorna and CIA has eheir Oin inspector gensral function as
6 part the Agency.
7 I Woula like t0 corent acditionally
on that, shat
those two functions of auditor and inspector general would
basically b in ccnflict with she primary , ths basic budget
10 function OHB in terns of atterptinc t0 assess future Year
11 requirenentS . The honesty with Ihich an agency would project
12 his future year requirenents based on an indepth audit approach
1
8
13 to prior
Irar funding woulc probably creat? fof? difficulties
2
14 for us in terns Of atteripting t0 exanine these futur? naeds _
15 MRa BELIW : Woulc OBM generally detect inproper
16 2ctivity if it involved a snall number of people and a srall
17 ainount of monzy?
18 MR . DON OTIUE : As a
general rla, I think it Fvould
19
probably not have tha capahility to do1n +o small numbers
3
20
of peopla entagzd in roper activiti?s or a snall nuinber of
5
21 Zollars tproperlv sed_ Obviously we cannot follo red wigs L
22
bought 021 an individlual baais
5
23 'IR BFLI:! : A+ Tvhat level
1
24 MQ. DO:TO ITE : Te do no: attczp? 20 20 'chat and havz
Z
8
25 not succeadzd in doing th2*.
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1R . BFLIT 1 2 mhat Jsvsl of :i2her p?ople or ron?y L
1
would such an
activity he detected if i + Wer} inproper?
8 2
3
3
ARa DOTOHUI: That is very hard 20 answer If would
1
depend on 2 lot of factors SOmE: of which I enunerated earlier
4
Bu: for exanole 1f share was
express presidential interest in
5
questions of illegal activities conducted by the Foreign
Pesourcss Division CIA 5 Directoratc Operations she
77
budget s3aniner rioht look at thaz very intently during the
8
coning Yar, and navh2 tke coning tMo ox three Years , and migh-
9
notice Sona illsqal ac-iviti?s at a fairly sn2ll size_ But
10
as a rule, I think w3 can s?; that unless YOIl are approaching
11
sonething on the ordler of s1 gillion or s0fe
thing
or thz orcer
12
1
of 100 people involvad , sha: 5h2 lare nuber of CTA peoplz
0
13
11 tnat cher? ar?, IY2 probably cculd not notice it.
14
IRa BFLT T: Zhen di n 2.13 hecone awar9 0f 3 CI? trans_
15
fer cf $3 / 0d ~0 the whita Iouse in 1970 20 fund responses
16
lcttsrscr ~izsonl 3 Canbodia spsech?
17
;IR DO:JO" TZ : No , TJC, were noh aware and it was not
18
requ?sta? it Vas noi sransfcrred under sh2 a1thoritv nf 2he
19
1
CIA Act J9 /9 ,
20
8
1R. BIGT: Di? ths 03 becora awars of Richard Ober 5
21 |
Special (frations Srown Which Vas Toritorint Atarican dissidents
22
v {1? . DO Jo;Z ; rJg di: not .
23
1
WR BL'T, ( : Did 0t ccoje Jware 0f rail Qpzning Or
24 2
7ain interzent prontang c< th CIA?
8
25
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TOp SECrET_ 2389
]
1 MR DoO T ; Wa were noz fariliar Wish any nail
8 2 opening cperation in +he U.3_
3
3 MP - BELI : Vers You aware o { any 2ssistance to policz
L
4
epartnentS givzr Yy she Office of Security cf CIA?
5 iTR, DOTOETE : I have checked she files on
that partic-
ular Tusstion
1
and aS of the norent I cannot locate any infor-
mation incicating our knol-dce_ 15 I I Mes not tn2
exaniner 01
CIA during that period
8
bu: I found no infortion
in Eha files indicating
011X knoledge sherzoE_ CWn
10 recollec-ion is t1at CIA diq not at+37nt to hide, and i= we3
11 knormn shat Wers involve: in sone training of police
on
12 a reinbgable hasis Eron sia departm?nts I (o no: think that
1
13 was hidder, but I co no: have any records to prove if, an 1+
0
1
14
is a vzry vague recollec-ion for r:
15 'P BFLI: TYors O1 neop]e aware of investications
16
by she 0ffics of Security of CIA 'hich night hav? involved Wirs
17
tapes ar? surreptitious entries?
18
MR. DO:O;UZ; : Ox22r tkan things that I hav? in
th? nsws :a7er, no, 7e Mere nc' faliliar Gith azy suc:h Jclivit_
19
2
i25 in +k3 United States.
20
8
[R_ FEGI T: Vowll You
pleas3, Zescrih? for :3 cases 21
6
in [vkic +h? 03} hzs crucstinsd the prcpristy of CIA ctivities?
22
5
MR DOVOF U : Propriety is 2 difEicnlt ters; Ec) dzal
23
11
With _ If the qu?sbion beccnzs ons
of illegality, I +hink there
24 1
9
25
probahly ar9
only EMO instance;, if i+ i: brozdly intirprcted in
KOP SECRET
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:y
they
read
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10
FOPSECRET_
2390
1
1 terms Thther +th: Agency should , in Ezct , that for Ivhatezr
8 2 reason Tt Toullc cover a laras nunber of chincs _ Obviously
Bz
1
3 nake 2 nunber, 71 larg? nun')~= 0 E speci{ic recormendations in
1
4
their budet cach vear. Let 71c touch on 2 couple of these _
5 One Was th liquiration hy C1A of sor € airlin?s 1+ Was
running
6 as
proprictary onerations in] Thich CIT originally proposed
7 its con ressional comnitt?e that tha procseds fron these liqui-
dations bs use2 :0 off-s2k their budlo? = request for fiscal 74 _
As 1" turned out , Ncrc in fact , used partially with the
2l
10
approval oE the Coxr?ss L0 off-s2+ S4)rillion
0f CIA budgetary
11
requirenents for Tiscal Year '74 . In fiscal year 75 , CIA did
12
not maka 8 proposal to include such linuidating assest as an
1
13
off-set it5 rcglar buds?t , ana shs office of Managenent and
0
1
14
Budget pronos2c shat it do S0 and , in fact , reduced CIA s
15
appronri tions by (2@nillion heczw;? of anticipated rcceipts
from thss?, fron 5h? sals these nroprietarics Quring fiscal
16
year 75 _
17
Subseguently the CIA General Counsel , Nr Warner , indi
18
cated Lver he Eelt there wa; 50re lenal question involvsd in
19
{
t2rns cf ths propricty of Us? of proprietary reczints here
20
8
ff-set th2 obliga!ion reguirenants CIA_ {2 rsviewed it mith
21 L
hir. Bas: < on th - Tegal opinion ~hat h2 Gav:, [Jhic 'r Colby
22
v
concurrcc IS :viewed if Vith our 12,21 counss 1 anc our
23
1
legal ccinszl in icate that chis [vas prohahly a reesonable
24 Z
9 position on th? ;'cl : 0f :h? CIA , 50 Ehosc C1cs are noiv not
25
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t0
Lhey
+0
of
+0
of
in ,
ar
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11
TOp seerEF_
2391
being - to off-s?: CIA appropriations_ It was not One V2
8 2 originated. In Ezct, +he CIA Ganeral Counsel originatsc i+_ IE
3
3 is probably a dcbatablz ler2l ques-i0n , a5 2 natter Eact ,
L
but as i2 turned ou: Te deciced those funds woule be
5 utilized +0 Off-set regular apr
ropriations_
6 IIR _ GRISWOLD): But ars recoverzd into the Treasury
7 receipts?
8 MR. DO:OHUE : A- this point Gill be used as
regular receipts in sha Treasury-
10 'IR _ GRISMTOLD: Zhcy are not acdi-ional funds for the
11 CIA to spend?
12 MR DOVO:IUK That is correct , and wz Wezz attenpting
1
0
13 to ensure that they (ere used 1o off-s?1 regulaf CIA approp-
1
14 riations a: thz tinz the appropriations and of she Prasident
15 budget 3S opposed to ths subssquent Congressional reduction, usid
16 the sa*e {unds
17 A coupl? other iten5 which I vould just like L0
18 cite in Jrzas Ivhera OBN has bzen involved in the pas+ where CIA
19
activities might relevant is she Equal Employ:ent Opportunity,
2
20 xhich anain because of CIA' 3 unique statutory exenption not
8
21
uniqu? , but exerp-ion fron ehs Civil Service Connission revie1 |
22 QMB has initiated 2ction to insur? shat CIA made a conscientious
v
23 cffort Eo achisvz squal erployrent opportuni-y gozls I havs
1
24
mentionsd the covsrt action project previously xhich there was
2
8
25 a question of roles 2nd ssion. I think ther? is one other
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0f
0 €
rj
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cb 12
FOP SECRET 2392
7
episod? like that mer? it is partly roles and issions hut
8 2 1+ is certainly Where I as Lha unit chief in OBM could 0se ths
3
3 guidance of this corission
1
and tha: is ths use of sone CIA
1
equiprent sorz CIA invol-ernt jointly with the FBI in
5 conducting surveillance 0f foreiyn enbassies , foreign residences
and which the corrission_
0
or Thich I think 1t is unclear at the
present tine she exsent t0 which thsse operations are involved
8 in tive foreign intelligence collection , which obviously is
9 an
appropriat? nission for CIA Versus
counterintelligence
10 activiti?s tiore appropriately seens 4 mission for the FBI
11 MRa STLI T: Basically shat
12 iR _ DO:TOITUE Can I add 9 cowl: of itens this?
1
13 MRa BILI:: Go ricnt ahead_
0
1
14 MP. DO:TOUUS : I do recall very heavy involvznent
15 our offic? in i+, and arain I [a5 not personally involved in
16
th1e inw)larentation of xh1? Ealzenbach Peport in 67 vien it Iag
17
dzcided tha: CIA involvstwnt in priva-? volunteer organizations
18
szemsa 2t shat point +0 bs inappropriate_ And wnils I an
no+
sure shere was 3
dis-inct question 0f lecality invclvzc: it vas 19
1
decided Lhzt Sor" 0f thss? activities should not ba continusd
20
i
21
0v3 Vas instruenta) in insnring that ths Acency Aiq nox L
22
fund Lhas: activities which hy presidential Jecision ha bzen
vj
cited V2 hsyona ths realn 3f CtA 2t that particuler point.
23
1
#Ra BFtJ: TThet i-wac* , if any, has 03133 h20 on the
24 2
8
25
manarerient of ths CIA?
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posi
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60
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cb 13
TOpSeerE}
L
1 MR DO:O;:UC into 2 Guch broader quzstion
8 2 therz, an I wou ld lik8 EO spend a fzw ninrtes just 2laborzting
3
3 on th? larcer rol? shat O:B h13s With respect €0 Tanagenent ,
1
4 some of which I ehink mav ba Mr 0 ' Jeill coversd, But , there
5 would be snaller instances of ranagemen: activities thaz Wva
would becone involwac in on an alnost Foufins hasis. I had
flentioned personnel Tanagenent 25 an ar2a that T: look into
hsavily, but there are other prorrannatic are33 Bhere wa mould
feel tha: CIA S
relationship vith anothzr aoency of governrent
10
night n2sd +0 b2 straightenec ou+ , and Ws would initiate steps
Eo S traighten that On1+ . I can shink hers trans- 11
12
ferring fundin for certain third-perty SIGINT operations
1
the National Security Agency Ihere Te werz
hezvily involved _
0
13
11
On a hroacer 2 Te Gere
intinately involved as a staff
14
in OMB in support of Dr. Schlesinger in his 1971 re-organization
15
study of the intellirencc cOriunity and t12- had broad
16
reconnen a-ions with respect to the organization of +he Foreign
17
Intelligsncc activities_ of th2 C,S . such a3 the Fresident
18
signed off I sucss 3 10 pag? Jirec-ive in Jovs_er 71 Thich
19
2
provided ior a greater role for th1e Director Central Intelli
20
8
oence in the nanacei anr coordination 0f the ovsrall (.S .
21 1
22
Foreign Intelligence cffort_
v
I could t0 inio that in nor Zetail Kr Relin, but
23
1
this is uD t0 You_ Zhis is 2 vary lon? anz exhaustivs stud_
24
1
8 anounting +0 about 2 ear o2 staff tinne an essentially six
25
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of 0
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very
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Went
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2394
cb 14
1 mambzrs +la in-elligence corfunity_
1
2 PIR. BTLIT: Becaus? o€ +he 6i:12 linitations T a; 8
1
5
going t0 surn to another 2rzz; and tha" is whether or not since
1
the CIA is not subject L0 the General Accounting Offic? , and
5 11 is nc' subject +0 thozouc} Congressional review
1
do ycul
believe +hat OMB} 3 Otersinh1+ role should h2 expanded 2i-her in
concepe Or in st2ff T0 s3= -her2 rick- b: 3 bctter op;ort'mnity
0 redUoe any irproper activity?
1?_ DONOFTCE : I chink +hat sh1? chancs ther? cf 3n
10
enlarcs; )" staff in Fact , discoveri: ? illegal or igpropsr
11
activiz: : ; wish ar agnc; +12+ is ertrewe]y aZcpt at hijing
12
thincs if it Mishss would really bz impossible I con t think,
1
with O3le czaninr presently 0n thc budget , ane revis 0f sha:
0
13
1
agency #12t tTo , 4hr??, fiv? Mo -ld essentielly nak? 2 differencs
14
it "ould essentially requirs
3 larje ~unhar oE pcopl:
15
in fac: 8o ths +yn2 of a: i finction that r10 does for +h?
16
question ~f inproper activi-i2s +0 really arise in ordar L0
17
into ihaz in such Jctail
0
2: least 29 2 guzrant2?, a0 c pande:l
18
O:B S+af? cola noh provids thas guarentzz Ulass i+ cssertially
19
17
changed: its funcsion to On: aE audit, 2rd EV:n in ~hat C352 it
20
8
woula h: post-audit func-ion: It woul? bz one th3+ 1o1lz
21
7
Zisco-er ill2cal ac-ivitics cozmittes perhaps ~10 or sh228
22
4
6 Years A6C, nos
activitiss currently unrer corission I
23
1
20 not ~licve 0:t3 coula casily eccept 2n1y adni-iona] responsibil
24
E
in th? 7 ;? of aulie. IL is jnst bsyond i*5 charter- It is 0u+
8
25
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cb 15
TOp SECRET
2395
1
1 of ~une Kith its scnpc 2; a3} acency , 2n4 wonld basically be
8 2 cour terpro-uctite in terns 0f cur basic Eunction_
1
5 NR BEII: Tell
0
dl0 you hav? any other rsconandations
1L6
4
involvind OfB s
relationship With shz CIA?
5 :R. DO:TOICE : In tcTES of 0M3 S role I Se6 a nunber 0f
things +hat probahly we coulc 4o t0 , in fact , strencthen it in
7
relatively ninor ways. I offer then not in any hope of guaran-
teeing in sens : that inproer or illegal chiviti?s would
9
not occur , but certainly
Wve coula taka 3 cJoser revie
10
CIA' s proprietary onerations Ghich no , when oncz ss+ablished
11 as an elenent, [i2 no- require any continuing government
12
funding , and woula not rensrally be reviewed by O.1; _ except ir
1
S0 far 33 reri annv?l transfcrs +0 thesa proprietari?s
0
13
1
for Iaintenance. 2here probably could p? some increse in
14
OMB revisw of transfcrs E0 anr Frori CIA under 2l1 provisions of
15
2h2 law _ probhably hav?: +C he Io awrictsc t0 najor trans_
16
fers bacauss thars are a lards nuber of Wiinor transfers that
17
reimburs: oersonnel on detail that woule bz Very Jifficul- if not
18
imposaihl: to track_
19
2
OMT} couldl underrake sone stricter apportionrant 0z CIA
20
8
vy project or by ofFice-
1
or hy progran Nhich w9 Jo not nOw do .
21 7
1e essenti appcrtion +o CIA as an ?cency
0
and hnva the
22
5 liberty to: repronran within those furrs; re coulai tighten that
23
1
t0 2 czrtjin seni
24 7
9 VJe could nrobahly
n0' gst down to each indiviflual
25
TOp SeerEF
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project or 2ach individual office, but Ws could provide sone
8 2 liritations Mithin four , fivz, possibly 25 rany as ten categoriesl
3 where would thsn have :0 seek our approval reprogramning
1
4 actions That [O11ld help
uS
in civing
a closer reviaw of
5 'CIA on it5 reprograrning actions at the Sar2 tire.
6 These are things tka: could involve sora additional
paperwork: . I don 2 think thcy have, mould have much prospect
8 for really providing 2
guarantse against illegal
or improper
9 activitics.
10 TR BCLI:T: questions by any nembers of tha
11 Conmission?
12 HR CO:or : Ao.
1
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13 MR. BELIN: other conents that You want t0 make ,
1
14 Xr. Donohue ths record?
15 ThR DO JOIIUZ : No . I think J' ;2 probably covered i+
16 as well 22 I can , in Eact.
17 012. BCLIij; Vell thank You very such for coning here.
18 :R. DO:TO;VI; : Thar} Jou.
19 J2rsupon
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at 6 :40 0' clock PaT1. the Coritt?e Was
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