Transcript of 124-10274-10127.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== File # 63-Il3q5 Serial Scope: 586- Bulke1 Released under tne JohnF. Kennedy Assassination Records CollectionAct of 992 (44 USC 2107 Note) Case#:Nw 3a608 Date; 03-18-2025 1 5 NWV 88608 @eld:32989638 1 Page ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 62- HQ-116330 #3s6 Serial 586 BULKY 62-Ho-116359-E586 FBI CENTRAL RECORDS CENTER HQ HEADQUARTERS BOX 3585 Class / Case # Sub Vol. Serial # 0062 116395 586 ONLY 2113/85777 NW 88603 Docld:329 00474in ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== INSPECTION DOMSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION AUGUST 17 SEPTEMBER 9, 1971 8608 |Docld:32989638 Page 3 ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== RETA'N Copy / Vs ?f85toN 5 9 //> 1 Reconnerd entire cocunent be classificc #Secret, Mi XCDS 1, 2, 3 Portions reconmended for @xcision fron attached have baen underlined in red Or bracketed in red in left Dacgin. Cencrally criterio For excision Tece: 1_ Information which could identizy Sources or sensitive techniques 2 _ Vanes 0f individuals or orgonizations rrnose privacy rcquires protection 3_ Inforration :hich %ould reveal Our overall success or lack: of success In 1 given investigative area 4 Inforration fron 21 '4hird Agencies" or fricnaly Eoref;n ogencies 5 Identities Of Bureau personnel bclorr the Section Chier level The adequacy of Personnel Sections, In general_ 9 discloje the extent of our comnitment in speciflc arcas 0f countorintelligcnce activity. Ve have given the Cornjittue Lcrinistretlve Division figures regerdinz total Denpo;-er involved In security investigeticns to my koizlecge, ;e have not given then 8 breaktioxn as to here these personnel ore assigned , policy dccision is necessary a5 to Thether @ Eent to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel" sectiong pf these inspection ceports 9 precisely hov much oc hoi lircle Canpoi ter '7 bave 0n specific types of investigations. It is questionable whether the information regarding criminal cases in the San Francisco report iS germane to the Comittee 8 inquiry. It would not seem improper to me to celete ell references to criminal matters and mecely substitute 2 page saying that "pages to relate to criminal M investigations _ 08608 Docld:32989638 Page 4 3 / - but , ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== IABLE OF CONTENTS NW 88608 Docld:32989638 5 Page ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== TABLE OF CONTENTS Page SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS Ellsberg Case East Coast Conspiracy 23 ACCOMPLISHMENTS Internal Security Section 31 Research Section 39 New Left Section 43 Espionage Section 57 Extremist Intelligence Section 66 Nationalities Intelligence Section 74 SURVEYS PROJECTS AND /OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS Security Index Program (Basic Revolutionary Organizations) 89 Counterintelligence White Hate Groups 91 Thumbnail Sketch Program 93 Security Informant Program (Basic Revolutionary and New Left Organizations) 94 Security Index Program 97 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 6 Page ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== Page Surveys , Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued) Emergency Detention Program 97 Technical and Microphone Surveillances 98 Survey Regarding Potential For Racial Violence 99 New Left Movement 101 Key Activist Program 105 Students for & Democratic Society (SDS) 107 Worker Student Alliance (WSA) 107 The Venceremos Brigade 110 PROSAB 110 ALEM Program 114 BANPOP Program 115 CANL Program 116 COKMA Program 117 DESECO Program 119 East West Exchange Program 121 Radio and Technical Equipment 123 Purchased by the Soviets Black Extremist Matters 125 Black Nationalist Movement 127 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 7 ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== Page Surveys , Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued) Black Panther Party 132 Black Revolutionary Party 136 Congress of African Peoples (CAP) 137 International Black Workers Congress, aka Black Workers Congress 139 Junta of Militant Organizations 140 Nation of Islam 142 Republic of New Africa 144 Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) i46 Communist Influence of Black Extremist Groups 148 Key Black Extremist Program 151 Extremist Informants 152 Ghetto Informants 154 Counterintelligence Program 4 Black Extremists 156 Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas 158 Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border Gocov 159 Security Index Cuba 161 American Repatriate Program 164 Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries 165 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 8 Page ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== Page Surveys , Projects and/or Intensification Progrars (Continued) International Organizations L Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet Bloc 167 Chinese Aliens Entering the U. Chinese Entering the US S. Claiming U. S. Citizenship 169 Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United States (CHICOIN) 172 Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments 173 LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES 4 FOREIGN LIATSON Bern 178 Bonn 179 Buenos Aires 180 Hong Kong 180 London 181 Madrid 182 Mexico City 183 Ottawa 184 Paris 185 Rome 185 Tokyo 186 Beirut 187 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 9 8.; Page ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== Page Legal Attache Offices Foreign Liaison (Continued) Caracas 188 Copenhagen 190 La Paz 191 Managua 192 Tel Aviv 193 Chinese Communist Activities 200 Subversive Activities Control Board 213 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS Dividing Domestic Intelligence Division Into Two Divisions 215 Antiriot Laws and Bombing Matters 224 Computation of Case and Work Load in the Domestic Intelligence Division 239 Potential Double Agent Program 244 PERSONNEL MATTERS Adequacy of Personnel Agent 249 Adequacy of Personnel 5 Clerical 300 SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM Payments to Security Informants and Confidential Sources 314 NW-88608-Beeld-32989638_Page-l0 ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== Page Suggestion Memorandum (Continued) Survey Concerning Computerization of Security Informant Indices 321 Supervision and Control of Security Informant Development and Coverage by Internal Security and New Left Sections 324 Utilization of Inserts in Reporting Investigative Results in Criminal Cases by Legal Attaches 325 Black Nationalist Photograph Album 327 Young Socialist Alliance Internal Security Communist (Trotskyist) 329 Automation of Intelligence Data re New Left and Extremist: Individuals 231 Preparation of Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security Type Investigations 334 Black Extremist Activities In Penal Institutions Extremist Matters 340 aNiN 33608_Desld: 29896 I; ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== Specitic Division" ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== ELLSBERG CASE 4-A-3 "NNS?ECTOR E. S. MLLER: This case is currently being afforded preferred supervisory and investigative attention. You are requested to furnish the following information about the case: 1. Brief narrative of basic investigation involving Ellsberg and provide current status_ 2 . You have advised this case may be part of a greater conspiracy. Advise what part you feel this and other leaks may be_ It is realized the broad aspects of this case may be unconfirmed conj ecture; however furnish narrative of conjecture_ 3 Advise what progress we have made and anticipate making in projecting our investigation into areas described in number two. 4. Advise a8 best you can at this point how 'big" this investigation may become from a s upervisory standpoint and indicate what impact &n overall successful investigation may have on Governmental processes in our system of Government. 5 . In regard to the administration of this investigation handled by the Nationalities Intelligence Section and due to certain intricacies of supervision the following information is requested individually from both Division Head and Section Chief: a. At the outset of the investigation, what instructions were issued Section handling case ? b What subsequent instructions or suggestions have been issued ? C What have been the manpower requirements of the case thus far and how have you worked these out with this Section ? d Division Head and Section Chief requested to make any further comments considered appropriate at this time_ Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requestez IDOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 NW 88608 _Bgeld;329896384 Eage13 yet ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== ELLSBERG CASE 4-A-3 SECTION CHIEF W _ R. WANNALL NATIONALITES NTELLIGENCE SECTION 1. Initial investigation by Bureau opened 1/20/70 based on informa- tion from step-mother_of_subiect's former wife to the effect that subject, with his children, took papers from his office at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California, and copied them with intent that they be made available for Senators Fulbright and Goodell_ This information had come to knowledge of Carol Elsberg_ through the Ellsberg_children Initial investigation continued through 9/25/70 when basic facts were presented to Department of Justice with note that no further action would be taken in the absence of a specific request from the Department. No such request was received, On 6/13/71 "'The New York Times" commenced publishing a series of articles purporting to report on the history of the U. S. decision-making process concerning Vietnam policies for the period 1945-1967 _ "The New York Times" claimed the articles were baged on 2 study later identified 98 9 47-volnme history entitled "United States Vietnam Relations During the Period 1945-1967, M1 commonly known as the "McNamara Study_ The "McNamara Study" was prepared beginning in 1987 and was classified Secret." On 6/15/71 the Attorney General requested FBI to conduct all necessary investigation into the matter relating to the publication of classified information by "The New York Times_ Our 1970 investigation and initial reports from sources obtained in instant matter pinpointed Ellsberg 28 the prime suspect responsible for the leak of classified data to news media _ Extensive investigation at Los Angeles pinned down the identities of individuals present in October, 1969 when Ellsberg duplicated classified documents available to him through his employment at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica . Also revealed were his own statements to his former wife that he in fact, was converting the classified documents to his own use to furnish them to various Congressional figures. The Los Angeles investigation has resulted in Ellsberg's current indictment alleging violation of Section 793(e), Title 18, U, S. Code (unauthorized possession of documents involved and unlawful retention of same) and Section 641, Title 18 (conversion of the documents to his own use). The Los Angeles investigation was the sole basis for this indictment and served a8 the basis for current imprisonment on charge of contempt of court of Anthony J Russo who was present on one occasion when Ellsberg allegedly duplicated material in his possession, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION NSPECTION 8/23/71 WRW:ams 4-A-3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 14 Www) "Top Page ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 2 - Investigation at Washington, D_ has pinned' down Ellsberg's access to the documents in question and has additionally revealed his early change from "'hawk" to "dove_ It has also revealed his contacts with individuals at high levels in Federal Government attempting to persuade them to before American public details of decisions underlying the U. S. policy in Vietnam_ Investigation at Boston has uncovered activity by Neil and Susan Sheehan employees of "The New York Times, I1 in late March, 1971. This activity has included extensive details of sessions where duplication of portions of the "'McNamara Study" were involved, Revealed have been details identifying the printing companies utilized by the Sheehans, considerable travel between these companies and apartments available to or utilized by Ellsberg: We have uncovered extensive detail of Ellsberg'ts contacts from his Cambridge, Massachusetts, residence with members of the news media_ Also revealed has been contact by Ellsberg with factions of the New Left and anti-Vietnam peace groups_ We have recently expanded our investigation in attempt to uncover details of dissemination of the "McNamara Study" by Ellsberg to other newspapers in which articles appeared attributed to the "McNamara Study. T This investigation has revealed at least three newsmen from the Washington; D bureaus of the newspapers involved were in the Boston and/or Cambridge area during the week immediately prior to Ellsberg's surrender on 6/28/71. We have learned that at least one newspaper had been contacted by an unknown individual in Boston who had offered the "McNamara Study" instructing that if the newspaper involved wished to avail itself of the offer, the classified documents could be picked up in Boston after contacting: a given telephone number in that area for more detailed instructions_ We are pursuing this facet of the investigation vigorously to down exact activities of the newspaper personnel involved and when this is we contemplate interviewing them for additional details. Extensive investigation has been afforded the possibility that Ellsberg benefited from considerable assistance from other individuals in his attempt to disseminate the "McNamara Study" to the news media. Along these lines we have detected early reports of Ellsberg 's cooperation with elements of the War Resistors League and have identified individuals in that organization described by Ellsberg as the principal influences on his change to & militant opposition to the U_ S _ Vietnam policies. Investigation is continuing along these lines to establish if any individuals in these dissident groups may have assisted Ellsberg in his alleged violations of the statutes noted. A relative of Mr . Haldeman at the White France Raine reported that while attending & football game in Los Angeles in October, 1970, he overheard a conversation between two men sitting near him whom he believed to be prominent NV 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page_15 8E40 C., put C., pin done , House, ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 3 7 in the Business Executives Movement for Vietnam (BEM)_ This conversation involved the plan on the part of an unidentified individual to leak secret informa - tion to the press in the Spring Of 1971, with the unidentified individual being mentioned as being an employee of Rand Corporation and having formerly served a8 an advisor to Dr Kissiger at the White House_ Also mentioned by the conversants was the plan on the part of two White House aides to resign their positions sometime during the Summer of 1971 and to make anti-Administration revelations at that time regarding U _ 8. 5 Vietnam policy. Ellsberg was known to have appeared on at least two occasions as & speaker for BEM functions in Los Angeles and Washington; D. C. A close associate of his in Los Angeles was a former leader of the BEM chapter in that city_ We have intensified our investiga - tion of BEM and conducted extensive investigation to pin down identities of persons seated near Raine during the game in question_ We are continuing our investigation along these lines to pinpoint a possible conspiracy existing a8 early as October 1970, with ramifications of anti-Administration activity and revelation of classified information_ We have recently received from Attorney General clarification of the areas in which we can conduct investigation in this matter and, as a result; are extending our interviews into news media circles where we feel we can uncover individuals who will cooperate with us in revealing details of the Ellsberg revelations and any conspiracy that may have existed involving him and others to expose to public scrutiny the classified information involved in this case. 2 . At the outset of this investigation Assistant Director Brennan spoke at a Division Chiefs 1 Conference and also directly to the Section Chief Nationalities Itelligence Section, regarding the possibility of a wide-scale conspiracy in which Ellsberg could be involved. His observations along these lines were recorded in a memorandum to all Division Chiefs dated 7/23/71 and captioned "Re: Organizatiocz Survey (Priorities and Manpower)_ Mi In this memorandum he commented upon the fact that the Ellsberg case might be & landmark in historical significance in view of the long-range potential regarding Governmental operations and the FBI:s role in rel ation thereto_ He stated that the leak in this case represented a deliberate and determined effort on the part of certain individuals to seriously disrupt and destroy the Government's capacity to carry out effectively its foreign policy in various areas_ Mr . Brennan noted that the past 15 to 20 years had witnessed the evolutioc of a new breed of fanatics who were determined to disrupt and destroy Governmental operations and to alter this country's foreign policy. He further noted that the movement supported by these fanatics bordered on treason Which must be dealt with if our current form Of Government i8 to survive _ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 16 ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== During the early stages of the investigation in this case it became quite evident that Ellsberg had received assistance in getting into the hands of various newspapers the "McNamara Study _ " He admitted as much on 6/28/71 in responding to questions raised by reporters when he surrendered himself at the Boston Courthouse following issuance of a complaint charging him with violating the Espionage Statute _ Accordingly, the thrust of our investigation has been directed toward identifying any individual or individuals or organization that may have assisted or conspired with Ellsberg_ It was noted that developments had indicated that at least part of the "McNamara Study" was reportedly in the possession of the Institute for Policy Studies and that while & page-by-page review of the Bureau's file on that Institute had not revealed any information concerning Ellsberg; we had developed material in the Ellsberg investigation showing connections between him and some of the Institute employees 'On 7/6/71 the Director prepared a memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, N: Sullivan; Brennan and Bishop to advise that the Eonorable H. R Assistant to thePresident; had called the Director about the Ellsberg case The Director stated that Mr__Haldeman said the President wanted a report on,the case immediately to bring him up to date and then to keep him filled and that the President was particularly interested in the complicity of individuals. On 7/6/71 with the Director 1 S approval a conference was held with Departmental attorneys during which Assistant Attorney General Robert C Mardian explained that information coming to his attention from Departments of Defense and State officials indicated that a group at each of these Departments 'may-be involved in & ring to pass out classified information He said that while this may or may not be related to the Ellsberg case he was most desirous of getting & complete rundown on Ellsberg's background to determine if any of his associates may have come under suspicion in connection with other leaks He also said the President was vitally concerned not only with the Ellsberg case but with all aspects of leaks of classified information of the Executive Branch _ We have not developed any hard evidence confirming that & wide-spread organized conspiracy exists to leak Government information _ We are aware, however, of one thread common to certain of these leaks_ That individuals such aS Ellsberg, who were either bitterly opposed to the U. S. Vietnam policy or in disagreement with other major foreign policy issues, have set themselves up above the claiming the right to decide what should be released to the public regardless of Executive Branch classification assigned to information. Many of these individuals in common with Ellsberg have been affiliated with one or more Of the so-called "think tanks, M1 such as Rand Corporation, have served NW 88608 Docld:32989638 17 Haldemanv 8 in, is, law, Page ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 6 5 in a number of sensitive positions in te Executive Branch of the Government and to & large extent are acquainted with one another } at least on & professional basis _ Communications to appropriate field offices dated 7/7 and 12/71 contained instructions regarding the necessity for exploring the various facets of this Situation_ The conspiracy aspects of the Ellsberg case a8 revealed to date &re set forth in' Item 3 below_ 3_ Speculation that Daniel Ellsberg conspired with others in obtaining; reproducing and disclosing the "McNamara Study" has some basis in public remarks made him o 6/28/71 indicating that "It is implicit that other individuals helped out in various ways, M1 and that he and the press share the responsibility for the newspapers 0 obtaining the study. We have; however, pursued the possibility of conspiracy from every conceivable angle and while investigation has produced some circumstantial evidence to support this theory, we have not found grounds to indicate existence of an over-all plot or conspiracy, threading its wAY throughout Ellsberg's actions_ Count One of & two-count indictment returned by a Federal grand jury on 6/28/71 charges Ellsberg with unauthorized possession, access and control over copies of what, in effect, was the "McNamara Study, !Y from about September, 1969, to approximately October; 1989, while Count Two of this indictment charges that during the same approximate time span Ellsberg willfully, knowingly and unlawfully converted to his own use copies of these documents _ We have established Ellsberg legally had access to the Study in the course of his employment with Rand Corporation at Santa Monica; California, but that he also obtained and had in possession 18 volumes of a preliminary draft of the Study for at least nine months without the knowledge of the Secret Control Officer at Rand in Santa Monica_ Failure of Rand employees in Washington; D: and at Santa Monica to adhere to established; in-house security procedures accounts for the fact Ellsberg was able to conceal his possession of these 18 volumes, and while over-all possession by Ellsberg of the Study and its preliminary draft volumes continues to be closely examined, no evidence exists of conspiracy at this point of the case_ Count Two of the aforementioned indictment, relating to conversion of these documents, is founded on information that Ellsberg reproduced & large quantity of classified documents in October_ 1989, at the office of one _Lynda Sinav in the Los Angeles area _ Ellsberg's two children present at this reproduction session, have identified individuals who assisted Elisberg in this task, but NW 88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 18_ by to, his Top C., ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== 6 - interviews of these persons have developed nothing to indicate they were aware of the nature of the items being reproduced or of what use Ellsberg intended to make of the copies reproduced, Anthony Russo: a fellow employee of Ellsberg's at Rand in Santa Monica, would have been in an excellent position to have been aware of the ultimate purpose of Ellsberg's actions but has refused to talk to the Federal grand jury in Los Angeles, and is currently in jail for contempt of court relating to this refusal_ Subsequent to the duplicating of documents in October 1989 Ellsberg; by his own statements, claims to have made efforts to furnish copies of these documents to Senator J William Fulbright and former Senator Charles E Goodell and Senator George 8_ McGovern may also have been approached by Ellsberg concerning making these documents public_ Representative Paul N_McCloskeys Jrlb is also known to be in possession of documents which he publicly admits were given to him by Ellsberg. Data available concerning this phase of Ellsberg' s actions also fails to indicate he acted in concert with anyone On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" published the first of a series of articles purporting to have been based on the "'McNamara study, and a number of other newspapers in the U. S. subsequently printed similar articles _ Investigation has placed Neil Sheehan, a reporter for "'The New York Times, Mt in Cambridge, Massachusetts,; during March and April, 1971_ under an assumed name, and we have determined Sheehan and his wife engaged in a number of frantic copying sessions of documents during the period 3/21-23/71. Four blurred Xerox copies discarded during this duplicating have been identified by the National Security Agency as being reproductions Of pages appearing in the "McNamara Study It 15 highly probable Sheehan and Ellsberg cooperated closely in actions which enabled "'The New York Times" to obtain the documents utilized in articles published by this newspaper and we have recently uncovered evidence indicating representatives of at least three other newspapers which have published articles based on the "'McNamara Study" were in the Boston area in June, 1971, for the apparent purpose of obtaining copies of these documents. A source closely 'connected with one of these newspapers has advised that his newspaper obtained the documents after receiving a telephone call from an unknown individual who instructed that & reporter from the newspaper go to Cambridge and make the necessary arrangements to obtain them by calling & certain, unidentified telephone number Investigation subsequently placed this reporter in Cambridge, but we have , to date, been unsuccessful in determining Who furnished him with the material in question_ While the newspapermen thus involved may have cooperated with Ellsberg in various wayg in order to obtain the desired documents, available evidence does not suggest they conspired with him in carrying out the disclosure of these documents, but rather took advantage of his offer to furnish them with the material_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 19 ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== We however, vigorously pursuing all leads relating to the possession by "The New York Times" and other newspapers of the "McNamara Study'= 1 and have proposed that the field be authorized to immediately initiate interviews with friendly newsmen concerning this matter _ We believe this area of investigation offers excellent possibilities of effecting & major breakthrough in this case _ There remains the suggestion Ellsberg may have received the coopera- tion of or conspired with various New anti-draft, anti-Vietnam war ;elements, and this possibility has received the most penetrating examination_ We know Ellsberg to have been friendly with a number of individuals connected with the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington, D_ C, and evidence exists that the IPS has been in possession for some time of documents which may be identical with the "McNamara Study 11 We have also learned, in tracing the development of Ellsbergts thinking from "hawk" to "dove, I1 that from August, 1969, he became increasingly associated with & number of the more prominent anti 7 war exponents in this country, many of whom occupy important posts at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology We are in the 'process of tying together all of this data, in an effort to surface if possible, any possible connection between these elements and Ellsberg in the disclosure of the highly classified "McNamara Study, but information available to date does not, aS yet, substantiate or corroborate existence of a conspiracy in this regard. 43 With particular regard to the President's concern expressed by k V, Mr Haldeman to the Director mentioned hereinbefore with respect to the complicity Of individuals, and the instructions of the Attorney General that the Bureau in each leak case identify the individuals responsible, it is quite clear that we must resolve all allegations, especially those pertaining to possible conspiracies, during the course of our inquiries. As noted in Item 1, our inquiries have expanded to include not only the leak to "'The New York Times" but to encompass the eight other newspapers which carried portions of the "McNamara Study _ 11 Since its inception, the Ellsberg case has required expanding supervisory attention here at the SOG _ Nine men are currently committed to the "case _ There are no indications at this time that less supervisory attention will be needed in the near future _ In fact, al1 indications are that there may have to be more commitments in this regard, particularly if the Department refers additional leak matters to uS for the intensive investigative attention which has been requested in the past, A successful investigation followed by a successful prosecution would certainly have a very important impact on Governmental processes, particularly NW 88608 Docld:37989638 Page 20 are, Left, sare ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== within the Executive Branch of our Government. When the Supreme Court refused to grant injunctions sought by the Executive Branch against newspapers publishing the "'McNamara Study, M this upheld the freedom of the press. The question has not been litigated with respect to the right of the Executive Branch to protect its secrets through its classification system_ Unless Ellsberg is prosecuted successfully, anyone' within the Executive Branch would apparently have the right to decide on his own initiative what information he wishes to place in the public domain by turning the informa- tion over to the newspapers. Much of the sensitive negotiations of the Executive Branch with foreign countries is dependent upon the secrecy with which they are carried out. If through & classification system or some other means the Executive Branch is not able to preclude the unauthorized disclosure of its secrets it is felh Branch will be weakened to the extent that it cannot effectively function on IttkonBi scene certainly, and probably on the domestic scene in some instances. the structure of the Executive Branch might well collapse_ Azi unsuccessful prosecution would buttress the considerable support, particularly from the news media, for Ellsberg's contention that his disclosure Of the classified documents was basically motivated by conscience and by deep concern that the public should be informed. It is closely related to the viewpoint held by a small but growing minority that an individual is free to follow the dictates "'Of his conscience and to be the final arbiter of the validity Of our criminal and civil statutes. If this thesis were to be supported, then it could apply to murder and bombings of Government and private institutions where such acts are dictated by conscience _ It could follow that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial functions of the Nation are exercises in futility; This would be a road to anarchy. From the above, it would appear that the outcome of the Ellsberg case would have a direct bearing on the Executive Branch 0f our Government and could affect the entire Governmental structure _ 5(a) _ At the outset of the investigation, Assistent Director Brennan instructed the Section Chief to afford special attention to this case and to let him know of any manpower needs _ He emphasized the importance of the case in his mind and wanted it handled as & special_ Within a day or two Mr_ Brennan introduced the Section Chief to Departmental attorney Jemes McGrath: who is a special assistant to Assistant Attorney General Mardiar Mr _ Brennan advised the Section Chief that McErata was the coordinator for Mexdiag %f the various groups under Mardiag engaged in consideration of phases of the Ellsberg case _ For example, he explained that NW 88608Docld: 32989638_Page 21 yet thel Thus, ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== one group headed by Departmental attorney Johi Martinenalyzed all investigative results received by the Department in an effrt to establish whether & case was being made Mr _ Brennan advised the Section Chief that Mr_ McGrath would be in a position to furnish any information required by the Secti8r Chief from the Internal Security Division and instructed that copies of daily teletypes received from our various offices be furnished through Mr McGrath to the Internal Security Division aS came in_ 5(b)- Approximately two weeks after this case was.instituted, the Section Chief asked Mr . Brennan if he would brief both the Section Chief and the Section Number One Man On his concept of the magnitude of this case and its various ramifications_ This was done and Mr _ Brennan again emphasized the need for following all facets on a special basis Following the conference with Departmental attorneys 7/6/71, mentioned hereinbefore, Mr _ Brennan summoned Inspector D_ E. Moore and Section Chief Wannall to his office and instructed that a "book" be prepared on Ellsberg covering his activities and associates during a period of & couple of years. He explained what he wanted in this book and provided for an Agent from Research Section to be assigned full time on its compilation_ On 7/15/71 Mr _ Brennan instructed that a' copy of each teletype received at the SOG on this case be furnished to him_ On 7/28/71 Mr _ Brennan summoned Inspector D E Moore, Section Chief, Section Number One Man, and all Agents working on this case to his office for & conference _ In compliance with his request; he was briefed on investigative results to date. He asked if serious consideration had been given to the possibility that Ellsberg himself was not directly involved in turning over the "McNamara Study" to "The New York Times, Mt and instructed that we look into this phase of the matter very carefully_ ~On 8/2/71 Mr _ Brennan summoned to his Office the Section Chief and Case Supervisor Wagoner for the purpose of introducing them to Mr 99 Liddey of the White House He explained that Mr_ Liddey was coore dinating all White House interest in this matter. Mr _ Liddey pointed out that the White House wanted this case handled as a "'Bureaul 'Special" and that a letter from the White House to that effect would be forwarded_ NWN, 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 22 they ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== 10 5(c) . At the present time there are nine Agent Supervisors assigned to this matter_ Investigation was instituted 6/15/71 and from then until 6/23/71 manpower assignments were handled within the Section_ On 6/23/71 two additional Agents were placed in the Section on a loan basis and were assigned to operational desks, as Agents permanently assigned to those desks from within the Section were assigned to the McLek case_ On 6/28/71 an Agent was assigned on & loan basis from Extremist 'Intelligence Section and this loan Agent has been rotated on a weekly basis Since . He has been utilized to cover an operational desk while one of the regularly asSigned Agents in the Section (H_ J Morgan) has been assigned full time to this case_ On 7/8/71 an Agent from Research Section was assigned full time to prepare a 'book" on Ellsberg and has worked on this exclusively with the excejiioil Jf aii aiiilual leave period of 8/2-13/71_ Ie kas rot participatcd # any other phase of the case on a day-to basis _ On 7/8/71 one man on weekly rotating basis was assigned temporarily from the Espionage Section and continues to the present time This loan Super - visor has been utilized to cover.an operational desk within the Section while the regularly assigned Supervisor on the desk (J. R Hagy) has been utilized full time on instant case On 7/29/71 an Agent from within the Section (L: E= Belanger) was assigned part time to handle special aspects of the Ellsberg case, relating specifically to electronic surveillance checks on potential witnesses. Memorandum Mr _ Felt to Mr _ Tolson 8/4/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID), Wi recommended and the Director approved that the number of Agents assigned to handle leak cases, including Ellsberg case, be increased immediately from five to seven, these two additional Agents to be diverted from other assignments in Domestic Intelli- gence Division with at least one to be diverted from the CP= USA Unit_ The Director approved this _ At that time we had five men working full time on instant and related cases, including J M_Sizoo; who was involved exclusively in preparation of a "book" on Ellsberg On 8/9/71 in the absence of additiomal manpower from outside the Section, the number of Agents committed to instant and related cases was increased NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 23 they ~day ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== ~.11 from five to seven by assigning full time from within the Section SA Lo E Belanger and on & rotating basis one Agent from the Middle and South American Unit (B. M. Perez) _ Perez was replaced by SA W_W Hemilton on 8/16/71 , On 8/13/71 two additional Agents were provided from outside the Section, one on a full-time basis and one on a rotating weekly basis_ The Agent assigned on a full-time basis (T J_Seabaugh) was immediately assigned to the McLek case _ The Agent assigned on the weekly rotating basis was assigned to assist on one of the regular operational desks within the Section and an Agent who had been continuously on loan with the exception of an annual leave period of 8/6-16/71 (J1 P Benedict) was assigned full time to instant matters . In summary , manpower from outside the Section have been assigned on & temporary basis on 6/23/71 (two Agents); 6/28/71 (one Agent); 7/8/71 (two Agents); and 8/13/71 (two Agents) _ Three of these loan Agents are now working full time on NeLek case While iour are assisting in coverirg oicrational" desks that exist within this Section _ Six Agents from within this Section are assigned full time to McLek case. 5(d) : From above discussion, it will be noted that this cage is directed at developing evidence concerning violations of Federal statutes under which we have investigative jurisdiction and our principal efforts have been directed toward'this responsibility _ There are also far reaching aspects of the case which require investigative attention .and because they are s0 diversified there is a necessity for directing efforts in the first instance along those channels which are of greatest importance. These channels relate especially to the possibility of a conspiracy, if in fact one exists, on the part of individuals to acquire and release without authorization classified material of the Executive Branch of the Government. As noted above, evidence has been developed which would support those prosecutive aspects which to date have been considered by the Department and efforts are currently underway to resolve the potential conspiracy aspects. The principal problems which have arisen with respect to supervision of this case have related to efforts on the part of Assistant Attorney General Mardian and attorneys within his Division to (1) conduct investigative activity on their own and (2) to direct our investigative activities frequently into areas tangential to the main thrust of the case. With respect to investigative efforts by Merdian the following are cited as examples: NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 24 ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== 12 On 6/29/71 Mardian telephonically advised he was sending & Depart- mental attorney to see Senator Charles McC , Mathias Jr _ who had received from Ellsberg some copies of classified documents He said the Departmental attorney would discuss with Mathias the possibility of Mathias' turning these documents over to him_ Mardian asked if we wanted to have an Agent accompany 'the attorney. The Director concurred that no Agent accompany the attorney, stating, "Let Mardian'8 emissary accept them_ M 'On 7/21/71 when Agents of Washington Field Office endeavored to interview Mr_ Charles W_ Cooke; Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, they were advised by Cooke that he would not submit to interview in the absence of clearance granted by the Deputy Attorney General_ This was in pursuance of a lead which had been referred to us by Vardian and when the Cooke interview was attempted it was learned for the first time that two attorneys from the Internal Security Division had been designated to conduct_ the interview with Cogke- On 8/10/71 one of Mardian'8 attorneys telephoned to say that he was going to interview an' informant the next day in connection with this case and asked jf the Bureau would arrange a place where he could meet securely with the informant and whether the Bureau desired to have an Agent present during the interview_ In concurring that Bureau should not accede to these requests, the Director noted, "If Mardian's outfit would refrain from what are basically investigative activities and Teave it to the Bureau there would be less friction I On 8/12/71 the Bureau received through misrouting a communication which Mardian had addressed to the Attorney General to summarize current information in what he described as "Our continuing investigation into the acquisition of the 'McNamara Study' by the 'New York Times_ IM The Director inquired whether Mardian'g outfit was conducting their own investigation in this matter , as indicated by tne contents of tle memorandum_ As a matter of fact, material summarized by Mardien was nothing more than information extracted from Bureau teletypes showing FBI investigative results. With respect to Mardian '8 efforts to direct our investigative activities, the following are the most recent examples: letters dated 8/12 and 8/23/71 we received from Mardian lengthy instructions for conducting of investigation in the Ellsberg matter It is quite evident from a review of these communications that the requests contained therein are the results of disorganized review of the material furnished to Department by the Bureau_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 25 By ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== 13 For example, both letters contained requests to conduct investiga - tion previously conducted and reported to the Department. Certain other requests contained therein would more logically fall within the province of the Special Task Force Committee established by the Department of Defense to analyze Rand Corporation security procedures _ Other requested investigation had previously been initiated by the Bureau and other investigative requests were not on their face germane to the violations or potential violations of law. Certain of the requested investigation appeared to be based on unsupported assumptions and theories of the invdvement of other individuals in the leak of the "Pentagon Papers" but offered no basis or reasons for the requested investigation _ The most recent letter, 8/23/71, contained request for investigation of Ellsberg's travel. We have been developing this information Since the inception of our investigation and it has been furnished to the Department on an almost daily basis. This letter also requested inquiries concerning certain telephone calls by Ellsberg, investigation concerning most of which had also been previously initiated. ardian also stated Department files had no informa- tion on Leonard S Rodberg Whose name has recently come up in this case &s the possible source of the "McNamara Study" material which will be published by the Beacon Press in Boston _ We have in this and other cases furnished information on Rodbergin approximately a dozen communications_ The analyses of these lengthy letters from Mardian requires the expenditure of &,considerable amount of Agent time_ They idicate that Mardien's group, apparently in efforts to direct our investigation; are propounding questions, some of which are relevant but many of which are not relevant to the main thrust of our investigation, some of which should be referred elsewhere, and others of which have been previously answered. In accordance with instructions issued by the Assistant Director, we are furnishing to Mardian copies of the daily teletypes from our field offices. These teletypes contain raw"' investigative results not coordinated. The coordination of these results: regularly appears in our investigative reports which are also furnished to Nardian: We feel that the reports resolve many of the questions which have been propounded by Mardian in the past and it would enhance our investigative efforts to eliminate dissemination Of the daily teletypes in the future and to the Department investigative results in report supplemented by a weekly summary letter which we regularly forward to him _ '4 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 26 give form, ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== 4-A-3 ELLSBERG CASE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C, D_ BRENNAN I generally concur with the comments of Mx Wannall as to the progress and status of this case from an investigative standpoint I have reminded Mr Wanna11 that the development 0f direct evidence should not be obscured by the broadening of the scope of this case He has been advised that his objective must consistently be the development of substantial admissible evidence necessary to establish 2 conviction as to Federal violations charged in the Los Angeles indictment of Ellsberg and others which may develop from other corollary investigations being conducted. From the outset, as stated by Mr Wannall , I expressed the importance of this case and instructed him to advise me of any manpower needs The question of manpower is discussed under the caption "Adequacy of Personnel" found in 6E of this report and was the subject of my memorandum to Mr Sullivan 7/29/71 captioned "Proposed Adjustments of Work Assignments , DID 1} memorandum of W , R_ Wannall to Mr Felt 8/12/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Did , aud my memorandiimi to Hx _ Sulliven 8/12/71 ceptioned "Adequacv of Personnel, Leak Cases_ } DID." In reference to Mr Wanna 11 's concluding suggestion in his writeup, the procedure of furnishing daily teletypes_ to the Department in major cases is not unusual. The high level interest of the Department which will eventually be responsible for the prosecution of this case as well as the interest of the White House dictates that teletypes in this matter be disseminated consistent with the Director instructions copy attached_ It appears we Should clarify the Department's use of these "raw" investigative results as set forth in our teletypes and suggest their detailed reviews be conducted from Bureau investigative reports , which are the normal communication for such use Mr _ Wannal1 will be instructed to advise the Department by letter with regard to the foregoing pointing out that our weekly summary letters and investigative reports will resolve many of the questions they raise as to information in our teletypes _ DMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/27/71 CDB : lml 4-A-3 I3 NW 88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 27 _ 's ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== '"Ru STATR Dlrtae ~TTR Fknrnal W(fbal ar IXTESTJCATIA PASu;xGTU:, D.C. 20635 April 15, 1871 MENJrANDIl FOR M. SULLIVAI N2. BZ2TNZAN ME ROZSN bave trded to djm intelligent guidicliues a8 t0 mise slould bo gerknd wit shouid 1o: k sctt0 tho Inferaal Becurity Uldgiom Qf Up Capsrttrer, Ix %r ]uot ccrerel CyE 1 lve rted & miocr Ofmarozeade adcrecE3c t tha Lttorec; General &nj the Leraty Atcracy Gcnall acu meterg :bcat #hich thc Jeorrsl Secrtity Duwision jibnld usve boen &viced and I kcve hid t0 rerdlkeso back %nd rcquost trst memoransi bo aupiyrifbeiy &dressed {o {le figehedmt fiiprmey Gemcra) of %43 lerral Eecurity Division, Apprently 1 bave Iuiled iri pinting Out t3 %UfogAr } cxRiyerl' m bneeiortb: yC{ ik:nnlc cend overytaing; iacluciingtls ldtchen Stc12 iz i% co1led 1 {b9 Iiertz} Eecurty Dision. @t i3 hcxlcse ? 2 ccrjidcrod injccrctzucing Or mi] dsheg in t.ig maficr; Tbci iaievc iz lnrgely &up to somc Gegree Of stcbornjc }ecmu32 Cf to rczeet disciplicgly Qcticn [ lad tO tke Mhen Fe iflto &disa tha Atiorrcy Gcneral zhout #be 1zedia iurglery. Theretore: #3 ] hagc indlcited, benceforth %Om will Bend everytling %D tlc Jntsrnal Zccarity fvicic thzt iu 2m7 way relatss @rcily 0r incirectly to the wozk #ue jurisuiction of thet Jleicione Very yours, 3. Edgar Eoxccr Johu E:lgar Ecover Director JEE:EDM (7) NW 88608 Docld:32989638 28 Jgy 612, %* truly Page ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== ADREWDUM TNSPECTOR E, 8. MILLER: This case involves the publishing of parts (R E Whitetbhg 9/7/71) of the 'McNamara Study" in June, 1971, by "The New York Times_ The evidence to date strongly indicates Daniel Elisberg is responsible for furnishing the classified data to representatives of this newspaper, and he has been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for the unauthorized possession and conversion of these documents _ This is the case Simply stated; however . this matter is far from being S0 Simple . From its inception, this case has been complicated by the enormity of the work to be completed and problems inherent in this unusual inyestigation _ In regard to the amount of work involved, a Survey was made to establish how many communications were dated during the period of a Single week (Saturdays and Sundays included). As a result of this Survey, the following represents the number of communications dated during the weeks noted below: INCOMING Teletypes AirteTs Reports Letters 7/11-17/71 107 21 5 2 8/1-7/71 81 26 5 3 8/8-14/71 82 24 4 2 OUTGOING Teletypes Airtels Letters 7/11-17/71 8 4 8 8/1-7/71 14 8 8/8-14/71 19 3 10 INTRA SOG Memo 7/11-17/71 15 8/1-7/71 8/8-14/71 15 7 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 29 ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== The above-noted chart is believed to be representative of the high volume of communications received Many of these communications were lengthy and/or complicated requiring close analysis by one O more Super visors assigned to this 'ISpecial. 11 Also, a check of the work devoted to the preparation of Summary memos and of weekly Summaries disclosed a Supervisor would arrive at the office at approximately 5:30 &.m. each morning, Monday through Friday to have the daily memos dictated and typed by 8:15 &.m_ the Same and the Supervisor responsible for the weekly summary due each Monday would spend approximately 6 hours preparing this communication on the Sunday _ Noteworthy , is the fact that many responses to the letters from the Attorney General 's Office require extensive research. With the approval by the Attorney General to interview newspaper- men, it is anticipated that the work load will increase rather than decrease in the immediate future _ Initially there will be at least 75 newspapermen to be interviewed and numerous additional leads will be developed from these inter- views This investigation involves numerous facets and requires extensive work and supervision_ Presently there are 9 Supervisors assigned to this case and their responSibilities are a8 follows: E R Harrell Unit Chief, reviews all outgoing correspondence, reviews incoming reports in Ellsberg case; Supervises preparation of daily Summary memorandum, weekly White House memorandum in Ellsberg case, SALT Lek case (Leak of classified information concerning Strategic Arms Limitations Talks appearing in "The New York Times"), and the Toll Lek case (leak from State Department cables concerning alleged misconduct of Bert M. Tollefson Jr ); assists in setting out leads from daily teletype correspondence from field. J. R_Wagoner a8 case Agent in McLek, responsible for review of all incoming reports as to adequacy of reporting and leads; maintains and Supervises operation of lead box in Ellsberg case; responsible for follow-up communications on outstanding leads; has basic responsibility for preparation of weekly White House Summary; assists in preparation of memorandum Summarizing prior day's investigative activity in the field. 1_RHegy a8 case Agent, has all supervisory responsibility for Toll conducts research on all New Left aspects of Ellsberg investi- gation and responsible for preparation of comprehensive analysis of New Left implication in the case; responsible for setting out leads relative to New Left associates and contacts by Ellsberg; responsible for following field investigation; corroborating attendance by Ellsberg at New Left functions; assists in leads obtained from teletypes in McLek and Toll Lek cases; NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 30 daily _ daily day = too, prior daily Lek ; daily ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum; and assists in prepara- tion of weekly White House Summary H L_Morgan, as case Agent, has primary responsibility for Supervision of SALT Lek case; reviews all incoming correspondence and sets out pertinent leads relative to SALT Lek; assists in preparation of daily 'memorandum Summarizing investigation in all three major leak cases afore_ mentioned; assists in review f daily teletype traffic in all three major leak cases; review 0f dissemination of weekly reports in SALT Lek; asSists in preparation of White House Summary_ LE Belanger handles all ELSUR checks; reviews, correlates and conducts necessary research relative to all material received from Department of Defense in Ellsberg investigation; responsible for backup file reviews in connection with New Left contacts by Ellsberg; assists in preparation of weekly White House mem orandum; aSSists in preparation of daily Summary memorandum _ T,J Seabaugh assigned exclusively to a comprehensive charting and research Into extensive travel_performed by Daniel Ellsberg; responsible for setting out leads to insure complete coverage of all details of travel facets of investigation_ J. P Benedict responsible for extensive file reviews regarding numerous news media perzonnel and personalities involved in Ellsberg investigation to ascertain their Susceptibility to interview as cooperative sources; conducting extensive research and charting of the considerable telephone traffic involved in this matter , including traffic from Daniel Ellsberg, Anthony Russg, the Sheehans, "The New York Times i the Washington bureais of all newspapers involved, traffic from various hotels utilized by Ellsberg and his contacts, and all other individuals whose telephone traffic has been Subpoenaed a8 a result of Departmental action via Grand Jury Subpoena_ W. W Hamilton aSSists in preparation of daily Summary memo- randum; responSible for review and appropriate preparation of all Summary teletyes for dissemination to Department of Justice; file reviews on the numerous news personalities being considered for interviews as potential cooperative sources in the Ellsberg investigation; handling of correspondence connected with leads obtained from daily teletypes; assists in preparation of White House summary. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 31 study, ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== J_USizoo assigned exclusively to the research and preparation of an extensive biographical write-up on Ellsberg. In this regard, facts con- cerning Ellsberg's behavioral patterns, associates, education, political views, personality transformations, family, and influences will be studied and analyzed, In addition to the above Specific asSignments , each member of the unit on a daily basis is required to participate in Section, Unit and/or Branch conferences for resolution of investigative facets of the Ellsberg, Toll Lek and SALT Lek investigations _ Some of the problems involved in this investigation are: (1) Whether Ellsberg was alone responsible for this crime, or whether he was part of a Small or large-Scale conspiracy_ (2) Whether the purpose was for idealistic reasons (anti-Vietnam War beliefs), to discredit the Executive Branch 0f the Government, or to make available classified information to a foreign nation. (3) Investigations have been conducted by agencies other than the FBI: State Department, Department of Defense NSA and the Attorney General 's Office, and it is the Bureau'8 responsibility to review and analyze these investigations _ (4) To determine what other persons and newspapers received these documents and from whom they received this data. (5) Innumerable interviews involve newspapermen, Government officials, and persons having far left leanings, against U. S. policy in Vietnam and antagonistic toward the present Administration. These are all delicate interviews_ (6) To determine whether the New Left and/or any anti-Vietnam peace groups are involved in this case . (7) All logical avenues of investigation to bring this case to a Successful prosecution must be explored. An unsuccessful prosecution would open the door for anyone at whim to disclose classified information which could endanger the stability of the Executive Branch and impair our relations with other nations _ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 32 life , eaSily Page ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== (8) The White House and the Attorney General 's Office are closely following this matter and all other leak cases and in this respect the Attorney General '8 Office has sent numerous communications requesting certain leads be covered by the FBI. These requests must be analyzed by DID and the appropriate communications answered, which is a time-consuming administrative procedure. In regard to the last Situation noted above, you are aware that the Department is reviewing for lead purposes the teletypes furnish them _ Thereafter , they send us a communication requesting us to conduct these leads . This must be stopped. Such a procedure is unproductive &nd time consuming, resulting in additional unnecessary communications to the Department. You are instructed to immediately advise the Department that the purpose of the daily teletypes is to make them cognizant of the devebpments in this case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investi- gation based on these communications_ With the importance of this case, the urgency of the problems to be regoived the immnediacy of tie work to Je perforiied and the volume of communications received daily, there appears Sufficient work at the present for nine Supervisors. However , you must constantly evaluate the work load to assure that the assigned manpower is fully justified. Also, much of the present work is exploratory, which involves researching and analyzing and thereafter assuring that the many facets are immediately and fully probed. Once these exploratory aspects are Sufficiently investigated, this case will be directed toward more Specific objectives which will narrow the investigative field, As this transition period is entered, immediate con- Sideration should be given to reducing the manpower asSigned to this matter_ it is incumbent upon you to make certain that all logical investigation is expeditiously and fully conducted in order that the Bureau will not be Subjected to criticism by any person or agency A review of this matter indicates that yOu should continue affording it priority Supervision and direction Comments of Assistant Director and Section Chief Wannall requested. 21 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 33 daily we Also, top ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== ADDENDUM SECTION CHIEF W R. WANNALD The analysis and observations of (WRW:ams 9/7/71) the Inspector have been noted. We will continue affording top priority supervision and direction to this case. In addition, we will immediately advise the Department that the purpose of daily dissemination of teletypes to the Internal Security Division is to make that Division cognizant of developments in the case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investigation based on these communications. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN I concur with the above _ (CDB mls 9/7/71) NW 88608 Docld:32989638 34 22 Page ================================================== Page 35 ================================================== EAST COAST CONSPIRACY 4-A-4 INSPECTOR E. 8. MLLER: At the time of the last inspection this matter was being afforded urgent supervision and investigation for the purpose of identifying all of the conspirators and perfecting cases for prosecution against them You are requested to provide a brief narrative summary of this investigation and bring it up to date Indicate in your response the number of subjects on whom we have developed prosecutive cases_ 9 the number to be developed and in each instance indicate what you feel are the possibilities of successful prosecution: In this regard, identify any cases in which successful prosecution is in doubt and indicate what ecticn i8 being telen to erase tha douht. What is the current status of prosecution of these cases and when do you feel these cases will be adjudicated ? From a supervisory standpoint, advise how much manpower is being expended presently on the supervision of this (these) cases and indicate when you feel these men can be reassigned to other work Comments of Assistant Director requested. SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD A The investigation of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (EASTCON) is concerned with plots in Washington, D. to blow up the tunnels housing the heating system servicing Government buildings and to kidnap a high Government official_ Individuals connected wi th these plots are al1 associated with the Berrigan antiwar movement . An indictment was returned during 8/24/71 FBGZGHM plm DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 N ESM:wmj 4-A- NW 88608_Docld:32989638 35 23 yet C.' Jolu: . Page ================================================== Page 36 ================================================== the last inspection (1/12/71) at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania , which charged six individuals with complicity in these plots and two of these six were charged additionally with a violation of the contraband statute in that they caused unauthorized letters to be exchanged into and out of the Federal Penitentiary & Lewisburg, Pennsylvania There were also seven individuals named in the indictment as unindicted co-conspirators. Our investigation into this matter continued , and on 4/30/71 , a superseding indictment was returned which expanded the charges and strengthened our case Eight individuals were included in this indictment as defendants, and the number of unindicted co-conspirators was reduced to four _ The superseding indictment includes those charges listed above and added the conspiracy aspects of the selected Selective Service break-in cases in Philadelphia Pennsylvania; Rochester New York; Wilmington, Dover , and Georgetown, Delaware_ Two additional counts added to the superseding indictment involve three individuals and charged them with the mailing of a threatening communication. In addition to the substantive case, potential witnesses have been either cited for civil contempt of court or indicted' for criminal contempt 0f court in connection with their refusal to answer questions before the Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) in Harrisburg after being granted immunity_ Five individuals were cited for civil contempt } and four individuals were indicted for criminal contempt . Two of these cases are currently the subject of a petition by the Government to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, and the other cases are being held in abeyance until the Supreme Court renders its decision. From the investigation conducted to date and the comments of the prosecutive staff of the Department, there does not appear to be any reason to be lieve that.prosecution of this case will not be successful The substantive EASTCON case is currently in the pretrial stage. with numerous motions of both the Government and the defense still pending before the court At present , it appears that the court will be unable to set this ma tter for trial until January , 1972_ Even though we are well on our way to trial due to the complexities of charges in the indictment and the broad scope of the violations involved, there exists additional facets of investi- gation of a continuing nature which will possibly increase as the trial date approaches _ NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 36 ================================================== Page 37 ================================================== For example in the Fall of 1970 we undertook to determine through an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) project whether EA STCON principals had established a long distance telephone communication network_ The basis for this theory was information received from our informant } PH 1211-8, who advised that fictitious telephone credit card numbers were being utilized by members of the Berrigan antiwar movement to facilitate contacts_ This project disclosed voluminous calls between EASTCON principals and between them and sympathizers from their own telephones and also corroborate the fraudulent use of fictitious telephone credit card numbers This information was of value to t he Department in the examination of witnesses before the FGJ since it placed witnesses in 2 position of either admitting contact between each other on specific dates, committing perjury, or claiming the Fifth Amendment _ This project has more recently been extended and is now being utilized to identify individuals involved: in the Washington, D C_ plots of the EA STCON case through "nonhit" telephone toli cails between EA STCON activists and persons not previously known to have been active in the movement It is believed that recent information from this project, developed furtker by inveetigation_ has identified; a Capitol Hill elevator operator who was recruited for these plots_ The project is 2 continuing and the investigation of pertinent developments hopefully will identify an engineer who was consulted on the tunnel plot , as well a5 other individuals involved in the Washington, D C. action The very technical: nature of the raw material "deveioped by the ADP project has resulted in individuals at the Bureau and certain offices such as Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, and WFO having become well versed and particularly adroit in the interpretation of such complicated information_ The investigation of EASTCON includes the handling of two informants; the first, PE 1211-8, is the individual who will be responsible for the introduction of the most convincing evidence against al1 of the defendants L the letters between Philip Berrigen and ElizabethMcAlister which relate to every count in the indictment Since the testimony of this informant before the FGJ , he has 'become theoretically the responsibility of the Department , as a Government witness, but of the Bureau has coordinated his activities, etc } because of peculiar status until he testifies at trial. He is currently NW 88608 Docld:32989638 37 one, necessit his Page ================================================== Page 38 ================================================== 025 living many miles from Harrisburg under an assumed identity and is gainfully employed through the assistance of the Bureau. 411 of these problems have been coordinated through the Bureau to insure the securi of this valuable source As an example, the informant's father recently died and unfriendly members of the news media became aware of funeral arrangements_ By instructions of the Bureau and through very competent handling by the field, the security of this informant was maintained in spite of the presence of unfriendly members of the press at the funeral It will be necessary to continue to coordinate any other problems of this nature until his testimony is heard during trial_ In this regard, as the trial date approaches, other problems develop requiring Bureau assistance such as arrangements for "in depth M1 conferences with the Department 8 prosecutive team under secure circumstances _ This will be a very important conference since the informant has only been interviewed (briefly) by the Department on one occasion, and no opportunity has existed since his appearance before the FGJ to further explore his testimony. We have also developed another informant, PH 1223-S, who is a close friend of Philip Berrigen and active sympathizers in the Berrigan antiwar movement He iS the only individual wno nas obtained any identification of possible MEDBURG suspects from John Peter Gredy (arrested in the Camden Federal Building break-in 8/22/71) Grady indirectly claimed credit for that action and by inference named other people who are considered prime suspects_ The informant has recently accepted 2 position of running a newspaper at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on behalf Of The Defense Committee, the legal, bail bond, and public relations arm of the Berrigan antiwar movement _ He is 2 unique and cunning individual who is now in a vital position to keep uS informed of the on-the- scene and behind-the-scene activities in Harrisburg during the EA STCON trial One extremely important exa= of the valuable information this informant has furnished resulted in our initiating (as a corollary investigation to CASTCON) an Espionage X-type case based upon information he received from an ardent Berrigan supporter who has stated the intention to obtain classified documents from the Lyndon B Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, to be publicized for the benefit of the antiwar movement in the same manner as those circulated by Daniel_Ellsberg With respect to The Defense Committee, investigation is being coordinated a5 to the activities of this loose-knit group due to its direct relationship to the EASTCON case There has evolved a national organization, and the activities of local groups 9 as they become or ganized , will be followed by the Bureau for intelligence information_ As an indication of the potential of this body, recognizing that its real push for funds NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 38 5 ty mple ================================================== Page 39 ================================================== will reportedly not begin until the Fall of 1971, information hes been received that they already have substantial funds in their coffers _ From information developed by PH 1223-8, it was determined that John Peter_Grady was planning an "action Which from an analysis of the facts known at the Bureau appeared to centered in the New Jersey area After observations in this regard were furnished to the field, investigation culminated in his being located in the Camden, New Jersey, area _ The investigation Which followed resulted in the arrest of 20 individuals on 8/22/71 in the act of destroying and stealing draft board records in the Camden Federal Building . The individuals arrested included Peter Eordi (an original member of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives_ Paul_Coumings and John_Swinglish, both indicted at Harrisburg for criminal contempt after refusing to testify before the EASTCON FGJ When granted immunity from prosecution. PH 1211-8 determined Swinglish was the "recruiter" for the Washington, D. plots in the EA STCON case It is to be expected that other individuals who are EA STCON activists will aJso be indicted at Camden. The evidence already obtained in that case discloses other EASTCON activists were responsible for the Selective Service draft board break-in at Trenton, New Jersey, 5/21/71 - Likewise, the obviously coordinated Buffalo, New York, draft board break-in on the night of 8/21-22/71 involved sympathizers .of the EA STCON movement Much of the foregoing represents the continuing intelligence coverage of the Berrigan antiwar movement , absolutely necessary to the Bureau 's interests aside from the important development of admissible evidence in the EASTCON prosecution_ Further, many pretrial motions (by defense counsel) have been ruled on by the court, and many others are still outstanding _ In anticipation of the court ruling on a motion for Discovery and Inspection as provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government, in order to expedite such matters, has previously allowed the inspection of certain evidence in this case This has been done at various field offices under Departmental super- vision_ The lists of evidence made available 9 other arrangements and details with regard to such inspection, has been handled guidance from the Bureau_ Approximately one half of this evidence has thus far been inspected with hundreds of items of evidence still to be inspected in Washington, Da C., Philadelphia and Baltimore_ The court has ruled in favor of the defense broadly interpreting the right of Discovery and Inspection, particularly as to photographic evidence, Laboratory, and Identification Division reports_ The Department has requested such material NW 88608 Docld:37989638 39 27 C., by Page ================================================== Page 40 ================================================== to be made available for inspection at the Department in the near future, and this project is being coordihated by the Bureau_ There are estimated approximately 1,000 photographs submitted by 11 offices_ The Laboratory (document examinations) and Identification Division reports will be voluminous since they include not only those prepared in connection with the EASTCON case itself, but also al1 of those prepared in connection with six Selective Service Act cases included as conspiracy charges in the EA STCON indictment_ It is apparent that the evidence from the three offices covering these six Selective Service Act cases will be voluminous and require close coordination by the Bureau with the Department into the EASTCON case for a successful prosecution at trial_ At present, two supervisors are assigned full-time 9 and one supervisor spends approximately one half of his time in the supervision_ of this case This investigation continues to generate a great deal of paper not only on the substantive case but also in connection with the other matters directly related thereto It is anticipated the time of two and a half Agents will be the absolute ririmum reguired to effectively handle this matter through the completion of the trial Depending upon the volume of work generated by necessary requests of the Department in the pretrial and trial stages , additional manpower may be necessary at various times. The Inspector has Specifically inquired a5 to when these men can be reassigned to other work- It is to be noted that since the return of the superseding indictment on 4/30/71, two other full-time supervisors have been reassigned to other work within the Division_ It is not anticipated that the two supervisors assigned full-time to this case will be released prior to the conclusion 0f the trial in this ma tter ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C D BRENNAN have read the attached and concur (JAS:lrs_ 8-24-71 in the views expressed by Section Chief Shackelford. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 40 Page ================================================== Page 41 ================================================== ADDENDUM NNSPECTOR E _ S . MLLER} You should insure that every action (ESM:wmj 8/26/71) is taken to insure successful prosecution in this mater. Assistant Director please note _ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C , D. BRENNAN: The Inspector's comments (JAS mls F 8/30/71) have been noted. The 8 Bureau may be assured that every possible action is being taken in the interests of successful prosecution. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 41 Page ================================================== Page 42 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4- {SRECTOR E_ S. MLLER: Briefly set forth the noteworthy accomplishments of your Division, with a section breakdown, Since the last inspection, which ended on 1/26/71. This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical accomplish L ments _ Specifically where you have devised a program for a definite purpose furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplishments on this program: This will give you an oportunity to set forth any Division achievements pertain ing to the Bureau's progress_ 2 welfare_ efficiency or any other items not covered elsewhere in this inspection_ A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references to such matters should be in general terms. Comments of Assistant Director requested. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN Attached are individual (JAS:mls 8/20/71) write-ups from each Section in the Division pertaining to the accomplishments of that particular Section. 'OMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/17/71 NW 88608E6884w2939638 _Page 42 Rubkt= 30 ================================================== Page 43 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION SECTION CHIEF ARBOR I _ GRAY / Attached are memoranda setting out noteworthy accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the last inspection. This Section is responsible for supervision 0f investigations of the Communist Party, USA, its fronts, pro- Chinese communist groups , selected Trotskyist-communist groups , Klan and white hate groups_ 3 international organizations affiliated with the world communist movement and international New Left extremist movement , individuals affiliated with these organizations and movements as well as sedition cases_ Our purpose is to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these subversive orgauizaiion= afd iidividuals under various statutes relating to the internal security of the Nation and to gather intelligence of interest to Government officials and other agencies. The Section also supervises the development and administration of security informants in basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive and New Left groups _ Where appropriate, the Section directs counterintelligence operations against subversive groups and individuals in cases under our supervision_ NW 88608 D38d4S285638 MYGEHS IGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 0iiQni ================================================== Page 44 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS COMMUNIST PARTY , USA, UNIT The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves from the case entitled, "Solo_IS If Due to' the sensitive nature of this case, it wiii be orally discussed with the Inspector. In essence, this case involves sources developing intelligence information of the_highest_quality concerning the Communist Party , USA (CPUSA) the Soviet Union and its satellites and thezgerldcomunist movement Sincetits ipceptfon 0to 38 successiul ssions to communist coutries have been completed Totormation _develoned RY 3i7 Oer fon frm high _level contacts in_the worLdcomunist zovement is continually disseminated to the highest levels Of our Government and , in many instances , is information not available from another source Examples of this since early 1971 include the following: Soviets requested CPUSA to provide analysis of public opinion in U,S. regarding Nixon Administration and U,S.-Soviet relations to be used by General Secretary ui iile Cowiunist Farty oi the Soviet- Union (CPSU) ) Leonid Brezhnev 9 in speech before 24th Congress of CPSU in March, '1971, and essence of analysis was provided; during the 24th Congress, it was learned Soviets doubted whether U.S_ was serious on disarmanent and they were concerned over U,8,-Chinese communist improved relations; Soviet counterneasures to counteract include planued vast propaganda campaign against U.S., initiation of a European Security Conference to isolate U.8., and improvement of Soviet relations with Japan; General Secretary_ 9 CPUSA, Gus Hall, planned visit to North Vietnam and Laos Spring of 1971, thereafter returning to U.S, to hold mass rallies to raise antiwar movement in U,S, to 2 new high; visit was set for 5/15-20/71; however North Vietnamese canceled same, angering Hall Who felt this resulted from Chinese communist information concerning possible split in CPUSA along rgessciei lines; details concerning meeting of CPUSA leaders and Soviet Ambassador to U.S, Anatoliy F _ Dobrynin, at which time Dobrynin stated hope for world peace would be improved if President Nixon were re-elected in 1972 _ A11 of this information was furnished the White House and other interested officials of our Government , usually by teletype _ Central_ Intelligence Agency_has_expressed great inter- est in informatipn developed by ti7 operation and 0JTY 24 1970 3 requested permission to include pert nent data developed by %ur operation _in a Secret/No ForeignControlled 34 fr Dissemination cla3sified document Eor Senior UAS Intetligence Board officials DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 PCM: Sfw NW 88808 Dazid. 32989638 Page 44 ~ Cs mi ~Top nse ================================================== Page 45 ================================================== The two principal informants in this operation have received the "Order of Lenin, { with the title "Hero of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets_ This is the highest award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was given our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the international communist movement. If Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA represents 2 sustained major accomplishment_ At the time Of the last inspection, we had 11 informants who were Officially members of the CPUSA National Committee. This number remains the same In addition, we have another informant who is an ex officio member of the National Committee because of the sensitive na ture of his Party assignments_ This latter source is also 2 member of the Political Committee which, in effect, runs the Party. This top-level coverage is responsible for furnishing information regarding policy-making matters on a day-to-day basis as they occur DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 PCM: sfw 4-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 45 2 G 33 ================================================== Page 46 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND PRO-CHICOM UNIT A prime responsibility of the Bureau and the intel- ligence community is to develop intelligence relating to efforts of foreign hostile governments , organizations and individuals who influence, direct, or dominate the domestic subversive and extremist movements_ There has been considerable evidence compiled over the years Of this foreign influence _ Since the last inspection, the following noteworthy achievements in our investigations relating to foreign influence have been accomplished: 1. In March, 1971, 2 coalition of leftist individuals including subversives and 'extremists under the sponsorship of the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, American Friends Service Committee= } and Fellowship Of Reconciliation traveled to Paris where they were in contact with the North Vietnamese and other elements antagonistic to the U.Sa We developed two_ informants to participate in this travel and as a result, identified al1 170` people in "attendauee, iieir activiti8s) cortacts, a78 objectives_ A11 information developed was afforded dissemination to appropriate Government agencies and we were commended by one ibtelligence agency for the excellent coverage . 2 The World Peace Council is the leading Soviet- dominated international effort to discredit and subvert U.S_ domestic and foreign policy Upon determining the World Peace Council would hold a General Session in Budapest, Hungary, in 1971, an effort was made to obtain informant coverage . An informant was developed for the travel and coverage resuled in the identification of al1 American participants including the Communist Party 2 USA, delegation and the activities of these individuals at the meeting A1l pertinent documents relating to the Conference were obtained, as were the contacts and activities of American subversives at the Conference _ Widespread dissemination of intelligence relating to this Conference was made and both the White House and Central Intelligence Agency favorably commented on its exceptional value. 3 During the past six months the Unit has afforded specific coverage to the travel of U.S; citizens to three hostile communist countries: North Vietnam, North Korea , and Communist China A11 individuals traveling to these countries during 1970 have been identified and, where pertinent , investigations have DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 ~DB; sfw 4-E 3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 46 34 May ================================================== Page 47 ================================================== been opened . Careful records have been maintained regarding U.S, citizens who have visited these countries during the current year and arrangements have been made to receive quarterly reports from another intelligence agency which will enable us to double check our files and insure cases are opened on visitors to these hostile countries, when warranted _ We feel this is a strong achievement because, as noted below , we have developed evidence that Americans are currently being recruited for intelligence assignments in these countries . 4 _ Early in 1971 it was determined an informant who had participated in Venceremos Brigade travel to Cuba had established a rapport with North Koreans in_ that countzy 4 Through careful direction Of this informant 8t he was able to DE effect an invitation from Ehe_North Koreans visit their country at their expense He_depafted the L.S. with 8 egroup {uTFS 3 @f three other Americans and-traveledzto Korea via Paris and Alg1ers In Korea he was recrui fhe North Koreans for_ an itelligence assigpnent furnighed Eundez and a code nThis is the first individuai affiliated _with the domesticsubyersive movement aC ting in a capacity -for the-u:S Governmenthas Jeem aple to pejetzatd Wci L Ko7cz We bciieve tbis informant Ror wiii be able to furnish exceptionally valuable intelligence relating to foreign intelligence and political influence of the North Koreans_ in the domestic subversive movement. 5 _ Through_cooperation with the British Security 77 01 Service we haye_developed during tha past sixe months direct connection petween an individual was_assoctated with the Wea therman in the U.S. and bombing_activities in England 2 British Intelligence is extremely interested 1n "S5 thi3 matter and we are carefully foliowing it for developments" Through intensified investigation of the Revolutionary Union (RU) and Venceremos Party (VP) , we have been able to identify over 200 hard-core Marxist-Leninists who have al1 indicated violence-prone propensities_ Of particular note is the fact that our closely supervised investigations in this area have developed an informant on the National_Committeeof_ thea RU and have resulted in identification of an extremely militant RU group in Eugene, Oregon _ The Department has expressed extreme interest in our RU investigation and has indicated 2 desire to explore prosecutions at the first opportunity. In late 1970 Mark LawrenceWefers the student body president of the University of New'Hampshire traveled with a National Student Association group to North" Vietnam. While there he made recorded speeches encouraging the servicemen in DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 DR: sfw NW 88608 Da81a 32989638 47 toa ted-ky Thoez/ who ` Page ================================================== Page 48 ================================================== South Vietnan to lay down their arms or turn their guns on the real "pigs Wefers incendiary comments were broadcast over Radio Hanoi_ Intensive investigation has been and is continuing _ to be . conducted and the Department has indicated an interest to prosecute Wefers under the sedition statutes at an early date_ This will represent the first prosecution under the sedition statutes since the 1950 A suit was instituted against the Director and two Special Agents of the Memphis Office seeking preliminary injunction against the FBI and punitive and compensatory damages amounting t over $100,000 against the Director and the Agents _ The suit was instituted by the Southern Conference Educationai Fund claiming harassment and intimidation of war resisters Former communists, extremists, and subversives were invoived as plaintiffs_ In July the plaintiffs dropped their plea for a preliminary injunction. Excellent information identifying the principal plaintiff, on whose statements the false allegations were based , as having a criminal record involving furnishing of false information and theft, has been furnished to the Department as well as the fact that he is the subject" 0f curreft oitstaiding State Bemchi Warrait. It 13 anticipated when this matter is argued before the court, the plea for punitive damages will be dropped , much to the embar- rassment of the communist subversives and extremists involved_ The Unit endeavors to keep track of a11 efforts to discredit the U.S military effort through organization of antiwar coffeehouses } oriented groups , and publications _ Last January we intensified investigation on Peoples House, a coffeehouse operated by subversives in Clarksville, Tennessee . Excellent information has been developed = 9 a11 the principal subversives participating have been identified, and details have been furnished to the Department and interested military intelligence agencies _ The House Committee on Internal Security has taken an interest in this coffeehouse and it is expected to be the subject of 2 Congressional hearing Which will publicly expose the involvement , tactics, and objectives of the extremist elements behind this subversive endeavor _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 DRisfw 74=E 5 - 35 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 48 's= ================================================== Page 49 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT 4-E The FBI has continued its investigation of 18 Klan-type organizations including 255 klaverns (units) throughout the United States which had a slight increase in membership from 4,300 a year ago to approximately 4,500 at present. This increase in membership is primarily attributed to renewed interest in Klan-type organizations brought about by Federal directives regarding School busing in order to achieve racial balance in public schools_ In recent months the UKA and Shelton have under- taken a major campaign aimed at harassing "he FBI . The initial step of the campaign was named by Shelton as "Operation Polly" in which he sought to obtain polygraph machines to help "weed out FBI pimps_ 1 We have taken steps to assure he is not successful by instructing our key informants to talk it down and if necessary to ultimately refuse to take such an exam We have also discreetly contacted a potential supplier to be assured we are aware of any positive action taken Shelton in this regard_ Further as a result of our hard-hitting investi- gation and interviews of Klansmen 9 Shelton printed a series of articles in the monthly UKA publication "The Fiery Cross, It entitled "Exposing the CIA and FBI , 0 in which Shelton vehemently attacked the Bureau as a "Gestapo-like police force" and the Director aS "a man who has sold out his If country for his prided FBI Picketing of the Norfolk and Richmond FBI Offices to protest interviews of Klansmen by FBI Agents as infringement of the individual rights of Klan members also took place recently and Klansmen were instructed to attempt to secure photographs and identities of our Agents in order that this information could be published in 'The Fiery Cross" with the intent that the FBI be embarrassed and our Agents transferred. This information was furnished to appropriate field offices and to the Department _ To date our Agents have avoided having their photographs taken by the Klan. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 LLAico/bcw 4-E h 6 37 NW 88608 Docld:37989638 49 by Page ================================================== Page 50 ================================================== Violence has been noticeably absent among Klan-type organizations during the past year_ This is due in the main to our effective informant program_ We have been able to direct our infornants to positions of leadership throughout the country 3 and these informants have been extremely success- ful in forming nonviolent Klan policy. We have also been able to keep local authorities advised of potential Klan violence in time to thwart such action head of Minutemen, Since last inspection, informatjon was also developed through Joan Gourley former mistress of Robert_DePugh, con- cerning murder of Walter_Barnes former Minutemen menber who #as allegedly murdered and buried by DePughwhile in underground hide-out in New Mexico prior to his arrest by the FBI _ Gourley traveled to New Mexico to locate grevesite in company of local authorities who granted her immunity_ Gravesite disclosed only four small bones identified by coroner 25 coming from foot of human victim Gourley furnished statement to New Mexico authorities and, In addition, stated DePugh had indicated in July 3 1970 while imprisoned that body had been removed from original gravesite, but she did not believe him at that time_ Local District Attorney wnile believing Gourley's story felt prosecution not feasible without body During July 1971 _ SD1155_R, a Minutemen informant of this Bureau furnished information and explosives reportedly to be utilized in the bombings of Alcohol , Tobacco } and Firearms Division (ATFD) and Internal Revenue Service offices in the California area , resulting in the arrest of several individuals, including informant , by ATFD , thus preventing the bombings Subsequent to last inspection, dissemination has been made concerning weapons, possible violence and demon- strations of these groups which has resulted in the curtailment of activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white hate gc828o882"183/3888h83 some areas_ In several cases confi: weapons been made by ATFD of the Treasury Department based on our infornation We have also made apprehensions of extremist subjects for illegal possession of firearms following conviction of a felony , 2 violation under our jurisdiction_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 LLAico/bcw 4-E 38 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 50 Page ================================================== Page 51 ================================================== ACCOHPLISHMENTS 4-E epum SECTION CHIEF R, D, COTTER There foliows 8 summary of acconplishzents of tho Research Section since the lest Ingpection: Centrel Research Unit Thts Unlt performs a wide range of research and writing ass+gunents and preparation of varjous docunents and special reports_ These Jeclude the following: An extensive Speclal as81gnment On new left research for the' Director A special report mhich 1s kept up_ to de te on FBI usage 0f electronic surveillances . The "FBI Current Intelligence Analysis" issued approxlmately every week summarizes 'Slgnificant itens of interest In subversive {Leld. "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities- #1 Issued weekly summerizes Significant itews relating to black extremists . "Tbe Extrenist Speaks" 1g 8 monthly compilation Showing extremist views taken from their publications . A pamphlet entitled "The Black Panther" wa8 prepared for public distribution pemphlet entitled "1970 : Year of the Urban Guerrslla" wa8 prepared for distributzon. The monograph entitled "The CPUSA Annual Intelligence Digest" was issued In February . A number of papers were prepared for the Intelligence Evaluation Committee . 4 number Of -book reviews of interest were prepared . Special reports are prepared on a < continuing basts for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Committee . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 KSR:amt a-E 31 MW_8B608_Docld 32989638_Page_ G 8K ================================================== Page 52 ================================================== ~ 2 The Unlt coordinated the preparatzon of material for the Division 8 participation in the conference with police officials concerning attacks on police and prepared 2 special packet of material for distribution to those police officials in attendance _ Thfs Unit also was responsible for coordination of preparation of damage assessments relating to Domestic Intelligence Division docunents st len in the burglary 0f the former Media , Pennsylvania, Resident Agency , and handling other aspects of tbe Medburg case as related to this Division _ In addition, the Unit also collectea and prepared material Ror various articles speeches and surveys Personnel of the Unit have handled lectures on subjects of communism the new Left, and racial extremiSm These bave consisted of classified lectures to Bureau S New Agents and In-Service classes appearances before othor Intelligence agenczes and Nationai Acadeny classes and appearances before outside groups _ Spectal Records Unit Thls Unit Is primarily responsible for records keeping for emergency planning Further details concerning prograns handled by tbis Unlt are set forth in Sectlon 4-H. Civil Disorder Reporting Unit This Unlt, formerly called the Racial Reporting Unlt, hes continued to coordinate a11 Phases of disturbances violence and other developments where race 18 a factor as well a5 infor- mation bearing on the potential for violence throughout the country Material being reported on & daily basis by the field Offices is revlewed coordinated and disseminated to interested officials and agencies and current teletype summaries ere 'furnished to the White House , Attorney General, and other high officials Statistical data on civil disorders 1 school Gisorders and attacks on police 18 extracted from communications received from the field and 18 maintained in this Unit for use In the preparation of special pa pers Detailed statistical data is prepared for automatic data processing This Unit also prepares on demand certain studdes and briefs concerning specific subject matters relating to rac_al extrenists and racial situations Examples of these are a detailed study on the extent of foreign influence on the black extremist movement conpleted in February of this year _ 4 current document on thls subject matter is presently NW 88608 Doeld:32989638 Page 52 ================================================== Page 53 ================================================== ~3' _ being prepared for early dlsgemination In June, 1971, 2 comprebensive docunent on the potentlel for violence in the Nation during the Summer of 1971 was prepared for high- level dlssemina tion . In eddftlon to the above, this Unit pr epares 2 monthly "FBI Dlgest of Ctvil Disorders" brlefly summarizing 41l disorders occurring in the previous mon tb growing out of ractal unrest_ The Lncidents are listed geographically and chronologically 80 that the White House and other reclplents can tell at 8 glance the general nature of inc_dents and problems and where they are& Current_Intelligence_Repofting Unzt This' Unit, fornerly known as the New Left Reporting Unft coordinates coverage of activlties relating to a11 New Left, Student, end antiwar demons trations es well 88 other clvil disturbances arising from Issues other than racfal 1n nature _ 4 dafly teletype sumary on demonstrat_ons and other disruptive activity 19 prepared for dissenination to the White House the Attorney General and other interested Governnent officiais Continuing and tinely disseminetfon 1s made concerning maJor demonstrations in addition to tbe teletype sunary &na advance Infornatjon concerning PoSsIble dewonstrattons is furntshed Governnent officials (principally the President and Vice President) treveling throughout the country. Since the lest Inspection, this Unit hag covered the fOllowzng major demonstrations ; Harcbes on Masbington , Da and Sen Francisco, California on 3/20/71 sponsored by the Progressive Ibor Party (PLP} to protest unemployment, A series of disruptive demonstrations held In Hashington, D, during the period 4/1-5/71 sponsored by People S Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and Hay Day Collectlves Dur thig series of demonstrations , some 12,000 arrests ere mad0. A serjes 0f demonstrations 1n Hashington, D; C. sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Ageinst the War (VVAW) during the period 4/18-23/71 to protest contInued U.8. Iovolvement Jn Vietnan . 4) NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 53 C0} C0 , ing ================================================== Page 54 ================================================== A masstve demonstretion J0 Hashington, D. On 4/24/71 spongored by the Ne cional Peace Actlon coalftio? (NPAC) _ A sinflar demonstratzon R2s beld Ln San FrancIsco The Hashington, Da demonstration attracted &n estima ted 400 , 000 persons _ A March for Victory demonstration sponsored by the Reverend Carl McIntire held In Washington, D. 5/8/71 to protest WItharawal or @,S . rorces Yrom Vietnan . 4 "smoke-In" spongored by the Hay Dey Collectives In Waghington, Do 7/4/71 . Natzonwide dewonstretions during the period 8/6-9/71 sponsored by NPAC end PCPJ, 85 Iell 28 other peace groups t0 protest the wer in' Vietnan and to commemorate the & tomic bombing of Japan This Unft also prepared studles and briefs when they are called upon to do so and regularly Issues the monthly "FBL Intelligence Calendar or Major Events It Also 6026836405 #re maiztafiee cuicerning the dicorders for use 28 needed 42 NW 88608 Docld;32989638 Page 54 C., C., C., ================================================== Page 55 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS NEW LEFT SECTION SECTION CHIEF 3 R. La SHACKELFORD Attached are comments from each unit setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments of the New Left Section since the last Inspection_ This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left movement including terrorist groups and in- dividuals engaged in bombings_ arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college canpuses and off campus Investigations concerning New Left publications are also supervised in this Section, as we Sabotage investigations, and Protest and Trotskyist groups DID INSPECTION 8/18/71 IYNDPW:ilm 0 4-E NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 55 43 ================================================== Page 56 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT WEST The primary objective in this Unit has been and continues to be the goal of overcoming the threat to American institutions presented by violence prone extremistS such as those within the revolutionary Weatherman organization This Unit and the Special Investigation Unit East, supervise security investigations Of the Weatherman group and its individual members Through coordination with the General Investigative Division 1 which has handled certain criminal investigations involving Weatherman members and with the Special Inves tigative Division 1 which has supervised the investigation 0f Weatherman fugitives substantial accomplishments in the task of neutralizing these extremists have been achieved . A number of Weatherman leaders have been indicted on Federal charges involving violations of the Federal Anti-riot 1 gun control and bombing statutes Many leaders and activists in the Weatherman organization have gone underground ana the organization is currently composed 0f a few hundred adherents including those underground and above ground. Its underground existence and the fugitive status Of its leaders have isolated Weatherman from the mass Of American youth Consequently, Weatherman has experienced a considerable reduction in strength, based on the number of its present adherents and its influence among young people _ Weatherman 1 though a small group , continues to be extremely dangerous in view of its violent and des tructive tactics It is noted that Weatherman has claimed credit for a number of bombings including the bombing Of the national Capitol building on 3/1/71 Weatherman continues to receive intensive investigation _ In recent months a Weatherman bomb making factory has been discovered at 1038 A Pine Street, San Francisco, California, and subsequent investigation there has uncovered a number Of persons including attorneys_ who are acting in a covert support role for Weatherman The Department Of Justice has now indicated in a letter to the Bureau that it will institute Federal Grand Jury proceedings concerning activities at this Pine Street address , with the prospect of further indictments and further discourage- DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 EHM: smp E 2 44 NW 88608 Docld: 37989638 Page 56 ================================================== Page 57 ================================================== ment of Weatherman sympathizers Approval has been obtained for this Unit to supervise this Pine Street case in view of its intimate connection with the overall Weatherman investigation Approval has also been obtained for this Unit to supervise a New Left Violence case in Tucson, Arizona , which involves Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms (UPRE) charges _ This Tucson case concerns five New Left extremists three of whom have now been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury _ Two of these have been apprehended and the third is a fugitive_ Another subject in this case has been sentenced to jail for contempt of court for refusing to testify before the Grand Jury _ An example of the. salutary effect of vigorous investigation and prosecution of New Left extremists is seen in the Seattle area_ There, a radical group called the Seattle Liberation Front (SLF) 1 which was composed of former Weatherman members had fomented continuing violence Then SLF leaders were tried in Federal court on anti-riot chrges This tria] ended in a mistrial but the SLF leaders were cited for contempt of court Since that mistrial in December, 1970 , SLF has been disbanded and most SLF members have left Seattle There has been a noticeable reduction in New Left violence in Seattle In the several cases referred to above , it is noted that in each instance information crucial to the prosecution Of New Left extremists was provided by New Left informants In recent months significant accomplishments were made in a case involving two extremists in Ohio through the use of a tesur installation These two extremists were Nancy Kurshan and Howard who were leaders Of the Youth International Party Emes; Between February and June , 1971, 3 tesur covered the activities of Kurshan Emmer and others with outstanding success This source provided advance information concerning the plans Of May_Qay_-leader Rennie Davis for the recent May Day national action The source also provided extensive information on planned demons trations and strikes at Kent State University on May 3 and 4 , 1971, the anniversary of the killing of Kent State students by the National Guard in 1970 This source furnished information concerning activities and movenents of suspects in the Capbom case and other New Left extremists This source also developed information on plans for the Women 's March on Washington on April 10 f 1971 3 NLV 88608 Docld:32989638_Page 57 May 43 ================================================== Page 58 ================================================== As a result Of dissemination Of advance information developed by this source, authorities were able to further control these demonstrations and reduce the violence arising out Of such activi With reference to the complicated Weatherman investigation , much progress has been made recently in the deve lopment of information on the technical aspects of the actual operation of the Weatherman underground particularly its use and methods of obtaining false identities , its courier system, its use of radical attorneys in covert support roles and in the movement of its support personnel Effort is continually being made to develop new techniques and approaches to facilitate this investigation A "stop I index program in NCIC 1 for Bureau use only 1 concerning extremists on Priority I Of the Security Index was initiated in June , 1971- This program enables our field offices to receive prompt notice by teletype when ce agencies make inquiries about these subjects In addition 1 new procedures have recently been devised whereby the Identification Division can better disseminate to the field arrest information on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are On file_ This is accomplished by periodic submission by the field Of Security Flash Notices to determine if fingerprints have been received since the last check 4 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 58 45 ty . poli ================================================== Page 59 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT-EAST Incidents of sabotage currently being inv estigated by the Bureau . are, for the most part the "home grown variety" occasioned by attacks against the miiitary and related operations on the part of New Leftists, dissidents > and elements opposed to U.S . participation in the Vietnam War _ There are under investigation at the present time 9 sabotage initiated investigations with prosecution pending, involving 21 subjects who are charged with various violations including Attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government Property, Antiriot Law violations Civil Rights Violations, Violation of National Firearms Act } Possession of Destructive Device_ Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Contempt of Court and Conspiracy _ Since last inspection and as a result of sabotage iuvestigations 9 13 individuals have aithar bzz;i trizd i3 Federal court and found guilty or have entered guilty pleas. Three 0f these individuals have been sentenced to a total of 30 years while the remaining 7 are awaiting sentencing Additionally, since last inspection. and as 2 result of sabotage investigations, 6 additional individuals have been indicted but not yet brought to trial Two of these 6 are currently in a fugitive status It should be noted that as a direct result of this Bureau 's sabotage investigations 5 subjects are currently included in the Bureau s Most Wanted Fugitives List and Identification Orders are currently in effect concerning another 3 Subjects _ TJMice 8718771 DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 4-E 5 - 47 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 59 ================================================== Page 60 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS VENCEREMOS BRIGADE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT EAST 4-E The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being June 1969 , as a coalition of representatives from various New Zeft organizations including Students for a Democratic Society, Young Socialist Alliance, the militant Black Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left organiza- tions including the Communist Party, Progressive Labor Party and Socialist Workers Party. Four contingents have traveled to Cuba since November } 1969 _ The first group was composed of 216 young Americans who obtained their Own transportation to Cuba in defiance of the State Department ban on travel to that countzy . These ycurg revclutioneries were returned to Canada on 2/12/70 at the expense of the Cuban Government which converted a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship _ The second, contingent 0f: 687 sympathetic American youths were loaded aboard this boat for its return trip to Cuba _ This group, like the first contingent , worked in the sugar cane fields until its return by the same means of transportation on April 28 } 1970 _ In August 3 1970 , the third contingent of the VB , made up o 407 persons journeyed to the Isle of Youth where they participated in a Cuban agricultural experiment of planting and ferti- lizing citrus trees _ This group returned to the U . S _ mid-October 1970 _ The fourth contingent of 233 young Americans traveled by air to Cuba during the last week 0f March, 1971_ and were returned to Canada by Cuban on May 197i. Each group worked approximately 72 hours 2 day , 52 days a week , and in their free time were afforded the opportunity of absorbing communist propaganda offered by the Cubans North Koreans and North Vietnamese They were reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were here to show "solidarity with the socialist struggle , to DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 Jel FBS:bjn 4-E 6 4x NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 60 ship 29 , ================================================== Page 61 ================================================== smash the U. S . blockade, and to make a bjeach in the facade of the U . S , imperialist monster MI Each of the more than 1500 brigade members has been the subject of a security investigation which includes the identification and obtaining of background data as well 2s a personal interview with each brigade member 'These investigations are being made to determine the immediate danger presented by these young revolutionaries and also to ascertain the long-range role they Will take in the revolutionary movement in the U S _ Upon comple- tion of the investigation and the interview of each of these individuals the field must recommend either the inclusion 01" noninclusion of the subject in the Security Index_ In addition the field must continue to report every 90 days for a period of one year on the activities and whereabouts of each brigade member The intelligence responsibilities of the Bureau in regerd to the VB have been- handled through the placing of Bureau informants in the ranks of the various contingents . Accurate on-the-scene reports concerning the training and activities of these groups in Cuba have been furnished to the intelligence community and factual responses have been made to congressional and other legitimate inquiries re- garding these young supporters of the Castro Regime As a result of our investigations more than 275 VB partici- pants have been placed on the Security Index and it has been noted that about 25% of those individuals currently being intensively investigated as extremists in the New Left section, are ex-VB members Plans for a fifth contingent 0f the VB have been formulated _ This new group is tentatively scheduled to depart for Cuba in early January, 1972 and is to be comprised of 225-250 individuals politically oriented to the socialist cause 7 - 4q NWV 88608 Docld:32989638 61 Page ================================================== Page 62 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS NEW LEFT UNIT Among the primary responsibilities of this unit is the identification and investigation of individuals because of activities or affiliation with one or more violence-prone revolutionary groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the nation In most instances, this unit handles initial stages of the investigation and carries it through to completion _ In sone instances where individuals are determined to be of an extremist nature, those cases are referred to the units in this section handling extremist cases At the conclusion of each investigation or at the phase of the investigation when it is determined that the individual therein could be considered a danger to the internal security 0f iiie COUn an evaiuatioii 13 made and, if appropriate, the 'indoviduzi- name is included on the Security Index, The immense volume of cases handled in this unit is clearly exhibited by the fact that since the last inspection approximately 5o00 cases have been handled in this unit_ To be exact, 5418 cases have been opened and 4951 cases have been closed. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 WHE;rsm_ 4-E 8 - 3 0 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 62 who , 'S ~beih ================================================== Page 63 ================================================== PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT This Unit is responsible for the investigation of antiwar protest groups and activists connected therewi a5 well &s the Eastcon case. Accomplishments of the Unit worthy of note are as follows: EA STCON As a result of our investigation of the plots to blow up the underground tunnels housing the heating system servicing Government buildings in Washington, D and to kidnap a high Government official, an indictment was returned at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania , on 1-12-71 covering six individuals a9 defendants and seven unindicted Co-conspirators_ Our investigation into this matter continued, and on 4-30-71 a superseding indictment was returned at Harrisburg Which added two additional defendants and reduced the number of unindicted ci_Conspirstcrs to fowr In addi+ion; ve individuals have been cited for civil contempt for refusal to testify before the Federal Grand Jury regarding this matter, and four individuals have been indicted for criminal contempt_ By letter dated 2-25-71 to the Director 1 Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian advised of his appreciation for cooperation extended by the Bureau in this case and singled out the efforts of six members of the Domestic Intelligence Division, as well as two Agents of the Philadelphia Office. Of paramount importance to the successful prosecution of this case is our principal witness, Boyd Frederick Douglas He testified before the Grand Jury in Jmwry_ 1971 , an subsequently assumed a new identity and has been living under appropriate cover in Des_Moines Iowa Inasmuch as he is a witness rather than an informant , the Department is primarily responsible for his welfere and his cover_ We maintain liaison between the witness and the Department in order to insure that the Bureau S interests are properly looked after The_death 0fthe_informant'e father_in_July-19716 created a situation whereby the inforuant S Identity and location could have been ascertained by irresponsible members of the press _ Through the concerted efforts of the Qmaha Office, the informant and his wife attended the funeral with no adverse effects_ Assistant Attorney General Mardian, by letter dated 7-21-71, praised the high degree 0f proficiency of five Agents of the Omaha Office in protecting the identity of the witness DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8-18-71 FBGapln 4-E NWV 88608 Docld:32989638 63 key th, C., fi Page ================================================== Page 64 ================================================== The development of a highly placed informant , PH 1223-8, within the pro-Berrigan forces is also a Significant accompTiShment This indiVidual has gained the confidence of leaders in the Berrigan movement and is privy to information not available from any other source _ The informant has furnished a wealth of information regarding fund raising and strategy and tactics planned by movement leaders to propagandize their position and to attempt to gain public support for the Berrigan cause_ In the course of this coverage, the informant furnished information concerning plans of the group for action in the event parole was not granted to _Philip and Daniel Berrigan on 7-28-71 . He also furnished plans of the group to mount an attack on the Bureau of Prisons which culminated in 2 hunger-work strike at the Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut, on 8/6-7/71 _ This action resulted in the transfer of eleven inmates to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri We furnished plans of this proposed action to the Bureau of Prisons, and in 2 letter to the Attorney General dated 8-11-71 the Director of the Bureau of Prisons noted that the action of the inmates confirmed our intelligence reports received several weeks prior_ PH 1223_S also furnished information concerning the intention of the group to embarrass the administration by having Daniel Berrigan prepare the text for 2 Mess composed by musical conductor Leonard Bernstein. This Hegs is to be of the dedication ceremonies for the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, Da and is to be performed on 9-9-71 The words prepared by Daniel Berrigan were to have been in Latin and were to follow an antiwar theme The group anticipated the President and high ranking administration officials would applaud the work and subsequent publicity would be to the effect that they had applauded antiadministration views _ This information was furnished the White House according to the news media the President has declined to attend the ceremonies on 9-9-71 _ PE1223-S_has also furnished information showing the Berrigan supporters are interested in Obtaining classified material such a5 that publicized by Daniel_Elleberg in an effort to embarrass the Government The individual who is to attempt to these papers is Linda Shaw Finlay, an ardent supporter of the Berrigan cause Her target is the Lyndon B Johnson Library at the University of Texas Austin, which is the repository for former President Johnson S papers . We have a separate espionage investigation underway regarding this situation. 10 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 64 part C., and , get ================================================== Page 65 ================================================== ANTIHAR_MOVEMENT This Unit is responsible for the investigation of dissident protest groups in order that their potential threat to the internal security of the country can be assessed , This includes development of informant coverage and the dissemination of timely intelligence information, as well a5 possible violations of Federal laws _ The organizations concerned are the communist Socialist Horkers Party (SWP) its youth group the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA)_ } and the Student Mobiiization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) which is controlled by the SwP /YSA 411 three of these groups utilize the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) 2s 2 vehicle to project their antiwar message _ The Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) = 9 continuation group of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) , also exercises considerable influence in the antiwar movement and is a target for infiltration by the Communist Party 9 USA (CP) The May Collective (MDC) } organized by Reunie Wavis, is a militant group mhich Split from the PCPJ following the May, 1971 demonstrations in Washington, Da C; Also of consi derabie interest is the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) which came into prominence during the Washington demonstrations _ We have disseminated on a daily basis hundreds of reports and memoranda concerning the activities of these and other groups , as well as information regarding principal activists_ This dissemination has been augmented by the preparation of several CINALS pertinent to specific demonstrations, conferences , or activities_ Of particular value has been our coverage of national conferences and conventions sponsored by various: groups which are used to plan future antiwar activity and demonstrations We have been able to cover these sessions most effectively and have furnished other interested Government agencies with advance information of their plans. Included in these conferences were the following: 2/19-21/71 National student antiwar conference, Washington, D. sponsored by SMC . 5/15/71 Be SMC National Steering Committee meeting_ 6/25-27/71 Lt PCPJ national conference, Milwaukee , Fisconsin. 11 33 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 65 Day C., Page ================================================== Page 66 ================================================== 7/2-4/71 Rn Ad NPAC national antiwar convention, New York 8/8-15/71 L ea SWP national convention, Oberlin, Ohio, which also included Student Activist Educational Conference of the YSA 8/13-17/71 Ltr MDC national conference, Atlanta, Georgia_ 9 preceded by regional conferences in Nashington, D. and Fayetteville, Arkansas. With regard to the MDC national conference our informant coverage led to the apprehension of three ieaders of the New York MDC contingent by the New York City Police Department for possession of firearms_ Our informant determined the exact location in a specific vehicle where 2 shotgun, 22 caliber rifle, and 357 Smith and Wesson revolver, all loaded, were recovered . In addition, in excess of 500 rounds of ammunition for these weapons were seized Criz" 127estig:ticm of the--Comnittee 0f Lieiecn gith Families 0f Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIFAM) produced Significant intelligence information with regard to the exchange of letters between prisoners of war in North Vietnam and their families within the U.S, By letter dated 8-9-71, the Directorate of Special Investigations U.S_ Air Force , advised that this_information was of "considerable as8istance in an intelligende collection progran concerned with prisoners of war . 12 4 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 66 54 City. C., ================================================== Page 67 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS NEW LEFT GROUPS WNIT Included in the work of the New Left' Groups Unit are the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with the exception of the Wea therman) , other New Left campus groups, the Key Activist program, New Left Movement reports, New Left publications 9 and the maintenance of a library of research material on the New Left for use of Bureau officials in connection with approved speaking commitments . In 1969, the Worker Student Alliance (WSA) Weatherman, and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) factions of SDS split into separate groups 0 Accomplishments concerning Wea therman are reported elsewhere in this survey . The RYM faction of SDS is now practically defunct Currently, the largest faction of SDS is the TSA faction, which is dominated by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive Lebor Party -(PLP} Approxinately twenty Bureau informants attended the SDS /1YSA National Convention in Chicago, December 26-30 , 1970 . This convention was dominated by PLP controlled leadership; however J dissent was widespread, much of which was led by our informants _ Since the last Inspection, this dissent has spread further and has resulted in additional factionalism W ithin the 'SDS/TYSA During the past winter the SDS /WSA has continuously attempted to inject itself into iabor disputes without success, due mainly to factionalism. The objective of the SDS/WSA is to build ties with workers inasmuch as in the old Marxist- Leninist tradition, they view the students-Workers as the vanguard of the revolution_ In this regard, the SDS/WSA set up a Summer Project with the twofold objective of 2 massive recruitment program and the fostering of a general strike, nationwide, through infiltration of industry and unions We have been on top of this program from its inception and have kept al1 interested Govem ment agencies advised of developments on a continuing basis In addition, again largely due to factionalization, the SDS /WSA Summer Project program has not had significant success in any of its twenty-one target cities. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 DPWailm 4-E 13 J3 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 67 ================================================== Page 68 ================================================== New Left Movement reports submitted quarterly by each field office have enabled uS to furnish interested agencies timely and informative documents on the activities of the New Left movement This is a substantial contribution to the objective that responsible Government officials be alerted concerning the nature and extent of this aspect of subversive activities and the threat it presents to our democratic society. By conducting an intensive review of many New Left publications which range from the pornographic to te clearly revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these publications; their subversive activities and whether or not they urge violence; and sources of funds Since these publications are the voice of the New Left and are influencial in recruiting youth, pertinent factors concerning them are disseninated to interested officials and agencies. Since our review of these "underground" publications has revealed many of them frequently come into being and become defunct within a short we are alert to the birth of new publications by perusing various underground news service lists as well 2s other documents and books Which report new publicaiions in this field, A library of research ma terial on the New Left is maintained for use of Bureau officials in connection with approved speaking engagements before Government Officials and responsible citizens. In this manner, we have assisted these Government, officials and responsible citizens to more fully understand the subversive and anarchist manifestations of the New Left movement Through the key activist program, we have focused investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left movement with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate statutes, Federal or local 9 wvherever possible This program has proved successful in that we have been able to closely follow the activities of these individuals and furnish interested agencies and high Government officials with information concerning their subversive and agitational activities_ Of particular note is the fact that more than half of the 73 individuals designated as key activists are subjects of some type of prosecutive action. 14 35 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 68 time, ================================================== Page 69 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E Section Chief T _ A _ Branigan Espionage Section The pr imary mission of this Section involves counterintelligence operations aga inst Soviet-Bloc Intel- ligence Services (SBIS) Counterintelligence_ by definition and in ' practice is a reaction to initiative displayed by a hostile inteiiigence service This factor largely inhibits bold and aggressive initiatives on our part and the major of our efforts is spent in routine programmatic non- remunerative work and patient painstaking analysis 0f information developed _ Positive counterintelligence achievement in the final ana lysis depends on the ability to detect and exploit in a timely fashion circumstances which arise na turally--contriving, to the extent this is feasible, to anticipa - encourage, or modify circumstances tC cur SWr adventege or the disadvantage of the SBTS In this perspective, the accomplishments listed below are most noteworthy These are highlighted the current operation of four defectors-in-place and the identification of three 2 millegal" agents since the last inspection From both a quantitative and qualitative view_ point, these successes represent an extremely high level of accomplishment in these two vital areas In keeping with the Inspector instructions brevity will be stressed in the exa mples portrayed Security and the "need-to-know" principle a 1so requires limitation of detailed information on ma ny cases discussed . These matters 9 however are identified Sufficiently So that any additional data desired may be obtained from the individual file Accomplishments cited are restricted to the most significant and/or representative _ DOMCSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 DEz pdr 37 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 69 part te, by 's 84-E Page ================================================== Page 70 ================================================== 4-E I_ Defectors-in-Place (DIP) The most valuable asset which counterintelligence can acquire is the recruitment of a Soviet-bloc official who is an active intelligence officer or who otherwise has access to intelligence information Such a source can produce information of incalculable value not obtainable from any other source Highest priority a nd emphasis is assigned to cases which have such potential Although we have had success in this area in the past, at the time 0f the last inspection we had no DI: Currently we are operating four sources In this ca fegoryea which are briefLy described bezow IRONCLAD is a sensitive, highly placed DIP who furnishes on a continuing basis, a large volume of high level information concerning operations_of_Soyiet_Intelligence Services_(SIS)- He has identified hundreds of STS officers #5 Kte_ 1r#. and furnished informatio concerning approximater 250 Intell gencecoperations: Some of_his infornation nvoLves 40 penetrations of other Governmentagencies-a3,veji aszsubstantial information Which has been Of high interest to the White House The value of information he has furnished and has a potential to furnish is beyond estimate. WINGTIR is a DIP who is in a position to furnish information concerning Polish intelligence activities He was recently recruited and his potential is stili being "exploited,' KIELBASA is a DIP who is a Polish_intelligence officer whose recruitment was recently effected _ He is under continuing development _ SPINNAKER is a DIP in the_Yugoslavfield who has furnished information on_Yugoelar intelligence activities pertaining to identities of intelligence agents 9 their sources and targets Dissemination of pertinent information furnished by him has been made to interested U. S . agencies _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIS ION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EWLipdr/eco 4-E 2 - "TI 88608" ESc ================================================== Page 71 ================================================== 4-E II_ Double Agents A double agent is an individual under Bureau control who has been recruited and given intelligence assign - ments by SBIS . Double agent development is given great emphasis since this is a primary method to obtain va luable informa tion concerning hostile intelligence operations, targets techniques and personnel_ At the time of the last inspection, this Section listed ,138 double agents , 296 potential double agents and 49 inactive double agents Figures for August 1 , 1971, are 133 291 and 47 for the respective categories Apart from statistics , the most Significant accomplishment lies in the quality of the double agent opera tions which has . developed since the last inspection A representa tive number of these situations are set forth below _ CHOWLINE is a double agent which began in 1958 _ Through the years- Ehis operation has grown steadily In eignificance productivity The_source has been_paid over_852,000 by the Soviets while passing carefully cleared #nm materia LleSome 0f Which was eptive in nature Cdeception concept concezning nonexistent DZ 4930 military capa Dff5y has been accepted by the Soviets and their-attempts to_ ut counteract this_ ca pability_haye_reportedlycaused then to cqmnit ittion in their "defense budget G0 Most_ significant developments were the identification of Swo Soviet illegal agents in the U_ S_ as a direct product of the CHOWLINE operation (see_ Pa lmetto and Ixora) The SNOOD operation involves a Soviet agent who 5 wa s uncovered through informa tion received in 1962 from a DIP_ We initiated interviews with this individual on a pretext of interest in the source of fundsdepogited by_him Which #Zk 325 we knew %o have Originted with the Soviets Arter extensive interviews source admitted his involvement 25 2n agent_for D 024 SIS and agreed to cooperate with xthe Bureau During June 197,he met_with 8-Soviet 3& contact andthrough corroborative 01 L2 _information Erom DTe; ve knoy that Soviets_Stili accept 0I him 28 one of their most trusted and valua b1e U S_ "agents DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EWLepdr _ 4-E 3 ~ 3q NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 71 and "dece ================================================== Page 72 ================================================== 4-E BASELINE is a double agent operated aga inst Hungarian TntelTigence Services (HIS)hwho is reportedly consrdered to be the topHungarian agent in the U 5 Y3 ATthough HIS has been most reluctant t0 have persona 1 contact 63 3~ With this source in the U 87 we were able to induce SuC a meeting on January 28 4971257n Nev York_Cityaana identified 2 Third Seczetafy 3 the Hungarian United Na tions Mission Suu- 0r Informant 2s been told_ne WiII nandie HIS agents in the U S CANDY is a double agent operation directed aga inst HIS_on intermittent basis for 14years_ HIS interestawax doruantfrom1966 toL97Oalhen this_operation Wae_reactivated by_HIS HIS has_attempted to have source meet With then LaroS abroad but under our_direction_he_has_resisted this presure TVe are Stilf 2 'ttempting to manipula te this operation to bring a bout intelligence meetings in the U _ S In 1968 HLS underCoyer_Qf_the Fastelest_Exchange- Prograny dispatched 2 29-year_old Hungarian national A(L45478_PSI) to the U_ S on an intelligence mission "This individua is now under our control Under HIS instructions he_was tescek __nermanent_residence-1n chis cpuntzy toc urther_his intelligence mission This is being done under our control 4Q 366-S is a double agent serving_with_U84ir Force inNely Mexico He has been opera ted against the GRU (Goviet Wilitary Intel 1igence) He_receiveradiomessagesas: originating with GRU radio in Hayana Jo Cuba In 0 64 he had 8 meetIn Zuarez ierico;~and ~the_Soviet principal was identified as an official from the 3ovcet"Embasey in Mexico Considerable informa tion has been developed in this case concerning Soviet capabilities and communications systems In threedouble agent operations in the W8 Mexican border area we have identified four_Soviet officiale assigned to Mexico-City eS-intelligence officers In addition 1 we have uncovered a Soviet illegal agent _ (EP628-8; EP 656_8; SA 888-S) DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EWLipdr 4-E Lt 4 - Mbbeu8 1971 Juneas City ================================================== Page 73 ================================================== 4-E III_ Soviet Illegal Operations These operations are staffed by officers or agents of SIS who enter the U_ S . and operate without any connection with the legal bases , 1. e _ 9 the intelligence residencies staffed intelligence personnel under cover of official position located et the Soviet Embassy and Mission to the United Na tions In view of the completely clandestine na ture of these opera tions } they are the most difficult to detect_ We have in the past achieved some success in detecting several illegal opera tions Since the iast inspection three Such agents have been identified in the cases outlined below PALMETTO is an investigation of an individual detected 1emoving espionage material from a dead drop filled by the CHOWLINE source in Marcn , 1971 . Tnis individual was Successfully identified through intensive discreet investi- gation as a Mexican national currently_doing_graduate work at 2 western un IversTty in Ene U S Intensive investigation is underway in tnis case to aetermine additional information concerning this indiviuuai'6 activities with G vir; to- uncovering other Soviet agents in the U S . whom he may be servicing _ In another outgrovth of the CHQNLINE_ case, Ie have identified the IXORA subiect as a Soviet illega1 agent _ This individual is an Austrian national who entered the U , 8_ in 1968 as a permanent resident and resides and is employed in the New York City area Identity of this person was furnished the_CHOILINE infornant as an ewezgenGy contact Kam to be_made_only in event a war is imminent Intensive investi- gation is aIso underway in this case to determine the extent of this individual S activities and contacts In 2 double agent operation (referred to above) _ 2 Soviet illegal agent has been identified as a. resident of Juarez elexicgs who has been used in servicing Soviet agents in the U_ S . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EWL :pdr 4-E 5 G 1 NIAL 83608 Docld:32989638 73 by Page ================================================== Page 74 ================================================== 4-E IV _ Counterintelligence and Special Operaltions In this category, on a highly selective basis we take initiative in actions which are designed to disrupt , deter or otherwise disadvantage the operations of SBIS . We employ our own resources and whenever feasible, those of other U _ S_ igencies Brief examples of activity in this category since the Jast inspection are set forth A former Soviet exchange student in the U S reappeared as an official assigned to the Soviet United ~tions Tnssion During ni3 previous visit in the U S_ 5054 she had recruited a fellow_student Jhoin We_had ~denttried 72 a5 arasult infonationtfuritished bY ILP 0 When the Soviet recontacted this American we were in a position to control the latter 's actions At our direction the double agent wrote_a letter to the Soviet__United Nations_Ambassador compla ining about the treatment he had receiyed and tbe G indiscretions committed by tne Sovfet The Soviet has been reprimanded and {here are indica tions tha t his assignment io iive U _ 3 . wiii be cui silurt A Soviet defector who formally opera ted as a KGB E0 officer in zhe 9 USISR Jas recen jsedb 48 IO@ontar Czech professor temporariiy in the U S as an East-Iest 145 ezchenge qarticipant he_professor-S Wifesis a-Sovier national who was known to_ Q4r defector source as } 2et for Me7 the KGB in the Soviet Unfon _The_Czech was_Suspected of being affiliated with Czech_inteliigence An approach was made and aTthough the Czech-couple seriously considered the proposition for defection put to them_ 9 they fina decided against such action and returned to Czechoslovakia During our contacts some information of low level intefigence significance was developed The_Soviet 'Government is currently engaged in securing property In San Zrancisco to house the office and personnel of the Consylate Genera Through conferences held with-State Department We ha ve been able to exert an DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EWLapdr 4-E 62 NI 88608_Qocld: 32989638Page 74 4 Qf- 1ly ================================================== Page 75 ================================================== 4-E influence on the choice of properties made available to the Soviets As a result of our action it appears a lmost certain tha t the Soviets are settling on 3 property considered by uS to offer the best advantage for counterintelligence coverage_ In late January , 1971, we furnished information to state Department and White House concerning activities of a' very aggressive KGB officer in Washington D C ~whg was attempting to obtain equipment involyed in a classified 05407 communicationa System used by-White House and" other agencies_ 3r 3h24e T04 9i' Te suggested t0 State "tnat ZubjecEje deciared ersona nongrata and State , after securing concurrence of White House, decidea instead to personally a dmonish a representa tive of the Soviet Embassy concerning these activities This action resulted in curtailing the Soviet 's intelligence activities and probably resulted in his early recall A Soviet attached to the_staff_of the_new_Consulate 0571 General in San Francisco came to our attention as a KGB orficer yho_had TormerLy been Stationed_in_China_ He had been declared persona nongrata and expelled from Peking_ with some publicity _ Thiz infcrmaticn #39 furriehed by .uS to a cooperative newspaper source in_ San Francisco and resulted in a newspaper article Which repeated the charges _ Considerable embarrassment was caused and long range curtailment of this Soviet 's intelligence activities is hoped for V_ Prosecutive Action One objective of counterintelligence investigations is prosecution_ Since most intelligence officers ha ve diplomatic immunity, this objective is rarely attained . A Soviet intelligence officer operating under cover of employment at the United Nations Secretariat has requested classified information from a double agent regarding the F-14 aircraft being manufactured by Grumman The facts have been presented to the Department 0f Justice and Depa rtment of State and both have approved prosecutive action The Soviet was scheduled for arrest during May , 1971 , but this action DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EWL ;pdr 4-E 63 Ni 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 75 ================================================== Page 76 ================================================== 4-E was held in abeyance pending final approvall of the White House, which had requested a temporary delafy _ Soviet has been on summer Iea ve and recent ly returned to the U . S We are currently seeking concurrence from the White House So that arrest may take place at the next meeting scheduled for 9/13/71 VI _ Dissemination of Significant Intelligence Da ta One of the products of our counterintelligence operations is the development of intelligence da ta of interest to other U_ S_ agencies The following are examples of significant da ta which has been disseminated on a high level since the last inspection_ 1 Dissemination to National Security Agency regarding an unknown subject connected with that Agency who was reported to uuS as cooperating with the KGB 2 _ Dissemination to Atomic Energy Commission concerning a iign officiai of that' Agency who TS bcizs cultivated by the Soviets for intelligence purposes 3 Dissemination to State, CIA, and the White House 0f information we developed concerning the delivery to the Soviet Embassy on June 17 , 1971, of a package containing 2 copy of the "Pentagon Papers M1 4 _ Dissemination to White House, CIA, and state concerning an intelligence .approach ma de by the Soviets to a member of the President 's Science Advisory Committee . 5 . Dissenination to the White House of information we developed concerning the receipt by Soviet intelligence of information concerning Dr Kissinger 's trip to China prior to the release of this information by the President_ This informa tion was obtained from an American agent of the KGB in Washington , D. C_ 6 Dissemination on high level to White House and CIA concerning Soviet intelligence targets relating to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks then in progress DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 ELiedr 4-E 8 6 4 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 76 ================================================== Page 77 ================================================== 4-E 7 Information in the CHOWLINE and PALMETTO cases has been disseminated to Dr Kissinger and the Attorney General Dr Kissinger has commended the Director and the FBI in this matter and specifically requested that he be kept informed of any additional developments VII. Soviet Information Collation System (SICS) SICS is the system in which we have utilized automatic data processing equipment to record data concerning Soviet officials in the U. S . Since the last inspection } a continuing expansion has been made in this system and we are looking to the inclusion of Satellite personnel in the near future This is a time consuming project which holds a tremendous potential , already partially realized for reducing a dministrative work and ma king our overa1l investigative operations more efficient and successful Detailed write-up is included in Section 5-Q of the inspection report . VIII. Recovery $9,288. 76 has been claimed as a recovery in the SNOOD case This is the amount paid Internal Revenue Service as tax on income belatedly reported by subject due to action by the Bureau DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EWLipdr 4-E W8860820oelu2984638 Pagezlz 35 ================================================== Page 78 ================================================== ACCOMPL ISHMENTS 4-E SECTION CHIEF G C_ MOORE EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION The significant accomplishments of the Extremist Intelligence Section can be seen most clearly in the accomplish- ments through our investigative efforts as well as the accomplish- ments achieved through the extrenist informants . Since the last inspection we have supervised the "Newkill Special. 1i This case involves unprovoked attack on two New York City (NYC) police officers, 5/21/71, by two Negro male assailants . Both officers were shot and killed, Prior to this shooting on 5/19/71 two NYC officers were machine gunned and seriously wounded as attempted to a speed car occupied by Negro males Anonymous letters were received by news media in NYC cleining credit for these shootings The Director met with the President and the Attorney General regarding the killing of the two officers as this incident received nationwide publicity. The Director instructed an all-out effort be made to effect Bureau solution_ Intensive investigation has been conducted to identify assailants with investigation conducted abroad and in over 40 field offices. Over 2000 people have been interviewed_ The Identification Division has compared the fingerprints of over 700 persons with latent evidence and the Laboratory Division has conducted about 400 separate examinations of ballistics and other type evidence in this case Since its inception, we have concentrated on members of the violence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) as suspects_ This has off since four persons were arrested in NYC on 6/5/71 while attempting an armed robbery . Two of the individuals DOMESTIC INTELL IGENCE DIVISION 8/19/71 JGD;acs 4-E 66 NIL 88608-Dpeld;32089628- Rage; 657 C.14 they ing stop paid ================================================== Page 79 ================================================== arrested were Bureau fugitives_ We had previously identified the twa Bureau fugitives from fingerprints ffom material submitted by them to news media in claiming credit for the murders _ The two Bureau fugitives, Richard_Moore_and Edward_Josephs were BPP members who were reportedly in Algeria_ A machine gun utilized in armed robbery and in possession of Moore was deternined to be same weapon used in machine gunning of two NYC police officers on 5/19/71 . Moore has been indicted by Queens County , New York, Grand Jury for attempted murder of the two officers He and Joseph remain in custody of local officials. Our intense investigation has in some respects decimated the BPP in NYC , We have kept them on the defensive and in hiding- Our investigation and interview program has resulted in developing a witness who is an associate of the prime suspects in this case, Beced "pon hez testimony-of -acts cf violence, she identified seven Panthers who participated in kill a Negro BPP leader in NYC _ Of the seven , three had previously been arrested in the above-mentioned armed robbery 6/5/71 The remaining four becane Bureau fugitives for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution for murder. Or8/7/71 a Panther informant of our Detroit Office under instructions to locate the four fugitives located Michael Dennis Hill; one of the four 9 who was accompanied by an associate Based upon informant S report, Hill and Anthony_Nicholas La Borde were arrested both armed with firearns 1 and La Borde also had a live hand grenade in his possession_ A Federal Grand Jury has indicted Hill and La Borde with possession of destructive device and La Borde also charged with harboring Hill Hill 'is reportedly the "trigger in shooting of two officers on 5/19/71 and our witness has stated Hill was extremely upset for his failure to actually kill the officers and is a likely suspect in killing the two officers two nights later on 5/21/71_ Hill is described as the "hit of BPP NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 79 May ing man" man" ================================================== Page 80 ================================================== and was the planner and "hit man" in armed robberies and acts of violence committed by BPP La Borde was also indicted on armed robbery charges on 8/16/71 in NYC having been identified as the person who held up a bar dur- 1971. 2 Hill and La Borde are prime suspects in the kill on 5/21/71 and lineup is being arranged for our crime scene witnesses to view these two_ 5~S 2t 2222 : _ ~ We have kept the White House and the Attorney General apprised of all pertinent developments in this case and on five occasions Mr _ John DS Ehrlichman Assistant: to the President Dopestic Affairse the Wite House, has advised the Director Teztez f his appreciation of being keptfully_ informed on this case: 2-4 2ic{2 - Througk the ivestigative eftorts: of the: field' and' the various Bureau programs 9 we have been able to- follow closely the development and activity of the BPP which revealed as of June_ 9 1971, a total membership of 710 in 39 branches located in 37 cities_ Ili_21 1cziarizze #.22 2 2fe3z Ec: setcrs_ Frezs rrogre was <_ss-The-Bureau' s Black Nationalist ~Counterintelfigence Pregram (COINTELPRO) which was in effeet-for - Several ears; 2; was_discontinued 4/27/71. Prior to discontinuance; counter- intelligence activity directed toward disruption of -the BPP was carried out at an accelerated rate taking advantage-of-and exploiting any appropriate situation_ Emphasis was placed on creating distrust between Huey P Newton, BPP Minfster-of Defensez and EldridgeCleaver 2 BPP Minister of Information; 2 fugitive in Algeria_ These efforts resulted in a break between Newtonand Cleaver on 2/26/71 which soon grew into &n irrecor- cilable and a name-call contest between the two of them_ Through our mass media program, we disseminated publicity concerning the within the party as Well as the fact that Newton lived in a 8650-a-month apartment" while rank and file Panthers went hungry _ iC Zo ciacraiit The publicity concerning the internal factionalism as well as Newton S high living definitely served to discredit the BPP and caused further factionalism _ The financial NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 80 ing July, ing for by split ing split ================================================== Page 81 ================================================== supporters were disenchanted bringing to 3 halt the flow of donations into the organization_ The resulting strain added to the paranoia of Newton causing him to create complete chaos within BPP national headquarters_ Newtone in an effort to justify his position and to criticize Cleaver and his dissident followers 9 claimed that Cleaver and his appezite for violence were the root of all of the BPF problems jm the recent pasts Newton maintained the BPP was really nonviolent but was led astray by Cleaver and that Newton, will now return the organization to a position of nonviolence and comunity work_ In sumation, our COINTELPRO efforts split the BPP 9 cut off their supplies of outside funds created chaos within. As a result of the ever increasing information being reported by our informants regard the acquisition of weapons black extremist groups , on 5/17/71 an airtel was sent to al1 SACs setting forth instructions regard: the handling of such information_ This airtel sets out in detail the possible gun law viclatiors urder tkc National Firearms Act, State Firearzz Control Act and the unlawful possession or receipt of firearms_ The field was instructed that we have secondary investigative jurisdiction in such matters and that infommation developed by our informant coverage regarding possible gun law violations should be handled by uS and vigorously pursued looking to the ultimate prosecution of the black extremists involved The Black Afro Militant Movement BAMM) was organized in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970 _ The leader of this group was Alfred Dwight Anos_Feathersitone, an articulate black extremist and an aditted communist Izho had in the past visited Fidel Castro in Cuba Through the outstanding informant coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive investi- gative techniques used, this dangerous extremist organization has been completely destroyed and is no er a factor in the extremist activities in the Miami area _ (ur informant coverage developed information' regard the participation by BAM leaders and members in fire bombings in the Miami area including a bombing at the University Of Miami. Through this coverage and other investigations an excellent criminal case was developed NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 81 SE*x84*x72 44.5,455*/4i4 21744rrs he, and ing by ing long ing ================================================== Page 82 ================================================== regarding the teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices by BAMM leaders_ In December 9 1970 , Federal Grand Jury in Miami, Florida, rendered indictment charging Featherstone and two other BAMM leaders with violation of the new antiriot laws _ Al1 three subjects have been found ty in Federal court Miami. Featherstone and Charles Riley, Jr. another BAMM leader , have been sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for periods of four and two and a half years respectively. The third subject, after testifying for the Federal Government , was placed on probation. Earlier this year 9 one of our informants being operated the Richmond Office reported on a conspiracy by leaders of the Washington, D C., Chapter of the BPP and leaders of the Richmond Information Center (RIC) , an affiliate of the BPB to steal and transport weapons from Richmond Virginia, to Washington > DS C. This informant reported on the theft of such weapons in Richmond and their subsequent illegal transportation to Washington, D C., by this group As a result of this information developed and other investigation, two of the BPP leaders in Washington and three RIC leaders in Richmond , Virginia, were subsequently indicted by a Federal Grand Our informant testified in Federal court as the principal Governent witness resul in the conviction of the two Washington, D C., leaders and two of the RIC leaders _ The trial for the fifth individual involved is scheduled for 8/20/71 in Richmond . The sentencing of the convicted leaders is scheduled in the near future. As a result of the conviction obtained based on the 'excellent information furnished by our informant. the RIC has been completely destroyed and conviction of the two Washington BPP leaders has been highly significant in curtailing the activity of the Washington, D. BPP Chapter _ The continued operation and development of extremist informants has resulted in a steady flow of Valuable intelligence information, which information has brought about the apprehension NWB8608_Docld;32989638_Page guil by Jury. ting C. , ================================================== Page 83 ================================================== lof badly wanted extremist fugitives, confiscation of explosives and firearms in possession of extremists , the 'prevention of violence and the saving of lives _ In addition, these informants have been responsible for bringing about Ehe arrest of 630 individuals since the last inspection, 145 of these individuals were Bureau fugitives as well as being responsible for the recovery of s327,760.53 _ Concerning the development of information as to black extremist activities outside the United States effecting the United States , we have placed an informant in Canada under the direction qfLthe Royal Canadian Mounted_PolLice This operation 3 iS commented on in detail in the extremist informant write-up. Some of the concrete examples of 'our informant and investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following: Ghetto informants in June, 1971 , developed information concerning the motive and circunstances leading up to an unsuccessful attempted fire bowi _ of & Jackson, Mississippi, ice vehicle; identified a local subject involved in assault and theft of a revolver of a Cincinnati, Ohio, police officer , which information resulted in the arrest of the subject by the police department; furnished information which was instrumental in arranging for the surrender to FBI Special Agents of a 16 - year-old male who was badly wanted by the Buffalo Police Department in connection with a shooting incident, Omaha informants advised of the location of several weapons which were owned by members of the Black Revolutionary Party in Omaha and which were subsequently seized by the Onaha Police Department; Houston informants furnished information which was the basis of a raid by the Houston Police Department on the headquarters of the Peoples Party II, which resulted in the arrest of nine individuals 3 eight of whon were charged with burglary and firearms theft; and the recovery of numerous weapons, Detroit extrenist informants advised concerning a BPP member who was involved in a holdup killing in Detroit. He also advised that this individual was carrying the same NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 83 ilg Pol ================================================== Page 84 ================================================== pistol used in the 'killing, which enabled the Detroit police to arrest the BPP- member recover the pistol and determine that this weapon was used in the killing referred to above A Tampa informant furnished information concerning identity of two Negro males who placed a fire bomb in a garage in Tampa, Florida_ A Miami ghetto informant was instrumental in obtaining advance information concerning problems in a local high school It is noted there was a walkout by students at this high school and as a result several Negro students were arrested. A Washington Field informant obtained information concerning Stokely Carnichael 's to the United States fron Africa and this information was verified by the New York Division. Detroit informant provided information which saved two lives_ This informant 2 who was a member of the BPP 9 was instrumental in saving the lives of two BPP members who were being disciplined by the BPP and his information when furnished to local police was responsible for arrest of seven BPP menbers wno were charged with kidraping &rd 2ee2ult to d0 bodily harm less than murder A Memphis informant furnished information which prevented a shootout between members Of the BPP chapter and the Memphis Police Department_ Extremist intelligence information gathered through our informants and investigations makes up a major portion of the Bureau S sophisticated document which is disseminated to the White House and other high-level Government agencies _ This document captioned "'FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" furnishes the White House and other agencies with a digest of the extrenist problem in the United States The quality.of our informants can also be judged by the fact that since the last inspection 16 Special Agents have been recommended for either incentive awards or letters of commendation for their work in developing and handling these informants _ In addition 3 11 extremist informants were given bonus awards for valuable information furnished and services rendered_ NWV 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 84 trip ================================================== Page 85 ================================================== In relating to the accomplishments of the Extremist Intelligence Section, coment must be made' Goncerning the contributions regularly being made by the Inspection Division during their analysis of extremist matters: in the various field divisions In addition to acting upon information furnished to them by this Section, the Inspection Staff through their on-the- spot review of extremist matters in the field } are often able to detect weaknesses not apparent at the Seat @f Government and offer constructive assistance to the office involved in strengthening their operation. The information furnished in the: Inspection reports is used by this Section to do a comprehersive analysis of every field office operation and to furnish the results of the analysis to the field divisions by communications captioned "Administrative Review_ These reviews have been most helpiful in strengthening the various field office operations. Since the last inspection, infcmant coverage has improved in the Boston, Charlotte, Cincimari } Cievelana, Newark and New Haven field divisions and this improvement can be attributed in part to the Inspector 1 S analysis of the above operations. 73 NW88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 85_ ================================================== Page 86 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E SECTION CHEEF W . R. WANNALL NATIONALITES INTELLIGENCE SECTION There is attached a summary of significant accomplishments of this Section set forth by individual units _ Specific tangible accomplish- ments resulting from programs supervised by this Section are outlined in write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated herein _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION NSPECTION 8/19/71 AJDiams 4-@ 74 NW 88608_Docld:32989638 86 Page ================================================== Page 87 ================================================== 4 7 E SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT FBI liaison Agents stationed abroad in 17 'foreign posts have facilitated and encouraged the prompt handling foreign agencies of FBI requests for investigation in the countries covered by those agencies _ 'The productivity of this liaison during the first six months of 1971 was demonstrated by the location in those countries of 779 FBI fugitives } 35 fugitives wanted by other agencies, and 573 Selective Service delinquents for a total of 1,387 persons wanted in the U_ S Eighty- eight automobiles , stolen in the U_ S _ 0 were recovered abroad during the same six months and the total estimated value f stolen property and funds recovered abroad was 8596,442 Requests for U. S_ information and investigations withir tha U. 3 ai8 kandlez 0i 3 rccirrccal tasis for the foreign agencies with which we are in contact_ This cooperation has played 2 large part in maintaining our dominant position in international police work and has encouraged 2 spirit of cooperation between the countries concerned: During the first seven months in 1971, we handled a total of 1,773 investigations under our Foreign Police Cooperation program_ In one of these cases initiated as an FPC matter but transformed into an Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property case, New York City Agents were successful in locating the famous painting by El Greco tiLa Asuncion de la Virgen, I1 which had been stolen in Spain in 1936 and brought into the U. S _ in 1968 through Mexico This painting, 2 Spanish national art treasure is estimated aS worth a minimum of one million dollars and its location has received exceptionally wide publicity in Spain and resulted in expressions of gratitude to our Legal Attache for EBI cooperation_ 75 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 87 by ================================================== Page 88 ================================================== 4 - E The expansion of our operations abroad was under- taken at the instruction of the President for the specific purpose of developing high-level political intelligence and each such item submitted is identified by the code word "HILEV _ Mi After a slow start in January when the new offices were just getting underway_ } the production 0f HILEV items has increased to the point that during July, 1971, 73 such items were submitted of which 53 or 72 . 69 were actually disseminated to Dr _ Kissinger and the Attorney General. Through August 17 , 1971, a total of 245 items have been So disseminated_ By letter March 3 1971, Dr Kissinger , referring to our work , stated "it is gratifying that efforts thus far have been So fruitful" and "your contributions in the foreign area are deeply appreciated_ 1f In June, 1971, 'the President informed" the Director that he desired that we again expand our foreign liaison in view of the valuable information which had been procured by the Bureau in its operations abroad Agents of the Unit receive telephone calls from the otner agencies 1n tne Executive Brancn who neea information or have . problems wish to discuss with the FBI _ Soine of these are referred to the interested division but every effort is made to resolve them without un- necessarily involving Bureau officials As an example, in May, 1971, we received an Arny proposal for the checking of all fingerprints submitted by applicants for enlistment or induction into_ the Armed Forces Special Agent Schwartz immediately discussed this proposal with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Policy and a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army and was able to convince these officials that no change in the present procedures was necessary or desirable _ As a result of the efforts of Special Agent Schwertz, the Bureau was saved a large volume of fingerprint classification and searching and he was commended by the Director for his Successfui handling 0f this proposal, NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 88 4-72 they ================================================== Page 89 ================================================== X-EL CUBAN UNIT This Unit has responsibility for' neutralizing Cuban intelligence and subversive Puerto Rican independence activities against the United States The Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN ) . New York City, is the focal point for Cuban spying operations_ } but Puerto Rican terroristic endeavors are carried out by several groups , some leing stric local San Juan operations and others under Cuban direction, carrying out incendiary bombings and acts of sabotage in the New York City area, aS well as in Puerto Rico. Cuban Intelligence Matters We currently have 11 active, 21L potential and one iinactiva doiblc ~gentz in the Cuban intemligence field_ Through a concerted effort mounted against the CHVUN in February 1970 , we had developed 24_DESECO-type sources at the time of the last inspection _ Since that date, 19 other siinilar sources have been cultivated and each is being used in sone capacity on a continuing or intermittent basis in our efforts to @stablish blanket coverage of the known intelligence officials at te: CMUN (9 out of a 15 man 'complement) and to develop a defector-in-place there_ Recently we have developed documentary proof that an Attache at the CHUN is illegally purchasiig television cameras in violation of United States regulations, and State Department is considering persona non grata action Fased on this data . Ore of our sources has obtained the repain' contract for CMUN utomobiles_Which assures uS continuing @ccess to them 47 In March_ 1971 the Director s approval was obtained to carry out a concerted defection effort xgainst a CMUN Second Secretary using a Special Agent of theHew York Office who has a Latin American background and who has gained the complete confidence of the Cuban intelligence official through his facility with the Spanish language and his finesse in posing as 2 Washington D businessman who is looking ahead to the time When United States will reestablish traie relations with Cuba _ State Department is preparing back-up material for this operation_ The White House has been dfered this arrangement as a vehicle to feed disinformation to the Cuban Govemnment } and it has responded with enthusiasm that serious consideration is being given to use of this communication charnel NW-88608-Doeld-82989638_Page 89_ tly Czdee ================================================== Page 90 ================================================== 4-E In other positlve moves wo have #rranged for 8 friendly newspeperman , who writes for Spegdish-lengyage newspapers In New York City, to prenare feature articles On" Cuban aefectors who have settled happily in the United States In conjunction with State Department, we received concurrence of Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations to bar two strong-arm-type Cuben intelligence officials from Unlted States territory even chough nelther had ever peen in the United States or performed any known acts of violence against United Stateg property or citizens Mr 0 Thant pointed out that this was 2 landmark action, as the United States had never betore presented a case which warranted entry deniale in the history of the United Netions Our eround-the-clock coverage of Cuben intelligence ectivities has allowed uS to identify $ with 2 minimum of effort, the various ex tremist, New Left and subversive Puerto Rican independence leaders who maintain contact with the CMUN . Two va luable double agents in the Miami area have gained the complete confidence of 8 top Cuban colfaborator based in New York City, and they ere able to provide full detalls concerning Cuban Government milltary and civilian targets in thealtant_area One of these double agents 1s being grooned to make clendestine ' trips to New York_Citys and it 1s anticipated that we will receive valuable det concerning other Cuban Government tergets when these trips materialize The field offices responsible for covering Cuban intelligence activities heve consis tently taken an imaginative epproach %o the problem , and supervisory personnel in the fleld and at the Seat of Government conslstently strive to insure that a11 available tools are furnished the investigating Agents _ Subversive Puerto Rican Independence Matters The terroristic Puerto Rican proindependence movement responsible for over 230 incendiary bombings in Puerto Rlco and over 40 in the New York City ar8a since 1967 1s 2 very real menace to major United States installations and to the security of Puerto Rico, 85 well 25 to the United States_ While only 2 Small minority of persons desiring independence for Puerto Rico is Involved , we now have approximately 1,800 individuals marked for special handling in case Of: 8 national emergency and 2 majority of these have been assoclated in some way with violent acts against public or private property . The largest of the extremist Puerto Rican independence groups is the Puerto Rican Independence Hovement (MPIPR) 1 while others practicing violence are the Puerto Rican Socialist Workers NW 88608 Docld:32989638 90 Page ================================================== Page 91 ================================================== 4-E Perty (PSO) 6 Armed Revolutionary' Independerce Movement (MIRA) 8 Armed Conmandos for Liberation (CAL) end {he Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR ) the oldest 0f the revolutionary groups _ MIRA and CAL, in particular ere dominated native Puerto Ricans who nad many years 0f sabotage training in Cuba , returned gurreptitiously to puerto Rico and led the wave of major explosions which heavily damaged United States installations in metropolitan Puerto Rican areas Property loss resulting from such acts oi violence since 1967 has been estimated at over 815 million with an economic loss of over $100 million_ In addition t0 the previous apprehension of Iltberto_Qjeda Riog Cuban espionage agent and leader of Beveral major bomb expeditions $ the TBI Wzs instrumental in the arrest. by Police 0f Puerto Rlco (POPR) of Nerciso Rabell Mertinez and Roberto Jose Todd Pesan two Giher Tong-time esplonage agents With eztensive Sabotage training i2 Cuba _ Folloving the deatk o€ two police offlciels and an ECTC cadet during 2 riot in March , 1971 _ 2t the University of Puerto Rico, one of our informants was able to identify and bring about the arrest of 2 Federation of University Students for Independence (TUPI) leader iovolved in the killings _ TUPI 1s 8 redical college student group which advocates violence in bringing about indepen- dence for Puerto Rico. Our sources In the Puerto Rican indepen dence field have given u8 information concerning subversives traveling between Puerto Rico and New York City to transport incendiary devices for use in acts of sabotage _ Also & close rapport has been established between POPR and our San Juan Office in recent months The resulting arrests and seizure 0f explosives as well 25 incelligence ma teriel, bave slowed down - the acts Of violence noticeably during the ffrst seven months of 1971. We are quite apprehensive that the National Conference of Governors has been scheduled for Septenber 12-15, 1971, at Sen Juan _ Realizing the volatile nature of the Puerto Rlcan Independence movemnent, we have directed en airtel to a11 offices pointing up the powder keg situation and asking that every effort be made to obtain advance Information concerning planned acts of violence to be carried out against participating officials Fe are wa tching this 1tuation closely and are prepared to the POPE 911 logical assistance in helping to curtail any suchb plang 3437 NWA-88608_Decld 32989638 Page 91 by ing give ================================================== Page 92 ================================================== 4 - E MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT This Unit is primarily responsible for the overall supervision and direction of the FBI's activities relating to countries in the Western Hemisphere commonly referred to as the Latin American nations Such activities involve Espionage, Internal Security Registration Neutrality Matters and the coilection and dissemination of foreign intelligence data In addition, the Unit handles anti-Castro activities pro_ Castro organizations and individuals , Cuban Security Index matters and cases and Cuban travel, immigrant and refugee maiiers _ Tile Unii is aisu respuusible fof the supervision of cases involving Spanish American and other ethnic groups The President and other policy makers have indicated a continuing interest in" political intelligence information from areas in South and Central America and the Carribean_ The critical need for such data from these areas , which are in constant political turmoil, prompted uS to augument our office in Buenos Aires and to establish new offices in La Paz; Bolivia; Managua , Nicaragua; and Caracas , Venezuela _ These offices coupled with our offices in Mexico and Buenos Aires give uS representation in the areas from which political intelligence data is urgently needed. To further develop such information, we have established sensitive coverage in Panamanian and Chilean fields Nw 88608 Docid:32989638 92 Act, Page ================================================== Page 93 ================================================== 4 - E We have on a continuing basisl been able to provide the President and other responsible officials with information of the type needed . With increasing frequency our Legal Attaches have been able to provide high level intelligence information wich has been given exc lusively to the White House and the Attorney General One such item for example provided by the Legal Attache in La Paz on 5/20/71 and disseminated on the same date to the White House and the Attorney General dealt with plans of the Bolivian Government to request the withdrawal of the Peace Corps fron that country_ Subsequently on 5/22/71 , the Bolivian Government did request the withdrawal of this group from the country: A representative of the National Security Council commented favorably concerning this data and the Legal Attache was commended by the Director for developing the source who was able to produce this type of information_ The Unit continues to be successful in thwarting the plans of militant anti-Castro groups which have sought to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and property of foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba Successful development of key informants who have infiltrated anti- Castro groups under Bureau direction has enabled the Bureau to keep abreast of their activities Cuban exile activities are embarrassing to the U. S _ Government and could lead to 2 major confrontation be tween the U_ S _ and the Soviet Union which has assumed: the role of Cuba ' s protector_ An example of our success in this area was the ~arrest by appropriate authorities f four members of Alpha 66 } militant anti-Castro group, on 7/11/71 and the seizure of machine guns, ammunition, explosives 2 hand grenades } other weapons and a boat Seizure of this material has hurt Alpha 66's capability to conduct raids on Cuba _ Action taken in this instance was based on data furnished.by FBI informant_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 93 ~ - 5) Page ================================================== Page 94 ================================================== CHINESE UNIT 4-E During February 1971, we identified RobertMoling Teng_ (65-73910) as the individual reported by Royal Canadian Mounted_Police (RCMP) 2s having had clandestine contact with 2 Chinese communist (Chicom in- tefligence officer in Ottawa canada on 2T2Z71 7Teng nas ottstanding credentials as a former Chinese Nationalist diplomat and a former United States Government employee_ His background makes him an ideal type for covert use by the Chinese: Communist Intelligence Service_ Since February , 1971, Teng has attempted to gain employment on the White House staff ) with State Department , with Department of Justice and with a contractor handling work for National Aeronautics and Space Administration _ We learned of these efforts through a sensitive source. and were able to alert responsible officials concerning" Teng It Jily_ 1271, eith Director s approval a desk-level conference regarding Chicom matters was held at the Bureau with our RCMP counterparts _ The conference was most rewarding and informative and the results were furnished to the Director, who instructed that a memorandum based On results 0f the 'conference_ be prepared for Dr Kissinger at the White House This memorandum was sent to Dr Kissinger who replied with a personal letter of thanks to the Director Dr Kissinger noted that the Bureau' s timely coverage of these matters is most important , and he requested to be further advised of these developments as they occur An analysis of our existing method of handling cases on Chinese seaman deserters was made during February and March , 1971. This study resulted in a recommendation_ } approved_ } to streamline handling of these matters Annual savings of $16,160 realized from this new procedure (see Bureau letter to Albany: dated 3/22/71 captioned "Chinese Seamen Deserting in the U_ S _ IS Ma CH/' 105-129735) In view of the recent increase in the number of con- tact cases growing out of the_establishment of 2 Chicom_Embassy at Ottawa Canada it was recommended and approved that ~Legat Ottawa submit communications in unknown subject contact cases in a manner which would allow prompt. relay to appropriate field offices inasmuch as identification of unknown subjects is of extreme importance at the outset_ 3Rgdg2 4-E NW88608_Docld: 32989638.Page 94 32 ================================================== Page 95 ================================================== In view of the increase in the number of contact cases mentioned above , Legat Ottawa has been requested to devise a form he can utilize in furnishing pertinent infor- mation to the Bureau_ The present manner of submission of. this data does cause some administrative problems here During Augusty 1971, one of our sources began a trip scheduled to last almost three weeks during which he will con- tact a number of pro-Chicom individuals in the United States 2j and Canada and will culminate in an effort to establish contact with Chicom intelligence officers in Ottawa Travel to Canada is with the concurrence of RCMP and RCHP will provide coverage in order that we can evaluate the results of the source S "efforts 'During the last three months two other sources being directed against the Chicoms traveled to HongKong: where they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom con tacts Another source who is under Bureau direction and who is employed at the_UnitedNations_ GUN) , is now in Red China on home leave _ This travel was made at no cost to the Bureau and when debriefed it is expected that this source will be able to provide uS with up-to-date information regarding 'conditions in Red China and possibly valuable political intelli- gence During July 1971 9 Paul Lin_described RCMP as the foremost Chicom agent of influence in Canada 3 visited Cambridge Massachusetts 2 to consult With Harvard University officials His schedule also called for a meeting with Senator Kennedy who has exhibited a keen interest in U_ S . relations with "Red China_ One of our sources was able to main- tain personal contact with Lin during this visit 9 and Linahas asked the source to carry tasks for him It should be noted that RCMP has descri bed_Lin aS the_person mostLikeLyetorbe involved in any future discussions in the United States relating %o Chicom efforta to ensure entry into the UN NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 95 13 - 32 by ================================================== Page 96 ================================================== V 4 - E NATIONALITIES_UNIT Israeli and Middle East Investigations Information from these investigations continues to be of extreme interest to the White House, the Secretary of State, and high-level officials within the intelligence cormunity _ We have continued to furnish informa tion from our sensitiye_coverage in the Israelifield under a program of dissemination which has been assigned the security designation of "SCOPE 11 "SCOPE# information is disseminated only to select individuals at the White House and Department of State and to a previously cleared chain of command within agencies of the intelligence community. Data primarily relates to attempts by officials of the Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction and support within Uriitca Statcz Czzcrrmcnt circles fcr ccntinued. support of the Israeli Government politically and economically 9 as well as affording military equipment. The personalities involved in these dealings with Israeli officials have included prominent members of the United: States Congress 3 as well as individuals in the Exeative Branch _ With regard to the information we have furnished, favorable comment has been received from Dr Hehry A _ Kissinger at the White House, the Secretary of State and other dignitaries within the intelligence community relative to its timeliness and value in formulating United States Government policy keeping abreast 0f the continuing tense situation in the Middle East. This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for extremely sensitive operations undertaken in_cogperation with the National -Security Agency designed to penetrate diplomatic communications of foreign goverients We are $ 2 currentiy conducting (s1z, Such operations 3 afl f which are most successful and responsive to high national priority requirements in the production of cryptanalyticand intelligence data_ of the above-described operations were accomplished since January, 1971 _ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 96 34 and Two Page ================================================== Page 97 ================================================== 4 - E_ In view of the sensitivity @f these particular operations_ 3 it is suggested that I or my Number One Man be consulted for details Investigation of Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information to "The New York Times : by Daniel Ellsberg On June 15, 1971, the Attormey General requested the FBI conduct all necessary investigation into the publication of classified information by "The New York Times- Ti Our continuing investigation on a "special" basis into this matter has from its inception, identified Daniel Ellsberg, Senior Research Associate Center of International Studies , Massachusetts Institute of Technology , Cambridge, Massachusetts, as being the principal suspect in this matter Investigation has revealed that Ellsberg had access to the material involved while employed at Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California; reproduced classified documents in Los Angeles 2 California, in otcber 19c9; erd subsequently made eopies cf this meteriel availabie to various members of Congress: who failed to make the data public_ Strong circumstantial evidence has been developed indicating that in March, 1971 , he made copies of the information available to representatives of "The New York Times" for reproduction On June 28 , 1971, a Federal Grand Jury at Los Angeles returned 2 two-count indictment charging Ellsberg with violation of Section 793 (E) of the Espionage Statute in that he unlawfully retained classitied documents and failed to deliver them to appropriate Gover nment officials_ He vas also charged with violation of Section 641 of the Theft of Government Property Statute in that he converted to his own use certain documents having 2 value of excess $100 _ Investigation revealed that Anthony Russo, former employee at Rand Corporation and associate Of EiTsberg , assisted Ellsberg: in the reproduction of documents in October, 1969 _ He was immunized from prosecution and NW 88608 - Docld:32989638 97 of Page ================================================== Page 98 ================================================== 4 - E subsequently refused to testify before a Federal Grand Jury_ As a result, he was held in contempt and was comnmitted to jail on 8/16/71 until such time as he purges himself testifying_ Considerable evidence has been developed indicating employees 0f"The New York Times M have also violated Section 793 (E) of the Espionage Statute in regard to their unauthorized possession of classified information and refusal to deliver the information to appropriate officials of the United States Government upon demand_ The summary of facts in the Ellsberg matter, as stated above, derived from a mass of details uncovered by extensive investigation handled on a "special" basis in four of the Bureau ' s major offices and represents lesser degrees of investigative activity in virtually every Bureau continental office as well as several Legal Attaches The Unit has successfuily coped With the supervisory responsibilities of this investi gation +0 date i+'2 servicing of the numerous inquiries in this matter has contributed to the Bureau S stature in the eyes of the highest levels of the Executive Branch who have evidenced concern in the overall problem of the leak of classified information to unauthorized persons Ramifications of the Ellsberg investigation could foreseeably touch every level of Government operation in view of the necessary revisions in the' handling of classified data pointed up as being: required because of Shortcomings uncovered in this investigation_ The need to uncover such shortcomings and to uncover any indication of a concentrated conspiracy to subvert the national security violation of classification rules continues to be a matter of considerable concern in our investigation 0f Ellsberg and shares equally with the Unit's recognized responsibility for overseeing the investigation looking toward successful prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and others involved in this matter_ 3 ` - NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 98 by ana by Ye ================================================== Page 99 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICA TION PROGRAMS 4 - INSRECTOR E. S . MLLER: You are requested to furnish information regarding various urveys projects and/or programs in effect in your Division_ This infor mation should include identity of the project or program, background and date of inception scope and desired objectives positive results achieved Since last inspection extent and nature of current supervision current justification for continuance 3 and frequency of evaluation and date of last justification. Identify any surveys projects or programs you have in operation that are not set forth in my request In addition identify any surveys _ projects and programs completed or discontinued Since the last inspection_ Identify only investigative -type matters in this category Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs instituted Since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you may wish to comment on: 1. Security Index Program_ 2 . Security Informants _ 3 . Extremist Matters _ (Black extremist groups) 4. Extremist Informants . 5 . White Extremist Groups . Technical and Microphone Surveillances _ 6. Counterintelligence_ Communist Infiltration of Extrem ist Groups _ 8; New Left Movement. 10. Espionage _ 11. other program deemed pertinent: Comments of Assistant Director requested. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D, BRENNAN Attached are individual (JAS:mls 8/20/71) write-ups from each of tbe Sections concerning the above DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/17/71 ESM:wmj 4- Nlu88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 99 37 Any ================================================== Page 100 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/ OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W & GRAY: Oa In connection with the Inspector S request under above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following handled by the Internal Security Section: (1) Security Inder Program (2) Security Informant Program (7) Counterintelligence Program La Disruption of White Hate Groups (11) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent (a) Thumbnail Sketch Program DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 LLA:co 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 100 Page ================================================== Page 101 ================================================== SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS 4-H BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals mho in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat to the national security began prior to World War II_ The actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with lists of individuals considered for detention in the event of a threat to the national security. SCOPE AND DESIRE OBJECTIVES This program is field-wide in scope The goal of the Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individualg who because of their membership and activity and/or association with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially dangerous to tbe interna7 security of the country. The program includes the collection of sufficient information relat to the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension and detention in the event of a national emergency _ Another goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion The SI is broken down into three Priority groupings, the cards being tabbed 'either Priority I, II or III in accordance with the relative factor of dangerousness _ Most dangerous individuals are tabbed Priority I. POSITIVE RESUTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION By way of background, in February, 1969 , as a matter of temporary expediency } the Executives Conference approved a moratorium on certain Security Matter V Communist investigations and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971 . By memorandum October 29 1970, from the Executives Conference to Mr _ Tolson approved by the Director, the moratorium was lifted At the time there Were approximately 10,690 individuals on the SI who were of the Priority II and III types _ Virtually no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7 , 000 Of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 6SEP;xrd 4-R NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 101 ing ================================================== Page 102 ================================================== SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM 4-H BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS February 9 1969 _ Many 0i these persons had changed residence and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown _ It can thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an aggressive, timely and precise step toward fulfilling our current responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of these individuals Implementation was directed by airtel November 3 , 1970 , to al1 offices_ } and in doing So we took a realistic step in permitting the field to stagger the reopening of these cases so that they would be spread out over the period November 3, 1970 , to June 1971 This was considered essential in view of our approxima- 13€1017 that it would be necessary to reopen about 7 0o0 of the Priority II and III types _ Our experience in the nine months since moratorium was lifted has demonstrated the wisdom of the lifting of the moratorium a5 it was found that many of these subjects had changed residence and/ or employment 9 thus necessitating substantial investigation to determine new whereabouts_ There are presently pending 2 number of these cases for the precise purpose of determining whereabouts _ EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURIENT SUPERVISION Responsibility for administrative handling of the SI rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section_ Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate supervisory personnel I personally follow this matter closely to insure `it is current and that necessary changes are ma de wher e desirable_ This program receives constant supervision_ JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE This is a major internal security program based upon Title II 0f the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion _ FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated . The most recent justification is contained in memorandum from R~ D _ Cotter to Mr C. D Brennan dated January 12, 1971 _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 SFPirrd 4-A 5 - NW 88608 Docld:37989638 Page 102 ================================================== Page 103 ================================================== COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHITE HATE GROUPS 4-H BACKGROUND , DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES This program was initiated in September for the purpose of counteracting and neutralizing white extremist organizations leaders and a dherents During period January , February and March of 1971, there were 17 field offices involved in this program and as specific situations arose, other divisions participated_ THE UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA INC . (UKA) Under the leadership of John Paul Rogers_ Grand Dragon Rea Im of Florida the UKA in tnat area has become increasingly aggressive in recent months and has been afforded genera lly favorable coverage by the news media in Florida In addition Rogers has been infuriated by recent interviews of Klansmen by the FBI and has been increasingly vehement in his verbal attacks against TBI' Agents _ Ac 2 reselt Regezs bes been coneidered a primary subject for coun terintelfigence activity_ Tampa has instructed its informants to discredit Rogers wherever possible without creating suspicion Jobn_Baul_Rogers above has also recently devoted practicaTly al1 of his energy to the UKA to the exclusion of his wife and job, having hired a retired barber t8 handle most of his business; he purchased a 819 000 home Tampa is seeking ways to create suspicion of Rogers by other Klansmen Imperial_Hizard Robert M. Shelton of the UKA has for some time been attenpting, without success to purchase polygraph machines in order to "weed out FBI informants " Chicago, with Bureau authority interviewed Walter Van De Werkin past president of the American Society Of Polygraph Examiners, in an effort to ascertain who We should logically contact in the polygraph field to prevent Shelton and the UKA from purchasing this machine Interview } Which was handled in 2 discreet manner and in complete confidence_ revealed that we should not expand this endeavor further at this time due to the large number of individuals and companies involved_ In the event we learn of 2 specific firm or individual the UKA desires to contact for this purpose } further consideration will be given to this matter. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/20/71 LLAico 6 - 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 103 1964 , yet ================================================== Page 104 ================================================== During March, 1971, Washingto n Field Office was authorized to interview Robert J_Lee admitted Nationa 1 Socialist White People 5 Party (NSWPP) official a llegedly involved in raid on Mobilizati on Committee to End the Har in Vietnam to cast suspicion on Jesse Clayborn Stephens 1 self-styled east coast coordinator for Minutemen and to disrupt cooperative relationship between respective organizations and effect possible defection of Lee Interview appeared to be successful in that rapport was established with Lee which may be beneficial in the future . Lee volunteered information concerning NSTWPP matters not previously known to the Bureau and indicated he would be receptive for further contacts. It is felt this matter has long range potential_ CURRENT STATUS OF PROGRAM WhiJe coun terintelligence of Klan and white hate groups is an ongoing thing all counterintelligence programs 2s such which were operated by this division were discontinued by airtel to a11 field offices 4/27/71 . In exceptional instances where counterintelligence action appears warranted_ recommendations are nOW submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains These recommendations are then considered on an individual basis_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/20/71 LLAico 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 104 Page_ ================================================== Page 105 ================================================== THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM 4-H This program was initiated and authorized by SAC Letter 53-72 (J) dated October 1953 , to insure that the field is using current characterizations of subversive organizations and to provide uniformity in characterizing such organizations _ Those characterizations deemed to be of field-wide interest are now to be furnished to the field by letter to a11 offices on an annua basis rather than by SAC Letter as was formerly the practice, ip accordance with approval of suggestion in memorandum J . J , Casper to Mr Mohr dated December 7 , 1970 . The background and va lue of this program is the same 8s it was at the time of last inspection_ Since June 1 , 1971, me have been receiving and processing the annual submission of thumbnail sketches To date thumbnail sketches on 387 separate or ganizations have been received and these are being processed by appropriate supervisory personnel at the Bureau Those of field-wide interest,fwhich there are 70 at this time ) wil be furnished to the field by letter to 211 offices Others are being returned to submitting field offices as they are approved This program was last reviewed and analyzed and its continuance approved by menorandum Ra L. Shackelford to Mr C. D Brennan dated October 12 , 1970 _ Annual approval Will again be requested when the current project is completed . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 HEM:cb 8 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 105 93 27 , 444-H ================================================== Page 106 ================================================== SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM 4-H BASIC REVOLUTIONARY AND NEW LEFT ORGANIZATIONS At the time of the last inspection in January , 1971, the Internal Security Section handled informants only in the basic revolutionary organizations and related groups There was no Security Informant Unit as such , informants being handled on subversive organization desks On June 16 1 1971, a Security Informant Unit was formed and this Unit now handles informants in the New Left field as well as in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups At last inspection there were 264 member informants in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) ; at present there are 226 a decrease of 38 At last inspection there were 31 member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) ; at present there are 48 an increase of 47 As of July 31 , 1971 , date of latest monthly tabulation, the security Informant Unit nandled a ioiai ui 735 securiiy informants and 671 potential security informants , 2 total of 1,466. This inludes 630 informant cases transferred from {he New Left Section to the Security Informant Unit in the Internal Security Section on June 16 , 1971 _ There has been continuing recognition of the fact there must be no letdow in maintaining adequate informant coverage_ However economy has increasingly become a primary factor In line with the President's message on August 15, 1971, tightening economic control and our continuing efforts to hold down expenditures , the field is being instructed by letter to all offices to cut down payments to security and extremist informants and sources by five percent To assure uniformity and fairness in the application Of thiscutback throughout the field , each office was instructed to follow this formula : Total expenditures for a11 such informants and sources for the six month period ending July 1971; reduce this total by five percent; divide the resulting figure by six (months) The resulting figure is to be the guideline for each office, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 HEM: cb 44 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 106 31, 7 4 Page ================================================== Page 107 ================================================== SECURITY INFORMANT , PROGRAM REM : cb 8/19/71 This instruction is not a mandate to reduce payments across the board on a11 informants and sources Offices are to evaluate expenditures within the determined guideline amount and adjust individual payments accordingly . These instructions do not mean the Bureau will cease authorizing payments where new informants: are developed and fully justified _ It is incumbent on a11 offices to evaluate these matters within the guideline figure_ There are to be no increases in payments to informants and sources for the next 90 days , in line with the Director's instructions Each office was instructed to advise the Bureau by return airtel of the guideline figure determined By close of business September 30 1971, tbc Burczi is t8 be advised by each office that these instructions have been complied with and that expenditures have been reduced by the five percent factor On the basis of our expenditures during the past fiscal year 9 the five percent reduction will result in an annual saving of approximately $129 0o0 _ Security informant development receives continuous supervision It is not technically 2 program justified semiannually or annually but rather a fundamental procedure in our investigative operations that requires and receives vigorous to attention. The Security Informant Unit maintains an up-to-date index of Security Informants and potential security informants_ It correlates personal and operating data (such 2s name , address ) code, file and symbol number) concer ning these informants 1 which it receives from the Division S investigative sections and places such ma terial on FD-348s three by five cards that constitute the index _ This index is maintained on discontinued 25 well 2s current informants DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 HEM: cb 2 Ea 4F NWV 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 107 day day 25 ================================================== Page 108 ================================================== SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM KEM: cb 8/19/71 At the time of last inspection in January , 1971, a total of 1,159 security informants was being operated_ As of July 31, 7971 the number had increased to_1,182 or an increase of 23 During the same period the number of potential security informants increased from 765 to 844 9 or an increase of 76 & DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 HEMacb 4- 3 15 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 108 Page ================================================== Page 109 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRALS 4- pyir Sectlon Chjef R, De Cdtter: Following are appl cable activltieb of Research Section. Securtty Index_(SI) Progran Refer to mhite write-up prepared by Internal Security Section (4-H) 1 which has Investigative responsibility under this program Research Sectfon } Special Records Unit maintalng records applicable to the SI and Js responsible for coordinating program In line with this responsibility, Research Section prepared 2 Benorandum to Assigtant Dlrector Brennan , da ted 1/12/71, re-evalua SI. As or 12/15/70 there Mere in the Index 3,450 persons f leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,6i4 rank-and - ffle subjects (Priority III) for 2 total of 12,084 . Of these , 831 and 4,718 , respectively 9 are communfsts-e total of 5,549 or 46 percent _ As 01 7/15/71 there were 1n the Index 4,013 persuus 02 Zeaeiship Cajacim] {Pr4c746 1 254 II} ena 8,680 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for 2 total of 12 , 693 Of these J 825 and 4,329, respectIvely, aro conaunlsts-+? total of 5,154 or 40.6 percent. Energency Detentzon_Progran The Emergency Detention Progran (EDP) ; wnich 18 #ield-Wide Involves the planning for apprebenaion and detention of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public safety of the U, S in tine of a national emergency and for the seerch and seizure of con traband The EDP is pot 2 program 2s such but 18 baged on Title II of the Internal Security Act (ISA) 0f 1950 ; The bagic responsibility for the operation and implenentation of the EDP rests with the Attorney General Detailed plans regarding the EDP are drawn up and ineluded in the "Attorney General '8 Portfollo, M} copies of which are in the Bureau s possession. This program bas been maintained in an up-to-date stetus_ Administrative plans for the implementation of the progrem in each office are maintalned in the form of 2 "Detpro Survey M Lists 0f Individuals to be detained are furnished to DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 MSR:ant 4-} 9 7 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 109_ ting MSK ================================================== Page 110 ================================================== o8 the Internal Security Division of the Department each nonth and the listlng 0f places to ba searched under au thority of the Haster Search Warrant are mainta_ned on 8 current basis The Seat Of Government and 211 ffela divisions maintain essential records for Buccessful implenentation of the EDP Each office elso waiateing iostruc tiong to be turned over to the U. 8. Attorneye end U, S . Marshels upon Jnplementation_ Thts program 1s coordinated by Special Records Unit, Reseerch Section PrImary responsibility rests with the Depar tment and changes can be made only upon approval of the Department We merely reconnend and/or suggest any desirable changes Perjodic checks are made to insure that a11 record8 connected with the EDP , etored away fror Headquarters city;: are current_ FJeld division surveys are kept up to date and the Bureau i3 edvised saniannually 0f the status, Legislation hes been introduced {n the 92nd Congress to repeal Title II of the ISA 0f 1950 In the event Title II shoula be repealed 8* a future date under new 8efiSlterosily the Government 's inberent right to protect itself in- Rl1I continue to be safeguerded by tha Bureau under its pasic respobsibility for protecting this Natfon'$ Internal security. This program 1s under congtant Superviszon and re-evaluatlon 80 that any necessary changes and gtreanliulng may be made_ A nenorendun justifying the continuance of thls program Wa8 last submitted on 1/12/71 _ Tecbnical and Mcrophone Surveillanceg There has been no significant change regarding the utilization Of these techniques in the internal eecurity fleld since the last inspection _ As 0f 8/16/71 , we have 30 telephone surveillances (tesurs) 1n Bureau '8 internal security cases _ We also bave two tesura in operation at the request Of the State Departnent We are conducting four microphone surveillances (misurs) Jn internal becurity field, four misur installations are being operated at the request of the National Security Agency (NSA) and one at the request or Canral TnteTTgenCe Agency . In addition , 62 teletype facilities are bing covered at {he written request 01 NSA; such records presently maintained away from . SOG or field office headquarters are located at Quantico, Virginia _ NW 88608 _bocld:32989638 Page_i10 xOnly ================================================== Page 111 ================================================== 3 Survey Regardng_Potentfal for Racdel_Violence Thts progran Fas {nitiated Jn 1964 under the title "Pogsible Raclal Violence, Major Urban Arens . " It requires Bech fdeld of2fce to conduct 2 continulng gurvey of localities baving 2 potertzal Zor violence based on curren t racdal con- d:tions Objective 18 twofold-cto insure Bureau receives & current, realistic, and conprehensive plcture Of existing condttlons Fhich may Jead to violence, and to obtain advance InfornatJon of developents clearly pointlng to the possibilfty 02 violence. The field gubnits semdannual reports sumarizing information received Of course, pertinent informa tion Ss subulted on & tinely basis dependlng upon the circumstances involved _ The survey provides the basis for 8 cogent analysis of potential for violence and pertina Infornation i5 dissemi- nated to the Mhtte Kouse, Attorney General, and other Government agencies , In the spring of each year an enalysis entitled "Potential for Violence in Hajor Cities in Summer" 13 prepared end disseminated On 0 hzgh Zevel In tbe Governuent , NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 111 ================================================== Page 112 ================================================== SURVEYS,_ PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS NEW LEFT SECTION SECTION CHIEF 7 Re La SHACKELFORD Attached are comments concerning surveys, projects and/or intensification programs in effect against the New Left Movement_ This section is responsible for the supervision of investiga- tions of the New Left Movement, including terrorist groups and individuals engaged in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campus 0 Investigations concerning New Left publications are also supervised in this section, as are sa botage investigations, and protest and Trotskyist groups . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 TA DeI-jli 4-H 16 0 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 112 ================================================== Page 113 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/ OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H New Left Movement Special Investigations Unit 4 West The following surveys projects and/or intensification programs are in effect against the New Left movement : New Left Extremists By letter to all' field offices dated 2/13/70 , the field was advised that the violence-prone Weatherman group planned to go underground and to direct "strategic sabotage" at military and police installations The field was instructed to vigorously investigate the Weatherman group and to advise appropriate local police agencies of Weatherman plans _ By airtel to a11 offices datea 3719/70 , ine field was advised of Weatherman plans for extreme violence. The field was instructed to locate and identify Weatherman communes and activists _ Intensive investigation of Weatherman leaders was ordered _ By airtel to Chicago dated 3/24/70 , that office ~was instructed to initiate investigations and interview a11 individuals arrested in Chicago during 2 Weatherman rampage in October 1969 , where such investigations had not already been undertaken_ More than 280 persons had been arrested , most of whom were either members of or closely associated with the Weatherman group In connection with cases of bombing or arson which appeared to have New Left or black extremist connotations 3 SAC Letter 70-18 (C) dated 4/7/70 , captioned "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism M Bombing Matters 11 provided the field with guidance _ In those cases where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists or where the Department has advised that no investigation is warranted the Bureau must be immediately advised concerning involvement of subversive groups or individuals suspected in the incident and recommendation made concerning additional investigation_ DONESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 HM:ita/bjn 4- 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 113 Page ================================================== Page 114 ================================================== By teletype to al1 offices dated 4/17/70 , the field was advised of specific areas of investigations to be made against New Left terrorist groups and standards were set for investigations of communes The field was also instructed to develop necessary informant coverage of these commnunes and groups SO that advanced knowledge of planned violence could be obtained, preventive action initiated, and prosecution undertaken where possible _ By Bureau airtel to al1 offices dated 5/13/70 , instructions were given concerning implementation of investi- gations of New Left terrorism Which were begun with available manpower and further implementation was to be as rapid aS possible 411 adherents to the Weatherman ideology which advocated a Marxist-Leninist revolution and the use of terroristic tactics in furtherance of revolution are made subjects of these investigations These subjects are to be considered for Priority I of the Security Index and when placed on Priority I, the Bureau must be advised every 45 days of their current residence and other pertinent information developed _ Each office was instructed to submit a monthly airtel beginning 6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities of communes or organizations; (2) number of cases opened during month on individuals in these categories; (3) total number of cases under investigation; (4) informant coverage utilized against these comunes and organizations; and, (5) a brief summary of New Left violence in area during preceding month and action taken. Bureau airtel to a11 offices dated 5/15/70 , the field was furnished 2 copy of a Departmental letter concerning specific areas of interest to the Department of Justice in campus disorders looking toward possible prosecutive action The field was specifically instructed to develop information concerning New Left involvement in campus violence and concerning agitational activities prior to and during violent campus disorders by subversive groups 3 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 114 10 3 By Page ================================================== Page 115 ================================================== airtel to a11 offices dated 7/16/70 the field was advised that New Left terrorism was continuing through bombings } arsons and other violence and that each Special Agent in Charge must personally insure that sufficient personnel are assigned to handle these matters and to investigating New Left terrorists_ SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70 , captioned "New Left Movenent Violence, Internal Security Miscellaneous (Weatherman) # instructed the field to develop better informant coverage of Weatherman and other terrorist groups _ By airtel to a11 offices dated 9/3/70 captioned "Attacks on Police, Extremist Activity" the fieid was instructed that in view of increased attacks on the police 1 it could be expected there will also be physical attacks against the FBI and that al1 Special Agent personnel should be fully cognizant of this pcesibility Tc obtain comnete intelligence data concerning any extremist influence in attacks on police, the field was instructed to institute appropriate investigation when information was received concerning an impending attack on police and informants directed to develop full facts concerning the attack SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70 captioned "New 'Left and Black Extremist Terrorism G= Informant Coverage" instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing newv productive informants who can infiltrate terrorist groups _ SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70 } captioned "New Left Movement Police Training Matters "1 advised the field that in view of recent violence by New Left terrorists, the Bureau will consider requests for SACs or ASACs to brief local law enforcement command and supervisory personnel regarding New Left extremism and violence These briefings would be at law enforcement meetings and conferences where attendance is restricted to full-time duly constituted law enforcement officials NW 88608 Docld:32989638 115 By [b 3 Page ================================================== Page 116 ================================================== Bureau airtel to ali offices dated 9/9/70 advised that a Special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and other New Left terrorists has been initiated The field was instructed to submit to the Bureau the identity of New Left terror- ists whose fingerprints should be included in this special file_ By airtel to a11 offices dated 6/15/71 the field was advised that a new "stop index" program had been instituted in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) This program is for Bureau use only and concerns extremists who are in Priority I of the Security Index and who are not already carried in the NCIC Wanted Persons: file_ Through this program , 1 the field obtains prompt notice from NCIC by teletype whenever a police agency makes inquiry concerning one of these extremists which enables the field to better follow the activities and movements of extremists By SAC Letter 71-37 (E) dated 8/10/71, captioned "Security Flash Notices Regarding Security Index Subjects" the field was advised of new procedures which will enable the Identification Division to better disseminate arrest information on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file in the Identification Division This is accomplished by periodic submission by the field of Security Flash Notices (FD-165) which determine if fingerprints of a Security Index subject have been received since the last check and if a stop is placed in the fingerprint record to assure that the field is advised of a11 subsequent fingerprint submissions The Security Flash Notice is periodically submitted at different intervals depending on the priority 0f the subject 's Security Index status Intensified investigation of New Left extremists has led to numerous prosecutions and indictments of extremist leaders _ To provide further guidance for the field in these matters SAC Letter 71-10 (E) dated 3/9/71 and captioned "Security Informants R Judicial Matters" advised the field of procedures to be followed in handling informants who are developing information on New Left groups and individuals who are in contact with these Newv Left activists or with their attorneys _ 5 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 116 s0 , ================================================== Page 117 ================================================== The Department of Justice has advised that informants may be utilized in furnishing information concerning the location of fugitives or the location of other New Left activists even though such utilization may resilt in the informant inadvertently learning of defense plans or strategy_ The field has been instructed that when an informant is present in a conversation between an attorney and an individual under indictment he should, if possible, leave, or if this is not possible, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI Since radical attorneys are deeply involved with New Left extremists not only in their legal defense but in their other activities the above procedures are most helpful in extremist investigations _ Intensified investigation of New Left extremists has severely disrupted their operations and limited their influence _ Numerous Weatherman leaders have been indicted and subsequently arrested or remain in fugitive status The Weatherman organization has gone underground and is isolated from contact with the mass of American youth_ The number of adherents to Weatherman is significantly less as a result of these prosecutions and investigations The Weatherman group continues to be most dangerous in view of its adherence to violent tactics and continuous effort is being made to develop new approaches and techniques to facilitate this investigation_ Key Activists By airtel to al1 offices dated 10/23/68 the Key Activist program was intensified and expanded _ The field was instructed to maintain high-level informant coverage on individuals designated as key activists in the New Left movement . At the present time there are 73 key activists under investigation 6 - 3 NW 88608 DocId: 32989638 Page 117 ================================================== Page 118 ================================================== A Key Activist album containing photographs and biographical data on each key activist has been furnished to a11 offices _ This album is maintained in a current status and has proved invaluable in following activities and travel of New Left key activists_ By airtel dated 3/10/69 to a11 offices the field was instructed to submit reports each three months on key activists The field was also instructed to prepare communications suitable for dissemination when these key activists filled a speaking engagement and whenever they made statements indicating a propensity for violence or urging student agitation_ The purpose of this program is to secure testimony and evidence concerning violations of statutes particularly where these key activists are involved in campus disorders The field has also been instructed to develop detailed infornation on sources of funds used by key activists and to closely follow their travel _ Handwriting specimens of each key activist must be obtained and placed in the National Security file maintainea by che faporaiory_ The key activist program has been most successful We have been enabled to closely follow the activities of these individuals and to provide other interested agencies with pertinent information_ It is noted that more than half '0f the individuals designated a5 key activists are subjects of some type of prosecutive action It 6 NW 88608 Dbcld: 32989638 Page 118 ================================================== Page 119 ================================================== NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS) WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE (WSA) In Bureau airtels 5/24/71_ 9 6/2/71 and 6/3/71 9 appropriate field offices were alerted to the SDS/WSA Summer Project and its twofold objective consisting of a massive recruitment program in 21 target cities and the fostering of a general strike, nationwide through infiltration of industry and labor unions Instructions were given to appropriate offices to take aggressive measures to expand their informant coverage during: the SDS/WSA recruitment effort, and to develop and furnish information concerning the SDS /WSA Summer Projects in their territories. Numerous SDS /WSA members have been identified as having moved into cities other than those in Which they usually operate, in connection with the SDS /#SA Summer Project New University Conference (NUC) The NUC composed of radical professors, graduate students and teachers, is committed to the growth of a revolutionary socialist movement in the U.8 _ with educational institutions and professional associations being their primary targets_ In Bureau airtel 6/4/71, the attention of Chicago Division, office of origin, was directed to the fact that the NUC claimed 42 national chapters plus fifteen pre-chapter groupings, with 675 national members and anticipated further expansion Chicago Division was instructed to insure appro- priate leads were set out to confirn the existence of al1 NUC , chapters and to conduct appropriate investigations in accordance with Bureau instructions relating to investigations of organizations connected with institutions of learning_ It was further instructed these investigations should include information concerning the leaders and leading activists, aims and objectives and the activities of these chapters _ New Left Movement Reports By airtel to Albany 1 and all offices dated 10/28/68_ a program was instituted to obtain a comprehensive study of the whole New Left novement _ Offices were instructed to prepare summary reports on the New Left movement in their 8 DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 AENGiilm_ NWN 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 119 '1 SAC , ================================================== Page 120 ================================================== territories and to follow these reports with a report each quarter 1 Similarly captioned showing the status of the movement and its activity during the preceeding three_ month period. These reports have enabled the Bureau and the submitting field offices to assess the potential dangerousness of the New Left movement , determine from one document the divisive or unifying issues within the movement and whether the activity is increasing 9 decreasing or continuing at the level indicated in the previous report Since individual reports have not been required on the many small local New Left groups in each territory in lieu of adequate LH 1 inclusion of pertinent data concerning these groups in the quarterly report alleviates the need for regularly submitted reports and puts the activities in a better perspective within each field division Additionally , these reports have presented on a_ continuing basis a clear cut picture of the entire New Left movement which identifies its leaders sources of funds. 9 propaganda outlets, and shows the extent to which the New Left movement has been influenced by domestic and foreign subversive elements_ This program has enabled the Rnrean and the fieldto make a, self analysis of all facets of our investigation of the Newv Left movement So we may expand and intengify our investigation of those phases indicating a need thereof These reports have served as a valuable research tool at the Bureau and afford the individual field divisions an opportunity to evaluate the direction and success of their investigations in the New Left movement . New Left Movement Finances In February 1970 , Assistant to the 3577441070-23kSr acering %co, v requested, for the Pregident, ormation concerning income sources of various revolutionary groups Since that time, information of this nature has been gathered and transmitted periodically by memoranda to the White House , Attorney General Deputy Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General 9 Internal Security Division, after approval by the Director Key Activist Program The Key Activist Program, described in detail in the Special Investigations Unit 5 West write-up, is coordinated by the New Left Groups Unit. Ya 9 - 10 3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 120 desttsv Page ================================================== Page 121 ================================================== New Left Movement Publications By letter dated 11/5/68 to all offices under the cation of "New Left Movement , Publications, Internal Security Miscellaneous," the field was instructed to cover the principal propaganda mills of the New Left which are described as "underground" nemspapers_ This survey has been particularly beneficial in view of the fact that the New Left_ to a great extent depends on the written word to spread its propaganda_ The survey has disclosed that in excess of 200 papers are published on 2 regular basis with a central theme being criticism of the "establishment" in general and law enforcement the draft and the Vietnam War in particular_ Youth particularly students, are the main target of these publications 9 which are effective vehicles for agitation and recruitment in that they reach a large portion of the student population _ Additionally, the survey has revealed the papers are in poor financial condition and often miss publication dates de to lack of funds Funds are generally received from advertising subscriptions_ donations and benefits Volunteer labor is used in most instances and many times the staff of the publication resides collectively in a commune A survey of underground publications is currently being conducted by the New Left Groups Unit, the purpose of which is to determine if trend information can be developed . Trend information is being developed during the course of this survey and information obtained will be incorporated into an educational-type document. Based on this survey, it appears the Newv Left movement is at a crossroads and is groping for a sense of unity and direction This unity, if developed will no doubt include future activity in political channels These newspapers which are often mritten in the foulest language, are a major influence on the youth in this country and are the strident propaganda voice of the New Left movement _ Informant Development New Left_Groups Bureau airtel to al1 offices dated 11/5/70 concerning informant development in New Left groups directed each SAC to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete analysis of his informant coverage in New Left groups, clearly setting forth the weaknesses and productive steps being taken to rectify these weaknesses_ As a resulta clear-cut view of each division 1 S informant coverage was obtained as well as an 10 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 121 ================================================== Page 122 ================================================== analysis of where programs needed shoring up Those offices found to be deficient in their coverage were directed to submit periodic communications detailing their coverage and setting out what steps are being taken to increase the coverage in terms of quantity and quality. The Counterintelligence Program 4 New Left was discontinued by Bureau airtel to a11 offices dated 4/28/71 in view of the fact that sensitive intelligence techniques and disruptive activities Were involved and absolute security was difficult to achieve SPCCIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT Le EAST The Venceremos_Brigade The field was authorized by airtel to all offices dated 5/11/70, to interview a11 Venceremos Brigade (VB) members on SAC authority except in those instances where the subject is under 21 currently a student, professor_ has somne connection with an institution Of learning or is a journalisi_ Sureau approval is still needed concerning the latter individuals Bureau airtel to a11 offices, dated 5/15/70 , instructed the field to immediately intensify investigations of a11 VB returnees from Cuba ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt interviews and subait current reports With Security Index recom- mendation_ 0 In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy to a violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and willingness to participate in that revolution by these VB menbers, the field was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every 90 days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III and non-Security Index returnees In case of Priority I Security Index subjects, this information is to be furnished the Bureau every 45 days. Prosab Current Bureau instructions require development of adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and Intercontinental Baliistic Missile Bases of the United States Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative responsi- bilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal security fields can be properly discharged . Semiannual reports are submitted by each office having a Strategic Air Command Base or an Inter- continental Ballistic Missile Base within its territory. A review of semiannual reports submitted by the field a5 of 7/1/71 disclosed that a total Of 1225 informants bave been developed _ 11 DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 Cbl;cae NW 88608 '0eci4r3z989638 122 Page ================================================== Page 123 ================================================== PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT Day Collective (MDC) Prior to May, 1971, MDC was the hard-core youth activist group of the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and was the main force behind massive civil disobedience in Mashington, D.C . There has been a definite between the tio groups over the question of violence which is favored by MDC . Following regional conferences in Fayetteville 9 Arkansas, and Washington, D.C, } MDC held a national conference in Atlanta, Georgia, 8713-17/71 to map its future course and to plan antiwar activity for the Fall of 1971. By airtel to all offices dated 7-26-71, the field was instructed to determine the existence of MDC organizations in the respective divisions and to furnish al1 available information to Bureau by 8-30-71 with comments regarding extent of coverage Potential for violence by MDC was emphasized, and the field was alerted to possibility of violations of Federal lawS . Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) Letter tc 211 cfficee deted 8-3-71 instructed Aach office to initiate a survey to determine existence of VVAW _ This ection was necessary in the light of increasing indication that the VVAW may be a target for infiltration by subversive groups such as the Communist Party, USA , and the Socialist Workers Party and their respective youth groups. VVAT has also been involved in aiding and financing U.S. deserters, including false identity papers and reportedly in one area has a cache of arms VVAY has become increasingly active in the antiwar field and must be considered a prime target for infiltration_ East Coast_Conspiracy to Save Lives (EASTCON) This is an extremely Important investigation requiring constant supervision and review at the Seat of Government It involves plots to blow up the tunnels, housing, heating systems servicing Government buildings and to kidnap a hgh Government official Conspiracy aspects of selected Selective Service break in cases are included in the indictment as well as violations involving the contraband and issuing threatening communications statutes The Eastcon case is the subject of a write-up in Section 4-A-4, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 JzFBG;Plm 12 t NW88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 123 May split ================================================== Page 124 ================================================== SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT Bureau airtel to all offices,dated 11/3/70, instructed the field to resume verification of residence and employment in Priority II and Priority III Security Index cases and to resume periodic report writing in proportionate number in Priority II Security Index cases SO that a11 such cases would be opened by 6/30/71 _ 0 As a result, annual reports in Priority II Security Index cases are being received pursuant to existing instructions and where verification of residence and employment shows a change, appropriate changes are being made on Security Index cards Bureau airtel to all Offices, dated 11/4/70, instructed the field to initiate investigation of a11 SDS members as well as members of militant New Left-type campus organizations Biogonwnoifoilow who SDS advocacy of revolution and Violence and that eaci iudividuai investigatez skcula be considered for the Security Index_ Results of investigations in these cases are being received and supervised in this section, Activities in each instance are evaluated and where it is found the subject could be considered 2 danger to the internal security of this country in the event of a national emergency, the indwvidual 1 s name is included on the Security Index. SAC Letter 71-35 (D) , dated 7/27/71, instructed the field to discontinue use of Internal Security Miscellaneous, Security Matter 5 Miscellaneous, and Security Matter Anarchist as characters in security investigations _ Instructions for using new characters were set out, Tbis action was necessary in order to facilitate routine of mail at the Bureau and to more properly describe the characters of security investiga - tions, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISIPY NNSPECTION 8/18/71 WHEirem 13 NW88608_Docld: 32989638 Page_ 124 ================================================== Page 125 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/OR 4-H INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS Section Chief M . A_ Branigan Espionage Section The following programs discussed immediately hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the Espionage Section: Alem Program Bureau fiie 65-69532; Banpop Program_ Bureau file 65-70741; Cokma Program Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program Bureau file 65-70719 ; DESECO Program , Bureau file 105-71688; East-West Exchange Program Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365 . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 LW: bkr 4-H 1/3 Nw 88608_Docld- 32989638_Page 125 ================================================== Page 126 ================================================== ALEM PROGRAM Bufile: 65-69532 4-H 1 ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U . S_ under assumed identities as 1 alien husbands of American wives or 2 as male immigrants on first preference petitions because of certain professional and technical Iet Ren gri plbliea skills "Te "asts ofthis program 1S inforqation #urpioed YaL by the Fedora informant This program was initiated in "August , T965 _ Individuals entering the U_ S . under the above two categories have been determined through a machine run of Immigration and Naturalization sezvice 4ci Form G-183 punch cards TThe Bureau has reimbursed the 3l' #* 34nar Immigration and Naturarizatyon Sexrvice '0 expensres: inaurrea in Sorting these cards for immigrants entering the U S. between the years _196031965 2 Approximately 2100 cases have been opened under this program since its inception of which 77 are now pending _ we have not uncovered any iilegal5 to date although we have been 6DZ bZe to Edentiy tnrough this program a Vatuabze KGB agent who entered the U S as an immigrant fron Belgium "QBu@boazd aasexrt Bufiie -65368788 3 ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section Special Cases Unit, by SA_Abs_Litrento" The responsibility of reviewing the pertinent GF188 cards and initiating investigations is placed with the Washington Field Office_ The procedures followed in opening cases do not require the use Of much personnel or many man hours by the Hashington Field Office_ 4 _ According to the Fedora informant the KGB has used the feghniques:Set_forth-above In"drspatching KGB #1 to the U, S During 1960_1965 Jxc+ Eour KGB "irzegals Tt" reportedly_arrived %n the U S under category nunber one according to information the Fedora informant was 2b4e to Qbtain_Erom a-KGB-OE Ejcer in Ihe-New York_Residency 5 _ This program is evaluated on an annual basis _ It was last evaluated on December 24 , 1970 _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 LAPL: tdp A 4-H NW 88608 DocId: 32989638 Page 126 0 3772g27s ================================================== Page 127 ================================================== BANPOP PROGRAM Bufile: 65-70741 4-H 1 BANPOP is the code name for a progran initiated in August 1966 9 in an attempt to identify illegals in the U_ S who may be receiving_funds_through Swiss banks The basis for the program was an analysisvof Zour Soviet illegal cases between 1955 and 1966 in_Which theBanque Populaire Swisse Qf SwitzerLand was used by the Soviets to fund ilagajs The transfers are screened with the following criteria: 7(1) the person or individul beneficiary is pamed; (2) the amount of ~he transfer is between 8300 and :5000 and (3 the last name Qf the K7 person 9ar uLi ordering and_recedvingrthe Eunds is thersane_or_ the_ oney is directed to 2 specific pank account 2 _ The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago and Philadelphia Offices 3 When one of the offices locates an individual who might be a possible suspect : the Bureau is advised by Jetter and a copy iS sent to the appropriate field office requesting investigation to identify this person _ The title includes the name of the subject and the code name of the program to insure that all mail is handled by the same Supervisor At the present time there are 7 pending cases For the six-month period ending 4/1/71, Philadelphia reviewed 2950 transfers has two pending cases and used two Agent hours per month:' Chicago reviewed 1000 transactions opened no cases and used six Agent hours per month New York Office reviewed 6050 transactions , opened 8 cases and used 15 Agent hours per month. 4 This program is supervised by SA L.2 Lee of the Special Cases Unit, Espionage Section_ 5 _ 411 offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the program on a six-month basis The program was last justified _ by memorandum of" April 1, 1971 _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION TJPL tdp 8719771 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 127 Page ================================================== Page 128 ================================================== CANIL PROGRAM Bufile: 65-70719 4-H 1 CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet illegals who may have arrived in Canada as European immigrants and thereafter entered the U S on immigrant visas Qta ned at {na one of Dhe 2154 American: consulates_in Canada This program is based on the Cowslip case which_ involyed- a Soviet 1 24eg21 Rer husband and Wife tem Tho used This method Of entry Legat Ottawa ; 3> effected arrangements _With VariQus Awerican consulates inCanada to Qbtain the Immigratzon Visa and ATien_Registratzon (TVAR forms #iled European imm grants 7prior thedr destruction by the consulates It is consulate practice to retain 2G 0t A5 dhese forms for 16 to_18 montns then destroy_them Legat Ottawa forwards these forns to the New_York- Office where they are reviewed To deve suspects the New York Office uses criteria developed from anaiysis of the Cowslip case- 2 Since inception of this program in June , 1966 35 cases were opened_ There are 7 cases pending- No_illega]s have been uncovered to date. The procedures foilowved in this program do not require the use of much pe rsonnel or many man hours by the New York Office 3 CANIL is supervised in the Espionage Section 1 Special Cases Unit 2 by SA AP Litrento 4 The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the mos t difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security field_ It is felt this program still has a good potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical and has a sound basis Past experience has shown that Soviet intelligence will use the same modus operandi continuous ly , if successful. 5 This program was evaluated in February _ 2 1971. Legat , Ottawa, has suggested discontinuance of this program and New York S comments have been requested by Bulet 8/5/71. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 APL;tdp 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 128 byr~ tQ tO4 0ee lop ================================================== Page 129 ================================================== COKIA PROGRAM 4-H 65-73750 1. Title is code word for physical surveillance coverage of known meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelli- gence in the past several years. The New York Office instituted this program in July 1970 This program receives close supervisory attention, is evaluated on a continuing basis and was subject of justification memorandum dated 8/16/71- In view of the success of this program by the NewYork Office, consideration has been given to its implementation by the Washington Field Office, however, the abgence of_subway trangportation #acrltttes used extensively b%the-SovretsZn New York_City precludes its adaptfon by the Waghington_Eield Office; 2 _ The New_York Office has_catalogued_known_meeting 30 areas as 2 result ofrpast_physicaL_Surveillanees-0.-Sovier-intelli- gence @fficers 'information receiyed from defectors-in-place Axd and dciible agent3 @E3tating-~g3inS1 Sovlet Tateii233432 2felcersht is 2lmo3t imposs_ble conduct dizcreet _Phygicallsurveillance f7 a trained Intelligence_officer and this-ProgEal places 0ur Agents in an area where there is a iikeilhood of a Soviet meet 4 {r ~LEhouf survetliance hazards that_could Ehuart meetings. Our objective is to identify American agents meeting Soviet intelligence officers under clandestine circumstances_ 3 _ The New_York_Office utilized one four-man team initially #: in connection with this program: During the initiai six months 37 9f this prog7am ~eyen 3oviet-Intettigence_orfrcers were-observed 4 #1 in the area selected for coverage KJamaica area' 28 tje Quens New York,) on 22 occas ons Two Individuala were observed in contact -with-sovrets _ a "One indjvidua] contacted _g"Porieh Bu_ official Based on the Tesuies Jptained coverage_wasexpanded L Ko 4; to the Flushing and_Woodside section of the Queens as WeIi as M79r 44 7ne Rego Park section f Ine-Queens "adarng-an-addtlropaT Zour-man team: Since Jenuaryknown or suspected Soviet Inteifigence officers have been observed on 38 occasions_ accompanied by unknown individual or_indiviauals Q five-occasions in the area ~covered by this progran: He have deternined through Qur Ironclad source {he Soviets have placed the Jamaica section of the Queen_off Timits 7nu for meetings Hhile we areSti11 affording this area some coverage DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 BEBAcgC 4-H /17 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 129 tO 2, JE ================================================== Page 130 ================================================== COKMNA_PROGRAN 4-H we are now concentrat on the other selectedsites mentioned above One Of {he most interesting developments of recent date nas Teen tha deteatron Of' a know' Comittee #or State Security (KGB) officer Who during his tour 0 dty 1n the United States has made approaches Saviete Who"defeeted 7ula to this country, visiting 2 reatdence in the Jamaica area' "The 7 occupant_ of this residence is currently the subject of an 54 O investigation and it iS anticipated he Wiii pe interviewed%o determine the nature "of-nis "contacts with the-Sovietsr 4, This program is supervised by Special Agent E' J Cassidy Soviet Unit-New York, Espionage Section. Expense and time in handling this program is negligible at Seat of Government. Since program in field consist of surveillance activities there must be close supervision at field level. 56 'This program is sound and has enabled us to uncover Soviet intelligence activities with minimum expenditure of maiipower. It has also 3*ven 13 additicral irsigkt into Sovlet modus operandi. Manpower limitations have restricted our full utilization of this investigative technique. Special Agent personnel assigned to this program must be familiar with Soviets assigned to the New York area and must be experienced in surveillance procedures. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 BFRecgC 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 130 ing €o_ Page ================================================== Page 131 ================================================== DESECO PRCGEAM 4-H Bufile 105-71688 1 The Deseco Progran (progran for developmen t of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials) originated as result of conference between field and Bureau representatives in December , 1957 _ Purpose is to select and develop individuals to be placed in con tact with Soviet-bloc intelligence officers 2s a means of (1) penetrating Soviet-bloc in telligence; (2) exerting control by keeping intelligence officers occupied with running our sources; and (3) assisting in possible defection of bloc intelligence officers. 2 _ Nineteen offices are engaged regularly in this program and other offices on cccasion conduct investi- gations to develop background on selected sources_ Greatest activity has been in New York } Wa shington Field , Chicago and San Francisco which cover Soviet-bloc establishments_ The 19 offices are authorized to conduct 11 sounding-out" inter- views of prospective sources without prior Bureau authority_ Follow-up interviews with potential Deseco sources are con- ducted on 2 UACB basis. New York and Tashington Field submit monthly progress letters sumnarizing the results of the program_ The other 17 offices submit summaries on 2 semi-annual basis. 3 Between the last inspection and July 15, 1971, approximately a 6-month period_ 26 Deseco subjects were placed in con tact with Soviet-bloc officials_ Of these , four have developed to the status Of security informants or double agents. 4_ This program is correlated in the Espionage Section 1 Coordination Unit by Special Agent Lish Whitson The program is handled in the field by Special Agents assigned to Soviet-bloc investigations who are familiar with the habits, weaknesses and in telligence targets of bloc personnel and are qualified to select and develop the type of individuals needed in this program Unusual or sensitive cases in this program are routed to the Division front office for approval_ 411 rules, policies and procedures regarding DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 LW:bkr 4-h 4 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 131 ================================================== Page 132 ================================================== DESECO PROGRAM interviews, developents and handling 0f Deseco sources are contained in Section 105 0, pages 42-44, Manual of Instructions. 5 . This program is re-evaluated on an annual basis. It was last justified by mem orandul w 4 . Branigan to C. D. Brennan dated March 29 1971_ Limitations on other investigative techniques have underscored the value of this program demonstrated in the individuals developed 2s security informants or double agents_ Selectees have enabled uS to uncover and pin-point Soviet-bloc intelligence targets, identify Soviet-bloc intelligence officers and furnish information 0f value in considering defection approaches_ During the mon th of Harchs 1871, 2 double agent , developed through the Deseco program 2 was instru- men tal in enabling the Bureau to identify a Soviet illegal operating in the se 0f a graduate student in Mattn Salt Lake Direction of this progran agaznst Soviet- bloc in TOTigence ofiicers wiri con tinue to he pressed to insure improvenent in our coverage of Soviet-bloc intel- ligence operations. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 LM:bkr 4-H NW 88608 Docid: 32989638 Page 732 gui ================================================== Page 133 ================================================== EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM Bufile: 105-42300 4-H This program originated in 1955 in an attempt to provide internal security safeguards regarding the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals Soviet intelligence regards the visits of East-West Exchange Agreement participants as opportunities to promote intelligence activity_ As a result of the 1970 Inspection revisions were made in the investigative action taken in this field_ The change was made as a reult of other manpower commitments_ SAC Letter 70-25 provided that no investigations will be conducted of groups or individuals participating in the East- West Exchange Progran in the absence of any information indicating affiliation with Soviet intelligence _ Bufiles are checked on al1 Soviet participants and where information is developed showing inte lligence affiliation 9 cases are then opened and the field instructed to conduct necessary investiga- tion During the period of January-June 1971, 982 individuals were scheduled to enter the U . S. under the provisions of this exchange program and f this number , we had information indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 25 of these individuals _ Mith regard to Soviet exchange students there are currently 32 in the U_ S_ Based on information furnished by defector sources and investigations of Soviet students previously in the U. S. , we have determined that Soviet intelligence utilizes these students in an intelligence capacity, principally as spotters _ In view of this we afford these students active investigation_ We have also found that a number of these students return to the U_ S_ for assignment at one of the Soviet establish- ments and in most instances contacts which they made while in the U . S. as students are generally reactivated- The case of Yuriy Aleksandrovich Gostintsev is an example of an individual 28 entering tne U S. under the East-Hest Exchange Program as 2 graduate student and engaging in intelligence activities Ironclad our sensitive defector in place advised that Gostintsev Iie Who entered the D 5 B/977T74or 2 period of 5ix jonths to do A 8320 researc at three American Wilersities Fes corkingrfor Dr Martin Summerfield at a laporatery at Princeton Univers 344 According to ur source Gostintsev on 7/T7i turned over a portfolio of oo0 pages to a Soviet inte Tl-gence officer who DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 A-PL: tdp 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 133 ity [2 ( Page ================================================== Page 134 ================================================== RE : EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM took the documents to the_Soviet Mission to the United Nations 14r# 17 4Ea photographed them and returned them to Gostintsev Similar 30rt RK Operations_ "took pTace on 7/16 and--azii "Gosttintsev originally entered the U_ S_ in 9/69 under the East-Hest scfentrfic Exchange _AgreemenE Tor three_onths Ioxwork under Dr- Summerfield He_ left the U. S in 12769 and returned again in 5771. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION NW 88608 DDel97982638 134 34 Page ================================================== Page 135 ================================================== 4-H RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHA SED BY THE_SQVIETS 105-36365 1 Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have central repository for information developed in connection with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to radio and technical equipment purchased by them. 2 Washington Field and New York Offices furnish infor- ma tion developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis Dissemination of the ma terial is made to Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency Army , Navy , Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, Bureau of International Commerce United States Department of Commerce and where pertinent , to the Na tional Security Agency (NSA) Ma terial submitted includes name of Soviet purchaser , date, quantity, description and cost of the items purchased It involves ma intenance of three control files; one each at Bureau, Washingto n Field and Newv York Offices Program established to achieve following objectives: disseminate to interested Government agencies information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the United States by Soviet Qfficials; determine whether Soviet intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding ma terial appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control list;, and to permit discreetmarkings by FBI Laboratory of 06767 certain technicai equipment_ furnished to_Soviets through overt CrntT Or cove E7ueang ihicn vouza permit Its identification at some future time 3 Since January_ 1971 Program has disclosed continuing purchases by Soviet na tionals of Grundig Satellite Multiband portable radios During 3/71 one KGB officer in Washington purchased 12 of these radios at one time. Soviet husband and wife illegal team previously in U_ S. used one 0f these radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which con- tained their operating instructions Program made it possible to secure serial numbers for possible future identification Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments and security devices being operated . Program also disclosed detailed information 'concerning two new antennae systems purchased by Soviets from company in Nebraska It appears one of these will be used at new Consulate General in San Francisco when ppernanent location for that establishment secured _ Details concerning such installations are of interest, not only to FBI Laboratory, but to State Department and NSA in connection with DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 ECP:eco 4-H 13 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 135 36 ================================================== Page 136 ================================================== RADIO AN TECHNICAL BQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE_SQVIETS 4- its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities 446 "ia Intelrigence agencies of the miTitary, Such as Navy and Air Force, 'zogk to Bureau For" detarts concerning purchases 01 this type made Soviets since it 'enables reasonabie estimate of their Fy_ abirity to monitor and intercept 03 U_ S @ilitary _communica tions. Dur "Tit1 9 Program identified Soviet interest in purchase of sophis Eica Eed erectronic apparatus 1n New York which can pe Ztflized for radar or communica tions gateflite__traeking_ #al had not requested export license from Commerce Department for ~his article It mag beniterded forclandestine S for sateliite tracking designed to improve accuracy of Soviet Xs* "lr7 ZCBM gqidance Sysfems We have notified White House and interested Government agencies concerning this activity which is being conducted clandestinely from Soviet establishment in Washington, D. C. 4 Program supervised by Specia]_Agent_Eugene Cz Peterson, Soviet Unit Washington, Espionage Section_ Expense and time utilized in handling program is negligible Vissemination Of ma terial submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices requires minimum 0f time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor and no weaknesses in program are apparent _ Administrative tickler for control ma intained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Soviet Unit 5 Washington, Espionage Section _ 5. Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination of ma terial developed = Possession of some_equipment on ~Which discreet markings were_previousiy placed by FBf Laboratory or item with serial number Shar %ng orig InaT acquisttionby_Soviets coula serve to Tdentify posgessor with ipVolvement in Soviet {R intelligence activity Program 13 evaluated~annuatly tordetermine justification for continuance_ 6 _ Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971 . Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972 , and each year thereafter , if still of continuing value_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 3; ECP eco 124 NW 88608 ~Voan;p7989638 136 py ing They fse Page ================================================== Page 137 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS , AND /OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-A SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C . MOORE Al EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS Racial matters investigations were intensified through establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67 _ By memorandum dated 7/14/71 it was recomended, and the Director approved, that the Racial Intelligence Section would, thereafter , be known as the Extremist Intelligence Section and the character of cases supervised would be changed from Racial Matters to Extremist Matters _ This action was taken as the mejority of extremist activity in U.S_ is not based solely on racial hatred but based on a desire to overthrow U.S. Government by revolution. This section handles extremist matters investigations involving black extremist organizations and individuals_ Objectives are to identify organizations and individuals that are involved in extremist activities, that advocate or had actually comitted or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that advocate revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate Federal laws _ The dangerousness to the U.S. of such individuals must be assessed and a deternination made as to whether should be included in the Security Index. The extent of foreign influence or influence of the Communist Party or other domestic revolutionary groups among black extremists, especially black extremist organizations 9 is a prime objective To accomplish these objectives, sources have been developed who can furnish quality and timely information concerning individual extremists and extrenist organizations_ Such sources likewise have forewarned uS of potential violence and enabled the Bureau to stay on top of the black extremist situation_ These sources have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities of alerting local authorities, and of keeping other Governent DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 WHAical 4-H NW88608 Docld:32989638 Page 137_ they ================================================== Page 138 ================================================== agencies dependent upon us for information 'informed of pertinent developments and advance intelligence, including data concerning Potential violence. Our informant coverage has made it possible for uS to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House, the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an interest_ Additional information pertaining to black extremist intelligence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for Racial Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the Research Section_ Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly reviewed at the Seat of Government to insure that essential information is being obtained on a timely basis and that it is being promptly disseminated in the field, as well as at the Seat of Governent. The activities of black extremists continue to place a heavy demand upon the Bureau' s manpower and resources_ There are numerous black extremist groups throughout the nation, the majority of which are local in nature and relatively small in membership _ These groups_ however , either directly or indirectly, advocate defiance of the law, hostility toward constituted authority and, in some instances, advocate outright destruction of Government and establishment of a Marxist-Leninist form of Government. The activities of these groups constitute a constant threat to the internal security of the country through their propensity for violence, hatred Of and outright opposition to our form of Governent_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 138 126 Page ================================================== Page 139 ================================================== BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT Bufile 157-8415 4-H Black extrenism is concentrated in organized activities of 64 groups, some of which have chapters in major cities through- out the U.S_ The five major nationwide groups have chapters in 139 cities _ Hard-core membership in these black extremist groups totals in excess of 8 ,300 . This membership figure, however_ 9 disguises the real following of extremist groups in black areas of our cities and the extent of influence and leader= exercise_ This real support, especially from young blacks } is surfaced during confrontations with police and the Establishment . In fact, hostility toward the police by black extremist groups, as well as by black youths_ J continues unabated in many of our major cities. Set out hereinafter are summaries concerning the black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation Computerized Telephone Nuber File (CTNF) was expanded on 2/26/71 to include telephone numbers of black, New Left and other ethnic extremists As a result, black extremist groups_ black extremist Security Index subjects and individuals included in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album have been entered into the CTNF This has proven to be extremely valuable investiga- tive tool and has saved the field considerable investigative time in ascertaining subscribers of telephone nubers since "hits" are made On 15,5 percent of nubers checked against the file. The Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA) was established on 3/8/69 to assist in identification Of militant black extremists who travel extensively. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 WHAical 4-H 1b 7 NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 139 ship they key Ux; ================================================== Page 140 ================================================== The BNPA is maintained in all offices_ BNPA includes a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist organizations, militant black nationalists who are known to travel and black extrenists who are Bureau fugitives_ Each office pre- pares 2 form on such individuals within its territory and the form is then furnished to the Bureau and all offices where it is maintained in a complete album _ In the event of travel by any of these individuals, the office covering the area being visited already has a photograph and biographical sketch of the individual immediately available_ The album is also furnished to the Legats in Ottawa &nd Mexico and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel- Over 470 extremists are currently carried in this albu _ Informa - tion concerning fugitives was included to insure each office has a photograph and biographic sketch imediately available for its use in conducting investigation to locate or apprehend them_ To insure broad circulation among investigative personnel and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization of informants, especially extrenist sources, we initiated the Black Extrenist Bureau Fugitives List in June, 1970 _ This list, which is prepared quarterly and sent each field office and selected Legats, identifies those Bureau fugitives who by reason of their activities or organizational affiliations are black extremists _ For the months in wnich no quarterly list is prepared, all offices and selected Legats are advised of deletions and additions to this list_ Currently there are 64 fugitives listed, 20 of whom are IO fugitives_ This list has given greater emphasis to the location of these fugitives, particularly among Special Agents handling extremist matters and extremist informants and has been effective in affording greater exposure of these fugitives aong extremist informants, Thirty-two of these fugitives have been arrested since the list was initiated. Bureau airtel 11/12/70 advised the field of formation of Black Extrenist Section of Single Fingerprint File in Latent Fingerprint Section of the Identification Division_ Field was instructed to insure al1 black extrenists who have a propensity for violence or who would logically be considered suspects in serious crines in which the Bureau may have an interest were included in the Black Extremist Section. 12R NW88608_Docld:32989638 140 City Page ================================================== Page 141 ================================================== airtel dated 3/19/71, captimed "Black Extremist Section of Single Fingerprint File, Identification Matters, Racial Matters, 11 all offices were instructed to give greater emphasis to this Program on a continuing basis due to increasing Participation of black extremists in crines of violence and continued reports from knowledgeable sources of plans of these extremists to participate in bombings , hijackings , kidnapings and other crimes Of violence- As a result of this communication and aggressive supervision by Extremist Intelligence Section supervisors, the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File has doubled. The value of this valuable investigative tool was demonstrated in the special investigation being handled by this section known as Newkill_ This caise involves the murder of two New York police officers on 5/21/71. Latents forwarded by our New York Office for comgarison against this file resulted in the identification of two: Black Panther Party (BPP) members and directly led to_ the solution of the machine gunning of two New York City police officers On 5/19/71. This information has also resulted in these individuals being developed as suspects in the Newkill murder_ Supervisors are constantly alert to insure logical black extremists are included in this file. In view of the high percentage of black extremists who have been reported to have weapons in their possession, the field by letter 3/18/71 ceptioned "Firearms AcEs!" and by airtel 5/17/71 captioned "'National Firearms State Firearms Control Assistance Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Fire- arms , Racial Matters, "1 emphasized that active investigation should be initiated concerning firearms volations steming from Bureau investigations over matters within our primary jurisdiction, including racial (now extrenist) matters investiga- tions_ Field was instructed to vigorously pursue possible: violations arising out '0f extremist matters investigations. Such investigations will lead to statistical acconplishments and to the neutralization of blaek extremists _ It was; emphasized that all Agents assigned to extremist matters should thoroughly review all of the crininal statutes involving Federal gun law Violations so that would be in & position to recognize and Vigorously pursue possible violations coming to their attention during extremist matters investigations _ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 141 124 By City Act, Act, they ================================================== Page 142 ================================================== Numerous investigations have been initiated by the field as a result of these instructions and recently four BPP leaders in Richmond or Washington, D_ were convicted for Federal gun violations and one is awaiting trial With the emphasis being placed on violations of Federal gun laws by black extremists 9 the nuber of convictions will increase and add to the Bureau" S statistical accomplishments as well as neutralizing black extremists _ Investigation disclosed in Fall of 1970 that increased campus disorders involving black students posed a definite threat to the nation' s stability and indicated the need for increase in both quality and quantity of intelligence concerning Black Student Unions (BSU) and similar groups wnich were targets for influence and control by Violence-prone BPP and other extremists_ On 10/29/70 the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources, on BSU and similar groups , their leaders, and activists to determine if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant further active investigation_ On 11/4/70 instructions were sent to the field to implement the program authorized by the Executive Conference. The results of these discreet preliminary inquiries were analyzed and it was concluded that our responsibilities could adequately be handled by limiting our inquiries to black student groups on college campuses which have engaged in violent and lawless activities or are reported by knowledgeable sources to be moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness _ As a result, field offices were instructed by letter dated 7/26/71 that, thereafter, discreet preliminary inquiries on black student groups on college campuses should be linited to those groups which have engaged in violence and/or lawless activities or are moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness _ Results of any preliminary inquiries conducted through established sources in accordance with the above provisions must be reported to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination along with recommenda - tions regarding whether an active investigation of the group and/or its leaders is warranted. The field was instructed that NW 88608 Docld:32989638 142 C., key only / 3 8 Page_ ================================================== Page 143 ================================================== if established sources report a black student group 18 moving toward, or being influenced in the direction of 3 violence and lawlessness, although no such activity has occurred, the facts are to be furnished the Bureau with field office recommendations regarding active investigation_ No active investigation of an organization connected with an institution of learning is conducted without prior Bureau authority The following pages set forth summaries concerning the black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation_ /3 | NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 143 key ================================================== Page 144 ================================================== BLACK PANTHER PARTY 4H The Black Panther Party (BPP) , a black extremist organization, continues to be extremely active throughout the country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California, for the obstensible purpose of patrolling the black community to prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. It expanded rapidly throughout the United States during 1967-68 9 then suffered a gradual decline during 1969. Revitalized in December , 1969 9 and throughout the 1970s , it expanded until there were approximately 48 branches of the BPP with an estimated 1,000 hard-core members supported many thousands of sympathizers as of December 1970 _ Another gradual decline began in 1971; and as of June, 1971, the Party had 710 hard-core members in 39 branches representing 37 cities. In February, 1971, the differences between Huey_Ra Newion; BPP- Minister 0f Dafezsa J &d EldridgeCleever then RPP Minister of Information a fugitive in Algeria, rose to the surface; and Newton expelled Cleaver and his followers_ About 100 BPP members in' New York and New Jersey declared allegiance to Cleaver and became known as the BPP-Cleaver Faction. The official of the BPP has always been the violent overthrow of the United States Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist system. The BPP has openly advocated urban guerrilla warfare 9 assassination of Government leaders and other forms of violent terrorism. Since its inception, the BPP has aimed its most vicious invectives against law enforcement and particularly local police. "Off the pigs , I BPP jargon for "kill the is the battle cry of the organization. Newton now claims the BPP was led astray by Cleaver in his quest for violence when actually the BPP is a-nonviolent , community serving organization. In of Newton s peace loving front , the truth is that Newton and his BPP are just as much anarchists as ever, On 6-30-71 a Washington, D. C. BPP leader and follower of Newton stated "the ultimate of the BPP is the complete destruction of the United States Government and its replacement with Marxist-Leninist socialism. " DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8-19-71 FR RNB:bad _ 4H /32 NW88608_Docld:32989638 Page 144 by goal cop" spite goal ================================================== Page 145 ================================================== Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967 and since that time has expanded as the organization itself expanded. By letter to all offices dated 2-27-70, approved by the Director, offices having BPP investigations were instructed to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every six months in compliance with instructions in the Manual of Instructions, Previously, offices were submitting quarterly reports on the BPP _ The changes made on the basis of a recommendation by a Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to elininate some Paper work in the field. All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the status and activities of the BPP within its territory. This survey was commenced as a biweekly summary in November 3 1968 = 9 and changed to 2 monthly summary on the approval of the Director letter to al1 offices dated 2-27-70 . This change is a result of a recommendation the Racial Izfczmants Confererce of field supervisors to cut down Paper work' in the field. The monthly summary relieves the field of some Paper work and at the same time keeps the Bureau and the field up to date on BPP developments _ San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case continues to subnit a biweekly summary and analysis of the BPP . Because of the excellence of this summary and the need for such an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed by Bureau airtel 1-21-70 to furnish copies of its summary to all continental offices which is the current practice. All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation were instructed by airtel 6-17-70 to submit a monthly summary on the financial activities of each BPP branch_ This financial summary includes data.on sources of income, foreign funding, expenses the mechanics of local finance operations and the steps being taken by each office to develop full financial data. This summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all financial developments regarding the BPP on a national and international basis. /33 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 145 by by ================================================== Page 146 ================================================== San Francisco was instructed 8-19-70 to submit monthly lists of nationwide bank accounts and expenses for BPP_ This survey Was devised by San Francisco; and since it is very helpful in establishing, the picture" it is being required monthly. The Black Panther Party has formed a corporation known as Stronghold Consolidated Productions 9 Inc. (SCPI) to control all BPP funds and assets and to act as purchaser andlor lessee of any property utilized by the BPP The corporation and its activities are under intensive investigation which has revealed that its activities are centered in San Francisco and New York. By airtels 1-7 and 1-19-71 to San Francisco and New York , these offices were instructed to submit a weekly summary of all pertinent developments concerning the corporation during the previous week a monthly review of SCPI bank accounts_ These summaries keep the Bureau aware of SCPI operations and also enables uS to regularly fulfill our dissemination requirements. It is noted that there are currently 25 field offices conducting active investigations" of the BPP _ Our intensive investigation has enabled uS to identify its leaders > members and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed information concerning its operations and activities including organization plans = } funding programs 9 extent of control by headquarters and foreign support and internal factionalism. All field offices having a BPP investigation were required by Bureau airtel 10-3-68 to submit a monthly report containing evidentiary data required by the Department 2 and were also required by Bureau airtel 6-25-69 to maintain records of and to use permanent T symbol numbers to identify al1 concealed sources in BPP organization reports. Both of these requirements were based on Department requests. The Department advised that the need on which these requests were based no longer existed, and the field offices were instructed by Bureau airtel 5-17-71 to discontinue both programs_ /34 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 146 "big plus they Page ================================================== Page 147 ================================================== By Bureau airtel 1l-6-70 , all continental offices were instructed to submit a biweekly airtel regarding underground BPP operations within each field office_ This specific requirement was removed by Bureau airtel 4-29-71. However al1 offices were admonished to keep the Bureau advised of any developments in this area. "The Black Panther" newspaper 9 official organ of the BPP , had been printed in San Francisco since 1967 until recently when the printing was changed to New York The Bureau receives a sufficient quantity of the Paper from New York to disseminate it to interested agencies and all Legal Attaches _ New York also furnishes one copy of each weekly issue to all field offices. This newspaper in the past has been the best indication of current Party line; therefore, this program is essential to our intelligence gathering efforts. Our ultimate objective is the prosecution of the BPP as an organization or by individual members for any violations of Federal or State laws _ As in the pas we will continue to disseminate to local autnorities any informaiiOLL we may receive concerning possible local violations. A secondary objective is to more completely develop information concerning the activities and objectives of the BPP for intelligence purposes _ In 1969 the Attorney General established a special task force for the specific Purpose of developing a prosecutive theory against the BPP _ Attorneys of this task force, known as the Special Interdivisional Unit 3 have interviewed many of our informants in furtherance of this purpose. It is recommended that the intensive investigation of the BPP including al1 surveys and procedures outlined as above be continued_ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 147 City. t, July , /35" ================================================== Page 148 ================================================== BLACK REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 157-15276 The Black Revolutionary Party is an all black revolutionary political organization which was formed in April 1971 at an internal meeting of the pro-Red China Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) (CP of C-ML) Among 16 people present were four Americans including well-known black extremist Charles Knox former Black Panther Party leader in Des Moines Towa The BRP was formed within the CP of C-ML to organize blacks in the United States and Canada operating from headquarters in Detroit Michigan The BRP follows the political line of communist Chinese leader MAO Tse-tung and publishes a newspaper which serves as its vehicle for disseminating its revolutionary dogma known as the "Black Revolutionary, f the first issue of which appeared in May , 1971 _ The BRP intends to maintain its existence secret until firmly established which is estimated at taking from one and one-half to two years It intends to draw recruits from both sides of the current Black Panther Party factionalism and its proposed revolutionary program will reportedly be based on the issue of racial suppression_ This is to be accomplished by the formation of armed self-defense units to "fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly, capitalist I0 class_ On July 12 , 1971 Charles Knox and an additional Omaha black extremist were detained "temporarily by United States Customs officials in Detroit while returning to the United States from Canada Search of their vehicle by Customs officials determinedKnox and his companion were in possession of numerous pamphlets and leaflets of a pro-communist nature Investigations of the BRP and its identified leaders and members: are being aggressively pursued and_where pecessaryr closely coordinated with Royal Canadian Mounted Police via Legat Ottawa Doe DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 PENapag 2 4-H /36 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 148 Page ================================================== Page 149 ================================================== CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP) 157-16554 CAP was formed as an interma tional black separatist organization as the result of the convening of the fourth annua1 gathering of black power advoca tes in the United States and Atlanta 1 Georgia during September 1970 _ The organization, which is heavily infiltrated at the leadership level by black extremists, advoca tes tbe unity of blacks and the establishment of a black nation via the revolutionary ideology of Pan- Africanism a5 espoused by CAP supporter and well-known black revolutionary, Stokely A4c Carmichael_ CAP is now active in 15 cities across the Nation and is vigorously pursuing its objectives in this country as well as establishing rapport and lines of communication with black groups and individuals abroad . Recent infornation indicates two United States CAP representatives plan & trip in the future to Tanzania for the purpose of establishing a CAP organization 1 tha t CCmz CAP's domestic extremist element, headed by black revolutionaries HaywardHenry and LeRoi Jones call for the extensive use of ~diSruption and Violence, If necessary, by blacks in order to create Independent Black Institutions as are necessary to accomplish CAP S revolutionary objectives by mass action programs utilizing "direction, dedication, and II discipline: CAP held a Western Regional Conference in San California, during June, 1971 during which it was recomeeded a national comittee be estabiished to consider the possibility of establishing a black paramilitary organization which would furnish support in the form of a united front action with a11 "liberation struggles Ii in the United States and internationally_ CAP is currently engaged in efforts at forming an all-black political party in the United States to nomina te and elect black officials at local state and na tional levels who, it is felt, will support CAP S plans at es tablishing a separate black nation The organiza tion bas planned an Eastern Regional Conference in Newark, New Jersey , for September 1971, and bas tentatively scheduled another inter- national meeting in early 1972 _ NW 886082 Qocld:32989638 Page 149 trj /37 ================================================== Page 150 ================================================== Investigations of the CAP , its black extremist leaders and members } are receiving most close supervision _ Pertinent informa tion developed in regard to their activities is being dissemina ted to the Department and interested Government agencies and officials_ [ 35 NW 88608 Docld:37989638 150 Page ================================================== Page 151 ================================================== INTERNATIONAL BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS , aka BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS Bufile 157-21532 The International Black Workers Congress (IBWC) J which is in its formative stages, is dominated by James Forman, an official in the black revolutionary Student National Coordinating Committee- The IBIC makes its headquarters in Detroit, at the same locale as that of League of Revolutionary iochigaBiaci Workers, a black extremist labor union in that city. IBIYC is involved in the organizing of black workers and students to further the revolutionary struggle in the United States and other parts of the world as well as for the purpose of building unity among al1 third world peoples _ IBIVC s stated objective in organizing black workers is to bring about a national work stoppage, thus severely damaging the United States economy Janes_Forman has repeatedly stressed the necessity for blacksto be organized to change the capitalistic system to that of a Marxist-Leninist society through seizure of state power _ The IBWC held a regional meeting in Gary, Indiana, in June, 1971, at which discussions centered around organizing black workers into a Marxist-Leninist society and preparations for a drive to organize blacks employed in the steel industry 'and in the "U. S_ Post Office. " It was indicated that IBIVC would receive assistance from the pro-Chinese Communist Progressive Labor Party (PLP) in the form of advice concerning organizing activities_ An IBWC conference tentatively scheduled to be 'held in Detroit on August 21 S 1971, has apparently been canceled_ Indications are that the conference site has been Shifted to Chicago, Illinois, where the conference will be scheduled within two weeks _ It 18 particularly Significant to note IBWC leader James Forman together with other United States black extremists, Including affiliates of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers recently undertook travel abroad which was to include visits to North Korea, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Algeria. Q 134 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 151 22 , ================================================== Page 152 ================================================== JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS BUFILE 157-9903 4-H The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a black extremist organization with headquarters in St _ Petersburg, Florida. This group continues to be the leading organization of all black militant groups in the State of Florida_ It was founded in St_ Petersburg during 1968 , with 85 ghetto youths as a nucleus who believed liberation of black people will not come about through "normal channels _ Ii The organization has affiliated groups in Eouisville, Kentucky , and other cities in Florida have attempted to organize on a national basis but have experienced little success except with the establishment of a chapter in Boston, Massachusetts . The founder and leader of this organization is Joseph Waller an articulate Negro who holds the position Of "'Chairman" and states that he intends to have al black militant groups in Florida designated as affiliates of JOMO _ The organization 1 S voice and propaganda organ is "IThe Burning Spear" which i8 published on a monthly basis _ This publication has urged blacks to arms and to be prepared to fight white America_ In this connection, JOMO members have participated in racial disturbances, fire bombings, and have been involved in attacks on police through the use of violence_ Members reportedly blew up a radio station in Tampa, Florida, and participated in a plot to break out two black "political prisoners" from a Florida prison. Members have also been arrested for the commission of murders and robberies. The organization has accumulated a large cache of weapons , and its members are taught guerrilla warfare and receive firearms training. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection 8/17/71 HAN:maz 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 152 May , They Jr e buy 740 Page ================================================== Page 153 ================================================== Junta of Militant Organizations Bufile 157-9903 Recently JOMO has been reincorporated under The International Junta of Militant Organizations" and now appears to be attempting to make contact with organizations abroad and has embraced Stokely-Carmichael ' s concept of Pan-Africanism. JOMO has received contributions from all over the United States and recently was almost successful in receiving a large contribution from a church group in New York; however, this latter contribution was ultimately not received. 1 4 ( NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 153 ================================================== Page 154 ================================================== NATION OF ISLAM Bufile 25-330971 The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an independent semi 7 religious group consisting of an adult, hard-core, all black membership of 6,000 members _ Muhammad s Temple Nuber 2 of the Holy Temples of Islam, Chicago, Illinois, is the national head - quarters of this organization consisting of 108 groups in the U,S_ and one in Bermuda _ In seven U.S_ cities it operates University of Islam schools for 200 to 600 children at each school_ Local groups convene weekly , and once each year a national convention is held in Chicago which_ is attended by 5,000 to 6,000 individuals_ The NOI remains under leadership of Elijah Muhammed who is the self-proclaimed Messenger of Allah and "Supreme Ruler Of the Universe_ M Leaders continue to stress creation of a separate black nation; complete segregation of the races; hatred of the white man; and development of a black economic community. The group opposes the war in Vietnam, teaches members to evade the draft, and strongly supports the Arabs in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East, Although for years the leaders of the NOI have taught members to refrain from carrying weapons and engaging in acts of violence and open attacks on the white man, as recently as 1971, the NOI Mosque, Tyler, Texas, Planned the execution of radio disc jockey and his associate for having previously killed a fellow NOI member _ Subsequently , seven members of this mosque were involved in killing one of these men - Local police recovered three pistols and a rifle from among members of this group_ The highly inflammatory antiwhite ideology espoused by the NOI continues to make this group a highly volatile extremist organization- The organization is reaching new heights in accuulating wealth_ Three-fourths of a million dollars monthly flows in and out of bank accounts at a national level Corporations (8 1*2 NW88608 Qocld: 32989638 Page 154 July, ================================================== Page 155 ================================================== have been formed to operate food processing plants, acquire land in the U.S_ and in Bermuda, and acquire and maintain a fleet of jet airplanes . This group continues the propagation of its beliefs through distributing 400,000 copies weekly of its newspaper, "MMuhammad Speaks , II and radio broadcasts throughout the country. We have conducted a continuous security and/or extremist type investigation of this group since 1953 in accordance with Department directives_ Each group is reported on semiannually = and the leaders 9 functionaries, and those involved in violence or extremist activities are subject to active investigation_ The Department by letter dated 7/28/66 requested our investigation of this organization be continued_ NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 155 M3 ================================================== Page 156 ================================================== REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA Bufile 157-9079 The Republic of New Africa (RNA) was formed in Detroit, Michigan, in March, 1968 , by followers of Malcolm X, assassinated black extremist_ It has chapters in nine U.S. cities and a current hard-core membership of approximately 116 individuals_ RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard_Henryz long-time extremists in the Detroit area _ Then first formed, RNA named as its President-in-exile Robert_Franklin Williams violence-prone black extremist then living in China Willians who has since returned to the U,S_ has resigned his position as head of the RNA due to his own2 legal problems and dissension existing within the organization_ RNA was established to create a black nation within the U,S, demanding from the U.S. Governent the States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana 9 Mississippi and South Carolina_ in addition to individual reparations of S10,000 per black citizen as payment for 400 years of ancestral slave labor RNA S organizational structure is revolutionary in character and its leaders have proposed efforts pe made for inter- national recognition and financial assistance from Cuba, Red China and the black nations of the world. in September , 1970 , made a formal agreement of mutual revolutionary and financial support with the leader of the Black Power Movement in Surinam_ RNA established a black army known--as the Black Legion whose function was to protect the persons and property and to attack the enemies (police) of that nation_ Training programs were instituted and uniforms complete with leopard skin epaulets were designed as the official dress for the Black Legionaires _ RNA maintains its national headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, despite the fact that since 1970 , two factions have arisen within the organization_ One faction, led by Richard Henry is attempting to establish a national headquarters in New Orleans , Louisiana_ This faction is the most active and militant of the two groups and has called for intensification of RNA activities throughout the U.S. The other group, under the NW 88608 Dpzid:32989638 156 RNA, early Page ================================================== Page 157 ================================================== leadership of Milton Henry in Detroit, has been relatively inactive for some time. The Milton Henry Faction, however_ > has scheduled a national RNA convention to be held in Dayton, Ohio, September 4 through 6 , 1971 , which activity could herald renewed revolutionary activity by this group The Richard_Henry Faction has been extremely active #r in the past several months in attempting to obtain land and establish a black nation in Hinds County, Mississippi. During 1971 , this faction held a "peoples court" to hear RNA' s case against a black farmer and owner of the land claimed by RNA which was consecrated as the group 1 S capitol in March 3 , 1971. The black farmer has reneged on a former offer to sell his land to RNA _ The RNA group found the farmer guilty and threatens to seize the land by force, if necessary. The RNA ' s propensity for violent action is demonstrated by the fact that on August 18 1971 , local ice officers in Jackson, Mississippi, accompanied by Bureau Agents raided an RNA site seeking four subjects for whom warrants were outstanding, one of whom was wanted for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) for murder in Detroit. A shoot-out occurred during which two police officers and a Bureau Agent were wounded One police officer subsequently died of a head wound. Eleven RNA members , including_Richard_Henty have been arrested by local authorities and the UFAP subject is still being sought; A subsequent search of the raided RNA headquarters determined it was a virtual arsenal of weapons of al1 types including homemade bombs and Molotov cocktails_ The front door of this building had been booby-trapped and it had an escape tunnel leading from its rear which was accessible via a trap door in the building S interior and & trench-bunker similar to that utilized by the Viet in the war in South Vietnam NML 83608 Docld:32989638 157 July, Po] Cong /45 Page ================================================== Page 158 ================================================== STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC) 100-439190 SNCC was originally organized in Georgia, in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent 'Coczantatife Committee _ Prior to the election of Stokely Carmichael 2s its Chairman in May, 9 1966 } the organization operated as a nonmembership civil rights organization with both white and black participation Carmichael on assuming the Chairmanship of SNCC , immediately eliminated all whites from participation and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented group to one whose aims were those f antiwhite revolutionary action and the overthrow of the United States Government , a position which the organization maintains today. H Rap Brown_ Bureau fugitive and well-known black extremist Fho served as National Chairman for a time following Carmichael'8 vacating of that position in 1967 again assumed the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969 _ At that time it was announced SNCC was elininating the word "nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters waze also moved from Atlentz, Gecrgie, to New Vcrk City: Under Brown s direction, SNCC moved to restructure and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence as 2 black extremist organization The national leadership issued directives on the reorganization of the national office in New York City, as well as the local organizations and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary Economic Council, an: Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council a Research Council, and others which make up a body within SNCC known as the Revolutionary Political Council_ As a result of H Rap Brown s flight in to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland on local charges of inciting to riot and arson SNCC is presently under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt Hunt also serves as head of the organization S Revolutionary Political Council_ Frances Beal is the National Political Education Officer Hunt and Bel are the two national officers of SNCC _ In July 1971 a reorganizational meeting was held in Atlanta, Georgia SNCC cadres gathered from several states and were directed by Hunt to study , understand and then practice principles set forth in "Contradictions Mao Tse-tung and "Dalectical and Historical Materialism m1 by Joseph Stalin. SNCC members in San Antonio, Texas , are DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 ies 83 46 NW 88608 'Doeld 32989638 Page 158 1970 , May , only by ~@YESY: ================================================== Page 159 ================================================== Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) already receiving extensive political education in communist ideology of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The decision was made to establish a State Bureau of SNCC in every state and to move the national headquarters from New York City to Atlanta_ SNCC Will support various black revolutionary labor groups and will attempt to rally those under 25 years of age into a new Revo__ lutionary Youth Organization_ The cadres discussed establish- ment of a short-wave communication system utilizing code as a more secure alternative to telephone and mail systems _ Investigations of SNCC , its leaders affiliates and- their activities continue to receive close supervision Infor_ mation of pertinence concerning the organization continues to be disseminated to the White House, the Department and other interested Government gencies and officials. 14? NW 88608 Docld:32989638 159 Page ================================================== Page 160 ================================================== COMUNIST INFLUENCE OF BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS 100-442529 This intensification was initiated in August , 1964. The subject matter was previously reported in 2 subsection of the Comunist Party report but the volume and importance of this information made it necessary to follow this communist influence in a separate investigation: This investigation includes not the influence 0f the Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups, splinter groups and others including the New Left. The overall objective in this and related investigations is to protect the internal security of the United States by submitting information relating to possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for prosecutiona We also have the responsibility to develop int elligence information and disseminate to interested Government agencies. Additionally, we take measures to neutralize the communi st influence in the black extremist field whenever feasible. Reports are submitted quarterly and the investie gation is 'evaluated upon receipt of each report. Pertinent information is dissemina ed to the White House and the Attorney General The year 1970 saw continued influence by comunists and other subversives in extremi st groups. In fact, the comunist attempts to influence the black extremist Black Panther Party were SO insistent that the Panthers have becone wary of the motives of the Comunist This has not dininished in any way the Communist Party S efforts to influence and support the Black Panther Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers whether they want it or nt, 143 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 160 only Party- ================================================== Page 161 ================================================== There are those in the Communist Party who oppo se or are extremely reluctant to support the Black Panther Party especially those in the Black Panther Party who call for "revolutionary suicide_ Charlene Mitchell, Secretary of the Black Liberation of the Communist Party , is reportedly attempting to split the Comunist Party and form a Black Panther Communist Party which believes in violent and dramatic action, Her group is reportedly waiting for Angela Davis_ adnitted Comunist Party member currently incarcerated in California awai trial in connection with the kidnapping and murder of a judge in California during an attempted escape by prisoners from the courtroon, to be released at which time Daviswill become public leader of the new party. The Communist Party is girding itself to oppose the split. In June, 1971, a group led by James Rufus Forman, Cccrdintor- Of Interrational Affeirs for the BFIack extreie+ Student National Coordinating Comittee (SNCC) visited Hanoi ostensibly to establish rapport between the North Vietnanese and black people in the United States. The group S trip was also to include Algiers, Guinea, and Tanzania to reestablish old contacts for SNCC and initiate new ones, "SNCC Monthly," mil the publication of SNCC , in its March, 1971, issue, contained an article about "Third World People, MI united by "common historical oppression. 1f People in Cuba, Vietnam, Guinea, and the Palestinian guerrillas were mentioned as having cut off the tentacles of "the monster," imperialism. Another article in the sane issue was printed to politicize te readers on the Arab- Israeli conflict and, clarify the similarity between the Atab position and that 0f other "people of color" throughout the world; Curtis Nelson Powell, Black Panther Party member involved in restructuring Of Black Panther Party Cleaver Faction, while in Stockholm, Sweden, in early August, 1971, 'Vq NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 161 ting ================================================== Page 162 ================================================== inquired about the possibility of obtaining small arms on behalf of Eldridge_Cleaver for the Black Panther Party_ He specifically mentioned machine guns, pistols and bazookas and stated there would be 1o difficulty in getting these items into the United States _ His request was rejected. Powell subsequently traveled to Algeria, headquarters of the Black Panther Party International Section, and then on to Tanzania. He met with the Tanzanian Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning and requested permission to open a Black Panther Party office in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Although the Tanzanian Minister was sympathetic, he doubted the Tanzanian Government would grant such permission at this time. Write-ups concerning the Black Revolutionary Party and the International Black Workers Congress are incorporated in this slrvey _ 2 Such.writesups document the pro-Red China Comunist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) influence over the Black Revolutionary Party and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the International Black Workers Congress. 150 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 162 ================================================== Page 163 ================================================== KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM 4-H Key Black Extremist (KBE) Program initiated 12/23/70 with Director' 8 approval to intensify investigative coverage of selected black extremists throughout United States who are extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence_ Ninety individuals are currently on the KBE list, including such persons as Stokely Cericheel, Huey_Nevton and David Hilliard Objective of program is to develop complete and 'detailed information on the to-day activities and future plans of KBE individuals_ Investigative summary report is required followed investigative report every 90 days _ A1l KBE individuals are included in Priority I of Security Index_ Each is included in the Black Nationalist Fhotograph Aibu _ Ail aspects 0f their finances are determined, Their handwriting specimens are placed in the National Security File in the Laboratory Division_ Their fingerprints are included in the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File in the Identification Division_ Particular attention is to their travel_ Possible criminal violations are vigorously pursued. Emphasis is placed on obtaining record of their inflammatory statements _ High level of informant coverage on each individual is required. Supervision of KBE investigations is handled on the individual desks and additions to and deletions from KBE list must be approved Bureau. Inasmuch as KBE individuals are of the type whose investigation would ordinarily require close supervision by Bureau supervisors the adinistration and supervision of this program entails a minimu amount of time above that which would ordinarily be expended on the supervision of the cases of these persons _ Continuation of this program Wili be justified in Decenber , 1971_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 HEH;acs 4-H 4a 15 | NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 163 day- by paid by only ================================================== Page 164 ================================================== EXTREMIST INFORMANTS 4-H The prime purpose of development and utilization of extremist informants and sources is to provide intelligence and evidenciary information concerning black and white extremist organizations and individuals_ These sources are also called upon to furnish information concerning situations affecting civil unrest in all parts of the country. Supervision of extremist informants at the Seat of Government includes review and approval of new informants and confidential sources, review of progress of informants, review of payments being made to informants, analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nation- wide informant coverage of the various extremist organizations, coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such as Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremist groups ; conventions, supervision of operations for the development of top-echelon BPP informants, and other special projects such as development of information concerning black extremist under- ground escape routes and coordinating utilization of informants abroad with other agencies_ All procedures are constantly evaluated, in an effort to increase the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision with a minimum of paper work_ As of 7/31/71 we are operating a total of 1,477 1a extremist informants compared with a total of 1184 at the time of the last Inspection_ This is an increase of 293 informants _ Concerning the above informants 3 583 informants report on black extremist organizations and 353 informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan We are operating 6,541,ghetto informants who provide general information within the black ghetto areas of our cities as compared to 6 224 ghetto .informants at the time Of the last Inspection which represents an increase of 317ghetto informants. DMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 JCD;maz 4-H /5 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 164 Page ================================================== Page 165 ================================================== In line with the fluctuating membership in the various black extremist organizations, we have constantly adjusted our informant coverage _ This can be seen very clearly with the most violent of the black extremist groups, the Black Panther Party_ At the time of the last Inspection BPP membership was 1,000 _ and we afforded coverage of these 1,000 members with 173 informants which represents 17,3 percent of the member_ The present membership is 710, and we have 156 informants reporting on these individuals which represents 21. percent f the membership. This is a net increase of informant coverage to total membership of 4.4 since the last Inspection This also indicates our aims and purposes of penetrating these organizations with the most qualified informants and keeping within the policy of operating the informant program in 2 very efficient manner_ At the time of the last Inspection we were operating 376 informants furnishing information concerning white extremist organizations, and as of 7/31/71 we are operating 353_informants. This is in keeping with the current membership of the Klan and white hate organizations_ By memorandum dated 2/19/71 from G. C. Moore to Mr. C. Da Brennan captioned "Penetration of Black Extremist Groups in Canada, Racial Matters" it was recommended and approved that this Bureau attempt to penetrate the Hack extremist activities in Canada due to the close working relationship being developed between the extremists in that country and the United States_ We_made avaiLable to the_Reyal Canadian_ Mounted PoLice (RCMP) a source of the Baltimore Division By 4 VaJS letter dated 720771 from Leget Ottawa, it was set out Ehat Axl - # the RCMP advised Ehey have been ertremety Teased WfEh_ Ehe 33 Pregress_ made By our source in_ Ehat he has furnished information concern Euture_Rlans for acts 9f yiolence 44+ and the establishment Ae of guerrilla warfare training by black extremist groups in the #ot Toronto "Canada; area RCMPindicated that_ Halifay Nove_Scotia; is_fast becoming 2 focalpoint of black extremist activity in Canada. Lel AA7b RIxte Adttek Grirh / 5 3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 165 shipa top+ 74r7 ing Innun ================================================== Page 166 ================================================== RCM pointed out that the above area i8 vilited frequently by black extremist figures from the United States and admitted that they have experienced considerable difficulty in the recruitment of suitable sources in the Halifax area: RCMP requested of the Bureau another source of the caliber of the one presently operating in Canada. By memorandum dated 7/29/71 it was recomended and approved that we solicit of the field the identities of informants who may be able to travel to Canade. This project i8 presently being followed very closely. By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to Mr. W_ C. Sullivan` captioned "Racial Informant Development, Black Panther Party (BPP) ) Racial Matters" it was recommended and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a top level informant in the BPp By letter daied 8/17/71 TSan Francisco was instructed that captioned program is being discontinued_ Review of this program showed that all avenues leading to the possible development of high-level BPP informants have been explored and the groundwork laid for the development of toprechelon leaders who might defect_ Therefore, it was believed that it was no longer necessary to have two Special Agents assigned exclusively to this program_ This will bring about a savings in manpower; however_ San Francisco is under instructions to continue aggressive efforts to penetrate the echelon_of the BPP This is being closely 4+47 followed at the Seat of Government _ GHETTO INFORMANTS The ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67 to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening Posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. A ghetto informant is an individual living or working in the ghetto area who is available to furnish information concerning conditions which may create civil unrest. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 166 top _ /54 Page ================================================== Page 167 ================================================== Since 1967 this program has been significantly modified in that this vast network of informants have been changed from listening posts to individuals who are actively seeking extremist information as well as information concerning violations of Federal and local statutes We have noted nuerous incidents where ghetto informants are being converted by the field to regular extrenist info rmants in that they have been graduated into positions where they can report On a regular basis concerning the activities of individual extremists and/or extrenist organizations _ As a valuable by-product we are also achieving criminal statistics through contacts with our ghetto informants . This program was justified by memorandum dated 7/4/71 from G_ C Moore to Mr _ C_ D Brennan captioned "Ghetto Informant Program, Racial Matters" and is scheduled to be rejustified in 1972 . NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 167 July, 753 ================================================== Page 168 ================================================== 4-H COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BLACK EXTREMISTS Bufile 100-448006 Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70 . This program was a supplement to our black extremist investigative activities and involved 2 variety of sensitive intelligence techniques which were afforded close supervision at the Seat of Government . No action could be instituted under this program without prior Bureau authorization. To afford additional security to our sensitive techniques and operations, all counterintelligence progr: including this program, were discontinued and the field was So advised by airtel 4/28/71 . Although this program was discontinued, the field was advised if exceptional instances arose wherein it was considered counterintelligence action iS warranted, that recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the specific case caption involved. These recommendations will then be considered on an individual basis_ The field was also reminded that prior Bureau authority is required before initiating any activity of a counterintelligence nature. Significant results since last inspection a5 2 result of this program are set forth under If Accomplishments 4E" elsewhere in this report. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 WHA:pjc 4-H /5 6 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 168 amS , Uuls ================================================== Page 169 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H SECTION CHIEF WV _ R WANNALL NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION: There are attached separate write-ups regarding the following programs supervised in the Nationalities Intelligence Section 1; Name checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas 2 Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border (BOCOV ) Security Index-Cuba 4 American ' Repatriate Program :5_ Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries 6 Chinese Aliens Entering the U; S Chinese Entering U. S , Claiming U S, Citizenship Counterinteliigence Operations Against. Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United states 8 Visitors to Communist China and Contacts United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EXO:dgo 4-H 157 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 169 24 by ================================================== Page 170 ================================================== 4-H NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS This program was initiated in January, 1952, aS a means of keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of foreign officials where their activity requires such action: The basis for this program is found in the procedure by Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results being channelized to the FBI; We correlate this information with data from Our files ana furnisit Sallle io the Attorney General. In thoSc instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain ~clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions to the field for active investigation: Since the program was initiated, 794,570 Immigration and Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have undertaken '474 investigations based on results thereof, The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by substantive desk supervisors within the Division: Based On the limited number of active investigations opened Since the inception of this program, the cost of the program, consists mainly of name check expenditures: The program continues to serve & necessary purpose in our overall intelligence coverage , serving to alert uS to the presence in this country of persons having & capability for intelligence activities or who may pose & security threat to the United States. The program is justified annually , with the last justification having been made February 18, 1971. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 ERE:bipz 4-H 13 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 170 ================================================== Page 171 ================================================== 4 - H PROGRAM COMMUNIST COVERAGE ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER BOCOV BUFILE : 100-356015 I Background and Date of Inception BOCOV was initiated by the Direetor in 1948 to fill a void in adequacy of coverage in the 25-mile zone south of the U S P Mexican border by the Central Intelligence Agency and the, Inmigration and Naturalization Service II_ Scope and Desired_Objectives Three border offices El Paso , San Antonio, and San Viego, as weii a5 thel office of tne Legal Attache, Mexico, participate in this program_ Ten Agents and two Assistant Legal Attaches devote a portion of their time directing some 20.0 sources ahd informants Population of the zone areas involved is approximately 1,700_ 000 persons of which some 2,400 have been identified as either members, or sympathizers of najor Mexican subversive groups III. Positive Results Achieved Since Las Inspection Program has furnished valuable information relative to threat against U_ S_ by Mexican subversives residing and or operating in the border area Investigative results are furnished to all levels of interested U_ S _ Government intelligence community Program continues to keep uS advised Of potential trouble areas and allows for appropriate counter-measures DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTTON 8/18/71 BMiemjt 4 - H 15 4 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 171 SuL7sht, ================================================== Page 172 ================================================== Iv _ Extent and Nature of Current Supervision Periodic reports on individuals and organizations as well 2s informant coverage relating to BOCOV are analyzed and correlated by SA Bernardo M Perez Involved is review of incoming letters, memoranda 9 reports and semiannual progress letters detailing informant coverage and subversive strength_ Analysis of this material provides a basis for detecting weaknesses and making arrangements for counterintelligence moves V Current Justification for Continuance BOCOV continues to fill the above-described intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with other intelligence programs originating in the border area ,_ in particular the SECOMEX program VI. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification Program is evaluated, annually and was last justified January 8 , 1971 . I NW88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 172_ 76 0 ================================================== Page 173 ================================================== BOCOV Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this operation was to attempt to Identify foreign subversive elenents entering the U. S. Althcugh this operation 1s _o longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not vith regard to the internal security of the U_ but elso in investigeting criminal matters of an international nature Furthermore, unauthorized disclosure of details of this operation could jeopardize the lives Of individuals who cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing abrcad _ Subc/Auted for pajes W9k/60 ^6 Yo SSC <97 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 173 only S. , Page ================================================== Page 174 ================================================== 4 - H SECURITY INDEX CUBA Background and Date of Inception This program was instituted in November 1960 _ By that date it was obvious that Cuba , whose Government had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January , 1959_ was 2 communist state posing a real and present threat to the internal security of the United States In 1962 , at the time of the Cuban missile crisis an Agent Supervisor at the Bureau was assigned the specific responsibility for administering this program to assure the apprehension and special handling of the individuals included therein in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba . Scope and Desired Objectives As of July 15, 1971, there were 409 individuals includea in the Security Index L Cuba Program, divided into two categories: 1 Individuals placed on the Security Index solely on account of their pro- Cuban activities (Cuban Special Section F 93 persons) 2 _ Persons already on the Security Index because of other subversive connections and activities who would warrant special attention in the event of hostilities with Cuba (Security Index subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban" 316 individuals) DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/18/71 VHN: emj NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 174 ================================================== Page 175 ================================================== Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date record of location and activities of individuals included therein, by means of established Security Index procedures and reporting_ } in order that we are in a position to move swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of these persons become necessary. Positive Results Achieved Determination as to the validity of an individual's inclusion in this program is constantly under review Since the program was last justified on April 7 1971 the number of persons on the Cuban Section of the Index has been reduced from 95 to 93 _ These 93 persons are judged to be hard-core pro-Cubans action against whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory Of these 93 28 are Cuban aliens Each subject of pending security investigations with Cuban ramifications is considered for inclusion in the Index _ Extent and Nature of Current Supervision The Agent Supervisor responsible for this program is required to review each investigative communication in current cases of pro-Cuban individuals to determine whether the individual meets the criteria for inclusion in the Index, as ou tlined in the Manual & Instructions He must make a decision as to the degree of dangerousness of the individual under the Priority Apprehension Program and rule on the field's recommendations regarding these matters He initiates procedures with the Security Index Desk of the Domestic Intelligence Division and Voucher Statistical Section of the Administraive Division regarding the placing of an individual on the Index, his removal and the assignment or change in apprehension priority_ If the. individual involved is an alien, correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the Department is required to assure the preparation of a pre-positioned arrest warrant Immigration and Naturalization Service_ Action is also taken with the Department to cancel the arrest warrant if the alien is removed from the Index _ 16 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 175 2 by ================================================== Page 176 ================================================== Current Justification The threat to the internal security of the United States from communist Cuba has not lessened in recent years_ A workable priority apprehension system which receives current and continuing attention is mandatory_ This program as presently organized and handled, is fully justified. Frequencies of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation This program is evaluated on a semiannual basis_ The most recent review and evaluation was dated April 7 , 1971. 76 3 3 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 176 Page ================================================== Page 177 ================================================== 4 - H AMERICAN REPA TRIA TE PROGRAM The American Repatriate Program which was' instituted in February_ 1962 , to specify procedure to be followed upon receipt of information that U.S , citizens residing in Cuba hadabeen_issued_Swiss Protection Passports by Swiss Embassy in Havana Cyba, for Erave to S: was discontinued by memorandum W R, Wannall to Nr C. D. Brennan, dated March 1971_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/18/71 WWHN: emj 4 e H il 4 NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page-17Z 25 , ================================================== Page 178 ================================================== 4-H INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (Bufile: 65-63113) 13 Background,_Scope and Objectives Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations. Expansion of the program took place in 1955 and 1959 and during 1962 and a8 well a8 in 1970, additional coverage was approved. The program has four principal phases as follows: a. Regular notification to the FBI by other U. S. agencies regarding arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal expense. b_ Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments Kimo of selected non-Soviet bloc countries wth the approval of State Department and_the_Attorney_ General We currently have special coverage on Six diplomatic_establighments Oftfour_non-Soviet_bloc countries Countries currently covered are Panama Cuba Israel &nd the_United_Arab aurt nfiurr Republic Our cost in operating this phase O the program GtX Is celated to translation Qf the_intelligence_product and salary of_personnel_Who man specia] coverage_equipment 1z Costs are analyzed on an individual basis_each time the special coverage is iustified This justification is based on the value of the data developed. C This phase relates to the development of live sources wthin diplomatic establishments gf_po-Soviet bloc countries &8 well a8 the development of individuals so_ closely connected with official establishments are able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence informa- tion: We now have 39 actual and 14 potential live sources DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 #AEREbip _ 4-H /65 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 178 1963 , they Page ================================================== Page 179 ================================================== 4-H at the establishments of 24 non-Soviet bloc countries. The principal cost involved in this phase relates to Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and time spent in handling these sources. d_ This phase relates to our intensification of efforts our legal attache offices abroad to develop and instantaneously report high-level intelligence informa- tion susceptible to immediate transmission to the White House for consideration by appropriate officials involved in determining national policy 0n critical international issues. Since the last inspection we have instituted a program operating under the code word of "HILEV"' which provides for specific channels of transmission and dissemination along the lines noted above. The expansion of our operations abroad, at the instruction of the President, has resulted in the development of considerable expertise o the part of our legal attaches in developing the type of information required in this area and the resulting product of their efforts has resulted in laudatory comments by Dr:_Henry A Kissinger_ and other high-level members of the Executive Branch_ 2 Positive Results Achieved This program has enabled u8 to continue to produce & steady flow of substantive information of an intelligence nature for the White House and the highest level of the intelligence community. The program has been particularly productive in our coverage of such critical areas of tension as the Middle East crisis the continuing crisis in Panama, and the recurring areas of tension created in South America by the frequent overthrow and/or establishment of regimes in that continent, some of which are strongly anti-American in political leaning: In other fringe nationality areas, the program has served as a basis for obtaining information Which has served as a basis for advice to various high-level Government officials necessary for policy decisions within the international political arena. The majority of these data are not otherwise obtainable. The daily flow of information from our sources in the various facets of this program to the highest levels of Government has succeeded in firmly establishing the FBI a8 & lucrative source of foreign intelligence. 16 6 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 179 by ================================================== Page 180 ================================================== 4-H This ability to produce Such information has been recognized, as noted, by Dr Kissinger at the White House and by various officials of the Central Inte igence Agency in frequent contact with the Bureau. Specific comments regarding the HILEV program and its productivity may be found in the work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E, Accomplishments Special Coordination Unit. 3_ Extent and Nature of Current Supervision The program a8 it relates to all friendly foreign countries (except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section: 4. Current Justification for Continuation This program continues to produce information of substantial value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign political information of vital interest to the White House and members of the intelligence ccmmunity - The information contines to illustrate the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as & valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this program be continued; 5 _ Periodic Justification Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by memorandum dated 5/5/71. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA TIONS DANGEROUS ALIENS OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC Program was initiated in April, 1951, to create & centralized compilation of undesirable and potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom State Department can, when wartime emergency arises, initiate steps for deportation or lifting of their diplomatic immunity. The program applies only to aliens from countries outside the Soviet bloc employed in the United States in international organizations within provisions of International Organizations Immunities Act: The /6 7 NWN 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 180 ================================================== Page 181 ================================================== 4-H program is Similar in intent to the Emergency Detention Program and the PRODIP Program; however, it involves a entirely different type of individual: The program is & control device only and involves no investigative activity. Twenty-three individuals (as of 8/18/71) are included on the list, with New York Office responsible for nineteen and Washington Field Office responsible for four_ Current program requires only an annual letter with deletions or additions being made by separate letter a8 subjects involved qualify for elimination Or inclusion. Substantive desk supervisors review field submissions to verify need for inclusion of individuals on list. Program continues to serve & useful purpose a8 a precautionary measure for U.8. security in time of emergency It is justified annually, with last justification having been made 2/21/71. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 181 16 3 Page ================================================== Page 182 ================================================== CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE U_ S 4-H (Bufile 105-135923) CHINESE ENTERING THE U.S . CLAIMING U.S _ CITIZENSHIP (Bufile 105-12752) Inasmuch as the criteria and objectives regarding the above two programs are similar both- are included in this write-up _ Investigations under the Chinese alien program were instituted 1/26/65 and investigations relating to Chinese entering the U. S _ claiming U_ S_ citizenship were initiated 9/14/65 . Both of the above programs are designed to uncover through ethnic Chinese who may enter the_ U: S . under the guise of a alien and/or U S . citizen_ but who, in fact , may be covert intelligence agents "0f Communist China _ Prior to inception of these programs 2 we were: made aware of emphasis placed by Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence organizations on the need to introduce Illegal agents into the U_ S _ Provided sufficient indoctrinac tion and training are given, the legal alien channel is un doubtedly the easiest way to accomplish the desire of the" Chicoms to plant their agents in this country Under existing immigration laws 3* up to 000 Chinese aliens may be admitted to the U_ S _ for permanent residence annually Under an additional program initiated in 1971, another 250 Chinese aliens may be admitted to the U: S_ monthly as Conditional Entrants A11 of these aliens have backgrounds closely connecting them with Communist China and some leave behind on the mainland immediate family members or very close relatives Our experience in this field over the years indicates that alien entrants into the U_ S _ who may be selected for intelligence assignments wculd probably have resided in a communist country while in the 19 to 45-year age group and would probably have at least 8years of formal education Accordingly, our investigations of aliens are Jimited to those who fit the above criteria; DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 FXOi dgo 4-H 6 q NW.88608 Docld:32989638 Page 182 investigatioiegitinate 10, ================================================== Page 183 ================================================== 4-H The key to investigations of this type is the initial interview which is conducted after the field office covering the alien S residence has developed sufficient background information on the subject_ These interviews are designed to have the subject personally verify information he may have furnished to U. S _ authorities at some time in the past and in cases where significant discrepancies are disclosed through the interview we will intensify the investi- gation 9 looking toward the possibility that the subject is now unable to recall a previous cover story In the event the initial interview is satisfactory, the case is closed subject to being reopened after two years for a second interview_ The second interview, which is conducted for the same purpose as the first interview, will determine whether or not additional action is to be taken If the second interview is satisfactory, no subsequent action is taken with regard to the subject_ Cases investigated under the citizenship program are handled in a similar manner Our investigations in both these areas produce intelligence informa iiOll of variuus iypes wiichi is vaZiiable to other U. S agencies having a primary interest in develop- ments in mainland China The two programs have produced tangible results in that a number of sources in the Chinese field have been developed- through interviews Chinese alien cases originate with Legal_Attache: 'Hong_Kong who views appropriate records and thereafter submits pertinent "'data to the Bureau regarding those aliens who fit the criteria for investigation or any others whose backgrounds are deemed to be So unusual that investigation may be 'justi- fied even though they do not fit the criteria Cases in the citizenship category are initiated by the Washington Field Office after_review 2f_passport_records Alien and citizenship cases are handled on the Desks of two" Supervisors and consti- tute only a portion of the work on each Desk Results of investigation are carefully reviewed and evaluated in line with our objective of determining if the subject is or may be of investigative interest, It is felt that these two programs are fully justi_ fied for continuation since they cover areas which may be utilized by the Chicoms to introduce illegal agents into this country No other U_ S _ investigative agency carries out investigative activity along this line . In addition, these programs provide uS with sources and positive intelligence of /70 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 183 ================================================== Page 184 ================================================== 3 4-H interest to other U. S . agencies _ No additional manpower is necessary to' carry out our responsibilities' under these programs _ These programs are evaluated and justified annually Both programs were considered justified based on Division inspection write-up 1/12[71_ NW 88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 184 ================================================== Page 185 ================================================== COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST 4-H CHINESE COHMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI- I TIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN) (Bufile 105-135614) Captioned program was initiated in May 1965, to combat Chinese communist (Chicom) efforts to initiate intelligence operations and develop intelligence data in the United States Analysis indicates that our current: efforts relating to development of informants, particularly double agents 1 is an activity which we normally carry out in connection with our intelligence responsibilities _ Since CHICOIN was previously defined as a means by" which we were: creating situations and placing our informants in contact with Chicoms abroad_ with the aim of their being recruited by the Chicoms it.is felt we are accomplishing the same objective through source and double agent development in iudigidual :asrs We are constantly aware of the need to employ counterintelligence methods designed toward penetration of Chicom intelligence, particularly since a Chicom official establishment has opened in Canada and with the knowledge that the Chicoms will probably enter the United Nations within the next 14 months Along these lines, we are continuing , on n individual basis } development of sources who ~can be directed toward the penetration mentioned above _ Accordingly, it is felt that use of the term CHICOIN in connection with our basic efforts, is no longer necessary_ CHICOIN, aS a program , is therefore .discontinued. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 EXO*dgo - [72 NW88608_Dozi3k97983638 Page 185 ================================================== Page 186 ================================================== VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS 4-H Background Date of Inception, Scope and Desired_Objectives This program was initiated in 8/65 in an effort to uncover Chinese communist (Chicom) activities in the United States The identities of individuals, both citizens and noncitizens who are residents of this country , were furnished to uS by United States intelligence agencies and friendly foreign intelligence services These individuals either attempted to enter Communist China or contacted the diplomatic establishments of the People 's Republic of China (PRC) throughout the world. Since 1965 the number of diplo- matic establishments maintained by the PRC has increased many times, particularly during the past year when many, countries recognized the PRC This program is field-wide and not directly connected with any other investigative program The objectives include identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom establishments It is essential that visitors to Communist China and PRC Embassies in foreign countries be identified to deter- mine 1f they have access to classified material or could be utilized for an intelligence or espionage assignment upon their return to the United .States During recent months, the United states Government has lifted the ban on travel to Communist China However , the PRC has been very selective in the issuance of travel documents to United states citizens up until nOW , has restricted the issuance of these documents to chiefly a few newspapermen_ some scholars , known pro-Chicom sympathizers and a very limited number of ethnic Chinese Dur the past month, the Department of State and the Justice Department have indicated that the travel restrictions will be lifted on permanent resident aliens in the United States who wish to visit Communist China , Outer Mongolia and Albania _ Previously , the restrictions on United States citizens limited the number who actually entered China as well as the number of visitors to PRC diplomatic establishments The lifting of the DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE' DIVISION INSPECTION ,8/20/71 JEM smnl 4-H [7.3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 186 and, ing dgo Page ================================================== Page 187 ================================================== 4-H restrictions On United States citizens and the proposed amendment to the law concerning permanent resident aliens will greatly increase the number of investigations under this program Many of the individuals traveling to China from the United States will be legitimate merchants , scholars and tourists However they will be subjected to possible approaches for intelligence purposes _ In addition 9 we will possibly be able to utilize legitimate travelers a5 walk-ins Therefore, it is essential that we fully identify all those who enter China or contact PRC 'diplomatic establishments abroad. The ethnic Chinese is of greatest interest to the Chicoms as a visitor particularly if he has relatives residing on the Chinese mainland. Based upon the experiences of friendly foreign intelligence agencies , particularly RCMP 'we have learned that the Chicoms primarily recruit as intefli- gence agents the ethnic Chinese 2 Positive Results Achieved ` Since Last Inspection Investigations since the last inspection have greatly increased Many of the investigations are in the initial stages of identifying the individuals In February, 1971, the Chicoms established an Embassy in Ottawa, Canada During that month 2 14 United States residents contacted the Embassy _ During June 156 residents contacted the Embassy in addition to contacts with the Chicom propaganda news agency New China News Agency _ Included among these people are ethnic Chinese national" political figures in the United states 2" China scholars journalists and merchants_ The increase from February through June of over 1,000 percent indicates the acceleration of the problem facing the Bureau in this program During .July there was a substantial increase 'over June The Chicoms have taken on a new look and are encouraging visitors to the Embassy in Ottawa . Our common border which is So easily crossed, offers no resistance;_ it_is through the excellent cooperation of the Galt RCMP that we are able to obtain the names and addresses of individuals contacting the Embas; the New China-News Agency (NCNA). 34 It is expected that in the future the number of contacts Will increase both at ottawa as wel1 as at the China Travel Service in Hong Kong and the various Embassies of the PRC' in foreign countries The present policies of the President and the Department of State speaking for the United States Government /24 NW-88608-Boeld-32989638-Page-187 and ================================================== Page 188 ================================================== 3 : 4-H will continue to encourage visitors 2 any of which is a possi- ble subject for recruitment by Chicom intelligence for hard espionage , intelligence activities or propagandizing the American people_ 3 : 'Extent and Na ture of Current Supervision Portions of this program are handled 'by three Bureau supervisors However the visitors to China are correlated by one supervisor and the contacts with Chicom diplomatic establishments are correlated by a second super- visor This has become necessary because of the increased 'work load based upon information furnished_by_RCMLthrough 'Legat Ottawa Investigations are conducted to fully identify the individuals primarily through established sources if possible to determine their current residence and particularly their employment Identification of eiployment is essenti:l t? deternine j f the individua] has access to classified information or if he is in some field of .endeavor which is of particular interest to the Chicoms Each case is evaluated on its individual merits and cases are not opened on individuals O11 whom sufficient background information is available such as nationally known journa- lists scholars or political figures 4 Current Justification for Continuation RCMP has advised as recently as July 1971;_ that theyfeel ~qat at leas 50 percen 'Ene Chinese communist intelligence effort ip_ Canada will be directed against the United_States The Wife of 2 Chicom 1 ntelzigence officer 0r of the Chicqm Empassyzip ottawa has_stated that The-Embassy ~Staffin Canada will be_large because_ erwe wili be_ respons ipIe rr for the United States as well as Canada It {s"absoiuteiy necessary that thiz program be "continued to identify a11 contacts both in Canada as well as at other PRC diplomatic 'establishments throughout the world. In addition Legat , Hong Kong , has submitted a form which has been' approved to forward to the Bureau the identities of those individuals who are American citizens or permanent resident aliens who cross the border of Hong Kong into Communist' China at Lo Wu _ W_BB6n8_Docid:32989638_Page 188 46- 040 ================================================== Page 189 ================================================== 4-H In addition, identity of visitors will us a fertile field for development of sources which we may utilize as walk-ins particularly at the Embassy in Ottawa RCMP has greatly encouraged this procedure 5 _ How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification_ This program is evaluated annually and the iast date of justification took place on 1/12/71. 175 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 189 give ================================================== Page 190 ================================================== LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES 4--l FOREIGN LIAISON INSPECTOR E_ S. MLLER: In order that the overall foreign liaison can be fully and currently evaluated, you are requested to furnish your comments conce rning each Legal Attache Office presently operating (17); former Legal Attache Offices which you have proposed to be reopened (3); and proposed new Legal Attache Offices (3). In providing this information, you are requested to be specific a8 to: productivity (including intelligence) of each existing office (provide examples); (2) comment as to adequacy of personnel assigned (fully document if additions de letions or changes recommended); (3) make specific recommendations regarding continuing or discontinuing each of existing offices _ You are also requested to state your current recommendations regarding each former and new Legal Attache Office proposed above _ Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall reques ted. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR:C . D. BRENNAN I concur with the attached (CDB :mls 8/25/71) comprehensive analysis of Section Chief Wannali in regard to our Legal Attache operations abroad The Inspector should particularly note Wannall's concluding observation that any future expansion abroad will be resisted by the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and unless Specifically ordered by the White House , will require approval from State and Bureau of the Budget . As Mr _ Wannall points out, we are not in a position to balance the value of the information expected against the costs and I would suggest the Inspector insure that 2 copy of Mr Wannali's overall analysis is furnished to the Administrative Division inasmuch as the Director on 8/23/71 approved the recommendation that the Administrative Division should coordinate and handle all requests for increased staffing, as well as the creation of new Legal Attache posts _ OMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION NNSPECTION '19 /71 ESM:wmj 4--l (77 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 190 ================================================== Page 191 ================================================== LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES 4-H-1 FOREIGN LIAISON COMMENTS OF SECTION CHIEF T , WANALL: In response to the Inspector's inquiry, comments follow concerning (1) the 1l foreign offices in operation prior to the expansion in December (2) the 6 new offices opened in December , 1970 , and {(3) the 6 additiona1 offices which we proposed be opened in response to the Director's inquiry in May, 1971 _ With respect to categories (1) and (2) it is noted that these 17 offices have just undergone inspection, most of them during the current month _ As very few of the inspection reports are yet available, these comments ere necessarily based upon those facets of the work Which it 18 possible to obberve from the Seat of Government (1) Offices ip Operation Prior to Expansion BERN Our operations in Switzerland are most delicate because of the fierce independence of the Swiss, who would not permit the use of "Lega1 Attache "1 a5 It was considered too . Widely identified with the FBI As a result, our representative is known in the Embassy and in Switzerland merely as an Attache _ The office has become increasingly important in the criminal field very recentlas 2 result of the large sca le thefts of securities in the United States and their transportation to and attempted sale or hypothecation in Switzerland In addition, it has long been the goal to obtain access to information concerning bank accounts opened in Switzerland by subjects of our investigations _ Progress has been slow but we have been able to secure limited information and the cooperation received is the direct result of the personal liaison of our Lega 1 Attache Productivity During fiscal 1971, the office located 7 fugitives M and arranged 4 Finformal deportations Its pending case load a5 of 6/30/71 was 83 Which is approximately average on a per agent basis in the foreign field. Through 8/23/71 Bern had submitted 7 HILEV items of which 5 were actually disseminated _ This 1s the sma Ilest number of submissions of any Lega 1 Attache and the second smallest number of acceptable items_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 4-H-1 8/23/71 /7P NW 88608 DJGbeJafss Page 191 'WeiL R, 1970 , ================================================== Page 192 ================================================== 2 - 4-H-1 Personnel Adequate . No increase envisioned . Recommendation Continue_ BONN This i8 2 very important European office covering Germany _ > Austria, and the Netherlands There is a high vo lume of both crimina ] and security work The large United State military presence in Germany is both a0 espionage target and a source of Bureau work _ The military intercept program furnishes our office_copies_ Of correspondence pasging through Germany %orznd from Iron Curtain countries sC 7 end unet volume of 7hia 13 80 "great as to tequire ertra alerica ] assistance The Legat Attache haa 'Served 1n Germany siace 1951 ana is universely respected and given full cooperation. Productivity In fiscal 1971 20 persons wented in the United States were located in the Bonn territory and 5 stolen cars were recovered _ The Legal Attache is currently working a ring case which will result in location of an additional number Through 8/23/71 he has submitted 18 HILEV items Of which have been disseminated _ This 1s considerably below average and this matter was discussed Rith the Legal Attache during his visit to Washington on home leave recent He has shown improvement a5 evidenced by the fact that he has submitted 4 items already during August of which 3 have been used His pending case load 25 of 6/30/71 was 355 which 18 considerably above average on 2 per agent basis Personnel third agent was added to Bonn i0 December } 1970 , at the time Austria was added to its territory. It is felt this is adequate_ Recomnendation Continue . 174 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 192 ly . ================================================== Page 193 ================================================== 3 4-H-l BUENOS AIRES For several years this was a one_man office attempting to cover not only Argentina but aIso Brazil, some 1,200 miles away and larger than the United States _ Although we had 2 very capable Legal Attache, he could barely touch the high spots in his territory and maintained a very low case load _ Two additiona1 agents were assigned in December 1970 and Paraguay was added to the Lega1 Attache S responsibilities 2s was intelligence reporting on Chile We believe the results have justified this move although one agent is still trying to cover Brazi on a road trip basis Productivity During fiscal 1971, 38 persons wanted in the United States were located in the territory _ The pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 294 and above average on a per agent basis As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 47 HILEV items of which 21 have been used and 2 are still pending _ This is well above the average _ Personnel One agent and one clerk could be: transferred from Buenos Aires if an office were to be opened in Rio de Janeiro . Under present circumstances 1 the personnel is adequate but three agents and three clerks would not be needed if Brazil was removed from their territory. Recommendation Continue _ At present_ this is our only point of coverage for an enormous area of South America _ HONG KONG Originally opened to provide coverage' of Chinese communist activities, Hong Kong fell heir to the entire Southwest Pacific area when our office in Manila was closed _ Te believe the area has 2 high potential both for cases pertaining to the Bureau' s domestic jurisdiction and for items of high-level intelligence The intermittent road trips, however do not permit adequate development of contacts who can be relied upon to look out for our interests In addition, the Legal Attache has required an abnormal amount NW-88608_Decld:32989638_Page193 ================================================== Page 194 ================================================== 4-H-1 of supervision in regard to administrative matters _ He experiences great difficulty in meeting deadlines and has been censured twice already this year for delays in reporting He has an outstanding personality , speaks readily and fluently , and has a good background in Chinese matters Nevertheless , very few of his HILEV submissions bave been acceptable and he has evidenced a lack of understanding of wha t constitutes intelligence of interest to the White House . It mas suggested that these matters be inquired into by the Inspector together with the Legal Attache'8 relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) So far 2s the passage of information to and from British sources 18 concerned _ The results of the inspection are not kbown _ Productivity Fifty-four persons wented in the United States were located by the office during fiscal 1971_ Eight "infornal deportations" ff were arranged Tne case load 25 of 6/30/71 was 178 Which is approximaiely average uti & per #E8.t S3sis_ As of 8/23/71, the Legal Attache had submitted 27 items for HILEV dissemination of which 7 were considered acceptable. Personnel The' present personnel complement is not considered adequate to discharge the Bureau s responsibilities_ 9 including HILEV 1n Southeast Asia . We have 7 however , recommended that three additional offices be opened in this area If these offices ere opened the complenent Of two agents and two clerks should be able to handle the work in Hong Kong if necessary, provide relief to any one-man office opened in the area Recommendation Continue_ The resumption of relations with Communist China Wiil make this office increasingly important_ LONDON This is our most productive office in Western Europe and handles 2 heavy volume of criminal cases Our office has developed 2 very close relationship mith Scotland 'Y ( NWV 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 194 yet and, ================================================== Page 195 ================================================== 5 4-H-l Yard and its Special Branch with the result that we receive Splendid cooperation in both criminal and security investigations in the London area There are always a iarge number of Americans in England and Ireland and there Ffll always be a need for our representation there. Productivity As of 6/30/71, London had 333 pending cases, the largest number per agent of any office except ottama Ninety-one persons wanted in the United States Were located by the office during fiscal 1971 and 4 "informa 1 deportations" were arranged despite the British insistence upon forma 1 lega1 procedures As Of 8/23/71, London bad submitted 20 items for HILEV dissemination 11 of which were accepted_ This is slightly below average _ Personnel He have recommended that consideration be given io assigulng 81 adaiti3321 #gert te Ieedon and if approved , this will still leave London with an above average number of cases per man _ We believe that the Bureau gets high value for its investment in the London Office . Recommendation Continue . MADRID An increasing number of American travelers are visiting Spain and they have included fugitives and other United States criminals The present Lega 1 Attache has developed strong contacts in Spain, including PrLnce Juag Carlos the beir apparent to General Eranco: Although operating alone , the Legal Attache has done & particularly good job both in his contacts and the administration of his office. Productivity Twenty-four persons wanted in the United States Rere located by the Legal Attache during fiscal 1971 _ His case load as f 6/30/71 was 115 mhich is substantially above average on a per agent basis _ To date, he has submitted 28 items for HILEV dissemination of Which 17 have been accepted with 2 still pending_ This is above average _ NW-88608_Docld:32989638_Eaqe195 1Y > ================================================== Page 196 ================================================== 4-H-1 Personnel We recently recommended that one agent and one clerk be added to Madrid in the event of &8 future expansion _ Ihile the present complenent can handle the norma 1 FBI cases , the emphasis on HILEV items can best be satisfied by an additional agent Recommendation Continue MEXICO CITY Our operation in Mexico is unique in that we are actively developing informants and working most closely with the cooperative Mexican officers who haudle our cases: there This is ouI largest office both in terms of case load and personnel _ Unlike Canada where practically a11 our work is handJed by one agency , we are aealing witn a number of different agencies in Mexico most of which lack the training and sophistication of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) hence the disparity in the personnel required to handle our work north and south of the border In a1 effort to streamline our operations in Mexico, the Lega1 Attache has been instructed to reduce the number of informants he is operating and to cut back on his investigation in certain areas such a5 the American Communist Group in Mexico . Productivity Two hundred and eighteen persons manted in the United States were located by the Mexico City Office during fiscal 1971 _ Thirty "informa ] deportations"were arranged and 53 stolen automobiles were recovered . 'The case load ag of 6/30/71 mas 627 which is below average on a per agent basis_ As of 8/23/71, thbe office had submitted 37 HILEV items of Which 28 were actually disseminated This 1s substantially above average Personnel We feel the present complement 1s adequate until the Legal Attache recommends additional "Resident Agencies_ 1} The large expanse Of territory and the necessity of working NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 196 13 3 ================================================== Page 197 ================================================== 7 - 4-H-l closely with Mexican police require our agents to be. on the scene for anything but relatively routine investigations _ The Legal Attache has for some time been considering possibility of opening one or more additiona1 "Resident Agencies T to afford faster coverage and more thorough investigations in areas Which now require extended road trips. Recommendation Continue_ OTTAWA With Mexico City this is one of our two most important and productive offices_ The establishment of a Chinese Communist Diplomatic Mission in Canada the asylum afforded our deserters and Selective Service fugitives, and the relatively open border make Canada an area of intense FBI interest We are fortunate in having RCMP with setion-wide secnrity jurisdiction and nearly nation-wide police jurisdiction to handle our investigations While we have 2 two-man office in Ottawa , RCMP has a three_man office in Washington because of the number of United States agencies with which they do business Our relations with RCHP are outstanding and they are the closest counterpart 0f the FBI of any foreign investigative agency . Broductivity The case load as of 6/30/71 was 548 Which is by far the highest on a per agent basis During fiscal 1971 the office located 994 FBI fugitives 37 fugitives for other agencies_ ) 755 Selective Service delinquents and recovered 92 stolen automobiles Ninety "informal deportations I were effected , As of 8/23/71, the Office had submitted 22 HILEV items of which 10 were used . This is below average _ Personnel The sheer volume of work makes the problem in Ottawa primarily clerical As a streamlining measure, RCHP has printed routing Slips Mith spaces for our titles and file numbers which the Legal Attache uses in forwarding RCHP work to the Bureau_ An additional clerk has recently been furnished ottawa and it is expected that the recent inspection will have noted the effect of this increase _ Recommendation Continue_ NW-88608_Docld:32989638_Page 197 /x4 ================================================== Page 198 ================================================== 8 4-H-l PARIS This is a major continental office to which an additional Agent was assigned at the time of the recent expansion in order to concentrate on development .of high- level intelligence_ Our Legat enjoys the confidence of the French investigative agencies and is able to secure cooperation which is denied to the Central Intelligence Agency as 2 result of the latter involvement in a wire tapping incident during the 1960's The departure of the American military from France has somewhat reduced the volume of criminal matters, but the establishment of NATO Headquarters in Brussels, also in Paris territory has continued the flow of security matters_ 4 substantial number of friends of the Bureau visit Paris each year and require time and attention from our Legat _ Broduetigity During fiscal 1971, 23 persons wanted in the United States were located by Legat, Paris _ His case load 25 of 6/30/71 was 244 , which is everage on 2 per Agent basis_ As of 8/23/71 , Paris has submitted 38 HILEV items of which 21 have been used and one is pending . This is above average _ Personnel No increase in personnel is envisaged for. Paris_ This office provides both clerical and, Agent .relief to Madrid. Recommendation Continue_ ROWE In addition to Italy, Rome covers Greece, Turkey , and Cyprus on a road trip basis The office has not reached its full potential in the development of political intelligence but a very satisfactory relationship exists with the Itaiian investigative agencies; and we are receiving coverage of organized crime figures and other criminals who have relocated in Italy. It is expected that the Legat [36 NW 88608_Docld 329896J8 198 's yet Page ================================================== Page 199 ================================================== 9 4-H-l will expand his contacts in Italian cities other than Rome, such as Naples Milan, Florence , and Venice, in order to widen his capabilities in the criminal field and improve his collection of HILEV intelligence items _ Productivity During fiscal 1971, 14 persons wanted in the United States were located by the office and one informal deportation was arranged; As of 6/30/71 , there were 145 pending cases, slightly below average on a per Agent basis As 0f 8/23/71, 13 HILEV items had been submitted, of which 9 were used This is below average Personnel We believe the personnel are adequate but not excessive_ Recommendation Continue _ TOKYQ In addition to Japan, Tokyo covers South Korea and Formosa The latter presents a particularly delicate situation as the United States moves toward recognition of Communist China Our Nationalist Chinese contacts, however } have promised to continue their cooperation despite wha t they view as an unsympa thetic move by the United States Government Despite the language barrier in both South Korea and Formosa our representatives ha ve been consistently successful in getting the work of the Bureau handled in adequa te fashion_ As the United States military commi tment in Japan is reduced and as the economic goals of the United States end Japan draw farther apart, it is increasingly important that we have a liaison capability in Tokyo_ Productivity During fiscal 1971, Tokyo located 23 persons wanted in the United States and arranged three informal deportations. The case load 25 of 6/30/71 was 279, NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 199 /96 ================================================== Page 200 ================================================== 10 4-H-1 substantially above average on a per Agent basis and the third.highest of the foreign offices on that basis_ Tokyo has submitted 40*items for HILEV dissemination, 0f which 17 have been used. This is slightly abore average. Personnel We have recommended that one Agent and one clerk pe added to Tokyo in the event of further expansion_ This would permit more frequent visits to Taivan and South Korea and would also permit Widening of contacts within Japan itself } which is necessary if increased emphasis is to be placed upon HILEV production_ Recommendation Continue {2} New Offices Opened In" December , 1970 The following six offices were opened in_December 1970 for the specific purpose of developing HILEV intelli- gence _ Four of these offices were opened in entirely new territory while two were assigned areas previously handled other Legats_ In considering these Six offices, it must be recognized that they were primarily intended as intelli- gence collectors and not as sources of pormal Bureau cases. We have been pleased, however to note tha t several of these offices are making a substantial contribation to the Bureau' s domestic jurisdiction in addition to their FILEV work BETRUT This is 2 one-man post established in new territory where there had previously been little need for coverage The Legat has developed severa ] very productive sources of political intelligence and at the present time is the highest producer of HILEV items He has been commended for this Nevertheless, should there be any reduction in White House interest in HILEV items, we could not justify continuation of this office Productivity One FBI fugitive and one Selective Service delin- quent were located by this office between January and June , NW 88608 Docld:32989638 200 by /87 Page ================================================== Page 201 ================================================== 11 i-H-1 1971_ As of there was a pending case load Of 27 which is the Sma case load of any foreign Office Beirut has submitted 61 HILEV ltems of Fhich 31 have been used and three are still pending _ Tnis is the largest number of items used submitted by any office . Personnel Present complement is fully adequate and cannot Abe reduced_ Vacation relief for the Legat should come from Rome an for the clerk from Tel Aviv (we cannot send Assistant Legat Rubenstein to relieve in Beirut because or "the political situation) Recommendation In view of the high production of HILEV Items , the Office Should be continued CARACE & This office was opened to cover the large area of northern South America 1 together with the numerous territories and independent countries in the West Indies It is essentially 2 road trip office and affords the Bureau coverage in en are? where we have been totally dependent upon the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency for the handling 0f our leads Our Legat, who started out with a semihostile Ambassador } has won the latter '5 respect and has made 2 gratifying start at development of the large and scattered area assigned to him In addition to the Latin-American countries, he is covering French 2 British, and Dutch possessions; and the effectiveness of his liaison 15 demonstrated by his ability to devise channels of communication to his contacts throughout his area Productivity During the first six months of 1971, Caracas located 11 FBI fugitives one fugitive for another agency , and three Selective Service delinquents, while arranging one informa 1 deportation_ His case load 6/30/71 as which is well belom average on a per agent basis but is expected to increase with the further development of his territory _ He has submitted 25 HILEV items of Rhich 12 have been used , This is slightly below average 1sR' NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 201 6/30/71ilest 72 , ================================================== Page 202 ================================================== 12 4-H-l Personnel In view of the road trip na ture of this territory, two Agents will be necessary to insure continued coverage While the present case load is low , this is a brand new office in completely new territory and we expect improvement . Recommendation This office should be continued without regard to the emphasis on HILEVS , /24 NW88608_Docld: 32989638 _Page 202 ================================================== Page 203 ================================================== 13 4-H-l COPENHAGEN This office was opened to exploit the potential of the Scandinavian countries handled on a road trip basis from London prior to the expansion in December } 1970 _ A large number of deserters, Selective Service subjects, and other fugitives have been granted asylum in Sweden and the liberality of the Zaws in Denmark has Served as 2 magnet for youth from the United States In addition, the entire area is attuned to moves from the Soviet Union and it was hoped that there Rould be 2 reasonable volume of regular Bureau Work together with a steady flom of political intelligence The potential of the office has not yet been reached The unfortunate security breach which resulted in the change of Lega 1 Attaches has an experienced man in charge but he has been there less than two months and has bot been able to bring the office into line There has already been a marked improvement in the rate of HILEV submissions and we expect the office to be more successful under newv management _ Broductivity Twenty-eight persons manted in the United States were located by the Legal Attache during the first six months of 1971 One "informa] deportation" was arranged _ The case load 2s of 6/30/71 (prior to arrival of the new Legal Attache) was 43 representing the smallest per agent assignent of any Legal Attache Through July 9 1971, Copenhagen had submitted 8 HILEVs of which 2 were used Already in August, 4 submissions have been received for a total of 12 and 3 have been used for a total of 5 with 1 still pending This is the sma llest HILEV production of any Legal Attache and Bulet 8/4/71 pointed this out and insisted upon improvement Results thus far in August indicate that the Legal Attache is responding _ Personnel While the present case load does not on the surface, justify continuation of a two-man office, we believe the potential for far greater achievement exists in the Scandinavian countries and me feel that the new Legal Attache should be given an opportunity to exploit this potential_ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page_203 [40 put yet ================================================== Page 204 ================================================== 14 4-H-l Recommendation We recommend that the office be continued in its present status for an additional six months at the end of which time consideration should be given as to its personnel complement _ LA PAZ Coverage of Bolivia and Peru was initiated for the Sole purpose of developing HILEV data and cannot be justified on any other grounds _ The Lega1 Attache has done an outstanding job under very difficult circumstances The government (until 8/22/71) was pro- communist and basically anti-United States The Lega 1 Attache is living inside 2 barbed wire fence with a full- time guard at his door We have had to armor plate his car and furnish him a two-way radio to insure full-time communications with his Embassy _ The altitude is such that persons wi th other tken ccmpletely strong hearts and Tungs Should not be permitted to visit there_ The office gives uS coverage in an area we have not visited since the days of SIS but norma 1 Bureau work there is minima l _ Productivity During the first six months f 1971, the Legal Attache located 1 FBI fugitive and 3 Selective Service delinquents His case load as of 6/30/71 was 45 which is Well below average on a per agent basis He has submitted 24 HILEV items of which 14 have been used which is about average_ He has twice furnished advance information concerning important political developments including the current coup and he has received commendation from the Director for the material he has furnished _ Personnel The work load certainly cannot justify any increase in personnel but it cannot be decreased Without closing the office _ Recommendation It is recommended that operations continue in La Paz for another six months at the end of which time a close hard look should be given to closing the office. It is possible that a more friendly regine in Bolivia will result in a0 increase in HILEV items but it will have no bearing on his over-all case load _ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 204 ================================================== Page 205 ================================================== 15 4-H-l MANAGUA This is an office opened in the right area but in the mrong place _ There is Bureau business in Central America and we had long considered recommending an office there prior to the President s request in 1970 _ We did not want to open in Managua , nowever but in San Jose Costa Rica, where the living conditions are far Superior We were forced to settle for Hanagua when the Ambassador to Costa Rica objected to our opening there _ As a result, We have two men living under difficult circumstances resulting in varied domestic problens including education of their children, and mora Je in our Managua Office is probably lower than in any other foreign post _ It w2s expected that Central America would prove 2 fertile source of HILEV items because of the constantly changing political alignments in the various governments , This has not been the case and Bulet 6/4/71 informed the Legal Attache of our disappointment in his production_ At the start 0f June he had only submitted 2 items } 1 of which had been used _ He is showing improvement 25 indicated by the submission of three items in June, four iu Juiy , aid fiva 45 Aigus+ as of 8/23/71_ The Legal Attache has been placed on probation as 2 result of administrative deficiencies discovered by the Inspector and it is expected that this will have a Salutary effect not only in his administration but also in the contribution Of his office to the work of the Bureau Productivity During the first six months of 1971, 14 persons wanted in the United States were located in Central America, 5 "informal deportations "1 were arranged, and 10 stolen automobiles were recovered _ The Managua case load as of 6/30/71 was 65 which is far below average A total of 14 HILEV items have been received of which 9 have been accepted. This total is below average but his current submission rate is well above average _ Personnel The 7 Central American countries have enough substantive Bureau work to justify the present complement of this office, 1f the, potential is fully exploited _ We are watching this Situation closely and expect marked improvement . NW-88608_Decld:32989638_Paqe 205 712 ================================================== Page 206 ================================================== 16 4 4-H-1 Recommendation It is recommended that this office continue _ It is possible that a change in leadership may be necessary as indicated by the Inspector '8 findings and recommendations concerning this will be made as soon a5 it can be determined whether or not there has been en improvement TEL AVIV This office was opened solely as a source of HILEV material and it has proved fertile in this respect _ There have been some unexpected fringe benefits in that an organized crime figure has taken refuge in Tel Aviv ana the Legal Attache has been able to secure the cooperation of the Israeli police in affording coverage to the anti-Soviet Jewish Defense League , which has proven So troublesome in the New York City area _ As the office has only been open during the current year, it is too early to assess accurately either its potential or its achievements_ Productivity Eight persons wanted in the United States have been located in Israel and 3 "informal deportations" arranged _ The case load as of 6/30/71 was 69 , which i5 considerably below average on a per agent basis Forty-four HILEV items have been submitted of Which 27 have been used with 1 pending This is substantially above average, and the Director recently noted the Legal Attache 's excellent production and he has been recommended for commendation_ Personnel It is too early to make an accurate assessment as to future personnel needs One agent could handle the present case load but we do not feel that the full potential of the area has yet been reached and any reduction: would result in two one-man offices at the end of the Mediterranean with accompanying problems of relief. Recommendation Continue for the time being . NW 88608 Docld:32989638 206 /43 Page ================================================== Page 207 ================================================== 17 4-H-1 (3) New Offices Recommended If Further Expansion Undertaken In response to the Director's request we recommended by memorandum 5/28/71 that six additional offices be opened for the specific purpose of increasing our production of high-level intelligence of interest to the White House Three of these would be offices formerly operated but presently closed, while three would be completely new offices_ The following are the three former Legat offices which we proposed be opened: MANILA We recommended that one Agent.and one clerk be assigned to Manila to relieve Hong Kong of its present road coverage and to provide closer following of political developments in the Philippines_ which area is apparently drawing farther away from its former close alignment with the United States We ha ve a number of applicait_tyFC Joczc 13 #52 Priliprikzs, 224 tke bendling of these could be expedited by & representative- on the scene RIO DE JANEIRO We proposed that two Agents and two clerks be assigned to reopen our office in this important population center of Brazil, a country larger than the United States We are presently trying to cover this area from Buenos Aires, which is over 1,200 miles away , and we are passing up the opportuni to develop political intelligence items concerning developments in this huge country which, like most of Latin America is in the throes of deciding between communism and capitalism_ SANTO_DOMINGQ We proposed that one Agent and one clerk be assigned to reopen our office at the capital of the Dominican Republic_ This would be entirely for the purpose of developing HILEV items although there is 2 modicum of Bureau work `in the area which is presently handled on a road trip basis from San Juan. We developed 2 number of NW 88608 Docld:32989638 207 t9 H trip ty Page ================================================== Page 208 ================================================== 18 :4-K-l informants and sources during our period of operation there, and we feel that these could be reactivated to become 2 productive source of HILEV material The following are the three new offices which we proposed be opened, each to have a complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerks: CANBERRA AUSTRALIA 'This_ office could cover Australia and New Zealand thereby relieving Hong Kong from its present futile efforts to cover the area by road trip and give on-scene coverage in this huge area where our work has been increasing_ We presently 2re trying to cover 35_ Jeads in the area which indicates there is 2 nucleus of essential Bureau business upon which an office cam be predicated. Here again bowever the primary function of the new office wouid be production of HILEV items KUALA LUMPUR MALAYSIA This office would cover Thailand, Ma laysia and Singapore, presently handled out of Hong Kong, and would initiate coverage in Indonesia, where we have no coverage other than through State and the Central Intelligence Agency_ There is nOW a nucleus of 20 Bureau cases pending insufficient to justify the opening of an office but the high interest in Southeast Asia would indicate that any production of political intelligence should include coverage in this area Opening of the two foregoing offices } plus Manila , would relieve Hong Kong of a11 road trips and permit that office to concentrate on the important security matters involved in the new relationship_ between Communist China and the United States_ NW88608Docld: 32989638_Page 208 /93 ================================================== Page 209 ================================================== 19 4-H-l NEW DELHI INDIA This office woula open completely new territory affording coverage of India , East and West Pakistan, and Nepal _ The potential for political intelligence here is high, but there would be very little substantive Bureau work in the area Our recommendation for opening of the six foregoing offices was made strictly in response to the Director S request_ We cannot justify opening of these offices on the basis of substantive Bureau business but it is our judgment that these offer the most productive locations for the development of political intelligence_ Any expansion abroad will be resisted by State and the Centrel Inte)ligence Agencv; and unless specifically ordered . by the White House, will require approval fron Budget ana State who maintain a personnel ceiling for each Department 's representatives abroad _ We are not in a position to ba lance the value of the information expected against the costs: [46 WW-88608_Docld:329896J8_Page 209 ================================================== Page 210 ================================================== ADDENDUM OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION E.S_MILLER:wmj 8/26/71 You are requested to clarify and document J ur observations "that any future expansion abroad Will be resisted by the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and unless specifically ordered by the White House Will require approval from State and the Bureau of the Budget. "I Comments of Assistant Di rector Brennan requested. NML 88GO8 Docld:32989638 210 /4 ? Page ================================================== Page 211 ================================================== LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES 4-H-l FOREIGN LIAISON ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C, D BRENNAN: The quoted observation (GAD:hc 8/27 /71) concerning anticipated problems to be encountered in connection with any future expansion is based solely upon our experience during the December ) 1970 expansion together with regulations whichhave been promulgated appliczble to United States personnel overseas In December , 1970 , we asked to open an office in San Jose _ 1 Costa Rica , but ended` up in Managua Nicaragua , 1 a much less desirable location_ because of wha t was termed the "objective of lower United States profile " in Costa Rica We asked to open an office in Saigon , Vietnam and were met with intolerable restrictions imposed by the Ambassador with the result that we canceled our request_ In connection with opening in Caracas Venezuela , the Ambassador there demanded that we agree to coordinate any inteliigence activities wiiil ihe Centrai iuteiiigcice Ageuey under the provisions of National: Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 and that our representative measure up to a certain standard in his ability in Spanish. In fact, the Ambassador in Caracas said he would send our man back on the same plane :f he did not possess the desired ability _ Even before we had made a formal request State indicated their desire that we not open an office in Helsinki Finland, because of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) then in progress _ Reference to approval by state and Budget is actually reference to the procedures established for any increase in overseas personnel _ Such procedures are of long standing being known under the Johnson Administration: as "BALPA" (Ba lance of Payments) and initially during the Nixon Administration as "OPRED" (Overseas Personnel Reduction) A "National Security Council Undersecretaries Commi ttee, I which includes representation from Budget and State establishes fixed ceilings on a 1l United States civilian 'employees abroad Under the rules established by this DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE . DIVISION INSPECTION 8/27 /71 GADahe T1-1 NW 88608 DocId: 32989638 Page 211 14 >. ================================================== Page 212 ================================================== 2 - 4-H-l committee any increase in these ceilings must be either (a) 2 result of "special studies" or at White House direction; or (b) by a request for a ceiling increase by proposal to the committee explaining the requirement and demons trating its consistency with national policy and approved program plans _ The present FBI ceiling is 88 , and regular reports concerning our overseas positions are made to the committee through the Department by the Administrative Division The above has been set forth in some detail in response to the Inspector's request. The Director has stated that any expansion will be discussed with Dr Kissinger at the White House before any action is taken White House approval supersedes red tape developed by other agencies_ We ere confident that the President S desires can be rapidly and efficiently satisfied onces he gives the word NW 88608 Docld:32989638 212 744 Page ================================================== Page 213 ================================================== CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES 4--3 NNSPECTOR E, S. MLLER: Since the last inspection there have been certain Significant developments in the overall problems of meeting our responsibilities to this work. You are requested to furnish briefly such developments and also provide your appraisal of the Situation agYesently see it, Obviously, there are strong indications that increases of investigative manpo wer in the field and imaginative supervision and direction here will be necessary. What has been accomplished Since last inspection and what are your for the immediate future ? Be specific in advising of programs C urrently being considered for recommended implementation. Comments of Assistant Director requested. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D_ BRENNAM There is no doubt that our DEM:mjt 8/23/71 work in the Chinese field will increase both at the SOC and in the field. Attached are comments by Section Chief Wannall with which I concur Proposals for implementing programs discussed will be recommended by appropriate memoranda _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTON NW 88608 3J3404J3439638 Page.213 plans 0 ================================================== Page 214 ================================================== SECTION CHIEF W _ R: WANNALL At the outset it should NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION be noted that Western nations have been isolated from Communist China for more than twenty years The Chinese communists (Chicoms) have established thenselves officially in countries of the same or similar political persuasion therefore, we receive little or no data concerning the Chicoms which is relevant to our investigative responsibilities in the security field. We have been fortunate however_ to receive from Royal Canadian Mounted_Police (RCMP) much data relating 8 to their experience with the Chicoms who are now_firmly offi- "'cially_ established in Canada The prograns and methods we use or may implement in the future to deal with the Chicoms must, in some measure be based on our prior experience in the security and intelligence fields and an analysis of the data we' have received from the RCMP Recent Developments and_Appraisals Thereof Sizcz iast incpcction (1/8-26/71) the foliowing: significant developments have occurred: The "Chicom" Embassy in Canada has become opera- tional_ The Embassy staff numbers 26 of whom nine (33 percent) are known or suspected intelligence officers The significance of the aforenentioned figures is obvious when we recal1 the report of an RCMP source,who_guoted the wife 4 of an Empbassy 7440 officiai as stating i The (Chicom staff vill necessarily be 7044 F3 #arge 4s it will be respongibie for the Inifed Sfates as well as Canada In addition 45 RCMP haz: adVised 3 based On its Zun intensified and expanded coverage of ther "Chicoms that at Test 50 percent 0f"ChTcom efrort In the intelligence R sfzeid having a Canadian base wili be directed against the United States RCMP has confidentially advised uS that the Canadian External Affairs Office 15 wilting ro allow the Chicom official staff in Re S Canada a maximuin of 60 persons Tnis approxinates tne number ozindividuts 5 staffing soviet offreiar establishents in Canada _ In appraising the above 'we must heed the warning flags and prepare for a severe test of our resourcefulness We cannot expect less than a substantial effort by the Chicoms to mount a variety of intelligence operations against this country from Canada . This situation will exist at least as long as no official Chicom establishment is located in this country _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/23/71 FXOdgo _ 4-1-3 N88608 Docld:32989638 Page 214 WWu and , ================================================== Page 215 ================================================== 4-H-3 2 Restrictions on travel of U_ citizens to Red China have been lifted entirely , and there is presently under study by Department of State and the Attorney General a. recommendation that the prohibition On travel of permanent resident aliens to Red China also be lifted. Whiie the Chicoms have not allowed Wholesale' entry of Occidentals into their coun try, recent events suggest they are slowly but surely revising policy to permit more Westerners to visit the mainland. We are aware that the Chicoms have openly supported revolutionaries who operate in the U and the desirability of personal contact with such types as well as with others who would work for the Chicoms is obvious The new United States policy regarding travel of U,'S_ citizens to Red China will most assuredly prompt overt travel by individuals of Chicom persuasion as well as by persons who could well be subjected to an intelligence recruit- ment approach albeit unwittingly While this area may not immediately present problems of the magnitude expected in other areas involviug 'iie Ciicuiis , w8 must realistically ccrcider that U . S . citizens traveling to Red China deserve 2 careful look from an investigative standpoint either as potential sources, one-time interviews. for inte iligence_ purposes ; or as individuals who may have been recruited by the Chicoms during their visit to Red China _ With regara to the possibility that restrictions on travel of resident aliens to Red China will be lifted soon there are in the United States many thousands of Chinese aiiens having permanent resident status most of whom have family members or close relatives residing on the mainland. If travel restrictions on these individuals are lifted, we are faced with an even greater danger of having Chicom-recruited individuals returning here On its face, such a situation would pose an enormous investigative problem for the Bureau 3 Within the last few weeks Secretary of State Rogers announced U: S . policy as regards admission of Communist China to the United Nations (UN) Simply stated, Administration policy is to not oppose UN membership for the Chicoms while not agreeing to_ the ouster 0f Na tionalist China (Taiwan) from the UN _ There has been much talk of a "two China policy M but this is incidental to the real problem we face With the removal of U_ S . opposition, it is likelyz Red China NW 88608 Docld: 32989638` Page 215 202 S. , ================================================== Page 216 ================================================== 4-H-3 will be admitted to UN membership and that its representatives will appear in New York City between October 1971, and September , 1972 _ When this almost certain development takes place we will be faced with grave internal security/intelligence problems _ In appraising the above situation and noting that the Chicoms 1 should they gain UN membership, would be entitled to the largest delegation and largest percentage of UN Secretariat employees of any member nation, we would clearly require a sub- stantial increase in the number of Agents handling Chinese work in the New York Office Such an increase would include assign _ ments to that office of as many Chinese-speaking Special Agent personnel as may be available and examination of the need to train additional Agents in the Chinese language _ Dependent` on the size of a Chicom UN delegation,_ it might be necessary to establish a Chinese Section in New York Office Should a sub- stantial increase in case load in the Chicom field come about as a result of Chicom entry into the UN , it would also suggest an increase in the number of Supervisors in this field at the Seat of Government _ With regard to the investigative aspect of Chicom "etry into the UN , it is felt that the Chicoms , on arrival, will proceed cautiously at the outset in any program of covert or overt intelligence activity That intelligence efforts will be undertaken, there is nodoubt inasmuch as information in our files and sound logic demand the conclusion that the Chicoms will rely on a 'ariety .of methods by which to gather information to assist in the planning and execution of political moves as well as to combat or neutralize technical and scientific progress and military moves made by this and other countries The Chicoms , with a base at the UN , might limit early; intelligence efforts to political matters until they have their feet on the ground. Knowledge of their collection of such intelligence however could be of as much benefit to this country as wouid knowledge of Chicoms efforts to collect other types of intelligence The inevitability of the appearance of a Chicom delegation at the UN requires that we marshall al1 the assets we have in this field in order to be in a position to have broad quality coverage in the informant area and the ability to spring into quick and effective action from an investigative standpoint _ On' 7/15771, President Nixon announced his plan to visit Red China before 1972_ The FBI may well be called 2/3 MW88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 216 _ May , ================================================== Page 217 ================================================== 4-H-3 upon in months ahead to provide ` intelligenee support in connection with the President S: trip_ The step taken by President Nixon emphasizes the importance our Government places on the status of Red China as a world power It is felt we should be in a position to provide the White House with as much intelligence as we can logically gather in the event such a request is levied upon uS Accomplishments Since Last Inspection (1/8-26/71) Qur cooperative_efforts with RCIP paid Off during February } I971, when we identified an unknown subject who made a clandestine contact with a Chicom intelligence officer in Ottawa RCMP through its coverage recognized at the outset 337 43a that prelzminary contacts "Zhe unknown_gupject were_mos 5 34 61 unusual pecause of" security precautions demanded by him 2097 Within hours after our investigation was Initiated, Wer-identi- fied the unknown sbject as a Washington D_ ( resident holding impressive credentials in political circles Our sub- 'sequent coverage in this case disclosed efforts made by the subject to gain employment on the White House staff as well as jobs with State and Justice Departments We promptly alerted the White House and appropriate officials of. other agencies _ 'In' July, 1971, with the Director S approval, a desk-level' conference was held at_ the Bureau: with our RCMP counterparts The results were most productive at the Director s instruction, we sent a memorandum to Dr Kissinger setting out the highlights of the: conference_ Dx Kissinger in a personal letter to the Director expressed his thanks for the information and noted that the Bureau's timely coverage of these matters is mos+ important_ He' requested he be advised of significant developments as they occur Two of our sources who are being developed to fulfill double agent roles traveled from ther IS to Hong Kong where they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts Another source who_is enployed_at the JN is now in Communist_China , and this trip was made at no cost to the Bureau_ We expect to Obtain valuable current intelligence information from this source upon her return to this country Yet another source was directed to undertake a three-week period of travel. during which he was to. contact pro-Chicom individuals on the West Coasts of theU S NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 217 204 px: and, ================================================== Page 218 ================================================== 4-H-3 and Canada These contacts were planned to serve as a basis for his contact with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa as the last phase of his tripa Nine individuals are being considered for use along 'DESECO lines with the expectation that we will be able to target them against the Chicoms either ip Canada-or_in the U. S State Department approval has been obtained to inter- view and/or re-establish contact with 16 employees of the United Nations_Secretariat it is felt, offer potential to assist uS in the future or in an early effort connected_with 2 joint operation with RCMP; Two suggestions were submitted with a' view toward streamlining administrative and investigative procedures in 'the Chicom field, Both were adopted and annual savings indicated to be $16 160 _ Future Plans In connection with foreseeable additional security and intelligence responsibility as regards Chicom 'activities_ the following is set forth: 1 We have an Index of over 600 names of Chinese aliens who have been interviewed in the past and who are graduates of universities and graduate schools in Red China We see" tnis group as a reservoir from Which we eouid develop a number of sources who could be directed against the Chicoms in"the future or if facts So indicate could be utilized in connection with existing efforts to penetrate Chicom intelli- gence operations: This would involve opening cases on these individuals providing instructions to the field Offices involved, looking toward interviews for the purpose of deter- mining informant potential and Willingness to assist us 2. Five field offices are currentiy involved in an effort relating to ethnic Chinese scientists having security elearances Each office involved has been instructed to limit its efforts to ten such individuals in the hope that we may find some who would be willing to initiate a contact with the NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 218 who ,. Tor 20 3 ================================================== Page 219 ================================================== 4-H-3 Chicoms for the purpose of making themselves available for possible recruitment by Chicom Intelligence. We' have a list of approximately 3500 ethnic Chinese Scientists_and/er technicians who have security 'cre clearances Vn$ Because of manpower limitations 1 we have not inciuded other offices in this program nor have we allowed more than 50 cases of_ this type to be opened. It would be desirable to expand this effort to include other offices and to increase the number of individuals involved in each office to perhaps 50 Again, our object is to develop a nucleus of sources who would be of present 01 future value in our counterintelligence opera- tions against the Chicoms 3 . We would like to consider the use of ethnic Chinese Special Agents as well as nonethnic,Chinese-speaking Special Agents who: could, in an undercover capacity be targeted against the Chicoms in Canada or against any Chicom establishment which may be located in {his country in the future Such an operation would require substantial indoctri- nation direction and development of cover employment and identity; and wouid be in essence a most appropriate and secure means by which to mount an_ operation designed to develop a defector in place_ 4. Since the" door to travel by U_ S_ citizens to_ Red: China is wide open_ we should expand our efforts in this area to full identify each traveler (other than legislators and news media types) for the purpose of considering these individuals for interviews in order to gather positive intelli- gence or to identify any traveler who may have been subjected to;' a 'recruitment approach by the_ Chicoms 5 . We should consider instructing a limited number of field offices to begin efforts to develop sources who could be used in a 1 walk-in" program directed against the Chicoms in Canada as ~ellas,any Chicom establishment formed in this country Here, we would not have to look toward ethnic Chinese but could selectively approach types who might be of interest to the Chicoms including military personnel because of their backgrounds in fields in which the Chicoms have expressed an interest In Chinese alien cases where 2 hostage situation exists, we should revamp current instructions to require a reinterview of such persons one year after the initial interview NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 219 20b ================================================== Page 220 ================================================== 4-H-3 '(current practice calls for reinterview two years after ini- tial interview) This is felt desirable since the alien who has immediate family and/or relatives residing in Red China is most susceptible to a recruitment approach and is more likely to be the type who has entered the United States on an intelligence mission _ 7 We, should consider issuing instructions to closely examine our UN sources to determine which may be logically directed to initiate contact with the Chicom Embassy in Canada Contacts of this type , although they may indicate no: immediate interest on the part of the Chicoms may well serve aS 2 basis for a later approach by the Chicoms either before or after Chicom entry into the UN . 8 National Security Agency '(NSA representatives are of the opinion that Cthe possibilfty_exiezs-that _Chinese Intelligence service is beaming broadcasts to agents in the' ~Io R78te dnited-States "or ninorder Countrie3 (Canad "Mexico "Under Rureau instructions our San Diego Office recently monitored broadcasts on the basis: o* predictious maus iy #34, Broadeasts undoubtedly emanating from Red China were heard during this monitoring and the clarity of the signal on our West Coast was excellent Discussion with NSA led NSA representatives to_ "observe that ~tthe broadcasts mentioned anove_might_be_connected with an illegal agent_network and they agreedtomake a-further study of this situation and provide uS with additional Aeatb_ 4 Tr 45 sensitive ma teriat they"have jncovered in order to determine if 4rt some tie-in could be developed While this effort is' a new and "does not definitely estabiish that an illegal; Chicom opera- tion exists in this country, it is an indication that we should undertake action designed to' uncover such a situation In the absence of more specific data, we should consider at this time having field offices check warranty cards submitted by pur- 'chasers of certain radio equipment primarily radio receivers capable %f tuning in on broadeasts such aS those mentioned above This would involve identification of the equipment, its manufacturer subsequent instructions to the field to check warranty cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining names of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such 'cards Inquiry should include ` developing background information on the pur- chaser in cases where warranted; conducting interviews 22 7 NMY-88608-Doeld-32989638-Page-220 one, and and, ================================================== Page 221 ================================================== ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E _ S_ 7}H You have advised that items one through (ESM:wmj 8/26/71} nine in this write ~up Will be fully im plemented by separate memorandum in each case consistent with the availability of manpower_ It would appear that present developments indicate that further delay in implementation of some of these programs may seriously retard our response to important investigative responsibilities _ You are requested to advise specifically when such programs will be implemented and what manpower requirements are necessary to do so. Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requested. ASSISPANT DIRECTOR C, D. BRENNAN I believe the five areas (CDB:mls 9/1/71) outlined by W . R. Wannall constitute a valid base from which to expand our coverage of anticipated Chicom intelligence and subversion which will be directed against this country when diplomatic relations are established and/or United Nations membership is established for the Chicoms It is desirable to initiate these programs as soon as possible , prior to being faced with the Chicom activity. My position concerning available manpower to accomplish this is covered under the write-up captioned "Adequacy of Personnel Ii 6E _ As you are aware the proposed work load adjust- ments contained in my memorandum dated 7/29/71 will make available some additional personnel, and further adjustments may well be made possible by close examination of case count figures under the new tightened procedures for counting pending cases_ A mid- month case count was prepared for the Inspection Staff as of 8/20/71 , and an end of the month case count is currently being prepared. If these figures confirm a lower case load for Nationalities Intelligence (8/20/71 figure is 275 case load average and well below other Sections) } I believe at least one DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 9/1/71 4-H-3 20y N 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 221 ================================================== Page 222 ================================================== man from within that Section should be made available to implement this program_ If the Inspector feels two men should be made immediately available to this program from within the Domestic Intelligence Division complement and the nine men currently utilized by Wannall on the Ellsberg case are necessary and productive , a thorough review Of case loads and other gauges of work load will be made , Section by Section, and another man added _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 9/1/71 4-H-3 301 NI 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 222 ================================================== Page 223 ================================================== 'SECTION CHIEF WV _ R_ WANNALL In connection with our NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION objective of being prepared to counteract and/or neutralize the Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence and subversion effort we expect will be mounted against this country, it is proposed that the following action be recommended for implementation immediately_ In each case, a separate memorandum containing appropriate recommendation will be submitted within the next tten days_ Initiate investigation on 300 of the over 600 individuals listed in our Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools Index This effort woula 'be aimed at "developing^ quality sources we can direct against the Chicoms as well as developing 'intelligence from among a group of well-educated 'Chinese aliens Based on our initial accomplishments in this area , additional cases on the balance of more than 300 names in the above Index would be opened for the purposes indicated above _ 2 Initiae investigations on 500 ethnic Chinese scientists_who have securityclearances_ This represents an expansion of our current effort which we have heretofore limited to five field offices representing a total of 50 individuals in the above category The objective of this effort is to identify ethnic Chinese Scientists who would under Bureau 'direction be willing to initiate contacts with Chicoms for the purpose of making themselves available for possible recruitment Chicom in telligence We have a listing of over 3500 ethnic Chinese Jecientists who have_securityclearances_ and opening 500 cases would be our initial attempt to expand source development in this area Depending on the success of this effort, additional cases would be considered for opening for the ~purpose indicated above 3 Expand our investigations relating to United States residents' who visit Communist China to include development of background information on each visitor except in cases where the purpose of the visit appears legitimate on its face to consider these individuals for interview_ Such expansion is the obvious follow-up to the recent lifting of restrictions on travel by U_ S _ citizens to Red Chine Experience; in the DONSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION EXQ-dgg 8731771 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 223 Wp xby and, 3/0 Page ================================================== Page 224 ================================================== security field has shown that intelligence recruitment of individuals visiting communist countries is an established practice These investigation and/or interviews would not include subjects of pending cases handled in other Sections in: this Division Examples of the latter would be travel to Red China by New Left types or black extremists who are subjects of continuing investigation 4 _ Close examination of the situation as ` regards our sources in the Chinese field_ now employed at or having access to the_United Nations who could be directed against the Chicoms immediately This must be a critical examination closely supervised with the expectation that some of our existing sources and others who may be developed could be directed in early contacts 'with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa Canada Our objective here is to develop Within the Tnited Nations itself sources who can supply us with quality information on the Chicoms who will almost certainly enter the: United Nations within the, next year 5 Iritiate 2 survey of offices having ethnic @hinese-speaking Special Agents assigned to determine whether or not any of these Special Agents can be directed toward an operation against the Chicons involving an undercover role The purpose here is to establish an appropriate and secure means for utilizing one or more Special Agents for development of a defector in place among the Chicoms; Implementation of the above will require_ a substan- tial amount of research for the purpose of issuing instructions to' field offices It is felt that in order to provide . adequate supervision regarding the above numbered items, two Supervisors should be added to the existing complement (3) of the Chinese Unit- Consideration has been given to a11 items (9)_ pre- viously mentioned 2s being within the area of future plans for meeting our responsibilities in the Chicom field. It is felt that immediate implementation Of the above 5 items should be accomplished while the remaining items herein before discussed wiil be considered for implementation in light of continuing developments in this field We believe we have selected for immediate implenentation those matters which will bring about the most substantial positive accomplishments in areas of current criticaf' need_ NW88608_Docld:32989638_Page_224 3/1 ================================================== Page 225 ================================================== 4-H-3 9 _ Foreign intelligence agencies have concluded that one of the weakest links in Chicom intelligence opera- ions is in the field of communications We should, there- fore, consider renewing the Chiclet and Chiprop programs both of which were discontinued In 1965 . Trough these pro- grams we had a secure means to review communications_between 0ir7a the_United tazes and_Red China and Ero_them we acquired data on both ethnic Chinese and Caucasians which was of security interest to uS The matters discussed above are set forth in light of our current knowledge in the Chicom field. It is realized that continuing developments in this area may suggest new efforts which could be initiated or could suggest further expansion of our existing programs Such recommendations would, of course, be made on a timely basis_ Items 1 through 9 above wiil be fully implemented by separate memorandum in each case consistent with the availability of manpower 2/2 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638.Page 225 ================================================== Page 226 ================================================== SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITTES CONTROL BOARD 4--5 INSPECTOR E. S . MLLER: It is understood that additional work is anticipated as a result of Executive Order 11605 and subsequent Congressional action. You are requested to advise what action you have taken to brace for this additional work and how much volume you antic ipate_ Also advise a8 specifically a8 poSSible which Units will be affected the greatest, and to what extent. Comments of Assistant Director requested: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN The implementation of Executive Order 11605 will affect primarily the work of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence Section and Internal Security Section_ I have conferred with the Section Chiefs of the afore- mentioned Sections and instructed them to initiate a review 0f each of the cases which the Department has indicated it intends to proceed against to determine what additional investigation is required to develop the evidence necessary to present to the SACB _ Administrative procedures for handling these cases have been worked out and since the cases are supervised in three different Sections, a Division Coordinator, who has had previous experience in preparing cases for presentation to the SACB, has been designated to insure that the cases are handled in a uniform manner in each of the three Sections_ So the Department has indicated that it intends to initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party, Progressive Labor Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Ku Klux Klan; however , we have not a5 yet had any Specific requirements levied upon uS by the Department in these cases_ Based on past experience, it can be anticipated" the services of one supervisor, full tine, will be required to prepare each of these cases for presentation to the SACB _ CWT:djr 8/26/71 DON STIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/23/71 ESM:wmj 4 --5 ZM NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 226 6/3 far, ================================================== Page 227 ================================================== The language of Executive Order 11605 is very broad and generally coincides with the basis for our investigation of extremist groups, Conceivably, consistent with manpower avai lable, proceedings could be initiated on most of the organizations we have under investigation although the Department has not indicated at this time that they Will undertake any wholesale action_ For additional observations concerning the anticipated impact of Executive Order 11605 on the work of this Division, see the Adequacy of Personnel write-ups of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence Section and the Internal Security Section. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 227 314/ ================================================== Page 228 ================================================== ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS MWN-88608*p6 32989638 puge 28 AnNuSTEATIVE ================================================== Page 229 ================================================== DIVDDNG DOMESTIC WTELLIGENCE DIVISION 5-A-la NTO TWO DIVISIONS HYPPECTOR E.S. MLLER: Assistant to the Director Sullivan has suggested that Domestic Intelligence Division (DI) be divided into two separate divisions_ In order that this matter can be analyzed during this inspection you are requested to furnish: 1. Complete table of organization for each of two new Divisions as you would organize them if suggestion were adopted: Do not use names of supervisors, Section Chiefs Front Office administrators . Use only position designations Section and Unit designations and number of Agents and clerks designated for each Unit and Section_ 2 . In the event yeu feel work now being handled by another Division should be realigned in the event above suggestion ted, s0 indicate under appropriate new division. 3. Following each of the two tables of organization for the above new divisions set out Section by Section and where appropriate Unit by Unit, your reasoning for placement in division. In this regard, it will be necessary to take into account and balance both volume of work and nature of work being handled. 4. Indicate advantages in adoption of above suggestion. 5 . Set out disadvantages you feel apparent in dividing DD_ Also indicate how such can be overcome and resolved. 6 . Since adoption of above would involve possible realignment of space in some instances you are requested to advise what new space Would be necessary and what other movement of personnel and equipment would be involved. Comments f Assistant Director {xe Ateaiehed _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPEC TION 8/19[71 ESM:wmj 5 -A-la NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 229 adop O5 ================================================== Page 230 ================================================== DIVIDING DOMSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISTON 5-A-la INTO TwO DIVISIONS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: 1 In accordance with the: instructions of the Inspector there are set forth below two proposed tables of organization for the new Divisions Which would be created by dividing the current Division into two; Divisions_ These Divisions would be named Domestic Intelligence Division and Counterespionage Foreign Intelligence Division respectively. PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGAZIZATION Domestic Intelligence Division Assistant Director Inspector 2 secretaries 1 clerk-stenographer 4 Pam. to Midnight Supervisor (Agent) 10 clerks (Includes' security patrol and Front Office mail room) Division Front Office Total: 3 Ageats 13 clerks New Left Section Front_QEfice New Weft_Groups_Unit 2 Agents Agents 2 clerks 6 elerks Speciel Investigetions_Unit-East Subversive Individuals-New Left Unit 6 Agents 6 Agents 5 Clerks 6 clerks DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION: 8/20/71 5-A-la 3/5 NW 88608 Qocld: 32989638 Page 230 Hliga:nlm ================================================== Page 231 ================================================== Special Investigations Unit-West Protest and_Trotskyist_Groups Unit 5 'Agents 4 Agents 5 clerks 5 clerks Section Total: 27 Agents 28 clerks Extremist_Intelligence_Section Front_OfEfice Black Nationalist-White Hate Unit-East 2 Agents 6 Agents 2 clerks 7 clerks Black Nationalist-White Black Nationalist-White Hate Unit-West Unit-Centzal 5 Agents 4 Agents 5 clerks 3 clerk: Black Nationalist-White Hate-South Antiriot and_Bombing_Unit and Extremist_Informant Unit 5 Agents 4 Agents (4 Agents & 2 clerks 7 clerks 3 clerks to be transferred from General Investigative Div.) Section_Total: 26 Agents 27 clerks Internal Security_Section Front_OfEfice Comunist_Party _USA_Unit 2 Agents 2 Agents 2 clerks 3 clerks International New Left_and Subversive Individuals_Unit Sedition Unit 2 Agents 4 Agents 2 clerks 4 clerks Civil Disorder_Reporting_Unit Security Informant_Unit 2 Agents 3 Agents 4 clerks (2 clerks also handle 6 clerks MMN 88608 - "boclr-32989638-Page-Sacurity_Index) Hate ================================================== Page 232 ================================================== Current_Intelligence Reporting_Unit Steno_Pool 2 Agents 2 Clerks 14 (clerks Section Total: 17 Agents 37 clerks DIVISON PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION 73 Agents 105 clerks PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION Counterespionage Foreign Intelligence Division Assistant Director Inspector 2 secretaries 1 clerk-stenographer Midnight to 8 a,M. Supervisor (Agent) 9 clerks (Includes security patrol and Front' Office mail room) Division Front Office Total: 3 Agents 12 clerks Espionage_Section Eront_Office Soviet Unit New_York 2 Agents 4 Agents 2 clerks 5 clerks Coordination_Unit Soviet Unit Weshington 3 Agents 3 ' Agents 5 clerks 4 clerks NW 88608 Docld:32989638 232 ~/8 Page ================================================== Page 233 ================================================== Special_Cases_Unit Satellite_Unit 2 Agents 4 Agents 6 clerks 6 clerks Section Total: 18 Agents 28 clerks Nationalities Intelligence_Section Middle and South American Unit Front Office (South & Central America, Caribbaz countries and ethnic groups) 2 Agents 3 Agents 2 clerks 4 clerks Special Coordination Unit Nationality Unit (411 other communist countria 5 Agerts Agents 11 Clerks 5 clerks Cuban Unit Chinese_Unit 3 Agents 6 Agents 3 clerks 4 clerks SectionTotali 23 Agents 29clerks ResearchSection Eront_OEfice Central Research_Unit 2 Agents (Section Chief R D. 5 Agents 2 clerks Cotter on loan to 8 clerks Intelligence Evaluation Committee) Special Records_Unit Steno_Pool 1 Agent 3 clerks 14 clerks Section Total: 8Agents 27 clerks NW 88608_Docld:32989638 233 319 n22- Page ================================================== Page 234 ================================================== DIVISION PERSONNEL RECAPITUATION 52 Agents 96 clerks 2 It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and bombing cases currently in General Investigative Division has been included in table of organization of proposed Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and two clerks are now assigned t 0 this Unit in the General Investigative Division and should, of course, be transferred to the new Division. This is a most logical move and will afford tighter and more effective supervision of antiriot and bombing vio- lations in view of fact that extremists and terrorists mostly involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelli- gence Division (DZD} - Accordingly, in 2dditior to avoiding- duplicative supervisory action, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations and final prosecutive actions _ 3. The line of reasoning utilized in the breakdowns as set forth above in the tables of organization was to separate the work into two ategories as nearly as possible 0 domestic and foreign_ The proposed Domestic Intelligence Division is composed of New Left; Extrenist Intelligence and Internal Security Sections_ All work of these Sections is domestic oriented consisting of domestic subversive and extremist organizations such as Comunist Party, Socialist Workers Party, black extremi- New Left and anti-war groups as well as individuals affiliated therewith: On the other hand, the proposed Counterespionage Foreign Intelligence Division is composed of the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections which supervise investigations which for the most part have definite Eoreign ramifications_ The work of these Sections is foreign oriented consisting of such investigations as Soviet and satellite establishments and individuals as well as other foreign nationality groups and nationals, including Chinese comunists_ The Nationalities Intelligence Section wili continue to super- vise Legal Attaches and domestic Liaison through the Special NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 234 sts, ================================================== Page 235 ================================================== Coordination Unit. Other miscellaneous investigative matters involving extremist groups with foreign nationality ties such as Mexican-Americans_ 3 Spanish-Americans and Puerto Ricans will continue to be assigned to the Nationalitie s Intelligence Section 0 The Research Section has been placed in the Counter- espionage Foreign Intelligence Division in order to balance the workload as well as to provide for expansion for research- type work in espionage and foreign intelligence areas or for the manpower therein to be used as the Assistant Director sees most advantageous to carry out his responsibilities. It is recognized that this will cut DID short but it is felt DID will be able to handle any needed research at a Section level, The New Left and Civil Disorder Reporting Units, currently in the Research Section, will be placed in Internal Security Section as data pertains solely to domestic groups _ Likewise, administration of Security Index (SI) will be shifted fzor Research Secticr tc thc Internel Security Section as_most of the cases on the SI are supervised in the DID . In realigning work, we have provided for transfer of three Agents from Sections within the proposed Domestic Intelligence Division to the Nationalities Intelligence Section of other new Division_ This has been accomplished by absorbing Klan and White Hate cases (2 men) into Extremist Intelligence Section and releasing one Agent from the current four-man Security Informant Unit of the Internal Security Section_ The proposed reorganization will result in the following Agent clerical count: Domestic_Intelligence_Divisi_on 73 Agents 105 clerks This includes four Agents and two clerks to be transferred from Ceneral Investigative Division to handle antiriot and bombing matters. 2. / NW 88608 Docld:32989638 235 Page ================================================== Page 236 ================================================== Counterespionage Foreign Intelligence_Division 52 Agents 96 clerks This icludes raising the overall Agent complement of current Division personnel by one to provide for a new Assistant Director. 4 The advantage of the suggestion to form two separate Divisions out of the current Division is that it would provide for smaller Divisions thus allowing for tighter and more effective supervision_ 0 5 The disadvantages in dividing the current Division far outweigh the advantages as can be seen from the following observations: (a) The nature of the work of DID does not readily lezd itself to Jivision- The interrelationship of foreign influence in domestic subversion cases is well established and requires close coordination within the Division If split, sOme thing would be lost in the process, as is now the case with antiriot and explosives and incendiary devices cases predominantly involving extremists who are DiD subjects being handled by General Investigative Division_ Our should be to obtain maximum utilization of the knowledge and expertise of supervisory personnel, and division of DID would obviously result in diffusion of related talents and a less efficient use of available manpower. (b) Budgetary consideratins and administrative efficiency would be affected by imposing an additional Divisional superstructure (mail room, mail delivery clerks, Division Head and staff 9 with their equipment, odd-hour duty Agents_ 9 supply clerks , and steno pool, etc.) to handle the work presently being handled efficiently existing DID. The creation of an additional high- level job (Division Head and staff) would be contrary to the President' s economic freeze_ Apparently the 223 ~NI-88608_Deeld:329896.38_Page 236 goal by ================================================== Page 237 ================================================== suggestion of Assistant to the Director W _ C. Sullivan to divide the Division referred to by the Inspector is that set forth in memorandum from Mr Sullivan to Mr Tolson dated June 228, 1971. On that memorandum the Director stated, "I do not approve_ We do not have any provision for another Assistant Director and all hearings before Budget Bureau and Congress have been concluded for Fiscal Year 1972. 't In light of the current national economic picture, the Director S coment is even more meaningful today. These disadvantages, with the exception of the economy factor, can be overcone to a large extent by utilizing current space in 9th and D Street building with a minimum of carpentry work involved _ The Executive office space can easily be arranged to handle another Assistant Director and staff The Mail Room and Steno Pool would require alterations involving additions of partitions_ Extra-duty shifts involving 4 Pam. to Midnight and Midnight to 8 a.m, can be arranged to service -both Divisions Ercm cperaticrel and security stand- points _ On the other hand, the biggest disadvantage is that the definitely will serve to lessen coordination of cases having foreign ramifications as SO many of our domestic extremist cases do= This disadvantage likewise can be overcome to a large extent if we make up our minds to be extra careful to make certain that coordination between the new Division is such that Bureau is not embarrassed_ This could cause a certain slow down in the handling of mail and result in duplicative handling in some instances. It is felt current space is adequate to house the two Divisions with slight alterations as previously set out, Equipment for a new Assistant Director should not present any significant problen. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 237 223 split ================================================== Page 238 ================================================== ANTI-RIOT LAWS AND BOMBING MATTERS 5-A-b 2 {NSPECTOR E_ S. MLLER: In discussions } you have advised that in your opinion there appears a great deal of logic in realigning supervision of above cases from General Investigative Division to Domestic Intelligence Division. You are requested to advise in greater detail documentation of your reasoning and your recommendations in this regard. For your information, on receipt of your response to this write ~up it will be furnished to General Investigative Division for their observations and recommendations_ Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: By memorandum 8/30/68 from Mr Felt to Mr Tolson, Inspection Division did an in-depth survey with respect to similar problem relative to transfer of substantive violations of Antiriot Laws and bombing cases involving subversive matters from GID to DID. Survey ascertained proposed transfer involved two categories supervised by GID which were So interrelated with gathering of intelligence in racial and security field that overlapping supervisory responsibilities constant occurred. Accordingly 2 Inspection Division recommended transfer of these cases to DID to avoid duplication of supervisory review and to promote efficiency _ Transfer not effected as Director stated he was opposed to transfer of these duties A copy of Mr Felt's 8/30/68 memorandum is attached together with a cover memorandum from Mr _ Felt dated 9/4/68 _ Developments since 9/4/68 dictate that we take another good look at this problem _ Activities of extremists and terrorists have definitely escalated to the point that the overall situation is a matter of increasing concern to the public and the 8/20/71 CWT: djr DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTON 8/19 /71 ESM:wmj 5 -A-1b 224 MW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 238 ly ================================================== Page 239 ================================================== administration_ Since terrorist activities such as bombings_ riots and the like are in violation of statutes under Bureau is investigative responsibility it behooves us to make certain that our supervision is as tight and effective as possible. Inasmuch as DID is actively investigating the terrorists who are in violation of these laws , it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations and handle final prosecutive actions Not only would duplicative supervisory action be avoided but the DID supervisor has 2t his fingertips a feel of the case necessary background data and a full knowledge of sources who can develop needed evidence_ In 1968 , criminal prosecutions of these violations were handled for most part by Department S Criminal Division but now the Department has moved to invest the Internal Security Division with the overall responsibility of prosecuting terrorist activities regarding above-mentioned matters _ Similar reorgani- zation on our part would certainly enhance more effective supervision_ Of course any transfer of cases to DID would require transfer of personnel from GID now handling these matters. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that supervisory responsibility for a11 violations of Antiriot Laws and substantive violations of Explosive and Incendiary Devices Act (Bombing Matters) involving extrenist and political terrorists be transferred from GID to DID together with required Agent personnel. 2 - 325 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 239 ================================================== Page 240 ================================================== September 4, 1968 Mr. Tolson: We have carefully re-evaluated the preposal to shift subversive bombing cases and antiriot cases from Mi. Rosen'8 Division to Mr_ Sullivan'8 Divisian but find ourselves coming back to the original conclusion Messrs. DeLoach_Rosen and Suiliv2n are strengly in Iavor _ We recognize this does not regolve & Wide variety of cases where supervisezz jrospcnsibility eould everlap, hut these a1e the t5o lareas where constant overlap occurs and Where we lbave_great need for continuity of supervision. The' memorandum clearly out that antiriot case8 are handled in the Criminal Division of the Department; recial bombings in the Civil Rights Division 2nd nationalist bombings in the Internal Security Division: W Marerelt"? 9/4/68 ADDENDUM BY MR: TOLSON: I am opposed to placing supervisory responsi- bility for these violations under the Domestic Intelligence Division +04 QU CT:DSS dhiz). INW 88608 Docld:32989638 240 226 spellg [5 7 ~zlebs Page ================================================== Page 241 ================================================== .o*{i il 1la m3 Ic soto-Ic6 K# (34: IcifN CMi Gr "3. I8. 7} Taltz Eri? UNITEH) STAT O1'ERNMiENT" @ 81823; Cca;e Memorandum Ca35 Cc3;;: Sel: T0 MR. TOLSON DATE: August 30, 1968 S:.; Tc?e} Tsone; Tclc- #X FROM W. M.FEL Kolsc: 5ew}: SUMECT: PROPOSED TRANSFER OF' SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN CASES FRONI GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION TO DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SYNOPHIS General Investigative Division (GID) and Domestic Intelligence Division propose lhat supervisory responsibility for substantive violations of the new Ani Laws end for borhing cases involving Subversive matters should be transferre:: GID to DD. Mr. DeLoach recomrended and the Director &pproved {hat Inspec:: Division examine matier to be certein that responsililities are shaxply and deiin: fixed. In-Gepth Inspecticn survey redects problem of overlapping supcrvisory responsibilitics betieen_divisions caanot be eliminated unless aJl investigativc &: -teliigenc € functiong are-centered in & 'Single division Mi not fcasible bec?use & slleer volume. There are many investigative situations where occasional orcrl:? occizrs, e. g. the close connection between crininel cases handled by CID and ik: Criminal Intelligence Program Supervised hy 2nother division: Fowcver, prcpcz transfer involves t1vo categories now' Supervised GID wvhich are So inter-rcle:? wilh the gethering Of intelligence in the racial and security fields that overlap constzntly occurs. Accordingly, these two categories (relatively small in case volume) should be transferred to DID, 28 proposed, to avoid duplication 0l Super- visory review and to promote efficiency. ANTIRIOT' LAWS These JaIVS Were enacted on 4/11/68 and prohibit incitement to riot: anc related violent acis connected with riots and civil disorders. Since enactment 0: 1l Substantive caseg have been oened; however , extensive intclligence gatiiering is continuously directed by DID relative to organizations and indivicuals likely to engage in riots; suchr &s Stokely"Carmyichael, H Rap Browu and other' &gitators throughcut the country_ Incividual acts arising Tron Tiots and constituting poss:l violationg of Antiriot La1s &re not practicably separable without causing duplie:: of Supervisory revieiv &nd loss of continuity in the dcvelopment of cases. Antiriot LaTvs arc handled by tle Criminal Division of tle Depaltricat . nO1 disseminates intelligence material to the Criminal Division and woris with DeLoach 1 - Mr . Sullivan 1 4 Mr . Mohr NW 88608 Docld-82989688eRage 241 J - Mr_ Tavel G: Iy V1 . ================================================== Page 242 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr. Tolson Re: Proposcd Transfer Of Supervisory Responsibility For" Certain Cases from General Investigtive Division to Domestic Intelligence Division that Division On specilic violations such a8 current sedition case against Stokely Cermichael and prior requests of Criminal Division concerning activities 0f HB2g Browm: Since enactment; Il spocific cases have arisen; the most recent hei:g in connection with allegations 0f police brutality during the Democratic Convention in Cliczgo involving injary to over 70 police oficers; BOMBING MATTERS The same principle of duplicate supervisory review is involved in those bombing cases that arise from the activities of Subversive Organizations 2nd individuals which are supervised on & day-{o-day basis by DID Eramples are foredf nationzlist groups; Ku Klux militant black netionalist groups and New Ieit groups. These cases should definitely be supe 1vised by DID for' maximum efficienc All other bonibing cases Will remein Tith GID. The Internal Security Division of the Department now has responsibility 0; these foreign nationalist groups &S well &s the Klen end black nationalist Organi- zations. ME_Yeagley'g Division is als0 cliarged with the development 0 criininal violations In the recent bombings the SO-called Cuban Pover grOip. Thc Civai Rights Division of the Department usually has jurisdiction over' other bornbing cas: "erising from 'White &nd biaci hale g1OupS, but again DlD has Tizison with thzt Ditist on intelligence matters affecting tkze groups and has engaged in specific investi- gations to observe and photograph Gemonstrations at request of Civil Fights Divisiz Guidelines to delincate {he proposed consolidation of supervision haye bee:] drawn and are set forth in an appropriate SAC Letter to 50 inforr the field (attacic for approval). EF FECT ON WORK LOAD AN PERSONNEL The chang proposed larein deal only in the two specific categories cf riot LaWS and certaiil Bombing Mattcrs cases: Special cases that arise ii1 the ciriq riglts field such 2S tlle murder of Mertin Luther and the murder of the :hrce civil rights workers in Mississippi Will not be aiected by the propasec changes. Reviev ol all pending cases that are affected by these changes discloses only one group (Il cases) tllat should now be transferred ~O these are the recent bombings instituted by the Cuban Polver group- Analysis of all work Joad factors represented in the proposed switch of su} visory responsibilities # dlicatcs that, if approved; it would be appropriate ai thc sam 2 time Lo reduce per ~onnlel complemeilt of Civil Rights Section (GID} by on? supertisor and increase complement o Racial Jntelligence Section (DID) by Qii< slpervisor. 88608_Docld.32989638_Page 242 _ 2- ~628 CONTINUED OTER Klall, by King 4; M ================================================== Page 243 ================================================== Memorandun to Mr. Tolson Re: Proposcd Transfer 0f ervisory Responsibility For Certain Cases From Gencral Investigative Difision to Domestic Intelligence Division RECOMMENDATIONS 1. That effective close of Iusincss %/16/68 DID have supervisory respons: bility over all violations of Antiriot Laws and over those Bombing Matlers violatic within guidelines set forth herein. 26 That Supervisory responsibility ior the Specific pending cases (Cuban Power growp of bombing cases) identified in this memorancum be transferred to DID etfective 9/ 16/68. 3. That Agent personnel complement of: CID be reduced Iy one and that 0f DID increased by one. If approved; to be handled by Mr_ Mohr'S oifice. 46 That attaehed SAC Letter be approved, LJ DETAJIS CON'TINUED MW 88608 Docld:32989638 243 224 Sup VC Ie{ 3 ~ Page ================================================== Page 244 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr Tolson Re: Proposcd Transier' of Supervisory Responsibility for Ccrtain Cascs From Gcneral Invesligative Division lo Domestic Intelligence Division DETAILS BACKGROUND By memorandum W. C Sullivan to Mr . Delodch, 8/2/68, it vias jointly proposed Domestic Intelligence Division (DID} and General Investigative Divisio ] (GID) that supervisory responsibility for the nel? Antiriot Laws investigations (classification 176) and certain types of bombing matter cases be transierrcd from GID to DID, With respecl to the new FBI jurisdiction in Antiriot Laws, it was poi out in this memorandum that extremist organications and individuals who will likel be engaged in riots and racial disturbances &r8 the subject of continuing racial investigations supcrvised by DID. Similarly many of the bombing cases arise cut of work handled in DID such &8 bombing of diplomatic establishments a1d bombinz-l arising Out of activities Of groups in the racial field and internal security field. Following submission 01 this memorandun, Assistant to the Director DeLoach proposed and it Was epproved that Inspection Division thoroughly survey the entire question in order to draw appropriate guidelines and clearly define responsibilities to achieve orderly iranlsitiu:l ui iie propubeu reassiguuleui Of super vibury rebpuus bility in these matters. Thorough analysis has been made by Inspection Staff of all espects cf tke proposal and means to accomplish it in tlle most practicable manner; including revicws of representative cases that havc been handled uucer these categories ?1d the overall volume and work load represented. The logic of the proposed re- assignments appears unassailable. In both categories Of cases the principle invck: is the sane, namely; that individual violatiqns o epplicable statutes arising from the activities 0f subversive Organizations Or groups should be Supervised within th same dvision (DID) thet has tle basic and continuing responsibility for supervisio of the overall investigations of these organizations and groups &8 well &8 0f the members thereof and lhe development of informantz Within the groupse The obwic:| benefit to be derived from the reassignment of these categories is the avoicance & duplication Of supervisory revicws of these interrelated matters and the identification of individuals who may be involved in & specific Violation wilh person] already under investigation from &n intclligence standpoint. Informants who may be utilized in Specific violations or' Wlo are developed in {he course of investigatic-] of such violations must of necessity be closely correlated with the supervision of these iniormant programs Which nO1 rests With DID . Furthermore; violations of the new Antiriot Laws may well be revealed in the course of general supervision of racial intelligence malters_ DE TAILS CONTINUED 4 OVER -4- NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 24i 336 Dy ready ================================================== Page 245 ================================================== Memorandum to Mf} Tolsou Re: Proposed Transle) of Supervisory Responsibility for Cerlain Cases fron General lnvestigative Division lo Dom estic Intelligence Division ANTIRIOT LAWS Contained in Public Law 90-284 enacted 4/11/88 (Civil Rights Act cf 1983) were certain new additions to Title 18, representing criminal statutes for' Which invesfigaiive jurisdiction has heen assigned FBI Other provisions of this Act extended &nd enlarged existing civil rights legislation; the investigative jurisaict_ for Which primarily remains in the Civil Rights Section andl i8 uot involved in tne subject matter herein discussed. The three pertinent statutes are as follows: 1 Section 245-h (3) of Chapter 13, Title 18, which makes it & violation for any person to use force or threat Of force to wilfully injure; intimidate Or interfere with any person evgaged in & business alfecting interstate commerce during Or incident to a riot Or civil disorder Or attenpting to perforn any 0f these acts. 2. Section Chapler 102, Title 18, makes it & violation to travel interstate Or to use the maii; telegraph, tclephone, redio, television Or otler facility O interstate commerce to incite riot ar organize, PrOmote; "encourage_ $ participate in Or" carry On 2 riot Or commit act Of violence in furtherance of & riot or aid or' abet any person in inciting or participating in 2 riot. 3. Section Chapter 12, Title 18, makes it a violation to teach or demonstratc the application Or making 0f & firearm 01" explosive Or incendiary device Or technique causing injury or death intending Or having reeson to know that sama will be used in connection with & civil disorder Wlich mzy interfere with commerce or with a federally protected function or the transportation in interstate commerce Of such' devices with similar intent or the commission ol any act to interfere wirh any law enforcemenl Oilicer Or Iireman engaged in Ofiicial duties in connection with civil disorder 01 & federally protected function: The foregoing three-statutes have been designated hy the Bureau 28 hari-z the character 0f Anliriot Laws and are ill included in the new classification 176. No other violations are included in this character Or classification: Thus Lhe DETAILS - 5 _ CONTINUED OVER Nw 88608 Docld:32989638` 245 2101, ahly 231, use, Page ================================================== Page 246 ================================================== Memorandan) {o Mr. Tolson Re: Proposed Translel 0f Supervisory Responsibility for Certairi Cases from General Invcstigative Division to Domestic Intelligcnce Division reassignment of the entirc classification to DID should present no problems Tith respect to any dirision Of responsibility Or ro Of communications: Experiencz gained tlus far under apparent violations which the Buxeeu has been requested by €: Department to investigate supports the close correlation of' such violations with racial intclligence maters now handed by DID 1l specific cases have been openea thus fal and are now pending: The most recent involves allegations of police brct2 during Democratic Convention in Chicago involving injury over 70 policc oflicers. Reviel of these cases disclosed them to be noncomplex in mature and in viewv Of tlta current sizius of supervision and investigation; it appears most practicable Ior GE to retain the specific supervision 0f these Jl cases i0 thcir conclusion: Thus Super- visory responsibility under this classilication Will be fixed at & clear' cut-off poini after which all new cases arising will automatically be routed to and supervised by DID from inception. No furthel guidelines appear necessary in Lhis clessification. BOMBING MATTERS A varicty of different types f cases arises under this category and it Fill herezfter represent & split classification with those cases applicable to the overzll felds 0 supervision tin-DlD beirg ban cdby thatDivision:end Lhe remainder "coninting under 'Supervision-of-GED_ Eccctingly, specific gutdelines have been drawn to delineate this division of supervisory responsibility and encompassed in an SAC Letier in orcler that the field mzy make appropriate designation on com- mjnications to facilitate rOuting &t the Seat of Government. Upon adoption of the guidelines &nd tlle Gual character coincicental therewith proper routing will automatically be achieved of newv mattcrs arising (this coordinatcd with Files and Communications Division). Inspection Staff analyzed the varions types of bombing cases hencled duricg Fiscal Year (FY} 1968 and reviewed representative sampling 0f specific pending fles: There a1 t ' major areas herein Which appear proper and logical to czlege future supertisory responsibility to DID, These &re bombing matlers arising Iroz foreign nationalistic interests and those arising from recial intelligence interests_ The reasons are thle sam2 as heretoiore cited; namely the overall familiarity within DID of 3imS adactivities of organizations and grOups involved &s Iell.as the Iollowing of activities of individual members of such groups &nd the rcspon- sibility Ior the informant programs applicable to them_ Otler types 0 bombing cases not falling within {hle guidelines set forth hereinafter will remain Iith GD as in the past. Bombing matter violations (including threats) represent violaiions of Section 837, Chapter ?2, Title 18. The violation is the intcrsstate transportaiic: of explosives With intent ey be used Ior destruclion O real or personal properiz which property is used for the objectives specified in the statute (educational, ~ 6 - DETAILS CONIIUED OIE: NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 246 232 uting to" ================================================== Page 247 ================================================== Merorandiin to Mr. Tolson Re: Proposed Transfer Of Supervisory Responsibility for Certain Cases Irom Gencral Investigative Division to Dom estic Inlclligence Division business; civic; etc ). Threats or false reports also constitute violations withia statute and thle entire discussion within this mamorandum includes threats or felse reports under the use Of the term bombing matters Although the Department frequently resorts to other statules for prosecutive considerations; tius appears to have no significant bcaring on the question of supervisory responsibility which is directed toward thie full development O the investigation to establish identity o[ the perpetrators of the bombing violation and evidence to support prosecuiion. In the vast majority of potential bombing Violations that arise irom the field, the Department is promptly advised and appropriatc dissemination made without there a substantiol supervisozy responsibility thereafter for the folowving 0f investigations because relatively few &re opened by the Department for full investigaiion: For example; in FY 1968 there Iere approximately 15 hon:? maller cases opened ior full investigation at the Department'8 request wherezs approzimately 170 instances occurred of dissemination Ol initial information to t+? Departnent' with no subsequent investigation requested: Of {he 15 bombing matier ca5e8 opened Ior full investigation during FY 1968, nine were in the racial fiela (apparertly Klan inspired), five in the foreign nationalst iieia and one unrelaledi t0 DID responsibility _ The following guidelines are proposed for determination of supertisory responsbility in bombing maiter cases that hereafter will lie with DD (all others remaining with GI) Bombing matters (including threats) wherein: 1. The victim is & diplomatic Or other establishment Of & foreign government (such a8 embassy, consulate, Olficial 01' quasi - Official tourist agency, purchasing agency, etc: ). 2 It is apparelt Or' circum3tances strongly indicate that the bon! was instigated 2 foreign nationalistic organization, group or coalition (such 2s recent series of bombings by so-czlled Cuban power groups), or member thereof, 3 It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bomnbing was instigated by a Subversive organizalion (such as Communist Party Socialist Workers Party, 01 Students f0r a Democratic Society) , Or mnember thereof. 4 It is apparent Or' circumstances strongly indicate that bombing was instigated by a white or black extremist group (such a8 Minutem*li; Ku Kltx Nation- of Islam or Black Panthers Party) : O1' 12 2Ee h cr thereof. 7 - DETAILS CONTINUE D 4 OVZI: NN88608 _Docld: 32989638 Page 247 933 being bing by Ilan; ================================================== Page 248 ================================================== Memorandum to Mir. Tolson Re: Proposed Translcr Of Supervisory Responsibilily Ior Certain Cases from General Investigative Division to Dome stic Intelligence Division Those cases Kh ich fall under tlle foregoing uidelines "will hereafler bezr a Qual characler in addition to Bombing Melters Or' Boibing Matters Threets, Tz the appropriate designation Ior' the type 0f pparent insligator and/or Victim in ordcr to accomplish routing to {he appropriate unit and scction witlin DD such 2s Iiernal Security R, Racial Matters Klan; or Internal Security Cuba. The foregoing guidelines have been incorporated in 2n appropriate SAC Letter together with instructions concerning use Of dtlal character Which is attached for approrel. The supervision of & particular case will remain the responsibility o the Division originally assuming it even though subsequent developments it within tle purview Of {lle type normally handled by the ther Division; uless in tk= muttial judgment O the respective Assistant Directors, Bureau interesis are beticr served by translerring the case_ In making the proposed transler of the limited group of cases discussed herein, nO problem appears to be presented insofar &8 liaison With appropriate Citiz cf the Department is concerned. The Criminal Division has responsibility ior Anti-_ Igws. DD nor rcgalarly disccmirctos intelligencc material to that Divicice en2 closely With it 01 certain specific violations; such aS the Current sedition case 2g2::: Sbkely Czrmlcheel 28 well &8 prcvious regucsts to follow "activities of E Rap Erozz Te Tternal Security Division Of the Department h1as responsibility over Fhe forerz nationalist g10 ips a8 well 2s the Klan and black nationalist orgal zations and Jas 219- been charged Iith the devel opment of crim_nal violations in the recent bo mbings by Cuban Power group. It is this Division heededby Mr. Yeagley With Which DID corz: = deals on all subversive and cspiorage matters: The Civil Rights Division of the ment usually has jurisdiction over Other bomnbing cases arising fror White and blec hate groups, but again DID has regular liaison" With that Division on intelligence mzz: aecling these groups and has engaged in specilic investigations to 0hserve and phczz graph demonstrations at the request Of the Civil Rights Division: EFFECTIVE DATE O1: TRANSITION END SPECIFIC PENDING CASES To achieve an orderly transition and t0 permit coordination 0f policy; instruclions; etc. 3 anong the supervisors at the Working level prior t0 the eflective date of transfer it is proposed {hat such eflective date be applicable to all matiers arising after tle close of business 9/16/68. From review by Inspection Staff of {he currat pending cases now withit GID Which would under thle newv guidelines hereziter fall within the supervisory responsibilily 0 DDD, it appears that none of these pendin g cases should be physically translerred for 1emaining supervision to con- clusion exccpt Ior' one groun of eleven c2ses. Tlis group constitutes relatively recez cascs arising from the seri bombings and 2ttempted bombings in Florica; New Chicago; Newark and Los Angeles directed at diplomatic establislmzris and olher olfices O foreign governments Wh? maintain relations with Cuba: Crcaz Ioz' mnanly O {he bombilgs has been claimed by "Cuban Power, 1 a simllar term 0 Dlack Power and several militant anti-Casiro relugee organizations and individual: DETAILS @NTINUED ~ OVEI Nw 88608 Docld:32989638 248 bring De: 1S.0f: York, Page ================================================== Page 249 ================================================== Memorancum to Mc . Tolson Re: Proposed Transfer of Euparvisory Responsibility for Certain Cases from General Investigative Division to Dome slic Intelligence Division are suspects in these bombings. There has been extremely close coordination between GD and DI in these Spacific cases and DID is thoroughly conversani with the detzils of the ir ivicual invcstigations- Because of this &nd als0 in view of th1e likelihood Of additional such bombings arising in the future {he sane? g1O Up or groups it appears feasible and practicable to transler the eleven pending case8 now i:] DID a8 well &8 any new ones by the same group arising in the days alhead. These elcvcn cases 2re Bureau files 174-688, 174-889, 174-749, 174-759, 174-760,; 174-781, 174-762, 174-767, plus three newv cases Which have not been assigned Bureau file numbers; namely bombing of Mexican Airlines Olficc, Miami; 8/17/68; Bombing of West Side Liberal Club, New 8/19/68,.and Bombing of Air France Airlines; LoS Angelcs; Californiz, '7/19/68. WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL The Bombiig 4 Civil Rights Act of 1984 Unit of Citil Rights Section, i8 composed af 6 Agent supervisors inelucing Unit Chief and in addition to general bombing matters (those not Ialling under abOVc guidelines) has supervisory responsibility Over the Civil Righis Aci Of 1964, ihe Feceral-'Iiaiu Wieel Saiuie; 22. Discriuination in Housing (Civil Rights Act o 1968). The latter violation Ihich was established in tne-sant? Public LAw -&S the rtiriot Lav7s has had: only very recent experience and appears may well generate & substantial number O case8 in the ftture. Bowever; from anelysis Of total work lcad of the unit &8 Well as of the entire Civil Rights Section; both Irom 9 standpoint Of ratios of individual caseg supervised ior FY 1968 and percentage of manpower time expended; it appeers that the transfer 0f supervisory responsibility for those cases &8 Outline d in this menorandur will constitute tle approximate full {ime f one Agent supervisor and accordingly it is being recom mnended that GID Agent complement be recuced one. Within DD new Antiriot Laws the majority 0f the bombing matter cases Wvhich will be transierred wvill increzse supervisory responsibility in the Racial Intelligence Section: Other bombing matter cases will be spread among various units such 28 Special Investigations Unit of Internal Security Section; Cabzn Special Cases Unit of Latin American Section; etc. , and based upon past experience will not be Of such volume as to require additional Agent supervisory personel in those other indivicual units. Accordingly, it appears appropriate at this time to authorize increase of complenent of DID by one Agent supervisor 2 33 Ni 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 24g by York; GI, by and ~e ================================================== Page 250 ================================================== W3 NoT FiLE RT :F Iix. Mr. DeLo: Mi. Konr Mr . Bhc? Mr. CasFc August 15,,1968 Mt . Callez Ms. Cons: HR _ TOLSON: Mr. Felt Mr. Gale RE: SUGCESTED TTRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY Mr . Rosen FOR SUPERVISION OF CA SES INFOLVING Mr . Sellivea RIOT LimS AND CETTAIX BCMBING HA 'CTRS r . Tavel FROM GENEBAL INTESTTIGATIVE DIVISION TO Mi _ Trolie; THE DOEESTIC INICLLIGENCE JIVISION Tele. Roz= Miss Hol-es I have for somle time felt that 2 lack of clear Miss Gar:g cut responsibility existed in the handling of captioned ma tters , To be brief , it would seem {logical that the enforccrent of anti-riot legislation Would obviously belorg to the saie Division that is supervising the investigetions and developrent of infornants and intelligence regarding the Ku Klux Klan hate groups and racial organizations TThe question arises a5 to whetner or not the transfer of certain bombing matte investigz_ tions should also be nade to the Domestic Intelligencc Division Quite 1iz turally 1 the General Investigative Division, because 0f the supervision of certain type cases in this ca tcgory , should reia iJ overrii supervision in this' field. loivever ccnsicurcticz should be given to the Domestic Intelligence Division handling "thet ca tegory of cases wherein that Division' s develorent of informants and intelligence would greatly aid in the continuance Of supervision of this type case In vicw of the "gray area" involved in such supervision I asked Messrs Rosen 2nd Sullivan to study this matter carcfullz So that appropriate recoumiendations could be macie to you ard tne Dircctor regarding 2 shift of responsibility_ The findings 0f Rosen and Sulliven will be found a ttached to this memol'andum _ I however not satisficd tha t responsibility is sharply 232 definitely fixed_ I puld like to recommend tha t the Inspection Division make 2 survey of this entire ma tter and then present recommede_ tions which Will definitcly tie down this ma tter once and for a11 This survey should be expedited in view of the rew legisle-| tion passed by Congress for which the FBI will obviously hare heavy responsibilities in the: future_ Respectfully , Enclosure C. D. DeLOACI CDD : hmm (3) 1 DeLoach (4 1 1~ Fclt 8/5' 236 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 250 yet an , PG~ 29}67 lni 'a/e? Page ================================================== Page 251 ================================================== ADDENDUM NNSPECTOR E . 8 . MLLER: For the information of General Investi T= (ESM:wmj 8/23/[71) gative Division > by separate write ~up Domestic telligence Division (DI) was advised that Assistant to the Director Sullivan bs suggested that DID be divided into two separate Divisions_ In order that sqggestion could be analyzed during current inspection, DD was requested to furnish certain observations regarding suggestion_ Among these Division was asked 'In the event you feel work now being handled by another Division should ke realigned in the event above suggestion adopted, So indicate under appropriate new Division: 11 DD responded , 'It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and bombing cases currently in General Investgative Division has been included in table of organization of proposed Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and two clerks are now asSigned to this Unit in the General Investigative Division and should, of course, be transferred to the new Division_ "This is the most logical move and will afford tighier and uore effective supervision of antiriot and bombing Violations in viev Of fact that extremists and terrorists mostly involved are being actively investigated Domestic Intelligence Division (DDD). Accordingly, in addition to avoiding duplicative supervisory action, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations MI and final prosecutive actions_ A separate white write -up captioned "Anti-Riot Laws and Bombing Matters MI was prepared and DI asked specifically to comment regarding these matters_ This addendum is part of that write -up_ You are requested to furnish your views of Nz: Sullivan's suggestion both as to the present structure of DD and as to the handling in the event DID is split; For your information_ DD has proposed ARE and Bombing Matters be handled in the Extremist Intelligence Section. Comments of.Assistant Director Rosen requested. It would be appreicated if you Would expedite this request; NW 88608_Docld:32989638 251 23 7 by Page ================================================== Page 252 ================================================== ADDENDUM ASSTSTANT DRRECTOR ROSEN: The following comments are equally (AR:ige) applicable whether the Domestic Intelligence Division remains intact or is reorganized into two divisions. Transferring these cases to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DD) would eliminate much duplication of handling cases and would result in increased efficiency; however this would require transferring to DD all bombing and antiriot cases aS distinguished from transferring only those cases known to involve "extremists and political terrorists_ Mi As a practical matter substantially all antiriot laws investigations involve extremists and political terrorists. With regard to bombings, substantially all investigations deal at the outset with unknown subjects and it would be most impractical to attempt to delineate between bombings which do or do not involve terrorists. Since the act of bombing is in itself an act of terror it is logical to assume at the outset that terrorists are involved and the types of bombings delegated to the FBI by the Department's guidelines are limited to those targets most likely to be selected by political terrorists. (These targets pertain to Government property or functions, Federally funded projects, diplomatic establishments 9 colleges and universities , and those probably perpetrated by terrorists _ ADDENDUM: NNSPECTOR E . S . MLLER: Comments f Assistant Director Brennan requested (ESM:wmj 8 [25]i1) concerning Assistant Director Rosen's remarks. ADDENDUM: ASSTSTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN I concur with Mr . Rosen S comments. RES: djr 8/27/71 3 37 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 252 ================================================== Page 253 ================================================== COMPUTA TION OF CASE AND WORK LOAD N THE 5-A- c DOMEESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSRECTOR E. S. MLLER: I have been advised that a new system of computing case and work load has been implemented within your Divis ion. Describe and state reason for implementation. It would appear that utilization of this system will result in a decrease in case load figures but not necessarily in the work load picture. You are requested to advise by Section and Unit basis the number of cases it is anticipated that the case load will decline in each instance. Use a 'before" and "after" approach. Case load figures 7/31/71 will be satisfactory for use as known base (before). Be as specific a8 poSSible. Comments of Assistant Director requested. 'DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8[20/71 ESM:wmj 5A -1 c NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 253 239 ================================================== Page 254 ================================================== ADDENDUM ; 5-A-lc ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C . D BRENNAN In February, 1971 , I issued (MSR:ant) instructions that each Section Chief submit monthly case load figures for his Section to the Branch Chiefs to be furnished to me with the Branch Chief's analysis as a basis for establishing 2 logical and current method of periodically assessing work loads and manpower needs within the Division_ Inasmuch as it was intended these figures would serve as a guide for possible manpower changes to meet fluctuating and ever-changing problems it was 'essential that figures presented be accurate and equaliy essential that like matters be tabulated uniformly On August 6, 1971, I instructed that a study be made to insure consistency not only in the counting 0f the cases but in the presentation of the monthly reports As a result of this study guidelines were firmly established concerning case counts Within the various Sections Changes from prior figures principally relate to cases involving (1) security informants (2) Security Index cases (3) certa n organizations and.other matters requiring periodic reports_ Under the standardized procedures for case counts Within the Division, informant cases , whether relating to security informants or PSIs once initial approval by the Bureau for designation has been granted and where active day-to-day supervision is not necessary_ 9 are no longer retained in a pending status but are closed and placed on an adminstrative tickler to be reopened at the appropriate time to follow for the. periodic justification letters required _ Cases involving Security Index subjects as wel1 as certain organizations and other matters requiring only the submission of periodic reports at no less than six month intervals , are now opened on a uniform basis 15 days after the due da te of the periodic report in order that appropriate followup may be made to insure submission of report _ A format was devised for the Section Chiefs to submit the monthly data required and to acalnt for each Agent in the Section and bis current assignments as well 2s total and average case load figures by Unit and by Section 226 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 254 only ================================================== Page 255 ================================================== Pursuant to your request, there follows a tabulation of the case load Unit and by Section as of 7/31/71 and a5 of 8/20/71 0 Total case load for the Division decreased from 29,565 to 25 417--a decrease of 4,148 cases. Some small part of this decrease can be attributed to normal month by month fluctuation in case load; mos t of it is attributable to the changed procedures concerning case count a5 will be readily evident by the significant decreases in case loads in those Units bandling principally informant cases, Klan cases , and organizational-type cases_ This reduction in case load resulting from the changed case count procedures 9 of course, in no way decreases the work load on the individual desks It is believed the current procedures for counting cases is more accurate and equitable and places the case load figures in perspective insofar as these figures are 4 factor in judging overall work load. Tbis in brief constitutes the basis for implementing the naw system compnting case and work load in the Divjsion. In the overall it is directly related to our manpower problems and I have inciuded a more detailed write-up bearing on this new system in its relationship to the Division's overall capacity and capability to fulfill its responsibilities in the "Adequacy of Personnel " write-up (6-E) which also bears on the matter 241 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 255 by 9f ================================================== Page 256 ================================================== Caseload_figures 7/31/71 8/20/71 Change Espionage_ Section Special' Cases Unit 751 735 Soviet 5 Washington Unit 967 842 Soviet New York Unit 1223 973 Coordination Unit 1226 1022 Satellite Unit 1408 1261 Section Total 5575 4833 -742 Nationalities_Intelligence Section Special Coordination Unit (No cases assigned) Cuban Unit 1074 776 Chinese. Unit I125 1025 Midale & South America Unit 920 598 Nationality Unit 697 632 Section Total 3816 3031 (Handled by Clerk) 342 3333 4158 3364 -794 Extremist Intelligence Section Black Nationalist 3 East Unit 1501 1423 Black Nationalist ~ West Unit 3924 845 Biack Nationalist Central 1254 . 1332 Racial Informant Black Nationalist 4 South 1749 1564 Section Total 5428 5264 =264 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 256 242 Page ================================================== Page 257 ================================================== Caseload_figures 7/31/71 8/20/71 Change New Left Section Special: Investiga tions East 1719 1564 Special Investigations L West 1495 1343 New Left Groups 879 812 Subversive Individuals New Left 2492 2538 Protest and Trotskyist Groups 574 588 Section Total 7159 6845 -314 Internal Securi Section Communist Party, USA 548 272** #International New' Left and Sedition Unit '912 8713* Klan and White Hate Groups Unit 1683 511 "Security Informant Unit 1466. 869_ Subversive Individuals Unit 2636 2688 Section Total 7245 5211 32034 Rezearch Section No' cases assigned Division Total 29 565_ 25,417 -4148 XUnit now Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit **1 Supervisor and 253 cases transfered from CPUSA Unit to Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit 8/13/71 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 257 213 ty ================================================== Page 258 ================================================== POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM 5-A--d ESPIONAGE SECTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIION #NSPECTOR E. S . MLLER: 'Double Agent" (DA) is a commonly and frequently used term in the field of espionage and counter- F intelligence. In the Bureau's activities in these fields DAs are a distinctive group of Security Informants (SIs) utilized against foreign intelligence operations in the United States_ 'Potential Double Agent" (PDA) is a unique term used by DID to identify an individual under development as a DA; one who is in contact with a foreign intelligence officer but who has not been solicited by his foreign contact to perform clandestinely or covertly for the benefit: of the foreign intelligence group. During tkis #rspecticn 2 representetive number of files were reviewed to determine the extent of supervision afforded PDAs _ A similar reviv,was conducted last inspection _ It is realized, however that a comparison is not possible in view of recent DID instructions regarding the administrative handling of all SI and PSI files. Subsequent to last inspection DID established procedure whereby those SI cases requiring day-to supervision or PSIs still under investigation Should remain in active status; informant-type cases requiring oly periodic review are closed and placed on administrative tickler_ to be made pending 15 'days after the Six-month justification letter is due_ DA and PDA files are included in these categories. During the last inspection 237_files were reviewed. Included in that group were PSIs and DESECOs and not limited to PDAs . All of the files were then in & pending status During this inspection there were 65 files on PDAs' in & pending status and 212 PDA files in & closed status These were strictly PDA files and did not ind ude other PSIs or DESECOs _ It has been determined that at any given time there Will probably be approximately 7O such cases in a pending status ) if the number of such investigations in the field remains constant. Of the 65.pending files 58 or 899, were reviewed. Of these , 22 or 389 contained specific instructions directions or other guidance to the field DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/27 /71 JON:wmj 5-A-ld NWV 88608 Dbcld:32989638 Page 258 yet _day 344 ================================================== Page 259 ================================================== -2 _ since last inspection. At the time of last inspection of 237 files reviewed, less than m 10 , or 4%, contained such outgoing communications _ Also during this inspection 62 closed files on PDAs were reviewed at random. Of these , 12 or 19%, contained outgoing communications of the type described above Since last inspection _ It was observed that Since last inspection & majority of the closed files contained only the Six-month justification letter and were closed in accordance With Division instructions described above_ Due to current Division instructions only those PDAs requiring day-to S upervision or those on whom Six-month justifications are due are considered pending at any given time_ Hence , it is logical that a larger percentage of the closed PDA files will contain only the justification letters and no outgoing correspondence Since last inspection. It is well recognized that the field of DAs is a highly specialized one _ Its success , both at the Seat of Government and in the field_ requires skiiiiui ilandiing , patience, finesse &ud careiul aggresSivzness. Iz reviewing the PDA files it was observed that many excellent candidates, with varying back grounds, have reached various stages of development with excellent potential for use as actual DAs , Specifically, these cases are: 105 -113525 134 -11898 105 -141001 134-15414 105 -201286 134 -18458 105-207600 134 -9684 105 -26896 134-19961 134-20321 134-20912 The quality of these PDAs would, in itself suggest substantial potential and, in turn, need for greater supervision. The above -listed cases Should be kept in & pending status carefully reviewed_ with guidance and instructions furnished to the field. The field should be instructed to assume a more aggressive position in these cases and followed closely to insure proper attention is given to development of these persons as PDAs . Review of PDA files shows evidence of closer supervision Since last inspection The percentage of files including irs tructions and guidance to the field, rose from 49 to 38% However to realize greater accomplishments in this area of responsibility and to use our PDAs to the fullest extent, there is still need for improvement in supervision of these cases _ Comments of Section Chief W_ 4 Branigan, Inspector D_ E. Moore , and Assistant Director Brennan requested' NW 88608 Docld:32989638 259 8745 ~ay Page ================================================== Page 260 ================================================== Section Chief William A_ B8Gigan The comments of the Inspector EWL :pdr 8/30/71) regarding the marked improve- ment in supervision of our work is most gratifying_ As was noted during the last inspection, evidence of supervision appearing in the PDA informant file is not always a completely accurate gauge of the supervisory attention being given each case_ The informant file is designed by pro- visions of the Manual of Instructions 3 to be a repository for information regarding the background and administrative handling of the source Information reflecting operational activities and instructions more often appears in the active investigative file of the Soviet-bloc principal with whom the PDA is in contact_ In view of this significant factor_ it is felt that the marked increase in supervision (from 49 to 387) detected through review of informant files alone , is a most favorable trend and one which every effort will be made to sustain _ Twelve specific cases have been cited as quality PDAs which, by their very na ture suggested a need for greater super- vision due to the substantial potential of each The Inspector has instructed that these cases be kept in a penaing status, carefully reviewed , with guidance and instructions furnished to the field to assume a more aggressive position in these cases These instructions are appreciated and will be followed _ As the Inspector has noted, the development of double agents is a highly specialized field requiring special faculties, not the least of which is careful aggressiveness As these comments recognize_ aggressiveness in the development of a double agent is inhibited by the practical necessity to restrict our ma nipulation of the sources to actions which appear na- turally responsive to the initiatives displayed and opportunities offered by the Soviet-bloc representative with whom the source is in contact Particularly is this true during the development phase before the source has been accepted as bona fide by his principal unnatural or gratuitous action to hasten or strengthen the relationship is viewed with utmost skepticism and could result in compromise of our interest and rejection 0f the source This is not to say we must eschew any initiatives; but that any such options must be pursued only after careful consideration Of al1 the complex and variable factors peculiar to each individual case. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 260 345 ELgCcGs Any ================================================== Page 261 ================================================== Section Chief William A Branigan (CGS : ETL :pdr 8/30/71) Within this perspective the 12 cases referred by the Inspector will be kept open for intensive review to insure that a11 possible action not already taken to enhance and exploit the potential 0f each source has been considered and , where appropria additional instructions issued to the field _ It is noted that 10 of the 12 PDA cases referred to were in a closed status in accordance with recent DID instructions regarding the a dministrative handling of a11 SI and PSI files Briefly under these procedures such cases are placed in a closed status and are reopened only at such time as 2 justi- fication letter is due These criteria will continue to be applied to PDA cases with exceptions_ J on a selective basis , in those situations which fall within the category defined by the Inspector Inspector D. ES (DEM:bsf 8/31/71) D The continual need for quality double agents 18 certainly recognized in our counterintelligence efforts ageinst Soviet bloc intelligence and the cases referred to by the Inspector as excellent candidates will be given careful and aggressive handling. Assistant Director C. D. Brennar (DEM:bsf 8/31/71) The coments of the Inspector: have been noted and his instructions will be closely followed, NW 88608 Docld:32989638 261 347 te, Moore&) Page ================================================== Page 262 ================================================== PERSONNIELMATTEDS NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 262 PERSONMEL WAtZEMS ================================================== Page 263 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E INSPECTOR E . S. MLLER: Please tabulate by Sections and Units the current Agent and clerical personnel complement of your Division &8 of the close of business 8/17/71. Show actual and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the Division Front Office_ Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay should not be considered in the overall tabulation. 1 Include positions regarded a8 vacant but for which authority has been obtained to fill. 2 . Identify all personnel under transfer into Or ut of the Division as of 8/17/71 a8 well as those who have submitted letters of resignation aS of tnat date _ (Show data &f trarcfcr letter or of aclowledgment of resignation ) 33 Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized personnel &8 of 8/17 /71. 4 Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification. 5 Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected Since the last inspection a8 a result of streamlining Or &ny other means. 6 . Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel. In the write -up on adequacy of personnel by Sections describe criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section or Unit. Each Section write -up Should constitute & separate part of the overall Divisional write -up _ Comments of Assistant Director requested. DOMSTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 18/17 /71 ESM:wmj ~ NW-88608_Qocld:32989638_Page 263 243 ================================================== Page 264 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C _ D BRENNAN Attached find the Section (CDB :amk) 8/30/71 write-ups concerning each category of information requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel _ These comments are current as of August 17 , 1971 _ The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office consist of one Assistant Director two Inspectors two Special Agent Supervisors , five stenographic employees and twenty clerical employees _ This_complement includes the personnel directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division teletype room and Mail Room and Messenger Service, and the Security Patrol force in addition to five Agents The overall authorized personnel complement of the Division at the beginning of Inspection was 120 Special Agents and 199 clerks 3 compared to an authorized complement of 116 Special Agents and 19u clerks at tne cime 0f the iast Inspection As of August 17 1971 , we had 1l9 Special Agents assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) This inc ludes 2 Special Agents who are assigned on a temporary loan basis to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee in the Department of Justice (IEC) Since August 1971 , SA Dean N,Lloyd reported to the Research Section as a replacement for SA Bernard 4. Wells who retired on 7/30/71 . We are awaiting the replacement for SA Victor R_ Schaefer who was transferred to Salt Lake City on 7/23771 as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of that office. SA George M _ Quinn has been designated a5 SA Schaefer S replacement but hnas not as yet reported to his assignment . With the reporting of SA Quinn 3 our assigned complement will be 121 in view of the fact that SA Garnett T Tunstall (on loan to IEC from Extremist Intelligence Section) has been replaced and we include SA Tunstall in our total assigned complement _ As of August 17 , 1971, we had 204 clerical employees assigned to DID_ TThis is because recent replacements have reported to replace employees under transfer or resignation who have not left as yet _ Since August 17_ 1971 2 we had two additional clerks GS-4, report to the Division However , we have had two resignations submitted which will absorb them_ We have one Section with an additional employee assigned which is dependent entirely upon the approval of a new position involving no increase in grade or salary. NW 88608 Docld:37989638 264 'G 17 , Page ================================================== Page 265 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E This Division consists of six Sections The attached write-ups of the Section Chiefs disclose adequate authorized Agent complement with exception of R. D Cotter Research; and W _ R. Wannall 2 Nationalities Intelligence Sections Authorized is underscored since Agent personnel are on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section because of the McLek Case as follows: Espionage (1) , Extremist Intelligence (2) , Internal Security (2) , Research (1) , and New Left (1) . Concerning comment in write-up of R. D Cotter Research , Item 6 refers to assignment of Cotter on a temporary basis to Department and need for complete staffing of that Front Office_ Originally Cotter's assignment to the Department was not considered to be full time in that he was to be in the same building , readily available for consultation, and capable of handling special problems whieh might arise_ However the situation is not desirable for a long term arrangement and the term of that assignment is not known . Recognizing this, the adjustment of work assignments detailed in my memorandum to Mr . Sullivan of 7/29/71 proposed elimination of one Section, making Section Chief Arbor Gray available to take over thel Research Section. This would eliminate that problem with no additional personnel required. That proposal also makes No 1 Man Cel lahan of Internal Security_Section available for case assignment Concerning write-up of Section Chief W . R. Wannall several points must be considered. Wannall's suggested build-up of the Chinese Unit to five men from present complement of three at this time to "handle the current work in the Unit and expand into areas which are considered necessary M is reflective of a provincial outlook and a limited concept of the relative importance of proposed work in his area of responsibility in relation to the overaTl limitation of Bureau manpower and resources _ Obviously some differentiation must be made to establish priorities_ We must first cope with the immediate problems at hand before assigning manpower to projected pr oblems Concerning Wannall's reference to needing a man for the Foreign Liaison Desk, my observations contained in my memorandun to Mr . Sullivan dated 8/16/71, which is attached to Wannall's write-up, still apply: I would add to that an observation tbat much of the material received from our Legats is actually handled on the related substantive intelligence desks responsible for the respective countries and not by the Foreign Liaison Desk_ With the current special cases requiring extensive manpower commi tments } I believe that desk can continue as is until the manpower situation' is alleviated somewhat _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/30/71 CDB:mls 6-E MI 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 265 ~58 ================================================== Page 266 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL; 6-E As to Wanna11 S comments concerning manpower on the Ellsberg case, under write-up captioned "Elisberg Case 11 443 The personnel assigned to Ellsberg is cer tainly adequate and he does not at this point request additional personnel for that case. There are two interrelated but separate problems to be dealt with here The first, and broadest , is divisionwide adequacy of personnel and the Director has repeatedly stated the concept that major case specials must be handled With existing Division personnel_ I agree with this Wholeheartedly and have attempted to comply with that concept _ Also related here is the situation which uniquely affects the Domestic Intelligence Division in that our basic area of responsi- bility has been subjected to Shifting patterns of work. Essentially, the rise of the black extremist was largely met with reduction in other work areas The newer expanding threat of New Left terrorist activities is Similarly being met by reduction 0f personnel committed to other areas of work of less urgent priorities_ Obviously. there are practical limits to the elasticity of manpower and our overall increase in caseload is indicative of considerable strain on our manpower capabilities_ Facts concerning this increase are contained under "Pending Work and Delinquency , # 4-D-1_ I believe, however we can adequately cope with our responsibilities with existing personnel In order to accomplish tbis considerable study and review of existing administrative practices have been made at my direction since taking over this Division 8/1/70 _ In order to put available personnel where highest priorities existed, a major reorganization was effected 12/70 and our last inspection approved that action The Director's letter dated 2/12/71 advising me of the Inspection Staff findings included the comment , "Continue to pay careful attention to imbalances in work ioad throughout the Division and take necessary action to correct these situations ) as you did recently in your reorganization. M1 With this in mind, and drawing on facts developed during the reorganization and subsequent inspection, I directed a memorandum to Branch Chiefs J A= Sizoo and D E Moore dated 2/19/71 pointing to (1) the need for case count to reflect active matters 3 (2) their responsibility to know what is going on in their respective Branches and (3) specifically instructing them to submit 2 monthly analysis of the work load of their Branches _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/30/71 CDB : mls 6-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 266 35 / Page ================================================== Page 267 ================================================== ADEQUA CY OF PERSONNEL 6-E The need for uniformity in case count submitted by Sections was stressed to then, as was the need to establish a logical and current basis for a regular and periodic assessment of work loads and manpower needs within the Division Because of (1) 2 continued shift in manpower needs , and (2) 2 growing imbalance in caseloads between Sections and manpower demands of special cases by memorandum to a1l Branch and Section Chiefs I instructed Section Chiefs G. C. Moore and R. L. Shackelford to conduct a thorough survey of the Division and make suitable recommendations for manpower adjustments to cope with current needs of the Division My memorandum to Mr Sullivan dated 7/29/71 detailed their findings and recommended they be approved . Addendun of Inspection Division 7/30/71 approved this except for assignment of Special Coordination Unit to Research Section, recommending it be retained in Nationalities Intelligence Section_ Mr Felt's memorandum to Mr Tolson dated 8/4/71 recommended propceed e4justnent of work assignments in Domestic Intelligence Division be deferred pending his study and Director noted, "OK Expedite _ " We are awaiting a decision. Based on figures developed during the survey of G C. Moore and R. L. Shackelford, it was obvious my previous instructions to the Branch Chiefs had not been effectively carried out because case count figures still were not as meaningful or consistent between Sections as they should have been . To correct this situation and to establish what I intended in my original memorandum to the Branch Chiefs on this subject, I instructed two Supervisors } with Inspection Staff experience_ to do a complete survey of case counting procedures and prepare tight recommenda- tions to achieve the objectives previously sought _ This was done, and after discussion of their findings with Branch and Section Chiefs 1 these new procedures were adopted beginning 8/13/71 - The results of this procedural change is detailed in "Pending Work and Delinquency M 4-D-1, and .I believez validates the recommended work adjustments contained in my memorandum to Mr _ Sullivan dated 7/29/71. It must be strongly pointed out: here this procedural change does not bear on work load , but rather deals solely with tabulation of case count into a more accurate gauge Of pending work and where the work is by desk, Unit, and Section_ The work remains the same DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/30/71 CDB:mls 6-E 2 NI 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 267_ ================================================== Page 268 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E The proposed work adjustments contained in my memorandum of 7/29/71 essentially took manpower from work presently in the Internal Security Section (Klan and White Hate cases and Infornant matters) and made them available to other more heavily loaded work ares The Front Office staff of Internal Security Section will be available for other assignment as well It also called for Nationalities Intelligence to absorb one of the five men on Ellsberg from that Section S complement because of relatively low caseload_ Details set forth in "Pending Work and Delinquency , M10 4-D-1, disclose caseload decreased in Nationalities Intelligence and Internal Security Sections by 197 and 28% respectively, which is proportionately high compared to other Sections Espionage Section was proposed to receive a one-half man 's time to compensate for the Ironclad case, This is consistent with that Section S 136 decrease 10 case count under the new procedure. Tbat write-up aiso discloses 2 case count under the new procedure of 275 cases per Agent for the Nationalities Intelligence Section compared as follows : Espionage 303; Extremist Intelligence 303 ; New Left R 334; Internal Security 401 These figures are based on Supervisors assigned to case desks and do not include men on specials in any Section. I do not believe the problems faced by Nationalities Intelligence Section far outweigh those of other Sections to justify that low figure and therefore believe my original recommendation that Nationaiities Inteiligence absorb one man from existing complement was justified. W _ R. Wannall's comments in write-up captioned "Ellsberg Case 1" 4-4-3 , relative to manpower presently utilized on This case validate this further as he has now utilized manpower in his Section on this case Obviously, tangential issues will arise from time-to-time in an investigation of this type and can and should be handled on an emergency basis within the Section handling the special This has been the traditional practice and should be followed . The second problem is essentially intra-divisional in nature and deals with 2 Division Head's responsibility and authority to effectively utilize resources available to him to cope with DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/30/71 CDB:mls 6-E 25 3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 268 ================================================== Page 269 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E the area of responsibility levied upon him As detailed in Wannal1 write-up captioned, Ellsberg Case' I 4-A-3 , from the beginning of this case I made manpower evaiiable for the Ellsberg case as requested by him_ As this investigation progressed, however Wanna1l continued levy demands for manpower which I believed unwarranted in view of (1) his failure to effectively adjust and use his existing manpower at 2 time when he had a_ proportionately low case load and (2) his granting extensive leave to personnel in his Section while continuing to levy manpower demands Wannall now claims to have nine men assigned to the Ellsberg case. I invite comparison of the handling of the Ellsberg Casee to Eastcon_ Eastcon at no time has had over 5 men assigned full time to even though the case is of the very highest priority and of a magnitude and complexity seldom inatched in Bureau Investigations_ In addition to the basic and complex conspiracy itself, the case incorporates six separate substantive investigations (draft board entries) which had to be brought up to trial standard for prosecution of Eastcon_ There are at least 85 volumes to the Eastcon file alone at this time Eastcon was absorbed within the responsible Section until it was firmly established that Section S case load could not continue to absorb the impact of Eastcon_ No requests for additional manpower were refused by me on Eastcon, and those requests made were fully supported by facts, justified and granted. In my memorandum to Mr Sullivan dated 8/12/71, captioned "Adequacy of Personnel , Leak Cases Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) M I candi stated my position and evaluation of Wannal1's demands for manpower (copy attached) Attention is invited to page 2 , paragraph 4, concerning the 5 highly qualified and ex- perienced men available to Wannall $ none of whom were being utilized by him on the Ellsberg; case. Attention is also invited to page paragraph 5 , which details Wannall's claim to Mr Felt of "enormous" problems and need for still 2 more men. Note that part Of that "enormous" problem was resolved in one week with one interview_ Concerning the first reference your attention is directed to my memorandum to Mr Sullivan dated 8/16/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) "1 (copy attached) which attaches a menorandum from Wannall to me requesting an additional Supervisor for the Special Coordination Unit_ Concerning the second reference above_ 3 and the tenor of the entire memorandun , your attention is invited to Wannall's write-up in this report captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3 } page 10 , paragraph 1, wherein he states 9 men are now assigned to that case DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/30/71 GQE;mls NW 88608 Docld;32989638 Page 269 354 's to it, dly 2 , ================================================== Page 270 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E These two references and Wannal1 S responses to them clear draw the issues: (1) Whether he used good judgment and considered the Bureau and Division overall responsibilities in balance with his own desires for manpower in making his requests; (2) When weaknesses in his position were pointed out whether he attempted to cover them by making even more denands for manpower hoping this would somehow give them credence and (3) Whether he or the Division Head should judge the Division's resources and capabilities and determine their allocation and priority of need consistent with the Bureau's overal capabilities. In summary , the work load of the Domestic Intelligence Division as exemplified case loads set forth under "Pending Work and Delinquency, Mi 4-D-1, are very high _ Being mindful of the practical limits f Bureau resources I believe the currently proposed adjustment of work assignments detailed in my above referred to memorandum of 7/29/71 will allow the Domestic Intelligence Division to function effectively with existing manpower The new method of tabulating case count affords me 2 betier &duiiiistrative d-ice to- obtain-meximum "tiliztion of existing manpower and periodic adjustments within the Division will no doubt be warranted and made The observations of the Inspection Staff as to the validity of manpower committed to the Ellsberg case, a5 well as overall manpower needs of the Domestic Intelligence Division, are welcomed _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 355 N 88608_Docld 32989638 Pa@epzinls 6 - E ly by ================================================== Page 271 ================================================== Sxtra" 3, B. C Suriver #venct 12, 297} C+D Ereentezn AbaqEE Or FESI" 145e% CUSt3 DHYIC TREELLIGEREZ DETISIOR terd} Doeszo 8/4/*1 Iros %: Yelt %o % . Tolgon cantiond 28 above , 2 e Zolt #dcaurstted AMd tng Dizectop #PtrovEt thet t mbor oz Azents bardlicg Leal GRmex i0 DI b iotrersed Rrsatlingely Ircn $ t0 7 #8ing DID gnrer , @ . Fele #180 ?8COXGB40d tmt tbo gropc5t} adjustroat 02 Mnppetez i1 WID % #ereraod penditg %i3 8t157 Tc @izector RErc8d E04 #o6 "Exvedite: % Tho folloving Is Ozfered for coialderazion; T0s Sotolfer' 6rn problens : 0} % Wropaeed Renyttor a*just-8rte recoroondrd 40 Rerorandtn Rrca €.* Rr &rtek {Q #-c_Ep)livan 95 UzwltLc The Irsycotien Diriefor Eoacurre0 @itm *4o proghuccd changes f1 zr2t rrcrzadux: Gzcopt $0r #oribz Ehe %peri&} Cocraaatsce Vnie shick goordlnatez 1028] sr8c14 stters tt 02 €ht Ktiorlltics @atollirence Gection: 7no Iirector #g*co4, tectasdv to flpal @pprovel p% tbe Crganisatitna) cbarts. 106 cirts 8ere #utattad #J Me-aeraatua C, DaErerten to #0l lvzd 6/4fv) eiea Jed 0 %. Yolt'& Benortiiut Cf 8/4/71 roCconntl%z # f#r*kor grua . (2} Zle @ccore probler {nNolvea #mponar #eeds %or &00 Enabers 8d #Ehiez"Jenk C3ge0 %nic} Dazt arigeer #i#e 6/13/71+ T8022 ar0 hndled 80 tb0 #tsoralitlea Ietalligeuce seetion undor @ectl08 Chiel 6,4.2488811 . %aer e6a Attortey @brerel Teqeestee 85 Srvostisste tbe Ellebetg 02560 #% #/16/t1 % 88is0t #332212 tulg 3738 # 7itter 91 t #gbost sriortty #8 Lulz' 228 bn t0 u80 guxficicrt 05p84er e0 kvule 1t. #e Ed+{sge Flo aIter 040 initial 3#re4efe02 trzt hs wouid %oed tt2 02843+8380 0f $ audftiopal guperrigors. Tlese Ser0 imsdlately tCsposat{ rrms9:gted t0 bin Ir02 other sectlonz, #4 Exbsequcstly sai& tme Probles 03.8 rrpeduirg #rd n0 #ua noer 2 adaticna} Surervigcts: Tmese Fere alen jrosptiy terircrerily reagslgred to bfa fron ctner Gectiong, Tlte placcd 3 #eavy overaHl bzarton ou 411 Bections #nd Jed t0 84 recc7aero4tiozg fm #% Beroriawa 0f 7/20/71 %or Zmpoger emi%es Gitbfg M13 %0 {esue th4& %atoer 05 bainz u50 ou prforlty Itera. Ceclorwze CD%: Rul {W} E: %ifivea Hu #caallesea (CONIINEID G OvER) rccict 8 E, B %. Koore 1 4 C 0 beapar O56 NW 88608 Docid: 32989638 Page 271 ================================================== Page 272 ================================================== Henorendum C. Da Branpan to Wa C. Sullivan Be; ADEQUACT OF PERSONNEL Kr _ Felt's memorandum 8/4/71 indicates ha discussed tho manpower probler on the leak cases With #annall %ho said his problens bad now becone B0 great be would need 2 wore men for 8 totel of 7 _ 8z line with Bbr . Felt'8 stated intention to initete an overall etudy Of the atter , 3 bed Xx . Hannall Subnf & to me' EU overall @nalysis o1 bls manpoler and work load 38 4t relates to tbe leal Cases in his section. Set forth &r0 the casc loed figuz'em for Mr , Eannall '& section from Herch 1 5 Auguat 1, 1971: Harch 1 324 April 1 323 Hey 1 313 June 1 [ 291 July 292 August 1 294 T When thc _2 leberg case fIrst broke , Vannall aggured me he wa& using hib erlsting manpover to tbe fullest ertent possible &nd needed tenporerily assibtanco frow other Bections to carry on the other heavj burders 0f his section, but the Cas0 load Ilgureg now gvailable for tbe Bix~meek period Irom 6/15/71 to 8/1f71 Ghnz tn3i ali Tetuxa11 'did 4a3 Pi : his owa Men on the gpeclal (5 men) and brrow manpower X5 xlen) from otber sectiong to %eep 'bis "Other problems in hauU 21 the sacrifice of other cections #lth equally Or even more burdensoro problens _ 6 This i8 Ghown by the fact that for June gud <uly the case load averege Jn Sannall 6 S sectlon wbile handling the Elloberg case ras 292 eud.284 respectively 23 contrasted to a" Divleion case Toad average fcr 211 geetions duing tba Bame period 0f 339 and 335 This does not eve? take into consideration that ha hes 5 highly experienced and qualified gupervisors in the Special Coordinetion Unit Fhon he does not include 12 bis Cas8 Zoad count Ie could have Grawn on at lest one of these mem for special assignment In 80 emergeucy but did mok: Actuelly , It i8 now clear that Wannall responded In the Initial stage of bis problen Yith a panicky } prenature request for aadftional manpower 38 he subsequently did tbrough his observation to Hr . Yelt that he needed still 2 more men. In effect, #anuall DID in the untenable position of giving Hr . Felt an ff-the-cuff assessgentof uhat he considered to be a0 "enornous" problen and 2 need for still 2 mcre wer ungupportad by facts a0d oblivlous to the problems of tbe Division a5 8 Rhole _ As 8 matter of fact, ore or the Jeak cases which caused Wanuall great alarm wes referred to 43 by the Departrent op 8/2/71. By letter dated 8/9/71 Manna11 advised the Department that FFo had cordected ome Interview which Bhowed that prosecution could not be entertalned and accordingly would cordtpt do furtber investigation in tbo absence of 2 - (CONTINUED W OVER) NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 272 2J 7 pu ================================================== Page 273 ================================================== Memorandum C. D, Brennau to #. C. Sulliven Re: ADEQUACY CF FESONNEL speciflc instructions _ Therefore, one part of Tannall '& "onornous" problen was resolved in 01a roek wltb one interview and one letter to, tho Department . Of equal concern to 28 18 Mannall's handling 02 leeve requests during the period of 6/15/71 to 8/5/71 , When confronted with tbe Ellsbard case , he had discussed leave with me sna had buggetsted that if it was necessary for hin to cancel leave requests +0 2ls #%ection he felt leara Ghould ba cancelled throughout the entire Division 0 I told him it morid pe ridiculous to cancel Zeave Divisfon-wide because one section had 2 problen _ I advised bin Jeavo throughout the Division would be #pproved ou the basig of sound judgwent 1n reletion to overell Division Iork lcez and i0 accordance gith the Director 8 instructions concerning individuale involved on najor cases , I bave ascerteined that Since 6/15/71 Wannall bas approved Jeave for 18 supervisors in his section totaling 763 hours . Thls 18 4m averafe of nearly 8 days per man for each Of those 12 . He approved these estez_ Bfve leave reguests during the Ban0 period that ha #dvised bis problers were 80 "emotmous" tbet be needed 7 additional mena OESEEVAZZONE: Eistorically, the Bureat has Zearned to livB witb specials Gf various kinds. 3 sgree with the concept that such speclals 8r@ 4 test of the responsible official'6 ability to baudlo.thedl within the fraEe work 02 the Bureau*8 overall responsibilities and capabillties _ In lire nanuer , I erpect Do less fromi supervisory pereonnel .under me aad will not Condone unwarranted attempts to grab maapower within the Division regardzess Of whether the attenpts ara based on an inability to tbink clearly, an incapacity t0 adjust t0 2 stress Situation, r oversight resulting fron 2 provincial attitude and outIook. DID has absorbed Into its periphery or responsibilities meny nev problen areaz involving racial and qew left eztrenists in recent Yeers. These problens bave taxed our ingenuity and rebulted in aCross-tie-boara heavy work load iucreases brought about by the need ta flezibly realigo manpower to meet new challenges . Wben other priorities of the Bureau bave precluded additional manpower being added to DID, I have #ttempted to take the positive approach of maklng internal adjustments to fulfill our responsibilities witb available resources . In this vain, tbere 1s ettached & copy of 8 memorandum 1 prepared for al1 Branch &nd Sectlon Chieis or DID dated 7/23/71 vhich resulted in M7 menorandum to A . Sulliven 0f 7/29/71 recommend:ng DID manpower 3 - (CONTINUFD 8 OVER) Nw 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 273 ================================================== Page 274 ================================================== Hemorandun C. Da Erennan to T . C: Sullivar Be: ADEQUACY Or PRESOHWE adjustnents . I faol ft 7ill servo to Show #hy the fuspection Division wIth & minor exception appzoved Qur Propcsed manpoFer adjustments . Derhaps it EIll Sa7v8 also to fscilltste the study Hz _ Folt Indicated be w9 initfat1ng. 7 bopa it #ill resolve auy doubts the Director or others Bay bave about wha t We are trying to d with O27" wanpower resource: fr DID and why Fe ar0, trying to do It, RECQ ATIONS; (1) Peuding tbe Drector'8 final epprovel of the proposed manpowver adjustuents wichim DID, tko 6 men temporarlly aseigned 80 tbe E)lsberg case rematn 28 essigwed. (2) Any addftional pergonnel to he ess1gued to tbo_ELlsberg CR other Jeck Ceses a+ thia tibe should come from witbio tke Narionalitiev Intelligerce Eection #n viem 0z tbe relatively lower Caz0 load 10 tbat secticn. (3} 'Tbat Zuspector Do E, Hocre persoually As8una Ovorall directfon of the #lsberg sud leak cases to Insuro Wanaall'8 proper utilization 0f manpover 1x tke dfrection o% Ol cbjectives, Thls Sbould iuclude dally conferences with Wanoall a0d hfs mep on the Ellsberz and leak Cases and 0 roekly progress Teport t0 28 Iron Inspector Koore No . 3mnce it haf 6te1 %tated "GF'1;le tlct f Erennn Nis , skerx evfe + [o st Krenn Ell is. $ rcmaib Vn #il 1 emnclv_ Ie2 , # (4) That #r , Felt 8s instructed by tbe "Director expedite his stuay of reconorded DID @arpower adjustuents S0 thet desirable changes can be efzected' witbout further delay to enable 48 to put our mampower on our most Important proble1s, NW 88608 Docld:32989638 274' 354 6fs EllL;n%ue Page ================================================== Page 275 ================================================== I+% C: #ullfvau Asgust 16} 197} G D; Eseiaaa BDZQHWACT 0F PEZRAUNNHL Doaic INZZLLIGCCE DIYISIOH (DIS} Bv #teecbed Avatrundu @anma12 t Bronuan 8/13/71 requecting ORe addicie30l guparrisor bd #pproved Zror cusidc DID Kor tte Fcrelgn Wsison Desk {ZLD} beczuso of 8 bavy iocreaco i8 #ork valesa . 4 1 40708 czpirgion o2 Qur Lognt offices 033 Produced work increasa elch Eculd Juatffy addtf0041 supervisor Cl5 FLD . Corewor , f0 rogard t0 18nuvll'& roconrendstion concurrad i0 by tko Draacli Ciief, Isspoctor 0 % #ore, tr$ @kould Co6 Zrom cutsiee BID, 3 aw Euirdzul 0i t68 Iupectzon Dirisloi ctrtey of mor% 41 DID &riar weck 02 7/18/71 follcwir; rmuert %pr #d4i iotal BtpervAzor im @p4onage #wctior. Tba Enspector Ccacluimt tmzz tho presout btpervisory Cepabilities Of DIQ @re %8e0uea% & t0 tanllu axlsting vorie Ihe Lzsyeeedon Division 8n0ly518.01 %ork-Jn JII A8 41 #//71 roxparcd %12h Mast Inspection in canuaryo 1971, rovealod 2 eeaQility 92 overall responsibilitie8 fror 8 Case loed Jta3cpolne sbow 67 txe/83er 840r030 Cas0 loed.per gutervisor I0 Jzuwer} Y78& 322 &80 10 Joly 330. #6nnal] '& @vereze Cbge Joad in @Ruery per supervigcr 383 278 320 10 Jly 304 Am &verasc *ipe c2 pnly 3 Cn8cb i0 tbw Mlv48ior and 02 orly 10 Cased im #annell'€ gecticu f1 842 Eobths . crdiaarilye 2 mould point out to Ioth Kaspector #core 854 %38822 thaze factczt #lzigaze #galnof reqvesting aduikioRal supurvsstra Iron 0rteld0 Dir: Irpeckoz 2oote na# 808053 to tmose fects &1d aioule ba?8 ezplatted 20 %3meel} Ebt Dee& *0 {ollow tradlticm} patterns 1# requesti#g an addltfcul E20, 4. > duijasting withi the Divielon'8 owarell Dn power 200 @crk Jccu frascrork O1 capahllitled Ard resposibilities. Elle obvlous answer 40 for Tanml} to rems544# 3 %i2 frcu #ithid his wectfon Ko th #ID. TTmfs scule (1} alleviste the work Jond tbere aud, (3) Bring %4s 075 Icad cloaer to the Dlvision'8 8wpervlsory aNeraga Fsr 02- 4€ t20 01d 6f 90. #ys }e cculo #len foiesewe bis Bituation aud cor31dez &hy action tbo {ucts tban tarrant. Cobover , txe #ignlficaace placed 04 our rccant Leert ` expaxsioa: J3y La 2% cvertiding Zector to thp Imapaction Divisiou Gr . felt wbo Boclosaire J71 {3} 31. faisvaa D : # _ #3 Gohiabar }01ce2 7 G:eb2c3_ 4, R0610 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 ~Page 275 08 '@ Se0 ================================================== Page 276 ================================================== Resorardea C,r: Erende# tq #, Ca Gullivaz R#; AD27icY 04 PFESOYRELL DOHESTIC INTTEEEIGRICE DINISION (DID) Bey {c0l tho Zecte freccated by Matoall ar0 Sucem *0 ousnaish 4ll other eoxsteezation." % fe0l 4t #ould %e %2ll Itr @ . Yelt t0 conider thiu request $# Conjunction #lth t40 gdporor sojustmext survey bc is t0 {utfate &10 [ 01Il ba guidad accortllngly. I #va #altiated BC1d n83 giGelfue far daferalintr; Dvieiom banpor8r ass1gn37t8 aad Ce58 lartu. 3 %0lfer? txose will prcvido 2 6t111 batter baale Zor DID t0 Lnsaro its #antot 10 bolng Ooge erfectively uc& Qn rricrity mtters. V" .-ralt %ay demira tQ 0a8 tiese guldelftsg Srnealately 85 8 #e3st@ for 0i9 study . EONZTIou q0#% @ - Yelt_conslder tbc request 62 #arnaL} for Buperriecr Eroa cutsice DID 14 conjunction udth hla Geudy . Onxq albie(brnc& banmees MeEvrvr ~iL7>/}_ 'urne Km h 2 - Nw 88608 Docld:32989638 276 7x1tl 26 /` Page ================================================== Page 277 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION SECTION CHIEF 4. K'. GRAY : AJ As of close of business 8/17/71 the authorized personnel 0f the Internal Security Section was 17 Special Agents 9 7 Secretaries , and 13 Clerks . A breakdown by Units follows : FRONT OFFICE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS OF COB 8/17/71 Section Chief Seabetaone One Man 1 Secretary COMMUNIST_PARTY USA UNIT Supervisors Secretary 1 Clerks FOREIGN INFLUENCE HND PRO-CHICOM UNIT Supervisors 3 (SA Benedict assigned temporarily Nationali- ties Intelligence) Secretary 2 Clerks KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS_UNIT 'Supervisors Secretary % Clerks SECURITY INFORMANT__UNIT Supervisors 4 (SA Seabaugh assigned temporarily Nationali- ties Intelligence) Secretary 3 Clerks SUBVERSIVE INIVIDUALS _UNIT Supervisors 5 (SA WLSnith extended sick leave beginning 6/25/71) Secretary 3 Clerks DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION NW 886082Dak 2989638 (Cag32277 63 ================================================== Page 278 ================================================== SPECIFIC_COMMENTS 1 None 2 None 3 None 4 _ None 5 , During the period since the last inspection manpower savings have been effected in that the following Supervisors for the periods indicated have been assigned elsewhere in the Division_ 0 Supervisor James P. Benedict hes been assigned elsewhere in the Division for tne entire period Since the last inspection except for approximately 12 days that he was working in the Internal Security Section. Most of this period he was on temporary assignment in the New Left Section on the Special concerning the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives case More recently he has been on temporary assigiuueni io the Nationalities Iiteiligence Section on the McLek Special. Since 8/13/71 Supervisor Tony J Seabaugh has also been on tenporary assignment in the Nationalities Intelligence Section on the McLek Special_ 6 , When Special Agent supervisory personnel currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections, are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle existing case loade There is, however, an area of pending work which could greatly increase the supervisory work load and require expeditious file reviews } analysis of cases, availability of witnesses, reviews of informant reports and preparation of correspondence _ Funds were recently appropriated by Congress for tbe implementation of Executive Order 11605 which broadened the powers of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to enable the Board to bold bearings and designate violence-prone extremist organizations as subversive _ The Department has indicated that it intends to initiate proceedings before the SACB 2s soon as possible and there are a number of organizations being handled in the Internal Security Section, such as the Revolutionary Union and Progressive Labor Party, which are likely to be selected for presentation. Based on past DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 SFP:ebc 6-E NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 278 263 ================================================== Page 279 ================================================== experience, the preparation of & case for presentation to the SACB requires the services of one Supervisor on a full-tine' basis_ Thus , it is anticipated that the Departnent's action pursuant to Executive Order 11605 wiil substantially increase the work load of the Internal Security Section. 7 In evalueting adequacy of both Special Agent and clerical personnel the following criteria were used: case load mail count name checks complerity of cases and supervision involved deadline matters special assignments experienced supervisors Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in Ciarge {ravievizg 22il, ccnferring-with employees organizing Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignments handled. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 SFPaebc 6-E NW 88608_Docld:32989638 Page 279_ 264 ================================================== Page 280 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E SECTION CHEEF R, D. COTTER: As of close of business 8/17/71, the complement of this Section was a5 follows: Special Agents 12, secretaries 6, and clerks 13, for a total of 31. This is broken down by unit as follows: Section Front Office ~ 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary (Stenography)= 1 Secretary (Typing), 1 Clerk (Typing GS-5) _ One Special Aget on permanent detached assignment to Department of Justice. Central Research Unit ~ 5 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 3 Super- visory Clerks (technical publications writers): 1 Clerk (publications coordinator), 1 Clerk (omnibus)_ Civil Disorder Reporting Unit T 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 1 Clerk (omnibus) Current Intelligence Reporting Unit 7 2 Special Agents, L Secretary, 1 Supervisory Clerk (technical publications writer), 1 Clerk (omnibus)_ Special Records Unit e 1 Special Agent, 1 Secretary, 4 Clerks_ The following responses are numbered to correspond with Inspector's specific questions: 1. Position of Section Chief is technically vacant; with no authority to fill, Section Chief R. D Cotter, with approval of the Director, has been On permanent detached assignment with the Department of Justice since 6/1/71. Number One Man T J Smith has acted in capacity of Section Chief; One Special Agent position in Current Intelligence Reporting Unit has been vacant since retirement of SA Bs A Wells effective 7/30/71. Authority granted to fill position and SA DNLovd wili report 8/18/71' as SA Wells 1 replacement. DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/17/71 TJS:amt 6-E NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 280 76 5 ================================================== Page 281 ================================================== 2 3 2. SA Dean N. Lloyd is under transfer to the Division from the San Antonio Office: Transfer letter was dated 6/30/71. He has arrived in Washington and will report for assignment 8/18/71. Mrs Jacqueline Kelset Elliott, Clerk GS-4, assigned to Current Intelligence Reporting Unit; resigned effective 8/24/71. Letter acknowledging resignation was dated 8/3/71. Miss Jgyce_Webb Secretary, GS-5, assigned to Current 01 Intelligence Reporting Unit; resigned effective 8/20/71. Letter acknowledging resignation was dated 7/28/71. 3 There is one GS-4 Clerk surplus to the Section complement. This is located in the Current Intelligence Reporting Unit ad is due to fact that replacement for Mrs. Elliott_(above) received prior to effective date of resignation, 8/24/71, 4 "Current clerical perSOmnel Zoipleiicnt i€ considered adequate but not excessive to the needs of the Section. 5 There have been no manpower savings effected through streamlining procedures since date of last inspection. One Special Agent who had been on loan to Internal Security Section was transferred permanently to that Section effective 5/24/71, with no replacement to be provided. Overall Section complement was thereby reduced by one Special Agent and the work load occasioned by this reduction was absorbed by existing Agent complement with assistance from Supervisory Clerks (Technical Publications Writers). 6 Due to nature of permanent assignment of Section Chief Ra D_ 'Cotter to the Department of Justice, full burden and responsibility for running the Section and handling Section Front Office functions has fallen on the Number One T 6 J Smith: A replacement for Mr _ Cotter is very definitely deemed necessary so that an acting Number One Man can be designated to relieve SA Smith in the Section Front Office. In the interest of continuity of responsibility and authority it is felt that designation of an acting Number One Man is & must. A 'replacement was approved by the Director for the other Agent named along with Mr_ Cotter for detached permanent assignment to the Department. Personnel of the Section cannot be considered adequate SO long as there is only one Special Agent handling Front Office responsibilities of the Section. NW_88608_Docld: 32989638"Page 281 266 Man, ================================================== Page 282 ================================================== 3 7 . Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this Section includes a number of diverse factors. As pointed out in inspections, case load figures are not applicable, neither are there any other simple qualitative measurements of the Section's work. Research Section is essentially the service arm Of the Division and handles a wide variety of assignments involving research; study and analysis_ Of primary importance is production of a variety of documents aimed at providing the White House, Attorney General, other high level Government officials and Bureau officials current intelligence information relating to the broad spectrum of the Division's work: In addition to the writing of highly condensed intelligence summaries, digests, and analyses in pamphlet form for high level dissemination; the Section provides & daily teletype summary of racial disorders and developments and of antiwar, campus disorders and other disturbances growing out of various protest activity. The Section also handles all matters which involve the Division as a whole, where the matter crosses section lines. Director's specials involving such matters a8 wire taps, nonspecific topical subjects such as guidelines for internal security investigations, and similar matters are haudied and/or coordinated izi thc Sccticr The adequacy of personnel of the Section depends on the demands leveled by the White House or by Bureau officials for the specialized studies and other material which the Section is geared to produce on short notice: Demands for intelligence data were extremely heavy from the White House prior to and during the election campaign last year _ It can reasonably be expected that even greater demands will be placed on the Bureal during the months ahead, and such demands will invariably involve the elements of extremism, terrorism; racial and new left agitation and other internal security problems. It is to be noted that this Section actually wrote one speech for Vice President Agnew and provided the material for inclusion in several others_ We also provided Mr. Agnew with & special brief which was kept updated, for use in appearing before various groups NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 282 prior 26 ? ================================================== Page 283 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF' PERSONNEL NEF LEFT SECTION 6-E SECTION CHIEF R. Lo SHACKELFORD? There is set forth below a tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the New Left Section as of close of business, August 17 , 1971. Authorized Assigned New Left Groups Unit 4 Agents 4 Agents Clerks 4 Clerks Protest and Trotskyist 3 Agents 3 Agents Groups Unit 5 Clerks 5 Clerks Special Investigations 6 Agents 6 Agents East Unit 5 Clerks 5 Clerks Special Investigations 5 Agents 5 Agents West Unit 5 Clerks 5 Clerks Subversive Individuals 6 Agents 6 Agents Nem Left Unit 6 Clerks 7 Clerks Front Office 2 Agents 2 Agents 2 Clerks 2 Clerks Total 26 Agents 26 Agents 27 Clerks 28 Clerks 53 Employees 54 Employees 1, There are no vacant positions in the New Left Section. 2 _ There ere no transfers pending in or out of the Section, nor are there any letters of resignation in the Section pending as of August 17 , 1971 . 3_ As Of August: 17, 1971 , this Section is one secretary over tbe authorized conplement_ This secretary is temporarily assigned to the GS-6 secretary position in the Section Front Office, which was vacated by tbe reassignment of the incumbent to 2 proposed GS-6 clerical position in the Subversive Individuals G New Left Unit_ Upon approval of the proposed clerical position, thbe extra secretary will be utilized to fill the GS_6 secretary vacancy in the Front Office. DOHESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71 RLS cae 6-E NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 283 3 E 8 ================================================== Page 284 ================================================== Adequacy of Personnel New Left Section 6-E 4. At time 0f last inspection, this Section had a complenent of 24 clerical personnel as compared to present assigned complement of 28 clerical personnel _ Tbis increase was occasioned by the transfer of the Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit with accompanying personnel from Internal Security Section to the New Left Section. Congress recently appropriated funds for implementation of Executive Order 11605 which broadened power of Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to designate violence prone extremist organizations as subversive. The Department has indicated it intends to initiate these proceedings as soon as possible (See R. L. Shackelford memorandum to Mr C_ D Brennan, August 16, 1971, captioned "Executive Order 11605") _ This Section handles a number of organizations which will undoubtedly be selected by the Department for presentation before the SACB _ Based on past experience } the preparation of cases for presentation to the SACB creates a considerable increase in work of a clerical nature _ If tbe Department 's intention in tbis regard is implenented, it will be necessary *o obtain an additional clerk in tbe future, however we are not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this time. 5 _ The New Left Section, 2s 0f January 1971, had an authorized complement of 22 Agents and 23 clerks . Current assigned complement is 26 Age ts and 28 clerks This increase in complenent _ as noted above, was occasioned by the transfer of the Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit from the Internal Security Section to the New Left Section. 6 _ The caseload being handled by tbe New Left Section (average 371 cases per Agent as of August 1, 1971) is considered excessive. Re at the present time, making 2 conscientious effort to reduce this caseload to desirable level by weeding out and closing cases which -do not require additional investigation. If, in spite of our efforts, tbe upward trend continues, it may be necessary to request additional Agent personnel to bandle the excessive caseload in tbis Section_ As noted in number 4 above, it is anticipated that as & result of recent @ongressional action, the Department intends to soon present violence prone extremist organizations before the SACB for designation as subversive. Such presentations will, 2 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 284 264 are, ================================================== Page 285 ================================================== Adequacy of Personnel New Left Section 6-E of necessity include several organizations currently handled this Section. Based on past experience, the preparation of a case for presentation before the SACB requires the services of one supervisor on 2 full-time basis. No request is being made at this time for additional Agent personnel However based on the above, it appears that a request for one additional Agent will be necessary when the above proceedings are instituted. 7 Adequacy of personnel in tbe New Left Section i8 constantly evaluated on basis of caseload and type of cases handled by each Unit review of delinquency reports_ number Of requests received from Department and other agencies, and review of the overall objectives of tbe Section. Mhen it is noted, because of special circumstances 1 that an excessive amount of work is temporarily assigned to one Unit personnel from other Units are utilized to alleviate the situation_ 3 - 320 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 285 by ================================================== Page 286 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E SECTION CHIEF W . A . BRANIGAN ESPIONAGE SECTION (1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section as of the close of business August 17, 1971, is as follows: AGENT CLERK SECRETARY CLERK_STENQ Front Office 2 2 Soviet Unit Washington 3 2 1 1 Soviet Unit S New York 3 1 1 Special Cases Unit 2 5# 0 Coordination Unit 3 1 1 Satellite Unit 5 1 *Special Agent George M_ Quinn was designated to replace Special Agent Victor R Schaefer Special Agent Quinn is currently assigned to the Inspection Division; date of reporting to the Espionage Section is not known _ #*Intelligence Analyst, GS-lO, Mery E Triplett, performing work in lieu of Special Agent _ #**Clerk_ 9 GS-7 , 4. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of Special Agent (2) By letter dated July 28, 1971, Special Agent George M_ Quinn was ordered for assignment to the Domestic IntelTigence Division _ By letter dated August 1971, Dale P 96- Ramacci submitted his resignation to be effective at close f business DOMSTIC INTELLIGENCC DIVISION INSPECTION 8-19-71 WAB: hke 6-k NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 286 27/ 4* 3*** 4 ato 17, ================================================== Page 287 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL August 1971 . Letter acknowledging resignation has not been received_ (3) As of August 1971 , there was a shortage of one Special Agent in the Soviet Unit 4 New York As of August 17, 1971, there was no overage of authorized personnel in the Espionage Section_ (4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate but not excessive at the present time . (5) Since the last inspection the Special Agent complement of the Espionage Section has been reduced by tvo _ At the time of the last inspection the Espionage Section had a total case load of 5,089 cases of which 141 were handled by clerical personnel in lieu of Agent personnel _ There was, therefore, an average of 275 pending investigations per Agent Supervisor As of July 31 9 1971 the Espionage Section had a total of 5,575 cases, of which 270 were handled by clerical personnel This provided an average of 331 pending investigations for each Agent Supervisor (6) By memorandum June 4, 1971, a request was made to increase the Special Agent complement by one Special Agent. This was predicated on an increase in the volume and complexity of investigations handled _ The request was denied_ By memorandum July 14 1971, I asked to increase the Special Agent complement by one in order that the Ironclad case could be assigned the full-time job of one Special Agent IroncLad is a unique source of the Bureau and it is important that information from this source is given the analysis and consideration that it deserves _ This request was denied, and the Special Agent complement of the Espionage Section was fixed at 18 . In light of President Nixon's recent request to cut back , no request for additional Special Agent personnel is being made and the present complement is considered adequate. (7) Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of personnel includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity of the cases, and the importance of the investigation In the Soviet Units P Washington and New York, we are currently handling 2,190 cases among an authorized compiement of DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8-19-71 WAB:hke 6-E 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 287 272 20 , 17 , ================================================== Page 288 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL seven Special Agents _ The greatest majority of our double agent cases are assigned in these Units and these are among the most complex investigations_ The operation of 2 double agent requires minute supervision to insure that the objectives of the investi- gation are achieved. The Soviet Unit Lan Washington also supervises two illegal agent cases, and the Soviet Unit L New York has the overall supervision of the Ironclad source_ The Satellite Unit, which supervises the investigations in the Polish 3 Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav nationality fields; has a total of 1,408 investigations , including the informants and double agents that are being directed against the Soviet-bloc establishments and personnel There therefore, an average f 352 investigations in this Unit, The Coordination Unit is currently handling 226 investigations } of which 178 are assigned to a Clerk in lieu of an Agent. Considering that this Unit has the responsibility for & zirber- 0f 'special subjects ena speciel operatione; inclnding the adaptation Of our records to automatic data processing equipment , the case load is considered very high_ In our Special Cases Unit there are currently 751 investigations , of which 92 are handled by a Clerk in lieu f an. Agent These investigations are divided among two Special Agents _ The figure of 751 compares favorably with the total of 768 at the time 0f the last inspection, which number was divided among three Special Agents. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8-19-71 WAB:hke 6-E 3 G NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 288 273 is, 1, ================================================== Page 289 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE @ EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION The current authorized personnel complement Of the Extremist Intelligence Section as of the close of business August 18, 1971, is 22 Agents and 23 clerical personnel. This is broken down as follows according to Units within the Section: Front Office Section Chief Number One Man 1 Secretary to Section Chief 1 Secretery to Number One Man 1 Black Nationalist Unit East 6. Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge 7 clerical personnel Black Nationalist Unit Central 4 .Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge 3 clerical personnel Black Nationalist_ Unit 7 West 5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge 5 clerical personnel Black Nationalist South 2nd Racial Inforant Unit 5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge 6 clerical personnel DOMSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8[18/71 TDRimlm 6-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 289 24 Page ================================================== Page 290 ================================================== (1) There are no clerical or supervisory vacancies in the Section. (2) No one is under transfer into or out of the Section. (3) There is no shortage or overage of authorized personnel. (4) The derical personnel assigned to the Section is considered adequate at this time_ (5) The streamlining of our operations wherever possible to effect manpower savings is under continual evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since the last inspection include: (1) Abolishment of the Agitator Index on 4/21/71 as an analysis revealed that it was no longer the necessary administrative tooi inai ii once was; (2} After consultation with the Department, discontinued submission of monthly evidentiary reports concerning the Black Panther Party on 14, 1971_ At the time this program was discontinued, 23 field offices were submitting monthly evidentiary reports averaging 37 pages in length; (3) Limited the scope of inves- tigations, of black student groups on college campuses to those groups which have engaged in violence andlor lawless activities or are moving toward violence or lawlessness.by letter to all offices 7/26/71; (4) Assigned additional duties to clerical personnel in effort to reduce the workload of Special Agent Supervisors_ Specifically, a clerk is now handling the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List, correlates the receipt and review of publications and newspapers dealing with the black nationalist movement, reviews and forwards to appropriate field offices information received from the military on black extremist in the Armed Forces, and handles certain correspondence with the National Security Agency concerning matters of mutual interest. In addition, we continue to utilize our teletype dissemination facilities to the maximum extent possible NIN 88608 Docld:32989638 290 May 275 Page ================================================== Page 291 ================================================== (6) The Special Agent complement is 22 including the Section Chief and Number One an increase of one since the last inspection. The Division was reorganized December 17 3 1970, on the basis of approximate case load per Supervisor of 279 , This figure was based on the October 1, 1970 , case load figures. As of January 1, 1971, the case load stood at 349 per Supervisor and a request for two additional Special Agent Supervisors was approved. The opening of cases on Black Student Union-type organizations and leaders thereof on college campuses across the Nation in December, 1970, showed up in our case load figures during the early months of 1971_ These cases have been handled and closed by the end of the 1970-1971 school year. As Of August 1, 1971, the case Load stood at 5,428 or an average of 271 per Supervisor assigned_ These cases represent hard- core extremist individuals and organizations and require extensive supervision_ Additional factors dealing with the adequacy of Personnel is 2 speciel that wes received in the Section on May 29 9 1971, involving the killing of two police officers in New York City on 21, 1971, which the President instructed the FBI to investigate and solve The supervision Of this investigation occupies the full time of one Supervisor In addition, one Supervisor was placed on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on July 19, 1971, and a second Supervisor was placed' on loan to that Section on August 13, 1971_ With the return of these two Supervisors to the Section, I consider the supervisory personnel as adequate. There are several factors that would idicate that our work in th black extremist field will increase in the imediate future _ With the reopening of school in the immediate future, we can foresee an influx of cases involving extremist Black Student UNion-type groups and leaders thereof _ Executive Order 11605 signed by the President on July 2, 1971, expanded the activities of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) _ The Department has advised 376 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 291 Man, May Page ================================================== Page 292 ================================================== that a Section has been formed within the Internal Security Division of the Department to file petitions before the SACB pursuant to Executive Order 11605 and that the Department is interested in proceeding as quickly as possible against such parties as the Black Panther Party &nd the Ku Klux Klan among others_ Such proceedings will materially increase the workload of the Section_ Under the proposed reorganization of the Division which is under consideration at this time, this Section, if such reorganization is approved, will handle all Klan and white-hate organizations 9 individuals and informants with the present supervisory complement. In this connection, the informant cases are adoptable to full assimilation into our present extremist informant setup and a great deal of the work in connection with the handling of these informants will be assigned the responsibility of two grade 6 clerical employees in the Black Nationalist South and Racial Informant Unit: In order to abiozb tha Klan ard white-hete crganiza- tions and individuals, will be assigned in accordance with the geographic breakdown we are presently using within the four Units in the Section. Black extremist activity in this country is developing more and more in international aspects_ Residents of other countries including U. S. citizens and noncitizens are involved in clandestine and overt operational activity among racial extremists _ We have targeted Central Intelligence Agency as well as our Legal Attaches abroad for the develop- ment of data regarding foreign influence in the black extremist movement. We have levied requirements and are expanding on such requirements on the National Security Agency which has vast capabilities in developing the type of information needed_ (7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take into consideration not only the case load which is compiled on a monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts taken On a quarterly basis_ Many of our cases on figures in the black extremist movement such as Huey P Nevton,_Eldridge Cleaver, James_Forman, LeRoi Jones, and others require a considerable amount Of supervisory attention NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 292 277 they key ================================================== Page 293 ================================================== Analysis of current developments in the racial field; preparation of special studies, requests from other Government agencies, and SO forth al1 require considerable supervisory.-time and are taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy of supervisory personnel. 773 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 293 ================================================== Page 294 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E SECTION CHEEF W. R WANNALL NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION As of close of business 8/17//71 Section complement was:_ Authorized Actual Special Agents 20 20* Secretaries (Steno) 8 8 Secretary (Typing) 1 Stenographer (Supervisory) Clerical (Supervisory) 1 Stenographers 26, 26** Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, .7) 20 21*** Totals 178 #Does not include 7 Agents on loan from other Sections for McLek 'Special_ ##Includes one GS-5 Stenographer (Barbara J Raney) out of assign ment; working outside Bureau on loan to Inteiligence Evaluation. Committee. '*x*Includes one GS-4 Clerk (Kendall Wayne_Shull) assigned temporarily to Section 7/22/71 for training purposes Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one_ Secretary. {Stenography) and one Secretary (Typing) _ Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno - graphy) , one Clerk (GS-5).and one Clerk (GS-4) Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography) , one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4) Special_Coordination_Unit consists of five Special Agents, three Secretaries (tenography); one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and three Clerks (GS-4) _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION NSPECTION 8/19/71 WRW:ams NW 88608 fsaEid:32989638_Page 294 274 WuQw ================================================== Page 295 ================================================== 6-E Chinese Unit_consists of three Special Agerts, one Secretary (Stenography) , and three Clerks (GS-4) _ Middle_and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography); and three Clerks (GS-4)_ Division Stenographic_Pool consists of One Stenographic Supervisor (Clerk); one Assistant Supervisor (Stenographic) , one Clerk-Stenographer (GS-5) , 'and 25 Clerk-Stenographers (GS-4) _ While the foregoing represents the organizational structure of the Section as authorized, the actual structure has been affected by the McLek and related specials Since 6/15/71. There are seven Agents assigned on a temporary, and in part rotating, basis to this Section from other sections within the Division _ These men, together with the 20 Agents regularly assigned to the Section, are assigned as follows: Section Front Office two (no change)_ Cuban Unit three (two regular one on temporary rotating assign- ment--DavidA Brumble of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/13/71)_ Nationality Unit three (one regular and two on temporary assignment-- JJames H Kavanagh of New Left Section reported 7/19/71, and _John LuAdamg of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/9/71) _ This is one less than normal unit Agent complement Special Coordination _Unit_ five (no change) Chinese Unit two (regular) _ This is one less than normal unit Agent complement Middle and South American Unit three (two regular and one on temporary rotating assignment--Wfred R_Schlarman of Espionage Section reported 8/16/71)- McLek and Related Specials nine (aS follows): Eugene R Harrell (of this Section) James R Wagoner (of this Section) Jesse (fthis Section} Herbert J Morgan (of this Section) Lionel E Belanger (of this Section) NW 88608 Docld: 32989638' Page 295 Hagy 38 W: ================================================== Page 296 ================================================== 6-E Wiliiam W Hamilton (of this Section} Joseph M Tizoo (of Research Section) Tony I Seabaugh (of Internal Security Section) James P Benedict (of Internal Security Section) Harrell Wagoner_and Hamilton are regularly assigned to the Nationality Unit; Morgan to the Middle and South American Unit, Belanger to the Cuban Unit and to the Chinese Unit_ (1) All positions were occupied as of close Of business 8/17/71, 'although one transfer out was pending and one resignation was pending. (2) letter dated 8/16/71 Linda Marie Blum- Clerk-Stenographer, GS-4, was transferred to Phoenix Office Carol A Maslow has resigned effective close of business 8/27/71_ Letter acknowledging this was dated 8/2/71. (3) _Kendall Wayne Shull Clerk, GS-4, was assigned to Section 7/22/71 for training purposes pending clerical opening within Division to which he would be permanently assigned_ (4) The additional work involved in the handling of McLek and related specials has to date required the assignment of nine Agents_ There has been additional clerical work involved which to date has been handled by clerks regularly assigned to the Nationality Unit plus the clerical assistance rendered by Kendall Wayne Shull from 7/22/71 to 8/17/71 and by Waye T Smith who, for training purposes; was assigned to this Section from 7/7 to 8/3/71. # Teorganization results in setting up & special uit to handle McLek and related matters, we would require & GS-5 Secretary (Stenography) for the Unit Chief and a minimum of three clerical employees, one to handle lead cards, one to handle dissemination and the third to handle indices searches; file requests and related matters. We would endeavor to fill two of the three clerical positions from clerical complement presently in the Section by diverting one clerk from the present Nationality Unit and one clerk from the Middle and South American Unit_ We" would request that the clerical position which has existed since 7/1/71 for training purposes be made permanent by an increase in the clerical ~complement_ This would result in adding to the over-all Section' complement one Secretary (Stenography), GS-5, and one Clerk; GS-4. (5) The principal manpower savings effected since last inspection Was brought about through a voluntary reduction of over-all case load within the Section to preclude the necessity for requesting a additional Agent for assignment to the 13 operational desks within the Section (those existing in all units except the Front Office, the Special Coordination Unit, and the Division Stenographic Pool Unit), The case load reduction was effected by streamlining NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 296 2Y / Hagy By ================================================== Page 297 ================================================== 6-E procedures regarding the handling of cases relating to deserting Chinese seamen (a reduction of approximately 160 cases) ad restricting the opening of investigations of the Jewish Defense League to high-level national leaders (which resulted in & reduction of approximately 70 cases) _ Memoranda captioned "Case Load Reduction, Nationalities Intelligence Section, M dated 4/15 and 5/5/71 attached. (8) Our regular Agent complement is 28: and we have seven men on loan from other sections _ Of these 27 nine gre presently assigned to McLek and related specials, Six from the regular Agent complement from this Section and three of the loan Agents_ The assignment of the manpower from this Section has resulted in the temporary reduction of the complements of the Nationality Unit and the Chinese Unit by one Agent each_ While it is felt we can continue running these two units on & temporary basis in the immediate future with one less man assigned to each, we will not be able to expand efforts in the Chinese communist field which; at this is considered critical. To do the Chinese Unit should be built to an Agent eomplement of five_ This wouid permit "S tn handle the current work_in the unit and expand into areas which are considered necessary at this time and rhich are outlined in detail in the attached write-up dated 8/18/71 and captioned "'Chinese Matters_ 11 By memorandum dated 8/12/71 one additional Agent Supervisor was requested for assignment to the Foreign Liaison Desk_ A copy of this memorandum is attached, together with a copy of & cover memorandum dated 8/16/71 from AAssistant Director Brennan to Mr Sullivan captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID . 11 7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts; complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and intelligence requirements, personnel capabilities, and past experience in shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another _ NW 88608_Docid:32989638_Page 297_ 282 men, time, this, ================================================== Page 298 ================================================== April 15, 1971 CASE LOAD REDUCTION NATIONALITEES NTELLIGENCE SECTION We intend to reduce our current case load irom 4197 to 3739, 3 reduction of 458 activa cese8 and & reduction in the average cage load for the 13 Agents handling cage supervigion from 322 to 287 , This reductlon ig in part contingent uzon re-establishing the moratoriur on SI cage8 and would be effected as follows: Middle and South American Unit re-establighing the moratorium on(J cages, 30) pendlng cases would be closed. This Unit ha3 2 current cage Joar 0f 976 active cages and recuetion will result in 3 net cage load cf 946. Cainega Unlt ~ The recently approved gtregmlining_procerkixeg_gill regult in epproxlmately 30 dajs' (me in the closing 0r TeU caseg on Jegerting geamen This Drit has 1028 current Active cage8 and uith reductinn wl heve & 2et o2 238eetive-eacce Nationallty Unit 3 We iatend to restrict the Invegtigation ot tle Jewigh Defense League to tha Tigh-level national leaders which will regult In reduction 0(43 active cabeg . Unit haB current case load Of 9l7 active cageg and with reducticn reielred i0 above will have au active case Joad of 774. Cuban Unit Upon re-@stablishment of moratorium on SI cases the case Joad in this UnlE vould be reduced by223pending active investigationg. The current case load of 1278 wili be reduced to 1151. Inaddition;-re-estahliehment of the moratoriun will regiut in elimineting approximately 600 SL cages)which are presently carried in an inactive statug. The reduction In Chinese Unit will be accomplighed within & 30-day pertod. The reduction o[ 8l ca3es,upon re-e8teblighrent of the moratorium and the remaining reduction will be effected upon your concurrence. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 298 222 2 By tne ================================================== Page 299 ================================================== liay 5, 1971 CASE LOAD REDUCTIONS NATIONALITTES INTELLIGENCE SECTION Pursuant to your request for Obgervatliong concerning Our comments in attached 4-15-7l informal memoranduta, Iollowig 13 gubrltted: We concwr jn the re-establishmant 0l the moratorium on SL cage3 %ich will regult in some1150 pending active investigations being discontinued. We have previously noted tnat instructions have been outatanding Ior some tiroe which will result in streanlining procedureg in handling cases cn desexting Chinese_geamen. During April, such case0 have been closed, and f Je RnHoipeted during tne mcnth of about(123 more guch cases will bo disrontinued in tke normal courge of events. Tma step Thich we hava discussed M much detali #elates to citaigiug criteria fcr ocening casos onirdividuela ccanected with the Jewizh Eejense_Legme (JDL). The violent nature cr-mnany guch Individuals was the babls IOr Qur instructing geveral montng &g0 that each memher #ho ha8 actively partlcipated I6~ and supported the demonstrations, acts 0 violence, &c. of the group be made subject oz &n individual investigatlon. Thig amounted to about 8OJindiviciual cases 0n gore DOOO elleged members 0f the JDL at that time. The membership has jtcreaged tremeidously during tne interim and if we continue under this criteria; we estimate within the next year anywhere from 800 to 1080 additional cages would have to be opened, Despite the fact ve feel v7e will be taking & risk In not pinpointing someone who later turng out to be violence-prone ectivlst, Ige suggest that at this tirne we revart to opening case8-on (L) each JDL organization or subaidlary Organization; (2) individuals gerving in a leadership capacity of such Organizaticng; and (3) cther persons conneeted with the JDL Io by past actions have shcv propensity for violence gr connection witn activities Irvolving violence Or terrorizm . TThis will regult In cur droppirg from( 0-akases In the Immediate futare. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 299 324 eiay Page ================================================== Page 300 ================================================== August i971 CHINESE MATTERS On the security and ` intelligence scene Communist China has emerged as one of the most important 'countries handled in this Section This fact was dramatically emphasized by President Nixon S July 15, 1971, announcement that he will visit Red China before May 9 1972 . Available information including an announcement by Secretary of State Rogers indicates that Red` China 's entry into. the United Nations is imminent and will probably be an accomplished fact within the next 14 months For the pur- pose of securing more and better intelligence on Red China and Red Chinese sympathizers ; to develop more sources who can provide needed information; and to have a reservoir of sources we may utiiize in intelligence operations against the Chinese communisis (CnicOms) ii is_ feii ihe foiiow iuyesiigative' areas should be activated and/or . expanded: 'Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools Index The above Index consists of cards on more than 600 individuals who have been interviewed under our Chinese Alien Program and who have attended institutious 2f_higher_learning_in Red Chiza It is felt_ that these individuals because of tieir educational background_ would be the types we should approach in order to determine their potential for use in operations against the Chicoms This would require opening cases on each individual 9 reviewing Bureau file in each case and thereafter setting out leads ana instructions to the field in order to initiate the type of inquiry felt necessary in each case The objective of this effort would be to identify those individuals whose activities we can_ direct against either the_existing Chicom establishment in Canada or against Chicom establishments Which Gare expected to be opened in this country in the near future 2 Implementation of a program in which we would select four or more Special Agents for indoctrination and {training, looking toward their utilization in an undercover capacity against the existing Chicom official establishment in Canada or against any Chicom establishnent Whicn may be located in the United States in the' future_ 985 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 300 18 , i4g ================================================== Page 301 ================================================== 3 _ Implementation of an effort in selected offices whereby individuals present sources incluled, could be developed for the purpose of establishing a walk-in program directed against the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa Royal Canadian Mounted Police RCMP) representatives_ adviged during a July; 416 1971 conference woula" cooperate fully in an effort of this type Consideration should be given to renewing the Chiclet and Chiprop Programs both of which were discontinued in 1965 . These programs provided us with 2 secure means to obtain ni communications between_ the United_States__ and_Red China and Erom these comuni cations e_secured valuable intelli- 'gence and, background information on both ethnic Chinese and Caucasians of security interest to uS: 5 In connection with travel of U S . citizens to Red China , it should be noted that al1 prior restrictions on such travel imposed by the U. S, Government have been lifted. The result of this action is that J, S _ citizens who desire t?" travel to Red Chjna no Tonger need +0 accompTish such "travel clandestinely _ The door is now open and we may expect , in the near future a substantial increase in such travel by U_ S citizens It is felt we should fully identify each U . S & citizen traveling to Red China and in .selected cases should conduct appropriate interviews, since our experience in the security field historically indicates that U. S visitors to' communist countries are frequently approached by the 'intelligence services of those countries for recruitment . This problem may be further magnified if and when permanent resident aliens are authorized to travel from the US S to Red China Such a proposal is now under consideration by the Attorney General and the Department of State and favorable consideration could result in travel to" Red China .0f many thousands of ethnic Chinese who have permanent resident status in the U . S _ and who would desire to travel to Red China to visit families living there _ In these cases, 2 clear hostage situation exists and such situations are often exploited by hostile intelligence services_ Immigration laws relating to Chinese aliens entering the U: S _ have been broadened substantiaily and in early 1971, the Conditional Entry Program was begun This program permits entry into the U_ S _ of up to 250 Chinese aliens per month , who were heretofore ineligible under our immigration laws These aliens, in most cases ; have families NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 301 326 A2 they ================================================== Page 302 ================================================== residing on the China mainland, thereby creating a hostage situation which could pe used as a lever by the Chicoms to gain cooperation It is feIt desirable' at this time to revamp our instructions regarding reinterviews of Chinese aliens in 'cases where a hostage situation exists At the present time, our policy is to reinterview a Chinese alien two years after the initial interview_ It is felt that these' instructions should be modified to require that a second' interview of a Chinese alien having members of his immediate family in Red China should occur one year after the initial interview We should expand our present source development program at_the United_Nations, looking toward development of individuals connected with Ehe_United Nations who would be willing, under Bureau direction, to initiate contact with Chicom official representatives in Canada Based on informa- tion provided by RCMP contacts of this type S+ even if no recruitment by the Chicoms is obvious would serve to form a reservoir o1 indwViduals tie "CiiiCOms Iigici wei 1 dbfitact and/or T* CD operate upon their entry into the United Nationz 8 Our Chinese Scientists Program now involves five field offices each of whieh 1S "doing background inquiries on ten ethnic Chinese_scientists who have security clearances The . purpose of this program is to select appropriate individuals from the above group of 50 to target against_ the Chicoms We have a list of over 3500 ethnic Chinese who fit the criteria we, are now" using regarding the 50 individuals now under investi- gation. It is felt that continued development of good sources to direct against the Chicoms warrants expansion of this program looking toward possible contact with almost a11 of the 3500 scientists on the above lists The individuals on this list, being ethnic Chinese and being employed in the_scientific aid_technical fields would be most attractive to the Chicoms for .intelligence purposes 9 National_Security_Agency_representatives are of the'opinion that the ossibility ~t exists that Chinese Intelligence 'Service is beaming broadcasts to agents in the United States or in porder countries (canada or Mexico _ Our San "iego Office recently monitored broadcasts 72lr Ry National Security Agency to have come_from China and the clarity of the signal on our Ds717*L West Coast was excellent _ While this does not prove that an 3 287 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 302 ================================================== Page 303 ================================================== illegal Chicom operation exists on our West Coast, it is an 'indication that we should undertake action designed to uncover such a possibility_ In the absence of more specific data we should consider at this time checking warranty cards submitted by purchasers of certain radio equipment primarily radio receivers } which are capable of tuning in on broadcasts such as those mentioned above This would involve identifica- tion of the equipment , its manufacturer and subsequent instructions to appropriate field offices to check warranty cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining names of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards Subsequent inquiry should include developing background on the purchaser and in cases where Bureau interests may be served, perhaps conducting interviews NW88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 303 222 ================================================== Page 304 ================================================== I. 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Tbis %ulw {1} #lovisge Zke wrk 3o94 tlerv 470} {4) #ig #i0 000# lqww tirer &0 tbc Jividitm s @rerwi8cry 642r880 }Br 89%, 48 004 8i #1 #0 €0je % 80le thca r00s3l3 }is 948332i90 334 0o57les Z07 Ketiea %ha Zacts #BeR #Ars2E:, @ctovr $ #04 #igrifiezfo 010ced 0 00nt rccant 1g3t @35243i00 287 20 00 gwarr:dite 02tzer 10 tho Snpectiox Bivis_oz 03 @ 0 #elt xtq %eclccwre {bo:lel } 6 {Slezvaa 0 40 1 4 4, 434 8 Gwlnnea 4 08 0 Rur0en Nw-88608' Docld: 32989638 Page 304 284 M ================================================== Page 305 ================================================== Eazorarsta 0+7, Rrann *0 W4 €, Su.llvad 14: JIEZqWCT OT d#icob, DOXIIC IZZL,lFzI Divislor {3ID} 127 {20l %t6 f2068 9*0223{01 X3nunlz "3r& #xci &0 Ortsetsu 212 Atb0r 00332 2.26401. % 1031 $+ #muld %3 %211 1c2 % + #olt f0 Comltcz tbia reQtcat $m eo unction %120 #b0 #Aincrcr 8040522000k #0v0y &e 10 #0 {01.12t4 &d f @ill &9 gaid00 #Ccoreloily . 5 %70 [01040984 Goro 480 gridallrer for #oteralalgy Divtolon #antap '035 42360,002874 4Wu 2280 lomz. 1 tld8vs excs0 81l4 57o7ida & 05411 %or?cr Ncis %0r IG1} &0 Jswrw 4{0 %a0pobr 10 Noide %ost effoctivoly Ker0} Da #r484+} %R8tttz9 % 0 Zelt m39 42470 % E32 88024 03384lfn0x dunadxt0ly.40 & Reasara ior hic %e0y . Oce4%87# Vantc Ennoac 7& Ba Zelt coroltro fha som*03t 02 0at02 2 %m 0 {790rtass %ros @atxia ee Z30 10 %sat 0m26318 #4@ K1a #e328. addbbsnal" {uatr Ulenualls, ~Jzea snt Ucsno hu wlb~ Aa ,0,9 + 2 # 216 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 305 91 ================================================== Page 306 ================================================== 0 Er _ Sullivan m Hr . Hohr 1 Rr' Callahan ~= Mr _ Ponder Mx . C. D. Brennan 8/12/71 1 4 Kr: . Brennan Mz' _ Wennall w , R. Manna11 ir . Day FOREIGN LIAISON DESK (FLD) NATIONALITIES INTEILICENCE SECTION DOMEZTIC INTELLIGENCE DIV ISION (DID) REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FERSONNEL Fully nindful of the urgent Iatters requiring additiona! personnel in the "DID (Cest Coagt Corspiracy) *d particularly the Nationalities Intelligence Section (rlZebers and other leair cases) , 38 wust ask fox help in the 8upervision 0f our #creign ofrices . Mbile our Legat opetetions ar8 Tot in the public eye, they do constitute an importent 2r8# 0i Car work whicb must not pe overlooked in view 0i the evaluetian peing plecea upon iilew bY {16 Wbita fonee _ In Jaruarz > 1971, during tne.inspecticn of this Division, ve pointed out that tha cxponsion of our forslen liaison orfices frOr 11 to 17 had com8 2: & tima when tna two FLD Supervisors had been barely able to kaep up with the flow 0f paper Jet alone ectually examine and analy%e it 1n order to efford constructive supervision t0 the foreign offic88. 3e noted tba heavy demends nad on the tine of tbese twvo Supervisors in walconing and superviaing the visit3 to tbe Bureau Of tha many foreign dignitaries who er8 valuable 83d cooperative ccntacts o# our Legats exd the 62% incredse 0zer the past ten years in tbe Woreign Policc Cooporation Ceseb being handled , #e pointed out that tha Bupervisors ghould 00 pre- paring memoran1da to keep the Drector fully apprised 92 tu2 work being dono our Agents abroad but Jus%; di4 not have tire to do this_ 48 8 result of tbe inspection, memorandur 2/1/71 frcm %r _ Felt to Mr _ Tolsor secured ~pprovel for eddition 02 0ne man for nssigmnent zo tha Zip He reported 2/23/71. Conten~ poranaous Ly , it becane necessary to as3in ore Agent Supervigor On} 2 rotating basis to the New Left &ectior: On} 2 temporary basis to es8i3t 1n the East Coast Couspiracy 8#s0 An Agent Eron tke FID web selected for this temporary es3igwOnt, effective 4/25/71, which essigument waS nede pexanort wben 411 tecporary ass1gnmenta vere converted to permaner t #8signkents , effective 5/21/71. In effect, tberetore, tke additionsl m2a.n wrs awailable O1} 'he FLD during the two mon ths Zron 2/22 *0 4/26/71. ENidgg_ () CONT; NUED ~ CFER NW 88608 Docld:32989638. Page 306 34 ( by only ================================================== Page 307 ================================================== Rekor7,s?5} TD E + &0 3 . {rarnztr Bz: #GEEI1C7 LIAfSOZ D5SZ (ZV} XANIC BLITITB IXTZLUjCrCr S0C7104 DAlzar%C ZimtiLGzicc JITISICN {DID} REQuS2 ICz ADNITICL YESOne I &ha %820238 , betwzon Decesbas , 158, #bea tke @ar Zorciga cl2iC08 woro Opemnd and Julq, 1871, tk9 1ct038 "Lontk Zer whirb 1l0r08 38 #5agleble, there kas %802 a 0c8;17 603 43cr8230 Im &ho aRovnt 02 Doper b3i23 prciuead by &ir' foralga 0fzi0i #nd zcluiri2z rqviow cr Th0 Mid, Ua #r0 %03t scluctust t0 Eak {0r holp &+ & *180 @am t3 Dureet'& rcrou2420 8r0 gtretned 832 80 #eb} Ironts bt #0 #onlo @0 @or0 4t ir Owr *uk8 42 5X did Bor point Owt #aa% te Sfutiv@ waick &0 Ipopectorv 10 Jacu?y felt Ju8zi?ied ndg4tippal #545t2100 &og Blece #e0omg #7er 8orzm - #le : %@ 0ae}y 8544 43 # 52,# #2tk & ickzrcwed 02 0270180420 Abrodud Dla # 1o4gu me 0billt; %mo @Gaid t 4010 %0 taro 40l0 1s3ed13*el9 #itrcut Oxtrsive trainiig. 4s 04 Or3eple , 92 cn %h4n% 02 Specioi Agont Jom Mozie Jo# fr %ke 002stfc 218l0, anc 005 Soreod %0 @D% &0 02 Z0rirm t0 040 J+ 8, @13 S0 01e 0420*4 #BEiiticm golicuiag %m #esto 02 t002r {419+-h052 c2674, Iare 400 Wamonbzegly 0kk0z8 02 5u6} @ep2*12t7 #5. Doteutlal, @ny Roreisp ofzioial0 #he 5igls Rcabiestoa #0 83+ 0p04 @eriish 03 ere @ot #lemt %2 #* - Ys Rc8 Ipeve # Spparv1803 fJ00 An Apamisn %m4 &00 additi0x 02 & rrerck Gr Cerrag eBpaletlit1 #o0ld 9rorly %2d000 0u3" #cp* Jpr Iatardretors Ir04 tr2 Hasmlmytom Picld Ozfiga #Bd cle0rbere 1n *8 2r3ee4, T30 Mdv1g01 pragott *% %a3 680 Suporvieor Wikx #rarek @90 Ztn0 %180 Ger020. Tbore 9%0 0t0r* 5408 snab 1385wa223 2# #parigh; 0ar3mcge, Cainsen, Polisb, 330 tk3 21r0. J2 M0 C50 witm @zp0rie7ce 40 f0301g0 14sisem Caz b #bd3 Resilabl0, 91o #1 #kane 123g05? tAl#e Sn 0c434 &8 #een 9rcvidem @ Ioplleebgar %zam cut3ida the @vlclom %s Turilmhcd, Tbnre %0 %P 1Y %0 #lcl help cez be 05002604 ~ithig +Ro %iv}aloe #itbowz n Zoplacemout, Re b4v 24f3[04660 @4+ 3%0#5limed pcsrer #04 98 2re @nw 3@8f50415 Swrartigors 0* @ rctaticr bewts; tQ 3039+ & tha Ioak 00202, 1o27img' *#222 92z33rba% aaeltaecta @C3arina& Zor Freko #t & %re. DEEOreNrICa: "Isnt @8 91841840302 Bupezvescr be a@proged {Or 035 ize Zent to &b ZiD9 #0 #928 Ertxw cutsida tko 0ivf3ioz, 180*2384 2 tha Wivisic0 4g83t €orple33z;; by c03 + 7 2 # 242 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 307 ================================================== Page 308 ================================================== Mr _ Retyped page" bf memo W . R= Wanna 11 C. D. Brennan dated 8/12/T1 re : same subject Licmorauan ta &r, C, D, Brona3 {aE: FORMZG? LIAISCN DcEX (XLD) MATIONANITIES IRTELLIGIXC% SECTYO# DOEESTIC IXBLLIGSZ% DIYIZION RRQUEST FoR ADDITIOSAL PXRZONNEL ADOSNDUM : BY *. %, WCORE Dreb s/1/*1 Ruzrsuaat to 7our reques? , this 48 t0 0duic8 th2t *nere 8T6 tro superticcrs in tro Dosostic Intelligenco Dlvisiou %itb legal Attache exporionce, _foert_AaEgrlaregdt %ko 12 3o% ess1gn30 t0 txe FLD, 3%4 J3ssie 2e Juazwa$ ags1gncd #5 thi6 deck ut 10 nc? @9gign8d t0 th8 274378zg_ ~pociala Both 22.u.nghan #t4 NAgY #peak Spauisk. 'Iero a0 2} Other supervieors 4a %00 divlsion #168 Janguoge abilit7. Norc epcak 0e1720 ald QEly 08, _obi# Suellette, Epcaks Frcnca . Tha 2arjuag? ability 02 Zke cthor; Rrs 42 3u8s184,. Jazarese, Iteliau) Komanian, Polisi, Bulgarisz, Axbanien, Fortugusc, Kungris*, Tiddiab a0d Cbinese. 3 243 NWV 88608 Docld:32989638 308 Day Rae Page ================================================== Page 309 ================================================== ADDENDUM NSPECTOR E _ S . MLLER: During the course of instant inspection an in-depth (ES M:wmj 9/3/71) survey was made relative to the adequacy of personnel, both Agent and clerical, Within the DID The primary purpose of this survey was to determine the best posSible allocation of manpower bearing in mind the desirability to reallocate manpower to priority assignments_ ADEQUACY OF AGENT PERSONNEL Set forth below is & chart -graphically illustrating where it is felt reductions can be made in Agent complement: Interm] Security and Research Branch Internal Security Section Subversive Individuals Unit ~ 1 Security Informant Unit ~ 2 Klan and White Hate Groups Unit 4 2 Research Section 7 1 New Left Section Subversive Individuals Unit ~ 1 Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch Extremist Intelligence Section 4 2 Nationalities Intelligence Section Middle and South American Unit 1 Nationality Unit 1 TOTAL I B t t 11 Comments and observations justifying the above ~mentioned reductions in force can be found below under the individu Section and Unit captions. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 309 top 394 ================================================== Page 310 ================================================== INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION Subversive Individuals Unit This Unit has an Agent complement of 5. At the time of the last inspection it was a 3~man Unit; however one was assigned on a special in another Unit, leaving actually two Agents to handle approximately 1300 cases 3 or 650 per man. Since the last inspection the case load has increased to appoximately 2600_ Consequently, it would appear that 4 men averaging 650 cases per man could handle the work of this Unit, This position is further strengthened as it can be anticipated that the case load will decrease Since the deadline of lifting the moratorium expired 6/30/71 and the bulk of investigations have been brought up to date or Will be brought up to date in the near future_ memorandum dated 8/26/71 it was recommended that SA_Jobn_N__Quellette be returned to the Internal Security Section due to the slackening of activity in the EASTCON case_ Quellette was formerly assigned to this Unit and the reduction could be accomplished by reassignment of him (or another Agent) to more pressing duties elsewhere _ Security Informant Unit This Unit presently has 4 supervisors asSigned; however , one has been on temporary assignment outside the Unit Since June 1971. The case load a8 of 8/71 for this Unit was 889 and would result in about 217 cases per Agent in a 4-man Unit, and 290 cases per Agent in a 3-man Unit. Further , you have indicated one of the factors affecting the productivity of the Unit is the necessity of obtaining authority by memorandum for the utilization of students and/or teachers aS security informants _ It was determined that 122 memos have been prepared Since the last inspection requesting Such approval This is approximate] 1 memo per workday, which does not appear to be an excessive work load. Since this Unit was formed it has functioned with 3 Special Agent Supervisors _ This does not appear to have effected the efficiency of the operation and in view of the work and case load it is felt that the Unit could function quite satisfactorily with 2 Special Agent Supervisors. Klan and White Hate_Grous Unit Under the reorganization of DD proposed by Assistant Director Brennan in hi 8 memorandum of 8/3/71 it was indicated this Unit's cases could bd absorbed by the Extre mist Intelligence Section_ This would free two Special Agents for other assignment. It is felt this could be accomplished even if the proposed reorganization doeg not b ecome an actuality. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 310 By Page ================================================== Page 311 ================================================== RESEARCH SECTION It is noted under the proposed reorganization of 8/3[71 a supervisor from this Section would be reallocated to another_ It is felt this could be accomplished regardless of the reorganization: It is noted in this regard that this Section is presently oerating efficiently with an Agent supervisor assigned to the_Ellsberg case _ Addressing ourselves to the lack of a Section Chief, it is felt your recommendations regarding filling Mr. Cotter's vacated poSition should be handled by separate memorandum. The replacement request fa SA Merion S Ramey's transferral to another Division is being handled separately. NEW LEFT SECTION Subversive Individuals Unit This Unit has an authorized complement of 6 Agents but is presently adequately handling the work with 5 , one being asSigned full time to a special: Even though the case load is high , approximately 2500 , leaving 500 cases per man, many of the matters are quite routine and can be handled with bare minimum of suervision. Because of this 3 Agents assigned to this Unit are able to handle & large number of cases and it is felt that the Agent presently assigned to the special should not be returned: ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL BRANCH Extremist Intelligence_Section During the last inspection you requested two more supervisors due to the fact that your case load had increased to a total of 6642 breaking down to 349 cases per supervisor. Your request was authorized. During May, 1971, one supervisor was permanently transferred from your Section leaving you 2 complement of 20 supervisors Section Chief and Number One Man (total 22) . No replacement has been requested for this Supervisor_ Since 7/19/71 you have had one man on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on & rotating basis and aS of 8/9/71 a second man on loan. There has been a definite decrease in your case load Since the last inspection. However a Slight increase would be anticipated due to the absorbing of the Klan and White Hate Groups matters For the last 6 weeks you have been without the services of 1 supervisor on a rotating basis and for the last 3 weeks & second one. However 2 the Unit has still operated efficiently: As there is an imbalance as to cases and the number f men asSigned it is felt that 2 supervisors could be transferred out of the Section leaving 20 (including Section Chief and Number One Man) to handle the necessary assignments (including Klan and White Hate). NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 311 246 plus ================================================== Page 312 ================================================== Nationalities Intelligence Section Middle and South American Unit As of the close of business 8/20/71 the 3-man Cuban Unit had a case load of 776 and the Middle and South American Unit, also consisting of 3 men, had 598 cases _ These two Units ) the work of which is closely related and frequently overlaps_ had a total case load of 1374 for 6 men for an average case load of 229_ If the total case load of these two Units were handled by 5 men the average load Would be 275, which appears more equitable in view of the overall commitments and work load of the Division. In view of the above, it is felt that the personnel of the Middle and South American Unit could be cut by one man. With 5 incumbents and with the inter -relation and natural overlapping of these two Units future fluctuation in the work load could be equitably handled between the two Units _ Nationality Unit Under normal conditions it is believed that this 4-man Unit could be operated by 3 Supervisors. At present, there are 3 supervisors assigned this Unit's cases (exclusive of special) and the case load as of 8/20/71 was 632 cases which represents 158 cases per Agent for a 4-man Unit, or 211 per Agent for a 3-man Unit. Consequently it is felt that 3 supervisors could adequately handle the work of this Unit. As can be seen, a pool of 1l men has been created, Treating those assigned on special to the Ellsberg case (9) a8 a separate entity, 2 men are available for general assignment. One man could be assigned to the Chinese Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section and the one suervisor from the Foreign Influence and Pro-CHICOM Unit of the Internal Security Section along with his cases (492) . (Note this Agent is not included in the lL. ) What is left of the Foreign Influence Unit could be consolidated with that Of the CPUSA Unit. The other supervisor from the of 1 could be assigned to the Special Coordination Unit of the Natioalities Intelligence Section. This realignment Would result in a considerable decline in personnel within the Internal Security Section. However a balancing of work load could be accomplished through reassignment of the three -man Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit from the New Left Section to the Internal Security Section where it was in the recent past. Further aS you are aware_ a proposal is presently being considered to reassign Antiriot Laws plus Explosives and Incendiary Devices cases from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 312 277 pool ================================================== Page 313 ================================================== Division. While it is realized that logically these should be placed in the New Left or Extremist Intelligence Section, to balance work load they could be considered for assignment to the Internal Security Section if proposal is approved. The Research and New Left Sections would each be decreased by one Special Agent Supe rvisor the Extremist Intelligence Section by two_ The Nationalities Intelligence Section, excluding the Front Office, would be increased by one Special Agent Supervisor. QBSERVATIONS: Considerable time has been devoted to this phase of the inspection to assess as accurately as possible manpower requirements of the various Units and Sections. In addition to ticklers and file reviews your outgoing mail was reviewed for one work week. During the course of this mail survey covering a five work period_ 2 715 pieces of mail or 143 pieces 1 were generated and reviewed: Of this number 268 pieces or 37% were directed to the Front Office review and 497 pieces or 63% went directly to the field or other agencies without Front Office review. This indicdes an average of 6 pieces of outgoing mail per Agent are being prepared per work week; 55. 6% of the total pieces of mail were of a routine nature. > setting forth & minimum degree of supervision and direction. 36. 1% contained & moderate degree of supervision and 8. 3% contained a considerable degree d supervisory instruction or direction. Of the average of Six pieces of mail per Agent 3. 3 pieces were of a routine nature requiring minimal supervision ; 2.2 pieces moderate suervision and 5 pieces (1/2 letter 2 etc. ) considerable supervisory instruction or direction per week: Examples of minimum supervisory content would be communications permitting routine interview or informant payment (stamp)_ An example Of moderate supervisory content would be a letter to the Attorney General with cover memo bringing AG up to date in a particular case_ As example of supervisory content of considerable degree would be instructions to interview key witnesses on priority cases setting out pertinent points to cover in the interview or would furnish supervisory direction of & substantive investgation. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 313 24Y ~day day for top ================================================== Page 314 ================================================== It is realized the above survey reveals only a Small part of the Division'8 production; however, it gives some insight into the amount of actual supervision and direction being afforded the field as an overall consideration. It is not felt or implied that a "'letter writing" program for the sake of writing letters be instituted a8 obviously this does not relate to supervision. It may indicate however among other things_ 3 the amount of intensity of positive supervision being afforded, as an over view and is being furnished for wur information aS well aS for mine_ The above analysis (manpower) reveals in your Division & need for 9 men on the McLek case 9 2 for Chinese matters and one for Special Coordination Unit. On & priority basis inspection surveys reveal the manpower is wailable aS indicated. It is felt your Chinese program must "get going now" in view of impending developments _ In addition 9 our proposals will allow you to assign men permanently to McLek and make other necessary Shifts in manpower to away from the temporary assignment basis you now have ana which is disruptive io ail Sections involved. It is also acknowledged some of the realignment indicated has been proposed by your Division in studies made by you prior to this inspection. 294 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 314 get Page ================================================== Page 315 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL CLERICAL An analysis was also made f adequacy of clerical personnel within your Division and after careful study it was determined that & reduction of Il clerical personnel is possible. This reduction could be made through attrition_ Tbe reductions possible are graphically set forth in the chart below: Internal Security and Research Branch Internal Security Section Klan and White Hate Groups 3 New Left Section Special Investigations East - 1 Special Investigations ~ West - 1 Subversive Individuals E New Left - 1 Espionage_and Racial Intelligence Branch Espionage Section Special Cases ~ 1 Officials New York - 1 Officials WFO - 1 Satellite 7 1 Nationalities Intelligence Section Middle and South American G L Our findings in most instances are based on a thorough review of the Work of the individual units plus case load allocations_ The justification for the above mentioned reductions is set forth below under the individual Unit and Sectia designation: NTERNAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH BRANCH Internal Security Section Klan and White Hate Grous Pursuant to the above proposal that this Unit be absorbed by the Extremist Intelligence Section the two clerks and one secretary can be considered excess inasmuch a8 the work presently being performed by these persons can adequately be performed by the clerical personnel in the new Section_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 315 3o0 Page ================================================== Page 316 ================================================== New Left Section Special Investigations_Unit_ East The surplus clerk presently Work in g in this Unit is not needed inasmuch as the four clerks permanently assigned to this Unit were adequately handling the work before he reported. Special Investigations_Unit West It is felt three clerks could handle the Work in this Unit inasmuch a8 three clerks in Special Investigations Unit East handle a comparative work load. The East Unit has four clerks; however _ one clerk handles Sabotage cases and the West Unit does not handle these matters. Subversive Individuals New Left Unit Aitough tile case iuad iu titis Unit iS higti the work is routine and can be handled quickly. The Special Clerk (GS-6 Reviewer) handles much of the reviewing Of communications thus saving clerical time. This Unit is operating with one less Agent who is on loan to the McLek case_ Due to & comparison of the clerical work load of the Subversive Individuals Unit in the Internal Security Section it is felt this Unit could operate with one less clerk: ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL NTELLIGENCE BRANCH Espionage Section Special Cases Unit It is felt based upon the case load of this Unit being handled by clerks > that with the assistance of, the stenographer , this Unit could adequately operate and function with one less clerical employee_ Officials New York Unit It is felt the clerk-stenographer asSigned to this Unit could handle the IRONCLAD indices in addition to taking dictation from supervisors. This Teave the Unit with 2 stenographers for 3 supervisors and thereby release the clerk who is presently handling the IRONCLAD indices . Officials WFO Unit Based on the case load of this Unit; it is felt the clerk-steno - grapher presently asSigned could assist in clerical work, thereby releasing oe NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 316 30 would ================================================== Page 317 ================================================== of the clerks presently assigned to this Unit. Satellite Unit This Unit presently has three regular clerks and two Special Clerks It is felt that one of the Special Clerks could assist in the regular clerical duties 2 thereby releasing one clerk from this Unit. Nationalities Intelligence_ Section Middle and South American Unit Based on the case load of this Unit it is recommended that one clerk be released inasmuch as there does not appear to be sufficient work for three clerks _ Comments of Assistant Director regarding Agent and clerical adequacy requested, 30 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 317 ================================================== Page 318 ================================================== ADDENDUM ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D, BRENNAN I have thoroughly studied (CDB: djr 9/8/71) the Inspector S comments regarding adequacy 0f personnel_ both Agent and clerical, and have the following observations to make: I certainly recognize full well the need for reorganizing and reallocating personnel to provide manpower assistance to the Nationalities Intelligence Section which is handling the McLek case_ In fact, the proposed reorganization of the Division as set forth in my memorandum of August 1971, was based on the priority needs which arose from the McLek case and which continue to be critical As set forth in that memorandum, manpower was to permanently be assigned to the Nationalities Intelligence: Section in order to avoid disruption caused by handling this important case with temporary assignments. In meeting the priority responsibilities in the McLek case as well as in other citical areas, I am aIso mindful that we do not have a surplus of manpower but are undoubtedly faced witk tbc supervisicr cf mcre ccmplex c2ses in the security field with fewer Agents than at any other time in the Bureau S history_ Crises brought about by terroristic acts of black extremists, Weathermen, antiwar activists, and other extremists are increasing in intensity and from a11 indications will continue to place heavy demands upon the Bureau_ Likewise, the potential of Chinese Communist espionage activity in this country is readily apparent and the increased activity of 'Soviet Agents is a fact- These facts, coupled with special case commi tments, have stretched available manpower to the limit of elasticity. In making such manpower shifts, we must recognize that there will be a weakening of the supervision of the area from which the personnel are transferred and we must be prepared to accept this,_ at least on 2 temporary basis, because in the long run such weakening could be most harmful a5 well as embarrassing. For example, the Inspector has indicated that two supervisors could be transferred out of the Extremist Intelligence Section in addition, that Section should absorb all Klan and white hate cases (now being handled by two men in another Section) Actually, this means absorption of the work of four men by the remaining men in the Section (18) Put another way , the work load has been increased by almost 25 per cent. 30 3 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 318 3 , and, ================================================== Page 319 ================================================== As will be noted in the table set out hereinafter case loads are excessive in very sensitive areas of the Bureau responsibilities, e.g., Soviet espionage and black and New Left extremists who are daily escalating their revolutionary activity in our streets. The utilization of manpower on specials, such as the current nine men on McLek, will receive extremely close scrutiny and will be reallocated to these other pressing work areas as soon as possible as I do not believe the current case loads allow adequate supervision for any extended period of time. No one realizes the potential threat which the Red Chinese pose to the security of this country better than I, We must recognize, however that there has been considerable planning on the Bureau's part dating back to the 1950s when we had first indications that the United States might recognize Red China _ But the fact is that we have more important priorities at this particular time evidenced by bombings, assassinations, arsons and other terroristic acts daily occurring by exiremist eiements within oiir investigative responsibilities. We are faced right now with a very serious internal security threat which demands immediate attention. This does not minimize the Red Chinese threat at all' but we must recognize it is still a "potential" and until diplomatic channels are opened and active espionage activity begins again we must put "first things first Ti I believe affording one man to that work area is the limit of our available resources at this time_ With respect to the clerical reduction of 11 clerks, which is to occur by attrition, I feel that a reduction of this magnitude Will definitely result in 2 hardship on the work of the Division_ I have repeatedly stressed that wherever possible Agents should be relieved of as many duties as possible by competent clerical personnel, thus resulting in considerable Savings of Agent manpower throughout the Division _ A reduction of the number 0f clerks, as recommended by the Inspector, certainly will hamper our past streamlining efforts. 304 NWV 88608 Docld:32989638 319 's Page ================================================== Page 320 ================================================== Set forth below , by Branch, are more specific observations with respect to the Inspector S comments and recommendations; however in summary I desire to point out that we cannot reassign manpower of the quantity involved for an extended period of time and eliminate entirely by attrition 11 clerks without such action having a deleterious effect in certain areas of our operations_ I am strongly opposed to such lessening of our coverage in these areas but if such recommendations are approved and ordered, I will do my best to see that our responsibilities are fulfilled to the maximum degree possible under the circumstances The following comments are made concerning reallocation of Agent personnel to priorities regarding the Internal Security and Research Branch_ The Inspector recommends seven supervisors be reallocated from this Branch to other work areas Based on day-to-day experience in these Work areas and having available end of August case count figures, the following alternatives are recommended to make seven supervisors available. Research Section; The present supervisur as3igned to the ELlsberg case is a talented writer experienced in complicated research projects and preparation of research papers _ He is utilized full time on the Ellsberg case in this capacity and on his own time continues to handle some speeches and research matters_ Research Section will make a second supervisor available for the Ellsberg case and the original supervisor will return to Research Section 2s soon as his project is completed on ELlsberg . This is predicated on the assumption a replacement Will be provided this Section for SA_Reney who was transferred to another Division _ Internal Security Section: Wi11 make four supervisors available instead 66 five a5 recommended by the Inspector This is predicated on experience and present case load regarding the Subversive Individuals Unit primarily and also the Security Informant Unit August 31, 1971, 'case count for the Subversive Individuals Unit is 2,663 cases, in addition, 523 cases were opened and 496 cases were closed during August in this Unit_ This would be an average case load of 666 cases per Agent, not including the opening and closing mail flow. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 320 top 325 ================================================== Page 321 ================================================== The Security Informant Unit would be handling 904 cases, averaging 452 cases when reduced to tvo supervisors _ Under the new case count system these informant cases are largely cases with mail in hand requiring attention and close supervision because of funds being involved 25 well as the general sensitivity of these cases In the event of sick or annual leave, one man could not possibly keep mail current and work loads in other units would as a practical matter preclude use of other personnel to carry out the work _ The supervisor retained would reduce the case load in the Subversive Individuals Unit to a more reasonable and practical 533 case load average and also allow for a limited degree of flexibility in the infornant matters from time to time as necessary _ This provides the seven men from this Branch (This includes one man from the New Left Section, as indicated.) New Left Section: Will make One man available as recommended Regarding reallocation of Agent personnel to top priorities regarding the Espionage Branch, the following comments are made : Extremist Intelligence Section will make two supervisors available and absorb the 559 Klan and White Hate cases with no Agent personnel It must be borne in mind this_ in effect, constitutes 2 net reduction of four supervisors to black extremist matters at a time when these activities are on a definite upswing This can be lived with on a short term emergency basis and as manpower becomes available from the inevitable winddown of McLek appropriate recommendations will be considered within the Division as to reallocation of that manpower with this in mind consistent with overall Division needs at that time _ Nationalities Intelligence Section will make two men available as recommended With regard to the two Units being reduced it is pointed out that the Middle and South American Unit is responsible for matters NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 321 203 ================================================== Page 322 ================================================== relating to 32 countries There are five Legal Attache (Legat) Offices located in countries hand led by the Unit and each of these offices except Mexico covers more than one country The Nationality Unit is responsible for matters relating to 101 countries_ Eleven Legat Offices are locatedin the area of responsibility of this Unit and most of these Legat Offices cover more than one country. There is 2 high volume of material which is received daily in these Units consisting of intelligence information from other agencies and news media material 411 of this material must be reviewed in order that the supervisors will be in position not only to handle inquiries from any source relating to matters of Bureau responsibility in the nationalities intelligence field but also to process the high level intelligence (HILEV) items which are received from Legats The latter is a very heavy responsibility since we recognize that if one high-level item goes to the President and he acts on it and it proves to be incorrect not only the Bureau but the @hite House itself mignt encounier serioiis probleis_ During month of August Of 106 HILEV items received from Legats, 51 were processed by the Nationality Unit and 34 by the Middle and South American Unit Each of the two units disseminated 30 HILEV items Dissemination of each HILEV item consumes approximately one hour of a supervisor S time With regard to the Nationality Unit, which bas the lowest avera ge case load per supervisor other ma tters handled in the Unit not reffected by caseload are: providing for installation and maintenance of continued coverage in sensitive areas essential to the 2 fulfillment of requests of_tbeNational Security Agency_(Telex Coveragex- 64 at present); establishing and maintaining nighly sensitive coverage also for National Security_Agency relating to electronic_penetration of communications equipment; Supervising and coordinating on a recurring basis coverage relating to the various United Nations General Assembly sessions (which includes close working relationship with Secret Service) ; maintenance of all Bureau liaison with National Security. Agency It must be borne in mind the reduction of four case supervisors fron the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence Branch and seven case supervisors from the Internal Security and 30} NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 322 ================================================== Page 323 ================================================== Research Branch are accepted to meet an emergency situation (McLek case) but these reductions are not considered consistent with adequate supervision nor offer necessary flexibility Within Sections to meet emergencies and specials as they arise when viewed in terms of an extended period of time_ It is expected the Mcbek case, as with all specials, will ultimately wind down _ At that time and as personnel are available for reallocation, appropriate recommendations will be made and considered within the Division as to their commitment based on work loads at the time consistent with the overall needs of the Division. Supervisory Case Load Averages The following chart graphically displays case loads per Section (excluding men on Special or non-case assignment) as of August 31, 1971, and with the proposed shift of manpower contained herein which closely adheres to the Inspector 1 S recommendations_ Add or Velete Present Proposed SAs Cases Nationalities Intelligence 286 315 Extremist Intelligence 298 331 +559 Espionage 334 312 0 Internal Security 444 477 ] 4 559 New Left 333 333 0 Research 0 Division 335 341 It must be borne in mind the "Add or Delete" column pertains only to supervisors now included in case count computations as being assigned to regular case load duties and does not prtray total movement as recommended . Some of those included in the recommendations are already on special assignment (McLek , etc.) For example, Extremist Intelligence and New Left Sections will merely make permanent the personnel on loan to McLek and, therefore, are listed as zero. Espionage will get a man back and is listed as +1. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 323 328 ================================================== Page 324 ================================================== Nationalities Intelligence Section is giving up two men from present assignment one to the Chinese Unit and one to Special Coordination Unit_ The latter is a non-case assignment and deletes one man from computation of average case load in the Section which brings that Section more in line with the present Division average of 335 cases per case supervisor under the new rules for case count This also results in one less supervisor committed to case supervision and alters the Division average per case supervisbr to 341 cases_ It i8 recognized the Internal Security Section has 3 high average case load per Agent, however that Section has less organization cases and proportionateiy mnore individual matters requiring less supervisory attention than other Sections, Thisswi ll be followed closely an.: depending on approval of transferring EID and ARL cases to this Division and/or resolution of Eastcon and appropriate recommendation Will pe made to adjust 2 block of work internally within the Division to create a better balance there. 300 NWV 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 324 ================================================== Page 325 ================================================== As to the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence Branch clerical reduction recommendations, the following comments are made_ Nationalities Intelligence 'will reduce one clerk as recommended_ In the Espionage Section there are 16 substantive desk supervisors with 13 clerks actually performing the work for these supervisors, a ratio of .81 per supervisor To reduce this number by four would result in the ratio 56 or roughly 1/2 clerk per supervisor The Clerk-Stenographer position provides the incumbent to perform clerical work only 20 per cent of her time_ The use of a Clerk-Stenographer in the Special Cases, Officials L New York and Officials B Washington Field Units thus would not absorb the extra work placed on the remaining clerks in these Units and such is not considered feasible The use of a Special Clerk now handling cases in lieu of a Special Agent supervisor in the Satellite Unit to handle clerical functions for a Supe rvisor wouia aeieat tne purpose 0f establishing this position and would place an unfair burden of responsibility on that Special Clerk who should be free to concentrate on the supervision of her own cases, In summary, it is felt that the present clerical assignment is the minimum number necessary to handle the voluminous work associated with 5, 575 cases currently assigned to this Section The Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the case load of 559 cases but will need a minimum of one clerk to accompany these cases This Section was not recommended by the Inspector to reduce clerical complement and it is not felt practical to absorb 559 cases and no clerical personnel_ This is particularly true when it is considered no Agent personnel are being received with these cases I believe the above reductions, totalling three, are in good faith with the Inspection Staff's and my own desire to obtain maximum utilization of personnel and continue an efficient and practical operation_ Further reduction would merely result in Agents performing clerical functions, and with the continued escalation in case loads and current special cases being handled, I do not believe further reductions can be made within the bounds of good personnel management ard best utilization of clerical VS Agent manpower 3/0 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 325 ================================================== Page 326 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL CLERICAL The following comments are made concerning reduction of clerical personnel in the Internal Security.and Research Branch _ Internal Security Section: In the past it has been necessary on a frequent basis to afford consi- derable clerical assistance from the Klan and White Hate Groups Unit to the Subversive Individuals Unit because of the extremely heavy clerical duties involved in the escalating case loads carried in this Unit, coupled with 523 cases opened and 496 cases closed during the past month, for example _ It is necessary and warranted to retain two of the three clerical personnel in the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization in the Subversive Individuals Unit If this is not done, it will result in an impractical clerical work load, with nowhere to draw upon clerical help and result in supervisors being additionally burdened with clerical functions, which they can i11 afford to handle_ This would a1SO pe consistent ana in iine with the assignment of Agent personnel in this Unit detailed previously and allow one clerk per Agent , which is adequate but not excessive for the type of work involved_ New Left Section: It is believed the Special Investigations Ra East and Special Investigations West Units can function with one less clerk each as recommended by the Inspector It is not believed good management , however , to reduce 2 clerk in the Subversive Individuals New" Left Unit. With one supervisor reduced, the clerical work remains the same and retention of the clerk would allow one clerk per Agent , which is adequate but not excessive for the type of work involved. With the very heavy case loads in this Unit, coupled with 768 cases opened and 776 cases closed within the past month, for example, clerks are extremely busy _ Reduction in clerical staff merely means Agents will have to perform clerical functions which is uneconomical and hardly practical with the work loads involved. Bearing in mind Agent manpower reductions in the Internal Security and Research Branch, it is believed the Branch can operate with efficiency and in good faith with the Inspection Staff and Divisions desire to use manpower to its fullest and make the above three clerical reductions. 3 /d NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 326 ================================================== Page 327 ================================================== ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E S. MILLER: Your comments 'and proposals with (ESM:bhg, 9/9/118 respect to the reallocation of Agent personnel within the Division appear logical and are acceptable. However, exception must be made with respect to clerical employees. You state it is necessary and warranted to retain 2 of the 3 clerical personnel in the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization in the Subversive Individuals Unit 0f the Internal Security Section_ Based upon figures available the case load within the Subversive Individuals Unit approximates 2700 cases handled at present by three clerical employees giving an average case load per clerk of approximately 900 cases _ Retaining one of the Klan clerks would result in an average case load per clerk of 675 cases which is not felt unreasonable or intolerable a burden_ Further it iS not felt that less than 1 clerk per Agent is too great a load for the Unit_ Turning now to the Espionage Section based on our survey it was felt tiat 4 clerical positions couid be vuided ihrvugh aiiritiu,l, Vased primariiy on greater utilization of clerk-stenographers on clerical duties . You state that,the clerk-stenographer poSition provides the incumbent to perform clerical work only 20% of her time_ At present there are 10 secretaries and clerk-stenographers available for transcription of communications _ A Survey of communications conducted during this inspection revealed that the Espionage Section dispatched 121 pieces of correspondence during a 5-day period; `which results in approximately 12 communications per secretary or slightly over 2 communications per per employee _ This does not indicate a great work load on the secretarial force and consequently it is felt that clerk-stenographers could be freed for clerical functions where necessary_ In view of this it is felt that at least two clerical positions could be dissolved through attrition within this section_ With respect to the Extremist Intelligence Section, you indicate that the case load of 559 cases .can be absorbed but a minimum of one clerk will be needed to handle these cases _ Based upon case load figures available Should this clerk not be made available the average case load per clerk within the Black Nationalist East Unit would increase from approximately 470 to 660 cases _ Black Nationalist Central from approximaely 715 to 940 . Black Nationalist South from approximately 780 to 1000, and the Black Nationalist West from approximately 210 to 350 cases per clerk Particular note Should be made of the average case load per clerk increase NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 327 3/2 day ================================================== Page 328 ================================================== within the Black Nationalist West Unit should the cases be absorbed there with no added clerical employees . In view of the above it is felt that the Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the additional cases 'without an added clerk_ Based On the above it can be seen that at least 7 clerical positions could be dissolved without an unreasonable burden being placed on the remaining. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 328 31 Page ================================================== Page 329 ================================================== SUGGESTION MAEMORANDA NW 88608_'Docld:32989638_Page 329 SVCGESTION_ ================================================== Page 330 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM RE: PAYMENTS TO SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES INSF OR E. S. MILLER: Present regulations allow for payments up to $400 with SAC authority on a COD basis to individuals being developed a8 informants on security matters. (Manual of Instructions, Section 107 page 14.) Once the individual is 8400 and it appears he will furnish information on & regular basis recommendation ~ could be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis_ Such authorization is through usage of FD-401_ After the initial payments are approved, every 6 months an FD-401 is submitted requesting continuance, and, if approved 3 is stamped "approved" at the Bureau and returned. (Manual of Instructions, Section 107, page 15.) il view Of current Goveriieit-wide Ccorioiy iiovc &iid tko Bureau'8 own economy program it is imperative that the field exercise great care &nd scrutiny in payments to informants to assure that payments on a "regular basis" are fully justified and are not serving a8 an administrative crutch and expedient in lieu of payments under SAC authority. A Survey has been made of 80 files of informants who are presently being on a regular basis with respect to the date the informant was approved as a the date approval was given to pay him on a regular basis, and the amount the source under SAC authority before Bureau authority was sought to pay him on a regular basis. In the following 34 informant files authority was granted to pay the source on a regular basis before the field used the full amount that could have been under SAC authority, representing 42.59 of the total cases reviewed:, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 9/3/r1 JMM:bhg 3/4 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 330 paid paid PSI, paid paid ================================================== Page 331 ================================================== 2 134-6062* 134-19815* 134-20126 170-4092 134-6201* 134-19383 134-20310 134-18123* 134-4628* 170-4295 134-20026 134-21762 134-10548* 134-20302 134-19732 134-21218 134-20170 134-19115 134-18818 170-4355 134-6316* 134-19168 134-20998 134-21305 134-21561 134-20038* 134-20997 134-21179 134-20687 134-21173 134-17812 134-20051 134-13545* 134-19931 Those files marked with an asterisk indicate that only token amounts had been paid under SAC authority ranging from $25 to less than $100_ This analysis would indicate SACs are abdicating authority to approve paying sources the full amount allowed before seeking Bureau per- mission to pay on a regular basis. In the following 17 instances the Bureau approved the field's com- munication seeking approval of an individual as a PSl in wnich the same com- munication also asked approval to pay the Source o a regular basis: 134-10532 134-20302 134-21179 134-19815 134-8857 134-20608 134-20170 134-19383 134-13507 134-12826 134-19228 134-20175 134-14523 170-4355 134-21516 170-4295 105-188201 In the following 19 cases the Bureau approved sources being on 2 regular basis within 45 days of their being approved as & PSI: 134-6201 134-17689 134-20833 134-16923 134-20445 134-21762 134-20687 134-21622 134-19967 134-20773 134-20051 134-18818 134-20089 134-17337 134-19168 134-18059 170-768 134-21584 134-17762 These 36 cases (17 + 19) represent 45% of those files reviewed and indicate the field's undesirable practice of asking approval .to pay sources on a regular basis upon obtaining approval to develop the source as a PSI. It does not appear that contacts with these individuals are over a sufficient period of time to conclude the source iS furnishing data 0n a regular basis justify paying him on a regular basis. 3/3 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 331 paid to ================================================== Page 332 ================================================== 3 5 A representative number of informant files were checked where the full amount under SAC authority was not utilized and it was determined pay- ments were over a 3. 3 month period, for an average monthly payment of 873 . 00 for each source _ Subsequent to receiving approval to pay the source on & regular bagis each source received an average of $152 over the next 6-month period. It is concluded that if payments had continued for a longer period under SAC authority before paying on & regular basis, an average of approximately $80 less per month would have been expended in each case On an annual basis this would be 39680. Estimating that a8 few as 339 of the present number of Security Informants including New Left, Old Left (CPUSA); Extremists, Klan and other White Hate Groups have been developed in the past two years of the 1507 total number of Security Informants presently being paid on a regular basis, this could be projected into $240,000 less having been spent each year on these sources. Consequently, it appears every effort should be expended to insure that payments to informants on a regular basis should be initiated only after the source has furnished data on & continuing basis for at least 6 months and atter he has been paid the tull amount under SAC authority on a COD basis for value received. There Should be no objection to the field'S obtaining Bureau authority to pay source up to another $400 SAC authority before paying on a regular basis. Certainly, the request to approve an individual as & PSI Should not be coupled in the Same communication with a request to pay that individual on a regular basis_ (Of course, in exceptional and unusual cases facts could warrant conclusion that some sources could be paid on a regular basis in a shorter period of time.) This will als0 help to preclude informant's obvious conclusion that he is being paid on a salary basis because of the Similar amounts to him each month. In addition, all communications the initial payments on a regular basis to security "oricantonjopBtedtg through Mr _ Tolson's Office for review and approval. It is felt & wider uSage of payments under SAC authority to security informants will in the long run, serve to Substantially reduce total payments to them and further implement efforts to curtail costs in accordance with the Director's and President'8 recent directives on economy_ Comments of Assistant Director requested. 3/6 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 332 paid ================================================== Page 333 ================================================== Assistant Director C. D. Brennan Security and extremist (JAS:ebc 9/8/71) informants are essential to the Bureau 's investi- gative responsibilities _ They operate largely in controversial areas of old line and new left revolutionary organizations and individuals as well as in the volatile fields of black and white extremism and racial dissension_ They are fraught with controversy and potential for embarrassment to the Bureau Extended experience has taught us the absolute necessity for tight, effective , cen- tralized control of these informants by SOG . Fundanentally , whether an informant is paid under SAC authority or on a regular basis by SOG the same standards of justification are to be applied. The distinguishing element is the flexibility of on-the-scene spot payment authority available to the SAC on a daily basis without the formality of time-consuming correspondence with Bureau headquarters Money is paid in both situations on a c.0.d basis and full value must be received before payments are made Initial payments to a developing informant under SAC authority usually made on an expedient emergency basis, are not reviewed and evaluated at the SOG _ The judgment of the SAC prevails Generally the Bureau approves payments on a regular basis only when emergency and exceptional local conditions no longer prevail when the informant is active , productive and gives promise of continuing to be SO Should the currently authorized initial SAC-authorized 8400 be expended rapidly--as is frequently the case-_-there is bo objection to the field'8 Obtaining Bureau au thority to pay a second S400 to an informant under SAC authority This does require justification through submission of full facts in the matter for SOG judgment 2 similar to the justification required each six months for informants paid on a regular basis Authorization for SAC authority to permit such payments up to six months before the field requests regular payments from the Bureau 2s suggested by the Inspector } could dilute both the central and consistent control of payments at the Bureau and could cause an increase in paper work required to implement the procedure _ SAC authority currently has no fixed time limit for expenditures and in nany cases this authorization could be NW88608 Docld:32989638 333 3/8 Page ================================================== Page 334 ================================================== expended before the termination of a six-mon th development period thus requiring additional paper work in the field and resultant supervisory work at the Bureau. It is extremely difficult to draw meaningful conclusions concerning any savings between payments under SAC authority and costs accrued under delayed SOG approval of payments on 2 regular basis The informant while operating under SAC authority is in 2 developmental stage _ It can be expected that at any given point in his development whether he continues on SAC au thority or is approved for regular payments expenditures to hin Will increase It is the natural and practical order of informant development _ The sooner a developing security or extremist informant can be brought under SOG control the more effective and consistent becomes his supervision_ The SAC remains accountable , of course for the informant s handling 1 the validity of his expenditures and the worth of his information Additional supervision, based on broad field needs and applied with consistency to the over-all policies of the Bureau necessarily is furnished by SOG supervisors and Officiais_ This amounts to far more effective field-wide supervision of these sensitive matters. Strict economy continues to be the rule in Bureau supervision of security and extremist informants During the period 4/1/70 through 6/70 for example aS a result of reviewing regular payments to informants 84392 was saved_ During the period 1/1/71 through 3/1/71 S5156 was saved _ More recently on 8/20/71 a letter to a11 offices instructed them to cut back five per cent in their total payments to security and extremist informants--a projected saving of 8129, 000 _ It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the over-all sensitivity of security and extremist informants current procedures allowing for initial payments under SAC authority with a shift to Bureau approval 0f payments on 2 regular basis as the informant progresses and develops productivity, provide the most effective and consistent field-wide supervision for the over-all needs of the Bureau 2 - 3[7 NW88608 Docld:32989638_Page 334 ================================================== Page 335 ================================================== While there is no objection to the Inspector's suggestion that all communications approving initial payments on a regular basis to these informants be routed through Mr: _ Tolson S office for review and approval it must be pointed out, of course that this creates 2 substantial increase in the preparation and review of related correspondence , not previously required. In view of this forseeable increase in work load it is respectfully suggested that we continue to handle initial payment correspondence under existing regulations _ 3 3/4 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 335 Page ================================================== Page 336 ================================================== ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E S. MILLER: Your comments have been noted (ESM:bhg, 9/8/71) and you will be advised as to any further action necessary. Assistant Director please note _ Assistant Director C. D. Brennan The above observations (JAS:sjr 9-8-71) by the Inspector bave been noted 32 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 336 ================================================== Page 337 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM SURVEY CONCERNING COMPUTERIZATION OF SECURITY INFORMANT INDICES INSPECTOR E_ S. MLLER: During this inspection; it was noted that the Secui ty Informant Index is under the supervision of the Security Informant Unit, Internal Security Section. This Index contains certain data concerning security and potential security informants but does not include the extremist; probationary extremist, or extremist-ghetto informants _ It must be maintained on & timely basis_ As of 8/24/71, the Index had approximately 2026informants. This Index is maintained by 2 GS-5 clerks, one GS-3 clerk, and 309 of the time of a GS-4 stenographer on a full time basis. This means that 3 1/3 employees are utilized to maintain this Index at an annual cost of approximately $20, 000_ SAC Lcttcr 71 21 {C} dcted 5/18/71 instructe the field to a symbol number designation to all individuals being developed a8 any type of a Bureau source of information: This required the field to submit secure teletypes to the Bureau concerning every source under development and has resulted in a backlog of work in the Index of approximately 45 to 60 days. In each instance, the clerical staff is required to and 'alter 2 cards (FD 348) on each existing source or make 2 cards on any new sources. Subsequent communications add or delete from the original information which requires the cards to be again pulled and appropriate changes recorded: It would appear that this Index would benefit from being computerized which would result in & savings of clerical time and personnel: In addition to the informants now handled by the Index, other informant indexes could probably be computerized with & Similar savings At the time of the last inspection; the Inspector suggested that record keeping operations throughout the Division should be considered for computerizing where feasible_ It is suggested that immediate steps be taken through surveys and conferences to determine if it is plausible and/or practical to computerize and expand informant indexes similar to that already done to the Securi ty and Agitator Indexes_ Consideration should be DOMESTTC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 9/3/71 RHM:mea N83608 Dgcld: 32989638 ' Page 337 32 give puil ================================================== Page 338 ================================================== given to the initial and continuing costs and redesigning the source information :card (FD 348): The security of this information must be considered as data concerning informant matters is highly sensitive. Comments of Unit Chief Grigalus; Section Chiefs' Gray, Shackelford; G. C. Moore, Branigan, and Wannall; and Assistant Director Brennan are requested: NW 88608_Docld: 32989638_Paqe 338_ 32 2 ================================================== Page 339 ================================================== UNIT CHIEF GRIGALUS AND SECTION CHIEFS GRAY SHACKELFORD , G. C. MOORE } BRANIGAN AND WANNALL: The Security Informant Index contains certain data concerning present and former informants and sources This data basically consists of the identity of the infornant with limited background information The primary reason for such an index is to have a central repository containing the number and identities of informants This information is readily accessible. Informal discussions have been held in the past concerning feasibility of computerizing the Security Informant Index as well as the Extremist Informant Index During course of these discussions there were two prime considerations; namely, the ready accessibility of information on the indexes as well as the saving of manpower and cost to the Bureau Previous discussions did not result in a positive recommendation to computerizing the above indexes _ It is noted that the present indexes are serving the Bureau 'S purpose. In order to insure that a11 avenues 6f savings are considered, the Inspector 's suggestion will be carried out Surveys and conferences with Oir ezpert perSotzel i6 the -automatie datz pric8gsing field will be conducted to determine if such an operation is feasible, practical and economical, keeping in mind the accessibility of the information and the security of informants_ It is proposed, therefore, tbat this suggestion be immediately acted upon ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C, D. BRENNAN I agree that it would (JAS:cb L 9/7/71) be desirable to carry out this suggestion_ I will follow this matter closely to determine if such an operation is feasible. 323 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 339 Page ================================================== Page 340 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY IFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY WNTERNAL SECURITY AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS {tctor E S. MLLER: At the time of the last inspection & suggestion was submitted (pages 227 233) pointing out advantages in implementation of a program in this area of operation which Would make our approach to both above types of informants and Extremist (Racial) informants uniform_ You agreed to implement for one year; however_ your subsequent efforts to initiate the program were lost in a "security of transmitting problem_ " Your Extremist Intelligence Section solved the same problem by having tne fieid send iileir iuiurwaut reports: to the Bureat bj sccurc tcletype erd it is understood that method of handling is satisfactory. The overall Extremist Informant Program also appears productive It is recommended that you again favorably consider the prior suggestion and tailor implementation after its counterpart in the Extremist Section. Administration of such & program should be more efficiently handled now Since you have reinstituted handling of,these informants by a Security Informant Unit. Comments of Assistant Director Brernan requested. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN This suggestion will be (JAS;cb L 8/27/71) favorably considered A careful analysis will be conducted to tailor the suggestion to the needs of the Sections affected, keeping uniformity in mind _ This matter will be closely followed by me DOMES TIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/26/71 ESM:wmj NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 340 324 ================================================== Page 341 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING TNESTIGATIVE RESUTS In CRIMINAL CHSES BY TEGAL ATTACHES PFCTOR EDIKARD S_ MILLER : The Foreign Operations Policy Manual, Section 10 , page 1, provides that Legal Attaches Should submit investigative results by cover letter or cover page,on FD-263 , letterhead memorandum, or informant evaluation memorandum _ The Manual of Rules and Regulations } Part II, Section 4, page .21, provides that when reporting Information in crimina 1 and civil type cases received from the Bureau's Legal Attache, the information should be attributed to a confidential source abroad In reports the source would be identified on , the administrative page _ During the course 0f the" recent inspection of our Legi1 Attache Offices it was notea that generally Lega 1 Attaches would furnish investigative results in crimina 1 cases by airtel or letter where more expeditious means of communications was not necessary In some instances, these communications would be rather lengthy _ Upon receipt of these communications the respective field office and 1f preparation of a report was desired, the information fron the Legal Attache would have to be retyped , attributed to 2 confidential souce abroad , a0d the identity of the source set out on the administrative page of the report _ This rather burdensome task could be dispensed with if the Legal Attache would prepare an insert setting forth information and attributing it to 2 confidential source abroad The insert would be transmitted by airtel or letter with the identity of the source set out The above is being brought to your attention for appropriate comment and if felt beneficial, the Foreign Operations Policy Manua 1 should be amended to include ipserts as the fourth means of reporting investigative results_ by the Legal Attaches Comments of Section Chief Wanna 11 and Assistant Director Brennan are requested _ OMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION WEs bsf NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 341 221 by ================================================== Page 342 ================================================== UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTINGG INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY LEGAL ATTACHES SECTION CHIEF W _ R WANNALL TThe procedure ` pro- Nationalities_Intelligence Section posed by the GAD:hc 8/20/71 Inspector could be utilized by our foreign offices in those cases where they recognize that an investigative report must be prepared and where the information developed abroad is suitable for inclusion in such a report_ We do not believe however , that across-the-board instructions should be issued requiring this procedure in all instances, nor do we believe that such a requirement was visualized the Inspector inasmuch as he: suggests amendment of the Foreign Operations Policy Manua) to include inserts as one of four means of reporting investigative results by the Legal Attaches In fact Legal Attaches now prepare FD-302s in certain cases when Specifically requested bv the field. These are of course, restricted to cases in which testimony or evidence from abroad is anticipated. The minimal clerical staff abroad is insufficient to prepare inserts or FD-302s in more than a relatively few cases _ The high volume handled by most of our Legal Attaches requires them to use every possible streamlining device to reduce the clerical burden _ In Ottawa , for example our Lega1 Attache utilizes a specially printed RCMP rou ting slip to forward RCHP prepared letterhead memoranda . requirement that Ottawa prepare inserts or FD-302s in any volume would be impractical We propose therefore, to amend the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include inserts 25 2 fourth means of reporting without levying a requirement that it be utilized on 2 wholesale basis_ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C .D . BRENNAN The Inspector S suggestions DEM:mjt 8/23/71 and the comments of Section Chief Wannall have been noted and we will amend the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include the Inspector 1 S suggestion. DOMESTIC INTELL IGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/20/71 GAD:hc 32 6 NW-88608-Docld.32989638-Page -342 by Any ================================================== Page 343 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM BLACK NATIONALIST PHOTOGRAPH ALBUM INBRECTOR E S . MILLER : The Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA) was approved and established 1968 and at this time contains the photograph and biographical data of 472 black extremists who travel extensively in this country and abroad . Each field office plus Legal Attaches 9 Ottawa and Mexico City, maintain this Album to assist in coverage of movement of black extremist individuals in the United States , Canada and Mexico The Album appears to be an excellent investigative aid making immediately available photograph and background data on individuals traveling from one Division to another or out of the country whose activities must be followed A review of files discloses at least 10 individuals who are included in the BNPA traveled to Paris in the recent past It is noted a favorite route of Black Panthers traveling to Algeria is through Paris In view of the increased activity on the part of the Cleaver Faction of the Black Panther Party, it can be assumed tnat travel of individuals affiliated with the Cleaver Faction to and from CLeaver' s headquarters in Algeria wili continue or increase In view of these travels the Legal Attache , Paris, couid utilize the BNPA to faciiitate expedite coverage of these extremists while in France A' review of the BNPA itself reveals that some 0f the photographs attached to the FD-432 in this file do not have the names of the individuals photographed on the back 0f the photo- graph _ These photographs should have the individual's name on the back in the event the photographs become detached from the FD-432 . RECOMMENDATIONS : 1 _ That Legat , Paris } be provided with a copy of the BNPA - 2 _ If a further pattern of travel develops into an area covered by another Legal Attache , consideration should then be given to making available a copy of the BNPA to that Legal Attache DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/23/71 JTRiwmj/mkl NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 343 32 2 by ================================================== Page 344 ================================================== 3 _ That a review be made of all FD-432's contained in the BNPA to insure that al1 photographs are identified with the name of the individual described on the specific form _ Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief George C_ Moore requested SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE EXTREMIST INTELL IGENCE SECTION: The BNPA has been reviewed and subject' s name placed on the back of all photographs where not previously done_ Legal Attache, Paris, will promptly be provided a copy of the BNPA _ If in the future it appears' that the BNPA will be of value to other Legal Attaches consideration will be given then to mak available the BNPA to that Legal Attache. kev Gc:ecs_ 8/26/71 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C . D BRENNAN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: I concur with the above. CDB : acs 8/26/71 2 32 8 Nw_88608_Docld: 32989638 _Page 344 ing ================================================== Page 345 ================================================== SUGGESTION N MORANDUM RE : YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE NTERNAL SECURITY COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST) 21i 2 JE S . MILLER: From a review of the matters being handled by the New Left Section, it is evident that the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) 2 the youth group of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) _ is the fastest growing subversive youth group in this country. In August, 1970 , membership was estimated to be 1100 . During the SWP convention which was held in August, 1971, it was determined that YSA membership had grown to 1500 members _ It is noted YSA played an important role in the activities of the National Peace Action Coalition during the April antiwar aemonstrations in Washington , D. C. YSA has numerous chapters throughout the United States primarily on campuses_ In addition_ ) the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) has chapters on many campuses. The SMC is nothing more than & front group for the YSA and is dominated and controlled by YSA YSA claims it had recruited 450 new members into its ranks during the Spring of 1971. Its leaders have called for aggressive YSA recruiting among colleges this fall and have set a goal of at least doubling their present membership. YSA leaders have called for student strikes on campuses this fall in order to close them down and attempt to organize them for antiwar work The SWP is attempting to place its candidates on ballots in 32 states and YSA is being called on to asSist in & vigorous election campaign. SWP and YSA to use this campaign aS a means of recruiting new members to their ranks_ It is noted YSA is planning to hold its national convention in Houston, Texas 7 late this fall. DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 9/2/71 TMJwmj NW_88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 345 329 1971, May;, plan ================================================== Page 346 ================================================== 2 ~ In view of the above and because of existing criteria which was approved by the Department that membership in YSA is sufficient to place an individual on the Security Index the New Left Section should consider issuing instructions to the field that sufficient effort be expended on their investigations of YSA activities to insure that all YSA members are identified and investigated for poSsible inclusion in the Security Index. Comments of Section Chief Shackelford and Assistant Director Brennan requested. SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORAN I fully concur with the Inspector's observations concerning this matter We - are carefully analyzing the informant reports which are now being received concerning the results of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) National Convention and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA ) Educational Conference which was held 8/8-15/71 _ Considerable valuable information has been developed concerning YSA S future plans and activities including its plans for 22 intensive recruiting campaign this fall In edditier, YSA is continuing to play an extremely important role in the activities of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) and continues to dominate and control the nation-wide activities of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) With appropriate approval, we will furnish al1 field offices with the latest known plans and activities of YSA and will instruct them to vigorously pursue their investigations of the YSA and to insure all YSA members are identified and } thereafter , to submit appropriate recommendations for placing their names in the Securi Index pursuant to existing Bureau instructions ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN I concur With appropriate approval, the field will be issued specific instructions _ 330 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 346 ty ================================================== Page 347 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM RE : AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA RE NEW LEFT AND EXTREMST INDIVIDUALS ANSPECTOR E.' S. MLLER: The Espionage Sectim in close cooperation with the Voucher-Statistical Section Administrative Division > has designed and implemented an automated system known as the Soviet Information Collation System_ It is essentially 2 repository of pertinent data on Soviet officials assigned to the U. S. Through the fast and easy manipulation of this data by the computer outputs arranged by important elements of information can be readily and reliably obtained for Bureau use or dissemination to outside agencies _ The Espionage Section attests to the fact it has "streamlined our operations_ promoted uniformity and assured the highest level of accuracy. At the same time, it has resulted in a substantial savings in time money and man e power , both in the field and at SOG. 11 It would seem reasonable & Similar repository of information could be collected regarding New Left and Extremist individuals _ This would parallel the SICS operation: Various reports could be selected from this data such a8 an alphabetical listing of Key Activist, New Left; and Extremist individuals _ Other alternatives would include listings by phone number according to geographical areas listings by addresses according to geographical areas or listings by demonstrations in which certain individuals have participated. Summary reports or listings _ if required for dissemination to the field offices or other interested agencies could be efficiently prepared under Such a system_ There are numerous other alternative that come to mind; howvever any consideration for such a program must clearly take into account the need and benefit for such automation_ Comments of Section Chiefs Moore and Shackelford and Assistant Director Brennan requested. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 9/1/71 GNCawmi 4 23 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 347 ================================================== Page 348 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM RE : AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA RE NEIY LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS Aa SECTION CHIEFS MOORE and SHACKELFORDI As indicated elscwhere under Automatic Data Processing (ADP) 5-Q, automatic data banks are utilized extensively by the Extremist Intelligence and New Left Scctions in connection with the Computerized Telephone Number Filc (CTNF) CTNF lists telephone numbers known to be utilized by black, New Left and other ethnic extremist groups and indlviduals. Telephone numbers included in CTNF are listed according to geographic areas In addition, 2 special project utilizing ADP is being operated in connection with the EASTCON case . In this EASTCON project, ADP analyses of telephone calls between EASTCON subjects are made and also new subjects are identified through ADD enaZyses of FASTCON tol1 s2lle At present, over 12,700 individuals making up the Security Index (SI) have been incorporated into the Bureau '5 computerized data bank and this data is available to a1l offices through ADP _ In connection with this ADP SI project, identifying data concerning each subject, as well as his residence and business addresses, are included therein along with other pertinent items such as his organizational affiliation_ Over 20 separate print-outs are prepared monthly for administrative and investi- gative use of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the field. The facilities of NCIC have also been utilized to aid our investigations 0f New Left and extremist individuals. "Stop Index" programs for Bureau use only at NCIC have been devised which furnish notice of any police inquiry concerning missing Vencerenos Brigade subjects and all Priority I, SI subjects who are extremists, unless are already included in the NCIC Wanted Persons File. As indicated, much effort has been made to avail our- selves of opportunities provided by ADP _ The Inspector's suggestion that furtner effort be made to expand our use of ADP facilities, taking into consideration the need and benefit for such automation, appears to have merit; this will be studied and appropriate recommendations made as to its adaptability. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 9/2/71 SHMisad NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 348 2 - 33 2 they ================================================== Page 349 ================================================== ASSISTANT DIRECTOR BRENNAN I concur with the above comments . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 9/2/71 Hisad 3 332. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 349 ================================================== Page 350 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM PREPARATION OF INTERVIEW REPORTS (FD-302) IN SECURTTY TYPE INVESTIGATTONS #BPECTOR EDIARD S . MILLER : From 2 review of the FBI Handbook, Manual of Rules and Regulations, and Manua l of Instructions provisions in regard to security type investigations, more particularly espionage matters, Registration security investigations, internal security nationalistic tendencies matters security informants and racial matters , it was notea that no mention is made that information which may be the subject 0f later testimony in judicial or administrative type hearings must be made a matter of record on an interview report (FD-302) In this connection the ` Manual of Rules and Regulations Part II Section 4_ page 4a makes reference to the preparation of interview reports in security type cases Due to the discovery procedures existent in our judicial systen, the preparation of these interview reports is most necessary particularly when dealing with information of a testimonial nature received from security informants It is felt that quite possibly the seeming reluctance on the part of investigative agents handling security matters to prepare FD-302 '8 may be due to the lack of mention of this in the Manua 1 and Handbook proyisions dealing with security investigations In view of the above, it 1s suggested that those provisions of the Manua 1 and Handbook having to do with Security type investigations be thoroughly reviewed and amended where necessary to set forth the fact that when information is received from security subjects; security informants, or other individuals which may become the subject of later testimony , an FD-302 should be prepared , Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/18/71 JFH: bsf 3 34 NW88608_Docld:32989638 350 Act , Page ================================================== Page 351 ================================================== ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN Tke following are my cqmments requested in Inspector S Suggestion Memorandum entitled '"Preparation of M1 Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security Type Investigations: Inspector notes at outset that from a review of the FBI Handbook , Manual of Rules and Regulations and Manual of Instructions in regard to the various types of security investigations no mention is made that information Which may be the subject of later testimony in judicial or administrative type hearings must be made a matter of record on an interview report (FD-302) Inspector does recognize that the Manual of Rules and Regulations Part II, Section 4, page 4a makes reference to the preparation of interview reports in security type cases In Section 4 , Part II of the Manual of Rules and Regulations_ } which Section pertains to Communications there is a subheading entitled "Reporting Information That May Become Testimony which is covered on pages 4 and 4a It i8 specifically stated on pa ge 4, paragraphs 2b and C, that FD-3025 should be used when information is obtained Which may be the subject of testimony At the very top of page a specific reference is made to security-type cases and the use of an FD-302 in these cases The requirement for using an FD-302 is further reiterated in paragraph 6 on page 4a Part I of the Handbook has a section commencing on pa ge 36 item entitled "Reporting Information That May Become Testimony This is the counterpart to the Manual of Rules and Regulations provisions cited immediately above The requirement for the use of an FD-302 is enunciated in item number 48 Of particular significance is the fact that both the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Handbook provide in their respective Indices for the requirements discussed above . In the Manual the material is indexed under "Reporting information that may become testimony" as well aS under "Testimory-~reporting information that may become M The Handbook index has the same two references It is therefore obvious that the requirements for the use of an FD-302 are logically and: easily retrievable by reference to either or both the Manual and Handbook DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVI SION INSPECTION 8/24/71 SFPirrd 335 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 351 4a , 48 , ================================================== Page 352 ================================================== A cursory spot check of some criminal violations in the Manual of Instructions notes that there is no specific mention made for some violations and it is quite likely that the specific requirement for use of an FD-302 is not spelled out for each of the many many criminal violations covered in the various sections of the Manual of Instructions The requirement is covered in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Handbook as are many other requirements which pertain to the Bureau S work generally A primary function of the Manual of Rules and Regulations is to have in one place general requirements that are applicable across the board in our work The Section relating to Communications referred to above is a good example It was observed by the Inspector that "quite possibly the seeming reluctance on the part of investigative agents handling security matters to prepare FD-302 S may be due to the lack of mention of this in the Manual and Handbook provisions dealing with security investigations T1 It is respectfully observed that we have not noted any "seeming reluctance" on the part of investigative Agents handling work in the security field Te have found that the requirements for the use of an FD-302 are being generally compiied with and when any shortcomings might be noted they are dealt with on an individual case basis In short , we have had no problems in this area of our operations It may be that the Inspector 's observations are based on noting rather few FD-302s in security reports as compared with reports in the criminal field If this be the case, it is observed that by and large our obtaining of information in the security field is of an intelligence nature with prosecutable situations being generally the exception In other words situations where information might become testimony are rather limited A further aspect of the Inspector 's Suggestion Memorandum relates to the preparation of FD-302s When obtaining information from security informants In this respect it is observed that a great many of our security informants prepare written reports which are firsthand accounts and thus preferable to FD-302s which are secondhand accounts Thus the informants' reports are even more valuable than FD-302s and are available for the same purpose as are the FD-3 02s When an informant furnishes information orally which is not backed up by a written report from the informant and the information may become a matter of testimony, the Agent is under the same requirement to execute an FD-302 We have not observed any failings to speak 0f in this regard DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/24/71 SEParrd 336 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 352 Page ================================================== Page 353 ================================================== In conclusion , it 1s my studied judgement that there is no necessity for augment the requirement concerning FD-302s in the various Manuals presently being utilized in tbe FBI _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/24/71 SFP:rrd 337 NW 88608 Docld:37989638 353 ing Page ================================================== Page 354 ================================================== ADDENDUM 'WNSPECTOR E. S. MLLER: The primary intent of this suggestion was to point EHanlonawmj 8/27 /71) up a possible problem developing &8 a result of the increased number of criminal violations being encountered by Special Agents handling security work An excellent illustration Of this can be found in case captioned 'Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice; IS -Miscellaneous I{ Bufile 100 -459771. In WFO report of SA James F Whalen dated 5/7/71, serial 423 page 5 is found a narrative of events at a demonstration on November 1970 , at New York This information was not placed on an FD-302 and became an issue at a preliminary hearing: As the contents of this report were not on FD-3028 it was necessary to excise pertinent portions of the report and considerable issue of this was made at the preliminary hearing: A further indication Of this most necessary indoctrination of security Agents in the use of FD-302s can be found in the EASTCON case. Your attention is invited to an airtel under that caption dated 8/25/71 calling for an in-depth interview of a key witness . In this airtel the supervisor felt it necessary to instruct that the results of this interview be placed on an FD'-302_ In light of the above, it is felt ya should take whatever action deemed necessary to bring to the attention of Special Agents working security matters the necessity of placing information which could be testimony on FD-302s It is felt the matter should definitely be highlighted and then followed in the individual cases_ Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested. 33& NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 354 21, ================================================== Page 355 ================================================== ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Ca D. BRENNAN Domestic Intelligence Division is appreciative of the observations and suggestions set forth in the Inspector 's Addendun Accordingly , I am instructing a11 Section Chiefs to stress this ma tter with a1l supervisory personnel in the Division Further } all of our supervisors who regularly lecture to In Service classes and New Agents classes will stress this matter We will of course follow the field in the individual cases where it is obvious or even appears that the required action is not being taken in the preparation of necessary FD-3 025 DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/27/71 SEEitzd 334 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 355 9 ================================================== Page 356 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM BLACK EXTREMST ACTIVITIES IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS EXTREMIST MATTERS NSPECTOR E_ S. MLLER: airtel to all continental offices 8/26/71 under the above-mentioned caption _ all offices J>e requested to determine the extent of activity and/or influence attribiteble to black extremists within penal institutions_ This was undoubtedly & result of the attempted prison break at San Quentin Prison in California in Which black extremist George Lester Jackson was killed. Reports have indicated that_Jackson had hidden a gun in his 2fro haircut. Further , press releases indicate that when the maximum security cell block was searched an afro hair-style Wig was found. Due io the numerous arrests made by Our Agenis , it is iele that the field should be alerted to the secreting: of weapons in this manner. Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested. AASSISTANT , DIRECTOR C_ D BRENNAN I concur with the DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION suggestion o€ the Inspector_ The Extrenist Intelligence Section is preparing an airtel to all offices alerting then to the possibility of secreting weapons as noted above _ CDB : bad 8-26-71 DOMESTTC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/26/71 OFLimj 340 NW 88608 ` Docld: 32989638 Page 356 031* By ================================================== Page 357 ================================================== INSPECTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION JANUARY 8-26, 1971 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 357 ================================================== Page 358 ================================================== $_ Ist baul i~ Mll~ bk @lin w 4k in Gn "~qraiZ,: 7 1 z lwLnens mmys Auiltl Ruu sk 47 Aas ? 17 | . Lchy 8 - #4 . (Leemnn suchule { Okk 2 Q~8 9 Xx+T pchds didb iO #u TP _ iebly;? TiatLian ( Luk 7) ? 12 Pxt 13 yuan men ? 14 23 - 77 Whn n b in < 26 i R Px 5z Kunijan 54 Auliti Hinhct 68 ahlohmsn NW 88608 Docld:32989638 358 Qaos @k 0^ 2 tteil ahnq Qak A4 Muk QaK El pat Mx @sa {ure Qutred,bt snul Pass 5z Qak T> Page ================================================== Page 359 ================================================== 11 Suulll esaux n UaL Ant R Eelt 2 separc a /2oxe?e2, Sjc 6e0 esAcd wksf {o28 &€ Pa ~"1 72 Yer/ 78 27 ra6// . Jnyseve TR *k skcura <4Coe 5z Jin % shQLii MirenaluiCsrnmunuckhs k &et ? 1v9 bx ALuu dinls F (s A? "Cy" Acs madar~ I^ Uannxee Jc inchcr 30 C6 / 2e/ ; cTuded F6 prcs rreej writa-Yp _ 13 9 kubo Je NW88608-Docld:32989638-Page 359 (a^ KE, Butz I 4 7p 62 6ece "(o6 iP+ Qok CrinLeml> ================================================== Page 360 ================================================== D / D Z/sFEC$ /a % 7/z->6/ v 1 Tetin Ca RY Recommend entire document be classified "Secret, " XGDS 1, 2, 3, Portions recommended for excision from atteched have been underlined in red or bracketed in red in left margin. Gencrally criteria for excision Tere: 1 Information which could identify sources or sensitive techniques 2 . Nanes of individuals or organtzations vhose privacy requires protection 3. Informatlon Ihich would reveal Our overall success or lack Of success in 2 given investigative area 4_ Infornation from #1 4hird Agencies" or friendly foreign ag2ncics 5. Identities of Bureau personnel belowz the Section Chief level The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in general, cisclosa the otent of our comnitnent in specific areas of counterintelligence activity. We have given the Comnittee Aoninistrative Dlvision figures regarding total manporer involved in security investigations but, to my knowledge, ie have not given them 2 breakdown as to where these personnel are assigned . 4 policy decision I8 necessary as to !thether Fe want to Pinpoint, through release Qf "Adequacy of Personnel" sections of these inspection reports= 3 precisely howv much Or horr little manporzer ve have O1 Specific types of investigations_ It i8 questionable whether the information regarding criminal cases 'in the San Francisco-repoft is gerqaneto the Committee S iqquiry . fA would n6t geem improper toxmne t6 deleta &ll references to criminal matters &nd merely substitute 8 pege saying that 'pages to relate to 'criminal M1 investigations _ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 360 ================================================== Page 361 ================================================== Table OF COHTENTS NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 361 ================================================== Page 362 ================================================== TABLE OF CONTENTS Page SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS Substantive Errors East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives 5 Accomplishments Internal Security Section 10 Research Section 20 New Left Section 24 Espionage Section 33 Racial Intelligence Section 43 Nationalities Intelligence Section 50 Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs Security Index Program 64 (Basic Revolutionary Organizations) Security Informant Program 66 {Basic iievoluiionary Organizatiois} Counterintelligence Program 67 Disruption of White Hate Groups 60 Thumbnail Sketch Program New Left Movement 73 Potential for Racial Violence Security Index Program 80 Emergency Detention Program 81 Security Informants 82 Technical and Microphone Surveillances_ 82 ALEM Program 84 CANIL Program 85 DESECO Program. 86 East-West Exchange Program- 88 COKMA Program 90 Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased 92 by Soviets BANPOP Program 95 Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U.S_ Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments 96 Chinese Aliens Entering U.S and Chinese Entering U.S. Claiming U.S, Citizenship 99 Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries International Organizations 102 NW 88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 362 1 (-1_ ================================================== Page 363 ================================================== Table of Contents (Continued) Page Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside Soviet-Bloc 104 CHICOIN 105 BOCOV 107 Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas 109 Security Index 3 Cuba 111 American Repatriate Program 114 Cuban Refugee Program 116 Racial Matters 117 Black Nationalist Movement 119 Black Panther Party 122 Congress of African Peopies 126 Republic of New Africa 128 SNCC 130 Junta of Militant Organizations 132 Nation of Islam 134 Communist Influence of Raciai Groups_ 135 Counterintelligence Program Black 'Extremistsi38 Kej Black Extremist Program 144 Black Student Groups on College Campuses_ 145 Racial Informants 146 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS Administrative Write-Ups Potential Double Agent Program Espionage Section Domestic Intelligence Division 149 Coverage of Known Meet Areas (COKMA) Program 161 PERSONNEL MATTERS Personnel Interviewed 167 Adequacy of Personnel 168 SUGGESTION MEMORANDA: Addition of Suitable Designation Racial Informants For Seat of Government Routing 205 Articles Concerning Activities of Racial Extremists Research Section 208 Eqbal Ahmad 211 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 363_ ~v ================================================== Page 364 ================================================== Table 0f Contents '(Continued) Page Chinese Matters 216 Defector Program 218 Maximum Utilization of Ghetto Informants 220 Revision of Racial Informant Status Report Form FD-405 222 Supervision and Control of Security Informant Development and Coverage by Internal Security and New Left Sections 227 Venceremos Brigade 234 SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UPS Robert P Bokinsky PSI-PO (13479651) 241 Jan Adau Kiase IS-2o_(105-106986) Eris_Nelson, PSI IS_R (134-19669) xikiiuz% "Izaryan IS-R (ATC-KGB 247 WW1N 886Q8-Qocld; 32989638_Page 364 0602 Slj 6946hkel '/8-24/1, ================================================== Page 365 ================================================== SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 365 Specific 1t37 k742 267-E[F7LE46572 #UleEF ================================================== Page 366 ================================================== SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS 4-B TBSPECTOR E.S, MILLER : During the course of the inspection , two substantive errors were detected in files reviewed . Both of these errors involved inadequacies in the supervision of Espionage related cases You should consider 2 further review and evaluation of these matters in this area of your operation _ Assistant Director Brennan note _ Hsfel CA DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1726771 4-B NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 366 (spIBDWAsfx ================================================== Page 367 ================================================== EAST COAST CONSPIRACY 4-4-1-a NSPECTOR E. S. MLLER: You are requested to furnisk 2 very brief_narrative background x: this case from is beginning until the present time In addition, you shcu:a specifically outline the case developed on each subject showing probzzple cause established a8 of this time. You are also requested to advise when these cases will be presented to the Federal Grand Jury and indicate: the prospects in each instance for & return of a true bill, Comments of Assistant Director requested. DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/8/71 ESM:wmj 4-A-l-a NW_88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 367 ================================================== Page 368 ================================================== 4-A-1-a EAST COAST CONSPIRACY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C , D. BRENNAN The East Coast Conspiracy" is a loosely knit movement com- posed primarily of Catholic priests and nuns teachers students and former students and others who have manifested opposition to the Vietnam war by acts of violence against Government agencies and private corporations identified as defense contractors The main thrust of their efforts has been vandalism of draft boards The Philadelphia Office developed an informant in Lewisburg_ Penitentiary who was a confidant of Philip Berrigan 2 Catholic priest Serving time for destruction of Selective Service records Investigation prison authorities determined this informant had been transmi tfing messages in and_ out of prison in a clandestine manner between Berrigan and Sister 3 Elizabeth McAlister-z_a nl associated with the Religious Order of the Sacred Hearz 492 f Maryr"arryiz iew 3o5s . 144 addition to tzansmitting Jetters tozand from Berrigan; the informant met on several occasions with followers of Berrigan such as Neil McLaughlin and Joseph Wenderoth 05 unasgigned Cathoric priests in Baltimore Maryland Through these individuals he me t others associated With the movement _ Information contained_in the letters andobtained as 2 result of personal contacts 0f the informant produced information Showing this group intended to call attention to their anti-Vietnam war position by blowing up the underground heating and electrical systems servicing Government buildings in Washington, D C., and to kidnap a high Government official Dr Henry 4 Kissinger 3 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 2 was mentioned as a possible victim The proposed target date for these actions was February 22 , 1971 _ Following the arrest on September 6 , 1970 , of several individuals associated with this movement for the destruction of draft board records in Rochester New York, which action included extensive vandalism to the office of the U.S . Attorney as well as our Rochester Resident Agency the informant learned that the leading activists in the movement intended to expand their activities to include attacks against FBI offices _ Informant also learned from McAlister that the group intended to undertake some sabotage-type action a t Picatinny Arsenal, Dover 9 New Jersey , on an undisclosed date . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1-11-71 FBG : Rlm 4-4-1-a NWV 88608 Docld:32989638 368 py OwAoe Page ================================================== Page 369 ================================================== East Coast Conspiracy Because of the basic responsibility of this Division for investigations involving subversive antiwar groups overall responsibility for this investigation was assumed by memorandum dated September 10 , 1970 . This, of course did not include individual Selective Service violations existing in various stages of prosecution or subsequent substantive violations in which affiliates of this group were suspected of being involved_ This investigation has been specifically targeted to two areas of prosecutive potential_ First, to develop sufficient evidence to prosecute leadership of this broad conspiracy to impede the Government's functioning and conduct of the Vietnam war In this vein, a comprehensive review of pertinent ma terial discloses 16 related incidents from October 27 1967 at Baltimore, Maryland 1 to Rochester New York on September 6, 1970 _ Of 97 individuals involved in 16 incidents during this period_ 25 persons have been established as being involved in three or more 9f these incidents This particular phase of the investiga tion is mos t detailed and complex; however in terms ot rar-reaching damage to the movement , it is most significant For example, we have set up an extensive Automatic Data Processing (ADP) project Which resulted in a print-out Showing over 300 telephone calls of interest between telephone numbers utilized by these conspirators and which corroborate information from the informant regarding calls he received from principal conspirators, Second_ 9 we are developing sufficient evidence to prosecute the perpetrators of the plots to kidnap Presidential advisor Henry A_ Kissinger and to blow up the tunnels which contain stean and electrical conduits between Government buildings in Hashington, D.C. Because 0f publicity given the plots to kidnap Kissinger and to blow up the tunnels in Washington, D it is imperative this phase of the investigation be vigorously pressed toward prosecutive action Consistent with this objective the Federal Grand Jury has been hearing evidence in this matter since December 18, 1970 , and according to Departne #IRE ntal attorneyGuy L. Goodwin_Will return indictments concerning the above = mentioned Rpiots on January 1971 Goodyin_states the Federal_grand Jury Wi1l_ continue to hear evidence regarding_gther facets_of this complex -2 - Nw-88608_Docld:32989638_Page 369 C., 12,5 ================================================== Page 370 ================================================== East Coast Conspiracy matter and probably wizl return additional indictments at 2 later #orrtX 3# date According to Goodwin the_ Grand Jyry vil} return indictments 4t agaip8+ six_ conspiretors 04 named R beloj and seven indiyiduals including Danief_Berfigan; wili be named as_ unindicted Co-conepirators at this time 3 ihose to pe indicted are Philip Berrigan Elizabeth McAlister soseph_Wenderoth,--Nezl "McLaughlin Eqbat:Ajad, and Anthony scop1Tck Philip Berrigan: Laboratory examination determined he authored letters regarding plots to kidnap a high Government official and to blow up tunnel system which were clandestinely transmitted out of Lewisburg Penitentiary. Biizabeth McAlister: Laboratory determined she wrote letters to Philip Berrigan_regarding above plots Investigation, including ADP project , has also established her contacts with other conspirators. Considered a leading activist in the movement Joseph Reese Wenderoth: Leading activist of the movement and reported coordinator of plot to blow up tunnel system , with responsibility for recruiting necessary personnel Met and discussed plan with informant Auto_ mobile registered to JWenderoth and Neil_McLaughlin observed at farm in Northern Maryland reported by informant as training site used by conspirators_ Neil Raymond McLaughlin: Leading activist in the movement involved with bombing plot . Met with informant to discuss plot_ -3 - NW 88608 _Docld: 32989638 Page_370_ Lr:" ================================================== Page 371 ================================================== East Coast Conspiracy Eqbal Ahmad: Ahmad is Pakistani citizen and_permanent resident alien. He is a principal figure in The Tidnaping plot ADp project has linked him with Wenderoth andMcLaughLin. Anthony Scoblick: Involved in the bombing plot _ He has met with informant and discussed plot and ADP project produced calls between informant and Scoblick 8 telephone _ ADDENDUN INSPECTOZ S , MILLER; This case was formally received by the 1/18/ ij Dumestic Intelligezce Divicior on JAA/Ekiamaz 9/10/70 and responsibility for sane assumed by memorandum of R_ La Shackelford to C, D_ Brennan dated 9/10/70 . It is presently supervised by Superyisor_James F McGuire and overall supervision afforded by Wnit Superviser Fred B Griffith It is acknowledged that it was necessary to issue instructions to the field cautioning then about conducting extensive background investigations on members close to this conspiracy prior to the presentation of facts of this case to the Grand Jury to preclude the possibility of compromising an informant However , the following suggested investigative action is being set forth for your consideration inasmuch as it is of paramount importance that you continue to press this matter vigorously _ These suggestions are not to be considered as a11 inclusive but are being set forth for your consideration and appropriate action: 1, You Should insure that the field aggressively intensifies its investigation of this conspiracy including detailed conprehensive background investigations on a11 subjects both directly and indirectly associated with the ICCSL _ It should be emphasized, however , that utmost discretion and good judgment should be exercised in the conduct of investigations of the principal conspirators So that unfounded charges f harrassment cannot be leveled against the Bureau _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/18/71 JAA 'EBF maz 88608 ================================================== Page 372 ================================================== During the conduct of these background investi~ gations the field should be particularly alert to every potential opportunity for developing member informants in not only the ECCSL but also in other sympathetic and splinter groups which develop or spin off from the vortex 0f this group_ 1 It is noted that you have pointed out elsewhere 2 in this report that 97 individuals have been involved 1 in 16 separate and distinct organized incidents and attacks on Government agencies and private corporations_ Twenty- five persons were involved in three or more such incidents _ 2 . The field should be appropriately instructed to keep the Bureau fully advised of a11 demonstrations vigils, harrassment tactics, etc_ 1 conducted by sympathetic groups aid folcters of tbc ECCSL- Sucb vigils and demon- strations Should be afforded sufficient appropriate coverage to develop identities and background of leading activists and sponsors of such sympathetic activities During these background investigations particular emphasis should be placed on developing sources of funds and financing of the principal conspirators A review of this file noted that the subjects appear to travel frequently , make numerous long-distance phone calls, rent cars etc. , outwardly, appear to have limited sources of income 3 The field should be alerted to the distinct possibility that other groups similar to the ECCSL are formed as a result of the indictments returned in this matter_ Field offices Should also be alerted to other retaliatory actions by sympathetic groups attempting to.capitalize on the "persecution "1 theory thereby exploiting the indictments as a Sympathetic rallying point for more conspiratorial activities Assistant Director note. NW_88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 372_ yet recent ================================================== Page 373 ================================================== EAST COAST CONSPIRACY 4-A-l-a ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C_ D. BRENNAN- The suggestions and comments of the Inspector in this matter are pertinent , appreciated , and are being complied with _ Because this case is of national signifi- cance and has received nation-wide publicity, you may be assured it will continue to receive expeditious handling , close supervision, and my personal attention_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/20/71 CDB:jlm 4-A-1-a NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 373 ================================================== Page 374 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4 -E NNSPECTOR E. S. MLLER: Briefly set forth the noteworthy accomplishments of your Division, with a section breakdown, Since the last inspection, Which ended on 4/17/70. This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical accomplishments _ Specifically where you have devised a program for a definite purpose furnish also where possible Specific tangible accomplish - ments on this program_ This will give you an opportunity to set forth any Division achievements pertaining to the Bure u'8 progress welfare, efficiency or any other Items not covered elsewhere in this inspection, A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient; Do not include identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references to Such maliert Shuuid be ini general terms: Comments of Assistant Director reqjested. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN : Attached are individual (JAS:mls 1/14/71) write-ups from each Section in the Division pertaining to the accomplishments of that particular Section. DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/8/71 ESM:wmj 4- NIN 88608 Docld:32989638 374 A Page ================================================== Page 375 ================================================== 4 ACCOMPLISHMENTS INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION 4-E SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W GRAY ly Attached are memoranda setting out the noteworthy accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the last inspection This Section 18 responsible for the supervision of investigations of the Communist Party , USA (CPUSA) , its fronts; pro-Chinese communist groups; Trotskyist groups; Klan and white hate groups ; protest groups ; international organizations affiliated with the world communist movement , the world Trotskyist movement and international New Left movement , individuals affiliated with these organizations and movements as well as sedition cases Our purpose is to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these subversive organizations and individuals under various statutes relating t8 the internal security of the nation This Section also supervises development 0f security informants in basic revolutionary organizations and where appropriate, directs counterintelligence operations against subversive groups and individuals in cases under our supervision. DID Inspection 1/12/71 RCP;mkl 4-E NW-88608-Doeld:32989638-Page-375 ================================================== Page 376 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS COMMUNIST PARTY , USA, UNIT The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves from the case entitled, "Solo: IS C, Due to the sensitive nature of this case, it wiii be orally discussed with the Inspector_ In essence, this case involves sources developing intelligence information of the highest_quality concerning the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) 37 the_soviet Jnion and,itS; satellites and the world_ comunist movement Since its Inception 37 successfulWissions to communist 0I countries havexpeen_completed Information develoned_ by tiis operation from high-Tevet cpltacts 194n8 world communist movement is continuaily disseminated to the highest levels of our Government and, in many instances , is information not available from another source _ Examples include the following: the current_struggle among the O1 leadership_ of the Eodcnn Soviet Union as 0f Spring 1970 and early Winter 1970 2az32uEz #F " ar5p2g2e for Dower diring-tje e#r Iiy upcoming 4th Congress 0f the Communist__Party 0f the Ia Jt1 ic Soviet Union ~(CPSU); a message sent the Government 0f Gr North Vietnam by {be CPUSA giving suggestionz on how 66 North yietnam couTd aid antiwar_protest groups in the inIted_States; the Soviet reaction tothertreatysigned_by West_Germany_ withtheSovietsos-along_with secret_portions of this treaty Which have notyet_been made_puplic; the Initiation JOE a_or idwide propaganda campaien the soviets to @Qunteract and_eakenathe nri United_States-position-ip--the- Strategic Arms Limitation talks and details 0t on the_regrganizatzon Which is suppoged%o take_place within the CPSU and the Soviet Government after Dne 24t1 congress The -CESU to_be held [h Maroh ,-1971 J A1l of this information was furnished the White- House and other interested officials of our Gover nment , usually by teletype. Central_Intelligence Agency has expressed_great_interest_in Zuformation developed by- this operation and on Julxx24 727 1970_--reguested permission to include pertinent _data developed hy our operationin_ @TopSecret/NoToreign/ControLled_Dissemination T1 classified document for senior U S Iptelligence_Board Officfals DID Inspection 1/12/71 RCP:mkL 4-E NWV 88608 Docld:32989638 376 LE re JarL bxx: Qf Page ================================================== Page 377 ================================================== The two principal informants in this operation have received the "Order of Lenin, 1 with the title "Hero of Soviet Labort from the Soviets _ This is the highest award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was given our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the M international communist movement _ Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA represents a sustained major accomplishment _ At the time of the last inspection, we had 11 informants who were officially members of the CPUSA National Committee At the present time, this overall number remains the same , but we have exchanged two informants to give uS a better geographical breakdown In addition, we have another informant who is an ex officio member 0f the National Committee because of the sensitive nature of his Party assignments_ This latter source is also 2 member of the Political Committee which, in effect runs the Party. This top-level coverage is responsibie for furnishing information regarding policy-making ma tters on a day-to-day basis a5 they occur DID Inspection 1/12/71 RCP:mkl 4-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 377 Page ================================================== Page 378 ================================================== 4-E ACCOMPLISHMENTS PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT This unit was formerly known as the Protest Groups and International New Left Unit. As of December 16 , 1970 a separate International New Left Unit was organized Which took over investigations pertaining to this particular work Since the last inspection, the intensified investigation of cases has continued to produce positive results Selective supervision has enabled us to have advance knowledge f New Left leaders conferences , and demonstrations Through this advance knowledge , we have been able_ to furnish the White House and other interested Government agencies informa tion O1 a daily basis regarding pertinent activities of individuals and groups of interest to us We have disseminated voluminous letterhead memoranda 9 reports 2 and teletypes concerning plans of leaders of these groups Which were most timely , particularly where violence was a possibility On the basis of material furnished by this unit 9 two Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) were published pertaining to the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and the New Mobilization Committee to End the Mar in Vietnam (NMC) These investigations furnished complete coverage of the major antiwar demonstrations in May and October 1970 , as well as sectional and national meetings a i which plans for these demon- strations were formulated _ This coverage afforded detailed knowledge of the major shift in the antiwar movement , and the view of its leadership pertaining to the degree and amount of militant tactics to be employed . We were able to follow closely the emergence of the National Coalition Against War Racism and Repression (NCAIRR ) out of the once powerful NMC and the attempts of the Trotskyist groups to exercise greater influence Within the antiwar movement through the formation of the National Peace Action Council (NPAC) The NCAMRR has proposed a national action for 1971, whereby efforts will be made to close down Washington , D _ C_ by the use of militant tactics The NPAC plans national demonstrations in April 1971, which may very well undermine the impact of the NCA WRR action DOMCSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 JJSaplm 4-E ~2 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 378 May ================================================== Page 379 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT (Prior to 12/16/70, part of Protest Groups and International New Left Uxitrlne responsibility of the Bureau and the intelligence community is to develop intelligence relating to efforts Of foreign governments, organizations, and individuals to influence, direct, or dominate the New Left movement in the U.S, In this regard over the years, there have been a number of international-type conferences often sponsored by international front-type groups frequently under the direction or control of the Soviet Union _ Late last summer this Bureau received information that the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam (SCV) 9 an organiza- tion established in 1967 which is controlled by the Soviet dominated World Council for Peace , intended to hold a World Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in Stockholm, Sweden, 11/28-30/70 _ As the SCV , since its inception, bas been a major sounding board for anti-U.S_ propaganda 3 partic- ularly that of the North Vietnamese, we dispatched JIE 1777-8 to attend the World Conference _ The informant attendance provd cf czceptic221 veZee_ She pot cely ettended Rranaratorv 042 meetings and m Post-conference @earings, Futrtiao partic pated in all sessions of the Worid Conference ideptifying_ the entire Amertcan delegation other internationa Organizerious-involved, and forelgn delegations Includipg those_repregenting the Cambodian Government in exile the Provisiona Revolutionary (comunist Government of South Vietnam the_North_Vietnamese, and conunists froiLaos= Informant _WaS-able tordeveLop ther acti of the American delegation which was led by__David K5t pelliger) ernotorfous_Ned Leftritlitant; and the obvfously directed plans of the Conference to discredit the U.8, at the Paris peace talks Informant al50 develored the ne ture 'of the international propaganda attack to be directed at the U.S, } worldwide action planned in support of the comnunist position in Vietnam, and plans to "expose" the "criminal" position and actions of the U.S. 2s relate to Vietnam. Our coverage of this Conference was of value to Officials of other Government agencies and undoubtedly assisted in the formulation of positive U.S, policies relative to the U.S_ position in Vietnam, The excellent coverage also resulted in our being able to directly rpoint the foreign influence of the domestic subversive movement and resulted in a number of important investigations. DID INSPECTION 1/12/71 DRisfw 4-E 5 X - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 379 's Anter vity = pin- Fonz ================================================== Page 380 ================================================== Uant ACCOMPLI SHMENTS KLAN AND WHITL HATE GROUP UNIT 4-E Membership ip Klan-type Organizaticns and other white hate groups has experienced 2 continuous decline for the past four years The Klan reached 2 post-_Morld War II membership high of approximately 14,000 in 1966 _ From that point on , there has been a continuing decline in membership _ At the present time we have 18 Klan organizations made up of 225 Klaverns (units; There are of course, in addition to the membership, many thousands 0f sympathizers . Investigation in the white extremist field for organizations other than the Klan is centered around the Minutemen , the National States Rights Party (NSRP) , and the National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) There are numerous other Sma11 groups whic h likewise fall within this category _ This reduction in Klan end other Rhite hate group membership is attributable to the continuous attention given tlrse investigations by then Seat 0f Government and the field, with Specific attention given to' hare-' bftirg investigations counterintelligence prograns directed at thez_ J and penetration of these groups at 211 Zevels by our recial informants_ The year 1970 showed 2 continuing decline in the membership and effectiveness of the various Klan and white hate groups throughout the U ,S , As of January _ 3 1970 , Klan membership totaled approzimately 5 300 _ Our present_ figures indicate that Klan membership now totals approximately 4,300 . The largest Klan group is the United Klans of America , Inc . 9 Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA) under the direction of Imperial Wizard Robert M Shelton:- The membership of this group in January 1970 was approximately 4,100 whereas it now numbers 3 506 members or approximately 809 of the member- Ship of a11 Klan organizations_ These recent figures represent an approximate decrease in overall Klan membership 0f 176 and 15% decrease in UKA membership_ Menbership in white hate organizations other than the Klan which has always been relatively smaller membership-wise has likewise experienced a relatively similer decline_ With the arrest of Robert_DePygh Tr National Coordingtor Of tbe Hinutener _in July_ 1969 and his subsequent conviction for Federal Firearms Act violation and incarceration , this group DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1-12-71 JViliu 3 _ NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page_380 4-E0 ================================================== Page 381 ================================================== bas Virtually fallen apart and there is practically 2o organized activity. Membership is approximately 180 $ but individuals remain violence prone The National States Rights Perty under the direction of Ja B Stoper is likewise experiencing difficulty in Increasing either membership or activity and -consequently i8 planning to move its headquarters from Savannah, Georgia, to Atlanta, Ceorgia In the meantime this organization continues to grind out anti- Negro and anti-Jewish propaganda in crude fashion in their publications and speeches _ Membership is approximately 150 The National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) (formerly the American Nazi Party) has its beadquarters in Arlington, Virginia, which is the center for its activities There 18 moderate activity in LoS Angeles and Chicago _ Recen dy a serious split in the ieadership has occurrez 3S ~ Zoctlt ~f coustcrirtelligence ection taken On the part Of the Bureau through use of racial informants_ Here again menbership continues to decline They appear to be content with publishing 2 variety of anti-Negro anti-Jerish publicatios and preparing their "Nhite Power" telephone messages Membership is epproximately 125 , The above is set forth to Show the general accomplishments made by this Unit in the Klan and White bate field during the past year_ Sone specific examples of accomplishments ere hereafter set forth: In February } 1970 , we furnisbed information to the White House the Army } Secret Service_ Internal Revenue Service the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions Of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit, Which we received from racial informants of our Tampa Division who advised tbat the United Florida KKK had printed 15,000 protest letters which were being made available to the public for mailing to President Nixon in connection with school desegregation We also furnished a Copy of the actual protest letter for the benefit of the White House and Other agencies_ On February 20 , 1970 , Robert DePugh National Coordinator of the Minutemen mentioned above, was sentenced to four years imprisonnent following conviction for bond defeult It is noted_DePugh_was previously convicted and released on bond for Federal Firearms Act Violation 6 NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 381_ ================================================== Page 382 ================================================== In March, 1970 , we again advised tbe White House } the Attorney General, the Army 1 Secret Service Internal Revenue Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Division of the Department &nd the Inter-Division Information Unit of information learned from racial informants Of our Mobiie Ditsion relative to another letter which was made available to the public by the UKA for mailing to President Nixon 2s a protest in connection with school desegregation in Alabama This was similar to the information previously furnished relative to the other letter which was made available to the public by the United Florida KKK _ A copy of this letter was elso furmished to the White Houge the Attorney General, Secret Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisionsof the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit_ In July } 1970 , 25 2 result of our investigation , two individuals associated with 2 paramilitary right wing group called "The Raiders, " Ferri Loyd_Hayes and_Kenneth Ray McMaster_were arrested by Bureau Agents in connection with the bombing of 36 school busses at Longview Texas on July 4 , 1970 A Federal court had ordered bussing in connection with school integration _ A Special Federal Grand Jury at Tyler Texas on July 23 1970 } returned 8 true bill of indibment charging the two individuals on two counts; count viola- tion of Title 18 , U,S, Code Section 241 (Civil Rights Act , 1964) and count violation Of Title 18, U;S. Code S. 1509 (Obstruction of Court Order) These two individuals had also been found to have placed "flashlight bombs" in two Negro residential areas Both these individuals were held in lieu of 8125,000 bond each; later reduced to $25, 000 each. They are stiii awaiting trial_ In July, 1970 , as 2 result Of 2 counterintelligence technique utilized in connection with the counterintelligence program directed at the Klan Exalted_Cyckops Thomas Stipes Of Mascet_Klavern 778 Hascot Tennessee was eliminated Irom {his top position and Subsequently banished from the UKA _ As a result of this counterintelligence action_ ) membership in this Klavern has fallen off appreciably : On 9-25-70 Robert_DePugh was found guilty in U.S, District Court, Albuquerque ) New Hexico; under Federal Firearms Act for . possession of various destructive devices at the time Of his arrest in New Mexico _ He received a ten-year sentence on 10-9-70 On these charges _ He is presently serving his sentence at the U.8? Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas "7 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 382 one, two, ================================================== Page 383 ================================================== In September, 1970 a5 2 result of counterintelligence action taken, two Of our racial informants in the Little Rock Division were instrumental in successfully causing the defeat of 2 Klensman mho was running for Sheriff in Jefferson County Arkanses This unsuccessful candidate was Victor Calvert Exalted Cyclops Pine Bluff Klavern Association of Arkansas Klans During his "campatgn -Caivert-attempted to hide his Klan affiliation because he "Toped-to receive a good percentage of the Negro vote in his area Our informants had discreetly spread the truth through the Negro community that Calvert was actually an active Klansman As a result of this action Calvert was overwhelmingly defeated. In September , 1970 , we advised the President , the Vice President and the Attorney General of current information concerning Klan activity in the U.S.; the decline in Klan membership; techniques the Klan Mes instituting to attempt to increase its income and the fact that 2 black box resembling a coffin mas being' Shipped to the President by & gz3up called "United Parents of Duval Countv M1 Florida This was being sent to the President in connection with 3 protest against school integration in Jacksonville, Florida In furnishing this information we advised that the individual Who paid for the shipping was identified 25 2 member 0f the U;S Klans , Knights of the Inc _ In September } 1970 wie advised the President the Vice President and the Attorney Genera1 of the fact that Imperial_Wizard Robert_M Shelton_of the UKA was going to request an eppointment with the Attorney Genera 1 to discuss the latest interpretations of civil rights laws _ We further advised that Shelton was preparing copies of 2 "night Zetter" which he was going to make available to the news media in the Washington_ 9 D_ C } are? to publicize the fact he desired an appointment This information was learned from 2 top_Level racial informant of our Birmingham Office who advised that Sbelton was making this request allegediy because it in Shelton 8_mind, concerned the welfare of people 0f Aiabama in addition to those of other states Our informant advised that Shelton would point out in his letter that appointments for black leaders bad been granted and he was requesting equal opportunity treatment and courtesy on behalf of the white people of his community _ Our informant also reyealed that Shelton did not expect to receive an appointment with the Attorney General but was doing this merely to receive publicity a5 a result Of tbis action The appointment never came ebout . "8 - NW-88608_Qocld:32989638_Page 383 476 KKK , ================================================== Page 384 ================================================== In November , 1970 , as a result Of counterintelli- gence measures taken we were successful in causing the resignation of W__ Jeivi" Sextola the Imperial_Kligrapp (National-Secretarys UKA) This was Of particular importance in that he actually_ran_the_UKA during the time Shelton was in prison _ The 1970 National Klonvokation of the UKA was held at the Ramada Inn, Tuscaloosa Alabama 9 on November 28-29, 1970 _ At this Klonvokation, Robert_M Shelton was again elected Imperial Wizard to serve for three years , During a speech he made at the Kionvokation, Shelton_stated (and has since reiterated his feelings to high-ranking members of the UKA who are racial informants of this Bureau) that he definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and possibly to utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on a11 Klan officials and members in order to ferret out FBI informants _ Shelton in 1967 , also had plans to utilize a polygraph machine and truth serum on Klan members in order to learn the identity of FBI informants At tbat time, we used counterintelligence techniques in various torms including & press release in irder to discourage Shelton in this regard. It is to be noted that many of our sensitive racial informants are in high-ranking positions within the UKA _ In order to again discourage Shelton in his desires in this regard , it was recommended on 1/5/71 that a press release be provided to reliable news sources through Assistant Director Bishop' s office_ Our desire is that we will discredit Shelton.and frustrate his attempts by exposing his desires to the glare of publicity_ The news release pointed out that Shelton_is losing control of_bis subordinates and that_Shelton is attempting to maintain control of the Klan_by threats against anyone who criticizes him_ The news release also pointed out that the Klan, which expresses patriotism and democratic ideals must resort to gestapo-like tactics to hold its members in line _ The above are highlights of results of Bureau investigations into these matters _ Many other disseminations made throughout 1970 have resulted in the curtailment of activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white hate group organizations 3 g _ NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 384 ================================================== Page 385 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E SECTION CHIEF Ra D: COTTER: Acconplishnents of Research Section since last inspection follow. Central Research Unit This Unit has Continued to perform a wide range of research and writing assignments, preparing various documents and special reports, most of which have been disseminated outside the Bureau a5 well 2s to our field offices, These have included the following: An extensive special assignment on New Left research for the Director 0 Statement by Director for use before President s Comnission on Campus Unrest, Issues (14) of Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) 9 2 periodic intelligence letter sumnarizing Significant items of interest in the security field. Issues (9) of The Extremist Speaks & monthly compilation - which shows the extremist views Of right, left, and racially-oriented groups and individuals in the United States. Monographs (7) setting out in-depth studies of significant factors in the security-intelligence field. A comprehensive survey concerning the potential for racial violence, four (4) special reports for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and miscellaneous research assign- ments for the Divisiona In addition, a number of Special studies have been prepared in response to requests from the Bhite House, These include: A Secret" study on domestic intelligence for the Inter-Agency Committee for Intelligence, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 amt Azl-B: NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 385 eachr #Top ================================================== Page 386 ================================================== An extensive brief, "Special Report, Nationwide Civil Disturbances" at .the request of Vice President Agnew (revised periodically) A study , 71 $ Stop the Bombing 6 Campaign: A Communist Cause, If at request of President' S Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; concerning foreign influence in the 1964-68 campaign seeking a halt to U,.S, bombing of North Vietnan. Secret" blind memoranda (3) for a special intelligence evaluation committee on extremist and terrorist groups in the UoS. A "Secret" paper for the U.S. Intelligence Board analyzing "Racism, Radicalism, and Nationalism in the Caribbean. Mt This Unit has also collected and prepared material for various articles, speeches, and surveys, and has prepared szeciel memoranda for the information of Bureau Officials. Personnel of this Unit bave handled lectures on the subjects of communism, the New Left movement and racial extremism, These have consisted of classified iectures to Bureau' $ New Agents and In-Service classes appearances before other Intelligence agencies and National Academy classes_ and 2 number of nonclassified lectures before civic, church, and law enforcement groups. Since last inspection, & total of 42 speeches have been handled :involving outside groups. Special Records Unit Primarily responsible for records keeping, this Unit is also engaged in emergency planning. In addition, beginning in September the Unit has prepared the Division' s portion of the 19@Ciet For Director S Use In Connection With Attorney General's Staff Conference, It Thursdays, at 5 P,m. Also beginning in September _ 9 1970 , this Unit has prepared the "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities, M 4 weekLy summary of racial extremist activities, which is disseninated to the White House top Government officials, the intelligence community, and each field Office. The Mhite House has been highly commendatory of this paper_ 9 praising the content, format , and style. The Director approved an incentive award for the Agent who prepares the summary. -4 - NW 88608_Docld:32989638 Page 386 "Top ================================================== Page 387 ================================================== New Left_Reporting_Upit This Unit, which coordinates covering of a11 New Left, student_ and antiwar demonstrations throughout the country, has handled the reporting of the following major disruptions or demonstrations since the last inspection. National demonstrations 4/14 -15/70 to protest the war and the payment of war taxes. National Environmental Actions, which was held throughout the U,S. on 4/22/70 . Intensified and widespread student disruptions which occurred throughout the U.S. during the last part of April and during May , 1970 , A March on Washington on 5/9/70 to protest the invasion of Cambodia. Nationwide demonstrations to protest the military, on 5/16/70 . A Yippies Smoke-in at Washington, Do on 7/4/70 . This also involved attempted disruption: by the Yippies of the Honor America Day ceremonies, The People' s Army Jamboree, which was held at Portland, Oregon, 8/28-9/3/70 . for the purpose of disrupting the National American Legion Convention. The Harch for Victory, which wes held at Washington, Da Cc, on 10/31/70 by Dr Carl McIntire Demonstration against President Nixon, San Jose, California, 10/29/70 _ Tinely dissemination was made to the White House and the Attorney General, 25 well as other interested officials and agencies of the Executive Branch, concerning these demon- strations as well as nationwide agitation occurring on 2 daily basis throughout the country_ Frequently, advance information was furnished to such officials and agencies pointing out likely trouble spots and predicting the possibility of violence. -2 - NW88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 387 2 Co , ================================================== Page 388 ================================================== In addition, a timely study concerning disruptive attacks on the courts was prepared and disseminated to high- level officials and interested agencies_ Racial Reporting_Unit This Unit, formerly called the Riot and Racial Disturbance Unit, has continued to coordinate all phases of,racial disturbances and violence and other racial developments aS well as information bearing on the potential for violence throughout the country_ Voluminous material being reported on a daily basis by the field offices is reviewed, coordinated, and disseminated to interested officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are furnished to the White House, Attorney General . and other high-level officials. In the past year more than 5, 500 memoranda and teletypes have been disseminateda Statistical data on ~racial disorders, sciiooi disoruers, axid aitaeis Ji police are maintained in this Unit for use in the preparation Of special papers. This Unit also prepares highly useful research studies concerning developments in the racial fieldo Since the last inspection, these have included Special papers on the black action movement at racially harassed University_of Michigen; a review of newly formed black extremist groups; numerous papers concerning provocative articles appearing in the Black Panther Party newspaper; 2 special paper for the Vice President concerning racial disturbances in Mississippi and Georgia; a study on racial disturbances in secondary schools in the 1969-70 school year; and 2 detailed account of advance information concerning the potential for violence in support of the Black Panther Party in New Haven, prepared for the Departmental Evaluation Committee. Connectecutied 4 study on the extent of foreign influence in the black extremist novement, similar to that disseminated just after the last inspection, 1s presently being prepared for early dissemination, In addition to the above, instructions in the Manual of Instructions and the FBI Handbook concerning the handling of general racial matters were completely revised and streamlined by this Unit since the last inspection. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 388 ================================================== Page 389 ================================================== ACCOMPLI SHMENTS 1?6 7 4-E NEI LEFT SECTION SECTION CHIEF L R. L. SHACKELFORDA Attached are individual memoranda from each unit setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments of the New Left Section since the last inspection_ This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left Movement including terrorist groups and individuals engaging in bombings arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campus _ The development of New Left informants and investigations of Neiv Left publications are also supervised in this Section as are sabotage investigations and counter- intelligence operations against the New Left. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 ~hHMiiln 4-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 389 Page ================================================== Page 390 ================================================== bpi ACCOMPLISHMENTS NE LEFT GROUPS UNIT The work of this unit concerns students for a Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with the exception of Teatherman) 9 other Newv Left campus groups , the Key Activist program, New Left Movement reports } New Left publications } New Left informants, and the maintenance of a library of "hand-out" material on the New Left for dissemination on 2 high level to Government officials and responsible citizens, In 1969 Worker Student Alliance (TSA) 9 Weatherman, and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) factions 0f SDS into separate groups_ Accomplishments concerning Weatherman are reported elsewhere in this survey The RYM faction of SDS is nom practically defunct _ Currently, the largest faction 9f SDS is WSA faction WSA is dominated by the pro_Chinese, Marxist_Leninist Progressive Labor Party; and, while not as violent as Heatherman, is avowedly 2 revolutionary group. Our efforts to achieve informant coverage in WSA showed results when WSA held its National Convention in Chicago in December } 1970 _ Approxinately 20 Bureau informants attended this convention, and extensive information on activities at the convention was promptly reported and disseminated Through informants 3 we have encouraged faction- alism in TYSA _ At the convention 1 dissident groups led by one Of our sources threatened 2 new split in SDS/ISA which may occur in the near future Such dissension will reduce the possibility that SDS might once again become a massive student organization 2s it was before its division in 1969 _ Through the Key Activist program we have focused investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left mOv ement with the ain of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 ~Limaz 4-E NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 390_ split ================================================== Page 391 ================================================== Bkt At the present time we have designated 75 individuals as Key Activists. Of this number , 40 are curr 'ently the subject 0f prosecutive action This has definitely severely disrupted the entire New Left movement as well as component New Left organizations, Through the New Left Mov ement reports prepared guarterly by each field office, we have provided to interested agencies timely and informative documents On the activities of the New Left movement , thus making 2 substantial contribution to the objective that responsible officials be fully aware of the threat the New Left presents to our democratic society. closely following a myriad of New Left publications ranging from those merely pornographic to those clearly revolutionary_ 9 we have determined the leadership of these publications; their propensity for violence and subversive activities; sources 0f funds; and through dissemination have advised interested officials and agencies_ Since these pubiications fregiertlj appcar and disappesr Githin 1 short time, we are alert to the birth of new publications by following various underground news service lists 2s well aS other documents and books which report new publications in this field_ We have recognized that in the past , informant coverage of New Left groups has not been adeguate and accordingly have given great emphasis to this aspect 0f our responsibility As a result informant coverage in this area has been dramatically increased _ At present , we have_ 900 infornants and sources of l al1 types providing coverage of the New Left This number includes 178 security informants and 410_potential security informants. Since the last inspection, New Left informants have provided information which has: led to the indictment of a number of New Left leaders on Federal and local charges; located fugitives including some Weatherman fugitives; provided advance information on numerous New Left demonstrations including plans for violence; and furnished detailed information on the organization, membership, and activities of 2 broad range 0f New Left groups _ ~X - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 391 By ================================================== Page 392 ================================================== The assistance of New Left informants has been invaluable, and we are continuing to emphasize the development of additional quality informants in this field_ Through the maintenance of a repository of "hand-out" materials and publications on the New Left for distribution to Government officials and responsible citizens we have assisted these important individuals to more fuliy understand the subversive ramifications of the New Left movement "3 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 392 J7 ================================================== Page 393 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT MEST Since the Summer 0f 1969_ 9 New Left extremists have becola increasingly identified 85 Marxist-Leninist revolutiouaries, and have utilized extrene violence in effort to ~chieve their purpose In the period since the last inspe tion 9 the prosecution of these revolutionaries bas contiried to be one of our primary objectives to the end that iadividual terrorists are neutralized and their organizat:nas are isolated; leaderless; and finally defunct. Be bave 144 Significant accomplishments in this regard _ On April 2 , 1870 , 12 leaders of Weatherman (the most violent faction 04 Students for a Democratic Society) were indicted in Chicago on Federal Antiriot Law (ARL) charges_ Other Weathernj# leaders were indicted on local charges and became Bureau itives The Weatherman organization has gone undergrouais and bas taken extreme measures to avoid apprehension. #cvzrtk-lsss, five 6f tiiese Teatherman leaders hevc been located 97 the FBI aS a result of investigations by Agents on New Ler+ squads in tbe field and through the efforts of New Left irformants . Dn July 23 1970 , in Detroit, Michigan , indictnents were obtz_hed against 13 Keathernan leaders for violation 0f Federal *annbing and gun control statutes_ Five of these indiv idualis bave since been arrested or have surrendered Other Meatherman leaders remain in fugitive status and intens rve efforts to locate then continue Already these indictmenas &nd errests have had 2 noticeable effect on the Weatherman organization_ Bernardine Dobrn 2 Weatherman leader wot in 1970 , had declared a state of war against the U_ S announced in December 1 1970 = that Weatherman had made a iitary error" in tending to consider only "bombings and pickizas up the gun as revolutionary If Weatherman bas learned , rebrn said, that 2 group of "outiaws" who are isolatea rom" the youth communities cannot grow to include large nunarers of people _ DOMESTIC ~zWTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 HH:maz 4-E NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 393 fug May , "3 . Lilziam 1 ? ================================================== Page 394 ================================================== Weatherman and their ilk will doubtless try to organize wider support in the broad youth culture, most of Which is not presently committed to violence _ By the continuation of energetic efforts to prosecute the instigators of violence we can increase the isolation of terrorist groups and reduce their influence on youth_ This objective is being forcefully pursued wherever possible_ In Seattle, a group of seven violence-prone individuals with Weatherman connections were tried in November and Decenber , 1970 , on Federal ARL; Conspiracy; and Destruction of Governne nt Property charges _ A mistrial in this case was declared December 10 1970; however , due to the defendants misconduct in court, all seven were cited for contempt _ These Seattle indictments were made possible through New Left informant coverage_ The East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives, led by the notorious Berrigen_brothers has been the subject of intensive investigation since the Tast inspection. This group which 15 masked 2s a religion-oriented peace group, has actually plotted kidnaping and violence _ This matter has been presented to a Federal Grand Jury with the result that six individuals iucluding_Philip_Berrigan _ were indicted on January 12 , 1971. Seven other individuals } including Daniel_Berrigan_ were named by the Grand Jury as unindicted coconspirators Information set forth above referring to New Left extremists and the Weatherman organization also applies to work handled by the Special Investigations Unit T5 East 2 7 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 394 ================================================== Page 395 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS VENCEREMOS BRIGADE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT EAST 4-E The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being Jun 1969 9 as 2 coalition of representatives from various New Left organizations including Students for a Democratic Society, Trotskyist Youth Socialist Alliance . the militant Black Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left organizations including the Communist Party, Progressive Labor Party and Socialist Workers Party. Three contingents have traveled to Cuba since November 1969 _ The first group was composed of 216 young Americans #kc obtaired tkeir: own transportaticz tC Ciba i7 defiance of the State Department ban on travel to that country _ These young revolutionaries were returned to Canada at the expense of the Cuban Government which converted a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship_ This boat arrived in St _ John _ 2 Canada > on February 12_ 1970 , and immediately loaded 687 sympathetic American youths aboard for its return to Cuba _ This group, like the first contingent worked in the sugar cane fields until its return by the same means of transportation on April 28 1970 _ In August , 1970 the third contingent of the VB , made up of 407 persons, journeyed to the Isle of Youth where participated in 2 Cuban agricultural experiment of planting and fertilizing citrus trees _ This group returned to the U . S _ mid-October , 1970 _ Each group worked approximately 73 hours a day , 52 days a . Wsek , and in their free time were afforded the opportunity of absorbing communist propaganda offered by the Cubans } North Koreans and North Vietnamese They were reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were here to show "solidarity with the socialist struggle to smash the U_ S_ blockade and to make 2 breach in the facade of the U_ S. imperialist monster 1I DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 FBS :amk 4-E NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 395 trip they ================================================== Page 396 ================================================== Each of the more than 1300 brigade members has been the subject of a security investigation whick includes the identification and obtaining of background da ta as well as a personal interview with each brigade member These investiga tions are being made to determine the immediate danger presented by these young revolutionaries and also to ascertain the long-range role they will take in the revolutionary mevement in the U . S _ Upon completion of the investiga tion and the interview of each of these individuals the field must recommend either the inclusion or noninclusion of the subject in the Security Index In addition the field must continue to report every 90 for a period of one year on the activities and whereabouts of each brigade member Fiyeapproved Bureau informants accompanied the second VB and the third VB also included in its ranks four Bureau approved informants_ These sources have ma terially assisted the Bureau in discharging its intelligence responsibilitiss. While the security investigations of all brigade members are not completed more than 1ou VB participants have been placed in the Security Index and a5 we conclude these investigations it is anticipa ted numerous others will also be listed in this Index The fourth contingent of the VB is currently being organized and recruiting emphasis is being placed on "quality individuals M who have open outlooks and socialist backgrounds This group is tentatively scheduled to depart for Cuba March 1, 1971, and is to be comprised of approximately 300 individuals Information set forth above referring to the Venceremos Brigade also applies to work handled by the Special Investigations Unit L West . & - NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 396 days ================================================== Page 397 ================================================== ACCOMPLI SHMENTS SABOTAGE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS EAST UNIT 4-E Incidents of Sabotage have been on the rise since the mid-l960 's , occasioned primarily by growing opposition throughout the country to the Selective Service System, tbe Armed Forces, and in particular to the war in Vietnam _ There are under investigation at the present time 7 Sabotage cases with prosecution pending involving 29 subjects who are charged with 43 separate violations including attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government Property, Anti-Riot Law violation, Civil Rights violations 1 violation of the National Firearms Interstate Transporta- tion of Stolen Motor Vebicles_ and Conspiracy In connection with one of the above investigations $ One subject in October 1970 , was found guilty and sentenced to five years, which sentence is being appealed , and another subject in November 1970 pleaded guilty and is scheduled to be sentenced. sometime in January , 1971. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 MUTJMicae 4-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 397 Act, ================================================== Page 398 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E 76 SECTION CHIEF TV _ A _ BRANIGAN ESPIONAGE SECTION 1 Persona Non Grata and other Removal Actions Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov was a correspondent in New York City for De 3ovretr J0 newspaper _ "Drazda from June 1968 to July 7 1970 Based on the results of FBI investigation, on the latter da te he was expelled after the Department of State informed the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C . on June 24, 1970 , that Orekhov had engaged in activities incompatible with his status as 2 journalist His departure from the United States wa S requested_ Orekhov 163 departed July 7, 1970 , depriving the Soviets of the presence in the U_ S_ 0f a very active intelli- gence officer_ In a similar case also 2s a result of our investi- gations, on November 6 , 1970 State informed the Soviets of ihe ezpulsioncErom the U . S _ of Leouid Nikolayeyich Zhega_ev a 4 Washington_ D: C_ } correspondenE for Ee Soviet news agency "Tess This action was in direct reciprocity for the expulsion from the USSR of a U . S . correspondent _ In an interesting and successful counterintelligence operation_ the Soviets were forced to remove Yergeniy YYelshin_ a KGB officer , from the United Nations Secretariat and send him home Yelshinhad been in contact with sources under our control in the aerospace field_ In September 1970 , the "arrest" of one of our sources during a meet with Yelshin_was staged _ Subsequently , Yelshin was contacted by our Agents concerning his intelligence activities Although Yelshin had not completed the term of his contract with the UN secretariat, he returned home with his family, at Soviet expense , on 11/1/70 _ In a pending case our investigation has established violation of U _ S . immigration laws by an individual known to be a KGB agent _ He has denied affiliation with the Soviets, but has admitted immigration fraud INS and State have initiated action to have him dismissed from the UN Secretariat and expelled from the U S . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPT 4-E NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 398 ipld ================================================== Page 399 ================================================== 4-E Information we furnished to the Department of State apparently has prevented the return to the United States of two Polish commercial officials formerly assigned to New York City We told State how the one a Polish military intelligence officer, with the assistance of the other had since mid-1969 been very active in trying to purchase electronic equipment of defense significance and Ship it to Poland in violation of export licensing requirements _ On 3/27 /70 , State informed the Polish Ambassador to the U_ S . that the activities of these two Poles must cease Both left the country_ We have subsequently learned through our sources that one expected to return to U_ 8., has been reassigned and will not return The other has not returned Thus 1 the usefulness of two Polish agents in the U . S, was destroyed by our investiga tions_ 2 Double_Agents One measure of our effectiveness in countering the activities of the intelligence personnel among the hundreds of communist bloc representatives in the U . S . is our ability to continue to develop and operate double agents aga inst hostile agents_ This is a matter of vital concern and continuous attention in the Espionage Section_ Since the last inspection we have continued to improve our position in this regard, as the following chart shows : Active Potential Inactive Country Double_Agents Double Agents Double Agents 4/1/70 12/1/70 Change 4/1 12/1 Chg 4/1 12/1 Chg: Soviet 67 74 +7 207 227 +20 33 Blbgaiia i 18 5 5 4 1 8 : Czech 2_ 13 14 2 -2 East German 3 3 3 3 %3 18 # 1 1 26 3 4 5 ji Yugoslavia 2 10 -2 2 Totals 128 138 +10 277 296 +19 49 49 0 DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPT;pld 63 NW 88608 Bodid:32989638 Page 399 1 ================================================== Page 400 ================================================== 4-E It is obvious that despite the sophistication and security-consciousness of the Soviet Intelligence Services, our efforts to direct double agents aga inst them continue to meet with conspicuous success Examples of the productivity 0f our double a gent operations appear elsewhere herein _ Some declines in the number of double agent operations against the intelligence services of countries other than the USSR handled by this section have occurred since the last inspection _ In part, this may be a reflection of a change of emphasis in direction of our efforts, Which has resulted in 2 reduction 0f the number f supervisors assigned to satellite ATbanian and Yugosiar qatters "(1-4/707~nine full ~t ine *and_ oner part-tine supervisor were_handling this work at pregent there are four supervisors assigned to this Wozk- fult-€ime and tmece part time However, reference to the above chart 'showvs that the bulk of the drop in the number of active and potential double agents has been in the Czzech field This is attributable primarily to two factors _ Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia (CSSR) by Soviet bloc armed forces in August, 1968 which resulted in the fall of the liberal Alexander Dubcek regime the Communist Party of the CSSR began a critical analysis of ali party members who had supported Dubcek This analysis included individuals assigned to diploma tic posts in Washington and New York and resulted in the recall of about two-thirds 0f such personnel A number were expelled or suspended from the Party _ Of those recalled, several have not yet been replaced _ The_Chief_Czech Intelligence Services (CIS)_Resident_in Washington -as--one the- latter Anbextreme Lyvell placed source has_reported that tne purge , which began early in '1970 , caused great anziety among al1 the Czech personnel in Wa shington and New York and that morale dropped to rock bottom and, as consequence, little intelligence work was carried on during the current year Naturally with the CIS agents missing or dormant, our opportunities to target double agents aga inst them diminished _ This unsettled political situation, together with the overt defection 0f a CIS officer in Mashington on 6/29/70 , resulted in the CIS assuming a defensive posture and maintaining contact only with persons considered by them to be fully trustworthy Indicative of the quality of our rema ining double agents 15' the fact that CIS has held meets with two of our sources-in the-immediate-past;z 374 DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPT;pld 4-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 400 ================================================== Page 401 ================================================== haelus 4-E The above chart, showing numbers of double agents at the time of the last inspection and at present tells only part 0f the story_ It does not show that there is a continual process of review and analysis of double agent ma tters and close attention to field activity in this regard_ We are constantly striving to weed out any "deadwood" and to introduce fresh blood into our counterespionage efforts_ Presentation of precise figures on the turnover among double agents during the period since the last inspection is not feasible because various offices have different reporting dates on which they inform the Bureau of additions and deletions of double agents in the various na tionality fields _ However, the following available figures clearly indicate desirable turnover In the Soviet field, from Narch 1, 1970 , to December 1, 1970 , we added 41active and potential double a gents; a net increase of 303 In the other countries currently supervised in the Espionage Section, we added 28 active and potential double agents and dronped 17, a net gain of 11 Several of those dropped were used up In counterintelligence actions which terminated their active usefulness; and some left the country _ 3 Counterintelligence and Other Significant Operationg In our eyes, counterintelligence activity is activity designed to disrupt and hamper the operations of an opposition intelligence service . Although it may involve harassment at tines, it is for the most part much more serious and worthy of our efforts only when it inflicts actual damage on the effective- ness 0f the enemy To this end, we employ our own capabilities and , whenever indicated and possible, those of other U_ S _ and other Government agencies _ Following are some examples of this activity since the last inspection. Upon instruction from us one of our double agents told his Soviet handler Vladinir Azaryan an Antorg_Trading Corporation_empLoyee)that the FBI interviewed him and he admitted he had been contacting Azaryan _and 38 also 4030 his predecessor, 00ty } Yuri Kitaevk a United Nations Secretartat_employee The doubie Su7E agent pZaned Azaryan s 1 neptness fOE EBI interest Azaryan obvious reported the matter to his_superiors Shortly there- after, both Soviets left the United Sta thus 'disrupting the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 NW 88608-0EEi; 3d5538 Page 401 7e Ly tes, ================================================== Page 402 ================================================== ~E As a result of Bureau counterintelligence action, an Aeroflot official who was a GRU officer wa s hurriedly removed from the U_ 8 , under Soviet guard by the Soviets _ In addition, an Intourist official a suspected KGB officer wa s also recalled from the U. S . because he was also blamed by the Soviets for the security breach involving the aforementioned Aeroflot official Thus , one counterintelligence operation caused the removal from the U . S . of two Soviet Intelligence Service operatives. In another operation a Soviet official assigned to Washington, 2 known KGB officer Ivas the_principal in a Bureau double_agent_ operation JithState_Departnent_cTearance_ve" confronted himduring a meet With the double agent He rejected our initial invitation to defect but analysis Of information subsequentlyreceived Indfcated Ihat he had mt reported the approach Aga n we contacted him and that time he acknowledged 3re that he had persona proplems and agreed be contacted in the future has returned to the DSSR on home leave and has agreed tu 4ue8t 70nr7%e comes begk to fhs TT S There are ndications that ihe delayin his return 13 due to Atc his wife illness This operation Continues to offer the possibility Of his recruitment either here or abroad On the basis of information developed through one of our operations two_Argentinians were arrested in October 1970kin Argentina as ~illegal Soyiet_agente ? Qur information is that the were targeted to ultimately operate in and against the U_ S Our effective handiing of this matter stopped them Tefore they even entered this country Based on information received from a well placed source we recently identified a U. S , agent of the Soviets In initial contact he has indicated 2 desire to cooperate with 88 us andwerpzan to 25 use hinina_counEetintelligence action agamst has Soviet_principa In_another caseewe deveLoped Sufficient information concerni X ng_the_intelligence operations of Yuriy P Vetrov that the U S, Ambassador to "tne Un was able to inform his Soviet: counterpart concerning Vetrovs activities. Vetrov_ was not the subject of persona non grata action because Sta te did not_want 4o_gtve the_Soviets the opportunitya expel one of our diglomatg from Moscow and Vetrov 70 Ipas due to 0X leave the U "4 However ; the detaiied information in our ambassador S possession must have caused considerable disruption of Soviet intelligence activities in the United Na tions when our ambassador disclosed our knowledge of it. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPT:pld NW88608 0aii 32989638_Page 402 _ tOwa He_ 17 1s 1O1 ================================================== Page 403 ================================================== 4-E By letter to the Director 6/10/70} the U_ S . Air Force expressed its appreciation for the invaluable contribution of Bureau personnel in supporting an OSI counterintelligence operation involving an East German Intel ligence Service (EGIS) officer who came to {he Tr 8 _ to service an Air Force @@Ble_agent We had been coopera ting with Air Force in this case since 1965 _ Information was obtained by one of our double agents against EGIS that EGIS has for some time been interested in penetrating 'tate Department and is particularly interested in 2 State Department employee Wi7h wnom our source is acquainted Te have" furnished pertinent details to State and in December 1970, Sta te indicated that it was taking action to derensively Trief the eployee Without 3743 pinpointing or Jeopardizing our source Such action Should put uS one "gtep ahead in 4wy attempt by EGIS or another bloc intelligence Service to approach the employee DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPT:pld 4-% NW 88608 Docld:32989638 403 X2 Page_ ================================================== Page 404 ================================================== 4-E On July 1-1970+ the State Department announced that Antonin Nenko, former Second_Secretary Czech Embassy, Washington nad defected and requested pofrticai -asyTun In the U, S. Nenko S action caused the termination of a 377 highly successfy 2nd va1uaple operation we nad peen conduct- 1777 gainst the CIS for some time Nenko; 2 major iq the tr 30- Fu Soientific and Technical Departient of the"crs; "had been LX working exclusively I Zhe intelfgence fiela Since 1936 poth in the UnitedStates and_abroad rserfor to_his overt defection Nenko had been under our control_furnishing detalzed highly Sign4ficant Zntornatfon concerning_Czech eperations against tpe U S Although hisovert defection 1s public knowledge his activities 28 our defectorzin- place have not peen revealed but the valuable informa tion Oo he furnished nas been made avajlable to interested Government agencies. In 1969 2 Hungarian_Intelligence Service (4LS) agent came to the U, S a5 an immigrant He has been under 3 FBI control almost since his arrival He was sent by HIS with instructions that he would ultimately take over the direction Of HIS illega] agents in the United States: He nas had seyerar eetings_Vith HIS_handlersand the eperatzon involying hin includes the use ZOf clandestine communications, meets in thira countries secret message_drops and other Sophisticated espionage techniques: Not a11 Of our responsibilities in the Espionage Section involve activity against hostile intelligence services, Among the immigrants from communist countries are many whose hostility to their former communist homelands is such, that given the opportunity, they would take violent action against representatives of their countries of origin. We have effected coverage of these nationality groups designed to permit us to alert responsible outside agencies to threats from such people 0 One example of our effectiveness in this regard occurred in connection with the visit of Yugoskav President Tito to Belgium in October crotg 1970, The Belgian Securi Service 7(3330_ requested our cooperation in its efforts to _rotect Tito In November ~970s_through Legat Paris, we received a letter thanking DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPTaas 4-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 404 ing ty ================================================== Page 405 ================================================== 4-E the Bureau for its invaluable assistance in contributing to its successful handling, yithout serious_incident of the Tito visit 8 Because of our extensive coverage Of anti-tito Yugoslavs in the U, we had been able to furnish con- siderabre information to theBelgzans on possible trouble - makers and to furnish prompt responses to specific inquiries. Returning to our more usual counterespionage work, we developed and operated as a defector-in-place from Julyo1969 Nevember _2970. 2 Soyiet official assigned to a"Soviet establishment in New Yorr City This source aLthough notAffiliated_gith Seviet_iatelligence Fe was abie to furnish information Of counterinteliigence vaiue and to identify members of the_Soyiet_intelligence conmunity. The Source left the United States in November 1970_ but 942823493337 P43 Ner york Oftice received 2 communication from the source through a specia channel The communication 5 indicated @ possibility that he; source_may becable to_cooperate with the U 8 Govergment in the future This posbibility Ca1 Of course, dependent upon {e source 's future Soviet assignments. In October 1970 , the Internal Security Division Of the Department informed us that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security was concerned with the espionage and intelligence activities of Soviets employed at the United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC) We were requested to prepare a paper concerning such activities. The paper was furnished to the Department and to State during November, 1970 . We have now been informed that based on our information U S Ambassador Phillips at the United Nations is considering placing certain restrictions in 'effect concerning the travel of Soviet nationals assigned to UNSEC . Should this take place, our efforts in this matter could definitely lead to more effective and efficient coverage of these Soviet intelligence personnel by the Bureau. Coverage of 2 Soviet establishment, Washington,D.C., 37t revealed Soviets had constriicted_a 23r ten_foot_Square opening_ in the roof covered by 2 door on roliers: Monitor- 712 pZ fir #0 ingdetected a pattern of opening Of the Toof Use Of DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPTaas 4-E NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 405 8ee until Ca4 is, ================================================== Page 406 ================================================== 4-E sophisticated laboratory technical equipment enabled the National Security Agency (NSA) to determine Soviets__were using the opening in tne tooz in an operation to improve @ccuracy %f_guddence syscem Of Soviet_Intercon inental Ba7 iet9 Misstlestazgeted against the United States; NSA and the Defense Integrigezce Agency have stated that this extremely valuabie positive intelligence had not previously been developed any place in the world _ Another counterintelligence operation which has been conducted against the Soviets since 1966_took 2 novel turn since the last inspectiona We had been using this operation to pass disinformation to fhe_Soviets_using ma teriel provided by the Air Force In 7970, we arranged for 2Burean Agentato meet_Zth-xSoviet_in place of the former double agept This meeting__was the product Of prior @Ezengemente_engipeered torhave_the new Soviet handler_eccept_ our Agent 26 his_Rredecessor's 44 former contect The-Sovjetr Who appeared at the Mey_meeting had not been previously known to be an intelligence officer. He gave the double agent instructions for future_operations and we continued to pass Air Eorce material The Joint Chiefs Qf Staff are interested and involved in supporting this operation_ 6 Since we substituted anFBI Agente for r52 the original double-agent we have Obtained sophisticated eSpionage paraphernalia not previously acquired in our other operations against the Soviets_and we have received over 85,000 of Soviet_funds. In another Sensitive double agent operation, conducted against the Soviets for almost 12 years we have been passing di information supplied py the Joint Chief of_Staff to the-Soviets Army anlysis Of resules Qf 0his operation @ndicates Zhat 7t has caused the Soviets to commitzone and a _half billion doliars to an attempt to counteract the_purported U S military #ac 44513%*e 424064 Ati 0 capability desarined the_material Ve-have passed: As recently as Decenbergs1970 word has been received from the Seviets that they plan to continue this operation and may_use an illegal agent_to-do-SO: We have also received from dhe Soviets in this operation over 84260OO Ian DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPTias 4-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 406 MayA May @i4a the: ================================================== Page 407 ================================================== 4-E 4, Foreign Agents_Registration Act (FARA) and_Other Prosecutzve Action On April 17, 1970 , the Internal Security Division Of the Department, based on our investigation, agreed to solicit the registration of Robert_CharlesOgens III under the FARA, a5 an agent of the USSR . On October 1970 , the registration of Endre Kerteszunder Title 50, U S Code_ $ Sections 851-857, in Which he described his assignment for the Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS) was secured by the Department. This was the result of our investigation 0f_Kertesle2 Hungarian immigrant who admitted he had been given an assign- ment by HIS to gather information concerning missile sites in the U, S, Ingur 34, exploitation_Of_@defector from the Yugoslav inteliigence_Service (YIS) we Obtained information that the Yugoszavs had recruited a french_military inteliigence employee Based on our information and follow-up investigation by French authoritiess 1r the French Afficial} Eugene_Rousseau; was convicted of espionage in Aprir) 1970 5 InDecember;; 1970 theSupremeCourt in Paris_Erance;_upheld sentence: of 15 years. 5, Recoveries In many of our double agent operations the double agents receive payments from the foreign intelligence service well in excess of our expenses in conducting the operations. As such operations are concluded, we turn over the balance of monies received to the U. S, Treasury . Since the last inspection, we have turned over to the Treasury, as 2 result of these operations, over S16,000 . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIS ION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPLas_ 4-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 407 2 21*_ his ================================================== Page 408 ================================================== 20 ACCOMPLISHENTS SECTION CHIEF G, C . MOORE RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION The key to developing racial information on a regular and current basis is the operation and development of quality informants along with intensified investigation_ In this regard we have increased the number of our racial informants since the last Inspection by 1,699which brings our total number of informants to 7,184 In addition, we are continually intensifying our investigations and in line with our need for closer coverage of black extremists , we instituted by airtel dated 12-23-70 the Black Extremist Program_ Racial informants have been furnishing a steady flow of valuable racial information which information has brought about the apprehension of badly wanted extremist fugitives the confiscation of explosives and firearms in the possession of extremists, the prevention of violence and the saving of lives In addition, these informants furnished valuable racial intelligence on a regular basis which intelligence included information concerning foreign influence, the Black Panther Party (BPP) underground as well as discussions by extremists as to South American style kidnapping of government officials and threats to kill the President It is significant to note that since the last Inspection racial informants have been responsible for bringing about the arrest of 510 individuals 9 342 of which were local arrests and 168 Federal arrests as well as being responsible for the recovery of 8330,179.03_ In order to improve our investigations and racial informant coverage in addition to our regular supervision furnished from the Seat of Governent we held a two-day conference with racial supervisors from 39 field offices two legal attaches _ The topics discussed at the conference covered the entire spectrum of the problems inherent in investigating and DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIS ION 1-12-71 JGD:bad 4-E NW-88608_Qocld:32989638_Page 408 key Key Plus ================================================== Page 409 ================================================== Mcuas developing informants in the BPP as well as related extrenist matters These topics included detailed discussion concerning the need for full penetration of extremist groups to obtain information concerning terroristic activities which may be aimed against Government officials In addition, the conference took note that maximum attention should be given to the extremist activities in Canada in connection with our investigations as well as intensifying our investigations having international ramifications The above items , along with other items affecting counterintelligence against extremists, the BPP underground activities and intensified investigations were fully discussed _ Concrete suggestions were obtained from this conference and were subjects of individual memoranda which were approved thereby increasing the efficiency of our investigations and informant developmert _ Some of the above-approved suggestions are as follows : 1. Proposal to identify escape routes utilized by black extremists to flee the United States by utilizing a Bureau racial informant as a decoy _ 2 Intensify BPP underground investigations including making available to select field offices copies of the film "The Battle of Algiers 2 " which sets forth guerrilla warfare tactics used successfully by the National Liberation Front and which is now being studied and copied by the BPP 3 , Granting approval for Special Agents in Charge on their own initiative to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a" Special Agent or proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except where such appearances are at educational institutions 4 _ Obtaining approval to reproduce an article by Victor_Riesel noted_Labor columnist = 9 which article was highly critical Of the BPP and set forth a proposal by a union member that unions nffiLiatedIith the freight _handlers who_handle the BPP newspaper_shipments refuse to handle these Papers 994 Ni 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 409 ================================================== Page 410 ================================================== 5 . Obtaining approval for a racial and New Left extremist activities In-Service classes 6 . Obtaining approval for the deletion of the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List from the Black Nationalist Movement in the United States Racial Calendar and transmitting this to the field by separate letter in order to give greater emphasis to these fugitive investigations 7 Obtaining approval for revising the Agitator Index deleting those individuals who are also included on the Security Index. In addition to the above , there are other suggestions made by the attendees at the conference and approved by the Director which will assist in streamlining the overall invesiigative a1d iIforiianz development operatior 6s well as making these operations more effective Some of the concrete examples of our informant and investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following: Through our investigations we have currently identified and closely scrutinized the activities of the 43 branches of the BPP which covers an area of 31 states and the District of Columbia. These investigations reveal that the BPP membership has increased to 1,000 hard-core members which is an increase of 250 in the last six months As a result of our investigations and informant penetration along_with the_cooperation with local authorities _ 3 408 BPP members have been arrested on either Federal or local charges during 1970 _ Racial informants in the Los Angeles and Chicage Divisions were successful in penetrating the BPP underground and now will be in a position to furnish information on BPP underground activities In connection with underground activities, 2 Dellas racial informant furnished the information which brought about the arrest of Elmer Gerard Pratt a LosAngeles BPP leader and an alleged leader in the underground Pratt S arrest along with NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 410 by ================================================== Page 411 ================================================== the arrest of four other of his associates enabled uS to obtain possession of documents apparently relating to the BPP underground and should give uS knowledge concerning it and the possible identities of others involved in this underground operation_ In early June, 1970, efforts were made to establish a National Committee to Combat Fascisi (NCCF) chapter, which is another name for a BPP chapter in Tampa , Florida_ Through aggressive investigation, including thorough interrogation of al1 known members , the development of a tep-Level informant and effective use of information provided by this informant, Tampa Office was successful in decimating this group to the pbint where it is now floundering, nameless and without ieadership and there is no indication of support for the BPP in that area_ The Black Afro Militant Movenent (BAM) was organized in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970 _ The leader of this group was ALfred Duight Amos Featherston an articulate black extrenist and an admitted communist who has in the past, visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. Through the outstanding informant coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive investigative techniques used, this organization for all intent and purposes 3 rendered inactive by the latter part of 1970_ During 1970, BAM engaged in an intensive recruiting program in the Miami area directed toward young blacks _ formed an action group which participated in a number of fire bombings in the Miami area including one such bombing at the University of Miami_ Through informant coverage and other investigative activities 9 the Miami Division developed an excellent case involving the teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices and in December the Departmental Attorneys presented this matter to a Federal Grand Jury in Miami resulting in Featherston Cherles_Reiley and JeromeTrapp- being indicted under the new antiriot laws dealing with the teaching &nd making of incendiary devices_ This is the first such case brought under the new statute charging black extremists with this particular violation_ NW88608_Docld: 329896J8 411 Page ================================================== Page 412 ================================================== A Detroit racial informant furnished advanced information regarding planned ambush of Detroit police officers which, when furnished to Detroit Police Department enabled them to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officers and resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons Informant also furnished information resul in the location and confiscation by Bureau Agents f approximately 50 sticks of dynamite available to BPP and likely resulted in saving of lives and preventing possible property damage _ A Chicago racial informant furnished information which identified an individual who is a member of the BPP as the person who raped and shot a middle white housewife and then pistol whipped her husband in Chicago on 12-25-70 _ The same Chicago informant furnished information which resulted in the identification of 817 individual wbc FzS rczporcible for the murder of a police officer in Carbondale, Illinois_ A Springfield ghetto informant furnished information concerning an individual who was attempting to sell explosives for $2,000 _ This information enabled local authorities to apprehend the individual and confiscate 100 lbs of explosives _ A Boston racial informant made a verbatim recording of a speech by a BPP member where he indicated the Panthers should utilize South American style kidnappings in order to effect the release of Panther political prisoners _ A Norfolk racial informant furnished daily information relating to a. demonstration at Norfolk State College 5/8-18/70_ During this demonstration she reported the_Student_Governent President at the college threatened to kill President Nixon and observed another student burning the American Based on this information, Secret Service is considering prosecution against NW 88608 Docld:32989638 412 ting aged flag_ Page ================================================== Page 413 ================================================== the Student Government President and local police are prosecuting the student who burned the A New York informant furnished the identities of black extremists who were scheduled to depart the U.S for Al Fatah camp in the Middle East for possible guerrilla training_ In discussing the accomplishments of the Racial Intelligence Section, it is felt that comment should be made concerning the contributions regularly being made by the Inspection Division during their analysis of the racial investigations in the various field divisions In addition to acting upon information furnished to them by this Section, the Inspection Staff through their on-the-spot review of racial intelligence matters in the field are often able to detect weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and offer constructive assistance to the' office involved in strengthening their operations In reviewing the racial surveys prepared by the Inspection Division, we regularly note concrete guidance being afforded field offices_ Examples can be found in recent instructions given during the inspection of the Mobile Office to direct two existing informants to seek membership in the Nation of Islam (NOI) These instructions were implemented and both informants currently report on NOI activities and have membership applications pending_ During a recent Cleveland inspection, the Inspectors instructions for the Cleveland Office to develop informants in a leadership position with the Cleveland National Comittee to Combat Fascism (NCCF)_ As a result of these instructions Cleveland has been successful in developing two_informants within this organization both of whom are furnishing valuable information on the structural composition of the organization, staff members and proposed activities One of these informants is a member of the_security cadre of the Cleveland NCCF and as such has furnished valuable information concerning firearms in possession of members of this group NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 413 flag gave ================================================== Page 414 ================================================== Racial intelligence gathered thrpugh our informants and investigations makes up a major portion of the Bureau' s sophisticated document which is disseminated to the White House &nd other high level Government agencies This document captioned -"FBI Summary of Extrenist Activities" furnishes the White House and other agencies with a digest of the racial picture _ The quality of our racial informants can also be judged by the fact that since the last Inspection, 26 Special Agents in various field divisions were recommended for incentive awards for their work in developing informants and 15 racial informants were given bonus awards for valuable information they furnished and services performed _ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 414_ ================================================== Page 415 ================================================== ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E SECTION CHIEF W _ R. WANNALL_ NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION There is attached a summary of significant accomplishments of this Section set forth by individual Units Specific tangible accomplishments resulting from programs supervised by this Section are outlined in write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated herein_ NW 88608 DOOISIS: FXZGHGIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 7 Li"Jn7 0 oxnctC Aly ================================================== Page 416 ================================================== 4-E Nationality Unit Israeli and Middle East Investigations Prior to the beginning of the 25th Session of the United Nations General Assembly this Unit recognized the vulnerability of the large concentration of foreign diplomats attending the Session to acts of terrorism and demonstrations originating with groups dissenting with the incumbent regimes of the countries represented. We issued appropriate instructions to the field to alert sources and provide information immediately which would indicate a threat to the physical security or well being of these dignitaries who were coming to the United States for the Commemorative Session of the United Nations. Subsequent to this action, the White House Similarly recognized the potential danger of embarrassment to the United States a8 host country for the United Nations if incidents occurred; and called on the Bureau to cooperate fully with United States Secret Service to uncover such incidents and provide full security for the chiefs of state and missions resident in New York City during the commemorative celebration: We established a system of liaison with United States Secret Service command post in New York City_ as well as intensifying our liaison with New York City police and United States Mission to the United Nations. A flow of information from our sources was furnished to the interested agencies locally and to the intelligence community at & national level Which resulted in laudatory comments by Secret Service liaison personnel who commented favorably on the Bureau's assistance in completing the Presidentially ordered mission of United States Secret Service in providing security for the officials mentioned. During the same period of the 25th General Assembly of the United Nations 9 we furnished a continuing flow of information to the United States United Nations Mission regarding the the tense Middle East situation and developments related to peace talks instituted by the United States and carried out by United Nations officials. The data furnished to the United States United Nations Mission resulted in the United States Ambassador to the United Nations Charles W. Yost; advising the Director by letter dated 11/13/70 of his desire to pay special tribute to Agents of this Bureau who had provided him with swift and accurate reports which he had found heipful and which provided him With privileged insight and perspective into the maneuverings during the 25th Session: NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 416 ================================================== Page 417 ================================================== 4-E In the Israeli field we have continued to furnish information from our sensitive coverage_under a program of dissemination which has been assigned the security designation of "'SCQPE 1 "SCOPE" information is furnished only to select individuais at the White House and to a previously cleared chain of command within agencies of the intelligence community- These data relate to attempts by officials of 'the_Israeli_Government to obtain favorable reaction within United States Government circles for Israeli_Government support including economic and military assistance_ The personalities involved in these dealings have included prominent members of the United States Congress a8 well aS individuals within the executive arm Of our Government: Favorable comment has been forthcoming from Dr. Kissinger at the White House, from the Secretary of State and from other dignitaries within the intelligence community who have been privy to this "'SCOPE"! information relative to its timeliness and value to them in formrulating policy decisions within our Government: Miscellaneous Programs This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for extremely sensitive operations undertaken in cooperation_Wth the_National Security Agency (NSA designed to enhance our nation 's capability to infiltrate the diplomatic communications of foreign governments: Our first significant breakthrough in this area occurred in 1968and resulted in NSA estimate of 8200,000_annually in evaluating_the product of_Our_coverage: We have realized continued success in this sensitive area with_two additional successes Since the last inspection for &total of_four_nationality ereas being_totally_covered by theBureay at this time_ Dr. Louis W Tordella Acting Directer NSA by letterdated 11/10/70 ~commented most favorablyon the_productivity of our program_in_this_area noting that our coverage provided information of priority concern to the NSAwhich would be otherwise unobtainable to the United States Government. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this information, it is suggested that either I or my Number One Man be consulted for further details. In the migcellaneous espionage area & decided accomplishment was attained with close of investigation relating to Vernon Edward Thompson_of Santa Barbera California In September and October, 1970 , high officials of the intelligence and military communities= cabinet members, Dr. Henry A_ Kissinger and Mr_ Herbert J. Klein NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 417 ================================================== Page 418 ================================================== 4-E of the White House Staff and other highly placed United States Government officials began receiving cryptogram messages which, after decryption, disclosed implication of bombings of certain major cities on 11/29/70. Content of the messages revealed that the writer was privy to intelligence information and possibly had knowledge of United States nuclear weapon deployment; The receipt of these messages was the object of extreme concern by the recipients and resulted in our investigation. Through outstandingly aggressive and imaginative investigation and with a dearth of investigative leads, the Los Angeles Office successfully identified the typewriter on which the messages were being prepared as being located in a library in the_Santa Barbara area. Discreet and productive surveillance was conducted, which resulted in identification of Thompson and his neutralization as a point of anxiety and concern on the part of the highest level of officials in the executive branch and in the intelligence community. We are now awaiting a decision as to prosecution after review of the details of this matter by the Criminal Division of the Department. The President has noted the paucity of positive intelligence information available to him for high-level policy decisions. We have recognized our responsibilities in this area through intensified coverage in the nationality fields supervised by this Unit a8 illustrated in the increase of establishments being afforded sensitive coverage and through the increase of our live informant coverage targeted against the nations involved: Three of the Six new foreign liaison posts established recently by the Bureau involve countries within the area of responsibility of this Unit and information from those liaison posts should add to the production of our foreign intelligence information in response to President Nixon's requirements. NW 88608 Docld: 37989638 Page 418 ================================================== Page 419 ================================================== ~1 CUBAN UNIT Our sustained pressure on Cuban Intelligence Service (CuIS) operations in the U.S _ resulted in the recall to Cuba of three very experienced CuIS fficers in April, 1970 _ They had been serving as officials of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN ) and their withdrawal was in line with information provided 2 CIA source_ to the effect that the 49 Lar Cuban Government planned t recalI any personnel Whom Tt 0f _ Jt believed were susceptible to"Persona non grata ac ctio by the 4xct HRG US State Department Based on FBI information, a leading Puerto Rican terrorist in New York City (Carlos_Feliciano_Vasquez ) was apprehended by the New York City Police Department on 16 , 1970 , while in the process of placing a bomb in an Armed Forces recruiting station. After being confronted by uS in early August 9 1970 , a very attractive and sexually permissive employee of the South African Washington, D admitted her deep involvement with tne She had furnished the Cubans data concerning American and foreign officials with whom she was in social contact. After becoming sexually involved with a State Department protocol officer in March , 1970 , she was able to gain entree to diplomatic functions where she met ranking officials and employees of the U.S_ and foreign governments_ Our investi- gation indicated she was unable to establish contact with her principal to furnish information concerning the dignitaries she met following her involvement with the protocol officer and she voluntarily returned home to South Africa shortly after our interview of her Her name i3 Jennifer Enid Miles A San Juan Office source was primarily responsible for developing information leading to the conviction on 8/26/70 of four Socialist Workers Party (PSO) leaders in Puerto Rico. The information developed by our source enabled the Police of Puerto Rico to arrest a total of nine PSO members The PSO has been active in the wave of bombings taking place in Puerto Rico and the arrests were for violations of the Puerto Rican Explosives Law_ Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection 1/12/71 RAM: 4-E NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 419 by May imbassy- cuIS C., dlw_ n ================================================== Page 420 ================================================== During the Summer of 1970 a counterintelligence program aimed at creating dissension was instituted by our San Juan Office against the activist Puerto Rican Socialist League (LSP) On October 10 1970 , a high-placed Miami security informant reported the LSP was Showing signs of grinding to 2 halt and that it recently experienced a severe away from its youth group_ Our counterintelligence move was directly responsible for the havoc occurr in the LSP_ As a result of disclosures made by Jennifer Enid Milesand other corroborative evidence developed by New York and Washington Field Office, we were able to have State Depart- ment declare persona non grata the two highest ranking CuIS Officials in the U.S on October 9 , 1970 _ Counsellor Rogelio RodriguezLopez and First Secretary Oxlando Prendes Gutierrez_ Of the CMUN were the individuals involved and they made a total of seven against whom similar action has been taken by State Department since February , 1938, based Uf FBl investigati3zs cf CMUN personnel _ On October 10, 1970 , Filiberte_Qjeda_Rigs a known Cuban espionage agent and a Bureau fugitive, was apprehended by FBI agents and the Police of Puerto Rico_ Oiedax leader of the Puerto Rican Armed Revolutionary Independence Tovement (MIRA) , had been the prime mover behind the wave of violence and terrorist bombings which has occurred for many months in Puerto Rico . Documents found at his hideout definitely confirmed the close collaboration between the Cuban Government and Puerto Rican terrorist groups _ On October 19, 1970, an intensification program was instituted by our Miami Office based on instructions from the Bureau aimed at identifying CuIS agents in the Miami area who are believed to be tipping off Castro concerning infiltration efforts by anti-Castro refugees in the U.S_ A coordinator had been made responsible for directing these efforts and progress has been made in eliminating certain suspects as well as developing valuable background regarding other logical suspects _ In_December _1970 an actual member of the_clandestine 45 MIRAorganization e previously mentioned X was developed as an informant This is the first informantto be_in a position to get inside information regarding the group S plans and we previousLyhad to_depend_ on_"fringe Mi sources to cover this very dangerous terrorist group _ 2 NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 420 split ing ================================================== Page 421 ================================================== Since our intensification program directed against the CMUN was begun in February, 1970, we have been able to institute some sensitive coverage for a period of six months , have installed equipment which can moni #e handie-talkie radiosusedhy Cufs personnel have learned that CuIS personnel carry arms at a1 times and have developed sources in a position to keep uS advised as to the activities of such personnel on a 24-hour basis NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 421 tor ================================================== Page 422 ================================================== 4-E ACCOMPLI SHMENTS MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT The President and other policy makers have 2 continuing interest in current political matters affecting Central and South America We have provided officials in the Executive Branch of the Government on a continuing basis with information concerning the activities of political figures and leftist groups in a number of Latin American nations _ Of particular Significance was information concerning the activities of ArnulfoAriaSMadrid,_deposed Panamanian_President: residing in Miami Florida who is planning the over- throw of the current Panamanian Government In an effort to provide the President and other policy makers with even more such information, we have recently expanded our coverage in the Chilean 9 Peruvian and Bolivian fields. The unit continues to be successful in thwarting plans of militant anti-Castro groups Which have sought to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and property of foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba Successful development of key informants who have infiltrated anti-Castro groups under Bureau direction has enabled the Bureau to keep abreast of their activities and often to have advance knowledge of the plans of these groups enabling uS to take appropriate_ action to prevent such activities. An outstanding example of our success in this area was the thwarting of two militant anti-Castro T attempts in 1970 to infiltrate Cuba and the seizure of boats, arms, ammunition and miscellaneous military equipment valued at $64,500 by U, S_ authorities_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/11/71 VHN; emj 4-E NWV 88608 Dbcld:32989638 Page 422 July, ================================================== Page 423 ================================================== THE CHINESE UNIT 4-E As a result of our close cooperation with RCMP , that agency , in 12/70 , provided uS with details of one of its double agent operations which clearly depicted intensi- fication of Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence efforts directed against the United States We learned that the Chicoms have funded travel of the RCMP source to New York and Washington, D.C_ 9 where the source undertook to fulfill in- telligence contacts and development of data for the Chicoms _ As a result of getting this information, we learned that Chicoms desire to the foundation to "our people" (Chicoms) into the United States under suitable cover probably when the Chicom Embassy pens in Canada in the very near future The Director's letter to the Commissioner , RCMP , expressed appreciation for RCMP information Dur August 1 1970 , three of our Chinese informants made contacts with Chicom intelligence representatives_in Hong_Kong and Canada_nand it_is_believed_they-were affirma= tivelyassessed_for recruitment_ Another source has _ade 'several trips toVancouvera Canada and-San Erancisco where 64 74 be has ,made strides to penetrate Chicom groups which would be essential bases for future Chicom operations directed against the United States_ 6 In August 1970_-Nationa] Security Agency Gr (NSA) advised of increased interceptions of radiostransmissions 256 Trom_RRed_China directed foillegal-agents possibly in_the United States Immediate instructions were "directed to appro- priate field offices and efforts are under way to pinpoint areas 0f reception 332 with the expectation that illegal agents will be uncovered. Investigations have developed data indicating possi_ ble Chicom intelligence net formed in New York City utilizing Chinese seamen deserters as mail drops and/or couriers _ We identified a Chinese alien residing in New Jersey as an individual who provided an intelligence report to the New_China_News_Agency_(NCNA representative in Canada The NCNA representative_has_previously_been_identified as a Chicom Intelligence Service officer The alien indicated he had a sub-agent working for him in New York City _ EXO:dgo 1/13/71 NW 88608 Daci8.32989638 Page 423 lay get ing 3e ================================================== Page 424 ================================================== :- 2 _ 4-E In view of the apparent upsurge in Chicomn activity we furnished a detailed memorandum to Dr Kissinger at the White House and to the Attorney General under date of 9/30/70 _ Our memorandum outlined the recent activities of Chicom in the intelligence field and pointed out increasing Chicom support for New Left and Black militant revolutionaries in this country _ We furnished information to State, Central Intelligence Agency and Secret Service which led to strengthening of guard and security around CHIANG Ching-Kuo } Deputy Prime Minister of Nationalist China and son of CHIANG Kai-shek, who was in the United States during April, 1970_ As 2 result of this increased security, an attempt by two anti-Chinese nationalist individuals to assassinate CHIANG was thwarted_ Our investigations of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) and Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) &zvezoped infcrziticr cf growing: Chicom intereet {n these groups indicating Chicoms might desire to cooperate with them to bring about the downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government _ positive information has been developed regarding the intelligence activities of pro-Chicom individuals assigned to the United Nations Secretariat: Our close coverage determined that the three most active of these individuals recently traveled to Europe,_ 4 and coverage 0f their activities has been requested through contacts of Legate Berz We have initiated an effort in four field offices to develop sources among ethnic Chinese scientists having security clearance and who are logical Chicom targets We were assisted in this effort byaDefensea IndustriaL Secarity "ffice We brought to attention of the White House and Secretary of State Rogers information regarding an anti-Chinese 'nationalist individual who had escaped house arrest in Taiwan, fled to Sweden and who later applied for U. S . visa His presence in the United States could have adversely affected United States-Chinese Nationalist relations Secretary of State Rogers took personal note 0f this information in 2 letter to the Director 10/28/70 _ Other investigations indicated intensified Chicom interest in and support of radicals in the United States_ S9 NW 88608 Docld 32989 key ================================================== Page 425 ================================================== SPECIAL COORDINATION_UNIT During December , 1970 , six new foreign offices were established_ As a result of personnel moves , 19 Special Agents and 16 clerks were transferred to foreign offices each requiring passport 9 visa, and Department of State and Embassy notifica- tion_ The numerous contacts with State and the outgoing letters (two for each person transferred) were handled in this Unit, together with the memoranda and notification to the White House regarding various phases of the operation_ 4 special one-week indoctrination session was arranged and attended by most of the new Special Agent personnel _ The Director's instructions that the expansion take place were issued 11-20-70 Each of the new offices was open and opera- during December , 1970 _ Through liaison with appropriate officials at the White House , the interest of those officials in proposed legislation which would provide increased retirement benefits for FBI personnel has been maintained _ The advice of these officials concerning channels to be used in promoting this legislation was secured and has been followed _ Since the last inspection, SA Haynes has expedited and coordinated visits of the Director to the White House on approximately six occasions This has included meeting the Director taking him to the meeting site, introducing him to persons present if not known to and assuring his return to his car by the most direct route following the meeting _ Through carefully controlled contacts with the Commission on Campus Unrest , it was possible to secure 2 copy 0f their report in advance in order to insure that there were no unfavorable comments concerning the FBI The left- wing staff 0f. this Commission was very active in areas of direct interest to the Bureau, and SA Haynes was able to avoid any conflict and there were no derogatory references to our work made by tbis group _ Direct personal liaison was established during the period with Washington representatives of two additional countries: The Union of South_Africa_and Jappan The repre- sentative the Bureau for State Security Of the former and ~Of the Nationa] _Police Agency_of the latter are now working directly with representatives of the Unit. NW 88608 02a032089638 425 ting him, of Page ================================================== Page 426 ================================================== Swiss Police asked Bureau assistance in establishing the location of YosephGaXgYle W-a:-4 who bad secured more than 8400, 000 in an armed robbery of a jewelry store in Zurich The ioot was recovered in Italy, and investigation under the Foreign Police Cooperation character resulted in the location of Gargy in the United States_ We arranged for his arrest by other authorities so that he migbt be held for extradition_ During the calendar year 1970 , Agents on the Foreign Liaison Desk handled 822 foreign visitors_ These included not only special tours of Bureau facilities but also, in many instances special conferences with Bureau officials including the Director 9 and other courtesies for these contacts of our Legal Attache personnel _ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 426 ================================================== Page 427 ================================================== SURVEYS 9 PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICA TION PROGRAMS 4- INSPECTOR E . 8 . MLLER: You are requested to furnish information regarding various surveys projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This infor S= mation Should include identity of the project or program, background and date of inception_ 9 scope and desired objectives } positive results achieved Since last inspection } extent and nature of current supervision current justification for continuance _ } and frequency of evaluation and date of last justification Identify any surveys projects or programs you have in operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any surveys projects and programs completed or discontinued Since the last inspection. Identify only investigative-type matters in this category Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs instituted Since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you may wish to comment on: 1. Security Index Program. 2 . Security Informants _ 3. Racial Matters . 4. Racial Informants _ 5 . Technical and Microphone Surveillances . 6. Counterintelligence_ Minutemen } Klan and other hate groups_ 8 Nation of Islam_ 9_ Communist infiltration of racial groups. 10. New Left Movement_ 11. Espionage. 12_ other program deemed pertinent: Comments of Assistant Director requested: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN Attached are write-ups from JAS mls 1/15/71) each Section concerning tbe above . DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/8/71 NWT DS04032989638 Page 427 Any 88608 ================================================== Page 428 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/ OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-B SECTION CHIEF ARBOR T _ GRAY : 03 In connection with the Inspector 's request under above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following handled by the Internal Security Section: (1) Security Index Progran (2) Security Informant Program (6) & (7) Counterintelligence Program Disruption of Wbite Hate Groups (12) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent (a) Thumbnail Sketch Program DOMEST IC INTELLIGENCE DIV ISION INSPECT ION 1/12/71 ~SEP:lnj 4-K NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 428 ================================================== Page 429 ================================================== SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM 4-H BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat to the national security began prior to World War II_ The actual program began in June 1940 , and dealt wainly with lists of individuals considered for detention in the event of a ' threat to the national security. SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES This program is field-wide in scope The goal of the Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals who because of their membership and activity and/ or association with subversive or ganizations are dangerous or potentially dangerous_ to the internal security of the country_ The program includes the coliection of SUIIicient information reiai iu the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension and detention in the event of a national emergency _ Another goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize possibilities Of espionage , sabotage and subversion_ POSITIVE_RESUUS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSRECTIQN By way of background in February 1969 , 2s a matter of temporary expediency, the Executives Conference approved a moratorium on certain Security Matter Be Communist investigations and periodic report writing in Priority II and Prior III Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971 . By memorandum October 29 1970, from the Executives Conference to Mr Tolson, approved by the Director the moratorium was lifted _ At the time there mere approximately 10,690 individuals on the SI who were of the Priority II and III types_ Virtuelly no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7 , 000 of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 SSEE;lnj_ 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 429 ing ity ================================================== Page 430 ================================================== SECUR ITY INDEX PROGRAM 4-H BASIC REVOLUT IONARY ORGANIZATIONS February } 1969 _ Many of these persons had changed residence and/ or employment and their whereabouts were unknown It can thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an aggressive timely and precise step tomard fulfilling ow: current responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of these individuals _ Implementation was directed by airtel November 3 , 1970 , to all offices, and in doing So wve took 2 realistic step in permitting the field to stagger the reopening Of these cases So that they would be spread out over the period November 3 1970 , to June 30, 1971 _ This was considered essential" in vien of our approximation that it woula be necessary to reopen approximately 7 , 000 of the Priority II and III types _ EXTENT AND NATURE OP CURRENT SUPERVISION Rasponsibility for administrative handling of the SI rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section. Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate supervisory personnel_ I personnally follow this matter closely to insure it is current and that necessary changes are made where desirable This program receives constant supervision_ JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE This is a major internal security program based upon Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be implemented in the event of 2 national emergency to minimize acts of espionage , sabotage and subversion _ FREQUENCYOF EVALUATION The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated _ The most recent justification is contained in memorandum from Charles D Brennan to T . C. Sullivan dated January 8, 1970, and as of instant date (January 12, 1971) a current rejustification memorandum is in preparation _ DOHESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 SFR;lmj 4-H NW88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 430_ ================================================== Page 431 ================================================== SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM 4-H BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS At the time of the last inspection in April, 1970 , we had 279 member security informants in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) while at the present time we have 264 member informants in the 'CRUSA, a decrease of 15 _ In addition, there are 31 member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) ; the number of SWP informants at last inspection is not known On December 16 1970 , 2 reorganization of Sections within the Division resuited in 2 realignment of informant handling and record keeping, with the result that only informants in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups are now handled in the Internal Security Section As 0f December 16 1970 , there were 578 informants in basic revolutionary organiza- tions and related groups The number at last inspection is not known . There has been continuing recognition of the fact that there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant coverage in basic revolutionary organizations In this regard, SAC Letter 70-40 dated August 4 , 1970 , captioned "Racial and Security Informants," pointed out in-depth quality informants in these fields are more imperative than ever under present conditions in view 0f the upsurge in violence SAC Letter 70-48 dated September 15, 1970 , captioned "Security and Racial Informants," pointed out that never in our history have we been confronted with as critical a need for informant coverage. This SAC Letter authorized development of informants between the ages of 18 and 21, thus presenting the field with a tremendous opportunity to expand informant coverage not only among violence-prone New Left and radical groups , but also in the basic revolutionary groups as well There can be no doubt but that these instructions have stimulated development of informants Security informant development receives continuous supervision_ It is not technically a program justified annually , but rather a fundamental procedure in our investigative operations that requires and receives vigorous day-to-day, attention. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 431 ~QEEEMamki ================================================== Page 432 ================================================== COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM DISRUPTION OF WHITE HATE GROUPS 4-H BACKGROUND DATE OF INCEPT ION AND DES IRED OBJECTIVES This program was initiated in September , 1964 , for the purpose of exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing activities Of white extremist organizations_ } their leaders and adherents_ There are currently 17 field offices regularly participating in this program and as Specific situations arise other divisions also participate, POSITIVE RESUTS ACHIEVED The follow are highlights of accomplishments achieved through this program since last inspection: A racial informant of tbe Birningham Division has been able to influence Robert_Shelton: Jeader_%f the largest Klangroup, Unitea rians Of America, Inc } (UKA) } to be more moderate in bis speeches by opposing violence and stressing need for law and order as well 2s continuing his acts against communism, This has been Bffective in toning down Klan violence Midwest coordinator of National Socialist White People 's Party, former known as Anerican Nazi Party, was expelled from that organization after publicity furnished under this program disclosed he was of Jewish descent . Through manipulation of informants, anonymous letters and utilization of friendly press services we were successful in creating a split in the UKA in North Carolina This split was brought about when a rally of dissident Klansmen in September 1969, showed their disaffection with the UKA leader- ship by burning their Klan membership cards_ This split was highlighted in front page news stories in North Carolina newspapers_ Dur 1970 National Klonvokation, Robert Shelton Who_was_again elected pperial Wizard, made a Speech Tndicating bis feelings that high ranking members of the UKA may be disloyal and that he definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and DOMEST IC INTELLIGENCE DIVIS ION INSPECTION 1/12/71 MLAilni 4-H NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 432_ ing ly ing ================================================== Page 433 ================================================== 4-H possibly utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan officers and members to ferret out FBI informants As a result, we recently furnised reliable news sources with information In belief that public exposure will deter considerably from any future enactment of these plans _ It is too early to determine results of this move at this time As a result Of counterintelligence action taken through racial informants in the Knoxville Div ision, we were successful in having the Exalted CycTope Of Mascot Klavern #778, Mascot Tennessee 9 Thomas Stipas eliminated from this position and were able to have him subsequently banished from the Klan_ This was brought about by having our racial informants create dissension Within the ranks Of this Klavern_ Through the use of two racial informants of our Little Rock Division, we were successful in causing the defeat of a Klansmen who was campaigningto be elected as Sheriff of Jeffergen Cezunty, Arkanses Thie individunl Vietor Calvert Ezalted Cyclops Pine Bluff Klavern, Association Of Arkansas Klans 1n conducting his campaign attempted to hide his Klan affiliations because he hoped to receive a good percentage of the Negro vote in his area Our informants were successful in discreetly letting out the word of his secret Klan membership. As a result of counterintelligence action taken, Melvin_Sextons Inperial Kligrapp (National Secretary of the UKA , the largest Klan organizatfon in the country, resigned fro his position_ Both Sexton and his wife, in addition to being Klan me mbers, were employed in the National Office Of the United Klans of America _ This is particularly significant in that for many years Sexton had been "number one man" to Imperial Wizard Robert M; Shelton of the UKA and actually ran the UKA While Shelton was i0 prison following his conviction for Contempt of Congress_ This resignation was brought about by our informants planting the seeds of distrust regarding Sexton and exposing the fact that Sexton had a serious drinking problem. CURRENT SUPERV IS ION AND JUSTIF ICATION FOR CONT INUANCE The counterintelligence program requires little additional' manpower since these extremists are under continuous DOMSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECT ION 1/12/71 LLA : Imj 48 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 433 top ================================================== Page 434 ================================================== W3h 4-H investigation. All counterintelligen ce proposals are subuitted to the Bureau for approval and positive results achieved from this prograi, when balanced against the relatively small expenditure of Agent and supervisory time, indicates that its continuance is justified. This program 18 re-_evaluated annually and was last re-evaluated by memorandum G. C . Moore to W? . C . Sullivan dated July 20, 1970 . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIS ION INSPECT ION 1/12/71 LLA;lmi_ 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 434 ================================================== Page 435 ================================================== THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM 4-H This program was initiated and authorized by SAC Letter 53-72 (J) dated October 27 1953 , to insure that the field 1s using current characterizations of subversive organizations and to provide uniformity in characterizing such or 'ganizations_ Those characterizations deemed to be of field-Hide interest are now to be furnished to the field by letter to all offices on an annual basis rather than SAC Letter as was formerly the practice, in accordance with approval of suggestion in memorandum J . J. Casper to Mr Mohr dated December 7 , 1970 . The background and value of this program is the same 2s it was at the time Of the write-ups for the 1970 inspection. Upon receipt of the annual letters from the field in June, 1970, 422 separate ciaracierizaiiois mEre recaivcd 3zd ~cmiz3ed by appropriate supervisory personnel at the Bureau. Those of field-wide interest were furnished to the field by SAC Letter 70_62 dated November 1970_ The remaining characterizatlons were returned to interested field Offices following their approval by the Bureau _ This program was last reviewed and analyzed and its continuance approved by memorandum R. Ls Shackelford to Mr . C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970 . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECT ION 1/12/71 HEMa:lmi 4-H NW88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 435_ by 3 , ================================================== Page 436 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AN /OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRA MS 4- New Left Hovement Sec tion Chief: R. I. Shackelford The following surveys projects and/or intensification programs are in effect against the New Left movement : By airtel to SAC Albany and a1l offices dated 10/23/68 , the field was instructed to expand its Key Activist programs and these programs were intensified, Each Office was instructed to submit its recommendations on individuals considered as Activists_ The field was instructed to maintain high-level informant coverage On these individuals The purpose of this program is to render Key Activists ineffective and thereby drastically reduce their influence io:the New Left movement_ At the present time there are 75 Key Activists under intensive investigation A Key Activist Album which contains photographs and biographical data On each Key Activist has been assembled and has been furnished to all offices _ The Key Activist Album is maintained in a current status 9 40 are subjects of prosecutive action The Album bas proven to be invaluable in following the activities and travels of New Left activists } both for the Seat of Government and for the field_ airtel dated 3/10/69 to SAC , Albany 9 and 211 offices , the field was instructed to submit summary reports every three months on those individuals designated as Key Activists The field was also instructed to prepare an appropriate communicatio suitable for dissemination in the event any of these individuals held a speaking engagement and whenever they made a statement indicating a propensity for violence or urging student agitation. The purpose of this program was to aevelop information in respect to the securing of testimony and evidence concerning violations of statutes within the Bureau 's jurisdiction in connection with leaders involved with campus disorders By letter to all offices dated 5/5/69 the field was instructed that when it is ascertained that a Key Activist is scheduled to speak on campus in addition to the coverage of his appearance they should determine through established sources the amount received by him and the source Of the funds _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 WAP:dir 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 436 Key By Page ================================================== Page 437 ================================================== MbAl The purpose of this is (1) to provide for 2 central- ized reporting of Ner Left activity in this field; (2) to enable uS to keep abreast of funds utilized to finance these Inflammatory speeches ; (3) to enable uS to take advantage of situations which could embarrass the New Left or stifle future activity; (4) to facilitate the necessary evaluation and analysis by the Bureau and other interested agencies By letter dated 12/23/69 to al1 field offices 9 information concerning financial aspects of the New Left were emphasized_ 1 and the field tas instructed to develop solid information concerning the travelling of Key Activists By airtel to SAC , 9 Aibany_ and ali Offices dated i0/28/68 , a program Ras insti tuted to Obtain 2 comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement . Offices were instructed to prepare sumary reports_ On the Neiv Left movenent in their territories_ The purpose of these reports was to Obtain 2 eomprehensive study Of the movenent in order t0 assess its potential dangerousness Following the submission of the original summary reports, offices Were instructed to submit sucb reports On a quarterly basis with an appropriate breakdown of the material in the report: These reports enable_ the Bureau to maintain recent and comprehensive information_concerning various aspects of the New Left movement ; These repotts are disseninated to interested agencies to enable them to maintain 2 clear picture 6f New Left movement_ Sic. ietter 7o-ll (E)_&atea 3/3/70 instructed fieid to @iscontinue submission 0f quarterly letter lsting identities 6f New Left movement groups under investtgation; coverage afforded each group and programs of each office to develop necessary coverage_ This riormation in order to streamline paper work is DOw to be set forth in cover pages Of New Left quarterly report . By {litei to ali 6ffices dated i2/9/70,instructiors #ere reiterated to- the field concerning the preparation and content of New Left movement quarterly reports The organizaticns to be inc luded in this report were noted aS well as the sub- headings to be utilized; 4 brief analysis of the current status 6f New Left activity in each Division is io be inc luded in tbe cover pages of the report as well as the number of individual cases opened and closed concerning 8DS menbers as well a5 members 6f pro-communist militant New Lef campus organizations who foilow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence . = % = NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 437 t-type ================================================== Page 438 ================================================== Ao By letter dated 11/5/68 , to SAC Albany , and a2l offices under the caption of "New Left Kovemen€ , Publications , intecuai Security 4 Miscellaneous } 11 the field was instructed to cover the principal propaganda mills Of the New Left which are described as the 'underground M newspapers The field was instructed to conduct 2 detailed survey Of these publications and to submi t information concering these obscene, seditious and inflammatory newspapers At the present tine , there are over 200 such publications being circulated. Cases on various of these newspapers Which are deemed important to the New Left movement have been opened. By airtel dated 3/16/70 to all offices, a survey was instituted to determine the amount of financial support given to New Left groups tax-exempt charitable foundations prominent or wealchy individuals and politically oriented groups _ The field was instructed to furnish results of this survey in form suitable for dissemination, letter to all Special Agents in Cuerge , iated 2/13/70 , the field was advised that the militant and violence- prone Heatherman faction of the SDS planned to go underground and to direct "strategic sabotage 121 at military and police installations The field wes iostructed to advise appropriate local police agencies of the aims or the Weatherman faction and of the necessity to vigorous investigate the Weathernan group. By airtel to all field offices Gated 3/19/70 the fleld Ras advised of the plans of the Wea therman faction of the SIS to form commando-type units to engage in bombing , arson and assassination_ The field was instructed to make @ery effort to locate and identify Heathernan comunes and their activists A list of major Keathernan activists was furnished to the field which instructed intensive investigation to determine their whereabouts and to advise the Bureau and office 0f origin on a weekly basis The field was instructed to utilize a, caution statement tbat IFea therman activists should be considered dangerous for their known propensity for violence. Bureau airtel to select offices handling bulk of Weatherman investigations dated 3/24/70 reiterated instructions in airtel to a11 offices 3/19/70 and specifically noted that Newv Left communes were to be located and participants identified to determine if they were violence prone _ The offices were instructed to bave Special Agents assigned to these investigations to be reminded of their prosecutive potential and to consider establishing 2 special squad to fully comply With Bureau instructions to intensify these investigations NW 88608 Docld:32989638_Page 438 3 by By 1y ================================================== Page 439 ================================================== Bureau airtel to Chicago 3/24/70 instructed that office to promptly initiate investigations and interview a11 individuals who were arrested in Chicago during National Action week 10/8-11/69 if such investigations not already undertaken _ Over 280 individuals were arrested most of which were either members of or closely associated with Weatherman group. Chicago airtel to numerous offices 4/9/70 restated Bureau instructions SAC Letter 70-18 (C) dated 4/7 /70 under caption "Ner Left and Black Extrenist Terrorism Bombing Matters" set forth instructions to be followed in bombing and attenpted bombing matters In those instances of bombing Or arson which appear to have New Left or black extremist connotations Or motivation and where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists or the Departmen t bas advised no investigation is warranted the Bureau is to be immediately advised Setting forth pertinent data regarding involvement Of subversive groups or individuals suspected in the incident as Well as 2 recommendation for any additional investigation warranted . Teletype to all SACs 4/17/70 set forth specific areas of investigations to be covered by field in lts investigations against New Left terrorist groups and individuels and also set forth the definition of a comune for purposes of Bureau investigations and instructed field to conduct sufficient investigation of all members of the commune when they are members of 2 commune falling within Bureau standards for investigation The field also was instructed to develop that informant coverage necessary Of a11 communes and/or groups so that advance knowledge Of any planned violence could be Obtained to insure preventive action be initiated ard prosecutive action broughtto bear where possible . By airtel to all offices 5/11/70 the field was authorized to interview al1 Venceremos Brigade (VB) members on SAC authority on completion 0f investigation except in those instances where the subject is under 21, currently 2 student professor } has some connection with an institution Of learning Or is a journalist_ Bureau approval is still needed concerning the latter individuals _ 4 4 - NW B8608_Docld: 32989638 Page 439_ ================================================== Page 440 ================================================== Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70 instructed the field to begin implementation of investigations of New Left terrorism promptly with available manpower and sca le of implementation should be a5 rapid as possible All adherents to Weatherman ideology of advocating a Marxist- Leninist revolution now and use terroristic tactios in furtherance of revolution are to be subjects of these investigations All of these subjects are to be considered for Priority I of the Security Index, interviewed and the Bureau advised every 45 days by letter of those placed 1n Priority I of their current residence and any other pertinent information developed . @ facilitate handling at the Bureau , a11 reports and other cOmmunications within defined categories are to include word (Weatherman) in cheracter _ This airtel also instructed each office to submit monthly airtel beginning 6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities and locations of communes or organizations under investigation; (2) number of cases opened during month on individuals in these categories; (3) total number of individua 1 cases under investigation ; (4) informant coverage used against communes or organizations; and , (5) brief summary Of New Left-oriencea violence in area duriug preceding month and action taken. Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 concerning the VB Instructed a11 offices to immediately intensify investigations Of all returnees from Cuba with this Brigade, ascertain their whereabouts 9 conduct prompt interviews and submit current reports with Security Index recommendation . In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy to 2 violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and Willingness to participate in that revolution by these VB members , the field was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every 90 days of whereabouts and activities Of Priority II and III and nor-Security Index returnees In case Of Priority I Security Index subjects this information is to be furnished the Bureau every 45 days _ Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 forwarded the field a copy of a Departmera 1 letter concerning the specific areas of interest to the Department in campus disorders looking toward possible prosecutive action. The field was specifically instructed to develop information concerning New Left involvement in campus violence and all agitational activities prior to and during violent campus disorders subversive groups and such information must be fully determined and reported_ 5 5 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 440 by Page ================================================== Page 441 ================================================== SAC Letter 70-30 (D) dated 6/2/70 reiterated prior instructions Of moratorium on Security Matter Communist investigations _ Recent field inspections indicated some Offices needed clarification of this moratorium_ The SAC Letter noted instructions concerning moratorium Only applied to routine communist investigations and not those individuals belonging to such groups as the Wea therman Progressive Labor Party, Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance_ Bureau airtel to all offices 7 /16/70 noted that New Left terrorism is continuing through bombings 9 arsons and other forms 0f violence and each SAC must personally insure sufficient personnel are assigned to handle these matters as well as investigating individuals involved and those following Weatherman ideology Of utilization of violent revolutionary tactics against our Government _ Bureau airtel to select offices dated 8/20/70 handling Key Activists were instructed to promptly submit to tne Bureau Sufficieut jaiidmziting Specizcng cf 3zch Key Activist and the specimen is to be placed in the National Security File maintained by the Iaboratory _ This was done in view of the propensity for violence of these individuals and the fact a number of them are currently Bureau fugitives _ SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70 captioned "New Left Hovement Violence, Internal Security B Miscellaneous (Weatherman) 11 refers to strategic sabotage plans Of Weatherman against military and police installations and 'Dec laration Of Har "' by Weatherman underground and instructs a11 security personnel to develop better informant coverage. This developent shoula concern informants and sources who can furnish advance information regarding activities of Wea therman and other terrorist groups and was specifically stressed _ By airtel to a11 offices dated 9/3/70 captioned "Attacks on Police, Extremist Activity 11 the field was instructed , because of increa sed attacks on police, that it can be expected there will also be 'physical attacks against the FBI and it should be insured that all Special Agent personnel are fully cognizant of this possibifity_ If information is received targeting police, appropriate 6 - NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 441 ================================================== Page 442 ================================================== investigation must be immediately instituted and informants directed to develop full facts concerning the attack The purpose of these investiga tions is to obtain complete intelligence data concerning any extremist influence. SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70 under caption "'Ner Left and Black Extremist Terrorism L Informant Coverage 11 instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing new productive informants who can infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations their collectives ) comunes and staffs Of their underground newspapers Constructive plans to implement this progran are to be included in Item 4 of the monthly airtel On "New Left Movement- Violence " Which was outlined in Bureau airtel to a11 offices 5/13/70 . Bureau airtel to al1 offices 10/1/70 instructed the field to replace the word (Weatherman) as noted in Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70 With the word (Extremist)_ This was done to insure prompt and efficient routing at the Bureau &5 well as proper Lardliz; i2 tke field_ 4 2ew caution statement was also t0 be inc luded in all correspondence in respect to those individuals involved in Weathermnan and other New Left extremist activities SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70 captioned "New Left Hovemen t Police Training Hatters 1i advised the field that in view of recent developents concerning Violence caused by New Left terrorists 9 the Bureau will consider requests from the field for SACs or ASACs to brief local law enforcement command and supervisory personnel regarding New Left extremism and violence at law enforcement meetings and conferences where attendance is restricted to full-tine duly: constituted law enforcement Officials_ Bureau airtel to a11 Offices dated 11/3/70 advised the field that the moratorium of suspension of report writing in Priority II Security Index cases and suspension of verification of residence and employment in Priority II and Priority III cases is rescinded_ Offices were instructed to reopen a proportionate number of cases each month and insure a1l were open by 6/30/71. Furthermore } residence and employment On a11 Of these subjects is to be verified annual reports submitted in Priority II cases and LHH submitted in Priority III cases where necessary . NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 442 27 ================================================== Page 443 ================================================== Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/4/70 instructed the field to initiate investigation of a11 members of SDS and members of pro-communist, militant New Left-type campus organizations wbo follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence. Each individual under investigation shou ld be considered for the Security Index Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning informant development in New Left groups noted that each SAC was to make this matter his persona 1 concern in order that penetration Of these groups by top quality informants Will be accomplished in the imediate future: Each SAC was directed to submi t to the Bureau 11/13/70 a complete ana lysis of his informant coverage in New: Left groups clearly setting forth the weaknesses and productive steps being taken to rectify these weaknesses Current Bureau instructions require development of adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States Air Torce (PROSAB) to insure that Our investigative responsibilities in the sabotage espionage and internal security fields can be properly discharged Semiannual reports are submitted by each office bavinga Strategic Air Command Base or an Intercontinental Ballistic Hissile Base within itS territory _ A review of semiannual reports submitted by the field 2s of 7/1/70 disclosed that a total 0f 1281 informants have been developed . Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised field that special Single fingerprint file oz Weatherman fugitives and other Newv Left terrorists has been started_ Field is instructed to immediately review files for identity of individuals who fit category f a New Left terrorist and whosefingerprints Should be included in this special Single fingerprint file_ Names of these individuals were to be submitted to Bureau With sufficient identifying data and 25 new names cone to attention of office promptly furnish the Bureau 8 - NW 88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 443_ by ================================================== Page 444 ================================================== SURVEYS J PROJECTS AND/ OR INTENS IFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H PMr Section Chief RS D. Cotter: Following are applicable activities of Research Section_ Survey_Regarding_Potential for Recial_Violence This survey program was formerly under the title II "Possible Racial Violence Major Urban Areas _ The program was initiated in 1964 in order that the Bureau would be aware of potential danger spots in the U. S _ The present program requires each field division to conduct a continuing survey in their respective territories covering al1 localities having a potential for racial violence based on current racial conditions The objective is to .insure that the Bureau receives a realistic and comprehensive picture of existing racial conditions in these areas on a current basis and to obtain advance information of any impending racial developnents which clearly point to the possibility of mob violence Quarterly reports submitted by field in line with this survey represent information obtained through contacts with local government and police officials 9 leaders of racial groups 9 and a cross section of informants and sources_ The survey enables uS to be thoroughly knowledgeable of racial develop- ments and potential trouble spots and provides timely and pertinent information which is disseminated to the White House, Attorney General 9 and other Government agencies Information developed is also used for an analysis of the potential for violence in the U_ S_ 9 which is prepared in the spring of each year, just prior to the most active months in this field, and which is disseminated on a high Level_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIS ION INSPECTION 1/12/71 LJBieknkw NW-88608-Doeld:32989638_Page LU 7244-H ================================================== Page 445 ================================================== 2 Security Index (SI) Program Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security_ Section (4-H) 9 which has investigative responsibility under this Research Section, Special Records Unit maintains Reccrds appeseabce to the SI and is responsible for coordinating program_ In line with this responsibility, Research Section a memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan , dated prepared 1/12/71, re -evaluating SI_ As of 4/15/70 there were in the Index 2,794 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8 352 rank-and - (Priority III) for a total of 11,146. Of these , file subjects communists--a total of 848 and 4,770, respectively, are 50 . 4 percent _ As of 12/15/70 there were in the 5,618 or of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) Index 3,450 persons {Pricrity ITT) for a total and 614 rank-and-file subjects Qf 12,064. Of these , 831 and 4,718 , respectively, are comunists--a total of 5,549 or 46 percent_ NW 88608 Docld:37989638 445 8 , Page ================================================== Page 446 ================================================== 3 Emergency_Detention Program The Emergency Detention Program (EDP) 9 which is field-wide, involves the planning for apprehension and detention of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public safety of the U_ S _ in time of 3 national emergency and for the search and seizure of contraband. The EDP is not a program as such but is based on Title II of the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950 _ The basic responsibility for the operation and implementa - tion of the EDP rests with the Attorney General_ Detailed Plans regarding the EDP are drawn up and included in the "Attorney General' s Portfolio, WI copies of which are in the Bureau' s possession_ This progran has been maintained in an up-to-date status Administrative plans for the implementation of the program in each office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro Survey . It Lists of individuals to be detained are furnished to the Internal Security Division of the Department each month and the listing of places to be searched under authority of the Master Search Warrant are main- tained on a current basis The Seat of Government and all field divisions 5 with the exception of Honolulu, maintain essential records at safe locations for successtul implemeniaiion of the EDP Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to the U. S . Attorneys and U_ S _ Marshals upon implementation. This program is coordinated by Special Records Unit, Research Section Primary responsibility rests with the Departmeri and changes can be made upon approval of the Department_ We merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable changes Periodic checks are made to insure that al1 records connected with the EDP stored away from Headquarters cities are current_ Field division surveys are kept uP to date and the Bureau is advised semiannually of the status Legislation was previously introduced in Congress to repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950 _ When the 9lst Congress ended, no affirmative action had been taken in this regard. In the event Title II should be repealed at a future date under new legislation, the Government' s inherent right to protect itself internally will continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic responsilil- ity for protecting this Nation' s internal security_ This program is under constant supervision and re-evaluation So that any necessary changes and streamlining may be made _ A memorandum justifying the continuance of this program was last subnitted on 1/12/71. NW886u8 Toc1d337989638-Page-t46 only ================================================== Page 447 ================================================== ~'4 ~ Security Informants Special Records Unit maintains an up-to-date index of Security Informants and Potential Security Informants. It correlates personal and operating data (such a5 name, address, code, file and symbol number) concerning these informants, which it receives from the Division 1 s investigative sections, and places such material on FD-348s three by five cards that constitute the index_ This index is maintained on discontinued as well as current informants_ At the time of the inspection in April, 1970 , a total of 1.141 Security Informants were being operated. As of 1/12/71 the number had increased to 1,159 for 2 total increase 0f 18 During the same period, tbe number of Potential Security Informants had increased from 616 to 765 for 2 total increase of 149 Technical and Microphone_SurveiLlances There has been no significant change regarding the utilization 0f these techniques in tne internal security field since the last Inspection_ As of 1/12/71, we have 40 telephone surveillances (tesurs) in Bureau S internal security cases and Seven awaiting installation Fe also have six tesurs in operation at the request of the State Department. Fe are conducting sixmicrophone surveillances (misurs) in internal security field, and four misur installations are being operated at the request of the National Securi Agency KNSA) In addition, 64 teletypefaciTities are being covered at the written request of NSA 8 2 '886083Doclr.3298963871 ty ================================================== Page 448 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/OR 4-H INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 2 A Section Chlef W . A, Branigan Espionage Section The following programs discussed imnediately hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the Espionage Section: Alem Program Bureau fiie 65-69532; Banpop Program , Bureau file '85270741; Cokma Progr= Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program_ Bureau file 65-70719; DESECO Progran, Bureau file 106871638; East-West Exchange Progran _ 9 Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365 . Following the inspection of April, 1970 , the Counterintelligence Progran was discontinued and a GS-14 Siijz-iS? Fiz seze #pailcble fcr ~eeigreert eleewbere. No write_up has been subiitted for the Rega Program since this is now being phased , out . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1-13-70 WAB;hke 39 4-H 8-3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 448 "* t 7= a11 , Page ================================================== Page 449 ================================================== ALEM PROGRAM Bufile: 65-69532 4-H ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. S_ under assumed identities 2s 1. alien busbands of American wives or 2 2s male imnigrants on zirst preterence petiztons 464 because 0f certain professiona and technical 57 647 Skills The basis of this progran i8 information furnished 3152 S1c tX DL 044 8 I56 Tythe Fedora informant Tbis program was iritiated 10 9se; August 9 7965 . Individuals entering the U S _ under the above two categories have been determined through a machine run of Imigration and Naturalization Service Tozi G 188Runoh_cards The Bureau has reimbursed the Inigration and Naturalizatzon Service for expenses incurred ip Sorting these cards for immigrantsentering_the U. S . between the years 1960_1966 2 Approximately 1960 cases have been opened under this program since its inception of which 106 are now pending. We have not uncovered any lilegals to date although we have been 2b1e to Tdent1fy through tnis program 2a va luable; KGBagent who went to the U S as an immigrant fro_Belg-um E04de ~(BudEoard case Buftje 65368188)5 3 ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section Special Cases Unit, by SAAP Litrento. The responsibility of reviewing the pertinent @ 188 cards and initiating investigations is placed with the Washington Field Office- The procedures followed in opening cases do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office. 4 According to the Fedora informant tbe KGB has used the techniques set forth above 10 dispatching KGB Sillegale" 8051 Ze5 to the U 8 During 1960-1965 four KGB "IllegaTs Teportedly arrived 1n7 U 8 & under categgry number one @ccording torInformatzon the Fedora informant was able 4 to otazn from a-KGB Officer 1n the Nev York Residency: 5 _ This program is evaluated On an annual basis. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 APL:tdp 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 449 the ================================================== Page 450 ================================================== CANIL PROGRAM Bufile: 65-70719 4-H 1_ CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet illegals whomay_haye_arrived _in Canada a8European immigrants and_thereafter entered the U 8 on immigrant visas Obtained at oxe Of the Anerican consulates Zn Canada I5> This program is based Qp the Cowslipcase Which 1 nyolyed 2 Soviet 112egal husband and wife team who used this_method of entry Legat 1 Ottawa 2 effected arrangements with various 4t4e Anericn consulates 1 Canada torobtain the 31246 Immigration Visa and Alien Registration (IVAR) forms M Irzed )yY European tmigranteeRrtor-to-theIr destructzon by the consulates It is COnsulate practiceto retain these forms for 16 to 18_mopths then to destroy then: Legatottava, forgards _ these forms to the_Ner_York Office where they are reviewed To develop suspects the New york office uses criteria developed from anaiysis of the Cowslip case. 2 Since inception of this program in June , 1966 , 27 cases were opened. There are no cases pending_ No illegals_ have been uncovered to date The procedures followed in this program do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the New York Office. 3 _ CANIL is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SA 4 P. Litrento. 4 . The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security field_ It is felt this program still has a good potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical and has 2 sound basis_ Past experience has shown that Soviet Intelligence will use the same modus operandi continuously, if successful. 5 _ This program is evaluated On an annual basis. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 APLitdp 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 450 ================================================== Page 451 ================================================== DESECO PROGRAM 4-H Bufile 105-71688 The Deseco Program (program for development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc Officials) was conceived in an espionage conference in December 1957, Its objective was to intensify the development of informants and double agents to penetrate Soviet-bloc intelligence and for use in sensitive defection approaches, Between the last inspection and December 1, 1970 , approximately an 8-month period 37 Deseco subjects were placed in contact with Soviet-bioc Officials and 8 of these have developed to the status of security informants or double agents. The majority of work is concentrated in the New York, Washington, D. and Chicago areas where Soviet- bloc establishments are located. A Soviet Consulate General is scheduled to- becomia cperative i7 San Frczciscc durizs 1971 , and a skeleton staff Of four Soviet Officials with five dependents is seeking appropriate buildings for this establishment. San Francisco and other West Coast offices are currently developing 2 "pool" of Deseco sources for eventual use against Soviet intelligence officers who will operate out of the Soviet Consulate General. Due to the increased number of Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States and their relative freedom of travel, particularly to technical and scientific conventions, a total of 19 offices have been M authorized to conduct sounding-out" interviews of prospective sources without prior Bureau authority_ Follow-up interviews with potential Deseco sources are conducted on 2 UACB basis. Unusual and highly sensitive cases are routed to the division front office for approval. The Nem York, Hashington Field and Chicago Offices submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of the program, The other 16 offices submit summaries on a semi- annual basis. This program substantially assists uS to penetrate and neutralize Soviet-bloc intelligence. The results achieved thus far warrant the program s continuance . It is the best means f penetration available considering the DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 I:a5 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 451 C , ================================================== Page 452 ================================================== DESECO ' PROGRAM limitations on other sensitive investigative techniques. It affords u5 a pool Of human resources available for use against Soviet-bloc intelligence personnel in political economic and particularly scientific fields in which #he intelligence services of the bloc have shown extreme interest. This program has been reevaluated on an annual basis, It was last justified by memorandum dated 10/22/69 , but by the action Of the Executive Conference approved by the Director on memorandum of 10/29/70, Washington and New York were instructed thbat every Special Agent in those Offices handling investigations of Soviet personnel should immediately open on and develop two completely new Deseco subjectso These instructions were: Sent to the field by airtel of 11/2/70 . The program will next be justified by memorandum in Merch, 1971 , ghen progress letters summariring the resin]ts of the program will be due from all participating Officese This program is correlated in the Espionage Section Coordination Unit by Special Agent L, Whitson. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION NW 88608 D3yd 3473638 Page 452 ================================================== Page 453 ================================================== EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM Bufile: 105-42300 4-H This Program originated in 1955 to provide internal security safeguards regarding the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence regards visits of the East-West Exchange Agreement participants a5 opportunities to promote intelligence activity. As a result of the last inspection SAC Letter 70-25 was prepared which set forth revisions of our investigative action in the fielda This change was made as a result of other manpower commitments. The instructions in that SAC Letter provided that no investigations will be conducted of groups or individuals participating in the East-West Exchange Program in the absence of any information' indicating affiliation with Soviet intelligence. Bufiles are checked on all Soviet participants and where information is developed Showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then opened and tne fieid is instructez t2 cenduct the necessary investigation. During the period of June-December 1970 , 525 individuals entered the United States under the provisions of this exchange agreement and of this number, Fe had information indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 28 of these individuals. With regard to Soviet exchange students there are currently 31 in the United States. Based on information furnished defector sources and investigations of Soviet students previously in the United. States we have determined that the Soviet Intelligence Services utilizes these students in an intelligence capacity , principally as "spotters_ " In view of this, we afford these students active investigation. We have also found that a number of these students return to the United States for assignment at one of the Soviet establish- ments and in most instances 9 contacts which they made while in the United States as students are generally reactivated. For example, Mikhail Fomichev currently assigned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations aS a Third Secretary, was in the United States as an exchange student in 1966_ Through a defector source we learned that he had recruited an American agent for 82 he KGB and extensive investigation under Xlot tne code ord "Nikotine" (Bufile: 65-70250) bas resulted in the identification 0f this 4 agent in December 1970 , He-nas-aanitted nis recrurtmentand DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPLiCgCe 4-H NW 88608-Docld-32989638-Page-453 by ================================================== Page 454 ================================================== EAST-IEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM meetings with Fomichev since bis return to the United States, ~Oneof the possipilttres-berng "considered_ by the KGBrforrthis individual is to bave bim obtain employment a5 a Bureau" ~Agent. Rral> t4zr #tv DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 JPliegc NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 454 ================================================== Page 455 ================================================== 3 BANPOP PROGRAM Bufile: 65-70741 1 BANPOP is the code name for a Bureau program through which an aempt is made to identify Soviet illegal agents wbo may beutilizing 2 Swiss bank to transfer s40 Sl MC funds to thenselves The program is based on an analysis of four Soviet iTlegal agent cases between 1955-1966 In Which funds were furnished through the Banquepopulaire Suisse in Switzerland 'The transfers of funds are reviewed with the f8fiowing criteria: (1) the person or individual beneficiary is named (2) the amount of the 0245765*7 730i04 Jrd 814e #r transfer iS Between 8300 ana $b000 ana 7(3) {the last name oftne person ordering and receiving Ehe; Tunas_is tha 73e same or the money is directed to a specitic bank account_ Oit 4 TThe program was initiated by Bureau letter of" August 26; 1966 . 2 . The program is nOw operated in the New York, Chicago and ' Philadelpnia Uffices_ Tne Pniladeipnia Office uriginaiiy had the program in effect from September, 1966 , until May _ 9 1968 when it was discontinued. However , it was renewed in that office in February, 1970 . 3 _ When an office locates an individual who might be considered a subject, it writes a letter to the Bureau with 2 copy to the appropriate field office and requests that inves- tigation be undertaken to identify this person. The title includes the name of the subject and the code name of the program in order that all cases will be handled by the same supervisor_ At the present time there are six pending cases. The New York Office utilized i2 Agent hours per month in handling 10 100 records for a six-month period ending August 31, 1970. The Philadelphia Office utilized four Agent hours per month and the Chicago Office utilized three Agent hours per month in handling its program_ This program is supervised by SALaA_Lee of the Special Cases Unit, Espionage Section; 5 _ All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the program on a six-month basis, submitting letters March 1 and September 1 of each year DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION JPLitdp 1/12/71 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 455 by Page_ ================================================== Page 456 ================================================== 4-R COKZA PROGRAH 65-73750 1 Title is code mord for physical surveillance coverage of knowp meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelli- gence in the past several years 0 Tbe New York Office instituted this program in Julys 3> 1970 2 , New York Office hascatalogued_knorn_eeting-areas 2S 2 Te3utz 62 RhysicalSurveillances_ of_Soviet -inteziz- gence oEficers_and information_received fromdefectors-:ip-place and double agents operating_ageinstSoyiet #nteliigence %fficers. 5r3 Soviez Znteriigence officers are trained o_detect surveillances: and accordingly are extrenely X astute in_detecting such coverage. It is F1 aimost-_mpossible to-copduct 2 discreet-physicel surveil- Zance of then Vhich Fill result in_ubcoveringan Cinteliigence operation TThis program places Our Special Agents in areas R where there Z3 rikelitnood oL_Sovtet-meet wtthoutzhzerd of pEior Surveillazce mr 7i4ch 7C;ld #337t Geeting Almegt 2l1 '" SovzetIntelligence_officers spend approx-mately Or onartorthree bours in cleandng" themse ves to Insure_tey are notcunder survazzance Vban meetingapagent When sheSou et_aFrives 2t {Une eeting area -he 43 confident that he is_not_under surveillances Our objective in this program is to identify American agents meeting Soviet intelligence officers under clandestine circumstances 3 Ner_ York utillzing one team consisting of four Special Agents, afforded physicar SurveiTHance coverage to tbree-conseetutive_subway stops ipQueens r7 New York 1bZCh were known tohave been_frequented sov et _ntelTtgence 4x officers I the_past; Erom_July hrough 0otopet, 19705, six Soviet Intelligence officers mere observed in tnese areas on 16occasions Ivo significant cases have been developed out Of this coverage and New York bas current_authoritytointerview One of thesubjects Observedin_clandestine contact_kith a_known Soviez Committee Jor`State_Security officer on iilio/io; New York Fas authorized to further impfewent this program and @dvised" {z 17ntended to cover two other known meet areas Nr i0 Queens, New YorE, dur ear evening_hots on Teerdys and 0n Saturdays;~nroh Ja sinilar To,thecoverage previously afforded 4. Program supervised by Special Agent GeorgeaM_ Quinny; Officials Unit We New York, Espionage Section _ Expenses and time in bandling program is negligible at Seat Of Government_ Since program in field consists 0f surveillence activities, there must be close supervision at field Zevel_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION NW88608_Declgl32989638 Page 456_ pasz "dry by _ ing ing 1y ================================================== Page 457 ================================================== 4-H COKIIA PROGRAM 5 . Program offers excellent potential on basis of results achieved during Short period it bas been in operation. It must be noted that Soviets were not as active as usual during Septenber November 1 1970 , because of Twenty-Fifth United Nations Anniversary Celebration and meeting of United Nations General Assembly . Sogiet_Intelligence has in the_past_been eztrenely reluctant to engage in Intel2 gence @t_vitiesQuring Sugh Rerzods because detection at Such time could be extr "enely embarzesg ng 0F37 to Soviet Goverment Tenpower Zinttations navecrestriczed our full jitzation of #bia Investigetive technique Speclal Agent personnel asS1gned to this program must be faniliar with Soviets assigned to the New York area end must also be experienced in surveillance procedures_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 GMQiaeb 4-A NW 88608 Docid:32989638 457 Page ================================================== Page 458 ================================================== 4-H RADIO AND TECHNICAL_EQUIPHENT PURCHASED BY THE_SOVIETS 105-36365 1 Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have central repository for information developed in connection with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to radio and technical equipment purchased by them _ 2 , Washington Field and New York Offices furnish infor- mation developed concerning these purchases on 2 monthly basis_ Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency , Army Navy , Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, and Bureau of International Commerce, United States Department of Commerce _ Material submitted includes name of Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description and cost of the items purchased_ It involves maintenance of three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington Field and New York Offices Progran established to acnieve foliowiiig objectives : disseminate to interested Government agencies information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the United States Soviet officials; determine whether Soviet intelligence iS circumventing restrictions regarding material appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control list; and to permit discreet markings by FBI Laboratory %f 24 certain technical equipmentfurnished to Soviets through_%vert or covert means which wouid _pernit Ita identif catio at Some Tuture tine" 3 _ Since April, 1970 Progran has disclosed continuing purchases by Soviet nationais of Grundig Satellite Multiband portable radios_ During 9/70 one KGB officer in Washington purchased 30 of these radios at one time_ Soviet husband and ' wife illegal team recently in U, S . used one of these radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which con- tained their operating instructions Program made it possible to secure serial numbers for possible future identification. Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable estimate Of internal communications used at Soviet establishments and security devices being operated_ Program also disclosed type of transmitting equipnent and antenna system purchased by Soviets, apparently for installation at Cordae General in San Francisco when that establishment becomes operational. This information is of interest not only to FBI Laboratory but to State Department and National Security Agency in connection with its morldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities. 4< Program supervised by Special Agent Eugene C Peterson, 04 Officials Unit 7 Washington, Espionage Section. Expense and time Nw-88608_Da2ran82188838_RATEARBIGENCE_DIVISION INSPECTION by ================================================== Page 459 ================================================== RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPHENT PURCHASED BY THE_SQVIES 4-H utilized in handling program is negligible. Dissemination of material submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor and no weaknesses in program are apparent Administrative tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Officials Unit B Washington, Espionage Section . 5 Program is 0f value not only to Domestic Intelligence Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissenination of material developed . Possession of some_equipment_onWhich discreet_markings were-previgusiy @laced by FBI Loboratory_could serve to Tdentify possessor witth involvenent in soytet Itertigeece @CtiVITY Progran iS evaTuated annually to determine justification Tor continuance 6 Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971. Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and each year thereafter, if still 0f continulng value. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 ECP:eco 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 459 3 ================================================== Page 460 ================================================== 3 SURVEYS , PROJECTS AND/ OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H SECTION CHIEF W _ R. WANNALL NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION: There are attached separate write-upS regarding the following programs supervised in the Nationalities Intelligence Section: 1 Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments 2 _ Chinese Aliens Entering the United States and Chinese Entering the United States Claiming United States Citizenship 3 _ Intelligence Coverage 0f Friendly Foreign Ccuntries 4 Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United States (Chicoin) 5 _ Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border (BOCOV) 6_ Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas 7 _ Security Index Cuba 8 _ American Repatriate Program 9 International Organizations Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet Bloc NWV-88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 460 ================================================== Page 461 ================================================== PROGRAM VISITORS TO COMUNIST CHINA AND CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHENTS 4-H (Bufile 105-144424) 1 Background, Date of Inception Scope and Desired_Objectives _ Program was initiated in 8/65 in connection with efforts to cover Chinese Communist (Chicom) activities in the United States Through cooperation of both United States intelligence agencies and friendly foreign intelligence services, the identities of United States residents are furnished to uS who attempt to enter Communist China or contact People' s Republic of Cbina (PRC) diplomatic establishments in certain countries throughout the world. This program is field-wide and not directly connected with any other investigative program_ The objectives include identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom establishments The identity of these visitors is absolutely necessary in order to determine if they have access to classified material or if they could be utilized effectively by the Chicoms when they return to the United States Some of these individuals have excellent potential for informant development _ We have utilized contacts with Chicom diplomatic establishments in the development of selected sources who are attractive to the Chicons and have been developed as double agents _ By SAC Letter No _ 70-26 dated 5/12/[70 we restricted our investigations to cover actual visitors to China _ This procedure was initiated to conserve manpower inasmuch as State Department had relaxed travel restrictions to China on 3/16/70 in order to allow travel to PRC for any "legitimate purpose_ M1 The President recently directed that a committee prepare recommendations for additional steps which may be taken to relax restrictions on travel to and promote further trade with the PRC . This highly confidential directive, if accepted, will permit many people_ to be eligible to travel to China if te Chinese will grant travel permits Up to the present time 3 however 9 the Chicoms have only granted travel permits to pro-Chicom propagandists such as Edgar Snow_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 JM:cal 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 461 ================================================== Page 462 ================================================== 2 _ Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection Investigations since the last Inspection have totaled 95 _ Many of these individuals were interviewed; however 9 it has been determined that none were allowed to enter Communist China During the cultural revolution which ended during 1970 , very few United States residents were allowed to enter Communist China including a number of United Nations employees who had previously made numerous trips to Communist China There is every indication } however, that the Chicoms have taken on a look" internationally and are attempting to gain the friendship 0f the western world_ This program has not reached its great potential due to the xenophobia Which existed during the past three years_ Communist China is expected to open an embassy at Ottawa , Canada , in 1/71 as result of Canadian recognition _ This will make it far easier for United States residents to cross the border into Canada and either seek 2 travel permit to visit Communist China or make contact with Ciizom intelligance represcntatives at tha cabassy iz Ottawa 3 _ Extent and Nature of Current Supervision This program is handled by one Bureau supervisor who correlates information as received from either United States intelligence agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services and directs the office covering the individual's residence and employment to conduct necessary investigation according to the Manual of Instructions Investigations are conducted to fully identify the individuais_ } determine current residence and employment and ascertain whether he has access to classified information In absence of any unusual circumstances indicating need for further action the case is closed . Each case is closely supervised and evaluated on its individual merits 4 _ Current Justification for Continuation_ The potential of this program is far grea ter than what has been realized in the way of results to da te As mentioned above , the Canadian recognition of the PRC has given Communist China 2 foothold in North America RCMP_adyises that they feel that 50 percent of the Chinese Communist Ea intelligence effort will be directed toward the Uited States_ 2 S NW 88608 Docld:32989638 462 "new Page ================================================== Page 463 ================================================== At the present time the restrictions for crossing the border from the United States to Canada are practically nonexistent for a United States resident with proper documentation_ There- fore, it is imperative that we continue such a program So: that when RCMP reports individuals contacting the PRC Embassy in Ottawa we may fully identify theser-individuals 37 5 _ How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification. This program is evaluated annually and was last justified on 12/31/69_ At that time, it was stated that the program would be evaluated and justified during 1/71; this is currently being undertaken _ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 463 ================================================== Page 464 ================================================== CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE WNITED STATES 4-H (Bufile 105-135923) CHINESE ENTERING THE UNITED STATES CLAIMING UNTTED STATES CITIZENSHIP (Bufile 105-12752) These two programs have similar criteria for investigation and, therefore, are being handled under one write-up_ 1 Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired: Qbjectives The alien program was instituted on 1/26/65 and the program concerning Chinese entering the United States claiming United States citizenship began on 9[14/65 . Both programs were originated in an effort to identify Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence operatives who may be sent to the United States in deep cover In 1955, Chicom intelligence emphasized the need to deploy deep cover illegal agents abroad and specifically in the United States The number of cases currentlyinvestigated under the citizen program has been approximately 15 to 20 annually; only one, however 3 has been opened since last inspection These individuals offer the Chicoms an ideal situation for placing an illegal into the United States who has assumed the identity of a Chinese whose father or grandfather was a United States citizen These individuals, once they arrive in the United States, are never checked on by any agency _ The Chinese aliens 3 a number of whom are students "1 temporarily, II entering the United States to attend universities, have decreased in nuber during the past two years from approximately 2,000 per month to 600 per month_ Recent relaxation of immigra- tion regulations will now permit a great increase in the numbers allowed to enter the United States during 1971. Since the inception 0f both programs 9 we have simplified the criteria for investigating citizens and aliens keeping in mind the necessity for conserving manpower in our investigations 1 but also fulfilling our responsibilities The scope and investigation of these two programs are identical The prime objective of these two programs is the identification of intelligence agents; however , the two programs have been responsible for the development of positive intelligence information as well 2S 2 continuing increase in source coverage of Chinese matters, not only in our heavily populated Chinese localities, but also covering the lesser Chinese communities throughout the United States DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 JEM: sem NW 88608 DOcldR32989638 Page 464 ================================================== Page 465 ================================================== 2 _ Positive Results Achieved Since the Last Inspection Since the last inspection 151 cases have been opened on Chinese aliens and only one case on Chinese claiming United States citizenship_ During this period 197 alien cases have been closed and eight cases involving citizens were closed_ Information developed during these investigations has been disseminated to the intelligence community To date 20 Chicom intelligence agent has been uncovered by these two programs however we have steadily increased our source coverage and collected positive intelli- gence which has been disseminated to the intelligence community _ This is a long-range program and it is expected it will pay dividends during the coning year with the establish- ment of a Chinese Communist embassy in Canada . 3 Extent and Na ture of Current Supervision The alien cases most of which originate from our Legat in HongKongx_ are supervised by three Supervisors accoraing to 952 g3cgraphic location the elier i2 destined to in the United States The citizen cases are also supervised three supervisors accor ding to geographic location and these cases are furnished to uS as a result 0f Passport Records_beingschecked 4 byWFO: Cases in both programs are closely supervised to make certain that each subject falls within the criteria and that when the cases are reopened for investigation after two years the case is evaluated to determine if the subject may possibly be an intelligence agent _ 4_ Current Justification for Continuation These two programs cover two vulnerable areas whereby the Chicoms could penetrate the United States by utilizing either aliens or individuals claiming United States citizenship who have been fully trained in Communist China and entered Hong Kong subsequent to 1/1/55 _ The screening process at United States Consulate General S office in Hong Kong is meager 'and current proposals for relaxation of rules will make it easier for the Chicoms to filter agents into the United States through the easiest route, that is, an alien or a citizen fully documented. These two programs also are one of the best sources for the development of informants and the gathering of positive intelligence information_ These programs are fully justified NW 88608 Docld:32989638 465 by Page ================================================== Page 466 ================================================== for continuation and no additional manpower Or expenditure requests are needed at this time for the continuation of these two programs_ 5 . Frequency_ of Evaluation and Date 0f Last Justification These programs are evaluated annually _ The alien program was last justified on 1/22/70 and the citizen program Will be justified wi th the alien program on 1/22/71 . On 9/18/70 , a memorandum was submitted indicating that the citizen program would be coordinated with and justified with the alien program during January, 1971 . NW-88608_Qoeld:32989638_Page 466 ================================================== Page 467 ================================================== 4-H INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (Bufile: 65-63113) 1 Background Scope_and Objectives Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive intelligence information; as well a8 data of value to FBI investigations. Expansion of the program took place in 1955 and 1959 and during 1962 and 1963 , as well aS in 1970, additional coverage was approved: The program has three principal phases as follows: 2. Regular notification to the FBI by other U.S. agencies regarding arrival in U.8, of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet bloc countries_ This phase consists chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal exrence, b Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments of selected non-Soviet bioc countries_wth theapproval of State Department and the_Attorney General We currently have_Special coverage on eleyen diplomatic 2stablishments of seven non-Soviet bloc countries and three _additiona] istallations as recently approved by_the_Attorney General: Countries currently covered are Panama srael;_Jordan; the_United Azab Republic "Chile Boliva and Peru: Qur cost _operating this phase @ the program js relatedto_ tzanslation of the intejligence product _nd salery %f 5 personne Who_man gpecial ceverage equipment; Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the Special 06 e coverage_is justified: This justification Is based on the value of the data developed: C This phase relates to the development of live sources within diplomatic_establishments_%f_pon-Soviet_bloc Ex countries @8 welia8 the development_of individuals_sQ closelyconnected wth official establishments_they are able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence informa- tion. We now have 47 actual and 22 potential live sources DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 ERH;bjp 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 467 ~GfX ================================================== Page 468 ================================================== 4-H at the establishments of 26 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The principal cost involved in this phase relates to Agent time devoted to investigations f sources and time spent in handling these sources. 2. Positive Results Achieved This program has enabled us to provide the White House and the highest level of the intelligence community a continuing flow of valuable foreign political information affecting the national and international interests of the U.S. The program was particularly productive in Our coverage of such critical areas Of tension a8 the Middle East crisis_ the continuing crisis in Panama, and the recurrent political crises created in South America through the unseating and establishment of regimes in the various countries covered. In the areas mentioned, as well &s in other fringe nationality areas, this program has served as & basis for obtaining information which has provided U.S. Government with current data regarding the international political scene and has contributed otherwise unobtainable information for the benefit of those responsible for policy decisions at the highest level of our Government: An example of the importance of this information is illustrated in the comments of the US Ambassador tothe United Nationss Charles W; Yost made by him in a letter dated 11/13/70 to the Director. Ambassador Yost noted that the support given to the U.S. United Nations Mission by the Bureau was deeply appreciated by him and had afforded him privileged insight and perspective. The quality of this program is further attested to by realization by the White House of the capabilities of the FBI to produce positive foreign political intelligence with resulting instructions to the Bureau to expand this capability abroad in select liaison positions. As a result of these instructions our capability in furnishing foreign political information was expanded through the opening Of Six new liaison posts in Beirut, Lebanon; Caracas, Venezuela; La Bolivia; Copenhagen, Denmark; Managua, Nicaragua; and Tel Israel. With this expansion; our overseas liaison Agents were increased from 28 to 42 with supporting clerical personnel being increased in number from 32 to 46: This move has increased the number of our foreign posts from Ilt0 17. (More detailed comment regarding increase in liaison abroad is set forth in the work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E, Accomplishments Special Coordination Unit: ) NW 88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 468 Paz, Aviv, ================================================== Page 469 ================================================== 4-H 3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision The program aS it relates to all friendly foreign countries (except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section: 4. Current Justification for Continuation This program continues to produce information of substantial value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign political information of vital interest to the White House and members of the intelligence community. The information continues to illustrate the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this program be continued: 5 Periodic Justification Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by memorandum dated 5/8/70. INTERNATIONAL ORGANZA TIONS 4 DANGEROUS ALIENS OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC Program was initiated in April, 1951, to create a centralized compilation Of undesirable and potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom State Department can, when wartime emergency arises, initiate steps for deportation or lifting of their diplomatic immunity. The program applies only to aliens from countries outside the Soviet bloc employed in the United States in international organizations within provisions of International Organizations Immunities Act: The program is Similar in intent to the Emergency Detention Program and the PRODIP Program; however, it involves an entirely different type of individual. The program is a control device only and involves no investigative activity. Twenty-five individuals (as of 11/5/70) are included on the list with New York Office responsible for twenty and Washington Field Office responsible for five. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 469 ================================================== Page 470 ================================================== 4-H Current program requires an annual letter with deletions or additions being made by separate letter as subjects involved qualify for elimination Or inclusion. Substantive desk supervisors review field submissions to verify need for inclusion of individuals on list. Program continues to serve a useful purpose as a precautionary measure for U. S. security in time of emergency. It is justified annually with last justification having been made 2/6/70. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 470 only Page ================================================== Page 471 ================================================== PROGRAM 4-H COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN) (Bufile 105-135614) SECTION CHIEF W _ R_ WANNALL NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION 1 Background and Date of Inception Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence service, lacking base from which to operate in United States , must rely on illegal and third-country operations to develop intelligence data in U. S_ Chicoin was instituted in 1965 , to combat these efforts 2 Scope and Desired Objectives To create situations and place our informants in contact with known Chicom agents in foreign countries, with ultimate aim being Chicom recruitment of our assets for illegal operation within U_ S 9 resulting in penetration of Chicom intelligence activities inside our borders 3' Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection In. August Xart 1970_ 44 we directed Los Angeles informant , code name DINA to travel to Canada to initiate contact with representatives of China News e Agency_(NCNA) _who are known Chicom intelligence agents Source succeeded in making such 'contact and arousing_interest of NCNA personnel As bonus source also encountered a double agent code name ICED TEA operated by_Roya Canadian Wounted Porice_(RCiB) "who has asgign_ ment from NCNA pr incipal to recruit illegal agent in U S and 18 Seiotr {i who now intends to propose recruitment of DTNA to ;icoms 67 eut=) Seattle source code name JUDD has developed close association with Key Chicom sympathizer in Vancouver British Columbia Canada and duringperiod was invited to visit 44 zwo Chicom Ships in port at Vancouver Source also made trip to JRH: 1/12771 4-A NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 471 May , New dgo ================================================== Page 472 ================================================== 2 4-H San Francisco for_his Chicomfriends , taking_with-hin_books and messages for individuals there_ from prOzChicom individuals 4vo in Canada other sources NY 5896_S and 2739_8 4 main- tained personal contact with persoppel of China Travel Service (CTS) i0 Hong Kong_during_period CTS is Chicom_agency Specializing in arrangement trips to mainland China and front for Chicom Intelligence Extent and Nature of Current Supervision Chicoin Program is handled by one Bureau Supervisor who 'correlates activities of field offices involved to insure proper direction of informants and control of specialized double agent operations_ Close supervision of cases is maintained. 5 Current Justification for Continuance Counterintelligence ana penetration of Chicom 'intelligence operations is long-term process Sources developed to date under this program present excellent potential for such penetration, especially in light of fact Chicoms expected to open Embassy in Ottawa, Canada , in next thirty to sixty days, with strong possibility Consulates will also be opened in border cities such as Vancouver RCMP expects at least 509 of all future Chicom operations in Canada wizi be directed against WnitedStates_and present Sources oom large in penetration of such operations Further, strong possibility exists Red China " will finally gain admittance to United Nations during Fall, 1971, a move which makes development. of quality sources in this field most imperative _ 6 Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification Program justified annually last justification being on 5/7/70 _ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 472 SF Twg ================================================== Page 473 ================================================== #acs 4-H E0i[ 35r7" LF PROGRAM COMMUNIST COVERAGE ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER BOCOV BUFILE : 100-356015 7744 3 4 $ ( Background and Date of Inception BOCOV was initiated by the Director in 1948 to fill a void in dequacy of coverage/in the 25 mile border zone south of the U S ~Mexican border by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Scope and_Desired_Obiectives Three border offices, El Paso , San Antonio and San Diego , as well as the office f the Legal Attache, Mexico, participate Ten_Agents and two Assistant Legal Attaches devote a portion their time directing some 212 sources and informants The population of the zone area,s involved iS/approximately 1,700,000 individuals of which 2 371 are 'either members; or sympathizers of major Jan Mexican subversive groups Positive_ Results Achieved Since_Last Inspection Program has furnished valuable information relative to threat against U . S_ Mexican subversives residing in the border area Investigative results are furnished to a11 levels of interested U _ Government inteiligence community Program continues to keep us advised of potential trouble areas and allows for appropriate counter-measures, LDaid Domestic Intelligence Division 1/12/71 JEG: emi 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 473 2 tof by ================================================== Page 474 ================================================== Extent and Nature of Current Supervision Periodic reports on individuals and organizations 2s well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are analyzed and correlated by SA Joseph E Gauzens Jr Involved is review of incoming letters memoranda 1 reports and semi- annual progress letters detailing informant coverage and subversive strength Analysis of this material provides 2 basis for detecting weaknesses and making arrangements for counter-intelligence moves Cutbacks initiated by the Bureau for the purpose of conserving manpower and streamlining operations heve substantially reduced manpower and number of informants utilized. Agents and Legal Attaches participating were reduced from 16 to 12; informants and sources utilized from 312 to 212 These reductions resulted in annual savings of 819, 934.65 and total manpower currently utilized 0n2 the program is 1.72 Agents Effectiveness of BOCOV and Qur abiJity to re-expand the program should future circumstances warrant were not impaired by the cutbacks cited. Current Justification for Continuance BOcOV continues to fill the above-described intelligence void and 1 in addition, is coordinated with other intelligence programs originating in the border area , in particular the SECOMEX program _ Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification Program i5 evaluated annually and was last justified 10/2/70 _ 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 474 ================================================== Page 475 ================================================== BOCOV Bocov is e code word which concerns 2 highly sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive elements entering the U S. Although this operation is -o longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilicies of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not with regard to the internal security of the U. but also in investigeting criminal matters ,of an international nature . Furthermore, unauthorized disclosure of details 0f. this operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who cooperated with this Bureau and who: are currently residing abroad _ Sulchsuted for pases /07+to} ^ 6 7o SSC <8 7 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 475 only S., ================================================== Page 476 ================================================== 4-H NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS This program was initiated in January 1952 , as a means of keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering the United States in official capacities: These data are required by the Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of foreign officials where their activity requires Such action: The basis for this program is found in the procedure by Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results beirg channelized to the FBI We correlate this information with data _ from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General: In those instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions to the field for active investigation: Since the program was initiated, 617,290 Immigration and Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have undertaken 452 investigations based on results thereof: The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by substantive desk supervisors within the Division Based on the limited number of active investigations opened Since the inception of this program, the cost of the program consists mainly of name check expenditures: The program continues to serve & necessary purpose in our overall intelligence coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons having & capability for intelligence activities o who may pose & security threat to the United States. The program is justified annually, with the last justification having been made February 9, 1970. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/11/71 4-F NWV 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 476 QYEREsbig ================================================== Page 477 ================================================== 4-H SECURITY INDEX CUBA (Bufile 100-358086-210) Background and Date of Inception This program was instituted in November ) 1960 . By that date it was obvious that Cuba , whose Government had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January , 1959, was 2 communist state posing a real and present threat to the internal security of the U _ S_ In 1962 3 at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, a Supervisor at the Bureau was assigned the specific responsibility for administering this program to assure the apprehension and special handling of the individuals included therein in tiie aveiit cf & l4.itcd emergercy involving Cuba Scope and Desired Objectives As of 12/15/70, there were 419 individuals included: in the Security Index L Cuba Program, divided into two categories: 1 Individuals placed on the Security Index solely on account of their pro-Cuban activities_ (Cuban Special Section ~ 96 persons) 2 _ Persons already on the Security Index because of other subversive connections and activity who would warrant special attention in the event of hostilities Mf with Cuba (Security Index subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban 323 individuals) Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date record 0f location and activities of individuals included therein by means of established Security Index procedures and reporting, in order that we are in a position to move swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of these persons becone necessary. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 1/11/71 E AHSEemj 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 477 ================================================== Page 478 ================================================== Positive Results Achieved Determination as to the validity of an individual's inclusion in this program 18 constantly under review_ Since the last inspection } critical attention has been given this matter with the result that the number of persons on the Cuban Special Section of the Index has been reduced from 193 as of 3/16/70 to 96 as of 12/15/70 . These 96 persons are judged to be the hard-core pro-Cubans, action against whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory_ Of these 96 , 27 are Cuban aliens Each subject of pending security investigation with Cuban ramifications is considered for inclusion in the Index _ Extent and Nature of Current Supervision The Supervisor responsible for this program is required to review each investigative communication in current cases of pro-Cuban individuals to determine whether the individual meets the criteria for inciusio im tha Izdoz, as outlined in the Manual Of Instructions He must make a decision as to the degree of dangerousness of the individual under the Priority Apprehension Program and rule on the field s recommendations regarding these matters He initiates procedures with the Security Index Desk of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Voucher Statistical Section of the Administrative Division regarding the placing of an individual on the Index, his removal, and assignment or change in Priority. If the individual involved 15 an alien, correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the Department is required to assure the preparation of a pre - positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and Naturalization Service Action is also taken with the Department to cancel the arrest warrant if the alien is removed from the Index . On 10/29/70 , the Director approved the lifting of the moratorium on report writing and certain investigative procedures in security cases on individuals _ This will require the field to reopen by 6/30/71 and conduct investi- gation in cases on some 372 individuals involved in this program who have not received recent investigative attention The Bureau will receive in the upcoming months sumary letterhead memoranda and other communications in Tercutiiy a411 of these cases. The moratorium, in effect 2 ~NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 478 ================================================== Page 479 ================================================== pi since February 1969 has limited investigative and re- porting activity in this field_ As of 1/11/71 there were 18 active and 78 inactive case in the Cuban Special Section Of the Security Index (196 of the 96 case total) and at the time of the last inspection there were 25 active and 168 inactive cases (13% of the 193 case total) , Current_Justification The threat to the internal security of the U_ S_ from communist Cuba has not lessened in recent years . A workable priority apprehension system which receives current and continuing attention is mandatory Instant program as presently organized and handled, 1s fully justified. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation This program is evaluated on a semi-annual basis. The most recent semi-annual review and evaluation was dated 10/8/70 , NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 479_ ================================================== Page 480 ================================================== 4-H AMERICAN REPA TRIATE PROGRAM BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION G Program was instituted on February 28 ; 1962 , to specify procedure to be followed upon_receipt of information that U S Dker citizen_residing_ in Cuba had been issued 2 Swias Protection Passport by Swiss 37 Embasey in Havana Cuba for travel to U S Tel Americans, 5rr urzr however Ohurr received such passports prior to T966 when the 2 State_Department estimated8003900 U" Val S V~ citizens were still in Cuba and_ desired to return to the_U S In February; 15 1987 wher it appeared these U S citizens_Jight_be_permitted to leave Cuba en_mass instructions were issued to field out- lining investigation to be conducted relative to individual repatriates_ SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTI VES Specific objectives of program are verification of repatrate S identity; ascertaining whether the individual has or had Cuban intelligence contact , training or assignment , or possesses intelligence infor- mation; and instructing individuals to alert us to any future intelligence contact Program is field wide POSITI VE RESULTS ACHIEVED E From August 9 1969 to July, 1970 , eTeven FTights brought an average of 18 citizens out of Cuba per flight These repatriates were accompanied by a total of 425 relatives and/or close frienas, al1 of whom were Cuban aliens_ Some 300 U_ S . citizens remain in Cuba awaiting repatriation There have been no repatriation flights since July 31, 1970 _ Program ,has &lerted uS to return to this country of Security Index subjects_ Castro sympathizers, individuals who 'traveled to Cuba without State Department authorization and individuals affiliated with Communist Party, USA As a result of interviews conducted with repatriates, worthwhile data concerning conditions in Cuba has been obtained and disseminated to the U , S . Intelligence Community . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/11/71 VHN emj_ 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 480 To- ================================================== Page 481 ================================================== EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION Program is Supervised by one Seat of Government Agent who devotes a portion of his time A1l cases are afforded careful supervision in an effort to detect presence of a repatriate who may have been recruited by the Cuban Intelligence Service for activity in this country. Thirty-two cases are pending _ CURRENT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE Fidel Castro has consistently used tne mass exodus of individuals from Cuba to infiltrate intelligence agents into the U S; Program offers excellent potential for detecting such individuals who reenter this country under the protective coverage Of their citizenship. We feel that the program is fully justified_ FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION AND DATE OF LAST JUSTIFICATION An annua1 evaTuation 1s made The progran was Tast Justified on September 1, 1970 _ 2 3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 481 ================================================== Page 482 ================================================== 4-H CUBAN REFUGEE PROGRAM The Cuban Refugee Program 3 which had as its objective the detection of Cuban intelligence agents possibly being infiltrated into the U _ S _ via refugee channels was discontinued by SAC Letter 70-25 , dated 5/5/70 , paragraph C. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/11/71 VHN: emj 4-H NW 88608_Docld:32989638 482 Page_ ================================================== Page 483 ================================================== SURVEYS , PROJECTS , AND / OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H SECTION CHTEF GEORGE C . MOORE RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION RACIAL MATTERS Racial matters investigations were intensified through establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67 _ This Section handles racial matters investigations involving black extremist organizations and individuals_ Objectives are to identify organizations and indiduals that are involved in extremist activities , that advocate or had actually comitted or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that advocate revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate Federal law3 The dangerousness to the United States of such individuals must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they should be included in the Security Index or the Agitator Index. The extent of foreign influence or influence of: the Communist Perty or other domestic revolutionary groups among racial extremists , especially black extremist organizations is a prime objective. To accomplish these objectives, sources have been developed who can furnish quality and timely information concerni-€ individual extremists and extremist organizations _ Such sources likewise have forewarned uS of potential violence and enabled the Bureau to stay on top of the racial situation_ These sources have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities of alerting local authorities and to keep other Governent agencies dependent upon uS for information informed of pertinent developments including information' concerning potential violence. Our informant coverage has made it possible for uS to a constant flow of information going to the White House; the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an interest. Additional information pertaining to- racial intelli- gence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for Racial Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the Research Section. DOMESTIC INTELLIGEWCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 WHA:sef 6 NW 88608 Docld:82989638 Hade483 keep ================================================== Page 484 ================================================== Reports submitted the field are' thoroughly reviewed at the Seat of Government to insure that essential information is being obtained on a timely basis and that it is being promptly disseminated in the field, as well as at the Seat of Government The Director on 11/27/70 in testimony before the Senate Appropriation Committee for the purpose of securing additional Special Agents emphasized again the violent and revolutionary nature of the Black Panther Party (BPP) He testified there has been an alarming increase in the number of black extrenist attacks against law enforcement officers; BPP publications consistently advocate Violence, including assassination and kidnapings , to achieve overthrow of the Establishment; BPP Leaders have participacea in crimes of Violence; and Black Panthers have substantial connections with hostile foreign elements 9 notably the comunist regime in North Korea and Arab terrorists in Algeria Increasing ties between Arab terrorists and Black Panthers , according to the Director, raise the ominous possibility that militants may seek to ape Arab tactics 2 including air- plane hijackings , to the release of jailed Panther members NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 484 by gain ================================================== Page 485 ================================================== BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 4-H Bufile 157-8415 Since 1/7/69 all offices have submitted semiannual reports presenting concisely a complete picture of black extremist activity in its area This enabled uS to identify groups and individuals involved in black extremist activities, to develope quality informants who report on such activities and to initiate intensified and penetrative investigations of such individuals and groups , Since the desired objectives for which these reports were originally designed had been realized 9 since field informs uS on a timely basis in substan- tive cases of pertinent data concerning this movement and to insure manpower is utilized on priority matters, the Director on 7/6/70 authorized discontinuance of these reports_ On 3/8/69 the Black Nationalist Photographic Album (BNPA) was established to assist in identification of militant black extremists who travel extensively. The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extrenist organizations and militant black nationalists who are known totravel_ Each office prepares a form on such individuals within its territory and the form is then furnished to the Bureau and all offices where it is maintained in a complete album _ In the event of travel by any of these individuals, the office covering the area being Visited already has-a photograph and biographical sketch of the individual immediately available. The album is also furnished to the Legats in Ottawa and Mexico andto the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel _ Over 300 extrenists are currently carried in this album _ In view 0f importance of an individual S fingerprint classification for identification purposes, the field by letter dated 5/8/70 was instructed to include such data in biographical DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 4-H WAisef 1/12/71 NW 88608 Docld:32989675 485 City Page ================================================== Page 486 ================================================== sketch concerning each individual included in the BNPA and to amend those sketches then included in the Album to show such data_ The BNPA was also broadened to include black extremists who are Bureau fugitives_ This insured each office having a photograph and biographical sketch immediately available for use in conducting investigation to locate such fugitives or in apprehending them _ SAC Letter 70-65 , item (D) dated 11/17/70 the field was advised that, henceforth, deletions of individuals from the BNPA would require Bureau authorization since Bureau did not agree with some deletions made by field which resulted in unwarranted action by all field offices. To insure broad circulation among investigative Rersonnel to serv? as an avenue for greater utilization of informants especially racial sources, we initiated the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitives list in June, 1970 _ This list, which is prepared monthly and sent each field office and selected Legats_ } identifies those Bureau fugitives who by reason of their activities or organizational affiliations are black extremists _ Currently there are 45 fugitives carried on the list, 9 of whom are I0 fugitives _ Twenty of these fugitives are reportedly living outside the U,S_ This list has given greater emphasis to the location of these fugitives, particularly among Special Agents handling racial matters and racial informants and has been effective in affording greater exposure of these fugitives among racial informants _ Fifteen of these fugitives have been arrested since the list was initiated, with 5 being arrested in December _ 1970 _ One of those arrested in Decenber is the reported leader of the Black Panther Party (BPP) underground_ Racial Intelligence Section prepares monthly a Racial Calendar pertaining to the Black Nationalist Movement in this country_ This Calendar identifies scheduled racial events throughout the country which are more than local in nature as well as all major scheduled events which could NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 486 0 By and ================================================== Page 487 ================================================== logically develop into a racial event _ Purpose of the Calendar is to assist field in coverage of these events in view of widespread travel on the part of black nationalists in attendance at such affairs and to take part in demonstra - tions commemorating certain anniversaries of interest to blacks _ A listing of recently published publications and articles concerning the black nationalist movement is also set forth in the Calendar Publications included are public source and are identified to assist the field in keeping on top of writing by and about black nationalists and the black nationalist movenent. Black extremist activities are concentrated in organizez activities of over 65 groups, some of which have chapters in major cities throughout this country_ The violence-prone Black Panther Party_ > for example, has 48 branches throughout U,S_ Hard-core membership in these black extremist groups totals about 9600 _ This membership figure, however_ 2 disguises real following of extremist groups in black areas of our cities and extent of influence and leadership they exercise_ These organizations, and particularly BPP have substantial sympathetic support_ 9 especially from young blacks , which is frequently surfaced during confrontations with police. Extent of black extremist strength is illustrated by Louis Harris Poll which was set forth in 4/6/70 issue Of "Time_ "1 The Poll projects that nine Per cent of al1 blacks 3 some two million Americans, call thenselves "revolutionaries" and believe 3 "readiness to use violence" will acleve equality_ Twenty-five per cent have "a great deal" of respect for the BPP _ Most alarming is that 40 per cent of those in the age group 14-21 years old believe violence is necessary to achieve equality. The following pages set forth summaries concerning the black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation_ NWV 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 487 only key ================================================== Page 488 ================================================== BLACK PANTHER PARTY 4H The Black Panther Party (BPP) , a black extremist organization, continues to be extremely active throughout the country Formed during late 1966 in Oakland . California, for the obstensible purpose of patrolling the black community to prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense _ It expanded rapidly throughout the United States 'during 1967-68, then suffered" a gradual decline during 1969 Revitalized in December, 1969 and throughout the 1970s it has aain currently expanded until today there are approximately 48 branches of the BPP with an estimated 1,000 hard-core members supported by many thousands of sympathizers _ It also has an international ufiice in -Algiers } Algerie_ The branches include 17 chapters and 31 affiliated groups that masquerade under the names of National Committee to Combat Fascism or Black Community Information Center The ultimate goal of the BPP is the violent overthrow of the United States Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist system_ The BPP openly advocates urban guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government leaders and other forms of violent terrorism _ Since its inception, the BPP has aimed its most vicious invectives against law enforcement and particularly local police: "OEf the pigs," BPP jargon for "kill the cop" is the battle cry of the organization. The weekly Panther newspaper; "IThe Black Panther" and its other publications and propaganda paraphernalia are abound with articles and cartoons encouraging lethal attacks against police and other forms of authority. Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967 and since that time has expanded as the organization itself expanded _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 ABE:drl k 4H NWV-88608_Docld;32989638_Page 488 ================================================== Page 489 ================================================== By letter to all offices dated 2/27/70, approved by the Director, offices having BPP investigations were instructed to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every six months in compliance with instructions in the Manual of Instructions Previously offices were submitting quarterly reports on the BPP The changes made on the basis of a recommendation by a Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to elininate some Paper work in the field. All field offices having a BPP investigation are also required to submit a monthly report containing evidentiary data required by the Department Original instructions in this regard were issued by Bureau airtel 12/3/68 and the continued submission of this monthly report is necessary in view of possible prosecution of the BPP Ail field offices conducting an active BPP investi~ gation are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the status and activities of the BPP within its territory. This survey was commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968 9 and changed: to 8 monthly summary on the approval of the Director by letter to all offices dated 2/27/70 This change is a result of a recommendation by the Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to cut down paper work in the field_ The monthly summary relieves the field of some Paper work and at the same time keeps the Bureau and the feld up to date on BPP developments San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case continues to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the BPP Because f the excellence of this summary and the need for such an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed by Bureau airtel 1/21/70 to furnish copies of its summary to all continental offices which is the current practice- All field offices conducting an active BPP investi- gation were instructed by airtel 6/17/7.0 to submit a monthly summary on the financial activities of each BPP branch_ This financial summary includes data on sources of income, foreign funding, expenses , the mechanics of local finance operations NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 489 ================================================== Page 490 ================================================== and the steps being taken by each office to develop full financial data- This summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of al1 financial developments regarding the BPP on a national and international basis. By airtel to all continental offices 11/6/70 all field offices conducting an &tive BPP investigation were instructed to submit a biweekly airtel containing specific comments regarding underground BPP operations within the area of each field office_ This includes progress in the identity and interviewing of expelled BPP members who, it has been determined, are the logical candidates for 'member- in the BPP underground _ The underground operation of the BPP has an ultimate of terroristic guerrilla warfare_ It is a recent development in the operation of the BPP which is the subject of an intensive investigation Ihe biweekly summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all developments il the undergrourd ard to intelligently coordinate the investigation thereof In recent. months the Black Panther Party has formed a corporation known as Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Inc _ (SCPI) to control al1 BPP funds and assets and to act as purchaser andlor lessee of any property utilized by the BPP The corporation and its activities are under intensive investi- gation which has revealed that its activities are centered in San Francisco and New York. By airtel 1/7/71 to San Francisco and New York, these offices were instructed to submit a weekly summary in form suitable for dissemination of al1 pertinent developments concerning the corporation during the previous week _ This summary keeps the Bureau aware of SCPI operations &nd also enables uS to regularly fulfill our dissemination requirements _ It is noted that there are currently 32 field offices conducting active investigations of the BPP Our intensive investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, menbers and new branches . In addition, we have developed detailed information concerning its operations and activities including NW 88608 Docld:32989638 490 14 ship goal Page ================================================== Page 491 ================================================== organization plans = funding Programs , extent of control by headquarters and foreign support. In addition, evidentiary information that could support prosecution is regularly furnished to the Department. Our ultimate objective is of course the prosecution of the BPP for violations of Federal criminal, civil rights and security statutes . A secondary objective is to more copletely develop details of the BPP for intelligence Purposes In 1969 2 the Attorney General established a special task force for the specific purpose of developing a Prosecutive theory against the BPP Attorneys of this task force, known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have interviewed many of our informants in furtherance of this Purpcse and hav instituted a continuing Federal Grand Jury in San Francisco _ Ten of our informants have testified before this Federal Grand Jury and its is anticipated that others will be called. It is recommended that the intensive investigation of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as ~above be continued. NW-88608_Docld: 32989638_Page 491_ July, ================================================== Page 492 ================================================== CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP) 157-16554 The CAP was formed as an international revolutionary organization as the result of the convening of the fourth annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States in Atlanta, Georgia } September 1970 _ This gathering was unique in that it was attended" by approximately 2 500 blacks of so-called moderate and militant persuasion, as well as a large number of extremists_ Representatives attended from 35 states and 21 different nations including Canada , Australia, various independent nations of Africa, and the Caribbean area _ A number of the workshops at the CAP were dominated by extremist elements who urged the ceation of massive coopera- tive programs and institutions designed to destroy any progress made toward integration of the races by complete rejection of white society, the formation 0f a separatist black nation, na tional African parties, ultima- tely, a World African Party . These objectives are to be achieved through tbe unification, cooperation, and interdependence of blacks wherever they reside, regardless of their "imposed" nationali- ties and under the revolutionary ideological banner of Pan-Africanism of the well-known black extrenist Stokely Carmichael Specifically, CAP's domestic extremist element, headed by black revolutionaries HaywardHenry and LeRoi_Jones 379 from Newark, New Jersey, calls for extensive use of disruptive tactics against all segments 0f white-dominated institutions and organizations, including the police and the military. Since its founding in Atlanta, CAP has held a number of regional meetings in various sections of the United States for the purpose of setting up its national organization and in furtherance of its revolutionary programs _ As a result, CAP is currently activating in at least 17 different cities with its national headquarters and Chairman Hayward Henry located in Boston 9 Massachusetts LeRoi Jones however , appears to be the dominant figure in the organization, Current CAP planning indicates the organization intends to move aggressively through deceptive programs DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 PEN;mkl 4-H NW88608_Docld: 32989638 Page 492 1 2 6 3-7 , and , ================================================== Page 493 ================================================== (Congress of African Peoples (CAP) to establish black political power through four basic activftfes which are: (1) influencing of black political candidates; (2) organization of the black community; (3) formation of coalitions with al1 dissident and extremist groups whether white or black so long 85 CAP benefits from same; and (4) the massive use of disruptive tactics. CAP has emerged as another deadly threat to racial harmony as a result of its programs and ties with foreign extremist elements and well-known revolutionary Stokely Carmichael must also be considered an imposing threat to the national security. Investigations of the CAP: its leaders and extrenist affiliates are receiving most close supervision_ Pertinent data developed in regard to their activities is being dissemina ted to the Department and to interested Government agencies and officials_ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 493 7 yet and, ================================================== Page 494 ================================================== REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA 4-H Bufile 157-9079 The Republic of New Africa (RNA) formed in Detroit, Michigan in March, 1968 by followers of Malcolm X, assassinated black extremist, has chapters in ten U.S_ cities and a current hard-core membership of 100-130 individuals. RNA was primarily formed by Milton_and Richard Henry black extrenists of long standing in the Detroit, Michigan, area When first formed, the RNA named as its President in exile Robert Franklin Williams, violence- 2 prone black extremist "Ehen resiang in"China Williams has since returned to the U,S_ but has resigned from his position as head of the RNA due to his own legal problems and dissension existing vithin the organization_ RNA was established to create a black nation within the U.S_ demanding from the U,S, Government the States of Alabama . 9 Georgia, Louisiana Mississippi and South Carolina, in addition to individual reparations of S10,000 per black citizen as payment for 400 years of ancestral slave labor_ RNA' s organizatiael structure Was designed to be revolutionary in character and its founders proposed that efforts be made for international recognition and financial assistance from Cuba _ 9 Red China and the black nations of the world. RNA established a black army known as the Black Legion whose was to protect the Persons and property and to attack the enemies (the police) of that nation Training programs were instituted and uniforns complete with the leopard skin epaulets wer e disigned as the official dress for the Black Legionnaires_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/8/71 GTT sef 4-H NWV 88608 Docld:32989638Page 494 duty ================================================== Page 495 ================================================== High point in the RNA S activities occurred during a national convention in Detroit, Michigan, in March 1969 when members of the Black Legion engaged in armed confrontation with Detroit police resulting in the death of one policeman and the serious wounding of another_ The RNA is currently with dissension with two distinct factions _ The Richard Henry Faction with headquarters in New Orleans } Louisiana, is the most active and militant of the two groups_ The other faction is headed by Milton Henry with headquarters in Detroit, Michigan_ Current Plans of Richard_Henry_ call for an intensification of RNA activities throughout the U.S_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 495 1 ^ 9 split ================================================== Page 496 ================================================== STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMITTEE (SNCC) 100-439190 SNCC was originally organized in Atlanta 9 Georgia, in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Prior to the election of Stokely Carmichael as its Chairman in May , 1966, the organization operated as a nonmembership civil rights organization with both white and black participation_ Carmichael on assuning the Chairmanship of SNCC , immediately eliinated a11 whites from participation and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary action and the overthrow of the United States Government , a position which the organization maintains today. B Rap_Brown, Bureau fugitive and well-known black extremist who servea as National Chairman for a time following Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967 , again assumed the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969 _ At that time, it was announced SNCC Fas eliminating the word "nonviolent" from its title_ The organization 's headquarters were also moved from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City. Under Brown S direction, SNCC moved to restructure and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence as 2 black extremist organization _ The national leadership issued directives on the reorganization of the national office in New York City, as well as the local organizations and the formation of councils to include 2 Revolutionary Economic Council, an Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council, a Research Council 9 and others which make up a body within SNCC known as the Revolutionary Political Council 0 Included among new organizational procedures are plans for raising the number of active participants in local cadres, the obtaining and training in the use of weapons 3 the purchase Of land for ostensible use in an Agrarian Reform Plan to aid black tenant farmers but which will also serve as a weapons training site. Training manuals on revolutionary activities, including guerrilla warfare and the medical care of wounded or injured persons, have been prepared and are to be disseminated to local SNCC chapters in furtherance of this reorganization: As a result of B Rap Brom 's flight in May, 1970, to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 PEN :mkl S NW88608_Docld:32989638 496 Page ================================================== Page 497 ================================================== Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt _ Hunt also serves as head of the organization S Revolutionary Political Council Hunt has successfully directed the opening of 2 "coffeehouse {1 known as the Third Eye Lounge in Augusta Georgia. This facility, in line with SNCC S historicai anti-Vietnam Har posture_ is to serve as 2 propaganda center from which to foment anti-Vietnam War sentiments among black military personnel at Fort Gordon , Georgia, as well as among the black civilian population in that area_ In addition, Hunt_has initiated publication and distribution of 2 revolutionary news organ known as "National SNCC . Aggressive programs are underway to obtain new SNCC activists, and in an effort to capture the support of black females, the organization recently formed The Third World Homen 's Alliance under the leadership of Eran Beal, a member of SNCC s Revolutionary Political Council Strong evidence of progress in connection with the organization S plans to initiate guerrilla warfare tactics is given by development of recent information indicating Hunt and other SNCC leaders are in the process of selecting a number of candidates to receive such training in North Korea . These individuals } on completion of training, will serve as instructors in various parts of the country 9 thus providing SNCC with 2 well-trained, hard-core cadre of personnel capable Of initiating acts of terror against individuals and institu- tions of Government in furtherance of their revolutionary objectives. Investigations of SNCC , its leaders, affiliates, and their activities continue to receive close supervision_ Information Of pertinence concerning the organization continues to be disseminated to the Department and other interested Government agencies and officials. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 497 ================================================== Page 498 ================================================== JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANTZATIONS BUFILE 157-9903 4-H The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a black extremist organization with headquarters in St_ Petersburg, Florida. It is the leading organization for all black militant groups in Florida_ JOMO was founded in St_ Petersburg during 1968, with 85 ghetto youths, who believed liberation of black people will not come about through "normal channels _ The organization has affiliated groups in Louisville, Kentucky &nd Gainesville, Florida_ During December , 1970, leaders of JOMO decided to expand their operation throughout the nation. Attempts are currently being made to create chapters in Boston, Massachusetts and Miami, Florida_ Joseph Waller 9 Jr the articulate founder of JOMO, and present chairman of the organization intends Eo nave ali biack nilitant groups in Florida designated as organization chapters _ The organization' s voice and propaganda are carried out through the publication "The Burning Spear_ If This publication has urged blacks to buy arms and to be prepared to fight white America_ In this connection, JOMO members have participated in racial demanstrations, used fire bombs and have been involved in attacks on police through use of violence_ Members reportedly blew up a radio station in Tampa, Florida; and recently participated in a to break out two black political prisoners from a Florida prison _ Eight members of the organization were arrested in 1970 for committing three murders and 15 armed robberies _ One of the murders was committed to obtain money to pay a water bill for JOMO headquarters. The organization is in the process of accumulating weapons and making for members to be taught guerrilla warfare and firearms training_ In this connection leaders are interested in establishing contact with revolutionary African groups _ Waller desires to create within the organization "Simba Warriors" who would act whenever violence might be necessary in order to "bring down the white man- 1i During December, 1970_ WalZer reportedly had in his possession two Thompson sub-machine guns Dmestic Intelligence Division Inspection 1/11/71 NW EAE 284332989688 498 May , plot Plans Page ================================================== Page 499 ================================================== Junta of Militant Organizations Bufile 157-9903 JOMO receives extensive contributions from all over the United States. It has association with the Black Panther Party and other black extrenist groups as well as other New Left groups . NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 499 ================================================== Page 500 ================================================== 4-H NATION OF ISLAM Bufile 25-330971 The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an all-Negro; semireligious organization headed by_Elijah_Muhammad, self-proclaimed messenger f Allah Under Muhammad !s Teadership, the NOI has grown uP into a nationwide organization with a well-disciplined and devoted member- ship of almost 6,000 comprised of approximately 50 numbered mosques and approximately 50 unnumbered groups _ The NOI continues to teach antiwhite, anti- United States philosophy of hate aimed at a complete separation of the razes It oppuses any iori Of integration and at the same time has remained aloof from other black extremist groups who favor Violence_ During racial disturbances , NOI members are given instructions to not get involved in the rioting_ The NOI also opposes the war in Vietnam as a war against other non-whites and implies in its teachings that members should not serve in the United States Armed Forces as can serve one master, Eli jah Muhammad, It also supports the Arabs in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East. The NOI also publishes a weekly newspaper known as "Muhammad Speaks I1 which contains vicious antiwhite propaganda An average of 475,000 copies of this newspaper are distributed each week in the black communities and ghetto areas throughout the United States _ We" have conducted a continuous security and/or racial-type investigation of this organization since 1953 in accordance with directives of the Department_ Each active NOI group i8 reported on semiannually and the functionaries and leaders of the organization are those being investigated_ The Department by letter dated 7/28/66 requested our investigation of this organization be continued. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 L 4-H CEE: sef 124 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 500 they only 00 Page ================================================== Page 501 ================================================== TiA Communist Influence of Racial Groups 100-442529 This intensification was initiated in August 9 1964 . The subject matter was previously reported in a subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume and importance of this information nde it necessary to follow this communist influence in a separate investigation_ This investigation includes not the influence of the Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups , splinter groups and others including the New Left_ The overall objective in this and related investigations is to protect the internal security of the United States by submitting information relating to possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for prosecution. We also have the responsibility to develop intelligence informtion djsseminate to interested Government agencies Where feasible, certain counter intelligence measures are employed to neutralize the communist influence in the racial field: Reports are submitted quarterly and the investi- gation is evaluated upon receipt of each report Pertinent information is disseminated to the White House and the Attorney General The year 1970 saw continued influence by communists and other subversives in extremist groups In fact_ the communist attempts to influence the black extremist Black Panther Party were SO insistent that the Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist Party_ This has not diminished in any way the Communist Party S efforts to influence and support the Black Panther Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers whether want it or not_ One illustration of the communist influence on the violence-prone Black Panther Part:y is the situation in which Huey_Newton Panther Supreme_Commander , found himself DONSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/11/71 CEG:ekw (4-H) NW 886u8/JDocld: 32989638 Page 501 only and they ================================================== Page 502 ================================================== in connection with a film on Angela_Davis_ the communist and black revolutionary being held in California on murder charges _ The Communist Party, USA, sponsored a motion picture on Davis and invited Newton to film the introduction to the film_ Newton_conferred with Eldridge_Cleaverz exiled Information Minister of the Panthers, and told Cleaver he positively would not film the introduction because it appeared he would be required to follow the Communist Party line and, according to Newton. the Panthers did not follow anyone S line Despite Newton' & seemingly hard stand on this 9 the Communist Party found ways to make him relent and three later he agreed to the communist request 9 muttering that he would be "damned if he did and damned if he didn 't Ii As violent as they are, the Panthers are n match for the sophistication of the experienced communist intrigue_ The communist hoodwinking is not confined to the Black Panther Party The Communist Party' s well-oiled propaganda nechine hes sterted to ertfully transform Angela Daviss the accomplice in the brutal murder of a judge in California into a national monument and into a growing source of funds _ Not new at this sort of thing, the communists_ are well on their way to surpassing the monetary returns they have received from other racial and ethnic causes have exploited_ 9 such as the Scottsboro boys nine young blacks convicted twice in the 1930s in Alabama for raping two white on a freight train_ The communist influence in the' Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) the organization of the late Martin Luther Jr has continued since King' 8 death_ Although Hunter Pitts 6 Dell a communist, amicably terminated his position as aide to the SCLC President in December , 1970 , his influence continues as does that of Stanley Levisen and Harry_Wachtel who also have communist backgrounds Levison handles the SCLC fund-raising In the Pa st Levison and Wechtel operated behind the scenes ; t they are listed in SCLC literature as directors of the SCLC DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/11/71 CEGiekw 4-H NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 502 days they girls King oday 13 6 ================================================== Page 503 ================================================== In the year 9 as anticipated there has been a continued merging of racial activists and extremists with pro-Chinese communist groups ) Trotskyites 9 the Students for a Democratic Society, and similar groups _ In October 1970 , Elbert Howard a Black Panther Party functionary, stated that the Black Panther Party is composed of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and no longer confines its interest to black power or black nationalism_ He added that in the future the Panthers will encompass al1 revolutionaries regardless of race We can expect this merger to continue DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/11/71 CEGiekw 4-H NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 503 37 past ================================================== Page 504 ================================================== 4-H COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BLACK EXTREMISTS Bufile 100-448006 Counterintelligence in the black extremist field is a supplement to our investigative activities that cannot be identified as a function of this Bureau because of its clandestine nature_ The goals of it are to prevent violence and other illegal activities by black extremists and black extremist organizations, to prevent the growth and/or unifica- tion of blck extremist groups, to prevent such groups from gaining respectability and to preclude the rising of a leader who might unify and electrify various extremist factions and individuals_ To achieve these objectives, techniques are employed to neutralize organizations and individuals involved in extremist activities that are a threat to the internal security of this' country. These techniques are aimed to embarrass, expose or otherwise neutralize these organizations and individuals_ Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70 Counterintelligence operations are supervised on individual case desks as a logical adjunct of our investigative activities In addition, one supervisor is designated coordinator to insure that operaions initiated in different offices do not conflict. A quarterly letter is submitted for each participating division showing operations under consideration and results gained. All communications authorizing the institution of any counterintelligence operaions are routed through Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan; no operations are initiated by the field without Bureau approval DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 WAi sef 4-H Tpfh NW 88608 Docld:37989638 Page 504 ================================================== Page 505 ================================================== EZS Counterintelligence operations and techniques were thoroughly discussed with field representatives attending the October 22 and 23, 1970 , conference at the Bureau concerning the Black Panther Party (BPP) The conference concluded counterintelligence was an effective tool and there was a definite need for counterintelligence operations to neutralize black extrenist activities. The effect on black extremists of some authorized counterintelligence operations are difficult to assess, but a substantial number effected since last inspection have had measurable consequences and some of these included the following: Four articles revealing extremist nature of BPP based on information furnished a news media source in Mississippi resulted in tne closing of the Bpp chapter in Cleveland, Mississippi. Agents of the Jackson Office were commended by the Director for this operation, Following the arrests of BPP leadership in New Haven after torture-murder of BPP member in 1969, a Black Panther from Boston wa5 sent to New Haven to rebuild that chapter _ He proved to be an energetic organizer who built a closely knit and highly disciplined organization that effectively brought about mass demonstrations, attracted additional membership and which posed a serious threat to established Government. To neutralize this dynamic leader, New Haven was authorized to forward an anonymous letter to national BPP headquarters in California alleging he had embezzled BPP funds . Since then, numerous reports have been received indicating he had fallen into disfavor with BPP leaders and his motives were suspect. This resulted in his transfer to an insignificant BPP chapter in North Carolina_ In Rochester, New York, an anonymous letter sent to the Superintendent of Schools resulted in cancellation of subscriptions to the obscene, hate-filled, extremist newspaper of the BPP by a high school These newspapers had been used NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 505 May , ================================================== Page 506 ================================================== in classrooms and costs of subscriptions had been charged to the school system_ Philadelphia division was authorized to send a letter to BPP national headquarters bearing an excellent facsimile of signature of a former BPP officer in Philadelphia who had been expelled a week previously due to problems with BPP leadership in Philadelphia The letter accused Philadelphia BPP members of stealing clothing, food and drugs collected for poor children. Al1 of these accusations 9 incidentally, were true Since this letter was sent, Philadelphia BPP chapter has experienced severe problems with BPP headquarters 9 has been chastised repeatedly and prevented from participating in some BPP activities Several members were disciplined by transfers_ Subsequently , this situation was exploited by an authorized mailing of an anonymous letter to Huey R Newton Supreme_ Commander and co-founder of BFF which crlileized iile meeiiflgsIzil under BPP auspices in Philadelphia September 5-7 9 1970 concerning the Planning for BPP-sponsored Revolutionary People' s Constitutional Convention_ These counterintelligence operations were primarily responsible for expulsion of head of the Phila- delphia BPP and many of his followers from BPP on 10/16/70_ These individuals have formed an independent local group in Philadelphia which contends with BPP for local support in tat Thus , another result of thi operation has been the splintering of Philadelphia BPP chapter _ To exploit a in BPP leadership in Winston- Salem, North Carolina, Charlotte was authorized to prepare and send a leaflet to residents in vincinity of BPP headquarters_ The leaflet insinuated the head of one BPP faction had pocketed donations secured for BPP Breakfast for Children Program: The leaflet caused consternation among BPP personnel and resulted in young Negro males poking fun at this BPP leader and accusing him of being a parasite_ A decrease in financial donations to BPP followed the distribution of this leaflet_ Los Angeles set up a television expose of BPP in which George Putnam newscaster KTTV-Los Angeles 9 California, noted that spread of Panther hoodlum-type revolutionary activity NW 88608 Docld:32989638 506 city_ split Page 4o ================================================== Page 507 ================================================== 3724 was a serious internal security threat, with law enforcement as its immediate target. He utilized the Director 1 S compre- hensive testimony on the BPP before the House Sub-Comnittee on Appropriations on 3/5/70 in bringing out the revolutionary and terroristic threat presented by BPP and its leaders He concluded the program with the opinion that Itwe are subsidizing our own destruction if we allow this to continue_ Mi To drive 3 wedge between BPP and many of its contributors, data concerrg the anti-Zionist and anti-Semetic nature of BPP was furnished a news media source_ As a result articles were published during June and 1970 , in Various newspapers throughout U,S including Island Press," Long Island, New York; "Daily News 1i Springfield, Massachusetts; and "Mobile Register. 9 Mobile, Alabama These articles discussed the close alliance developed between BPP and Al Fatah, azi Arab terrorist organizatior #cging guerrilla Farfare ag2inst Israel_ These articles emphasized that numerous pro-Arab and anti 5 Israeli articles have been published in the BPP newspaper and some of the latter articles called for the coplete distruc - tion of Israel. The above articles as well as many other counterintelli- gence operations authorized since last inspection have contributez materially to drying up of contributions to BPP . Loss of revenuz is one of the BPP' s greatest problens and perhaps the best illustration is the drop in the size and circulation of the BPP newspaper the Party' 8 primary propaganda device. This paper has declined from 20 or more pages to 12 in its 1/2/71 issue and circulation at the end of the year was less than 100 ,000 after a high of 183,000 in October 2 1970 . Counterintelligence action has also contributed or led to disruptions _ } dissension and factionalism in the BFF , the most important of the black extremist organizations _ Sources have reported internal strife has developed among top BPP leaders and there is a growing distrust aong them of one another, For example, Albert Howard national leader who has been supervising BPP activities on East Coast, and Robert a BPP leader in New York, have been recalled to national BPP NW 88608 Docld:37989638 507 July, "Long Bayz Page ================================================== Page 508 ================================================== headquarters in California, where were disciplined and severely criticized. In addition, SF 3421-R* on 12/26/70 reported a degree of dissension between Eldridge_Cleaver x Minister_f Inforation_who is fugitive from justice and resi_ inAlgeria and Huey_P Newton Informant learned Cleaver was extremely upset because BPP headquarters and Particularly Newton are not keeping in touch with hin and are not keeping him advised of developments _ This matter is being closely and aggressively followed for purpose of additional exploitation of these circumstances under this program Effective means of neutralizing black extremist groups is by drying up their sources of funds We authorized the New York division to advise the Episcopal Church Center by anonymous letters that a S67 000 requested grant from the Episcopal Church Screeninz Board in New York, Ne; York, tC finance the Liberation School in Atlanta, Georgia, was in fact intended for use of Student National Coordinating Comittee (SNCC) as the school was an operation of SNCC , a black extremist organization,and SNCC in seeking the grant had concealed its connection with the school_ This operation resulted in the Church placing such low priority on this request that financial assistance for the school was precluded and the Liberation School was SO advised. Since SNCC is in poor financial condition, this denial of funds was a blow to its endeavors to revitalize itself_ The Director noted "excellent" on 9/3/70 memorandum which advised of this successful counterintelligence operation. A highly successful counterintelligence operation exposed to college administrators the unethical and deceptive use made of college funds by Back Student Organization, Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, Michigan, to purchase literature concerning the creation of explosive devices and concerning guerrilla warfare_ As a result of this operation, college confiscated such literature, admonished Black Student Organi - zation leaders and tightened administrative procedures to preclude similar misuse of its funds _ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 508 they ding key ================================================== Page 509 ================================================== The Jackson Office was authorized to furnish data concerning Republic of New Africa (RNA) 9 a Violence-prone black extremist separatist organization, to a cooperative newspaper source, resulting in the publication of an excellent article exposing the violent nature of this organization on the front page of the only state-wide evening newspaper in Mississippi_ This publicity on the evening before the RNA regional conference was to begin, jolted RNA leaders _ In addition, Negro participants from Jackson area were shocked to learn of the Violent nature of this group and withdrew their support. The scheduled agenda was shelved and the conference was completely disrupted_ Agents of the Jackson Office and Domestic Intelligence Division Supervisor were commended by the Director for this operation_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 509 Page ================================================== Page 510 ================================================== THE KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM On December 23 , 1970 , the Black Extremist Program was initiated with the Director S approval, to int ensify our coverage of certain black extremists who are extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence_ As the program started about 90 were included _ With Bureau approval others may be added by the field. This program is to provide intensified coverage of the day-to-day activities and future plans of these people: and to assure that all possible violations of law on their parts are vigorously investigated when are within our jurisdiction and are referred promptly to the appropriate agency when are not _ An investigative sumary report on all these people is due by February 15 1971 _ Thereafter an investi- ve report is to be submitted every 90 days _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISON INSPECTION 1/12/71 CEGiekw (4-H) NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 510 Key they they gati ================================================== Page 511 ================================================== BLACK STUDENT GROUPS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES On October 29, 1970 , the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries 9 limited to established sources , on Black Student Unions and similar groups , their leaders = 9 and activists to determine if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant further active investigation_ On November 4 , 1970 , instructions were sent to the field to implement this program _ The number of campuses involved is about 500, representing approximately 750 black student groups The officers will represent about 2 ,500 cases and the key activists another 250 . The potential for new cases in this program Will approximace 3,500 cases This program includes junior colleges and two-year colleges as well as four-year colleges_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 CEG:ekw (4-H) 40lB8608 Docld:32989638 Page 511 key ================================================== Page 512 ================================================== RACIAL INFORMANTS 4-H The prime purpose of development and utilization of racial informants and sources is to provide intelligence and evidentiary information concerning black and white racial extremist organizations and individuals_ These sources are also called upon to furnish information concerning the general racial situation in al1 parts of the country . Supervision of racial informants at Seat of Government includes reviem and approval of new informants and confidential sources , review of progress of informant every six months review of payments being made to informants analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nationwide informant overage of an organization coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such as the national convention of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and supervision of special projects such as development of top echelon BPP informant } using informant to develop information concerning a black extremist underground escape route and ccordinating utilization of informants abroad with other agencies _ Al1 procedures are' constantly evaluated in an effort to increase the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision and assistance with a minimum of paper work_ As of 1/12/71 we are operating a total of 7l84 racial informants compared with a total of 5,485 at time of last inspection_ This is an increase of 17899 informants 584 informants report on black extremist organizations 376 informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan _ (In line with recent reorganization of Domestic Intelligence Division supervision of racial informants furnishing information on white extremists will shortly be transferred to the Internal Security Section.) We are operating 6,224ghetto informants who provide general information within the black ghetto areas of our cities Informant coverage of black extremist groups has been increased since the last inspection with a Significant increase being noted in our coverage of the BPP At the time of the last inspection we operated_1l9informants reporting on BPP as compared with 173 as of 1712/71, which represents an increase of 54 informants _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 ~rUhKans NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 512 ================================================== Page 513 ================================================== Our ghetto informants have materially increased from 4,605 at the time of the last inspection to_6,.224 as of 1712771, which represents an increase of 1619 At the time af the last inspection we were operating 438_informants furnishing information concerning white extremist organizations and as of 1/12/71 we are operating 376 such informants which represents a decrease 0f 62 This is to be expected as a result of the continuing decline of Klan and other white extremist activities By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G . C Moore to Mr _ W . C. Sullivan 3 captioned "Racial Informant Development Black Panther Party (BPP) Racial Matters , 11 it was recommended and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing 2 top-level informant in the BPP It was also approved that 81, 000 could be expended for the purpose of developing a top-Leyel_informant As part of this program Je have-been: in contact with a national BPP Teader on severa occasions and while he has not agreed to cooperate with this Burzau he reutnse friendty 5o fhe -confacting-Agents -and fuzther_efforts are cont emplated to induce_his cooperation In-addition_Ie have been successful in obtaining the_cooperation 0f another national BPP 1eader!s_ Wife and-through_her_cooperation_we have made contact With this ieader Again the leader has not indicated a willingness to cooperate however additional contacs-WilLZbe initfated withyhi; _ This_operation Was Specifically designed to develop top-Level informant in_the_ top eaheton Of the BPP shighjecriticallyneeded _ We will continue to pursue the deveiopment of 2 top_Level informant until it is accompl ished_ GHETTO INFORMANTS Ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67 to fulfill an urgent need to develop 2 network of "listening posts' M in the ghetto areas of our cities Ghetto informants were those persons living or working in the ghetto areas who furnished information concerning general racial conditions in their areas As the field has gained experience in the handling of ghetto informants their value has steadily increased_ Ghetto informants today are being utilized by field offices to attend public meetings held by extrenists, to survey extremist NW 88608 Docld:32989638 513 Page ================================================== Page 514 ================================================== bookstores to verify residences and employments of Agitator and Security Index subjects living or working in ghetto areas and to identify individuals responsible for extremist activities tending to increase racial tensions in the ghetto areas_ We are also noting numerous instances wherein ghetto informants are being converted by the field to regular racial informants furnishing information on black extremist organizations and individuals_ As & valuable by-product we are also picking up criminal statistics through our contacts with ghetto informants_ The ghetto informant program was last justified by memorandum G_ C. Moore to Mr W _ C_ Sullivan dated 7/17/70 2 captioned "Ghetto Informant Program, Racial Matters , M and is scheduled to be rejustified in July, 1971 - TRAINING A two-day conference of field supervisors handling racial matters investigations was held at Seat of Government 9/17-18/70 _ Representatives from 39 offices and two Legal Attaches attended _ The conference dealt specifically With investigation of the BPP and informant development therein_ A number of recommendations and suggestions resulted from this conference and were implemented _ Suggestions approved as results of the conference are the subject of a separate write-up_ Those in atfendance were in agreement that the conference had been most beneficial to both field and Seat of Government personnel participating. 148 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 514 ================================================== Page 515 ================================================== ADMINSTRATIVE OPERATIONS NW88608_Docld: 32989638Page 515 7Z ================================================== Page 516 ================================================== ADMINISTRA TIVE MEMORANDUM POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM ESPIONAGE SECTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION NNSPECTORE MMILLER: This program is designed to develop double agents who can give uS vital information from their kowledge of plans and illegal operations of our enemies within the United States , A potential double agent your definition is one in contact with representatives of & foreign government under Bureau control but has not been requested to give information or given assignments_ During the course of this inspection, the Inspector asked for and received a iist Of 2J8 &ctive poleiiiai duuble agents. A review 0f 287 files {809} indicatez the following: a_ These files deal primarily with PSIS and some SIs who have limited social, Situational and business contacts with Soviet and Satellite nationals. Most of these nationals are allegedly intelligence agents_ 2 suspected intelligence agents or persons who are contacts of these nationals _ b. Generally the people selected for development a8 potential double agents are correspondents and journalists who come in contact with Tass news agency officials and employees; American businessmen who purchase Russian products or sell American products through Amtorg or other Russian companies operating in the United States; neighbors and building managers where nationals reSide; naturalized American citizens of Slavic derivation who are contacted by suspected intelligence agents; naturalized American citizens who travel to Russia and satellite countries; leaders of Slavic -American societies 3 organizations and publications ; American citizens taking educational and business tours in Russia and other Iron Curtain countries; and prominent members of technical and scientific societies who have an interest in Similar scientific work and publications by Russian and satellite country professionals. DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION V21[71 ESM:wmj NW 8608 Docld:32989638 Page 516 by ================================================== Page 517 ================================================== -2 - C Generally a thorough background investigation is completed on each individual selected to be a potential double agent before the Bureau authorizes him to be interviewed to determine if he is receptive and willing to assist and cooperate with the Bureau; These investigations are not completed within & specified period: Several instances were noted wherein the national returned to his native country before the informant could develop suitable rapport. Review indicated several of these cases remain active although the national returned to his native country. d_ After the Bureau has authorized the field office to develop the potential double agent, the field office sends in progress reports each 6 months (FD-401). In most instances only a slight social acquaintanceship is established over an extensive period. Field and SOG supervision of these cases appears to be mechanical and perfunctory and laclsimaginative, aggressive and timely direction_ e_ During the year 1970 there was an average of three communications per file received from the field. Most of these were semiannual reports _ Communications from SOG to the field averaged less than one letter per file and in almost all instances this was a very short letter authorizing in I vestigation and development of potential double agent There were less than 10 cases noted where specific instructions directions or other guidance was furnished to the field in developing these potential double agents _ f. 110 of the cases were reviewed at random for the specific purpose of determining generally how long they had been pending: 4 cases had been pending prior to 1960 3were open in 1961;6in 1962; Zin 1963; 6i 1964; 5 in 1965; 10 in 1966; 12_in 1967;,JQ in 1968; 22in 1969; and 25_in 1970. The average case has been opened 3 1/2 years and there has been an average of oe piece of outgoing correspondence from the Bureau in each file. Very little outgoing correspondence concerning instructions or directions were noted in these JlO files _ For example,_E of the files reviewed had no out - going correspondence in them Since 1967 _ One file was reviewed in which the last outgoing correspondence was: in 1962. '65 of these JL0 files did not have any outgoing correspondence in the last 12-month period (1970) Review of this program as indicated the above observations 9 reveals that virtually no direction is given the program_ Separate write -ups have been prepared on two individual cases where supervision has been most inadequate_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 517 by ================================================== Page 518 ================================================== 3 - As a general consideration, it is felt that you have 298 cases pending in what appears on the surface to be an important program but in reality are mere "numbers I from a supervision standpoint. You are requested to explain why this condition exists what is your justification for this type of handling, and what action you anticipate necessary to correct. Comments of Inspector D. E. Moore and Assistant Director C. DS Brennan_ requested. NW 88608 Docld: 37989638 Page 518 ================================================== Page 519 ================================================== INSPECTOR DONALD E The comments and observations (1-24-71 dGs EIL : DEM/djw:ekn) of the Inspector dealing with a "POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM" have been carefully reviewed and the following comments are responsive to the questions raised: For purposes of clarification it is important that the terminology and designations used be defined The designation "Potential Double Agent Mi (PDA) is a descriptive term denoting an individual usually already approved by the Bureau as a Potential Security Informant (PSI) or as a Security Informant (SI) The approval of a PSI or SI is based on his current or potential capabilities to furnish information of intelligence or security interest_ If individuals in either of these ca tegories have an association with a Soviet-bloc official, for statistical purposes they are considered as PDA S_ This labeling is incidental to their primary designation as a_ Bureau- approved PSI or SI ) and their administrative handling at the Bureau conforms with overall Bureau policy and instructions relating to all Bureau approvea sources wnether or not they are considered to be PDA S , and this designation does not alter the administrative handling of these cases Justifications for Bureau-approved PSI's and SI 's are required on a six-month basis following definitely estaished form_ The primary purpose of this justification is administrative in na ture to insure the individual involved continues to meet Bureau standards_ Substantive information which may have been furnished is reported in detail in the 134 file ma itained by the Office of Origin as required by Bureau regulations This information is then reported to the Bureau under appropriate substantive captions _ Normally the only occasion when substantive data received from a source appears in the informant case file is in the semi-annual justification letter in extremely abbreviated form_ See Section 107K, paragraph 7 , page 13 , Manual of Instructions which states, "Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case If caption _ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 519 MOORF/ ================================================== Page 520 ================================================== 5 Regarding specific comments in paragraph C as pointed out, the primary designation ofE an individual as a PSI or SI is his ability to furnish information of intelligence interest, which may or may not depend upon his association with one Soviet-bloc national This association a lmost without exception becomes productive only when the Soviet-bloc official initiates action to exploit this relationship_ The fact that the Soviet-bloc national departs this country } first, does not end their relationship, and secondly, does not end the potential that exists in the relationship_ Very often there is a follow-up contact by another Communist-bloc official based on the apparently disrupted initial relationship Characteristic of the patient long-range planning and execution of Soviet-bloc ioteiligence, this reactivation may occur at some indeterminate future date . We must be alert to this concrete possibility in order to fully exploit the potential that exists in such cases_ Therefore, contacts with the source, in cases of this type, must continue for a reasonable period _ Concerning paragraph d., in cases where the potential for development of an individua 1 aS a double agent is based exclusively on a social acquaintanceship with a specific Soviet-bloc official the initiative for this development rests almost entireiy with that Soviet- bloc official_ Experience has taught uS that a ttempts on our part to maniuplate our sources to hasten his development are most often recognized by the hostile intelligence officer as a provocation _ When direction is necessary and practical, it must be developed in the overall context of the Soviet_bloc official S investigation, and such direction is apparent in the substantive case files These factors will account for what appears to be "mechanical and perfunctory I supervision which "lacks imaginative, aggressive and timely direction, Ii in the informant case file. Paragraph e refers to the lack of communica tions in the informant files reviewed _ The na ture and purpose of the informant file has been previously explained, and in this context it can be understood that operational instructions usually appear in the substantive files and not in the administrative file of the informant . NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 520 15 3 ================================================== Page 521 ================================================== 6 Paragraph f notes many instances of cases concerning "PDA s" have been opened for varying periods 0f time aga in, the lack of extensive outgoing communications noted It is again stressed that the designa tion of "PDA " is an arbitrary one these files are eva luated and administered on an individual basis in accordance with Bureau requirements related to PSI 's and SI 's, and not solely on their double-agent potential _ These requirements are met in these cases _ The Inspector has commented in his Survey that "virtuilly no direction 18 given the program_ "t The foregoing comments have established 1.) the designation of PDA to a SI or PSI does not require administrative supervision or ha ndling by SOG over and above that required for any SI or PSI, 2.) if direction and instruction is necessary and practical in 2 particular case, such is given in the overa1l supervision and handling of the substantive case file of the Soviet-bloc national involved, 3.) in accordance with current Bureau policy and instructions relating to the handling of these files tney cuuia ifl a minimal amount of information relating to the productivity of the source, and 4.) the labeling and designation 0f a SI and PSI as a PDA is an administrative device adopted for the purpose of emphasizing the need for Double-Agents _ There is no program as such , for the handling of these cases_ To the general consideration expressed that the 298 cases are mere numbers from a supervisory standpoint, the above comments clearly indicate such is not the case These cases are not opened and maintained as a program _ They are opened on individual merit and ma intained in accordance with Bureau standards under the same requirements as all other PSI and SI cases at the SOG . In summary , it appears that the criticisms leveled in this particular Survey are due to 2 misconception involving terminology "PDA {i is a label It carries no reguirement for administrative handling over and above supervision a fforded the case as a PSI or SI These cases are basic and vital investiga tive tools_ Administration of such cases are guided by rigid Bureau standards; the comments made by Inspector do not indicate these standards have been breached _ Thus no corrective action is considered necessary and none is 9 recommended . This does not mean that I will not continue to exert every effort to see that qualified informants wi)} continue to be developed and that carefully considered and logical means will be employed to have these informants AW-88608-Doeld-32989638-Page-521 54 and, ================================================== Page 522 ================================================== developed to the point they are accepted by Soviet-bloc officials and become operational Double-Agents I am pleased we have increased the number of active Double- Agents since the last inspection and will closely follow our progress in this field_ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN I have carefully noted (DEM:ekn 1-24-71) the comments of the Inspector and also those of Mr _ Moore_ I certainly am awa re that Double-Agents active against Soviet-bloc officials are a vital part of our counterespionage work _ I share the views expressed by Mr Moore and assure the Inspector I will closely follow the development of informants in this field and see that proper guidance is given the field to increase the number of active Double-Agents_ ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER "ESM:mjt 1/25/71) Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we have in the Bureau today and during this inspection our review of your program waS made with this attitude_ I have reviewed with great interest the accomplishments and progress which you have made; howvever , there were certain aspects of your operation Thich have caused concern Specifically, your handling of "Potential Double Agents" does not nearly result fron a review standpoint with the feeling that this phase of work is compatible with the challenges presenced. Elsewhere in this inspection we have discussed development of Double Agents in place as being highly desirable goals in our work, yetss_we_haveLacked success inthis as evidenced Jy an extended"ary" Berzod of almost_nine Years I feel that perhaps foreign intelligence may not be that good and that by improving ourselves we may be able to accomplish our goals. In the above write-up it was my feeling that your Potential Double Agent progran needs considerable attention from a critical self-analysis standpoint for the purpose of strengthening it consistent with its potential for provi valuable assistance both here and in the field. Assistant Director note. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page_522 ding 1S ================================================== Page 523 ================================================== 8 - Assistant Director C, De Brennar (1/25/71 WAB:hke) The comments of the Inspector are noted, I most certainly share the Inspector's view that Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we have in the Bureau today I have and am continually stressing the development of. good double agents_ The Inspector referred to "Double Agents-in-place mi and in view 0f the context of his remarks_ I concluded ne 18 referring to "Defectors-in-place, T( and I know of no higher goal in our work than developing then, To my knowledge , the first Soviet_Defector-in-place the_Bureau ever developed was_Kearzo Tuoni Jan illegal_agent Iho was 2 Captain the_Soviet and-Wbo_was-developed in March 1959 We operated him for approzimately _four and oneshalf years Nezte-in 1961-1962 'Ez8 we developed Tophat 2 31 Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Army who operated intthis countryuuntil 628Zetz to the Sovfet Unjon 1n"1962 Whfle 4 theSoviet_Union, he cooperated and furnished valuabie information #bich Mas ~ecovered thesCIA from_deaddrops 37 in_Moscow In 1966 Tophat 07 Wes assigned to Burma and was contacted' by the Bureau in that coun Rith {he Director S approvat he was turned over to CIA 3 @ndhoperated by then and a130 for uS Since Zerviced_require- mepts Tor uS_ until 1969 fophat nas_now_ returned to the Soviet 0510n,,and to Fe our Knowledge, zhe 4s stili a_~cooperat Ve Detector-in- 74 place and way come to the West again, In October 1961,& we developed through investigation and interrogation the GunsonDefector-in-place, who was 2 member of the illegal apparatus for the SovietMilitery IateLligence Seryice Jp_Hay 4217 1962 9errk he returned to_ the Soviet Union Sa and if he can Leave that coyntry 1l = we can_expect_that he_Wili be in t#- contact with 4s again In 4962 9 we began operations with the_Fedora_source, & Colonel ip the Soviet Comnittee for State Security (KGB) He furnishea voluminous infornation on KGB operatios inaiuding the deta which_resulted in the_arrest conviction o Hgor Ivanov and _John_Miqlian Buzenko. Tp May, 1967 Jy he TeturpedZEo the Soviet Union pbut Was_again_contacted by the Bureau inCanada #7A 2 12 1968 ,qhere ne Yas_ visiting for a Short_period In_September 3 '4 3+ 1969Fedora uisited ipNew York and was again i touch with NiN 8B608_Docld-32989638_Page_523 5m cf in Army by _ trYe they and 18 6 ================================================== Page 524 ================================================== 9 Bureau Agents To our knowledge Fedora is still a viable source ana neTilt nt Be reassrgned in the United States 7ra certainly we can_ anticipate contact Txh him at Scjentiific 35r) syuposiuns elsemhere in the western worla: In 1962 we developed the_Nicknack_Defector-in-place, Fho was 2 tecbnical man connected 7di Soviez_nilitary_intelligence. Miaqagr returyed 1o the Soviet Unior.i01964 anticipating "rhat his nezt overseas assignment mould be with 'the Soviet Military Office in Washington, D. C. In 1963, we compronised the Hiter source who was a co-opted agent of tbe KGB and who furnished political information which was disseminated at he highest level. Hereturned to the Soviet Union in October 1964- Contact w2s first made with the Shanrock source in January 1967 At one tine he Ras the Acting Resident of the KGB in New York. He furnished information concerning T02 KGB operations 0 Based upon information furnished by Shamrocr, 7be 07 Adcztification cf 22 i1l2gal egent hushend and Tita Zen has 4? been effected. Tbey are presently Jocated in Argentina, 26 494 During the sumuer of 1969 an Agent of the Neiv York Office successfully developed the Henlo source , Rno aceed a3 2E a Defectorcin-place from July, 7969 to Novomher , "T970 . " The" Harlo source was in 2 position to furnish 'informationof value and to Tdentify members of the Soyiet intelligence community The source left the United States in November 1970, under 17al circumstances_ Ihich may indicate 2 wilringnegs tocfurther cooperate 4f the opporzunity Presented-itgelf While the above is a listing of Defectors-ino-place achievements in the Soviet field 9 we have been equally successful C5 with the_Satellite intelligence Services Conmencing in 19638 we developed the Prine sources wbo FF29 2 Polish code clerk at the Polish United Nations Hission: Ke furnisned Czph2r p2ds 97= and Levs vid guabrean Luonn Secuty @gency to break tne S74ar Polish code TThat 0gency described his operation as the 77 intellgence supernaul of the century: in the Polish field In addition to two Defectors-in-placeTauring the ensuing years, wve now operate the_Panther SQ43Ce2 who is presently in-place in the United Nations Secretariat in New York. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 524 18 2 17r Page ================================================== Page 525 ================================================== 10 We developed Gimme a member of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, in 1962 ana operated him until he returned to"iCzechoslovakia in November 1963 Thereafter he was in continual @randestine contact _yith "theCTA utjz nis retur to Weshington 10 Januzy,- 1969 Fnere he was again 4217 operated Successfully untii his overt defection in June 1970_ HF 1373-S was a Yugoskav diplomat and intelligence officer who was successfully recruited and operated from July_1962 until_September 1965_ He was believed to be the 3i 0 Trst Professiont inte_zigence AinooVTw Yugoslay -%fficer recruited anywhere in the woria: From early Julys1966 through the_first_week_+n November S 1966 2we were in contact with an extremely sensitive T3 Defector-in-place in the_Wasbington Ctrnarea Knowledge of this Defector-in-place is and has been limited to very few Bureau personnel four mep in the Espionage_Section are aware of bis past cooperatio Thile in coutact this Defector-in- place furnished extremeiy vaiuable counterintelligence and has tne_potegiial fu4 reaseigmett t3 tia 8nite: Statzs Wc are 32 currently operating 3 double agent_devaroped bY tis source ip 22 effort to_bring about bis reassignment %o This country In additfon_we nave taken actzo@ aga3n3t thoze Sovdet ZutalTzgence offlcers in the sane departuent 2s this source_ in an effort to force their recall thus opeqing Wp the Tay Tor source %o be Ss reassigned to the_U.S as their replacement Shouid we succeed bis Enovedge rouid give uS an insight into thez KCBlega1 apparatus in the L,S that we have never preyzously had_ In addition, we have been in contact with numerous Soviet-bloc officials both through double agents who were carefully directed by us and by Bureau Agents. At the present time we are in contact with Henryk_Cieslale an employee. 0f_the Polish Embassy Agents have talked to him several times and have an appointment to clandestinely meet with him_this _ Saturday s January29,.L9ll.2t National Airport He_has indicated uTTingness to cooperate with uS buthas some teservations in view of his family situation- We expect to #4 overcome this In addition, in New Yozk, Alezander_Adan Messing-Mierzejewski Chief of the Representation_and Liaison Wnit,OEEice-of Tnteragency Affatrs Untted Natjons_Secretariats Pole has been 'contacted &nd expressed agreement to cooperate and we are continuing our contacts With him and hope to develop him fully. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 525 44a Dear Oply_ (a Page Cf ================================================== Page 526 ================================================== 11 These are just_tKo_Of_Jany contacts we have made during recent years in the Sarellite field. In theSoviet field we have been particularly anxious to develop Defectors-in-place and have made nuerous contacts_ During 1970 we had an Agent meet clandestinely on_three_occasions_with Balentin P Nizhelskiy Inthizd Secretary a8 the Soviet Embassy, who Ot is a known_KGB officer and we_had Several_brush meetings With bim He returned tothe Soviet Uion on normal 'home 7x leave in late September 1970 bue Rrior to_hig_departure arrangements were made for subsequent meetings with hin mhen he_returned He has not returned_and information 3343 9AU recently received indicates tiis is due to serious illness 01 "522 Of his Wife in Ehe_USSR Hhhile Zhe_reported llness Qf his Wife may beonly= a cover by the KGB to_keep uS from Knowing he reported niscontacts tne illnessqf_biS_Wize I U may be very real and if SO and he returns to this 03 country subsequently we have-excelzent_ground work already 770 laid After 8 long period of working against Yuriy P # Lignevgkiyrz kom_GRU Agent_and_head_ef AEROFLOT_Office in Ney_York we developed excellent information about him and established a close relationship with him. Hesecured very detailed_personal information about Li snevskiy and in October contcted him and_while he waas Jadly shaken Jecause % Eherdetailed operzation Ie_had run Against him he did not commit himself to cooperate and after thinking about the matter for a period of time apparently decided to report to his superiors and was_Whisked_back to_the Soviet Union_ Lisnevskiyand Nizhel are examples of efforts we have made and are continuing to make in this field, I am setting forth this very sensitive information SO that the Inspector will be aware that we have been and mos t certainly Will continue to do everything possible to accomplish our goals _ I feel we have very dedicated and knowledgeable men working in this field and we are constantly analyzing the overall field in the light of changing world conditions to see that we take advantage of every opportuni- The Inspector may be assured we will continue to do SO NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 526 1s9 skiy ty_ ================================================== Page 527 ================================================== ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM COVERAGE OF KNQHN MEET AREAS (COKMA) PROGRAM During the course of this inspection, 8 volume of material was reviewed part of which were cases and investi- gations dealing with the above program in the New York_Qffice: The program was instituted in July 1970 a team 0f Special Agents in the Jamaica-Queens area in an effort to observe clandestine activity there based on: an analysis of previous activity in that area SPIA letters dated 8/14/70 and_9/4/70 from_New York Feporred tergpservagion At Ape 0f numerous K Sovfet inteliigence officers in tbe area dur ng July 2d_ Sut Zugust and three individua1s were identified in contact with soviet_Zntefiigence officers under 70 euapic ous circumstances It appears . that the successes o1 the recent and current Ner_York efforts in these matters still have not been brought to the attention of the Washingtor_Eield_Office- in the form of instructions or directions to analyze their situation for possible implementation of the program (if not areedy being done) in the Washington area . For this reason, you ar0 being requested to advise of supervisory procedures you have to insure the dissemination of new techniques and the "cross-fertilization" of ideas to appropriate offices. It is realized that New York furnishes copies of communications to Washington 58 Eeld office What provisions do you have at the Seat of Government to insure adequate aggressive attention and supervision is provided to the field in matters such as this? Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan, Inspector Donald Eg Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTIOF Ssyinkl 1/21771 NW 88608 Docld:32989638_Page 527 By 56 [ 6 6 ================================================== Page 528 ================================================== ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS (COKMA) PROGRAM Section Chief W . A Branigan Espionage Section The Inspector comments regarding the success of captioned program in the New York Office have been noted and are valid_ Bureau has furnished New_York a communication offering suggestions and asking for its comments and recommendations regarding expansion of the program No instructions or directions have been issued toWFQ concerning possible implementation of this program in that office, although as the Inspector notes WVFO has been made aware of the activity conducted by the Newy Yonr Office since the conditions on which the program is based are appficable only in the New York area by reason of conditions peculiar to that office alone; 1 fact that analysis of activities by Soviet intelligence officers %as disclosed they "1se areas in the_"icinity 0f certain_subway stops for meetings 44th agents either for the convenience oK their sources or the sacurity of fered to poth bv the subwy_in REZ tra eling to or fron meet areas No Sibay exists in Weshing 04 TraveLinthe Mlashingtonarea_is primrily jy autonobiie 0 due_ the Lack of any_appreciable rapidtransit_System,_White in Nelzyork the_primary_ means 0f transportation_is the_subivay system 4} Since conditions peculiar to New York do not exist in Jashington_D:-C it was not deemed necessary to issue instructions or directions to WFO concerning this particular program Another factor considered by Bureau was knowledge of prior use by_HEEO of programs directed against _geographic_and other knovn factors_-concerning_Soviet intelligence operations peculiar to Jashington_as _Qpposedto_NeleYork: Several years ago a program was used wherein aLL.thoreughfares_from the District where Soviets resided almost_exclusivei;y .at that time were checzed during hours we Knew-they conducted meets in the Suburban areas_and night perdetected travelingrtosuch_areas via_these routes for this purpose This was discontinued due to lack 0f {1 productivity More recently WFQ used a "Sweeper Program wherein al1 Special Agents assigned to Soviet investigatios checked 2it 49 Shopping centerskin the metroparttan area District} virganii-and Maryland euburbz) after an analysis disclosed 2 preponderance of usage by Soviezs 0f_such locations forintelligence meets This is the same concept on which the COKIA program is based . It DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION E72z882 4p_ 1 6 ( NW-88608_Qoeld: 32989638_Page -528 07YtT 's ton, tor ================================================== Page 529 ================================================== Vci 2 6 operated from about 1967 to 1968 and was implemented on the basis of conditions detected as existing inJEObut which were not applicable in New_York; therefore, instructions were not issued toNew_York for Tmplementation of similar program but it was kept informed 0f developments in the same manner that New York is now It informing WFQ of developments occurring in instant matter "Sweeper was discontinued due to lack of positive accomplishments such as those which have been disclosed in the COXHA Progran From about 1968 to 1969 "Blitz Program 11 was used by WFO to check residences 0f "{he more active Soviet_ntelligence oi+ icers Eo determine the 350 40n1 presence or absence of their automobiles Vith te expectation Of KBE discrosing parterns Thhr Eforce moreaintensive attention to ascertain nature of activity being conducted during These periods when tbeir presence could mot be accounted for "Blitz program was also discontinued during weardays by IFO due to lack of positive accomplishments and 9 incidental thereto, man- power limitetions or need to apply persornel to areas offering more firm possibilities for producing positive results; however , the principle is still utilized in connectiom with weekend_physical surveillance_scheduling Recognizing the value of accouting for al1 Soviets during as much of the 282 possible 3 especialzy When were {#37 away from our Sophisticated coverage at the estabiishment where they are 25S igned Bureau pointed-out "to bothNew"York"Office -and 1 WFO the valuable informa tion disclosed through "BlitzE of their residences_and instructed both offices to develop egta6riShed neighborhood sources who could furnish information regarding arrivals and departures use of automobiZe and odometer readings 4ra as a means Of insuring continued receipt Of the information Which would no longer be available following reevaluation and modification of the program- This instruction was also based on the fact that Soviets nOw reside throughout the periphery %f suburban D, C. due to @nanging sociozeconomic condittons _naEing it practicalty 78 4 "impossibie to cover these widespread Zocatfon_with any degFee 0 of LC Sufficency without some added_technigue_ During December $ 1970 _ Espionage Section recommended distribution to ai1 Bureau personnel at Seat of Government, MFO and' the adjacent Resident Agencies of Baltimore and Alexandria of small card appropriately_coded listing license numbers of vehicles_ used py "the €en most-active 4 Sovjet Tntettagence ofticers Tnis was approved by Director Rationale here was to add several hundred pairs of eyes to cover individuals who are extremely conscious of and adept at detecting surveillances Personnel observing these cars would not conduct any activity other than to DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION ECP:eco ~Nw-88608_bocl Page_529 they day ================================================== Page 530 ================================================== 3 eaa report pertinent information concerning observation of the vehicle toWFQ by routing slip for compilation V87 and deternination of suspicious patterns Which Should be resolveq through Concentrated surveillanee coverage 4 on_ the basis_of available_Infornation (again the basic COKMA philosophy) 'This is being used on a trial basis in_WFQ to test its productivity and value _ If found to be of assistance, consideration will be given to implementing inNer_York_Office; however in this instance again, tne program is designed to exploit conditions prevelant in Washington, D_ C ra ther than New York where Bureau personnel do noz reside in sane general area as Soviets and therefore, might not be expected to produce positive results_ Means of transportation available in both areas, previously mentioned, was also considered _ SPIA letters themselves are 2 vehicle for "cross-fertilization" of ideas between recipient and submitting offices They contain monthly, detailed summaries of intelligence activities which have occurred in the submitting offices _ They are routed to ~each Espionage Section Supervisor for review If significant information is contained in submission from WFO which might be applicable to New York, or vice versa 3 Bureau Supervisor directs attention of appropriate office: to the information by means 0f communication in the substantive file involved _ Weekly Section Conferences allow for a more current discussion of significant or unusual developments as they occur in individual cases providing a more immediate vehicle for directing attention of one office to developments in another which might be applicable to 2 current or prior investigation _ Periodically_ 9 Espionage Section learns from other intelligence organizations foreign and domestic, of new in- telligence techniques or changes in MO by Soviets which should DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION ECP:eco I722T71 163 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 530 ================================================== Page 531 ================================================== 4 - be considered offices having a Soviet establishment or particular investigative situation. This information is immediately furnished to interested offices by Supervisor having responsibility for coordination of the SPIA-SATPIA matters or by the substantive supervisor handling the particular investigation to which it pertains Determination in this regard is made by Section Front Office which issues appropriate instructions and follows prompt compliance _ Examples are notification fmm British and CIA regarding_Soviet capability use "djel ZFessage telephones (time wea ther_aprayer AA etc withSophistlcaced device on their telephone as means of clandestine communications: Onanother occasion Britiah told uS about Soviet use of compact broad-band Scanning receiverby_personne supparring fnrelligence Officer duping Deet 45 means of detectingradio_transmi88iog8 in area which might_indicate_counterintelligence seryice inferestin that partieuiar activity- Both New York and TFO were a lerted to these circumstances for consideration in their coverage of Soviet establishments and covering double agent meetings _ 4i1 maiiers pertaining to progrms sech as captioned are routed through Section Front Office to: insure adequate and aggressive attention and supervision is provided to field, and make certain no possibility is overlooked to exploit such situations for maximum counterintelligence benefits on field-wide basis, consistent With feasibility or applicability. Inspector D. E. Moore DEM lmb 1/23/71 I share Mr _ Branigan*s views that Cokma is not applicable to WO_in view of the different conditions existing ~inthe twocities _ Noting the other coments of the inspector and the information set forth by Mr Branigan, I would like to advise that in communications I read, in contacts with personnal of New York and WFO and supervisors at the Seat of Government and in contacts with representatives of cooperative foreign intelligence agencies, I am most alert to situations and procedures that can be adopted by uS , In conferences with Section Chiefs in the Branch, I stress the need to be alert for procedures that may have worked in one area of our operations and can be adopted to other areas _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION =ECE;ecoa 1/22771 fL4 NW-88608-Doeld:32989638-Page-531 by to Ru ================================================== Page 532 ================================================== 5 - Assistant Director C. Da Brenna) DEM: lmb 1/23/71 I have carefully noted the inspector 's comments and also the comments of Mr Branigan and Mr Moore _ I am most alert to the development 0f new ideas and the need for "cross-fertilization "1 of ideas and stress this in my conferences with a11 Section Chiefs at the Division_ I not only seek ideas about the operations of 2 Section Chief within the Section, but for ideas of operations anywhere within the Division and throughout the Bureau I am constantly alert in my many contacts with representatives of other Government agencies foreign liaison contacts and representatives of business for ideas which can be successfully utilized in our work and will continue this_ In discussions with SACs _ I constantly stress the challenging conditions the Bureau faces and the need for new ideas and new applications _ I most certainly will continue to stress this ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E, S , MILLER (ESM:sjr 1/25/71) It is my understanding that the COKMA concept is not "new" in theNew_York Office but , as indicated has had recent successes It is realized COKMA deals with subway trayel%f_ur_subiects; however the concept was that to which I alluded in the above write-up. It was my feeling perhaps due to internal conditions in the Soviet Union and the Polish situation etc., that Soviet Intelligence may now be more active and consequently "pressing" for some reason thus making it possible for uS to have significant success in New York in a relatively short period of time . For this reason, it was my feeling that the matter should have been highlighted by SOG which has the responsibility ior coordination and direction of field activities_ I do not agree with the concept that one field division is different from another when we are dealing with as important a topic as Soviet espionage. Assistant Director Brennan and Inspector Moore note. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 532 68 ================================================== Page 533 ================================================== 6 INSPECTOR D. E. DEM:mjt 1/25/71 I certainly agree with the Inspector that one field division is no different than another in connection with the topic as important as Soviet Espionage The Point that Mr . Branigan and I were attempting to make is that we have to recognize the difference in methods of operation in Soviet intelligence officers in NerYerk and_WFO. The Inspector may be assured that I Will follow the operations of Soviet-bloc intelligence officers in New York, WFO and also in San Francisco in view of the establishment of a consulate there_ I Will continue to be most alert to any successful procedures utilized in one office that may be productive in another and will certainly see that the proceduires ae APpT ied where feasible_ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C _ D BRENNAN DEM:mjt 1/25/71 I concur with Inspector Moore _ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 533 MOOREe) Dl 16 6 ================================================== Page 534 ================================================== PERSOMNEL MATTERS NW 886u8 Docla32989788 Paga 534 PERSONNFL ================================================== Page 535 ================================================== PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED 6-A-4 JNSPECTOR E.S . MILLER: In addition to review of work performance 9 various personnel , by reason of supervisory position held were interviewed during the course of this inspection by a member of the Inspection Staff_ The interviews and review of work performance of these personnel have disclosed no substantial delinquencies of matters requiring recommendations for any specific action The personnel are : Employee Category Richard D_ Cotter Section Chief George C Moore Section Chief Robert L Shackelford Section Chief W _ Raymond Wannall Section Chief Conrad W Thompson Approved Bureau Speaker Lambert L_ Anderson Approved Bureau Speaker Frank B Still Jr Approved Bureau Speaker ' Robert C Putnam Approved Bureau Speaker Davzd Approved Bureau Speaker Joseph M < Sizoo Approved Bureau Speaker 42 Ervin L. Recer Approved Bureau Speaker Louis Brune Jr Approved Bureau Speaker MI 3a C Edwin Enrigbt Recommended for Advancement Z6 Assistant Director Brennan please note_ lukl DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION JVB;sfw 6-A-4 1/21/71 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 535 Ryan 0I Page ================================================== Page 536 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6 -E INSPECTOB MLLER: Please tabuate by Sections and Units the current Agent and clerical personnel complement of your Division as of the close of business 1/8/71. Show actual and author ized personnel in each Section or Unit; including the Division Front Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay should not be considered in the overall tabulation. 1. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority H5 been obtained to fill. 2 _ Identify all personnel under transfer into or out of the Divigion a8 of 1/8/71 as well as those who have submitted letters of resignation as of that date _ (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of resignation. ) 3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized personnel a8 of 1/8/71. 4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification: 5 . Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected Since the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means. 6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel. In the write -up on adequacy of personnel Sections describe criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section or Unit. Each Section write -up should constitute a separate part of the werall Divisional write-up Comments of Assistant Director requested. DOMESTIC NTELLIGEN CE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/8/71 ESM:wmj 6-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 536 I6k by ================================================== Page 537 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C D BRENNAN: Attached find the Section ABK:jgr 1/15/71 write-ups concerning each category of information requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel_ These comments are current as of 1/8/71: The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office consists of one Assistant Director, two Inspectors } two Special Agent Supervisors } five stenographic employees and 19 clerical employees This complement includes the personnel directly essigned to the Front Office, those in the Division teletype room Mail Room and messenger service, the Security Patrol Force in addition to five Agents_ I have not aS yet requested a replacement for a GS-4 clerical position in the Front Office } which was created with the resignation of James _ A Pettingill on 12/24/70 I am attempting to absorb the work 0f this position with the present personnel comple- ment in the Front Office This is on a trial basis and if it isn t satisfactory, 1 wiii recuuuneud a replacefemt . The overall authorized personnel complement of the Division at the beginning of the inspection was 116 Special Agents and 190 clerks compared to an authorized complement of 126 Agents and 186 clerks at the time of the last inspection _ We now have assigned to the Division 116 Agents and 188 clerks The clerical vacancies being the aforementioned GS-4 position in the Front Office and a vacancy in the Mail Room, which was created when 2 clerical position in the Internal Security Section was filled_ At the present time we have outstanding requests for two Agents to replace Special Agents_George M Quinn and C Edwin Enright who are under transfer to the Inspection Division We atso have requests for two GS-2 Mail Clerks for the Division Mail Room to replace the clerk who was trans- ferred to the Internal Security Section and the second to replace the GS-3 clerk who will be reassigned or rotated when the replacement is made available to the Division The Racial Intelligence Section bas submitted a request for an additional clerk for the Black Nationalist L South and Racial Informant Unit_ In addition, this Section is now making a request for two additional Agent Supervisors because of the heavy increase in the case load in the black extremist field. (Justification in Section write-up attached) NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 537 1 6 9 ================================================== Page 538 ================================================== The request for a clerk by the Internal Security Section for a newly approved clerical position mentioned in its write-up has been filled. The Espionage Section may find it necessary to request an additional clerk to handle extra duties assigned to a clerk who is already Liea vily assigned if the present system (now on a trial basis) proves unworkable The New Left Section may find it necessary to request an additional Agent and clerk if the present trend of heavy increase in case load continues We are wa tching this closely _ As you will note in the write-up by the Nationalities Intelligence Section we are making a request for two additional Agent Supervisors at this time This is necessary due to the recent increase in foreign legats from 11 to increasing our legat personnel from 60 to 88 _ To recapitulate, our requests for additional personnel are: Front office Two GS-2 clerks Racial Inieliigeuce Sne G5-4 cierk One Agent Supervisor to replace Supervisor Enright Two additional Agent Supervisors _ Espionage Section One Agent Supervisor to replace Agent Quinn _ Nationalities_Intelligence Two additional Agent Section Supervisors: I firmly believe that our limited requests for additional personnel at this time are fully justified_ As you will note in the attached write-ups, we are not asking for additional personnel until, after on 2 trial basis, we have found it absolutely necessary and fully justified. The increase of terroristic tactics by the Wea therman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society and militant organizations such as the Black Panther Party and the Jewish Defense League has ma de it absolutely impera tive that intensive investigation be conducted to identify, locate a11 members of these militant organizations and secure evidence for Bhesectreoeiy if we are to meet our ve responsibilities in the vital field of internal security This has increased the work load of the Racial Intelligence Section the New Left Section, and the Nationalities Intelligence Section_ Because of this increase NW 88608 Docld:32989638 538 17 , gra Page ================================================== Page 539 ================================================== in work and my interest in conserving manpower wherever possible, we recently reorganized the Division in order to make the most efficient use of our manpower _ I conscientiously believe I have now trimmed my manpower to the bone Under my direction, Branch and Section Chiefs continually evaluate personnel adequacy in order to assure we the job done with 2 maximum amount of efficiency with the minimum amount of personnel _ I conscientiously believe I have done this and I Will continue to pursue this policy. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 539 /71 get ================================================== Page 540 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION SECTION CHIEF A_ W_ GRAY:(JAs of 1/8/71 thk authorized personnel of the Internal' Security Section was 15 Special Agents , 7 Secretaries, and 9 Clerks_ A breakdown by Units follows: FRONT OFFICE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS OF 1/8/71 Section Chief Seabetaone Man 11 Secretary COMMWNIST PARTY , USA UNIT Supervisors Seerestary { (1 new requested but not SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT assignea) Supervisors Ceeretary { PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS WNIT Supervisors 3 (1 McGuire temporarily assigned New Left Section) Secretary Clerks 2 (1 Hanning temporarity assigned New INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND_SEDITION_WNIT Left Section) Supervisors Ceeretary i KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT Supervisors Ceeretary i DMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 IFXC :bcw ~Nw-88608_Dlocld:32989618 _ Page_540 yet ================================================== Page 541 ================================================== SPECIFIC COMMENTS 1_ In Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit, one Special Agent Supervisor (McGuire) and one clerk (Hanning) temporarily assigned New Left Section. Supervisor in Charge of same Unit Griffithl also spending majority of his time in New Left Section assisting on special An additional Supervisor from International New Left Unit (Benedict) and one clerk from Klan and White Hate Groups Unit ~eam are also working majority of their time on New Left Section special_ 2 _ No pending transfers or resignations_ 3 . See number 1 above _ 4 . We have requested one additional clerical employee for the Communist Party USA Unit (request not yet filled) because of substantial need due to increase in Unit case load from 572 to 1076 as 2 result of reorganization _ We are currently eseeesing need for another clerical employee in Klan and White Hate Groups Unit to handle large volume of mail involved in supervision of several hundred Klan and Bhite Hate group informants. 5 Considering that Internal Security Section, as it is now constituted, was established December 16 , 1970 approxi- mately three weeks ago no meaningful comments regarding manpower savings 2s related to this Section can be made We are carrying a substantial case load, with increases in several areas, For example , the case load of the Communist Party, USA } Unit a5 2 result of the reorganization increased from 572 to 1076 with no increase in personnel_ Additionally , two Supervisors assigned to this Section (Griffithand McGuire are on temporary loan to the New Left Section along with a clerical employee_(Hanningh Additionally 2 third Supervisor (Benedict) and a second clerical employee (Deap) are spending the majority of their working time on assignment to Newv Left Section special_ For all practical purposes, the work of three Supervisors and two clerical employees 18 being absorbed on a daily basis within the present personnel complement which, of course, is 2 tangible manpower savings_ In al1 Units we are constantly involved in attenpting to eliminate or curtail the volume of paperwork being handied , reducing programs and projects to bare essentials and wherever possible, keeping the case load volume at a manageable figure Another example of manpower conservation exists in the Subversive Individuals S Basic Revolutionary Groups Unit DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 DFXC : bcw 6 NW88608 Docld:32989638_Page -541_ ================================================== Page 542 ================================================== '4ait which handles approximately 1,400 pending cases and is responsible for over 7 , 000 subjects on the Bureau S Special Indices_ A moratorium on routine communist investigations in effect at the time of the last inspection which curtailed the work of this Unit, has been removed and the case load increases daily The removal of the moratorium warranted the expansion of this Unit from a two to three-man Unit at the time of reorganization but for al1 practical purposes, the Unit has functioned as a two-man Unit with the third man (Schwartz) on loan for the majority of the period to the Research Section for 2 special project 6 . Rhen Special Agent supervisory personnel currently assigned temporarily on loan to other Sections, are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle existing case load. 7 In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent and clerical personnel the following criteria were used: case load iaii couit nane checks complexity of cases and supervision involved deadline matters special assignments experienced supervisors Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in Charge (reviewing mail conferring with employees, organizing Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignents handled . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/13/71 PXC abcr 6-E NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 542 ================================================== Page 543 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL NEF LEFT SECTION 6E SECTION CHIEF R. L, SHACKCLFORE: There is set forth below 2 tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the New Left Section as of close of busiuess, January 1971 . Authorized Assigned New Left Groups Unit 6 Agents 6 Agents 4 Clerks 4 Clerks 1 Super Clerk 1 Super Clerk 1 Secretary 1 Secretary Subversive Individuals 5 Agents 4 Agents New Left Unit 4 Clerks 4 Clerks 1 Secretary 1 Secretary Speci:l Ecvestigeticns ~Agente 2 Agente Hest Unit Clerks 4 Clerks 1 Secretary 1 Secretary Special Investigations 5 Agents 5 Agente East Unit 4 Clerks 4 Clerks 1 Secretary 1 Secretary Special Assignment 1 Agent* 1 Clerkt Front Office 2 Agents 2 Agents 2 Secretaries 2 Secretaries Total 22 Agents 21 Agents 16 Clerks 17 Clerks 1 Super 1 Super Clerk 6 Secretaries 6 Secretaries 45 employees 45 empToyees 1 There are Do vacant positions in the New Left Section. 2 Two Agents under transfer in: SA J La Er Hogan assigned to Special Investigations West Unit and SA B M Perez assigned to Subversive Individuals " New Left Unit No resignations #One Agent and one clerk On tenporary assignment handling major case involving East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 NW 88608 ~032831339638 543 Gt 8 , Page ================================================== Page 544 ================================================== 6 3 Special Investigations West Unit has one Agent and one cierk on loan from tbe Internal Security Section_ 4 _ Activities by New Left terrorists during the past year has been marked by an increase in acts of violence and conspiracies toward violence _ The Weatherman group and other such groups bave made it imperative that we institute continuing intensive investigations approved airtel to SAC Albany and a11 offices dated 11/4/70 the field was instructed to initiate investigation of ali members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and members of procommunist militant New Left type campus organizations which follow SDS advocacy of violence and revolution_ It is estimated tbat this will involve some 6 500 nem investi- gations _ If this trend continues, it will be necessary to obtain an additional clerk in the future; however, we are not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this time_ 5 _ At the time of the last inspection; this Section bad 22 Agents and 27 clerical employees authorized of which 22 Agents and 25 clerical employees were assigned . As a result of the. realignment of the Division in December 9 1970 , this Section currently has 22 Agents and 23 clerical employees authorized. 6 _ As noted in number 4 above, the increase in terroristic activities by New Left militants has increased the burden of this Section _ On the basis of the above , if this trend continues it appears that it will be necessary to obtain one additionai Agent in the future 7 _ Personnel adequacy in the New Left. Section is constantly evaluated on the basis of the productivity of each unit, requests received from the Department and other 'agencies and the overall objectives of the Section_ The delinquent work in each unit is closely followed and in special situations where an excessive amount of work is assigned to one unit supervisory personnel from other units are utilized NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 544 By ================================================== Page 545 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: As of close of business 1/8/71, the complement of this Section was aS follows: Special Agents 13, secretaries 5, and clerks 15, for & total of 33. This is broken down by unit aS follows: Section Front Office 2 Special Agents; 1 secretary (Stenography) ; 1 secretary (typing) Central Research Unit T 5 Special Agents, 1 secretary, 2 supervisory clerks (technical publications writers), 1 clerk (publications coordinator), 1 clerk (typing) Racial Reporting Unit T 2 Special Agents, L secretary, 1 supervisory clerk (technical publications writer), 2 clerks New Left Reporting Unit 3 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary, 1 supervisory clerk (technical publications writer) , 1 clerk Special Records Unit 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (assigned but not authorized, see #3 below), 6 clerks The following responses are numbered to correspond with Inspector 1 S specific questions: 1. There are no vacant positons. 2 _ There are no personnel on transfer into or out of Section at this time and no pending resignations. 3_ Only shortage or overage of authorized personnel is in Special Records Unit. Position of secretary in this unit has been approved by Director contingent upon final action by Position Classification Office which is now pending 4. Current clerical personnel complement is considered adequate but not excessive. DONESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 RDC:mea 6-E NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 545 Lit ================================================== Page 546 ================================================== 2 5. Since last inspection we have reduced one Agent from the complement of the Racial Reporting Unit as a result of various streamlining measures adopted relative to reporting requirements. This streamlining involved the elimination of a substantial number of letterhead memoranda and airtels previously required from each field office with regard to racial conditions and the elimination of daily cover memorandum to our outgoing racial teletype to the White House_ 6. The authorized Agent complement for Section is considered adequate but not excessive at this time. 7 Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this Section includes & number of diverse factors. Case load figures are not applicable to work of this Section nor are there any other Simple, quantitative measure- ments 0f Section's work. Work of this Section involves primarily research and evaluation and the preparation of & variety of documents aimed at providing iztelligence to the Whitc Eczcc, thc Attorney Cenerel, sther interested agencies and Bureau officials_ This Section seeks to.summarize into comprehensive and meaningful "package" form information relating to current topics of intelligence interest and concern. The finished product is provided not only to other intelligence agencies and policy-making Officials of the Government but; where appropriate, to our field offices for their information and guidance. The type of documents prepared varies from 'daily teletype summaries regarding racial disturbances and student agitation; to detailed monographs containing in-depth research into various facets of our work. During the past year there has been & continuing demand for various intelligence summaries and this Section has been faced with a number of expedite projects on behalf of Bureau officials, including the Director, the White House, the Vice President's Office, and the Attorney General. Basis for this heavy work load has primarily been interest and concern in the explosive issues concerning racial and student disorders. The great majority of our projects have revolved around the preparation of material either for internal FBI use or for outside dissemination with respect to these issues. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 546 ================================================== Page 547 ================================================== ADEQUACY Or PERSONNEL 6-E SECTION CHIEF W . A. BRANIGAN ESPIONAGE SECTION (1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section as of January 8, 1971, is as follows : AGENT CLERK SECRETARY CLERK-STENQ Front Office 2 2 Officials Unit Kashington 3 2* 1 Officials Unit New York 3 1 1 Special Cases Umit **# Coordination Unit 3 1 Satellite Unit 4 5 1 GS-4 Clerks (Barbara Ann Holland and Keith Ra Bhite) resigned closeof business January 1971_ Gafr wftson , "GS-3; } and Virginia A Lensch GS-4 , reported Tor trial assignment on 2t January 11, 1971- George M Quinn, under transfer to Inspection Division, to A depart close Of business January 1971 . Replacement requested_ ##*Intelligence Analyst } GS-1O,_Mary E. Triplett, performing work in lieu 0f Special Agent #***Clerk, GS-7 , AJris Kirby, performing work in lieu of Special Agent . (2) By letter dated December 22 , 1970 , Special Agent George_M Quin was transferred to the Inspection Division. He will depart by the close of business January 22 , 1971 _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1-13-71 WAB:hke 6-E NI 83608 Docld:32989638_Page 547 L21 5** 2*#*# #Two 8, #*SA 22 , ================================================== Page 548 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL Barbara Ann Rolland and Keith RWite submitted resignations close Of business January 8 1971 . Replacenents were received as enumerated in item one above . (3) As of January 8 , 1971 9 there was a shortage of two GS-4 Clerk in the Officials Unit 9 Hashington, but this was remedied on January 11, when replacements Fere received as indicated in item one above A replacenent has been requested for Special Agent George M Quinn in the Officials Unit 54 New York, but none has been designated at this time There is D0 overage of authorized personnel in the Espionage Section_ (4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate at the present time Fith the reorganization of the Division, and combining Soviet and Soviet_bloc investigations in the Espionage Section } an extremely heavy burden has been placed on the clerical personnel handling the assignment caras for the Sectiol (imere are now 5,046 cases) This situation is being watched and it may be that it is unworkable to place the responsibility for maintaining the assignment cards in a GS-4 employee who is already heavily assigned . If this proves to be a fact, 2 recommendation will be made to add 2 Clerk at a GS-3 level who would exclusively handle the assignment cards_ (5) Following the 1970 inspection, personnel handling Soviet investigations was reduced by two Special Agents_ ) GS-14 . Following the inspection, personnel handling Soviet_bloc investigations were reduced by one Special Agent GS-14, and one Clerk, GS-4. At the time of the reorganization of the Division in Decenber 1970 personnel handling Soviet_bloc investigations were reduced by four Special Agents (one GS-15; three GS-14) and five clerical personnel (one GS-5 and four GS-4) . (6) Special Agent personnel is considered adequate. (7) Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of personnel includes tbe volume of cases supervised , the complexity of the cases , and the importance of the investigations _ In the Officials Unit, both' Mashington and New York, we handle the greatest volume of complex investigations since DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1-13-71 RAB:hke 6-E , NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 548 _ ================================================== Page 549 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL these cases include the bulk of our double agent operations_ As of December 1, 1970 , there were 74 active double agents in the Soviet field_ This is the largest number of double agents we have ever achieved. At the time of the lzst inspection as of April 1 , 1970 , there were 67 active double agents_ The current number of 34is compared most favorably witb the number of actual double agents three years ag0 (12/1/67) #inen there were 47 active double agents_ At that time there were 18 case Agents handling Soviet matters_ At the time of the last inspection, there were 16 case Agents in the Soviet field, and the: current load is being carried by less than 14 case Agents. Threa of the 14 are assigned part time to the handling of Soviet-bloc matters. Fith the reorganization of the Division in December , 1970 , the volume and work load for the Supervisezs in the Espionage Section were materially increased, Four Agent Supervisors Fbo pere ` formery assigned to the Sino-Satellite Section pere transferred to the Espionage Section and hrought with them in excess of 2 cases _ The only possible may that this volume could be handied Ras by redistributing tbe work within the Coordination Unlt and the Special Cases Uoit & The volume of investigations in these Units i8 extremely heavy considering tbe nuiber of special projects and special operations which are normally assigned in the Units. In the Satellite Unit handling Pelish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav investigative matters } wve currently have 1,293 active cases divided anong four Special Agents . In our Soviet-bloc counterintelligence work, we xere a5 Of December 1970, operating 64_active dowole agents. This should be compared with the figure at the time Qz our last inspection, April 1, 1970 , Then there were 61 active double agents, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTIOR 1-13-71 WAB:hke 6-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 549 , 00o 1, Page ================================================== Page 550 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E SECTION CHIEF G_ C. MOORFI RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION The current authorized personnel complement of the Racial Intelligence Section as of the close of business 9 January 8, 1971, is 21 Agents and 22 clerical personnel with a request pending for one additional clerk for the Black Nationalist L4 South and Racial Informant Unit_ This is broken down as follows according to Units within the Section: Frent_Office Section Chief Number One Man i Secretary of Section Chief Secretary (Stenography) 1 to Number One Man Black Nationalist Unit East 5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge 7 clerical personnel Black Nationalist Unit Central 4 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge* 3 clerical personnel *one Supervisor under transfer to Inspection Division Black Nationalist Unit West 5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge 5 clerical personnel DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/12/71 TDRikir 6-E NW88648_Docld: 32989638 550 Page ================================================== Page 551 ================================================== BLack Nationalist L South and Racial Informant Unit 5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge 5 clerical personnel 1) There are n0 clerical vacancies in the Section; however 9 as it was noted previously, a request has been submitted for an additional clerk for the BLack Nationalist South and Racial Informant Unit which would increase our complement to 23 if approved, 2) Special Agent Supervisor C Edwin Enright is under transfer to the Inspection Division, transfer letter dated January 8 , 19710 A replacelent is beirg requested. 3)' With the transfer of Special Agent_Enright there will exist a shortage of one Supervisor in the Black Nationalist Unit Central 4) The clerical personnel complement is inade- quate and will be barely adequate if the request for one additional clerk is approved. The workload of the Section continues to increase and shows no signs of tapering off. We will continue to closely watch the clerical situation and make appropriate recommendations as required by any substantial change in the clerical workload. 5) The streamlining of our operations wherever possible to effect manpower savings is under continual evaluation_ Examples of streamlining measures taken since the last Inspection include: 1) The discontinuance by each field division of semiannual reports concerning the black nationalist movement (Bureau file 157-8415)_ This was accon- plished 6 , 1970. 2) On November 3 , 1970 the Agitator Index was revised to delete those who were also included on the Security Index; 3) On November 5, 1970 existing instructions were modified concerning recordings of black ~Nw 88608_Docld:.32989638_Page_6SL July ================================================== Page 552 ================================================== and New Left public appearances to allow the SAC to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or a proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except such appearances at educational institutions_ Pre- viously, prior Bureau approval was necessary. In addition, we continue to utilize our teletype dissemination fecilities to the maxinum extent possible. 6) The Special Agent complement of 21 is the same as at the time of the last Inspection. The Division was reorganized December 17 , 1370 OXI ihe basis Of approzizate caseload per Supervisor of 279. This figure was based on the October 1, 1970, caseload figures_ Since that time there has been a beavy increase in the caseload in the black extremist field where at present the average caseload as of Janry 1, 1971, stood at 349 per Supervisor_ At the time of the last Inspection, the caseload of the Section stood at 5,946 including Klan and white hate-type cases _ Under the reorganization this Section lost the Klan &nd white hate cases and as of January 1, 1971 9 the caseload encompassing black extremist individuals and organizations including racial informants in these organizations stood at 6,642 , an increase of 696 cases since the date of the last Inspection. There is .a dire need for additional Special Agent supervisory personnel to handle our heavy responsibilities in the black extremist field, if we are to afford these cases the attention that deserve. Based upon the Division reorganization figures 9 an additional four Supervisrs would NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 552 )<4 they ================================================== Page 553 ================================================== be required; however we have tightened our belt and taken S treamlining measures wherever possible and are requesting only two Special Agent Supervisors at the present time. We will attempt to accomplish our objectives with two additional Supervisors_ There are several factors that would indicate our work in the black extremist field will continue to increase: The increasing militancy of black extremists on college campuses caused uS to require the field airtel 11/4/70) to open cases on all black student groups on college campuses as well as cases on the leaders thereof There are numerous such groups throughout the United States_ The Black Panther Party is growing and in September 9 1970_ 9 openea up an international beciioil in Algiers In addition a grand jury is sitting in California with witnesses being heard in efforts to develop a prosecutive theory against the Black Panther The work in connection therewith and other aspects of the Black Panther Party invest- igation consumes almost the full time 0f one Supervisor_ Black extremist activity in this country is rapidly developing more and more in international aspects _ Residents of other countries, including United States citizens and non-citizens, are involved in clandestine and overt operational and propaganda activity among racial extremists _ We have targeted CIA as well as our Legal Attaches abroad for the development of data regarding foreign influences in the black extrenist movement_ The National Security Agency has vast capabilities in devel oping the type of. information needed and we have alerted that Agency to our basic needs and have made arrangements for future assistance_ A prime fector in the rapid increase in our caseload has been our technical coverege of the Black Panther Party_ At the time of the last Inspection we had sixsuch technical surveillances in operation. We presently have 12 installed, one awaiting installation, NIN 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 553 (by Partys ================================================== Page 554 ================================================== and one awaiting approval: This special coverage provides on a daily basis a wealth of intelligence information and is most productive source for the opening of numerous new cases in the black extremist field. With the added coverage we can expect a continuing increase in the caseload. In view of the above factors, there exists a dire need for two additional Special Agent Supervisors at this time 7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take into consideration not only the caselozd which is compiled on a monthly basis but als0 results of periodic mail counts taken on a q1 arterly basis_ 0 Many of Otr cases on figures in the black extremist movement such as David Hilliard Huey_ P Newton 2eks Elbert Howard Le_Roi 7s Jones ekz Eldridge_CLeaver Enory_Douglas and others require a coasiderable amount of supervisory attention. As previously noted, the Department is attempting to develop a prosecutive theory against the Black Panther Party and as a result it has been necessary to assign one Supervisor almost, exclusively to handle investigation of this or ganization_ The investigations of other organizations require a great deal of supervisory attention and direction. Analyses of current developments in tha recial field, spa cial requests from other Government agenci preparation of special studies, and initiation of special projects all require the expenditure of considerable supervisory time and are taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy of-personnel. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 554 key es, Page ================================================== Page 555 ================================================== ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E SECTION CHIEF W_ R. WANNALL NATIONALITES INTELLIGENCE SECTION As of close of business 1/8/71 Section complement was: Authorized Actual Special Agents 20 20 Secretaries (Steno) 8 8 Secretary (Typing) Gterca: bepe.Svory) sory) 3 J Stenographers 26 Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7) 19 19 Totals 76 76 Section_Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno) and one secretary (Typing) _ Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno), one Clerk (GS-5) and one Clerk (GS-4) _ Nationality_Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno); one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4) _ Special_Coordination_Unit consists of five Special Agents, three Secretaries (teno), one Clerk (GS four Clerks (GS and two Clerks (GS-4) . Chinese_Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno) and three Clerks (G3-4) _ Middle_and South American_Unit consists of three Special Agents, One Secretary (Steno) , and three Clerks (GS-4) _ Division_Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor (Steno), one Assistant Supervisor (Clerk) and 26 Clerk-Stenographers, GS-4. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIION INSPECTIOV 1/12/71 WRWams 6-E NW 88608 Docld:32989638 555 -5), -7), Page ================================================== Page 556 ================================================== 2 6-E (1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 1/8/71, although one resignation was pending (described in item 2 below) _ (2) Miss Agnes M__Klima, Clerk-Stenographer, GS-4, assigned to Stenographic Pool, submitted her resignation effective 1/14/71 and acknowledgement of same was dated 1/6/71. This stenographic position was approved to be filled by assigning & GS-4 Clerk (Wiss Barbara A Hatcher) who had passed the stenographic test and request for replacement for Miss Hatcher dated 1/8/71 was submitted. Miss Hatcher actually was transferred to the stenographic position in the pool as of beginning of business 1/11/71 when her replacement, Miss CheryL D Carpenter: reported to this 2t Section for assignment_ (3) There was no shortage or overage of authorized personnel as of close of business 1/8/71. (4) Authorized clerical personnel complement is considered adequate but not excessive_ (5) As result of last inspection authorized Agent complement was reduced from 17 to 15 . This manpower savings was effected by discontinuing two programs and streamlining a third one_ Supporting memoranda in this regard have been submitted as attachments to yellow write-up 5-A-4on Section and Unit Analysis dated 1/12/71. Memorandum to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors 70-13 dated 7/29/70 noted that the Liaison Section of Domestic Intelligence Division was being abolished effective immediately_ This resulted in a cut-back of one Section Chief plus eight supervisory Special Agents who were engaged in domestic liaison functions_ Calls from other U. S. agencies formerly handled by these nine men are now handled by Agent personnel throughout the Bureau who are principally concerned with the subject matter of the call. the majority of such calls are handled by Agent personnel presently assigned to Nationalities Intelligence Section_ In addition, representatives of other agencies who were contacted in their offices prior to discontinuance of Liaison Section frequently call at Domestic Intelligence Division for consultation_ Arrangements were made for couriers representing certain other sensitive agencies, Silch a8 National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, to call at Domestic Intelligence Division foz the purpose of delivering Or receiving mail requiring protective services of armed couriers. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 556 By far, ================================================== Page 557 ================================================== 3 3 - 6-E Tius, many of the functions formerly performed by Special Agent personnel are handled by currently assigned personnel within the Division, resulting in the savings of the time of the nine Agents released. As a result of the Division-wide reorganization effected 12/16/70 this Section absorbed without offsetting Special Agent personnel work relating to Chinese matters formerly assigned to three Special Agent Supervisors in the Sino-Satellite Section (now abolished) . This resulted in an increased case load of over 25 percent. (6) While there are 20 Agents assigned to the Section, two are assigned to the Section Front Ofice and five to the Special Coordination Unit; which handles remaining domestic liaison functions and all foreign liaison functions; thus, there are 13 Agents assigned to desks on which cases are handled. The case load per Agent since the last inspection has increased from 193 to 278, a 44 percent increase _ This has been the result of cutting beck twc Agente 28 result of the last insnectinn and the assignment of Chinese work to the Section effective with the Division reorganization 12/16/70. There has been insufficient time since the latter date to establish whether the significant increase in case load per man will adversely affect the efficient operation of the Section _ At this time, however_ no additional Agent personnel is being requested for assignment to desks handling cases but the matter will be closely followed and if recommendations in this connection are considered appropriate in the future they will be submitted with justifying data. At the present time there are five supervisory Special Agents assigned to the Special Coordination Unit and the heavy increase in work load on the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD} in that Unit (to which two of the five Agents are assigned) has resulted in & Situation warranting the assignment 0f two additional Special Agents to the desk_ In connection with following is submitted: In December, 1970, our foreign liaison offices were expanded from 11 to 17_ It has come at a time when the two FLD Supervisors have been barely able to keep up with the flow of paper let alone actually examine and analyze it in order to afford active and constructive supervision to our foreign offices. This problem arises from two causes, (1) the heavy demands made on the time of these two Supervisors in welcoming and personally supervising the visits to the Bureau of the many foreign dignitaries who are valuable and cooperative contacts Of our Legal Attaches-~such visitors NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 557 this; ================================================== Page 558 ================================================== 4 - 6-E currently average 27 per month; and (2) the appreciable increase (62 percent) in the past ten years of the Foreign Police Cooperation cases we handle _ The Legal Attach? expansion in Dzcember, 1970, increased Bureau personnel abroad from 80 to 88, of which latter number 42 are Special Agents . The latest case load figures available for the 11 Legal Attache offices then existing are for 10/31770, at which time the 11 offices carried a total of 3, 020 cases_ In October; 1960, five Special Azent Supervisors were assigned to the FLD, one of whom devoted a portion of his time to Buplans matters, which matters have now been transferred to another Section. At that time the case load for all foreign offices was 1693 _ In October, 1960, we had 168 Foreign Police Cooperation cases on the FLD_ In October, 1970, there were 273 , This large increase in Foreign Police Cooperation cases was absorbed as a result of the delegation to a clerical employee of supervisory responsibility for about 95 percent of the cases_ This clerical employee, who is in Grade G3-7, is most efficient and quite capable but cannot be expected to have the experience of an Agent to recognize promptly potentially embarrassing situations arising. As we now have six new Legal Attache offices, we can expect both the case load and the Foreign Police Cooperation requests to increase substantially _ The FLD Supervisors should be watching mail flow to determine the promptness with which Legal Attaches respond t0 requests; the thoroughness of handling such cases; and the adequacy of foreign agency contacts in a position to afford the Bureaj the desired degree of cooperation_ The FLD Supervisors should be preparing memoranda reflecting Legal Attache accomplish- ments in order to keep the Director fully aprised of the truly excellent work being done by our Azents abroad. As the situation now stands, the two present FLD Supervisors just do not have time to do this and we are incurring the risk of failing to afford direction and guidance in this very important area of the Bureau 8 operations. To comply with Bureau requirements our 42 men abroad must seek cooperation of foreign agencies . In reciprocity must accept requests for investigations in the U, S, regarding matters a3 simple a3 running down bad debtors to complex investigations involving the location of murder suspects_ The two present FLD Supervisors at this because of the NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 558 0 they time, ================================================== Page 559 ================================================== 5 - 6-E heavy demands on them; are unable to afford the necessary direction and assistance to the clerical employee handling Foreign Police Cooperation cases_ To afford the necessary and proper guidance to or foreign operations; particularly to the Six new offices which have now been established and which will make heavy demands for immediate support; and to overcome the present heavy work load dascribed above, two additional Agent Supervisors, preferably men having potential for foreign assignment; should be approved for the FLD at this time_ Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts, complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and intelligence requirements, patterns of delinquency 3 personnel capabilities, and past experience in shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another_ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 559 ================================================== Page 560 ================================================== ADDENDUM NNSPECTOR E _ S. MLLER: During the course of this inspection ESM:wmj 1/22/71) thorough analyses of work were performez which have given some insight in the supervision of work in your Division: Taken into consideration was your recent reorganization of the Division which appears to have accomplished a better balance of work between branches. In this write -up you have requested replacement Agents for SAs C E. Enright andG_M_Quinn_both assigned in your Espionage and Racial Branch: In addition . you have requested two additional Agents for the Racial Intelligence Section and Agents for the Special Coordination Unit Division case load was surveyed by categories from the field administrative reports for a 12-month period (January through December 1970) to establish treids over this period. Bacicelly, pcrtinent trends indicated increases of 70.29 in Internal Securityand New Left cases during the 12 month period; a 57. 49 increase in racial matters; 34. 9% in Security Informants; a decline of 33% in Espionage (65) and decline of 13.3% in Internal Security Nationalistic Tendency (105) cases_ In addition, case loads by Section were reconstructed (in view of Division reorganization) and compared with case loads at the time of the last inspection aS indicated in the following: Last Inspection Current Inspection Espionage 5846 5038 ( -808) Racial 4746 6642 (+1896) Nationalities Intelligence 2944 3620 (+676) (Does not incluca Internal Security 3658 5318 (+1660) Spec. Coordina New Left 6551 6421 (-130) tion Unit) Research No cases To further analyze case and work load the Research Section and Special Coordination Unit were excluded from computations and manpower Was considered on the basis of 50 men in the Espionage Racial Intelligence Branch and 33 men in the Internal Security Branch(Section Chief and Number One Men also excluded' Total case load in Espionage Branch currently is 15,300 and 1L, 739 in Internal Security;case load per supervisor in Espionage determined to be 14% lower than NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 560 two ================================================== Page 561 ================================================== his counterpart in Internal Security (306 vs _ 356) . It is noted in this regard that the Racial Intelligence case load raises the Espionage Branch figures , since the Nationalities Intelligence Section has an average of only 278 and Espionage Section of only 280 cases per man: The average in Racial Intelligence Section is 350_ We next conducted surveys to determine whether the complexity of cases in Espionage and Nat ionalities work was appreciably more complex to justify the above ~noted differences in case load. All pending 65 classification cases (total 327) were reviewed and it was determined & total of 539 items of correspondence containing instructions or direction emanating from SOG were contained in these files or an average of 1. 6 pieces of correspondence in a 12 -month period Over half of this was somewhat routine and very short. We also reviewed the 100 most important (105s) cases and determined an average of 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at SOG in these files. 629 of this was considered somewhat routine. We rcviewcd cver 80% cf ycur 298 Potential Double Agent cages end determined the average case was 3 1/2 years old and contained only 1 piece of correspondence in over 3 years (subject of separate write -up). Other surveys revealed current active cases in these categories had an average of only 3+ pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period. It is felt that degree Of supervision and the amount of instruction and direction given our cases can be measured in one way by the frequency of correspondence necessitated the individual cases_ Another survey of mail Signed out at Section level revealed that approximately 57% of your outgoing mail emanates from the combined efforts of your New Left and Racial Sections_ Espionage Section contributed about 8. 7% and Nationalities Intelligence about 159. On the basis of the above studies and reviews of files I conclude that, if anything, due to the intensity of the action that it requires more input to supervise Racial and New Left than it does cases assigned in the Espionage and Nationalities Sections . For this reason_ I feel you still have an imbalance in your Division which should be corrected. That is, you still have 5 men working Espionage and Nationalities NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 561 by ================================================== Page 562 ================================================== work who should be shifted to other work to balance your assignments_ I do not feel that you need two more men in the Special Coordination Unit at this time since increased work load considerations due to the additional Legats has not happened When and if it does, you should make necessary intra_Branch transfers_ I agree with your recommended replacements for SAs Enright and Quinn; however replacement for Quinn should be assigned to the Racial Section and not the Espionage Section_ I am submitting separate recommendations regarding this. Any further additions to the Racial Intelligence Section shou ld be made from within the Espionage Branch from the pertinent Sections _ To recap, I feel as a result 0f this inspection that your present quota of 116 men is adequate _ I feel the replacements requested are justified but I do not agree with your request for 4 additional Agents _ Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C , D. BRENNAN: The Inspector has noted (DEM ; ekn Id 1/23/71) our recent reorganization to accomplish 2 better balance of work between branches . The reorganization was based on memorandum 10/9/70, Sizoo to Brennan , requesting 6 additional Agent Supervisors and memorandum 10/14/70, Mr _ Felt to Mr Tolson, denying this request. Mr _ Felt's memorandum noted there were 18921 cases (excluding large volume of informants and Communist Party, USA, matters) and based on our set up at that time the average case load per Agent was 305 in the Internal Security Branch and 225 in the Espionage Branch _ Details of the 2 pproach utilized in our reorganization, 12/16/70, are set forth in the attachment. With 116 Division Agent complenent and 83 desk agents (same figures utilized during current inspection) we distributed the Division case- load (22 857 as 0f"10/31/70= or an average of 275 per desk agent) as equitably as possible This resulted in apportion- ment of caseload among the six present sections as follows: NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 562 yet ================================================== Page 563 ================================================== Desk Average Cases Section_ Agents Cases Per Agent Internal Security 13 3627 279 Nationalities Intelligence 13 3692 284 Racial Intelligence 19 4948 260 New Left 20 5491 275 Espionage 18 5099 283 Research 0 Totals 83 22857 275 During the reorganization all work as well as cases formerly handled in three sections in the Espionage Branch was consolidated into two sections _ All cases and work formerly handled in two operational sections in the Internal Security Branch were spread among three sections with the creation of the New Left Section as & separate entity. This resulted in additional Agents for New Left work_ Since 10/31/70 (caseload figures utilized for reorganization purposes) caseloads in each section have changed as follows: Current Section 10/31/70 Inspection Net Change Espionage 5099 5038 -61 Racial Intelligence 4948 6642 +1694 Nationalities Intelligence 3892 3620 -28 Internal Security 3627 5318 +1691 New Left 5491 6421 +930 Research 0 The slight reductions in caseloads in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections have left the average cases per Agent at 280 and 278, respectively, both above the norm of 275 established for reorganizational purposes. The Inspector has noted the number of outgoing pieces of correspondence in the 65 classification cases, .the 100 most important 105 classification cases, and a review 0f 80 percent of 298 "potential double agent" cases _ The vast majority of the cases handled in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections are 105 classification cases_ Recognizing the Inspector reviewed the most important cases and determined that on an average 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at the Seat of NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 563 ================================================== Page 564 ================================================== 'Government in these I would estimate that a conservative minimum of over two pieces of corre spondence originated at Seat of Government in each of the 105 classification group aS a whole_ With an average caseload of 280 per Supervisor, this would mean that 560 outgoing communications would be submitted each year _ Minus weekends and holidays, there are 252 workdays in & year and I would estimate &n average of 32 days per man would be accounted for by annual leave, sick leave, inspection assign - ments_ } tour assignments, firearms and physical examinations_ This would leave 220 days for productive work per Supervisor This would mean that each Supervisor would be required to review the necessary files and dictate approximately two and one-half communications per I feel this iS perhaps a conservative estimate inasmuch a8 many of the cases involved relate to foreign diplomats and in each case, at the inception; we have to prepare a communication to Department of State setting forth basic facts about the individual and obtaining authority to investigate, and, thereafter, issue appropriate instructions to the field_ Thus; in these cases, there are two outgoing communications prepared at the very inception_ In addition to measuring work on the basis of outgoing corres - pondence, I think note must be taken of the fact that the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections have & responsibility with regard to over 130 countries_ The vast majority, of course, are Of concern to the Nationalities Intelligence Section_ Supervisors on the various desks have to be aware of conditions existing which affect the Bureau'S responsibilities in the intelligence field and this encompasses the review of much intelligence material which shows up in the incoming mail count, all of which must be properly reviewed and coordinated. During the inspection a mail count was kept for five days and the results, of course, are available to the Inspector _ In this connection; during the five-day period, each Supervisor in the Espionage Section received an average of 255 pieces of regular incoming mail (such aS, Seat of Government memoranda, letterhead memoranda, teletypes, airtels, cables, letters from field, and letters from outside agencies) for & total of 378 pages_ Other incoming mail (such as intelligence reports and cables from ther agencies, Bureau Source 6 and Bureau Source 200 items, publications, visa notifications and Similar such items) averaged 40 items per Agent in the Espionage Section and the pages totaled 213 , With regard to outgoing mail, there was an average per man 0f 11 items and 18 pages of dictated material and 79 items and 157 pages of outgoing nondictated, al1 of which involved preparation of material for dissemination to other agencies . In the Nationalities Intelligence Section, the comparable average figures per Supervisor were 213 items and 416 pages of incoming regular mail, 109 items and 440 pages of other incoming mail, 22 items and 40 pages 0f outgoing dictated mail, and 68 items and 169 pages of outgoing nondictated mail. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 56 files, day. 19 6 ================================================== Page 565 ================================================== STPIRVISCRY XON-INVESTEGATIVE PERSONNEL Special Coordination Unit CmDeeet Gae4 u 5 New Left Report Unit Ge ~eoc te04 E Racial Rerort Unit Special Reeords Unit 2 Centra; Research Unit_ tat4 G A 350X 5 16 Front Offices (Sections & Division) 17 (Proposed 12-8 Zin} (4-12 shift) 1014L ITON-IWVESTIGATIVE 33 PRSOKNEL' TOTAU DI:SzOn CC ?LENEiz I1& LdV Total rom-fovanti_ getive Xersonnel 33 Ytrt "OIAL 4VAILABL INVXSTI-- GATIVE PERSONMEL 33 DIVINIO4 CASE Load AVIRAGE (1021/70) Cotal Division Case Count 857 Totai Investigative Perscjnel 83 Division Averze Ccs? Joid 275 19] NW 88608 Docld:32989638 565 '2 ," Page ================================================== Page 566 ================================================== INT'ERMiL SECURITY SECTION Cases Hen Averege Zrontt Officc 2 Commiunist Party, US: Uit 382 2 191 x3 Basic Revolutionary individual Unit 1517. 3 606 Internationel New I:eft 26+* Unit 644 223 Klan & #hite Hate Groups Unit 726 2 363 Security Infornert Uilit? Est _ 3323** 186 Ozie Jdditional @en 47+rlt .3627 15 279 #IC frog Research Section *# Ad Hoc, etc; X** Dcs not jnclude 268 routine CP inforsant cases. (9 & ~NW-88608_Dosld:32989638_Page566 ================================================== Page 567 ================================================== 1 NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE Cases Hen Average Front Office 2 Cuban Unit 657 3 219 Middle & South, American Unit 622 3 307 - Nationelities Unit 926 4 232 Echnic Groups Unit (Inc1_ CK . ) 1487 3. 496 Special Coordination Unit 5 3692 20 284 13* #Net Case Supervisors Lvw-88608_Dlocld:32989638_Page_567_ 19 9 0 ================================================== Page 568 ================================================== RACIAL SECTION Cases Men Average Front Office Three Black Nationalist Units 4380 16 274 Racial Informant Unit 568 3. 189 4948 21 260 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page}568 ================================================== Page 569 ================================================== NEH LEFT' SECT'ION Cases Men Average Front Office 2 'Security Informant Unit (Ist.) 56* 3 189 L= 3 New Left Indivicuals Unit 1464 688 New Left Groulps Uuit 952 238 Special Investigations Unit 2341 8 293 Sabotage 167 1_ 167 5491 22 275 600 (Est) cases to Internal Security Section #ith thcse organizations transferred_ NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 569 0( ================================================== Page 570 ================================================== ESPIONAGZ SECTION Cases Men Average Front Office Four Soviet & Two 5099 18 283 Satellite Units 5099 20 283 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 570 ================================================== Page 571 ================================================== RESZARCH SZCTION Cases Men Average Front Office 2 Central. Research Unit Racia] end New Left Reporting Unitx Special 'Records Units* 2 13*** xCorbining two uits frees one 8IC to haudle. iufori aiits in Internal Security Section_ ~#mill a8sume record Keeping function iol Becurity Informants. ***Tlis loiv corplerent of Agent pcrsonnel shoud stand up when super clerks (4) a1e takei into accoui & NW88608 Docid: 32989638_Pagel571 ================================================== Page 572 ================================================== The fact that the work on a desk is measured by more than just caseload can best be illustrated by citing figures of incoming and outgoing mail for Special Coordination Unit, Nationalities Intelligence Section, for which no case load is reported. In that Unit there were 1173 items consisting of 1777 pages of regular incoming mail; 52 items consisting of 137 pages of other incoming mail; 117 items consisting of 233 pages of outgoing dictated mail; and 290 items consisting of 456 pages of outgoing nondictated mail. As can be seen from the above, since the time 0f reorganization when equity in caseloads was established and manpower assignments made, there has been no decrease in the amount of work responsibilities in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections The December 1970, reorganization resulted in the assignment of significant extra work to those two Sections_ The substantial increases in caseloads in Racial Intelligence, Internal Security and New Left Sections have resulted from the opening of new investigations on members of basic revolutionary groups and the removal of the moratorium on Security Index reporting, approved by the Director, plus increased efforts in these areas by the field: I feel & strorg recponsicility in Qur work in the Domestic Intelligence Division in connection with the national security of our country and am concerned with the ever increasing number of officials from communist countries assigned to the U. S. In addition, the President has recently expressed his urgent need for better high-level coverage which has resulted in expansion of our operations abroad and where possible in the U. S. Foregoing was taken into consideration in connection with my request for additional personnel and you may be assured that whatever decision is reached I and the men in my Division will do our utmost to fulfill our responsibilities in all areas. ADDENDUM The information furnished INSPECTOR Et S _ MILLER : by you will be taken into TESM:ajr 1725771) consideration in further evaluating your request for additional men and you will be advised of the Bureau ' s decision in this matter Assistant Director note . ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C_ D. BRENNAN 1/25/71 Noted. DEM:mjt 204 8963 Page ================================================== Page 573 ================================================== SUGGESTION MAEMORANDA NW 88608 Docld:32989638 573 Page ================================================== Page 574 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM ADDITION OF SUITABLE DESIGNATION TO CAPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS PER - TAINING TO CERTAIN RACIAL INFORM- ANTS TO INSURE PROPER ROUTING OF SUCH CORRESPONDENCE AT SOG . INSPECTOR S MELLER: Prior to the reorganization of the Domestic Intelligence Division on 12-16-70 , all informants reporting on racial matters and white hate groups (including Ku Klux Klan) were supervised by the Racial Informant and White Hate Unit of the Racial Intelligence Section Al1 such informants are designated 85 Racial Informants Subsequent to the reorganization of this Division supervision of substantive matters pertaining to white hate groups and corresponaing informanis {336) {5 iiaiiied by the Kizz and Mhite Ha te Groups Unit of the Internal Security Section Supervision of black nationalist organizations and related informant cases (5642 continues to be handled in the Racial Intelligence Section As a result of the above the Racial Intelligence Section i8 receiving mail concerning racial informants who are reporting on white hate group activity This mail should be reviewed and handled by the Internal Security Section At the present time_ it is not possible to determine to which section such mail should be routed without reviewing the content of the incoming correspondence since the caption of communications pertaining to al1 racial informants indicate only that a racial source is involved _ The type of activity- on which the informant reports black nationalist as opposed to white hate groups R B is not set forth in the caption In view of the fact that over 40F of the cases pertaining to racial sources involve white hate groups , it would appear desirable to identify such matters clearly in the caption of communications submitted to the Bureau by the field_ This will permit such mail to be routed directly to the Internal Security Section and will save an appreciable amount of time in getting the mail to the section where it DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 2p-71 EeHaliw NW 88608 Docld:32989638 574 Os Page ================================================== Page 575 ================================================== ni1l be handled _ Such an addition to the caption will also preclude the necessity for the content of communica- tions of this nature to be reviewed in the Racial Intelligence Section It is believed the desired routing could be effected by adding 2 characterization } such as Tyhite Hate Group (abbreviated WHG) to the caption of correspondence CO ncerning informants who are reporting on the activities of such groups Under existing procedure communications concerning racial informants reporting on White hate groups are submitted under a caption such as: Co 1234-R. Under the suggested procedure the communication would be captioned: CO 1234-R (WHG) Comments of Section Chiefs Gray and Moore and Assistant Director Brennan are requested. 2 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 575 2 0 6 ================================================== Page 576 ================================================== SECTION CHIEF A.W , GRAY Inspector s suggestion is a good one and should be adopted. However , in conformance with both existing "character" structure of Bureau case titles and a recommended change regarding security informant titles (memorandum A .I Gray to C,D_ Brennan captioned "Security % Informants; IS Communist; New Left, dated 1/21/71) 9 it is proposed that the character designation Racial Matters be included. Incoming communications concerning white hate group informants only would thus bear the title: CO 1234-R RM WHG The Internal Security Section, if the Inspector concurs, will implement this change with appropriate instructions to the field. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/21/71 AFG : bcw SECTION CHTEF G. C. MOORES With respect to the Klan and white hate informants I concur with the above ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above _ DOMESTIC' INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/21/71 AWG : dlb 3 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 576 1oz 230/ Page ================================================== Page 577 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM ARTICLES CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF RACIAL EXTREMISTS RESEARCH SECTION INSPECTOR S MILLER : The Research Section prepares a number of timely monographs and other studies dealing with the activities of racial extremists These papers as well as the daily teletype summary and the weekly "1 'Summary of Extremist Activities, # serve to keep Bureau personnel, appropriate government officials 1 and the intelligence conmunity advised on the up-to-date situation involving these matters . Much information received is from public sources or otherwise of 2 non-confidential nature. The, Bureau is in 2 unique position to collate and place in perspective the in- formation concerning activities of these violence-prone ex- tremists This data could be used for preparation of articles for publication in magazines 9 journals 9 and newspapers whicn would serve to expose these individuals and organizations for what they are. Such articles would give the public an insight into the true nature of these extremists who would destroy our system of government and our society. This would serve to dininish public Sympathy and support for their activities and ould strengthen public support of law enforcement in general. Although the Bureau has prepared and/or been in- strumental in the publication of a number of articles concerning the campus revolutionaries of the New Left and of whit hate groups , the only recent material we have made available to the public concerning racial extremist activities is that set forth in the Appropriations testimony _ There is a definite need for good_ } timely articles for public consumption placing in per - Spective and showing the true nature of the activities of racial extremists The Crime Records Division has sources available to facilitate publication of such ma terial SUGGESTION It is suggested that Research Section, with the assistance of and in coordination with the Crime Records Division, correlate the preparation and publication of articles dealing DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/20/71 MSR MCM_ mkz NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 577 2 0% fek _ ================================================== Page 578 ================================================== Suggestion Memorandum Articles Concerning Activities of Racial Extremists Research Section with the activities of racial extremists Care should be taken to use only material of a non-confidential nature which would not be detrimental to Bureau Operations_ Consideration should be given to a study of the Black Panther Party along the lines of the article entitled "A Study of Marxist Revolutionary Violence; SDS , 1962-1969" which effectively exposed the SDS_ Other articles perhaps shorter and more limited in scope, on specific activities and groups also should be considered at an early date _ Comments of Section Chief R. Da Cotter and Assistant Director C, D, Brennan requested _ SECTION CHEF R D. COTTER: The Inspector's suggestion (TJS/mea1/21/71) has merit. It is believed that Research Section would be able to gather together material which would be of value in educating the public to the real nature of extremists such a8 the Black Panther Party. Research Section will; consistent with current work assignments,_begin preparation of material which, in coordination with Crime Records Division, can be made public. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/20/71 MSR :mcm mkz 2 7 2 0 4 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 578 1 ================================================== Page 579 ================================================== ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I think the Inspector's (TJs/mea 1/21/71) suggestion is very worthwhile_ We believe that wherever possible the truenature of extremists should be publicized. Within the limits of available manpower, we will furnish Crime Records Division with as much unclassified material as possible for public consumption, L 3 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 579 2 ] 0 ================================================== Page 580 ================================================== CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP EQBAL_AHMAD SECURITY MATTER MISCELLANEOUS BUREAU FILE : 100-_448675 PECTOR EDWARD S . MILLER : This case was originally opened on 1/25/68 based upon Albany letter to the Director dated 1/19/68 , requesting Bureau authority to institute an investigation of the subject based upon his antidraft and anti-Vietnam protest activities_ At the time, subject was also considered to be a campus leader and agitator at Cornell University, IthaceslNeV_York, where he was employed as an assistant professor in the school of_Industrial and _ Labor Relations_ Val= Ahmad_has subsequently become involved in the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL) and is presently under indictment as one of the coconspirators in this matter (The ECCSL involves a conspiracy by a dissident group of priests nuns , teachers 3 students and former students who have displayed opposition to the Vietnam War by committing acts of violence against Government agencies including selective service boards and private corporations.) The leaders of the ECCSL, one of whom is Ahmad planned to destroy underground electric and heating systems serving Government buildings in Hashington, D_ C _ The group also has reportedly planned to kidnap a high Government official and Ahmad was a figure in this phase _ Set forth below is a brief summary of background information taken from the subject's file: Personal_History Immigration and NaturalizationService (INS records at Buffalos_Ney Yorko; ndicate that Ecbai Anmad was born December 30 Atze5 193022t Irki Bhtar Inda 17 and is a citizen of Pakistan His parents are listed as IaU Ataur Rahman En na; Zather: and Khatooh "Bahnan , mother Sukiect 80 # is descrzbed as male } 52137 7677) 135 pounds brown eyes black hair broyn compTexion; Scar on Teft hana In 1969 he was 31Z single and Ws assigned ~4rien Regrstration Nuber ((ARN) 413183502 INS records disclose that on February 3 1967 ~Anad"s "Status Was adjusted to that f a permanent resident P9*mR Ywy/- 27en NW 88602/ RocEL 32989638 Page:B80l igence Division Inspection key 45a O _ ================================================== Page 581 ================================================== Eqbal Ahmad INS records further indicate that Ahmad first came to the United States in September , 1957 2 on a trip financed by 2 Fulbright Travel Grant and that Occidental College at Los Angeles, California provided this fellowship. His sponsor was the Institute of International Education In September , 1958 , Ahmad transferred to Princeton University on a university fellowship and remained there untii September ) 1961 } when he left the United States to take up residence in North Africa _ INS records indicate that Ahmad last arrived in the United States at New York City on September 21 , 1963 destined for Princeton University, Princeton_ } New Jersey, on a teaching fellowship INS files also set forth prior residences at Lahore, Pakistan; Los Angeles California; Tunis, Tunisia; Urbana Illinois; and Ithaca, New York Former employments include "lecturer in Modern History" at Forman Christian College and the Pakistan Military Academy in Pakistan as well as teaching assignments at Princeion Uiivcrcity , University of Illinois and Cornell University He was registered in absentia during 1961 and 1962 and during this time was in Morocco and Tunisia. He was awarded a Ph.D. degree on June 1967 , by Princeton University _ On January 14 , 1969 , the Chicago Office deternined that Ahmad was employed at the time by the Adlai E. Stevenson Institute of International Affairs (ASIIA) 5757 South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago , Illinois Ahmad was listed as a recipient of funds for study in Vietnam for the period 1968-69_ In July 2 1968 the Albany Division reported that information was deveioped indiczting thot the subject proposed to travel to North and South Vietnam _ It iS further noted that Ahmad was leaving Cornell University because of failure to have his contract renewed _ Ke indicated in a published article of the "Cornell Daily Sun" that he would travel to North and South Vietnan during the 1968-69 academic year as a' fellow of the Center for International Studies of the University of Chicagc_ The article further reported that Ahmad would carry press cards from 2 Pakistani newspaper and two Algerian newvspapers _ He was identified as a person active in the antiwar movement at Cornell University. "NW-88608-Docld:32989638_Page -581 13, 27 & ================================================== Page 582 ================================================== Eqbal Ahmad On July 12 , 1968 9 Ahmad S former landlord at Ithaca New York , advised that the subject told him that he wouid travel to Vietnam in September 1968 , in order to study and report upon the war Ahmad reportedly said that this study would be within his field of interest since he has been conducting research on guerrilla warfare and revolutions_ Language_Ability Subject reportedly speaks fluent English, Urdu, French , Arabic, Persian and Hindustani Revolutionary Background On May 8 , 1965 , an issue of the "Daily Illini, M1 a daily student newspaper published at the University of Iilinois, Champalgi-Urbaua ecuupus Illinois, iisted t%a participants in a local "teach-in 1i on the war in Vietnam to be held on Mary 15 1965 _ One of the speakers was identified as Eqbal Ahmad, assistant professor of political science who was described as an expert on guerrilla and internal warfare who had worked with the anti-French FLN guerrillas during the Algerian independence struggle and who reportedly had studied guerrilla movements al1 over the world. Ahmad 's file cites numerous instances of Ahmad 's involvement in antidraft and anti-Vietnam demonstrations and activities as well as numerous anti-Ameri can statements made by him During his subsequent association with the ECCSL , Ahmad has been one of the prime movers in the plot to kidnap a high Government official and appears to have played an increasingly important role as a leader and advisor of the ECCSL. In view of the foregoing information, the following suggestions are set forth for your consideration and appropriate action: 1 Eqbal Ahmad appears to have the potential qualities (background , intelligence, education, experience and linguistic ability) of a foreign intelligence agent. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 582 5 / 3 ================================================== Page 583 ================================================== Eqbal Ahmad It is suggested that consideration be given to issuing instructions to the field to institute an intensive full field investigation of this subject particularly with respect to his national origin, travel and residences in foreign countries and involvement in foreign political activities_ If investigation abroad so justifies, it is suggested that consideration be given to intensifying our investigation 0f the subject to include the establishient of sources or informants close to him Physical surveillance and the development of highly confidential sources should not be overlooked in effecting full coverage of Ahmad 's current activities _ This background investigation should insure that emphasis is placed on developing information concerning Abad 's income and financiai aftairs 2 verification of subject S travel to South and/or North Vietnam in 1968-69 and subject's activities in the Los Angeles, California, area during the period of his attendance at Occidental College at Los Angeles You should insure the field aggressively intensifies this background investigation, yet it should be emphasized that utmost discretion and good judgment should be exercised to avoid unfounded charges f "harassment" being directed against the Bureau _ The above suggestions are not to be considered as all-inclusive; however you should insure that this matter receives close personai Supervision_ Comments of Assistant Director requested. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 583 2/4 ================================================== Page 584 ================================================== SUPERVISOR WILLIAM J. MC DONNELL: Suggestions of the Inspector have been noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be pursued and the field will be instructed to intensify its investigation in this matter, utilizing the utmost discretion in view of pending prosecution against the subject: For this reason, no effort will be made, pending prosecution; to institute sensitive coverage or other overt activity which might prejudice the prosecution, result in a charge of harassment or otherwise be a source of embarrassment to the Bureau. Following final prosecutive action of subject, all investiga- tive measures and techniques will be considered in line with the Inspector's suggestions to determine the nationalistic orientation and activities of the subject. SECTION CHIEF W R WANNALL: Suggestions of the iispector have been noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be pursued and the field instructed to intensify its investigation of subject, consistent with the fact that at this time prosecution is pending and therefore discretion must be exercised: This matter will be closely followed: ASSISTANT DRRECTOR C. D BRENNAN: Inspector 1 S comments are noted and appreciated and prompt action will be taken to implement his suggestions along the lines set forth above by the Supervisor and Section Chief. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 584 2/8 ================================================== Page 585 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM CHINESE MATTERS TNSPECTOR EDWARD S_ MILLER: The DESECO Program (development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials) has been operated with considerable success since it was implemented as a result 0f an espionage conference in 1957 _ As a result of this program } a substantial number of security informants and double agents have been developed _ Simultaneous with the imminent opening of the Chinese Communist (Chicom) Embassy in Canada in early February, 1971, we can expect more intelligence operations by the Chicoms in the U.S Information already furnished by the_Royal Canadian_ Mounted Police indicates thatpossibiy fifty per cent 0f the Intefligence activity generated the Chicoms in Canada_wilL be drectedat the LS It is recognized that certain steps have previously been taken with a view toward developing double agents and informants among the Chicoms These include contacts with certain Chinese scientists working in strategic technical fields in the U.S as well as efforts to develop some ethnic Chinese sources who might be targeted against the Chicoms It would appear that these programs should be expanded and intensified with a view toward developing an aggressive effort directed at the Chicoms and patterned after the DESECO program. This program should include persons who by the nature of their 'occupation, national origin, or otherwise might be logical targets of the Chicoms or would have occasion or opportunity to be in touch with the Chicoms _ This program would include journalists 1 students, educators, politicians 1 librarians, travel agents and the like Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION' INSPECTION 1ig-71 lrs NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 585 by 94EDT: 2/ 6 ================================================== Page 586 ================================================== SECTION CHIEF W . R WANNALL NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION 1/20/71 EXO: dgo The intelligencelespionage threat posed by the Chicoms , particularly in view of the opening of the Chicom Embassy in Canada during 2/71, is recognized. In line with the Inspector S suggestion, we will intensify our current efforts aimed at penetration of Chicom intelligence through development of methods and techniques similar to those utilized in the DESECO Program_ We will extend this operation on a highly selective basis and will strive to come up with sources who will be in a position to disrupt or neutralize Chicom intelligence efforts directed against the U_ S . In connection wiii pUssible operatiois 1z Carade, we will of course work_closely with RCMP which has been most cooperative with uS in the past Ior ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C_ D. BRENNAN 1/20/71 DEM:mjt The Inspector S suggestion will certainly be followed. In addition, with the strong probability the Chicoms will be admitted to the United Nations in the near future, DESECO ' s in the Chinese field will be most useful to target against Chicom officials who will be assigned to the Chicom United Nations Mission and who will be employed in the Secretariat. NW83608 Docld: 32989638 Page 586 J /7 1 ================================================== Page 587 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM DEFECTOR PROGRAM PPECTOR EDW ARD S . MILLER : The development of a Soviet intelligence officer as a defector-in-place who Will advise us of hostfle intelligence activities and plans is an urgent and paramount requirement of the Bureau He have failed to_ Fa achieve tbisObjective in almost_ ten_years_despite our Programs and investigative activities This suggests me take 4 fresh approach to the problen_ The present "Defector Program" operates as follows: "Defector committees" consisting of Espionage desk Supervisors in both the New York and Washington Field Offices select five Soviet intelligence officers (with Bureau approval) as defection targets _ This selection is based on a variety 0f reasons which indicate the Soviets have defection potential_ These Soviets are then marked for priority attention and "defection teams" consisting of four men in each office are czcleci-cly 288igrez to 2eeist the fita Casa Agents in con- ducting physical surveillances and to apply increased investigative attention to these Soviet targets which will hopefully lead towards a successful defection approach_ It is unlikely that only four men and five case Agents would be able to obtain complete information relating to the daylight , evening and weekend activities 9 contacts and behavior of the five Soviet targets to present a true picture of their character and psychological makeup essential to a successful defection approach_ It is suggested that serious consideration be afforded to decreagiug_the number 0f_selected_Soviettargets to two or three and to increase the number of Special Agentz on ea@ team It_is more Tikelythat ten to" fifteen 84g80@e"ot; motivated_Agents can be_successful in_3total a1130ut team effort to bring apout the defection of the 7 Atr targeted Soviec Ths @fforf incjudephygicai sur- veillances the_Placing 0fPegeco 0r social and doub1e agent informapts close to the sarget the deveTopment 2 cIose Lih_ friendship with the target by an Agent under appropriate 737 cover torougp psydnozogic Study; and whatevar other imaginative and unorthodoz procedures may be required to DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION HDCiukl 1/20771 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 587 #ould or 2 / f ================================================== Page 588 ================================================== create the best possible situation to enable the Soviet target to defect This all-out effort on the "part-of-each team should be highly professional and treated: as a Bureau "special" wi th resolve and overriding determination to succeed _ It is fully realized that your manpower directed against Soviet_intelligence has been decreased _ It is also realized that it is an extremely difficult job to defect a trained Soyiet intelligence officer Extremely difficult jobs require extraordinary and sometimes unorthodox methods You should afford this proposal serious consideration and survey the New York and Washington Field Offices for their ideas regarding this proposal Comments of Section Chief William 4 _ Branigan and Assistant Director Charles D Brennan requested_ Cf SECTION CHIEF MILLIAH A, BRANIGAN 1/21/71 (HAB:hke) Tbe Siggestivu vf tKe Izapector is apzzcciat:z, and it is our feeling that it has merit, steps wili be taken to promptly initiate the survey of the New York and Hashington Field Offices. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D BRENNAN 1/21/71 DEM:mjt We are certainly cognizant of the importance of developing a defector-in-place in the Soviet field and will imediately initiate the survey suggested by the Inspector_ 2 - 2/1 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 588 624t ================================================== Page 589 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF GHETTO INFORMANTS INSPEcToR EDWARD S. MILLER; Since the implementation of the Ghetto Informant Program in 1967 , it has developed into 2 productive source of accomplishments for the Bureau. Experience has shown that in addition to being mere listening posts for black extremist action, these informants, when motivated by specific assign- ments, also furnish va luable criminal infornation. As a result of conferences held at the Seat of Government , the field was instructed in March, 1970 to give mlore positive assignments to ghetto informants. The Director noted , "This is most important. I1 The number of ghetto informants now stands at more than 6,200. and it is essential that we continually make certain we are achieving maximum results from this vast reservoir of information It is believed one additional step toward this goal would be the giving of more specific assignments to these ghetto informazts, aspeciclly cCzcermiza blsc: extrcnists living in their locality, such as subjects on the Security Index and selected Agitator Index subjects with extremist tendencies_ Such assignments would include the development of detailed information concerning black extremist targets such 2s data relating to their daily activities, sources of income , and information 2s to whether the black extremists are operating in violation of Federal or local statutes. Ghetto informants would be assigned to black extremist targets with whom they are acquainted or who reside or work in the same area It is also probable that in many instances ghetto informants could also be targeted against similar subjects of interest to the New Left Program. Based on our experience to date, there appears to be little doubt but what these additional specific assignments, if fully implemented throughout the field, would not only increase our intelligence coverage of black extremists but couid also be the vehicle for putting more of these militants in jail on criminal charges- The success of this approach would, of course, be commensurate with the enthusiasm of the individual Agents in the field and it is necessary that pressure be kept on it_ A suggested means for checking on the Program S progress at the Seat of Government would be to amend Form FD-405 under the heading "Racial Informant Accomplishments" to require the field to specifically list major accomplishments attributable to ghetto informants during the previous month_ Comments of Section Chief G.C. Moore, Section Chief R.L. Shackelford, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennen requested DOMSTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION NW 88608 Dacla32989638 Page 589 ================================================== Page 590 ================================================== ADDENDUM SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. 1/21[71 I agree that the suggestion made by the Inspector has merit and should further strengthen the productivity of our Ghetto Informant Program and increase our concrete accomplishments _ Necessary instructions will be issued to the field to implement the suggestion as set forth by the Inspector. SECTION CHTEF R_ L. SHACKELFORD: I concur with the above suggestion. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D_ BRENNANE I concur with the above suggestion and as stated above the appropriate suggestion will be is3ued to corply with tke Isispector' $ suggestion_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/21/71 JGD:dlb 2 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 590 'ke MOORE Z 4&* ================================================== Page 591 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM REVISION OF RACIAL INFORMANT STATUS REPORT FORM FD-405 INSPECTOR EDW ARD S 0 MILLER : The Racial Intelligence Section currently utilizes Form FD-405 (copy attached) captioned "Status Report, Racial Informants 1 Extremist Groups (White-Black) ; Racial Matters 11 The form is submitted by the field quarterly, and it requires 2 detailed breakdown of militant black extremist groups, ghetto area , and indicates the specific informant coverage including member informants , for each group and area, in addition to informationrequired for white extremist groups _ A complete listing is furnished quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the field a5 they occur during interim months The FD-4O5s are handled centrally the Black Nationalist ~ South and Racial Informant Unit and are furnished to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive case on each organization listed for timely evaluation of infufiani Gevelopuueiie aid coverege in each fiald cffice. This enables the Bureau Supervisor to detect weaknesses quickly and take appropriate corrective measures It is suggested that in order to provide tighter accountability for member informant development and coverage, FD-405 be revised to include an additional section to state as follows : "Explain why you do not have member informants in those groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a "Indicate what specific action is being taken to_ develop member informants in those groups and advise when Mi member informant coverage is anticipated for each group . Comments of Section Chief George C. Moore and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are requested. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/18/71 HCamkl NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 591 12 by ================================================== Page 592 ================================================== FD 405 (Rev: 4-23-70) Optional #JIm No. 3010-106 MaY 196 r uifion 6S^ Cin: ItC . No. 17 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandiim TO Director, FBI DATE: NOTE: Itcms 1 through 9 list SAC, total numbers; items 10 through FROM 12 list dollar value; fumish dctails FD-405b SUBJECT : STATUS REPORT RACIAL INFORMANTS EXTREMIST GROUPS (WHITE-BLACK) RACIAL MATTERS Re: All racial inforants 1. Inforants other than ghetto Ghetto Informants a. Listed at beginning of month b. Added C. Deleted d. Listed at end of month 2 Informants (Probationary) a, Listed at beginning of month b. Added C. Deleted "d. Listed &t end of month 3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively White Extremist Black Extremist to the development of racial informants 4_ Total amount of mioney to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and individuals under SAC authority. Services Expenses Total STATISTical ACCOMPLISHMENTS 5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases 6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Ilem 5) 7. SubjectsLocated, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6) 8. Subjects Arrestcd, other Federal Agencies 9. Subjects Arrested, Statc and Local 10." Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases 11. Mcrchandise Recorcred, State and Local 12 Merchandise Rccovered, other Federal Agencies NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 592_ 123 paid ================================================== Page 593 ================================================== pix 4(u (Ruv , 4-'-(HA)) Purninh cnnpleto Iimting (unrtorly hy lho 1(lh of ,anuury, Aprll, July, Oelolyr; renal monlhu fulah only portinont clugon. Nuxta loulion und #III} uemnhers; of ock exlremicl Idlentitics of indlividualt & ihiic hule groups includ- [dentilicg 0f informante or groups Iho havc palrti- Idenlitics of informiunle and idnfities of local & gourcc9 providing cipalcd in or ure aclive wourceg providing coverage Identify ghetto areae & eati- Fumieh tho numhcr of chaplcrs & groups on covcrage: Undcrlinc in planning acta of racial of the individual or groupg malc the populatioil in each ghctto infonn:ls fumishing lege cuupuses. metn informant. violence. in preceding colurin: areul. coverage of cnch area. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 593 nine bcr ing- col- ber ================================================== Page 594 ================================================== U Lrllr 44 Milk Fu-4056 (Rev: 423-70) - RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLIHIMENTS (Summarize Infomant Accomplishments for Previous Monlh re Raciol Intelligence Information.) DETALS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED OV FD-405 (Include (1) Coresponding Item # {ron FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; {3) Field or Bufile #; (4) Type of Accomplishment ) NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 594 ================================================== Page 595 ================================================== ADDENDUM M/ SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C . MOORE 1/20/71 The suggestion made by the Inspector Will definitely enable the Racial Intelligence Section to afford closer supervision to the important task of developing quality racial informants especially member informants in extremist organizations_ Our present practice of reviewing the FD-405 and then communicating to the field when it is noted there is no member informant in extremist organizations will be streamlined by the suggestion made by the Inspector. In view of the above, appropriate instructions will be issued 1 to comply with the Inspector S suggestion_ AZSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES 2 PRENNAN : I concur with #he above views and 2s stated above the appropriate instructions will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/19/71 JGD:pdr NW 88608 Qecld 32989638_Eage-595 1 226 ================================================== Page 596 ================================================== SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM SUPERVIS ION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY INTERNAL SFCURITY AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS INS PECTOR EDWARD S _ MILLER ; Each field office currently submits an annual report ob all security informants and confidential sources , advising which informants are paid regularly . The report lists the subversive organizations currently under investigation by that office and includes the following basic information: address of organization, character of case, field file number Bureau file nunber , approximate membership _ The report also lists informant coverage of each organization 85 follows: officers Br Rank and File other In addition, quarterly reports on the"New Left Movement" are submitted by the field. These reports list informant coverage of New Left groups but do not specify which are member informants Azditionally 3 Bureeu 2irtel to 211 ffices dated 11/5/70, captioned 01 Informant Development } Black Panther Party, New Left Groups 1f ordered 2 complete analysis of informant coverage in the Black Panther Party and New Left groups by each office in the field_ This is not a regularly scheduled analysis_ It is noted that the Racial Intelligence Section currently utilizes FD-405 , (copy attached) 9 captioned "Status Report $ Racial Informants , Extremist Groups (White_ Black) ; Racial Matters." It is submitted by the field quarterly and requires a detailed breakdown of militant black extrenist groups , ghetto area , and indicates the specific informant coverage , including member informants for each group and area, in addition to information required for white extremist groups_ A complete listing is furnished quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the field as they occur during the interim months The FD-405s are handled centrally in the Black Nationalist South and Racial Informant Unit and are routed to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive case on each organization listed for timely evaluation of informant development and coverage in each field office _ This enables the Bureau Supervisor to detect weaknesses and take timely corrective measures . DfHESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIS ION INSPECTION 1/18/71 HDCapkl 2 27 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 596 ================================================== Page 597 ================================================== The immediacy of the need for member informant coverage in all extremist organizations is obvious if the Bureau is to be forewarned of plans for bombings } kidnappings } demonstrations , and other acts of violence in this country It is suggested that the New Left and Internal Security Sections devise 2 form Similar to the FD-405,designed to fit the unique requirements of those Sections , which will assist Supervisors to more accurately evaluate and control informant development and coverage in the field_ The form should require specific information on member informant develop- ment and coverage in each revolutionary, New Left extremist, and protest group under investigation in each fieid Office_ In devising the new form, the New Left and Internal Security Sections should bear in mind the suggestion wbich has been proposed separately for the Racial Intelligence Section to revise FD-405 by~adding a section to read as follows: "Explain why you do not have member informants in thoge groupe listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a "Indicate what specific action is being taken to develop member informants in those groups and advise when member informant coverage is anticipated for each group. Mi FD-405 also lists statistical accomplishments attributable to racial and ghetto informants FD-374 is used for criminal informants This information is tabulated by computer in the Voucher-Statistical Section and is available for immediate reference, including use by the Director in his Budget Testimony , While not ordinarily 'engaged in criminal activity to the same extent as criminal, racial, or ghetto informants, it is nevertheless true that security informants especially in the New Left field are increasingly responsible for Statistical accomplishments each year_ These include location of Bureau fugitives > recovery of stolen merchandise, and other similar data_ It can be reasonably anticipated that they will be responsible for additional statistical accomplishments in the future. There is no current procedure for compiling and recording this type of statistical data by tbe New Left or Internal Security Sections 2 O NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 597 28 ================================================== Page 598 ================================================== It 1s suggested that in order for the Bureau to receive full credit for statistical accomplishments attributable to all FBI informants, the new form devised by the New Left and Tnternal Security Sections should include statistical accomplishment data as currently required on FD-405 . Comments of Section Chiefs Arbor W . Gray , Robert J _ Shackelford and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are requested. SECTION CHIEFS SHACKELFORD , FANNALL AND GRAY: The Inspector's suggestion appears to have merit_ The New Left , Nationalities Intelligence and Internal Security Sections agree that FD-405 could be adapted to fit security informant evaluation in the New Left movement and in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. It is proposed that representatives of each of these three sections implement the Inspector s suggestion by revising the form for security use and preparing the necessary instructions to the field requiring quarterly sub - miesion of this informant status report concerning organizations under investigation Coordination; routing and statistical compilation of the incoming forms would be the responsibility of the Special Records Unit of the Research Section which maintains Security informant records but the substantive sections involved would be responsible for evaluation and any necessary action on the basis of their content It is believed further that should this procedure meet our needs for evaluation of member security informants, pe should consider the elimination of the annual security informant report now submitted by each field office. It is proposed, therefore 2 that this suggestion be implemented for a six-month trial period (two submissions) to determine it8 feasibility and whether it does meet our needs for member informant evaluation_ At the end of that trial period, the results will be analyzed and a commensurate recommendation submitted. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN I agree that it would be (JAS:sjr 1/21/71) desirable to carry out this suggestion at least on a trial basis to determine its feasibility I will follow this matter and at the end of the trial perod the procedure will be carefully analyzed to determine whether or not it should be contimed. K 3 5 2 24 NW 88608 Docld: 32989638_Page 598 _ ue} ================================================== Page 599 ================================================== FD{05 (Rer. 4-23-70) Optional Torm 10 soi0-106 MAt 4#J2 GS^ GIN; B{G. "o. 17 UNITED) STATES GOI ERNMEN7' Memorandum T) Director, FBI DATE: NOTE: [Lcnis 1 through 9 list SAC, tofal numnbers; items 10 through FROM 12 list dollar value; fumish details FD-4O5b ~"BJECT : STATUS REPORT RACIAL IWFORMANS EXTREMIST' GROUPS (HFIITE-BLACK) RACIAAL MA TTERS Re: AIl racial infomants 1. Informants olher than ghetlo Ghetto Infotztanls a. Listed at beginning of month b. Added C. Deleled d. Listed at end of mnonth 2. Informants (Probationarv) a. Listed at beginning of month b. Addcd C. Deleted d. Listcd at end of nonth 3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively Rhite Etremist Biack Extremist to the development of racial informants 4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for inforation concerning black cxtremist organizations &nd individudls under SAC authority: Services Expenses Total STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTs 5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases 6. Burcau Fugitives (included in Item 5) 7. Subjects Localed, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6) 8_ Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies 9. Subjccls Arrested, Statc and Local 10. Merchandlise Rccovercd, FBI Cases 11. Merehalisc Recovered, State and Local 12 Merchandise Recovercd, other Federul Agencies NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 599 2 30 "oio;; ================================================== Page 600 ================================================== 1 4+7 "11 tirmi' '1 #Jeto Wl# 'Jnrorly hy tho I(h o' ,uury, Aprll, duly, (elalwr; '/AI Iulug Mlonthm Mrnlnh (ily pet luont ehungon Nalm Ioe #ic ad muubwr mneibc" > " bluek extremist Iclcntitics 0/' individuals whit hate groups iuclud- [dentilieg of informants or groups who havc parti- [dtntiticy 0f informante nnd iclemii I6' of local & sourcc& providing cipulcd in or aro aclive hourcc s providing covcrage Identify ghelto arcag & esti- Fumish thc nemher of ~chtiplers groups on col- covcragc: Undcrline in Qltning acts 0' raciul ol lhe individualor grupg matc the population in each ghetto infomniits fumishing ('ripuses. menber informant: violence. in preceding column. are &, coverege of' cach area. ; NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 600 ing legc ================================================== Page 601 ================================================== FD-403b 4-23-70) RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISIMENTS (Summarize Inforant Accomplishments for Previous Month re Racial Intelligence [nfomation:) DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISITMENTS LISTED ON FD405 ({nclude (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or Bufile #; (4) Type of Accomplishment_) NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 601 (Rev. ================================================== Page 602 ================================================== ADDENDUM C INSPECTOR EDHARD S _ MILLER : Your concurrence with this suggestion on a trial basis is considered forward-looking , particularly since you have used this type of handling with marked success in your Racial Intelligence Program _ It 18 felt, bowever , that a six months period is not an adeguate period to measure the effectiveness considering the time required to reach full implementation of the progran in the field For this reason it is strongly suggested you make your trial period at ieast one year_ Comments of Assistant Director Charles D, Brennan requested _ 8 ADDENDUM ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D, BRENNAN In line with the Inspector's (JAS:sjr S 1/22/71) suggestion, we will implement the program involved and evaluate it at the end of one year _ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION ~He_ EGmk} 1722771 5 4 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 602 22 3 ================================================== Page 603 ================================================== VENCEREMOS BRIGADE 4NSPE@TOR EDWARD S MILLER : The Venceremos Brigade (VB) originated with a group of Americans who traveled to Cuba in January 1969 to take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary Of the Cuban revolution_ The national organization of the VB obtained support from a wide spectrum Of leftist organizations including the Communist Party Socialist Workers Party and the Progressive Labor Party 2 as well as violent revolutionary groups such as the Black Panther Party La Raza (a militant Mexican-American civil rights group) 2 and the Weatherman faction of the Students for 2 Democratic Society The idea of aiding Fidel Castro in meeting his proposed quota of harvesting ten million tons of cane sugar for 1970 quickly took the fancy of the young revolutionaries_ Twvo hundred sixteen young Americans went to Cuba in November 9 1969_ to cut sugar cane and returned on February 11, 1970 _ The second contingent of 687 American youths left New Brunswick, Canada , 0n February 13 1970 gbogrd 2 converted Cuban cattle boat and returned on April 28 1970 _ The third contingent of 407 individuals sailed for Cuba aboard the Conrado Benitez on August 25 1970 _ They returned to New Brunswick_ Canada , on October 21 1970 _ Presently 2 fourth group is being formed to leave on or about March 1, 1971, to stay in Cuba until approximately May 15 , 1971. While no evidence has been received tht those persons who traveled to Cuba received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba , they were constantly told that they were the vanguard of the revolution in the United States. They were told the only way t0 defeat the imperialistic Government of the United States, which must be overthrown, is through revolution_ Under the current instructions individual cases are opened to locate, interview_ 9 and recommend placement on the Security Index on each person who traveled to Cuba _ The SAC may authorize the interview except where the person is under 21 years is currently 2 student or professor has some connection with an institute of learning, or is 2 journaiist In these instances Bureau authority must be obtained for the interview . Investigation of these persons under the current instructions is that the case remain open for one year with 90_day verifications f residence and employment after their interview_ The purpose is to determine whether their inclusion on the Security Index after the interview is warranted DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/20/71 maz 23 4 NW R8608_Decld; 329896 603 (JiRJDa Page ================================================== Page 604 ================================================== Venceremos Brigade To date, less than half of the VB members have been located and a large portion of those located have been uncooperative insofar as the interview is concerned_ Over 100 of these persons have been placed on the Security Index , and it is anticipated that nuerous others will be listed. Many have been arrested for engaging in acts of violence since their return, have participated in anti-Vietnam demonstrations, or demonstrated at trials involving members 0f the Black Panther Party or the persons involved in the October, 1969, "days of rage" indictments in Chicago, Illinois It is proposed that prior to closing any of the VB cases after the interviem and a year of following the individual 8 activity on a 90_day reporting basis he be interviewed a second time _ For those who were initially cooperative, we should make every effort possible to convert these persons as informants. Those who were initially ircccporativc shoula be concidered for Priority II handling, and those who have met the reguirements for Security Index inclusion in the initial stage should be re-evaluated to insure they still meet those reguirements. Since the members of the VB have made blatantly false statements in their passport applications by not disclosing their true destination, a technical violation 0f the law? exists 0 In addition many of the applications contained either false or out_of-date information including incorrect or old addresses and places of employment These technical violations and items of incorrect information should be brought to the attention of Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian who has recently been appointed in charge Of the Internal Security Division 0f the Department of Justice_ together with Attorney General John N_ Mitchell and James 0 Eastland 9 United States Senator from Mississippi, has publicly indicated they were considering some antisubversion bills making it a crime to give aid and comfort to the enemy , particularly the North Vietnanese who had representatives in Cuba to meet the and toughening the law against advocating the overthrow of the Government _ The passport violations could certainly be reviewed and brought under their consideration for prosecution under current laws or for new legislative proposals_ Inasmuch as some of the VB members have indicated they were going underground and the fact that 2 majority have 2 - NW 88608 Docld:32989638 604 238 He , VB, Page ================================================== Page 605 ================================================== Venceremos Brigade not been located for interview, you should consider placing name stops in the Identification Division So that if these persons are arrested or an inquiry is made by local law enforcement authorities this fact will be immediately brought to the attention of the Bureau, In addition, a stop file is now being set up by the NCIC Unit for persons other than fugitives concerning whom the Bureau has an interest_ This file will require, in addition to the name and birth date of the individual, a5 many other items of identification as possible such as his fingerprint classification Social Security number , military service number } Selective Service number 1 and the like_ Every effort should be made to utilize stops with the Identification Division and the NCIC Unit on these persons _ We should continue to impress upon the field the need fOz {iiffortiait; GIcs #ka VR groups and inzure tbet coverage 0f the fourth contingent is at least at the level of the second contingent (ive informants) and the third contingent (four informants Be sure that al1 efforts are made to have informants previously refused for passage with the prior contingents as well as those _ine_ informants who have previously traveied with the second and third contingents, be considered for the currently proposed trip. Also , sufficient other new informants should be proposed so that coverage of this latest contingent will be adeguate for the Bureau S intelligence needs _ Comments of Assistant Director reguested. 3 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 605 Page 236 ================================================== Page 606 ================================================== 1d VENCEREMOS BRM GADE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D. BRENNAN : The Inspector's keen analysis and thoughtful suggestions in regard to the investigation of the Venceremos Brigade (VB) is Sincerely appreciated; In connection with the above the following observations by this Division are set forth: 1 As the Inspector is aware, security investigations are being conducted concer ning each participant of the VB _ These investigations require that background data including any prior subversive activities be escertained , each individual participant be considered for interview and that the field make a recommendation as to the inclusion of each VB subject on the Security Index (SI) Upon conclusion of the above the field is to advise the Bureau each 90 days for a period of one year as to the whereabouts and activities 8f Priority II , Priority III 5 and any non-SI subjects who are VB returnees Priority I VB subjects are regarded 2s extremists and this Bureau is notified each 45 days of their activities and whereabouts . 2 _ As to the difficulty in locating VB returnees , it is to be noted that the first and second contingents of the VB were comprised of approximately 900 individuals made up of young revolutionaries who were college dropouts leading nomadic and communal existences _ This mode of living inherently makes the Bureau 8 job of locating these subjects for purpose 0f interview more difficult In contrast investigation to date of the third contingent which was composed mostly of established college students; indicates that these individuals will be more easily located Since the third contingent returned to the U.S, approximately 90 days ag0 , these investigations as to background data are now being completed and the initial interviems will be promptly conducted _ 3 _ The suggestion tbat these subjects be reinterviewed upon the expiration of above-mentioned one year period will be given serious consideration and instructions to this effect will be issued to the field upon approval of the Director Efforts will be made to develop as informants those VB subjects who are cooperative and the need for further investigative attention regarding uncooperative individuals Will be evaluated on the merits 'of each individual case_ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/21/71 TJM;cae MAWv_88608_ bocld: 32989638_Page_606 ================================================== Page 607 ================================================== Venceremos Brigade 4 _ Regarding foreign travel such as that in which the VB is engaged , it is recognized that the best interests of this country would undoubtedly be served by prohibition of such travel. The Internal Security Act of 1950' contained sanctions restricting travel on the part of Communist Party members After extended litigation_ } the Supreme Court in June , 1958 ruled in the Kent and Briehl VS _ Dulles passport case that the State Departnent could no longer deny passports to individuals with past history of subversive affiliations In June 1964 , the Supreme Court in the Flynn Aptheher passport case ruled that the right of U.S citizens to travel abroad is protected by the due process clause of the 5th Amendment In January , 1967 , in the Laub decision specifically dealing with travel to Cuba , the Supreme Court ruled that the State Department could not confiscate an individuals passport simply because the individual traveled to Cuba without State Department sanction_ In December 1967 in the Lynd decisien tbe District 0f Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that anyone can travel to a restricted country if tbey did not use their passport to enter that country _ A number of bills have been introduced into Congress in recent years to remedy the above situation 9 most of Which have never cleared committee The Senate curr 'ently has a the Eastland Bill, before the Senate to impose criminal penlittee for violation of travel restrictions A pending bill, A.R_ 1493 was in December 1969 , introduced to restrict travel in violation of area restrictions This bill has been sponsored approximately 20 Congressmen . In view of the above , this Division has not considered it warranted to suggest additional legislation along these lines _ 5 _ As to technical violations regarding false or erroneous statements made by members of the VB on passport applications } a11 information developed along these lines has been furnished both to the Department of Justice and the Department of State for whatever action they deen feasible _ To date neither Department has requested that additional action be taken in this matter 6 _ The Inspector S suggestion regarding the placing of name stops with the Identification Division and the NCIC Unit for information concerning hard-to-locate VB members is well taken This Division will coordinate this matter with NCIC to determine what information is necessary to place such stops and the manner in which this can best be effected . Instructions will be issued to the field regarding 228 NW88608 Docld:32989638 Page 607_ by ================================================== Page 608 ================================================== Venceremos Brigade implementation of this suggestion. 7 The VB is current formulating plans for a fourth contingent to travel to Cuba approximately March 1, 1971_ By airtel dated January 6 , 1971 interested field divisions were instructed to immediateiy initiate an aggressive campaign to obtain informants to travel to Cuba as part of this contingent These offices were instructed to advise the Bureau no later than 1/29/71 and weekly thereafter as to their progress in this matter This Division is acutely aware of the importance of such informant coverage and will afford this program close attention_ ADDENDUM 'INSPHCTOR E_ S . MILLER : You should bear in mind that the attitude and instructions expressed PJD: bah the President , the Director and 1/22/71 many 0f the legislators in Congress have been to curtail the militant actions and the violent activities on the part 0f a significant group of young people in the United States today_ The thinking of the Supreme Court of the United States with its several recent changes may be along the lines of suppressing the activities of those who so openly espouse the overthrow 0f al1 forms of democratic authority in the United States _ In addition_ the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice has been specifically enlarged and strengthened to deal with these matters _ It is recognized that individual violations of the passport laws have been brought to the attention of the Department of Justice in prior times _ It might be well to consider presenting the matter in its entirety to the Department showing the number and frequency of violations for their consideration and study _ t We cannot overlook or minimize the fact that over 1,300 individuals have Willingly and freely gone to Cuba 2 contrary to the State Department's specific instructions These persons left in many instances with the impression that they would be trained in the use of revolutionary weapons including explosives and incendiary devices_ They Were subjected 2 3 9 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 608 1y py Page ================================================== Page 609 ================================================== during their Cuban stay to al1 manner of propaganda On their return to the United States many have gone underground and disappeared completely; others have become involved in crime violence, and general disruptive activities; still more have refused to cooperate in any manner with the duly constituted authorities as they were SO instructed by the leadership_ We cannot afford to overlook these known 1,300 potential Cuban insurgents_ Assistant Director C . D Brennan please note_ ADDENDUM ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C, D. BRENNAN= The Inspector S observation (JAS:sjr Ve 1/22/71) with reference to the VB cases has been noted and the Bureau may be assured that these matters are being pressed , and we will press the field to furnish these cases vigorous investigative attention. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 609 4e ================================================== Page 610 ================================================== SUBSTANTIVE WRITE- UPS N88608 Docld:32989638 Page 610 0rzt 33R+7472407*5rr*rtK66448 ================================================== Page 611 ================================================== SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE -UP ROBERT P BOKINSKY PSI ~ PO OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHIGTON FIELD WFO FILE 134-9096 BUREAU FILE 134 -19651 INSPECTORE 7/ /MLLER: The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 12/31/89 advised that the subject, a body shop_mechanic employed by_Amatucci_Chevrolet Company Wbeatop; Maryland Rewas interviewed on 12/30/89 concerning his recent contact with Jan Adam Klasa Assistant Military Nava] and Air Attache Eolish Embassyz Washington, D= C. who has been designated a known intelligence agent with defection potential; The subject appeared to be frank and cooperative during the interview and indicated his desire to assist the FBI: Accordingly the Washington Field Office felt the subject had definite informant potential: In the same communication the Washington Field Office furnished the Bureau with sufficient background data relative to subject and his Wife and requested the Bureau to check indices_ The Bureau advised the Washington Field Office on 1/-/70 that Bureau files contained no record of the subject or his wife_ The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 3/17/70 furnished results of background investigation concerning the subject and requested authority to recontact the subject and attempt to develop him aS an informant in the Polish field. The Bureau by letter to the Washington Field Office dated 4/1/70 granted authority to recontact the subject in accordance with provisions of Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions _ The Bureau further instructed the Washingta Field Office to furnish results of recontact with the subject along with recommenda ~= tions concerning future utilization of subject. The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 6/30/70 advised the Bureau that the subject had not been recontacted by Klasa of the Polish Embassy: but due to subject's continued cooperative attitude and willingness to assist the FBI, again requested the Bureau to grant authority to develop the subject as 2 DOMESTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/21/71 NWN 88608 8SJcid33389638 Page 611 2 4/ ================================================== Page 612 ================================================== ~2 L PSI in the Polish field. The Bureau by letter to Washington Field Office dated 7/7/70 designated the subject aS a Bureau ~approved PSI and again instructed that he be developed in accordance with instructions contained in Section 107_ 2 Manual of Instructions_ The above comprises a summary of all correspondence to date in 134-19651 file. JAN ADAM KLASA IS ~ PO OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD WFO FILE 105-92157 BUREAU FILE 105-186986 The U. S. Department of State advised the Bureau in October, 1968 , that the subject was scheduled to be assigned to the Embassy or_the_Eolish People's Republic Washington D_ Cizsas Assistant Military Naval ad Air Attache, Subject subsequently arrived in Washington, D. C. 9 on ay 19894 By communication to WFO dated 6/20/69 the Bureau instructed that coverage of subject be intensified to determine the identities of any Agents he may be operating. By communication dated 8/4/69 WFO advised Baltimore_ > Chicago, Los Angeles and Seattle Field Offices concerning identity and background of subject, furnished each office With & photograph of subject, and set forth additional investigative leads_ The same WFO communication requested Bureau authority to conduct active investigation of Subject including Fisurs when deemed appropriate, following clearance with U. S. Department of State. On 9/2/69 the Bureau, with approval of U. S Department of State_ 3 instructed WFO to proceed with the investigation. Subsequent to 9/2/89 WFO and those offices listed above conducted active investigation of subject and promptly furnished results in a form Suitable for dissemination to the Bureau: In a progress memorandum to the Bureau dated 6/8/70 , WFO advised that "PSI Bokinsky has agreed to attempt to contact Klasa on & social basis. Ii This information is not substantiated in the PSI file (134-19651) nor was the proposal to use the PSI ackowledged in &ny commurication from the Bureau: NW 88608 Docld 37989638 Rege.622s letter from_ DEOdotdAe[n @arDOlo XLaL+_ ^Qt ================================================== Page 613 ================================================== L 3 Bokinsky is now employed by Fenner Pontiac in Rockville_Maryland It is noted that this information is not in the PSI the Baltimore Division was not advised, and no action was taken by the Bureau. It iS noted that the last Bureau communication to WFO in this matter is dated 9/2/69 granting authority to conduct Fisurs as may be necessary to determine if subject is engaged in intelligence activities _ It would appear that this entire investigation to date has lacked proper supervision at the Bureau level. You are requested to advise the following: 1. Explain your overall supervisory policy in directing the development of Potential Double Agents directed against a known intelligence agent. 2 . Wny yOu faiied to promptiy and aggressively instruci tne Wasningion Field Office to fully utilize PSI Bokinsky against Klasa, a kown intelligence agent. 3. Why you failed to properly instruct the office of origin to disseminate to Baltimore Office and verify & change in employment by PSI Bokinsky Explanations Requested: 1. Unit Chief Howard H Wallace Jr is requested to explain why in his overall supervision of these cases he failed to detect the above delinquencies _ 2_ Comments of Section Chief Arbor W. Inspector D_ E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D_ Brennan requested. NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 613 2 43 file , Gray, ================================================== Page 614 ================================================== UNIT CHIEF HOWARD H WALLACE , JR The Inspector s comments FHW :bcw 1/22/71 ~relate to the attempted development of a security informant 3 an_automobile_mechanic for the purpose of providing better coverage 0f the activities of a Polish intelligence Officer assigned to the Polish Embassy _ This development is proceeding because the mechanic is in contact with the intelli- gence officer in connecrion With repair of the officer 's autonobile It is our policy to develop as many assets of al1 types as necessary to provide coverage of the activities of active Polish intelligence personnel_ The Manual of Instructions, Section 107A , page 3 , defines various types of sources (confi- dential sources, potential security informants, security informants, and double agents) developed for use in these types 0f investi- gations _ The term "potential double agent" 1s not a status defined in the Manual It i5 rather an administrative term used to distinguish a source being used against an intelligence officer when the source has Dot as yet been solicited to handle essignments for thet officer but appears +9 have the notential for such functions if requested 82k,88k64/72504 was designated a potential security informant by the Bureau on The Manual of Instructions, Section 107K , 7 , page 13 , provides that correspondence in security informant and potential security informant cases Should be Strictly linited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under the substantive case caption_ The six-month justification for the subject 5 status as a potential security informant (per SAC Letter 68-47 _ 9 8/20/68) is contained in WfO letter 1/19/71_ The relationship of Bokinsky to Klasa is developing in a normal pattern and at 2 pace consistent With avoiding Suspicion that he is under our control Bureau supervision has determined this through the case on Klasa, the Polish intelligence officer against whom tbe potential security informant 16 targeted. In that regard, a 90-day evaluation letter in the Klasa case was submitted by WFO on 9/8/70 which stated that attempts ere continuing to have the potential security informant placed in contact with Klasa. The potential security informant was to contact_Klesa and advise him of his newv employment at Fenger_Pontiac Rockville 8 Heryland. Again by 90-day evaluation letter dated 1277770 WFO advised the potential security informant had been in contact with Elasa concerning an autonobile repair- As a result Klasa had requested potential Security informant to handle tbe repair 0f_Polish Embasgy 3 automobiles wbenever necessary . It was stated tnat the potential security 2 44 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 614 Eocy Page ================================================== Page 615 ================================================== 5 - informant would attempt to maintain contact with Klasa through the entre of autonobile service. It is respectfully submitted that a review Of botn cases , the potential Security informant and the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted, shows that these matters were afforded proper supervision at the Seat of Government . 2 . The field has and must have the primary responsi- bility for development ana direction of potential ,security informants against communist intelligence officers_ The nature and intensity of the direction of SuCh potential security informants must be commensurate with the apparent authenticity of the informant S relationship to and course of conduct with the intelligence officer against whom he 18 targeted. Over the: years it has been firmly established froin both investigative experience and information obtained from defectors that anyone Tho is aggressively cultivating an intelligence officer is eutonatically suspected 28 being under the control of opposition intelligence and; therefore. 4 provocateur- In instant case Bokinsky 8 logical entre to Klasa is KlaBa 's_need for mechanical worr on his and theEmbassy S automobiles "Given time and 4 curtivation 8 1S Teing dobe-according to-90-day letters being received in the Klasa case be may develop 2 rapport or relation- ship with Klasa ~that could result in his being upgraded to a security informant _ Reviews of the Bokinsky file and the 90-day letters in the Klasa_file show this matter is progressing normally and at & tempo in line with the facts of the relation- Bhip existing as well as normal experience in these matters_ Therefore, it i5 believed there is no lack Of proper Supervision at the Seat of Gevernment, 3 It 1s respectfully submitted that there was no necessity for the Seat of Government to instruct the office of origin to disseminate to Beltimore information concerning Bokinsky and to obtain verification of his employment change 2S These items were covered in investigation As a matter of long-standing policy FFO has the responsibility for developing and bandling source coverage against communist intelligence officers assigned to diplomatic establishments in the Washington, D.C; area even though the source may live or work in suburban Matyiand or Virginia Review of the Bokinsky file shows tbat WFO by letter dated 3/17/70 to the Bureau stated that there was no record Of information concerning Bokinsky available to the NW 88608 Docld:32989638 615 2 4 Page ================================================== Page 616 ================================================== Baltimore Office. This indicated to the Bureau Supervisor at the time that an interoffice communication had been sent to Baltimore by FFO . A check with HFO on 1/22/71 disclosed that by interoffice letter 11/6/69 it had advised Baltimore that Bokinsky was being considered for development as 2 potential Security informant by WFO _ His employment , residence and date of birth were set forth and indices check was requested. By interoffice letter 12/12/69 Baltimore advised WFO that its indices were negative _ Subsequent verification 0f Bokinsky ' 8 change of employment was unnecessary when Same was brought to the attention of the Bureau in 90-day evaluation letter submitted under the Klasacaption on 9/8/70 , and again i0 90-day evaluation letter Of 1377/70 _ No separate communication was required for the informant file regarding the change of employment because that information would be furnished in the normal six-month ijustification submitted by WFO and it does appear in the six-month justification dated 1/19/71. SECTION CHIEF A.w GRAY I concur with the explanation of AWG: bcw 1/22/71 SA Fallace. In accordance with existing instructions, normal procedures and at a pace consistent with security require- ments and our experience in these matters, I respectfully submit that there was no lack of proper supervision at the Seat of Government _ Inspector D, E. 1/23/71 DEM : Imb I concur with the above comments of SA Wallace and Section Chief Gray_ I feel that PSI Bokinsky Must make any cultivation 0f Klasa appear entirely norma 1 and WFO , by letter dated .1277770 In the Klasa-caption, stated that Boki will continue to contact_Klasa_concerning auto repairs and will attempt to establish a social relationship: Assistant Director C.D: Brennan 1/23/71 DEM: lmb I concur with the above comments , NW 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 616 246 Moozerl) nsky Grto ================================================== Page 617 ================================================== SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE -UP ERIC NELSON PSI IS - R OFFICE OF ORIGNN NEWARK NEWARK FILE 134-3757 BUREAU FILE 134 -19669 NNSPECTOR WLLER: Captioned inves tigation was instituted by the Newark Division based upon a communication to the Bureau dated 12/18/69 in the case entitled "Vladimir G Azaryan;IS-R (ATC Bureau file 105-184321; Newark file 105--21293. This communication seekS Bureau autho rity to interview subject to assess his potential as a security informant or double agent_ The subject, a naturalized American citizen,is employed a8 the_chief_chemist at Kaygam Corporation gf America Paterson New Jersey, and reported to Y3e have had numerous contacts With Aaryan, Who 1S @ief engineer at Amtorg and a kown KGB officer. communication to Newark, the Bureau on 1/6/70 instructed that office to interview subject "in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects" to evaluate his potential with regard to furnishing information regarding Azaryan_ The Bureau further instructed Newark in the same communication to furnish results in a form suitable for dissemination. Newark by communication to the Bureau dated 2/12/70 set forth background information relative to subject (in memorandum form, not Suitable for dissemination aS instructed by the Bureau) and stating information contained therein would be furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan caption. On 3/31/70 the Newark Office advised under the Azaryan caption and not the case caption,that Nelson had been interviewed. The above constitutes a summary of all correspondence contained in captioned file to date_ DONSTIC NTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/21/71 ESM:wmj NWarehs Docld:32989638 Page 617 ~KGB);_ By ================================================== Page 618 ================================================== -2 - VLADIMR G AZARYAN IS - R (ATC KGB OFFICE OF ORIGN NEW YORK NEW YORK OFFICE FILE 7 105-97980 NEWARK OFFICE FILE 105-25293 BUREAU FILE 105-184321 The subject of this investigation first came to the attention of the Bureau in August, 1968 via a U. S. Department of State communication advising that the subject had been issued a visa to enter the U. S. as an employee of the Amtorg Trading Corporation NYC New York At that time Bureau communication to NYO 0 dated 8/14/68 instructed that office to be alert to subject's arrival and handle in accordance with Section 105 K, Manual of Instructions. Subsequent to that time the NYO and auxiliary offices conducted extensive investigation including discreet Fisurs and kept the Bureau advised of their progress by letter dated 12/9/68. In this same communication 2 a request was made of the Bureau to contact U. S. Department 0f State for authority for intensified investigation of subject including surveillances when necessary. The Bureau by communication to U. S. Department of State dated 1/3/69 sought such authority which was subsequently granted by State 1/22/69. The subject has been under constant investigation by the NYO since that time with a free exchange of information between the NYO and the Bureau. The Newark Office advised the Bureau by communication dated 3/31/70 that Nelson the PSI, had been interviewed, the results of which were furnished the Bureau in LHM form dated 4/8/70. The results of the interview were furished U. S. Department of State 9 CIA, Commerce and the U. S. Information Agency: On 4/17[70 Newark Office again furnished results of contact by PSI Nelson with the subject in LHM form suitable for dissemination. On 6/17/70 Newark reported another cotact by PSI Nelson with the subject. The NYO advised the Bureau by LHM dated 6/26/70 that on the evening of 6/14/70 the subject was observed boarding Aeroflot for & flight to Moscow. Although a concentrated investigative effort was put forth by the New York and Newark Offices in the investigation, it is noted that no specific directions were given PSI Nelson by the New York or Newark Offices or the Bureau from January, 1970 , to the time subject left for Moscow in June 2 1970 , in spite of the fact that Nelson and the subject had mutual professional backgrounds (chemists " and from a review of the files appeared to speak the same language. 248 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 618 ================================================== Page 619 ================================================== 3 It is noted that this case was originally opened as a PSI and potential double agent case _ It is still in a pending status and is still being reported by you as 2 potential double agent case when in fact the individual (Azaryan) against whom Nelson was directed departed the U.S_ in June, 1970 _ A review of the Nelson file fails to contain any instructions or directions regarding the development of Nelson as a double agent and in addition a review of the Azaryan file Similarly contains no infor- mation or instructions from the Bureau in this regard _ There appears to be 2 definite weakness in the overall administration and supervision of this "potential double agent M at the Seat of Government _ You are requested to advise the following: 1_ What is your overall supervisory policy in connection with developing potential security informants directed against a double agent? 2 _ Why Ycu continue to, carry this case (Nelson) in a pending status when the subject whom he was directed against (Azaryan) left the U.S_ for Russia in June , 1970 _ 3 _ you failed to instruct and aggressively direct the office of origin in the Nelson case against the double agent target Azaryan: 4 _ you have the Nelson case listed as a potential double agent when in effect he was being developed as a PSI_ Explanations Requested: 1 Case supervisor and Unit Chief Bowen F Rose for failure to detect the above delinquencies in your overall supervision of the Nelson matter 2 Comments of Section Chief William A_ Branigan, Inspector D E. Moore and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 619 J49 Why Why Page ================================================== Page 620 ================================================== T 4 - SA Bowen Rose The case of Eric JNelson PSI IS-R, (1-22-71 BFR;a3) was assigned to me on therefore, I was not respoisilie for instruction or direction Of the office of origin in this matter prior to that date and it has not come up for review on tickler as yet. With regard to the case of Yladimir G Azaryan, IS-R, this case is closed and has never been assigned to me. With regard to questions raised by the Inspector, the following is set out. It is presumed question one relates to our super- visory policy with regard to the developent of informants to be targeted against Soviet Officials and/or Soviet agents, not against our double agents. It is our policy to encourage informant development of as many individuals a8 possible against a Soviet target to provide the widest spectrum of information concerning his social, business and personal life in order to develop data essential for in depth defection enelysis_ In addi+ion we seek to identify those individuals whom the Soviets appear to be selecting for recruitment and to develop them to act in our behalf against the Soviets. Such highly controlled actions serve either to involve the Soviets in time consuming and costly operations in which they can only receive carefully selected and screened information or disinformation or may provide uS the basis for effective counterintelligence actions against the Soviets, a5 is So well illustrated in the_Azaryan case Our supervision in the development of informants is accomplished through the close review and analysis of the periodic progress letters submitted on Soviet officials; the direction which we afford to contact cases and to the cases resulting from the DESECO Progran. As the result of an excellent counterintelligence effort formulated and carried out by the New York Office with Bureau guidance and direction, 2 defection approach waS made to Azaryan by NY 5179-S on6/4/70_ This informant had previously been handled by Yuriy K Kitaev another aggressive KGB officera As a result of this ecpecienbodh Soviets departed the U S, almost immediately. The loss of these two experienced operatives most certainly caused a serious disruption in the activities Of the New York Residency of the KGB. NW 88608 Docld:32989638 620 2 So Page ================================================== Page 621 ================================================== 5 - We have learned through defector sources that in instances such a5 described above , the entire activity of the KGB officers involved as well 25 the Residency as a whole are subjected to most careful scrutiny to determine if there has been a penetration; if the operation was mishandled and what, if anything, can be sa lvaged from other operations which were being run by the officers involved_ Such 2 review may take many months. No doubt Azaryan s contacts with Nelson have been the subject Of such careful study. Inasmuch as we did not involve Nelson in our approach to Azaryan, there is no reason to believe that the KGB does not stiil consider Nelson as 2 potential agente It would be logical for the Soviets to have Nelson' s development continued by Azaryan S replacement, Who would by now have been in the Ua S , for a relatively Short period of time. Historically, 2 newly arrived KGB operative takes some months to acclimated to the eivirorucnt ir Ghich Kz 0ilz work therefore, does not jump right in to take over a net of agents. The Nelson case has been maintained in 2 pending status aS it was felt he still possesses potential 2s a source against the Soviets. At this point the only ones who know if this is true are the KGB . If we were to attempt to initiate contact between Nelson and the Soviets, they would be convinced he is 2 plant and lose al1 interest in him, The only course of action we can pursue at this time is to wait for the Soviets to make a move . Newark S most recent communication in this matter advised that Nelson is alert to our interests and they are maintaining contact with him, This is essential to insure we have full knowledge and control of any future Soviet initiatives. Experience has shown the Soviets will allow situations such 25 this to remain dormant for as long as eight years. It is not suggested that this matter will be kept pending for this length of time; however for reasons indicated it is incumbent upon uS to con tinue to follow this matter for a reasonable period of time A review of the Azaryan file will show aggressive supervision by Seat Of Governient supervisors, including specific instructions to the field. As 2 prime defection NW 88608 Docld:32989638 621 get and- Page ================================================== Page 622 ================================================== 6 - target, all facets of the investigation of his activities were carefully considered _ NY 5179-8 was selected as the vehicle to carry out our defection approach. Nelson a contact of Azaryans was interviewed and was cooperative _ His operation as a source against Azaryn was proceeding in proper fashion, and having decided On the utilization of NY_5179_8 to make the approach to_Azaryans there was no need to expedite Nelson S development. By not involving Nelson in this operation we have not unnecessarily revealed Our interests in him and preserved 2 potential asset , With regard to question four the designations Of an individual as a Potential Security Informant and as a potential double agent are not mutually exclusive- Potential Security Informant is the term defined in the Manual of Instructions for an individual in position to become active in intelligence activities and administrative supervision is in accord with provisions of the Manual of Instructions. On the other hand potential double agent 1s merely an arbitrary designation we apply to an individual who is in contact with 2 Soviet-bloc official, but in which the relationship has not deveLopea into one Of & Covefi intelligence nature. Such a relationship is well illustrated in Azaryan' g overt business contacts with Nelson on behalf Of Antorg, the Soviet trading__company 76 That such a relationship may abruptiy change in character to a covert intelligence operation is well documented in countless cases which have arisen out of 110 innocent" business oriented contactsa For this reason the arbitrary designation of potential double agent was given to Nelson In connection with the observation that the Bureau_ instructed the Newark Office to interview Nelson and furnish results in 2 form suitable for dissemination the Newark Office furnished background information and advised information would be furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan caption. The only occasion when substantive data received from a source appears in the informant case file is in the semiannual justification letter in abbreviated forme See Section 107K, paragraph 7 , page 13, Manual of Instructi which states: "Correspondence in security informant and potential informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under " substantive case caption. 28 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 622 yet ons, ================================================== Page 623 ================================================== 7 - I have noted the Inspector S comments and I will continue to provide the type 0f direction and supervision to which those comments are directed , Section Chief T . A. Branigan (1/22/71 WAB:hke) I have noted the explanation of Unit Chief Bowen_EsBose_together with his comments and these comments are in keeping With long-established policies for following field investigations in individual counterintelligence investigations _ Inspector D. E. 1/23/71 DEM: Imb I have carefully noted Mr Rose comments ana agree with tbeii, 2343 Nelg?5 #5 2 ctenist gho has been in contact with the Soviets and I feel he will be Of continuing interest to them and that he presents potential for use against Soviet intelligence. Assistant Director 0, D. Brennar 1/23/71 Imb I concur with the above comment and wish to assure the inspector I will closely follow our progress in developing informants to use against Soviet intelligence and the direction of their activities. NW88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 623 Moczese2 "S DOPDEM: 9 2

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