Transcript of 124-10273-10105.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== Releasedunder the JohnF. Kennedy Assassination Records CollectionAct of 0992 (44 USC 2107 Note) Case#Nw 88608 Date; 0318-2025 The Senate Select Committee (sSC) letter of 14, 1975, to K. William 0' Connor , requested a response to Iten 43. Item 413 is set forth as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which relate to or reflect discussions about the Ku Klux Klan at the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958_ 9 and all memoranda and any other materials which relate to or reflect recommendations 9 proposals , and decisions made either prior to or following said conference I1 A diligent , extensive; exhaustive search was conducted in an effort to obtain a copy of the minutes of the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958_ However , this search disclosed no memorandum reflecting an Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958_ Executive Conference memoranda for the year 1958 wer e reviewed_ This review did not disclose any memorandum which related to discussions about the Ku Klux Klan. NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 1 July Esq. , being ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== The Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter of 14, 1975, to K: William 0' Connor , requested a response to Item 43. Item 43 1s set forth as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which relate to or reflect discussions about the Ku Klux Klan at the Executive Conference held On2 October 1, 1958 , and all memoranda and any other materials which relate to or reflect recommendations, proposals, and decisions made either prior to or following said conference_ 0 A diligent , extensive, exhaustive search was conducted in an effort to obtain a copy of the minutes of the Executive Conference held On October 1, 1958. However , this search disclosed no memorandum reflecting an Executive Conference being held on October 1, 1958 _ Executive Conference memoranda for the year 1958 wer e reviewed_ This review did not disclose any menorandum which related to discussions about the Ku Klux Klan. NW 88608 Docld:32989629 2 July Esq- > Page ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== NtrD STATES GOI NMENT Iierorandum "0 DIRECTOR , FBI DATE: 9/23/64 JACZSONVILLZ SUEJECT: COUNIzBINTLLIcz%C? RZCCZ4M INTZRNAL SECURITY DSREPTLQA_OF_HATE_@Z:.S: (rwo-WAY RADZO UNITS ) ReBulet 9/15/64. The Jacksonville Office has carezully noted the cbvious intent of reBulet ana egrees taa€ there is 2 real strong' possibility for teking Sore counter-intelligerce ection 2geiest tb2 Klan tbrough this medium. T2S re-contected a2d he stated at the present tize tcere is nQ eddition2l information concerning the us2 of two-wey redigs ror has the locel Klar in Jackscn- ville forzuleted 21y code_ Tnis would indicete that at the present ti-e, Tnile 2 nunber 0f local Klanszen bave redios, tere i8 G0 opportunity k0 introduce deceptive trensmissions 25 the Ilen nas '2O "ni33icns" on the plenning board. The bove informaEt hs reported tbat it is enticipated addi- 3ioral Ilaesz8n will purchase Zore two-T7ey radio equipnent Ginicb sjould b2 indicetive 0f 22 expension in 2lens of the Klzn to us2 this netnod 0f conunication_ To da*2 there has bcen J3 operetion of the Klan where two-way radio communicz- tio2s have' played 22 integrl p2rt. This office through its infornents, particularly wili rerain lert 2nd will pronptly advise tke Z1re.71 woewever infozmation is received indicating the Klan h23 2 sizeable "mission": in the plenning stages wherein r2dio3 #ill pley 2@ inportant pert. Deperdirg upon tbe puzpos2 of tke "nission" plans could be fornulated for some Zeceptive attaeks 02 tbe Klan itself_ Nw-88608_Docld+32989629 SAC , _Paqe ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== NITED STfEs GOT NWENT Memorandur DIBECTO? , FBI DATE: 9/23/64 {oV' JACZSOXVILZS SUBJECT: COENTZRIKEELLICZNCE-3ZCZR1H INTRNAL SECURITY DSRUPTIQN_OF_F4TE_CZQS. (To-NAY RADIO UNITS ) ReBulet 9/15/64. Tbe Jacksonville Office bas carefully noted the obvious intent of reBulet and egrees that there is a real strong possibility for tekirg sone counter-intelligence ection 2gzinst the Klan tbrough tbis mediu. 7r 143% F2s re-contected and he stated at the present tine tbere 13 nQ additional information concerning the us? of tvo_Tay redigs nor has the local Klan in Jackson- YElle forrulated a1y code_ Tbis woula indicate that at the Zresent tire; waile 2 nu_ber 0z local Xlansmen have radios, tharc is 2o opportunity to introduce deceptive transmissions 23 the %lan h2s 2O "missions" on the planning board. The above infOzEant b2s reported tbat it is anticipated addi- tional Klanszen will purchase @orE two-vay radio equipment wnich would ba indicative of 2n expension in plans 0f the Ilen to 3s2 this metnod 0f cormunication. To date tnere has been 28 operation 0f the %l2n Fbere two-way radio communica- tions have plzyed 22 integral pert. This office through its infornents, particularly 81-143-8, will rerain alert 2nd sill promptly advise tbe Zur ezu Mcenever infortation is received indicating the Klan hs 2 sizeable "mission" in tbe planning stages wherein radios Yill play 2@ irportant pert Depending upon the puzpose of tbe "nission" plans could be fornulated for some Gzceptive attacks 02 tbe Klan itseli NW 88608_Docld: 32989629 4 SLC , Page ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== iSirD SIES COIE ~ENT L/emor andur 40 DIECZOR , FBI DATE: 10-15-64 FRO: Sac, JACKSO: SCBJECT: CCUNTERINTELLICENCE PROZRAM, INTERNAL SECURITY 3 DISRUPTION OF HATE CROUPS Re Burezu letter co Atlanta deted 9-2-64. To implement & ccunterintelligence program as outlined in referenced letter, this office has been and will continue to penetrete klan 2nd hate organizations with continued informant coverage This is the first to learn the coplete orgenizetional structure, members their activities , syrpathizers 2nd follovers ) action plan, including actions of violence and distruction of property . Once their activities, etc., are deternined through irbrnant coverege proper 2ction can be taken to disrupt and neutralize their activities and efforts czn be directed to frustrate their plans_ In addition, those specifically responsible for unlawful actions are determined through informant coverage Informant coverage Will be specifically concentrated on the White Knights of the Ku Xlux Klan since this is the largest &nd most important 0f-the klan groups in Mississippi. Other pertinent orgenizetions considered fof counterintelligence action are: Hississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan_ 0 United Klens Of America, Inc. , Knights of the Ku Klux Klan . Anericzns for the Preservation of the Wbite Race . NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 5 step they ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== The pertinent individuels to first consider 2re the state" officers of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. They are: SAMUELBOWERS _ 2 ~Laurel 9# Vississippi> Imperial Wizari JULIUS_ HARPER; -Crystal' Springs, Mississippe, Crand Dzegon BEjibk BUCKLES ; ' Roxie, Mississippi; Crand_Giant 4~-C HARRINCTON , Ruth; Mississippi 5 "State-Organizer ERNEST CILBERT 9 Brookhaven; .Mississippi; Chief Of the' Kians Bureau 0f Investigation(KBI} 2AUE FOSTER, Netchez , Mississippi, State Cheplain ACE WEATHERS 9 Hattiesburg; Mississippi,. Contact Lezder for the -County 2nd Secretary: Informant coverege will be supplenented by technical installations where prectical_ Specifically, it has been learned through an infornant that 2 klan group holds meetings in 3 building especially built for this purpose in Copiar Coun-Ey . These meetings are held On a weekly basis The building i8 in 2 rural area sevetal miles fcom che nearest town 2nd has access by only one road_ During mee tings guards are placed 2t stretegic points outside the building to insure complete privacy_ An appropriate Survey is being made to deternine the feasibility 0f 2 technical installation in this building. The Burezu will be advised by separete 'communication regarding this Other logicel points are being determined for this type of coverage CCUNTERIATELLICENCE ACTION 1 Liaison is established with the governor 8 S Office to bring pressure to bear on local officials , such 2s mayors , chiefs of police 2 sheriffs , etc, 2 to solve recent bombings 2 chuzch burnings 2 2nd other acts of violence. NW-88608_Docld:32989629_Page 6 ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== EZAZLZ: Jackson teletyze to the Bureau Guted 18-12-3 captioned UNSUBS ; EXLOSION ON LAWN OF RESIDENCE OF N45er JOEN-ROSSER ;--NATFCHEZg ~MSSISSIPR 9 9-25-64, stated that an Irvestigator of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol(MSP) advised he was instructed by Coverner-PAU-Bo ~JOESON to inform Adans-County -SherifE ODEEL-ANBERS that the ~governor was seriously considering sending the National Cuard into 4d23s_ County to close dorvn 2ll gambling and liquor activity in the. county. Sheriff-AEgRS advised he is in the process of contacting all gambling and liquor establishments in Adans County to inforn operatorg that if pertinent infornation regarding Neeciez bonbings are not ini his possession by October 15 he will close al1 such establishnents on October 16_ The Jackcson Office will, in each instant that presents itseli in other localities 2nd counties , arrange for similar action and follo tthrough On each. 2 Repeaced contacts an& constant interviews of known ` and suspected klen menbers are being conducted each Saturday_ This has been done since 1964 , 2nd is being continued_ This hbas 2 thzee fold purpose. It lets the klensmen know the FBI is interested &nd will be around. It also enables FBI to know teir whereabouts on that becone better acquainted with their habits 2nd more backcground information regarding che person being intervierved. In several instances during such interviews it has been possible to convert certain klensnen into informants During interviews of klansmen who 2re compltely unco-operetive 2nd who want to know how we got their 21e 2nd ar2 being interviewea we can through the cards and out 2 nane 0f 2nother klansnan who is completely unco-operative. This is 8 disruptive tactic which can breed suspicion among thenselves NWB860B_Docld:32989629 Page July, day , gain why they flip pick ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 3 , Consideration is being to invice the 212t2 Police to rake raids at knorn klan m2e Gitzz. 20 ~c2-7 2 of course, Will not be invited to partic -za 82282 3:~; most likely in on the klan Eee tings MS? Investigators 2t HcConb Iave indicated they seemed interested in this sort of thing &nd it is believed this will have the backing of the governor since he has indicated such to then_ This `type of thing, of course, will be used at places wvhere technical installations ere not feasible or productive_ 4 Will perticipate with the governor in press releases on the arrests of klansmen when eppropriate_ This hes been done in the recent arrests in McComb , Missisgippi, in: connnection with recent "bonlangs in that area_ 5 Information has been developed through an informant that 2 faction of the klan is interested in putting another nan in' Office rather; than the present person _ More information is being obtained on this S0 as to exploit 2ll possibilities end create dissention among the leaders 9 end by doing S0 the opportunicy may present itself to have the informant in 2 high office. The above is eOme of the potential counterintelligence action contemplated by this office_ It is being studied on 2 to basis The Burezu will be furnished with complete details 0n all the above plans 2s the opportunities are made and present themselves , Prior to any specific action being taken by this office_ ACTION_CROUPS Recent actions of violence in McComb , Mississiepi, were for the most Part believed to be carried out by an 2ction "{ group As 2 result of Er intensive investigation &nd informant coverage, 11 men were arrested. One had a membership card in the Ku Klux Klan and another 2 card for membership i toa 17 "Auericans for the Preservation of the Wnite Race Some NW-88608_Docld:32989629 8 gien pit &ay aay Page ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== zcrs of viole-ce such 25 borbirgs ar@, ecc3rs- planned witi greez secrecy %y cjal1 g+4: 3c L A1 dezermine which ones do the job_ Oftez 8-1131- 223 _23, : ozbers not officielly under kler orders, pretend to rezresenc the klen 25 2 cover for 2cts of violence Recomaendations for specific counterintelligence action will b2 subnitted by separate communications 2nd the status letter required will b2 subnitted beginning 1-1-65. 5 NW 88603 Docld:32989679Page ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== Memor andum To DIRECTOR , FBI DATE: 10/12/64 {ROII SAC [ ` CZARLOTTZ SCBJECT: ~~CQUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCRAM INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS Hena ReBulet 9/2/64 to Atlanta and other offices It is noted this letter lists as one of the target organizations as No _ 7 on page 2 , the Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn , S C. - Since this organization is no longer active or in existence , it is suggested it be deletea fron this list. Since the major organization in Charlotte Division is the United Klans of America Irc. , of wnich Birminghan is origin, 3 cozy of this letter is being designated to Birningham foz information Tne folloiing represents tke consensus 0f" Charlotte Agents fzuiliar with Klan ectivity: 1 Diaruptive activity should not be undertaken 2t a particular Klavern ; 2s 2 general rule, unless there is sufficient well established informant coverage to be able to `2ll tne effect of the action when institutea_ Such action ivould probably Serve to "tighten up" the organization ana make it more difficult to an inforaant in thereaztex, 2 _ It is considered doubtful that newspaper publicity, 0f only 3 generally unfavorable nature against the Rlan crgani- zation , is effective in reducing new applicants or causing Zy large number of present members to drop out_ The "Chazlotte Observer I; wnich has wide distribution throughout North anz South Carolina published in August and Septembar , 1964 [ a series os articles, copies Of whicn were sent th2 Bureau charlotte letter of 9/15/64. These axREgcles ridiculed the United Klars NW 88608-Docla: 32989629-Page-T0 get Ry ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== of America, Inc< , in North Carolina, ana published both photos and names of a nuber of members So far as has been learnea from informants , this had very little adverse effect upon the organization. It was allegea that two to five members weze dischargea from their jobs , or warned about continuing member- ship, but the identities of these alleged persons is not knawn , NerthCarolina Grand-Dragen-J44 TONES has stated, both publicly and privately to informants, that this publicity was very valuable to the growth of the organization 0 One informant reportea that the after the articles published his name as 2 local lezder, three persons contacted hin ana applied for membership, stating nad not previouslv known whom to contact. It is considered that pubflcityof 'this trpe generally deters from joining those persons who woula not be interested in joining in the first place, It is believed that 2 large proportion of those persons Tho are potential members are seeking status ana recognition, and publicity is no deterrent to them; it nakes them feel important and member3 0f an important group, Ihe major apparent effect of the series of newspaper articles referred to has been a tightening up 0f security ana refusal of leaders to allom newspaper photos of inaividual Klansmen to be taken at public rallies. 3 _ Disruptive activity, wherever possible, should be 0f 2 nature Ihich does not expos? the faci that the Buxeau, or Zhe "Federal Covernment" is behind the activity- It is believea that open action, to 2 large eztent, can backfize an create resentment and sympathy_ It must be rememberea that Klan nembership, in many sections does not by any means carry the odium that alleged Communist membership or sympathy does in alost any section Of societya 4 , Along this same line, thee is probably 1o poiat in trying disruptive activity, at least not at this stage_ On a local Klan group which is small, inactivz, and peaceful- such activity which is not comgletely Jiscreet and coacealed would likely have the effzct of stirring it up , 5 , By letter o2 9/26/64 , charlotte furnished the Zureau 2 samle of a lapel which was adopted at the IoQ-rial 2 NW 88608 Docid:32989629 'Page 11 RoA day tbey only Any pin ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== Xlonvocation of United Xlans of America at Birmingham on 9/5-5/64 _ Tnis is to be sold to nembers for $2 each ana there is apparently considerable demand for it Since it is not apparent to the unitiated that it has anything to do with "the Klan , 1} it is expected that members will wear it openly as 2 secret recognition signal- If it aoes become widely adopted and worn , consideration shoula then be given to giving widespread publicity to the fact of what it represents; inis shoula have the result of aiscouraging some persons who do not want their Klan membership publicly known 0 6_ It is considered that possibly the most effective way of discouraging membership , or causing existing membars to withdraw, is to establish that someone in the organization is getting rich off it, or embezzling the proceeds, Charlotte is endeavoring to aevelop information along these lines, but nothing specific has yet been developed. 7 , zhe following are suggested tactics that appear useful on 3 selected basis against individual Klansmen , particularly those wnose employers mignt object to their Klan nembership: a , Anonynous letter Or phone call to the employer telling 0f the Klan membershipa b. Enter on behalf of the memoer 2 subscription to the "Fiery Crosa," United Klans of America publication, and have it mailed to his employment - C. when a particular member is away from hone at 2 Klavern meeting , have a female phone his home and indicate he was to meet her and is late. This night have the 2ffect of making it dizficult for him to get awzy from hone at night thereafter, Tnis should be linited to particular individuala who are considered potentizl ones to stir up trouble in 3 Klavern- 3 , NN-88608_Qaeld:32984629 Paqe ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== 8 _ ROBZRT-BenOrs-SCGGGINS , Akae , Charlotte file1o5-S9l-7 Bureau_file-15771530, is South-€arolina -Grand -Dragon-of Unitad Klans of Americaa Charlotte reports SA JOHI-ALDEN *UN 1/31/64 and 3/27/64 _ show that he is receiving over $300 per month from the Veterans Administration-as a_108per Iil AAe disabied veteran; Az Ene samz 2~Eime he operates a plimbieg boubines3 ana is active in United Klans of America, making public speeches , etc. Charlotte furnished extra copies of thosz reports to the Bureau , with the suggestion furnishing them to VA b2 considered. It i5 suggested consideration be given to asking the ~A to re-evalvate his disability rating, in view of his eaploynent ana activitiesc It 1g believed this shoula be done on a SCG level, to reduce the possibility of-SCOGCINS learning that sucn a suggestion cane from the FBI_ 9 . "Action Groups I Mo particular such groups , given to violence, are Xnown within Klan organizations in Charlotte territory- As the Buxeau is aware, Unitea Klans of America has instituted what it calls "Security Guards 8 JI who wzar military type uniformns and have military ranks , Tnese function at public rallies for the purpose of keeping order watching for W} "spies, etc. It is expected that if violence is undertaken_ } these will probably be the ones to do it, but 10 such under_ takings have been learned. Specific individual recommendations for counter- intelligence action will be submitted by subsequent letters as developed, 4 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 13 Jpy ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== K cJA Jil; 0 : UNTED STATES GO[EEAW;ATT .Nerorandur DIZICTOR } 731 DATE: 10/13/64 *0M 3AC LIZTLE ROC% 3 IS surjeet: COINTELPRO ReBulet to Atlante and Otner Gifices 2 9/2/64: ~Sez out below ar2 22 anglysis and recommerdations unjer captioned progrem , NATIONAL STATES RICNTS PAZFY (NSEP) The Arkansas tianch of NSRP hes been inactive in the State of Artensas for the past yeer mith the excep- tion of placing on the Arlansas ballot cardidatesiifor President and Tice President of the United States It is not recommended tbat any action b2 taken ageinst tbis gro up 21 this time ASSCC IATION 07 ARKANSAS KLANS O2 TEE KU KLUX XLAN (AAX) The AAX in Arkers2s is 22de up 0i three klaverns Jccated 2t Little Rock, Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and it has no 2ffilistion with ary naticnzl klan group, There 3*2 3O "acticn" grOups within any of these tnrez klaverns 0 The three kleverns do not Owin or leese any propsty for meeting places, The four Little Bock @enbers usually meet in the" hcze 0f 2 @eiter Tne Terarkanz Klavern bas not held any klavern reetings 23 such in several zonths , Txe Pine Blufi Klavern neetings vary from residences to business places of klavern menbers , State meetings 238 held 2t irregular intervals 02 an 278r2g8 of about orce per month Or Zess. There is 20 reguler seeting place for tne state reetings, which 2re} held in various 4rkansas towns i2cludirg towns in which there 2*2 ro klaverns, Tha- State zeetirzs are attended NW 88608 Docid: 32989629 74 Page ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== by fro one to five repSezs of eech of the three klaverns and 21'2 mell covered by informants , The state C3ena--Dr2gor-Brzb-WiLrzazs hes continually cautioned mezibezs against violerce 2rd eny type 0f 11les_l 28 c7i+ics0 None f the klaverns have ezgezed ir violerce 1 LITTLC RcCK ELAVEEN Oz the iour rembers mho atzend weekl; eetings 703 #22 wino 16 considered the Fead 0f this S22il grou?, Gzawis 2 pensicm frcz tn2 302e3?- Gcvernment ana , accordirg to informants , is 2ff2id 10 engage in any illegal 2ctivity Or to let his naae bz used ir connection with the klan for fear 0f losing his pension, The two infornants maintain the full Confidence of the other tmo menbers a In recent months the klevern ran 2 series of Small ids in 2 Little Rock deily newspaper in an effort to renem interest and gain new members , The klavern received 3 nyrber of responses , but no action wiztsoever has bezn teken by the klavern t0 take in any new enberS _ The: klavern has: no crganized activity other than the weekly neetings described by infornants 25 bzing "bull sessions" with the principal topic being politics_ 0 No reconmendation for counterintelligence is being made concerning zha Little Rock Klavern. 2 , TEYARKANA KLAVERN This klavern h2s not neld any klavern meetings aS such in several months and it eppears that the principel reason for the lack of meetings TZS the inter-_ vien of rzmbers and leaders concer ning the assassination 0f President KENNEDY . Klevern representatives egularly: attend state meetings , ore reason being that Stete -Erand - Dragon BTLl #TLlifr3, who officiates at state meetings , is a member of the Tezarkana Klaverne Of the five or six menberS who Iron time to time attend state meetings, two 21 e inforrants On 10/1/64 eadvised that the Crsnd Dragon haa stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern cencers wili Geet with tha Bivins Kildare, Tezes, Klavern 0f the AAXo -2- NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-15 213 , ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== Gzand-Erzgon #-#Lhf4 S eccording to inforrants, is 2ctive i2 2clitics in 3owie County, Teras is 2 fortier nembez 0f tba Bozrd cf Zegents 0f-Texerkena_Zusior_College, Tezarkznz;-Pers) 2rd :2 recezi rcjiis x3 3% 78- f8r election to tbe Bo2rd 0f Eegents 0f 122 college ana defzated 2S 2 c2ndidate for the City Council cf Texatkan_ Tezes, He cannot 2fford to becone involved in any illegal cctivities beczuse 0f his activities in legitinate enter- pris2s, fe hes contimiuelly ceutioed Texarkana Klavern ze_bers 25 Fell 25 Eezbers 0f other rleverrs 2tterding stata reetirss 2g2in5+ any violence end/r illegal activities, No recormendation is being made for counterintel- ligence egairst the Texerkena Klavern except 25 it is efiected by 2 recommerdation set ouz hereafter under the Pine Bluff Xlavern: 3 . PINZ BLUF? KLAVERN Tne Pine Bluff Klavern has 2 menbership of approxi- sately :twenty t0 twenty-fivec It Reers once 2 week in different business locations of its members and average weekly atterdance is twelveo Among the 'eweiven onea or two inforrants 22zi mitb then and furnish full coverage of their activities: The klavern'S main ctivity has been t0 dis_ courage integretion by legal Dears and to get meabers elected to schcol poard positions_ Tbe klavern collected the funds 2nd Zonated the noney foz the C3732ign expense 0f two 0f its zecbers mho r2n for 2 positicn on the Pine Blufi Schcol 3o2rd 2nd the Dollarway School Board. These two members nade a niserable showing and wer e defeated The ilevern W2S behind and orgenized the National Patriots League (YPL) to further its non-integration prCgram puclicly The Exelted Cyclops 2 Or president of the Klavera is chairean oi tne NPL. The NPL actualiy is 2 front organization for the klavern. The nein activity 0z the NPi Tzs to orgenize 2 private country club,. Which is knoin 2s tne Butran Country Club, Tbe purpose oz tke -3- NW 88608 Docld 32989629-Page 16 ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== club W2S to build 2 Swiraing po01 for 1bitc on}v corstruction 0f the pool itseli "72S cxwncicsr but suificiently to place it in 1se this B8e3: E3_ in Butran Country Club is 325 Zrj mjority cI tbe merters ar € not aware of the fact th: tne klavern was behind its organiztion. Henbership in the Butran Country Club w2s easily obtained 2s the public pool for whites and public pool for Negzoes were both closed during the Sumer 0f 1934 when Negroes 2tterpted to'integrate tne white pool_ This left 20 public pool open in Pine Bluff. 31534#, vice president 0f the klavern, donated the land for the Butran Country Club; as he owns land sur - rounding the club, he wiil benefit financielly from tne s2le 0f this Land for ouilding lots The NPL hes also distributed 4 limited number of leaflets publicly dis- coiraging peopk from patronizing certain restaurants and businesses which nad hired or servea Negroes_ #embers of the klaverr were responsible for forning 2 John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and 2 klavezn rember is leader of this chepter Appr oxinztely eight to ten people artend the monthly zeetings 0f the John Birch Society Cnapter; and oi the men wno atterd, 2ll are klavern meabers with the exception of one man. Hembers 0f the klavern coapletely control and doninate the Jokn Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff_ however only conduct John Birch Society business_ Like_ wise, thz members of the Krlavern further the John Birch Society progrzm through the klavern. lerbers of the klavern ar8 mor 'king individually in politics for the re-election of Goveznor:_ORVAL-E. FA-UBUS an for the election 0f BARRY-€OLDWATER: The klavern has not advocated any violence but 0n occasion nas cautioned its members against violence. 4S 2n exazple klavern members were cautioned to stay- aw2y fron S Truck Stop, 2 location mhich Negroes were attenpting to integrate, in tke spr ing oi 1964 So tnat Ro violence woula occur Wenbers of tha %lavern recently distributed a Ku Klux Xlan (KKE) Zeeflet seeking new zencers and ~47 "NW88608-Docld:32989629-Page-1Z 70 € They , Rzy ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== staticz recuasts for 2pplications be directed to' P_ 0_ 2ox 1182 , ?ir2 Bluff_ In tnis leaflet it was pointed out that tba R w2s striving for 2 l2wful settlement of the difficilties brough + on by the Nztional Associa_ tion for tha 4dvercerert of Colored Pzople (NAAc) ard that it is opposed io violence_ This leaflet irzther set forth that this w2s 2 char tezed, legalized movement 2ra it i5 no 30-8 illeg2l to bz 2 Eemer of it than to te 2 nember 0f other orgenizations At verious tices in the past the %lavern has atterpted to crgenize "ection" groups mithin the klavern, but 03 each occasion the project has died fro lack of interest. In line Fith Bureau policy 0f dissemination of infornation, the min 2ctivities regarding the Pine Bluff ilavern have been diss2zinated confidentially to Chief ~of_2olice KoziLiN.D_ YCUNC; Pine Bluff 1 (NA) on 2 regular besis Chief YCIG-has exerted every effort to keep down the possillity of violence_ Through bis confidential sCurces he i3 2lso well 2war e of the identities of the klavcrn Eezbers ana their 2ctivities_ He personally res warred perticu = klavern nenbers against ay violence 2na h:s steted wiil be net mith irnediate arrest if eny violence occurs_ 4s 22 example, Crriez-YOUNG was advised througn his 05n confidentizl Source 0f tne tire an8 location 0f tbe klavere reetirg On the night 0f Cctober 5 , 19549 Chfes Y8iNC Sent 2 lieutenant of his depertnent in unifora t0 cneck the location, record iicense nuzbers , and to be seer checking the neeting So that the klavern pembers mould %row thai he was checking on thec. This h2s b2d 2 strong influence on making the klavern follon 2 line 0f legel activity. It has also resulted i2 the more responsible leading citizens 0f the corrunity being e2d2 2w2re of certain klavern nembers, causing tbese klavern =erbers to c2 discredited in the eyes 0f tre public, Tnis was borne out in the recent school boara election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members, one 0f Fboa is J_B-BUTREM , were miserably defeated_ Tre rlaverr has during the p2st few months ergcd its Zezbers to solicit and obtair mew members. The inefiec-iveness 0f their program is shown by the -5- NWV 88608 Doc1332989629-Page 18 tcey ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== fact that only ope 2ew jezcer w2s i2i212*82 #crber i5 2 non-orgenizional 13 ~ 2 Rock Divisioz, Lilewise) 35 2 -8sul- cz ~08 I3 i021 lets distributed enccureging people to Mrite Zor 22314- cations they have .received only two letters; and neither of the writers have becone 2 member The leaflet h2s met with coplete failure in its effort to build up its sen ership. At this time the following 2re the only Specizic counterintelligence action being recomnended : 1. An anonymous letter pe railed to the National Cffice 0f John Birch Seciety, Belmont 3 Massachusetts pointing out that the XKK is in full control of the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, In this letter specifically rention tne name 0f one Or two f the more 12ading klan IemberS Who. 2r2 also leading tne John Birch Society in Pine Bluif 2 _ 42 arongzoGS letter 62 niled to CHARrES CUTHBERTSON } Ez2ited-8yelops-0f the Pine Bluff Klavern, 234 2 Cc?y m2iled t3 31LL WILLIAHS , Siate-Grard Dregon; wieh the Zetters to be mailed to the Post Office Box in Pine. Blufz and in Texarkana , Arkensas, 0f the 4AX The letter should be 2 coaplairing letter from 2 menber who T2s active in the past and wno recently found one of the KKI leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged renbershipo Tne letter would let them know why he has not rejoined; it mould point out that he dropped out because 0f such leadership 4s 1c-ZX BUPRAM , who has used tne klen f0z persoral g2in as -BgErier had 2 residence on his pr operty remodelea at klavern expense ard then nade the klavern Stop holding meetings tnere; that BUTRzy has now donated Zand for the Butrem Country Club So tnat ne can sell his surrounding lard for building lots at an ezorbitant price. The letter should also set forth tbe fact he heard 3u#R4# w2s discharged from the Army for nental Zeficienc] (mozon) _ This letter should be @ailed irom Little Rock. Interviews of klan menbers and Leaders in the (ior ez2nple, 2t the time 0f tha essassination of Presizent YENNEDY and on particular bonbing natter cases) ~6- NW 38608 Docld: 32989629 Page 19 Pzst ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== 464 tave had deterrirg effect on tne klan, For exemple, the Tesarkena Klavern hzs not held 2 rlavern neeting 23 Such sirce that tice. One Little Roclz member has dropped out 25 2 result 0z beirg iptarwiswcc; 218, eccordirg to 2n informart, tnis menber is 2 "changed can , " reaning thaz he is noi 23 radical 2S previcusly. In interviews with zembers 0f the Pine Bluff Klavern , ~gerts have not net with any hostility ard have been treated cor 'dially 2n2 with reszect Individual menbers during these interviews have indiceed they 2r e opposed to violezce and advocate proceeding in 2 legal manner 4 nunber of the nembers have said that through political presspre and voting 2r8 the only ways any change can be mede However , tney have stated they are still avid segregationists and do not cordone race mixing in any manner When and if it appezrs that interest may be renewing in te AA% i2 Arkeszs 3 consideration will pe given to anotrer interview pr ogran. It is noted: tkt particuier klan zenbers are interviewed on 2 spasmodic basis im regard leeds fror Surrounding field offices 02 boabirz matter cases, 2nd inis has had 2 tendency to deter eny violent activity on the part of klavern members , -7_ Nw-88608_Doeld:32989629_Page 20_ t0 ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== 8y 6J 1t UEI; :ATES COiRAzf E/ieror andux DIRZCTOz } 731 DATE: 10/13/64 80M S2C 9 LIzCiZ BZCI ~CEJECT: COIATELPRO ReBulet to Atlante 2nd Other Ozfices, 9/2/64: Set out below are an anglysis and reconmmendations urder ceptioned progran. NATIONAL STATES RiCHTS PARTY (NSRP) Tce Arkansas branch 0f NSRP has been inactive in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the excep- tion 0f placing on tbe Arkansas ballot cendidatesiifor President 2nd Vice President of the United States 0 It is not recornended that any action be taken against this group at this time 0 ASSCC IATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS OF TKE KU KLUX KLAN (A.K) The AAX i2 Arkarsas is made up 0f three klaverns Iccated 2t Little Rock, Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and it has 10 affilietion Fith any national klan group. There 2r2 20 "action" gr oupS mithin any 0f these three klaverns The ihree klaverns do not OFn or lease any proparty for meeting places, Tbe four Little Rock menbers usually meet in the hone of 2 nember Tne Texarkana Klavern has not held any klavern reetings as such in several months . The Pine Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to busijess places of klavern members . State meetings 2re held at irreguler intervals 02 an 2Verage of about Orce pex month or less: Tnere is no reguler Eeeting place for the state meetings 2 which are held 12 verious Arkansas towrs including towns in which theze 2re no klaverns Tne- state zeetirgs ar8 attended NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 21 [3s3 ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== by f-03 one to iive zezbers 0f each of the three klaverns and 22*8 well covered by informants_ The ~State 9248-Dn4gon-BTrU iIjTAMS-has continually cautioned menbers egainst violecce 2rd &ny type 0f illesc1 ccciviticss None of the kleverns have engezed in violence 1o LITTLE Rcz% KLVERN Of the four renbers who atrend weekl- veetings two are informants. 7a3 J77 ZERMER } who is coxsiiezed the bead 0f this sm2117g*oup, Graws 2 pension fron tha @cZerzi Governnent and 9 2ccording to informants 2 is afr2id to engage in 2ny illegal 2ctivity ox to let his rame be used in connection with tne klan for fear of losing his pensiong The two infornants naintain the full Confidence of the other two members _ In recent months the klavern ran 2 series of small 4ds in 2 Little Rock daily newspaper in an effort to renew interest end gain new members , The klavern received 2 numbef of responses , but no action wnatsoever has been taken by the klavern to take in any new nenbers . The; klavern has no organized activity other than the weekly neetings described by informants 2s being bull sessions" with tbe incipal topic being politicsa No reconnendation for counterintelligence is being mede concerning the Litile Rock Klavern. 2 , TEXARKANA KL: VERN This klavern has noz held any klevern meetings 2S such in several months 2nd it appears that the principel reason ior the lack 0f meetings TS the inter_ viem of menbers and leaders concerning the assassination 0f President KENNEDY . Klavern representatives xegularly. attend state neetings, one rezson being that Sta+e-Ezand~ Dragon Biil #TLLit#8, who officiates at stete meetings, is 2 menber 0f the Texarkana Klavern_ Of the five six members who fron time to time attend state meetings_ tro are infornants . On 10/1/64 LRASZEE-advised that the Grand Dragon haa stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern Bembers will mezt with the Bivins Iildare, Texes, Klaver p 0f the AAX, -2- NI-88608-Docld:3298962g-Page-22 pr or' ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== Grerd-Dregon Fibiars according to informants, is 2ctive in politics in 3ow12 County = 2 Texas is 2 forzer memb2z of' the Board 0f Regents 0f-Tezexkana_Zunior_College, Texarkana; Penes, 2nd in recent Eon-hs X3 33 fcr election to the Bozrd of Regents 0i tnat colleze ~rG defeated 25 a candidate for the City Council of TFexeniana Texes , He cannot afford to becone involved in any illegel ectivities because 0f his activities in legitimate enter- prisas. He has continually cautioned Texarkana Klavezn merbers 2s well 25 menbers 0f other Xleverns attendirg state meetings against 2ny violence and/or illegal activities 0 No recormendation is being nade for counterintel- ligence against the Texarkana Klavern except as it is effected a recommendation set out hereafter under tbe Pire Bluff Xlaverno 3 . PINE BLUFF KLAVERN The Pine Bluff Klavern has 2 menbership of approri- mately:twenty to twenty-five, It meets once 2 week in different business locations of its members and average weekly attendance is twelve. Among the twelve, one- or two informants neet with tben and furnish full coverage of their activities 0 The klavern'$ main activity has been to dis_ courage integration by legal means and to get members elected to school board positions 0 The klavern collected the, funds and donated the money for the campaign expense of two of its members vho ran for a position on the Pine Bluff School Board and the Dollerway School Board, These two members made 3 miserable showing and Here defeated_ The klavern was behind and .organized the National Patriots League (NPL) to further its non-integration progr am publicly. The Exalted Cyclops, or president of the Klavern is Chairman of the NPL , The NPL actually is 2 front organization for the klavern. The main activity of the NPL TS to organize 2 private country club, wbich is known 2s tbe Butram Country Club, Tbe purpose 0f the -3- NW 88603 DocTa3329896297Page by ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== club W2S to build 2 stinning pool for Piita o23 construction 0f the pccl itself n2s CC= 7i3c2 but 7oE sufficiently to place it in us2 this Selcs: Ec in Butrem Country Club is 825 Tho mejorizy C1 tne mempers Rre not aware 0f the fact tr the klavern was behind its organization Henbership in the Butram Country Club T2S easily obtaiced a5 the public pool for whites and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the Surer 0f 1964 when Negroes ettempted to integrate the white pool_ This left 20 public pool open in Pine Bluff 5 4 32eec vice president of the klavern , donated the land for the Butran Courtry Club; 2S he owns land sur - rounding the club, he will benefit financially from the s2l2 of this land ior bailding lots The NPL has also distributed 2 linited nunber of leaflets publicly dis- couragirg peopk fro patronizing certain restaurants and businesses which had hired or served Negroes Hembers of tne klavern were responsible for forning 4 John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and 2 klavern rember is leader of this chapter Approximately eight to ten people attend the monthly reetings 0f the John Birch Society Chepter; and 0f the men who attend, al1 ere klavern menbers witb the exception of one man . Menbers of the klevern completely control and dominate the Johz Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff however only conduct John Birch Society business_ Like_ mise, the @enbers of the klavern further the John Birch Society progran througn the klavern. Hienbers of the klavern are wor king individually in politics for the re-election of -Governor-ORVAL -E, FAUBUS and ior the election 0f BARRY-€OLDWATER: The klavern hes not edvocated any violence but on occasion has cautioned its members egainst violenceo As 2n exanple 3 klavern menbers were cautioned to stay 2w2y fron Ray S Truck Stop, 2 location which Negroes were atterpting to integrete, in the spring of 1964 So that Do violence would occur Members of the klavern recently distributed 2 Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leeflet seeking new Zenbers and NM88608-Docld332989620-Page-4 They , ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== stating requests for applications be directed to* P. 0_ Bo% 1182 2 Pine Bluff_ In this leaflet it was pointed cut that the KKK wes striving for a lawful settlement 0i the difficulties brought on by the National Associa_ tion for the Advancerert of Colored People (NAAC) and that it is opposed t0 violence This leaflet further set forth that this was 2 char tered , legalized movenent as4 it is no nore, illegal. to pe 2 member of it then to be 2 menber 0f other orgenizations At various times in the past the klavern has attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern, but on each occasion the project has died fron lack of interest 6 In line with Bureau policy 0f dissemination of infornation, the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff Klavern have been disseninated confidentially to Chyef _OfxPolice NORAAN_D 0. YOUNG ; Pine__Bluzf 2 (NA) on a regular basis . Cbief YOENG-has exerted every effort to keep down the possitility of violence Through his confidential scurces he is also weli aware of the identities of the klavern nembers and their activities_ He personally hes warned particulz klavern members against any violence and has steted they Will be met with irmediate arresr if any violence occurs , As an example , Chier-YOUNG was advised through his 07in confidential source of the time 2nd location of tbe klavern neeting on the night of October 5 , 1964. Chief *YOiNic sent 2 lieutenant of his departnent in uniform t0 check the location; record license nubers , and to be seen checking the meeting So that the klavern members would rnow that he was checking on them , Tnis nas had a strong influence on making the klavern follom a line of legal activity. It has lso resulted in the more responsible leading citizens of the conmunity being made aware of certain klavern members , causing these klavern members to Je discredited in the ejes of the public. 0 This was borne out in the recent school poara election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members, one of whon is J_Fa~BUTRAM_ 1 were miSerably defeated. The klavern has during the past fem months urged its menbers to solicit and obta:: new members . The ineffectiveness of their progr am is shown by the 5_ NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-25' ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== fact that only ore ren center w2s i4t2t32, aczcer iS 2 nor-orginiz: icjcl 2 Eocz Divisic_ 11327232, 35 2 ~esul: 0i +h2 ZI 101i- lets distributed encorregirg Qeople to writ2 for eppli- cations rave received only two letters; ana neither of the writers have becone 2 menber The leaflet has Eat with conplete failure i0 its effort to build up its renbershipa 4t this tize the following 2re the specific counterintelligence action being recommended: 1, 4n anonymous letter be n2iled to the National Office 0f John Birch Seciety, Belnont 9 Massachusetts pointing out that the KKK is in full control of the 'John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. In this letter specificelly rention the name 0f one Ox two of the mOre leading klan nenbers who are 2lso leding the John Birch Society in Pine Bluff, 2 _ R0 eronynous Jetter be mailed to @FEZE CUEEBZRT SON 1 Stied-Eyelops-of the Pine Bluff Klavern, and 2 copy Eciled to BiLl @ILLilis , State_Grand Dr ag0n7: with the letters to be mailed to tbe Post Office Box in Pine. Bluff and in Tezarkana , Arkanses 2 0f the AAK. The letter should be a corplaining letter from 2 member who Fas active in the pst and who recently found one 0f the KZ leaflets in his 2utomobile which leaflet encouraged resbershipo The letter would let then knowv why he has not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out bccause of such leadership 2s 4-E} BUPRAL , who has used the klan for personal g2in 2s-BEERyer had 2 residence on his pr operty renodeled at klavern expense and then made the klavern stop holding meetings there; that BVRAw has now donated land for the Butram Country Club So that he can sell his surr ounding land for building lots at an ezorbitant price. The letter should also set forth te fact he heard BUFRAZ wa5 discharged from the Army for nental deficiency (moron) This letter should be niled froz Little Rocko Interviers f klan menbers and leaders in the pest (for ezanple , 2t the time 0f the assessination of President KENNEDY and on particular bombing matter cases) ~6_ NW 88608_Docld:32989629 26 they only Page ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== have nad deterrirg effect on the klan. For example , the Texarkana Klavern has not held 4 klavern meeting 43 Such since that tine . One Little Rock nenber has dropped out 25 a result of beirg inecvijped; Z5C, accordirg to 2n informant 2 this member is 2 "changed ran , 1 meaning that he is noz 2s radical 25 previously . In interviews with members of the Pine Bluff Elavern, agents have not set vith any hostility and have been treated cor dially and with respect_ Individual Rembers during these interviews have indiczad they are opposed t0 violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner A pumber of the nenbers have said that through political pressure and voting are the only ways any change can be made However 2 they have stated are still avid segregationists ana do not condone race mixing in any manner , When and if it appears that interest may be renewing in te AAK in Arkanses, consideration Will be given to another interview progran. It is noted tkt particular klan members are interviewed on 2 spasmodic basis in regard to leads from surrounding field offices on bombing matter cases 2nd this has had 2 tendency to deter eny violent activity on the part f klavern members , ~ 7- NW-88608_Docld: 32989629_Page ZZ they ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== Nleror andur 70 Directox, FBI DATE: 10/13/64 :ROM 7 SAC,_ Birmirgham SZBJECT: CQWTZRINTELLIGENCE_PRCGRAH INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTICN OR EATE GROUPS Ie Be Bulet to Atlenta 9/2/84 Tbe Klen-type and bete organizationa opereting in Birminghan territory and mhicb 278 potentiel objects of 3 ccunterintelligence progrzm 2re the United Klens of Amarica, Ince , Knigbts 0z the Ku Klux Klan and the National States Rights Perty. Recently Mr &' TINCENT TOHNSEND; Vice-President and 70 As3istant ~Publisher; Birmirghen-News; and-SA6-Gontacty 2dvised 3AC EVERETT J . INGRAH that he read a story in the Chicago Dafly--News concerning Klan activity i1 Mississippi 2nd felt the story coula ot have been prepared Fithout FBI cooperation . He w2s impressed mith this and has indicated 3 strong interest in similer material for tbe 3i7n+agham #ews, He prcmised to protect the Bur8au,8 interast in 22y such endeavor. He is 2 Rell Known civic leader in Birmingham . A review of the files in tha Birminghzm Ozfice is being mad2 for Suitable information in this connection. Bureau instructed in referenced letter tbat specific mention be made of "Action Groups" in Klan organizations , At tne present time the meekly maetirgs Of Zastview Klavern No, mhich bzs been the leading Xlzvern in United Klans of Anerica, Inc, , i2 this tetripry, haye been poorly attended, Thbe principel nemters of the "Action Group" Nw-88608_Doeld 32989629_Page 28 13, ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== in tbis Klavern are HARRT-#ALKER CECIz-HENS ON } EUGENE-rx REZVES , and RONNIE_TIDHELE: Efiorts are being made t0 secure inforaation suitable ior disruption puzposes in connection nitb this gzouP ,> Ingestigatio 15 Ieing conducted concerning 2O3z2T #ARTISEZLTON , Tba Atlant2 Office bas teen requested to 2scertair E_Ls ZDi:rps, 2Ow deceased, ousted SEELTOF-Zron his then position 0f_Grend_bragon 0f tha T, S , Kl2ns, A copy 0f tha article appeering in tbe "Birminghan-News" for April- 307 1380 , entitled "SHELTON ousted frcn Klan Post, 1 bes been obteinedb The article did aot disclose tbe ezzct nature 0i tbe cbarges against 6222FE* Records 0f the #labama Secretary of State reflect tbst SSZLTOM Ras dropped 23 the Klan'S authorized agent and Ra3 replaced by Rey_:AL43+-#ORN of Telledega, Alabama. E Lo~EDHARES; Impesiel #izard, U, S . Klans Knights of tke Ku Klux xl2n, 52s quoted 25 s2ing "He had to bave 2 grand dragon in Alabana 2m4 Fe didn'+ have Ore in RQBZ3T 8 6 SEEXFOM T He told reporters tbat SHEBTON 7as replaced 25 grend 'dragop 23d agent 0z the "Klen" in 1l2bama "for conduct uabeccging 2 rlansman and atteapting t0 u58 the organization for seliish purposes , " The article said EDARDS did zot elaborate On mhat i3 considered conduct unbeccmirg 8 Klazsaan, Inforwaets are being contacted zof any information 0f 3 derogatory nature concerning SZEEZOt Discreet inguiries 2r8 being nad2 i2 Tuscalocsa concerning his finencial status0 In viam of recent information irc the Bureau Do request is being mede for 2 12i1 cover 0n Sreiton or the United Klans, Tha information on Lezi-#OGERU 2nd #IELIA-Ao_-BOLI; ~~ will bz afforded prcmpt attention, 2 MW_B8608_Docld. 32989629_Page 29 Aby ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== As tba Burezu 13 aware, SCme fem montbs ag0 several individuals 3 gbo hed been active officials and/or dedicatea members of tbe National States Rights Party (NSRP) , left the NSBP. They ere trying to form and make 4 going party 02 tbe American States Rights Party (ASRP) with its hzad- quarters in Birnirgbam, Since tbe group pulled out of the NSRP, both tbe ASRP and NSRP leaders have baen belittling, berating and making extremely derogatory remarks concerning each other Both gzoups are uSing tbe Same Dailizg list 9 (tbe NSRP 's 1ist), sbich tha ASRP group obtained. before pulling out 0f the NSRP 3 and tbey disseminate their darogatory remarks in tba litereture tbey distributea Tha Burezu bas 2150 been advised that-GBORCE LINGOLN-ROCEEZEL, Americen Nazi Party (ANP) leader nas receatly filed 2 3550, Ooo,00 libel suit in tba U, S> District Court, Birirghan;-4lebama; 2gainst Dr_~EDHARD R:' FTELBS , Informztion Director 0f tha NSRP, a2d others connected mith the NSRP, Birningbam contemplates furnishing certein items, 02 4 conridential basis to 2 few trusted, reliable rewsmen {established SAC contacts) , concerning the NSRP; t3a .ASRP 2nd the ANP for tbe purpose of possibly causing further diszuption of 32y unified actions or morking arrangements between tbese groxps, Such rewsmen may be usad t0 contact tha leaders of Ope grOup to irquire 2bout or conzirm something Of 4 derogatory rature reportedly nad8 by scme leader of O1e Of tbe other groups , Birninghan also contemplates working closely with other lam enforcement egencies t0 S82 that any ectivity of sucb grcups 2re known, covered a3d mrare considered destrable, tbe group will be made cognizant tbat tkeir ectivity is knowr, NW 88608 Docld:32989629 -Page 30 ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== Birningham elso is considering having SCme racial informants drop remarks to or for the benefit oi tha leaders oz tba NSRP , etco : tbat will tend to C2u32 tba leaders oz one group t0 retaliata 10 like manoer against the other gtoupS $ Iz tba Bureau bas amy material on disrptive tactics Or results of ezforts; which is not already in 2l1 field Offices, Birpingham mould be glad to receive it0 NW 88608_Docld:32989629_ 31 Page ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== 6*a 0n " "O. (ITED SATES G: ERIMEN" L/geos andun T 3EZECCO? > F2I DATE: 10/14/64 Pj% SAC 9 2EX Ycz< SURJECT: COUAFTZRINTELLECENCZ_ PRCGRAM INTEPAAL SECURITY DISRUPTIOV OF HATE_CROUPS, Rexulet, Y[Li04 , YY nas case files on ,the following organizations which mere listed in relet: 4EZIC0N AAZI- PARTY (ANP) (r=+37+ OO:BH Availeble information reflects that there is cuzrently ro ANP 2ctivity in the NYC area ad the organization eppezrs to be defunct z1CHZZTC _ERICAN N4ZIONALLSTS (FAN) (NY-+5-7-195)) 33:E: Aveileble information reflects that FAN has ceased to exist 2s 2 seperate orgenization &nd is merely 3 name used on occasion by the Anerican Nazi Party. 4AfIC)AL REAISSANCE PARTY (NR?) (NY;1O5-6l12) 03:4 The FRP is nom defunct in NYC and available infoznatizn makes it appeer unlikely that it >ill be ~ezctiveced_ "NW-88608-Doeld-32989629_Page-32 ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== NZCAL SZ-ZZ3 RICEZS 24xT (NSRP) 2J Zhe XSw2 in NYC is operated by NILA 23r self-idenzified as the NY Bireeser-offtre NSRZ _ This is a Ore nen orgenizetion in )YC Fith no nembership ocher than KOer who utilizes 2-0 4284-1243 _@23 18 , as his NSRP mailing 2daress . Beczuse of this there ara no meetings of this organization in NYC- WWIIZ YCUZF CopPs (WYC) , OO:CC 1 i.forzczion kes been developed by NY icdiczting tke WZC exists in NY Ezcc_mZctiozs Iz #z25 0= cke above, NY hzs 20 specific recommenda - tio:s 2r t2 pzesert tire. Logicel persons handLing above cz?rio-ec 2rd relczed batters are 2lert to captioned Pzczraz, azd 12 tia evezt information is developed which Eculd 22*2 sore co_rzerintelligence activity Eeasible, tne 3_reau will 6e 2gvised, Ty will again reviewv the above files SQ that 2 letter will reach the Bureau on or before 1/1/65. 2 - NW-88608_Docld: 32989629_Page 33 ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== X:o 'Vi CE^ je "6atO. 27 ENITED STATES Gi ERAMENT Iieroox axdax T0 DIRZCTO?, FBI DATE: 10/14164 533 NES YORK SLBJECT: COUNTERINTELLLCENCE_PRCGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF HATE CROUPS. KeBulet, MiL[o4 . NY has cas2 files On 4 the followving organizations which were listed in relet: AMEZICAN NAZI: PARTY (ANP) GvY_157+3) 0J:PH Available information reflecis that there is currently no ANP activity in the NYC area &d the organization 2ppears to be defunct FIGKTNC AMERICAN N4TIONALISTS (FAN) (y15+-195) OJ:BA Available information reflects that FAN has ceased to exist as 2 separate organization and is merely 2 name used on occasion by the American Nazi Party . NAIZONAL RENAISSANCE PARTY (NRP) (NY10576115 O3:4Y The NRP is now defunct in NYC and available information makes it appear unlikely that it_ be rezctinateda NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-34 SAC , Jill ================================================== Page 35 ================================================== ATIONAL.STATZS RICHTS PARTE (NSRP) 03.24 The NSKP in NYC 18 operated by 6E+2 ~St ~ 4500 Gself-identified as the` ~Y @arac+0,-Of the NSRP This is a one nan orgenization in AYC witn n0 Eembership other than #eer who utilizes 2-Oy-Rei-J1243_,-C25 1--W , 2s his NSRP mailing adaress_ Because of this there are 20 meetings 0f this organization in NYC . WXITZ YOUTH CORPS (WYC) : O0;CC No informstion has been developed by NY indiceting the WYC exis:s in NY Eecczaendations In view of the 2bove, NY has no specific recommenda- ti3s 2t the present time Logical persons handling above czztioned &nd related ntters are alert to captioned prozran, 2nd in the event information is developed which wc _ld rake sone counterintelligence ectivity Eeasible, toe Bureau will be advised NY will 2gain review the above files So that 2 letter will reach the Bureau on or before 1/1/65 _ 2- ~Nw-88608_Docld:32989629_Page_35 ================================================== Page 36 ================================================== F31 Dcte: 10/14/64 Trcrss%2e ocky '1322 in plci: text or code) (Priority) TO : DIRZCTOR , FBI FrCH: 84C , %Z1PMIS SU3JECT COLA TZR INTZLLIGZNCE PROGRAM INt3ZAAL SECLRITY QISRUETION OF FATE GROUPS Relet Bureau to. Atlanta, copies Menphis, 9/2/64. The Gemphis Division has carefully reviewed the corients 0f relet including the list of organizations designated for action pursuant to this program_ Nore 0z these organizations are currently active in the territozy covered by the Benphis FBI Division_ Sinilerly,tbere 2re 20 so-called "action groups" known to erisi Or io heze ezisied in this territory. This office Fill continue to be alert for possibilities and methods 0f inplenentation of this program. NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 ' Page 36 ================================================== Page 37 ================================================== F B I Date: 10/14/54 Trceszi: the iollowks in (Ty?e in text 0r code) (Priority) TO : DIRECTOR , FBI FROH : 8AC_ 2 MZZIPIIS SUBJECT 'COUNTER INTZLLICZNCE PROCRAM INTERNAL SZCURITY DISRUFTION OF FTE GROUFS Relet Bureau to Atlanta , copies Memphis, 9/2/64 _ The Memphis Division has carefully reviewed the contents of relet 9 including the list of organizations Cesignated for action pursuant to this program_ None of these organizations are currently ective in the territory covered by the Nenphis FBI Division_ Similarly,there ar8 no so-cailed "action groups" known to exist or io have eristed in this territory. This office Till continue to be alert for possibilities and methods 0f implenentation 0f this program NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 37 plcen ================================================== Page 38 ================================================== M LiN GNITKd STATES ( ErAENT Memorandur To DATZ: JIRZCTOR , rSI 10/14/64 TROL SAC ,_4J4FI SUBJECT: COzN-ZZI1TZLZIGZCE PROGRAZI IFTERril SECU2ITI DISRUPTIOV Oz F4T2 CzouPZ Re Burzau letter to Atlenta, 9/2464 . The folloring news @edia can be utilized in tbe Cointelgro @pon confirnetion of any action group forning_ in Zis2i ana Zt- Lzudercale, Florida (Dade and Broward Counties) : Nezspaperz "Biari Herzld" 4 corning Ziemi_ > 'Floride, deily rewspeper G_c1es 32733, renasing Ecicor -(8te -Contect) "Tbe Eizzi News" An evenirg locel _i2ni, Florida 3 Rewspaper ~Liir CX34CZ8, Zatior-{SAC Cortace) "Tbe Ft. Leuderdale f8zz" 4 d2ily Zrowezd County rerspaper EILTOYAKELLZ, EZitor T Statiozs FCKT-TV } Crinnel 7 XBC e27 STRWEI Mens_Director MLB:-Tv Crennel 43C CEizizs-G= XropiiuLER; Gezeral_Fanager _ (SAC_Contact) CEARLZS iLTT5rS , ~#azionel Seles-Directon NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 38 A0 ================================================== Page 39 ================================================== Radio Statioes. WCBS , ~3obY LBTIN,_Yews MIOD , J4s 62 &425 4t Setrirg, Florida (Zighlands County) United Zloride Ku Kluz Klan Sebring Ilavern Tbrorgh recent irforratior furnished by it is coted that tha Sebrirg Elavern is apparently dying out . Attendence at tne veekly reetirgs hes been very poor #ith 2 marizuz of 3 t0 4 in attepdance_ On the l2st twro scheduled neeting d2tes J- the only ones present were tie Zalted ctclops; CYARLES 72ITZ erd 4 In view of the bove, the Sebring Klavere will propably becoze izactive i2 tbe very nea future It is felt that 217 counterintelligence move 2t the present tine Fould possibly result in 2 renewed interest and regrouping by tbe 3erbers rather tban ihe dasized results_ Should thbe Sebring Klavern not disband in the near it is tbej felt that information could be corfi- detti8i1y furrisbed to Eighlenes County Sheriff BROWARD_ COKER , Sebring , 2S to tize, date 22 locetion of the Ku Ilux Klan reetings_ Sberiff's Depertzent patrol cars could patrol tbe 2r81 in 22 obvious fashion in order *0 disrupt the neetings a2d 2ause concern a302g teosa i2 attendance. Sertzf Corzr bas been very cooperative and has reflected 2 disteste fOz ay Zu xlur Elan activity in his county It is not f2lt t`2t 5.8r4+2-COKER-would in any way reveal the Burezu'S izerest or betray our confidence. It is felt tbat counteriztelligence contact 7i*1 tho Sebrirg press would b2 urvise. 2 NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 39 ================================================== Page 40 ================================================== Reported Attezpts to Organize Xlavern 0f {nited Florizz Ku %luz %ler in Sepasti22, Florida (Izdian Rivez County) It is reconzended tbet imaedietely upon coniirration of the 2ttezpted organizetion 0f 2 Ku Kluz Klan Klavern in Indian River County, that courterintelligerce steps be taken to discourege s238. The 'E+: Pierce_NewsZZibune 3 I1 a daily newspaper Tvith dirculetion including Indizn RIver County 3 could be Jutilizea 'r ~CELebES ZILEY-,_Zeitor; is a@-SAC-contact 0r the Zi2mi Division 2na h2S proven reliable and cooperative in past dealirgs_ Through information furnished to #HHs2Y; the attempt at organizing the Ku Kluz KZan in Sebastian Floride, cculd be ezposed to tce conmunity_ Connunity leaders woula ther lilely take" steps :0 counteract tbe formation of tnis orgenizetion_ It is not felt tbat 3: #ibey would in any way revezl tre 31-e2u'S ijterest 0r tetrzy ouf confiderce. It is 2lso ~econrended tbat LEl-BRUNLEY ; Chief J Deputy, Izdian River Coujty Sheriif 5 Offica b2 furnishez inforiatic regz-ding the 2tzerpted Ku Kluz Klan organization in Sebestian_ 33543 could 2rrange for patzol cars to cover the %u Kluz rlen zeetings i2 22 obvious feshion_ "his mould likely aiscourege 2ttengarce ara cause concern_ Chief-Deputy--BRUBELZY is 2 Nationel Academy graduate and has been cozpletely cooperetive vith contactirg Agents _ It iS rot felt that BRUYLZY woula in 2y way reveal the 3ureau ioterest or betray ouf confidence_ NW--88608_Docld: 32989629_PageA0 's. ================================================== Page 41 ================================================== ft Test Pela Bezch Ziozide (Fala B22ch County) Council 7o7 Statenood Mest Paln Bezch, Floride Tbe Council fOz Statebood h2s been found to pe not an 2ction group but ratber 2 mailing facility for Fritings 0f 42z Z| DATISON . These writings are disseminated to local 2nd egtional legislators and 211 ar2 filed with the Librery 0f Congress in Washington_ The dissezination 0f vritings by this group has now become practically negligible_ The group is Seid to have politicel ojertones 2S 2 republicen group. It is not recozzended that &ny positive harasszent activities be underteken with regara to this group 2t this time, since sich 2ction, in all probability, would encance tbe activities of this gtoup rather tban 2ccosplish the desired: effect. United Free %en #est Paln Beach, Florica This organizetion is nO defunct. At the present tine there are no knorm "actlon grqups" within the Ziizai Division SUCCESTIONS FOR COINTEL?RO (1) Hany hate groups send litereiure, to individuals on their r2iling lists Which b2s been distorted or is ozt 0f contert, regarding individuals an4 orgeniz2tions _ The literaiuze is interdez *0 prorore 2 bostile 22d uRfsvoreble i=~zZ of the 0rg23iz2t103 enc/or ijdivicucl Favorite tczge5 12 this rezeri 2re tba Uiited 3iors 22d U _ S_ Sip-eze Cozzt Justice ERZ WAREZX_ T 4 - NWV 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 41 tre ================================================== Page 42 ================================================== It is nctea tbe United N2tic25 rzs corcids-iblc literziure settirg forth Iz7orable 'inforrstion Tegezc:us accorplishnents 22d tha desirsbility 0i having 2 Unitez Nations _ It voulc appear approprizte to offset tbe literature sent out py tbe hate groups , by sending out favorable inforzetion concernirg the organizetion or individual under atiack. (2) 4ny hate organizations tend to disguise their true identity ercer tbe pretezt 0f 0ei-g 2 religious study 'group _ Using such 2 disgrise 2 they Zind it eas] and inexpensive to obtein the fecilities of an establisked chuzch to hold special or orgerizational meetings. By using an appropriate pretert , such 2s a free lence reporter 30r tha lozal paper } or through 2 relifble news contect the individual resporsible for the fzcility cozld be contected Shortly prior to the planned feeing- 4t tbis tize, tne trve identity 0z the hate organizetion could be ezposed, resulting in considerable disruption especielly if the use 0f the facilities are canceled 2t tbe last Eorent _ In September , 1982 3 and Decenber } 1983 , SFOWER spent several weaks in Zloridz, including visits to Miazi end Vero Bezch = 2 Florida 2ttezpting zo orgznize anc prcjcte the MSR? _ To &2te tha 4322 r2s i2iled to gein 42] "foot hold" witbin the %i2ni Division_ It iS rj} Kcm 42 this 2rticle was responsible z0z 82272s f2ilur8, Goweve: , it Zoes repre3mzz 2 type cf coun-erirteiligerce L 5 - NW-88608-Deeld-32989629-Rage 4Z ================================================== Page 43 ================================================== 3o-: U)itED STATES ( ERAWENT Niemoranzwr TO DATZ: DIRZCTOR , rBI 10/14/64 FRO 84C,_4141 SUBJECT: COU: ZEINTELLIGZCE PZOGRAZI INTERNAL SECCRITY DISRUPTION OF HATE CoUPS Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64 . The folloving news nedia can be utilized in thbe Cointelpro upon confirration 0f any action group forming in {iari ana Ft Leuderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward Counties) : Nezspapers "Hiami Herzla" 4 corning Hiami, Florida, daily newspaper 8 Gzo2e3 SZE3E,-#enasing_Edi6or_(8A€-Conteet) "The Ziz-i News" 4n evening,locel Eieni, Floride, newspaper Firbl} 0 X BACC8, Zditor-{SAC €Conteci) "Tbe Zt_ Lauderizle Vezs" 4 daily Zrovera County nemspaper EICTONAEELLY, Editor TT Stations WCKT_TV Channel 7 NBC @31ri STRIHL,_Ners_Director MLBN-TV Chennel 10 43C CHARLES_E;YTOP#LLSR; General_Knager_(SAC__Contact) CHABLZSABAFTHE S; -Nation2] Sales_Director NW 83608 Docld: 32989629_Page 43 ================================================== Page 44 ================================================== Radio . Stations WCBS , ~3oB AALBLIN__Yevs" WIOD , Jals 63-64T2 4t Sebring , Florida (Zighlands County) United Zloride Ku Klux Klan Sebring Klavern Through recent information furnished it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apperently dying ou € Attendance at the:neekly reetings has been very poor with a marinum of 3 t0 4 in attendance . On the l2st twro scheculed meeting dates J; the only ones present were tme Balted Cyclops;-CEARLESHZRiTz 2nd In viev of the above, the Sebring Klavern will prooably becone ieactive in the very nea future. It is felt that eny counterintelligence move 2t the present time Fould possibly result in a renened interest and regrouping by the members rather than the.desired results_ Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near future) it is then felt tbat information could be confi- dentially furnishbed to Highlands County Sheriff BROWARD COKER , Sebring , 25 to tine, date and location of the Ku Klux Klan meetings _ Sheriff s Department patrol cars could patrol the arez in an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings and carse concern among tbose in attendance. Siertff COzr Las been very cooperative and has reflected 2 distaste for a2y Ku Zlux Klan activity in his county It is not felt tnat 8ker+ff-CB1ER- would in any way reveal the Bureau S interest or betray our confidence. It is felt tbat counterintelligence contact Viti tho Sebrirg press Tould be urvise_ 2 NW 88608 Docid:32989629 44 py Page ================================================== Page 45 ================================================== Reported Attempts to Organize Ilavern 0f United Floridz Ku Iluz Xlen i Sebastian, Florida (Irdian Rivez_County) It is recomnended that imnediately upon confirmation 0f the 2ttempted organization 0f 2 Ku Klux Klan Klavern in Indian River County , that counterintelligence steps be taken to discourage same _ The 'Et,Pieree_Nevs_"Tibune T a daily newspaper with circulation including indian Rlver County could be Jutilized. Hx -CE+rbbS- #ILEY-, Editory-+S: E-SAC-contace of the Ziiami Division and b2S proven reliable and cooperative in past dealings _ Tbrough infornation furnished to #HELEY , the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Florida cculd be exposed to tbe conmunity _ Community woula then likely take" steps *0 counteract `the formation of this organization_ It is not felt that Lc:Kibey would in any way revezl the Bureau interest or petray our confidence. It is also reconnenced that LEI-BRURZEY; Chref- Deputy , Izdizn River County Sheriff?s Office be furnished information regarding the 2ttenpted Xu Kluz Klan organization in Sebastian 2r5uEY could arrange for patrol cars to cover the Ku Kluz Klan meetings in 22 obvious fzshion_ This would likely discourage attendance and cause concern, Chtef-Deputy-BRUHLZY is 2 National Academy graduate and has been completely cooperetive with contacting Agents. It is not felt that BRUHEEY would in any way reveal the Bureau'S interest Or betray ouf confidence. MWN-88608_Qocld;32989629 45 Sebastia" ieaders 85 Page ================================================== Page 46 ================================================== 4t Jest Paln Beacb flozida (zaln Beach County) Council For Statehood Hest Paln Beach Florida The Council f0z Sitetehood has been found to pe not an 2ction group but rather 2 mailing facility fot the Fritings Of Upz 457DA1SON,_ These writings are disseninated to locel and national legislators and 211 are filed with the Librery 0f Congress in Hashington. The dissezination 0f writings by this group has now becomne practically negligible_ The group is said to have political overtones a5 2 republican group. It is not recojnended that ery positive harassnent 2ctivities be undertaken with regara to this group at this time, since Such 2ction, in all probability , zould enbance the activities 0f this group rather tban accomplish the desired: effect. United Free Hen West Paln Beach, Florida This organization is @Ow defunct , At the present time there are D0 knorm "action groups" Fithin the Hiazi Division_ SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO (1) Bany hbate groups send literature, to individuels on their meiling lists, which bas been distorted or is ouz of contert, regarding individuals and orgenizations The literatuze is intended to promote 2 hostile a2d unfavorable ircga 02 the org2-1zctios-enc/o indivicual Favorite tergets i2 this regerd 2re tbe Uitez 3tions 2nd U_ S Supzere Court Justice 2RIcWARRZ 7 4 - NW 88608_Docld: 32989629 46 Page ================================================== Page 47 ================================================== It is poted the United Natiozs rzs corsidc--ble litcreture settirg forth fevor_ble iniorrstion regarcing accorplishnents 224 the desirebility 0f having 2 United Nations It vould appeer epproprite to ofiset the literature sent out py the hate groups , senaing out favorable information concerning the orgenizetion or individual under atteck. (2) Any hate organizations tend to disguise their true idertity under ibe pretext of pefng 2 religious study group Using such 2 disguise, they find it easy and inexpensive to obtain tne fAcirities of 2n established church to hold specizl or orgenizational meetings_ By using a1 2pproprizte pretert 3 such 2s 2 free lance reporter f0r the local paper , or through a relicble news contact the individual responsible for tbe facility could pe contacted shortly prior to the planned Geeting_ At tbis tire, the true identity 0z the hate organization could be ezposed, resulting in considerable disruption especially if the use of the facilities are cenceled 2t the last morent . the Bureau is ope copy of tbe Ratiopal Federation 0f Labor Yens T} dated prepare na distributed py 0tedthat Zor TanY years until ne Tas discontilzed #ow Ber 1931 2 in yiew-0E_continuing evidence Of-_indiscretion an2 8 of poor judgmente regarding the [etaeqel_States Rights Prty (NSRP) an8 B XSTONER " This Te #S prepered and disiributed by 0i his 71 vofreion, 2s 2 reans 02 keepirg the NSRP cut South Floride In September > 1962 } and December 2 1963 , STONEz: spent several meeks in Zlorida, including visits to Hiani and Vero Beach Floridz, 2ttezpring to organize and prozote the NSRP To date tba NS22 bas failed to g2in any "foot hold" within the Hiami Division It is ror Scwr if tnis 2rticle w2s responsible foz 83233 S failur8, howeve: , i% Zoes represcnt 2 type 0f counterintelligence 5 - NW 88608-Docld: 32989629-Page-47 by ================================================== Page 48 ================================================== 3oio-tCX UNITED STATES ( RNMENT Memorandum TO DAT?: DIRECTOR , FBI 10/14/64 FROL SAC ',_IJAMI SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ?ROCRLH INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION Or FATE CROUPS Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64 . The following news media can be utilized in the Cointelpro upon confirmation 0f any action gfoup forming in Ziami ana Ft. Lauderdale Florida (Dade and Broward 2 Counties) : Nevspapers "Hiani Herald" 4 norning Hiami , 'Florida 3 daily newspaper CICRe_ BEZBE,-Hanaging-Editor -(Sae-Contet:} "The Ziami Nevs" An evening Jocel Miani , Florida 3 newspaper YELETEM €7/ 34688, Editor-(SA€ 800726+-} "The St_ Lauderdale News" 4 daily Broward County rewspaper MICTON KELLY , Editor Tv Skations TCKT_TV 2 Channel 7 , NBC @EiEKSTBUHL,_Ners_ Directo MTLEM_TV Channel 10 ABC CHARLES B KOPMziLER , ~General_Lanager (SAC. Contact) CHARLESKiATTHEIS z ~Natione]Seles-Direetor_ NW BB608_Docld: 32989629_Page 48 ================================================== Page 49 ================================================== Radio Stations TGBS , ~BABVuRTIN__News WIOD, JAigsk+z-CATE 4t Sebring , Florida (Highlends County) United Floride Ku Klux Klan Sebring Klavern Through recent information furnished by #-8e232 , it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying out _ Attendance 2+ the:meekly neetings hes been very poor with a marinun 0f 3 €0 4 in attendance _ On the la3t two scneduled meeting dates the only ones present were the Exalted Cyclops,sCHARLES ERizz &nd Mi 842-R: In vievi of the above, the Sebring Klavern #ill propably becone inactive in the very rear future_ It is felt that eny counterintelligence move at the present tine Fould possibly result in 2 renered interest and regrouping by the nenbers rather than the.desired results_ Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near it is then felt that information could be confi- detti8ily furnisbed to Highlands County Sheriff BROWARD_ COKER, Sebring , 2S to time, date and location of tbe Ku Klux Klan neetings _ Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the are2 in an obvious fashion in_ order to disrupt the meetings and cause concarn among those in attendance. Sneriff COizr has been very cooperative aed has reflected 2 distaste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in nis county_ It is not felt that Shar+# 2-COZER--vould in any way reveal the Bureau 'S interest or betray our confidence. It is felt that counterintelligerce contact w2ci the Sebring press vould be unwise_ 2 W NW 88608 Docld: 32989629' Page 49 ================================================== Page 50 ================================================== Reported Attenpts to Organize Klavern of United Florida Ku Xlux Klan in Sebastian, Florida {Indian Rivez County) It is recommended that immediately upon confirmation f the attempted organization 0f 2 Ku Kluz Klan Klavern in Indian River County , that counterintelligence steps be taken to discourage Same The "Tt,Pierce_Newzs Tzibunez" 2 daily newspaper witn circulation Including iaizn River County could be ltilized Ix ~CEARUES ILEY ,_ Ediior;-is-an-SA€-contact of the Zizmi Division 2n& has proven reliable and cooperative in pest dealings_ Through information furnished t0 #EEEY, the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebestian, Floride could be exposed to the connunity _ Conmunity leaders would then likely take steps t0 counteract the formation of this orgenization. It is not felt that @rc:-Mibsy vould in &ny way reveal the Bureau?S interest or betray our confidence It is also ` reconnended that LEL-BRUHLEY ;-Chief ~ Deputy , Indian River County Sheriff 5 Ofzice pe furnished information regarding the attempted Ka Kluz Klan organization in Sebastian_ BRUiEY could arrange for patrol cars to cover the Ku Xlux Klan #eetings in an oovious fashion_ This vould likely discourage attendance and cause conceri. entez-Depaty-BBUMLEY is 2 Nationel Acadeny graduate and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents. It is not felt tbat BRUNEEY would in &ny way reveal the Burenu 'S,interest of betray ou: confiderce _ MW_BB6DB_DocId:32989629_Page.50_ ================================================== Page 51 ================================================== 4t West Pln Beach Florice (Palm Beach County Council For Statehood West Pal@ Beach,_Florida The Council for Statehood has been found to be not an action group but rather 2 mailing facility for the writings of MiBY , KDAIISON _ These writings are disseminated to local an& national legislators and 211 are filed with the Library 0f Congress in Washington. The dissenination of writings by this group has now becone practically negligible_ The group is Said to have political overtones as:2 republican group. 1 It is not recommended that any positive haressment activities be underteken Tith regard to tbis group at this time, since such action, in al1 probability, woula enhance the activities 0f this group rather tban accomplish the desired effect. United Free Hen West Palm Beach;Florida This organization is now defunct_ At the present tine there are no known "action groups ?} Within the Miami Division_ SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO (1) Many hate groups send literature, to individuals on their mailing lists, which has beea distorted or is out of contert, regarding individuals a2d organizations _ The literatuze is. intended o progote 2 hostile and unfavorable inage of the orgsnizatio-and/or individual Favorite targets in this rezarc are the Unitec nitions 2nd U , S Supreme Court Justice ZRE"MARRE: 5 4 - NIN 88608 Docld:32989629 51 Page ================================================== Page 52 ================================================== It is noted the United Naticns ris consiz?--blc literature setting forth favorable inzorration regerd:ng accorplishnents and the desir_bility 0f having 2 Unitez Nations_ It would appear eppropriate to offset the literature sent out by tbe hate grorps , by sending out favorable infornation concerning the organization of individual under attack (2) hate organizations tend t0 disguise their true identity under tbe pretert oz peing 2 religious study group Using such 2 disguise, they find it easy and inerpensive to obtain; the facilities of 2n established church to hold special or organizational meetings _ By using an :@ppropriate pretet 3 such 25 a free lance reporter for the local paper > or through a reliable news contact the individual responsible for the f2cility could be contacted shortly priof to the planned meeting _ At this time , the true identity of the hate organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable disruption 3 especially if the use 0f the facilities ere canceled at the last monent (3) Enclosed foz the Bureau is one copy 0f the PNational Federation 0f Labor News 9 # deted_September ,1963 2 prepared and distributed bj TILLIAM SOMERSETT 9 formerly 2 607_C: (RAC} , Burear"file 66-16458_ It is noted that SOMERSETT was fornerly 2 Bureau informant for many years until he was discontinued November 9 1961 } in view 0f continuing evidence of indiscretion ard use of poor judgmentl Pege 3 0f tbis paper sets forth 2n article SOMERSETT Yegarding the National States Rights Party (NSRP) and & BXXSEONER: This article was prepared and distributed by SOMERSETZ of his Orr volition, 25 2 means 0f keeping the NSRP out of South Floride _ In September 3 1962 3 and December 9 1963 3 STew3a spent several weaks in Florida, including visits to Hiani an4 Vero Beach 3 Florida ettenpting to organize and prozcte the NSRP _ To date the NSRP has failed to g2in anv nioot hold" Witbin the Hiami Division It is rot kacti 4 tnis article was responsible for 348iz ~ failuze, bowevez , it doc:s represent 2 #ype of counterintelligence_ L 5 - Nw-88608_Docld:32989629_Page Any py _ ================================================== Page 53 ================================================== SioSRESG :Z1MZIC 1/ereor andutn DI33CTOz , I3I DI7r: ~Eit-: SEC , CZICACO Sir;ECT: COINTZLPRO Re Bureau letter to S_C , 4tlete? 2/2/3.. Referenced cojcunicition a0-iscs t8 followizz nate orgenizetiors operatirg Wiiin 6C-1c250 Dxvision 2s included in this prOgr2m : Anericzn Nezi Party (Origin: EictzOr:) Bhite Youth Corps (O-igin: Cbicago) Regarding tbe White Youth Cozrs it is notcd confidentizl informants 0f tbis division b212 aduiscd that the Fnite Touth Corzs in Cniczzo did c i7 Iect, ezist 2s 2 organizetion per s2 but RZS Co3sidered rathcr 2 "iewzi 0f 2ffili2tio3" Gitnia the Stlctefc uf iuj 4jericzn Nazi Zarty 2t Chic?go , iliizc' 811 opcrctions 3f this unit were Subsezueztly combieed #th thoso of the &raricen %azi Perty 22d were catried on urce? t*3t razc only The white Youts Corps w2s dtezzixed R0 :0 lozgcr exist in 22y #2y in Cnicago ard ro infozzz:fo? nas developed to indiczte the possible reorgenization 02 8*1S grou?. On October 12 1 1954_ cozzico e_z] i3or33tS CC6535-3 80-3557-R 2rJ CG-8650-3 , 211 02 R03 b:vo } furnisied reliable inforzatio? i3 tre PZS € , ac*Iscd that tie Ebite Youth Corps rO lorger exiszs J: 2:; cfprcity in Chicago To sources kociedge :c 19f60 Yoith Corps does not ozerete 33 22 ozgeniz2-io3 iz :?y oe*c? Jocale known to them Tbese sou-ces :urtkez =wb:d 2*1t 2S 0f tnis cste 00 informatio3 is 2vcilable *0 J.:c2tu 2ossible interesi_ip reorgenizicg the Kite Ycie} Corz: NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 53 33 SyMbol bexs Nume ================================================== Page 54 ================================================== Iz view 0f tra abov2 Chiczzo furtner inquiry rega-di-s 042 :3, Erd in tht tbe #hite yozth Cczzs is 20 ~20231 it will noz b2 considezed in coznection witk tris DFOCICZ_ Regarding Chicego 's proposed plan to cxpose, disrupt and otrerwise neutralize the #mprican Nezi Party in Chicago , fllirois, tbe following is Fubsitted for the Burezu S corsideration: I_ Proposal To Increese Financial Burden 0f the #nerican Nazi Perty Brief Resure oi Current Beononic Pzoblees The principel reekness in the Chicego unit of the Agericzn Nazi Party exists in treir J2ck 0f funds to operate. Tnis Iect eior8 nes forestalled a1i ir&e perticipation 0f the Chiczgo org2niz2tion i2 public demonstratiors 2rd other activities in tbat sufficient zonies 218 not available to provide necesser] boncs acafor fines should Recbars be arrested during the course 0f such activity. Furtber tbe Chicago Arerican Nazi Party has recently purchased 2 building Thich tiey utilize 2S 2 neadcuerters Tbe building iS old 2nd in dire need of rapair - Zortgzge peycents 2rd nainterarce alone absorb the bulk 0z 211 funds #bich the Cbiczgo ur_i collects Peoposed 212n 0f Approach In tbet 1t is the desire 0f tke local Azerican Nazi Perty to "iold onto" their beadquizters building at 211 ccsS , it is apperent tbat tbe i4-30 lizc 0f 3pproach to incre:se the orgenizztion's {inarcial burden is to direct our ezforts 21 the heaccuarters buildi?g Itself_ Discreet i3quir7 e2d obszrvation t:S srow the building n2s nuzerous buiiding code violatiozs, sOac 02 2 NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 54 ================================================== Page 55 ================================================== Kcici E2e the building reinly unirhebetzblc :1 S:7 violetions are rectifiad such 23 eleciriccl %i-tzg 224 plurbirg _ It is secognized tht buildi:g cocc 2cthoritics will 2l1057 such ceziciencies to exist for a rcasonsble pericd 0f tiza 22d during such tine habi-ation on the pr2nises 1S parzitted Violations such 25 tbose zcntioned 2-2 Krow to be costlj to elininate 328 270 0z tbe type that cznzot cr sbould not be "do-it-yourself" projccts sizce Tepsizs 22de 28 subject to inspection by Suilding awthorities In tbei tbe Anericam Nezi Party kcs in the past 2nd still Zeveis its 2ttacks 2t Pers0?3 of the Jemish faith, Chicago Jevish orgenizetions 2ze zost desirablc 0f accuzulating infcrration sich can serve to initiate 2n 3tack by these organizztiors 2gzirst tce Azerican %3z: Party. Proninent 23023 Such orgelizetiojs are the Jefish iaz Vetcrans and tre Enti-Deferation Lezgue B'cei S'rith. The Cbicego Division, either by di-cct approach to establishea Sorrces in these orgacizatios or through us2 cf Siitable pretext 1 ca2 rake 2v?ilable to copropriate ofiicials inzorzetioz eStablisbing tbe fact that such building ccze violations do ezist_ There iS ro doubt tbat should such iniorzation becorz 2vaileble to pzopcr injividuals within these organizetiors 3 great pressure mill bc brought to bear to insist that tbeze building coda violations 270 corrected a2d tha possibility strongly ezists trat court action Ray follcw 23d fires 2ay be levied 4S 22 alternative, 2 direct ??prozch can be cade to establisbed contects withir tbe city covcrzzert to such buildicg ccde violetions to tke a#tc3. 03 02 appropriate authorities Anticipeted Zesults penetreting analysis 0f t;c Frcscat cconosic situation 0z tre Americen Naz1 Zarty serosly Iadicates L 3 3 NW-88608-Docld: 32989629-Page-55_ bring ================================================== Page 56 ================================================== ~%pJ fi=7y increas_rg ite {in228i21 buzck: 32 tris group the following results 2r2 cez*2: 1 Arericea Nezi Perty public #ctivity will be beld to t22 barest einirzm due t0 fear of yssible erzest resulting i2 further economic nerdship_ 2 _ Tunds will Dot p2 2vailable to brirg about necessarj repairs on the %eadguartezs cuilding 3 _ Furds foz the printing 22d distribution 0z litereture Jocelly for recruiting purposes would not be aveilable Korale 04 tbe orgenization in Chicago, win ich is 2o7 2t low 2bb would be further lessened tbus creeting feelings 0f dissztisfaction among tbe mezbezship 5 _ As a direct zesult 0f iters above the attractivenes of,the_ Azerican Nazi Party to possible recruits would be held 2€ 3 nininun Ii_ Proposal Le Divide Loyelty 0f Benbership Against Present Leaders Brief Resume 0z Leadersbip Problens 4t the present tire tbe Chiczgo American Nazi Party h2S no establisbed leaders One 0f 82: mebers 3 JOHN_WALLACz , w2S #ppoirted by CEDZCE_LINCOL LBCCE WZLL: , tbe group 'S nabional corrnder rozever #4L4C2 b2s failea to uedertake the responsibilities of lezcership and aS 2 result certain dis- sntisfzctior ezists amorg rambers _ 4s 2 result 0f "41i283"S failure currcnt 2ctivities 0f tb2 orgenization 2re being cirected CzRISZORIZR . TIB#JzTICE Rbo is operating without zuthority 0f the national 3 beedquarters NW 88608 Docid: 32989629 Page 56 by ================================================== Page 57 ================================================== E2c2r52 of the incctivity 2nd the f2ilure 0f tha Clicago organizztior to derozstrate 2-og-ess 02 ~a-cikic: "harc core: oi tba #e=bership _2ve riisad rUzsrous Gucbtiors in tze =ecert past cballerging tle adequacy &na czmabilit; 0f #4ELeCZ 2nd-_TIZXSZVICE to hezd their Orgenization in Clicago . Rzorosed P1zn 0f iAppro2ch It is a ticigated thet through cs-blissed sources 411 0f whor 2re current =ezbers of the en2-i322 72 ?83 iQ Chicago_ Zeelings 0f discontent can be inifiid 7w7*38, conaunicatiozs mhich Tould indicate.: tnoroug? 2r& substantial knowledge 0f the Chicego ofgarization cou ld be directed 2t tba 406103l Cemgnuer-820303-riNCOr-RO:XIEEL either anonynously or under the signature 0z 2 likely "ember Tko is known to be in disegteerezz Fith local lezderShip and practices Anticieated Eesults concentreting:the ezforts of this program in 2 firm bu z cerefully corcezled rinzer it is strongly believed that the following results will be obtained : 1 . Loyalties 0f the zenbership wilz be divided and dissension 5:li be created 2 _ Tbe nationel readguerters oi the Anerican Nazi Perty will have Suificient rezson to question the adeguecy erd capabilities 0z local leadership Through estebliseed sources progr?ES proposed by those in legCership capecities car be sabotaged chereby tbe confidence Of both the national heedquarters 2nd the local Gesbership Till be shettered It 1s recogrized that tbe Burezu corsicers it vital that tbe functiors ana cembe-s_:? 02 ~hzse o-ziizations be brought into the "piblic spotlizet" Chiczzo cccs rot dezn Je 5 - NW-88608-Deeld-32989629_Page 57 3v ~J By ================================================== Page 58 ================================================== sech 20 eppro2ch 2pp-8rrdcte 4i tbis timz due tol t: mezbczship 5ich 2t this tize corsists 0f thrde ectl?fiszez iriorrJis 8f 1ojg stcncizg. Activity to b-izz publle pressure to bezr 2t tbis perticular tixe couid jeopardize tne pcsition 0f tne tbree i-forranis siho furrish velueble infornation to tbis Eurezn corcernirg the rerbership 2nd 2ctivities 0f the Azericen Nezi Party at Ckicago It is requested that the Bureau consider the above deteiled epproecbes 12 connection Witb this program and anthorize their iz3titution in Clicego NW-88608_Docld: 32989629_Page_58 $=2l1 ================================================== Page 59 ================================================== MJ, UTE) STATES G ZRAMENTT Mgrorandeto 78 DIRECTC? ) FBI DATE: io/ia/& 7263 S.C, CHICAco SiEjECT:" COINTZLPRO Re Bureau letter to SAC , Atlantz 9/2/64 . Referenced communication advises the folloving hate organizatiors operating Within the Chicago Division 2s iecluded in this progrem : American Nazi Party (Origin: Ricknond) White Youth Corps (Or igin: Chicago) Regarding Wnite Youth Corps it is noted confidential informants 0f tnis aivision have advised that the hite Jouth Corps in Chicago did not , in fact , ezist 28 a organization per se but was considered rather 8 "lewel 0f 2zfili2€ion" M1 within the siructure of the 218zicen #Gzi Party at Chicego , Illinois 411 operations of t22 unit were Subsequently cOrbinec with those of the #ericen Nzi Perty and were cerried on inder tnat name only Tbe Mhite Youtb Corps was deternined to no longer ezist in 2ny way in Chicego and no infornetion nas developed to indicete the possible reorgenization of this group O1 Oztober 12, 1334 corfidential infornants 211 of wbon have furnisked zeli2ble inforzation i2 tre pasi, advised tnat the Ebite Youth Corps n0 lorger exists in any capacity in Chicago_ To sousces rnovledge the White Youth Corps does not operete 25 22 orgenization in eny other locale kzorn to then Tbese sources furthez edvised thet 2s of this Cite 2o infornation is evailable to indicate possible interest_ ip reorganizing the Mhite Jouth Corps "NW 88608-Docld: 32989629_Page-59 tbe ================================================== Page 60 ================================================== In view 0i tha abov2 Chicezo C?.eer? C_ furtser inquizy Tegerdizz t22 1" Ec_ 2nd in that tbe White Youth Corgs 'i3 23 18238r 40 #ictezci, it wiil not be considered in cornection Tith this proztZA Regarding Chicego 's proposed plan to expose , disrupt and otherwise reutralize the Anericar Nazi Party in Chicago, Illinois, the following is submitted ior the Burezu S consideration: I_ Proposal Ca To Increzse Financial Burden 0z the American Nazi Party Brief Resune of Current Econczic Problens The principe] veakness in tbe Chicego unit of the Arericzn Nazi Perty exists i2 tneir lack 0f funds to operate. This iect alone n2s forestalied a11 the perticipation 0f the Chicego Orgenization in public cezonstrtions 2nd other activities in that sufficient ronies ar8 not evailable to provice necessery bonds and/or fines should members be 2rrested dufing the ccnrse 0f Such activity. Further 9 thbe Chicago Anericen Nazi Party has recently purcbased a building vinich they utilize as 2 headguerters The building is ol& end in dire need of repair liortgage payzents 2nd mainternce alone absorb tne pulk of 21l funds #bich the Chiczgo unit collects Proposed Plan 0f_Approach In that iz is tbe desire off the local Anerican Nazi Pezty to "hold onto" tbeiz headguzrters building at 211 costs it is apperent that the first lin8 of epproach to increase the organization'S financial burden is to direct our efforts at the hegcouerters building itseli. Discreet inquizy 2nd observetion has show the building has nurerous building code violations J some 0f ~ 2 L" NW 88608 Docld: 32989629_Page_60 ================================================== Page 61 ================================================== Inice makze the building neinly uninbabiteble untfl srch violations 238 rectified such 28 electrical wiring 2r2 2lumbing_ It is recognized thet building code authorities #ill allow such deficiercies to exist Ior 2 reasonable period 0f tima ard during such time babitation on the prerises is pernitted Violations such 23 those mentioned 2r2 %rown to be costly to elininate and are of the type tket cznnot or should not be "do-it-yourself" projects since repairs m2d8 a18 subject to inspection by building authorities In tnet the Aneziczn Nezi Perty has in the past 2na still Zevels its attacks 2t persons 0z the Jewish faith Ch icago Jevish organizations 2re most desirable of accumulating inforration Tich can serva to initiate an attack by tbese organizations ag2inst the Am2rica2 Nazi Derty . Pronipent aronz such organizations are tne Jewish War Veterans and tie Anti-Defamazion Leegue 8 nai B'rith The Chicego Division, either by direct approach to established sources in tnese organizations or through uze cf suitable pretezt , c2n @ake 2v2ilable to eppropriate officials information' eSteblishing the fact tbat such building code violatiors do exist. Tbere is no doubt tbat should such inforzation becoma 2vaileble to pIOpeI individuals vithin these organizations grest pressure will be brought to bear to iesist that these building code violations ar8 cortected a2d tna possibility strongly ezists that court aciion nay follow and iines may be levied As an alternative , 2 direct approach can be made to established contects witnin tbe city government to bring Such building code violatiors to tne attention 0f appropriate :utnorities Anticipated Results 4 penetreting analysis of the present economic situation 0f the Anericnn Nczi Party strongly indicates 3 4 NW88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 61 ================================================== Page 62 ================================================== thct py fizmly .increasing tk2 zinancial burden "0f tbis group the following results ar8 certiin: 1 Anericen Nezi Party public activity will bz held to tbe barest niniuum_ due to fezr of sssible errest resulting in further economic hardship 2 . Funds will not be available to bring 2bout necessary repairs on the headquarters building 3 _ Fands fOr tbe printing ana distribution 0f litereture Jocelly for recruiting puzposes would not be available 4 Horale 0f tbe orgenization ip Chicago , which is ow at low epb would be further lessened tbus creating feelings 0f dissatisfaction 2mong the renbership 5 _ As 2 direct zesult 0f items above the attrectivenes of the Anerican Nezi Party to possible recruits would be held 2t a ninimuz II_ Proposal #le Divide Loyelty 0f lienbership Against Present Leaders Briez Resune 0f Leadersbip Problens 4t iche present tina the Chicego American Nazi Party n2s ro established leaders One 0f ~bee members , JOHDLWALLACE, TzS ~ppointed by CZORGELINCOLlROCEWELz , the group 'S 23bional ~ coetz-der nowever F4iL48z n2s failed to undertake the responsibilities of leedership and 2S 2 result certain dis- satisfsction exists among renbers 4s 2 res ilt 0f WA3L4C3*s failure current activities 02 tbe organization er8 being directed by URISTCRHZR_ 1z93327ICE; wzo is operating Vithout authority 0f the national ceadquarters 57 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 62 Page ================================================== Page 63 ================================================== Beceuse 02 the inactivity end the failure 0f the Ciicazo orginization to dezorstrste progress trc so-cziicd "hard core" of the nembership bave raised nurerous quesziczs i" tsc zecent past chellenging the adequacy and czpabilitj 02 #L~ZACZ and-ILIDEAJEEICH to nead their orgenizetion in Cnicago Prorosez Plzn of_Approch Ic is anticipated thet through established sources 211 02 Mbon 2re current sazbers of the #nerican #2zi Pc~J in Clicago , Zeelings of discontent can be initinted Zurtrez 3 ccuzunications which would indicate.2 thorough end substertial knowledge 0f the Chicago ofganizetion could be directed 2t the 4281038 Eoirender-836383-jiNeorl ROCENEbt-either anonynously or under tbe signature: Of 2 likely member Fiho is known to be in disegreenent with local leaderShip and practices 4nticipeted Results concentreting-the efforts of this program in 2 firr but cerefully concealed minner it is strongly believed that the folloving results mill be obtained : 1. Loyelties of the meabership will ba divided 2nd dissension will be created 2 _ The nationel headqurters of the Anerican Nazi Party will hbave sufficient reasor to question the. adecuacy and capabilities of locai leadership 3 . Through established sources progrers proposed by those in leadership capecities can be' saboteged whereby tbe conzidence of both the national heedquerters 22d the Iocal menbership will be sbettered It is recognized that the Burezu cons iders it vital that the functions and unbezship of these orgenizations ba brought into the "public spotlight" Chicago coes not deem 5 - NW_8B648_Doeld: 32989629_Page 63 By ================================================== Page 64 ================================================== such 2n spproach appropriate 2t tbis time due to tha sz213 nenbersh13` which 2t tbis tize consists of three establisked inforeants of long standirg . Activity to bring public pressure to bear at this perticular tine could jeopardize the position of the three infornants sho fjrnish veluable inforretion to tbis Eureeu concerning the rembership and activitias 0f the Anerican Nazi Party 2t Chicago It i9 requested that the Bureau ` consider the above detailed approaches in connection with this program and enthorize their irstitution in Chicago 6 - NW 88608 Docld:32989629_Page 64 ================================================== Page 65 ================================================== i1TZ3 STATES G ZRNNMENT Mgrorandur 73 DIRECTO? 2 FBI DATE: ic/1a/ 720 CHICACO SiZjECT:- COINTZLPRO Re Bureau letter to Atlantz9/2/84 Referenced cormunication advises the folloving hate organizatiors operating witain the Chicago Division 2s iecluded in this program : American Nezi Party (Origin: Ricbeord) Thite Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago) Regarding tbe White Youth Corps it is noted conzidential informants of tpis divisicn have advised that the Tnite Jouth Cops in Chicago did not , in fact , ezist 28 2 organization per se but was considered rather 2 "Jevel of 2ffili2fion" within tbe structure of tbe Eiericin Ncz1 Party at Cnicego , Illinois 411 operations of €64 unit were subsequently corbinec with those of the A_ericen Nezi Party and were cerried on inder that nane Tbe Mhite Youthb Corps was deternined to no longer ezist in :ny Way in Chic2go and no infornetion has developed to indicete tne possible reorgenization of tnis group On Octocer 12 2 1964 confidantial informants 211 0z Tibom have furniszed relisbie inforzation i2 tre pest 1 advised tnat the Ehite Youth Corps no lorger exists in any capacity 1 in Chic2go _ To sources krovledge the Ynite Youth Corps does not operzte 55 an orgenization in 2ny other locale kborn to thern Tnese sources further 2dvised that 2s of this Czte no infornation is 2vailable to indicate possible interest_ip reorganizing the White Youth Corps NW 88608-Docid:32989629-Page 65 SAC , SAC , only . ================================================== Page 66 ================================================== In view oi tha abovE Chicazo c?" 0 furtcer inquizy regerding t22 ~r 10> Ec_ 22d in that tbe Wbite Vouth Ccrps ,s co 102zez ir 313t82201 it wiil not ba considered i0 connection With tnis progren Regarding Chicego 's proposed plan to expose, disrupt ard otberwise neutralize the Americar Nazi Party in Chicago, Illinois, the following is subnitted ior the Bureau's consideration: I_ Proposal 3~ To Increase Financial Burden 0z the Anerican N2zi Party Brief Resume 0f Current Econozic Problens The pr incipel weakness in the Chiczgo unit of the Agericzn Nezi Perty exists i2 tneir lack 0f funds to operate. Tnis Iact alone hzs forestalled a11 tbe perticipation of the Chicego orgerization in public demonstrations 22d other activities in that sufficient ronies ar8 not evailable to provide necessary ponds a2d/ox fines should members be errested dufing the course 0f Such activity. Yurther the Chicego Anericen Nazi Party has recently purcbased 2 building Vnich they utilize as 2 headquerters The building is old 2nd in dire need 0f repair . Jlortgage payients 2nd mainterance alone absorb tne pulk of 211 funds mich the Chiczgo unit collects Progosed Plan 0f_Apgroach In that iZ is tbe desire of the locel Anerican #azi Perty to "nold onto" tbeir headquarters building at 211 costs , it is apparent that the first iine 0f epproach to increase the organization'S financial purden is to direct Our efforts at the headquerters building itself Discreet induiry 2nd observation has show the building hes nurerous building code violations J some 0f 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 66 Page ================================================== Page 67 ================================================== wb ice nake the building nzinly uninbabiteble e2til srck violetions ere rectified suca 2s clectrical wiring 22d plumbing_ It is recognized thst building code 2uthorities will aliow such deficiencies to exist for 2 reasonable period 0f tina e2d during such time babitation on the pzerises is pernitted Violetions such 25 those mentioned are xrown *o pe costly to elininate ard are of the type tket cznnot cr should not be "do-it-yourselz" projects since repaits nede are subject to inspection building authorities In tnet the Americen Nezi Perty has in the past 2na still levels its attacks 2t pezsons of the Jewish faith 9 Ch icago Jerish organizations ere zost desirable 0f accunulating inforretion wbich can Serve to initiata 2n attack by these organizations 2g2inst the Americ2n Nazi Perty. Prominent among such orgenizations ar2 the Jewish War Veterans end the Anti-Dezemazion League B 'n2i 8'rith The Chicego Division, either b] direct approach to established sources in ihes? c-ganizations 2 or through use 0f suitable pretezt , C2n rake 2vailable to pproprizte 0fficials informetion" eStzblishing the fact that such building code violations do exist_ There i5 no doubt that should such infornation becone available to proper individuals witbin thes2 organizations 2 great pressure Will be brought to bear to insist that these building coca violations ar8 corrected and tna possibility strongly ezists tbat court acition Gay follow ard fines may be levied 4s 2n alternative 2 airect 2pproach can be made to established contzcts within tbe city government to bring- such building code violations to te attention 0f appropriate autnorities Anticipated Results 4 penetreting analysis Of the present econonic situation of tne American Nczi Party strorgly indicates 3 NIN 88608 Docld: 32989629_Page 67 by ================================================== Page 68 ================================================== tic py fizmly increasing tre iicancial burden 0f tcis group tbe following results er8 certain: 1. Arerican Nezi Perty public activity will be beld to the barest ninimum due to fear of yssile errest resulting in further economic hardship_ 2 , Tunds will pot p2 available to bring about necessafy repairs on the beadquarters buildizg 3 _ Furds {0r tpe printing ana distzibution Oi litereture Jocelly for recruiting puzposes would not be available 4 Horale 0f the organization in Chicago, which i5 now 2t low ebb would be further lessened tcus czeating feelings 0f dissetisfection azong *he renbership 5 _ As 2 direct zesult 0f itens above tha attrectivenes of,the Anerican Nazi Party to possible recruits would be held 2t a minimum II_ Proposal Divide Loyelty 0f }iembership Against Present Leaders Brief Resume 0f Leadersbip Problens 4t the present tire tbe Chic2go Amnerican Nezi Perty h2s ro establisbez leaders One of baa nenbers , JOENLIALLACE , Tizs eppointed by CSOBCE_LHCOLlROCrmzbz , tbe group 'S eatonal coenznder ; norever F4LL483 hes failed to undertake the responsibilities 0f leedership and 2s 2 result certain dis- satisfaction exists among cenbers As 2 resilt 0f WA5LecrS failure current 2ctivities 02 tbe organizetion ere beirg directed by CHRISECPEZR V29r;z7ICE , who is operating without authority of the national headquarters 4 7 NW 88608_Docld: 32989629_Page 68 ================================================== Page 69 ================================================== Becerse 0f the inectivity end the failure 0f the Chicago orgenization to derozstrste progress tra 88-C2110d "hard core" of the nezbership bave raiszd nurerous questiozs in tc recent past cbcllerging the adequacy and capability 0f Z2ASZ ana-IBEOELICH to nead their orgenization in Cliczgo _ Prozosed Plan of Approzch I* is anticioated thzt through established sources 211 0f wpom are currentt sazbers of tne Lmericin X2.1 23~J in Cliceg8 , feelings 0f discontent ca1 be initiated jurtzez } ccizunicatiOrs wnich wiould indicate.2 thorougn 2nd Substenrial knowledga 0z the Caicago ofrganization could be directed 2t the 2ideng Eeiender-636281- INCOLN-ROCKMElr either 2nonynously or upder tia signature 0f 2 likely member Fibo is known to be 1n disegreerent witb locel leadership 2nd practices Antici2eted Results By concentreting:the efforts 0f tnis progran in 2 €irr but cerefully concealed manzer it is strorgly believed that the following results will be obtzined : 1 . Loyalties 0f the membership will be divided dissension will ba created 2 Tne nationel headquerters of the Anerican Nazi Party will have Sufficient reason to question the. adeguacy &nd capabilities 0f local leadership 3 Through established sources progrers proposed by #hose in leadership capecities can be saboteged wereby the coniidence of both the national peecquerters and tbe Iocal nenbership will be shatzered It iS recognized that the Burezu considers it vital #h21 the {uactiors end nenbership of these orgenizations be bronght #pzo tne "puplic spotlight" Chicago Coes nor deem 5 I NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-69 and ================================================== Page 70 ================================================== '1 such 2n epproach appropriate at this tima due to tha sz2l1 menbersh13 Wbich 2t tbis tize consists of three establisked inforeants of long standirg . Activity to ping public pressure- to bear 2t this perticular tire could jeopardize the position of the threa inforrants wbo fur2ish vsluable infornation to tbis Eureau concerning the rembership 2nd activities 0f the American Nazi Party 2t ` Chicago It is requested that tne Bureau consider the above detailed approaches i2 connection with this program and 2nthorize their institution in Chicago_ NW 88608 Docld:32989629_Page_Z0 ================================================== Page 71 ================================================== '4 A= "60' {0. 77 UITED) SIATES COI AEVZ" Heor andu TO DIRECTOR , FBI DATE: 10/15/64 ZRoW SAC , XOXVILLE SUBTECT - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAA INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS ReBulet to Atlanta 9/2/64 _ in compliance with referenced letter , the Knoxville Office has opened an active control file captioned as above and has assigned this matter to an Agent_ who is experienced in the investigation of hate and racist-type organizations The Knoxville Office currently has under investigation two klan or ganizations The Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Ilux Klan, Inc (DK , KKKK ) has its national headquarters in Chattanooga, Tennessee , and presently has one chapter active Tin that 2re2 Information reflects that the weekly meetings 0f the chapter of this organization are attended by approxi- Gl Iately 25 nembers, although the actual menbership is reported to pe approrisately 45 mexbers The other klan organization under investigation in this division is the United Klans of America_ 7 Inc. , Knights of Ihe Ku Klux Klan (UKA, KKKK) The national headquarters of this organization is located within the Birmingham Division_ Tke organization has active chapters witnin the Knoxville territory at Harriman Maryville Knox- ville and Sevierville _ The Maryville chapter has approximately 127 nembers and the other three chapters have less than 30 members Investigation and information obtained from informants disclose no information that there are any "Action groups" vithin either of the two klan organizations_ Informants have been continuglly reminded to be alert for any members within che groups who might organize strong-axm groups to engage in any violent actions and have reposted no information_Of this nature. MW_BBGQB_Docld:32989629_Page they ================================================== Page 72 ================================================== In corsiCering verious cisruptive ectionc ~83 32 excrcised against these gz Ouj2, i2 skci rit neitner the DK, KK roz 12 UZA , I 02 ihe Attorney Ceneral's list riier 23 13+33 Knoxville territory does not Zie Fithin the treditionali- deep South, there iS, 0f course, some sympathy for organizations such as the klans within the territory 2S evidenced the increased grovth and ectivity 0f these organizations in recent years Within the Knoxville territory there heve been no acts 0f violence within recent years which were attributable to. the klan_ Although there may not be any public sympathy for che klan in this erea, there is certainly no antagonism toward the 01 ganization and many persons have a passive feeling toward its membership and 2ctivities 4 In some instances, politicians have solicited the support of the klan in local elections Just recently_ one 0f the informants of the Knoxvi lle Office, who is 3 high official in the UKA, KKKK , reported that one of the candidates for U_ S . Congress running from the Knoxville district had contacted him and solicited the support 0z kian members on his bebalf Because 0f such factors 2s the above , it is not believed tt the cooperation of individuals can be utilized for plans 0f disruptive action such 25 nigat be available if the ~targets were Cornunist front organizatiors or related groups. In this regard, although news Redia are very cooperative with the 3ureau in this territory, it is not believed that in a program such as this 135, it would be feasible, to utilize news media in any counterintelligence operation in this area . This matter has been discussed with Agents handling investigations of the klan organizations in the Knoxville Division and tne following plans have been suggested_ as feasible for operation against the DK , KKKK and UKA, KKKK in this terri- tory: It is suggested that anonynous telephone calls be made to employers of klan members inferring to the employer: that his company or business must be folloving 2 racist policy in view 0f the fzct that he has an employee (giving his identity) 2 NW_BBGDB_Docld:32989629_Page by ================================================== Page 73 ================================================== Fo is 2 Zenber 0j the klan Or 'gcnization_ These calls Tor_ be iisited to those instences wbeze the klan memnber is 3: 1 by some large company or leading business who would possibij pc concerned about the picture they present to the public con- cerning racial matters_ In view of the previously expressed desires of the officials of the Enoxville Police Department to maintain racial harmony in Knoxville , it is believed that arrangements coula be" nade with the Chief of Police to have one or more squad cars visible in the vicinity 0f the neeting hall of the Knoxville Ilavern on the nights of their neetings It is believed that if the members saw these squad cers parked in the vicinity on 2 continuing basis, it would cause them some epprehension and would 2ct 2s 2 deterrent_ to their activities, 25 wel1 2S possible recruitment 0f net members . The UKA , KKKK often holds public meetings on private property leased for that "purpose _ At these meetings, officials noke speeches and invite spectators to make epplication for rerbcrshi?_ Infornants report that the actual purpose of such 2 Gceting is to publicize the klan and secure new members _ In 2 fem insterces, inforrants have reported that some members arriving at the neetings nave intentionally covered their license plate with 2 confederate flag metal insignia or with 2 facsimile_ On occ2sions, both the rear and front license plates have been obscured or usually only the front license obscured_ It is believed through the cooperation of the High- fay Patrol on 2 comnand level, thet patrolmen might be assigned to the area where the meeting is held So that if the klan nerbers leeving the neeting continue to have their license plate obscured, they may be arrested fof violation 0f the state Law prohibiting such In connection with the informant program of the Knoxville Ozfice, certain persons 2r e interviewed t0 ascertain their cooperation and their potentiels as 2 possible informant It is believed that in such cases where antagonism is shown io *he Agents 1 contact , that 2 later anonymous call might be n2de :o other members accusing the person contacted by the 3 ~ NW_BBGDB_Docld: 32989629_PageZ3 ================================================== Page 74 ================================================== F32 &5 being an informant This would cause 2 disruptive in- fluence "anong the rank and file and would arou58 Sispiciom ard distrust This same plan could be pursued furtrer 2ra cziiz be made to members even though tney had not actually been Con- tacted by an Agent in connection with the informant progren. Additional ideas and tactics were discussed but were not considered feasible Many of the ideas were discarded: because it was believed that other actions proposed vould great jeopardize our present informant coverage _ As the Bureau is avare, this office has informant coverage in these organizations on 2 very high level and we have been able to secure detailed information on membership rolls and_appli- cations, 2s vell 2s detailedfinformation on personal activities 0z members, as well as detailed activity '0f the membership as 2 gr01p The Bureau has previously been advised that the program 0f interviewing klan members at the time of the assassination 0f President KENNEDY and later in connection with the bombings in Birminghan tended to jeopardize our informant coverage, Gre to their high-level positions and the fact that some of the klan menbers felt that the information in the possession oi the FBI could only have been obtained from some high official source in the klan Agent personnel responsible for the klan investigations 218 continuing to give this program thought and attention, and 2s the investigations progress , expect that additional ideas pill be submitted to the Bureau in connection with the status reports_ The inplementation 0f any of the above-listed plans 3 0f course, will not be into effect without Bureau approval and benefit of Bureau suggestions_ NW-88608-Doeld:32989629_Page-74 ly put ================================================== Page 75 ================================================== Ro. :TED SIATES GOI E)"Z Memor andurn 70 DIRZCTOR , FBI DATE: 10/15/64 z0k SAC , #OrtiliZ SCEIECT: COUNTZRIFTZLLIGENCZ PROCRAY INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF FATZ GROUPS ReBulet to Atlanta 9/2/64 . In compliance with referenced letter , the Knoxville Office has opened an active conirol file captioned 2s above and has assigned this natter to a2 Agent who is experienced i2 the investigaiion 0f hate and racist-type organizations_ The Knoxville Office currently has under investigation two klan or ganizetions_ The Dixie Klans , Knights of the Ku Ilux Klen, Inc (D1 , KKKK) hs its national headquarters in Chattancoga, Tenzessee and presently has one chapter active Tin that area _ Infornation reflects that the weekly meetings of the chapier 0f ihis orgenization are attended by approxi L nately 25 nesbers, 2lthoush the actual membership is reported t0_ be approxinately 45 rerbers _ The other klan organization under investigation in this civision is the United Klans of #zerica, Inc_ Knignts of the Ku Klux Klan (UK.A, KKKK) The national headquarters of this organization is located within the Birminghan Division The organization has active chapters within the Kpoxville territory at Harriman Maryville, Knox- ville and Sevierville The Maryville chapter has approximately 127 nembers an& the other three chapters have less than 30 Gerbers Investigetion 2rd information obtained from informants disclose no informetion that there ar2 any "Action groups "1 within either of the two klan organizations_ Informants have been continually reminded to be alert for any members within the groups who #ight organize strong-arm groups to engage in any violent actiors and they have reported no information_Of this nature_ MW_BB6da_Docld:32989629 75 Paqe ================================================== Page 76 ================================================== In considering verious e:sru"ive ections b2 exercised against these gz013S, 11 shczi_ rhat neither the DK , KKKI ror tne UUIE] II on the Attorney Ceneral's list ender 33 234S3 Knoxville territory does not lie within the traditional ceep South, there of course, some sympethy for organizations such 2s the klans within the territory 2s evidenced by tne increased grovrth and activity of these organizations in recent years_ Within the Knoxville territory there have been no acts ` of violence within recent years which were attributable to. the klan Although there may not be any public sympathy for the klan in this area, there is certainly no antagonism toward the Or ganization and many persons have a passive feeling torard its membership and 2ctivities : In some instances, politicians have solicited the support of the kLan in local elections Just recently- one of the informants of the Knoxville Office, who is 2 high 0fficial in the UIA, KKKK , reported that one 0f tie candidates for U_ ~S_ Congress running from the Knoxville district had contacted him and solicited the support of klan nembers on his behalf Because of such fectors 2s the above, it is not believed that the cooperation of individuals can be utilized for plans of disruptive action such 2s might be available if.the targets were Conmunist front organizations or related groups_ In this regard, although news media are very cooperative with' the Bureau in this territory, it is not believed that in 2 program such 25 this iv291 it would be feasible, to utilize news media in any counterintelligence operation in this are2 This matter has been discussed with Agents handling investigations of the klan organizations in the Knoxville Division and the following plans have been suggested as feasible for operation against the DK, KKKK and UKA , KKKK in this terri- tory: It is suggested that anonymous telephone calls be made to enployers of krlan members inferring to the employer that his company or business nust be following a racist policy in viey 0z the fect that he has an emp loyee (giving his identity) 2 MW_BBGOB_Docld.32989629_Page iS1 ================================================== Page 77 ================================================== Tho is 2 eenber of the klan organization These calls TO; ` be iisited to those instances wbere the klan member i5 27 by sone large company or leading business who would possibiy be concerned about the picture they present to the public cor- cerning racial matters_ In view of the previously expressed desires of the ofzicials of the Knoxville Police Department to maintein racial harnony in Knoxville, it is believed tbat arrangements could be" made with ihe Chief of Police to have one Or more squad cars visible in the vicinity of the meeting hall of the Knoxville Klavern on the nights of their meetings It is believed that if the members saw these squad cers parked in the vicinity on 2 continuing basis, it vould cause them some apprehension and would act 2s 2 deterrent. to their activities, as we1l 2s possible recruitment of newv nembers . The UKA, KKKK often holds public meetings on private property leased for that urpose At these meetings, officials make speeches and invite spectators to make application for membership_ Informants report that the actual purpose of such a meeting is to publicize the klan and secure new members In 2 few instances, informants have reported that some members arriving at the meetings have intentionally covered their license plate mith 2 confederate flag meral insignia or "with 2 facsinile On occasions 3 both the rear and front license plates have been obscured or usually only the front license obscured, It is believed through the cooperation of the High- way Patrol on 2 command level, thet patrolmen might be assigned to the area where the meeting is held So thaz if the klan members leaving the meeting continue to have their license plate obscured, they may be arrested for violation 0f the state law prohibiting such in connection with the informant program of the Knoxville Office, certain.persons 2re interviewed €0 ascertain their cooperation and their potentials 2s a possible informant_ It is believed that in such cases where antagonism is shown to the Agents contact, that 2 later anonymous call might be nade to other members accusing the person contacted by the 3 MW_BB6QB_Docld;32989629_Page_ ================================================== Page 78 ================================================== 731 2s being an infortent_ This rould cause 2 disruptive in- fluence 'arong the rank and file 2nd would arous2 sispicioa and distrust Tnis sane plan could be pursued furthcr cra ciis be made to members even though they had not actually been cor- tacted by 2n 4gent in connection Gith the informant progren. Additional ideas 2nd tactics wrere discussed but were not considered feasible_ Hany of the ideas were discarded" because it w2s believed that other actions proposed ould greatly jeopardize our present informant coverage As the Bureau is aware, this office has informant coverage in these organizaiions on a very high level and we have been able to secure detailea information on menbership rolls and_appli- cations, 2S wiell 25 detailed:information on ` personal activities Of members, 2s well as detailed activity of the membership as 2 group The Bureau has previously been advised that the program 0f interviewing klan members at tbe time of the assassination 0f President KZNNEDY and later in connection with the bombings in Birminghan tended to jeopardize our informant coverage, &e t0 their high-level 2ositions and the fact that some of zhe klan nerbers felt that ihe information in the possession 0f the FBI could only haye been obtained from some high official source in the klan Agent personnel responsible for the klan investigations 218 continuirg io give this program thought and attention, and 25 the investigations progress , expect that additional ideas Giil be subnitted to the Bureau i0 connection with the status reports The implenentetion of any of the above-listed plans, of course, Till not be into effect without Bureau approval and benefit of Bureeu suggestions_ "NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-78 put ================================================== Page 79 ================================================== Dn 054 X 7866.N&. CAITEI) STES G( RMEVT Z/emorandur DIRECTOR 9 F3I DATE: 10/15/64 ~RGM S4C 9 RICHMOND s"#JEc= CQUNTERINTZLLIGENCE, PROCR4M INTZRNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF HAZE GROUPS - ReBulet to Atlanta, dated 9/2/64 . The following i8 en analysis 0f potential counter- intelligence action against the American Nazi Party (AN2 ) 3 the only hate or Klan organizetion currently active in the Richrond territory_ The ANP is-headeo--by-GEORGE-~EINCOEV" ROCKWELLS 4F T a Ihite_American -citizer; Wno" resides-with nis 'Army at 6150 wilson Boulevard Arlington, Va . Headquarters of ANP 1s located at 928 North "Randolph St. , Arlington, Va _ The ANP X 'Army consists of about fifteen nondescript incividuals from all parts of the ` country who have no place to g0 & Zhey are between the ages 0i 18 to 40 _ ANP also has remberz throughout the country, totaling about 200_ GEORGE ENNCOEN ROCKIFEEE has many personal idio- syncrasies or weaknesses .which make hin vulnerable for attack, He cannot stand criticism; he.is afraid for his own personel safety; he continually believes that ne has been infiltrated by the Anti-Defamation League the FBI and hate groups , He iS suspicious of 2ll members , 'beiieving they will be potentiel a3sassins Of hinself or spies within his group . In View of these characteristics , it is suggested tnat consideration be given for a careful campaign of corres- pondence: to be sent to~RBEZfWEEL from unnamed individuals to warn him concerning a new member who plans to do bodily harn to hir , NW 88608 Docid: 32989629 Page 79 ================================================== Page 80 ================================================== jurther, 17 t2is conrection, corre spondence cr3l& c2 Cirectea to ROCHHEETE to plant the seed of suspicion I M *c28 2in rew mezbezs, ~dentif;ing them as 'spies or the Inji-Cefenetion League 07 hate groups such as the National States Rigrts Perty (NSRP) Ic is noted that both buildings leased by the ANZ W from "syopathizers are in poor condition ana would be, most liirely, in violation 0f local law It is suggested that con- sideration be given to contecting officials of the Arlington Courty Boarz of Health erd the Arlington County Fire Depart- rent ror 2n official investigation of ANP premises _ zurthermore, 12 this regard it is believed that if reliable nexs sources were epprised of the investigation, tnere 7oula be an expose of tne true conditions of the ANP , resulting 1 public criticism 0z ROCIWEEE Also, the publicity would tenc to frustrete efforts to recruit new and youthful 2drererts xo hold _ny grndeur of ANP when apprised of the true piciure. FOCRELL maintains 2 prirting press at ANP Head - ~carters, 528 2. Randolpn St_ ' > and without this printing press, ANP 2c-_vities wold be greatly impaired_ This printing press i8 2ct2ll; owred: OT 3 former member,_CHRESTOFER AVERY T BAIEEI, %no ieased tne Frinting press to ROCKNETL for 417 pcr Jeaz. inzorretion recently received indicates that BATzY n2s expressec interest in getting back his printing press. It is Suggested tnet consideration be given to approaching BAIBEY , thzough 2 tnird perty, to seek the return of the prirtirs pzess end possibly entertainment of a law suit which seeks tne ~eturn of the printing press . BAELEY is presently residing_i? the Washingtong_ C, area. It i8 roted enimosity exists between ROCKWELL and EENARD RVAFEEEDS,_shezd 2E_NSRP Furthermore, it is noted 'tnat ROCKZELi recenfly Erought suit against FTEEDS for slander in 2 letter written to a third perty_ It i8 suggested that tnis relationsnip could pe Zurther 2ntogonized by inflemmatory correspordence , ostensibly sent to ROCKWEDL NSRP officiels in 3iruingher; Alabana _ It iS thought such corre spondence might al80 resulz in disrupiive 2ction 0f NSRP _ 2 ta NW-88608_Doeld:-32989629_Page 8O D~ by ================================================== Page 81 ================================================== It is recommended that consideration be given €o tne potential counterintelligence actions against ANP 2nd if the Bureau approves , specific recommendations will be immediately submitted. 3 - NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page ================================================== Page 82 ================================================== LTET) STATES kf XUETFC 1/enor andur 7) DIRECZOz , 731 DATE: 10/15/64 7301: SKC J RICHKOid S:"#JEcT : CQUNCE?INTZLLICSNCE PROGRAN INZERNAL SECURITY DISRUZTION OF HATE @ROUPS - ReBulet to Atlartz, deted 9/2/64. Tne following i3 an analysis of potential counter- intelligence action egainst the American Nezi Party (ANP ) , tne only hate or Klan organizetion currently active in the Richmond territory_ Tne ANP is-headed ~by -GEORGE ~EENCOEN. ROCKWELLS "1 2 khite_Anericen -citizer:, wno. resides with his' "Army" at 8150 wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va . Headquarters of ANP 18 located at 928 Norin "Randolph St. , Arlington, Va _ Sne ANP # consists of aboit fifteen nondescript inuividuals Irom el1 perts of the courtry #iho have no place to 50 _ They are cetxeen the ages of 18 to 40 . ANP also has Eember: tnrouznout the country , totaling about 200 . GzezCr-LINCOLN ROCKHIELZ has many personal idio- syncresies or weakmnesses Thich make him vulnerable for attack. He cannot stand criticisr; ne.is afraid for his own personal bafety; he continually believes that he hes been infiltrated pj the Anti-Cefemetion League the FBI and nate groups , He is suspicious 0z 2ll members, beiieving they Will be potential 2ssansins 0f hinself or spies Within his group. In view of these charecteristics, it is suggested tnat consideration be given for 2 careful campaign of corres_ pondence to pe sent to-BO3+EELL- from unnamed individuals to warn nim concerning 2 new menber who plans to ao bodily harm to hin, NW 88608_Docid:32989629 'Page 82 "Aimy ================================================== Page 83 ================================================== Further, in this connection, corre spondence enculd 62 directed to ROCKHEEEE to plant the seed of suspicion' Mi conce rning rewi members , identifying them as "spies or the inti-Cefanation League or hate groups such as the National States Rights Perty (NSRP) It is noted that both buildings leesed by the ANZ M1 from "sympathizers are in poor condition and woula be, mos~ likely } in violation of local law_ It i3 suggested that con- sideration be given to contacting officials of the Arlington County Boerd of Health end the Arlington County Fire Depert- ment for an official investigation of ANP premises . Furthermore , in this regard it is believed that if reliable news sources were 2pprised of the investigation, there woula be an expose 0f tne true conditions of the ANP resul in public criticism of ~ROCInEEL Also, the publicity Tvould tend to frustrate efforts to ~ecruit new and youthful adherents Fno hold Lny grandeur of ANP when apprised of the true ture. ROGKWEEL maintains 2 printing press at ANP Hezd - quarters, 928 N. Randolph Sto , and Without this printing press , ANP 2ctivities woula be greatly impaired This printing press is actually owned: by 2 former member,_CHR-ESTOPER-AVERY BAEEZZY , who leased the printing press to ROCHEETL for-$1--00 per year. Information recently received indicates that BaizY has expressed interest in getting back his printing press . It is Suggested that consideration be given to approaching BAEEEX , tnrough a thira perty; to seek the return of the printing pre8s and posbibly entertainment oi 2 law suit Which seeks the return of the printing press . BAIEE is presently residing_ in the_Washington,_ C. area It is noted aninosity exists between ROCKWEEL and EDWARD" R'APEEEDS ~hexd 0f Furthermore ) it is noted that RCEREEbb recently gEougEe suit against -FIELDS for slarder in a letter Written to a third party _ It is suggested that this relationship could be further &ntogonized by inflammatory correspondence, ostensibly sent to-ROCKNEEL by NSRP officials in Birningham_ 9 Alabana It iS thought such corre spondence #ight also result in disruptive action of NSRP _ 2 ~ NW 88608_Docld:32989629 83 ting pic Doz_ Page ================================================== Page 84 ================================================== Ir is recorzerced that consideration be given zo tne rojertial counte?_ntelligence actions against ANP 227 if the Sureeu approves, specific recommerdations will be irediately submitted. 3 1 NW 88608 Docid: 32989629 Page 84 ================================================== Page 85 ================================================== UZD STATS G ER ENZ I/eor andura DIRXCOR , 731 DATE: f20} { S4C , 842Z SRJECT: COURTERLRTZLLICEICZ P2CGRAM IVTER_HAL 3ZCURITI DISRUFTION Op HATE GRCUPS ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/2/64 _ Thbe Eavannah Office has the following klan_ nobgani zaiions currently under active investigation 1_ Association of Georgia Klans This klan nas. only one klavern, Klavern #24 located in Savannah, Georgia_ It has recently been atterpting to organize 2 klavern in Brunswick,: Georgia, but nas mt mlet with any success CreRLES #ADDOX , ~the-Teede#_of this group is ineffeciive in that he talks 2 great deai about what they should do and what the officers and nenbers should but does not take any specific ection _ 2 Associatio of South Carolina Klans 2 XKKK This klan EOW has only one active klavern withib the Savannah Division and that is Klavern #335 in Test Columbia 8 C This klan has conducted several rallies in South Carolina for the purpose 0z building up their klavern and starting new klaverns } and may have 2 new klavern in Hemingwey , 8 , C_ The ective Jeader 0f cnis klan group appears tc be 202ze ile3e8_ 2 post_af fixeepboyee in Columbiz S. C. 4 2lthough he carries the ritle only oi secretasy. Tnere nave been recent indications thet nembers of tne Board 0f Association oi South Cerolina Klans feel HODGES is usurping their autbority and making decisions_ withoud_ consulting then NW 88608 Docid:32989629 85 a0 , Page ================================================== Page 86 ================================================== 3 _ United Klans 0f America Inc_ 2 KKKK This klan group has the fcliowing 2crive Elovcznz located Iithin the Savannai Division: 2 _ Klavern 0l22ta, S_ C. This klavern moved about 2 year ag0 from Effipghan to Olanta in anticipation of attracting nbre members; but still attracts a Iaxinum} 0f 9 members to its meetings _ b Klaverz Savannah, Georgia The attendants at the meetings of this klavern have fallen off to usually 2 maxinun of 6 _ It did-sponsor one rally in the summer of 1964 which wras considered 2 failure_ Klevern #314, Swainsboro, Georgia- This klavern iS one 0f the most active, but meets only once 2 month_ Hany nmbers- also meer with Klavern #310 , Waynesboro , Georgia, but neither klavern has engaged in any activity other thzn one street welk held in Waynesboro this past sumer The active membership fallen off epparently due to lack of activity during the year a Klavern #310, Waynesboro, Georgia This klavern has only 8 to 10 members in attendance at their monthly meetings and hes lost nenbership during the past year. Klavern #301 Washington, Georgia This %lavern has reportedly been in 2 doubtful state for the past two years The klavern w2S torn by dissension over financial matters about two Jears ago ana has rarely had suzficiant meibers in attendance since that time to hold a meeting. -2- NWV 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 86 #41 #412 has past ================================================== Page 87 ================================================== 2 _ 4ltc22h2 ien Club #72 Bazley, Tnis kiavern is the newest active klavern and has about 40 members 0f which aboui 16 2r0 2ctive_ They ousted one Exalted Cyclops who indicated he favored aggressive action, and several menbers have quit because of the viens of this Exalted Cyclops_ This is the only klavern in the Savannah Division believed to have an "action {1 group vithin the klavern . 4t 2 meeting 31 7/27/64, the Exalted Cyclozs stared CALILIKCR4IG;_SretecErandsPregon 7 hid ~La= advised then I0 start & military unit" They plan to have this unit trained in 2 secret type 0f_ training_ It Ias #ndiceted that in the event the Conmunists and Negroes atteupt *o take: over public facilities_ that the klan would take over operation 0f the railroads_ At 3 neeting on 8/11/64, it was decided the militery unit would be called the "Brothers 0f Patriots" and that they have 2 bank account 2s such A fee is charged to join } and they are going to teach the members judo_ The nost effective disruptive action taken' against the Alan So far wes the interviewing of klan members -in connection with the "Bapbonb" case It is believed the most effective counterintelligence program would be 2 progtam that vould reveal to the members 0f this organization that their identities are know to the F3I This would include 2 program `of harassment by setting up "not too discreet" stake out of the meeting places Of roads leading to meeting places to obtain license nunbers, interview 0f the klan members 7 neighborhood investigations and inquiry 2% their pleces of employnent concerning the members' activity in the klan It is further believed that efforts should be made &uring the course 02 these inquiries to obtain knovledge con cerning the individual menber ' s personzl life wnich might ~3- NW-88608_Docld: 32989629_Page 87 Ca. 89 ================================================== Page 88 ================================================== 1r.sh i3C3171032 that cziid be used in 2 czrpaign of LCIJEOCS #eiepione calis or notes to his family or employer . Curing intervie1s of #enbers, inferences or slight _ts cc-id 32 dropped indicating another specific member 3i ~he klavern 25 the source 0f information On 9/25/64, Chieert ~STRaN;#-(N4) 2 South `Carolina LJw Enzorcerent Division ~(SCLED) Colunbie, S, C . 3 advisea his orgenization had arrested five persons fron the vicinity 02 Rest Colurbie, 8. C. , in connection With the burning of 2 crcss On the gounds 0f the Goverzor 7 S Mansion, Colubia, S_ C_ These persons acmitted they are members of 2 recently Zorned group cf tne United Klans of America, Inc., at West Columbi: , 3 . C. Cbiez.STRO# Said he desires to call 'in several resporsible ne5sppernen fron throughout South Carolina 2 ad Es.- thcz to publish 2rticles in the leading South Carolina ncws;czers, po_nting 0jt to the pablic hov membership in 2 klan organizction 21] burt an individual 1 his family or his children i2 later Jife 8rez ~STpe#_requeszed that the FBI assist him in g2t427473,#7f@-2rion concerning this matter such_ as how REziF4c023ii5 723_ 2f28c2 the_opportunity_Eor ihe klan nember Or re5c?zs 84.1i8 fenily in obteining_empleynent with Ene U ~5; coverrzer: In 22dition 7 sOre klan inforwants are in 2 position to take the side of dissident groups within the klaberns and help *o create Of increase dissension 0' It is requested that tbe Bureau consideration to nelping Chiez-& 2 ~3533w 0z :c 'SCLED in__cojnectioi Jith his 720"est Zor inforration 28-to how_klan _mlembership_ Way prcvcnz e=plerzent by Ilan menbers or ~~lembers CE oi their 70 families ~rt~ "art by #he #edezal covernieat It is also suggested that the Atlanta Office ascertain appliceole stete laWS thaz could be used in the State of Ceorgia in Giscouraging klan menbership, perticularly: on the part 0f state Or local enployees Or eppointees_ NW-88608_Docld:32989629_Page 88 2 give ================================================== Page 89 ================================================== 4"8 " R7 (NiTED SiATES C ERNMENT IFemorandur To DIRZCTOR , F31 DATz: 17 / . 7R04 SAV4Z II SUBJECT : COUXZERINTELLIGCNCE PRCCRAM INTERNAL SZCURITY DISRUPTION Op HATE GROUPS ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/2/64. The Savannah Office has the following klan agrgani- zations currently under active investigation_ Association of Georgia Klans This klan has. only one klavern, Xlavern #24 located in Savannah, Georgia- It has recently peen &ttempting to organize 2 klavern in Brunswick,; Georgia, but has rt met with any success CHARLZS-#-X ADDOX , adex_of this group is ineffective in that he talks a great deal abou t what they should do and what the officers and members should but does not take any specific action 2 _ Association 0f South Carolina Klens KKKK This klan 220w has only one active klavern withi# the Savannah Division and that is Klavern #335 in Test Columbia 3 S C This klan has conducted several rallies in South Carolina for the purpose 0f building up their klavern and starting new klaverns, and may have a new klavern in Hemingway , 8_ C_ The active leader 8f cnis klan group appeers tc be R02z 52S _ 2 ~posiezoffireeptoyee-in Columbia 8. C. 2lthough he carries the titre only of 'secreraty: There nave been recent indications that members of the Board of Association of South Cerolina Klans feel EBOEGES is usurping their authority and making decisions_ Without_ consulting them NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 89 3AC, do , ================================================== Page 90 ================================================== 3 _ Uritec Klans 0f Aeerice, Inc_ KKKK Tnis klan group h25 the following 2c*ivc Aliwczr= located within the Savenna. Divisicn: a _ Klaveze #4,_Olenta, S C This klavern moved about a year 4g0 from Effingham to Olanta in anticipation 0z 2ttracting mbre nembers; but still attracts 2 nazirum 0f 9 members to its meetings . b_ Klavern #41 ) Savanneh, Georgia The attendants 2€ the meetings of this Klavern have fallen .0ff to usually a maximun 0f 6 _ It did-sponsor 0ne rally in the surier of 1364 wnich was considered 2 failure_ Klavern 6314 Swainsboro, Georgia- Tbis kiavern is one of the most active, but seets only once a month. liany lenbers: also 2eet With Klavern #310 , Waynesboro , Georgia, but neither klavern has engaged in any activity other than one street walk held in Waynesboro this pest sumer The active membership has fallen off apperently due to Lack of activity curing the past year . Klavern #310 , Geynesboro, Georgia This klavern h2s only 8 to 10 members in attendance at their monthly meetings and has lost nenbership during the past year rlavezn #301 Eashington, Geor This klavern bas reportedly been in 2 doubtful staie for the past two years Tne klavern w2S torn dissension over financial matters about two Jears ag0 and has rarely had sufzicient nzmbers in attendance since that time to hold 2 meeting. ~2- NW 88608 Docid: 32989629 `Page' 90 'gia Jy ================================================== Page 91 ================================================== f_ 4it22aha Jier S Club#12, Bexleyz Tnis klavern is rhe newest active klavern and bas 2bout 40 members 0i which about 15 2r8 2ctive_ They ousted one Ealted Cvclops who indicated he Zavored aggressive ection, and several members have quit because 0z tbe views of this Ealted Cyclops _ This is the only klavern in the Savannah Division pelieved io have an "action" group within tbe klavern . 4t & neeting 1/27/64, the Ezalted Cyclops stated C4i VS_CR 4IC;-Sgre ErandZrason , bad aGvised tmcn %o stert a nilitary unit" plan to ha ve t is unit trained in 2 secret type 8f treinirg_ Ir was indicated that in rha event the Comunists and Negroes 2ttempt ro take: over public Zacilities, that the klan would take over operation of tne railroads_ At 2 neeting on 8/11/64, it w2S decided the eilitery unit Fould pe called the #Brothers 0z Rctriots" and thet they have 2 bank account 25 such_ 4 fee is charged to join, and they er2 goirg *o teach the menbers judo. The nost effective disruptive 2ction taken against the klan So f2r T2s tre interviewing of klan lembers -in connection mith the "Bapborb" case Iz is believed the most effective counterintelligence prograr woulc be 2 progra-i that would reveal to the members 0z this organization thaz their identities are known to the 131 This rould include 2 prograr `Of harassment by setting up : nor to0 ciscreet" stake out 0f the neeting places O1 roads leading to zeeting places to obtain license numbers, interview 02 the klan Ezzbers 3 neignborhood investigations and inquiry :t tncir pleces 0f employrent concerning the members 3 activity: in the klan. It is further pelieved rhat efforts should be made curing ihe course 0f these incuiries to obtain knowledge concerning the incividual Eeriber'S personal life wnich might -3- NW-88608-Doeld:32989629_Page 91 Cz- They ================================================== Page 92 ================================================== 2.13m inforzation that couid be used in 2 cemipaign 0f ercnynors telephone calls or notes to his family or employer . During interviews of menbers inferences or slight Wris cojld be dropped indicating enother spccific monber 0z tke ~levern 2s the source of information On 9/25/64, Chieize__EzSTRal;-(N4) , South 'Carolina L2v Zeforcement Division (SCLED) Colunbia, S. C- advised his orgenization had arrested five persons fron the vicinity 0f Mest Colunbia , S , C. 2 in connection With the burning 0f 2 cross O2 the grounds of the Governor S Mansion, Columbia , S C_ These persons admitted they are members of a recently Zormed group of the United Klans of America, Inc., at West Colunbie; 3 C_ Ghief STROW: said he desires io call in several responsible nerspapermen from throughout South Carolina ) ad 2s - thca to publish articles in the leading South Carolina nerspapers , pointing out *o the public how membership in 2 klan organization w2] hurt an individual, his family or his children in lctcr life_ Crzef_STre#_requested that the FBI assist him in gathering informafion concerning this matte such 25 how zion _Feapersiip E21ffect the_opportunityfor_Ehe Elan nember Or menbers 0i his family in obtai employmet with tne #l 05S; "Govezzment In 2ddition 3 Some klan inforwants are in 2 position to take the side of dissident groups within the klaberns and help to create or increzse dissension_ It is requested that the Bureai consideration to helping 'Chief-#rn ~SZROw Qf;tke "SCLIP_ inconnection fith ks redlest for, infornation 2s-io_hol_-klan _membership Qay roveng @@pleyenz by klan menbers or c,members WMtyx 0f their families Io 37 1n~ by-tle Zederal Goveriinent 204O It is also suggested thae the Atlanta Office ascertain applicable state lawS that could be used in the State of Georgia in discoureging klan membership , prticularly: on tbe part of state or local employees or appointees_ NW-88608-Doeld: 32989629-Page 92 nins_ give ================================================== Page 93 ================================================== Mermor andurn 7 DIRECTOR , FBI DATE: October 15, 1964 Rol SAC , BALTIMORE SLBJECT: 'COUNTERITELLIGENCE_PROCRAM INiERNAL SECURITY DISRUFTION 0F HATE GROUPS Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta datea Septenber 2, 1964. A reviewr of Baltimore files reflects that there are presently no Klan organizations opereting Within the territory covered oy the Baltinore Office Baltimore files reflect that there ere several alleged members of the American Nazi Party (ANP) living in the Baltimore area However these individuels are associated mith the ANP located in the territory covered by the Richmond Office and there are no ANP groups in the Beltimore territory_ The Fighting American Netionalists (FAN) orgenization in the Baltinore erea is defunct Tne Hational Stetes Rights Perty NSRP ) wa.5 to SOme extent active on tha Easter Shore of Maryland during the Spring "end early Summer Of 1964 but there has been no reported activity there in recent months The only evidence of current ectivity by the NSRP in the Baltimore area are news stories which appeared in the Septemoer 28 &nd September 30 , 1964, editions of tbe Beltimore Evening Sun, Thich reflected that tvro Baltinore County Counciluen received letters Irom WILLIAM BRA EESFORD , organizer ii 0i tne NSRP 9 threatening to 'peper their districts with derogatory pemphlets 12 they voted for a proposed civil rights bili in Baltinore County. Information wes 'als0 received that 2 leeflet out by the NSRP entitled "A Stab in the Back" @as peing distributed in the Tows on , Maryland, erea Of Baltimore county . In view of the current lack of activity by Klan and nete groups mithin the Baltimore Division territorj, the Beltimore Ozfice is not in a position at this time to make any specific recommendations for counterintelligence action NW 88608 Docld:32989629 'Page 93 put ================================================== Page 94 ================================================== Tne Baltimore Office will be alert for any opportunities for potential counterintelligence action ageinst pertinent orgenizetions or individuals active within the Baltimore Office territory. L 2- NW 88608_Docld:32989629 94 Page_ ================================================== Page 95 ================================================== ~Mterorandur DIECTOR , FBE DA TE: dcko 15, 1954 ROM SAC , BALTTXORE :eJECT: 'CQUTTERINTRLZ "GZZICE__PROCRAM IMzERMAL SECUREY DISRUPTION 07 HATZ GROUPS Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta dataa Septenber 2, 1964. A review 0f Baltinore files refiects that tnere are presently no Klen organizations opereting within the territory covered oy the Saltipore Ozrice_ Baltimore files rerlect thet therz ere several alleged rembers of the American Nazi Party (AN?) living in the 3altinore erea Hoxever these individuals are es3ocieted mitn tre AWiP located in the territory cotered by the Richeond Office ena there are no ANP groups in the Beltimore territory_ Tne Fignting Azerican Netionalists (FAM) orgenizetion in the Baltinore erea is defunct _ The Mationel Stetes Rights Party NSRP) was to SOme extent active on tne Estern Shore of Maryland during the Spring 44 early Surmer of cut there has bzen no reported ectivity tbera in recent zonths Tne only evidence Of current ectivity by the NSRP in tre Baltimore area are news stories which eppeared in the Septezber 23 end September 30, 1964 3 editions 0i t2e Beltimore Evenirg Sur, Miich reflected that tio_Beltinore Coun Bouncilmen received letters irom WILLIAM33ATESFORD , orgenizer 8i of the #SRP , threatenirz t8 'paper"i their districts with derogatory Pemphlets ir tney voted for a proposed civil rights bili in Baltizore County Information was also received that 2 leaflet out by tne MSRP entitled Stab in the Back" 138 ceirg distributed in the TCAsOn , Karyland, area of Beltimore county . In view Oz tha current lack 0f activity by Klan and hete grou2S mithin the Seltizore Division territorj, the Belticore Ozfizz is not in 2 position &t tnis time to make specific reeomandations for" ccinserintelligence action_ NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 95 1964 y "A put any ================================================== Page 96 ================================================== Tre Zeltizore Ozfice #ill be 2lert zor |ezy ppportunities for Potentiel cojnterintelligence ac818n] ageinst bertinent crsen_zetiors 8z indivizuals ective within the Baltimore Offic? territorj. -2- ~Nw88608_Docld:32989629_Page 96 ================================================== Page 97 ================================================== Nc- U:TZD S1 TzS CoT ~VWE)T 1/Leror andum 3-230203, 7E3 DATZ: 2c/12, Y ^ 32, GZZIZ SUZjECT: ' SEEZINZHIIAZCE PROGRAM IZZzP_WAL SZCUEIZY DISRUFTICV_03_1442.GRQUPS_ 22 zurea3 lettar to 4tlanta, 9/2/64. Anslysis 0z Potential CI Action Against Orgenizations and Personnel of United Kians 0z Arerica, Inc KKKK UKA ) Zsproved Ord2r of the {.8 Klans KKKI , inz (Iousi} ; and the 4labama States Rignts Party (ASRP) 72les on car-zoned orzanizations have been reviewved 4: %22 7041e Ofrice to :iscover any information of the ~cirG xrich koila preyert a potertial for effective CI Ec332. 213 rcv_e% cz 2ile8 includes the files Of the or erezabioc3 tkezsalve3 and of individuais known to be Orzicar8 231 Z_cers 0z' 322 organization It is the under_ 3*1-24n3 c2 {218 office t22t this information would consist ~t_1-ior8 i-volvirg zotential friction between individual 3078 3r catzaen rivz organizetions or woula consist of _ror_ction rezlecting __oralitj, particularly sexua1 iErc-olisy on tre Z2rt 0z one Or rore menbers 5 sossibly fvo_vn3 &ne #ife 0r Kves of other members ; Of consi sting generelly 32 inforrzticr 0z 3 nighly unfevorable or embarrass _ ing nature r2rtaining 5o 2 memier or group of mezbers which wOuZc be not mo:n, 2nd ~he exposure of Rihicn could produce ctable ccnflicts 4 cinimum 0f such information is con- jeirzi in Rcc_ia f+les pertaining to Klan and States Rights 23768 52p30n21_ Trere rve pezr conflicts be tween individuels 660 Srcp5 2: cetkea renbzrs 0f different groups_ 3 buz ~oa) eonriicts rzva elready ratured and have alreedy pro_ 632d tre divie_on and eninosity 0f Ivhich the situations 32 2~ze2_e Un_ie pzrsonnel 0f |communist orgenizations NW-88608-Doeld:32989629_Page 97 ================================================== Page 98 ================================================== 2i2 0F3234z*iors 3ra nod perticrl;rij E~c_1t, 2524 23 irforvicr 8 1C23- 21 ilcac_ng Jromieclity On tha part of 2 Kleiorig xir ~ 216 of 2 Ilansmen, altnough infcreants whc furrim ciaclon perteining to 6.232 individuals are faidy well A.1nRed with rany oz tnen Approx inately two years 250 , 82 31 s_n did becorze jealous Then a single Klan member (rnzzzried) flirted Mith nis wife at a social function_ Zoxever , tb rarried rember iS no longer 2ctive , and trere <3 noz Ioiin *o bave been 2ny further developrent of tnat 3ituation_ Pertinent to this analysis is the following observztion: :ithin tne past 70 days , Kontgorery, Ala . , xere ectivity of UKA end ASRP are centralized has exrerienced desegregation of resiaurants hoteis 3 motels , 2rc public scools, pursvant to the 1964 Civil Rights 201 End pursrant to orders of the United States District coizi at Kontgozery_ Initially_ } particularly on 7/4 ana 2/:/3", following tnz passage of tne 1964 Civil Rights #8, tnere K2s an atterpt by Klansnen to gather ana con- spir2 for; t22 purpose 02 interfcring Ivitn the desegregztion cf :ovie theaters ara restauranis in downtonn Montgomery _ Eo:cver , Kobile inrormants furnished information well in viilce cf tra actual. pcoposed action; enabling Mobile to 3-12Y thna Kontgomzry Pclice Department Thne Police Depert- L6 actec very proxptly &nd effectively 3 disburs Klanssen 3J cad 3awherea in tre danger area , and raking it quise 0_22r that 20 unlawful activity Of interference with tne eorcerent 0f trz Civil Rights Act would be tolerated _ 3032 tne iect trat tne informetion was leaked r0 authorities and tke fact 82: the authorities took effective action wer? highly demorelizing to the Klan personnel who are 2130 the Only 3ignif_cent personnel of the ASRP) Tne Cenorelization Nas S0 conplete tht when Montgomery public scrools were desezregated, Klanszen did not even appear in t22 vicinities 0f tne schools and took no action of an] %nd 3 cither at the schools or in any other place > in eny efrort t0 interzere mizh the desegregation It 13 therefore fully evident that the purposes Eoigt by thz CI program, tnat is the dmoralization and t22 ~enderirg ineffective 0f such organizations 3 Was 4ccc5712shea direc: investigation and Police action 53 EEplicetior 13 interded tnat the work of tre Mobile 3ff:je zs s22n firally done pertaining to these orgerizations 2 NW 88608_Docld: 32989629 Page 98 irE 1964 pJ ================================================== Page 99 ================================================== -8ci, t22 current prosren of the Mobile Office is "J R-913iC] ira make zore extensive the inforniantc cover- e3 of pertirent organizations_ These inforrants Iill be 22-6icularly alert for persoral information 02 tre kird #hich nigit be siiitable for the institution of CI &ction in tre iuture 3 and such inforration will be diligently s33.t pJ Agents" conductirg investigation concerning these orjanizations and individuals Mobile will also continue t0 b2 alert for any opportunity to utilize the system Which 23 ceen effective in the past_ tnat of cooperating with 2ocel lavi enforcenent to take the kina of action which dis_ col;reges unlawrul action on the part of the Klan groups Recomrendation Tne Mobile Office hes no recommendation for any logical immediate CI action at tnis time Action Groios Mobile racial infornants have furnished the _fcnt_ ies' cf #3t individuals within tre UKA and ASRP who 2r3 ccrsidered tke most, likely to commit acts of violence or ini_miCetior Rsk of these persons have been under _vcscigation for sone time , and in many instances Summry epcrrc izvc bezn furnisred to the Bureau pertaining to then. Ir 22:* of %re insiances of pombings in the vicinity of Zontmorcry, Ala 3 including the bombings in Mississippi in rec3n) 322.3 J Agents hvc interviewed neighbors and employers 32 ~1232 irdiv_duels and have rade visual checks_ J particularly ict2 2+ night, in efforts to 2scertain wnether or not the pezcon8 tierselves mere home or Ihether or not their auto_ Zokiiez Herz F.rec at sheir residences In many ceses, ed probably in most cas2s, trese Klan personnel pecome 2xer2 oi' these inquiries and on several situations it i8 Ic: tiat tney observed 4gents checlcing their cars and obcerv_ng tncir residenczs at night @nes persons are tkerezore uder the imprcssion tnat Bureau Agents have them undcr Virtuelzy constent surveillance Trey rerarked to cch otner {n the presence Of' inforrants 0n occasion that tk2] feel {h2t tkeir telephones are tapped and they have als0 2--pr2c328 trz fear that their reeting places are 81;6 Zecte8 to cicrophone devices It iS pelieved that this 1833 0: s22r %rt constitetes a very effective deterrent, 228 Fzy Kil be 2 princ ipc1 reason for their failure t0 32j &3 Z.l2rfl1 Zzsliies in connection with tha racial 3 NW 88608_Docld: 32989629 Page 99 3x ================================================== Page 100 ================================================== Tieon 2 sni: 8122 xibrin ?ecent Iveels ; Through in- 7 ~ c2 nzouzo obzezva:_ons of license tags` of auto_ 01103 pried at meeting plac2s, Mopile Ofice is cor;ertlj E-ozn_rg of the identitics 0f nCw percorc Mho Gva 3o5C ;ocontiel 3 violence In 111 Such ca8c8 , a Ca3e filc i3 cjena 0n tnat individual, his identity being establisned 22d ris backgrond being obtained _ No particular effort is cide t0` !izep ihcse investigations So discreet that the Klans _ rn 3il1 not learn that the FBI iS inquiring about hin Irij practice iS deemzd to be effective with respect to trzse individuals As set fortn hereinbefore, Mobile will intensify it3 efforts to discover information which can pe used in 102 CI program Pertaining to the possibility of exposure 0f Kien &rd Klan-type activities through reliable news media, ~1 3.ould be observed Dnat it is the firm policy of news 8 in tnc Kcntgoxery Al2 > , area to completely ignore 3.0a Xlan Soups 3 End t0 give them n0 publicity at a1l_ 280292 mortks 3 UC4 1as &ld several lic rallies, T cisirg SOr xitn Z2afle: distribution and even one 4 232 0z 9 redio advertisenent They have 2a ~he pre3s *0 atkend trcse rellies, noping to secure 3__city Izom them_ Again, 1t 18 believed that the 732203 Of tr pre38 %o ~snore these groups has nad che 3c36 desireble effect, both in frus treting then in their Geerch zor puolicity, ard in avoiding edvertising then 1402, if done 3 nignt rally more ersons to the Klan cause 222 resiiz in their increesing their membership_ Peczuse cf tnzge corsiderations, it is believed that at least in 3h13 crea tne current press policy of ignoring the Klan 10 3ze effective than would pe a' policy 0f exposure 0f tz 2vils 02 the orgenizetions MW_BB60B_Docld: 32989629_PagelQ _ AJ pub spoz paic ================================================== Page 101 ================================================== Attached hereto is the response to Item 4F2 in the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter to Mr . K. William 0' Connor , on 14 , 1975 . Item 4+2 is set forth as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which contain or reflect studies of counterintelligence and disruption tactics and the making of appropriate recommendation as mentioned in approved Recommendation 183 On page 5 of the 30 , 1964 memorandum captioned Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups' from J_ HS Gale to Mr Tolson. 0 NWN 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 101 July Esq: July ================================================== Page 102 ================================================== Attached hereto is the response to Item 42 in the Senate Seleet Committee (SSC) letter to Mr. K William 0' Connor, on 14, 1975_ Iten #2 Ls Set forth as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which contain or reflect studies of counterintelligence and disruption tactics and the making of appropriate recommendation as mentioned in approved Reconmendation 13 on page 5 Of the 30 , 1964 memorandum captioned Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups' from J. H. Gale to Mr - Tolson _ " NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 102 Esq' July July ================================================== Page 103 ================================================== oronak lou ~o. 1 Min-to6 MT 04 N. Eeaioo Ho. 77 Bison UNITED STATES GC RNMENT Mont Miohr "so 'Memorandum Ccnrad Peypack TO MR. TOLSON DATE: July:), 1964 Savaran Trotter Tele. Roor FROM J. E. Holmes Gandy SUBJECT: NVESTIGA TION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE GROUPS I) Mr _ Sullivan has proposed that the development of informants in the Zu Klur Klan (KKZ) and other hate groups a8 well as tne investigation and penetration O tnese organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID): He bases his recommendations on the premise that organizations like the KKK and supporting groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses of action that are inimical to the Constitution a8 are the viewpoints of the Communist Party_ He does not maintain that the actions of the hate groups constitute the same menace a8 the Communist Party inasmuch as are not controlled by a foreign power . C-uneeinTelli9e, Praqr Disru 0 F N_Te Cra-y , _ He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources, sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of a highly specialized nature, etc: , and that his division could this experience to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups. Mi_ Sullivan feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups with the Same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party is concerned: He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question: He states the Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial n tters and civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KKK and Similar organizations to confuse the issue_ He feels that because of the stepped up activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent marked confusion from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DI assumes these responsibilities. The functions in question were formerly handled by the DID up until 1958 when were transferred to the General Investigative Division: This matter was 2 considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/ 58 and the transfer recommended 1 ~ Mr . Rosen 1 ~ Mr . Sullivan REc 30 1ElC] 1 7 Mr . Belmont ~ Mr . Mohr E JHG;wmj (7) Enclosures_: Ox 4 SEP 28 TsY' "4 05T SENT DIRECTOR 'IusE? 28 1.54 7-34-6 NW88008-Doeld 32980629 Page--03< '4i GALEY they pTish) #i put they ~ t( EX-108 [NAUsTC ================================================== Page 104 ================================================== Memo Mr'. Tolson Re: Investigation of,Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these responsibilities from the DI in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such incidents after their occurrence. Mr. Rosen was opposed to the transfer of the functions in questio to the General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that he maintains that the development of informants and the penetration of the Klan and other hate groups are primarily intellizgence functions which shoula be handled by the DI &8 suzzested bv Dlr: Sxlliveu 3E~a Rczon feels #t 2520] ~n best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united in one division a8 suggested by Mr: Sullivan: Mr. Rosen points out that the development, supervision and administrative handling 0f racial and security informants are analogous. Mr < Rosen feels that there is & tendency toward oversimplification in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups: He points out that the murders of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination of President Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate g1 up members whereas i;-stigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of Evers ad Moore were without organization affiliation and the Pred dent was slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Mr _ Rosen and Mr. Sullivan both agree that the investigation of individual cases, i. e. bombings, murders, police brutality, etc. 3 should be handled by the General Investigative Division. Mr . Rosen feels that whether subject or victims are Klan members, Communist Party members or completely without organizational affiliation has no more bearing on our supervision f the substantive civil rights violation than it would have jf the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment; Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act: Mr . Belmont disagrees with Messrs: Rosen and Sullivan and feels that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative to the Domestic Inteligence Division is theoretically appealing; it is not a practical answer to our problem_ He states that at the time 0f the 1958 transfer of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the activities of the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation. He feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958,,because, over - whelmingly, OUr interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with integration and civil rights: Mr . Belmont believes the transfer of functions would create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc. is through information developed from the inside as & result of coverage estabiished in the 8 2 - NW 88608 Docld:32989629. Page 104 fow 2 ================================================== Page 105 ================================================== Memo forlMr _ Tolson Re: Inves tigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups community where the crime occurred; i. e. informants and' sources in 'the Klan, hate groups, subversive organizations, but also sources not connected with any group, who Wil report potential violence and individuals prone to violence. We are following the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence even though have not violated a Federal law as He feels that the Division that is going to investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose. Mr _ Belmont does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the Bureau from an invesigative standpoint nor in meeting tne heavy Fesponsibilities we no have in this area. VEWS OF TH NSPECTION DIVISION: Inspector feels there is certainly some merit and logic in Mr . Belmont's reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white. Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of information between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters 0f information are brought to the attention of each other a8 they arise from matters for which each Division is primarily responsible. However, ii seems the issue ioday just 28 in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question. In 1958 it clearly lay in the General Investigative Division because, accor to information available to the Bureau at that time, in practically no instances had racial incidents been caused 0r inspired by Communist Party elements although the Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after occurred. in 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations. Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic Intelligence Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced & definite interest in the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be exploiting it to an ever-increasing extent; Although prosecution for civil rights and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so a8 to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities. This seems more properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Analysis was made by Inspector relative to coverage of the Klan and other hate groups . The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage on certain key Klan figures, J ve interviewed at least once all known Klan members} all Klan leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan member. A weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning informant development: However , undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns tat have been formed since the civil rights bill passed There is no question about 1 Swv drb mrl athRZ a~nd 0 2 Lsza bh_~a NW 88608 Docld: 2989629_Page_105 they yet: reai 'ding they Also, Lim 37 ================================================== Page 106 ================================================== Memo for Mr _ Tolson Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups the fact that the DD has had broad experience in the penetration of S1 JVersive organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the onimunist Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this experience and know-how could be to advantage :n penetrating the Klan and other hate groups. The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division as outlinzd by 1z. 811347212411. 1imrCitj33ill}16825_44325 c _.ig hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases. Under the proposed transfer of phases of.the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, Mr- Rosen to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations nd other criminal violations_ This dual responsibility, however should pose no problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled in the Bureau today. In this regard it will be noted that the adninistrative hamdling of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative Divisioi Waich includee the informants being utilized On General Investigative Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles the informant and intelligence aspects of organized crime. However the General Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy, Extortion, Assaulting & Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment violations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing Criminal Intelligence informants. It is understood that there have been no in- soluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information between the General Investigative Division and the DI I any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and: supervision 0n the field if these functions are transferred The same Agents in the field will be working the cases and developing the informants: However , it is felt that the DI should be given a chance to demonstrate whether their broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups_ I is felt that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly merits further consideration_ It is also felt that the proposed series of field con- ferences on this problem should be favorably considered: "4 - NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 106 good put ================================================== Page 107 ================================================== Memo for Mr _ Tolson Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups RECOMMENDA TIONS: 1. That the responsibility for development of informants and gathering Of intelligence 0 the KKK and other hate groups be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the DID. (T approved, appropriate memorandum Will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DID. ) M<. X 2 That a series 0f regional field conferences be held appropriate Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and aggrecsive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration: (Tf approved, to be coordinated by Mr _ Belmont. ) a H . 3 That counter-intelligence and disruption tactics be given further study by DI and appropriate recommendations made. 98 D-TAv 3 5 - NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page_107 by Veare Ce ================================================== Page 108 ================================================== ONAL 'Qam Ko; 10 soio-iog ip62 Edition GeN {t6. No: 37 Tsison VNITED STATES GC RNMENT Xhont Mohr 3c Memorandum r Conraa DeLipach TO MR. TOLSON DATE: JulyaO, 1964 {ose "lvcn Tavel Trotter FROM J. H. GALEQ' FalmeRcon Gandy SUBJECT: NVESTIGA TION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE WY GROUPS Ox Mr _ Sullivan has proposed that the development 0f informants in the Ku Klur Klan (KK ) and other hate groups a8 weil &8 tne investigation ana penetration 0f these organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID): He bases his recommendations on the premise that organizations like the KKX and supporting groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses of action that are inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints 0f the Communist Party. He does not maintain that the actions Of the hate groups constitute the same menace a8 the Communist Party inasmuch as are not controlled by a foreign power . @euneiiTelli qem & Proqr Disru pTisn 0 F N_Te Cro-p,-6 , He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources, sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of a highly specialized nature, etc. , and that his division could this experience to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and ther hate groups. Mr . Sullivan feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups with the Same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party is concerned: He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question: He states the Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial matters and civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KKK and Similar organizations to confuse the issue_ He feels that because of the stepped up activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent marked confusion from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DID assumes these responsibilities. 2 lv The functions in question were formerly handled by the DD up until 1958 0 when they were transferred to the General Investigative Division: This matter was - considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/ 58 and the transfer recommended 8 1 4 Mr . Rosen 1 Mr. Sullivan REc 30 1: 4 1 5 Mr . Belmont 1 G Mr . Mohr_ JHG;wmj (7) Enclosuresr_Ox 3 SEP 28 i984 1Y' 6 11 I6T SENT DIRECTOR IUseF z8 34 7-3/-6 $ N88608Decld 329890297Page-108z, 4 they w1n! put *( Ex-108 @Fuscd ================================================== Page 109 ================================================== Memo for: Mr _ Tolson Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these responsibilities from the DI in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the {racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such lincidents after their occurrence. Mr . Rosen was opposed to the transfer of the functions in questio to the General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that he maintains that the development Of informants and the pepetration of the Klan and other hate groups are primarily intelligence functions Which should be handled by the DID &8 suzzestec by Bir. Sulli-n Ti 2c33n feclst 2+t: 222 2n best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united in one division a8 suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr _ Rosen points out that the development, supervision and administrative handling of racial and security informants are analogous_ Mr _ 0 Rosen feels that there is a tendency toward oversimplification in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups. He points out that the murders Of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination" of President Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate g1 up members whereas investigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of Evers and Moore were Without organization affiliation and the Pred dent was slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Mr _ Rosen and Mr . Sullivan both agree that the investigation of individual cases, i. e- bombings, murders, police brutality, etc. 3 should be handled by the General Investigative Division. Mr _ Rosen feels that whether subject or victims are Klan members, Communist Party members Or completely without organizational affiliation has no more bearing on Our supervision of the substantive civil rights violation than it would have if the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment; Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act. Mr . Belmont disagrees with Messrs_ Rosen and Sullivan and feels that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative to the Domestic Inteligence Division is theoretically appealing, it is not a practical answer to our problem He states that at the time Of the 1958 transfer Of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the activities 0f the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation: He feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958, because, over 5 whelmingly, Our interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with integration and civil rights. Mr . Belmont believes the transfer of functions would create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc: 9 is through information developed from the inside as a result of coverage established in the ~2 4 NWV 88608 Docld:32989629 109 Page ================================================== Page 110 ================================================== Memo for Mr_ Tolson Re: Inves tigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups community where.the crime occurred; ile_ informants and sources Iri t ie Klan, hate groups, subversive organizations, but also sources not connected with ny; group, who Will report potential violence and individuals prone to violenee W are following the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence ever though they have not violated a Federal law as He feels that the Division that is going to investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose_ Mr. Belmont does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the Bureau from an invesigative stanapoint nor in meeting tne heavy esponsibilities we now have in this area. VEWS OF THE NSPECTION DIVISION: Inspector feels there is certainly some merit and logic in Mr Belmont's reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white. Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of informaton between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters Of information are brought to the attention 0f each other as they arise from matters for which each Division is primarily responsible- Fowevef , ii seems {he real issue today just as in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question. In 1958 it clearly Jay in the General Investigative Division because, accor- to information available to the Bureau at that tire, in practically no instances had racial incidents been caused 0r inspired by Communist Party elements although the Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after occurred. in 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations. Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic Intelligence Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced & definite interest jn the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be exploiting it to an ever-increasing eztent; Although prosecution for civil rights and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so a8 to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities: This seems more properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division: Analysis was made by Inspector relative to coverage of the Klan and other bate groups . The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage %n certain key Klan figures, J ve interviewed at least once all known Klan members} all Klan leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan member. A weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning iniormant development: However , undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns tat have been formed since the civil rights bill passed There is no question about 17+ thua Sun dmb snl NW 8860-docldk32989624-Rage i! 574 3 S3dkk~S~e ; yet. 'aing they Also, Li ================================================== Page 111 ================================================== Memo for Mr. Tolson Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups the fact that the DD has had broad experience in the penetration of subverSive organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the Communist Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this experience and know-how could be to good advantage in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups. The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division 2S outlined by 1z. 81.22d13 2ii3cu673;511021NC3_43e5 C c7inge hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases. Under the proposed transfer of phases of the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, Mr _ Rosen to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations and other criminal violations_ This dual responsibility, however should pose no problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled in the Bureau today. In this regard it will be noted that the administrative handling of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative Divisioi- Which includes thc informants being utilized On General Investigative Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles the infurmant and intelligence aspects of organized crime However the General Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy, Extortion, Assaulting & Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment volations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing Criminal Intelligence informants: It is understood that there have been no in- soluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information between the General Investigative Division and the DDD_ In any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and: supervision on the field if these functions are transferred The same Agents in the field Will be working the cases and developing the informants. However , it is felt that the DI should be given & chance to demonstrate whether their broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups: It is felt that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly merits further consideration. It is also felt that the proposed series of field con - ferences on this problem should be favorably considered: ~4 - NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 111 put ================================================== Page 112 ================================================== Memo for Mr Tolson Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and' Other Hate Groups RECOMMENDA TIONS: 1. That the responsibility for development 0f informants and gathering 0f intelligence on the KKK and other hate groups be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the DID. (If approved, appropriate memorandum will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DI. ) 01<: h 2. That 2 series Of regional field conferences be held by appropriate Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and aggressive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration. (Tf approved, to be coordinated by Mr. Belmont. H . 3. That counter-intelligence &nd disruption tactics be given iurther study by DI and appropriate recommendations made. YX YM 271"' 3 5 - ; NW 83608 Docld: 32989629_ Page_412 ax Vrsre ================================================== Page 113 ================================================== BaC , Atlanta Septenberj2, 1964 Dfrector, FBI (157-9-Bajo) PEBSOHAL AND CCIFIDETTIAL 4 Belnont CCUITERINTELLIGEICE_PEOGRAH 3 ~ H; Sullivan IZZEZIAL SECURIZY 1 ~E; Gzuygardner DIEtZZIC &7 ECZ CzICZS_ 0 E , Treinor 1 ~ Mr . By2n Lufukt 1 Effective irediately, the Brrezu 19 iratituting 9 coprdinated Ccunterintell-cence_PEogza= (Cointelpro} directed against Ilan7tyja and hate organizations. OfficEs receivirg Copies 0f this letter are instracted to Iurediately Open an active cortrol file, capticned 2s ahove, and to as81g0 responsibility for t513 prograz to ap experienced eud iraginative Special Agent Gbo is vell versed i Investigction '0f bate &nd racist_type organizations and their nenbership. Yba purrose 0f this progtm Is to expose disrupi end othernise reutralize the activities 0f the various Klans 7 8 ad hate orgenizatious, their leadership and 2daercnts, = ~/ T/o activitics 02 tiese grojps cust ia fllowed Ob 2 continious basis So ve rzy take advantage Of a11 Oppor - ~ tunities for Counterintelligerce and also inspire action 3 1 In irstances Fhere circistances warret, Tke deviojs H 1 saneavcrg ard duplicity 0z tbese groupb wust be ' exposed to public scrutiny tbrough the cooperation 0f reliable 2 Mvs redia sourczs , both locally a.d at tbe Seat o2 2 Goverr ent. Te must frastrate a1y effort Of the group5 t0 Corsolidate tbeir forces or to recruit rev Or yothful amherents _ Ia evezy instance , consideration Should be given to disruptirg the organized activity 0f these groups and *o opportunity shonld be missed to capitalize DpcD organizational and personal Conilicts 0f &neir leaderghip 2 Belticore MAILED Lenpbis REG T1Ei_ Bircingian 2 Hlazil ARo Charlotte SEA 3 19642 Eobile SEP 4411964 Tolson 1 Ghccsogvill COMMFBI 2 Her %ole Belmont Jackson Richzond Cosper Yzozville 2 Savannah Callahan Congad 2 elttle Bock 3 Tampa DeLodch Evans Galv; 100-3-Tof_lain (CPUSA, Cointelpro) Rogea Sulkvan Tavel NCTE : See neno Baungardner to Sullivan, 8/27/64,.Sane' caption, Trotter Tolo. Rcom DR:bgc, Goldy:_ DR: bEE ROOM C04ZH] TELETYREUNIT 0p2,_813 P NW 88608-Docid:372989029_Page-M-3 0/ SrleansucyP Q J#x) ================================================== Page 114 ================================================== Letter to Atlanta RE: COUETTERITELLIGEECE PBCGRAM INTEREIAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF JATE GROUPS 157_9-_Jiain Thc following Elen Organigetions durrently under acti-e 4=72324-322-2, slcul4 3e corsidared for counterintelligerce action: 1 Assoclation Of Arkansas Klans 0f the Enlghts 0f the Ku Klux Elan . 2, Asgociation 0f Georgia Klang , 3 Assoclation of South Carolina Klans, Knigbts 0f tbe Ku Kluz Klaa. 4. Christian Knights 0f the Ku Klux Klan, H:nton , West Virginia. 5 Dizie Klans , Knights 0f tha Ku Klux Klan, Inc 6, Improved Order OP the U. 8 Klans , Koights of tbe Ku Klux Klan, Ixc, %: Independent Klavern, Fountain Ina_ Independent Klar Unit, 8t. Augustine, Florida 9 Knights 0z the Ku Klux Elac, Aka . 10_ ulssissippi Knights 0f tke Ku Kluz Klan . National Enigits of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. % Origical Knights 01 the Eu Kluz Klan, 13 Pioneer Club, Orlando, Florida. 14. United Florfda Ku Klux Klan. 15, United Klans of Anerica, Inc. , Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. 16, 0, 8, Klars , Enights of the Ku Elux Klan _ } Inc 17, Fhite Knights of the Ku Kluz Klen 02 Hississipp:, The folloving hate organizatlons currently being efzordod actfve investigation are included in this progren. 1, Alabaca States Rights Party (Origin: Kobfle) 2 Aderican Nazl party (Origin: Richnonq) 3 + NW 88608 Docld:32989629 114 ~U Page ================================================== Page 115 ================================================== Ldtter to Atlanta RE: CCUETIT IITELLIGECE PRCGRAM ITTZR ?D SzCUEIZY DISTUPTION 0z MATE GXOUFS 157-9-kafn 3, Councsl Zor Statehood, aka, Freemon (Origin: Liinai) 4. Fignting fmoricrz fiationaliet? (C1#r,in: Ciltiro) 5, Natipzal Seze 3 30 7i7ty (Oricin: Birrinzhaa) 6 . Narlonaz Rcnaissance garty (Origin: Ncwv York) United Frccron (Orizln: Miant) % Viking Youth O2 Anerica' (Origin: Tanpa) Whito Youth Corps (Orlgin: Cillcago) J5 or beforo 10/15/04, participating 0f2iceg are Jnstructed to Eubnnit to &ho Bureau & aocalled analysts Of porontial Colnterintellisence actlon AGaingt pertinent Organizations and individuals activa vitbin tieir rospactive territories &nd Gpeclfic reconmendatlons should bo Ircluded for) anY lcgicnl izediate counterintolliCence action_ Roconcendations Gubnitted under ti3s program Dust lrclud 411 poccssary facta t0 @nable tbo Burezu to intellicently pass upon tbe fcasibility O2 the proposed actiona In Jostances wiexe a roliable Bnd cooporative neu3 rcdia representative or othor sourca outsice tho Buroau 1s to be contactod or utilized 1n connection rith 2 proposed countorintelllgezce operation, 1t %i11 ba Jocunbont upOn the recorwlonding Ozzica to Zurnisi asgurances tla bourc9 MIll poi raveal ti0 Bureau 8 Interest or betray our confidence. Of2ices partlcipatlrg 10 trlg prograr who heve Investigative reaponsibility for Elan organizatiors Siould Bpeclfically corarent in the I5itfal latter *9 tho Bureau regardlng "Action Groups_ "1 As tleso Ofricca a10 nware, theso groups have been doacribod a3 tro rclativcly fom Individuals in eaci organizetion Eo uso @trons-ara tactics a*d vzolont ections to acliiovo tholr ends_ Orten tliese Brqupa act vithout tle approval 0f the Klan Organtzation Pw NW 88608 Docld:32989629 115 Page ================================================== Page 116 ================================================== Yetter to Atlanta FB : COiETTERIITELLIGENCE PROGRAH IMTERIAL SECUZITY DISRUPIION OF IATE GBOUPS 157-9-Main or nembersbfp. The Bureau conslders It vital that 1B expcse the idontitzes and activitles 0z guch gzoups and Muere Dossiblo 4452"3+ {2f1 cfforts_ Taepe Groups Should be Subjccte; 3 Czz}_ 2fi 3124 Fazc 22*231, No counterietelligenceaction nay beinitzated by the field Titnour SpecIzic Dureau nu7znor 1zazz0r, Comnenclrg 1/1/65 and every 3 ronths thereafter, each parttcipating ofiice should Subiit to the Bureau a btatus letter coverirg tie prior 3-nouth 'period, Jncluding comments under tbe following captiors : 1, Potentlal Counterintelligence Action 2, Pending Counterintelligenca Actlon 3, Tang ble Results If necessary J a 4th caption "Mscellaneous" Dey be utilized for additional conrents . Eecommendations for counterlntelligence action should not ba Included 1n 90-day Status letterg to tne Bureau but following tha initial analysis due 10/15/64, @bould be Bubrlitted individually by Separate letter. 4ll Speclal Agent personnel responsible for the Invegtigation 8z rlan-type and bate organizations and their renbership Sizould be alerted to our counter- Intelligence plans relating to these groups , Counter- Intelligence action directod at tncse grours 19 intendad to conplenent and gtimalate our accelerated intelligence Investigatiors Each investigative Agent has a responsi- bllity to call to the attention Of the counterint eliigence coordinator suggestions and pogsibilities for Iaplecenting the prograu _ 6 You are cautioned that tho naturo 0f this dew endeavor is stch that under no circunstances Should the existence of tie progt?m be Eade known outside the Bureau and appropriate vithin-OfZlce gecurtty should be efzorded this Sensitive operation. NI88608-Docid332989629-Page-116 ================================================== Page 117 ================================================== Lettar to Atlanta Bi : COU:TTRIITEELIGECE PROGRAH IMTCPEIAL SECURITY DISPUPIIO: OF INTE GROU?S 157-9_Ziain The Bureau 18 pleaged witb past euccegges achieved by Our" courterintelllgerce efzortd in Other phases 0f 01" #Fvjriceivc T?a orsibiliti/3. ro Insure 013' clccog; 117 %-15 03; cjccnvos wo 1+193 to whon tne prozzam is assigned in each Office must have a detailed krowledge of tbe activities 0f the racist groups 1n the territory and that knowledge nust be coupied With interest, initiative and iragination. The Agent rust be alert for information mich has 8 disruptive potential. Tie imfortation %ill not cone to htn B= E ke cust Joo* for it. Tha rost effective Fay of being assured 01 keeping on top 02 tne situation J8 to maintain close contact with thcse Agents Fko bandle ehe Investigation 0f the racial a3d Rwto 5r0w?s #nd iielr merbershLp and also to periodically review relevant files. If an enthusiastic approach 1s made to tbis new @ndervor 7 there is Do reason tie results achieved under this prograr Fill rot equal or' surpass our achievezents in sinilar-type progtars directed egadngt subversives, Ni 88608_Docld:32989629_PageL1Z' wny ================================================== Page 118 ================================================== OMAL Ioim No. 10 810-100 'r4z Idition GIN: Kto. Mo. 77 Toioon NITRD STATES GC ERNMENT ArImont MMohr Cusper Memorandum Soliatan oac; Evans TO Mr . M. C. Sullivan DATE: August 27 , 1964 SGolen 04) Sullivar Taver Trotter FROM Mr , F , J, Baumgardner F8 Tele. Roor ~ Belnont Holmes Js _ Sullivan Gandy SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRCGRAH 1 " - lir _ 'Bzuygarder INTERNAL SECURITY 5 Mr _ Trainorf DISRUPTION OF FATE GROUPS Mr _ [Tyan Memorandun from Bir . J. H. Gale to Hr Tolson dated 7/30/64 captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups Mt was approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence Division to give consideration to tbe application 0f counterintel- ligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter make appropriate recomnendations ; It is our recommendation that we_imediately_initiete 2 hard-hitting 8- closely_Supervised _ coorainated_countezintelligence_progran to expose disrupt and qtherwise neutralize_the_Ku_Kluz_Klan_(KKK) and specified_ Tt other bate_groups _ This new counterintelligence effort wili take advantage Of our experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques Successfully applied against the Communist Party = USA , and related organizations since 1956 _ Prinarily, we intend to expose to public Scrutiny tbe devious maneuvers and duplieity of the hate groups; tofrustrate any_efforts or plans they may have to consolidate their forces; to_discourage their recruitmnent of new or youthful adherents; and to _ disrupt or elininate tbeir efforts to circunvent or violate the law_ Our counterintelligence efforts against hate groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complenent our expanded intelligence ibvestigations directed at these organizations_ Fe are furnishing general instructions to 17 field offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations and New York Chicago and Baltimore who bave active investigative responsibilities for one hate organization each) relating to the administration and prompt enactment Of this new counterintelligence progran_ Briefly 9 these instructions require the 17 participating offices to subnit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of poSsible counterintelligence operations including any specific recommendations for action_ Thereafter conmencing 1/1/65) the partieipating offices will subnit 2 90-day status letter setting Enc Ze_rU 4 -3 - 64 GCI-Y REC 20 TELi2 157-9-Main 4 1 5 100-3-104-Main (CPUSA _ } Cointelpro) SEP 24 1v84 DR: bgc Fsx] SEP 3 0 1964 CONTINUED G OVER NW 88608-Docld: 32989629-Page-1-18 c0Yc ================================================== Page 119 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr _ Sullivan RE; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRCGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY DISTUPTION OF HATE GROUPS 157-9_Main forth a Summary of current possible and successfully achieved counterintelligence activity during the prior 3-morth period. Each 0ffice #_li 3 i7 =Zzci 00 ~4~X]-~ip*222 ii investigation relating to this program and to assign a Special Agent on 2 part-tine basis as the program coordinator responsible Tor following and initiating counterintelligence action, As 1s the instance in our established counterintelligence program against the Conmunist Party USA Tand i0 our current 90-dey trial counterintelligence progran directed against Soviet-Satellite intelligence all_reconmended counterintelligence action against Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be approved at the_Seat of Governuent This new counterintelligence progran directed at Klan and bate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar progrars directed against the Communist Party USA, and Soviet-Satellite intelligence His efforts will be ciosely coordinated Vith Bupervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations 0f the Klans and hate organizations and their nembership_ An annual memorandun justifying continuance of the progran will be submitted and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised of techniques which have been found to be most successful_ At Such time 25 the program is corsidered to be Successfully under a status nemorandum will be submitted 1hich will include any additiosti recomendations relating to manpower or other administrative requirenents _ RECOMENDATIONS: 1 That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to Immediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence progran directed at exposing disrupting and othervise neutralizing the 17 ective Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations_ 3 Cato ~ibcckls_ 8 #Hee 2 Zessct 61742z 2 ~NWV-88608 Docld:32989629- Page 119 :3 3a OueQ s114M ================================================== Page 120 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr Sullivan RE: COUNTERINTELLIGZNCE PROGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS 157-9-Main 2 . That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17 field offices slated to participate in this nemv counterintelligence program Settirg iozth izsiruciiojs for 612 adwinistration anq immediate enactment Of the program, 4& 3 - NIM88608_Qocld:32989629 120 I4 , CR gl Page ================================================== Page 121 ================================================== OrTONAL KM No.10 mio-i06 16 ATION Glm. #b. mo. 37 Toison UNITED STATES GC ERNMENT Delmont Mohr Casper Memorandum Sallalan oach Evans rGale TO Mr . .. C, Sullivan DATE: August, 27 , 1964; Rosen Cl) Sullivan Taveft_ Trotter FROM Mr , F. J , Baungardner Frd Telc. Roon ~ Hr . Belmont Holmes Gandy ~ Sullivan SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAH. 1 ~ 0 Bzuygarder INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF FATE GROUPS Trainort Mr _ Iyan Memorandum fron Rr . J: H. Gale to Hr . Tolson dated 7/30/64 captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups" was approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence Division to consideration to the application 0f counterintel- ligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter make appropriate recommendations ; I+ is our recommendation that cflx we immediately_ initiate 2 hard-hitting X- closely_Supervised, coordinated_counterintelligence_program to expose disrupt and Qthervise neutralize tbe_Ku_Kluz_ Elan_(KKK) and Specified other j bate_groups This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage o2 cr experience with a variety 0f Sophisticated techniques Successfully applied_against the Communist Party } USA , and related organizations since 1956 . Prinarily, we intend to expose to_public scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups; to frustrate_any_efforts or plans they may have to consolidate their forces; to discourege their recruitment of new or youthful adherents; and todisrupt or elininate their efforts to circumvent or violate the law Our counterintelligence efforts against hate groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complenent our expanded intelligence investigations directed at these organizations_ Fe are furnishing general instructions to 17 field offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations, and New York Chicago and Baltimore, who bave active investigative responsibilities for one hete organization each) relating to the administration and prompt enactment 0f this newv counterintelligence progran_ Briefly 1 these instructions require the 17 participating offices to submit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific recommendations for action Thereafter conmencing 1/1/65) thie offices will submit 2 90_day status letter setting partigipating TSL__ Enc Ze_rZ - 4 - 3 - 64 GCT-Y 20 157-9-Main {i<4 1 3 100-3-104-Mlain (CPUSA } Cointelpro) SEP 24 1v84 DR:bgc R8) SEP 3 0 1964 CONTINUED Wa OVER N++88608 Doolde 1620_Rage -121 KNs give REC ================================================== Page 122 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr _ Sullivan RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRCGRAM INTCRNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS 157-9-Main forth a Summary 0f current 3 pOSsIble and successfully achieved counterintelligence activity during the prior 3-iorth period Each Ofiice #1ii iz18u2z1u 0 ~;-4 &i 1*icriii ii #@Vestigation relating tothis program and to assign a Special Agent on a part-tine basis as the progran coordinator responsible for following and initiating counterintelligence action. As 1s the instance in our established counterintelligence 'program against the Conmunist Party USA , @nd in our current 90-day trial counterintelligence progran directed against Soviet-Satellite intelligence all_reconmended counterintelligence action against Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be_approved at the_Seat 0f Government , This new counterintelligence progran directed at Klan and hate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government by the Special Agent supervisor responsible_for our sinilar progrars directed against the Communist Party USA, and Soviet-Satellite intelligence His efforts will be ciosely Coordinated with Supervisory personnel responsible for thbe intelligence investigations of; the Klans and hate organizations and their membership_ An annual memorandun justifying continuance of the progran will be submitted and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised of techniques which have been found to be most successful At Buch time as the progran is considered to be Successfully under Fay , a status nemorandun will be subnitted Thich will include any additional reconendations relating to manpower or other adinistrative requirements_ RECOMENDATIONS: 1, That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to #mmediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence progran directed at exposing 9 disrupting and othervise neutralizing the 17 ective Klan organizations and 9 active racial bate organizations _ 1 Rator ~bAl exs#tee @ Seasct 61#+182 S 2 - NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 422 OueQ s1144r ================================================== Page 123 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr Sullivan RE: COUNTERINTELLIGZNCE PROGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS 157-9-Ma in 2 , That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17 field offices slated to: participate in this nei counterintelligence program setting iozth ixstruceiozs Xor 612 administration ana immediate enactment 0f the program, 06 p . CX ~3 - ~NW88608_Docld: 32989629 123 84 , Page ================================================== Page 124 ================================================== Cot7j; ACX. 043. WITEI) STATES ( ~RIMEVT I/eror cndur DIRZCTOr 3 F31 DATZ: 9/9/64 RROM LS:c 2 TA#A S PJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRALI INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF RATE GROUPS Re Bureau letter dated 9/2/64 captioned as above On Page 3 Bureau listed the Viking Youth of America Tampa origin, 2s one of the hate groups currently being afforded 2ctive investigation and included in captioned program . Reference is now made to Tampa letter to the Bureau dated 5/6/64 wnich made reference in turn to Jacksonville letter deted 4/30/64 Wherein GEOREE-ERA~NRELIN M@eziios sta ted that the "TiEing Youth of America never beczme organized in tha United States and that he never made 2n actua1 active attempt to recruit members in this organization The Tampa file in this matter is closed. Me have rot been able %0 determine that any active chapters oi this group are in existence Of that any members were recruited for the gr oup. It is therefore felt tbat there woula be no point in our attempting any disruptive tactics in connection with this group_ The Bureau is requested to advise Tampa whether it vould be satisfactory not to initiate any action on the Viking Youth 0f America and to.substitute some other organization for this purpose_ NW 88608 Docld:32989629 124 Page ================================================== Page 125 ================================================== ETED NTATES ( RIE)TT I/errorandum DIRECTC? , 731 DATE: 9/9/34 20M 0.224 SCZJECT: COUNTERINTELLICEFCE P2CZRALI INTzZNAL SECURITY DISRUPTIOY OF HATE CROUPS Re Bureau letter dated 9/2/64 captioned as above On Page 3 Bureau listed the Viking Youth of America Tampa origin, 2s one of the hate groups currently being afforded 2ctive investigation and included in captioned progrem Reference is nOw mede to Tampa letter to the Burezu dated 5/6/64 which nade reference in turn to Jacksonyille letter dated 4/30/64 wherein GEOReE-E2#NEETN #LEngios stated that the "Viking Youth of America never becane organized in the United States ena that he never rcde 23 actual active attempt to recruit members in this organization The Tazpz file in this matier is closed_ We iave not been 2ble *0 deternine that any ective chapters OI tbis group ar8 in ezistence or that any menbers were recruited for ihe group . It is therefore felt that there woula be no point in our attempting any disruptive tactics in connection with this group. The Bureau is requested to advise Tampa whether it mould be setisfectory not to initiate any action on the Viking Youth of America and to.substitute sone other organization for this purpose NW 88608 Docld:32989629 -Page 125 SC , ================================================== Page 126 ================================================== {J UED SATzs GO' r1EIT Ieaor andut Director 731 DATE: 9/9/64 ~: s_C, 42w Crleses SiZJECT: CONTERINZZLLEGEFCZ 2zCG.43 ITENAi SECURITY DISRURTIONV_Oz #4TZ_GRCUES ReBulet to 4tlanta end interested offices 9/2/64.- 1) Fotentiel Counterintelligence Aczion Tne #2jority 0f ne_bers 0i klan-type orgeni- z2tiors i2 tbe Ket: Orleers 2r82 ar8 located in rural areas and; i0 Sinall ccanunities Ir order to effectively expose the icentities and ectivities Of individuals in these groups, indivicual c2ses efe being opened on members and 2 background type or investigetion is being instituted by the Orleans Office 031 these ircividuel menbers _ These inivicual investigetiors of course, will S~coze norn throush coczaci #itn varicus individuals in the &avclcpi4s 0z pac*gr0u22. Tne jere knowledge that their idectitias ire Xnown to the FBI will have disruptive force OC {he indivicual's activities_ To higalight an4 further cause consternation, intervie:s 0f one or t;o specificelly hand-picked members will pe ` coraicted by Agents i3 these areas, after which background investigations mill be instituted immediately on other known members in the particuler conrunity. The indivicuals to pe interviewed wiil be members 0j "wrecking crers' 22 mere fact 0f these investigations rill plen: the: sezds of jistrust among tbe members and leader - ship i2 the particular communitj. Bureau 8ithority is requested to immediately i2itiate_ tie 2bove couzterintelligence activity. "2) Pending Counterintelligence Action NW 88603 Docld32989629-Page 126 New ================================================== Page 127 ================================================== Surveys 2r8 being conducted' at Xonroe West Ecr-oc 4larazdrie and Bogalusa Louisiana, Pirsuerz %0 Eureau setncrity by airtel dated 9/4/64. 3) Tengible Results Tangible results of such potential 2nd pending counterintelligence ection will be furnished the Buregu aito: inaugurticn 0z the above 4) Ziscellameous ; 4 cojpleted initial analysis Will reach the 31re2u 02 10/15/64 concerning tbis matter 2# MW_BB60B_Docld: 32989629_PageIZZ ================================================== Page 128 ================================================== LNED STATES GO' QNMENT" 1/grorandura ~0 Director 2 FBI DATE: 9/3/64 ~xoli S:C , New O-lecns SUBjecT: COUNTrRIN?ZLLIGENCz PRCGAAN Jut)eeb INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION_Or HATE_CROUPS_ 3CLtn ReBulet to 4tlanta and interested offices 9/2/64. 1) Potential Counterintelligence Action The majority 0f"menbers of klan-type organi_ zatiors in the Nei Orleans are2 ar8 located in rural areas 2nd; in Siali communities_ In" order to effeetively expose the identities and activities of individuals in these groups, individual cases are being opened on members and 2 background type 0f investigetion is being instituted by the New Orleans Ozfice on these individual members Zhese individual investigetions of course, will ~econe known through contaci wiih various individuals in the Geveleping of background The mere knovledge that their identities ire known to the FBI will have disruptive force on tie individual's activities To highlight and furtner cause consternation 3 interviews of one or two specifically hand-picked members will be conducted by Agents in these areas, after which background investigations Will be instituted immediately on other known menbers in the particular community. The individuals to pe interviewed will be members of "wrecking crews" The mere fact 0f these investigations Will plent tae' seeds of mistrust among the members and leader - ship in the particular community. Bureau authority i8 requested to immediately initiate the above counterintelligence activity. 32) Pending Counterintelligence NW88608-Docld- 32989629-Page-128 Action ================================================== Page 129 ================================================== Surveys ar2 being conducted at Monroe, West Ecero2_ 4lerandria and Bogalusa Louisianz, pursu:nt %0 Eureau authority by airtel dated 9/4/64 . 3) Tangible Results Tangible results of such potential and pending counterintelligence action Will be furnished the Bureau aftc= inauguration 0f the above 4) Miscellaneous; A conpleted `initial 2n2lysis will reach the Sureau 012 10/15/64 concerning this matter 2# NWB8608_Docld:32989629_Page 129 ================================================== Page 130 ================================================== DTIONAL FORM No. f0 Dio-Ic0J Ay 1562 Edition SA GEN: REG . NO: 77 JJNITED STATES G( 'RNMENT Memorandum To DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main) DATE: 9/16/64 'SAC , ATLANTA' (157-826) (p) SUBJECTF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF KATE GROUPS UNITED KLANS OF AMRICA INC KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN) ReBulet 9/2/64 . In 1960, a comparatively small group of Klansmen pulled out 0f U, S . Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc_ and formed a new Klan group called Knighte of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc _ The Imperial Wizard of this new group was ROBERT Ly RIivd: of Jonesboro, Georgla In the Siiiiiiiizz of 1961, following a Teeting pecmeen BING and officials of United Klans 0f America Inc _ 3 Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (United Klans ) the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., were merged into United Klans and BING was given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64 . At this meeting_ BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by Iruilho 0 and J D-XOHNWON , a Georgia State Klan fficer NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 130 FROM ================================================== Page 131 ================================================== PTIONAL FORM No: I0 Dilid 0 AY 152 EdItIon SA GEN: REG: NO: 77 { TJNITED STATES G( RNMENT Memorandum To DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main) DATE: 9/16/64 'SAC , ATLANTA` (157-826) (p) SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION OF' HATE GROUPS UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA INC 0 $ KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN) ReBulet 9/2/64 _ In 1960, 8 comparatively small group of Klansmen pulled out of U_ S _ Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Kian, Inc ' and formed a new Klan group called Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc The Imperial Wizard of this new group was ROBERT L of Jonesboro, Georgla 1 tiie Siiiiiiiiei of 1961, 'Xollowing a Teeting perween BING and officials of United Klans of America Inc Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (United Klans ) tne Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc ., Were merged into United Klans and BING was given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans neld at Birmingham, Alabama_ ) 9/5-6/64 _ At this meetings BING wias opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by and J _ D ~KJOHNWON 2 a Georgia State Klan Officer NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page" 131 1 FROM ================================================== Page 132 ================================================== pPtic FORM NO: 10 D10-10XM] Kmat DITION IGSA GeNi REG. NO. z7 JUNITED STATES GC 'RNMENT Memor andum To DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main) DATE: 9/18/64 'SAC , ATLANTA (157-826) (P) Syubol SUBJEcT? COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY Aluxbs DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS UNITED KLANS O@ ANRICA INC 3 KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN) ReBulet 9/2/64 . In 1960, a comparatively sma11 group of Klansmen pulled out of U_ S _ Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc _ 02 and formed a new Klan group called Knighte of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc _ The Imperial Wizard of this new group was ROBERT L_ oi Jonesuuo, Geosgia Ii the Siiiiiiiiei of 1961, 'XSlowing a meeting Decween BING and officials of United Klans 0f America Inc 9 Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (United Klans) the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., were merged into United Klans and BING was given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64 _ At this meetings] BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by AT 1705-R and J _ D_ XXJOHNWON , a Georgia State Klan officer CALVINiCRAIG _ Grand_Dragon for Georgia of United Klans, through nis support and infTuence Adu I705-R, AT 1705-R was elected Imperial Klokard _ AT 1652-R, AT 1705-R, AT 1700-R, AT 1720-R, and TAT 1761-R have a11 reported that BING is extremely bitter, icularly at CRAIG , over his defeat Recently, BINQ made a trip to Macon Georgia and contacted ROBERT LEE]DAVIDSON , JR He asked DAVIDSON to join with him in an effort to CRAIG removed as Grand Dragon for Georgia DAVIISON did not conmit himself but told BING he would think it over and notify him when_he had reached 2 decisian' NW886p8 Docld:32989629 132 . FROM part_ get Page ================================================== Page 133 ================================================== ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON , JR. , is a racial informant of the Atlanta Office He Was formerly Imperial Wizard of first U 8 _ Klans Night8 0f the Ku Klux Klan, Inc _ 9 and later 0f United Klans _ He is present ly not a member of any Klan group; however, he has considerable influence and contacts among many of the members of United Klans This situation appears to offer an opportunity to capitalize upon the personal conflict of two Klan leaders _ We propose the following action: Instruct Racial Informant ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON JR. , to agree to help BING oust CRAIG as Grand Dragon for Georgia and instruct DAVIDSON to actively work with BING to achieve CRAIG 8 ouster BING has considerable following, particularly in the rural area south of Atlanta DAVIDSON has contacts in the Klan throughout Georgia We believe that with DAVIDSON 8 assistance, BING could disrupt much of the United Klans organization in Georgia: The Bureau is requested to authorize the above action_ Z 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 133 frMant Mlaux _ Page ================================================== Page 134 ================================================== ITED STATES GOI NMENT Memorandur 0 DIRECTOR , FBI DATE: 9/23/64 JACzSONVILLZ SUBJECT: COINtERINTELLICZICr-?ECGRAM INTZZNAL SECURITY DISREPTION_OF_F4TZ,_GR3*3. (rwo-WAY RADIO UNITS) ReBulez 9/15/64. The Jacksonville Office bs carezully noted the obvious intent of reBulet and egrees that there is 2 real strong ' possibility for taking Some counter-intelligence action 2gsinst tbe Kan tbrough this medium_ tas re-contected a2d he stated at the presen% tize trare is 2Q additional information concernirg the us? of two_way radigs nor has tne locel Klar in Jackson- ville forzulated ary cod2, This sjoula indicete that 2t tbe present tize, mnile 2 nunber 0f local Klanszen have redios, ttere i8 20 opportunity *0 introduca deceptive transmissions 25 the Ilcn n2s 2O "nissicns" on the plaaning board. The above infornart bas reported tbat it is enticipated addi- tional Ilanszen will purchase zore tvo-wey radio equipnent Gibich sroula bz indicetive 0f 22 expension in plees of tbe Klen to u32 this method 0z cozuication_ To da? there nes becr 13 operetion of the Klan Rhere two-way radio communicz- tiors tave pleyed 22 integrel pert. Tnis office through its infornents, particularly wilI rer2in elert 2nd viil pronptly 2dvise tbe 3r2.31 mhenever infozmation is received indicating the Ilan hs 2 sizeable "mission" i2 the plenning stages wherein radios wili pla; 20 ieportent pert. Depending upon tbe puzpos? of tba "nission" plans could be fornulated for some Z2ceptive attacks cn the Klan itseli- Nw-88608_Doeld:32989629_Page -13 4t SAC , ================================================== Page 135 ================================================== #Y 40 nw 067 ~ X0. : CAZED STATES GOT NMENT I/Lemorandur 50 DERZCZOR , FBI DATZ: Io/z; b 1308 34C, ZCZIIS SUZJECT: CQUNTE INTZLLIGENCE PROGRAM INTZRNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION QE_ HYTE_GRQUPS_ Re Bureau letter to 4tlante, 9/2/64. Anlysis of Potential CI Action Against Organizations and Personnel of United Klans of America_ Inc KKKK ( UKA ) Improved Order 0f the U.S Klans ) KKKK , Inc (IouSK} ; and the Alabama States Rights Party (ASRP) Piles on captioned organizations nave been reviewed 21 trse Robile Office to ` discover any information Of the kira hich woula prevent a potential for effective CI ;yon_ gnis rcvic# of files includes the files or the ~lemlllatiocs tnenselve3 and 0f individuals known to be 0iii3r3 and remoers or the organization_ It is the unaer- Stncing of inis office that this inforration would consist 31 s_tiotiors involving potential friction beiween individual' 33438 '3r between rival organizations; or woula consist 0f inrc=at_on reflecting imcorality , particularly sexua1 #._orolity on tha part of one Or more Eembers 2 possiby ivoiving the wife or Wives of other members ; or consisting generelly 0f information of 2 nighly unfavorable or emtarrass_ ing pature pertainirg to 8 member or group of members Mhich woula be not xown, and the exposure of hich could produce svitable conflicts A minizum 0f "such information is con- tairea in Mcb_le files pertaining to Klan and States Rights 37 personrel _ Tnere nave been conflicts betieen individuals {in %roups &na cecieen members of different groups , but to32 'conflicts have already ra cured and have already pro- auced tec division &nd animosity 0f which the situations R0r2 ccpeble Unlike personnel 0f |cormunist organizations_ : NW+ 88608-Doeld-2980629_Rage 13 ================================================== Page 136 ================================================== 22025122-1022 ar8 noi pert_clarij r?oR? 24 23 for_cdic; 28 1023 2 0 3r Gzz3cuily 3 tne pert 0z 2 Klcrs-n:; Ai :_ 2 Elanszer, &ltrough infcrmants who fenici 122 723-2/nins zo 6h2sc individuals are faiy Well 038 Ztzi 52 0 522; of tner_ Approxirately iwO years ag0 , C2) 1222232 &3 teccz2 Jealous when 2 single Klan member 2?lej; zi_rj2d Micr nis wize at 2 social function acxevez , r? -x-_2? E2.ber iS no longer active and there 13 rot 4c, 38 rva ceen any further developient of that; situecion Fzz-irant to tnis &nlysis i8 the folloning obsrvtioz: :iotin tre 92s & 78 dajs_ ) Montgonery 3 Ala . 0) vhar8 Ectin~ 3f 3 andASRP are centralized has experienced Ge223 egetion of resiaurants , hote is 3 motels , end piblic sc23o_S, pirsuant t0 tre 1964 Civil Rights Acf ana 7-79112 to oriers of tre United States District Soirt at 522*33337 Ir_tiall;_ particularly on 7/4 ana 3/2/34, foilcvs; tre 223825e-32 tne 1964 Civil Rignts 4c~ , 6.-72 *2: 25 2-ie3pt by Ilansnen to gather and con- spir ^ 02? 32 7.73382 cz ~terfcring ivith the desagregation cf Lovie 312572_5 2r: ~2Staurerts in downtown Montgomery j.2v27 , Riza 3035 5 firnished information well in exVence cf t2 22-21 ~soposed ection, enabling Kobile to 3061-% tk2 73333327- fclice 3ezartment The Police Depart- Le_% &c-22 723" 73C637 erd ef ectively, disbursirg Klansmen mij nid 3a;-8320 1 tce canger area 3 and making it quite clear trat 33 Eiei? 33 2ctivity o* interference with the erforceren; cz #k2 Civil ?ights Act woula be tolerated _ 3o3n t82 122~ ~8j tna inrormation was leaked 'co authorities and tte f22 1229 tra ewthorities took effective action Kerc rgn j Ce_crelizin3 to the Klan personnel who are ais0 "re c.l; S_0-if2c228 personnel of the ASRP) The denoraliza:_cr *3 30 ccnplc e that Ivhen Montgonery public Seko3is ;832 22c23-2g2tez, Ilarsren dia not even appear in tre vic_r_-i23 32 tr2 sehools 22d took n0 action of any %nd S _ 2itr?? 2 ~ tre scnools Of in any ocher place, in any e_zo-& ~C ~i23i2re :ii ~1a desegregation_ Z~ 13 ~erezcre fully evideni that tne purposes sjurt% 33 tr2 3I ZroCrer, tnat is che deaoralization and &1 rencezcr; 422f2c6_ve of Sich orgenizations ) Was 4c0037_13223 Z_rec~ inves igetion and Police action K3 3-4c2f_~- {3 fzendea tnat the work of tne Mobile 0rzicj E; 523r ~irel3J cone pezteining to these orgenizations , NW 88608 Docid: 32989629 ' Page 136 1334 ================================================== Page 137 ================================================== L 2sc#, n 33rr3r; 3303725 of tne Kobile Ozfice is 5:rd 2; 231 =11- 3032 cxie_sive tre inforzant cover- 232 02 perci-as+ %rsenizetions These inforrznts will be ss6iculir1y al2rt Sor cersonel inforration 0z the kid cick Giani c2 suiisable for the institution 0f CI action ir 632 ~iture, 2r2 suzh inforzation will pe diligently 891;3*8 J87 4genss corcicting investigation concerning these orzen_zetions 2-] individials #obile will also continue :0 32 2lert Zoz env opportunitj to utilize the system Which r; czcn effec-ive in ~ne past_ 3 that Of cooperating Iith Locei l3m enzorcerent to take the icina of action which dis_ 2Jireses erlaz-1 action on the pert of the Klan groups RzccSiation Tre Zo0iie Office has 20 recommendation for any los-c2i irzedia-e CI action &t tis tine Ic-icr Groips Zor_ie 222181 irforrnts have furnished the Licrt_e_es 2 3st Zitijuals kithin tre UA and 4SRP who r2 ecsice-3z tc2 =ost. likely ~3 comnit acts of violence or 118211207_3r {osh o3 tn23e sersons have peen under 4ves-_Zation f02 s332 t_ze, an6 in many instences Summary 32703, Cvz 2233 firriered to tre Bureau pertaining to chem_ 3; 83 %6 ins erces cf bo-bings in the vicinity 0f 33058J, 412. , inc_uaing tre bojbings in Mississippi in ~3230; :22x 43er-s rave interviened ne ighbors and employers 32 t82;> Zral-3lals ena kve 3de visual checis 2 particularly 1222 c: niznt, in effor-3 t0 2Scertain Thetrer of not the 2873828 tiezzeines Kere onz Or wnetrer or not their auto~ 50k_13 Nerz 1324 2t sreir residences In rany cases , Era prc 2~i; 1r 3cSt c238s, tresc Klan personrzl cecome 2322 of trzsz irqu_ri23 and Or several situations it i3 I; ;2t &22" c~served Agents ~recling their cars and ~{0PV_lr ihc_? residarce; 2: nisht Tne S persons are ;ror oje Wcaz 622 iprc88_on tnt Bureau Agents have them id27 viztucll; corstent strveiilance Trey rerarked to 222 otbzr : 382 3-832n22 0f inzorrants on occasion that ;12; 221 t6; +21- te_erhones 2r8 tapped and tney nave 2118 03r2c32d j2 f22r 1223 tne_r ree pleces ere 3; :226a iS3 ~czopione Czvices _ Ii is pelieved that this 1'883 c:^ :1223 -~1 consiitrtes 2 very effective deterrent, 2.& vzry Bil 32 2 332n84323 ~eason for treir failure ~0 02 _ 27 ?~ 11 KzSLrzs 22 conrecticn :ith trc racial NWV 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 137 ting ================================================== Page 138 ================================================== ~0 6305 trin ~2cent neeis ; Through in- Z; 222 63 0kzerte__cs o2 license {eg3' Of aito- 0b6iivz cz=d 98 3cetng places) Kopile Officz 18 conctzntl; Z~a7rn; c_ #ne ide-+1-228 02 02n perzons Who cv3 So#C ;ote46Ll 3? Ttolcrce I a11 Sich c23cs, 2 cas8 file 15 p%204 0; s individual, his _dentity being established a26 613 ba3. Cround beirg obteired No particular effort is ride t0` {387 3h2se investigetions S0 discreet that the Klans _ sn 6il aCi Jear trzt tne FE1 is inquiring &bout him_ Tnis rjoc _ce" is Reemec t0 be effective With respect to tk2se in3iv au2l5 23 32+ fortn rereinbefore, Kobile Till intensify i68 Cffcres to Giscover inforrztion ihich can be used in the CI prj;21. Zeztaini-s to the possibility of exposure of Kle:! :a Ilon-tize act vities through reliable news media , 2& arouid 623 o~s2r-2& 6t it iS tne firm policy of news LC:: ~ t ZortCozzrn, 41a 2rea to completely ignore 62802 icr 3ow73 > Enc to g-ve them ro licity at a11 30222; :-923, 1 28 ld scveral piblic rallies , Zzi5 ZCG 3 12e_12: Zistribution and even one 633 3 2 722C 22810 2dvertisement They have 7-1-20 t2 77223 *o ej*erd *6252 rellies, roping to secure 9-8_e5 ~ ~225 Aga_n, 1~ 18 pelieved tnat the zoi_c of tre 2-235 t3 ~Sore shese Sroups ras nad the 3c3} 2es_-e3_2 efZect, botn i- frustrating then in their se:rch Zcr 7_b12c2t7 erd in 2-oiding edvertising them 2102, 10 Ziz ~elly rcre persons to the Klan cause end resii~ 11 s~ir inczeesins cheir rembership_ Pecause of tbzre ccrs_je?et_cns, it i2 believed that at least in tnis 2r22, 32 current jress colicy of ignoring the Klan 13 3p2 2zz22tiv2 than would pz a policy of exposure of %k2 2viis 83 trz orgenizations MW_88608_Docld: 32989629_Page138 ' 9 pub sp3: S3} ================================================== Page 139 ================================================== Memorandm TO DIRZCTOR , ZBI DATE: 10/12/64 FR81 S?C , CziLOTtT3 SUBJECT: ~COEXTZBINTZLLIGENCE PRCSRAM INzZRYAU SECURIZZ DISRERTIOV Or ZATE GROU2S ReBulet 9/2/64 to Atlanta and other offices It is noted tois letter lists as one of the target organizations 3s No . 7 O2 page 2 , the Independent Klavern Fountain Inn , S . C. Since this organization is no lorger active or in existence f' it is suggested it be deletea fron tbis list. Since the major organization in. Charlotte Division is the Unitea Xlans of Haerica, Inc. of which Birminghai is origin, a @o?y of this letter is being' Jesignated to Birningham for informat:on Ire f3llowing represents tke consensus of" Charlotte Agertz fznilizr ~ith Klen activity: 1_ Disruptive 2ctivity should not be uncertaken at 2 zarticular Ilavern, as a general rule unless there is Suzficient vell established informant coverage to be able to tell the effect 32 tha 2csion Ihen instituted. Such action ivould probzbly serve to "tighten 4p" the organization ana make it more aifficult to an inforaant in thereafter. 2 . Ir is considered douzful that newspaper publicity: 0f 2 generally unfavorable nature against the Klan crgani- zation , is 2=fec-ive in reducing new applicants or causing any large number o2 present members to drop out- The "Charlotte " Observer wcich has wice distribition throughout North an3 South Carolina peblishea in August and September_ $ 1964 , a series 02 ariicles: copizs cf woicn were sent the Bureau %Y Charlotte letter 02 9/12/64. Tnese azkEg-les ridiculed the United Klans Nw-88608-Docld:2989629_Page-139 get only ================================================== Page 140 ================================================== of America, Inc., in North Carolina, ana published both photos and names of 2 number of members, So far 2s has been Iezrnea Erom informants , this had very little 2dverse effect upon the organization, It was allegea that two to five members were discharged from their jobs, or warned about continuing nember- ship, buz the identities of these alleged persons is not known, Ajer+-Carelina Grand Oragen -J4423 TONES has statea, both publicly and privately to infornants, that this publicity was very valuable to the growth of the organization. One informant reported that the after the articles published his name as 2 local lezdez , three persons con tacted hin and appliea for membership, stating tbey nad not previouslv Known whom to contact. It is considered that pupTicicyof this-type generally deters from joining those persons wno woula not bz interested in joining in the first placeo It is believed that 2 large proportion of those persons who are potentizl members are seeking status and recognition, and publicity is no deterrent to them; it makes them feel important 2na members Of an important group. The najor zpparent effect of the series Of newspaper articles referred to has been a tightening up of security ana refusal 0f leaders to allow newspaper photos of individual Klznsmen to be taken at public rallies. 3 _ Disruptive activity, vnerever possible, shoula be of 2 nature which does not expose the fact that the Bureau, or the "Federal covernent" is behind the activity- It 13 believed that open action, to 3 large eztent, can backfire ana create resentment ana sympatny_ It nust be rememberea that Klan membership, in many sections 2 does not by any Reans carry the odium that alleged Cozmunist membership or sympathy doe3 in alost any section of society. 4 , Along this s2me line, thezz is probably no point in trying disruptive activity, at least not at this stage, On a Jocal Klan group which is sm2ll, inactive, ana peaceful- ach activiny ;hich is not completely Jiscreet and concealed would likely have Ehe effect c2 stirring it up , 5< letter 02 9/26/64 , Charlotte furnished the Buteau 3 52mole of 2 lapel shich was adopted at the Io?-rial 2 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 'Page 140 Roh day only Any By pir ================================================== Page 141 ================================================== Xlonvocation 02 United Xlans of America at Birmingham on 9/5-6/64 . Zinis is to be sola to mambers for 82 each ana there is apparently considerable demand for it, Since it is not apparent to the mitiated that it has anything to do "1 " with the Klan, it is exzected that memoers will wear it openly as 2 secret recognition signal. If it aoes become widely adopted ana worn , consideration shoula then be given to giving widespread publicity to the fact of what it represents, Tnis shoula nave the result of aiscouraging sone persons wno do not want their Klan membership publicly known. 6 . Ir is considerea that possibly the most effective way of discouraging membership , or causing existing members to withdraw, is to establish that Someone in the organization is getting ricn off it, or embezzling the proceeds Charlotte is endeavoring to aevelop inzormation along theaa lines 1 but nothing specific ha3 been develozea. 7 Tne following 2re sugsested tactics that appear useful on a selected p2sis against individual Klansmen , particulazly those Inose enployers might object to their Klan membership: 3 Anonynous letter or phone call to the employer telling of the Klan nembershipa b, Enter on behalf of the memoer a subscription to the "Fiery Crcss," United Klans 0f Anerica publication, ana have it mailed to his employnent. 2 mhen 2 particular member is away from hone at 3 Klavern meeting, kave a female phone his home 2nd indicate he was to meet her ana is late. This mignt have the effect 0f making it Gizficult for tim to awzy from hone at night thereafter. mnis should b2 linited to particular individuals who are consiaered potential ones to stir up trouble in a Klavern- 3 . NW88608_Docld: 32989629 141 yet set Page ================================================== Page 142 ================================================== 8 , ROBERT-Berazs-SCOGCINS , Aka. 1 Charlotte file-105-99lp ~ 3ureal_file r57-I530, is South-earolina Grand-Dragon-of United Klans of Anerica. Charlotte repotts by SA JOENY_ALDEN-MUni , 1/31/54 and 3/27/64 , show that he is receiving over -5300 per month from the Veterans ~Administration "as7a-100_per "ezne Rell di52oled veterar: A€ tne Same time he operates a prinbing _ buainess ana is active ir United Klans of America, making public speeches , etc. Charlotte furnished extra copies of tnose reports to the Bureau, with the suggestion furnishing them to WA b2 considerea_ It is suggested consideration pe given to asking the JA to re-evaluate his disability rating, in view of his employment ana activities. It is believea this shoula be done on2 2" SCG level, to reguce the possibility of -SCOGCINS learning that such 3 suggestion cane from the FBI_ " 9 "Action Groups_ No particular such groups , given to violence, are Xnown within Xlan organizations in Charlotte territorya As the Bureau i3 aware, Unitea Klans of America has instituted what it calls "Security Guards " who wear military type uniforrs ana have military ranks_ These function at puolic rallies for the purpose of keeping order, watching for " I spies_ etc. It is expected that if violence is undertaken, these will probably b2 the ones to do it, but no such under- takings nave been learned_ Specific individual recommendations for counter intelligence action wiil be suomitted subsequent letters as developedo NW 88608 Docld:32989629 PPage742 by ================================================== Page 143 ================================================== Vlenor andumn TO Directoz , FBI DATE: 10/13/64- :ROM SAC, Birmingham SiBJZCT: COUNTZRINTELLIGENCE PRCGRAHI INTERNAL SECURITY DISRUPTION Op EATE GROUPS Re Bulet to Atlenta 9/2/54 Tbe Klan-type and bate organizations opereting in Birminghan tertitory 2nd mhich 2r8 potentiel objects Of 4 ccunterintelligence program are the United Klens of Amarica, Inc. $ Knights Oi the Ku Klux Klan and tha National States Rights Pertya Recently Mr & VINCENT TOWNSEND; Vice-President 224 Assistant-Publishar; Birminghem--Mews, and_SAC-€ontacty edvised SAC EVERETT J INGRAH that he read a story in tbe Chicago Daily-News concerhing Klan ectivity in Mississippi nd felt tha story could not have been prepared nithout FBI cooperation. He was impressed mith this and has indicated 2 strong interest in similar material for the Birmingham Wews . He prcnised t0 protect tha Bureavs interest in 22y such endeavor , He is 2 Fell known civic leader in Birmingham, A raview of the files in t28 Birmiegham Ozfice is being made for Suitable information in tbis connection , Bureau instructed in referenced letter that specific mention be mad2 of "Action Groups" in Klsn organizations , At the pregent time the weekly maetings of Zastview Klavern No, 13, which bas been the leading Xlevern iD United Klens of Agerica, Inc0 , in this terriory, bzve beer poorly attended, The principel memters of the "Actior Group" NW-88608_Deeld: 32989629_Page_143 ================================================== Page 144 ================================================== in this Klavern 218 HARRY-#ALKER 1 CECIL"HENSCN, EUGENE-~ REZYES , and RONNIE-TIDHZLb: Zfforts are being made t0 secure information suitable for disruption purposes in connection with tbis gtOUP, Ingestigation 1s being conducted concerning R08237 #ARYILSHSLTPON. Tba Atlazta Office bas been requested to escertain why E_Ls-BDHARDS, Row decezsed, ousted S3ELt:-Zrom bis then position Of Grend_bragon of tbe ", S , Klens, A copy Oi the article appearing in the "Birminghem-Nems" for April-88, 1980, entitled "SEEETON ousted from Klan Post, " bas been obtained. The article dia not disclose tbe ezact nature 0i tbe charges against 613579M Records of the 4labama Secretary Of State reflect tbat SEZLTO1- was dropped 2s the Klan's authorized agent and 9a5 replaced by Rejyo ALIIIFCRN of Talladega, Alabana . E _LoEDTARES ; Imperial-#izard, U, 8 , Klans, Knights oi the Ku Klwz Klen, was quoted 2S saying "Hle had t0 have 2 grand-dragon i2 4labama and we didn"+ hav8 Ore in ROBZRT H,ASHELTON _ T He rold reporters that SFEYTON 935 replaced 2s grand 'dragon end 2gent oz tba "Klen" in 4labam2 "for conduct unbeccqing 2 Klansman 2nd attenpting t0 u58 tbe organization for selfish purposes," The article s2id EDTARDS did not elaborate on wbat i5 considered conduct unbeccming 3 Klansmzn, Informants 2r8 being contacted for 317 information of 3 derogatory natur2 concernizg SEEbrox_ Discreat inguiries 238 being mad8 in Tuscalocsa concerning his financi2l Status, In vi8w 0f recent information frcg the Bureau 0o request is baing mede for 2 mail cover on `Shelton Or the United Klans, Thz information on LoBb ROGERS end #ILLIAALECLI; o will be 2fforded prompt attention. 2 MWN_B8608_Dock:32989629 144 Page ================================================== Page 145 ================================================== As tba Buzaan 1s awafe, some fem montbs ago Sveral individuals ) wbo bad been ective officials and/or dedicated members 0z the National States Rights Party (NSRP) 9 lezt #he MSBP, They 2re trying to form and make a going party 0z tba American Btates Rigbts Party (ASRP) mith its bead- quarters in Birmingham. 8ince tba group pulled cut of the NSRP 3 both tbe A3RP and NSRP leaders have been belittling, berzting end making eztremely derogatory remarka concerning each other 0 Both gzoupS ar8 uSing the 63me pailifg list 2 (tbe NSRP's list), mbich tha ASRP group obtained. bezore pulling out Of tbe MSRP , and they disseminate their darogatory remarks in tbe literature they distributes Tba Bureau baa 2130 bean advised tbet-GBORCE~ LINGOLN-ROCZHELL, American Nazi Party (ANP) leader nas rerently filed 2 S550, 00o_ 00 libel suit in tba U> 82 District Court, Birmirgbamy-Alabama ; against Dr;-BDwaRD %: 27.b3_ Information Director of the NSRP, 22d others conzected Fith the NSRP . Birmingham contemplates furnishing certain itens, 92 2 confidential basis to 4 few trusted; reliable nawsmer (established SAC contacts) , concarning tbe NSRP, t32 ASRP 2nd the ANP for tha Purpose of possibly causing further diszuption of 3ny unlfiad actions Or morking arrangements between these groups . Buch nexswer may be us2d to contact the leaders Oi One grou to inquize about Or confirm something Of Cerogatory rature reportedly mada by 5cwe leader of one Of tbe other groups , Birmingham also contempletes working closely vith othar law enforcement agancies t0 692 that any activity of such gzoups are known , covered a2d #bere considered deserable, tbe group 9ill be pade cognizant that their 2ctivity is xnown, NW 88608 Docld:32989629 'Page 145 ================================================== Page 146 ================================================== Birainghzm 2lso is considering having Scme racial informants arop remarks to Or {or tha benezit oz tba leaders Oi tba MSRP, etca? tbat will tend to C2432 tba leader3 of One gtoup to retaliate i2 Iike mamnar against tbe other gtOUpS $ Iz tbe Bura3u bas any naterial On disrptive tactics or results of efforts, which is not already in 2l1 field Offices, Birwingham wculd be glad to receive it, NWV_83608 Docld: 32989629_Page 146 ================================================== Page 147 ================================================== I7 0J;s Iili 8: U"D) STATES GO[ERAEAZT MLerorandur DIRICTOR 3 F31 DATE: 10/13/64 Z0M; SAC LIZTLE ROCI $ SUDjEET: COINTELPRO ReBulet to Atlanta 2nd Otner Cffices, 9/2764: Sez out below are an anglysis axd recommerdations unier captioned program. N4TIONAL STATES RICRTS PAZ3Y (NSEP) The Arkansas tranch 0f NSRP has peen inective in the State oi Arkanses for the past yer With the excep_ tion of placing on the Arkansas ballot cardidates @for President 2nd Yice President of the United States It is not reconmended tbat any action ba taken against this gro up 2t this time , ASSCC IATION 0F ARKANSAS KLANS O2 IZz KU KLUK XLAn (AAX) The AAx in Arkarsas is e2de up 0i three klaverns iccated at Little Rock, Texarkana, ard Pine Bluff; and it has no 2ffiliation mith any nationel klan gro&p, There 272 no "acticn" gr Oups within any 0f these tnree klaverns, The tnree klaverns do not own or lezse 2ny prorzty for meeting places . The four Little Rock nenbers usually @eet in the hoe of 2 eember Tce Terarkara Klavern mas not held any klavern reetings 25 such in several months , Tne Pine Bluff Klavern neetings vary from residences to business places of klavern meabers , State reetings 2r8 held 2t irregular intervals on an 2Ver2ge of about orce per month Or Zess, Tneze is no reguler neeting place for the state meetings_ 3 which are: held in verious 4rkansas towns includirg torns in which thare 238 no klaverns Tha state zeetirzs 3r8 attendea NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 147 ================================================== Page 148 ================================================== by f-oz one to five @ersers of ezch of the three kljverns and 222 zell cowered by inforrants_ The state @ene-Pnegor-BEEb-i+ILLtagS has continually cautioned merbers against' violerce 2nd any type 0f 11l2s_1 :c 7i+_880 Nore 0f the klaverns have ergeged" in violerce 7r'Et 1 LITTLE BCCK KLAVERN Of the four remberswho atzend Weekl; eetings 203 YZZER, wio 15 coxsidered th2 head of tnis S22il gro1p, aiaws 2 pensicn frcz tha 32e581 Gcvernuent and according to iaformants is 2fr2id t3 engage in any illegal ectivity or to let his name bz uszc ir connection with the klzn for fear 0z losing his pensione The two informants maintein the full confidence of the other two menkers 4 In reccmt months the klavern ran 2 series of saaLl ids in 2 Little Rock deily newspaper in an effort to renem interest end gain new menbers 0 The klavern received 2 nunber of responses, but no action wietsoever has bezn taken by the klavern 't0 take in any new nembers 0 The:' klavern has no crganized activity. other than the weekly #eetings described by infornants 25 being "bull sessions M8 with the principal topic being politics_ 0 No recommendation for counterintelligence is being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern. 2 0 TEXARXANA KLA VERN This klavern 22s not held any klavern meetings 25 sjch in several months 2nd it appears that the principal reason for the lack of neetings TS the inter_ vien of renbers and leeders concer nirg the assassination 0f President KENNEDY _ 0 Klevern representatives regularly. attend state meetings , one reason being tnat St2+eErand-- Dragon Brti # tiritm3 who officiates at state meetings , is a member of the Texerkana Klaverno Of the five or six mencers who fron time to time attena state meetings, two 21e informants On 10/1/64 eadvised that the Grcnd Dragon had stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern nenbers wili reet with the Bivins Xildore, Tezas, Klavern 0f the Aako ~2- NW-88608-Docld: 32989629-Page-148 ================================================== Page 149 ================================================== Gven:-Brzgor: F-#LbfAs ccording t0 infornants, is active in 2clitics in 3owie County , T2zas iS 2 fCzzer neabe? Of tba Boara cf Regents 02-Tearkena_Eurior_College, 'fesarkzma;-9e3es, 22d 62 rece3: rzaiis Z3 3x : 1 fcr election io tie Bo2rd 0f Eegents 6i tnsz collega a54 Zefeated 2s 2 candidate for the City Council 0i exatkani Teras , He canrot affora to becone involved in any illegal 2ctivities beczuse 0f his activities in legitinate enter- prises, Fe h2s continually czutioned Texarkana Klavern mezbers 23 well 2S rerbers 0f other kleterrs etterding state meetirgs 2gein5+ any violence and/or iilegal activities, No recormendation is being nade for counterintel- ligence against the Texerkan2 Klavern except 2S it is effected by 2 reconmendation set out hereafter under the Pine Bluff Klavern. 3 . PINE BLUF? KLAVERN The Pine' Bluff Klavern has & nenbership of approxi- nately :twenty to twenty-fivee It 2eets once 2 weer in different rusiness locations of its members and average weekly atterdance is twelve, Among the tweive, one- or two inforzants 2ezi mitk them and furnish full coverage of their 2ctivities. The klavern's main activity has been to dis_ courage intagration by legal Deans and to get members elected to school boerd positions_ Te #lavern collected the funds 2nd doxatec the nozey foz the ca372ign ezpense 0f two 0f its rerbers mho rn for 2 position on the Pine Blufi School Bozrd 2nd the Dollarway School Board, These two members made 2 niserable shoing and 1er e defeated_ The ilevern W2S bebind and orgenized the National Patriots League (FPL) to further its non-integration pr ogram puolicly. Tie Exelted Cyclops Ox president 0f the Klavern is chairnaa of toe NPL. The NPL actualiy is 2 Sront organization for the klavern. The sein activity 0z zhe NPi TzS to orgarize 2 privat8 country club,. Which is knoiin 2s tbe Butr2a Country Club, Tbe purpose 0f the ~ 3- NIt 88608- Docld:32989629-Page-149 ================================================== Page 150 ================================================== club W25 to build 2 swineing pool for Thi0 o;" construction 0f the pool itself mas Coszlcte? but sufficiently t0 place it in use this 8836 in Butram Country Club is $25_ Snj #jority cI :be mezbers 2re not aware of the fact ti the klavern was behind its organizatione Henbership in the Butran Country Club W2S easily obiained 2s the public pool for whites and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the Sumber of 1934 when Negroes 2ttenpted to'integrate the white pool_ This left 20 public pool open in Pine Bluff. 82 43yTR-#, vice president 0f the klavern , donated the land for the Butran Country Club; as he Owns land sur - rounding the club, he wiil benefit financially from tne sele 0f this land for ouilding lots The NPL hes also distributed 2 linited number 0f leflets publicly dis- couraging peopk from patronizing certain restaurants and businesses which had hired or served Negroes_ Gembers of the klavern were responsible for forning 2 John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff , and 2 klavern sember is leader of this chapter Approxinately eight t0 ten people attend the monthly reetings of the John Birch Society Chepter ; and 0z the men wino atterd, 2l1 are klavern members with the exception oi one man Hembers 0f the klavern cozpletely control and aoninate the Jobn Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff 0 however , only conduct John Birch Society business_ Like_ mise, thz enbers of the klavern further the John Birch Society prog*23 through the klavern. lembers of the klavern ar8 wor king individually in politics for the re-election of Governor:-ORVAL-Ea FAUBUS 2nd for ihe election 0f BAERY- GOLDWATER: The klavern hes not advocated any violence but 0n occasion hes cautioned its meabers 2gainst violence. As 2n exanple 3 klavern members were cautioned to stay- am2y fron Ray 's Truck 2 location which Negroes were attenpting to integrete, in the spring of 1964 So tnat no violence woula occux Henbers of the klavern recently distributed 2 Ku Klux Xlan (KKK) Zeaflet seeking new cezcers and NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-150 7o € They , Stop, ================================================== Page 151 ================================================== stetifz recuasts for applications be directed to' P_ 0. 23: 1182 , ?i02 Sluff_ In tnis leaflet it w2s pointed cut tket tbe 31 52s striving Zor: 2 l2wzul settlenent of tke difzicelties brogh : o2 by tae National Associa- tion ior tha Jdvarcezert of Colorea People (NAAC) ard thzt t is oppcsed +0 violence_ This Zeaflet further set fortb tbt tbis w2s 2 cnartered, legalized movement ana it i3 40 Q0fe illegel to be 2 member of it than to tz 2 rzabor 0z otner orgenizations At Verious tizes in the past the klavern has atterpted to organize "action" groups within the klavern, but Ow ezch occasion the project has died from lack of interest. In line with Bureau policy 0f dissemination of infcrzation, the nain ectivities regarding the Pine Bluff Ilivern have been dissainated confidentially to Chief ~of_Police XOR4}. D , YCUNC; Pine Bluff, (NA) on 2 regular besis Chief: YOJG_has ererted every effort to keep aown tnc possihlity of violence Through his confidential Sciices he is also well 21Zr e of the identities of the klaorn Eccjers end their 2ctivities: He personally res Farned perticu z klavern zerbers against any violence 2nd nss steted they wiil be #et with iumediate arrest if a2y violence cccurs _ 0 As 2n ezanple, Criez-YOUNE was sovised tizougn his 052 confidential source of the tine end iocation 0f the klavern neeting on the night 0f Cctober 5 19840 Chie: YOv:€ sent 2 lieutenant of his depertnent in uniform to check the location, record iicense cuzbers , and to be seen checking the meeting So tna: the ilavern nenbers mould %now thet he was checking On tharo Tris hes bad 2 strong influence on making the Klavzrn follow 2 line 0f legel activity. It has also resulted i2 the Dore responsible leeding citizens of the cozmunity being n2de 2wzre 0f certain klavern nenbers , causing these klavern zenbers to p2 discredited in the eyes 0f tre public, Tnis w2S borne out in the recent schcol board election on 9/29/64 when two klevern members, one 0f shoz is J-_R_BUTRAM) were miserably defeated_ Tre xlaverr has during the past iew ronths urgcd its zenbers io solicit ana obtair 38w members . The inefiec-iveress 0f tneir prcgram is shcwn by the _5_ NM88608 Docld:32989629-Page-151 ================================================== Page 152 ================================================== fact that only ore 2ew zenber w25 i2i*22*82 #Czber i6 2 pon-or 'gEnize*iomal 4 Eock Divisicz, Lilerise) 35 2 ~esu17 0i ~42 1024- lets distributed encouraging people to write f02 2p314- cations have received only two letters; and naither 0f the writers have become a member The leaflet nas R2t with complete failure in its effort to build up its renbership. At this time the following are the only Specific counterintelligence action being recomnended: 1. An anonynous letter be railed t0 the National Gffice 0f John Birch Scciety, Belmont , Massachusetts pointing out that the %KK is in full control of the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff In this letter specifically rentior tne nan8 0f one or twvo of the more l2ading %len Iembers Ih0. 2r€ also leading ihe John Birch Society in Pine Bluff 2 _ 22 aronjrouS letter p2 Gailed t0 @HARiz CUTHBERTSON , Ezaited-Cyelcps-of the Pine Bluff Klavern, 2n4 2 ccpy Raijea %3" 3ILL FILLIANS Siate-Grand Dragon7' with the lettez;s to be maied *o the Post Office Box in Pine. Bluff and in Texarkana , Arkensas, 0f the AAX: The letter should be a conplaining letter from 2 menber who was active in the past and wno recently found one of tne IKI leaflets in his atomobile Which leaflet encouraged renbershipo The letter would let them know ne nas not rejoined; it mould point out that he dropped out because 0f such Zeadership 2s J_-EXBUERAM , who has used the kian for persoral gain 2s*BJERAw had a residence on his property remodelea 2t klavern expense ard then nade the ilavern stop holding meetings tnere; that BUTR:y has nCw donated land for the Butram Courtry Club So tnat he can sell his surr 'ounding land for building lots at an ezorbitant price. The letter should also set forth the fact he heard 30FRa# was discharged from the Army for mental deficiency (noron) This letter should be ziled from Little Rock. Interviews 0f klan menbers and leaders in the pzst (for ezenple, at the time of the ass2ssination 0f Presicent XENNEDY and on particuler bombing matter cases) ~6- NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 `'Page 152 they why ================================================== Page 153 ================================================== ave had deterring effect On the kleq, For exaxple , the Tescrkena Xlayern 22S not held 2 ilavern meeting 23 Such since that +ice. One Little Rock menber has dropped oui 25 2 result 0z being i-*xvi2u82; 212, eccordirg to 2n icformant, this @enber is 2 "changed Dan, 11 ceaning tnat he is noi 23 radical 2S previcusly. In intervizws witb zembers of the Pine Bluff Klavern , ~gerts have not et Qitb any hostility and have Jzen treeted cordially 2nd with reszect 0 Individual menbers curing these interviews have indiceed they are opposed to violerce and 2avocate proceeding in 2 legel manner o 4 nunber of the pembers have said that through political presspre and voting 2r2 the only wajs any change can ba mde_ Hcwever 1 have stated they are still avid segregationists ard do jot concone race mixing in any manner When and if t 2ppezrs tnat interest may be renewing in te AAK i2 Arkans2s, consideration will be given to 2notner interview pr ogran. It is noted- tkt particuler klan nembers re interviewed on 1 spasmodic basis i2 regerd to leeds fron surrounding field offices 0n boabirg matter cases 2nd tnis has had 2 tendency to deter eny violent activity on the part of klavern members, ~7_ NW-88608_Docld:32989629_Page_1.53 fL- tcey ================================================== Page 154 ================================================== 1 ene = 2 62-1l6395-551 30 EWL:Lbb 8/8/75 LCLTL The Actorney General 0.S. SENATE SELECT COMITTE ON INTELL ACTVTS (SSC} Re 7/28/75 superseding req for FBI materiels rec that date Erom SSC . Enelsd is memo for forvarding] to Committee vhich responds to reg Identified 88 Roman numerals set frth belov As indicated in mewo 9 V C. is being delivered by separate COiM ~ icatn 8/8/75 _ Also encled for ur records is ee Of memo prepared for Committee. 1 NVV 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 454 ================================================== Page 155 ================================================== Attached hereto is the response to Item 41 in the Senate Select Committee (sSC) letter to Mr. K William 0' Connor , on 14, 1975 . Iten #1 is set forth as follows : "Al1 memoranda and any other materials prepared in or by the General Investigative Division, the Domestic Intelligence Division, and the Inspection Division, which relate to, are referred or alluded to or portions of which are summarized or described in, the July 30 , 1964, memorandum captioned 'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups' from J. A. Gale to Mr _ Tolson. (See attachment to your letter of June 17 9 1975.)" NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 155 July Esq: in, to, ================================================== Page 156 ================================================== July 24, 1964 PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 2 Dear Mr _ Hoover: Thank you very much for your letter of July 17 2 1964._ I have been giving this reclal problen constant thcught , Paren - thetically, 1 did Mhat I could yesterday in New York to get thet Office moving faster and more effectiveiy in thls matter; You asked for suggestions and tnis is wbat 1 now offer you for wbatever little va lue 1t hag. (1) After writing you I reconmended t0 the Inspection Division that 2 study be made relative to Fhether or not the Domestic Intelligence Division can better hardle certain aspects of the Civil Rights-Raclal problem. Bir Gale is very much in favor of this inquiry and is moving promptly In this matter_ 1 think the results of hls inquiry will be most helpful in evalueting the situation_ 2) Wbat I bave in mind basically is this: You may want in light of his inquiry , consider transferring the responsibility for the developent of informants in the Klu Klux Klan White Citizens Council and related "hate" organizations to tbe Division while leaving the responsibility for investigating bombings, killings_ end So fortn where it non 13. My idea is: This L Divislon Can bring to bear 2l1 the technigues, skills, and procedures which it has used ; to successfully penetrate the Comnunist Party and egpionage organizations to nOw penetrate these kete Orgenizations causing uS So much trouble_ (In talring to Kr _ Tolson tbis norning I mentioned this briefly to him.) If 1 (3)my idea i8 operationally sound , and if this 18 done, I would immediately hold sone 1 regional congeronces Ln 2rezs wbere the raciel issue i8 acuze and get under iay in these offices,. SRaciel and aggressive programs to carry*out tnig [igh leve} cu4l1/487 informant developent You 258_gpmg_etely REc S AUs "e6774 NWV 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 156 9 to , ================================================== Page 157 ================================================== right when you Bay that informant develop- ment of the right kind i3 essentially the solution to our current problem _ The rumber of informants per se a3 we both know _ are 0f no significance_ That we nust have is the right kind of informants on tbe right level_ Tbe old saying "The proof of the pudding is in the eating" is relevant here because if We had this kind of informant penetretion, we wouldn t have Some Of these uusolved cases now causing uS So much concern _ This is simply 4 bard , stubborn fact we Cannot theorize away . (4) Further we should expand our informant penetration to cover some 02 thege legitimate but extremist organizations which we have up t0 now ignored in tnis respect _ TThey often ar8 "supporting" forces for such 28 the E.K.K: etc. and we ought to be on the inside o% thein , This then is ny response to your letter for nOw . As % bave Said, the Inspection Division 18 making the inquiry to ascertain the operational facts ana the feasibility Of Tha t 1 suggest. Cordlelly, iJseAsr Miliiam Sullivan 'exasstx k 2 - NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 157 ================================================== Page 158 ================================================== OPIIONAL fORM No. 10 soo-106 May 1962 (Dimion JsA G[N: [[c. No. 27 Toison UNETED STATES €C JRNMENT' Bclmnont Mohr Casper Memorandum Conraan_ DeLoach Evans Gale TO Mr:_ DATE: July 27, 1964 oisevan Tavel Trotter 1 7 Mr. Mohr Tele. Roomn FROM A_ Rosen 1 3 Mr: Gale Holmes Julltr Gandy 1 Mr. Belmont 1 5 Mr. Rosen SUBJECT : RACIAL MATTERS 1 7 Mr _ Malley 1 3 Mr _ McGowan Certainly, the items mentioned by Mr. Sullivan are such &8 to be handled by the Bureau on an intelligence basis. The racial field is a most fertile field for Communist Party and other subversive groups. There are indications of this such a8 in the cases of Martin Luther King and Michael Schwerner, one of the missing civil rights workers from Philadelphia, Mississippi, and other situations. Also there are reports of foreign funds being used to support the current actions of Malcolm X The racial strife and disorder are of such major significance aS to have international aspects and this is tailor-made for the disruptive tactics of subversive elements both right and left. We cannot afford to divorce the national racial program from its possible international aspects: The devices and tactics presently in use in the security field should be utilized to the fullest in developing intelligence information regarding national as well as international developments in the racial strife_ The tense racial potential in major cities is & fertile field for subversive activities both right and left. We have seen from the killings in the South, for example, the killing of Medgar Evers, that such appear to be isolated incidents usually carried out by one man or a small unattached group occurring on the spur-of-the-moment, such as the killing of the Lieutenant Colonel near Colbert, Georgia, and the assaulting of a minister in the streets in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. 770 [RECS" l. 84 2 5ixa The investigation of the Klan and hate groups a8 well as the development of informants in such organizations must, out ofsneces?ity?4 be handled as a whole. The following of the informants cannot be isolated from the over-all investigation Of the organizations just as the Iformants in the Communist Party cannot be isolated from the organizations are connected with: CLM/nkr *in letter to the Director dated 7/24/64 (7) SEP 21364 NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 158 _ Belmonl Vkis 6587 they JW) 7 0 ================================================== Page 159 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr. Belmont RE: RACIAL MATTERS Of course, any specific offenses such as, for example, the case of the three missing civil rights workers in Philadelphia, Mississippi, "or cases involving brutality, bombings or any other violations these individual investigations should be handled by the appropriate substantive desks such as the Civil Rights Desk. The over-all racial field is specifically an intelligence operation for the Bureau: It can best be organized when all facets are followed and directed by one Division: The communist potential for activities in this field would seem to be &a major factor as evidenced by the doings of Martin Luther King and his associates. The Bureau can best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united in one Division utilizing the tactics which Mr_ Sullivan has suggested as being effective. 2 I NW 88608 DocId:32989629 Page 159 ================================================== Page 160 ================================================== OPTIONAL FORk No. 10 3010-106 Kay 1962 Edition kune GEN; Rc No. 37 olson UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Belmont Mshr Casper Memorandum Collahan DeL9Sch Evans Gale TO MR. TOLSON DATE: August 4, 1964 3eR8ye Sullivan Tavel Trotter Tele. FROM J_ H: "GALE Gj) Holmes SUBJECT: PERSONNEL TRANSFERS TQ EFFECT PROPOSED REASSIGNNENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITES N RACIAL MATTERS AND RACIAL NFORMANTS_ By memorandum J. E Gale to Mr_ Tolson 7/30/64 it was recommended; and now approved by the Director , that supervisory responsibility over Racial Matters Qand Racial Inf ormants be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the boraestic Intelligence Division; In accordance with th s approval, proposed realignment and distribution of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Inteligence Division are being submitted Inasmuch as approximately 75% of the work of this Unit is now represented in the-categories being transferred.to Division 5, appropriate personnel transfers consistent therewith should be made: Category Caseload_June,1964 Percent Racial Matters 870 51. 59 Racial Informants 481 28. 5 Bombing Natters 183 10. 8 Federal Train Wreck 80 4.7 Statute Destruction of Aircraft or 74 4.5 Motor Vehicles 72946Y Total 1,688 38 38 100 . 0% REC-143 1} 2*_ The current supervisory responsibility among the seven Agent Supervisors in this Unit, including Supervisor in Charge Joseph C. Trainor , is aS follows: SA J> C. Trainor supervises classifications (other than_racial informants and organizations) for Atlantic Seaboard offices north of Virginia, 18 SEP 244584 SA J. G. Deegan has responsibility for racial informants for all field Mimeiecs Sgervises other classifications for the- Virginia ad Florida loffices. JX; 3 {exy Mr<~Caliahan 1 5 Mr . Mohr 1 - iMr. Beimont Mr . Rosen 1 3 Mr . Sullivan DIRECTOR 3214 ymj (7) 4.2mf4 0'#E, 101 SEE NEXT PAGE NW 886d8 Docld:32989629 Page 160 PEES BpdTN? Kns Roon 44n00 g S-[0 -c SHNT 3146 ================================================== Page 161 ================================================== Memo for Mr. Tolson Re: Personnel Transfers to Effect Proposed Reassignment of Supervisory Responsibilities in Racial Matters and Racial Informants SA F. H Freund has responsibi lity for Klan organizations for all field divisions and Supervises other classifications for Il western and midwestern offices. SA L: A. Giovanetti has alternate responsibility for Klan organizations for all field divisions and supervises other classifications for Atlanta, Little Rock, Savannah and 4 other midwestern offices. SA C. A_ Parkis-has responsibility for other hate organizations (8 currently active) for all field divisions and supervises other classifications for Birmingham, Mobile, Cleveland and the 4 Texas officesa SA F_ Po Smith supervises classifications (other than racial informants and organizations) for New Orleans, Memphis, Knoxville and 7 western offices, and special cases: SA H. E. Trent supervises classifications (other than racial informants and organizations) for Charlotte, Savannah, Baltimore, Washington Field office, Louisville and 2 midwestern offices. Based on the distribution of work, Inspector'& analysis reflects that it would take 5 of the 7 men assigned to the Organizations Unit to handle racial matters and racial informants under the approved change of responsibilities: There are 7 clerical employees assigned to the Organizations Unit of the Civil Rights Section and it is felt that 5 of these clerical employees who generally hande the work being transferred from the General Investigative Division to the Done stic Intelligence Division be transferred along With the supervisors. Assistant Directors Rosen and Sullivan are in accord that the proposed personnel changes are equitable, consistent and correspond with the transfer of responsibilities: RECOMENDATIONS: 1. That Supervisor in Charge Joseph C. Trainor and Agent Supervisors Deegan, Freund, Giovanetti and Parkis be transferred to Division 5 (Domestic Intelligencel Division) concomitant to the transfer to that Division ofapervisory responSibility over racial m tters and racial informants (if approved to be handled by Mr_ Mohr's Office). Zanxshl hnaMt Dep 8 Ivkf 2 SEE NEXT PAGE G7 NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 161 eexd 29k8 4l} -18-64 ================================================== Page 162 ================================================== Memo for Mr. Tolson Re: Personnel Transfers to Effect Proposed Reassignment of Supervisory Responsik lities in Racial Matters and Racial Informants 2_ That the remining Agent Supervisors, Smith and Trent, be retained in the Civil Rights Section to supervise bombing matters, Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles, Federal Train Wreck Statute, and special cases. Q} 3. That the following clerical employees be transferred (presently assigned to the Organizations Unit) to the Domestic Intelligence Division (if approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division): Ga.y4. a foxdu} May A_ Cammann 5 stenographer Kathryn T_ Chernitsky stenographer Sue E. Waller stenographer Carol Ann Hancock 5 clerk Y Wilbur Lane Perkins der} bel b { M f Vf 7 ADDENDUM: (WcS:jdd, 8-5-64) The personnel changes as recommended are ecceptable to tbis Division at this time. Contingent upon our thorough analysis of this situation and upon developments which will take place in the coming months, the personnel requirements may be elther reduced Or increased deperding upon tie volume of work and related ramifications Rv Yet Gn 3 - NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 162 2 R 7 3 rirto } 'E8hx hr~ 6 ,_ 5 S: @k'_ Mnlx 4; atZl 722 X+ Ar Aurrttr S/n}o F uts tl mna)bnt hun~, Lvh) a~ p & ================================================== Page 163 ================================================== ORTYQNAL FOrM,No: 10 3010-106 CAr 1/62 Eqitigv GM GIN: bG. No. 37 Tolson UNITRD STATES GC: RRNMENT Belmont Mohr Casper Memorandum Contaan DeLogch Evar Gale TO Mr. Belmont DATE: August 17 , 1964 Rosen Sutiivan Tavel Sullivan 1 4 Mr. Gale Trotter FROM Y: RSsezi 1 Mr . Sullivan FolaeRoom 1 5 Mr. Belmont Gandy 1 ~ Nr. Rosen SUBJECT: AGREEMENT REACHED_N CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT @F. SUPERVISORY Alev RESPONSIBLLITIES INVOLVNG THE KU KLUX KLAN OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS Reference is made to the memoranda of Mr. Gale to Mr. Tdlson dated 30, 1964, and August 4, 1964. PURPOSE: The purpzse 0f this memorandum is to set forth the V responsibilities of the Jomestic_Intelligence Division and the -eneral Investigative Division following the reassignment of supervisory responsibilities involving the Ku Klux Klan; other hate groups, 1 and racial matters. To clarify this matter it is set forth in two parts ' Part I will set forth the responsibilities of the Domestic Intelligence Division: Part I will define the responsibilities of 3 the General Investigative Division. PART I 0 ft; 4 IC} I The Domestic Intelligence Division will-be responsible for 3 the investigation of all Klan and hate-type organizations and their members on a selective basis. Several inquiries are presently pending in the field regarding additional organizations to determine whether such organizations in fact, hate groups. I The Domestic Intelligence Division will assume the responsibility for the development of quality informants in all such organizations_ BEC:Ja & 3/5 wCS&A R:hw patacr Aa ) 5 ( CONTINUED 5 OVER 7-772 L 1964 0 672 2e1264 SEP Tpow Mt @3eF ,71964 , J 1-RrBlo % ~Fos8.2 NW-B8608 ~Docld:32989629 Page-163 CjUA July are, 5.3-7482 XEROX 5e ================================================== Page 164 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr_ Belmont RE: AGREEMENT REACHED N CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN, OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS IL The Domestic Intelligence Division Will assume the responsibility for formulating and carrying out disruptive counterintelligence programs against such organizations. IV The Domestic Intelligence Division, in addition; is willing to go beyond the recommendations approved by the Director related to the above and will, with Bureau approval, develop highly placed, qyality informants in certain legitimate organizations whose activities generally relate to racial matters, such as National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) headed by Martin Luther King White Citizens Council (Each one, of course, will be handled on a carefully selected basis and the action approved individually by the Bureau ) V. Similarly, the Domestic Intelligence Division is willing to go beyond what was originally approved and will, with Bureau authorization; proceed to establish informants and sources in Negro communities throughout the Nation for the purpose of developing intelligence information relating to the degree of racial tension; the possibility of violence erupting in theform of riots, etc. ; and will disseminate this material to all interested persons inside and outside the Bureau: The organizations and objectives a8 set forth in paragraphs IV &nd V above are being made the subject of & separate memorandum inasmueh aS this involves a matter of policy and will have to be acted on separately subject to approval by the Director_ 2 CONTNNUED " OVER NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 164 ================================================== Page 165 ================================================== Memorandum to Mr. selmont RE : AGREEMENT REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSTBILITY INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN, OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS VI; The Domestic Intelligence Division will follow and disseminate information concerning demonstrations, picketing activities, racial disturbances, riots and incidents relating to matters of a racial nature violations of a local nature which occur during the above and are not Federal violations should be disseminated by the Domestic Intelligence Divisidn. (However, if during the course of any of theabove situations, 8 Federal violation is indicated, this should be immediately referred to the General Investigative Division. It will be the responsibility of the General Investigative Division to conduct any necessary investigation of the specific Federal violation which occurs. It will also have the responsibility of disseminating such information to persons entitled to receive same. Where special cases arise which are not Federal violations and an investigation is requested BZ 8be Hbite,3gg3384 #r G0h2sr te deter 9E8983jo# Hba4 25 will made Division I The General Investigative Division will have the responsibility for the Bureau's supervision relative to the enforcement of all Civil Rights legislation. It will also have the responsibility for the supervision, accumulation of information, and dissemination Of material relating to civil actions undertaken to enforce compliance with the various elements of the Civil Rights laws. Ia The General Investigative Division will have the responsibility for investigating bombings, police brutality and all other Federal violations now assigned to the General Investigative Division. M The daily racial matters memorandum disseminated to the White House, the Attorney General etc. 2 which is coordinated by 2 representative of Mr. DeLoach 1 S Office, will be prepared in Headquarters building: This requires the use of a stenographer who reports on duty at midnight each night in order to complete the memorandum by 8.00 a.m. , in the morning: This duty should be alternated, a week at a time, between Division 5 and Division 6. p 3 3 - NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 165 Any being W-e8 ================================================== Page 166 ================================================== ctioNal fOKm No: 10 Joto-106 "'MAY Edition Tolson GM Reo . No.37 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Boiront Casper 4 Caligtar; Memorandum ~Deiaach Evans Gale MR BELMONT DATE: 8/18/64 Rosen TO Sullivan Tavel Trotter Tele. Room FROM A: ROSEN C 1 Gahdes_ 1~. Ge SUBJECT : PERSONNEL TRANSFERS TO EFFECT PROPOSED REASSTGNMENT OF SUPERVIORY RESPONSIBLLITES N RACIAL MATTERS AND RACIAL INFORMANTS SsF Pursuant to Mra Gale's memorandum of 8/4/64, to Mr. Tolsontr in the above-captioned matter, the personnel on the attached list will be transferred from the Civil Rights Section, General Investigative Division, effective 9 ao mlo , 8/19/64, to the Domestic Intelligence Divisiono Enclosure AR:WW (12) 1 3 Vr: Belmont 1 - 'Mra Rosen 1 7 Mra. Malley 1 - Mra McGowan 1 - Mro Callahan 5 Att: Movement # Mr. Callahan 4 Att: Voucher Statistical Section, Rm: '6221 1B 4 3 Mr. Mohr ~ Mr. Evans --Mro DeLoach Mr. Tavel S Mr. Sullivan s 1 3 Mi-[O0Q)~ ~M] 3961 L -3X 9 1ie~ 23 ranA { 9-7/-b*.4h REMOVED BY SRD W3= OcT 8 139 NV 88608-Docld: 32989629_Page 166 _ 5710 0 8-/9-6 - Viusz REC-143 XEROX #bre: 1964 ================================================== Page 167 ================================================== NAME TITLE GRADE SALARY Joseph Deegan Special Agent GS-13 813,28513, 755 Frederick H: /Freund, Jr. Special Agent (A) GS-14 15,415 16,130 Louis A. 'Giovanetti Special Agent GS-14 14,51515,150 Charles A/ Parkis, Jr. Special Agent (A) GS-14 14,515 15,150 Joseph CXTrainor Special Agent GS-14 15,415 16,130 Mary 4z Cammann Clerk-Stenographer GS-5 4890 5000 Kathryn T;7Chernitsky Clerk-Stenographer GS-H5 42154489 500( Sue Waller Clerk-Stenographer GS-5 4890 5000 Carol Ann-ancock Clerk GS-4 47455080 Wilbur Lane Perkins Clerk GS-4 49+5 5230 NW-88608 Qocld:32989629 Page 167 Ej] ================================================== Page 168 ================================================== Ercised Copy Qodkt Vnl? 'Illes ================================================== Page 169 ================================================== April 29, 1966 'XKE ROLE or 4nD 3I IN CEANCESTINE ?OREICN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THI UNITED STATES NWV-88608-00eid32989629-page 169 Cia ================================================== Page 170 ================================================== [6 [90 ,/6 1/3 NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 170 ================================================== Page 171 ================================================== T A B & E 0 @ C 0 N T E N T 8 Page A ,' PURPOSE AND SCOPE _ INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY 2 C THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITE STATES 8 1 Prior to World War II 8 2 _ During World War II (ig4i i945) 8 3 Na tional Intelligence Authority (NIA) 15 4 Responsibilities of CIA 20 a The National Security Act of 1947. 20 b National Security Council Intelligence Directive_ 22 Director of Centrai Inteiiigence Directives 26 d_ Dulles Committee, 1949 29 Hoover Commission 9 1948 and 1955 _ 33 f The Doolittle Committee, 1354 33 8 The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligencc Activities of the United Stetes Government_ 41 5 _ Responsibilities of the FBI 44 a LawS and Directives 44 b Requests From Other Agencies 45 C FBI ' s . Role in the United States Intelligence Board _ 46 d, The President 8 Foreigu' inteiiigence Advisory Board (PFIAB) 48 The Director 8 Stand Over tbe Years_ 50 D; : TRE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U, S. 55. E CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES _ 59 Mi8868 _Docld 32989629 _Eage_171 B . ================================================== Page 172 ================================================== T A B L % 0 # C 0 N T E N T 9 Page F $ CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE rBI - 64 1 Manpower Being Devoted_ 64 2 . Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances With Eva luation Of Product 65 3_ Live Sources With Eva lua tion 66 4 < Anagram Program. 67 5 Double Agents and Informants 67 6 _ Addition81 Potential 68 G; AREAS OF CONFLICT , FBI 4= CIA 69 H CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA 74 I, ETFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES . 77 Overi Coiieciiuu fctivities _ 2 , Clandestine Ga thering Activitie8 79 GENERAL FINDINGS 82 K RECOMENDED PLAN Op ACTION_ 86 Authorization_ 86 Selection of Targets 87 Technical Surveillance of Targets 90 Technica 1 Surveillance Controls_ 91 Anagram Program_ 91 Live Sources 91 Training of Personnel 93 Reporting Procedures 94 Language Capabilities 94 Relations With Other Agencies _ 95 Administra tive Reorganiza tion 97 ALTERNATIVES 99 11 NITBE6IE DocTd332989629 Page 172 10 {J, ================================================== Page 173 ================================================== PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this study 18 to define a new role for tho Bureau in the field of clandestine collectlon of {oroign Intolligonce in tho U_ 8 . This action is necessary end most timely becauso 0z our Government s vital need for increased foreign Intolligence end becausa of CIA 8 expanding intereste in the United Statos _ There is a decided need for a new Bureau concept, the implementation of which could greatly increase our effectiveness and could deter CIA from becoming a threa t to our opera tional interebts Thbe study encompasses a review of hibtory as it relates to foreign intelligence collection in the U S, Analysis 1s made of the need and the potential for such intelligence; the capabilities of the Bureau and CIA in this field; and the responsibilitiea of over-all (overt and covert) collection of foreign intelligence in the U , S. We have submitted our general findings 9 and we recommend 9 plan 0f action for a new Bureau role. This study was not designed to eliminate once and for a11 the many problems relating to collection of foreign intelligence in the U, S . It would have been a Utopian objective to recommend a Plan which would produce maximum intelligence collection, remove existing defects within the U_ S . intelligence community, and establish complete harmony among interested agencies. We did not g0 that far_ Careful and exhaustive analys.s dictated that we endeavor to reach a reasonable consistent with prudent planning and Bound operational implementation_ We feel that the recommended plan meets such guidelines that it 18 a decidedly major step forward for the Bureau, and it strongly conforms with the national gecurity needs , It Should be noted that this document does not. deal with our Jaw enforcement Or internal security functions, although It is fully recognized that internal security and clandestine collection Of foreign- intelligence ar8 closely linked, Any plan on our part to produce foreign Intelligence Rill affect our capabilities in the fleld of counterintelligence. 88608 aqe 7 goa1 ================================================== Page 174 ================================================== B INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY People who do not speak and understand a common language have difficulty in communicating their ideas . Even in a country such as ours where English is the common language, words take on different meanings in different geographicai Ioclos and in difforont Gocial political and economic environments Likewise, in professional fields, varying backgrounds and experiences have conveyed different meanings to torms in tho professional vocabulary. In the field of security, intelligence, and counter- intelligence operations, certain professional terminology has developed ostensibly to assist in the exchange of ideas by persons in this field. However as progress is made in a field or a special segment 'of the field, new horizons develop which require additional terminology or cause an evolution in existing terminology _ This development or evolution in security and intelligence terminology coupled with individualistic usage, brings further problems in meaning which Fe also face in the broader aspects of the English language _ We have all noted that our dictionaries do not always provide a single meaning and we must be careful in daily conversation that we are not misunderstood when merely using 2 conversational vocabulary_ iie face 4 siullar problem ir the use 0f professiona] torminol- ogy in security and intelligence matters a5 this terminology takes on new meaning with additional experience and takes on varying meanings to different persons, An additional factor to consider in understanding the meaning of terminology is the context in which a term is used . For example, the term "intelligence" may be vague and confusing without the knowledge of the coatext in which it is used, It can, a5 a generic term, pertaim to the Whole field of activities undertaken by a governmenti tke collection of information, the protection of its institutions, and the con- duct of nonattributable activities to facilitate the formation and implementation of government policy_ Also, it can relate to the. organization devoted to the collection and production of information necessary to the governmeat _ In addition, it may pertain to the whole body of theory and practice on the .basis of which_ an intelligence_ or 'ganization operates_ Finally the word "intelligence" 1 may be utilized to mean any . or all of the above The following definitions do not include ali possible meanings that have been utilized but , 'Instead, are designed to assist the reader in digesting thig study- Nm-88608 part ================================================== Page 175 ================================================== Y BASIC INTELLIGENCE is that factual intelligence wnich results from the collation of encyclopedia information of a fundamental and more or less permanent nature and which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, 16 deternined to be the best availablo BIOGRAPHIC' INTELLIGENCE 1s intelligence concerning individualB, CLANDESTINE COLLECTION A coordinated complex of collection activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counter_ intelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted by a governmental department or agency, or jointly by two or more such entities, in such 2 way, as to assure secrecy or concealment. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE is military intelligence for use In combat "situations, This is commonly referred to as tactical, COUNTERESPIONAGE is identifying, penetratiug, 4aiifpulating or repressing inimical espionage organizations, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE is defined a5 that intelligence activity, with its resultant product_ 1 whicn is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information, and installations against espionage, sabotage, and subversion_ Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring 9 developing , recording, end disseninating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capeble Of conducting such activity. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest Which i8 usually disseminated Without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation. DEPARTAENTAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission, N 88608 DochR32989629P2geJ5 ================================================== Page 176 ================================================== DOIDSTIC INTELLIGENCE concerns information and investigation of espionage, counterespionage, etc_ 0 which pertains to the internal security of the U.S , and, therefore 9 is in subject matter pertinent to the internal Rffairs of the U,S, ICONOMIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the potentialities, utilization; and vulnerabilities 0f & nation'8 natural and human resources 0 ESPIONAGE is defined 85 that intelligence activity which is directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine operations, TOREIGN INTELLIGENCE pertains to foreign affairs and subject matters pertinent to foreign countries The word "foreign" as used here denotes the target of the intelligence and is distinct from the geographic location of the source providing the information_ For example, refugees, defectors, and immigrants from target countries (such aS the Soviet Union) have the petertiel for s"rr)yin€ intelligence regarding their countries to United States authorities_ Although physically located in the United States, they are potential foreign intelligence sources, GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the meterology , hydrography , topography , and basic natural resources 0f an area , INTCLLI GENCE is the product derived from information collected for the formulation and execution of Government policy and for safeguarding the national welfaree INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION is information collected for intelli- gence purposes that has not been evaluated by comparison with the existing body of knowledge on the subject: reported on; the raw material 0f intelligence _ 0 INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions; but Which transcends the exclusive competence of a single depart- ment or agency to produce_ 'N88608_Docld:32989629-Page- 476 ================================================== Page 177 ================================================== INTERNAL SECURITY relates to the defense and protection within the United States and its territories and possessions of the people= the government , the institutions and the installations of critical importance from 211 hostile or destructive action, INVESTIGATION means systematic and direct inquiries or pro- cedures (such 38 physical or tochnical surveillancos or neighbor- hood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; investigation does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions MILITARY INTELLIGENCE : See Combat Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national Security policy 9 concerns more than Cic dczartment or agency , and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency . OVERT COLLECTION is collection activities conducted in such a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the sponsor government_ POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns foreign and domestic policies 0f governments and the activities 0f political movements , POSITIVE INTCLLIGENCE may be described as 2 comprehensive product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, and interpretation of all available information relating to national security and co_cerning other countries where such information is Significant to our Government S development and execution of plans policies_ } and courses of action_ Such intelligence can be divided into various categories, such as basic, biographic, combat, current 9 departmental 9 econonic, geographic, interdepartmental, military, national } political, Scientific, sociological, strategic, tactical and technical. Perhaps the most Simple definition would be that positive intelligence is al1 the things you should know in advance of initiating 2 course of 8ction, NM-88608-Eoeld:32989629-Page- ing ================================================== Page 178 ================================================== There appears to be much confusion in professional 11 circles regarding the use of the term "positive intelligence. Some professionals use the term "positive intelligence" synonymously with tho torm "foroign intolligenco_ 1 In 8till anothor ff usage, "positive intelligence and "Intelligence" are uscd interchangeably . In another useage, which i8 closely related to the definition utilized in this study "positive intelli- gence" is described 2s what is left of tie entire field after "security intelligence" has been subtracted. This source continues that both "positive intelligence" and "security intelligence" can be against domestic targets 9 as Well as against foreign targets_ For example, the Department of State, in connection with its formulation of foreign policy, encounter8 a large number of organizations of Americans whose parents came from foreign countries_ Many of these or ganizations--the Poles for erample-_have strong views on wha t United States policy should be toward Poland _ The views of these organizations regarding our foreign policy is likely to be a matter of some importance to the Department of State in its policy formula- tion. The knowledge of Ivha t these organizations think and do can be a very significant phase of what might be called "dcmestic positive intelligence In addition, the connections which these organizations may have with the foreign country such as Poland sometimes provide a source of "foreign positive I intelligence _ SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE pertains to the progress of scientific research and development and usually this intelligence is within the framework of how it affects military or economic potential of a nation. SECURITY INTELLIGENCE is basically the intelligence behind the police function to protect the nation and its members from those Working to our national ana individual detriment_ For example, this would include intelligence regarding clandestine agents sent to the United States by a foreign power 0 SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE pertains to the social, cultural, psychological, or ethnic structure and characteristics of a people _ 0 STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE is the intelligence required for broad and usually long-range planning; especially with regard to military operations. ~NW 88608_Docld: 32989629 T78 Page ================================================== Page 179 ================================================== TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE See Combat Intelligence. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns devicos, equipmont and spocial Procobso8 _ This 18 rolated to Sclentific Intelli- gence , but tends to be differentiated from it as practice differs from theory NW88608: Qocld 32989629-Pagel79 ================================================== Page 180 ================================================== C THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE WTTED STATES 1_ Prior to World War II A study of the history and progress 0f foreign intelligence collection in the United States reveals that prior to World War II such collection efforts wera incidental and in direct proportion to the intensity of the coverage maintained in the counterintelligence field_ Accordingly , the history of foreign intelligence collection in the United States prior to Worla War II is primarily a history 02 counterintelligence and internal security coverage 8 of which foreign intelligence was a by-product _ Historical highlights of the developments in this field are as follows : (a) In August, 1914, when German espionage agents Count Johann Von Bernstorff and Dr _ Heinrich Albert of the German Embassy , Washington D_ C arrived in the Uuiied States with J31E8,006,Qno in German treasury notes to finance the first foreign espionage and sabotage apparatus to be organized in this country_ 9 United States Government intelligence work was handled for the most part by five small organizations (Bureau 0f Investigation 0f the Department of Justice, Secret Service, Army , State and Navy) , a11 operating on their own with small staffs and without coordination and sufficient delineation of responsibilities. (b) On April 6 1917 Congress declared war against Germany and President Woodrow Wilson gave the Bureau 0f Investigation the task of enforcing his proclamation governing the conduct of enemy aliens The Bureau at the time had 300 Agents but shortly after the outbreak of the war the staff was increased to 400 _ (c) As result of a rash of bombings believed executed by Bolsheviks Attorney General Palmer appointed Francis: P: Garvan '0f Neww' York aS #Assistant-Attorney-.General to deal with the problem_ He created a General Intelligence Division under command of J , Edgar Hoover and Mr Hoover was instructed to make 2 study of subversive activities in tho United Stateb to determine their scope and the potential for prosecution, ~ 8 - 48i NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 180 ================================================== Page 181 ================================================== (a) On May 9 , 1934, President Roosevelt called a White House conference attended by the Attorney General Secrctary of Treasury Secretary of Labor, Director of FBf and Chicf 0f United states Secret Service to deal with the problem of growth of fascist orgenizations in the United States_ The conference agreed that there should be an invostigation 0f these groups and their activities for intelligence purposes _ Since the only Federal lw believed applicable at the time was the Immigration Law the President decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service would confer with the Chief of Secret Service and the Director 0f the FBI to work out details of the investigation. Hr _ Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI personnel to conduct an intensive and confidential" investi- gation 0f the Nazi movement _ This was the first general intelligence investigation made by the Government into fascist activities in this country _ (e) As 2 result of President Franklin Roosevelt'8 concern ovcr activities of the communists and other subversive grOups , LL 80ri23 8f confercnccs "29 hojd {n the latter part of August and carly September 1936_ participated in by the Presidcnt tho Sccrctary of State and the Dircctor of the TBI. As a rcsult 0f his conccrn over thc international character of connunish and fascism the President stated the FBI skoula conduct necessary investigations and coordinate inforration upon thesc nc ~tFTS 5a the possession of the Military Erca" Egenge' Division, the Neval Intelligence_ Division end the State Department _ It is noteworthy that it was specified the investigation was to be for intelligence purposes only. The Presidential Order was implemented by the Director in a letter to all Special Agents in Charge , September 5 , 1936 , (f) As a result of opposition primarily by the State Department against accepting the FBI as the coordinating agency in the investigations of al1 subversive activities in the United States President Roosevelt, on June 26 1939 issued a confidential directive to Cabinet members which established a2 Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee composed of the FBI and the Intelligence Divisions of che War Department and the Navy . He named the FBI as the coordinating agency to receive 811 reports on subversive activities, 9 0 Nw-88608_Docld:32989629_Page 181 ================================================== Page 182 ================================================== (g) Pregident Roosevelt publicly designated the FBT to investigate matters relating to espionage_ sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations Presidontial Directive dated September 6 , 1939_ (h) On May 21 _ 1940 , President Roosevelt in a memorandum to the thon Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, authorized and directed the Attorney General in such cases a8 he might approve to authorize che use of listening devices directed to the conversations or other communications 0f persons suspected of subversive activity against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies _ Pursuant to such authorization commencing on June 1, 1940 technical surveillances were installed on diplomatic establishments throughout the United States of such countries as Germany, Italy } Japan , Russia and France _ These installations in addition to providing counterintelligence information of value produced a substantial quantity 6f foreign Intelligence information (1) Although lines of responsibility were established for domestic intelligence work in connection with the September 6 , 1939_ Presidential Directive, there were no clearly defined areas 0f responsibility of overseas intelligence operations and as time passed the need for decisions in that field grew more evident. As a result the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) came into being_ Presiaential Directive June 24 , 1940_ President Franklin D, Roosevelt set forth lines 0f responsibility in the operations 0f United States intelligence agencies in the foreign field. This Directive grew out 0f a series of meetings 'involving representatives of State Department } Army and Navy intelligence and the FBI wherein it was agreed that the SIS would act aS a service agency , furnishing the State Department , the militery, the FBI and other governmental agencies with information having to do with financial economic, political and subversive activities detrimental to the security of the United States_ The June 24th Directive placed the responsibility for no= nmilitary intelligence coverage in the Western Hemisphere on the FBI _ Less than thirty days thereafter the FBI had organized an SIS operation. Through World War II and until approximately March 31 , 1947 the FBI continued its SIS operations_ The culmination of our activities in this field came about as a result of the' January 1946, Presidential Directive establishing the Central Z2telldGence Group and giving it the responsibility of collecting foreign intelligence abroad. 10 by By ================================================== Page 183 ================================================== 2 _ During World Wer II (1941 1945) 8 , The FBI' 8 Role During World War II 1 as prior to the war foreign intelligence collection in this country was gcared to and principally a product of our intensive efforts in the counter- intelligence field. It is also significant to note that a steady stream of foreign intelligence continued to be developed from our technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of enemy-bloc countries } as well as other 8ensitive countries such as Russia, Argentina, Portugal and Spain. In line with the Presidential Directive of September 6 1939 the FBI continued to be in charge of al1 investigative work in matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage , counterespionage, subversive activities and violations 0f the neutrality laws_ On January 8 , 1943 , the President issued &nother Directive in which he reiteratea the previous Directive 0f September 6 , 1939_ In ordering the FBI to take charge in the foregoing areas President Roosevelt did not define the various types of inteliigence involved but placed the entire intelligence and internal security responsibilities involved under the jurisdiction of che FBI. As a matter of fact , in carrying out these responsibilities we did produce foreign Intelligence in substantial quantity especially through our technical coverege 0f foreign diplomatic establishments _ b, Office of Strategic Services The position of Colonel William J, Donovan as Coordinator of Information (COI) was created by Presidential Directive dated July 11, 1941. On July 14, 1941, President Roosevelt; Sent a letter: to the-Attorney Gereral:statingthe position was created "in order to provide a central point in the Government for the analysis of information and data which bears upon national security The President described Donovan 8 duties as "assist me and the various Departments and agencies' 0f the Government in ' assembling and' correlating information which may be useful in the formulation of basic plans for the defense of the nation." 11 NW-88608_Doeld:32989629-Pag9-183 ================================================== Page 184 ================================================== In the letter President Roosevelt clearly limited Donovan 8 jurisdiction wlth the following statement: "I should like to emphasize that Colonel Donovan' 8 work 18 not intended to bupersede or duplicate or Involve any dlrection of the activities 0f established agencies already obtaining and Interpreting defense information T The Presidential order dated September 11, 1941 established the position of COI with clear cut authority to collect and analyze information bearing on national 8ecurity; correlate and make such information available to the President and other Government officials as the President may deternine 0 COI ras finally authorized to carry out , when requested by the President, supplementary activities 83 mighz facTlizate The securing of information not then available to the Government _ Donovan 9 in 2 memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF ~ESTABLISHMENT Op SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORHATION # ezpanded on the President's directive in general terms Under his for procedure there was a Coordinator of Strategic Information responsible directly io ihe President_ {Note this same organizational set up was later adopted by the Director of Central Intelligence-) Donovan noted , hovever , in his memorandum "The proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI Army and Navy Intelligence } or any other Department of the Government # (62-64427 , serials 23 and X3 . ) Our file on the Office of Strategic Services (oss) reveals that that organization continued its organizational, training, and operational activities in this country based on Donovan 8 premise that he was the central clearing point for anti-Azis espionage and counterespionage An interesting insight into OSS operations in this country 1s provided in the nonfiction work "The Scarlet Thread" by former OSS agent Donald Downes Downes noted that he was a former British intelligence agent serving for tha t organization in New York when he was recruited: by OSS immediately after Pearl Harbor _ He tells of bis recruitment by Allan Dulles his association with Donovan, and his work in the counterespionage field in New York City and Mashington, D_ with other OSS agents, including the current United States Ambassador to the United Na tions Arthur Goldberg _ Downes detailed attempts by bim and other OSS agents_ to steal diplomatic codes from 12 WMt88608 Docld 329896297Page plan C., ================================================== Page 185 ================================================== "friendly" or "neutral" country embassies in Mashington i0 the early 1940 's and frequently referred to the fact that this w2s being done by OSS with knowledge that its juris_ diction in this country was pased only on the theory that a forelgn Embassy is not Americen 8011 and is technically outside the jurisdiction of the FBI which had full juris- diction for coun terintelligence in tbe Restern hemlsphere Our file on tbe OSS 1s replete with incident8 indicating OSS recruitment and counterespionage activities in this country during the early 1940'9 _ memorandum dated May 22 1945 , Stanley J Tracey , advised of 2 conversation overheard between two high-ranking State Department officials The conversation dealt with OSS attempts to take over Bureau SIS operations in Latin America with one of the State Department officials Aura Marren , stating tbat officials 0f OSS felt that organization was -better equipped to handle work than FBI personnel attached to various American Embassies in South America In response to this attempt of OSS to take over our duties , the Director commented: iy 4 woula liie lo iuOw vlleie Mazzcn g2+3 txiz_ According to. Ladd our contacts in State Department have no knowledge of such OSS efforts Also Tracey should point out it is Stete Department duty to initiate it aS we mould 'service it' and the State Department in fact started the SIS project . H" (62-64427-1059.) An interesting evaluation of OSS operations is provided in a report prepared by Colonel Richard Park of the War Department as a result of a survey of OSS operations made as a special and confidential mission for the President in 1944 and 1945 _ Colonel Park commented : "Without going into details I was everywhere left with the same impression 0f utter incompetency on the part of OSS leadership "Everywhere that the subject of OSS came up, unsolicited remarks clearly brought out the very well known anateurish: nature 0f the organization_ "The OSS has been restricted from active operations in South America by Presidential directive . Despite the absence of any jurisdiction in or" responsibility for counterintelligence operations in the western hemisphere , an of OSS wab reported to bave 13 6 NW-88608 R5 By pfficer ================================================== Page 186 ================================================== attempted to obtain cover, for an OsS agent in South America under guise of employment by an organization doing busine8g in South America A closing paragraph of Colonel Park' 8 report commented on observations made by an official of OSS aS follows : "Thls official of OSS added that it was the policy of his agency not to give any more information than necessaty to the Federal Bureau 0f Investigation He pointed out that OSS instructors in their school in the United States had discussed the FBI in an unfavorable light and had painted the picture of OSS .replacing the Federal Bureau of Investigation not only outside the United States bu % ip the domestic field The publicity campaign referred to was to be one Of the means adopted to accomplish this purpose 14 6 NW 88603 Docld:32989629Page 186 ================================================== Page 187 ================================================== 3 National Intelligence Authority_(NIA) On Januery 22,'1946_ President Harry S . Truman addressed 0 Directive to the Secretary of State the Secretary of Mar, and the Secretary of the Navy stating, in part "I hereby designate you , together with enother person to ba named by me as my personal representative, &s the National Intelli- gence Authority MI The Directive provided that each of thege three Secretaries would from time to time assign personnel and facilities from their respective departments "vhich persong Sball collectively form a Central Intelligence Group" (CIG) under a Director of Central Intelligence It wa8 provided that the latter would be responsible to the NIA President Truan then stated that subject t0 the existing law the Director of Central Intelligence should (a) accomplish the corre" ation and evaluation of intelligence and the appropriate dissemination Within the Government 0f the results; (b) plan for the coordination of such activities 0f the intelligence agencies of the three departments involved 25 releted t0 the national security; (c) perform such services 0f common concern as the NIA determined could be more effectively accomplished centrally; and (a) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence 8s the Pregident and the NIA might from time to time direct. The Presidential Directive said that no police, law enforcement or internal security functions Should be exercised under the Directive; that certain intelligence should be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence "for correlation, evaluation or dissemination" ; and that "the existing intelligence agencies of your departments shall continue to collect , evaluate, correlate and disseninate departmental intelligence _ M The ninth provision of the Directive stated, "Nothing herein Shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions 9 M except as provided by law and Presidential directives _ A series of communications between the Bureau and Lieutenant General Hoyt S _ Vandenberg; who was designated 2S Director of the Central Intelligence Group , then followed_ On June 1946, a memorandum analyzed a communication from Vandenberg which submitted a proposed memorandu to the NIA and a proposed Directive to be issued by NIA extending the powers and duties 0f the Director 0f Central Intelligence The Directive provided, in essence _ the following additional functions and powers for the Director of Central Intelligence: 15 0 NW 88608_Qocld:32989629_Page 187 21 , ================================================== Page 188 ================================================== (1) Undertake such basic research and analysis 0f intelligence end counterintelligence a8 may In his opinion be required_ (2) Act 26 the exocutivo agont o2 thig Ruthority (NIA) Ln coordinating and in suporvising a11 Federal foreign intelligence activities. (3) Perform the Tollowing services of common concern: (a) conduct a11 Federal espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign Intelligence; (b) conduct 8l1 Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers for the collection of intelligence information In discussing this Directive Which Vandenberg desired issued, the memorandum stated the Directive did not conform with the original plan proposed the President or Which was envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the President Issued his Directive_ The original plan, insofar a5 the Bureau was advised , contemplated the setting up 0f solely a coordinating agency Which was given the power to perform certain functions which it would be determined could more adequately and ecoromicelly be performed centrally for the benefit of a11 Government agencies _ The memorandum noted that "undoubtedly if this Directive is approved and the Central intelligence Group is successful in setting up complete foreign coverage, the Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a second rate' position insofar as purely intelligence functions are concerned in the domestic field, It is inevitable that the Central Intelli- gence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that field_ Also, it is impossible to separate entirely foreign intelligence and the domestic functions performed by the Bureau "* In reply to the Directive proposed by General Vandenberg , a letter was sent to him June 25, 1946, Which stated that tbe Directive was approved with certain changes suggested "for clarification purposes only _ M The Director suggested tbat to tbe item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence acting * # * * * # # * * * * * * * * * * * With respect to this last quoted statement, Mr . 'E. A. Tamm and Mr . C. A_ Tolson noted an exception by placing an addendum on the memorandum The Director's comments were set forth Thls is more fully reported below under the heading, "Director' 8 Conment8 1f 5 16 NW88608_Deeld:32989629Page-188 by ================================================== Page 189 ================================================== as the executive agent of National Intelligence Authority in coordinating and supervising all foreign intelligence activitios thero should bo addod "performed outsido thc United States and its possessions relating to the national security in accordance with the overall policies and objectives established by this Authority_ With respect to the proposal that the Director of Central Intelligence direct all espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence, it was proposed that the phrase "outside the United States and it8 possessions" also be inserted in tbis provision_ On July 1946 } General Vandenberg sent over 2 memorandum on the subject "Exploitation of American Business Concerns With Connections Abroad as Sources Of Foreign Intelligence Informtion " He added a proposed Directive The Director replied by letter August 6 , 1946 , "I Should like to comment that there appears to have been an addition to the field encompassed by CIG Directive #ll calling for a survey of the exploitation of American business concerns I note that in your report and in the proposed NIA Directive , you refer not only to American business con- cerns but to other private groups with connections abroad. This latter phrase in my opinion, 18 extremely broad and could be taken to include &11 types of organizations including Foreign Nationality Groups_ In fact, I feel that the report and proposed Directive should confine themselves to the discussion of American business concerns and that no references at 811 should be made to private groups' I feel that at 2 later date the question of exploitation of these private groups by CIG representatives might be worked out by discussing them individually with the FBI when their identities are determined _ M1 This matter remaIned unresolved, On August 22 1946 General Vandenberg submitted another proposed Directive concerning exploitation of American business concerns nongovernmental groups } and individuals (in the United States; with connections abroad 25 sources of foreign intelligence information A memorandum analyzing this on August 22 , 1946, pointed out the new Directive Tas @ven more 17 ~NWV- 88608Docld:32989629-Page 489 29 , ================================================== Page 190 ================================================== obnoxious than the one originally proposed. The Directive noted, in part "CIG field representatives will establish and maintain lialson With the intelligence officers 0f local Army and Navy headquarters and Air Forco headquarters if present through the medium of local interagoncy offices 16 The eniiyzing memorandum ~ointed out , "If this, means the CIG is going to maintain field representatives in the United States or establish offices, it certainly 1g something new and a provision that we did not understand was intended in the President s Directive _ Attached to the proposed Directive is 2 discussion which is more or 1ess the same 89 was attached to the original proposed Directive _ however , makes the following statement which the Bureau cannot subscribe to and it would seem must oppose, that 1s Foreign Intelligence Information related to the nationai security, aIthough it may be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the limits of the United States ,and its possessions } iS definitely a part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination ~0f which is specifically 2 function of the National Intelli~ gence Authority under the provisions 0f the President'6 letter 0f 22 January 1946,' In pointing out the Bureau 5 objections the analyzing memorandum of August 22 1 1946, stated, "There is now involved in this Directiv? the fundamental question of just what rights the Central Intelligence Group has with reference to operations within the United States Carrying to a logical conclusion the statements set forth above contained in the discussion, they could cover all foreign embassies in the United States, take charge 0f double agents we are operating or radio stations We are operating a5 double agent set-ups , etco, because essentially these operations engaged in by the Bureau do not directly involve enforcement of the laws but rather are concerned With obtaining information in the nature Of foreign intelligence Which, of course, is related to internal security a5 is all foreign intelligence Essentially the Bureau 5 domestic operations in intelligence involve the determining of the aims intentions and actIvities 0f foreign countries Mt of.their representatiyes The~memorandun: 0f..anely8ig-gtated -that. our position;_ would bo tho Buroau would not consent to any provisions except hoga rolatod to Amorican businoss concerns - With-connections 18 4-8be08 32989629-pge It, ================================================== Page 191 ================================================== abroad. On August 23 1946 , the Director sent 2 letter to Gonoral Vandonborg stating in pert _ "I must advise that tha proposed Directive does not incorporete the changeg suggested in my letter of August 6 , 1946, and I, cherefore cannot approve it_ This new directive also includes provisions and statements in which I cannot concur In fact, must M oppose The strong stand of the Director obvlously led to a conference between General Vandenberg and the Director which was; reported in a memorandum of September 13 , 1946, which the Director prepared As stated in the Director's memorandum the conference concerned CIG's desire to gather contacts among "nongovernmental groups and individuals with connections abroad." The entire conference was on thi8 subject matter and did not enter into collection of foreign intelll- gence from foreign embassies or from foreign officials or , in fact, from any other source The Director vrote , "I told the General that I could well appreciate that there would be cases in which bis organizaiion wculz bc desirous of making contacts in the United States for the purpose of obtaining information fron abroad and that the Bureau was not interested in such contacts except in those situations wherein the individual or the group might be engaged in activities Within the United States that were either under investigation by the Bureau or might possibly be the medium 0f obtaining information cone cerning the activities of a subversive character being carried on within the United States I told the General that I would be perfectly agreeable to his suggestion, with the &dded provision that if CIG was desirous of contacting any individuals of the character that he had indicated, before doing s0 t would check with the FBI." The foregoing has been set forth rather extensively since it shows the strong stand the Bureau took against CIG S operating in the United States Actually, as Will be reported chereinafter; Directiyes were adopted_permitting CIG to collect positive intelligence in this countfy contecting Unfted: States citizens American businessmen 8 aliens (withb prior FBi approval) through the" forelgn language press end in-later years through contacts mith United States goveranental personnel 19, NW 88608 Docld:32989629 791 and , Jy Page ================================================== Page 192 ================================================== 4 _ Responsibilities of CIA a , The National Security Act of 1947 Thls Act which 18 reported in 50 USC 401 et seq. established the National Security Council (NSC) and under it tho Contral Intolligence Agoncy . It providod that whon the Director of Contral Intelligence was appointed the NIA should cease to exist There was much discussion concerning the powers and authorities to be vested in the Director of Central Intelli- gence Many individuals, especially in Congress_ expressed fears thbat CIA could develop into a gestapo 1f permitted to become operational in the United States The following two excerpts_ of interest in this connection, are from a Congressional publication related t0 hearings prior to passage 0f the National Security Act of 1947 _ The publication is entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments House of Representatives goth Congress, lst Session on H. R= 2319 (National Security Act of 1947)" : Page 127 Te During testimony concerning authority for ~and scope of CIA, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, stated; "The purposesof the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except the collation of information gathered other government agencies. "Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 18 working at al1 times in collaboration with General Vandenberg . He relies upon them for domestic activities " Page 438 Congressman Clarence J_ Brown of Ohio in speaking about the National Security Act of 1947 , Which was upder . Bcrutiny before. passage, stated; "I want to write & lot of other safeguards into the section tbat deals Rith,the Central Intelligence Agency . 20 NWv-88608_ Docld:32989629_Paje192 by ================================================== Page 193 ================================================== "I want to mako certain that the activities and the functions of tbe Central Intelligence Agency were cares fully confined to international matters, to mflitary matters, and to matters 0f national security. Me have enough peoplo now running around butting into ovorybody else s business In tbis country Without establishing another agency to do So . "What WG ought to do 18 to eliminate 90 percent 0f the present snoopers instead of edding to them. 1 I do not think it would be the Central Intelligence Agency' s right, or responsibility to check on the ordinary domestic egthorictivitiee of the average Americen citizen, and yet they could have the power and &uthority to qo it under this bill 25 written_ Tf The National Security Act of 1947 wa5 approved 7/26/47 It provided tbat for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Govermment department8 afd agencies in the interest 0f national security, tbe, Agency under the direction of the NSC was: (1) To advise NSC in matters concerning' sucb C" intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies of the Govermment as relate to the national security, (2) To make recommendations to tbe NSC for the coordination 0f Such activities, (3) To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and provide for its appropriate dissemination Within the Government: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena 9 Iam enforcement powers , Or Internal security responsibilities, (4) To perform such additional seryices of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficieatly accoppliehed:centsallz (5) To perform such other functions and dutles 'releted tocintelligence affeciing hational: 'security-98,the- NSC may from time to timo direct_ 21 Pzoe i9 ================================================== Page 194 ================================================== There 1s tacit acknowledgement in Seccion 403 (e) of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers information affecting the national security. Thi8 section provides: (e) To the extent recommonded by the NSC and approved by the President such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government , except 2s hereinafter providod, relating to tho national becurity shali bo open to the inspection of the Director 0f Central Intelligence and such intelligence 25 relates to the national Security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies 0f the Government except a5 hereinafter provided , shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation 2 and dissemination: Provided, however_ That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation evaluation; and disgemination as may be "essentiai to tha national security. b . National Security_ Council Intelligence Directives To implement tbe authority granced to it undef iut National Security Act of 1947 , the National Security Council has issued a series of "National Security Council Intelligence Directives 18 usually referred to 25 NSCID ' & and commonly called "Nonscids The first of these was issued December 12 1947 , and provided for the establishing of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to maintain the relationship necessary for 2 fully effective integration 0f the national intelligence effort_ By Directive dated September 15 , 1958_ } the U . S _ Intelligence Board (USIB) was formally created as successor to the Intelligence Advisozy Committee and a counterpart known as the U, S . Communications Intelligence Board. NSCID No _ 1 provided that the Director of Central Intelligence Should coordinate the foreign- intelligence activities of the United States , such coordination to include both special and other forms 0f intelligence The US IB under this Directive sball "advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence 88 he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsi- bilities M It 1s the Board which is empowered to establish policies_ define intelligence objectives, make recommendations to appropriate U, S, officials 9 develop standards for protection 0f intelligence, a0d formulate policies with respect to arrange- ments With foreign governments _ The Director of Central 22 PIE8B608 Docld 324x96 Pate J9 ================================================== Page 195 ================================================== Intelligence is designated a5 Chalran of this Board and in this capacity is distinguished from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency . A more complete discussion with regard to the Bureau 5 role in this over-all setup is set Zorth horoinaftor undor tho ception "TBI Rolations With tho United States Intelligence Board." National Security Council Intelligence Directivo No _ 1 originally Issued 12/12/47 , defines the various types of Intelligence in Section 4 (a) National Intelligence is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one deparcment or agency , and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency , The Director of Central Intelli- gence shall produces national intelligence with the support 0f the U. S . Intelligence Board_ (b) Departmental Intelligence is tbat intelligence which any department or agency requires to ezecute it8 own mjeston (c) Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments ana agencies of the Governent for the execution of their missions but which transcends the exclusive competence 0f a single department or agency to produce _ The subcommittee structure 0f the U S . Intelligence Boara may be utilized for the production and dissemination of interdepartmental intelligence _ Director 0f Central Intelligence is then authorized to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence provided it is done consistent with statutes and Presidential policy, and provided further "that any disclosure Of FBI intelligence Information shall be cleared with that agency prior to dissemination_ " Thig acknowledges "that,FBI information jncludes both national and interdepartmental intelligence _ #7## #####y #X#$#%* "# #A footnote here states: "By produce 1s meant 9 to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security' as provided in the National Security Act of 1947 , 48 amended, Section 102_ (a) (3) ." 23 NW_88608_Docld: 32989629_Page-195 ================================================== Page 196 ================================================== NSCID No _ 2 ibsued 1/13/48 relates to coordination 0f foreign intelligence collection activities "not covered by other NSC Directives_ M Tho Director of Contral Intolligonco has rospons:- bility for planning to assure there is no undesirable duplication and that coverage is adequate Responsibilities are then assigned as folloms: (1) The Department of State shall have primary responsibility for and shall perform a5 a service of common concern, the collection abroad (i.e_ 1 outside the U. S _ and Its possessions) of political sociological, economic, scientific and technical information (2) The Department of Defense shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection of military intelligence information. Owing to the importance of scientific and technical intelligence to the Departnent of Defense and the military services,. this collection responsibility snall include 32i8mtific ard tccknical > 2s well a9 economic; information directly pertinent to Department of Defense missions (It seems Significant that While State Depart- ment primary responsibility was limited by the phrase "the collection abroad, I there was no such limitation on the. Department of Defense in its responsibility.) (3) The Central Intelligence Agency may collect abroad intelligence information in support of assigned func- tions or as a byproduct of assigned functions: Provided, that this collection involves no undesirable duplication of any of the specific assignments to State and Defense Departments, and Provided, that any such overt collection is coordinated with the Department of State or with the Senior U , S _ Representative In Section 7 of NSCID No ; 2 there. 18 delegated to CIA respopsibility for overt collection of foreign intelligence Xn the" U _ S: a5 follows: "Phe Central Intelligence Agency a8 a service of common concern, shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the United States of non-governmental organizations and individuals 8s sources 0f foreign 39 24 48 N 88608 podid332989629 Fage 196 ================================================== Page 197 ================================================== Intelligence information, in accordance With policies, procedures and practices established 88 provided in paragraph 3a of NSC ID No . 1, by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrences of the U . S . Intellic gence Board." Section 9 of the same Directive provides that CIA "shall conduct the exploitation 0r forolgn language publications Ror intelligence purposes, as appropriate, 25 a service 0f common concern_ When this function is carried out in the U, this also constitutes overt collection of foreign Intelligence by that Agency in this country. It may be worthy to note at this point that NSCID No . 1 and 2 were discussed approved, a2d issued in their original forms prior to 7/7/49 when the FBI vas designated & member '0f tbe Intelligence Advisory Committee. NSCID No . 3 on Coordination 0f Intelligence Production contains definitions of various types of intelligence (including those defined in NSCID No _ 1) and then delineates prinary responsibilities for Ii 'producing" intelligence among various agencies , stating with rebpeci 10 CIA : "The Central Intelligence Agency Shall produce economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and scientific and technical intelligence as 2 service of common concern_ Further, the Central Intelligence Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence _ " Since as noted hereinbefore, "collection" activities are defined in NSCID No _ 2; it would seem to follow that the word "produce" as used in NSCID No _ 3 bas the same definition as set out in a footnote to NSCID No _ 1, paragraph 1.0 $ "to correlate and evaluate intelligence.relating to the national security_ Mi Thus NSCID No _ 3 mould not appear to extond CIA's jurisdiction fo collect intelligence or be operational in any wey . Tbe renaining NSCID appear to bave no bearing on the subject matter o2 foreign intelligence collection In tbe United States. 25 0 I88608 Doeld 32989629 Page197 8. , 's 4 , "s ================================================== Page 198 ================================================== Director of Centrel_Intelligence_Directives To implement the National Security Act of 1947 a8 amendod and the various National Socurity Council Intelligonce Directives issued pursuant thereto the Director of Centrel Intelligence has issued umerous Directives (DCID' s) The first 0f these having a direct boaring on jurisdictional matters is DCID No _ 2/3 , captioned "Domestic Exploitation of Nongovernmental Organizations and Individuals_ M1 NSCID No _ 2 , paragraph 7 , states that CIA shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the U_ S _ of such organizations and individuals a5 sources of foreign intelligence information, therefore, have avoided and should avoid any operations among nongovernmental organizations and individuals designed solely to produce foreign intelligence without CIA prior approval or nullification 0f these provisions_ DCID No . 2/3 provides for exploitation of nongovernmental U. S. citizens by CIA domestic field offices and states "In cases where the Federal Bureau 0f Investigation has indicated an eperation] interest in 2 U. S . citizen, Central Intelligence Agency wilz coordinate with that agency prior to further contact, # This DCID also provides for exploitation by CIA domestic field offices 0f aliens following a prior name check with FBI So our stetutory obligations may be properly met WIthout CIA interference_ It is of possible interest to note that in dealing with these two matters, DCID No _ 2/3 refers to nongovernmental U S_ citizens but only to aliens (without the restrictive adjective) _ The NSCID on which it iS based refers to nongrovernmental individuals without distinguishing between citizens and aliens_ Thus there appears to have been an intention to confine CIA's inteiligence exploitation functions within the U S_ A review of our file on CIA (62-80750) indicates this might well have been a concession to the Bureau since we went on record opposing delegation 0f any intelligence collection functions within the U, S , to CIA 1p letters to Lieutenant General Hoyt S _ Vandenberg (then Director of Central Intelligence Group) on June 25 _ 1946 (Serial 96) August 6, 1946 , (Serial 138) and August 23 1946, (Seriai 222) which have peen discussed mora fully under the heading "National Intelligence Authority. 26 NW886m R96ZY Page 198 Te , ================================================== Page 199 ================================================== DCID No 2/8 is captioned "Domestic Exploitation 0f U, S . Government Organizations and Officials 10 It begins in very general terms, "Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No _ 1 and NSCID No . 2 It provides "Tho Contral Intolligonce Agency shall coordinate and have the primary responsibility for "exploitation of the foreign intelligence potential of non-USIB organizations and officials to moet community neeods 28 2 service of common concern "1 As set forth above there seems to be no basis for such CIA jurisdiction in NSCID No_ 1 and No 2 Paragraph 7 of NSCID No 2 specifically restricts CIA in this area of operations to nongovernmental organizations and individuals _ A review 0f our U, S, Intelligence Board (USIB) file, 62-90718 , shows following apropos this matter: The Draft Minutes of the 3/21/61 USIB meeting report that the Board approved the draft of 2 DCID on "Domestic Exploitation of U, S_ Government Organizations and Officials 81 whicn would pe issuea as DCID No 3/8 , effective 3/21/61_ Mr _ Belmont was present at this USIB meeting aS the FBI representative_ (unnumbered serial between serials 1131 & 1132, USIB file) Tracing this subject matter back through the US IB file it was learned that it apparently was first considered at the meeting held 2/23/60: at which the Bureau was represented by Fred A_ Frohbose _ The minutes for that meeting reported the Board agreed in principle that a directive on Intelligence Exploitation of U. S Governmental officials would be desirable_ However the matter was referred to the Committee on Domestic Ezploitation for further study and the submission of 2 revised draft for Board consideration. (unnumbered serial between serials 1040' & 1041, USIB file) From the foregoing it would appear that the Bureau concurred in the issuance of this particular Directive and thus to an extension of CIA's overt collection activities in the U; S, if:this Should, in fact , be interpreted as 8n extension. DCID 4/1 provides for the establishment of the Interagency Defector Committee. 27 JW-88608Decld:332989629Page-199- ================================================== Page 200 ================================================== DCID' s 4/2 and 4/3 relate to the Defector Program abroad and respectively The latter one dwells on division of dceeponsililities between FBI and CIA in the handling of dcfectors within the continental limits of the United Statos It providos that exploitetion 0f such defectors 8ha11 be conducted: 1 To obtain internal security information or other data required by FBI in view of its statutory respongibilitio8 in the internal security field, 2 _ To' obtain foreign intelligence information required in the interests 0f national security by the member agencies 0f the USIB . 3 , For such other purposes a5 are deemed to be in the interests of national security. The very next sentence then gives the implication that exploitation of the defector for foreign intelligence purposes i8 the principal responsibility of CIA, for it reads "Decision as to the relative importance of internal security exploitation by FBI and foreign intelligence exploitation by the Central Inte _igence Agefley (CzA} shali be made jointly by representatives 0f CIA and FBI." There then follows a listing of nine specific FBI responsibilities, one of which is to make available to CIA foreign intelligence information resulting from the initial exploitation of defectors_ There is no subsequent specific delineation of CIA responsibility over foreign intelligence exploitation until there is a transfer of respons_bility for handling a defector from FBI to CIA after FBI interests nave been fully satisfied_ There is 2 general assignment of such responsibility to CIA in the terms "CIA shall be responsible fot : a _ Coordinating the .activities of other departments and agencies concerned with defector matters , except those responsibilities assigned exclusively to FBI As a matter of practice, if it is determined there is 1ittle or no importance from an internal security standpoint in connection with a particular defection, we do not take over but in effect give clearance to CIA to proceed from a foreign intelli- gence stendpoint . DCID's in the 5/ series (numbers one through five) wero issued principally to implement NSCID Number 5 which deals with U. S_ espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities abroad, There appears to be no conflict with FBI jurisdiction in this series . A11 other DCID' s relate to Elint Critical Intelligence and other matters. which appear to have no bearing on possibie 'conflicts between CIA and FBI responsibilities; 28 TM 88608_doc 2989629 Page ================================================== Page 201 ================================================== d. Dulles_Comittees_1949 The Dulles Committee was appanted February 3 , 1948 by the National Security Council (NSC) to make 0 "comprohengiva, impartial ond objective burvey 0f the organization, activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 11 The Conmittee Was instructed to report 1t8 findings and recommendations on the following matters: (a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the organization structure of CIA (b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities. (c) The relationship 0f these activities to those oz other departments and agencies (a), The utilization and qualifications cf CIA personnel_ The Committee' s scope was extended on March 17 1948 , to include the following provisions "This survey Will comprise pr iua. ily & thborough #d comprchensive ercrizticz %f th? structure } administration, activities and inter-agency relations ships of the CIA a5 outlined in the resolution 0f the National Security Council It Will also include an examination of sucb intelligence activities 0f other Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make recommendations for their effective operation end overall coordination _ Thls report, which is dated January 1, 1949 } for tbe most part concerned itself with administrative matters affecting CIA and tbe necessity for reorganization Within that Agency It notes, however , that the Na tional Security Act, as implemented bby directives of the NSC , imposed upon CIA respansibility for carrying out three essential functions: (1) The coordination of intelligence activities. (2) The correlation and evaluation of Intelligence relating to the national security, which has been interpreted by directive 88 meaning the production* of national intelligence_ # * # # * * * # * # * #.# # # * X See definition 01' "produce" in. footnote to. NSCID No . 1, Section 4b a5 "correlate .and evaluate_ the reverse of connotation given here . 29 NW 88608-Deelda32989629-Page-z0i ================================================== Page 202 ================================================== (3) The performance centrally , subject to NSC direction, of certain intelligence and related functiong of common concern to verious departments 0f the Government The report noted that Section 102 0f the National Security Act 0f 1947 established a framework for a bound intelligence system and no amondment to that Section 02 tho Act was deemed necessary . Although the coordination of intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies concerned With national security was a primary reason for establishing CIA, the report noted the National Security Act does not give CIA independent authority to coordinate intelligence activities, a5 final responsibility to establish policies was vested in the NSC . The statutory limitations upon the authority of CIA to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of the NSC Were, according to the report , obviously designed to protect the autonomy and internal arrangements 0f the various departments and agencies performing intelligence functions In spite of these calculatea iimiteiiOns 0f tie aitcritz 22 CIA } the report noted, it was clear the Agency was expected to provide the initiative and leadership in developing 2 coordinated intelligence system In practice, the NSC has almost without exception approved the recommendations submitted to it by CIA for the coordination of intelligence activities_ The National Security Act does not define the "intelligence activities" which were to be coordinated by CIA under the direction of the NSC or specify the departments whose activities were covered . Presumably , according to the report a11 intelligence activities relating to the national security were included 2 from collecting information in the first instance to_ the preparation and dissemination of finished intelligence reports and estimates "The criterion, 6i which the report noted was a very broad one, was "such intelligence activities_ as relate to the national security and not the identity' of tbe. departments concerned o1 the na ture or locale 0f the intelligence activity i Thus , the report "otedili- practically no limitations a*G set. upon the scope 0f tbe gence activitieg With Which the Central Intelligence Agency i8 to concern Itself_ 30 NWT88608_Docld 32989629_Paga 202 ================================================== Page 203 ================================================== The report noted another broad field requiring coordination is that of foreign intelligence derived from domestic sources and the allied field 0f domestic counter- intelligence This includes tho oxploitation 0f intolligonce from United States business firms , travellers , etc exploitation of the intelligence possibilities of groups and individuals of foreign nationality in the United Statos tho rolating 01 domostic counterintclligenco to Roreign intelligence and the coordination of domestic counterespionage with counterespionage abroad Except for the exploitation of private sources 0f foreign intelligence in the United States which 18 centralized in the Office of Operations CIA, responsibility for other activities is scattered among the State Department , the armed services , the FBI and CIA The FBI } Which has primary security and law enforce- ment responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important arez of intelligence _ This includes domestic counterespionage vand countersabotage, control of communist ana other subversive activities and surveillances of alien individuals and groups A1l of these functions according to the report are closely relaied to the comparabla activitics abrcid 0f the CIA The report noted the FBI was not, part of the then existing machinery for courdination of intelligence through the Intelligence Advisory Committee and there was no continuing manner whereby domestic intelligence and counterintelligence were related to overall national intelligence in order to serva 'the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act, whbich was set forth 25 "of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of ational security 0 It was the opinion 0f the authors of the Dulles Report that CIA had tbe duty under the Act to concern itself with the problem of coordinating those phases of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence which relate to the national security and CIA should submit recommendations on this subject to the ~NSC _ The report noted this was not inconsistent with the stipulation of the National Security Act that CIA "shall have no police, 1 subpoena _ } law enforcement powers or internal security functions 31 NN-88608_porl3 2989629-Pagezny ================================================== Page 204 ================================================== The Dulles Commission recommended that the FBI should be made a member 0f the Intelligence Advisory Committee to improve coordination of domestic intelligonce and countor- inteliigence ingofer 88 these matters related to the national security. Mhile discussing the production of National Intelligence Estimates by CIA the report noted "There 18 no systematic way of tapping that domestic inceiligeece information, which should be chiefly in the hands 0f the FBI, having a bearing on broader intelligence issues' and there is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by tbe FBI and for the use 0f intelligence from domestic sourCOS in a na tional estimate_ It National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 7 provided that CIA shall be responsible for the exploitation, on a highly selective basis within the United States of business concerns other non-Governmental organizations a nd individuals aS sources of foreign intelligence information. The, report concluded the amount 0z foreign intelligence Which can be obtained through the exploitation 01 noll-Guvertiental sources in the United States 18 considerable and 1t8 quality could be very high if appropriate arrangements were made and discrimination was employed . It was felt the vest number 0f organizations institutions and individuals having Yoreign interests and knowledge represented 2 potential source of intelligence that in many ways was superior to any other, a5 it was felt that they were in a position to provide information obtained from their foreign contacts end from the findings on their own people abroad _ A furtber important source of information, the exploitation for intelligence purposes 0f foreign individuals and groups in the United States was also being developed_ The report noted that these individuals and groups as well 28 political refugees and former foreign government officials were often engaged in poTitiCal activity with Gignificant international implications 34 CIA and other intelligence- agencies had mot developed coordinated .&nd effective policies and procedures fOr the exploitation 0f intellibence in this important field. The FBI, 'according:to the report; had &: major intereet_in_foreign 32 TW88608-Docid332989629-F3g0-204 ================================================== Page 205 ================================================== individuals and groups in the United States because 0f possible security implications The report indicated tho FBI possessed considerable information concorning many individuals and groups but this information had boen obtained primarily With security rother than intelligence consideration8 in mind and was not normally given the kind of interpretation or dissemination that intelligence required if it w2s to be properly used , It was also noted the FBI wa8 , in cases mhere it had a security interest reluctant on security grounds to have intelligence exploitation by outside agencies The general result of this situation according to the report was that an important source 0f inteiligence was not being fuily exploited The report noted that the question of the exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign groups and' individuals in the United States was a clear example where the Intelligence Advisort Committee 8 with the FBl being added as 8 member 9 Should establish principles and rules for coordination_ Iz discugsing tke edninistrative handling of espionage and counterespionage matters within the CIA, the report noted the FBI was charged with all counterespionage responsibilities in the United States except those &ffecting personnel 0f the armed services The Dulles Comission recommended the counterespionage activities 0f CIA sbould be increased in scope and emphasis and that closer liaison in this field should be established With the FBI The only effect the Dulles Report had on the FBI was its inclusion as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee by amendment to HSCID Number 1 dated July.7 , 1949 . e_ Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955 Task forces 0f the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) conducted surveys of CIA operations from 1947 to 1949 (under F Eberstadt) and from 1953 to 1955 (under General Mark Clark) 33 NM-88608-Docld 32089629 ================================================== Page 206 ================================================== The Commission concerned Itself principally with the efficiency with which CIA was fulfilling its statutory missions 0f coordination, correlation evaluation, and dissemination 0f the intelligencc product 0f other Government agencies and departments , The Commission examined agency activity in light of the CIA primary mission of advibing NSC and performing services and duties related to intelligence and national security a8 the NSC directed, (1a) Eberstadt Task Force Report The results of the first examination of CIA by the Hoover Commission were more or less apologetic in tone, emphasizing the soundness of directives setting up NSC and it6 direction of the Agency _ The report pointed out; however_ that CIA and its parent NSC , haa had little time to actually implement the coordination necessary for leadership in the field_ The Task Force clearly defined its understanding 0f the CIA mission as: coordinate intelligence activities of Federal agencies concerned with national security M1 The duties Of CIA were listed as ; 1 Advise National Security Council on national security intelligence activities of Federal departments and agencies. 2 , Recommena necessary coordination 0f such ectivities to National Security Council_ 3 Correlate, evaluate and disseninate national security intelligence. 4. Render intelligence services for other Federal departments and agencies _ T} (62-88575-3 enclosure behind file.) In discussing the duties 0f the CIA the Task Force noted, 61 Under the statute CIA is entrusted with the performance of such, services of common concern 25 the National Security Council shall determine_ At present these include apart from Scientific Intelligence which is discussed separately: (a) maintenance of central indexes of report records and documents having intelligence value; (b) examination of foreign documents from which intelligence material is extracted and disseninated; (c) maintenance of central map facilities; (d) monitoring 0f foreign broadcasts; and (e) collection of the infornacion by clandestine means and counterespionage abroad. 34 NW_88608 Docld 32989629 Page 206 ================================================== Page 207 ================================================== In evaluating the operations and location of CIA counterespionage the Task Force commented 25 follows : "The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appoar properly integrated with CIA' s other clandestine operations Although arguents have been made in favor 0f extending CIA's authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this Country such an exteonsion of Jurisdiction does not a present appear justified. For one thing, concentration of power over counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director of Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might justifiably arouse public suspicion end opposition_ Conceivably it could form the basis for a charge that a gestapo is in process of creating even though the pover to arrest were specifically withheld. To transfer responsibility for domestic counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established organization and long tradition, to CIA which is not equipped for the assignment } would probably create moro problems than it would solve. It is doubtful whether the logical benefit of having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such & trinsfer pould inevitably occasion { "CIA representatives have indicated that their present working liaison with FBI is satisfactory, but the Committee doubts that TBI-CIA relationships are Completely adequate_ The Director of FBI declined the Committee' s invitation to appeer before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its representatives on the ground that he knew too little of its activities_ Mi The groundwork for CIA acceptance was laid by the Committee recommendation and finding: "CIA is not now properly organized; Co-equal improvement in G-2 TBI, ONI State Department , and other Government intelligence services 1s also essential. Spirit of teanwork must govern interagency intelligence relationships . CIA deserves and must have greater degree of acceptance aud support from old-line intelligence services than it has had in the past _ ft A pitch was made for a single agency controlling internal security in the Committee' s finding: "The committee believes that responsibility for internal: security"policies should be immediately focused in one agency . A more thorough study of the' subject than any: yet made must be. prosecuted and interagency frictions must; be ended_ 81 It is noted that the committee commented elsewhere in its report: 8 35 . - NI-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-707 ================================================== Page 208 ================================================== "Detailed study of or 'ganization and activities of intelligence divisions of the Governmont including CIA, 18 being made by a committee consisting of Messrs_ Allen Dulles , Milliam H. Jackson, and Mathias Correa, assisted by 2 staff of .four directed by Mr _ Robert Blum of the Office of Secretary 0f Defense." With this statement it may be assumed the Task Force excused omissions it may havo made with the observation that the Dulles group was conducting almost the same survey carried on in the Roover Commission s0 far a5 CIA was involved. (1b) Clark Task Force Report The Task Force headed by General Mark Clark submitted a Top Secret report dated in May } 1955 _ setting forth results of the second Hoover Commnission survey of tbe organization of CIA _ The report pointed out the survey was of departments and agencies with entire or prime responsibility in the field of positive foreign intelligence as it pertains to national defense and security. It qualtfied this survev when speaking of the FBI, noting survey was limited to survey of Bureau only ro tne extent that it dealt in security intelligence_ Again the Hoover Commission through its Task Force pinned CIA jurisdiction down to the areas defined by statute, and emphasized the Agoncy was subordinate only to the National Security Council in its coordination, correlation, dissemination and' collection of intelligence data . The Task Force noted that since CIA is charged with the over-all responsibility for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces, the Task Force was giving special attention to tbe work 0f that Agency . In the Task Force Report 2 revien of the FBI functions in the intelligence community was set forth. The committee noted that the IBI had only linitea activities in the positive intelligence field but noted additionally that FBI functions in tbe current intelligence @ffort were of interest in order t0 fill out the intelligence' picture. 3 36 _~ NW-88608_Doeld:32939629 Page 208 ================================================== Page 209 ================================================== The FBI was cited as one of the four members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) created by the . NSC approved by tha President 3/23/49 , to coordinate "the Investigation of a11 domestic espionage countorospionago 9 sabotago , subversion, and other related matters affecting internal security_ 11 It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete investigative coverage in compliance with the needs 0f the IIC , which had full responsibility for coordination of the investigation 0f &11 domestic espionage } counterespionage, et cetera, affecting internal security. The Committee stated , "The Central Intelligence Agency is by excluded from duplicating the internal security functions of the FBI _ However the CIA does develop within and without the U . S 9 sources for foreign (positive) intelligence_ ) and incidental thereto may develop leads as to subversive activities within this country. In such cases CiA ii4 oigk 11a1532 S:v2c it5 informatjon to tha FBI 01 A Task Force survey revealed "Through the Central Intelligence Agency s donestic field offices contacts are made on a highly selective basis with business concerns and other nongovernmental agencies 9 as well as with previously cleared individuals who travel abroad Under the provisions of DCID 7/1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Comnittee is required to establish in Washington a focal office for the purpose of interviewing nongovernment visitors Any visitors to these offices demonstrating good inteliigence potentiai are referred to the CIA for further exploitation. The Task Force noted that as far back as 1939 President Roosevelt by executive order directed the FBI to coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities. In 1949 according to the Comnittee survey , the IIC wras formalized and by charter restricted to coordinating investi- gationsin intelllgence matters domestically. 37 ~Nin-88608-Qeeld 32989629 law , '5 ================================================== Page 210 ================================================== In commenting on the role of the FBI the Committee further noter "Tho Federal Bureau of Investigation, however , is the recognized center of the domestic espect of internal socurity Including countorintolligonce Within the Unitod Stara8 and 1t8 possessions M Hith regard to tha us0 and surfacing of sources , the CommIttee noted that CIA was not bound to disclose it8 sources; however it commented on the excellent liaison system of the FBf which had overcome this restriction SO far as internal security within the U _ S_ 16 concerned. "Now , as a matter of practice he CIA usually refers domestic sources to the FBI , the only exception being where the source is to be used in foreign intelligence work by the CIA 18 In the area of defectors within this country , the Committee noted that the FBI will receive from CIA or by a direct interrogation of a CIA-controlled defector information Which the defector may bave concerning internal security. Persons who defect within this country } on the other hand, Were found t0 be under the cognizance of the FBI _ Then the reverse 0f the above situation comes into play and CIA has access to the defector for developing ieads in the fereigr irtelligence field, The Committee commented, "It is the duty of the FBI to conduct investigations 0 of all cases involving f-reign nationals in the United States 8s set forth in the Delimitations Agreenent _ Tf A review of the Commission report lends one important fact to our study of this subject matter This was pointed up by the membership 0f the various groups at the disposal of the National Security Council within the field of national intelligence _ Ten subcommittees or working groups with member- ship from separate departments or interested agencies acted in advisory capacities to the IAC parent committee In each of these subcommittees the chairman was 2 representative of the Director of CIA and the working groups were individually serviced by a secretariat furnished by CIA_ From the top- heavy alignment of CIA personnel in IAC and its working groups it was obvious in Which direction advisory opinions would be slanted when dissenting matters were presented by tbe IAC end CIA to the NSC . 38 JNW88608 Docld;32989629_Rage-210 ================================================== Page 211 ================================================== f The Doolittle Comnittee 1954 In July 1954, we received information' from the White House that the President had appointed Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle to study in collaboration with tbe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certain aspects 0f the national intelligence effort By letter dated July 28 , 1954 Sherman Adams the Assistant to the President , requested that the Bureau brief General Doolittle's group concerning the relationship that existed between the Bureau and CIA_ We subsequently learned that at approximately the same time a survey would be conducted by the Hoover Commission under the chairmanship of General Mark Clark We learned from Allen FT Dulles Director of CIA, that the President strongly believed that General Clark should not permit the survey to into CIA covert operations particularly in the field of political and psychological warfare_ The President had told Dulles that he was selecting General Doolittle to study CIA's covert operations General Doolittle's group was briefed on August 25, 1954, at mhich time the Bureau s position in the intelligence field was described and the manner in which the Bureau transacted business with CIA was explained . In addition, certain constructive criticism concerning problens and conflicts experienced in dealing with CIA was furnished General Doolittle's group. The following salient features of the criticism appear to bear on the current 'study: Te were critical of 2 policy 0f the Office 0f Operations, CIA, which precluded that Division from identifying any of its sources in the United States when such sources possessed information bearing on the internal security of the United States The Office of Operations as of: 1954 collected foreign intelligence information in the United States from aliens , businessmen , and others, and periodically would receive information of interest to the Bureau Instances arose where the Bureau desired to interview tbe original source but w2s' prevented from getting to the 39 ~N-88608-pocku32989629_Page I get ================================================== Page 212 ================================================== source CIA policy We were of the opinion that CIA 8 policy could be modiffed to allow us direct accoss to tbo sourco in the United States when such was necessary . As 6f 1954, CIA had intorest in various organizations such as Radio Free Europe and others and from time to time the Bureau would get involved in. investigation 0f organizations only to learn they were being supported or guided by CIA_ Our opinion Was that 1f we bad been appropriately notified of CIA S interest considerable investigative time and manpower could bave been saved and in addition we would have been in a position to notify CIA when anything of interest came to our attention_ Concerning CIA investigations in the United States we readily acknowledged CIA s right to investi- gate its own applicants or consultants _ We did object to CIA's undertaking any investigation in this country w hen the facts indicated the case was clearly within Bureau jurisdiction and pointed out tbat the Bureau bad recently become involved in investigating an individual suspected of espionage activity_ We were in contact witch CIA and had- solicited its help concerning certain aspects in the case but it was 2 few weeks before we learned CIA had conducted a very close investigation Of this sam6 individual _ Te made the observations that close and open cooperation between the Bureau and CIA was. vital to che proper handling of espionage cases The Bureau pointed out that as Of 1954 it had received little or no Significant: information concerning espionage or sabotage agents coming to the United States _ We excluded diplonatic personnel in this matter but clearly indicated that CIA should be in a position to give us some advance notification whea. spies wero coming to this country. 40 [BBW TocE2989629 212 by Page: ================================================== Page 213 ================================================== Possibly this latter was the strongest cricicism we had since we did not feel CIA with Its resources and overseas contacts was performing one of its prime functions in the intelligence fiold; that iSnitea ttaresg foroign illegals who a10 an route to the States During our' briefing of General Dool:ttle S group, we described the Bureau S collection 0f intelligence information for the interested Govornment agencies as 2 major operation_ Our discharge 0f our intelligence operation concerning the Communist Party and Soviet and Satellite diplomats was explained in detail to the satisfaction Of all personnel attending the briefing _ General Doolittle asked for recommendations aS to What could be done to improve CIA So the Bureau would better service It was suggested that corrective action be taken on the matters which had been criticized constructively; CIA should establish adequate coverage (although not specifically noted, this obviously regarded advance notice of foreign intelligence personnel coming to the United States) ; and finally CIA should transmit information developed in a0 e-pedite faskioz. Prior to submitting the report to the President } General Doolittle expressed a desire to see Mr Hoover whom he regarded a5 the outstanding intelligence authority in the worId The General visited the Director on October 5 , 1954, during which visit CIA's operations were discussed and generally the points of the previous meeting were reiterated General Doolittle felt the ideal solution would be to Wipe out CIA entirely and start al1 over again, but since this was impractical his committee would point out certain meaknesses and make certain recommendations and suggestions to the President for the correction of these weaknesses . We do not have the contents of Goneral Doolittle's report and there is nothing to indicate an executive order was issued from it which in any way delineatea the respective jurisdiction of the Bureau or of CIA _ g The JointStudy Group on Foreign_Intelligence Activities of the UUnized States Government Captioned report was prepared by the Study Group and iesued 12/15/60 . The Group W2s under the chairmanship of 41 ~NI 88608Docld:32989629_Page213 get ================================================== Page 214 ================================================== Lyman B_ Kirtkpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) acting a5 & representative of the Director oz Central inteiligence (DCI) . Tbe other four members of the Study Group represented the Department 0f State 9 Secrotary of Defonso Buroau 0z the Budget , and the National Security' Council (NSC) = Tho stated targets 0f examlnation by tho Group were organizational and management aspects within the intelligence effort relating to a11 aspects of foreign intelligence _ In the confines of these objectives the Bureau was not considered for examination by the Group in view of the Bureau '8 lack of operational jurisdiction in matters outside of this country _ Hx Belmont acting for the Bureau , gave 2 briefing before the Group on 7/29/60 regarding the Bureau S relations with other United States intelligence agencies There was no mention made of the Bureau in the report except in one of its recommendations relative to reorganization of the membership of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which will be dealt with in more detail later The 141 page report snhmitted the Group appeared to be apologetic in tone for any shortcomings of CIA The reader obtains the definite impression tche report was used 2S a sounding board for differences 0f opinion as to methods and administration for collection 0f foreign intelligence (overt and covert) abroad The main basis for conclusions and recommendations made by the Group rested in delineation 0f duties of DCI a5 coordinator of intelligence as opposed to DCI secondary responsibility as head of CIA_ The Group recognized service jealousies apparently resulting from refusal to accept the fact that DCI could control and coordinate intelligence effort without affording preferential treatment to CIA which was bis operational and administrative arm There is no reference in the report to a clear definition of CIA operational responsibilities. or jurisdiction within continental United States The. Group found that' DCI through heads of missions abroad and designated DCI 'representatives in foreign' countries had principal responsibility for control and coordination of foreign collection efforts _ The. CIA S operations abroad were recognized in almost &ll 43 .0f the Group 5 recommendations 42 NW 88608_Deeld 32989629-Page- 214 by ================================================== Page 215 ================================================== Recommendation number 17 emphasized that CIA should place emphasis on the establishment of unofficial cover throughout the world; recommendation number 20 was that CIA Should increase intelligence support to unifiod an8 component commandors by direct disgomination from portinent field stations The report noted that CIA S main requiremente problem related to clandestine collection and concerned the great number of requirements served on the Agency . The main tone of the report was that greater cooperation was required between tbe Joint Chiefs 0f Staff (JCS) Department of State, and CIA in carrying out foreign inteliigence collection missions The recommendations 0f the Group were a11 directed toward this end and had no bearing on internal espionage or counterespionage activitieg within the United States In commenting on the coordination duties 0f the DCI , the Group pointed out that USIB had been officially directed to "establish policies and develop programs for tie guidance 0f all Cepartneits anc ageicies conCerned; tbs DCI is authorized to make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities or the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection With bls duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence effort Of the United States Ii The report interpreted these official directions t0 indicate that USIB should assume 2 greater proportion of the actual direction and control of the intelligence community of Which the Bureau was noted to be a member To strengthen US IB position 2S a director, coordinator, and controller of intelligence effort_ tbe Group recommended (recommendation number 30) that the USIB should be reduced to four members Rho should be the DCI (chairman) and representatives 0f `Secretary 0f State, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff_ The TBI and the Atomic Energy Commission would be relegated to ad hoc representation on the Board _ 43 NW-88608 Docld: 32989629_Page-215 ================================================== Page 216 ================================================== It should be noted In considering the proposed change of USIB membership that the Bureau was 2 member of six of the twenty-six bubcommitteea which formed the committoo makecup 0f the USIB_ Hemorandum January 10 , 1961 Mr : Belmont to Mr . Rarsons outlined the proposed US IB membership change for the Director It recommended that Bureau make no isgu0 of the proposed recommendatlon The Director underlined a passage of the memorandum which stated 11 In one sense of the word it could be artued the FBI would lose prestige by changing from 2 regular member to an ad hoc member The Director approved the recommendation of the memorandum with the following notation: "O.K= but I am not enthusiastic about the change of our status . H," Our status, however 9 wa8 not changed end the Bureau bas continued t0 hold full memberc ship on the Board _ In brief , the Joint Study Group Report noted that the majority of the recommendations of the Study Group had bccn fevorebly received by the intelligence community in that positive action bad been taken to place most of them in effect . Many 0f the recommendations of the Group were felt to have .been met by the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which acted 25 8 coordinator and overseer of the intelligence effort of the Joint Chiefs of Staff There is no comment mede in thi8 report which would bear on our present survey of CIA jurigdiction or activlties within the United States in conflict With our OwD jurisdictional and investigative interests Tbe only reference to the Bureau in this latter report was 28 previously mentioned in the comment reletive to reorganization of the membership of the US IB _ 5 _ Regponsibilities of the FBI 8 , Laws end Directives No information has been developed with respect to eny laws passed or directives issued specifically delegating to the FBI responsibilities for the positive acquigition Of foreign intelligence in the United Stetes , As heb been Bet 44 Fate 216 ================================================== Page 217 ================================================== forth above under the caption, "The History of Foreign Intelligence Collection in the United States 4 Prior to World Far II, 61 Presidont Roosevelt conducted certaln conferences following which he Issued {nstructions with regard to invostigations of fascist and communist activitios in the United Steta8. Thoso investigations were to be for intelligence purposes , For the most part , they took on a counterintelligence 8spect; however, during the course of them foreign intelligence Information Wa8 developed either as an outgrowth of 'investigative activity or through the conducting of technical eurveillances _ We found no record regarding the designation of the FBI as the agency responsible for collection of foreign intelligence information in' the United States 28 of the time the Office of Coordinator of Information was creeted on 7/11/41. Neither did we find any record indicating such rebpongibility bad been delegated to any other agency . ba Requests_From Other Agencies From time to time the Bureau has received specific requesi= Irou Otiiaz agenctzs besed epce Ehich wA have undertaken the collection of foreign intelligence information In the United States in 2 clandestine fashion. Two instances 0f this nature were based on requests from the Department 0f State and from' .the Mhite House . (1) Department of State Request F Recognizing agap in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments , on 10/21/55 we discussed with the then Deputy Undersecretary of State, Robert Murphy , the question of instituting limited discreet technical surveillances on official establishments 0f selected foreign nations, principally those located In world trouble areas We pointed out that the FBI stood ready to institute such coverage as might be desired by the Department of State. Mr Murphy was quite receptive to this Idea, stating that limited coverage sufficiently flexible to` change with changing world: conditions might be highly desirable After #urmher discussions it was agreed: that a program ; progressive" in nature would be instituted. By this Mr Murphy explained that he did not feel at that time that ai1 desirable coverage should be instituted at 8 given date, but rather that coverage should be placed on one country at 2 time as moving eventg abroad migbt dictate, On this basi8 thi8. typa covorege w28 Ingtituted 45' NW88608 'Wocid32989629 prge ================================================== Page 218 ================================================== based on a specific request from Mr Murphy on 12/5/55 that wO place technical surveillances on 4l1 Egyptian establishmente In the United States _ Since then, technical surveillances have been placed on numeroub establishments of foreign countries for oither oxtonded or limitod porlodg 0f time , deponding upon developments on thbe international 8cene 0 (2) Nhite House Request 0u In May 9 1965 , President Johbson advised the Director he wanted the FBI to. bet up 2 group in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of taking charge of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advibing the Governmont 0f those who might try to infiltrate Government ranks _ This was the basis for opening our Santo Domingo Office , which bas continued operation since, 5/21/65 . As a result of maintaining our Dominican Office and assisting in it8 mission, we have instituted various technicsl surveillances and developed numerous live sources :n the United States from which we regularly acquire foreign intelligence cinformation_ 0 Since the President has relied on the Bureau to keep him apprised of developments from an intelligence standpoint as well as developments with respect to communist influence , these sources ar6 regularly ccitactod #cr Lnfernetion ghich fits Within the terms of foreign intelligence data . C0 FBI ' &Role in tho United States Intelligence Board The predecessor to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was the Intelligence Advisory Committee the IAC was established by National Security Council iitclisgence Directive (NSCID) number 1 dated 12/12/47 . By amendment to this Directive datea 7/7/49 the Bureau was designated a member of the IAC for tbe purpose 0f coordinating domestic intelligence with' foreign intelligence: NSCID 1 has been revised several times_ Subsequent to 2 revision dated 4721/58, the President S Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board merged the IAC and the U S , Communications Intelligence Board into one body known as the United ~tates Intelligence Board. National Security Council Directive dated 9/15/58 approved by the President,_ formally created the United States Intelligence Board 28 s4ccessor to the IAC end the U S Communicatlong Intelligence Boaid: The USIB in it8 present form 18 chaired by the Dtrector 0f Central Intelligence _ Tha.Director 0f Central 46 NW_88608 Docld-2989624 ================================================== Page 219 ================================================== Intelligence Is distinguished from the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that the Director of Central Intelligence 28 Chairman 0f the United States Intelligence Board 1s considered the President 8 principal advibor on foreign Intelligence Mombership on tho Unitod Statos Intelligence Board consists of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of the Deputy Director of CIA; the Director of choe Defense Sttogilgaace Agency; the Director 0f the National Security Agency; the Assistant General Manager for Administration, Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the FBI _ The primary respossibiiity 0f the USIB is the coordination of intelligence ectivitie8 In this regard, USIB S major effort is concerned with the preparation and approval 0f National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) for u86 policy makere _ As 2 rule, the Bureau does not participate in the preparation 0f NIE'& inasmuch as the subject mattor 18 usually outside the jurisdiction of thls Bureau. We have 1n the past_ participated in some selective NIE' s such a5 certain estimates oD Cuba , world communism, the clandestine introduction 0f pucleer weapons 'nto the Toited States and op the Dominicen Republic. As part of it5 staffing procedure US IB has created numerous committees in some of which the Bureau maintains membership. The USIB committees on which the Bureau has representation are the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee the Signal Intelligence Committee, the Interagency Defector Conmittee, the Watch Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee , the Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Security Committee, and the Comnittee on Documentation As a general rule attendance at Committee sessions is handled by the Liaison Section_ Attendance at meetings is in the main restricted to the Interagency Defector Committee the Watch Committee, the Security Committee the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee and the Committee on Documentation: The Bureau hag 2 primary interest in the business of these five committees A1l decisions made by these committees , which are subsequently epproved by: the`USIB; :are the:subject: of individua}: memoranda:_ submitted to the' Director for his approvel, 7 NW88608_Doeld-32989629-Page 219 by ================================================== Page 220 ================================================== Over the years consideration has been given to the Bureau' s Withdrawing it8 membership from US IB On each occasion the Director has chosen to have the Bureau retain it8 mnembership on the Board The last such occasion occurred in 1964 ` during the period when John McCone was Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board At that time, the military services were removed from membership on the Board and replaced by the Defense Intelligence Agency At the time, Mr Belmont, then Assistant to the Director orally discussed with the Director the possibility of the Bureau'8 withdrawing from the US IB _ The Director S comments were tbat we would not request removal from membership on the Board but would withdram our membership only if so requested by the Director of Contral Intelligence in his role as Chairman of tho US IB The Bureeu '8 Withdrawal would, of course requlre action on the pert f the National Security Council d . The President Foreign_Intelligence_Advisory Board (PFIAB) This group was originally organized in 1956_ 2S tne President 5 Buara of Couultanta cr 7ozcis: Jeluazli12956a Activity Its primary function at that time was to review periodically the Government's foreign intelligence efforts With specific emphasis on the operations 0f the Central Intelligence Agency It was established 45 8 result of recommendations by the Hoover Commission In the later yeers of the Eisenhower Administration the activity of the group fell off and it was re-organized in its present form With tbe advent of the Kennedy Administration Our relationship with this Board hag historically been one of informal lieison in view of the fact that the primary function of the Board is concerned with foreign intelligence _ There bave been occasions where representatives of the Bureau briefed individual membera and/or panels of the Board concerning our jurisdiction } techniques and accomplishments in the intelligence field. These briefings have been received with &. receptive and Sympathetic attitude. Our main concern in' following the activities of this Board 'bas' been to assur6 that the~Centrar Intelligence' Agency: doeg" not encroach upon our j"risdiction and upon tbe functions of the various intelligence communities in Which we hold memberghip. 48 NB86 Docld 32989629 Page 220 {s ================================================== Page 221 ================================================== The case involving Army Sergeant Jack E Dunlep , a former employee of the National Security Agency who w88 2 Soviet espionage agent was thoroughly roviewod by the present PrIAB 1n view of the most serious ramificationg 1t presented _ This case concerned the penetration the Soviets of the National Security Agency The report which emanated from the PFIAB study Included proposals which aZfect the responsibilitles and activities of several agencies within the intelligence community _ 411 of the twenty-one recommendations of the Board dealt with various aspects of achieving a strengthened counterintelligence capability to guard against penetration of our security establishments by hostile intellio gence agencies _ Nineteen of the recommendations of the Boerd were approved by the President and three of these related directiy to Bureau activity _ They are a8 followe ; #18: "That steps be talen to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate agent resources to effect the required domestic counterintelligence coverage of both bloc and nonbloc official installations and personnel who may be engaged in iutelligence afd ~elatcz activities inimical to the national security. #19: "Tha t the policies of the Department of State with respect to authorizing technical coverage (use 0f wiretapping and listening devices) by the Federa1 Bureau of Investigation of foreign official: installationg and personnel in this country be re-examined with a .view to liberalization to the extent necessary to provide the counterintelligence coverage required In the It interest of national security #20: "That , in future, when consideration 18 given to exchanging detected Soviet_bloc intelli- gence agents for imprisoned American pergonnel in bloc countries 9 advance consultations be held with Central" Intelligence Agency and the Federa1 Bureau of Investigation to assure that adequate attention 418 given a1l intelligence aspects of such proposed exchanges in the interest of the national security, weighed againgt the political gains to be echieved 49 NWN-88608_Docld:32989629-Pagez by ================================================== Page 222 ================================================== The Director's Stand Ovor the Years The Director'6 stand ovor the yoars with regpect to Jurisdiction concerning foroign Inteliigence matterg Within the United States is reflected in numeroub comments he has made dating back to the days when tho Centrel Intelligence Group.(CIG) Was being formed _ In June 1946, General Vandenberg , then head of CIG , sent a memorandum to the Director proposing that the National Intelligence Authority issue a directive extending the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence, which position General Vandenberg occupied _ The memorandum was analyzed on June 1946, in a memorandum from C, HS Carson to D_ M_ Ladd in which it was pointed out that it was inevitable that CIG must enter into the domestic picture because of sources of foreign intelligence in that ffeld An addendum was placed on che memorandum by Mr Edward 4. Tamm and Mr C . A Tolson Which was followed by comments by the Director Which is most pertinent to the subject matter uidez discu3sic3_ Tkc 3dderduz -eed: "Mr Tolson and Mr Tamm do not concur with the conclusion expressed in this memorandum that 'It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that fleld They feel that a coordinated pro- gram for the exchange 0f information between the Central Intelligence Authority and the FBI , pernitting 2 free and comprehensive exchange of information in matters of mutual interest , will enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field without interference from the Central Intelligence Authority in tbe same manner that the Bureau works , for example with local police departments or other governmentai agencies within defined jurisdictional lines We believe that the attached letter to General Vandenberg i8 satisfectory_ "i Tho Director commented a9 follows: "I am not as optinistic 85 are Tolson & Tamm I think it 18 Inevitable that there will' be 2 collision with CIG over our domestic jurisdiction 50 ~ui88608-0oci332989629 Pagezz2 21 , ================================================== Page 223 ================================================== or .rather thoir expansion into it on intolligence ma tters _ It ought not occur but this now memo of CIG shows how grocdy it 18 _ It. 18 tho Donoyan plan aImost in toto & 18 boing Glyly over It means we must zealously guard our domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch & be ever alert to regist any encroachment 1i On March 1953 1 the Director testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations In response to a question from Senator McCarran concerning liaison between FBI and CIA , the Director stated: "There 'is close liaison CIA has exclusive jurisdiction abroad for intelligence Ke have exclusive jurisdiction Within the United States Me maintain continuous liaison With CIA Headquarters in Mashington through a liaison representative of our Bureau in order to facllitate the transmission of material from them to us and from our bervice to them In October , 1958 CIA approached uS requesting ci; concurrence ip CIA's e8 tabldshing physical end technical 'surveillance in the United States on the CIA had an operational interest in this individual_ By memorandum it was recommended that the Bureau not become involved in this CIA operation and that CIA be informed that this would not establish a precedent for approval of future CIA activities in the United States Responsive to continuing to present problems the Director noted: "This is an understatement particularly if we ar0 going to adopt a macaroni backbone attitude instead of standing up forthrightly for our rights and jurisdiction _ 1} CIA, in April 1959 advised uS that one of its sources would be Visiting the United States , and requested our concurrence in CIA'8 establishing coverage including technical surveillance It was recommended we stay out of this matter and inform CIA that this was not to be construed as a precedent for approval 0f future CIA counter- Intelligence activity in the United States The Director commented on the menorandum: "The trend has gone 80 far we bave become nothing but & rubber stamp for CIA yet they won 't even allow us to perform liaison functiong abroad much 1e88 operational ones 51 NWV 88608_Docld:32989629_Page-_223 put 27 , ================================================== Page 224 ================================================== In January , 1960 , CIA agreed to comply with conditions 'imposed the Bureau with rogard to developing positive intelligence information through contacts botween U_ S _ residonts and visitors from Iron Curtain couitrios, CIA agrocd to contact 48 first boforo promoting such associations In March, 1960 CIA inquired 1f it might obtain Bureau clearance at the ficld lovel for such contacts in the intorcst 0f oxpodloncy_ Mix 'Tolson notod: "'Moro and moro wo are agreeing to CIA operations in the U _ S . I am opposed to this relaxation_ We can exercise better control here than through our field offices. I The Director added : "I share Tolson S views M CIA was advised clearance was to be obtained through Bureau headquarters _ 4 source furnished information alleging penetration of American intelligence One Serge Karlow , a CIA officer , was developed as a suspect _ On 2/9/62 _ wa took over the investigation On 2/26/62 Sheffield Edwards , thon CIA Director of Security, admitted CIA had had technical coverage on Karlow from February, 1961 to 2/9/62 Edwards clifzec his reluctence to tel7 "8 of thfs situation earlier because of obvious possible jeopardy to prosecution 1 embarrassment to his Agency Should the Bureau raise an objection to CIA's maintaining such coverage The Director noted: "I only Wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion but on specific instances al1 too many in number_ Yet thore exists wistful bolief that the leopard has changed his spots' In April 1962 , we received information on a strictly confidential basis from Sourwine of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that an unidentified CIA representative had talked to Senator Eastland concerning an alleged move to place CIA in charge 0f' all intelligence-gathering operations for the Government Gt to include Soviet espionage in the U_ S The Director noted: "I am not surprised at the above alleged effort, There 1s no doubt in many quarters a desire to eliminate the FBI in dealing with espionage and subversion for we are a thorn not only in the side 0f communists but also the ADA and Fabian Socialists . CIA which failed again and again to know What 18 actually going on abroad could be counted upon to blunder the sam0 way in the USA _ 01 52 TW 88608 Docld:32989629 224 by plus Jay Page ================================================== Page 225 ================================================== In April 1963 we received information indicating that CIA Director John McCone was considering expansion of CIA operations in the United States ~" specifically intelligence covorage and the development of sourc08 in thib country . The Director made a note on the memorandum recording tbis: "McCone is trying to do another Donovan _ If he injects himself into the U, the FBI get8 out. Too many cookcs epoil the brothe" In December 1963 the Director inquired as to the nature and extent of intelligence operations wherein CIA had established contact with a diplomat operated him in the U . S , with our coordination, and continued to operate him upon his baving departed this country. Four such cases were cited_ On the memorandum , the Director noted: "I have little confidence in CIA abiding by agreements if it serves it8 purpose better not to do So . 18 In January, 1964 , CIA advised us 1t bad reorganized its ectivities in the U_ S. The Domestic Operations Division, CIA, 1 had established field offices in this country under appropriate cover A memorandum was prepared describing the hisiory of"CIA operatiuus 10 the 80 3 and rcczzorditg ecti02 designed to protect our interests_ A letter went to CIA with ground rules which the Bureau expected CIA to follow in el2 matters requiring coordination. The Director noted; but I hope you are not being taken in. I can't forget CIA withholding the French espionage activities in the U . S_ nor the false story concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, only to mention two of their instances of double dealing.- I8 The New York Office, by letter 2/14/64 = 9 set forth its observations concerning a briefing given that office on the matter of CIA operations in the U. S_ The Director commented: "I thirk this domestic operations expansion of CIA 18 very dangerous and will inevitably muddy the waters _ Mf In May, 1964, the Bureau reconsidered its stand with respect to permitting CIA to approach sources at foreign establishments in the United States; for intelligence purposes. The following policy Mias proposed and subsequently approved: (1) Fibere there was no indication 2 bource wouid be leaving tbe United we would deny CIA clearance for contact uatil we bad adateiiy expiazed the person 8 potential for our own purpose8. If we decided we bad bo 53 N-88608-00ci732989629-Pugezi 8. , "OK , ================================================== Page 226 ================================================== interest and CIA contact would not Jeopardize any FBI investigations , we would grant CIA approval to proceed with It6 contact with proviso we be kept informed of information developed of possible interest to u8, (2) Where it appeared source would be returning to 2 foreign country shortly we would normally grant CIA clearance for preliminary contact with proviso wo be kept informed of results_ We reserved the right to take direct access to the source 28 our needs required. (3) Where there was a2 overlapping of interests and source expected to continue in United States for fairly extended period 0f time in those instances where CIA had entree and no Bureau investigation would be jeopardized we would pernit CIA to explore matter and make preliminary contact keeping us advised of progreb8 and getting our specific clearance before direct recruitment approach; however where factors indicated it would be to best Bureau interests to operate source , we would undertake the recruitment and keep CIA advised of information of interest to that Agency . When these matters were submitted . for approval Mr Tolson commented, "Looks okay , but we will bave to watcb this very closely." 11 The Director concurred in Mr _ Tolson ' 8 remark 54 MWBBGOB_DocId332989629 Page 226 ================================================== Page 227 ================================================== Do TE NEED AND TE POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U , In 1941, tho U, S . a llegedly had in it8 posbession practically a11 0f tho forolgn Intelligenco it needed regarding military and strategic targets in Japan_ The informa ~fon was scattered among various individuals who had porsonal krnowledge or was located in libraries 8 various Govornment agoncies 9 private business firms 2 institutions, et cetora Tragically , the U . S. Government did not have any mechanibm to collect 9 record and ovaluate such information_ Intelligence was bady needed in 1941 9 and we dearly in lives and financial resources to accomplish certain missions because the informa tion 1a8 ,not readily available. Today , the need for foreign intelligence i8 grea ter than ever The stakes 0f foreign policy have never been higher The U , being 8 doninating world power , has assumed vast responSibilities enmeshed in delicate political situations throughout the world The ever_existing threa t of an atomic war with communist countries aemanas a continuing acquirenert 22 rcowledga S0 that policies and courses of action can be designed in the most effective manner possible. The information needed applies to numerous fields 0f activity, a major area being scientific research and development.' In thfe connection, the revolutionary break-throughs in the scientific category are occurring with unusually high frequency , and if the U. S _ is to remain In the forefront it 18 absolutely necessary that we obtain an accurate eva luation of the enemy S capabilities and intentions _ We have been fortunate to collect high quality positive intelligence through sophisticated collection methods , 1,e high altitude photography and research in this area is proceeding at an accelerated pace_ Nevertheless 1 electronic_ gadgets and machines will never produce. a1l that 1s required. Te still need supplementary coverage on 2 heavy scale, and the human being still continues to be a vital source of information . The individual talks and volunteers information_ He talks and his statements are intercepted. A11 of this produces va Zuable increments of intelligence The individuel can still provide badly needed da ta either through his voluntary contribution or through hi8' unwitting divulging 55 ' _ NW-88608_Docld:32989629_Eage 2ZZ S_ paid S., ================================================== Page 228 ================================================== 0f intelligence _ Tho Importanco of the individual is further omphasized when wo realize that 18 cach sophfsticated collection techniquc 1s Introducod, science also introduccs newly desicnod countortochniquos of covoring , protccting, and camouflaging important assets : In essence, technology eventually hits an inpenotrable or leveling-off depth Toreign intelligence is not geographically restricted. Infornation regarding Chinese Communist8 can bo obtained anywhere in the world, and even if it is of a fragmentary nature, the data can bo '0f significant va lue Tho denand for information is heavy and is sought by every agency in the Government, Becausa of this 9 it has been necessary for tho' 1 U _ S_ Governmont to map a program 0f collection on a priority basis_ This bas becn done through tho creation 0f a committee which is attached to the U . S. Intelligence Board. The committee maintaing a list Of priorities on a current basis_ A recent list of guidelines Zor the collection of foreign intelligence pertaining to scientific affairs In Communist Cnina included approximately 170, i~ei? _ 9 In the U, S. proper } the sources 0f foreign intelligence ar0 voluminous_ Host 0f these sources overtly provide informa tion through newspapers , scientific publications } libraries tourists, visiting professors and students journalists, and immigrants. The compilation,,collation, analysis and reporting of such information involves an extensive program and, needless to Bay , the U S. today does not have the capability of tapping all available bources on a current basis. 56 ~NW 88608-Docld332989629 Page 228 1.@: ================================================== Page 229 ================================================== For the purpose of this paper , we are thinking about the search for knowledge considered vital for national survival, One could suggest that clandestine collection of intelligence is ovoromphasizod and that our Govornmont could roadily protect Its interests through overt collection and the employment of our best analysts and eva luator8 . If G tako this approach, we may a5 well discount tho importance .0f the Bureau 5 activities in the counterintelligence field, which essentially ar0 of a clandestine nature and which bave produced time and again vital intelligence_ We therefore, must move on the assumption that the ciandestine collection of foreign intelligence 15 very definitely 2 most necessary element of our over-all intelligence capabilities. In addition to the overt sources , there exists 2 rich potential in the U. S. among the foreign diplomatic establishments including the U. the officials of foreign governments 9 and vigitors such as students 9 professors ) and scientists. A certain amouni Oi iufufIuatloi frOm such sources 822 be obtained in an overt fashion, but the high quality data is noza acquired through clandestine means , This can pe done through technical: monitoring, development of live sources, access to records files 9 et cetera There are approrimately foreign officials in the U. S. assigned to embassies, consulates, trade missions, U. N_ 9 and other international organizations_ This excludes dependents During the fiscal year ending June 30 , 1965 9 38,544 foreign government officials visited the U _ about 1500 of these came from communist_bloc countries_ During the fiscal year endlng June 30 , 1965, approximately 50,000 foreign students came to the U . 733 Of these Camo from the communist bloc . During the same fiscal year tbere were 2,075 967 visitors from al1 countries_ Everyone of the foregoing 18 a potential 'source 0f foreign intelligence. As can be readily accerted 9 the U . S . Government does not have a capa - bility 0f assessing each ana every one 0f these sources for foreign intelligence. Te can say at this point that the FBI and CIA are just scra tching the surface, It 18 recognized that 2 program designea to 885038 57 Mu_88608 Docld332989629_Paje 229 N. , 1ly 10,600 S. ; S.; ================================================== Page 230 ================================================== or attempt.to recruit each potential sourco mould be out of tha question. Such a massive undertaking would not bbe compatible witb U_ S . Government foreign policy. Thore' 1s" o quostion that thero must bo selectivity 0f a Judicious and prudent naturo. Since the U. S . is such a major power, Nashington, D_ C_ is tbe center of diplomatic activity involving practically all foreign nations . The location of the U . N _ in New York City presents us with another area 0f intensified activity. Most countries Bend their most able diplomats to the U. S. s0 wG ar0 confronted with hundreds 0f highly talented people_ The day-tosdey activities in diplomatic establishnents, conferenceb meetings, negotiations, liaison between countries, ai1 create 2 tremendous reservoir Of foreign Intelligence potentialo 58 NW88608_Decld32989629Pgge 230 ================================================== Page 231 ================================================== E:' CURRENT CAPABILITIES OP CIA IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES In order that thore may not bo ady misunderstanding regarding CIA '8 capabilities to collect foreign intelligence in the United States , To shoula first clarify that one of the componente of the Agency wnich has offices in the United Statee does not engage in this particular activity_ 0 The Office of Security, which is responsible for personnel and physical security 2 maintains severe1 offices in the United Statos under authorized Treasury Department cover Personnel 0f this office conduct investigations of applicants 9 firmg or individuals sho may be utilized by CIA on a contract basis to support intelligence operations overseas, The overt collection of intelligence by CIA is handled by the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) (formerly called Contact Division) CIA estimates that DCS has 2 capability of tapping approximately 15 per cent of the total potential of intelligence in C the U, S , This Division has 18 field Offices and 16 resident agencies in the United States 9 and each office is openly identified a8 being connected with CIA Personnel totaling approximately 140 carry CIA credentials, The Division regularly has a number of officers from the various military services who are assigned to this Division on a tenporary basis_ These military officers concentrate on the collection 0f that foreign intelligence Which relates to the immediate United States military needs The personnel 0f DCS intervien aliens tourists Officials of import-export firms, students, scientists 1 and the information collected covers a very broad Spectrum in the positive intelligence category. DCS: claims to have contact with about 7200 organizations institutions, or businesses 2nd bas approximately 60 , 060 contacts or sources 0f infornation . The information is reported in the form 0r "Infornation Reports ," Which 18 disseninated throughout tbe intelligence community. During- 1965, 59 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 231 Page ================================================== Page 232 ================================================== DCS disseminated 26 0o0 such reports_ DCS does not have any respcesibiiocies in the clandestine collection 0f intelligence, and in that sonso it is very specifically not operational_ 0 DCS definitely cannot engago in any activity 0I an internal security nature, and withio CIA it is clearly understood that DCS 1s not to ba operational under any circumstances DCS has boon tha Subject of Somo controvorsy withib CIA There is ono school 02 thought which maintains that DCS Should be an appendago 0z the Deputy Director of Plans, Fho 1s responsible for ali clandestine operations, The other school which has prevailed holds to tha line that DCS should be separate and_ continue under the supervision Of the Deputy Director 0f Intelligence (DDI) This situation not only has causod headaches for CIA but a1so for the Bureau because of situations Rhich ariso where the "left hand does not know what the right hand 1s doing_ 0 ". DCS is essentially carrying out CIA 8 responsibilities emanating from National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No . 2 Which has Its roots in 2 similar airective issued under tne Ncticzcl Intelligence Authority in 1946, It has beon in business for approrimately twenty years 0 Per agreenent , DCS cannot interview 80 alien without first clearing with the Bureau, This is dono on 2 dally basis_ With regara to' American citizens , Bureau approval 1s not required unless the Bureau has indicated a prior interest ir the individual; however , DCS nevertheless Submits name checks 'on Americans 8 and if it so happens that the bubject Of such an inquiry is 2 Bureau source or involved in 2 Bureau investigation, we are in a position to move to protect our interests, It should be noted that although DCS is engaged primarily in positive intelligonce collection, it 19 requirod to ba on tho alert for sources Tho possibly might be useful to CIA '& clandestine operations For example, if' DCS encountere an alien who can be utilized in an overseas operation, the lead is passed n to the appropriate division. At the present tine, DCS alerts the newly created Domestic Operations Division (explained bolow) regarding potential sources, Our current controls With regard to DCS ar0 functioning efficiently. We regularly Oxamina the 60 % NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 232 ================================================== Page 233 ================================================== status of tbis and we periodically make adjustments in order make certaln there is no "freewheeling" and to take.advantage 0f the Information which DCS ga:ns. and which is 0f interost to the Buroau For oxaxple wc ar0 currontly Working out arrangements where our Zield offices can contact the Jocal DCS offices concerning Chinese aliens who might bo of interest to uS either a5 subjects for investigatlon or 88 potential informants Tbl8 liajzon at the field level Fias deemed desirable 80 that we coula get information at the "horse'8 mouth" rathor than wa it for a reply from CIA headquarters , which 18 often prolonged Mhen transmitted, is Sometimes stripped of pieces of information. This occurs because of the involved and sometimes complicated maze or bureaucratic conpartmentation within CIA: In the latter part 0f 1963 , CIA created it8 Donestic Operations Division (DOD) 9 Which vras to be responsible for any clandestine developnent of sources in the United States_ Prior to the establishment of this Division CIA activity in this field was managed from each individual area division at Mashington headquarters _ The pressing need for more clandestine sources, coupled with the recognition of the vast potential in the United States, prompted CIA to creato 8 new division which would be responsible for &11 of the area division interests DOD has headquarters at Washington, D and currently has field officeb at New York Boston, Chicago, San Trancisco, Los Angeles Honolulu and Washington, D C_ 9 proper Approxinately 40 ibteiligence Officers are assigned to the task of engaging in assessment and/or recruitment 0f positive intelligence sources, primarily in the diplomatic field_ Some Of the personnel ar0 as8igned to the handling of firns or organizations which nay bo supporting certain CIA operations abroad, DOD personnel in the field operat- under authorized Department 0f Defense cover:, Thbe heads of these.field offices ar0 known to and wO have established a Satisfactory liaison area at the field level. DOD iS also responsible for the handling of CIA agents (informants) who have been recruited abroad and who come to the United States for as8ignments either on a tenporary basis or for tbe duration of & nozma l diplomatic assignment. 43 61 ~N88608Docld: 2989629-Page 233 relationshigo and , C., City, uS, ================================================== Page 234 ================================================== The creation of DOD within CIA was and s+il1 1s a somewha t controversial Agency subject_ DCS saw DOD as a interfering element_ The area desks wore reluctant to havo a new' division to tako ovor thoir agonts_ Some 0z tho DOD porsonnol aro vory capable and seasoned intelligence officers , Many 0f them ar0 considered Of mediocre capability 9 and there is a frequont rumor that othez CIA divisions send their misfits to DOD_ From CIA s standpoint tbere appears to bo 2 definite need for 3 much stronger taam witbin DOD. Theoretically, DOD 15 required to be on tho alert for a11 potential sources wbo can be used by CIA in its intelligence operations 9 and the approach 18 H basically Ona of 2 long-range nature_ DOD 18 required to make uSo Of a11 leads emanating from fellow employees who may have developed social contacts or associations with foreigners abroad or who might meet potential | sources in the United States. Since CIA personnel operate under diplonatic cover when abroad they do get the opportunity to TOVe in diplomatic circies Similarly , undercover agents of CIA traveling throughout the world aIso make contacts which offer potential exploitation if and Rihen the target stops io the United States , Since January, 1964 , when DOD actually began moving 2 it has recruited approximately ten individuals in the diplomatic field. Most of these were in the noncommunist_bloc area A11 of those recruited appear 0 t0 have been in a fairly low-level category. A11 of then Wer6 carear diplomats 9 and there was no evidence that the individuals were connected With eny intelligence service, In addition to the activities of DCS and DOD, thero is a certain amount of CIA operational movements which do not fall under either 0f the foregoing divisions. One ezanple is the CIA base i2 Miami which was set up for CIA 'S operations directed &gainst the Cuban Government,. This base is used for the training and dispatching of agents into Cuba and to some extent into other countries in the Caribbean, perticularly the Dominican Republic. This base iS directly responsible to the Testern Henisphere Division of CIA , which coula be called tho Latin American Divisiona 62 N-88608-Docid32989629-Pige' ================================================== Page 235 ================================================== CIA also becomes involved in political and psychological warfare type of programs directed against targets in foreign countries The Agency, broadly refers t0 this activity as "covert action_ Tho programs ara essontially dosignod to influence individuals 1 organizationb or governments through various news media and this wilz include the utilization of "agents of inziuence Tht8 activity falls under tho International Organizations Division (IOD) of CIA , %hich has no responsibility to collect information IOD does use people in the United States to help implement the overseas programs _ Quite often the Agency uses cutouts Or covers for such an operationa Althc _gh IOD does not engage in intelligence collection, it is 2 CIA division which Should be kept i0 mind, since its activities quite often Will ba tangent to matters 0z interest to the Breau For example IOD becomes involved in the World Youth Festival, where its objective is to neutralize communist influence_ of course have had a0 interest in the Festival because of the participation 0f Americans including members of the CPUSA Theoretically 9 IOD is required to coordinate closely with other appropriate components of CIA We do not believe that this coordination nas been effective enougn c There is no doubt that there are individuals in CIA who aspire to broaden the Agency s operational activities in the United States Such individuals would like to see an arrangement similar to one currently in force in England where MI-6 has a free hand to assess and recruit all foreigners 9 including diplomats 9 where there is no evidence that they are engaged in intelligence activity_ If such evidence is obtained, MI-6 is required t0 coordinate with MI-5 _ There are people in CIA wbo would like to see similar machinery and in addition would want the freedom to conduct cartain investigations and maybe even institute technical surveillances _ In summary 9 CIA So far has a very limited capability to recruit foreign diplomatic sources in the United States , but the Agency appears to have done fairly well with a relatively Small staff; however , it can be anticipated that this capability will increase_ CIA '8 effectiveness will probably be adversely affected for some time to come because of the Agency 8 well-known deficiencies, such as lack 02 discipline Zoose admin- iStration, and lack of skilled and talented personnel, 63 9 NBHU WocId32989629 Page 235 Te , ================================================== Page 236 ================================================== r CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THIC FBI 1 Nanpover_Being_Devoted It is most difficult to lgive any specific figures a8 to how much manpower the FBI is currently dovoting strictly to foreign intelligcnce collection, scparate and apart from the Bureau's internal security ind counterintclligence functions _ Much of the foreign intelligehce developed by tho Buroau is an outgrowth 0f our internal sccurity investigations and cannot ba neatly separated ,in terms 0f manpower or time A substantial amount of our Yoreign intelligence activity is concentrated in two offices There most of the diplomatic establishnents in the United States are located; namely New York and Washington Field, Both offices wero requested to furnish estimates as to how much manpower is being allocated to foreign Intelligence matters, including both live sources developed and technical coverage_ In both cases , the estimates provided were highly tentative and both c fices stress that manpower commitmente in this area fluctuate widely from week to week depending 0n international politics and other unpredictable factors _ For instance during the_Cuban missile crisis of 1962 both offices greatly increased their nornal manpoler commitment to the develop- ment OI current foreign 1ntelligence_ 'The present Dominican cr1sis which involves production of foreign intelligence to a large extent represents another "abnormal" situation_ Bowever for what it is worth, WFO and Newv York have estimated that at the present tine they are allocating approzi- mately 35 Agents and 20 clerical employees to the full time task of foreign intelligence collection Virtually a11 of the clerical time and about 40.per cent of the Agent time is related to technical coverage and the balance is aimed a1 the development of live sources In addition, of course, a11 of the other offices including 0ul" Legal Attaches abroad, have devoted manpower to foreign intelligence collection in varying degrees operations conducted in different field offices have involved the assignment of a5 many a5 10 01 12 Agents for tenporary periods, In connection with #ts responsibilities in the' 'Cuban and Latin-American fields the Miami and San Juan Offices have devoted considerable manpolyer to the development of foreign intelligence in recent years_ The Chicago Office in connection with its handling of our informant has devoted manpower to the development of foreign intelligence _ These represent only a few examples _ On an overall basis and bearing in mind the difficultyiin citing any precise figures it is estimated that the Bureau probably averages approxinately 50 to 75 Agents and 25 to 30 clerks a681gned primarily to foreigu intelligence work , 64 G ~NW 88608 Docld:32989629 .Page 236 ================================================== Page 237 ================================================== 2 _ Numbcr of Xicrophone and Telephone Surveillances with Evalua ion or Proauci At present , Bureau has only one mi- crophone surveillance in forcign intelligence field and this is in connection with a spccial National Security Agency project directed against coded communications Concerning tcchnical survoillancos wo aro now operating about 70 foreign intelligence installations on various diplomatic establishnents in this country. The majority 0f these are in Washington Field and New York with scattercd installations in Chicago, Miagli Pittsburgh , San Francisco and San Juan Under current Bureau pblicy, we are linited to 80 foreign intelligence technical surveillances and no microphone surveillances with the exception of one on the In addition, during recent years 1 we have maintained approrinately 50 so-called "teler" surveillances on the teletype facilities of various, foreign establishnents_ This has been dono at the specific request 0i the National Security Agency in connection with its efforts to break foreign codes and to read foreign government communications . We have had excellent results from these technical installatios Any compilation of items of valuo to the U: S. Iuieiiigenee CUluiuiiry and poiicy-iaking officials developed through this coverage woula run many hundreds of pages_ The results have rangea from information regarding plans and activities of key foreign countries in the diplomatic field to information regarding intelligence, political, economic and military develop- ments in the countries concerned In many instances, we have been able to forewvarn the White House the State Department and other interested agencies of impending developnents and to furnish data giving aTL insight into the thinking and strategy Of key foreign officials and governnents This coverage has proved specially valuable during crisis periods such aS the Cuban nissile crisis of 1962 and during the tense negotiations involving the Panama Canal in 1964 _ On many occasions top-ranking United States officials have commented on the effectiveness of this data The particular importance 0f this information has been itS timeliness to current events as well as the fact that it represents a penetrtion of foreign diplomatic circles which 1s only infrequently available through live sources In some instances of coursa this type coverage on a particular foreign establishment or 'official has not paid off_ We have had cases where Ichis technique has been unproductive for sustained periods of time on & particular country. This: is to be expected and we bave sought to overcome this by rotating our installations correlating our technical cporations with Shifting international developments and putting coverage on those countries which appear to offer tho most promise for worthwhile Intelligence. 6 65"~ Mw88608 Doc[d32989679 Page 237 ================================================== Page 238 ================================================== 3 _ Live Sources With Evaluation At present Ie ar0 making active efforts to develop live informant coverage in the diplomatic establishments of 37 non- Soviet bloc countries _ This list of so-called "target countries" varies from "time to time but essentially we are secking informant covcrago in countrios considcred critical from an intolligenco standpoint sucb as those leaning towards the Soviet bloc or countries in which the United States has paranount political or military intorcsts or" which ar0 otherwiso of primary conccrn Tho current list includes virtually a1l Latin-American countries, a number of Middle Cast countries, and scattered countries throughout Africa and the Far East_ Our program was initiated in the early 1950s , and we are now using some 50 sources (This number fluctuates due to transfers, resignations etc.) In each case, wG clear with State Department prior to designating any country aS a "target" and we also clear with State prior to conducting interviews with employees at the "target" establishment _ In a number of instances , including most Latin-American countries, State has asked us t0 restrict our efforts €o Anerican citizens This, 0f course, 18 2 highly limiting factor. Qver the years this liva informant coverage has on many occasions produced foreign intelligence of rel value Our sources bave frequently provided dara regarding proposed political, diplomatic or economic action by the countries concerned, on occasion in advance of other forewarning to U.S_ intelligence. They have also been able to furnish 2 consiaerable amount 0f information regarding the whereabouts, background and general activities of individual foreign officials of security interest, thereby sa ving investigative time These sources have been especially valuable in connection With the Program and other sophisticated attacks on foreign establishments, providing uS with data regarding the physical security, location of code rooms, etc., of the various foreign establishments _ In addition to so-called "target" countries Which ar0 in the non-Soviet bloc area, the Bureau has developed a number of informants and defectors-in-place in Soviet_bloc establishments who have been able to furnish a substantial amount 0f foreign intelligerce. In tbe Soviet_bloc field, wo have also developed 2 nunber of sources in quasi-Official establishments such as trade missions wbo have produced valuable foreign intelligence _ In the Soviet_bloc field of course, ou live informant development has been aimed essentiaiiy at internal security and counterintelli- gence needs 0f the Bureau 66 NW 88608 Docid332989629' Page 238 ================================================== Page 239 ================================================== It is significant that we have becn able to operate for many years in the developnent of live sourccs in foreign diplomatic estalishnents , both Soviet bloc and non-bloc, without encountering any serious incidents embarrassing to the TBI or the United Statos Government In assessing tho product of such livo sources in a numbor of instances .in the non-Sov_et ficld, State Department has requested that we restrict our efforts to Amorican citizens _ To 2 considerablo decreo this has limitod tho effoctivcness of our progran in the Don-Soviet field since U.S, employees of foreign establishments will normally hot have access to top-grade data Thus especially in the non-Sovied bloc field w@ are not tapping the full potential which exists for high-level foreign intelligence. This can only be realized through the development of high quality sources 4 _ (Tht8 material, wh ich i8 a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operatidn, Will be covered in @ briefing t0 be ortanged by the Counsel *0 the President) IC 5 , Double Agents and Informants In a number of instances Bureau double agents and informants , developed to assist us in connection With our Internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities have been: able to provide Significant high-level information of foreign intelligence value_ For example } in the Soviet field, we have developed a number of top-level sources such as who have provided current intelligence regarding the organizational structure, personnel, and operations Of the KGB and GRU , both in the Soviet Union and abroad; a description of various technical equipment used by Soviet intelligence; data regarding current relations between tbe Soviet Union and Coiunist China; and data regarding Soviet foreign policy, political and military developnents _ etc Sinilar inforna- tion 0f foreign intelligence value has beon developed through FBI informants , double agents and defectors-in-place oporating against 67 NW 88608_Docld 32989629. Page 239 ================================================== Page 240 ================================================== Polish } Yugoslav Czechoslovakian and otber comunist-bloc countries. For instance, ir the Cuban field on sovera] occasions FBI informants have beon able to develop high-level or current intelligence regarding corditions in Cuba and policies of the Castro regime through personal contacts with ranking_ Cuban officiale both in the U,S, and abroad _ Through our coverage of the Conmunist Party, USA , and related organizations we have also frequently produced foreign intelligence_ although to 3 lcsscr extent than in our opcrations in tbe foreign nationality iield_ One 0f our best sources 0i forcign intelligence in the domestic arca is our so-called wherein se have informants acting in a 'capacity bctween the Comnunist Party, USA ; ard foreign communist groups including the Conuunist Party 0f the Sovict Union Te have doveloped iniornation through this operation regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, social and political conditions in various countries, both in and outside the Soviet bloc, and tactics 0f the international communist movemenr . 6 _ Additional Potential As iniicated in the foregoing subsections_ the Bureau 1s currently producirg 2 considerble volume' of forcign intclligence throvgh covett neizs, ruch 0f 1t of 2 Significant nature_ kost of tnis azta 1S an ouigrowin of itfu4Wd4is iccliiical covorato ind investigative prograns targeted Drigariiy €0 fulfill ou internal security ana counterintelligence objectives and relatively speaking , Ye have comnitted ozly 2 small percesecge 0i our assets exclusivcly in the direction of foreign intelligence. It is believed that the Burecu possessCS considerable potential for the development of foreign intelligence which could be realized with a fairly modest expenditure of ranpower aad costs if we were t0 Iake foreign intelligezce collection a primary aim. For example, with existing ecuipnert and facilities, we could expand our technical coverzge 0f foreign cstablishients t0 includa additional 30 to 40 foreign establishnents provided we could ass1gn about 25 additional personnel to this field. Wich the assignnent of an additional 75 to 100 Agents, v7e could greatly intensify our foreign intelligence collection through live informants primarily through the devclopaent 2nd exploitation of additional sources at foreign diplonatic :establishnents_ We-could place morc stress 0m, foreign intelligence collcction in ou training progrars and conferences to nake rofe cffcctive use 0z our aIready aviilable aS< We coula, for ezzzgle 2dd Specialized classes on foreign intellig: Collection to our In-Service schedules or designate selected Burea persornel to atterd trcining sessions operated by other D,S. agenc regarding this subject_ 68 G identifbes @_pecultarly sensitiie foreign counterintelligence operation. NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 240 ================================================== Page 241 ================================================== G AREAS OCONTLICT FBI Ea CIA differences betiveou FBI and CIA ara first related to a basic problem exis( AIng in any country among the major powers , namely How 2 lav enzorcement agency coordinate its internal Aecurity functions with an intelligence organization which must operate 25 2 clandegtine service?" The very nature of 1hn functions of the two organizations imnediately introliicos potential areas Qf conflict One essentially oporates overtly and the Gther covertly Tbis alone is enough to create an atmosphere fraught with controversies and vonfusion Because each agency was molded differently aucl because ' responsibilitie8 differ , there naturally will be conflicting approaches to national Security objectives_ For example, in the field 0f intelligence the Bureau 1s basically a counterintelligence body _ CIA to the contrary, har 0 much broader responsibility in intelligence, wvhich included collection 0f foreign intelligence politicel and psyehological warfare inter- agency coordinating 9 evaluation 4 research, etc Counter- intelligence Mithin CIA is actually" 2 relatively small component 0f the agency _ Persoinel in the tvo organizations i3 reciited uzder different crJteria and standards Training is likewise at variancd In a final analysis, the experienced FBI Agent and seasoned CIA intelligence officer are not 0f the Samo molil but certainly aro tailored as two entirely and distinctly lfferent instruments Te should bear in mind that little hns been done to introduce truly substantive cross-fertilieiation of outlook , approach and operational philosophy betiann the two agencies Thi8 could be advocated irom 2 Utopimll point of view, but it also could be argued that there Rr0 distinct advantages to maintaining sound compartmentation, Separate from the above basic and fundamental situation, the differences betWeen FBI and CIA also relate to other factors such as: 1) FBI was first on scene and was well established long before CIA calo to life. This led to 2 conception in the early years that CIA was an intruder . 2) The seed 0f CIA wag the Office 0f Strategic Services (OSS) 8 an organization whose personnel, activities and #ree-Iheeling were the sources of numerous conflicts 69 ~NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-241 Any dos the {he ================================================== Page 242 ================================================== With the Bureau during Morld Far II _ It was during these years that an atmosphere of mistrust and lack of confidence was createde 3) CIA ws ostablished 25 our Iirst over-all, worldwide intelligence agency . The events and the maneuvering which led to this certainly. dia not bring Rith thom 2 harmonlous relationship. 4) Unfortunately, CIA grew big and grew Yast, particularly because of an unsettled atomic world and developnents such 25 the Korean War . The Agency did not jell effectively 25 2n organization, and with this came numerous difficulties, many 0f which exist to thi8 5) Each organization has lacked adequate knovledge of the other'5 operational machinery, objectives, and "ways and means 0f doing things m} 6) An element of rivalry actually developed over the years 9 and this, Fhen zot tempered With prudence and sound iudgnent , creates unhealthy situations A growing tendency on the part of CIA to expand its operational activities not originally contemplated in the formation of that agency . It can be recognized that with this background it has not been an easy matter *o establish 2 good vorking relationship with CIA vithout frequent conflicts, and sometines agonizing negotiations _ It could be suggested that the ideal situation Fould be to remove CIA from the U S _ with the understanding that We would assune respon- Sibility for any and all activity in the intelligence field_ As described in another section of this report, such 8 move would be highly infeasible for the Bureau It is to our credit that despite the problens of the past there have bean some highly constructive develop- jents in FBI-CIA: relations, particularly as they &ffect activities in the U_ 8_ Several years ag0 arrangenents Mere made whereby CIA S Office of Security could conduct applicant investigations without infringing upon our juris_ diction_ For several years we havo been pernitting CIA to interviewz aliens Ror foreign intelligence information under ground; rules which haye peen very successful Our liaison 70 _ 6 NV88608 Docld 32989629.Page 242 day . ================================================== Page 243 ================================================== mechanism has been functioning effectively . Mle have frequent conzerences. Bureau personnel lectures before CIA officers Dissemination of.Information 18 excellent. The atmosphere for negotiating and discussing unusually complicated problens i8 vory good. Personnel Can work in the same are? with 2 minimun of probles_ 9 a5 evidenced in the Dominican Republic, We attend USIB meetings and aro actively engaged in tho work 0f several committees attached to USIB_ 0 A1l of this is commendable progress and certainly beneficial to national security. A11 0f the foregoing Fas set forth in the way of background in order t0 better understand the current source 0f differences vith CIA, namely the Agency' s desire to asses8 and recruit foreign intelligence sources in tho U.S _ in the' foreign diplonatic establishments including United Nations, and to some extent among foreign visitors CIA fully acknowledges our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities_ Tnis is clear-cut erd free of any debatable question; however CIA feels that we have no' legally-established responsibility in foreign intelligence collection that somebody (in this case, CIA) should be fully exploiting the foreign intelligence potential In the United States, bearing in mind that there are approxi- mately 10,000 foreign officials and employees in this country. CIA argues that a foreign diplomat can be recruited anywhere in the world but maintains that there is no better place than the United States for assessment recruitment training and orientation 0f an informant CIA further maintains that if the Agency moves on 2 target_ } such as an Argentine diplomat wbo may be a career officer not connected With a foreign intelligence service, there should not be any con- flict because the ectivity is in no way related to the internal security functions 0f the Bureau CIA has also expressed the attitude that in the communist_bloc field CIA should be permitted to assess and recruit those individuals not connected with an intelligence or internal security service_ jhere are" Some" people 'in CIA" who are of the opinion that in the field 0f Zoreign intelligence the Bureau should be exerting more effort to actually essist CIA in spotting sources and , when needed, give CIA support in developing an individual through such means as surveillances, neighborhood investigations, etc. Wnen CIA 18 permittea to 71 3 NV 88608 Dlocid 32589629 Faqe z43 and ================================================== Page 244 ================================================== recruit 2 source in the U . the Agency takes the position that 1f the source can be 0f help to the Bureau wvo should levy requirenents on CIA and not ask for access to tho source unless it clearly appears that only through acc0ss VO can properly discharco our rosponsibilitie8 , CIA takes a very strong: viem that onca a sourca 18 developed it 1s basically unsound to introduca another agency into the relationship_ Tha developing agoncy may havo used techniques peculiar to its OvD organization and may have developed 2 relationship under varied cir- cumstances and when 2 new agency 1s introduced thi8 relationship with the source could ba unfavorably disturbed. CIA does not dispute the fact that informant and Agent turnovers sometimes ar0 absolutely necessary . CIA maintains Ichat 1f the Bureau 16 given acces8 to 2 CIA source we would be responsible for the counter- intelligeace aspects , but if the source produces foreign intelligence CIA should be responsible for handling this infornation, including the dissemination_ CIA's position i8 that ix is better qualified to evaluate the information and correlate it with the foreign intelligence being developed abroad, For example 0 if 2 Nigerian squrce of CIA: also available to the Bureau, furnishes infornation regarding the Nigerian Foreign Office, CIA claims that it can batter handle the teport and dissemination_ Discussios and agreements vith including tbe actions stemning from meetings with -the representativee 0f that agency in November 1965, have resulted in a greatly inproved coordirating Iachinery There still are areas 0f potential conflict which will necessitate Improvement They are: 1) DOD personnel receives leads or tips pertaining to possible access to Soviet_bloc diplonats_ This CIA Division pursues these leads and is inclined to take the position that such individuals conacted by , CIA are their "CIA-controlled sources "1 If we permitted thls to go on over 2 period 0f time, CIA Rould have a vast network Of sources not directly available to tho Bureau _ This is basically unsound, and there is no reason CIA shouldn' & immediately give us the lead or tip for exploitation. We can recognize that, depending upon circumstances, it might be favorable to us and CIA for the Agency to bandle 2 particular individual, and if it would be clearly 3 72 6 NWN 88608 Docld:32989629 Page_244 8 . , CIA , S0, ================================================== Page 245 ================================================== coordinated. This would be most important if the individual in any way Was connected with or asbociated with an intelligence service. 2) DOD is anrious to have freedom to a5se58 and recruit Bloc diplonats not kxown to be engaged in intelligence activity. On the surface," thls does not appoar to present 2 problen, but realistically speaking it is impossible for uS to know that a Soviet diplomat, not known t0 be engaged in intelligence ectivity one appears O1 tbe scene the following week as an agent Or coopted agent _ To give CIA wide latitude in this field could create 2 truly undesirable mess Ke believe that if CIA is permitted to move on such targets it should be done on 2 selective basis and with maximum coordination_ 3) CIA's organizational and operational deficiencies, such as lack or discipline poor internal coordination, unsatisfactory records, ali introduce bead- aches which undoubtedly will contimue to exist for many years_ There continues t0 be an element 0f mistrust and misunderstanding between the two organizations because 0x the bistorical reasos described ebove . 5) Continuing lack of one agency'8 appreciation for the other'8 objectives , responsibilities and operational philosophy. 6 The absence of a clearly defined Bureau policy and objectives in the field 0f foreign intelligence collec- tior_ CIA really does not know the neture and the extent of our interests 9 and consequently this lends to confusion and misunderstanding. 73 NLV-88608-Docld-32989629-Page 245 day , ================================================== Page 246 ================================================== H, CURRENT AGREEHENTS BETIEEN FBI AND CIA 1. According to SAC Letter 59 dated 5/24/49 = 9 CIA and FBI had reached agreement whereby clearance would be! requested of FBI boforo CIA conductcd an intorviow with an alion in tha U,S_ Thie clearanco would consist Of 2 reviewv 0f Bureau files concerning individual in question _ According to same SAC Letter agreement had been reached by the FBI and CIA whereby CIA was ailowed to contact American businessmen without obtaining clearance from FBI in order to obtain positive foreign intelligence information and arrange covers for CIA personnel abroad _ This agreement was based strictly on collection of foreign' intelligence and positively did not allow for the formulation of a network 0f confidential informants for CIA in the U,S. Regarding FBI-CIA agreement that CIA would clear with us prior t0 interviewing aliens in U.S., folloving docuentation has been located. By letter 2/19/48 Director of CIA Hillenkoetter wrote Director and referred to National Security Council Intelli- gence Directive No . 7 2/12/48 _ This Directive states in part that CiA wiii be respouslbie Zo1 efpbitation On higkly sclcctiv? besis within U.8_ 'of business concerns , other nongovernnental organiza- tions and individuals 2S sources of foreign intelligence information. fillenkoetter comented that CIA had been interviewing foreign businessmen, imigrants and refugees on Small Scale, always clearing matter first with FBI office in area concerned . He asked Director'8 views as to possible expansion of tbis activity. letter 2/26/48 Director replied to Hillenkoetter In part, this letter pointed out FBI had no objection to CIA inter- Viewing individuals enuerated above for foreign intelligence purposes; however , it was suggested that prior to interview such individual matters be cleared with FBI Headquarters . 2 _ Bureau letter to CIA 1/16/64 confirmed results of meetings between CIA and Bureau via liaison in discussing reorganization of CIA 5 Domestic Operations Division (DOD) Letter recognized CIA needs (recruitment "of sources in U.8 : 'who' may: be used abroad; recruitment of diplomats, including UN representatives_ who might be useful to CIA in overseas operations or who might bo transferred to Soviet-bloc countries; training of agents recruited; bandling of agents developed abroad Tho come to U.S, for a visit 0x assignment ; and approaches to foreign officials and visitors to assess- their' Rotentia] as sources when they,leaye_ the U AEoliowed Oui letter to CIA get forth the foliowing grodnd ruies to be in" coniection with CIA's operetions in order to avoid operational conflicts and embarrassment ; 4 74 3 T886u8 doci329896z9 Page Z46 By ================================================== Page 247 ================================================== 2 , CIA would not conduct investigation Of any foreigu official in U.S_ and if CIA felt such investigation warranted, FBI should be consulted. p. No foreign official would be approached for recruit_ ment by CIA without its conferring with FBI 0 C_ Wmhen CIA agent arrives in U.S. for visit Or assign- ment FBI will be advised and tvo agencies will confer regarding handiing 0f agent in this country, it being recognized each Ca50 has its individual peculiarities d Before approaching any foreign official or visitor for recruitment assessment , CIA will clear with IBI 3 _ As result of conference with CIA in January , 1966 } the above "ground rules" were modified and expanded and agreed upon by both agencies early this year (Confirmed by letter to Admiral Raborn 2/7/66. New ground rules in summary are as follows : 2 CIA will not intiate investigation of any foreign official in U,S,- without concurrence of FBI_ (Comment : This is essentially same 2S (a) in January , 1964 2 ground rules difference is that wording of this modification implies more sympathetic FBI attitude towards any proposed CIA investigations _ b_ CIA will seek FBI concurrence before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist bloc visitor in U.S. FBI will concur if CIA action does not conflict with any FBI operations_ (Comment : This is similar to (b) and (c) ground rules adopted in January, 1964, with tto differences First, it drops requirement that CIA-dear with uS before approaching 2 non-Soviet visitor although it must still do So with regard to non-Soviet officials Secondly, it specifically commits the FBI to concur if proposed CIA action does not conflict with FBI operations.) C CIA will advise FBI prior to meetings between CIA assets and foreign Officials or communist bloc visitors of interest *o FBI . (Comment: This was Dot included in previous set of ground rules.) " d: Agents 0f CIA- Who come ~to U.S.' Will be identified to FBI by name or appropriate description depending on national security interest involved_ 0 When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for a visit or assign- ment FBI will be .advised and two agencies Will confer regarding hendiing.otagept in j_ S It isrecognized exch cage will have 75-- NW 88608 D2ci332989629 Page Z4T Only ================================================== Page 248 ================================================== individual peculiarities and governing principle 1ill be positive intelligence Veighed against internal security factors _ CIA may , however continue its contractual relationship for purpose of handling training procurement_ of positive_foreign int elligence, (under- lining added) fulfillmenz Of CIA commitments to the agent and preparation next assignment abroad, f_ Where CIA Will be handling its agent in U . CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requiremcnts and wiil provido FBI 211 information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters_ Where CIA servicing is inadequate for TBI internal security interests, FBI will have direct access to agent (Comment : Rules (d) (e) and (1) represent greatly expanded and refined version of rule (c) of January 2 1964 8 agreement . Old ground rules provided considerable latitude With regard to wbo would handle CIA source in the U,S. and this has led to some disagreements with CIA _ The current ground rules clearly provide for CIA to retain contact with its agents not only for training, financing,. etc. } but also for "procurement 0f positive foreign intelligence_ " In addition, they make it clear {hat the FBI shoula not esk for direct eccess unless there is a specific internal security need.) 4 _ In addition to the above, there is one agreement we have reached With CIA Thich iS of possible relevance; nanely our recent agreement relative to treatment Of Soviet students in the U.S, By way Of background, there are a nunber 0f Soviet exchange students cur 'ently attending various U.8 universities Each' student , of course, is not only a possible Soviet intelligence agent but also 2 potential source for the U.S; after he returns to his homeland . Accordingly, both FBI and CIA have an interest in these students . Per memo dated 1/14/64 we advised CIA via liaison on 1/20/64 that the Bureau would adopt following procedure relative to Soviet students here FBI will take responsibility for collecting material regarding each student on expedite basis 1 furnishing results to CIA as developed _ At logical point FBI will confer with CIA to decide on case_by-case basis re possible recruitment If Bureau recruits Soviet student Fc wili resolve whether we should turn bin over to CIA bezore he leaves U.S, Under this procedure, CIA will not make any inquiries (thrcugh its sources in U.S.) unless "t-has "some unusual "Source ir`a- university not available to-FBI who; could furnish daia o, the student In latter case, we would allov CIA to obtaiz aata and advise us The foregoing represent all of the major agreements me have reached to date: With' CIA with respect to CIA;operations here in-foreigp iatelligeece.field 76 MNB86:_Docld:32989629 248 for S. , Page ================================================== Page 249 ================================================== I; CFFCCT ON THE FBI or rULL RESPONS IBILITY TOR COLLECTION "TFrORETCN INTELLICENCE TN THE UNTTED STTTES 1 Overt Collection Activities It is evident fromn the National Security Act 0f 1947 and the succeeding National Security Council Intelligenca Directives 2s well 2S the directives of the Director of Central Intelligence that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is charged with major responsibilities in the overt collection of foreign intelligence in the United States. In pursuit 62 this CIA exploits non~governmental organizations and individuals foreign language publications and aliens Although CIA claims to have contacts with about 7 200 organizations and businesses as well as about 60,000 sources of information as a result of its overt activities for this purpose, CIA estimates it is reaching only 15 per cent of the fcreign intelligence information aVailable in this country. The question we must consider here is whether the FBI should take over the overt collection of foreign intelligence in the United states , tnerepy Jakitg CIA operaticril only in areas outside the limits of FBI S jurisdiction_ In this connection, the following would have to be considered: (a) Reporting: The Bureau is 2 fact-finding agency which has traditionally gathered evidence and presented its findings ithout bias or conclusions This would not change _ Intelligence developed by the FBI would be evaluated by the users in the intelligence community _ Ouz report writing format might have to be geared to the needs and established procedures of the United States inielligence community. (b) Coordination With Other Government Agencies: Foreign intelligence is 2 commodity produced for vthe penefit of"many: separate agencies- Of-the,United: States "" Government_ Because 0f this if the Bureau were to have fuli-responsibility for the; ovext collection 0f foreign intelligence in this country } we would have to" greatly expand our liaison services not only for dissemination purposes but to; assure that we are kept fully informed Regarding_4ll_matters_deeling. Vith intelligence Priozities 77 - _NW-88608 Docld33289629_"page 7u9 ================================================== Page 250 ================================================== Our role in preparation 0f National Intelligence Estimates would bc more active 25 a result 0f our increascd contribution under this: progran It might be necessary to utilize the assistance of highly trained personnel of other agoncios to assist us poriodically o inrezviews decling With complicated military or scientific matters. (c) Hanpowez: While no manpower requirements can be presently estimated should we assune full responsibility for overt foreign intelligence collection, CIA is currently using approximately employees throughout the United States to interview individuals in connection with its overt intelligence ga thering activities 1 and is reaching What it estimates to be only 15 per cent 0f available foreign intelligence infornation. These CIA employees do noz include personnel required at CIA Headquarters to correlate evaluate and disseninate the data gathered in the field _ Fe woula want to more effectively exploit this intelligence potential_ To merely handle the necessary review of the vast number of foreign language publications vould require many additional employees proficient in foreign languages and with backgrounds in scientific or technical fields (d) Selection and Training 0f Personnel: To assune full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign intelligence in this country, voula require tbat Fle vastly broaden our selection and training procedures_ We would require applicants with degrees in the sciences , languages history, government and economics _ Our basic training and In-Service agenda would have to be geared to meet our new responsibilities_ We would undoubtedly desire to utilize the services 0f outstanding lecturers from the agencies constituting our intelligence community, and in turn we would wish to afford our personnel training at the Mar Colleges operated by the Departnent of Defense } and from time to time Zurnish them the opportunity 0f specialized training and briezings provided by tbe members 0f the U . S , Intelligence Board 78 4 Nicebgla-Docl32989629 250 Page ================================================== Page 251 ================================================== (e) Legislation: CIA currently has the duty to correlate and evaluate intelligencc rclating to che national security and to provido for appropriate dissemination 0f such intelligencc Witnin the Governmlent _ This is set out in Title 50 , USC Section 403a The overt collection of forcign intollifence is not the subjoct of legislation bu% raiher 0f National Security Council Intolligence Directives whicn would have to be revised in order to give the Bureau this authority now lodgcd with CIA_ (f) Organizational_Changes: To carry out a progran comnitting the Bureau to the full responsibility for the overt collecting of foreign intelligence in this country would necessitate a substantial increase to the hezdquarters staffs of the Domestic Intelli- gence Division and the Laboratory Divison, as well to the_ personnel assigned to the New York and Mashington Field Offices where diplomatic establishnezts and international organizations ere m?iniy Tocated In all probability the creation Of a new division a t the Sea 0f Goveraient devoted entirely to overt collection responsibilities, would be required (g) Observations: The nany responsibilities that would be ours under 2 program naking the Bireau accountable for the overt collection 0f all foreign intelligezce in this country would (1) require an enormous increase in our owR personnel, trained in nany specialized fielas, or (2) the delegation of varied intelligence functions to other governmental agencies and close supervision 0f such agencies to insure efficient execution of the tasks levied upon them These overt collection responsibilities would undoubtedly be subject to the scrutiny 0f many sources , some 0f them hostile ana we would bave to face the charges, unjust though they night be that the Bureau had ceased to perform the duties 2or. Fbicn it Was originally created and had developed into 2 gigantic bureaucratic octopus 2 , Clandestine Gethering Act::ities There are no statutory provisions for the clandestine gathering 0f foreign intelligence in the United States. We have inr the' past produced substantial: foreign intelligence whbile carrying out our present responsibilities _ CIA established its Donestic Operations Division (DOD) in 1963 and began *o clandestinely gather fozeign intolligence in this colntry. It ROw nas field officos wl th approximatoly L 79 NW 88608_Docld: 32989629 251_ Page ================================================== Page 252 ================================================== intelligence officcrs assigned to these matters _ It is anticpated that DOD ' s efforts will become more eztensive- CIA estintcs thero aro approrimatoly 10,000 employeos and depondents assigzed to the diplozatic establishments and international organizations represented in this country by approxinately 120 foreign natsors It can rcndily bo 6c0n that wO woula havo to cstablish prsorities and well-defined objectives in order t0 cope ' effectively T7ith the problem presented by the vast number of persors and establishments which could be considered for clardestine coverage Today there are approrimately 40 nations in addition to the Soviet-bloc countries, whose establishnents in this country we consider "target" countries foc tne purpose of developing live sources therein_ In the absence 0f more precise criteria, Our initial efforts in 2 program designed to ezpand our clandestine gathering 02 foreign intelligence, coula be directed against these "target" nations (a) Objectives ; Under a prograr confined to the clandestine gathering 0f foreign intelligence in this country , and consistent with the intelligezce needs 0f this (Goverument , we woula have as our objectives: (1) Increasing substantially the number of live sources of high quality in diplomatic establishments , trade missions consilar offices or international organizations iocated Within the United States; (2) Expanding our pesent technical and microphone coverage in such establishnents_ (This material, wh i ch 18 @ peduliarlj sensitive foreign intelligence opetation, will be covered in a briefing to be arranged by the Counsel t0 the President. 80 TW 88608 Docld:32989629 252 Page ================================================== Page 253 ================================================== (b) Observations: While 3 program limited_ to the clandestine gathering 0f foroign intelligonco would roquire 2 substantial increaso in manpower ) both in the field and a t the Bureau' S headquarters , as well as a0 expansion 0_ our personnel selection and training procedures our liaison responsibilities and our filing_ and data processing facilities however; in none 0f these phases would the increase be nearly as great as that which would be required should we assume full responsibility for the overt gathering of such foreign intelligence 4 81 3 Ni 88608Docl32989629"Page 253 ================================================== Page 254 ================================================== J, GENERAL FINDINGS The study conducted by the Committee has produced the following Signizicant findings: '(1) There definitely is 2 vast potential for collection 0f foreign intelligence in the U, S. available through overt and clandestino channols_ Even 1ith the available capabilities of existing agencies, there is 2 large resorvoir 0f untapped sources , (2) CIA has been authorized by statute and implementing directives to collect foreign intelligence in tha U , S , through overt methods and has been involved in such collection since the 'establishment 0f the Agency . This includes reviem of foreign language press and interviews vith selected individuals such as American businessmen aliens , and students_ In addition, CIA nas estabiished an elaborate systen 0z processing, storing, evaluating , and disseninating tbis informationo (3) Such overt collection by CIA does not present any threat Or infringenent on IBI jurisdiction or operations_ 0 The present Bureau controls for such / CIA activity are satiszactory: (4) We coxcluded that it would be highly undesirable for the Bureau to become responsible for overt collection 0z Zoreign intelligence in the U_ S_ The necessary reorganization, expansion of facilities end manpower 9 and beavy task 0f information colleccion and processing could place 4 damaging buraen on the Bureau, (5) There has never been-any statutory ox Sinilar provision for the clandestine development by CIA 0f foreign intelligence in the United States . ~Tnere are instamces- There the FBI-has. received specific assignnents which encompassed foreign intelligence collection in the; United States (SIS operations covering entire' Western Heaisphere in Toria Tar II; present operations concerning Dominican Republic) There is no statute .Or directive which assigrs or confirms 9xclusive;FBl,iurisgictior 1n clandestine aevelopment 82 Gr N88608 ' (ocld:32989629 Page 254 ================================================== Page 255 ================================================== of foreign intelligence in the United States . As a result of our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have produced 2 volume of foreign intelligence covertly. In addition 2 either at tho speclfic request 0f other U_ S . agencies or on our own initiative in response to national intelligence needs we have produced such intelligence_ We have dono this on 2 selcctivo basis and have not assumcd full responsibility in this area 0 As indicative Qf this certain agreements have been made with CIA pernitting that Agency to assess and recruit after coordination with the FBI covert foreign intelligence sources in the United States (principally for use abroad) We have reserved the right to take over such sources if internal security factors are paramount , In the absence 0f such factors 9 CIA is permitted to utilize these sources for foreign intelligence purposes , (6) We concluded that the expanded development 0f clandestine foreign intelligence sources is essencial 1f national security interests are to be effectively served, (7) Erploitation 0f foreign diplomatic targeta fortifies our efforts in the internal security and counterintelligence fields 0 Information developed increases over-all knowledge and produces leads or tie8 to intelligence activity being carried out by foreiga intelligence 2nd security services , (8) The U . S , intelligence community currently does not provide an organization or 2 mechanism which can effectively exploit the intelligence porential in the foreign diplomatic field Ther have been expressions of concern and certain linited action taken by IBI end CIA , but there has not been 2 well-organized Or united effort and most important f there has been a decided lack of leader - ship directed tovard attacking the problen and at the Sare time inducing 2n atmosphere of narmonious application 81 a11 avallabie resources; (9) Te 'concluded there 1€ an excellent opportunity iox the Bureau to asume leadership in this matter and in So doing, enhence dational Security and L 83 NW-88608_Doeld:32989629_Page 255 2119 ================================================== Page 256 ================================================== tho: capabilities ci tW0 307*(iv:} + The time has arrived #or u3 to.#dopt ara irztonane 0 nOM concept toward foreign intelligenco Cclicc%fon It vould be sunwise 4f tpe: Bureat did 396 mcvr 10t0 3 leading role and instead applied peldy "214 temNcs conforming witb 3 "holding actiona ~fnlz, #0 olri opinion, 18 not consistent with tic "2c3111t20.01 & progressive and bEorwart LocirdEs 0r;mic0tiozt {10) Tio Zircar Guns7 bavo talent and capabizity-to ZsSu0 3 ro3c cc*ive role in clandestine coilection-or" foreig intciisseace= We have the potential to #andle clandestinq collection 0f foreign intelligence in the tT. Se in 2' more effective {anner thap any dtber agercy<' Zhis Ca5L be ` done in 2 constructive and pruaent manner T (i11). It 06 roccgzi that a new approach by the Bureau "ill involve opescrionel risks: , If one 18 to progress: he aust take rtct-s Tte feel that wa hava- tb0 Capabisity "to; spccccd-wizh 4 mininum Of losses 31 debits_ 6 02) Te fecl, tna: if Ive do not adopt a new Pole, characterized Vith en ZGgressive approach, a door 15 Jeft: open: Zor: othes ~Zeicies such 'as CIA to pzogressively introducc Pross2is 'desighed to fi11 tho vacuum CIA:' Cuz1" 'entzy coes not. have the .capability t0 intect 3 rapid "tilezover" Of operational areas To dq-eeel that Such;Voizacbs accelerated not by CIA '8 btrength, Dut" by our weeknesses, (13). CIA 18 progressively expanding its 0 bjectives and ceiabilitics to conduct clandestine iuteiligence Operitic36 12 the UJ . S_ This presentg 2 potenziai for areis 01 ccnzlict:betieen CIA and FBI. 624) Fie definitely "must dezine Our role in tbe #ieid,01 ciandestine foreign intelligence collection So; t S1Zey ard chdentives Are clear-cut_ 0 Not oly Ouj 012r; Sonnol bur other agencies including CIA Sboula Jaom e7ar ; Pibere ftsnd- {(15) CI# Czp be' 'cermitted to develop elapdestane: Scurce: Qixgcreigu intelligence under the 'NW88608"Tocid:32989629 256 Zei VEes. Page ================================================== Page 257 ================================================== established ground rules Which do protect Bureau interests_ A new epproach being recommended would beavily deter CIA fron eztensive developnent of clandestine sources and would really leavo the Agency i0 2 mixor Or subordinato roleo 85 NI-88608-Doci 32989629 Page 25J7 ================================================== Page 258 ================================================== K RECOMMCNDED PLAN Or ACTION A penetrative and objective study 0f the Bureau' S position has led uS +0 conclude that the Bureau should play 2 nuch moro active and influontial role in the clandestine collection of positiveintelligence in tho United States_ Me are recommending the implementation 0z 2 plan which wili lead to a valuablo eontribution "co our national security effort and concurrently Vill improve our internal security capabilities_ This plan presents concept of an TBI 25 an Agency primarily responsible for internal security, but supplenenting its coverage witn 2 substantially expanded capability in the clandestine collec- tion 0f positive intelligence . Me believe that Ve have the capability 0f developing tnis new look knoving 'that at the same time W/G can institute 8 badly needed leadership to elininate 2 g2p in the acquirement 02 high-quality intelli- gence in the United States The main {eatures of this plen ar0: 1) Establishment 0f 2 list of foreign diplomatic targets consistent with the needs of the Government 2) Expansion 0f our techiical surveillance capabilities with emphasis on misur? . 3) Expansion 0f live sources characterized with selectivity and high-quality value. 4) The FBI assuning a role 0f leadership In the clandestice exploita ion 0f positive intelligence in the U_ S _ and in So doing naking maximum use 0f the talent and capabilities of other appropriate U_ 8 _ Agencies . Authorization The plan would be implemented under proper executive authorization (Presidential) and furthermore would be coordi- nated With the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) A letter Irom the President authorizing the Bureau to expand its capabilities in clandestine positive intelligence collec- tion consistent with the needs 0z the governnent 9 would Sufzice_ In order to avoid any nisunderstanding or confusion within the intelligence comnunity; USIB would be epprised of the Presidential autborization Tbe letter fron the President mould not require any details regarding the na ture and the scope 0z the action to be taken by the Bureau but could be 86 e NI-88608_Docld: 32989629 Page 258 ================================================== Page 259 ================================================== expressed in general terms This sam0 authorization could be further defined by the Presidont 8 Foreign Intelligence Advisozy Board. It 1s realized that it woula be necocsary to discuss this plen with the President 8o that he %ully under- stood the purpose, Scope and the controlling Zeatures, Tith his epproval 2 the plap could also be discussed with tho foreign Intelligence Advlsory Board_ Selection of Targets Priority on targets can be established, by appli- cation 0z the following criteria: 1) Review 0f requests or requirement8 levied on us the President and 'U. S _ Intelligerce Agencies . 2} Review o2 priority listed by the USIB _ (This 16 done O2 a regular basis.) 3} Gux otn cza Zjzic en4 eveluation 0r international political developrents This primarily will be done at SCG, but we should be S0 organized that the field would ba Zree to subult recommendations . As of March 1966, tbe following coula be set forth 2s 4 tentative list of priority targets in tbe United States: 1) USSR 2 , Indications 02 significant changes ip Soviet policies, particularly with respect to-relations with the Mlest ana with Communist China p Background information illuninating tbe decisiors OI the 23rd Perty Congress 9 especially indications 02 policy disputes Or politicl rivalries; repercussions_ in othez Connunist perties. C _ Developnents in Soviet space progrars 10 the rake of Luna 9_ 2) Vietnan/1aos/Cembodia 2 Chinese Conruzist, Soviet and North Viete cames@ cspebilities, intentions, and actions with respect ta Vietnan/Laos 2nd t0 US activiziez 13 tbe arez . 87 49 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 259 by ' ================================================== Page 260 ================================================== b Indications 0z Soviet deployment of Surface-to- suryace missiles to North Vietnan _ C . Changes in the ettitudes and policies of influential South Vietnanese , especially Buddnist leaders, toward tho War Gfiort or tho US 0 d. Indications of & najor change in Viet Corg/PAVN and Pathe: Lao military capabilities end tacticb. Information pertaining to the location, size, and types 02 Chinese troop units in Indochina f Evidence of Viet Cong/PAVN/Chinese , Communist uae 0f Canbodia as 2 sanctuary 9 operating base, or source 02' supply; Cambodian Government attitudes toward suchb uses _ 3) Comnunist Cbina 8 _ Military 2 logistic, transportation, and economic information becring on Connunist China 8 capability to fight 2 ~ar in Southeast Asia and indications 0f Chinese intentios ~iccocting dizcct involvement in this are7 p Kovements 0f Chinese submarines out of their normal bases or operating areas, particularly toward the South Chiza Sea and the Culf of Tonkin. Increased air dezense capability, percicularly production and deployaent 0f advanced fighter/interceptor aircraft. d Military activities in other border areas, 4) Zrance a , French foreign policy 9 especially concerning NATO , the USSR , the Fiar in Vietnaw/iaos and estrangement or com~ Petition with tbe US _ 5) The Bninican Republic 2 . The character $ strergth, influence and potential 0f the contending parties &nd 'Zactions; their capabilities and intentions to' coaduct coups or insurrectionist activities; their attitudes toward the June elections; capbilities: 02 the Provisiomal Covernaenk to miintain control_ 88 =NW88608_Deeld:32989629Page 260 ================================================== Page 261 ================================================== 6) India-Pakistan 2 , Developments in Indo-Pakis tanl relationg and attitudes toward the US , the USSR and Communist China . 7) Latin America 2 Evidenco 0r incresed external Communist aceietanco to insurgency movements in Latin America in the wake 0z the January conferences in Havana _ 0 8) Indonesia end Malaysia/Singapore 2 Political ains 6f the Indonesian military; Surarno health and political intentions and capabilities; moves to rebuild 2 Communist party . b Indoresian intentions to continue or reduco the conflict witb Malaysia, C_ Changes ia Soviet or Chinese policy toward Indonegia resulting from the current internal conflict, 9) Thailand and Buzaa 2 Communist Subversive ectivity and external support; governnent capabilities to oppose subversion_ 10) Africa a _ African an& Conmunist support ro Southern Rhodesian black nationalists; nationalist capabilities to act against the Srlitb regine; White opposition *o the Smith regime; South Africen and Portuguese assistance to the Smith regine. b. Effect 0z recent coups On the stability 0f other African stetes. 11) Yenen a _ Evidence 0z intentions and ections 0f tho UAR and Saudi Arabia Fith espect to the Yemeni situation_ LD 89 NW 88608-Docld: 32989629 261 '8 Page ================================================== Page 262 ================================================== Technical Surveillance of Targets Coverage in this field will be divided into the folloning' categories: 1) Technical Surveillances 2) Microphone Surveillances 3) More Sophisticated electzonic monitoriig, 1.@. code machines At the present time we are bandling 2 very limited number of installations With ezisting capbilities, WG could virtually double our present technical coverage Once we have established reasonable pribrity listing it is believed we should systenatically expand our operations. In this connection, the folloving Should be borne in mind; 1) Heavy empbasis should be placed on microphone surveillances 2) Today we ere placing greater stress on coverage of official establishents The hev program asks for an expension 0f coverage Ox individuals and/or residences 0f iadividuals Here again selectivity will bo a dominating characteristic, 3) The progran Should be so flexible that we would be able to deactivate any installation for security reasons or for non-productivity and whenever possible enploy techniques which would permit easy reactivation 4) Ezcept for current intelligence requiring immediate dissemination, the product should be handled a3 communications intelligence and dissemination would be subjected t0 well-established Comint controls 0f the National Security Agency (NS4) plus any 2ddicional restric- tions the Bureau felt should be imposed. 5) The product ould be transmitted to NSA by us for dissemination within the intelligence community . NSA vould be responsible for handling any needed translation We must recognize that tbe program wiil produce voluminous information and the responsibility for processing the data Should be fized Tith 2n egency which 1s organized end equipped t0 handle the job_ It is believed that if the Bureau essued this respons: bility we would be burdened. 1ith 2 gigantic task of information processing to the point thet this element vould adversely effect other phases 0f the progran _ 90 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 262 Page ================================================== Page 263 ================================================== 6) If the infozation collected by us suggested" 2 potential for the dovelopnent o2 an operation, 1.0_ double agent , the Burezu could assune conplete control 0f this Opcration including tho dissenination 0f tno Informatioa 7) Ouz involvezent in the "sophisticated" catesory Shoula po inc-eezod by expanded rescarch ard developnent bocring ir mind we should be utilizing tbe most procuctive eqipmert 2vzilcble- The importance 0z this field cznmot ba exaggerated in light 0f tae repid Geveloprents in the scieztific Forld_ Technic:l Surveillerce Controle Under this plan we could furnish tho President and the Attorney Cezeral 2 liscing 02 technical surveillcnce targets and do So Ori 2 periodic besis_ This could even include 2n anxual evcluazion 0r the progrem _ (Thi8 moteriol, wh i ch i8 a peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence will be covered in a brtefing t0 be arranged by the ReeCotigei to the President) Live Sources The category 0z "live sources" Fhen broadly irter- preted Ixcludes every indivicual fron the cisual contect to the controlled iaforziit Iio 18 delivering high quality infortiation at 2n obvicus risk Ar the present tine, our sources in diplozctic egicblishnente ar0 for the rost pert Arericzn citizens . This sitietion 'i8 largely due" to' a2 uedesi-eble crrengezent.Wnere Txe Fust 2irS€, Obiain cleazezce fr03 the Stcte Jepcrtmert before Te" prozeed to recruit 23y erployee or ozficialf of # diplonatic eStablishzert: This pleces State in the "Griver'8 8e3t" a2d that Depcrtncnt tberezoze, 18 prccticc_ly cozizolli?z 0u37 ezf0-iC , Te 28e1 thatysucb;en errangement_ i8 certainly rot;co cucive to 91 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 263 ================================================== Page 264 ================================================== producing the best results In our opinion this can be reaoved by the President S advisirg the Sacretary 0f State that the FBI is boing authorized to develop penetrations in foreign diplonatic establishmonts without obtaining cleatanccs irom State It rould be understooa that the Burezu Fould proceed in 2 discreet and secure manner Periodic coniact with the Secretary of Stato or other top Stote officisls to discuss gonornl dovolopments and any potertial problens will provide 2 mechanism for healthy coordiration vith State Me recognize that 2 source can turn "sourt 2nd, thererore, there is tbe danger 02 potential enbarrassment However , 1t should pe noted that our record in this regard has been outgtanding over the years Any efficient investigative agency needs sources 0f all categories and we are n0 exception. Therefore, wa should continue our present program 0f general sourca developent 9 and this mould include contacts Vbo Can produce information on 22 occasional basis or Fho ~night be in 4 position to be Of assistance in & particular investigation_ In diplonatic establishents the reception clerk, chauffeur, the maid, can always be 01 assistance Hopever , the prirary emphasis oz this ne1 progtam would be directed toward bigh quality sources , such as: Code clerks 2) Officials Tho bave access to Iiles, records, or comunications 3) Officials or employees Fho are 1n" a position to penetrate comnunist_bloc circles or establishnents 4) Hembers of Zoreign intelligence and security services _ Our existing prograus 0f seeking penetrations in comnunist_bloc installations naturally must continue but mill require an increased ezfort toward production 0f- information relating t0 personality data, and this Sboula 'pe" done On 2 Larger humber of' imdivicual targets: 'We realize that Bloc persojnel does_liye id 2 foirly insulated morld, end elenentary investigetive techniques do rot producd voluminous and bighly significent data _ It is therezore believed tbat Our techniques Should become nore Sophisticates thzough additional coverage oa tbe residerces oz indivicuals 92 2F NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 264 ================================================== Page 265 ================================================== Such efforts naturally fal1 in line with ouf internal security responsibilities, but the coverage may also provide leads for development 0z sources in the positive intelligence field_ Every Soviet 1s not 2 member 0z XGB or GRU , but ha novorthelecs could orfer Information 0z value, and he could be most useful on 2 long-range basis . Our program very definitely Should have this losophy in mind, 3nd it is an elenent which must bo impressed upon our personnel in our training programs In this regard, we must recognize that a t some point lt may becom@ necessary to turn over reczuited sources Io another agency such eS CIA or one 0f the military services_ Such turnover Will, of course, depend on the circumstaces The guiding principle should be the preservation 0z the source under tbe best security. In the non-communist bloc field we mould con- centrate on development of high-quality sources to meet the priority needs 0f the Government Training 0 Personnel At the present tine, our personnel are not properly_ oriented to effectively engage in 2 program 28 recommended. To accommodate to a 3ew epproach , it will be necessary to: 1) Include in our training classes lectures which will cover 2 more detailed picture Of U. S. intelligence, its history,, definition Of terms , functions 02 intelligence agencies. 2) Include lectures regarding the %oreign intel- ligence needs 0f the U_ S . Governnentc 3) Use outstanding officials of other agencies to lecture on special intelligence matters. Tbis would include tbe critical ereas throughout the world_ Disseminate 2 bulletin to ` the field on 4 regular basis to. emphagize foreign intelligence needs as they relate to Gur capabilities_ 5) Irstitute 2 special In-Service class (once or twice per year) which wiil concentrate oz foreign intelligence: 77/? This will be idegigked*to: develop tbe: Zeaders: or the specialiste in the field. 93" & Ni-88608_Deeld Page-265 phi ================================================== Page 266 ================================================== 6) Arrenge for attendance 0f selected Bureau personnel to schools oz other agencies such 2s State Department , and tbe military services_ 7) Arrange for attendance 0f selected porsonnel at Wer Colleges_ 8) Expand the treining 02 Agents in the handline 0i technical surveillence inctallations, Reporting Procedures This program Will not require any basic departure from Our present reporting procedures_ The Bureau shoula not become involved i2 evaluating 2 estinating, etc We should endeavor to adhere to Ouf traditional position of reporting the facts 2s collected. He nay wish to give consideration to adding one feature to our regular reporting On individuals _ This could be an annex for "Personality Data M1 The objective vould be to maintain an up-to-date book on everything collected relating to the subject'8 chcrzcter, habits, fanjly Jite: interests: weakeesses, etc. C Language_Cepabilities An expanded program for collection 0f foreign intelligence would require increased capability to handle foreign languages _ As explained ebove, the material collected tbrough technical surveillances should be handled 85 connunications intelligence, and the major translating responsibility Fould, therefore, be placed on NSA 0 We hovever , recognize that it is necessary to maintain 2 strong foreign language capability in the field wherever it may be useful to develop live Sources In offices such 25 New cork City and Washington, D we Should expand the number 0f Agents who are fluenc in French, Russian, Zolish, Czech , Gernan, Chinese; and Spanish An office vhicn is" vell equipped With 2 capebility i2 the foregoing 1s generally able to handle most Situetions Which arise. 94 0 NW 88608_Docld 32989029-Page266 CIA, do , C., ================================================== Page 267 ================================================== Relations with Other Agencies If this program is adopted, other intelligence agencies Would be oificially apprised o2 the Presidential authority grented to the FBI +0 collect foreign intelligence in the United States . Other agencies mould be informed regarding tho naturo aed tho cxtont 0f the authority bcing delegated to the Bureau It would be necessary to make clear that the Bureau Was not assuming responsibility for the clandestine collection 0f 2ll foreign intelligence in the United States, but we were taking a constructive step in an effort to increase the production 0f foreign incel- ligence through assets svailable to uS Te would clearly point out that the FBI was not taking this approach 2s a solutlon to 211 0f the problems relating t0 foreign intel- ligence collection in this country. We would emphasize that Te would move ~gainst targets in line vith established priorities end that we would do So 02 2 selective basis_ e would have it understood thet operational activities would be properly coordinated wherever it was obviously necessary _ Hith regard to the handling of the product 0f technical surveillances, it Fould be necessary to effect a working egreenent With NSA _ 0 To do this Fe might be obliged to discuss this at the USIB level So that NSA could obtain the required authority to support tbe biring of additional personnel and purchese of equipment for the processing of our product _ Ou errangenent With NSA would include ground rules for processing, translation, and classification end dissemination _ Since any announcement that we were in the foreign intelligence field would prompt unusual interest and very likely queries, we shoula brier CIA regarding the objectives of our program Our plan Vill not abrogate the existing ground rules which permit CIA to assess and recruit positive intelligence sources in this country under certain conditions. Since both Agencies will have foreign intelligence sources in tche U.8 2 we uncoubtedly will find it useful t0 work out an egreement whereby ore Agency kncws that the other has coverage in a particular arez or establishent He already receive the identities: 0f CIA sources _ It would not be necessary for us t0 identizy our sources , but we could 3 indicate to CIA:that FA had an asset-in 2 particuler_ area 95 Ni_88608_ DocId:32989629-Page 26Z ================================================== Page 268 ================================================== This vould permlt CIA to levy requirenents on us _ For example, if we recruited the Third Secretary 0i the French Embassy, CIA might wish to ask any nuber of questions dealing with the French political situation. If wo folt that the request W2s roasonable, we could handle this through our source' It 5ill be noted that tko proram doos not prcclude CIA Irom development of foreign intelligence sources in the U. 8 _ fo1 fulfillent of CIA reSponsibilities_ 0 CIA will continue to operate urder exlsting ground rules which ar0 designed to protect Bureau interests_ We believe that if the program 1s implemented and jells we vill be in a position to "spot" sources required by CIA and other agencies to discharge their responsibilities_ This would apply %o cases where the target was in the. U_ S , for a visit or if he had some Specialized knowledge noz related to our internal security responsibilities _ These vould be targets which other agencies could handle without interfering with our operations and Without making us carry 2 Zoad for another agency This particular concept should include 2 Burezu attitude that any and every source handled by anowher- agency in ine C U. 8_ potentially ca . be useful to us We should have 22 outlook that a11 sources should be exploited to the fullest extent and under secuze conditions. If another agency has 2 capability to open 2 door we should take advantage of the situation_ In those instances where CIA has 2 source in the United States, we should that agency *o seek information 0f interest to the Bureau , and where obviously necessary WG should arrange aCcess t0 the CIA source The important feature 0f this nem concept is that we assune the role of projecting initiative, leadership and aggressiveness _ Our position Should be such that me push the other agencies to use their resources even to the point 0f heal irritation. We heve looked at CIA as the "other agency" in this picture, but we should not neglect. the potential 0z agencies such 2s ACSI 9 Air Force, ONI and State_ A11 02 them have entree xo diplomatic cizcles _ The day-to-day contects which ozficials of these agencies have with personnel 01 foreign governments produce many "pieces" 02 personality data which, mhen added up ovor 2 period of .time, 96 NW-88608 'Docid:32989629 Page 268 prod thy ================================================== Page 269 ================================================== can prove to be extrenely useful. Me should 'conzer with these agencies regarding Fays and means oz recruiting sources either to be handled by uS jointly or by one of the intelligence agencies _ Here again, the Buroau can bo tho dominant and pushing sourco. It is believed that 1f ve moved along the lines described above , tne Bureau over 3 poriod of time, vould have collected valuable information regarding numerous personalities and the inner workings of the many diplomatic establishents The ecquirement of data 0f this type creates operztional strength It places US in a position to exploit the developnent of ner7 sources , bearing in mind that in planning our epproaches we vill be equipped with amunition not gained through casual surveillances and observations With the krowledge that WE gain, we can high quality operations It is interesting to note that during the past two years the information received from} CIA S souzces in the Unitea States hzs been fairly voluinous and very definitely valuable It is 2 good illustration of the Bureeu s gaining useful data from another agency with 2 minimum of Bureau expense and effort, but 50j17 maintaining very effective control 0f our juris- @ dictional rights _ Undoubtedly related to the utilization 0z other agencies resources is the considerably vast potential offered by friendly foreign security services _ If the services of Creat Britain Gerneny 2 France, Holland 9 Italy , Australia and Canada provided uS information collected in Washington, D_ C_ and" New York resulting from contacts With communist_bloc officials 8 we would have another valuable source or inforzation We Should bear in mind that we do spend hundreds and thousands 0z man-hours Seeking Such information through other difficult channels _ We Should utilize the friendly liaison services along the lines described above _ Administrative_Reorganization The presert 2 anipisirative franerork ,at the Seat 0z Governnent .and in;the field- would not be adequate:to implement 'the recomi_ended progren_ Placing the additional load on ur existing. supervisory structure of course, 97 NW 88608."Docld:32989629 269 plan 18, Page ================================================== Page 270 ================================================== out` of the question _ Me definitely would require gn increase in supervisory personnel in the Domestic Intelligence Division In addition, there vould be a need for more manpower in our Laboratory to handle expansion in tho technical "surveillance field. There would be 8 need foc additional personnel t0 be assigned for the development of live sources in the field. It wouId bo necessary %o have Ziold perconnellassiynod to techbical surveillance installations on 2 continued basis and, 0f course there would be 2 need for support related to such activities 25 prelininary securicy surveys _ It is utside the scope of this Committee' s conpetency to outline any specific aGinistrative rer organization and propose wha k personnel, equipment and facilities Fould be needed _ Te Reel that this 0uld be best hanaled only after the objectives 0f the program are approved. At that point, officials fron the Seat Oi Government and the field could meet to map out the necessary reorganization _ The extent 0f reorganization will hinge on our decision 2s to the pace we should set_ Wle recommend that we proceed 2t a steady , even pace, making certain that we lay solid groundwork for 213 oz our activity_ We should refrain from becoming involved in 2 "crash" progran unless C national security interests obviously warrant such an approach In connection with any planning for reorganization, it would be unwise to proceed [ithout first obtaining 2 reliable inventory of our current resources Such an inventory would encompass the following: (i) The number 0f Agents currently assigned to Strictly positive intel- ligence collection; (2) Our foreign language capabilities; (3) Our current sources. and informants with 2n Objective assessnent of capabilities; (4) Number 0f supervisors at the Seat 0f Government currently handling positive intel- ligence matters_ In connection With any plans for reorganization, we should Rot Reglect t0 give consideratiOr to the problems Wiicn we Will-eneounter es time"goes ox in the areas of inzormation Storage and retrieval_ therefore, should realize that ij-moula be upwise to: exclude research Qr Study regarding the computeriziig of information_ NW 88608 . Docid.32989629.Page 270 We, ================================================== Page 271 ================================================== L. ALTERNATIVES In addition to the recommended plan set forth in preceeding sections there aro several alternative courses of.action we might take: 1 We could take the position, and seek ways to implenent it, that the entire field of foreign intelligence collection in the U . both overt and covert, shoula bo handled by tho IBI Such an acroso-tho-board approach wculd exclude CIA and other U_ S. agencies from foreign intelligence collection in this country and would place exclusive responsibility and jurisdiction in this field on the FBI. As indicated in Section 1, this would require a revamping of. existing legislation and directives and would necessitate drastic changes in the Bureau S operations, including major increases_in personnel end costs and a substantial expension in our recruitment and training programs 2 and other reorganiza- tion We do not feel this approach is warranted nor ao_ we believe it would be 4 practical and sound one. 2. We could recommend that CIA continue to be responsible for overt collection 0z foreign intelligence in this country but thaz the FBI exclusively handle covert Zoreiz iztcllizcnce collection. This has several Obvious drawbacks _ First, we would be assuning 2 wide range of heavy and fixed respons_bilities which in many cases would be completely divorced from the Bureau'S internal security and counterintelligence interests . Second 9 we would becone to a large extent 6 service group for other U, S _ agencies and departments (including State the military and others) in the handling Oi a host of foreign intelligence requirements levied by other agencies This voula involve 2 considerable commitment of manpover , communication costs, etc. on the part 0f the Buzeau_ In addition 9 such an approach would necessitate Significant changes in our recruitment and training procedures and Fould also place on ouf shoulders 2 definite accountability in connection With any failures in U. S_ intelligence foreign "collection It is not elieved that this approach is_ as sound or desirable aS our recommended of action: nanely tbat we expand our foreign intelligence collection efforts but on .a selective basis end Without_our . assuming full responsibility: 99 NW 88608_Docld:32989629 271 S., CIA , plan Page ================================================== Page 272 ================================================== 3 , Te cou_ cndczvor to work out 2 Lsion of responsibility :nd wozk in this irc2 whercby thc Bureau and CIA Fould ezch nave ccrtjin primary arers 0f operation. Forcxanple, tne FBI could make krOwn its Villingncss to contribute Zoie heavily in support 0f U. S. forcign intelligcnce collcction effozts and pzopose this ficld be brokren into two ccregories; nanely, technical coverage (this mould include and live infcrrant developient cmorf foroicn diplozatz_ Mc couid proposo that tho IBI conkiuuo to ope-aic exclusively i2 tha {irst category (Icechnical covoraee) Vith CIA ccniizuing to stay entirely out 0z this Riola. In tmis regard, the Burezu is better equipped than CIA *0 nardle technical surveillances 27d operatiors by #cason 0z ouz long experience ana expertise in this arez. With regczd t0 %he second category (live sources) we could propose tiat CIA conduct no operations involving countries weere the Burezu 8 counterintelligence interests ar0 perercunt Or significcn*_ This Fould include the Sino- Soviet_bloc cointries 2n2 ccuid aiso include certain other countries, suck 2s the Bozinican Republic, where Te have already develozed strong cepabilities Or wnere there are unique f2ctors_ With regerd to otrer countries {uuf-3iuc) , ii6 'could propcse tkzt CIA sbouid essuno primary responsibility for develozizg iive diplozctic sou:ces However , this vould b2 with tbe clear proviso thzt, in the event the FBI Should develop signizicant inter al Security interests, TiC woula have the prerogetive 0f levying requirenents 0m CIA sources , havirg dizect 2ccess t0 CIA sources when needed, Or aS 2 fimal step, developing ou: O1n sources if CIA could not satisify our needs _ This dternative plan Fould not involve 25 much manpower Or othez experse *o the Bureau 2s ur recomlerded plan_ Kowever it would iovolve our approval of CZA operz- tions in the iive inforzant field a2& Iould risk CIA infrizg- ing on 73I interests_ It is our consensus that this approach not be adopted. 4} ~Me "could"recozmend hat the IBI could Trithdraw: entirely f302 ine field 0z covert €o3eig intEligezce collectio? allowing: CIA to Qandle alz 3spects, including and both live a2c iechzicci coverege: We ar8 stzongly opposed to such 22 epproach 0n the grounds that it would dastic2lly Gi_i_is2 012 73788 3312 12 tr2 iz8elligC2c2 communityy; would. give.CiA carte blancke #0 operate in tbe U _ S_ :ad :0 6zy iiStcmces Iould Ceztainly zesuiz i6 'CIAs comprozisin? Oi irterzel Socurity &zd ccunierintelligezcc oporations. 100 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 272 '1 ================================================== Page 273 ================================================== 5 _ Finally, ve could take no action to change the current situation and, in effect , 2dopt 2 "status quo" approach. Me are opposed io tnis As indicated in this study , U_ S. Government needs for foreign intelligence are groving on 2n alnost deily basis and CIA has made definite efforts to move more actively into this Iicld_ If we were to adopt a "status quo" attitude, it is only 2 question of time until this matter cOMes to 2 head; for example, in the U . S . Intelligence Boara or the Prcsident ' 8 Foreign Intolligenco Advisory Boara _ If and when this occurs the decision as %o the TBI'8 role would, of course, be subject to the thinking end aims of people outside the possibly including individual8 who are not sympathetic to Our views _ We would not be in a position t0 maintain control 0f developente 101 w NW 88608 Docld:37989629-Page Z73 FBI , ================================================== Page 274 ================================================== 1s |98 - [0/k3 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 274 ================================================== Page 275 ================================================== Copy ident ifying ezcised material (taw esty 2/2 $hns" NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 275 DZ ================================================== Page 276 ================================================== 4t Apr+l 29, 1966 "0E RUiE Gf 4414 ru} 447 CLzz 6 XBZSTINE Le + 4 ro2rt@4 INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN TKE UNTTED STATES Qaqih kerit- NW-88608-Bocld:32989629PageZ1 UJ: Ara ================================================== Page 277 ================================================== T A B & E 0 F C 0 N T E N " 8 Page A PURPOSE AND SCOPE , 1 B, INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY 2 C0 THI HISTORY OF' FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 8 1_ Prior to World War II_ 8 2 = During World War II (igii': ig45) 8 3 National Intelligence Authority '(NIA) 15 4 _ Responsibilities of CIA 20 a The National Security Act of" 1947 _ 20 b_ National Security Council Intelligence Dlrective 22 Director of Central Intelligence Directives 26 Dulles Committee_ 1949 29 Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955 _ 33 1 TThe Doolitcle Committee, 1554 53 g, The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligencc Activities of the United States Government_ 41 5 , Responsibilities of the FBI 44 8 _ Laws and Directives_ 44 b Requests From Other Agencies 45 C FBI' s Role in the United States Intelligence Board_ 46 d_ The President'8 Foreign Inteiiigence Advisory Boara (PFIAB) 48 The Director 8 Stand Over the Years 50 D: : TEE NEED AND THE PCTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U, S. 55_ 1; CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FORCIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN TRE UUNITID STATES _ 59 ~NW88608-_Deeld 32989629_Page-277 0 , ================================================== Page 278 ================================================== T A B L % 0 F C 0 N T € N T $ Page F CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI _ 64 1 Manpower Being Devoted_ 64 Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances With Eva lua tion Of Product_ 65 3 Live Sources With Eva lua tion 66 4 _ Anagram Program. 67 5 Double Agents and Informants 67 6 _ Additional Potential_ 68 G; AREAS OF CONFLICT , FBI Ae CIA_ 69 E= CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA 74 I EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 77 1 Overt Colleciiou ieiivities_ 77 2 Clandestine Gathering Activitie8 79 GENERAL FINDINGS _ 82 X RECOMENDED PLAN Op ACTION_ 86 Authorization_ 86 Selection of Targets 87 Technical Surveillance of Targets 90 Technica 1 Surveillance Controls _ 91 Anagram Program_ 91 Live Sources 91 Training of Personnel 93 Reporting Procedures 94 Language Capabilities 94 Relations With Other Agencies 95 Administrative-Reorgeniza tion; 97 ALTERNATIVES "99 11 NWAHWE DocI329396Z9 Page Z78 {J, ================================================== Page 279 ================================================== PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose 0f this Study 18 to define a_ new role for tho Bureau in the field of clandestine colloction of foroign intolligonce in tho U 8 This action 1s necessary and most timely becauso oz our Government's vital need for increased foreign intolligence and becausa of CIA 5 expanding intorobtb in the United Statos There is a decided need for 8 bew Bureau concept, the implementation Of which could greatly Lncrease our effectiveness and could deter CIA from becoming a threat to our operational interests. The study encompasses a review 0f history as it relates to foreign intelligence collection In the U, S Ana lysis 18 made of the need and the potential for such intelligence; the capabilities of the Bureau and CIA in this field; and the responsibilities of over-all (overt and covert) collection of foreign intelligence in the U, S . We have subnitted our general findings , and we recommend a plan of action for a new Bureau role. This study was not designed to eliminate once and for a11 the many problems relating to collection Of foreign intelligence in the U_ S. It would have been a Utopian objective to recommend a Plan which would produce maximum intelligence collection, remove eristing defects within the U_ S, intelligence community, and establish complete harmony among interested agencies_ Te did not g0 that far Careful and exhaustive ana lybis dictated that we endeavor to reach a reasonable goal consistent with prudent planning and Bound operational implementation_ Te feel that the recommended plan meets such guidelines_ that it 18 a ' decidedly major step forward for the Bureau, and it strongly conforms With the national gecurity needs _ It Sbould be noted that this document does not dea1 with our Jaw enforcement or internal security functions, although it 16 fully recognized tbat internal Security and clandestine collection of foreign intelligence ar6 closely linked. Any plan on our patt to produce foreign intelligence wili affect our capabilities Jn the field Of counterintelligence . NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 279 ================================================== Page 280 ================================================== Ba INTELLIGENCE_TERMINOLOGY People who do not speak and understand a common language have difficulty in communicating their ideas_ Even in a country such a5 ours where English is the common language,' words take on different meanings in different gaogr aphicai localoe and in difforont so0ial political 8 and economic environments_ Likewise, in professional fields } varying backgrounds and experiences have conveyed different meanings to terms in the professional vocabulary. In the field of security, intelligence, and counter- intelligence operations, certain professional terminology has developed ostensibly to assist in the exchange of ideas by persons in this field. However as progress is made in a field or a special segment of the field, new horizons develop which require additional terminology or cause an evolution in existing terminology . This development or evolution in security and intelligence terminology coupled with individualistic usage, brings further problems in meaning which we also face in the broader aspects of the English language Te have a11 noted that our dictionaries do not always provide a single meaning and we must be careful in daily conversation that we are not misunderstood when merely using a conversational vocabulary Ve face 4 oiullar problez i7 the use-of profeseiona] terminol- ogy in security and intelligence matters as this terminology takes on new meaning with additional experience and takes on varying meanings to different persons An additional factor to consider in understanding the meaning of terminology is the context in which a term is used_ For example, the term "intelligence" may be vague and confusing without the knowledge of the context in which it is used _ It can, as a generic term, pertain to the .Whole field of activities undertaken by a government in te collection of information, the protection of its institutions, and the con- duct of nonattributable activities to facilitate the formation and implementation of government policy_ Also, it can relate to the organization devoted to the collection and production of information necessary to the government _ In addition, it may pertain to the whole body of theory and practice on the basis of which an intelligence organization operates _ Finally, the word "intelligence" may be utilized to mean any or a11 of the above . The following definitions do not include all possible meanings that have been utilized but , instead, are designed to assist the reader in digesting this study. 2 ~NxLbaed8 Boclk32989629 280 part Page ================================================== Page 281 ================================================== BASIC INTCLLIGENCE is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedia information of a fundamental and more or less permanent nature and which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, 18 deternined to be the best availabla. BIOGRAPHIC INTCLLIGENCE is intelligence concorning individuals CLANDESTINE COLLECTION A coordinated complex of collection activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counter- intelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted by a governmental department or agency , or jointly by two or more such entities, in such a way , 85 to assure secrecy or concealment. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE is military intelligence for use in combat situations, This is commonly referred to &5 tacticalo COUNTERESPIONAGE is identirying, penetraiiug , Waffpulating or repressing inimical espionage organizations 0 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product , which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the na tion, and its personnel , information, and installations against espionage, sabotage, and subversion Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring 9 developing, recording, and disseninating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating or repressing individuals, groups , or organizationg conducting or capable of conducting such activity 0 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which 18 usually disseminated without :the ~delays incident to.complete evaluation or interpretation; DEPARTENTAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to' execute its own mission , NW_B8608_"biocid.J2989679 Eage ================================================== Page 282 ================================================== DONSTIC INTELLIGENCE concerns information and investigation of espionage , counterespionage, etc_ which pertains to the internal security of the U,S6 and, therefore 9 i8 in subject matter pertinent to the internal affairs of the U,8 , ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the potentialities, utilization, and vulnerabilities of a nation ' s natural and human resources , ESPIONAGE is defined a5 that intelligence activity which is directed toward the ecquisition of information through clandestine operations 0 TOREIGN INTELLIGENCE pertains to foreign affairs and subject matters pertinent to foreign countries, The word "foreign" a5 used here denotes the target of the intelligence and is distinct from the geographic location of the source providing the information. For example, refugees, defectors, and immigrants from target countries (such as the Soviet Union) have the rctential for supplying intelligence regarding their countries to United States authorities Although physically located in the United States, they are potential foreign intelligence sources, GEOGRAPHIC INTCLLIGENCE concerns the meterology ) hydrography , topography , and basic natural resources of an area & INTELLIGCNCE is the product derived from information collected for the formulation and execution of Government policy and for safeguarding the national welfare, INTCLLIGENCE INFORMATION is information collected for intelli_ gence purposes that has not been evaluated by comparison with the existing body of knowledge on the subject reported on; the raw material of intelligence_ 0 INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions; but which transcends the exclusive competence. Of 8 single departe ment or agency to produce _ NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 282 ================================================== Page 283 ================================================== INTIRNAL SECURITY relates to the defense and protection Within the United States and its territories and possessions of the people = the government _ the institutions, and the installations of critical importance from a11 hostile or destructive action, INVESTIGATION means systemetic and direct inquiries or proe cedures (such 08 physical or technical surveillancos or neighbore hood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual $ S activities or background; investigation does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made CIA agents in discharging their cover functions MILITARY INTELLIGENCE : See Combat Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national Security eodscKhe- concerns more tkam cne department or Agency: and transcends exclusive competence of a single department or agency , OVERT COLLECTION is collection activities conducted in such a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the sponsoring government , POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns foreign and domestic policies 0f governments and the activities of political movements. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE may be described as a comprehensive product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation 3 analysis, and interpretation of a1l available information relating to national security and co__cerning other countries where such information is' significant to our Government s development and execution of plans policies, and courses of action Such intelligence can be divided into various categories such as basic, biographic, combat, current, departmental economic, geographic, interdepartmental, militacy, nationai political, scientific, sociological strategic, tactical ana technical Perhaps the most Simple definition would be that positive intelligence is a1l the things you should know in advance 0f initiating 8 course of action. 5 NW-88608-Doeld 32989629-Page 283 by ================================================== Page 284 ================================================== There appears to be much confusion in professional circles regarding the use of the term "positive intelligence. Some professionals use the term "positive intelligence" synonymously with tho torm "forcign intolligcnco 11 In 9t111 anothor M usagc, "positive Intelllgence and "intelligence" are used interchangeably . In another useage, which is closely related to the definition utilized in this "positive intelll- gence" is described as wha t is left of entire field after "security intelligence" has been subtracted, This source continues that both "positive intelligence" and "security intelligence" can be against domestic targets, as Well a5 against foreign targets_ For example, the Department of State, in connection with its formulation of foreign policy , encounters a large number of 01" ganizations of Americans whose parents came from foreign countries _ Many of these organizations--the Poles for example-_have strong views on wha t United States policy should be toward Poland . The views of these organizations regarding our foreign policy is likely to be a matter of some importance to the Department of State in its policy formula- tion, The knowledge of what these organizations think and do can be a very significant phase of what might be called "dcmestic positive intelligence It In addition; the connections which these organizations may have with the foreign country such as Poland sometimes provide 2 source of "foreign positive intelligence_ I SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCC pertains to the progress of scientific research and development and usually this intelligence is within the framework 0f how it affects military or economic potential of & nation. SECURITY INTELLIGENCE is basically the intelligence behind the police function to protect the nation and its members from those working to our national and individual detriment_ For example, this would include intelligence regarding clandestine agents sent to the United States by a foreign power SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE pertains to the social cultural, psychological, or ethnic structure and characteristics of 8 people, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE is the intelligence required for broad and usually long-range planning; especially with regard to military operetions_ NW 88608 Docld:32989629 284 'studysie Page ================================================== Page 285 ================================================== TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE See Combat Intelligence. TCCINICAL INTCLLIGENCE concerns dovicos, oquipmont, ond special P1oco8so8 . Tnis 10 rolated to Scientific Intelll- gence , but tends to be differentiated from it as practice differs from theory6 NW 88608 Docld:32989629_Page285 ================================================== Page 286 ================================================== C THE HISTORY OF TOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE WTTED STATES 1 Prior to World War II A study of the history and progress of foreign intelligence collection in the United States reveals that prior to Worla Tar II such collection efforts were incidental and in direct proportion to the intensity 0f the coverage maintained in the counterintelligence field_ Accordingly, the history 0f foreign intelligence collection in the United States prior to World War II is primarily a history of counterintelligence and internal security coverage , of which foreign intelligence was 8 by-product Historical highlights of the developments in this field are as follows: (a) In August , 1914, when German espionage agents Count Johann Von Bernstorff and Dr _ Heinrich Albert of the German Embassy , D_ C. 2 arrived in the Uni-ed States with S150 onq in German treasury notes to finance the first foreign espionage and sabotage apparatus to be organized in this country, United States Government intelligence work was handled for the most part by five small organizations (Bureau 0f Investigation of the Department of Justice, Secret Service, Army , State and Navy) , a11 operating on their own with small staffs and without coordination and sufficient delineation 0f responsibilities , (b) On April 6 , 1917 Congress declared war against Germany and President Woodrow Wilson gave the Bureau 0f Investigation the task of enforcing his proclamation governing the conduct of enemy aliens The Bureau at the time had 300 Agents but shortly after the outbreak of the war the staff was increased to 400 _ (c) As result of a rash of bombings believed executed by Bolsheviks Attorney General Palmer appointed Francis P Garvan of New York aS Assistant Attorney General to deal with the problen_ He created a General Intelligence Division under command 0f J_ Edgar Hoover and Mx Hoover was instructed to make 8 study of subversive activities in the United States to determine their 8cope and thbe potential for prosecution, ~ 8 * 88608 Docld: 32989629_Page286 Vashi[5t9no ================================================== Page 287 ================================================== (d) On May 9, 1934 , President Roosevelt called a [hite House conference attended by the Attorney General Secrctary of Treasury Secretary of Labor Director of FBI and Chief of United statcs Secret Service to dea 1 with the problen 0f growth of fascist organizations in the United States_ The conference agreed that there should be an investigation 0f these groups and their activities for intelligence purposes _ Since the only Federal 18w believed applicable at the time was the Immigration Law 9 the President dccided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service would confer with the Chfef of Secret Service and the Director 0f the FBI to work out details of the investigation. Kr . Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI personnel to conduct an intensive and confidential investis gation of the Nazi movement . This was the first generel intelligencc investigation made by the Government into faScIst activities in this country _ (e) As a result 0f President Franklin Roosevelt'8 concern over activities of the communists and other subversive groups , 0 sorics 8f confe-crc?s w29 held {n the Jntter part of August and carly September 1936 participated in by the Presidont tho Sccrctary of state and the Director of the FBI , As 3 rcbult of hs conccrn over thc international character 0f conmunisa and fascism, the President stated the FBI skoula conduct ncccssary investigations and coordinate inforzation upon these Mc~cTS in the possession 0f the Military Ercu_Zegenge' Division, the Naval Intelligence Division and the State Department _ It is noteworthy that it was specified the investigation was to be for intelligence purposes only. The Presidential Order was implemented by the Director in 2 letter to al1 Special Agents in Charge , September 5, 1936. (f) As a result of opposition primarily by the State Department against accepting the FBI as the coordinating agency in the investigations of all subversive activities in the United States President Roosevelt, on June 26 1939 issued a confidential directive to Cabinet members which established an Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee composed of the FBI and the Intelligence Divisions of the War Department and the Navy . He named the FBI 25 the coordinating agency to receive all reports on bubversive activities, NW-88608_Docld:32989629_Page_28Z ================================================== Page 288 ================================================== (g) President Roosevelt publicly designated the FBI to Investigate matters relating to espionage_ sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations by Presidontial Directive deted September 6 , 1939_ (h) On May %1 , 1940 President Roosevelt in 2 memorandum to tho thon Attorney General, Robort H. Jackson, authorized and directed the Attorney General in such cases 28 he might approve to authorize the use of listening devices directed to the conversations Or other communications of persons suspected of subversive activity against the Government of the United States , including suspected spies . Pursuant to such authorization commencing on June 1, 1940 technical surveillances were instailed on diplomatic establishments throughout the United States of such countries as Germany_ 1 Italy_ Japan, Russia and France _ These installations in addition to providing counterintelligence information of value produced 8 substantial quantity of foreign intelligence information. (1) Although lines of responsibility were established for domestic intelligence work in connection with the September 6 , 1939 9 Presidential Directive , there were no clearly defined areas of responsibility of overseas intelligence operations ana as time passed the need for decisions in that field grew more evident . As a result the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) came into being_ By Presidential Directive June 1940 , President Franklin D Roosevelt set forth lines of responsibility in the operations of United States intelligence agencies in the foreign field. This Directive grew out of a series of meetings 'involving representatives of state Department _ 1 Army and Navy intelligence and the FBI wherein it was agreed that the SIS would act as a service agency furnishing the State Department the military, the FBI and other governmental agencies with information having to do with financial economic, political and subversive activities detrimental to the security of the United States. The June 24th Directive placed the responsibility for no nmilitary intelligence coverage in the Western Hemisphere on the FBI _ Less than thirty days thereafter the FBI had organized an SIS operation, Through Worla War II and until approximately March 1947 the FBI continued its SIS operations_ The culmination of our activities in this field came about as a result 0f the: January 22 1946, Presidential Directive establishing the Central Intelligence Group and giving it' the responsibility 0f collecting foreign intelligence abroad. 10 ~HW 88608-0ocid37989629 -pade288 24 , 31 , ================================================== Page 289 ================================================== 2 During World Wer II (1941 6 1945) a, Tha FBT' 8 Role During World War II 3 a8 prior to the war , foreign intelligence Collection in this country was goarod to ana principally a product of our intensive efforts in the counter- intelligence field_ It is also significant to note that a steady stream of foreign intelligence continued to be developed from our technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of enemy-bloc countries 1 as well as other sensitive countrieg such as Russia, Argentina, Portugal and Spain_ In line with the Presidential Directive of September 6 , 1939 9 the FBI continued to be in charge of al1 investigative wotk in matters pertaining to espionage , sabotage , counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality iaws_ On January 8 , 1943 , the President issued another Directive in which he reiteratea tne previous Direciive uf September 6 , 1939_ In ordering the FBI to take charge in the foregoing areas President Roosevelt dia not define the various types of intelligence involved but placed the entire intelligence and internal security responsibilities involved under the jurisdiction of the FBI_ As 2 matter of fact , in carrying out these responsibilities we did produce foreign Intelligence in substantial quantity especially through our technical coverage 0f foreign diplomatic establishments . b. Office of Strategic Services The position of Colonel William J , Donovan as Coordinator of Information (COI) was created by Presidential Directive dated July 11, 1941. On July 14, 1941 President Roosevelt sent 3 letter to the Attorney General stating the position was created "in order to provide a central point in the Government for the analysis of information and data which bears upon national security_ M1 The President Gescribed Donovan S duties as "assist me and the various Departments and agencies 0f the Government in assembling and correlating information which may be useful in the formulation 0f basic plans for the defense of the nation. Tt 11 989629 ge ================================================== Page 290 ================================================== In the letter President Roosevelt clearly limited Donovan 5 jurisdiction with the following statement ; "I Should like to emphasize that Colonel Donovan'& work 18 not intondod to bupereode or duplicate or involve any direction of the activities of established agencies already obtaining and interpreting defense informa tion The Presidential order dated September 11, 1941, established the position of COI with clear cut authority to collect ana analyze information bearing on national security; correTate and make such information available to the President and other Government officials as the President may determine 0 COI was finally euthorized to carry out , when_requested by the President , supplementary activities 25 mighe FacITita€e Ehe securing of information not then available to the Government Donovan } in a memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF ~ESTABLISHMENT Op SERV ICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION Tt expanded on the President' s directive in general terms Under his plan for procedure there was a Coordinator of Strategic Information responsible direcily to tne Fresideit (Nte this same organizational set up was later adopted by the Director of Central Intelligence .) Donovan noted 9 hovever , in his memorandum "The proposed centrallzed unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI Army and Navy Intelligence_ or any other Department of the Government_ (62-64427 _ 9 serials 23 a2d X3 ) Our file on the Office of Strategic Services (oss) reveals that that organization continued it8 organizational } training, and operational activities in this country based on Donovan ' S premise that he was the central clearing point for anti-Axis espionage and counterespionage An interesting insight into OSS operations in this country is provided in the nonfiction work "The Scarlet Thread" by former OSS agent Donald Downes Downes noted that he was a former British intelligence agent serving for that organization in Newv York when he was recruited by OSS immediately after Pearl Harbor He tells of bis recruitment by Allan Dulles his association with Donovan, and his' work in the counterespionage field in New York City and Washington, D_ with other OSS agents , including the current United States Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg_ Dowvnes detailed attempts by him and other OSS agente to Steal diplomatic codes from 12 0 ~NW 88608-Dpcld:32989629-Pagez290 C. ================================================== Page 291 ================================================== "friendly" or "neutral" country embassies in Washington in the early 1940's and frequently referred to the fact that this was being done by OSS with knowledge that its juris- diction In this country was based only on tho theory that a forelgn Embassy is not American s011 and is technically outside the jurisdiction of the FBI which had full juris- diction for counterintelllgence in the wostern bomlsphere Our file on tbe OsS 1s replete with incidents indicating OSS recruitment and counterespionage activities in this country during the early 1940' 8. By memorandum dated May 22 1945, Stanley J_ Tracey , advised of a conversation overheard between two high-ranking State Department officials The conversation dealt with OSS attempts to take over Bureau SIS operations in Latin America with one of the State Department officials Aura Warren , stating that officials of OSS felt that organization Fras better equipped to handle work than FBI personnel attached to various American Embassies in South America In response to this attempt of OSS to take over our duties , the Director commented ; "i woula like io KIOW wlere Mazzer getz tkiz_ According to Lada our contacts in State Department have no knowledge of such OSS efforts Also Tracey should point out it is State Department duty to initiate it as we would 'service it' and the State Department in fact started the SIS project. H" (62-64427-1059.) An interesting evaluation of OSS operations is provided in a report prepared by Colonel Richard Park Of the War Departnent as a result of a survey of OSS operations made as a special and confidential mission for the President in 1944 and 1945 _ Colonel Park commented : "Without going into details I was everywhere left with the same impression of utter incompetency on the part of OSS leadership "Everywhere that the subject of OSS came up, unsolicited remarks clearly brought out the very well known amateurish nature of the organization. "The OSS has been restricted from active operationg in South Anerica by Presidential directive Despite the absence 0f any jurisdiction in or responsibility for counterintelligence operations in the western hemisphere, an Qfficer of OSS wa8 reported to have 13 ================================================== Page 292 ================================================== attempted to obtain cover' for an OSS agent in South America under guise of employment by an orgenization doing businesg in South America A closing paregraph 0f Colonel Park' 8 report commented on observations made by 21 Official 0f OSS a5 follows : "This Official of OSS added that it was the policy of his agency not to give any more information than necessary to the Federal Bureau of Investigation He pointed out that OSS instructors in their school in the United States had discussed the FBI in an unfavorable light and had painted the picture of OSS .replacing the Federal Bureau of Investigation not outside the United States but in the domestic field_ The publicity campaign referred tq was to be one of tbe means adopted to accomplish this purpose _ 14 O5 NW 88603 Docld3329896297Page 292 only ================================================== Page 293 ================================================== 3 6 National Intelligence Authority (NIA) On January 22, ' 1946 President Harry S , Truman addressed 8 Directive to the Socretary of State the Secretary of War, and the Secretary 0f the Navy stating, in part "I hereby designate you 9 together with another person to b0 named by m0 as my personal reprebentative, as the National Intelli- gence Authority The Directive provided that each of thege three Secretaries woula from time to time assign personnel and facilities from their respective departments "which persong shall collectively form 2 Central Intelligence Group" (CIG) under 8 Director of Central Intelligence It Was provided that the latter would be responsible to the NIA _ President Truman then stated that subject to the existing law the Director of Central Intelligence should (a) accomplish the corre ation and evaluation of intelligence and the appropriate dissemination within the Governmert 0f the results; (b) for the coordination of such activities of the intelligence agencies 0f the three departments involved as relatcd t2 tha nsticeel cecuritv; (c) nerform such services 0f common concern 25 the NIA determined could be more effectively accomplished centrally; and (4) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence 8s the President and the NIA might fron time to time direct_ Tne Presidential Directive said that no police, law enforcement or internal security functions should be exercised under the Directive; that certain intelligence Should be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence "for correlation, evaluation or dissemination" ; and that "the existing intelligence agencies of your departnents shall continue to collect 1 evaluate, correlate and disseninate departmental intelligence _ I The ninth provision 0f the Directive stated, "Nothing herein Shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions 2 except as provided by law and Presidential directives A~series: 0f-communications between the:Bureau-and Lieutenant General Hoyt 8 Vandenberg; who was designated 25 Director_-cf the Central Intelligence Group, then followed . On 7: June 21 1946 2 memorandu analyzed a 'communication from Vandenberg which Submitted a proposed memorandum to the NIA and- 2 proposed Directive to be issued by NIA extending the powers and duties of the Director 0f Central Intelligence_ The Directive provided , in essence the following additional functions and powers for the Director of Central Intelligence; 15 Ww B86u8 Doeld 332989629 293 plan Page ================================================== Page 294 ================================================== (1) Undertake such basic research and analysis 0f intelligence and counterintelligence 28 may in hig opinion be required . (2) Act 28 the executive agont of thig authority (NIA) in coordinating end in supervising a11 Federal foreign intelligence activities. (3) Perfort the following sorvices 0 common concern: (a) conduct 211 Federal espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence; (b) conduct all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts 0f foreign powers for the collection of intelligence information_ In discussing this Directive which Vandenberg desired issued the memorandum stated the Directive did not conform with the original plan proposed by the President or which was envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the President issued his Directive The original plan, insofar 25 the Bureau was advised contemplated the setting up of solely a coordinating agency which was given the power to perform certain functions Which it would be determined could more adequately and economically be performed centrally for the benefit of al1 Government agencies _ The memorandum noted that "undoubtedly if this Directive 16 approved and the Central Intelligence Group is successful in setting up complete foreign coverage, the Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a second rate position insofar a5 purely intelligence functions are concerned in the domestic field. It is inevitable that the Central Intelli- gence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources 0f foreign intelligence existing in that field_ Also, it 1s impossible €o separate entirely foreign intelligence and the domestic functiong performed by the Bureau _ "# In reply to the Directive proposed by General Vandenberg, 2 letter was sent to him June 1946, which stated that tbe Directive was approved with certain changes suggested "for clarification purposes only _ 11 The Director suggested tbat to the item relating to the Director 0f Central Intelligence acting # # * # * * * # * * * * * * * * # X With respect to this last quoted statement, Mr . E. A . Tamm and Mr . C. A _ Tolson noted &n exception by placing an addendum on the memorandum The Director 1 S commente were set forth This is more fully reported below under the heading, "Director 8 Commonts," 16 NW-88608 Qocld:32989629_Page 294 25 , ================================================== Page 295 ================================================== aS the executive agent of National Intelligence Authority in coordinating and supervising all foreign intelligence activitios thoxe should bo added "performod outsido tbo United States and its possessions relating to the national security in accordance with the overall policies and objective8 established by this Authority_ ff With respect to the proposal that the Director of Central Intelligence direct a11 espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection 0f foreign intelligence, it was proposed that the phrase "outside the United States and its possessions" also be inserted in this provision _ On July 29 8 1946 General Vandenberg sent over a memorandum on the subject ft Exploitation of American Business Concerns With Connections Abroad as Sources of Foreign Intelligence Information Tf He added a proposed Directive The Director replied by letter August 6 , 1946 , "I should like to comment that there appears to have been an addition to the field encompassed by CIG Directive #11 calling for a survev of the exploitation of American businees concerns I note that in your report and in the proposed NIA Directive , you refer not only to American business con- cerns but to other private groups with connections abroad This latter phrase in my opinion, 1s extremely broad end could be taken to include a11 types of organizations including Foreign Nationality Groups In fact , 1 feel that the report and proposed Directive should confine themselves to the discussion of American business concerns and that no references at a11 should be made to private gtoups I feel that at a later date the question of exploitation of these private groups by CIG representatives might be worked out by discussing them individually with the FBI When their identities are deternined. It This matter remained unresolved _ 0 On August 22 , 1946 General Vandenberg gubnitted another proposed Directive concerning exploitation of American business concerns nongovernmental groups 9 and individuals (in the United' States} With connections abroad as bources. 0f.foreign intelligence information 4 memorandum analyzing this on August 22, 1946,.pointed out the new Directive was even more NW-88608Docld-32989629_Page 295 ================================================== Page 296 ================================================== obnoxious than the one originally proposed. The Directive noted, in part "CIG field representatives Will egtablish and maintain lieison with the Intelligence officers 0f local Army and Navy headquarters and Air: Forco headquarters 1f present through the medium 0f local interagency offices 6i The Gniiyzin8 memorandum ~ointed out , "Ii this means the CIG 1s going to maintain fleld representatives 1n2 the United Statos or establish office8, it cortainly is sonething new and a provision that we did not understand was intended in the President S Directive Attached to the proposed Diractive is 2 discussion which is more or less the same 28 was attached to the original proposed Directive It, however 9 makes the following statement which the Bureau cannot subscribe to and it would seem must oppose, that is Foreign Intelligence Inforation related to the national security, although it may be collected from sources whose headquarters a*e Within tha limits of the United States and its possessions 1s definitely' a patt of the national intelligence mission, the coordination 1; -0f which is specifically 8 function of the National Intellf- gence Authority under tbe provisions 0f the President 8 letter of 22 January 1946.m In pointing out the Bureau 5 objections the analyzing memorandum of August 1946, stated, is now involved in this Directive the fundamental question of just whbat rights the Central Intelligence Group has with reference to operations Within the United States _ Carrying to & logical conclusion the statements set forth above contained in the discussion, they could cover all foreign embassies in the United States, take charge 0f double agents we are operating or radio stations we are operating a5 double agent set-ups 2 etc., because essentially these operations engaged in by the Bureau do not directly involve enforcement 0f the laws but rather ar0 concerned With obtaining information in the na ture 6f foreign intelligence which, 0f course, is related to internal security as is all foreign intelligence _ Essentially the Bureau 's domestic operations in intelligence involve the determining of the aims, intentions and activities of foreign countries or' #helr:representatives .. The memorandum of analysi8 Gtated.that' our position would bo the Bureau would not consent to any provisions except thoso. rolatad to Amorican pusinoss concerns Rith-connectiona 18 ~NW-88608_Doclxk32989629-E70a796 #There 22 , ================================================== Page 297 ================================================== abroad; On August 23 1946 _ the Director sent 8 letter to Genoral Vandenborg stating in part_ "I must advieo that tha proposed Directive dces not incorporate the changeg suggested in my letter of August 6 , 1946, and I, therefore, cannot approve it_ Tbis new directive eIso include8 provigions and statements in which I cannot concur 1n fact, must oppose The strong stand of the Director obviously led to a conference between General Vandenberg and the Diector which was. reported in a memorandum of Septenber 13 , 1946, which the Director prepared_ As stated in the Director's memorandum the conference concerned CIG S desire to gather contacts among Ii nongovernmental groups and individuals with connections abroad , IT The entire conference as on this subject matter and did not enter into collection of foreign intelli- gence from foreign embassies or from foreign officials or in fact, from any other source The Director wrote, "I told the General that I could Well appreciate that there would be cases in which his organizezion would be desireus 0f making 'contacts in the United States for the purpose 0f obtaining information from abroad ~nd that the Bureau was not interested in such contacts except in those situations wherein the individual or the group might be engaged in activities within the United States that were either under investigation by the Bureau or might possibly be che medium of obtaining information cone cerning the activitles of 2 subversive character being carried on within the United States I told the General that I would be perfectly agreeable to his suggestion , with the added provision that if CIG was desirous 0f contacting any individuals of the character that he had indicated, before doing so it would check with the FBI _ M1 The foregoing has been set forth rather extensively since it shows the strong stand the Bureau took ageinst CIG's operating in the United States Actually_ 2 25 Will be reported 'hereinafker ; Directives were adopted permitting CIG to collect positive intelligence in this country by conticting: United States citizens American businessmen, aliens (with prior FBI approval) through- the foreign language press and in later year8 through contacts With United States governmental personnel _ 0 19_ NW 88608 Docid:32989629 297 and, Page ================================================== Page 298 ================================================== 4 - Responsibilities of CIA a The National Security Act of 1947 This Act #hich 18 reported in 50 USC 401 et seq: , established the National Security Council (NSC) and under it the Contral Intolligence Agoncy . It provided that whon the Director of Central Intelligence was appointed the NIA should cease to exist There was much discussion concerning the powers nd authorities %o pe vested in the Director of Central Intelli- gence _ Many individuals } especially in Congress_ expressed fears that CIA could develop into a gestapo 1f permitted to become operational in the United States The following two excerpts_ of interest in this connection, are from a Congressional publication related to hearings prior to passage 0f the National Security Act 0f 1947 _ The publication 1s entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures jn the Executive Departments House 0f Representatives, 8oth Corgress, ) Ist Session on R. R 2319 (National Security Act 0f 1947)" : Page 127 During testimony concerning authority for `and scope of CIA, James Forrestal, tnen Secretary of the Navy , stated: "The purposesof the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country , except the collation of information gathered by other government agencies_ "Regarding domestic operations the Federal Bureau of Investigation is working at al1 times in collaboration witb General Vandenberg He relies upon them for domestic f8 ctivities_ Page 438 E Congressman Clarence J _ Brown 0f Ohio in speaking about the National Security Act 0f 1947 ) whfch was under Bcrutiny before passage, stated; "I want to write a lot 0f other safeguards into the bection thet deals with_ tbe Central Intelligence Agency . 20 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 298 Page ================================================== Page 299 ================================================== "I want to make certain that the activities and the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency Fere care- fully confined to international matters, to mllitary matters , and to matters of national security _ We bave enough peoplo now running around butting into ovorybody else 3 business In tbis country Without establishing another agency to do So , "What wo' ought to do 18 to eliminate 90 percent of the present snoopers Instead of dding to them "I do not think it would be the Central Intelligence Agency's right authority, or responsibility to check on the ordinary domestic activities of the average Americen citizen, and they could have the power and euthority to do if under this bill as written." The National Security Act 0f 1947 mas approved 7/26/47 . It provided thbat for the purpose 0f coordinating the intelligence activities of the severel Government departments a.d agencies in the interest of national security, the, Agency under the direction of the NSC was: (1) To advise NSC in matters concerning such intelligence ectivities of tbe Government departments and agencies of the Government as relate t0 the national security, (2) To make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination 0f such activities, (3) To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and provide for its appropriate dissemination within the Governent : Provided, That the Agency Shall bave no police, subpoena 9 law enforcement powers , or internal security responsibilities, (4) To perform such additional seryices 0f commop concern 25 tho NSC determines can be more efficiently accompl-ebed centrelly (5) To perform such other functions and duties reated 'to #ntelligence 'afzecting ~national: aacurity 05- tbe NSC may from time to timo direct 21 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 299 yet Page ================================================== Page 300 ================================================== There is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e) of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers information affecting the national security. Thi8 section provides: (e) To tho extent recommonded the NSC and approved by the President such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government , except as hereinafter provided, releting to tho national Bocurity shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies 0f the Government , except a5 hereinafter provided , shall be made available to the Director 0f Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissenination: Provided, however, That upon the written request 0f the Director of "entral Intelligence the Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director 0f Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and disgemination as may be essential to the national security. b _ National Security Council Intelligence Directives To implement the authority granted to it unaer ine National Security Act 0f 1947, the National Security Council has issued a series of "National Security Council Intelligence Directives ," usually referred to a5 NSCID '8 and commonly called" "Nonscids The first of these was issued December 12 9 1947, and provided for the establishing 0f the Intelligence Advisory Committee to maintain the relationship necessary for 2 fully effective integration of the national intelligence effort By Directive dated September 15 _ 1958 the U, S _ Intelligence Board (USIB) was formally created as successor to the Intelligence Advisory Committee and a counterpart known as the U , S Communications Intelligence Board - NSCID No 1 provided that the Director of Central Intelligence should coordinate the foreign. intelligence activities of the United States 1 such coordination to include both special and other forms 0f intelligence The US IB under this Directive Sball Vadvise-and assist_ the Director of Central Intelligence 83 he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsi- bilities, It is the Board which is empowered to establish policies, define intelligence objectives, make recommendations to appropriate U, S . officials, aevelop standards for protection 0f intelligence end {ormulate policies With respect to arrange- ments with forelgn governments _ The Director 0f Central 22 TVT-88608 Docld:32989629 8 by ================================================== Page 301 ================================================== Intelligence 1s designated as Chairman of this Board and in this capacity 1s distinguished from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. A more complete discussion with regard to the Bureau' 6 role in thig over-all setup is 80t forth horeinaftor undor tho caption "TBI Rolationd With tho United States Intelligence Board." National Security Council Intelligence Directive No . originally issued 12/12/47 1 defines the variou8 typeg 0f Intelligence in Section 4 (a) National Intelligence is that intelligence whicb is requtred for the formulation 0f national security policy concerns more than one department or agency , and transcends the exclusive competence of 2 single departnent or agency . The Director of Central Intelll- gence shall produce* national intelligence with the support of the U. S . Intelligence Board. (b) Departmental Intelligence is tbat intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its Own mission , (c) Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence Phich is required by departmenta and agencies of the Governent for the execution of thelr missions but which transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce The subcommittee structure of the U. S . Intelligence Board may be utilized for the production and dissemination of interdepartmental intelligence _ Director of Central Intelligence 1s then authorized to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence provided it is done consistent with statutes and Presidential policy, and provided further "that &ny disclosure of FBI intelligence information Shall be cleared with that agency prior to dissemination_ M This "acknowledges: that FBL,infornation .includes oth national and interdepartmental intelligence _ # # # # # # * * * # * # # * # # # #A footnote here states: produce' is meant 8 to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security' as provided in the National Security Act Of 1947 , a8 amended, Section 102, (a) (3) ." 23 NW-88608_Dleeld;32989629_Page 1, "By ================================================== Page 302 ================================================== NSCID No _ 2 izsued 1/13/48 , relates tq coordination of foreign intelligence collection activities "not covered by other NSC Directives." The Director of Contral Intelligonco has rebponsi- bility for planning to assure there is no undesirable duplication and that coverage is adequate Responsibilitie8 are then assigned as follovs: (1) The Department of State shall have primary responsibility for , and shall perform a5 2 service of common concern, the collection abroad (i.e outside the U. S _ and its possessions) of political sociological, econonic, scientific and technical information. (2) The Department of Defense shall have primary responsibility for , and shall perform as 2 service of common concern, the collection of military intelligence Information_ Owing to the importance of scientific and technical intelligence to the Department 0f Defense and the military services, this collection responsibility siail iuelude 3cientizic' and--teckaicel, 28 well 2 2 economjc; information directly pertinent to Department 0f Defense missions _ (It seems Significant that while State Depart- ment primary responsibility was limited by the phrase "the collection abroad, # there was no such limitation on the. Department 0f Defense in its responsibility.) (3) The Central Intelligence Agency may collect abroad intelligence information in support of assigned func- tions or 85 a byproduct of assigned functions: Provided, that this collection involves no undesirable duplication of any of the specific assignments to State and Defense Departments, and Provided, that any such overt collection is coordinated with the Department of State or with the Senlor U . S. Representative_ In Section 7 0f NSCID No ; 2 there 1s delegated to CIA responsibility for overt collection 0f foreign intelligence i0 the U_ S; a8 follovs: "The Central Intelligence Agency 25 a service of comdon concern, shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the United States of non-governmental organizations and individuals 8S sources of foreign 24 MNBB WocIdE32989629 Page 32 ================================================== Page 303 ================================================== intelligence information, in accordance With policies , procedures and practices established 28 provided in paragraph 3a of NSCID No . by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrences of the U . S . Intelli- gonca Boarda" Section 9 of the same Directive provides that CIA "shall conduct tho exploitation of forelgn language publications for intelligence purposes, a5 appropriate, as a service 0f common concern Mhen this function 1s carried out in the U . this also constitutes overt collection of foreign intelligence that Agency in this country. It may be worthy to note at this point that NSCID No _ 's 1 and 2 were discussed approved, and issued in their original forms prior to 5,6449 when the FBI was designated 2 momber 'of the Intelligence Advisory Comnittee NSCID No . 3 on Coordination of Intelligence Production contains definitions 0f various types of intelligence (including tbose defined in NSCID No _ 1) and then delineates primary responsibilities for " producing" intelligence among various agencies $ stating witn rebpeci to CIA: "The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviot Bloc and scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern_ Further } the Central Intelligence Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities 0f the Director 0f Central Intelligence t Since } as noted hereinbefore , "collection" activities are defined in NSCID No _ 2; it would seem t0 follow that the word "produce" 25 used in NSCID No _ 3 has the same definition as set out in a footnote to NSCID No _ 1, paragraph 4 , i.@. , "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security_ #f Thus 1 NSCID No _ 3 would not appear to extond CIA' $ jurisdiction to collect intelligence or be operational in any wey . The :remiining NSCID*& appear to have no"bearing 01 the subject matter 0f foreign inteiligence collection 1n tbe United States. 25 NW88608Deeld 32989629-Page 303 1 , 8., by ================================================== Page 304 ================================================== Director of Central Intelligence Directives To implement the National Security Act 0f 1947 25 amonded and the various National Security Council Intelligonce Directives issued pursuant thereto the Director of Central Intelligence has issued 2umerous Directives (DCID' s) The first of these having a direct bearing on jurisdictional matters is DCID No _ 2/3 , captioned "Domestic Exploitation of Nongovernmental Organizations and Individuals 111 NSCID No _ 2 , paragraph 7 , states that CIA shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the U, S_ 0f such organizations ana individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. therefore, have avoided and should avoid any operations among nongovernmental organizations and individuaIs designed solely to produce foreign intelligence without CIA prior approval or nullification of these provisions DCID No 2/3 provides for exploitation of nongovernmental U, S , citizens by CIA domestic field offices and states "In cases where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has indicated an eperetiona] interest in 2 U. S . citizen, Central Intelligence Agency Wili coordinate with that agency prior to further contact,# This DCID also provides for exploication by CIA domestic field offices 0f 'aliens following 2 prior name check with FBI So our statutory obligations may be properly met without CIA interference. It is 0f possible interest to note that in dealing with these two matters, DCID No 2/3 refers to nongovernmental U_ 8 _ citizens but only to aliens (without the restrictive adjective) _ The NSCID on which it i5 based refers to nongrovernmental individuals without distinguishing between citizens and aliens , Thus there appears to have been an intention to confine CIA' s inteiligence exploitation functions within the U, S_ A review of our file on CIA (62-80750) indicates this might well have been a concession to the Bureau since we went on record opposing delegation 0f any intelligence collection functions within the U: S_ to CIA in Jetters to Lieutenant General Hoyt S . Vandenberg (then Director of Central Intelligence Group) on June 25 , 1946_ (Serial 96) August 6 1946 (Serial 138) and August 23 , 1946, (Serial 222} wkich have been discussed more fully under the heading "Nationai Intelligence Authority_ 26 N 88608Docld:32989629Page 305 We , ================================================== Page 305 ================================================== DCID No 2/8 is captioned "Domestic Exploitation 0f U. S . Government Organizations and Officials_ Mi It begins in very general terms , "Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No _ 1 and NSCID No_ 2 _ It provides, "Tho Contral Intolligonco Agency shall coordinate and have the primary responsibility for "exploitation of the foreign intelligence potential of non-USIB organizations and officials to moot community neods 88 2 service of common concern M1 As set forth above ) there seems to be no basis for such CIA jurisdiction in NSCID No 1 and No _ 2 _ Paragraph 7 of NSCID No_ 2 specifically restricts CIA in this area of operations to nongovernmental organizations and individuals _ 4 review 0f our U, S . Intelligence Board (USIB) file, 62-90718 shows following apropos this matter: The Draft Minutes 0f the 3/21/61 USIB meeting report that the Board approved the draft of 2 DCID on "Domestic Exploitation of U, S . Government Organizations and Officials Tf which would be issuea a5 DCID No_ 2/8 Giieciive 3/21/61 . Mr _ Belmont was present at this USIB meeting 25 the FBI representative (unnumbered serial between serials 1131 & 1132, USIB file) Tracing this subject matter back through the USIB file it was learned that it apparently was first considered at the meeting heid 2/23/60 at which the Bureau was represented by Fred A Frohbose_ The minutes for that meeting reported the Board agreed in principle that 2 directive on Intelligence Exploitation of U. S _ Governmental officials would be desirable_ However } the matter was referred to the Committee on Domestic Exploitation for further study and the submission of 2 revised draft for Board consideration_ (unnumbered serial between serials 1040' & 1041, USIB file) From the foregoing it would appear that the Bureau concurred in the Issuance of this particular Directive and tnus to an extension of CIA's overt collection activities in the U; S. if this should, in fact , be interpreted as an extension_ DCID 4/1 provides for the establishment Of the Interagency Defector Comnittee. 27 NW-88608Deeld 32989629--Page-305 ================================================== Page 306 ================================================== DCID' s 4/2 and 4/3 relate to the Defector Program abroad and domestically respectively_ The latter ono dwells on division of responsibiiities between IBI and CIA in the handling of dcfectors within the continental limits of thc United Statos It provides that exploitation 0f such dofoctors shall bo conducted: 1 To obtain internal security information or other data required by TBI in view 0f its statutory responsibilitios in the internal security field, 2 _ To obtain foreign intelligence information required in che interests 0f national security by the member agencies 0f the USIB _ 3, For such other purposes as are deened to be in the interests of national security_ The very next sentence then gives the implication that exploitation of the defector for foreign intelligence purposes is the principal responsibility of CIA } for it reads , "Decision a5 to the relative importance of internal security exploitation by FBI and foreign intelligence exploitation by the Central Intelligence Agency {CIA} shall be made jointly bv representatives 0f CIA and FBI_ Tf There then follows a listing Qf nine specific FBI responsibilities $ one of which is to make available to CIA foreign intelligence information resulting from the initial exploitation of defectors There is no subsequent specific delineation of CIA responsibility over foreign intelligence explaitation until there is 2 transfer of respons_bility for handling 2 defector from FBI to CIA after FBI interests have been fully satisfied_ There is a general assignment of such responsibility to CIA in the terms "CIA shall be responsible for: a _ Coordinating the activities 0f other departments and agencies concerned with defector matters , ff except those responsibilities assigned exclusively tq FBI As a matter 0f practice, 1f it is determined there is 1ittle or no importance from an internal security standpoint in connection with a particular defection, we do not take over but in effect give clearance to CIA to proceed from a foreign intellir gence standpoint _ DCID' s in the 5/ series (numbers one through five) were issued principally to 'implement NSCTD Number 5 which deals with U, S , espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities abroad. There appears to be no conflict with FBI jurisdiction in this series . A1l other DCID' s relate to 'Elint Critical Intelligence and other matters. which appear to have no bearing on possibie conflicts between CIA and FBI responsibilities. 28 NI88608-Docld32989629-Page 306 ================================================== Page 307 ================================================== d. Dulles_Comnitteez1949 The Dulles Committee was appanted February 3 , 1948 by the National Security Council (NSC) to makce a "comprohengiva, impartial and objectivo survey of the organization, activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ." The Committee was instructed tc report it8 findings and racommendatons on the following matters: (a) The adequacy and effectivonebs 0f Ihe organization structure of CIA (b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities . (c) The relationship 0f these activities to those of other departments and agencies _ (4), The utilization and qualifications cf CIA personnel. The Committee' s scope was extended on March 17 ) 1948 , to include the following provisions "This survey will comprise primarily 3 thorough and comprehensive examination of the structure administration, activities and icter-agency relatione ships of the CIA a5 outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council It Will also include an examination of such intelligence activities 0f: other Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make recommendations for their effective operation and overall coordination Thls report, which is dated January 1, 1949_ 1 for the most part concerned itself with administrative matters affecting CIA and tbe necessity for reorganization Within that Agency _ It notes, however , that the National Security Act, as implemented by directives of the NSC , imposed upon CIA responsibility for carrying out three essential functions; (1) The coordination of intelligence activities_ '(2) The correlation and evaluation 0f intelligence relating to the national security, which has been interpreted by directive 88 meaning the production*_ 0f national intelligence _ # * * * # * * * * * * ##$ # # # % X See definition of "produce" in.footnote to. NSCID No _ 'Section 46 as "correlate aad evaluate, M the reverse of connotation given: here. 29 N88608-Doeld32989629Page 307 1, ================================================== Page 308 ================================================== (3) The performance centrally, subject to NSC direction, of certain intelligence and related functions 0f common concern to verious departments of the Govornment The report noted that Section 102 0f the National Security Act of 1947 established a framework for a bound intelligenco system and no amondment to that Soction of tho Act was deomed necessary . Although the coordination of intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies concerned With national security was 2 primary reason for establishing CIA the report noted the National Security Act does not give CIA independent authority to coordinate intelligence activities, a5 final responsibility to establish policies was vested in the NSC _ The statutory limltations upon the authority of CIA to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of the NSC were, according to the report , obviously designed to protect the autonomy and internal arrangements 0f the various departments and agencies performing intelligence functions In spite of these calculatea iimitations 04 tia.&ithcrity 28 CIA, the report noted, it was clear the Agency was expected to provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated intelligence system In practico 9 the NSC has almost without exception approved the recommendations subnitted to it by CIA for the coordination 0f intelligence activities_ The National Security Act does not define the "intelligence activities" which were to be coordinated CIA under the direction of tbe NSC or specify the departments whose activities were covered , Presumably ; according to the report all intelligence activities relating to the national security were included, fron collecting information in the first instance to. the preparation and dissemination of finished intelligence reports and estimates "The criterion 11 which the report noted was a very broad one was "Such .intelligence activities as relate to tbe national security and not: the identity of the. departments concerned or thbe nature or locale of the intelligence activity _ 10 Thus , the report noted practically no limitations arG set upon the scope of the inteili- gence activities with Which thbe Central Intelligence Agency 1s to concern itself_ 30 Nw-88608_Doeld:32989629_Page 308 by ================================================== Page 309 ================================================== The report noted another broad field requiring coordination is that of foreign intelligence derived from domestic sources and the allied field of domestic counter- intelligence This includeg tho oxploitation of intolligonce fron United States business firms , travellers , etc exploitation of the intelligence possibilities of groups and individuals of foreign nationality in the United Statos tho rolating 0f domostic counterintelligenco to foreign intelligence and the coordination of domestic counterespionage with counterespionage abroad _ Except for the exploitation 0f private sources 0f forelgn intelligence in the United States which is centralized in the Office 0f Operations CIA, responsibility for other activities 1s scattered among the State Department , the armed services , the TBI and CIA The FBI Which has primary security and Law enforce_ ment responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important area of intelligence _ This includes domestic counterespionage and countersabotage, control of communist and other subversive activities and surveillances 0f alien individuals and groups _ A1l of these functions according :0 the report are closely relaied iu ihle cUwpafable activities abroad cf tk8 CIA The report noted the FBI was not. part of the then existing machinery for courdination of intelligence through the Intelligence Advisory Committee_ and there was no continuing manner whereby domestic intelligence and counterintelligence were related to overall national intelligence in order to serva 'the general purpose set forth in the Nationel Security Act, Wbich was set forth a5 "of coordinating the intelligence activitieg of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security. 11 It was the opinion of the authors of the Dulles Report that CIA had the duty under the Act to concern itself with the problem of coordinating those phases of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence which relate to the national security and CIA should Submit recommendations on this: subject to the "NSC . The report noted this wes: not inconsistent With the stipulation 0f the National Security Act that CIA "shall bave n0 police_ subpoena , law , epforcement powers or ipternal.securtty #unctions NW 88608'Docld: 32989629_Page_309 ================================================== Page 310 ================================================== The Dulles Commission recommended that the FBI Should be made 2 member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to improve coordination 0f domostic intelligence and countor- intelilgence insofar 88 these matters related to tho national security, While discussing the production of National Intelligence Estimates by CIA the report noted "There i8 no systematic way of tapping that domestic igceiligeece information, which should be chiefly in the hands 0f the FBI ; having 8 bearing on broader intelligence issues: and thore is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by the FBI and for the use of intelligence from domestic sourcos in a national estimate_ Ii National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 7 provided that CIA shall be "esponsible for the exploitation, on 2 highly selective basis 9 within tbe United States 0f business concerns other non-Governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information, The. renort concluded the amount 02 foreign intelligence which can be obtained through the exploitation 01 nol-Guveriiicnti] sources in the United States 18 considerable and its quality could be very high 1f appropriate arrangenents were made and discrimination wzs employed , It was felt the vast number 0f organizations institutions and individuals having foreign interests and knowledge represented a potential source of intelligence that in many ways was superior to any other, aS it was felt that they were in a position to provide information obtained from tbeir foreign contacts and from the findings on their own people abroad A further important source of information, che exploitation for intelligence purposes 0f Zoreign individuals and groups in the United States Vas also being developed _ The report noted that these individuals and groups 2s well 28 political refugees and former foreign government officials were often engaged in pOTitiCal activity with Blgnificant international implications CIA -and other intelligence agencies had not developed coordinated and effective policies and procedures for the exploitation 0f intellizence In this important field_ The FBI, 'according to. the report_ had a._ major interest i4 foreign 32 NW-88608-Doeld-32989629-Page 310 ================================================== Page 311 ================================================== individuals ana groups in the United States becausa of possible security implications The report Indicated tho TBI possessed considerable information concorning many individuals and grcups but this information had been obtained primarily With security rother than intelligence considerations in mind and was not normally given the kind of interpretation or dissemination that intelligence required 1f it W2s to be properly used . It was also noted the FBI wa8 , in cases rhere it had a security interest reluctant on security groundg to have intelligence exploitation by outside agencies The general result 0f this situation according to the report was that an important source of inteiligence was not being fully exploited. The report noted that the question of the exploitation for intelligence purposes 0f foreign groups and" individuals in the United States Was a clear example where the Intelligence Advisort Committee, with the FBI being added 8s a member , should establish principles and rules for coordination In diccucoing the edninistrative handling of espionage and counterespionage matters Within the CIA 2 the report noted the FBI was charged with all counterespionage responsibilities in the United States except those affecting personnel of the armed services The Dulles Commission recommended the counterespionage activities of CIA should be increased in scope and emphasis and that closer lialson in this field should be established witb the FBI _ The only effect the Dulles Report had on the FBI was its inclusion as 2 member of the Intelligence Advisory Coxamittee by amendment to HSCID Number 1 dated July.7 , 1949 Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955 Task forces of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) conducted surveys of CIA operations from 1947 to 1949 (under FS Eberstadt) and from '1953 to 1955 (under General Mark Clark) 33 Ni++-88608-nocld:32989629 Pa 2 ================================================== Page 312 ================================================== The Commission concerned itself principally with the efficiency with which CIA was fulfilling its statutory. missions of coordination corrolation evaluation, and dissemination 0f the intelligencc product of other Government agencies and departments _ The Commission examined agency activity in light of the CIA primary mission of advising NSC and performing, services and duties related to intelligence and national security 28 the NSC directed, (1a) Eberstadt Task Force Report The results 0f the first examination of CIA by the Hoover Commission were more or less apologetic in tone emphasizing the soundness of directives setting up NSC and its direction 0f the Agency _ The report pointed out however that CIA and its parent NSC , had had little time to actually implement the coordination necessary for leadership in the field_ The Task Force clearly defined its understanding of the CIA mission 2s ; coordinate intelligence activities of Federal agencies concerned with national security." The duties of CIA were listed aS : 1_ Advise National Security Council on national security intelligence activities of Federal departments and agencies: 2 . Recommend necessary coordination of such activities to' National Security Council_ 3 _ Correlate, evaluate and disseminate national security intelligence _ 4 , Render intelligence services for other Federal departments_ and agencies_ 110 (62-88575-3 enclosure behind file.) In discussing the duties 0f the CIA the Task Force noted, "Under the statute CIA is entrusted With the performance of such services 0f- common concern aS the National Security Council shall determine. At present these include apart from Scientific Intelligence= which is discussed separately: (a) maintenance of central indexes of report records and documents having intelligence value; (b) examination 0f foreign documents from which intelligence material is extracted and disseninated; (c) maintenance 0f central map facilities; (a) monitoring 0f foreign broadcasts; and (e) collection of the information by clandestine means and counterespionage abroad." 34 Nw-88608_Doeld;32989629_Raqe ================================================== Page 313 ================================================== In evaluating the operations and location of CIA counterespionage the Task Force commented a5 follows ; "The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear properly integrated with CIA's other clandostine operations Although arguents have been made in favor of extending CIA' & authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this Country such an extension of Jurisdiction does not 2 present appear justified_ For one thing, - concentration of power over counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director 0f Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might justifiably arouse public suspicion and opposition. Conceivably it could form the basis for 2 charge that a gestapo is in process of creating even though the pomer to arrest were specifically withheld, To transfer responsibility for domestic counterespionage from the FBI , which has an established organization and long tradition to CIA which is not equipped for the assignment would probably create more problems than it would solve_ It is doubtful whether the logical benefit of having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such Z txensfer wovld inevitablv occasion_ "CIA representatives have indicated that their present working liaison with FBI is satisfactory but the Committee doubts that FBI-CIA relationships are completely adequate_ The Director of FBI declined the Committee's invitation to appeer before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its representatives on the ground that he Inew too little of its activities_ J The groundwork for CIA acceptance was leid by the Committee recommendation and finding: "CIA is not now properly organized. Co-equal improvement in G-2 FBI, ONI State Department , and other Government intelligence services is also essential_ Spirit of teamwork must govern interagency intelligence relationships _ CIA deserves and must have greater degree of acceptance aud support from old-line intelligence :services than it has had in the past i A pitch was made for a single agency controlling internal security in the Committee' s . finding: "The committee believes that responsibility for internal security policies should be immediately focused in one agency . A more thorough study of the' subject than any yet made must be prosecuted and interagency frictions must be endea." It is noted that the committee commented elsewhere in its report: & 35 . = NW 88608-Docld 32989629-Page-H13 ================================================== Page 314 ================================================== "Detailed study of or ganization and activities 0f intelligence divisions of the Government including CIA, i8 being made by 2 committee consisting 0f Messrs_ Allon Dulles, Milliam E . Jackson, and Mathias Correa, assistcd by 2 staf1 of four directed by Mr _ Robert Blum of the Office 0f Secretary of Defense _ M With this statement it may be assumed the Task Force excused omlssions it may have mado with the observation that the Dulles group waa conducting almost the same survey carried on in the Hoover Commission s0 far 88 CIA was involved_ (1b) Clark Task Force Report The Task Force headed by: General Mark Clark submitted a Secret report dated in May 1955 , setting forth results of the second Hoover Commission survey of tbe organization of CIA _ The report pointed out the survey was of departments and agencies with entire or prime responsibility in the field 0f positive foreign intelligence 2s it pertains to pational defense and security. It 9ual.1fied this survey when speaking of the FBI, noting survey was limited to survey of Bureau to the extent that it dealt in security intelligence _ Again the Hoover Commission through its Task Force pinned CIA jurisdiction dowmi to the areas defined by statute, and emphasized the Agency was subordinate only t0 the National Security Council in it8 coordination, correlation, dissemination and' collection of intelligence data . The Task Force noted that since CIA is charged with the over-all responsibility for coordinating the output of al1 intelligence forces, the Task Force vas giving special attention to tbe work 02 that Agency . In the Task Force Report a review of the FBI functions in the intelligence community was set forth- The committee noted that the TBI had only limited activities in the positive intelligence field but noted additionally that FBI functions in tbe current intelligence effort were of interest in order to f111 out the intelligence picture. 36 NW_88608_Docld:32989629_Page314 Top only ================================================== Page 315 ================================================== The ` FBI was cited as one of the four members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) } created by the NSC , approved by the President 3/23/49 to coordinate "tho Investigation 0f al2 domestic ospionage counteroepionato, sabotago , subversion, and other related matters affecting internal security_ M1 It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete investigative coverage in compliance with the needs 0f the IIC , which had full responsibility for coordination of the investigation 0f all domestic espionage, counterespionage , et cetera, affecting internal security The Committee stated , "The Central Intelligence Agency is by excluded Zrom duplicating the internal security functions of the FBI . However 9 the CIA does develop within and without the U . sources for foreign (positive) intelligence, and incidental thereto may develop leads as to subversive activities within this country. In such cases CIA iirough Iiaiscz gives st2 information +Q the FBI _ 19 A Task Force survey revealed "Through the Central Intelligence Agency S domestic field offices } contacts are made on 2 highly selective basis with business concerns and other nongovernmental agencies, as wel1 as with previously cleared individuals who travel abroad Under the provisions 0f DCID 7/1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee 1s required to establish in Washington a focal office for the purpose of interviewing nongovernment visitors Any visitors to these offices demonstrating good inteliigence potentiai are referred to the CIA for further Ii exploitation_ The Task Force noted that as far back as 1939 President Roosevelt by executive order directed the FBI to coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities. In 1949 8 according to the Committee 's survey the IIC was formalized and by charter restricted to coordinating investi- gations in intelligence matters domestically. NWV-88608_Docld: 32989629_Page_15 law , S. , ================================================== Page 316 ================================================== In comnenting on the role of the FBI tne Committee further notcd, "The Federal Bureau of Invesiigation, however , is the.recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal socurity including countorintolligorce Mithin tho Unitod Statez and it8 possessions_ M1 Yith regard to tha us0 and surfacing of sources, the Committee noted that CIA was not bound to disclose its sources; however it commented on the excellent lialson system of the FBI which had overcome this restriction so Zar as internal security Within the U . S _ 1s concerned . "Now , as a matter of practice ~he CIA usually refers domestic sources to the FBI, the only exception being where the source is to be used in foreign intelligence work by the CIA I{ In the arex 0f defectors within this country, the Committee noted that the FBI will receive from CIA Or a direct interrogation of 2 CIA-controlled defector information Which the defector may bave concerning internal security. Persons who defect within this country_ 9 on the other hand, were found to be under the cognizance of the FBI _ Then the reverse 0f the above situation comes into play and CIA has access to the defector for developing leads i* +k2 27c1gr intelligence #eld The Committee commented , "It is the duty of the FBI to conduct investigations 0 of al1 cases involving f-reign nationals in tbe United States a5 set forth in the Delimitations Agreement. 01 A review of the Commission report lends one important fact to our study of this subject matter. This was pointed up by the membership 0f the various groups at the disposal of the National Security Council within the field of national intelligence_ Ten subcommittees or working groups with member- ship from separate departments or interested agencies acted in advisory capacities to the IAC parent committee_ In each of these subcommittees the chairman was 2 representative of the Director of CIA and the working groups were individually serviced by 2 secretariat furnished CIL _ From the top- heavy alignment 0f CIA personnel in IAC and its working groups it was obvious in which direction advisory opinions would be slanted when dissenting matters were presented by tbe IAC end CIA to tba NSC . 38 NW88608_Docld 32989629_Rage 316 by by ================================================== Page 317 ================================================== f The_ Doolittle Comnittee 1954 In July 1954, we received information from tbo White House that the President had appointed Lieutenant General Janes E. Doolittle to study in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certain aspects of the national intelligence effort letter dated July 28 , 1954, Sherman Adans the Assistant to the President , requested that the Bureau brief General Doolittle's group concerning the relationship that existed between the Bureau and CIA_ Me subsequently learned that at approrimately the same time 8 survey would be conducted by the Hoover Commission under the chairmanship of General Mark Clark We learned from Allen Yt _ Dulles Director of CIA } that the President strongly believed that General Clark should not permit the survey to into CIA covert operations particularly in the field of political and psychological warfare The President bad told Dulles that he Was selecting General Doolittle to study CIA 1 S covert operations General Doolittle group was briefed on August 25_ 1954, at Which time the Bureau S position in the inteliigence field was described and the manner in Which the Bureau transacted business with CIA was explained . In addition_ 1 certain constructive criticism concerning problems and conflicts experienced in dealing with CIA was furnished General Doolittle's group. The following salient features of the criticism appear to bear on the current 'study: Te were critical of a policy 0f the Office 0f Operations CIA 9 which precluded tbat Division from identifying any of its sources in the United States when such sources possessed information bearing on the internal security of the United States The Office 0f Operations as 0f 1954 collected foreign intelligence information in the United States fron aliens businessmen, and others, and 'periodically:would receive information of interest- to .the Bureau Instances arose " where the ` Bureau deaired to Interview tbe original bource but Was prevented from getting to the 39 NL--886080ocid332989629 Page 317 By get 's ================================================== Page 318 ================================================== source by CIA policy We were of the opinion that CIA'8 policy could be modified to allow uS direct accoss to tbe sourco in the United States when such was necossary . As of 1954, CIA had intorost in various organizations such aS Radio Free Europe and others and from time to time the Bureau would get Involved in investigation of organizations only to learn they were being supported or guided CIA Our opinion was that 1f we bad been appropriately notified of CIA s interest considerable investigative time and manpower could bave been saved and in addition we would bave been in a position to notify CIA when anything of interest came to our attention Concerning CIA investigations in the United States wle readily acknowledged CIA 8 s right to investi gate its own applicants or consultants_ We did object to CIA's undertaking any investigation in this country V hen the facts indicated the case was clearly within Bureau jurisdiction and pointed out that the Bureau bad recently become involved in investigating an individual suspected of espionage activity _ Ne were in contact with CIA and bad solicited its help concerning certain aspects in the case but it was 2 few weeks before we learned CIA had conducted a very close investigation of this sam0 individual We made the observations that close and open cooperation between the Bureau and CIA was: vital to the proper handling of espionage cases The Bureau pointed out that as of 1954 it hbad received Zittle or no significant: information concerning espionage or sabotage agents coming- to the United States Te excluded diplomatic personnel .in this matter but clearly indicated that CIA should be in 2 position to give u8 some advance notification when spies were coming t0 this country 40 N88e08 2989629_Page I18 by ================================================== Page 319 ================================================== Possibly this latter was the strongest criticism we had since we dia not feel CIA with 1t8 resources and overseas contacts was performing one of its prime functions in the intelligence fi8ld; that is idontifying foroign illegals who are en routo to the United States_ During our briefing of General Dool:ttle s group, WG described the Bureau S collection 0f intelligence information for the interested Government agencies as 2 major operation_ Our discharge of our intelligence operation concerning the Communist Party and Soviet and Satellite diplomats was explained in detail to the satisfaction of all personnel attending the briefing General Doolittle asked for recommendations 25 to what could be done to improve CIA So the Bureau would better service It was suggested that corrective action be taken on the matters which had been criticized constructively; CIA should establish adequate coverage (although not specifically noted this obviously regarded advance notice of foreign intelligence personnel coming to the United States);. and finally CIA should transmit information developed in an czp2dite foskicn- Prior to submitting the report to the President General Doolittle expressed a desire to see Mr Hoover whom he regarded as the outstanding intelligence authority in the world The General visited the Director on October 5 , 1954 , during which visit CIA S operations were discussed and generally the points of the previous meeting were reiterated _ General Doolittle felt the ideal solution would be to Wipe out CIA entirely and start all over again, but since this was impractical his committee would point out certain weaknesses and make certain recommendations and suggestions to the President for the correction of these weaknesses. We do not have the contents of General Doolittle's report and there is nothing to indicate an executive order was issued from it which in any way delineated the respective jurisdiction 0f the Bureau or 0f CIA g The Joint_Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities Of The United Sta tes Governent Captioned report was prepared by the Study Group and ibsued 12/15/60 . The' Group was under tbe chairmanship of 41 4 NI88608Docld: 32989629-Pager319 get ================================================== Page 320 ================================================== Lyman B Kirtkpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) acting as a representative 0f tha Director 0z Central inteiligence (DCI) The other four membors of the Study Group represented tho Department of Stato 9 Secrotary of Dofense Buraau 0f the Budget, and the National Security: Council (NSC) Tho statod targots 02 examination by the Group were organizational and management aspects within the intelligence effort relating to 811 aspects of foreign intelligence _ In the confines 0f these objectives the Bureau was not considered for examination by the Group in view of the Bureau S lack of operational jurisdiction in matters outside 0f this country_ Hr Be Imont acting for the Bureau, gave a briefing before the Group on ` 7/29/60 regarding the Bureau's relations with other United States intelligence agencies There was no mention made of the Bureau in the report except in one of its recommendations relative to reorganization of the membership of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which will be dealt with in more detail later The 141 pge report swbmi++ed by the Group appeared to be apologetic in tone for any shortcomings of CIA_ The reader obtains the definite impression the report was used 25 a sounding board for differences of opinion as to methods and administration for collection of foreign intelligence (overt and covert) abroad The main basis for conclusions and recommendations made by the Group rested in delineation of duties f DCI as coordinator 0f intelligence as opposed to DCI secondary responsibility a5 head of CIA_ The Group recognized service jealousies apparently resulting from refusal toaccept the fact that DCI could control and coordinate intelligence effort withouk affording preferential treatment to CIA which was his operational and administrative arm _ There 16 no reference in the report to a clear definition of CIA operational responsibilities or jurisdiction within continental United States. The Group found that DCI through heads of missions abroad and designated DCI representatives in foreign countries had principal responsibility for control and coordination of foreign collection efforts The CIA s operations abroad vere recognized i0 almost all 43 -of the Group 8 recommerdations 42 4 NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 320 ================================================== Page 321 ================================================== Recommendation nuber 17 emphasized that CIA should place emphasis on the establishment 0f unofficial cover throughout the world; recommendation number 20 was that CIA should increase intelligence support to unifiod and component commandors by direct dissomination from pertinent ffeld stations The report noted that CIA's main requirenents problem related to clandestine collection and concerned the great. number 0f requirements served on the Agency . The main tone of the report was that greater cooperation was required between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS Departnent Of State, and CIA in carrying out foreign {JceliiBexce collection missions The recommendations 0z the Group were a11 directed toward this end and had no bearing on internal espionage or counterespionage activities within the United States In commenting on the coordination duties of the DCI , the Group pointed out that USIB had been officially dlrected to "establish policies and develop programs for t.8 gufdance 6f a13 departienta aid ag8nci28 conceried; th8 DCI is authorized to make such surveys 0f departmental intelligence activities or the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection With bis duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence effort Of the United States M The report interpreted these official directions to indicate that USIB should assume 8 greater proportion of the actual direction and control of the intelligence community of which the Bureau was noted to be a member Tc strengthen USIB position 2S a director, coordinator, and controller of intelligence effort, the Group recommended (recommendation number 30) that the USIB should be reduced to four members Fho should be the DCI (chairman) and representatives 0f ` Secrecary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs 0f Staff The FBI and the Atonic Energy Commission would be relegated to &d hoc representation on tbe Board _ 43 4 NW.88608_Docld:32989629_Page-321 ================================================== Page 322 ================================================== It should be noted in considering the proposed change of USIB membership that the Bureau was & member 0f six of the twenty-six gubcommittees which formed the committee makecup 0f the US IB . Hemorandum January 10 , 1961 } Mr : Belmont to Mr Parsons outlined che proposed USIB membership change for the Director It recommended that Bureau make no is8u0 0f the proposed recommendation The Director underlined & passage of the memorandum which stated 01 In one sense 0f the word it could be arzjed the FBI would lose prestige by changing from a regular member to an ad hoc member I The Director epproved the recommendation of the memorandum with the following notation: "O.K_ but I am not enthusiastic about the change of our statub H M Our status 9 hovever , wab not changed and the Bureau bas continued to hold full member- ship on the Board _ In brief the Joint Study Group Report noted that the majority of the recommendations of the Scudy Group had beer fevorebly recpfved bv the intelligence community in that positive action had been taken to place most of them in effect. Many of the recommendations of the Group were felt to have been met by the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which acted 85 8 coordinator and overseer of the intelligence effort of the Joint Chiefs of Staff There is no comment made in thi8 report which would bear on our present survey of CIA jurisdiction or activities within the United States in conflict with our own jurisdictional and investigative interests The only reference to the Bureau in this latter report T88 28 previously mentioned in the comment reletive to reorganization of tbe membership of the US IB _ 5 _ Regponsibilities 0f the_FBI 8 , Laws and_Directives No information has been developed With respect to" . any laws passed or directives igsued specifically delegating to the FBI responsibilities for the positive acquisition of foreign intelligence in the United Stetes Ag ba8 been Bet 44 Nt-88608_pocld32989629-Pamn 322 ================================================== Page 323 ================================================== forth above under the caption, "The History of Foreign IntellLgence Collection in the United States 0 Prior to Morld War II, "1 President Roosevelt conducted certain conferences following whlch he issued iustructions with regard to invostigations of fascist and communist activitios In tho United Stetoa 0 Thobo investigations were to be for Intelligence purposes For the most part, they took on 8 counterintelligence 86pect; however 9 during the course of them foreign intelligence Information wa8 developed either a5 an outgrowth 0f investigative activity or through the conducting 0f technicel surveillanceb _ We found no record regarding the designation of the FBI a5 the agency responsible for collection of foreign intelligence information in' the United States a8 of the time the Office of Coordinator of Information was created om 7/11/41S Neither did wG find any record indicating such respongibflity bad been delegated to any other agency . b Requests From Other Agencies From time to time the Bureau has received specific requesis ErOm otier agwzcicc baged wpon which wA have undertaken the collection of foreign intelligence {nformation in the United States in 8 clandestine fashiona Twzo instances of tbis nature were based on requeste from the Department 0z State end from' the Whito House 0 (1) Department of State Request Ja Recognizing a gap in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments_ on 10/21/55 we discussed with the then Deputy Undersecretary of State, Robert Murphy , the question of instituting limited discreet technical surveillances on official establishmenta 0f selected foreign nations principally those located in world trouble areas_ Fe pointed out that the FBI stood ready to institute such coverege as might be desired by the Department Of State, Mr Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating that-limited coverage sufficiently flexible to' change with changing world: conditions might be highly desirable After Yurmer discussionb "i# was" agreed thot a:program;."progressive" in nature 2 would be ingtituted. By this Hr _ Murphy explained that he did not feel at that time that e1l desirable coverage should be instituted at a given date, but rather that coverage Should be placed on one country at 2 time 8s moving events abroad might dictate_ 'Ox" thiz bast8 thig type coverage t38 Ingtituted;. 45 Wf88608 Nn0 ================================================== Page 324 ================================================== based on a specific request from Mr Murphy on 12/5/55 that TFO place technical surveillances on ali Egyptian establishment: 1n the United States_ Since then, technical burveillanceg have been placed on numeroub establishments of foreign countrieg for 0ithor extondad or limitod porlodg of time , doponding upon developments on the intornational cene. (2) White Houso Request 5 Ir 1965 , President Johnson advised the Director be wanted the TBI to. eet up a group in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of taking charge of cleaning out comunists in the Dominican Government and advibing tha Government of those who might try to infiltrate Government ranks This was the basis for opening our Santo Domfngo Office, which has continued operation since, 5/21//65 . As a result of maintaining our Dominican Office and assisting in it8 mission, we have instituted various technical surveillances and developed numarous live sources in the United States from which we regularly acquire foreign Intelligence ~information. Since the President has relied on the Bureau to keep him apprised of developments from an intelligence standpoint as we 11 as developments with respect to communist influence , these sources are regularly cjitactez fcr Infermetton phich fits Within the terms of foreign intelligence data. C FBI ' s Role in the United StatesIntelligence Board The predecessor to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was the Intelligence Advisory Committee the IAC was established by National Security Council fntolilgence Directive (NSCID) number 1 dated 12/12/47 By amendment to this Directive dated 7/7/49 the Bureau Wa8 designated 9 member of the IAC for the purpose 0f coordinating domestic intelligence vith" foreign intelligence _ NSCID 1 has been revised several times Subsequent to 8 revision dated 4/21/58, the President Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board merged the IAC and tbe U, S . Communications Intelligence Board into one body known as the United States Intelligence Board. National Security Council Directive dated 9/15/58 approved by the President, formally created the United States Intelligence Board a8_ successor to the IAC and the U 8_ Communication8 Intelligence Boara, Tbe USIB in it8 present form 18 chaired by the Dtrector '0f Centrel- Intelligences The Director 0f . Central 46 MWEB68 _Docld.2989629_Paje 3z4 May 's ================================================== Page 325 ================================================== Intelligence 1s distinguished from the Director 0f Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that the Director of Central Intelligence a5 Chairman 0f the United Stateg Intelligence Board 1s considered the Presidont'& principal advibor on foreign intolligence_ Memborship on tho Unitod Statob Intelligence Board consists 0f the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Director of CIA; the Director of the Defense Inteliigence Agency the Director of the National Security Agency; the Assistant General Manager for Aduinistration 9 Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the FBI The primary responsibiiity 0f the US IB is the coordination of intelligence activities_ In this regard, US IB S major effort i8 concerned With the preparation and approval 0f National Intelligence Estimates (NIL) for u80 by policy makers . As a rule , the Bureau does not perticipate in the' preparation of NIE's inasmuch 25 the subject matter i8 usually outside the jurisdiction of this Bureau. Fe have in the past _ participated i0 some selective NIE'8 such as certain estimateg on Cuba , world communism, the clandestine Lntroduction 0f euclear weapone into tha Tnited States and on the DomInicen Republic. As part of its staffing procedure 9 USIB has created numerous committees in some of which the Bureau maintains membership. The USIB committees on which the Bureau has representation are the Technical Surveillance Counterneasures Committee the Signal Intelligence Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee. the Watch Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee the Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Secur Committee, and the Comittee on Documentation As a general rule attendance at Committee sessions 1s handled by the Liaison Section_ Attendance at meetings is in the main restricted to the Interagency Defector Committee the Watch Committee, the Security Committee the Technical Surveillance Countermeasureg Committee and tbe Connittee on Documentation: The Bureau has a primary interest in the business of these five committees A1l decisions made by these committees Fhich are subgequently approved the USIB , ar0 the subject of individual memoranda subnitted to the Director for hig approvale 47 NW 88608_Docld:32989629_Page 325 ity by ================================================== Page 326 ================================================== Over the years consideretion has been given to the Bureau'8 Withdrawing It8 membership from US IB On each occasion the Director has chosen to have the Bureau rotain its membership on tha Board The last such occasion occurred in 1964 during the period when John KcCone was Chairman 0z the United States Intelligence Board _ At that time, the military services ware removed from membership on the Board and replacad by the Defense Intelligence Agency At the time, Mr Belmont, then Assistant to the Director orally discussed With the Director the possibility of the Bureau'& withdrawing from the US IB _ The Director 9 comments were that we would not requegt removal from membership on the Board but would withdraw our membership only if S0 requested by the Director of Central Intelligence in his role as Chairman of tha US IB _ The Bureau '8 withdrawal Would, of course requlre action on the part of the National Security Council d , The President'8 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) This group was originally organized in January_ 1956 , aS the President S Boara Oi Couyutints cii Fozoig:: iutcii_gozce Activity Its primary function at that time was to revlem periodically the Government's foreign intelligence efforts with specific emphasis on the operations 0f the Central Intelligence Agency It was established 4s 8 result of recommendations by the Hoover Commission In the later years of the Eisenhower Administration the activity of the group fell off and it was re-organized in its present form with the advent of the Kennedy Adiinistration Our relationship with this Board hag historically been one of informal lieison in view 0f the fact that the primary function of the Board is concerned with foreign intelligence There bave been occasions where representatives of the Bureau briefed individual members end/or panels of the Board concerning our jurisdiction techniques and accomplishments in the intelligence field. These briefings have been received: with a receptive and sympathetic attitude Our main concern in following the activities 0f this Board has been' to assure that the Central' Intelligence Agency does not encroach upon our j"risdiction and upon the functions of the verious intelligence communities in whlcb RG bold memberebip 48 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 326 ================================================== Page 327 ================================================== The case Involving Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap, a former employee of the National Security Agency who w28 a Soviet espionage agent was thoroughly reviemod by the present PFIAB in view of the most serioug ramifications 1t presented This case concerned the penetration by the Soviets of the National Security Agency The report which emanated from the PFIAB Btudy included proposals which aZfect the responsibilities and activities of beveral agencies within the intelligence community A1l of the twenty-one recommendations of the Board dealt with various aspects of achieving a strengthened counterintelligence capability to guard against penetration of our security establishments by hostile intellio gence agenc ies Nineteen of the recommendations of the Boerd were approved by the President &nd three of these related alrectly to Bureau activity. They are a8 follows: #18: "That steps be taken to assure that tho Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate agent resources to effect the required domestic counterintelligence coverage of both bloc and nonbloc official installations and personnel who may be engagea iIl 1Ls ielligence 8n& related activities inimical to the national security." #19; "That the policies of the Department of State with respect to authorizing technical coverage (use 0f wiretapping and listening devices) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of foreign official: installations and personnel in this country be re_examined with 2 ~view to liberalization to the extent necessary to provide the counterintelligence coverage required in the interest of national security_ M #20: "That , in future when consideration 1s given to exchanging detected Soviet_bloc intelli- gence agents for imprisoned American personnel in bloc countries advance consultationg be held with X 84 Central- Intelligence Agency and the Federe1 Bureau of Investigation to assure that adequate attention is given al intelligence aspecte of such proposed exchanges in the interest 0f the national Security, weighed againgt tbe political gains to be achieved 49 NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Pagez1 ================================================== Page 328 ================================================== e The Director's Stand Over the_Yeerg The Director'6 stand ovor the yoars with respect to jurisdiction concerning foreign Inteliigence matterg within the United States is reflected in numerou8 commenta he has made dating back to the days when tha Central Intelligence Group .(CIG) was being formed _ In June 1946, General Vandenberg , then heaa of CIG sent a memorandum to the Director proposing that the National Intelligence Authority issue 2 directive extending the powers and duties of the Director of Contral Intelligence , Which position General Vandenberg occupied, The memorandum was ana Iyzed on June 21 , 1946, in 2 memorandum from C. H_ Carson to D_ M _ Ladd in which it was pointed out that it was inevitable that CIG must enter into the domestic picture because of sources of foreign intelligence in that field An addendum was placed on the memorandum by Mr Edward A , Tamm and Mr C_ A Tolson which was followed by comments by the Director Which is most pertinent to the subject matter iudez discusaiom Fhz ~ddondur r2d: M Mr Tolson and Mr Tamm do not concur with the conclusion expressed i0 this memorandum that 'It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that field. They feel that 8 coordinated pro- gram for the exchange of information between the Central Intelligence Authority and the FBI, permitting a free and comprehensive exchange of information in matters Of mutual interest, will enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field without interference from the Central Intelligence Authority in the same manner that the Bureau works , for example with local police departments or other governmentei agencies within defined jurisdictional lines We believe that the attached letter to General Vandenberg i8 satisfactory. " The Director commented 29 follows: (' I am not as optimistic 85 are Tolgon & -Tamm T tmink it 18 ineviteble that there-Will :be &- collision witb CIG over our domestic jurisdiction 50 NW-88608Docld332989629Page328 ================================================== Page 329 ================================================== or rather their expansion into it on intelllgence matters It ought not occur but this new memo of CIG shows how greedy it 18 _ It 18 the Donovan plan almost in toto & 18 boing olyly put over It means we must zealously guard our domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch & be ever alert resist any encroachment On March 27 1 1953 , the Director testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations In response to 8 question from Senator McCarran concerning liaison between FBI and CIA, the Director stated; {'There is close liaison CIA has exclusive jurisdiction abroad for intelligence _ We bave exclusive jurisdiction within the United States We maintain continuous liaison with CIA Headquarters in Washington through 8 liaison representative of our Bureau in order to facilitate the transmission of material from them to us and from our service to them ff In October 1958 CIA approached us requesting cir corcurrence in CI4'9 extablishing phygical and technical surveillance in the United States on the Wrother of the then current ruler of Yemen CIA had an operational interest in this individual_ By memorandum it was recommended that thbe Burezu not become involved in this CIA operation ana that CIA be informed that this would not establish 2 precedent for approval of future CIA activities in the United States Responsive to continuing to present problems the Director noted: "This is an understatement particularly if we ar0 going to adopt 8 macaroni backbone attitude instead 0f standing up forthrightly for our rights and jurisdiction 18 CIA, in April 1959 _ advised uS that one of its Egyptian sources would be visiting the United States 9 and requested our concurrence in CIA '& establishing coverege including technical surveillance It was recommended we stay out of this matter and inform CIA that this was not to be construed as a precedent for approval 0f future CIA counter- intelligence activity in the United States The Director comented on the memorandum; "The trend bag gone 80 far have become nothing but a rubber stamp for CIA yet they won ' t even a llow u8 to perform liaison functiong abroed much 1e88 operetional ones 51 Aweab6m8 14674 3g t0 C: we Paqe ================================================== Page 330 ================================================== In January , 1960 CIA agreed to comply with conditions imposed by the Bureau with regard to developing positive intelligence information through contacts betweon U , S , residents and visitors from Iron Curtain countries_ CIA agreod to contact 46 first before promoting such associations In March, 1960 , CIA inquired if it might obtain Bureau clearance at the field level for such contacts in the intorest of expodiancy_ Mr Tolson noted : "Mora and moro wa aro agreeing to CIA operations in the U _ S . I am opposed to this relaxation_ We can exercise better control here than through our field offices." The Director added : "I share Tolson 5 views T CIA was advised clearance was to be obtained through Bureau headquarters . Anatol 1Go11t3,8, 2 Soviet, defected in Finland in December 1961 and furnished information alleging penetration 0f American intelligence One Serge Karlow , a CIA officer was developed a5 a suspect _ On 2/9/62 _ we took over the investigation On 2/26/62 Sheffield Edwards , then CIA Director of Security admitted CIA had had technical coverage on Karlow from February_ 0 1961 to 2/9/62 Edwards clained his reluctence to t9ll US of this situation earlier because of obvious possible jeopardy to prosecution, plus embarrassment to his Agency Should the Bureau raise an objection to CIA maintaining such coverage The Director noted: "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with uS Certainly my skepticism isn t based on prejudice nor suspicion but on specific instances all too many in number Yet there exist8 wistful belief that p the leopard has changed his spots In April 1962 , we received information on a strictly confidential basis from Jay Sourwine of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that an unidentified CIA representative had talked to Senator Eastland concerning an alleged move to place CIA in charge of: &ll intelligence-gathering operations for the Government to include Soviet espionage in the U , S . The Director noted: "I am not surprised at the above alleged effort There is no doubt in many quarters a desire to eliminate the FBI in dealing with espionage and subversion for we are a thorn not only in the side of cOmmunists but also the ADA and Fabian Socialists _ CIA which failed agaln and again to know what 18 ectually going on abroad could be counted wpon to blunder f8 the same way in the USA _ 52 38648 Paqe 's ================================================== Page 331 ================================================== In April 1963 wB received information indicating that CIA Director John McCone was considering expansion of CIA operations in the United States Ge specifically intelligence covorage and the developmont 0f sourcob in thio country . Tho Director made a note on the memorandum recording this: "'McCone is trying to do another Donovan . ,1 If be injects himself into the U, the FBI gete out. Too many cooks Bpoil the brotha" In December 1963 the Director inquired as to the nature and extent 0f intelligence operations wherein CIA bad established contact with 2 diplomat 9 operated him in the U. S , with our coordination, and continued to operate him upon big baving departed this country. Four such cases were cited_ On the memorandum, the Director noted: "I have little confidence in CIA abiding by agreements if it berves its purpose better not to do so." In January, 1964 , CIA advised us it had reorganized its activities in the U. S . The Domestic Operations Division, CIA , had established field offices in this country under appropriate cover A memorandum was prepared describing the nisiory of CIA operatious i0 the 8.-8. a3# racomnenzirg eo+ion designed to protect our interests_ 4 letter went to CIA with ground rules which the Bureau expected CIA to follow in 211 matters requiring coordination. The Director noted; but I hope you are not being taken in. I can't forget CIA withholding the French espionage activities in the U . 8 _ nor the false story concerning Oswald's trip to Mexlco City, only to mention two 0f their instances of double dealing _ Tf The New York Office, by letter 2/14/64 , 9 set forth its observations concerning a briefing given that office on the matter of CIA operations in the U_ S_ The Director commented: "I think this domestic operations expansion of CIA 16 very dangerous and will inevitably muddy' the waterb . " In May , 1964 _ } the Bureau reconsidered its stand with respect to permitting CIA to approach sources at foreign establishnents in the United States for intelligence purposes. The following policy Mas proposed and subsequently approved: ;{ '(1) "Wbere there was no indication a source would be Ieaving tbe United Fe would deny CIA clearance for contact until we had adateiiy expiazed tbe person' 8 potential for our' own purpose8, If wo decided we bad G0 53 NIb8608-Dock32989629 Page 8., "OK , ================================================== Page 332 ================================================== interest and CIA contect would not Jeopardize any FBI investigations 9 we would grant CIA approval to proceed with Its contact with proviso we be kept informed 0f information developed of possible interest to u8, (2) Where Lt appeared source would be returning to a foreign country Shortly we would normally grant CIA clearance for preliminary contact With proviso wo be kept informed of results_ We reserved the right to take direct access to the source 28 our needs required, (3) Where there was an overlapping of interests and source expected to continue in United States for fairly extended period of time, in those instances whero CIA had entree and no Bureau investigation would be jeopardized we would permit CIA to explore matter and make preliminary contact keeping us advised of progrebs and getting our specific clearance before 2 direct recruitment approach; however where factors indicated it would be to best Bureau interests to operate source, we would undertake the recruitment and keep CIA advised of information of interest t0 that Agency . When these matters were submitted . for approvel Mr Tolson commented, "Looks but we Will bave to wetch this very closely, te The Director concurred in Mr, Tolson' € remark. 54 Ni_8360b Docld.32989629 Pade 332 okay , ================================================== Page 333 ================================================== D, THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U , S. In 1941, tho U 8. allegedly had in its poseossion practically a11 of tha forelgn intelligence it needed regarding military and strategic targets in Japan_ The informa Jon was scattered among various individuals who had personal krnowledge or wa8 located in libraries, various Govornment agencies 9 private business firms_ > institutions, et cetera Tragically, the U. S. Government did not have any mechaniem to collect, record and eva luate such information. Intelligence was badly needed in 1941, and we paid dearly in lives and financial resources to accomplish certain missions because the information waB not readily available. Today , the need for foreign intelligence 18 greater than ever The stakes of foreign policy bave never been higher The U S being a dominating world power , has assumed vast responsibilities enmeshed in delicate political situations throughout the world_ The ever_existing threa t of an atomic war with communist countries demanas a cuniinuing acjuirczest cf knopledge S0 thatpolicies ana courses of action can be designed ir the most effective manner possible The information needed applies to numerous fields of activity, 2 major area being scientific research and development . In thi8 connection, the revolutionary break-throughs in the scientific category are occurring with unuSually high frequency, and 1f the U, S_ is to remain in the forefront it 18 absolutely necessary that we obtain an accurate eva luation of the enemy 5 capabilities and intentions_ We have been fortunate to collect bigh quality positive intelligence through sophisticated collection methods , 1.e high altitude photography and research in this area is proceeding at an accelerated pace Nevertheless electronic gadgets and machines will never produce &11 that 1s required. Ke sti1l need supplenentary coverage on a heavy scale_ } and the human being still continues to be a vital source 0f information. The individual talks 'and volunteers Information. He talks and his statements are intercepted_ 0 A11 of this produces va luable increments 0f intelligence_ The individual can Still provide badly needed da ta either through his voluntary contribution or through bis' unwitting divulging 55 - NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page 333 '9 ================================================== Page 334 ================================================== of Intelligence _ The importance of the Individual is further emphasized when we realize that a8 each sophisticated collection technique 1s introducod _ science also introduces nowly designod countortochniquos 0f covoring, protocting p and camouflaging important assets_ In essence , technology eventually hits am inpenetrable or leveling-Off depth . Foreign intelligence is not geographically restricted, Information regarding Chinese Communiste can be obtained anywhere in the world, and even if it is 0f a fragmentary na ture, the data can be of significant va lue_ The demand for information i8 heavy and is sought by 0very agency in the Government, Because of this, it has been necessary for the U . S, Government to map 2 program of collection O1 a priority basis_ This bas been done through the creation of a committee which is attached to the U. S. Intelligence Board_ The committee maintains a list of priorities on a current basis A recent list 0f guidelines Ior the collection of foreign intelligence pertaining to scientific affairs in Communist China included approximately 173 iiews 1.0 Llong-range plannlng 0f Comnunist China in the nuclear field; nature of research in oceanography; computer capabilities of Shantung Univorsity; climate modification and cloud physics research; development 0f' meteorological rockets; development of nuclear weapons; location of uranium refineries; strength 0f Naval forces; intentions along the Sino-Indian border; tyres of equipment being supplied to Laos and North Vietnam, In the U, S. proper 1 the sources of foreign intelligence are voluninous Most Of these sources overtly provide information through newspapers scientific publications, libraries, tourists visiting professors and Students journalists, and immigrants. The compilation 9 coiiatiol, analysis, and reporting 0f such informa tion involves an extensive program and, needless to say , the 0_ S. today does not have the capability 0f tapping all available bourcas on a current basis. 56 ~ANW-88608_Deeld:32989629Page 334 ================================================== Page 335 ================================================== For the purpose of thbis paper , we ar0 thinking about the search for knowledge considered vital for national survival, One could suggest that clandestine collection 0f intelligence is ovor omphasizod and that our Govornmont could roadily protect itS lnterests through overt collection and the employment of our best analysts and evaluator8 , If WG take this approach , we may 25 wolz discount the importance .0f the Bureau s activitles in che counterintelligence field, Which essentially are of a clandestine nature and Which have produced time and again vital intelligence_ We theref- must move On the assumption that the ciandestine collection of foreign intelligence 18 very definitely a most necessary element 0f our over-all intelligence capabilities . In addition to the overt sources , there exists a rich potential in the U_ S among the foreiga diplomatic establishnents including the U. the officials 0f foreign governments, and visitors such as students, professors, and scientists_ A certain amount 0z informatloz Izozi Suek Zcurces can be obtained in an overt fashion , but the high quality data is mormally acquired through clandestine means , This can be done through technical: monitoring, development of live sources , access to records files 9 et cetera There are approxima 10 7600 foreign Officials in the U. S. assigned to embassies, consulates , trade missions, U. N_ 9 and other international organizations_ This excludes dependents_ During the fiscal year ending June 1965_ 38,544 foreign government officials visited the U_ S.; about 1500 of these came from communist_bloc countries During the fiscal year ending June 1965, approrimately 50,000 foreign students came to the U . 733 f these came from the communist bloc_ During the same fiscal year there were 2,075,967 visitors from a11 countries_ Everyone of the foregoing 18 a potential source of foreign intelligence As can be readily acceptea 9 the U_ S . Government does not have 2 capa - bility Of assessing each and every 0ne of these sourCOs for foreign intelligence. Te can say at this point that the FBI and CIA are just scra tching the Surface. It 18 recognized that 8" program designed to 858088 57 TW&&6_Docld3299629 Page 335 ore, N. , tely 30 , 30 , 8a ; ================================================== Page 336 ================================================== or attempt.to recruit each potential sourco would be out of the question, Such a massive undertaling Fould not be compatible with U_ 8 _ Government foreign policy. Tbore' 16" no quostion that thero wust be felectivity of 2 judiclous and prudent neture. Since the U . S , 1s such a major power, Mashington, D_ C: is tbe center of diplonatic activity involving practically all foreign nations _ The location of the U_ N _ in New York presents 48 with another area 0f intensified activity. Host countries Bend their most able diplomats to the U S_ S0 wo arG confronted with hundreds of highly talented people. Tho day-tosdey activities in diplomatic establishments, conferences meetings , negotiations, liaison between countrie8 , 811 create a tremendous reservoir of foreign intelligence potential_ 58 Nt88608-0ockd3329896297Pagel 336 City ================================================== Page 337 ================================================== CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THI TOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES In ordor that thore may not be any misunderstanding regarding CIA 8 capabilities to collect foreign intelligence in the United States 9 Wo should first clarify that ono 0f the componente of tho Agency which has offices in the United Stateb does not engage in this particular activity. The Office of Security, which is responsible for personnel and physical security 3 maintains several offices in the United States under authorized Treasury Department cover Personnel of this office conduct investigations of applicants, firms or individuals who may be utilized by CIA on a contract basis to support intelligence operationg overseas, The overt collection 0f intelligence by CIA is bandled by the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) (formerly called Contact Division) CIA estimates that DCS has 2 capability of tapping approximately 15 per cent of the total potential of intelligence f the U , S_ This Division has 18 field offices and 16 resident agencies in the United States, and each office is openly identified 2S being connected with CIA Personnel totaling approrimately 140 carry CIA credentials_ The Division regularly has a number Of officers from the various military services who ar0 assigned *o this Division on a temporary basis These military officers concentrate on the collection o: that foreign intelligence which relates to the immediate United States military needs The personnel of DCS interview aliens tourists officials of import-export firms , students, scientists, and the information collected covers a very broad Spectrum in the positive intelligence category_ DCS _ claims t0 have contact with about 7200 or ganizations institutions, or businesses and bas approximately 60 , 0o0 contacts or sources Of infornation The information 16 reported in tbe form f "Information Reports, m wbich 18 dib8eminated throughout the intelligence community. During 1965 , 59 Nv88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 337 E6' ================================================== Page 338 ================================================== DCS disseminated 26 0oo such reports. DCS dQes not hava any responsibiiities in the clandestine collection 0f intelligeace, and in that sonso it is very specifically not operational_ 0 DCS definitely cannot engago in any activity of an intornal security nature, and withfn CIA it 1s clearly undorstood that DCS 1s not *o be operational under any circunstances 0 DCS has bcon tho subjoct of somo controvorsy within CIA There 1s ono school 0f thought Which maintains that DCS Should be an appendage of the Deputy Director 0f Plans , who is responsible for a11 clandestine operations The other School Which has prevailed holds to the line that DCS Should be separate and _ continue under the supervision or the Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) This situation not only has caused headaches for CIA but 41so for the Bureau bacause 0f situations Which arise where the "left hand does not know wha t the right hand 1s doing. M DCS is essentially carrying out CIA 8 responsibilities emanating from National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No . 2 Which has its roots iD 2 similar aireciive issued under tha Ns+1ozcl Intelligence Authority in 1946, It has been 1n busines: for approxina- twenty years_ 0 Per agreenent, DCS cannot interviem a0 alien without first clearing With the Bureau. This is dono on a dally basis_ With regard to' Anerican citizens, Bureau approval is not required unless the Bureau bas indicated 2 prior interest in the individual; however , DCS nevertheless subnits name checks on Americans 9 and if it So happens that the subject Of such an inquiry is a Bureau source or involved in a Bureau investigation, we are in 2 position r0 move to protect our interests 0 It should be noted that although. DCS is engaged primarily in positive intolligonce collection, it 18 roquired to ba on tho alert for sources who possibly might be usefui to CIA'& clandestine operations For example, if. DCS encounters an alien who can be utilized in an overseas operation, tme lead 1s-passed On to the appropriate division_ At tne present time, DCS alerts the newly created Domestic Operations Division (explained below) regarding potential sources, Our currant controls With regard to DCS AIG functioning efficiently. Te regularly exemino the 60 NW 88608_Deeld 32989629-Page: 338 tely ================================================== Page 339 ================================================== status of this and we periodicdlly make adjustments in order make certain thero Is no "freewheeling" and to take,advantage 0f the Information Which DCS gains, and which is 0z interost to the Buroau, For . oxample wo a20 currontly working out arrangements where our field offices can contact the local DCS officee concerning Chinese alions who might ba of intorost to us either as subjects for investigation or 36 potential informants Thi8 liaibon at the field level pas deemed dosirable 80 that we could got information at the "horse'6 mouth" rather than wait for 2 reply from CIA headquarters , which 18 often prolonged when transmitted, is sometimes stripped of pieces of informatione This occurb because of the involved and sometimes complicated maze of bureaucratic compartmentation within CIA : In the latter part 0f 1963 , CIA created it8 Domestic Operations Division (DOD) , which via$ to be responsible for any clandestine developnent of sources in the United States Prior to the establishment of thic Divisicn CIA ctivity in this field was managed from each individual area division at ashington headquarters_ The pressing need for mora clandestine sources, coupled with the recognition of the vast potential in the United States 9 prompted CIA to create 2 new division which would be responsible for 811 Of the area division interests 0 DOD has headquarters at Washington, D c and curr ently has fleld officeb at New York Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles Honolulu and Washington, D C_ 9 proper Apbroximateiy 40 inteiligence officers are 8ssigned to the task of engaging in assessment and/or recruitment 02 positive intelligence sources , primarily In the diplonatic field, Some Of the personnel are assigned to the handling of firns or organizations which may be supporting certain CIA operations abroad, DOD personnel in the field operate under authorized Department of Dezense cover The heads of these field offices are known to and We have established a satisfactory liaison area at tbe field level, DOD is also responsible for the handling of CIA agents (infornants) who have been recruited &broad and who come to the United States for assignments either on 2 tenporary basis or for tbe duration of & normal diplonatic assignnent. 61 ZNI 88608-Doeld:32989629-Page 339 relationshigo and , C., City, uS , ================================================== Page 340 ================================================== The creation f DOD within CIA was and 8+111 is 3 somowhat controversial Agency Subject 0 DCS saw DOD as an Interfering elemont_ The area desks wore reluctant to havo a new division to taka ovor thoir agents_ Some of tho Don porsonnel ar0 vory capable and seasoned intelligence officers . Many 0f them &re considered of mediocre capability, and there 1s 8 frequent ruor that other CIA divisions send their misfits to DOD_ From CIA 's standpoint there appoars to ba a definite need for a much stronger team within DOD, Theoretically, DOD is required to be On tho alert for all potential sources who cam} be used CIA in its intelligence operations_ 9 and the approach 18 basically ono of a long-range nature_ DOD 1s required to make us@ of .a11 leads emanating from fellow employeas who may have developed social contacts or associations vith foreigners abroad O1 who might meet potential sources in the United States. Since CIA personnel operate under diplonatic cover when abroad they do the opportunity to Tova in diplomatic circles , Similarly , "ndercovet 2 gents Of CTA traveling throughout the world aIso maka contacts which offer potential exploitation if and vhen the target stops in the United States 0 Since January 1964 , when DOD actually began moving, it has recruited approximately ten individuals in the diplomnatic field, Most of these were in the noncommunist-bloc area 411 Of thoso recruited appear to have been in a fairly loW-level category_ A11 of them wore carear diplomats 9 ana there was no evidence that the individuals were connected with any intelligence service. In addition to the activities of DCS and DOD, there is a certain amount of CIA operational movements which do not fall under either of the foregoing divisions , One exemple is the CIA base in Miami which was set up for CIA S operations directed against the Cuban Government. This base is used for the training and dispatching of agents into Cuba and *0 some extent into other countrios in the Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic. This base is airectly responsible to the Western Henisphere Division 0f Which could be called tbe Latin American Division. 62 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 340 by get CIA , Page ================================================== Page 341 ================================================== CIA also becomes involved in political and psychological warfare type Of programs directed against targets in foreign countries_ The Agency broadly refer8 t0 this activity as "covert action Tho programs a*0 ossontially dosignod t6 influenco individuals 9 organizations or governments through various news media and this wilz include tho utilization of "agents of inziuence Thte activity falls under tho Intornational Organizations Division (IOD) of CIA 7 T/hich has no respongibility to collect information IOD does uso people in the United States to help implement the overseas programs Quite often the Agency uses cutouts or covers for such an operation. Althc_ IOD does not engage in intelligence collection, it is 2 CIA division which Should be kept in mind , sinca its activities quite often Will ba tangent to matters 0f interest to the Bureau For example, IOD becomes involved in the World Youth Festival, where its objective is to neutralize communist influence_ 0f course, have had a0 interest in the Festival because of tha participation of Americans including members 0f the CPUSA Theoretically 9 IOD is required to coordinate closely with other appropriate components of CIA We do not believe that this coordination bas been effective enougil. There is no doubt that there are individuals in CIA who aspire to broaden the Agency'8 operational activities in the United States Such individuals would like to see an arrangement similar to one currently in force in England where MI-6 has a free hand to assess and recruit all foreigners , including diplomats > where there is no evidence that they are engaged in intelligence activity If such evidence is Obtained, MI-6 is required t0 coordinate with MI-5_ There are people in CIA wbo would like to see similar machinery and in addition would want the freedom to conduct certain investigations and maybe even institute technical surveillances _ In summary 9 CIA so far has a very limited capability to recruit foreign diplomatic sources in the United States, but the Agency appears-to have done fairly: well with a relatively Small staff; howvever, it can be anticipated that this capability will increase_ CIA 's effectiveness will probably be adversely affected for some time to come because of the Agency'8 well-know deficiencies, such as lack 02 discipline loose admin- istration, a0d lack of skilled and talented personnel 63 7 NBB@I Docld.3289629 Page3341 xgh Te , ================================================== Page 342 ================================================== F, CURRENT CAPABILITIES Op THE TBI 1 Manpower Being Devoted It is most difficult to Igive any specific figures a8 to how much manpower the FBI is curtontly devoting strictly to foreign intelligence collection separate and apart from the Bureau's internal security ind counterintelligence functions_ Much of the foreign intelligence developed by the Bureau iswan outgrowth of our internal security investigations and cannot ba neatly separated in terns of manpower or time A substantial amount of our foreign intelligence activity is concentrated in tvo offices where most of the diplomatic establishments in the United Staces are located; namely, New York and Washington Field_ Both offices were requested to furnish estimates as to how much manpower is being allocated to foreign intelligence matters, including both live sources developed and technical coverage In both cases _ 3 the estimates provided were bighly tentative and both c {fices stress that manpower commitment8 in this area fluctuate widely from week to week depending on international politics and other unpredictable factors For instance during the_Cuban missile crisis of 1962 9 both offices greatly increased their' normal manpower commitment to the develop- ment OI current roreign intelligence_ The present Vominican crisis which involves production of foreign intelligence to 2 large extent represents another "abnormal" situation However for what it is worth, IFO and New York have estimated that at the present time they are allocating approxi- mately 35 Agents and 20 clerical employees to the full tine task of foreign intelligence collection Virtually a11 of the clerical time and about 40 per cent of the Agent time is related to technical coverage and the ba lance is aimed at the development of live sources In addition, of course, a11 of the other offices including our Legal Attaches abroad, have devoted manpower to foreign intelligence collection in varying degrees Anagram Pperations conducted in different field: offices have involved the assignment of as many as 10 or 12 Agents for temporary periods In connection With- its responsibilities inthe Cuban and Latin-American fields the Miami and San Juan offices have devoted considerable manpower to the developnent of foreign intelligence in recent years The Chicago Office in connection with its handling of our @op-level 8olOlinformant has devoted manpower to the development of foreign intelligence These represent" only - a few examples_ On an overall basis and bearing in mind the difficultyiin citing any precise figures it is estimated that the Bureau probably averages approximately 50 to 75 Agents and 25 to 30 clerks &881gned primarily to foreign intelligence work 64 3 NW-88608 Docld:32989629 "Page 342 ================================================== Page 343 ================================================== 2 _ Number of Microphone and_Telephone Surveillances with Eva Tuation of Product At present_ Bureau has only one microphone surveillance in foreign intelligence field and this is in connection with a special National Security Agency project directed againstTTurkish coded conununications Concerning technical survoillanc6s wo aro now operating about 70 foreign intelligence installations on various diplomatic establishments in this country. The majority of these are in Mashington Field and New York with 6cattered installations 1n Chicago, Miami Pittsburgh , San Francisco and San Juan Under current Bureau poiicy 8 we are limited to 80 foreign intelligence technical surveillances and no microphone surveillances with the exception of one on theTTurkish United Nations Mission In addition, during recent years we have maintained approximately 50 so-called "telex" surveillances on the teletype facilities of various foreign establishments_ This has been done at the specific request 0f the National Security Agency in connection with its efforts to break foreign codes and to read foreign government communications Te have had excellent results from these technical installatios compilation of items of vaZue to the U' S Intelligence Community and policy-making officials devefopea through this coverage would run many hundreds of pages_ The results have ranged from information regarding plans and activities of key foreign countries in the diplomatic field to information regarding intelligence, political_ 9 economic and military develop- ments in the countries concerned . In many instances , we have been able to forewarn the Fmhite House the State Department and other interested agencies of impending developnents and to furnish data giving an insight into the thinking and strategy of key foreign officials and governments _ This coverage has proved Specially valuable during crisis periods such a5 the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and . during the tense negotiations involving the Panama Canal in 1964. On many occasions top-ranking United States officials bave commented on the effectiveness of this data- The particular importance 0f this information has been its timeliness to current events a5 well as the fact that it represents a penetiztion of foreign diplomatic circles which 18 only infrequently available 'through live sources_ In some instances of course, this type coverage on a particulaz foreign establishment or official has not paid off . We have bad cases where this technique has been unproductive for sustained periods of time on a particular country_ This is to be expected and we bave sought_ to overcome this by rotating our installations correlating our technical operations with Shifting international developments and putting coverage on those countries which appear to offer the most promise for worthwhile Intelligence. 8 65- - ~NI-88608-Docld 2989629-Pyge343 Any ================================================== Page 344 ================================================== 3 _ Live Sources With Evaluation At present we ar0 making active efforts to develop live informant coverage in the diplomatic establishments bf 37 non- Soviet bloc countries This list of sO-called "target countries" varies from time to time but essentially we are seeking informant L coverago in countrios considerod critical from an intolligence standpoint such as those leaning towards the Soviet bloc or countries in which the United States has paramount political or military interests 0r which aro otherwise of primary concern . The current list includes virtually all Latin-American countries? a number of Middle East countries, and scattered countries throughout Africa and the Far East Our program was initiated in the early 1950S, and we are now using sone 50 sources (This number fluctuates due to transfers, resignations 3 etc.) In each case, we clear with State Department prior to designating any country 2s a "target" and wre also clear with State prior to conducting interviews with employees at the "target" establishment. In a number of instances , including most Latin-American countries, State has asked Us to restrict our efforts to American citizens This, of course, 18 a highly limiting factor Over the years this live informant coverage has on many occasions produced foreign intelligence of real value ur sources bave frequently provided data regarding proposed political, diplomatic or econonic action by the countries concerned, on occasion in advance of other forewarning to U.8, intelligence. They have also been able to furnish a considerable amount of information regarding the whereabouts, background and general activities of individual foreign officials of security interest, thereby saving investigative time. These sgurces have been especially valuable in connection with the IAnagram Program and other sopbisticated attacks on foreign establishments, providing us with data regarding the physical security location of code rooms, etc. ) 0f the various foreign establishments In addition to so-called "target" countries which are in the non-Soviet bloc area, the Bureau has developed a number of informants and defectors-in-place in Soviet_bloc establishments Who_ haye been. able to furnish a substantial amount 0f foreign intelligence _ In the "Soviet-bloe field; Pie havo also developed a number of sources in guasi-official establishments, such as trade missions who have produced valuable foreign intelligence_ In the Soviet_bloc field of course, our live informant development bas been aimed essentfaiiy at internal security and counterintelli- gence ` needs of the Bureau 66 NW88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 344 ================================================== Page 345 ================================================== It 1s Significant that we have been able to operate for many years in the development of live sources in foreign diplonatic estallishments , both Soviet bloc and non-bloc, without encountering any serious incidents em barrassing to tbe FBI or the United States Government In assessing tho product of such live sources in a number of instances in the non-Sov..et fieldy State Department has requested that we restrict our efforts to American citizens_ To a considerable degree this has limited the effectiveness of our program in the mon-Soviet field since U.8 , employees of foreign establishments will normally bot have access to top-grade data Thus especially in the non-Soviet bloc field we are not tapping the full potential which exists for high-level foreign intelligencea This can be realized through the development 0f high quality sources 4 Anagram Program Laxstdd ; "4] G TI Anagram is code word for FBI program to penetrate foreign diplomatic establishments in U.S. for purpose of securing crypto- graphic material: This material is primarily of value to National Security Agency in its communications intelligence efforts_ Since inception of program in 1954_ } we have conducted Anagram operations involving 38 different foreign countries and a total Of 57 separate establishments Approximately 10 FBI field offices bave participated in the program _ Our operations under this program have resulted in monetory savings to the Government estimated Y at better than $13,000,000 and it has provided data 0f incalculable intelligence value While it has been Of primary value to NSA 9 We have on occasion produced information of prinary interest to the Bureau_ For example , in April, 1963 we affected a successful penetration in the Polish field Which produced material disclosing the activities of Polish Intelligence Service in this country. 5 _ Double Agents and Informants In a number of instances Bureau double agents and informants, developed to assist uS in connection with our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities have been: able to provide Significant high-level information of foreign intelligence value_ For example, in the Soviet field= we have deyeloped 2 number of top-level sources such as Fedora and Tophaz} who have provided current intelligence regarding the organizational structure, personnel, and operations of the KGB and GRU 9 both in the Soviet Union and abroad; a description of various technical equipment used by Soviet intelligence; data regarding current relations between, the Soviet Union and Comunist China; and data regarding Soviet foreign policy, political and military developments, etc, Similar informa- tion of foreign intelligence value has been developed through FBI informants , double agents and defectors-in-place operating against 67_ ~ MWBB68 Docld337989629.Page 345 only ================================================== Page 346 ================================================== Polish, Yugoslav Czechoslovakian and other communist-bloc countries _ For instance, in the Cuban field on soveral occasions , FBI informants have been able to develop high-Level or current intelllgence regarding conditions in Cuba, and policies of the Castro regime through personal contacts with ranking Cuban officialg both in the U.8, and abroad, Through our coverage of the Communist Party USA 1 and related organizations we have also frequently produced foreign intelligence_ although to a lessor extent than in our operations ip tbe foreign nationality field_ One of our best sources of foreign intelligence in the domestic area is so-called Bolo operation}* vberein we have informants acting in 8lisison a capacity between €he Communist Party, USA ; and foreign communist groups including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Me have developed information through this operation regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, social and political conditions in various countries, both in and outside the Soviet bloc, and tactics of the international communist movement, 6 _ Additional Potential As indicated in the foregoing subsections 9 the Bureau 18 currently producing 2 considerable volume' 0f foreign Intelligence through covert means, much of it of 2 significant nature. Host 0f tnis aara 1S an outgrowih oi iufuxuauis iccillcal ccveraso aed investigative prograns targeted primarily to fulfill our internal security and counterintelligence objectives and relatively speaking, we have committed only 2 Small percentage of our assets exclusively in the direction of foreign intelligence. It is believed that the Bureau possesses considerable potential for the developnent of foreign intelligence which could be realized with a fairly modest erpenditure of manpower and costs if we were to make foreign intelligence collection a primary aim For example with existing ecuipment and facilities, we could expand our rechnical coverage of foreign establishments t0 include additional 30 to 40 foreign establishnents provided we could assign about 25 edditional personnel to this field: With the assignmant of an additional 75 to 100 Agents we could greatly intensify our foreign intelligence collection through live informants, primarily through the developnent and exploitation of additlonal sources at ~foreign diplonatic establishments _ He-could place moze stress_on. foreign intelligence collection in our training programs and conferences to make more effective use of our already available ass We could, for examgle add specialized classes on foreign intellige collection to our In-Service schedules or designate selected Bureau persornel to attend training Sessions operated by: other U.S . agencil regarding this Subject. 68 'covlEissly Sh NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 346 7ah ================================================== Page 347 ================================================== AREAS OF CONFLICT FBI S CIA differences between FBI and CIA are first related to a basic problem existing in any country among the major powvors , namely 1 How does 2 l2m enforccment agency coordinate its internal security functions with an intelligence organization which must operate 38 a clandogtixo service?" The very nature 0f the functions of the two organizations immediately introduces potential areas of conflict. One essentially operates overtly and the 6ther covertly_ Tbis alone is enough to create an atmosphere fraught with controversies and confusion Because each agency was molded differently and because' responsibilities differ , there naturally will be conflicting approaches to national security objectives _ For example, in the field 0f intelligence the Bureau is basically a counterintelligence body _ CIA, to the contrary , has 2 much broader responsibility in intelligence, which includes collection of foreign intelligence political and psychological warfare inter- agency coordinating, evaluation, research, etc Counter- intelligence within CIA is actually' 2 relatively Small component of the agency Personnel in the two organizations 45 recruited uadez differeit criteria aid staidatds Training is likewise at variance In 2 Zinal analysis 9 the experienced FBI Agent and the seasoned CIA intelligence officer ar@ not of the sane mold but certainly ar0 tailored as two entirely and distinctly different instruents Te Should bear in mind that little has been done to introduce truly substantive cross-fertilization of outlook, approach and operational philosophy between the two agencies Thi8 could be advocated from 2 Utopian point of view, but i1 also could be argued that there ar0 distinct edvantages to maintaining Sound compartmentation_ Separate from the above basic and fundamental situation the differences between FBI end CIA also relate to other factors such as: 1) FBI was first on the scene' and was well established long before CIA canme to lifea: Tbis led to a conception in the early yeers that CIA was an intruder. 2) The seed 0f CIA Fas the Office 0f Strategic Services (OSS) an orgenization whose personnel= activities and free-Wbeeling were' the sources of numerous conflicts 69 NIY-88608-Docld:32989629 Page-347 Any ================================================== Page 348 ================================================== With the Bureau during Morld Rar II_ It Fas during these years that an atmosphere Of mistrust and lack 0f confidence was created_ 3) CIA was established 08 our 2irst ovor-all, worldwide intelligence ~gency _ The ovents and the maneuvering which led to this certainly.did not bring with them 0 harmonlous relationship. 4) Unfortunately, CIA grew big and grew fast, particularly because 0f an unsettled atomic world and developments Such 85 the Korean Mar The Agency did not Jell effectively as an organization, and with this cama numerous difficulties, many 0f which exist to this 5) Each organization has lacked adequate knowl of the other 8 operational machinery, objective8 , and "ways and means 0z doing things I 6) An element of rivalry actually developed over the years_ and this, when not tempered with prudence and sound judgment, creates unhealthy situations A growing tendency on the part of CIA to expand its operational activities not originally contemplated in the formation of that agency. It can be recognized that with this background it has not been an easy matter to establish 2 good working relationship with CIA without frequent conflicts, and sometimes egonizing negotiations_ It could be suggested that the ideal situation Fould be to remove CIA from the U_ 8 _ with the understanding that we would assume respon- Sibility for a2y and a11 activity in the intelligence field_ As described in another section 0f this report, such 8 move would be highly infeasible for the Bureau It is co our credit that despite tho probleng of the past there have been some highly constructive develop- ments "in FBI-CIA: relations; particularly as they &ffect activities in the U 8 . Several years ago arrangenents Rere made whereby CIA S Office 0f Security could conduct applicant investigations without infringing upon our juris_ diction_ For several years we have been permitting CIA to interview aliens for foreign intelligence information under ground;rules,which bave beep very successful Our; liaison 70. - NW88608 Deeld332989629 Page 348_ day . edge ================================================== Page 349 ================================================== mechanism has been functioning effectively. Vle have frequent conferences_ Bureau personnel lecturesbeforo CIA officers_ Dissemination 0f Information 18 excellont. The atmosphere for negotiating and discussing unusually complicated problens i8 very good_ Personnel can work In the same arez with 2 minimum of problems } as evidencod In the Dominicen Republic. We attend USIB meetings and {ro actively engaged in tho work oi several committees ettachod to USIB_ A1l 0f this is commendable progress and certainly beneficial to national security. All 0f tbe foregoing Fias set forth in the WRy of background in order to' better understand the current Bource of differences with CIA, namely the Agency'8 desire to asses8 and recruit foreign intelligence sources in tbe U,S_ 1n the' for diplomatic establishments 2 including United Nations, and to some extent among foreign visitors_ CIA fully acknowledges our internal security and councerintelliconce responsibilities _ Tnis is clear-cut and free of any debatable question; however , CIA feels that we have noi legally-established responsibility in foreign intellirrcnce coTlection and that somebody (in Ichis case, CIA) should be fully exploiting the foreign intelligence potential in the United States, bearing in mind that there are approxi- mately 10,000 foreign officials and employees in this country & CIA argues that a foreign diplonat can be recruited anlywhere in the world but maintains that there is no better place than the United States for assessment, recruitnent training end orientation of an informant CIA further maintains that 1f the Agency moves onl 2 target, such as an Argentino diplomat who may be a career officer not connected with 2 foreign intelligence Service, there should not be any con- flict because the activity is in no way related to tho internal security functions 0f the Bureau CIA has also expressed the attitude that in the communist_bloc fiold CIA should be permitted to assess and recruit those individuals not connected with an intelligence or intornal security service_ There are some people 'in CIA wiho are 0f tho opinion that in the field 02 foreign intelligence tho Buresu Should be exerting more effort to actually assist CIA In 'spotting sources and, when needed, give CIA support in developing a2 individual through such means as surveillances, neighborhood investigations, etc. When CIA 18 permittad to 71 V N88648 -Qocid:32989629Page3349 eign ================================================== Page 350 ================================================== recruit a source in the U , the Agency cakes the position that if the source can be of help to the Bureau wo should levy requirements on CIA and not ask for accobs to tho source unless it clearly appears that only througb 2CCoss wvo can properly discharco our rosponsibilitios . CIA takes 0 very strong: view that once a source 18 developed it is basically unsound to introduce another agency into the relationship. The developing agoncy may hava used techniques peculiar to its OWn organization and may have developed 2 relationship under varied cir- cumstances, and when 8 nem agency is introduced this relationship with the source could be unfavorably disturbed . CIA does not dispute the fact that informant and Agent turnovers sometines ar0 absolutely necessary. CIA maintains that 1f the Bureau 18 given acces8 to 2 CIA source we would be responsible for the counter- intelligence aspects, put if the source produces foreign intelligence CIA Shoula be responsible for handling this infornation, including the dissemination _ CIA 5 position 1s that it 1s better qualified to evaluate the information and correlate it Fith the foreign intelligence being deweloned ahroad. For example 9 if a Nigerian source of CIA; also available to the Burezu, furnishes infornation regarding the Nigerian Foreign Office, CIA claims that it can better handle the report a*d dissenination. Discussios and agreements vith CIA, including the actions stemning from meetings with the representatives 0f that agency in November 1965 , have resulted in a greatly improved coordinating machinery There still ar0 areas of potential conflict wbich will necessitate inprovement . They are: 1) DOD personnel receives leads or tips pertaining to possible 2Ccess to Soviet-bloc diplonats _ This CIA Division pursues these leads and is inclined *o take the Position that such individuals contacted .by CIA ar0 their "CIA-controlled sources " If Fe pernitted this to go on over 2 Period of tine, CIA would have 2 vast network of sources not directly available to the Bureau _ This is basically unsound, and there is DO reason CIA shouldn' * imediately give uS the lead or tip for exploitation. We can recognize that, depending upon circumstances, it wight be favorable to us and CIA for the Agency Eo handle 2 particular individual, and if it would be clearly 72 4 NWV-88608-Docld:32989629- Page 350 S . , so, ================================================== Page 351 ================================================== coordinated. This would be most important 12 the individual in any way was conpected with or associated Mith an intelligence service_ 2) DOD is antious to have freedom to assess and recruit Bloc diplonats not koown to be engaged in intelligence activity_ On the surface, thls does not appear to prosent 3 problen, but realistically speaking it is impossible for us to know that a Soviet diplomat, not known to be engaged in intelligence activity one day , ) appears O1 the scene the following week 25 an agent or coopted agent _ To give CIA wide latitude in this field could create 2 truly undesirable mess _ He believe that 1f CIA is permitted to move on such targets it Should be done on a selective basis and with maximun coordination, 3) CIA S organizational and operational deficiencies, such 8s lack 0f discipline poor internal coordination, unsatisfactory recor a13 introduce bead- aches Which undoubtedly Will continue to exisc for many years . Tbere continues to be 2n element of mistrust and misunderstanding bezween tba two organlzations because of the bistorical reasons desczibed ebove . 5) Continuing lack of 0ne agency'8 appreciation for the other'8 objectives, responsibilities and operational philosophy . 6) The absence of 3 clearly defined Bureau policy and objectives in the field 0i foreign intelligence collecr tion. CIA really does not knom the nature and the extent 0f our interests, and consequently thie lends to confusion and misunderstanding. 73 ~NI 88608_Docd:32989629-Page 351 ds, ================================================== Page 352 ================================================== 8. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETIEEN FBI AND CIA 1. According to SAC Letter 59 dated 5/24/49 , CIA and IBI had reached agreement whereby clearance would be requested of FBI pofora CIA conducted an intorviow with an alion in tha U.8 _ Thie clearanco vould consist Of a review of Bureau files concernirg individual in question According to same SAC Letter agreement had been reached by the FBI and CIA whereby CIA was ailowed to contact American businessmen Without obtaining clearance from FBI in order to obtain positive foreign intelligence information and arrange covers for CIA personnel abroad This agreenent was based strictly on collection of foreign intelligence and positively did not allow for the formulation 0f 2 network 0i confidential informants for CIA in the U.S. Regarding FBI-CIA agreement that CIA would clear with us prior to interviewing aliens in U.8., following docuentation has been located_ By letter 2/19/43 Director of CIA Hillenkoetter wrote Director and referred to National Security Council Intelli- gence Directive No _ 7 2/12/48 This Directive states in part that CiA wiii pe respoucibie iux eapoitation on highly sclective besie within U,8 _ of business concerns, other nongovernnental organizas tions and individuals 2S sources of foreign intelligence information, fillenkoetter commented that CIA had been interviewing foreign businessmen immigrants and refugees on Small scale, always clearing matter first with FBI office in area concerned _ He asked Director'6 views as to possible expansion of tnis activity. By letter 2/26/48 Director replied to Hillenkoetter_ In part 9 this letter pointed out FBI had no objection to CIA inter- viewing individuals enuerated above for foreign intelligence purposes; however 9 it was suggested that prior to interview such individual matters be cleared with FBI Headquarters_ 2 _ Bureau letter to CIA 1/16/64 confirmed results of meetings between CIA and Bureau via liaison in discussing reorganization of CIA S Domestic Operations Division (DOD) _ Letter recognized CIA needs (recruitment ~of*sources in U.S: who may be used: abroad; recruitment 0f diplomats 9 including UN representatives who might be useful to CIA in overseas operations or who might ba transferred to Soviet-bloc countries; training of agents recruited; bandling Of agents developed abroad who come to U.S, for a visit or assignment; ;and ' approaches to foreign officials and visitors to assess their potential 2s.sources when tbey Zeave the_ 8 Eoliowedf lerter to CIA "Tser forth the following ground-rules to pe in Connection Witp CIA's operations 1p order to avoid operational conflicts 8nd embarrassment ; 8 74 - NW 88608*Doci332989629 Page 352 ================================================== Page 353 ================================================== a . CIA would pot conduct investigation 0f any foreign official in U.S_ and 1f CIA felt such investigation warranted, FBI should. be consulted_ b. No foreign official would be approached for recruit_ ment by CIA without its conferring with FBI . C _ Then CIA agent arrives in U.S. for visit or assign- ment FBI will be advised and two agencies will confor regarding handiing of agent in this country, it being recognized oach Cas0 bas its individual peculiarities d Before approaching any foreign official or visitor for recruitment assessment , CIA will clear with FBI _ 3 _ As result of conference With CIA in January, 1966 the above "ground rules" were modified and expanded and agreed upon by both agencies early this year (Confirmed by letter to Admiral Raborn 2/7/66, New ground rules in summary are as follows : a _ CIA will not iniate investigation of any foreign official in U,S,- without concurrence of FBI _ (Comment: This 15 essentially same aS (a) in January, 1964 8 ground rules Only difference is that wording of this modification implies more sympathetic FBI attitude towards any proposed CIA investigations b_ CIA Will seek FBI concurrence before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist bloc visitor in U.S, FBI will concur if CIA action does not conflict with any FBI operations_ (Comment: This is similar t0 (b) and (c) ground rules adopted in January, 1964, with two differences _ First, it drops requirement that CIA-dlear with uS before approaching a non-Soviet visitor although it must still do So with regard to non-Soviet officials_ Secondly, it Specifically commits the FBI to concur if proposed CIA action does not conflict with FBI operations.) c CIA will advise FBI prior to meetings between CIA assets and foreign officials or communist bloc visitors of interest to FBI _ (Comment: This was not included in previous set of ground rules ) #Agents: 0f CIA`who come -to U.S: 'will be identiffed t0_ FBI by name or appropriate Jescription; depending on national security Interest invoived- 0 When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for a visit or assign- ment' FBI will be advised and tvo agencies ViIl confer regarding hapdiingQEpgent in U_S. It 1s recognized_each case will have: 75 ~Ni-88608-Docid:32989629-Page 353 ================================================== Page 354 ================================================== individual' peculiarities and governing principle will be positive intelligence weighed against internal security factors_ CIA may , however continue itS contractual relationship for purpose of handling training procurement of positive foreign_intelligence, (under- lining added) fulfilIment of CIA comnitments to the agent and preparation for next assignment abroad. f_ Where CIA Will be handling its agent in U.8,, CIA will Service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provido FBI 211 information boaring on counterintelligonce or internal security matters _ [here CIA servicing is inadequate for FBI internal security interests ) FBI will have direct access to agent _ (Comment : Rules (a) (e) and (f) represent greatly expanded and refined version 0f rule 'c) of January, 1964, agreement Old ground rules provided considerable latitude with regard to who would handle CIA source in the U,S. and this has led to some disagreements with CIA The current ground rules clearly provide for CIA t0 retain contact With its agents not only for training, financing, etc_ 1 but also for "procurement of positive foreign intelligence. In addition, they make it clear that the FBI should not ask for direct access unless there is a Specific internal security need.) 4 In addition to the above, there is one agreement we have reached with CIA which is of possible relevance; namely our receni agreement relative to treatment 0f Soviet students in the U.S_ way Of background, there are 2 number of Soviet exchange students currently attending various Ua&_ universities _ Each' student , 0f course, is not only a possible Soviet intelligence agent but also 2 potential source for the U,S ; after he returns to his homeland _ Accordingly , both FBI and CIA have an interest in these students Per _ memo dated 1/14/64 we advised CIA via liaison on 1/20/64 that the Bureau would adopt following procedure relative to Soviet students here_ FBI will take responsibility for collecting material regarding each student on expedite basis 1 furnishing results to CIA as developed _ At logical point FBI will confer with CIA to decide on case-by-case basis re possible recruitment_ If Bureau recruits Soviet student Fc will resolve whether W@ should turn bim over to CIA bezore he leaves U.S. Under this procedure, CIA will not make any inquiries (through its sources in U.8,) unless 4% has some urusual source if a university not available to FBI who could furnish data op the student In latter case, we would allow.CIA "O: obtain data. ard: advise_ us The foregoing represent al1 of the major agreements we have 'reacbed to date With 'CIA. with respect; to CIA.operations here ipxforeign .intelligence field; 76 EBB6DE Docld332980629.Page 354 By ================================================== Page 355 ================================================== I; CFFCCT ON THE FBI 0p FULL RESPONSIBILITY TOR COLLICTION TF FORETGN INTELLTGENCE TN "TFE UON1TTED STTTES 1 Overt Collection Activities It is evident from the National Security Act 0f 1947 and the succeeding National Security Council Intelligence Directives 2s well 2s the directives of the Director 0f Central Intelligence that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is charged with major responsibilities in the overt collection of foreign intelligence in the United States _ In pursuit 0 f this CIA exploits non-governmental organizations and individuals foreign language publications and aliens Although CIA clains to have contacts with aboui 7 9 200 organizations and businesses 2s well 25 about 60,000 sources of information as 2 result of its overt activities for this purpose, CIA estimates it is reaching only 15 per cent of the foreign intelligence information available in this country, The question we must consider here is wheher the FBI should take ovef the overt collection of foreign intelligence in the United States , tneredy Waling CIA opezaticnil cnly i1 areas outside the limits of FBI S jurisdiction_ In this connection, the following would have to be considered: (a) Reporting: The Bureau is & fact_finding agency which has traditionally gathered evidence and presented its findings without bias or conclusions_ This would not change _ Intelligence developed by the FBI would be evaluated by the users in the intelligence community Our report writing format might have to be geared to the needs and established procedures of the United States inielligence community _ (b) Coordination With Other Government Agencies: Foreign intelligence is 2 COMMO dity produced for the benefit' of: many: separate-agencies 0f_.the. United States Government _ Because 0f this if the Bureau were *o have full responsibility for the overt; collection' cf foreign intelligence in this country , we would have t6 greatly expand our liaison services, not only for dissemination purposes but to" assure that we are kept fully inforned regarding.4l1 ma - tters-dealing With intelligence PFiorities_ 77 - NW_88608 _Docid32989629 355_ "Page ================================================== Page 356 ================================================== Our role in preparation of National Intelllgence Estimates would be more active 2s a result 0f our increased contribution under this program_ It might be necessary to utilize the assistance of highly trained personnel of other agoncie8 to assist us poriodically on interviews dealing With complicated military or scientific matters (c) Manpower: While n0 manpower requirements can be presently estimated should we assume full responsibility for overt foreign intelligence collection, CIA is currently using approximately/140 employees throughout the United States to interview indfviduals in connection with its overt intelligence gathering activities ) and is reaching what it estimates to be only 15 per cent 0f available foreign intelligence information. These[Z4o CIA employees do not include personnel required at CIA Headquarters to correlate evaluate and disseminate the data gathered in the field _ We would want to more effectively ~exploit this intelligence potential_ To merely handle the necessary review of the vast number of foreign language puolications woula requife mauy additional employees proficient in foreign languages and with backgrounds in scientific or technical fields (a) Selection and Training of Personnel: To assume full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign intelligence in this country, moula require that we vastly broaden our selection and training procedures We would require applicants with degrees in the sciences , languages history, government and economics Our basic training and In-Service agenda would have to be geared to meet our new responsibilities We would undoubtedly desire to utilize the services 0f outstanding lecturers from the agencies cons tituting our intelligence community, and in turn we would wish to afford our personnel training at the Mar_ Colleges operated by the Departnent of Defense and from time to" time furnish them- the-opportunity of: specialized training. and briefings provided by the members of the U, S . Intelligence. Board 78 Mv-88608 Doeld 32969629 Page 356 ================================================== Page 357 ================================================== (e) Legislation: CIA currently has the duty to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and to provide for appropriate dissemination of such intelligence withbin the Government_ This is set out in Title USC Section 403 The overt collection 0f foreign intelligence is not tho subject 0f legislation but rather of National Security Council Intelligence Directives which would have to be revised in order to give the Bureau this authority now lodged with CIA _ (f) Organizational_Changes: To carry out a progran committing the Bureau to the full responsibility for the overt collecting 0f foreign intelligence in this coun try would necessitate 2 substantial increase to the headquarters staffs of the Domestic Intelli- gence Division and the Laboratory Divison, as wel1 to the_ personnel assigned to the New York and Washington Field Offices where diplonatic establisbnents and international organizations 2re minly Jocated In all probability the creation Of a new division at the Seat of Government devoted entirely to overt collection responsibilities, would be required _ (g) Observations: The many responsibilities that woula be ours under a progran making the Bureau accountable for the overt collection 0f all foreign intelligence in this country would (1) require an enormous increase in our Own personnel, trainea in many specialized fielas, or (2) the delegation 0f varied intelligence functions to other governmental agencies and close supervision of such agencies to insure efficient execution of the tasks levied upon then . These overt collection responsibilities would undoubtedly be subject to the scrutiny of many sources , some 0f them bostile ana we would have to face the charges, unjust though they might be that the Bureau had ceased *o perform the duties for wbich it was originally created and bad developed into a gigantic bureaucratic octopus _ 2 _ Clandestine Gathering Act:rities There are no statutory provisions for the clandestine gathering 0f foreign intelligence in the United States We have in the past produced substantial foreign intelligence while carrying out our present responsibilities_ CIA established its Domestic Operations Division (DOD) in 1963 and began to clandestinely gather foreign intelligence in this country. It Dow has/Eiz]rield_ offices with approrimately 79 NW-88608_Doeld 32989629-Page- 50 , ================================================== Page 358 ================================================== 40 intelligence officers assigned to these matters It is anticpated that DOD S efforts will become more eztensive CIA estimates there ar0 approrimately 10,000 employees and dependents assigned to the diplomatic establishments and international organizations represented in thls country by approzima 120 foreign nations It Can roadily bo seon that wa would havo to establish priorities and well-defined objectives in order to cope effectively with the problem presented by the vast nunber of persons and establishments which could be considered for clandestine coverage Today there are approximately 40 nations in addition to the Soviet_bloc countries, whose establishments in this "country we consider "target" countries for the purpose of developing live sources therein_ In the absence of more precise criteria, our initial efforts in 2 program designea to expand our clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence, coula be directed against these "target" na cions (a) Objectives: Under a progran confined to the clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence i2 this country , and consistent with the intelligence needs 0f tbis Covernment , we woula have as our objectives : (1) Increasing substantially the nuber of live sources of high quality in diplomatic establishnents , trade missions consular offices or international organizations iocated within the United States; (2) Expanding our present technical and microphone coverage in such establishments Me would 0f course maintain our M1 Anagran" program which has been So successful in the clandestine acquisition 0z the cryptographic systems of various foreign nations as well as our "Telex" program which is the technical coverage_we afford the teletype facilities of certain foreign countries pamt WolDir) 67 . 4 80 ~NW88608-pocid:32989629-Page 358 tely Kr3 ================================================== Page 359 ================================================== (b) Observations: While 3 program limited t0 the clandestine gathering of foroign intelligonco would requiro 2 suDstantial increase in manpower , boh in the field and at the Bureau' s headquarters , as well as an expansion 0_ our personnel selection and training procedures our liaison responsibilities and our filing and da ta processing facilities nowever ; in none of these phases wou ld the increase be nearly as great as that which would be required should we assume full responsibility for the overt gathering of Such foreign intelligence 81 ~ WV 88608 pocid;32989629 Page 359 ================================================== Page 360 ================================================== J, GINERAL FINDINGS The study conducted by the Committee has produced the following Significant Zindings; '(1) There definitely is 2 vast potential for collection of foreign intelligence in the U, S, available through overt and clandestine channels_ Even with the available capabilities Of ezisting agencies, there is 2 large reservoir of untapped sources , (2) CIA has been authorized by statuto and implementing directives to collect foreign intelligence in the U_ S_ through overt methods and has been involved in such collection since the establishnent oi the Agency_ Tnis includes reviem 0f foreign language press and interviews vith selected individuals such 2s American businessmen aliens 9 and students In addition, CIA has estabiished an elaborate system 02 processing, storing , evaluating, and disseminating this information. (3) Such overt ccllection by CIA does not present any threat or infringement on IBI jurisdiction or operations _ The present Bureau concrols for such / CIA activity ar8 satisfactory : (4) Me concluded that it would be highly undesirable ioc the Bureau to become responsible for overt collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S. The necessary reorganization, expansion of facilities and manpower 3 and heavy task 0f informacion collection and processing could place a danaging buraen on the Bureau, (5) Tbere has never been.any statutory or Sinilar provision ior the clandestine development by CIA 02 foreign intelligence i2 the United States. Thera are.instances mhere the :FBI has received specific assignnents which encompagsed foreign intelligence coiiection i2 the United Sta#es (SIS operations covering entire Western Henisphere in Xorid Var II; present operations concerning Dominican Republic) Thore is no stacute .Or directive Which assigns or confizms oxclusive FBT jurisdietion:An clardestine development 82 G NW 88608_Docld: 32989629 Page 360 ================================================== Page 361 ================================================== of foreign intelligence in the United States_ As 2 result of our internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities_ 2 we have produced a volume of foreign intelligence covertly _ In &ddition either a t tho specific request 0z other U_ S agencios or on our own initiative in response to national intelligence needs 9 we have produced such intelligence. Wo have dono this on 2 sclectiva basis and have not assumcd full responsibility in this are2 . As indicative of this certain agreements have been made with CIA pernitting that Agency to assess and recruit after coordination wvith the FBI covert foreign intelligence sources in the United States (principally for use abroad) We have reserved the right to take over such sources 1f intermnal security factors are paramount , In the absence of such factors, CIA 1S pernitted to utilize these sources for foreign intelligence purposes_ (6) Ple concluded that the expanded development 0f clandestine foreign intelligence sources is essential if national security interests are to be effectively served, (7) Exploitation 0f foreign diploma tic target8 fortifies our efforts in the internal security and counterintelligence fields _ Information developed increases over-all knowledge and produces leads or ties to intelligence activity beirg carried out by foreign intelligence and security services_ 0 (8) The U_ S, intelligence community currently does not provide an organization Or a mechanism which can effectively exploit the intelligence potential in the foreign diplonatic field 0 There have been expressions Of concern an certain linited action taken by FBI and CIA but there has not been 2 well_organized or united effort and most important of there has been a decided lack of leader- Ship directed toward attacking the problem and at the Same time inducing an atmosphere of barmonious application of all availabfe resources, .(9) Te concluded there is a1 excellent opportunity for the Bureau to aSsume leadership i6 this matter and in So doing, enbance mational security and 83 NW-88608-Deeld:32989629_Page_361 all , ================================================== Page 362 ================================================== the: capabi ies or the Bureau , The @ has arrived for us to adopt and implement a now concept toward foreign intelligence collecticn, It would be unwise if the Bureau dia not mOVo into a leading rale and instead applied policy a7d tactics conforming with a "holding nctiona M This , in 011 opinion, J5 not consistent with the reputation of 2 progressive and forward loolsing organizationa (10) Tho Bureau does havo talent and capability to aSSUme 2 mor0 active role in clandestine collection 0f foreign intelligence We have the potential to nandle clandestine collection 0f Zoreign intelligence in the U S , in a more effective manher than any other agency. This can be done in 2 conakcructive and prudent manner (11) It is recognized that a new approach by the Bureau will involve operationel risks_ If ne is to progress he nust take risks 0 We feel that Te have the capability to succeed With a minimum 0f iosses 01' debits , (12) Te feel tnat if we do not adopt 2 new role characterized with a1 aggressive approach, 2 door is left open for other agencies such as CIA to procress} introduce programs designed to 2i1l the vecuun. CIA currently does 2ot have the capability to inject 2 rapid M take-over" 0z operational are2s Te do feel that such vould ba accelerated not by CIA 's strength, but by our weaknesses 0 (13) CIA is progressively expanding its objectives and capabilities to conduct clandestine intelligence operations in the U , S , This presents a potentiel for areas of conflict between CIA and FBI. (14) We definitely must define our role in tbe field of clandestine foreign intelligence collection So that policy and objectives a*8 clear-cut Not only our owm personnel but other agencies including CIA sbould know exactly vhere we Stand, (15) CIA can be pernitted t0 develop clandestine sources of foreign intelligence under the 84 0 Nw-88608_Docld: 32989629_Paqe 362 _ valy ================================================== Page 363 ================================================== established ground rules Which do protect Bureau interests_ A zew approach being recommended would heavily deter CIA from eztensive development of clandestino sources and would really Zeave the Agency 1n 2 mixor O1 subordinate role. 1 1 L Le 85 Ni 88608- Docld. 32989629-Page 363 ================================================== Page 364 ================================================== K RECOMMCNDED PLAN OF ACTION A penetrative and objective study 0f the Bureau's position has led uS t0 conclude that the Bureau should play 2 much mora active and influontial rolo in the clandestine collection 02 positiveintelligence in the United States . Me are recommending tke implementation 0f a plan which wilz led to 2 valuablo fontribution Io our national security effort and concurrently will improve our internal security capabilities _ This plan presents concept of 2n ZBI 2s 2n Agercy primarily responsible for internal security, but supplenenting its coverage with a substantially expanded capability in the clandestine collec- tion 0f positive iatelligence. We believe tha ve have the capability of developing tnis xew look knowing that at the same time WG can institute 3 badly needed leadership to elininate 2 gap in the acquirement 0f high-quality intelli- gence in the United States The main features 0f thig plan ar0; 1) Esteblishment 0f 2 list 0f foreign diplonatic targets consistent with the needs f the Government 2) Expansion 0f our technical surveillance capabilities with emphasis on misur8 3) Expansion 0f live sources characterized with selectivity end high-quality value. The F3I assuning a role 0f leadership in the clandestice exploita' ion 0f positive intelligence in the U 8 _ and in so doing naking maximum use 0f the talent and capabilities 0f other appropriate U . 8_ Agencies _ Authorization The plan mould be implemented under proper executive authorization (Presidential) end furthermore mould be coordi- nated with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) A letter from the President authorizing the Bureau to expand itS capabilities in clanGestine positive intelligence collec- tion 2 consistent with the needs 0z the governnent 2 woula sufzice_ In order to avoid any nisunderstanding or confusion within the intelligence community; USIB would be apprised of the Presidential authorization_ Tke letter from the President pot: Tequire apy: details regarding the Dacure and the scope 0f the ction "co be ` takeii by the Bureau but could' be 86 5 NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page 364 would- ================================================== Page 365 ================================================== expressed in gereral terms This sam0 authorizacion could be further defined by the President'6 Foreign Intellizence Advisory Board_ It Ls realized that i* woula bo necossary *o discuss this' plen Fith tbe President 80 that be fully under- stood the purpose, scope and the controlling Zeaturas Yith his epproval the plan could also be discussed with tho Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board_ Selection 0f Targets Priority O targets can be established by appli- catlon oz the following criteria: 1) Review of requests or requirement8 levied on u5 by-the President and U. S _ Intelligence Agencies_ 2) Review o1 priorizy listed by the USIB _ (Thia 16 dona O2 4 regular basis.) 3; Ciiz ciim czcljciz e22 2v2luarion ot interntional political developents _ This primarily Qill be done :t but we should be 5o orgenized that the field mould be Iree to subalt recommendations _ As 0f March 1966, tbe following could be Set forth 25 2 'tentative list 0f priority targets in the United States: 1) USSR 2 , Indicacions 02 Significant changes in Soviet policies, particularly with respect to relations with the Mest and with Comnunist China_ b Backgrouxd information,illuninating the decisiors of the 23rd Perty Congress especially indicatiors 0f policy disputes Or' politicelgfivaizies; repercussions in other Connunist perties_ C_ Developnents in Soviet space prograns in the rake 0f Luna 9_ 2) Vietnan/Laos/Cenbodia 2 Chinese Conmuzist , Soviet and North Viet- Raweso capabilities, intentions, a1d ections with respect to Vietnan/Laos and t0 US ectivities 1n tbe area 87 ~W-88608_ocld: 32989629 Page 65 'SCG , ================================================== Page 366 ================================================== b Indications of Soviet deployment of surface-to- surface missiles to North Vietnan C 0 Changes in the atcitudes and policies Of influential South Vietnamese, egpecally Buddhist leaders , toward tho war exzort or the US 0 d. Indications of 2 major change in Viet ConE/PAVN and Pathe: Lao military capabilities and tactics . Infornation pertaining t0 the location, size, end types of Chinese troop unlts in Indochina f_ Evidence of Viet Cong/PAVN/Chinese.Conmunist u3e 0z Cambodia as a sanctuary, opereting base, or source o2 supply; Cambodian Governnent attitudes toward such uses, 3) Comnunist China 2 , Militery, logiscic, transportation, and economic information bearing on Connunist China 8 capability %o f1ght a wa in Southeast Asia and indicatiors of Chinese intentios recpectizs dizcct iovclvement in +Kis AT83 : b Hovements 0f Chinese submarines out of their normal Os bases or operating areas, particularly toward the South China Sea and tbe Culz of Tonkin, C Increesed air dezense capability, percicularly production and deploynent 0z advanced fighter/interceptor aircraft. d. Hilitery activities In other border areas, France a , French foreign policy 2 especially concerning NATO , the USSR, the Fiar in Vietnan/Laos and estrangement or com- petition with tbe US _ 5) The Dominicah Republic a J The cbarccter , strergth 9 influence and potential 0f the contending parties and factions; their capabilities and intentios to coaduct coups or insurrectionist activities; their attitudes toward the June elections; capabilities: 02 the' Provisionl Covernment to.maintain: control. 88 ~' =NW88608_Docld:32989629_Page 366 ================================================== Page 367 ================================================== 6) India-Pakistan 8 Developments in Indo_Pakis tanf relations and attitudes toward the US , the-USSR and Communist China _ 7) Latin America 2 Evidenco of inczoased oxcernal Cormunist e.Seistanco to insurgercy movements in Latin America in the wake of the January conferences in Iavana . 8) Indonesia end Malaysia/Singapore 2 Political aims 0f the Indonesian military; Sukrarno'8 health and political intentions and capebilittes; moves to rebuild 2 Communist party . b_ Indoresian intentions t0 continue or reduce the conflict with Malaysia, Changes i2 Soviet or Chinese policy toward Indonebia resulting from the current internal conzlict. 9) Thailand and Burma 2 _ Communist subversive ectivity and external support; government capabilities to oppose subversion_ 10) Africa 8 African and Connunist Support to Southern Rhodesian black nationalists; nationalist capebilities to act against the Snith regime; Whice opposition to tne Smith regime; South African and Portuguese assistence to the Snich regine. b Effect 0f recent coups on tbe stability 0f other African states_ 11) Yemen a _ Evidence 02 intentions and ections of tho JAR end Saudi Arabia Fith respect to tbe Yemeni situation_ 89 5 Nw-88608_Docld: 32989629_Page 36Z ================================================== Page 368 ================================================== 'Technical Survelllance 02 Targets Coverage in this field Will be divided into tbe folloring categories: 1) Technical Surveillances 2) Microphone Surveillances 3) More Sophisticated electronic monitoring, 1.@. code machipes_ At the present time we ar0 handling a very limitea number of installations Mith existing capabilities, we could virtually double our present technical coverage Once we have established reasonable pribrity listing} it is believed we should systenatically ezpand our operations. In this connection, the Zollowirg should be borne in mind; 1) Heavy emphesis should be placed on microphone surveillances _ 2) Today we ere placing greater stress on coverage 0f official establishments The jew program asks for an expansion 0i coverage on individuals and/or residencea 0f individuals_ Here again selectivity Will be 2 dominating charecteristic. 3) The program Should be So flexible that we would be able to deectivate any installation for security reasons or for non-productivity and wbenever possible employ techniques which would permit easy reactivation. 4) Ezcept for current intelligence requiring immediate dissenination, the product Should be 'handled 25 communications intelligence and dissemination would be subjected t0 well-established Conint controls of the National Security Agency (NSA) plus any addicional restric- tioms tbe Bureau felt should be imposed- 5) Tbe product would be transmitted to NSA by u8 for dissemination within the intelligence community. NSA would be responsible for handling any needed translation He must recognize that the program wiil produce voluminous information and the responsibility for processing the data should be fixed Tith En agency which 18 organized and equipped to handle the job It is believed that 1f the Bureau assuned this respons:bility we would be burdened. with 2 gigantic task of information ' processing to the point that this element would adversely affect cther phases 0f the program 90 NW 88608_Qocld: 37989629 Page 368 ================================================== Page 369 ================================================== 6) I2 the information collected by us suggested" a potential for the developnent of an operation, 1.0. double agent , the Bureau could essume complete control of this operation including t6o dissenination 0f tno inzormation_ Our involvenent in the "sophisticated" category should be increasod by expanded rescarch and development bearing in mind we should be utilizing the most productive equipnent available_ The imporcance 0r this field cannoz be exaggereted in light 0z the rapid developients in tbe scientific world_ Technlcal Surveillance Controls Under this plan we could furnish the President and the Attorney Geporal 2 listing 02 techaical surveillance targets and do S0 on a periodic besis This could even include an annual evaluation of the progrem 'Anagrn_Progzen (Clandestine collection 02 cryptographic material) This has been ome 0f the more productive prograng handled by he Burezu thzoughout the years Me definitely believe that Ichis progran should oontinue and where feasible 67 Ie Should accelerate. Tbe product would continue to be disseninated t0 NSA = Live Sources The category of "'live sources" Fhen broadly inter- preted includes every individual from the casual contact to the controlled inforzant wiho 1s delivering high quality information at 2n obvious risk_ Ar the present tine, Our sources in aiploratic estcblishnente are for the most part Anerican citizens This situation is largely due %o a2 undesirable errangezent Fhere Fe must first obtain cleararce from the Scte Depertment before Tze proceed to recruit ary employee Or officials of a diplonatic establishzent . This pleces State in tbe "driver S seat" aad that Department tberefore, is precticelly controlling ouz efforts , We Yeel 'Athatteuch: a7.Arrangepept ;18,certainlysnot conducive to 91 NW-88608-Doeld32989629_Page-369 San = 0~ ================================================== Page 370 ================================================== producing the bestt results. In our opinion this can be removed by the President S advising the Secretary of State that the FBI is being authorized to develop penetrations i1 foreign diplonatic establishments without obtalning cleranccs from State It riould be understood tha: the Burezu rould proceed in 2 discreet and secure manner Periodic contact with the Secretary of Stata or other top State officisls to discuss goncral dovolopmente and any potential problens will provide 2 mechanism for healthy coordination vith State: Me recognize that 2 source can turn "sour" and, therefore, there is the danger 0f potential enbarrassment However 9 it sbould be noted that our record in this regard bas been outstanding over the years efficient irvestigative agency needs Sources 0f all categories and We are no exception. Therefore, we should continue our present progran 01 general sourca developuent 9 a2d this would include contacte who can produce information on an occasionsl basis or who might be in 2 position to be of assistance ip 2 particular investigation_ In diplonatic establishmerts the reception clerk , chauffeur, the mzid, can always be or essistance. However , the prirary enphasis 0f this new program would be directed toward high quelity Bources , such 2s: 1) Code clerks Officials Tho have access to files, records 7 or communications 3) Officials or employees who are in & position to penetrate comnunist-bloc circles or establishnents 4) Members Of foreign intelligence and security services_ Our ezisting programs 0f Seeking penetrations in communist-bloc installations naturally nust continue but will require an increased ezfort toward production of- information relating to personality data, end this Ghould b2 done on 2 larger bumber 0f individual Icargets_ Me realize that Blac personnel does live.in 2 R21rly insulated Morld, and elenentary investigative techniques do not produce voluminous and highly Significant data It is therefore believed that our techniques Should become more bophisticated tbrough additional coverege On *be residezces 02 indivicuals. 92 0 N 88608Docld: 32989629Page 370 Any ================================================== Page 371 ================================================== Such efforts naturally fall in line with our internal security responsibilities, but the coverage may also provide Jeads for development 0f-'sources Ln the positive intelligence fleld_ Evory Soviet is not Q member 0z KGB or GRU , but ho novorthelesc could 0ifer informtion 01 value, and he could be most useful on 2 long-range basis. Our program very definitely should have this philosophy in mind, and it 1s an element Fthich must ba impressed upon our personnel in our training prograns_ In this regard, we must recognize that at some point it may becoma necessary to turn over recruited sources T0 another agency such 2S CIA or one of the military services_ Such curnover will, 0f course, depend n the circustances The guiding principle should be the _preservation oz the source uder the best security. In the non-communist bloc field we would con- centrate on developnent of bigh-quality sources to meet the priority needs 0f the Government Training 0z Personrel At the present tine, our persomnel are not: properly oriented to effectively engage in a program 28 reconnended To eccommodake to 2 cew epproach , it will be necessary to; 1) Include in our training classes lectures Which will cover 2 more decailed picture of U_ 8_ intelligence, its history, . definition of terzs , fucctions o2 intelligence agencies 2) Include lectures regarding the foreign intel- ligence needs 0z the U, 8 . Governnent 3) Use outstanding officials of other agencies to lecture on Special intelligence matters _ This Would include the criticel 2res throughout the world_ Disseminate 2 buiietin"to' tne fieid on 4 regular basis to -emphasize foreign intelligence needs 45 tney relate to our capabilities _ 5) Irstitute 2 speciel In-Service class (once x twice per yeer) vhicn Will concentrate 0n Zoreign fnteiligence ~~Tnes will be-designed;to develop:thevleaders or the Specialists in the field. 93 NW 88608 Docld:32989629 371 Page ================================================== Page 372 ================================================== 6) Arrenge for attendance 0f selected Bureau personnel to schools 0z other agencies such 23 State Department , and the military services_ 7) Arrange for attendance Of solected porsonnel at War Colleges _ 8) Expand the treining 0z Agents in the handling 0f technical surveillenca inctcilations, Reporting Procedures This program will not require any basic departure from Our present reporting procedures The Bureau shoula not become involved in evaluating, estimating 9 etc_ Me should endeavor to adhere to our traditional position 02 reporting the facts 2s collected_ We may wish to give considerstion to adding one feature to our regular reporting on individuals_ This could be an annex for "Personality Data The objective would be to maintain an up-co-date book on everything collecced relating to the subject'8 ckeracter, hbits, femiJy interests; weaknesses? etc. G Language Capabilities An expanded program for collection of foreign intelligence would require increased capability *o handle foreign languages _ As explained above, the material collectea through technical Surveillances should be bandled 85 communications intelligence, and the major translating responsibility Fould, therefore, be placed on NSA. Fe however , recognize that it is necessary to maintain 2 strong foreign language capability in the field wherever it may be useful to develop live Sources In offices such 25 Nem cork City and Washington, D. we Should expand tbe nurber of Agents who are fluent in French, Russian, Polish, Czech, Gerzman, Chinese, and Spanish _ An office which is' vell equipped with 2 capability in the Yoregoing is generally able to handle most situetios which arise. 94 7 NW-88608_Deeld+ 32989629-Page-372 CIA , 1iFA; do , C., ================================================== Page 373 ================================================== Relations With Other Agencies If this progrem-is-adopted, other intelligence agencies would be officially apprised 0 tho Presidential authority granted to the F3I t0 collect foreign intelligence in the United States . Other agencies would ba informed regarding tha nature and tho extcnt of the authority bcing delegated to the Bureau_ It mould be necessery to make clear that the Bureau was not assuming responsibility for the clandestine collection 0f 211 foreign intelligence in the United States 2 but we were taking 2 constructive step in 2n effort to increase the production of foreign intel- ligence through assets available to us Me vould clearly point out that the FBI was not taking this epproach 25 8 solutlon to all 0f the problens relating to forelgn intel- ligence collection in this country , We would emphasize that Te would move egainst targets in line rti th established priorities and that we would do So on 2 selective basis_ We would have it understood thet operational activities would be properly coordinated wherever it was obviously necessary. With regard to the handling of the product of technical surveillances it Fould be necessazy to effect 8 working agreenent with NSA , To do this we might be obliged to discuss this 2t the USIB level So that NSA could obtain the required authority to support the biring of additional personnel and purchase of equipment for the processing 0f ou: product _ Our arrangenent vith NSA would include ground rules for processing, transletion, and classificacion and dissemination _ Since any announcement that we were in the foreign intelligence field Tould prompt unusual interest and very likely queries, Re should brief CIA regarding the objectives 0f our program Our plan vill not abrogate the existing ground rules which permit CIA to assess and recruit positive intelligence sources in this country under certain coaditions. Since both Agencies will have. foreign intelligence sources in Ihe U.8 we undoubtedly vill find it useful to wozk Ou t an agreenent vnc-eby one Agency Knows that the other has coverzge in 2 particulez area or establishment We already receive the identities: 0f CIA sources _ It would not be necessary for us t0 identizy our sources , but Ve could indicate to CIA that we had a1 asset in 8 particular area, 95 3 NW_88608_Docld: 32989629 373 Bage ================================================== Page 374 ================================================== This vould permit CIA to levy requirenenks on uS . For examplez if we recruited the Third Secretary 0f the French Enbassy 9 CIA might wish to ask any number 0f questions dealing With the French political situation_ If Wo folt that the request W2s roasonable, wo could hanale this through our Source. It will be noted that the procram doos not preclude CIA from development of foreign intelligence sources Ia the U. S_ for fulfilient of CIA responsibilicieg. CIA will contirue to operate uzder exlsting ground rules which are designed to protect Burezu interests_ We believe that 1f the progrem 18 implenented and jells we will be in 2 position to "spot" sources required by CIA and other agencies to aischarge their responsibilities Tnis would epply *o cases where the target was i2 the. U _ S . for 2 visit or if he had Some specialized kowledge not related to our internal security responsibilities_ Tnese vould be targets which other agencies could handle without interfering witn our operations and without naking us carry 2 load for another agency _ This particular concept should include a Buzezu 2ttitude that any and every source handled by aDuillef- &3tMLC y 12 tkz U . S. potentially ca. be useful to Us We should have a2 outlook that 211 sokrces should be exploited to the fullest extent and under secure conditions _ If another agency has 2 capability to open 2 door we should take adventege of the situation In those instances where CIA has a source in the United States, Fe should prod that agency to Seek infornation of interest to the Bureau 2 and wbere obviously cecessary Re Should errange aCCess to the CIA source The important fezture 0f this ner concept is that we assune the role of projecting initiative, leadership 21d 2ggressiveness _ Our position Should be such that ve push the other agencies to use their resources even to the point 0f bealthy irritation We heve looked 21 CIA 2s the "other agency" in this picture_ 9 but Fre should not neglect. the potential 0z agencies such 2s ACSI 9 Air Force, ONI a2d State_ Al1 of then have entree to diplomatic circles The day-to-day contacts Which officiels of these agencies have with personnel 0z foreign govermnents produce many "pieces" 0f personality data which, Fnen 2dded up over 2 period 02 tine, 96 NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 374 ================================================== Page 375 ================================================== can prove to be extrenely useful_ We should 'conzer with these agencies regarding waJs and means 0f recruiting sources either to be handled by us jointly or by one 0f the intelligence agencies _ Here again, che Buroau can po tho dominant and pushing source It is believed that if Fe moved along the lines described above , tne Bureau , over 3 poriod 0f time, woula have collected valuzble information regarding numerous personalities and the inner worirings 0f the many diplomatic establishents_ The acquirement of data 0z this type creates operational strength_ It places uS in & position to exploi€ the development of Rev sources, bearing in mind that in planning our approaches ve vill be equipped with ammunition not gained through casual surveillances and observations_ With the kno[ledge that we gain, we can high quality operations It is interesting to note that during the past two years the infornation received from CIA S souzces in the Unitea States has been fairly voluminous and very definitely valuable I is 2 good illustration 0f the Burezu S gaining useful data from another agency with 8 mininum of Bureau expense and efzort, but 8*iJ) maintaining very effectiye control of our juris- dictional rights_ 0 Undoubtedly relatted t0 the utilization 0f other agencies resources is the considerably vast potential offered by friendly foreign security services_ If the services 0f Great Britain, Gerneny , France , Holland 9 Italy, Australia and Canada provided uS information collected in Washington, D_ C_ and New York resulting from contacts witb comunist_bloc officials wie would have another ve luable source 01 information _ We Should bear in mind that we do spend hundreds and thousands 0f nan-hours Seeking sucb information through other dizficult channels . We Should utilize the Eriendly liaison services along the lines described above . Administrative Reorganization The present adninistrative framenork at the Seat 0z Government :and: in;the field would:noj be adequate to implenent the recojzZnded progien Placing the additional load on our existing supervisory structure iS, of course, NWN 88608 Tocid:32989629 375 plan Page ================================================== Page 376 ================================================== out of the question. Me definitely would require xh increase in supervisory personnel in the Dmestic Intelligence Division In addition, there would be 2 need for more manpower in our Laboratory to handla oxpansion in tho technical surveillance field. There would be 2 need for additional personnel t0 be assigned for the development of live sources in the field. It would po necessary to have 2iold personnel as8igned *o technical surveillance installations on 2 continued basis and, 0f course, there mould be 4 need for support related to such activities as prelininary security surveys . It is outside the scope of this Committee's competency to outline any specific adninistrative re organization and propose what personnel, equipment and facilities would be needed . Te feel that this culd be best handled only after ihe objectives 0f the program are approved_ At that point, officials from the Seat of Government and the field could meet to map out the necessary reorganization_ The extent of reorganization will hinge on our decision 2S to the pace wa should set We recommend that Me proceea a% 2 steady, even pace, making certain that WA solid groundwork for 211 0z our activity We should refrain from becoming involved in 2 "crash" program uniess national security interests obviously warrant such an approach_ In connection with any planning for reorganization, it would be unwise to proceed without first obtaining 2 reliable inventory 0z our current resources_ Such an inventory would encompass the folloving: (1) The number 0f Agents currently assigned to strictly positive intel- ligence collection; (2) Our foreign language capabilities; (3) Our current sources. and informants with an objective assessment 0z capabilities; (4) Number o2 supervisors at the Seat of Government cuzrently handling positive intel- ligence matters_ In connection with any plens for reorganization, we . Should rot neglect to give consideration to the problems {Kich ie" Will eneointer a8 time goes' ontin the< ar0a5 '0f` x' inzormation storage and retrieval therefore, sbould realize that it-,woula be unwise-to exclude research Or stidy regardibg the' computerizing. 0z' information , 98 NwN 88608 Docld: 32989629_Page 376 _ Jav We , ================================================== Page 377 ================================================== La ALTERNATIVES In addition to the recommended plan set fdrth in preceeding sections there aro several alternative courses of action we might take: 1 We could take the position, and seek ways to implenent it, that the entire field of foreign intelligence collection in the U. S both overt and covert, should be handled by tho FBI _ Such an across-tho-board approach wculd exclude CIA and other U _ agencies from 'foreign intelligence collection in this country and would place exclusive responsibility and jurisdiction in this field on the FBI_ As indicated in Section 1, this would require 2 revamping of. existing legislation and directives and would necessitate arastic changes in the Buzeau 's operations 9 including najor increases_in personnel end costs and 2 substantial expansion in our recruitment and training programs 9 en& otker reorganiza- tion _ Te d0 not feel this approach is warranted nor do_ we believe it would be 2 practical and sound 'one. 2 . Wecould recommend that CIA continue to be responsible for overt colleckion 0f foreign intelligence in this country but thac the FBI exclusively handle covert forei3m intcllizrce ccllecticn This has several obvious ( drawbacks . First 2 we would be assuning a wide range of heavy and fixed respons_bilities Which in mary cases would be completely divorced from the Bureau 's inteznal security and counterintelligence interests_ Second , we would become to 2 large extent a service group for other U , S_ agencies and departments (including CIA State 9 the military and others) in the handling of 2 host 0f foreign intelligence requirements levied by other agencies_ This voula involve 3 ccnsiderable commitment of manpower 9 communication costs, etc. On the part of the Bureau_ In addition 9 such an approach Would necessitate significant changes in our recruitment and training procedures and would also plece on our shoulders 3 definite accountability in connection with any failures in U, S_ intelligence foreign "collection It is not elieved that this epproach is as sound Ox desirable as our recomnended plan of action: namely that we expand our foreign intelligence collection efforts but on 8" 8elective basis_and_without_ Qur, esewmipg Eul} responsibility 30 NW_88608_Docld: 32989629_Page ', 8 , ================================================== Page 378 ================================================== 3 , We could endeavor to work out 2 division of responsibility and wozk in this area whereby the Bureau and CIA would each have certain primary areas of operation. For exanple, the FBI could make known its willingness to contribute more heavily in support Of US S . foreign intelligence collection efforts and propose this field be broken into two categories; namely 9 technical coverage (this vould include Anagram operations and live informant development among Roroign diplonats We could proposo that the "BI contiuuo to operate exclusively in the first category (technical coverage) ith CIA continuing to stay entirely out 0f this fiold. In this regard, the Bureau is better eguipped than CIA to hardle technical surveillances and[Znagraml operations reason of ouz long experience end expertise in this axea , With regard to the second category (1ive sources) we could propose that CIA conduct no operatiors involving countries vhere the Bureau S counterintelligence interests are paramount or significant This would include the Sino- Soviet_bloc countries and could also include certain other countries 9 such as the Doninican Republic, where we have already developed strong capabilities or whero there are unique factors With regard to otner countries (nuu-Blue) 9 vie 'could propose that CIA should assume primery responsibility for developing live dipJonatic sourCes However 9 this would be with the clear proviso that, in the event the FBI should develop significant internal security interests we would have the prerogetive of levying requirements on CIA souces having direct 2cCess to CIA Sources when needed 1 Oz 'aS 2 final step, developing our On sources if CIA could not satisify our needs _ This &ternative plan would not involve 88 much manpower or other expense to the Bureau as our recommended plan However it would involve our? approval of CZA opera- tions in tbe live infornant field and Would risk CIA infring- ing on FBI interests_ It is our consensus that this approach not be adopted. 4. We coula recommend that the FBI could withdrawv entirely from the field 0z covert foreign inteligence collection allowing CIA to nandle al1 2spects, including] nagram opera- tions and both live and technical coverage_ Pre are strongly opposed t0 such 2n approach on the grounds that it would arastically diminish the F3r'8 role in the intelligence community 9 vould give CZA carte blanche to operate in the U_ S 9 and in many instances vould certainly result in CIAs compronising Op internal security and counterintelligence operations. 100 MW_886a 2989629 3B by Page ================================================== Page 379 ================================================== 5 . Finally, ve could take n0 action to change the current situation and, in effect 9 adopt 2 "status quo" approach Te aro opposed to tnis_ As indicated in this study , U_ S . Government needs for foreign intelligence are growing on 22 alnost daily basis and CIA has made definite efforts t+0 move more Actively into this ficld_ If We were t0 edopt 2 "status quo" ettitude: 2 it is only a question of time until this matter cOmes to 8 head; for example, in the U. 8 _ Intelligence Board ior che Prosiden 8 Forcign Intollicenco Lavisory Eoara_ If and when this occurs the decision 2S *o the FBI'S role vould, of course, be subject to the thinking and aims of people outside the FBI , possibly including individuaZs who are not sympathetic to our views_ We Foula not be in a position to maintain control 0z developmentz. 101 4 NW 88603 Docid332989629-Page 379

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