Transcript of 124-10325-10318.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 124-10325-10318] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination System Date: 3/15/201 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY FBI RECORD NUMBER : 124-10325-10318 RECORD SERIES HQ AGENCY FILE NUMBER 62-80750-4166 Document Information ORIGINATOR FBI FROM: BRENNAN TO SULLIVAN TITLE : DATE : 09/11/1963 PAGES 12 SUBJECTS CIA LIAISON FILE DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION Secret RESTRICTIONS 1B; 4 CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVEW 12/29/1998 OPENING CRITERIA INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA COMMENTS INC MEMO, SUMMARY v9.] H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 1 ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SECREL 1G DIRECTOR S MEETING WITH J . JYMC]CONE p Although Mr McconeTIis indicated he will not be raising any problems or issues 8 the Director may find the following of assistance: AII IrsoeWsston ConeAINID AIREIW IS UNCIAESIZIED EICEPI' STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH CIA #REtr ShowN (YIHERR[SE. To say tbat the two agencies work in complete barmony is not true _ Conflicts of past years bave had their influences Fortu- nately we have been successful in establishing very effective work- ing_relations with several key figures in the agency Who have been very cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the job done _ Without this existing framework our relations with CIA could degenerate into 8 chaotic state With regard to differences with CIA 9 there were two situations during the past year which had a significant -bearing on the relations between the two agencies Approximately a year ag0 we learned that CIA had established contact with a Cuban exile who had come into the U.8 : and who had confessed to the agency that he had been trained a8 a Cuban Intelligence Agent CIA had this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau_ We lodged very vigorous protest (re Alwin_OdioTanayol The Cs) other event which led to 8 heated conflict arose from information which we disseminated to the President S Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning Bureau 6 technical coverage of diplomatic establishments in this country On May 15 9 1963 9 McCone informed Mr Belmont that a letter which the Bureau had sent to the afore__ mentioned Board should be retracted because the communication included statements which incorrectly were attributed to him the CIA Director Mr Belmont adamantly refused to retract the "ietter and after McCone asked for an apology Mr Belmont again made it clear that no apology was coming from hin The Bureau never retracted the letter because statements disseminated by us were predicated on information which had been given to uS by two top CIA officials The conflict Was eventually resolved by McCone writing 2 letter to the Board and admitting tbat two of his subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on 8 particular matter STATURE OF MC CONE IN THE PRESENT ADWINI STRATION_ McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power He considers himself not only the head of a particular government agency but als0 0 the Director of Central Intelligence"' and in culeleb BYSbLK:SL) 62-0254_ DECLASSIFY QN; 3XZOtP ENCLOSURE ZeCREL H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 2 To OSJECTION ANdior;, InfoRMATION Gor Tion NO DECLASSIFICAT HAS CHA DOCuMent HiA W 4 ShZC RELEASE Luetentriot ctr , THIS 41l& ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== fiasco we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became Director of the agency To show impressive results, McCone must fall back on intelligence information developed through high-altitude photography and the use of other sophisticated technical equipment being used to photograph targets and to intercept communications Much of this of course being done in collaboration with other U_ S. agencies such as the Air Force . FBI COOPERATION WITE CIA During the past year there have been numerous instances of excellent cooperation rendered by the Bureau to CIA 0 Set forth are some outstanding examples: INFORMATION FROV SENSITIVE SOURCE_SOLO We have furnished CIA information from our sensitive Communist Party source who has traveled to Russia and bas been in contact with Soviet leaders This information has been most valuable to CIA in following developments particularly the differences between Red China and Russia TOPHAT Our sensitive penetration of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (GRU) has produced highly valuable information of use to CIA GIE This is a highly sensitive penetration of theCCzech Intelligence Service3 His information Cs) has Significantlyyassisted CIA in obtaining 8 current picture of the Czech intelligence organiza- Cs] tion BUREAU FURNI SHES CIA A VALUABLE SOURCE Our sensitive(CzecbJsource ,(Cimme) is CsJ scheduled to return to Czechoslovakia . Arrange- CsJ ments have been made to make him available to CIA FEDORA Through this sensitive KGB penetration , we have furnished CIA leads pertaining to Soviet intelligence operations abroad _ In addition, we have given the agency data pertaining to the organization and functions of KGB 3 # H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 3 is, ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== SOVIET MAIL DROPS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES Through our investigations in this country , we bave identified Soviet mail drops in other areas and we have given this valuable information to CIA CIA APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET ANDSATELLITE MATTONALS IN THE UNITED STATES Under agreed-to restrictions we have per - mitted CIA to contact Soviet and Satellite visitors in this country for the purpose of assessing their potential 29 Sources when they return to their native countries CUBAN SOURCES We have afforded CIA the opportunity to brief Bureau sources before such sources made trips to Cuba SENSITIVE CUBAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS Both FBI and CIA have had access to intercepted radio communications being utilized by Cuban Intelligence _ The Bureau has been far ahead of CIA in identifying agents mentioned in the communications and has furnished pertinent information to CIA TECENICAL DATA TO CIA Thc The Bureau has been very successful in identifying Soviet and Cuban secret writing techniques We bave made this knowledge available to CIA CIA COOPERATION WITH BUREAU TOPHAT CIA did an excellent job @€ servicing drops Cs] in Moscow] in this very sensitive case. This was done ~at considerable risk and was productive for uS H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 4 ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== SECRET DOUBLE AGENTS FOR BUREAU There have been a number of instances where. CIA operated Soviet double agents outside of the U.8= and then made these individuals available to the Bureau for use in the U,S_ In this connection it is also noted that in our development of the sensitive sources, Fedora (KGB penetration) and(Gimme) (penetration of Czech entefligence}CsJ Service) JCIA furnished va Iuable assistance . VLADIMIR ROMASHKIN CASE Several weeks ag0 , CIA advised uS that one of its employees had been contacted by the Soviets With CIA 8 cooperation, we conducted investigation Which led to the ouster of a Soviet official and very favor- able publicity for the Bureau COVERAGE IN MEXICO Through surveillances and surreptitious entry CIA produced va luable informationnin our investigation oflFranz Froehlich, a GRU Cs3 Agenf Jwhom we since have doubled AVAILABILITY OF DEFECTORS CIA has been most cooperative in making defectors available to the Bureau for interviews COOPERATION WITH LABORATORY Fron time to time CIA has made certain documents and equipment available to the Bureau S Laboratory For example_ 2 a few weeks ago. CIA made available to our Laboratory , at no cost , a portable unit designed for making radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such characteristics 28 watermarks 8 printing , etc . ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT Through assistance afforded by CIA 9 we gained access to an individual who subsequently became a valuable informant in the labor rackets field (NY 3936-C) SECREI 4r 5 _ H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 5 CsJ ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== FRENCH |ACTIVITIES Cs] SECREL Information provided by 2 sensitive CIA source has been very_useful in following the activities of(FrenchJagents in the U . 8 . Cs POSSIBLE TOPICS WHICH: MC CONE MAY REFER TO JACK EDWARD DUNLAP This is tbe National Security Agency employee who. supplied information to the Soviets and who committed suicide in July of this' year We recently received information from our sensitive source Tophat in Moscow confirming that Dunlap worked for the Soviets Tophat 8 information was furnished to McCone last week McCone is particularly concerned about the possibility that Dunlap may have furnished the Soviets information which led to the compromise of Oleg Penkovsky 9 a sensitive CIA source in Russia . PERSONNEL SECURITY The Dunlap Case bas been raising questions concerning the effectiveness of security within 0. 8 agencies McCone anticipates that Congress eventually may initiate some inquiry and he already has been informed that the President' s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is looking into the matter ~Last week Mr McCone asked Mr Belmont for his views on personnel security. McCone , at that time _ 9 was briefed concerning our careful screening of applicants and our strong administrative controls including inspec _ tions It was emphasized that the Bureau always resolved security problems in favor of the FBI rather than the individual involved Mr McCone was told that the key to the situation appeared to be tight screening and control procedures and tthe willingness to take prompt action_ COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC ESTABLI SHMENTS IN TE 0 . 8 . In the Spring of this year McCone brought up this matter before the President S Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and he subsequently SECREE 6 3 H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 6 ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== had 8 discussion with Mr Belmont_ Essentially , 78' McCone is most interested in technical coverage of individuals and installations of non-Soviet_Bloc countries _ He has left the impression that in his opinion such coverage could be expanded in the U.S_ and thereby produce more intelligence and more sources Our coverage in this field at the present time is quite extensive . With- regard to CIA, we have the understanding that if the agency desires particular technical coverage , we will give each request the necessary consideration FRENCH ACTIVITIES In the early part of this year 9 we initiated extensive investigation of the alleged Grench agents in this country on the basis of data rur- nished to uS by a sensitive CIA source This source has informed CIA that De Gaulle)has embarked on an extensive espionage program in the U.8 primarily designed to collect sitent %if data which will enable France to hasten its SJ development of a nuclear' capability _ We have disseminated the results of our investigation to CIA and we are continuing the handling of numerous leads The information developed by US S0 far has failed to disclose any evidence that: the( French are stealing any classified 83 S secrets in the U.8 . The French appear to be obtaining_goluminous information available to the French Jthrough normal contacts between CsJ French]officials and their counterparts in the Cs3 U_ S TOPHAT A CIA agent recently obtained the message which our sensitive source Tophat secreted in 8 Cs] droplin Moscow . The message included information concerning Soviet activities in France Germany and Austria_ We have given this data to CIA In addition 9 McCone was told that Tophat identified Dunlap 28 a Soviet agent We bave told CIA that Tophat may bave loaded the drop 28 early 28 June , 1963 The delay in Obtaining the communica_ tion prevented us from getting into the Dunlap Case well before the subject committed suicide H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 7 CsJ CJ Gj ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== SECREL CIA did not service the drop because our informant did not exhibit an agreed-to signal He apparently did not use the signal in order to fully protect himself On the other hand CIA was unable to service the drop until August because State Depart- ment adamantly refused to give CIA clearance to conduct any activity in Moscow This position Was taken by State because it felt that any operational activity might jeopardize the test ban talks Cs] ANATOLI GOLITZYN AKA ANATOLI KLIMOV This_ is the Soviet KGB defector who came to the U. 8 under CIA control feuded with the agency , left for England under British Intelligence 'control and very recently returned to the U.8 Since bis return , he has met with the Attorney General and with McCone He has been extremely critical of the U.S position toward Russia . Although 8 prima donna Golitzyn has been the source of extremely veluable information for a11 U.8 , agencies including the Bureau_ Since his return he has indicated to the Attorney General and CIA that he will contact appropriate agencies when he Sees fit In the past , Golitzyn has asked to meet with the Director The Director has made it very clear that he will not see Golitzyn _ MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI The subject is a former high-ranking Official of the Polish Security Service who defected in January 9 1961 and in recent weeks bas been an embarrassing problem for CIA because of his many complaints_ He has communicated with the President , the Attorney General and has been in contact with 0 Congressman He is slated to testify before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee in the near future He has accused CIA of dishonesty and over-all failure to comply with his needs We have bad access to Goleniewski who has been 2 valuable source of information However 9 we have been most careful not to become involved in the feud between him and CIA We have cooperated to the extent of furnishing CIA any information received from Goleniewski which might be of assistance to the agency SECREL H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 8 ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== SECREV PRESIDENT 8 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD For your information, McCone has found this Board to be 2 constant irritant This Board was established several years ago by the Eisenhower administration then continued by President Kennedy . It is designed to periodically review foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The present chairman of the comnittee is Clark Clifford and the staff director is J Patrick Coyne = Apparently , McCone does not like a group such 28 this Board' looking into bis operations There is some indication that his irritation arises from personal differences with Coyne- WENNERSTROM CASE Colonel Wennerstrom, the Swedish Military Attache who, a few weeks ag0 , adnitted to his govern- ment that he had been working for the Soviets Wennerstron was in the U 8 from 1952 until 1957 and was collaborating with the Russians while he was here Recently 9 McCone indicated that 2 "damage 01 report should be prepared on this case and he expressed the opinion that this should be tbe responsibility of the Bureau = With regard to damage , he was referring to an evaluation of a11 information which Wennerstrom may have gained from the U. 8 _ We have taken the position that we will not prepare such 8 damage report and if one is needed the work should be done by each interested agency UNKNOWN SUBJECT; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA This 1s & Bureau investigation predicated on information furnished to 4s by Anatoli Golitzyn 9 the KGB defector who advised that CIA had been penetrated by KGB We have been endeavoring to identify_ the unknown Soviet agent We do have a suspect 9 ( John 8.Cs] Barescu who was born in Russia and who has been working for CIA for several years_ McCone may not mention this ma tter but he is very much concerned about the situation We bave been keeping CIA advised of a11 pertinent developments . 9 _ H# 52333 DocId:32313069 Page 9 Stig ~LCReE

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124-10325-10318.pdf

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