Transcript of 124-10276-10400.pdf
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124-10276-10400] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Optional Fork No, i0 5010-106
MY 1962 Editon
654 GEN: Reo. No. 27. Assoc.
UNITED STATES GO ERNMENT 6 Dep: AD Adm.
Dop: AD Iav. SECRET /coxE] 1 Kr _ J_ B_ Adams Asst. Dir_:
Memorandum
1 Mr _ T _ RS Hannall Admin:
Comp. Syst, 1 Hr . FT . 0_ Cregar
Ext: Affalrs
TO Ar . T. R.
FannalluulvL
DATE: 7/15/75 Filos & Com.
Gena Inv.
Identa 1 Mr _ F . S. Putma n
Inse
FROM 3. S. eutman
kelssm 1 W n @
Mr T . A . Branigan
{aeYerc
1 Mr . L. F_ Schwartz Loboratory
Logal 1 Hr _ H . R. L'Allier
Plon. & Eval; Ai Tnt D*{FIon CONfitu
Spec. Inv; SUBJEGT : SENSTUDY 75 BZEI [;' W"T {S_IZIDIC8 Troining
02132 QI:ZIIZ, Tolophono Rm,
Direc or{Sec' Y
Reference is made to memora ndum TT 0 Crerar to Dtssss %
Hr _ T , R. Tannall, dated 8/26/75, captioned "Senstudy 75 _
LAl"Ey
SYNORSIS:
The' purpose 0f this memorandum is to summarize
Pa
information in FBI files concerning G[sraeli intelligence col-
lection capabilitieg in the United States. James J _ Angleton,
former Chief Counterintelligence Operations_ Central Intelligence_
Agency (CIA) advised the FBI on 3/36/75 that he appeared before?
the Senate Sefect Committee (SSC) and in response to questions
advised SSC he only had secondhand: a nd fragmentary information
(s concerning @sraeli capabilities to conduct intelligence collectio
in the United States_ including Guclear informationj He advised
the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly
be directed to the FBI Kensitive technical source coverage by
the FBI of the Tsmaer-bmba Ssy ewa Shington BDerc betieen
February 1969 , and Oc tober 1972 , developed information showing
that
Angieton,
during this period in his official capacity at
CIA
1
had frequent personal liaison contacts with the Enbassy 9 inofving
dsrael , Israeli Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives
the exchange of extremely sensitive information_ Currently the
YBI has no
pending investigation involving Israeli intelligence
8 collection capabilities in the United States_ The most current
1
infestitigion i7babed folea 'EIGongeoriatichidatedtei/lnvGbveonceeni=
ng 3
the establishment at the Embassy of Israel Hashington, D C_ of
a n Israeli technical intelligence netwvork _ Also under
investi
4
gation during this period at New York City Tra s an IIS attempt to
6
penetrate United Nations and official Arab establishments by the
use Of live sources FBI files also reflect that LIS
periodically have operated in the Ulleted, Stateg23i0ez19s
133389ge4
1 65-58700 (IIS) CONTI NUED OVER (5
3 JUL 22 197;
MRL : med DETA ILS RAGE 2
2 ; (9) SECRET_ Ieco2Bll)
Classifxed by40O5
Exempt fr GDS Categories 2 and 3
Date Decsassification Indefinite '3
6 JUL 2 2 1975 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Dir.
Coun.
to]
STA-
REC88
'SPEc,. MATL/Ri
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SECRET /GcoPBJ (s
Memorandum to Ir _ T . R_ Mannall
Re : Senstudy 75
ACTION:
None _ For information,
Lo"
Y
SECRET_
EcorBts
la
tng
3
luob
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SECRET_ '/corDys)
Memorandum to Mr , T . R. Wannall
Re : Senstudy 75
DETAILS:
Accordi ng to referenced memor 'andum, James Angleton,
former Chief Counterintelligence Operations= CIA
1
advised the
FBI on
6726/75
that he had recently testified under oa th without
counsel before three Senators and staff members of the Senate
Select Committee (SSC) He wa s questioned concerning his knowl_ U)
edge of (sraeli capabiiities
to conduct.intelligence collection
in the United Sta including Quclear information; Angleton (5)
stated he avoided any direct answers, advising that knowledge
he might have mould be secondhand and fragmentary He informed
the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly
be directed to the FBI _
TE Senstive technical source coverage by the FBI of the
Embassy of Israel Hashington Da between February, 1969 , and
October , 1972 , determined that Angleton, in his official capacity
at CIA had frequent personal liaison contacts with Israeli
Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives at the Embassy of
Israel Wa shington D C
9
involving the exchange of extremely
sensitive
information_ This special relationship
was confirmed
by Angleton and other CIA officials during a meeting with an FBI
representative on 4/3/69_ At this meeting CIA representatives
stated that this liaison with IIS was krnown by the White House
and the U . S , State Department _ (s JFk)(B)
At the present time the FBI has no pending investigation
involving Israeli intelligence collection capabilities in the
United States. (s
The most current information in FBI files concerning
this matter involved the investigation based on CIA information
dated 11/14/68 concerning the establishment af the Embassy of
Israel
1
Wa shington, D of an Israeli technical intelligence
network directed by Avraham Hermoni Scientific Counselor Hermoni,
prior to his aSsignment as Scientific Counselor in Washington,
D C, wia s involved in the Israeli nuclear weapons program _ The
activities and contacts of Hermoni and colleagues at the Embassy
were investigated through 1972 _ The investigations of these
individuals were discontinued as no specific information was:
developed to indicate that they had acted unlawfully or outside
the scope of their official duties: 5 JFk 6)(e)
CONTINUED
L OVER
SECRET /ICOPE
tes,
any
Sta Irrlyj
C.,
C.,
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SECRET_ '/EcopB()
Memorandum to Mr . H. R. Hannall
Re : Senstudy 75
During the period of these investigations it Fas
determined that Embassy 0f Israel officials recruited U, S .
Scientists for employment in Israel; and extensive liaison ma s
established Fith individuals within U. S scientific, political,
academic and industrial communities_ As an example Hermoni
developed close contact with Dr Za lman Mordecai Shapiro, Director
of Nuclear Ma terials and Equipment Corporation, Apolio,
Pennsylvania
a firm which processes uranium 235 for nuclear
reactors. (s)
The basis of the discontinuation 0f the Sensitive
technical source coverage on the Israeli Emba ssy in 1972 was
2 U . S, State Department directive. (S
During this period it wa s also determined that the
IIS was attempting to penetrate the United Nations (UN) and
Arab diplomatic establishments in New York: City_ An informant
of the Nev York Office who previously engaged in intelligence
activities in the
Hiddie
Ea st for the Israelis between 1955 and
1960 while working at the UN was recontacted by Israeli intel-
ligence in August, 1968 ,
whiie
visiting Israel This informant
had access at the UN to extremely sensitive information from the
office of the Secretary General Israeli intelligence had
directed him to obtain and furnish, through a mail drop in
Belgium interoffice communica tions between the Secretary General
of the UN and his undersecretaries, and informnation recarding
the Middle East, particularly relating to Arab matters_ (s
In 1968 another informant of the New York Office,
who previously resided in the Middle East and was active in the
Egyptian intelligence service addressed a personal letter to
General Dayan of Israel in
which
he expressed his opinion the
Israelis should force the Egyptians to surrender and sign a peace
treaty _ Informant was subsequently contacted in New York City by
11 an Israeli intelligence agent who furnished bis name as "Hichael
1 Tho showed informant 3 copy of his letter to Dayan, "Hichael
subsequently "recruited" informant and furnished him 8 mail
in Italy "Aichael" instructed informant to obtain employment at
an Arab diplomatic establishment in New York City in order to (s
CONTINUED
L
OVER
SECRET_ '/{co2E
5
3
Sta1e
JFRC)tc)
May ,
drop
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SECRET '(BcopE(s) .
Hemorandum to Hr _ F _ R, Tannall
Re : Senstudy; 75_
furnish Israeli intelligence information on Arab moves in the
Middle East crisis_ Dur a meet in October 1969 "Hichael"
wa s surveilled to the Israeli Consulate where he met Paul Korem,
IIS representative_ The informant subsequently received
instructions that in the event of an emergency he should call
a specific telephone number and askr for "Paul "i This telephone
number was identified as being a private line located at the
Israeli Consulate. (S_
Neither of the above-described operations is currently
active at New York. (s
Korem during his assignment at the Israeli Consulate
in New York, initiated liaison contact with the New York Office
of the FBI _ (5)
FBIHQ currently has liaison with Menachem' Navoth, IIS
representative at the Embassy of Israel Fa shington, D. C.
During July 1956 through December _
1956 ,
while attending
American University Washington; DS C.
)
and employed part time
as a guard at the Embassy of Israel Navoth was engaged in intel-
ligence activities in the United States. Navoth met with an FBI
double agent Frho wa s an employee 0f the U. S. State Department
On several occasions and paid the double agent, 8250.00 for
cooperating mith the Israelis, (s)
New York currently has liaison with the Israeli Consulate 46)
rBI files also reflect that IIS representatives have
periodically conducted operations in the United States similar
to those described herein since 1948. ($
Stn
SECRET/Ico?E
Jts)
ins
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