Transcript of 124-10185-10099.pdf
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124-10185-10099] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
2384 cl
#ESOR YDUS FCR : Exccutivc Director/Cozptrollcr
VIf Acting Dcjuty Drcctor for Plans
SUBJECT Agcncy Sunport to thc {i.S. Sccrct Scrvice
(UssS) Icr %atiozal #crocritic (i6-14 uly
1973) ani Ratioral Rcjublican (21-24 auzust
1972) Cofvcntions
1 This nczortfdun Is {Or thc Infornatlon of trc Exccutive
Drcctor/Cozptroller_
2 . Auesorization fot CII sudnort to thc W.s. Sccrct Scryicc
for rhe ceocratic a!d Recublicsn Saticja] Comvcntions is co?-
taincd in a jcgorandta 0 [ 7 Jprl i372 Fron Chief CI Staff t0
clic LCI #hich wJ: co#currcd in % tic aCi? and approvcd by c;c
DGL on 10 April 1372 (ccp} attaci:cd) .
Jfk (J(B)
3 , On 13 Anril 1372 thclcos, m!a:Uact #{th the "ian1
USSS rcprcseitatinc 338 :t 'astrovito c f ES: haidcirtcrs $0
discuss nrcliaizzty Plaanin? for Gtztion RW'!iazi]sport to i4e
Jexe)
USSS Urio to an4 heri:; {r; co_veeiiurs. V 1"1 Xoril 12072
tuo(c/3C; &tid
'Eej
Lct Wit} "asttovito ar Ve2qatrc?c
to Irlcent tuc prclisimaty Plzm"ing #,recd E;on in 'ia:i Jcd
to Jcccrninc tilc crtcmit of: i:cadquartcrs' SUPDOTE rcquired by'tbe
USSS .
0 , The basic aerccccst cutually concrtcd ir thc UsSS
and licadquartcrs rcfrescntatires proriccd that;
Jfr()ce) (Station e8i2z[ would conduct naac ttacecs on
81l Cutaas of intcrcst €o tac csSS,
b , CIA #eadquartcrs would coaluct naRe craces on
al1 othcr forcizn born pcrsons 0f intcrest to tsc USsS.
C, CIX mould Kccx the dSSS infotrcd of z7Y evctts
{0 chc Caritcean and Latin) A@crican arczs tkat ~Cu lc
haVc awY bearin? O;x rhc USSS protcctive Eission duric?
thc cojkcation ?cricds This woule iacludc bricfin?s
on Cuba anc Culan policics tcward tkc {nitcd States and
On activitics 0f Cuyan intcllizcace Operatlozs #hich
could affect tkc sccufity of tkc convcationso
0057
Uyss
Yro
By
U a ,
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& Covcrage of Latlt Ascrlcaz exilc ;rauds in tte
Unfecd Statcs #owld b: tkc TcsFonsinilicy 0 t8? FBI
sincc CI: iad czased thc cxteesivc coycrisc foractly
tarsctcd #ginst Etcsc #rolrs sircc it xas nok' considcrcd
ap Joternal sccurity fLiction.
S On 27 Apri} 1072 3 pcctin; #is kcld at a buffcr office
Of (Station R7/ !iaoj with thc isSS Ckicf 0: Cozunica-
tofs Staticn Zersoazcl cid 3 #ezdqurtczs rcprescntativc_ It
X4s. Jcrecd whzt 2zc traccs Kculd #C tedled Piani srcurity
flcle" officc coutier fron the 6,FSS €o Wllfer office u:til t*c rcS
ostablisked coznunica:icns links frcj twcit coizajua rost i;
coQvcntion ceicr, J: #hich" ciac :ticc Tccucses xould be scnt
{ron cke CCSEZna pcst to USSS kcaacuertcrs 33d rclayea t0 (I;
146
Icadquattcrs_ Guba; aanc traccs, {rc rclayeal co (Szation ai/-:iazi
By thc Sicnal Ccntcr Jji Tor~Cliban traccs ire conjuctc Gy #Cos_
Rcplies to issS rcqucses on Jon-Cui:ans 2re ccotdimatca Sith
(ci/so:]] Jrkolld)
6 . (Stztion m/yiaeilhas artanzed rental 0f a safckcusc
lebout fivc 3irurcs fro?i coavcnticn ccrted whick #ill proviae J
scciitc and gcarby Aeccinzasitc {or "'SSS an4 Agcncy Perscuna]
This safchousc wili !2 JVtiliblc just {rior [o and QuriGs hotl
cohiyenfions 1 Acadquartcrs 0fficer rill T.YGto "IcziJericr :0
tke coavcntions and TcJic entil trS couycrtions ajcurr to
assist tic Station in Proridi:; ta sepfort dcscrii,cd in Fatjgta?a
four abovc,
7 . (scation m'(Piazilis in dafly contect mith thc isss 13
Mier1 i Utilizic?buller ollicc 35 &.#cctise sitc Kken "cccssary Tmc
locatvion oflstation #;if: iaoi] pJ5 nct bccn tcvcalcd to
thc {SSS_ (Station is locatcd SoGc aistancc TCZ buffcr office. ) Jfkoske)
Additicnally_ tbc
Kcai:
Sccurity Ficld Gfficd]Eintais aor a}
Ifaisor ith tkc tSSS Miani uoit.
8 _ Tlic Staticn understandg that 10 personacl wi1 bc Prescrt
at thc corvchtion ha)) , tnjz t#cy will not Frovidc Jny cauifeet
uniquc to tkc Ageacy, not iill it provide t*c uSC of any t:ct
fccilitics othcr cian cre sufelousc dcscribcd in naragraph six
EG
00577
JA ()(b)
MY
JFk
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Jfklll)
thc
JFK
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JFk6suo)
Jek
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May '1973
SUBJECT : Request for Infornation on Sensitive Activities
You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and '1972 ,
I believe Agency funds were made available to the FBI _
These funds may still be possibly held in a
special
account for that use. This is one of the areas where
TSD has been very
much invoived. Chuck Briggs would
have the details as this was handled through the Exccutive,
Director' s office and of course
Angleton would have
additional information .
Signecl
I:ZN-}; ;
Chief
Missions and Prograns Staff
V7
E2 INPDET CL By 357737
EVES BY
0058r
SECRET
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8 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT Areas of Possible Embarrassment
to the Agcncy
1, Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr _ John
Dean lcvied thc requirement on thc Agency for informalion relating to
the Investors Ovcrscas Servicc (IOS) _ The original request
non-specific but it gradually emer tliat Dcan was concerned with
the possible advcrsc publicily that might devclop regarding the
President' s ncpheWV , wvho "as cmploycd by IOS.
2 Thcre wcrc mulliplc channcls {rom the Whitc Housc to the
Agency on this subject;
a, Prcsumably Ilaldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director
Helms,
b Sonconc (unnamcd) in the While Housc lo thc DDCI,
Gcncral Cushman (scc atlached telephonc conrcrsalion).
Note lhat Ehrliclan is mentioncd, and
John Dcan to thc CI Staff. Thesc various channcls
were sorted out in timc and six rcports were passcd by
the CI Staff to' Mr Frcd Ficlding for Mr. John Dcan_
3, The telcphone call of General Cushman'8 is 0f interest since
it gives the flavcr of White House conccrn. It took several days to
uncovcr the fact lhat the While House intcrest centered on thc involve_
ment of thc Prcsident' s ncphew with IOS and possible adverse publicity-
Thc reports submitted to Dean' s office werc routine in nature and wcre
coordinatcd Ivith lhc DCI. After a [ew months , intcrest in this sub-,
ject died dowvn and We did not pursue it further.
4, Please relurn the attachments when they have served your
purpose.
EZJIMPDET CL BY 05451 ?
SECZT
00533
May
wa s
gcd
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5. Ialso include a short notc on the Intelligcnce Evaluation JFK_()u)
Committee and Staff prcparcd bylRichard Ober._ The original
meetings were held in thc office of John Dean at the White House
and the principal sparkplug for this group activity ias_the then
Assistant Attorncy Gencral (or Internal Security, Robert Mardian
and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.
Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and-it is always
possible that he might draw in thc Agency.
Jfk(sce)
63 Before appointing[Ober] to thc IES Staff as the Agency
reprcsenlative, I had allendcd various inter-agency mectings pre -
sidcd,ovcr by Mardian. I expressed thc vieW to Dircctor Helms
that Mardian vould require vcry careful handling duc to his inex-
perience_ Furthermore, Mardian was dccply involvcd in thc splil
betwccn Bill Sullivan and Mr _ Hoovcr On a
confidential basis
one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly
passing filcs to Mardian wvithout Mr ,. Foover! s pernission. This
wa s onc 0f the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from
the Bureau.
(626 6 Jek(Je)
Jamcs Angleton
Chicf, Counter Intclligence Staff
Attachments (5)
SECRT
0058*
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TitTT 7,
'JESIOPAAWTU:[ FO:: Deputy Dircctor for Opcrations
SULJECT Counter Intol ligcncc Staff,
Police Group Actiritics Jfkoxb)
JrkU()' Jpkuslb)
1. Countcr Intelligcncc Staff Colicc. Group ccWvG)
is responsih le for Staff coordination %ithin thc Officc
of thc !Je Director f0r Operations for actinitics an2
pro?t?rs involvina: assistancefte Foreicn nolicc/security JFkc Jce):
forces for t c niirosc of crjloitia: suc: ncti ities and
Lprograis for intcllisence purhoses :]
2 . GI ains Tiaison with thc Qfficc C { Puxlic
SaIcly
OC imtcr;atio?l ~ion:'Zit (i:;;)
and its facility
9
tnc International Folice _cadcny
Jyts)
(IP:) cIEd] acinisters 2ma' sesriiiscs Project
IOEN-I7L #ndl its trainin? ~ronrict?ri facility [)IZN-172
FEN-168 4n` Jizition CIDG coorcinatcs 3 joint Ops/.t) Tccifiea] JFk6)C)
Seriiccs Dirisio: Ccntrn] Iitclli icy ( /cI:)
Technical Invcstigations Coursc dance 86)
7anc coinsc] to tle aire?
~fousions €1 GGErovidcf
i2 rs ecrtainiuc
@olicc/security {Wnctions 3nd activitics Spcci{ic
detiils 0f these functions are as follows:
LIAISO" XITI QPS/.II)
JFKu)u) cI{G]liaison
rith OPS/AIW anal IPA is conducted on 3
daily basis and consists principally Qf:
A_ exchanse of inforration 0n IPA participants 5 Owc
of #on latcr attend IDEN-172 coutsss and Iho arc
of intercst to Agency cozponents
1
B , arrancing for inclusion 9f, Igency sponsored pattici-
pants in IP,/ops/:i? trainine progrars ,
Larran?inc {or In6/ops/ In' hricfinzs 2@4 toirs
{orcism "olicc/scirit; renresentetiwics s!'ons0red
Lby CIA Are a Dirisions J 00537
~ertwea
SET E.+,jigo~ET Cl
ny_45304
nuty
Raiat
Cor
toiatniso
7c?
&ui
Jpkosxeko
foT ']JFKO)(B)
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D, obtaiiing biographic and asscsSgcnt data _ on
IPA/OPS/AID trainces
I providing gencral infornation portaining to
police/security ofanizations activities cquip-
nen t andl pcrsonalities requested by Agency
operating corwoncats
coordinating thc :scncx ' s participation in te
Teciical Iavostigations Coursc desiyned to
JFkc)t)
faniliarizc thc trainccs ~itl tic tcclniquc
renuitcd to nrocctly inrestizatc tcrrorist
activitics wiercin cxplosives navc becn utilized,
obtaining OPS/AID
coier for CI: pcrsozncl to Serie.
ab road _ At one time as rany as 5Q CIA crnloyccs
Ivc rC covcrcd in Latin Azcrica , thc Far East and
UFk)
Africa_ Txis total Yas 'Icen rc?'uccc' deri;" thc
Cpas t sencral Xcars to 19 scrring in Thailana ,
HI arranging contact etreen Ilc sk officcrs and QpS/;In
sponsorcd narticinants
sunt 01
PROJECT IDEN-171 PROPRIET.iRY IOEEN-172 - Xc6 im| 1 IDEN-js
ICEN-172 Trainine Ncadc~w is 2 corvercial inter?risc
Sel;
It kas incororatcd undcr t`c laxs 0f thc Statc of" %rvlani
in 1252 and conccts its; Susiness in thc "istrict 0 f 0,&,
Colombiz. It is cngaged Principally in training forcign ConSvi ?
policc/sscurity ners Onne1 under 2n) o1crt contract %it) Sery::
nps/:Ip anal Sc
lin? )olicc/sccwrit" cawinewt to for?icn
policc/security personncl an 4 organiiations IDEN-[72 als0
provi &cs spccial" training-
prograes and bricfings to
foreig police/sccrity nersonncl of intcrest to "ccncy
operating divisions It providcs hioaranhic ana assess cnt
data 0n traiaccs to colntrv dests RecentlyIDEN-172 Has
acquired th capability of provi training to foreign
policc/security pcrsonnel in VIP protcctive sccurity
for Chiefs of State_
CIA pcrsonncl undcr this covcr %ill not he Icplaccd
as
Jk
such and al1 will be phased out by June 1974.
00533
SCSET
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3
CQ'LIEIT
cI(PG &oes
not maintain direct
contact or liaison
with any law enforccrent organization local or fedcral
at honc or abroad] Fhen thc necd ariscs such contact is
sonctiscs Fade on our behalf by OPS /AID 0r
DEN-l7@ithaut
divulgin:: Agcncy intercst) Ops/:ID #as swch contacts
at hoce anc abroad hcczsc of tie naturc 0 f its actiiitics
(treining 0f forcj: n nojicc/sccurity pcrsonnc ] at hor?
2nd ab101/)
2
m;lel its Pu'lic Safcty nrofrars arouna t'c
world . IJEN-172 has such contacts at hcfc local anc Jfk 4)6)
federal lcvc1 hccausc its ncrsonncl 3rC ncrschally-
acquaintcd #ith l3w cnforcexout of ficcrs througout tac
United States _ Xcnhers of the (DEN-172 staff
("ozoldentified) JPk(c}
as CI:) :ave appcarcd as sucst lccturcrs at suc 1 fcdcral
institutions a5 thc U.S . fark Police
)
the IJ.S_
Secrct Scrvice , and the U,S. Trcasury Enforcencnt Division_
5 . In. a dition to tkc liaison "cntioncd j; thc
previous paracraoh
)
Gic Accncy Raintains liwisonl in ~arying Jku)l}
degrees with forcign policc/sccurity organizations throush
its {icle stations ] Th2 cxistencc avd cxtcnt thercof
ho;eicr , is 3 decision to '' :acc t c .i2 2 Pivision,
and is not t'c rcsponsibility of CI/rg. Jfk W)u)
4 _ The CI: station as 3 merwhcr of thc Country Te an jn
Nontcvidco, Uruguay may havc nad S 01:C coutact with 72m1
'itrionc '0 :as aurderce th1e Twnaaros _ Zanl :itrione,
a1
expcricnced
and rcspcctcd lai enforcccnt 0fficer #as
a bon a fide OpS/.ID officcr assizncd to tha AIJ nission
in Uruguay
)
and #as ncver a CI: erploycc or accnt-
JFku)lB)
awc $ Xmclcton
Ciicf ,
Counter Intelligencc Staff
00593
GET
JFK
6)()
#KlYs)
IPA ,
9Y
JFK6)G)
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SENSTTTVE
Me) 73
SUBJECT: The MHICHAOS Progran
1 The MFICHAOS program is a worldwide program for
clandestinc collection abroad of information 011 foreign
efforts to. support/encourage/exploit /nanipulate domestic
U,S_ extreinisn, cspecially by Cuba Coimunist China
North Vietnam, the Soviet Union , North Korea and the
Arab fedayeen _
2 The MHCIIAOS program has not and is not conduct-
ing efforts domestically for intcrnal doncstic collcction
purposes Agency efforts arc foreign. Forcign-oriented
activity in the United States has bcen of tio types:
a Selectcd FBI domestic sources who travel
abroad in connection #ith their extremist activity
and/01 affiliations to make contact with hostilc
foreign powers 01 Kith forcign cxtrcnist groups
havc bccn bricIcd and dcbricfcd by Hcadquartcrs
officcrs Thc bricfing has includcd appropriate
opcrational uidance , including dcfensive advicc.
b . Amcricans: with cxisting cxtrcmist creden-
tials havc becn asscsscd recruited tcsted and
dispatchcd abroad for PCS assignncnts 3s contract
agents primarily sourccs offcrcd for such use by
the FEI jhen abroad thcy collcct information rc -
sponsive to NIICHLlOS progran rcquircnents
as wcll
as other Agcncy rcquircmcnts They arc thus uscd
prinarily for targc against Cubans Chincsc Con-
munists
)
the North Vietnanesc , ctc_
) as thcir back-
ground and thcir' particular access permits_ It
should be notcd that the NPTROIKA aspcct of the
1ft MPLODESTAR projcct of the East Asia Division is
similar to thc MFICIMOS PROGRAM .
3 As 'indicated earlier, MHICFAOS is a foreign PrO -
gram, conducted overseas except for the limited activity
described above _ The program is and has becn managcd S0
a5 to achieve the maxinum feasible utilization of exist-
rcsources of the Operations Dircctorate _ No assets
0053z
MiktHiR?; mahcc
[nsili; #fiilm; Slnuirccs SENSTITVE E8_Ix?RET
Cl VY
O.
Gy:im":evi u SECRET
ting
#s
ing
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SECRET,
CORPORATE_COVER
1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is rcsponsible for the
placement of Agcncy operational personnel under the cover
Of bona fide U.S companics abroad and in the U,S , This
process involves the selection 0f companies; rcsearch 01
their locations and key personncl ; clearanccs; contacts
with companies to solicit cooperation with thc Agency ;
arrangcments for integration 0f Agency ' personnel into thc
companics , including letters of undcrstanding; funding of
salarics , allomanccs and expenscs ; coiltinuous monitol-
ipg 0f each intcgratcd case throughout the course of the
cover use The ovc1ll objcctive is t0 ma tch thc individuia l
being placed, the company , a vid the locaion, in a manner
that will cnsure achievcmcnt of the Agcncy purposc and
tection 0f the company integrity
2 _ Currently, there are 191 integrecs for whOJ cover
is provided by 140 coliipanics; 179 intcgrces are locatcd in1
47 forcign countrics and 12 arc locatcd in the United Stalcs
To raintain this placenent lcrel , CCS personncl 21'0 10-
scarching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companics
at any givcn time
3 To minimizc the advcrse consequenccs to a coopcrating
company , and to prescrve thc Agency operational cquity in
the event of exposurc of an individual uncler corcl', it has
been established policy that 110 mOl'8 than two indlividuals
would bc furnishcd cover by the samc colipany . 1t the prescnt
time this rtio is confined to upproxima lely 257 of thc total
number Of companies nOW beilig used and efforts are undel-
way to effect furthcr' reductions toward the goal of one
individual per company
4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function
described in; paragraph 1 . CCS ma intains continuing
contact with two U,S , car
roovei
firs and two' US credit
card firms for' the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit
cards in alias for operational use in the United States and
abroad by Agcncy personncl . 42 such_ cards are now being
used by 34 individuals _
Jfpa)a
_i: i1 6 6_ SECRET , 00514
JfKs
and,
pro-:
's
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SECRET
DEVISED_FACILITIES_COVER
1 Central Cover Staff (CCS ) maintains 3i1 back-
stopped notional facilitics which were created t0 pro-
vide covel fol Agcncy personncl in thc Unitcd States
and abroad and to providc an attributable source for'
Agency funds used in opcrations and requiring conceal -
men t of Agcncy 01" U,S Govornmen t intercst. The facilitics
compriso 43 corporations providing pcrsonal status cover,
payrolling ancl tax attribution sources, anc other miscel-
lancolls: support such as title t0 .propcrty , funding, etc,;
61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational
covel , ineluding payrolling ancl tax attribution; acl 207
non-rcgistered companics providing support for high risk
operational requiremcn agents abroad, corporatc rcim-
bursemen and proprictary funding.
2 . 224 Agcncy personncl engaged in opcrational
activitics ax'@ payrolled by the facilitics,
an essontial
procedurc permitting_ thc rcporting of Agency salarics with-
out documouling the Agency a5 thc sour'ce _
3 Thc facilities providc 2 capability for passing
[Agency funds t0 30 Agcncy proprictarics aurd 97 bona fide
comnnics 011 2 continuing basis_ 225 bank accounts
located in 36 banks throughout chc United States providg
the mechanisms fo1' transmittal 0f these funds_
ear)
QC517
SCRT
xT CL cY _
ts,
ts,
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Optionx; Ioam NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 Edttion
0sa GEN: Reo. 'No. 37
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assoca Dlr .
1 L Mr _ J Cochran , Jr Dopa AD Adm:
AD Inv. Memorandum
Mr R_ J_ GaLlagher
Asst. Dlrst i
Mr _ W . R. Wannal1 Admln.
6 Mr _ W . 0 _ Cregar Syst:
Ext- Affalro
TO MR . W . R MANNe
DATE:_ July 24 , 1975 Fllos & Com.
Gon." Invs
W . A. Branigan
Ident.
FROM M . 'W 0
{rzGaR B. Fulton Iasolcren
~ G. Deegan
Loborotory
SYRJECT: SENSTUDY 75
1
~
W
5 Phtakelford "Pigal Ceval.
Spee. Inv. W _ Redfield
TrelaIng
Mr _ T. J McNiff
JU
Tolophone_Rm:
Dlreetor Soa
My memorandun dated 7/23/75 captioned
as above advised
you that this Bureau bad; received from Central Intelligence-Agency
(CIA) 190 pages & extracted from a 693-page document prepared by
CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities
may have exceeded its legal mandate_ Some of the CIA activities
cited in this document include references to Bureau-operations-Of
an extremely sensitive-nature and it was also noted that the-Senate
Select Committee has had access to this document_ It wasrecommended
that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to
the _respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section
believed to have an interest in the matertal contained therein for
the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and_making an
assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau S operation
is involved,
Tbis is to advise that the following pages from the docu-
~ment were furnished to the following Divisions- and/or Sections of
1
the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose 1
of review , assessment and recommendations , if any :
1
General Investigative Division
L
Pages 107 108 149-151,
0
155 , 156
158-16l
180 ,
181, 296 ,
298,- 301,
353 and 354
6
J
Laboratory Division Pages 65-67 113 , 118 _ 119 182, 202,
222 and 234 ,
(pages 238-240 ana
248 were
2 furnished for information purposes as these
pages containedk information concerning
techniques used and/or developed by-CIA
which may be of interest) : ] X6)
Intelligence Division
ilzar 441
Section CI-1
Pages 23 , 24 , 28162 29 , 70 72, 73 , , 77, 16, 140-142,
298, 329 582 , and'628 _
3 JUL 31 1975
62-116395
TJM:ekw (12) CONTINUED
1
OVER
(ku)
8 4 JUL 3 1 1975
Dopa
Comp:
ALGAN
Coun.
Yftld
111178
221 ,
REC-88
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Memorandum to Mr W R. Wannall
RE; SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
Section CI-2
Pages 30 and 329
Section CI-3
Pages 26, `59-61, "37883792 290 _ 292 295 310 , 334, 361-363
368 371, 373 ,
384, 385, %88,1468-476 , 591-598,
and 615
Section IS-l
Pages 188, 189, 283 , 330
Section IS-2
Pages 29 , 30, ` 171, 190,. 191, 193, 194, 197, 198 , 203 ,
and 482
Section IS-3
Pages 521 and 549
Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to
above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the
Senstudy Project, Room 4063 . JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75 ,
ACTION: None _ You will be advised of results of above requested
assessment
Existence of the 693_pagCIA /docunent_ and the
infornation contamned therein Dhould be @os@ly
guarded and diSclosed only on a Need-to-Fnow
bazs
Am
2
330 ,
Jf
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47 C71o GcT
ROJECT
MOCKIeBIBB ]
pProject Meekingbi1-a]
a
telephone intercept activity.
was conducted
between 12 March 1963 and,15 June 1963 , and targeted two Washington -
based' newsmen who,. at the .time, had been publishing news articles
based on , and frequently quoting, classified materials Of this Agency
and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.
Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's
office and at each of their homes {or a total of 3 . The connections
were established with the assistance of 2 telephone company oflicial
'who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.
Sheffield Edwards: Col. Edwards authority for the activity was Mr
CJohn A; McCone, Director of Central Intciligence- Thc latter conducted
the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr_ Robcrt Kennedy),
the Secretary of Defense (Wr. Robert Mc Namara), and the Dircctor 0f
the Defense Intelligence Agency. (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to
Office-of-Security: personnel directly involyed in the intercepts
research -of materials acquired therefrom; only 3 other- Agency
Officials are on record a5 witting of the activity: the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (Ceneral Marshall S. Carter), the Inspcctor
General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr, Lawrence
Houston)
The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying
con -
tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources
of information. For example, it was determined that during the period
received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators
and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members ,
of whom A were identified; 16 government e= mployees including
a staff
member of the White House, members of the Vice President' s office, an
Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals _ number
:of other sources were partially or
tentatively identified, but the short span
of the activity precluded positive identification;
It was observed that through
these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and officia]
data than could use, and passed s ome of the stories to Other newsmen
for release, 'establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines
were actually from the sources Of the target newsmen:
Since the termination of[Project Moekineotrd Jthose materials
related
it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access
of two Office of Security profeszozit 1/6 395- 4qgoo;1
ENcLosurE
SECRET EYES OHLY SEKSITIZ RHEG GoEEscLze:
"n (IcTu:inn 191pi VI,)
and
they
they
Isfrajst
==================================================
Page 15
==================================================
SEGEE;
EYES G32V:
SUBJECT : Soviet Defector
Soviet defector_ 'defectla'
to a
representative of this Agency in
1964 _ The responsibility for"
his exploitation
was assigned to the then SR Division of
the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country
After initial interrogation by
representatives 0f the SR Division, he was moved to a
safe-
house in Maryland where he
was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
he was moved to a speciaily constructed "jail" in 1 remote
wooded area at] FSOLATION The SR Division Kas convinced
that he was a #Tspatched agent but even after a long
period of hostile interrogation was unable t9 Prove their
contention and he was confined at FSOLATTON an an cffort
to convince him to "confess_
This Office together with the Office of General
became incrcasingly concerned with the illegality
of the Agency' s position in handling
a defector; under
these conditions for such a long Pefiod 0f time Strong
representations were made to the Director l(Mr . Helns) by
this Office, the Office of Generat Counsel and the
Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the
responsibility for his further handling was transferred
~to the Office of Security under the direction of the
director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral[Rufus_Taylos
The Soviet defector was moved to a comfortable safehouse in
the Washington area and was interviered under
sympathetic fonditions by his Security Case Officer,
Bruce_Solie for more than a Yeat_ It soon became apparent
that the Soviet defector was bona fide and: he was moved to
more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom
of independent movement and has continued to cooperate
fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
Office since that time _ Ke has Proven to be the most
E2 IMPDET
Su FcL By 000988]
0o023
EYES CXlY
Kfpe
Krteatt)
Lsr @seunse1
Deputy
ehienalyat .
SEGRETc))
==================================================
Page 16
==================================================
SECRET
Ep
valuable and economical defector: this Agency has ever
had and leads which were ignored: by the SR Division were
explored. and_have resulted in the arrest and prosecution
of Soviet recruited agents -in' several
countries throughout the world. He currently is living
undet an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife
and remarried an, American citizen. He is happy , relaxed ,
end appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states
"while I regret my Years of incarceration, I have
no. bitterness and now understand how it could happen _ 11
2
0002
SECRET
EYES CLY
EYES
==================================================
Page 17
==================================================
SECPET
EYES OYLY
I SURVEILLANCES
A. ~SLESTA
During the periods 1-20 February , 12 April-7 May
and 9 -20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of
Miss Deborah Fitzgerald] & former staff employec , and
Orlando Toro Nunez a, Cuban national with whom
Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emo -
tionally involved . Surveillance was predicated upon
infornation that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from
employees information in Information Processing Division
files and that employees were visi a, photographic
studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax
City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance ,
one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was
made and an attempt to enter the apartmcnt of Nunez
was aborted because of a door lock problem _
PARGON
Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff approved
by the DCI _ surveillances were conducted of Iden 69
and her associates at various times from May to September
1971 . Iden 69 an acknowledged Latin American revolu -
tionary , had long been a_ source of the AH Division and
had given information regarding a to assassinate
or kidnap Vice President Agnow and the BCI_ Surveil
lanceS]included coverage of the activitics of Iden 69_
during two visits to the United States technical cover-
age of debriefings of her by K Division representatives
in New. York City and surveillance including mail cover-
age , of several American citizens alleged to be part of
the plot _ Although most of the surveiilance occutred in
New York City_
> `
surveillance of one of the individuals
Lincluded extensive coverage 0f a commune in Detroit_
C_ EEEOTEX
At the direction of the DCI ,
a surveillance was con -
ducted of Iden 180 of the Washington_Post during
EZ IMPDET
LcL BY 000988 J
SECRET
00078;
EYES Bly
"Jpkml)
ting
Jhu)b
plot
Jfxug
Jrrw
==================================================
Page 18
==================================================
SECHET
EYES Ey
the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971
and on 3 January 1972 _ In addition to physical
sur-
veillance an observation post was maintained in the
Statler Hilton
Hotel where; observation could be ma in-
tained of the building housing his office_ The sur-
veillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources
of classified information of interest to 'the Agency
which had appeared in a number of his columns
D MUDHEN
At the direction of the DCI _ surveillance was con-
ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his
1i men , Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten_ and Joseph Spear ,
from 15 February to 12 April
1972 .
In addition to the
physical surveillance
) an observation post was main-
tained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite
Rnderson ' s office_ The purpose of this survcillance
was to attempt to detcrmine Anderson 5 sources for
highly classified Agency information appearing in his
syndicated columns
E. BUTANE
At the direction of the DCI a surveillance was
conducted on Victor L .
Matchetti
fron 23 March to
20 April 1972 _ The purpose of this surveillance was
to determine his activities and contacts both with
Agency employees and other individuals in regard to
his proposed book and published magazine articles
ex-
Posing_Agency operations
POLICE SUPPORT
A During 1969_ 1970 _ and 1971,
on several occasions
the Inteliigence Division of the Metropolitan Police
Department was provided a communications system to
X6
monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the
Rashington
area This system consisted of a radio
receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division
Headquarters and several autonobiles from an
Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans
5 mitters and manned bytwo Agency employees,
as well asi a
representative of the Intelligence Division Metropolitan:
Police Department_ The benefit to the Agency was that
the comunications over this system wete monitored at
the Headquarters Building to Provide instant notice of
possible actions by the dissidents against Agency
in-
stallations
00037
2
SEGEET EYES Cly
"1eg
Jfe)
Agency
==================================================
Page 19
==================================================
SECRET
EYES E3LY
Ba During the period from 1968 to 1973, several
items of tive audio equipment consisting
marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone
dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan
Police Department , Fairfax-County ,-Virginia Police
Department ,
Montgomery_County -Maryland; Poiice
Department NewYork City_Rolice Department and the
San-Franeisco, Califoriia, Police Department
III GENERAL SUPPORT
A SRPOINTER
Since 1953 this office has operated
a mail inter-
cept program of inconing and outgoing Russian majl
and at various times other selective mail at Kennedy
Airport in New York City- This operation included not
only the photographing of envelopes but als0 surrepti-
tious opening and photographing of selected items of
mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-
nal security interest which- was disseminated to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation _ This program is now
in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether
the operation will be continued or abolished .
AEEADEE
For several years the Office of Security has pro -
vided support to a Russian, defector of
interest to the CI' Staff_ This support has consisted
46
of nuerous things, including documentation for a change
of identity
on three: occasions
C REDFACE E
In July 1970 this office made a surteptitious
86
entry of an office in Silvcr Spring , Maryland occu-
pied by a former defector working under contract for
the Agency . This involved by-pass= a contact and
3
SECPET
;00028 .
EYES ONLY
Posi pri-
Jflic)
ing
==================================================
Page 20
==================================================
SECKET
EYES CXLY
'sonic alarm system entering
a vault, and entering
a safe within the vault_ The purpose of the opera-
tion was to determinc whether the" individual had
any unauthorized classified information in his
possession_
D BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AVD DANGEROUS_DRUGS
In' January 1971 the Director approved
2 request
from
the Director,-Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs to provide covert recruitment and security
clearance support to BVDD _ This has been accomplished
through the medium of a proprietaty of the Office of'
Security operating in
Falis Church ,
9
Virginia- Suppott
includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,
medical clearance_ and training It has been divided
into three phases A CI operation to place indi-
viduals in BNDD
{ie1dl2
offices to monitor any illega l
activities of other BNDD employees ; (2) Recruitment
of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)
Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD
but actually employed by BNDD although this fact is
known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD ,
In this case, artangcments were made_for_ a11 pay and
other employee benefits to come fromECIA on a reim-
bursable basis
F. FxHTENs_PROJECT]
As a result of a request from the Department of
State,Lepproved by the DCI this office has s ince
October 1972 provided protection
on a 24-hour basis
to two_ sons_ qf.a leader who are attending ,school
in the United States. This support includes
the financing of the protection and the detail to the
Department of State of six armed Agents of this office
who are documented a5 State Department Office of Security
employees _
F ~ERREMAC _
From February 1967 to November 1971,
an
Office of Security Proprietary , recruited and handled
several Agents for the Purpose of covertly monitoring
SECRET 00023_
EYES UXLY
JfNchb)
Jfpqa
foreign
IJfia
==================================================
Page 21
==================================================
SECRET .
EES @aY
dissident groups in the Neshington
area considered
to be potentiai threats to Agency personnel and
installations One of these Agents _so successfully
penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned
over to the FBI for handl In addition during
this period, the Office of field offices
were tasked with collecting available intelligence
on dissident groups _ All such information was in-
cluded in a periodic teport distributed to appro -
priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside
Government agencies _
ZNTLERS
Several months 2g0 , at the request of CI Staff ,
and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI this
office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of
a Europcan country via conmercial transportation and
gain entry into the United States without leaving
any trace of his true identity.
5
00030
SECRET
EYES Gy
Jfrcllc
ingecutity
Jfjp
==================================================
Page 22
==================================================
ES3CSI
MMay 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey
1. At the Director 1 5 instruction, and with the concurrence
of the then DDIP, the Office of Security developed informants in
RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security
questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of &
dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of
thrce, only One of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current
interest.
2. The principal object of Security' s intcrest through this
informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years
util she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation-
of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does
not know whcthef the employee was aware of this security review at
the time of her resignation_
3. Security' s interest in this employee was occasioned by
reports that she had developed an increasingly intimatc acquaintance
with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also
being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have
an intelligence interest in the female_ The seme informant also sub-
bequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among
clerical and secretarial employees %f the Agency- Among these
employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division
4. Subsequcnt to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID
employee entered into a common-law marital felationship with the
Cuban and joined him a8 partner in a photographic business _ In this
capacity she solicited business among CIA employees_ especially
those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought
to employ Security's informant in this business
on a part-time basis.
00053
ImPDET CL BYS ZT
==================================================
Page 23
==================================================
5, Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,
but it is inconclusive_ He is know to have been a member 0f anti-
Castro organizations this country. There are al_ reports that
his mother was imprisoned in Cuba &t one time. Trere are other
episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part
with some hostile service, but this is not definitely established:
6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant
in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the
principal informant.
7 There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed
interest in certain 20l files in the Agency, and there are good grounds_
for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one
s uch
file to the Cuban while she wa s still in RID- There is also evidence
that the female employee in SB Division has continued in freguent
contact with her friend,_ the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban: On
onc occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions
from the Cuban to O/S.s principal informant. The informant has no
knowledge, however, of any other requirement s that may have been
levicd on or satisfied by the SB employee_ Neithcr does he know of
the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees
cxcept social contacts.
8, (The-Office of Security has been running this operation for
over two Years_ in an cffort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelli-
gencc nature. CI Staif has been kept informed, The FBI, which
was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take rc-
sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CLA s internal securityy
As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhi bited in the actions
it can take against thc Cuban suspect: On the other hand, Security
has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of
com-
promising the operation:
9 It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied
with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures
to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followedthe course of watch-
ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that
would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our
knowledge
of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other
current
Agency employees with Ihom he is known to have contact continues
2 -
Oo0gj
34
yet
IJfiuk)
==================================================
Page 24
==================================================
to be guite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made
any further approaches to Security'$ informant recently, althousk hc
continues to see ther bcially. Thus , there is slir Reason t0 beliere
that further waiting Will produce a: break in the case.
10_ There are two courses open to the Office of Security now.
It can attempt to have the Agency employees know to be in contact
with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions_ This might
alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly
since a
piausiblc reason for trinsier would be difficult to develop
for some of the .persons involved: Alternatively, Security could
move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the
security regulation requiring reporting 0f contacts with foreign
nationals . This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's
operation.
11, One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.
The possibility that the employee in SB, Division may be passing
information onlCLA 's Soviet operationsjis too great to warrant further
delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban
has current productive penctrations of RID Thus , the 'risk of damage
to thc Agency seems clearly to outiveigh any: possible gains from
continuing this CI effort:
7L
John-O_Lalvrence_
3
00051
Jfrt
==================================================
Page 25
==================================================
ALMHSTHATRZ H3 JNY
9 1973
MEMO?LBZUM FOR; Deputy Director for Menagerent 8 Services
SUBJECT Press Allegations re Use of Agency
Polygraph
This memorandun is for Your information only
and confirns a report I made to You by telephone earlier
today .
2 On 22 July 1971,'
an article was carried on
American prcposals rclative to the SALT talks in The New
York Tines over the bv-line of Iden 18L. It was
devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from
a Presidential advisory menorandum the Ihite Kouse had
sent to Mr Gerard Smith , Director Arns Control and
Disarnanent Agency a
Eew diys eafiief
The President
was alleged to be
Eurious
with this unauthorized dis-
closure of classified infornation and directed a Sweeping
investigation within the Unitcd States Governnent to
determine the source of the disclosure Investigation
was conducted under the direction of Mr Egil Krogh and
Mr David Young Staff Assistants to Mr John Ehrlichman,
Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs_
3_ On the basis of investigations conducted by
State Security and Defense officials four individuals--
one indiridual in the Departnent of 'Defense
and three
individuals in the Arms Control and Disarnament Agency--
were tabbed 25
leading suspects_ Mr Egil Krogh contacted
we on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraphl
the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect
in the Department of Defense_
hDxxXiSThae-KEZL USE OXlY
00055
May
Jfpc)
==================================================
Page 26
==================================================
NVn STinTz mS iur~ "
4, I informed Mr Krogh that from time to time
in matters involving the natioral security the Agency had
detailed to Mr . G . Marvin Gentile Director of State
Security
a polygraph operator and 3 polygraph machine for
his use
in polygraphing State Departrent erpioyees who
were recipients of llegaticns concerning tfeir loyalty.
I emphasized that this procedure had the Director' s
and that State clearly understood that the exarin- SBRoovwa
was their total responsibility_ I further inforned
him that this Ias the only Gay Ie could undertake to enter-
tain his request and that even then' it would require the
specific approval of the Director. Mr _ Krogh asked Me to
obtain such approval and work out such arrangements Iith
Mr _ Gentile .
5 . Later that sane day , Mr _ Krogh called Nr . Gentile
and inquired 2s to Ihether the arrangenents had bcen made _
Mr _ Gentile indicated they had and suggestcd that the sane
polygraph perator bc used to examinc the Defense suspect
Mr _ Krogh inforned Nir Gentile that he considered this an
excellent idea and that hc would instruct Defcnse officials
to make their man available to Mr . Gentile for 2 polygraph
examination_
6 . 'The four individuals were Iden 182
0f the Departnent of De fense and Iden [83
Iden 184 and Iden [85 of
the Arms Control Jnd Disarnament Agency- The polygraph
examinations resulted in clearing the four nen and the
results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature
to Mr _ Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering
memorandun is attached_
7 Iden 186 a staff writer for The
Nashington Post, in an
article
dated 3 .Septembet 1971
stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
at a nels briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had polygraphed State Departnent employees
suspected of leaking ifformation
on the SALT talks in
July. Mr John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
ADxhzKSTRATZZ 2L USz CXly
00065
==================================================
Page 27
==================================================
ADkn.lSTnAztzz 5
I
Zitzi SE Gazy
Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation 'in a
letter to The Gashinetc Pest and said that the. polygraph
exaninations na: bech cofaucted by another agency . Specu-
lation centerec around tkc Agency but aftet 3 or so ,
press speculation in
this regard died
away .
8 _ Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied
end has been pressing Mr Charles Bray State Departnent
spokesman, for confiration 0.f Agency
involvement
Mr _
Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press
conference to be held at 2 :00 P. m . this afternoon to Press
this point further_ Xit _ Bray .has been guidance by
Mr . Gentile to avoid confirmation but this is impossible'
he will indicate thc exeninations werc conducted by State
Department Security officials utilizing
an opcrator and
a machine detailed to the Department for this putposc I
do not krol mhether or not the fact that the governnent-ivide
investigatjon Ias directed .by MI _ Egil Krogh is Knomi to
Iden 186 but I suspect that it is 'and that this is the
reason khy the mattcr has been raised again . Nir _ David
Young kas instrunental in pushing mY office to conduct an
internal Agency investigaticn of this disclosure and the
White House kas satisfied that n0 Agency employee was
the source
Howard OsboTn
Director of Security
Attachment
ADXRSTRATZZ
Lil,%I
a USE CylY
Co057
'day
"i8ivere
Isueac JI
(ta)
==================================================
Page 28
==================================================
ne' 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT Items in John Clarke Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 1973
1 Two items in the attached memorandum had not
previously been reported. The first: "1_- Use of CIA funds
and facilities to acquire: U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-
vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for
use
against a common target in the U.S."
2 . In a follow-up meeting with Mr _ Clarke, he advised
that involved hore was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
'given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
buying an apartment building;
There was also
Agency given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
some OTS assistance= ivas working on new gadgetry for the
surveillance_ Mr . Clarke said he thought the only problem
here was in thc use,of funds, not in the operat ion. He thought
the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr . Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.
3. The second item: "_- Use of CIA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of President Lyndon B. Johnson'8 trip to Southeast Asia. 1
4. Mr . Clarke said the total amount of money requested
by State Department was $3, 000, 000 but that the Director would
not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e,, crowd control, politicalaction influence
activity, etc. Mr _ Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
CLssaFled ;
eC?
00073 SCELze
8 '56* (.
:rji-: 6l SGzT-EY3 GYLY
(eales = jax~slin, &8 6 ~
May
JFktt)
being
help
Ray
v
==================================================
Page 29
==================================================
funds used. He flt that only Colonel White could supply
additional detai He said Senator Russell Repre
sentative Mahon were advised Of this Agency activity but
asked not to be briefed.in detail_
L 6 FclasL,
Joh 6_Richards'
Inspector
Attachmen t
2 - 00071
SECPzT-EYES @NLY
Jfpd
==================================================
Page 30
==================================================
9 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Per your instructions
J~ Ihave no recollection of specific contacts with the
Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young: Dick Helms' instructions
at the time regarding discussion 0f Hunt' s previous employment
should be 'a matter of record.
2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point
raise public questions should be exposed and on which Bill
Colby is fully conversant are:
CI activity of Dick Ober, DDIO_
WHBR INEY and WHAUTUAL investments and
accumulation of Government capital.
Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U: S.
real estate for FBI and provision Of technical
equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against 8,
a common target in the U. S.
Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer
Presidential representational expenses of La B. J:
trip to SEA.
6
JKuc)
47e
Ohn M. Clarke
Jm)
00073
EYES ONLY
E RLJimpdet Cl
BxfcI_!
ebreT
May
they
Iftsba):
Sc
~' [sm
24,
kk,T <
FYs
Dc(
==================================================
Page 31
==================================================
ine 1973
MZKCRANDUM FOR:_Ingpector General
S3 JzCT Itemg ik John Clarze) -morardum To1
to tkc Director o Ceatrel L:tellizence,
dl)
datzd 9 Mzy 1973
J. Two itemg in the &ttachcd memorander hed jot
previoualy bcen reported. The [irst: "_s Ugc of CLA funds
and facilities to acquirc U.S. real estate for FBI ard pro-
Vleion of tcchnical equiprents by NSA (MMDOZEN) for.us0
egalnst & common target in the U,S."
2. In a follox-up meeting With Air. Clarke, he advised
thet Involved here was thc uge of {unds appropriatsdfor CIA
being given to the FBI in cashierg checks for thc purpose of
buying an apartment building
There was alg0
Agency given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monieg in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
Bomc OTS aggistance_ ~wa3 working on new gacgetry [or the
surveillance. Mr. Clarkc gaid he thought thc only problem
hero was in tke use of furds, rot in the operat ion. Hc thought
tho only sourcc of additional information on this subject was
Mr . Rocca of the DDOICI Staff.
3, Tha gecond Item: Ugc of CIA funds to
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of Pregident Lyndon B. Jobngon'9 trip to Southeast Asla. t1
4. Mr . Clarke 6aid the total amount of money requested
by State Department was $3, 000,000 but that thc Director would
not agree to this 2mount. Tbe Director did supply fundg in
those {nstarces wherc somo Operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e.
0
crowd control, politiceection Influerce
ectivity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount o Agcrcy
CLASSHEa) FY
00073 67 T3?% GY
3/3 08 2C :%m
8 :~'"G
(0b!;s: iss> 31
Ji6)
help
Ray
"' help
{3(; ~
==================================================
Page 32
==================================================
MEMORAROUM FCR:
FBI referred to in Paza 1 1s not show
In other docucents in the agency . I:
has becn kept very close with Ilr Yale,
Mr, Magnusson, aind possibly sr . Colby.
All flles have been purged .
00073
TDRTE )
fork Ko R{plces foam 10.10|
Kug 56
oi
YX !CK Kay 0€ USEd _
==================================================
Page 33
==================================================
0 7 KAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for Management and , Services
FROM Director of Finance
SUBJECT Special Other Government Agency Activities
1 Project HHDOZEX Colonel Ihite, Executive Director-
Comptroller acting ror the Director authorized the Director
of Finance in 2 memorandun dated 17 Vovembcf 1971 to obligate
82,700,000 for 2 sensitive donestic FBI operation and to
dispersc a11 or any part thereof in such nanncr a5' nay be
deternined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by
the CI Staff, DDP_ This authorization Kas reaffirmed
by Mr _
(ChiefilfansCojby
18 April 1972 _ This Project is still
active.
2 = #PAEDLEY Rental of office space in New York City
for National Security Agency at thc request of Dr Tordella,
Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr _ Karamessines ,
Deputy Director for Plans_
3. Detailees The Agency has reimbursable : and non -
reimbursabie agreencnts with the Ihite House Department of
Justice, Defense Agencies, etc.
)
based on signcd memoranda
between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.
4 0 Project_TKOFOLD Reimbursezent from Bureau of
Narcotics ana Dangerous-Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
a domestic Agency Security proprietary.
5. Departnent of Justice On 29 April 1971 the
Executive Director-ComptroTer authorized a payment of
8858 _ 555.70 to the Departnent of Justice for ncgotiated
sensitive services_ Details were kept in the Office 0f the
Deputy Director for Plans.
E2 IMPDET
Jfmu)
CL BY : | 006567J
R:;; ;,_
SENsitiv: GER ~RceS
Gmd #Etxzs;: i,vulved 000777 SECET EYzS GLY
Jrxi
==================================================
Page 34
==================================================
MENORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT Special Report
1. This memorandun is in response to a request to
provide information on situations or associations that
might appear to be irregular on the surface
2 . Details to the Mhite House and Govcr nent Agencies
Backsrouna: For nany years rne Central IntefTigencc Agency nas
detailed enployees to the imnediate officc of the Khite House
Per se and: to components associated 'intimately with the innediate
office of the President such Js the Council 0n International
Econonic Policy and thc President' s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Bcard. #e have furnished secrctarics clerical
employecs and certain professional exployees on a_ reimbursable
and non-reinbursable basis _ At tke prcsent tine Te have no
clericals or professionals assigned to thc
imnediate
#hite
House office, but Ive do have one Young man detailed to their
Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP _
I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as
late a5 the fall of 1970 couriers telephonc operators , a
laborer assigned to the grounds and a
graphics man Kho designcd
invitations for State dinners By Octobcr of 1970 , more funds
werc apparently available to run the khite House and most of
our detailees #ere hired as bona fide #hite House employees .
CCIA is not the only Agency furnishing thc #hite House with
detailees . Levies have been made by this Administration and
others on Defense and Statc and other Governnent entities
whose employees have Secret: clearances_
Professional officers have been and are at the present
time assigned @ the National Security Council and we have seven
clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis_
In addition., to the above , Ie have technical specialists
detaiicd to NSA , an instructor at the National War" College and
security officers detailed to the Department of State to
Jfula)
E 2 IMPDET C1 By 003935 CONFIDENTIAL
00105
jxakG
3
Top
==================================================
Page 35
==================================================
SKklx)
protect foreign ris ors Recently John Ha was detailed
to the Secretary 0f he Treasury along with Jr other Agency
employees _ Ie have even in rare. instances, detailed our
people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of, time .
3. Details to the #hite House and Governnent Agencies
Discussion: Details to TSC , the Wnite Fouse RSA ana the
National #ar College are probably 'qite Zcfersible _ On the other
hand %ere may be those #ko would question Agency eriployees
currently workicg at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and Mr _ Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his
secretary Ihen he Ias the Secretazy of Cormerce (she also made
a with hin to Moscow) She is still Kith him in his
present assignment but Te expect that she will report to NSC for
a new detail sonetime this month. Iden 112 served" for
over ten Years a5 Director of the Office 0f. Public Safety for
AID This information has been kept "close to the vest" during
that entire period 0f tine He has been approved, for disability_
retirement and is presently on sick leave and' will rctire
eutomatically at the expiration of this leave.
Each detail of an Agency employee to thc White House or
other Government agency has been" carefully considered and
approval at a highcr level obtained Ihen professionals
Rere
involved .
4 Project TKOFOLD: I believc the support we are
providing to Project ToFOLD is an activity that should be
reported under your guidelincs _ Since this is an extremely
sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting On
I will not repeat the details in my memorandum_
5 _ Individuals Engaged in Donestic Activities: In a niore
general sense Contract Perscrnc; Division prcpares and executes
contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to cettY out
domestic activities_ Iie also proccss Staff Agents Rho are
aonestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided
in OP I really have no way of knowing with 2ny degree of
certainty what the specific duties of these individuals mill be _
6_ Arrangewects_with Anerican Firms In the interest 0f
71 T reporting too nuch , I kould renina You that Contract Personnel
Division writes "agreements" with domestically based Americar
firms to provide cover: for Agency assets The actual assign -
ments are overseas The' arrangcments , however, are backstopped ,
in the main, in the United States .
00103
CONFHDENTIAL
trip
it,
==================================================
Page 36
==================================================
HAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT Sensitive Activities Performed by the
office of Logistics
1_ This menorandun contains information for the Director
of Central Intelligence _
2 . This nemorandum is submitted pursuant to
advice given
the Deputy Director for Managenent end Services on 7
that Office Directors report on activities_ either under their
cognizance or otherwise knon to them, the nature of #hich
could possibly teed explanation or
justification when viened
within the statutory responsibility and authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence The responsibilities of the
Office 0f Logistics (OL) are such that in al1 matters herein
reported_ exccpt two , the actions undertaken Bere at the re -
quest 0f another Agency component . Ie have preparcd a brief
description of each action involved and then have included the
namc of the sponsoring component The substantive reason {or
the requests for action by this Office Will have to be deter-
mined by inquity to the designated sponsoring component .
3 _ Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the
initiative of this Office are a5 follows :
a, A covert procurenent proprietary concern, dedi;
cated to the acquisition of firearns amnunition_
)
and
related police-type equipment, is opetated in Beltimore,
Maryland. It was organized in 1969 This proprictazy
is operated in order to give the Agency a_ capability to
Obtain such materiel without associating the procurerent
action with the United States Governnent _ It is legally
necessaty that the,proprietary be licensed both the
State and Federal ' jurisdictions Since it is located in
Maryland it is appropriately licensed by the Naryland
State
Pojice
to and sell firearms and ammunition
00110
I;RS:Pi# MZTHCE
EYES ONLY
SENSIii" ELiz: :RCzS 2_uni337 CL &w
K;) {Rirjj: %:;#E
SECRET _
OL 3-2753
J+kb])
by May
by
buy
Q01777
==================================================
Page 37
==================================================
SUBJECT : Sensitive stivities Perforned by tk Office of
Logistics
The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency ' s
association with this ptoprietary and have assisted us in
obtaining the appropriate State license Sinilarly,
a
Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary
through an arrangerent with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco
and Firearns of the Departnent 0f the Treasury_ too
have been briefed on the Agency ' s association with
this
proprietary.
b Under Title 18 Chaptet 2512 of.the U . S . Code
(1968) the sale of electronic intelligence equipaent is
prohibited except
to Federal agencies , and state and local
law enforcenent agencies _ In essence this law makes it
almost impossible to Procure
electtonic intelligence
equiprent in a covert Manner S0 that no tic or
relationship
to the United States Government is made _ In order for the
Agency to covertly obtain such equipnent and hide any
Government interest; the Covert Procurement Staff Gf the
Procurement Division. has relied on an established working
relationship with a U.S. [irm This fitm_ 2 prominent
supplier located in Maryland deals in 3 Wide
range of law enforccrent, police supplies and cquipicnt _
The Covett Procurcrent Staff has. had a
reiationship
witian fficer
in the firm for over: 15 Years _ The officer agrced to
a1l0k" us to place orders tkrough his corporation to Fajor
suppliers of this equipment with 2
billing to an Agency national
proprietary.There is an
undcrstanding that if 2ny-inquiry
is raised by the Department cf Justice, the firm' s officer would
immediately call the Chicf of the Covert Procurenent Staif
who would through_appropriate liaison channcls
)
contact
the Departnent of Justicc, identify the Agencv s intcrest
in the procurement action and clear the officer of any
responsibilitv On 10 Septenber 1971, there Ias an inquiry
abbout the proprietary fron_an FBI agent making
a routine
investigation of the officer's books Through Office of
Security liaison wich the Departnent of Justice and the
the agent Fas informed that it is an Agency
notional proprietary _ This disclosure closed the inquiry
and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry
Most of the DD/0 area divisions from time to tine submit
requisitions to uS to acquire lsurveillance]equipnent_ The
majority 0f the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-
gence service with whom' liaison is conducted in various
foreign countries , By agreenent betreen this Office and
2
EYES @LY
SECREI 00111
They -
FBI ,
JFrd;
==================================================
Page 38
==================================================
7 _ Contractua Relationship USJPRS: he Agency
organization USJPRe nas a concractual assoc= ation with
approxirately 1,500 independent contrectors and 45 contract
employees These indivijuals are unritting of the fact that
they really forLCIA in the perfornance of theit donestic
activities
~osJPr?'
(United_States Joint Publications Research/
Service) is
a Part 0f FBIS They perform a translation service
of unclassified docunents for the Governnent_ The independent
contractors kork in their Gkn hozes and are given assigarents
a5 the need arises The contrict employees are "integrated"
into the Bureau of Standaris end are located in Weshington , D . C.
They are paid and adninistered by the Bureau_ CIA/reimburses
the Bureau Their basic conttacts of
eupiaynLG€
are prepared
in Contract Personnel Division _
8 _ Hunt_Requests a Lockpicker: This is. a record of
Bxternal EEployeent Assistence Branch S action on a request
from Howard Hunt for 3_ lockpicker who might be retiring or
resigning from the Agency.
Sometine in the spring 0f 1972 = Iden 38 Nf EEAB
receivcd a call from FiCward Hunt who askcd {den 38 1f he had
retiree or resignee who Ias at picking locks
3
Iden 38 sent hini a_ resume
accongfiched_AnaEa;
Iiho retired uYO
31 July 1971 Iden 38 did not docunent his EEAB record
to show the date of this exchange =
1
but Mr _ ThonaS-Hester (who
also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between
March and 1972 .
All of the above infornation was reported to the Office
of Security on 4 Octobcr 1972 following the FBI 's contact With
the Agency regarding Hioward Fiunt.
9 Resune Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract
enployee Iho retired in Septenber 1971
9 was a client of the
External Enploynent Assiscance Branch in his search for a job
after retirenent_ One of the leads given to Lambert Ivas
James McCord S security business _ EEAB sent a resume to_
McCord, but Lambert was not hired.
In mid-summer 1972 , Mr Lambert telephoned EEAB from
Chicago. (He had a :job there with the Halifax Security Co
a lead pTovided by EEAB, but until this telephone call
he had_
CONFIDENTIAL
001072
May
==================================================
Page 39
==================================================
not notified EEAB that he had the job and haa moved from
the D.C. area. ) He aid he had been visited a Special
Agent 0f the FBI_ wh told Lanbert that his re~Jme had been
found among AcCord S papers _ The Agent wented to KIOW' if
Lambert had any connection with McCord_ Lambert explained
how the resume got to #cCord, After the Agent left him_
Lambert telephoned EEAB _ Mr _ rennedy 0f OP and Iden 29
OS were notified imediately .
83.Q
Harty B Fisher
Director of Personnel
CONFIDENTLAL
00108
(4m
Jfkla
==================================================
Page 40
==================================================
15 1973
MEMORANDUV FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61
1 Information has bcen reccived from #H Division
which indicates that there Was a break-in at Identity 61
on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972 The Iden 76 Desk
of" IH Division has no
knowledge of Bureau coverage at that
time _
2 I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66
of CI Staff (Red 1731) , who advised that thc FBI did
have coverage of Identity 61, and /the Agency sup
pported this operation _ He . indicatcd that this Fas identificd
as-Operation #UDCOR and: he would be ablc tp provide additional
details On this if Mr _ Colby requcsts its
Is/ Identity 10
Acting: Exccutive Officer
CBTQSTYAL
E2 IMPDET 00372
CL BY 008246
To.a:
May
==================================================
Page 41
==================================================
Se)
8 HAR 1273
#Op: DUHJ TO?: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJZCT: FII Co.uents 0X) Jack Anlerson Column
REFZREXCE : Jack Anderson S #4ahinston 'ierfy-Go-
Rouadl Coluan of } Merci 1972: "Cbilean
Brznk-ins R2flezt ##tcrgnte"
1, WII Dlvision has reviewe:] the raferenced colurh
(copy a ttached) by Jacl; injeraon and fiis that it eon-
tains no {2h infornation_ 'To +m9 est %nomlcdge or thc
Division, there 15 no foundatian t0 the iliegation th?t
% . Howard Xlant #21S engagetl 01 bem21f 0f ITT' in bresking
Into Chilean diplonatic installations 12 Xieshinzton aixc?
Nely York.
2 , Any conuection bctwecn ITT and thee prcak-ins
is parely conjectural ard the coluza takes car& to
point this out .
3 . Harold #endri:, ITT Lotin Americ:n representa-
tive, kas told iS thnt h2 lad n0 ralationshi? With
Iiunt 0m this Or any Itt 33tter'_ %e haa aiticigatJc
that 4nrersoi 4isht i0piz swch 7 rclationshi2,in His
colucn and n2cl azsurea US that this {a5 rot trus _
Isl Identity 81
Chief
#estera Hcnisphere Division
Attachnent : as gtated
Mj 76
~Zoeadas
Kp,7T:'hF 7Darhan jcnr
Cx f.k#6hi
Gme
nejiyi7;t;
(963
eM/aae shk ~e)
1 I_3GZ
ICi' BX (N2:3#
00373
==================================================
Page 42
==================================================
Ds5)-EPS Fof1 Tot
6/70 EALCUTIVE PROTEcTKE SERVICE
S[bikl (Case) R?#6e3 INCIDE;T REFORT 3328
DaTe OccvT_ 62-5 3372105.15_72 L~=
Locatioh (StAeer _OORES Si 5, RatURE Qf ircijent
Katiom)
Chije 1736_lasaachuactts_Axeruc-L J Brglerx _It
REPORT[O BY; 7_ Kdjress 0. .0%{ Frjr€
32k-222}
9 officc fo:
Hcren Walzrro 1705 Jlanlet_Streete SerircfieldsWat 16,.2716
officc assighfj M1. DaTE 12. KouR 13. dar 6f Melx
Scrgeant Stevens" E. Eutler F) ? 5 ()
Screcant_Rilex_H Richardson 05-25-72_ 330 hrss M
IG.#itfess 1s, AdckcSS 16. Rovi 7
1H
17. offigi N/A X/
18 Witkess 19. ADORESS 20, #CM{
K
21. Off;c} {av W/A M/a x/ f
detKils 0f incidemt IGRIEfLy DESCRigc ikcident. Ccntikue ^boye itEms ^s mecessaRY ikdicajing item)
At @pprozizatcly 1330hcurss Jondils_Fir )3J572, Fercirn Eisciors Jilisicu=
Control_Ccnter_res_ediscd_bk_BLC 81_tut 2 tu-glc;;-Jad_tskonAleco e8-i88
Chancczv 0f Chile.J335 Lacaaciilactfs_Alri:_ik-}_&cjetiza_batxccn 1 h~I? on
Fridey, 13, 1972 and on C3S5 boilrs thie aetc
Scrrcant_Biler_k_Picherczcn_ard_thc_undorsicned_Kerc_dictchcd_at_epproriza:eli
1335_hours in Criesr 23
The_udgrsicnad_ 6s_&dviaed bx_Er Hernan_GGET) Eaierres Ltinistratirs_Ccics}57
0f the Ebagey 0 Cuilg, t@t tie_Chancozz_of_Chile_ #i2s cnterei_ 2l}4t3_ %:Eicz
were_ranseckczi._ 4t tkis tice_tleGztloi 0 cntaz 02' ite tdca is Vic3
Hr, Havatro adiuises tbat hc_Willcoiltact thg_Torcicu Eissicus_Divisicn-%atchE;z:
whcn_detcraiuaticn ot_bisairg _articlas is_rade: (contiruca ) 2?_ Pnji3s
0 Yes
Jam (Usc EP5 foSV 102 Su??lEliEsT fob /*eitionxl DEtKLSi fs}
24, suspect Axdior Arrested PERsos- ideytift 6y KaiaE, KoSReSs, Se*, RaGe, social S[curity Kumcer, Do9, [YEs, [TC
Last Maie first Midcle AObRE55
{u
Race SEX Keigkt weigkt KaiR {Yes CaT[ 0f Birtk social Security KO. #aTishAl _
Lkst KKmc First Kidole AcOpESS
{2) RACE Sx meigxt #eigmt hair {YES Date Of s1rth Socixl sccurity Ho. KaTic L'f}
25. KRREst p0 25. Krrest MQ. 27, aRest OfficeR-(nxMe Kiij 8+DGe Ko.) 28. date Gf ArScst 2) _ n?
incidegt StATus
3 OPEN 0. X Closco 0 URFOUKDEO 0. 0 CLEAREO aY
RepZRT; 0f Isignatwpe),ho: Date 32. Approying Off (sigmxiure) OxiE
2Le,,< [i.5*
"Zz,
#Juf
05-15-72_
GS6iTxk
C5,7.
n:_8
Suizcint_S:erens E: Futler 1500_hrs Centein Pete_H, Lantkcs Jcz
JJ.Siat[ Dc?t, Official Kotifieg Cate: 34. 0Ss;.12 Case $3_
W/A
KOuR;
w/A 003741
ko_
Kay
fEd
M89"
I
==================================================
Page 43
==================================================
NTDET REPURT SUPFLER 1; scRia: (CaSe} 6 v{
Fz72-383_
2. Kature Of incident
Erglary II
Reportco 8Y: address 5 _ To21272
6 . Heman_(#ZZ) lazerro 1605 _Jerlet Strcets_Springfield;_Kal "783766
Kdditigkal Dctails 0f incisent:
The following wcre previously on the sccne: Sergeant Clifton 0. Zadge 1
H,P.D.c<,3D, and Officer liichael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, H.P,D.C,,3D, also KoP E,=
Print Cruiser I 735.
s/a Hickael F Kurphy,, USSS-PID (Foreign Brench) , mas notified;
Jan
8, suspect Andlor KRREsTED PEfSONS. icertify By NAMIE, Adoress, Ses, Race, SJcial sccurity NuKBER, Dob, EEs, ETC.
Las]t RXME first Midoll Kcjrzss
RCE scI Keigkt wcigxt Kair cycs OaTE Of 0irtx | social securitr Ho: naticraii
Last KXKc first KiddL[ adzress
RKC[ SEX Kcigkt Ke(gkt Kair EYcS Dajc Of Birth .social Security Ko; NKTIcXa: &
KRREST p0 10 . KRRest Xo. ARREST OfEclr (KAMC & BA@GE #o:_ 12, DaTe 13.
14= cusbest CaS[ dispostijn ,1S, Usss-id CaSe #J,
AYcloser #pixrojxo:o DDcleaRcd By ARREST
Hi /A
16. Timal Case dispjsitioh
OPRI
00377
17 Fcs ~sc 23 18 _ OXTc 19. XFFROY{d {ixatuf{ 6 Titlc) {0.
Ilzt} >
"THNi IEi Wia+kca
Scrgcan t Stcicns E. Eutler 05-15-72 "Cartain Pctc %. Karthios
Gill, 1L7,
03)
Ropex
05-23
==================================================
Page 44
==================================================
"ature 0f incidcn;
Burglary II
REPORTED 8t: XddRcSs 5_ Hone {c38
321-2221
05 7 Hern_(IN) "yerro_ 7605_Eanlet_Strcety_Springficld,Yol 4B
13
Kdditicsal details 0f incisekt:
At approxisetely 1600 hars, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Hr: Haverro contected Officcr
Adrian Fo-zu Scnzelez 2> 1310 La Strcet, X; a% , and stcted thc followring i:ers Iis3i:?:
(L Portable Redios) onc (1) Senyo +/zi Portable Redio, tro `(2) Panascnic 4/3 &:
and 0ne (1) Eestinzicuse 4}i/FH/s:, Radio. KJso taken *as onc (1) Braun Elcctric Shave: =
one (1) Wozens pullover swcater, and en unkoxm numbcr' 0 bcoks ,
jem
8 = suspect-Rrdior ArRESTeu PeRsoNs. identift BY naBAC , Aoercss, SEX, Race, Secial SECURiTY Rulider, dod, EYcs, ETc. # /^
KME Tirst Kiddlc KcdRess
Rkce SEX Xcigkt Weigkt Hxin EYES date Of Birtk Socikl Security Ro_, KaTigex:;;
sLast KaMe irst Midjlc XczeESs
(2)
RKCE SCX Keicht #eigkt Kair EYES DaTe Cf birtx Social Security Ho. natiosxl;T
KrREst Pd 10. KRREST Ko. KEREST OfticeR (FARE 6 BAE;E #o: 17. DATE 13.Ao- {
14= (URREKT CRSe Disfostion AS: usss,id (Ase XO.
&FAeosED = #Pixroixoso LQCLcAREO By ARREST H /1
16. imxl CRsc dispositiox
OPEN
00378
Rccopjika STERCIR 18 CATc | IS. Rpproved 29. DA :
fj {sn
12797 "FiViRa AK
gcrccant Stcvens E,
Eitiez
05-15-73 Captain Petc # , Kanthos 05-};
Kjoxtn
==================================================
Page 45
==================================================
PZRSZ`:! CR F73pZR,
(
Em DF Cmke *ay48-23;
Ja. EX; copies JS, Dist. Jc. EZAT 17. 1,4 J. Stteet Address 4_ MORE Pcomi
1736 71SS, Aue J ,W. IV/
1B. COx:pLXiKIANT'S OccupiTion KrD HRS fOYECI 5. MheRE ERXPLOYED OR ScRCOL atie 6. BUs. fiionz
N/A 785 17 $
19. DESCFIEE LOCAtioi 07 IYPE 07 PlziiISE I. SEX RACE Dog R, CRime
2hLE E_sassy LUreZZ
20. VEKICLC UZED T;s FO. md STKTE 9. Location Of CRixE (4e*ccss) J0. CatEe CrY
p [73E 7355 Ae_ F.u, 53551&
21. YEAR MARE KoJzL ColoR(S) 1J. YicAPON; TOOL, Fo7ce 03 Venis used Priotos
0 YEs O#O
FS
O~OWNER R Reporti;G PErSON 12. Methiod USED J3_ CLASS:?,CA?': CODE: c_Com?iEAR
P a PrnE; GUAR
UJK
22. NAYLE (Lxel, Firs:, %.2zie) CODE RES: ADDiess ~ovrgfelq) Mlose Fhoxe Els.Pr'::
Ie EJAN 7425 Hamleks Va 53|-Z2L735 7
23.
%ayABB? 7s
klhnie - Counsolcei
24.
25. `IDZNTIFY SUSPECTS TY mU;SER Ulast:t %36 /48, S8w,FJ:s, #38, K:": , Fei; l Exes, Ksic , Clortinz ex)
IF 6RRESJ ED GI?Z ARzST RUiSzk AiD CtInRGE (=it Ceszripuisn I( e:c3ke3)
Q JU / ;
P
26. NRTURE Of IRijuties KRD LOCATio:i Oti BodY 27_ Mospit;Lizcd-{kerz} 0e:
P FcLEA
20. TRAMS?ORTED CY 29. TREAED GY
30_ Typz Of Ptoperty TiRem 3. Loss VALUE J2 _ TraDzraRRS, RctiOrts COHIVErsATiO ! Cf SUSPECT
Unk
3). ExACT LCCMo, Of PRcK; RTY 3+.'PCRT CF ExtrY 35. NEMiCLE Ffo Tag Ko. state Ycri} A;;) Kare
MMCii Jlizft WiElde_EAibissY Uvt
Occu:SEu
36 (i) CorriauTIC % 0F22TE 77ZETCITTCLU%: Cirt;
Li;;ED {3C;z (2) C;IZFLY CESCRISC ifc;ji;t iRd Actic;; "AREr. () Dsi;cz 7,33:
NARRATIVE: PROPERLY I@OiCATZ Dizzositio;= M0 DesCRizz iLL Fro?zity ivolkd_ USZ CC;TI;UAtc;;
PoRT if'KoRE S?aCE is #eeded: RECob) VALUE Of Loss ESTEATED BY ViCTE:
Mehi
NO. R-l BchecI_BcKxced_ZZehoecs_ef_JLLAsL.-Z 2E:S_
g-13-Z3_Z4e_EmbnssY_cE_Shzfe_
WaS 2LL 2a
2EEies BAZs_kea (skuaysL_aJlzlubs Ikey_ALZlles
EuLL ReAecZ 2E242ow_ Lalec
CBU 374
AgZtiLLez _Ssee
EzvL Elu
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@EE_LeZz_eE_EES NZZeZ ZiisgbLS:_
Office U3z 0*Y
TT. NukBer DaTE & Time Tis REf?R? 37_ DRTE/ikE Tt7e ro. 33. {eprji f ZFL 57/5--72 Sco
39. ReFosti:g 0f{Ize}: U;it 2 9{332FJ. 4J. StaTUS ;'e:8 DumoCRZEO U;mit;fefErRED 10 42. UCR DrsFcS:; 75 KcdKRLn_Sz74 7,SPIM @CLOEEO 0 slszeiiceu
X3. SICORO GirCei UniT 4 [idsE MO. 44. slfetisj? /f8iovi;;c 45. REVICWER
uT 2 &u2 {0. Dovnivg ZEGiKLLYZ 00879
Fn 251 RlFiszu 31/ 1 Lifimoni itaij roiicl ncuedtvfnt ##,Clincton 6
bhsSY
dzc
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6,L, StL
{n
==================================================
Page 46
==================================================
OGC 73-0930
25 1973
MEMOR ANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Identity 61 Break In on 15 May 1972
J. On .24 1973 [ tclephoned Mr. James Robinson,
Gcneral Crime Section, Departent of Justicc and asked if he
had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved
in & break in at Identity 61 in Wa shington, D. C. on
15 1972 , Robinson stated he had co knowlcdge of this but
suggestcd that it Ivould be bettcr to chcck with Mr_ G. Marvin Centile,
Deputy Assistant Sccretary for Security, rtnent of State, and
the Sccret Service sinlce had responsibilities for the Executive
Protectivc Servicc (EPS). I tclephoncd Mr. Gentile and he idcnti-
~
{ied two State Department cables rclative to the incident; one from
the embassy in Santiago to thc Departmcnt, No _ 2450, clated
15 1972 Subjcct: Unauthorized Entry Outlining thc Protest
of the Iden 76 Covcrnment presentcd to the Anerican Embassy ,
and the Slale Department rcply to Santiago _ No_ 084655, dated
15 1972 . Nr. Gentilc also idenlificd the EPS report of
investigation and suggested that I get & copy frorn thc Secret Scrvice.
I thcn called Afr Tom Kclly at Secret Scrvice and he had his liaison
man deliver mc a copy of the EPS report of investigation.
2_ On 25 1973 [ rcceived 2 call from FBI Agent
Mullens on green phonc No . 5303 stating that he had received
a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my icquiry
about prosecution: Mr_ Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington
Ficld Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police rtmert (MPD)
on 24 and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd
District, MPD which states that & break in occurred at Identity 61
between 5:00 and 8:00 a,m on 1 1972 .
00384
May
May
May Mr-
Depa
they
May
May
May
Ray
Depa
May
May
==================================================
Page 47
==================================================
Reparted at tha me consisted of four am /frr} dios
and one electric r@zor, Thc police investlgation identified
some latent fingcrprints but no idcntification of those prints
was made_ Since the reported loss was under S5, 000 and there
was no evidcnce of a crossing of state boundries_ the FBI did
not make an investigation 0f thc incident. The MPD reported
that there had been po prosecution and no suspect was identified:
Lk Fhe
TOFIN K. CREAZ
Assistant General Counsel
cc: Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
OGC:JKG:cav
Orig Subject: Watcrz Case
1 4
JKC Signer
1 Chrono
~2-
00325
loss
'gate
==================================================
Page 48
==================================================
77-2,7m18
ceivlii
EE 27
1 June 1973
HEMHORANDUMI FOR : Mr William E. Colby
SUBJECT : Special Activities
1 Following O1)' recent conversation , I have
searched my mcmory and Hr AIcConc 's files Ior examplcs
of activitics which to hostilc observcrs 0r to somconc
without completc knowlcdgc and with a spccial kind 0i
motivation could be inierpreted as examples 0f activities
exccedingfCIA s charter
JPAj()
2 _ First as wc discussed on 7 Mlarch 1962
DCI McCone undler prcssure Iromn 4 ttorney Gencral Robert
F Kennedy agreed to tap the tclephones of columnists
Robert S _ A1le
I1 and Pau] Scott in1 3m1 cffort t0 idcntify
their sources I01' classified information which was a ppcar -
ing 1n their columns Bccause thc primary SolrCC appcared
to bc 12 the Depa rtmcnt 0f Defensc HcConc orclercc I @
persona to brief Gencra [ Joc Carr011 Director 0f DI: ,
orally , which I did I unclerstandl more complcte inforation
on this operation is a va ilablc fr011 thc Director of Securily _
I, persona lly
}
managed to avoid ga ining any know ledge of
what prccise actions were taken , Ihat information xas gained
what was done With it , and #hen chc opcration was tcrminated.
3 As a rcsult, of a
devcloping relationship with
IDEN-122 thc[JEN-l23rcpresentative in Washington ,
and a lso aS 2
result of certain information conveycd
IDEN-124 James Angleton with the approval of
Dick Jlelns agreed Lo nount 3 countercspionage operation
aga inst the IDEN-95 in Washington This involved
breaking and entering and the removal of documents from
7970787181878587 73
2 44pott cL: 0,0037S8
L"
5234 jj4j?:jd
3 G;
00257
1ly
by
==================================================
Page 49
==================================================
7 ~791
25: , 6:
~hiaz
04Y
2
the IDEN-126 On 18 June 1962 DCI McCone and
He lms briefed Secretary of State Rusk genera lly 012 the
operation without going into operationa 1 details_ Later
on the same day , President John F Kennedy
was briefed _
Actual brca and' entcring occurred, somcwhat later = and
on 15 April 1963 DCI #cCone me t with Prcsidcnt Kcnnedy
a lone and bricfed the Prcsident on the dctails of this
nCl phase of the operation On thc samc thc Attorney
Genera 1 was briefcd an(l he agrced that he would not
mention it to thc FBI unless the FBI thcnselvcs raised
it with hin _ On 3 February 1964 , DCI McCone met a 1one
with Prcsident Lyndon B; Johnson a nd briefcd him on the
opcration_ On 1 February ScGcorgc Bundy was briefed.
On 6 February 1964 1n a
briefing of Sccretary of State
Rusk on the results of the opcration Rusk cxprcssed
rescrvations a bout .the propricty of such an opcration _
He raised this sa me conccln 1n subscqucnt convcrsations
with McConc on 17 April 1964 28 May 1964 and 14 June
1964 On 12 September 1964 Rusk continucd to express
gravc reserva tions aud repea ccdly suggcsted that the
IEN-$5 bc inlorned direcrly tlia t wC knew' a bout ihcir
espionage operations in) the United Statcs and ask them
to clesist In a meeting on 28 Slay 1964 Rusk exprcsscd
thcse reservations in thc prcsencc of DCI JicCone and
Prcsident Joim F Kennccly 'Sccretary of Dcfense McNamara
was a lso present and hcre is HO rccord that he had
prcviously been ma de aware 0f this operation .
4 _ Although certain activities never beyond
the planning stagc . there are I believc three examples
of: such planning which could be subject to misinterprctation:
Onc involved chcmica1 warfare opcrations aga inst ihe ricc
'crops 1n both Cuba and North Vietnam A second involved:
a paramilitary strikc against the Chi-Con nucleal instal-
lations Outsidc the United States Govcrnmcnt_ General
Eiscnhowcr was briefed on such planning A third_ which
assumcs a n@i Significance: today involved 3 proposal by
Angleton and Helns for a greatly increased intclligence
collection effort agninst foreign insta llations in this
country . This planning also involved a scheme for selected
~~01i lu 68 440 -
E_ 00453
ESS
king
day
got
ES
==================================================
Page 50
==================================================
@it i Liaijdidt
E E;
3
exposurc of KGB activities and counteractions against the
Soviet intelligence service The reasons are stil] unclear
to me as to Jhy the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the
effect tha t (CIA Ias planning to wiretap cxtensively and
Indiscriminatcly in this country to greatly imcrease
thc Agency representation in the Mos COw Embassy and
genera lly to usc KGB-type tactics a lso extens_
iVcly
and
indiscriminately This led to a hcated exchange betwecn
DCI HcCone and Hr Be lmont of the FBI OnC such meeting
taking place in the prescnce Qf the Attorney Gcneral
It is clear that thc TBI #as opposed to a m} such proposal
then
)
as now , and the plan never went foriard
5 _ During thc period when Des FitzGcr ld Ias in
charge of the Cuban Task Force DCI HcConc 's officc
learned , quitc by accident , that FitzGcrald had sccured
the cooperation of. several prominent US busincss firms
in dcnying economic itcns to Cuba Therc #aS no question'.
but that the busincsswen wcre to cooperate but know'-
ledge 0f this operation had to be rn ther widesprcad,
6 _ On 17 April 19644 Xr" Robcrt B _ Andcrson caie
to DCI flcConc On behalf 0f Amcrican business intcrests
) offering to insert somc S300 , 000 to to sccure a
favorable result: in the clections 1n Panama Shortly
after this approach DDEN'-[28 of IDEN-129
maclc a' Sili)ar proposal t0 McConc im colinection
with elections in Chile On 12 1964 a t a meeting of
the 303 Conuittcc , it Ias decicledl that thc offers of
Amcr ican busincss could mot be acceptcd it be ncither
a sccure way nor a 22 honorable wa y of doing such business
Tlis declaration of policy a t this time bcars On thc recent
ITT hearings, but 1 2 I4 not surprised that McConc has
forgottcn that he helped to set the precedent of refusing
to acccpt such collaboration betreen tle Agency s operations
and private business
7 , At the direction of Attorney General Robert
Kennedy and with the cxplicit approval 0f President Kennedy
McCone injccted the Agency and particularly IDEN-36
ETZS €
00259
{
glac
try
Ha y
ing
==================================================
Page 51
==================================================
C0HEI 2.2. APR. @72
Foreign Su rt for Activities Plann to Disrupt
0r Harass the Republican National Convention
SUBNBMARY :
There is little new evidence of forcign plans
or efforts
to inspire support, or take advantage of actions designed to
disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San
Dicgo, 21 to 23. August 1972 Thc Studcnts for 1_ Dcnocratic
Socicty, in joining thc ranks of domestic groups planning
actions at the Republican Convention has adopted
a Proposal
to cooperatc with Mexican workcrs and students in 2 dcmonsira -
tion in Tijuana Mexico during the Convention . The San Diego
Convention Coal
ition (Sicc)
another doiestic group targstting
on the Convcntion has received a letter of solidarity froin
the North Victnancse The lctter is of interest as an indica-
tion of North Vietnanese contact' with the SDCC; such contact
will be required for thc SDCC to implcnent its carlict-Tcpottcd
plans for broadcasts ovcI public address systems during thc
Convention of live telephone calls fron the Vietnancse in
Paris
DEVELOPNEVTS :
At its recent convention in Cambridgc _ Massachusetts
held 30 March to 2 April 1972 the Students for a Denocratic
Socicty (SDS) adopted a Proposal to hold dcnonstrations at
the San, Dicgo_
~ Tijuana bofder during the Rcpublican National
Convcntion _ The proposal includcd 3 call for SDS :0 coojcta:2
with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during
a fiesta in Tijuana ,
9
where Convcntion delegates will be
entcrtaincd.
The North Victnanese hare given thcir endorsement to
the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a
lettcr from the Victnam Connittce for Solidarity with the
American People (VCSWAP)
a quasi-official otgan of the
North Vietnanesc Govcrnment Thc letter which has becn
circulatcd by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972 ,
"expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC
and conveys the Committce' 5 "best wishcs of militant soli
darity and friendship_
11 The VCSHAP requcsts that the SDCC
writc often and "send us materials You havc
C0.P3. BZSZZ 00558
I ;on33 IZ
I,J
S3E /2;2ad
==================================================
Page 52
==================================================
CbRZi: Bej:ki
2 8* KAY 1972
Boreign Support for Activfties Planned to Disrupt
~ierass the Republican National Convention
SUMARY:
Indicetions rezain linited of forelgn plans or attenpts
.to inspire, suprort
3
influence or exploit actions desigred
to' disrupt or herass the
Repubiican
#ational Convention in
~aiilami Floriaa 21-23 August 1972 . A nenber of the Swedish
Comnittee fcr
'Vietha:
who Is 2lso a nerber cf the Secre-
tariet of the Stocknol Conference on Vietnam , hes stated
that the U.S , National Electicns are playing a role in
the__Sxedish Cowittee S, work The British-based Interna-
tional Cocfederation for Diserranent ana Peace (ICDP) hes
distributed a "Spring Offensive Calender" 0f activities
in the Unlted Stetes &gainst the bar based on 2 submission
by the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ )
The calendar includes ections planned in connection with
the Republican Convention
DEVELOEZZS:
I mid-April 1972 , a nember of the Swedish Conmittee
for V: :nam _
9
who is also 2n influential and well-infcreed
staff =cber of tne .Secretarfat 0f the Stockhola Conference
011 Vieinan stated in a priva-e discussion cf the Siedisn
Committee' s unusually heavy work load that "things will be
hectic' rignt until the elections in the U,S If
The International Confederation for Disarnanent 2na
~Peace
) a British-based antiwar organization and ore of the
more proninent nerber organizations of the stockholm Con-
ference
9
has atteched 2 {Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
April-2y 1972 issue of its resuler internacionel peblicz-
tion Vietnaa International The calendar had been furnished
by the People S coalifion for Peace and Justice (PCPJ ) ana
~ncluded the following entry:
August 21-23 Republican Convention_
>
"'Szn Diego
Demonstrations organized by the San
Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267 ,
San Dleco , Ca 92103 .
00557
==================================================
Page 53
==================================================
C8MzZz} BIS
The ICDP con-nentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
In support of some of the detes listed but does not specifice2l;
call for actlons in connection With the Republican Convention
00553
GUME32 D3z5
{i~ rc"Ti ri 7i ;7" n
==================================================
Page 54
==================================================
GUTTOLILD_
1 4 JuN 1972 _
Foreign Support for Activities Planncd to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUiNARY :
The only new indication of foreign plans 'or efforts
to inspire,' support , influence or exploit actions designcd
to disrupt or harass the
Rcpubiican
National Convention in
Miami Florida 21-23 August 1972 =
9
is an' exprcssion of
intercst by a menber of thc Xorth Vietnanese Dclegation to
the Paris Peacc Talks in thc plans of the major antiwar
organizations in the United states for denonstrations in
connection with the political conventions of both najor
parties
DEVELQPVENTS :
In mid-May 1972 ,
a menber of the North_ Victnancse
Delegation to thc Paris Pcacc Talks invited a visitor to
contact hin again when the visitor returned from an imiinent
trip to thc Unitcd Statcs The North Victnanesc official
gave thc visitor thc Xew York City addresscs of the Pcoplc ' s
Coalition for Pcacc and Justice (PCPJ) ard thc National
Peacc Action Coalition (NRAC) and askcd thc visitor to
inquirc a t their offices their .plans for demonstra -
tions during the coning sumncr_ North Victnamcsc
official stated that he Fa S espccially intcrcstcd in plans
for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican
National Conventions _
00552
IO" FORELzH} EISE {o BSS:I AGR_AD
COi ZLLC? EUSSEzL
regardinghc
==================================================
Page 55
==================================================
fontrolle d-Bisssn
2 8 JUN 1972 "
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Karass the Republican National Convention
There are no additional indications of any substantial
forcign plans
or efforts to inspire,' support , or take advan -
tage of activities designed to distupt or harass the National
Conyention of the Republican Party in Miani, Florida, 21-24
August 1972 _
00550
o Foreign Disscm /Ko Dissem Abr:I
Controllcd Dissem
==================================================
Page 56
==================================================
CONTRJLLED Bz
2 6 JUL 1972
Forcign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Hlarass the Republican National Convention
SUNMARY :
New indications of forcign plans oT efforts to inspire,
support, influencc , OT
exploit activities dcsigned to dis -
Tupt or harass the Republican Vational Convention in Miani,
Florida, 21-24 August 1972 consist of the 'following: A
lcader of the
Pcople'$ Coaiition
for Peace and Justice
(PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to
takc placc at Unitcd Statcs and allicd militaty installa-
tions abroad during the period inediately before and during
thc Republican Convcntion The PCPJ leader also stated that
representatives 0f thc Stockholm Confcrence on Vietnam will
'articipatc in activitics in connection with the Convention .
~The Anti-#ar Union (AKU) a doncstic organization which has
bcen activc in planning
acnonstrations
in connection with thc
Republicari National Convention has scnt a dclcgation to
Patis France
9
to mcct with
officials
of thc Dcmocratic Repub -
lic
of
Victnam (DRV) and the Provisional Rcvolutionary Govern -
ment of South Viewnan (PRG) Xo infornation is presently
availablc , howcvct, indicating that actions at tie Republican
Convention have been discusscd at thcse mcctings .
DEVELOPAENTS :
In an carly July 1972 meeting with prominent mcmbers of
forcign antiwat organizations 2 Tepresentativc of thc Pcople ' s
Coalition for Peacc and Justice (PciJ) , who occupics an ispor-
tant position within that organization discussed the plans
of thc PCPJ in conncction With the upcoming clection campa ign
i thc Unitcd Statcs The PCPJ reprcsentative stated that
during thc. period 14-23 August a "Peoples Campaign Against
Bonbing M would bc wagcd in U,S . cities involved in thc manu -
facture and shipping of materials for use in Victnam
9
and
that similar actions will be organized at Unitcd States and
allied military installations abroad The PCPJ rcprescnta -
tivc further stated that "dramatic denonstrations 11 in protest
005s:
CL #3eiFp"; 5;
I 1fT R{ G:3il Rr:
sci;s: J.I.:, M; #.r
(3) er ( #) {6 }: < J(
Ritu;iIciLLT Liit_W-J &:
IxA#;XIRIG; OacL
CZFZ!E D33z
Inpossiblc to dcterzi::
WSutivl EiiCe $ )iiCES
^fm Mi0 M|tiin' 1*1i6i i1 m1
K FC33 NS::6X ; 6ual; ixoi aSle, ju:'ft il Gr
==================================================
Page 57
==================================================
CONfjwa DZ331
Of the bonbing in ietnam ire bcing organi by the "Repub -
lican Party National Convention .Coalition" to, occur on
21 August 1972 _ In an apparent reference to the 21 August
actions thc. PCPJ leader addcd that representativcs of the Stockhoim
Conference on : Viethan will speak on the subject of
thc alleged American bonbing of dikes in North Vietnam
(Comucnt : Je have no. present infornation concc Tning Plans of
Stockholn Conference representatives to travel:to the United
States during the Repubiican National Convention; mor do Te
have any additional inforration concerning plans of Stockhola
Conference representatives to participatc in activities con
nectcd with the Rcpublican Convention )
The Anti-Iar Union (AlU)
9 a domcstic group engaged in
organizing counter-activities at thc Rcpublican National Con -
vcntion has sponsorcd thc travcl 0f a delegation of activists
to Paris
)
France to mcet with officials of thc Dcwocratic
Republic of North Vietnan (DRV) and thc Provisional Revolu -
#tionaty Govcrnnent of South Victnam (PRG) An advancc party
has already Tet with DRV and PRG rcptcsentatives to discuss
the, agcnda ` for mec tings with thc full AlU delcgation Althoush
no information is prescntly availablc indicating that actions
at the Republican Convcntion have bccn discusscd or arc schcd -
ulcd to be discussed at mectings betwcen thc AkU delcgation
and the DrV/PRG officials it is koxn that ienbcrs 0f thc AB3
advancc party havc askcd for advice fron the PRG officials
regarding thc stance the A#U should takc on ccttiin qucstions
relating to the presidcntial elections It is als0. Known
that thc DRV officials havc qucstioncd thc AwU ad1ancc party
about thc political nood in thc Unitcd Statcs One of thc
Alu delcgation ncnbers has statcd that upon thcir return to
th:: United States about 26 `'July 1972 some of thc mcnbcrs
will spcak at rallics over the radio and on tclevision
to "educatc the Anerican pcople about the
conscqucnccs of
voting for Nixon and the necd' to end the war and dcfeat
Nixon Mi The delegation ncnbct added that thc dcmonstrations
at.thc Republican Convention will be "unique
Cx3321w BZZEEI
0 FRix 063 LE #ERAD 005s
==================================================
Page 58
==================================================
GurezcJ @zZ
2 AuG 1372
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
Harass the Republican National Convention
SUARY:
There are no new indications of spccific foreign plans or efforts to
{nspire_ support, inllucnce, or
exploit activitics dcsigncd to disrupt or
harass the Rcpublican National Convention in Miami = Flerida_ 21-24 August'
1972 . Although nectings have bccn held rccently in Paris, France between
Amcrican antiwar activists and reprcscntatives of the Dezocratic Republic
of North Victrem (DRV) and the Proyisional Revolutionary Govcrnment of
South Victnam (PRG) currently available information indicatcs that the
DRV /PRG officials madc no efforts to cncourage or give guidance to thc
American participants Ivith respect to the upcoming Rcpublican National
Convention. Private cliscussions _ scparete from the mcctings Ivith thc cntire
American delegation were conducted by both thc DRV and thc PRG officials;
at prcsent, we have no information regarding the substance of thcse private
exchanges _ A sccond group of aclivists considcred morc irportant than
the first dclcgation, is sclleculcd to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972
Ior further consultations with thc PRG and DRV rcprescnlatives
DEVELQPHENTS:
In recent mectings in Paris, France, wvith mcmbcrs of an American
delegetion sponsorcd by thc Anli-War Union (AlU) representatives of
the Demnocratic Republtc of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional 'Revolutionary
Government of South Victnam (PRG)-wvere vcry guerded with respcct lo dis-
cussing activities at the Republican National Convention _ Although the Vietnam-
ese repeatcdly questioned the Americans conccrning the mood of the antiwar
movenent in the United States, they madc no direct refcrence to the Repub-
Jican Convention except for one instancc when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen
Van TIEN accused President Nixon 'of using the privatc and public sessions
of the Paris peace talks as XI 'propaganda for the Republicen Convention _
TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagardize the Sevcn
Point Plan oliered by the PRG. The Americans , too, for the most part,
refraincd from discussing the Convention _ other than to estimate that dcmon~
strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention
00533
CLASS;f GY
EXit FRON G :EI Deci Ec{3
SCiEZFLI 00: E. C 103 elcS
5 57W), 0. ( 1:) (cirsl: bf E
WATAHIiIG; ThupicC
{03Z 132
Kulom i;coLl) ec :-Lil)
fcmsitiief #ilii,:l Mxcls Wo Feaeiz N243E2 #G impossiblc to deterriee
6
==================================================
Page 59
==================================================
8XNTROAZEZ DEZ},
Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with thc AWU delegation ,
the PRG officiels held additional talks with sub-groups of the dclegation_
Additionally 2t least one of the American participants was invited by
the DRV officiels to return for further discussions _ At present, there
Is no information available concerning the substance of these privatc
exchanges _
A second , more imporlant delegetion 'of Americans connccted with
the Anti-[lar Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972
for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives _ This sccond
group is scheduled to bc lcd by Rennic DAVIS_ founcer and leader of the
AWU This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within reccpt months for
discussions with DRV and PRG representatives _ Upon his return from
his Iirst trip, DAVIS publicly s.ated that the AwU would demonstrate at
both the Democratic and the Rcpublican Convention _ but that the ATVU's
chicf target would bc the Republican Convention _
00554
Contrie
~1
Ii^ rocrri
1
==================================================
Page 60
==================================================
Cu.aiic_Z}
W.di.ni
9 AUG 1972
Forcign Support for Activitics Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
Thcre are no new indications 28 of this date, of foreign plans
Or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities dcsigned
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of thc Republican Party
in Miami Florida, 2l-24 August 1972 _
00535
CLX:SIffEd BX
Eizxt [~; &mI
L Sck_iz.z 03 [ C 1;
{ Sc(i), 0 (;,
W3mA#3 %JTRCE auncsin}iilX
SEFSIT ; E C"uTCzs Riza 835 impessible_le Jelgrmi::"
TT 'c .' V' 'Mimn
==================================================
Page 61
==================================================
Cclzihu ' 338
0.8 IxAr: i972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
Or Harass thc Denocratic National Convention
SUMMARY AVD CONCLUSION:
There are no direct indications thus, far of foreign
efforts to inspire support or take advantage of activities
designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of
the Dcrocratic Pirty in Miamis 10-13 July 1972 Thc conccpt
of coordinated intcrnational support for domestic activities
in thc United States was gencrally endorsed at the rccent
Iorld Assenbly for Peace and Independence of thc Peoples
of . Indochina; however the Confercnce issued no
specific
call for
internationai
support of disruptivc actions at the
Nerican national politicai conventions
BACKGROUVD:
At: thc Soviet-controllcd Korld Asscmbly for Peace
and Indcpcndcnce of thc Pcoplcs 0f Indochina, he ld in
Versailles fron 10-13 February 1972 tkerc kas nention 0f
Aerican plans for
dcnonstrations at
both the Rcpublican
and Denocratic ~ational Convcntions Thc final draft
resolution fron the confcrence ' s "Action Connission "1 con -
tains an appendix subaitted by Acrican dclcgatcs whose
was to sccure global coordination for doncstic acticns
in thc Unitcd States_ It calls for international support
to six weeks of donestic antiwar actions and dcmonstrations ,
from 1 April to 15 May 1972 and concludes fith tbc statc -
mcnt ; "This carpaign Will
iead
up to the Democratic Party
Convention at Miami on July 9 , 1972 and the Republican
Party Convention in. San Diego on August 1972 . "1
The final "Resolution of the Paris Korld Asscnbly
for thc Peace and Indcpendence of the Indochinese People"
of 13 February 1972 , drafted by thc "Political Commission"
states:
"In thc United 'States particularly , the protest
against thc' war is voiced Morc and more strongly ,
CB2Z.3 Bz)
00563
Iv F@7c PFZRF"K.
goal
21 ,
==================================================
Page 62
==================================================
3ici
C0N8I? D333
under: Various forms such a5 draft evasions
dcsertions
)
rcsistancc ~demonstrations Which
now affcct evcn the
soidiers
The Assembly
calls for support to thcse progressive and
antiwar forces in thc United States and asks
thc govcrnments togrant asylum to deserters
and to support their right to repatriation
All together the peoples of the world will
'efficicntly to inpose on thc U:S. Govern -
ment thetrestoration of peace
9
independence
and freedon in Vietnam; Laos and Cambodia _ I
00559
7n C5
14
help
==================================================
Page 63
==================================================
{8,i.lE) 8JZZ
0 9 HAY "1372
Foreign Support for Activities Pianned to Distupt
or Harass thc Democratic National Convention
SUMA RY :
New indications of foreign efforts or
plans
to inspire,
support , influcnce
} or
exploit actions designed to disrupt
or harass thc Dcnocratic National Convention in Miani 10-15
July 1972
9
arc linited to 2 reiteration by a nembet of the
Secrctariat of the Stockholn Cocference on Victnam of a
statencnt prcviously issucd by thc #orld Assenbly for Peace
and Independencc of thc Peoples of Indochina The Assembl}' s
pronounccmcnt generally endorscd the conccpt of internationai
support to a campaign of anti-Victnam lar activities in the
Unitcd States 1cading
up to the Dcmocratic and Republican
Convcntions but made no specific call for support of dis-
ruptivc actions at the conventions themselves
DEVELOPXENTS :
In early April 1972 an influcntial and well-informcd
staff Rcnbcr of thc Stocttola Confcrencc on
Vietnan discusscd
> in private _
)
the intcrnational anti Vietnam #at activitics
conducted on 1 , 15
)
and 22 April The Stockholn Confcrence
menbcr stated that thcsc actions wcre part 0f an intcrnational
'campa ign in support 0f domestic Amcrican antiwar cfforts
during the pcriod 1 April to 15 Xiay 1972 andl "mill culninate
at the election conventions in and August . "1
The World Asscmbly for Peace and Independence of the
Peoples of Indochina of which thc Stockhoin Confcrence wa s
a. major organizcr , had carlier enunciated a similar statemcnt
in an appendix to the final draft rcsolution of the Assenbly ' s
"Action Commission 11 The appendix called for intcrnational
support to six wceks of domestic antirar actions and denon -
strations from 1 April to 15 May 1972 and concluded with
"the statenent: "This canpaign_ will lcad up to the Denocratic
Party Convention at Miami on July 9 , 1972 and thc Republican
Party Convention in San Dicgo
on
August Zi,
1972 ." "1
C37322 03321 00520
F0 FG,E4 BI2" J T3 ,333
@fidrt
July
==================================================
Page 64
==================================================
Llll T35; aNJ ieEul Tilat:
CIRZIES!D DSS:H
2 3 HAY 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Pianned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUNMARY :
Indications remain linited of forcign plans or attcnpts
to inspirc support, influence ,
or 'exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass thc Denocratic National Convention in
Miani
T
Florida 10-13 July 1972 _ A menbcr of the Swedish
Comittce for
Vietnan
who is als0 a member of the Secre
tariat of the
Stockhoin
Conference on Vietnam has statcd
that the U .S . National Elections are playing a role in
the Swedish Committec ' s work- The British-based Interna -
tional Confcdcration for Disarmamcnt and Peace (ICDP) has
distributed a "Spring Offensivc Calcndar Mi of activities
in thc United States against the war based on 2 submission"
by thc Pcoples Coalizion for Pcacc and Justicc (PCPJ)
Thc calendar includcs actions planned in connection with
the Democratic Convcntion
DEVEL OPMENTS :
In mid-April 1972 ,
a mcnber of thc Swedish Committec
for Victnan, who is also an influcntial and Iell-inforned
staff rerbcr 0 f the Sccretariat of thc Stockholn Confcrcace
on Vietnan statcd in a privatc discussion of thc Swedish
Committec ' s unusually heavy work load that "things Will be
hectic right until the elections in thc U.S,"
The Intcrnational Confcdcration for Disarmamcnt and
Peace , a British-based antiwar organization and onc of the
more promincnt member organizations of thc Stockholm Con
ferencc , has attached 2 "Spring Offcnsive Calendar" to the
April-Nay 1972 issuc of its regular international publica
tion Vietnan Internatioual The calendar had been furnisked
the Pcople S Cozlition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
included the following entry:
July 9 12 Democratic Convention Miami Bcach
Demonstrations orgenised by Florida
People' s Coalition, Box 17521, Tanpa ,
Florida 33612_
CONTRGWED) DSEI 00571
Kb Fzii BZZ3ESLKRZ:J
by
==================================================
Page 65
==================================================
MU TuiEin" "Ti JET,7,7,v" 0ocE,T 'oa
Clmelz) DEZEZA
The ICDP conmentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
in support of some of the dates listed but docs not specifically
call foi actions in connection with the Democratic Convention _
00572
ChWaU:n DRSEB
IFGXiE Jix:LL29
==================================================
Page 66
==================================================
huiil
##XFRaZZED-BKSSEX
JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY :
The oly new indication of foreign plans oT efforts
to inspire , support_ influcnce or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Denocratic National Convention in
Kiami Florida 10-13 July 1972
9
is an expression of interes:t
by a menbcr of the North Victnanese Delegation to thc Paris
Peace Talks in thc plans of the najor antiwar organizations
:in thc United Statcs for denonstrations in' connection with
the political convcntions of both major parties _
DEVELOPHENTS :
In mid-May 1972
a membcr of the North Victnanesc Dcle -
gation to the
Pafis Pcace
Talks invited 3 visitor to contact
hin again #hen thc visitor returncd fron an imnincnt trip
to the Unitcd Statcs Thc North Victnamcse 0fficial gave
the visitor the Ncw York City addrcsses of thc Pcople S
Coalition for Pcace and Justice (PCPJ) and thc National
Peacc Action Coalition (NPAC) and asked the visitor to
inquirc a t thcir officcs rcgarding their plans for dcnon -
sttations during the coming
suaacr The Morth Victnancsc
~official statcd that he was espccially interested in Plans
for actions in connection with thc Dcmocratic and National
Conventions
00573
COJPRHXED 33
Jia ronficii 0'v;i' NfGKJ
==================================================
Page 67
==================================================
2 1 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activitics Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Demnocratic National Convention
Thcre are no additional indi= cations, &s of this datc, of foreign plans
or cfforls to inspire, support, or' take advantage of activitics dcsigned to
disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic_ in Afiami,
Florida, 10-13 July 1972 ,
(6J2HWR KSSE 0057*
"0 rn;
Party
==================================================
Page 68
==================================================
005*25
==================================================
Page 69
==================================================
'7) R 68777137 SEE27=
025448682
E1 EY
4
into the US labor situation , and particularly to
to ameliorate the quarrcl between George Meany and
Wa ltcr Reuther IzN-36 stcered a very skillful
course in this connection but the Agency could be
vulnerable to charges that Ie "ent behind Jleany 's back ,
or wcr€ somehow cons orting with Reuther against Meany 's
wishes
8 There ar8. three eramples of using Agency
funds which I know to bc controvorsial One was the
expenditurc of money undcr Project #OSES in securing
the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners Details 0f
this Qperation ar@ best knorn to Larry Jlouston Mike
Miskovsky IDEN-131 and Jard: Smith. Second ,
as yol we 11 Know w hen Lou Concin rcccivcd his sunmons
to report to thc Joint Gcnera 1 Staff Tleadquarters on
1 Novcnber 1963 a largc amount 0f cash went iith hic.
My impression is that thc accounting for this and its
use has never bcen very frank 01' complete Third, at
one 0f the early Spccial Group mcctings attended by
NlcConc hc took strong cxception to proposa ls to spond
Agency funds to improve the econqmic viability of #cst
Bcr lin and for 2 h invcs tment program in Ha ) i Iis gencrai
position was that such cxpcnditures were not
within thc: Agency's charter and that he sould a l1ow
such spending only on the direct personal request 0f
the Secretary of State 01 the Secrctary 0f Defense or
tbc White Housc
9 I raise thcse issucs of funding because I
remember the Agcncy 's being severely criticized by the
House Appropriations Subcommittce for having spent 83 , 000
36
for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors
to secure the release 0f prisoners from Cuba
10 _ Under the heading *of old business I knOw that
one who has worked in the Director S office has worried
about the fact that conversations within the officcs and
over the telephones were transcribed During McCone
S,
83h8'771,7<
Fz 6x
00453
try
any
77c
==================================================
Page 70
==================================================
Ezde.al
ES CY
5
tenure there were microphones in his regular ofIice
his inner officc his dining roon his Office' in East
Building , and his study at his residencc on Whitc Haven
Street _ I do not know who wou ld be willing to raise such
an issue but knowledgc of such opcrations tends to
spread,
'
and ccrtainly the Agency is vulnerable on this
score
11. Also under the heading 0f old busincss I
well remember thc hue ancl cry raised by Carl
Kaysen in the #fhitc Mouse when [the
"Acespodinjectea
3
contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet
Union . J Shortly aftcr the Cuban missile crisis thcre #as
a disposition in Iashington to reexaminc tho 0f
1
and the faet lhat scveral Alabama Naliona l 4ir Guard
officcrs lost thciz lives in thc of Pigs was surfaccd
with surprisingly littlc excitement at thc tinie
12 _ During my stint 0n the 7th floor therc was
a
special arrangcmcnt. With thc O[fice of Communications
whcrcby_ thc Director 's ofiicc gaincd: acccss to[Jon -CIA
traffic Tll is surfaccd bricfly at onC point shortly aIter
~Adinira 17Tayborn became DCI He had visited the Signal
Ccnter a nc removecl 3 copy of 3
tclegram f1O0 the Embassy
in the Dominican Rcpublic for Under Secretary Gcorge Ba 11 ,
Eycs Only Ie returncd to his office alid proeccded to
discuss this tclegram With Gcorge Ba 11 who was n2 turally
quite curious as to how Rayborn Kncw about it, and. a lso as
to how Rayborn had it in his possession beforc Ba 11 did_
Bcn Rea d in thc Sccretary of Sta ce ' s office and I spent
several wecks putting this one to rest
13 Finally DCI. McCone as you and I we 11 know
operated on a very
iofty planc
and I think certain of
his activitics coulcl be_ misundcrstooc : Onc' examplc was
his decision in, July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and
Maria Callas flown from Rome to_ Athens 01 Air Force KC 135 _
Their arriva] in Athens in this airplane attrcted the
attention of thc local press and in due course Mr John
~27 92377
elieaje-Ai-iviaddu
E3G
00463
'Bay Pigs
Bay
==================================================
Page 71
==================================================
6n@1Lib @ {Ueuh 438 4 !V
E3 83K
Hightower Chicf of the Associated Press Bureau for
Washington
1
came to See me to ask about the propriety
of this action
14 . Thc use of IDEN-132 aircraft
has bccn remarkably secure but DCI HcCone hinself
forgot about the cover arrangcment and bccamc quite
excrcised #hcn he saw Candidate Goldwater landl i1 the
Sa n Francisco airport f01' the Rcpublican Vational Con-
vention in 1964 aboard the [DEN-133 with
the highly visible tail nunber [DEA'-13+, This was I
explained to him carefully ,
a perfectly logitimate
charter , but he didn t like it
15 _ McCone dcalt quitc extensively with newsmen
in Washington In fact thcy gave him a giIt and 1
lunchcon Ihcn h1c left Washington which is perhaps
indicative of thc press S relations with him _ Iowcvcr ,
in the case of the Ross an2 cl Kise book , Thc Invisiblc
Goverunent , he clid try Lo bring prcssurc 012 the publisher
and tie auhors to change things _ They dlid not change
a coima and I doubt that this old sa1v willcer sing
again _
16 . Finally
)
and this will rcflect my Middle
Western Protestant upbringing #cCne 's dlca lings with
the Vatican including Pope John X X III and Popc Paul
would and coulcl: rjise eyebrows in certain quarters
17 _ The a bove listing is uneven but I have a
sinking Iceling that disciplinc has broken down = and that
allegations from ahy quarter which cast thesc things in
the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,
and 210 amount of denia l would ever' sct thc record straight .
If I may be of any assistance in tracking clown furthcr
details
)
I am of course a t your disposa] , but I would point
E17
Ooce
VI ,
==================================================
Page 72
==================================================
@Eeaid K #xwyii:i4g
ES GY
out that I was very mnuch in the position of the
enlisted m? nJ who knew that the commissioned officers
were aware of these activities and better able to
judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-
pretation _
6eldu =
WALTER ELDER
eiisig V {uxsvulicwx
ESS CI
00483
==================================================
Page 73
==================================================
SECRET SENSITIVE
SUBJECT : PLMPLODESTAR
Project MPLODESTAR is a
Headquarters initiated program
which has as its fundamental objective the long tcrm,
manipu-
lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division
difficult targets in the leftist and comunist milieu in various
parts of the .korld. Although targettcd overscas these' agcnts are
often exposed to and directed against Arerican radical, lcftist
}
and communist targets to a
practical knowledge of the lcftwing,
radical, communist #orld, Thcre is _ a
possibiiity that an assct
might becone suspect and be accused of being an employec of the
Agency or the Bureai; or it Right happen sot:e assct Rould, for
some reason _ beconc disenchantcd with his role and exposc his
Agency relationship and his activities , with resultant cnbar-
rassment . To minimize potential problems thcrcfore , each
case is cicared with the FBI and through ,CI/SO the Burcau is
kept. informcd on a regular basis
SECRET SENSITIVE E2 INPDET
CL BY 061090
00482
S-(e
gain
==================================================
Page 74
==================================================
SEC-Et
2
6 _ As a
means of sharing more fully our operational
experiencc
Wve have invited threc FBI officers to be
students in our Sovict Operatims Course from 14 to 25
May 1973 ,
7 . A Soviet dcfector was
confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to
Septenbcr 1967 While efforts werc being made to
establish whethcr hce was 2 bona fide defector_
Although his present attitudc toward the Agency is_
quite satisfactory the possibility exists that the
press cou]d cause undesirablc publicity :f it wcrc
to uncovcr the story .
cevbt.
David H. Blce
Chicf' /
Soviet Bloc Division
ert
00523;;
Ufe)
JUk
==================================================
Page 75
==================================================
MEMORA.lDUM FOR: Mr. Colby
Attached is the material we requested of Dic}
Ober;
A Tcn Reports, Foreign Support for
Activitics Planncd to Disrupt or Harass the
Republican National Convention
B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
Activilies Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
Democratic National Convention
C Twro Memoranda re Agcncy support to
Secrct Scrvice for Democ ratic and Republican
Conventions
Ober advises that the only Amcrican
we reported
on to thc IEC is Rennie Davis BE (1-L
73)
For' Ko REPLAcE$ {06v 10.10 |
aug 54
10i
KA / CH VAY 0€ Useo. (47 )
4f6o
Subj:
May
TaTeb054s
==================================================
Page 76
==================================================
EENQE TTCT" 4
iOcl crm (uRXMNATISIS SKCRFT
OFFJCIAI, KOUTING SLIP
to NiRJE AND ADDrEsS DATE TIAls
Inspector General
2
3
Karighi #cT E7L7 iu3EiY
Er25 GiSP: C Ce;' Fa24Ti24
(ei;emt File GE(#HN
CQ#CURREWIEE_ Lfo atiO# Sighature
Iemarks:
Nr. Broe;
Dick Oberlhas. bcen #dvised thal this package
JCIcac)
js being scnt to you: Stnce knowlcdge of thc
exiglence of this Committee-has bcen strictly
'inwild. I'f a-kd !~ 1: ho Aeli"crcd to YQ'
unopenedl. Allhough it ha s an ER wunibcr on it,
it }; s Got bcen sc1l threezh llit oflice J gavc
thein only thc day, subject, and originitor.
GB~
03547
Foll MZRE To[ EtuRN To SENDEF
From: Rnir; ^OnRess ANO Pixore No. OATE
O/ESIMC / Barbara Pinda r h5 May 73
(.1s (TKTM{IS s(It} [
FoRN Ho 237 Cse pI pious ediiigns (40)
1-67
Cc
==================================================
Page 77
==================================================
Routi :'G AND RECC:D Shiezt
SWbJECT: (Oplonai)
FROM; EXTENSICN NO.
DATE kRichard Ober @1 1465 14 1973
TO: (Otier ceJgoion, Ioom]ruisbec, ord DATE
ovildsngl OffICER"S CCMMIMTS (Nunber Gcch (8DNen' 1o shov {921 6": INRTIALS b whom: Drov Oqtos$ column cler 6ach (07~87'_ RECEHVED FojwaRZED
IDEN- 73
0{1CI Attached 21C :
2
1 . Bc 5round "ot? 0:
LiCuLL Connitte? per Your rci:i:
3
of this Ecrnin?.
2 . Copics of memoranda co1 -
ccrning !genc} s0?c:: 3::
Sccrct Servicc (7 April 3r{'
23 Junc 1972) _
5
6
FYES OW.Y
8
10.
12_
13_
Q0548
5
6104. 2S SC 0 C8;i3 J LI;"C U:LS:
U;E G.aix
sLk
May
lina
==================================================
Page 78
==================================================
EYZS Ely
1 4 KAY 1273
SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff
1_ Background: Formed December 1970 to' produce
fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies
including studics
0n dcnonstrations subrersion extrenisn
and terrorism_ Scmbcrship: Dcpartnent 0 { Justicc (Chair-
mnan) Fcderal Bureau of Investigation; Departnent of
De fensc Sccrct Service National Securit} Agcncy ; Ccntral
Intclligencc Agency; and as ncccssary rcprescntatives 0f
othcr Departnents or Agencies (folloiving have partici-
patcd = Trcas= and_ State) Staff: IEs Executive
Director John Dougherty and later Bcrnardl #ells supplied
by Dcpartnent of Justicc kith titlc 0f Spccial Assistant
to the Attorncy Gencral reporting to thc Assistant Attorney
Gcncral for Intcrnal Security Robert ardian and_ later
Willian O1son ICS has raccivcd rcqwireecnts directly
Tron aiL_dcli crcd IHHEHZEZIDzoZ;z ZZhe
@itc lousc Thc #hitc [lousc has ins isted that thc
cxistencc 0f this Conmittec be kept secrct. Awaxeness
of its existcnce within this Acency has bccn ITcitcd Lo
IG))"WOC@WiR)CICI ai.i Tif oiiecs OL" tjis oLifeg
2 _ CIA Participation: Contributions on forcijgn
aspccts (by ncmorandun with no Accncy lettcrhcad 01 at-
tribution) Contributions occasionally includc forcign
intclligence providcd by FB I and/ FSA Thc Chief 0 { tke
Special Opcrations Group servcs as thc Agency rcpresenta-
4ve 01 the Intelligence Fvaluation Cornittec Staff and
as the: <crnate to thc Agcncy rcprescntatire on the
Committce (who is the Chicf Countcr Intclligence Staff),
3 Special Report: Tl € Unauthorizcd Disclosure
of Classificd In foration Tovemhc r 1971 = This study
Ivas initiacc 1n
Julyi97i
by thc Whitc [louse as 2 con-
scqucncc of the Presidcnt 5 concern} about the relcase
0f thc Pentagon Papers by Danicl Ellsbcrg Both Robert
Mardian and G Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking
thc IFS to produce this cva luation Drafting done by IES
'Staff membcrs from Justicc and FBI. Agency partici
7
pation Fas editorial revielv _
00549
EYZS Ey
SEivZiiIVB ~IMf?ET Cl DxLie
CFCTRT
ury
On ly
==================================================
Page 79
==================================================
EkS El
4 _ Republican National Convcntion (21-24 August
1972) : At the request of the mhite [louse , 2 series of
estimates was prcpared by the IES on "Potential Dis -
ruptions at the 1972 Republican' National Convention,
Miami Beach, Florida 1i "The Agency providcd fron
Febfuary through August 1972 periodic contributions for
these estinates concerning Eoreign support for activi 5
ties planned to disrupt 01' harass the" Republican
National Convention (copies attachcd)
5 . Dcnocratic Xational Convcntion (10 -13 July
1972) At the requcst of thc #hitc Housc , a scries of
estimatcs Ivas preparcd by thc IS 0n1 "Potential Disrup -
tions at' the 1972 Democratic Nat iona] Convcntion, Miami
Florida _ M The Agency providcd betkeen March
July 72 contributions on
forcign support for activi-
ties planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic
National Convention (copics attachcd) .
Attachmcnts: a/s
FYE Cx 00552
SEI JITIVE
Gttyotni
Eeach i9 and
==================================================
Page 80
==================================================
FUEIN #.i ESI ACU,D
GuNRaliv DZSE_
8 3 FEB i972
SUBJECT : Foreign Surport For Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
1. There are only limited indications thus far of
foreign efforts to inspire , support or take advantage of
activitics designed to disrupt or harass the National
Convention of the Republican Party in' San Diego, 21-23
August 1972
Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled
Korld Asserbly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of
Indochina
J
hcld 11-13 February.1972 in Paris/Versailles
attcmptcd unsuccessfully
to include a call
for international
denonstrations to takc place at the time 0f the Rcpublican
National Convention . A rcprcsentative of thc San Diego
Convcntion Coalition (SDCC) one of the donestic action
eroups targetting on the Republican Conventicn rcquested
thc Anerican Delcgations Stecring Committce 2t the World
Asscnbly to includc 2 specific call for international
support of activitics aginst the Republican convention
in thcir proposal to thc Action CoEmission of the #orld
Assenbly _ This request horcver Kas dropped as too
divisive by the Steefing Cocnittce despite initial indica -
tions that the proposal would be taken to the floor of
the Assenbly.
3 John LENNON ,
a British subject has provided
financial support to Projcct "YES" which in turn
the travel expenscs to the Korld Assembly of a rcpresenta -
tive of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS (DAIIS' repre -
sentative is tentatively Planning
to assist in preparations
for disruptive actions at the San Dicgo Convention. )
Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LEVVOM;- supported pto -
ject
9
the Election Ycar Strategy Infornation Center (EYsIC) ,
of which Rcnnie DAIVIS is a
key leader, which #as set up to
dircct Ncw Left Protest activities at the Rerublican
National Convention In Paris Rcnnie DAVIS ' rcpresentative
to the Korld Assembly met at least once with officials of
thc Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;
it is not Known if the Republican National Convention kas
discussed _
82T33.3 13.
00552
pa id
==================================================
Page 81
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FEXT TESETEJTczi} AJrJNW
CbXez DSSZ
The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its
barassnent of the Republican convention _ A working draft
plan 0f thc SDCC includes- proposals for (a) the use of a
Special television network to broadcast video-taped ne ssages
Erom othcr countrics including coverage of sympathetic
denonstrations elsewhere and (b) broadcasts over public
address systens 0f live telephone calls from the. Vietnanese
in Paris and from the Comunist Chincse and others at the
United Nations .
00553
CO4ZEL3 DSSEM
Jii Dicrri D'fi( 8ca'n
==================================================
Page 82
==================================================
TURTT VnJjEmT, 77J TISSzMT TeidAD"
CONTHOLLE) DESZED}
8 1 MAR 1372
Forcign Support for Activities Planned to .Disrupt
r Harass the Rcpublican Vational Convention
SUNMMARY AVD CONCLUSION:
Indications remain limited , thus far
9
of foreign cfforts
to inspire , support or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt oT harass the National Convention of the Republican
Rarty in San Dicgo , 21-23 August 1972 _ Thc concept of coordinated
intcrnational support for domestic activitics in the United
Statcs *as generally endorsed at thc recent #orld Assenbly for
Peacc and Indcpendcnce 0f thc Peoplcs of Indochina; howevcr
)
the
Confcrcncc issued no
spccific call for international support of
distuptive actions at the Anerican national political conventions
BACKGROUND:
At the Sovict-controllcd World Asscmbly for Peace and
Indepcndencc of the Pcoplcs of Indochina held in Versailles
Erom 10-13 Fcbruary 1972 therc was mention of Ancrican plans
for dcnonstrations at both the Rcpublican and Dcaocratic
National Convcntions The final draft rcsolution from the
Confcrcncc ' 5 "Action Conmission" contains am appendix submittcd
by Anerican dclegates Ihose goal #as to sccure
global coordinacion
for donestic actions in thc United Statcs _ It calls for intet-
national support to six wecks of domcstic antinar actions and"
demonstrations fron 1 April to 15 May 1972 , and concludes with
thc statcnent: "This canpaign will: Jead up to the Dcnocratic
Party. Convention at Miami on
July 9 , 1972 and the Republican
Party Convcntion in San Dicgo on August
2i,
1972 .' I1
The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the
Peacc"and Indcpendcncc of the Indochinese People" of 13 February
1972 ;' drafted by the "Political Commission" states:
"In the Unitcd States particularly the protest against
the Iar is voiced more and more strongly , under vatious
forns such a$ draft evasions
9
desertions resistance dcnon -
Strations
which nom affect even the soldiers Thc Asscnbly
calls for support to thesc progressivc and antiwar forccs in
the Unitcd States and asks thc governncnts to grant asylun
tq dcsertcrs and to support their right to repatriation_
All togcthct
)
thc pcopics of thc world will' cfficiently hclp
to inpose 0n thc U.S Governcnt the restoration of , peacc
and indcpendcnce and frecdon in Victnan Laos and Cambod ia .
CBNZRQVLED DSZSEH 0055,2.
Il [nffkc! ChFsc'!'2n D?cr' 'NSP'O
==================================================
Page 83
==================================================
Tuict D: t,.T,JJ 4r_/ iuatrW
CONTRuzLzD DSS.a
DEVELOPNEENTS :
The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) one of the
domestic action gtoups targetting on the
Repubiican
Con -
vention , is planning, in addition to demonstrations for a
"large exposition in the canpsights (sic) called Expose 72 ,
which with novies_
)
exhibits displays Will portray the struggles
of people al1 over thc world 11 Plans for activitics at
Expose 72 arc helieved to include (a) the use of a_
special
television network to broadcast video-taped messages from
other countrics including coveregc of sympathctic denon _
strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address
systcns of live tclcphonle calls fton the Vietnamese in Paris
and fron thc Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations
In addition, the SDCC has suggested that
9
in order to "outflank
NIXON donestically and internationally i1 international opposition
can be cxpressed "by obtaining thc au thority of other countries
and liberation movcmcnts to catry their.flags in SDCC dcmon
strations
00525
==================================================
Page 84
==================================================
iJk
MEMORAVDUM
SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76' Embassy
in 1971 and 1972
1 A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Enbassy in
Kashington,
D C. was nounted by thc FBI with the support of
this Agency in April-May 1971_ This opcration, which used
Agcncy cquipnent and technical expertisel but
was nanaged
operationally by the wa 5 initiatcd only aftcr then-
Director Richard Melns had gone over the head of former
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain thc approval of then-
Attorncy General John N, Mitchell_ The operation was dis-
continucd at the Agency' s requcst on 2 February 1972 whcn it
appeared that Director Hoovct intended to testify before
Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and
identify this operation as/CIA instigated .
2 The operation consisted of the following three
technical devices:
a. An AC: powered, maSked transmitter and
two Switches in the. office occupied by the Deputy _
~Chief of Mission
-= An AC-porered, masked transmitter in the
office of the Ambassador S secretary Khich was
Ci; 7
SECDcT 00453
FBI ,
==================================================
Page 85
==================================================
LI iiil
~2 -
designed to up high quality audio of typing
in the office, It wa 5 hoped to break these audio
signals into clear text using advanced computer
techniques developed by, Division D No useful
product , however was ever obtained
C A battery-powered, . masked transmitter
and switch conccaled in the door of the
Embassy which would supply crytographic information
for NSA . (Produced exccllent quality signals
until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of
battery failurcs
3 In Decenber 1972 the Agency requestcd reactivation of
'the operation for a
60-day trial period in spitc of thc linitcd
va lue of intclligence produced previously (22 disseminations
of only moderatc interest) . Reactivation
wa$ requested because
of strong interest in the spccial IDEN-76 govcrnment mission
artiving in Washington in late Deccnber to conduct high-level
talks. with U,S. State Departnent officials concerning debt
renegotiation and-other maj%I itcms_outstanding between -the =
two-countries . The operat ion wa s reinitiated on 21 December
1972 but Ia s discontinued &gain
on 22 February_1973 by Acting
00453
SECRET
Jfkcle)
pick
==================================================
Page 86
==================================================
e_-it
"3-
Director L. Patrick at this Agency' s request . Our request
wa 5 prompted a ' decision that the intelligence production
0f
this Operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing
to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the
mounting disclosurcs about CIA involvement Jin DEN-76 This
was:
especially
S0 because of our reservations about maintaining
Proper security for the listening post which,
a5 with other
operational aspects of thc case, was under FBI managencnt _
00270
SECRET:
JrrN)
Gray
by
'.iwz
==================================================
Page 87
==================================================
SEC,ET
Alias Social Sccurity Cards 171 backstopped
accounts nave Deen estadTisnec for contract pcrsonnel
whose rclationship with the" Agency) cannot be revcaled
but who a1'0 entitled to 'Social Security coverage _
Following expiration of the contractual relationship,
at 2n appropriate time the alias and true nahe accounts
ar@ mergcd permitting the individual to rcccive coa-
plete bencfits upon rcaching the ag0 of eligibility_
f Alins IRS Tax Accounts _ 54 Social Sccurity
numbers havc pccn registcred Ior' the purpose of opon-
ing.54 ncw bank accounts since 1 July 1972_ 87 in-
dividual tzx accounts have bcen established with IBS
on 322 unwitting basis i1 14 cities in the United States_
g Notional Facilitics_ 311 notional [acilitics
(43 colporations; G1 Solc-proprictorships; 207 lawyers
and 61 telcphonc answCr'ing sCr'vicc aclclrcsscs 31'0 main-
tained by CCS i2) 58 citics in the Unitedl Statcs_
h. Alias Signatorics 01 Tank Accounts_ 24 aliases
for signturcs 011 25 rroprictary entity one notion-
al company bank accoulnts arC in ltsC b; 9 officcrs aud 1
proprictary-hiro as follows:
CCS/IIqs 5 Officcrs (12 aliases) 011 8
propictar; entities ajd 1
notional comnpany .
CCS/NY PHC*
~ 3 Officcrs (9 aliases) on 13
pl'oprictary cntitics.
CCS/NY PMIC* 1 proprictary-hire (i
alias)
01l 3 proprictary entities_
CCS/AID PHC* 1 officer (2 aliases)
on 2
proprietary entities.
#Proprietary Management Company
-3-
SECRET
00513.
JFK
@e)
apcl"
JaB)
==================================================
Page 88
==================================================
sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise
of normal coinmercial annuities_ Backstopping for
this arrangcrent is providcd through CCS-procured
bank accounts and Post Office boxes _ 19 retirecs
are currently being handled_
k, Crcdit Union Arrangerents for 'Selcctcd Non-
official Coigr Z2r3o12[ "iFiconcs Tintercst) carned
on Credit Unfon accounts by individuals undcr covcl'
are not eportcd to the Internal Revenuc Service based
on 50 U,S, Code 403g Or' Intcrmal Revcnuc Code Section
6041
Individuals under cover may borrow money frOm the
Crcdit Union for thc purchase of real estate; howover ,
the mortgagc is recorcledl in. the namc of 3 clcarcd
lawvyer and not thc actual lencor (Crcdit Union)
Paragraph 1. deleted bcause it contains sensitive
Agency operational methods and techniques.
~5_
0051*
==================================================
Page 89
==================================================
SECRETT
PROPRIETA RY ENTIT COVER
Yb)
1 Central Cover staff (CCS) maintains three domestic
proprietary management companies which provide funding and
operational support for 49 Agency entities; including 13
controllcd and dirccted by CCS
2 . The thrcc proprietary managemcnt companies are
staffed 9 . cmployecs; they furnish assistance in the
commercial, business and invcstmcnt aspects of on-going
operations_
1
Inanage the ` legal and comimercial affairs of
entitics supporting operations, ind provide cover and
funding ckamcls for' opcrational aciivitics as requircd_
Most importantly
1
professional serviccs are furnishcd in
a mannel rcsponsive to required security standards and
a t a cost considerably lcss than would be charged by
bona fide management firms_
3 The 13 proprietary entitics directed by CCS p1'0-
vide cover for tcn individuals in thc Unitcd States and
threc overscas 'Opcrationally, thc companics providc
commniercial funding channels OH) 2 world-wicc basis and
servc 25 corporatc Owlicrs 0f equipmcnt inven tory and
aircraft anc] as collection mechanisms for outstanding
notes and loans in or'der to conccal U.S, Govcrmmcnt
affiliation 01' intorest_
005_6
SECRET,
: CL
21
Jxe Jkxi
by
C*
==================================================
Page 90
==================================================
Serzt
7 May 1973
MEEMORAN DUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : Items for Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI
1 This Memorandun is" submitted in order to
identify to You
for possible bricfing of the
Director activities #iici) in ccrtain contcxts could
be construed as dclicatc `or inappropriate_
2 At the request of the Director of Sccurity ,
from]approximately nid-Octobcr 1972 to mid-January
1973Lsafcsite numbcr 585 #as made availablc to the
U.S; Marshal' s' . Scrricc for us@ a5 a securc rcsidlence
an Assistant U,.S . Attorncy Who rcportedly Fas
undcr thrcat of assassination organizcd criminal_
elements
3 SB Division ovcr the past
thrcc months has
interviewed Four graduate students as Prospcctivc
candidates for ass ignacnts under American business
cover in the USSR. Thcy #ere encouraged_ to locate
cover jobs on their Olf n _
4 _ Fof approximately two years the SB Division
has had the coopcration of the Commander of the
Morals Division of thc Distriet of Coluabia Police
Departmcnt in trai officcrs scheduled for
assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in holv to
conduct themsclvcs if.placed under arrest_ The
arrangcment Ias made through the Office of Security.
5 , Since late 1972 /CIA/has taken part in seven
FBI training courses at Quantico Virginia in
responsc to requests from
the FBI_
Ie have shared
with them through Icctures and discussions lessons
we have learned #hich are relevant to their counter-
espionage rcsponsibilities.
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 0599 52
0052:
Zt
YFk
by
by
ning
==================================================
Page 91
==================================================
673T73
SENSiTIVE
have been Tecuited and run exclusively for the MIICHAOS
program _ Instead emphasis has been placed
on the exploi-
tation of nel and old -gency assets who have a by-product
capability or 8_ concurrent capability for provision 0f
information responsive to the program 5 requiremcnts
This has involved the provisionl of custon-tailored collec-
tion requircnents and operational guidance This collec -
tion progran is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-
ment and collection programs of China Opcrations Vietnan
Operations Cuban Operations _
9
Soviet Bloc Dirision opera -
tions and Korcan Branch operations Agents who havc an
American "Vorenent" background <r who have known connec-
tions with the Ancrican "Novenent" are uscful as acccss
agcnts to obtain biographic and personality data
9
to dis-
cern possiblc vulncrabilities and susccptibilitics , and
to develop opcrationally cxploitable relationships With
recruitment targets 0 f the abore prograns Thesc assets
are of intcrcst to ou1 targets becausc 0 [ thcir connec-
tions with and/or knowlcdge 0f thc American "Movcmcnt . Mi
Over the coursc of thc MHCHAOS program
)
thcrc havc becn
approxina 2 0 important areas of opcrational intercst,
which at the prcsent time havc been rcduced to about ten:
Paris Stockhola Brusscls Dar Es Salaam, Conakry , Algicrs ,
Mcxico Santiago, Ottawa and Ilong Kong -
4 . The MIICILOS progran also utilizcs audio opera -
tions two 0f which hare becn inplcmentcd to covcr tar-
of special intercst .
Paragaph a _ deleted bcause it reveals & sensitive
foreign operation;
Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals & sensitive
Agency foreign operation.
SENSIIIVE
GFCRFT
0053:
tcly
City,
gets
==================================================
Page 92
==================================================
SENSITTVE
5 _ MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the
program originatcs in two waYS : Individuals who are noted
in contact With Cubans the Chinese Conmunists , etc.
2
and
who appear to have extrenist connections intcrests or
background are reported upon _
Othcr indiriduals
are rc -
ported upon in response to specific Hleadquarters require -
ments received fron the FBI because such individuals. are
of activc investigatory sccurity intercst to the FBI
6 A11 cable and dispatch traffic relatcd to the
MHCHAOS program is sent via rcstricted channels It is
not proccssed by eithcr the Cablc Sccretariat or the In -
formation Serviccs Division The control and retricv-
ability of inforration obtaincd including. information
reccived from the .FBI, is thc responsibility of the Spe
cial Opcrations Group
7 Information rcsponsivc to specific FBI rcquirc-
ments is disseminated to the FBI via spccial controlled
dissenination channcls i.0' by restrictcd handling cablc
traffic 01' via special pouch and specially numbered blind
memoranda
8 Informtion of particular significancc, Ihcn col -
lectcd has becn disseminated by special mcmorandum ovcr
thc . signaturc of thc Director of Ccntral Inteciligcncc_
to
the White liousc (Ir _ Kissingcr and John Dcan) as well a$
to the Attorncy Ccncral, the Sccrctary of State and the
Dircctor of thc FBI _
SENSTTIVE
SECRZT
00538
==================================================
Page 93
==================================================
SECRETISENSITZV -
FR 73-183
8 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities with Possible Flap Potential
REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7
1973 , same subject
1 The answers to your qucstions are as follows:
2, Question: Do wc recruit Anericans?
Answer: Yes, wc recruit Amcricans to be
used as-acadlemic support asgcts and access agents.
Thesc Americans Jre used for spotting &and 2sses s -
ment purposes and do not pcrform any rccruit-
ments,
Paragraph 1. b_ and 1. C. are deleted
because they contain sensitive agency
operational methods and techniques.
DZ IMPDET
CL BY: 057223
SECRETIZEUSITNVE 00611
May
May
only
==================================================
Page 94
==================================================
I2/
d. Question: What is the arrangement re recruiting
out of colleges? clearances or prohibitions?
Ansler: As of now CSI 50-10 spccifically
requires approval by the-ADDO or DDO Ior any:
recruitment attempt made in the United Slates
against an American member of the acadcmic
community or a
forcign target attending
a1 Ancrican
academic institution. This regulation.is presently in
the process o[ revision in that this approval aulhority
for acadcmic recruitments in the United States is to
be delcgated to 'Chicf, FR. Thc approval authority
for recrwitmcnt altempts against American students
outside the United States is to be delegatcd to the Chicf
of thc appropriatc area division. The only prohibitions
at thc present time are those precluding rccruitient
attcmpts #gainat [orc:gn studcuts hcre in tlc Uuted State:
on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockcfeller or Fulbright-
23 If you havc furthcr questions, plea se Ict mc know.
signed/IDEN-173
Chicf
Foreign Resourccs Division
0061:
SEC?TIEENSIZIVE
Any
Acting
==================================================
Page 95
==================================================
FR 73-180
7 197.3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities sith Possible Flap Potential
1 At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational
activities carried on by FR Division in thc United States run the risk
that unaulhorizcd disclosurc could crealc embarrassment to lhc Agency.
We have accepted this a $ a condition prccedent and have procecdcd with
our operational activities in thc most professional manncr possible under
thc circumstances. Thcrc arc ccrtain ra lner unusual activitics in which:
FR Division has partic:pated ald/or is participating that contain some-
what grcater possibility for cmbarrassmcnt if discovcred. I have listed
these bclow, not necessarily in order of cmbarrassnent potcntial:
JFk C)cs)
a, The Ncwv York Basc]providcs 2_ fairly considerable
amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the
Chinesc. This support %as authorized by Ar. Karamessincs
and Mr. Hclms _ Thus far tkcrc has been no' problem other
than the inordinate amount of time spent by@ew York Base
JrkcijlB)
personncl, not to mention the fairly sizeablc amount of
moncy that has been expcnded in support of these efforts.
b A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The
CIA Officer is presently assigncd overseas under dcep
cover;lhis cover is the Mullen Corporation:J(This is the cor-] Jfko)_
[poration that cmployed E. Howard Hurt. ] In discussions betiveen
NOCAD and the ADDO, it Ias decidcd that lle Officer would
be pulled out and reassigned in the United Statcs_
FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment:'
E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223
00611
SECRZTj33'3ITIVE
SECRETISENSITIVZ
May
==================================================
Page 96
==================================================
SECRETiSE :iTI . E
12[
We have concluded that the best solution is to have this
officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least
a
year, working towards
an advanced degrce until there
has been time for the situation to clarify itself. Wc plan
to make no operationa] use of tiic CIA Offiezr wnatsoever
during thc period of time that he is attending the: univer
Upon completion of hlis year's study, we will review the
situation and decide lhe next coursc 0f action at that time.
Faragraph 1, C, is deleted kecause it contains sensitive
Agcncy opcrational methods and techniques.
d. FR Division has bccn bricfcd in general on the
JFk(()
existence Of an audio opcration done by tle FBIbut with close
TSD supportjin San Francisco. This operation is directcd
against IDEN-62. I understand thc opcration has
bcen exccptionally done. However, the respons ibility
for this aclivity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction
Jpku)(y)
with SB Division.
e,
Thrcc microphoncs
were plantcd in various locations
in thc IDEN- 61 by the FBI, (The equipment sa $ pro- JFK 08)
duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no
CIA personnel have entercd the premises._ The operation was
deactivated and is pres dormant. The mikes, however,
are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause
somc embarrassment to the American Governncnt, but it is
unlikcly the fingcr would to CLAS
SEC? VZ 00617
sity.
Jfk(yt)
ell
Jfkc)k)
ently
point
==================================================
Page 97
==================================================
CoOT
SUBJECT: Sensitive nctivities Perforned by the Office of
Logistics
action would be more econonical and elininate the need for
one agency of the Government to' duplicate facilities
readiiy available from another typical example-of this
procedure is Purchas photointerpretation geaf for t*?
Defense Irtelligence Agency elenent located at NPICA In
connection Kith the current reporticg recuirerent ; however,
I have had ouur recoras researched for the past 2 Years and
Attachncnt 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
relevant to the subject of this menorandum_
d . In connection nith the disclosures during the S UM -
mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly
safeguarding classified docurents this Office undertook
two acts I directed the Securitlafficer from our: West
Coast Procurement Office at the.Iden 87
to visit tke Pand Corporation and satisfy
himself that classified material furnished then by the
SKp
[Agencyewas both properly safeguardcd and accounted for.
His report Fas affirnative _ On 25 August 1971, the senior
Security: Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a
letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
the procedures Rard Rust follow in sa Ecguarding classified
infornation furnished then byethe Agency ; Of residual
interest in this matter there is sunmarized the contents
0f 2 merorandun of 2
Juiy 1971
to theCExecutive Director-
Comptrolier fron the DD/ I Which is in our possession.)
This memorandum reports thatEFBIS regularly
disseninated reports to the Rand Corporation]
but that instructions had been issued to cease
distribution of classified reports _ While no
Other direct dissenination Tent to Rand , other
USIB agencies , primarily USAF were passing
"many" copies 0fDDD/I products
to Rand as au-
thorized under USIB regulations The menoran -
dum als0 states that Rand personnel had
requested searches and docunent retrieval from
the CRS facility.
5_ In connection with action taken for the Office of
Security , there are three relevant items:
a
The Printing Services Division_ OL was requested
by ` the Office Security to print a book written by
ha Fh Office of Security_ Tke book Fas pre -
pared byl iuy pnder a
Brookings Institution Federal
EYES ONLY
SECRET '00113
ing
UKke
0f
tk:
==================================================
Page 98
==================================================
SUBJECT : Sensitive :tivities Perforned by tk Office of
Logistics
theE DD/O,Zwe wil1 not honor any requisition fcr slrveil-
lance equipnent unless it has peen approrca cy tte CI
Staff of theEDD/o] I)
Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the
following items are pettinent:
a . In February L . K. Jhite the then
Executive Director-
Coapu-{filonez
called me to @ttend a
meeting in his office also
attended
by Mr . Willian Colby.
Colonel Fhite explained that the Technical Services
Divisior (TSD) had been requested to provide" assistance
to the FBI for a
Aroject JECEE
Ihite) did not dis-
close the putpose the as tance being provided by TSD
but did instruct ne to assist TSD: on purely contractual
matters Since the Officc 0f' Logistics has no infornation
conce Ining the mission or purpose of Project sub -
stantive questions concerning the subject should be
addressed tC TSD . Other procurerent actions accomplished
for the FBI_ire-Icborted be Iot Specific mention is made,
however 0f the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap-
proximately S1 nillion and the conplex technical equip-
ment that has been involved in the undertaking-
b The Procurcment Division currently has two
requisitions in
hand fron TSD khich
oule involve rein-
bursable sales to the F3I One such requisition in the
amount of S36, 900 is for to kestinghouse television
cameras . The second requisition in thc anount of 511,200
is for tIo Kide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
Bausch and Lonb No action is being takcn on either 0f
these requirenents pending further instructions which
will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
end Services _
C Over the years thistAgency]has often supported
other Government
agencles
fron a contractual or Rateriel
standpoint_ Upon the submission of an
officially
request supported by a traisfer of funds ,Cthe
1yezEP5OOd
would either
enter into "acconnodation procurements"
the requcsting agency or support the requesting egency by
the issuance of materiel fton stock_ Such actions are
legally accomplished under the Economy Act 0f 1925. This
Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
vide a service another Governnent agency Then such
EYES ONLY
00112
SECRET
J1) 4
Jrl)
OL ,
I301kb
To ftapa)
fot,
==================================================
Page 99
==================================================
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Perforned by the Office 0f
Logistics
Executive Fellowship _ The book is entitled "Whhere ' s
Mhat Sources of Infornation for Federal Investigators _ #
It is a full treatise on the existence of soutces of in-
formation that zay be useful :o en investigator_ The
book' s first printing cf 3c0 copies #as made in June 1967 .
Due to demand a second printing of 600 copies
#a5 Ezde
in Septenber 1968 The fitle Page of the took Sires
attribution tol" Office of Security |Certral'
Intclligence and the Brookings Institution Federal
Executive Fell
licesciz
The book is classified Ccnfidential ,
and it is our undcrstanding that the distribution kas nade
to approptiate)agercies of the' Federal Governaent _ A copy
of]Mr Murphy ' s book can be made available for review if
desired.
Sometime in 1972
a representative of the Lal
Enforcement Assistance Adninistration (LEL) requested
that the Agency consideration to our publishing, at
LEAA expense =
) an unclassified version of this volure It
was thc intent of' LEtA to nake broad-scale distribution
to Policc Departnents throughout the countty Tke Director
0f Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
dcternincd that the LEA reguest should not be honorcd be -
causeCthe AgencyJshould not put itself in the position of
publishing law enforcenent material for general and un -
classified purposes
1
and it would be an abuse of our print-
ing facilities_
b On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security
re-
quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven notor
vehicles for uS e in connection with a special support
operation #hich kould last approxinately 3 months The
Director of Security inforned me in his requesting mero -
randum of 5 January 1971 , that
"flis support
activity has
been undertaken at the specific instuction of the Director
and has his personal approval. 11 The request #as approved.
C From 1968 to date the Office of Security has
requisitioned from
this Office
a considerable anourt 0f
materiel which ke understand was to be given
or loaned
them to local Police Departnents In certain cases some
of this materiel was issued
fronfAgency stocksfand;
in
other cases , direct procurenent of the nateriel Kas made
by funds furnished by. the Office of Security A complete
listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2 ,
5
EYES YeCRCyLY
00111
fua)
give
TftIt0)
by
==================================================
Page 100
==================================================
SUBJECT : Sensitive nctivities Perforned by the Office of
Logistics
6 , In connection with :the responsibility held by this
Office to obtain, manage and dispose of safe sites for all
Agency operating components , the following information is
relevant
a. A safe &ite, identified as "Safehouse 562" which
is Iden 88
'was made available to General Cushnan ' s
Office on 23 July 1971.
The subject safe site was
acquired
on 15 June 1970
as a replacenent for a terninated OL standby safe site
and in keeping with the 2pproved requirement for a com -
Plement of fire standby safehouses for 2ll' Agency use
The apartnent has one bedroom and is located in an older
high-rise building along Iden 89. The nocinal
lesscc is Iden 90 4
security-cleared
attorncy with offices located at Iden 91
The covet stoty utilized is that
Iden rents the apattsent for business conferences ,
meet
?8gs
and occasional overnight stays by his staff
and/or his out-of-town clients The original lease term
was for a I-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,
with month-to-month renewals thereaftcr As an
OL standby
safe site_
)
the apartrent has been used by various: Agenc;
components to meet their short-tern or crash requirenents .
Control 0f the standby safe site and its security is the
responsibility of this Office A record is maintained of
each user component_ and date of use; holevet, no record
is made of those persons being met at the site nor for #hat
putpose the site is bcing used (neetings , trainicg, etc.)
Such information is naintained by the operating corponent
requesting the safe site _ Records maintained by this
Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made
evailable to General Cushman ' s office on 25 1971 in
answer to a telephonic request.
b, This Office is aware , although it had no cognizance
nor responsibility, that an apartnent was rented in Miaei
Beach, Florida during the pcriod of the Democratic Mational
Convention , 10-14 July 1972 and the Republican National
Convention
21-24 Ausust 1972.
The apartncnt Ras used as
a
meeting place for officers of the Miami Station #ho Rere
in liaison with menbers of the Secret Service and rendering
EYES ONLY
SECRET
00115
July
Jftatc)
==================================================
Page 101
==================================================
SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. HH Division is the cognizant
operating conponent or this matter.
7 ; The above recitation of facts represents_ to the best
of my knowledge and FeEOTY , those Eatters which appear to be
relevant to subject tesking given by the Director_
t
John F_ Blake
Director of Logistics
2 Atts
CC : DD/M&S
EYESz ONKY
00116
SECRET
==================================================
Page 102
==================================================
8too
0
0
E 1 8 8 8 8 9 9 8 3 8 8 & 8. g 8
8
1
:
1
1
: 8
:
WW4
J1
8
3
1 L 2 WWXW
1
1
7
11
7
1 8
9
8
1
2 5
1
H IF
3
Ha
03
L
1
8
1
2
0 0
~ F w % & 8 ~ & &
P 0 _
1
5
Ie
00
0
2 8 8 8
501 5
6
5
3
L
2 2 3 9 ! 2 3 3 8 37 5 0 "!! I:
8
3
0
1
9
#
2
==================================================
Page 103
==================================================
Cftoo
8 8 8 2 8 & @ g 9 & 2 8 8
1
1
1 1 1
MWK
8
1 ES E I F
1
1 2 L 3 1
1
E 1 1 1
1
7
4 8 9
3 E3 1 1
J
F
2
J
17h
3|
Ia 1 8
4
F P
8
~ ^ ~ 1 @ ~ F ` 8
1
{ 8
#
:
2 E E5
5
ET 5
g
eE
6
Ie
6 1 WETH 1
3 4 9 3 2 2 ] e
F
71
X 8 9
7
1
n
cr
1
F h
7 3
vu
3
==================================================
Page 104
==================================================
ONLT
OJCS_594-73 Jf Ka)
11 KAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence ency
THROUGH Deputy Director for Management and Services:'
SUBJECT Activities which might be considered sensitire
issucs,
I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of
Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which
might be considered sensitive'issues.
Most Sensitive Projects
OJCS Project Officer Nature OJCS
Project Organization, & of Rcason for
Identification Telcphone Project Listing
L#DR# Richard Ober A special pro - Type of
CI Staff ject initiated data being
Rcd 1465 by DCI collected.
SANCA Iden 48 Nachine Type of
OS index to data il}
Red 92.98 security files index.
CeRDSTAT} C John Hutchings Information Type of
ORD storage & re- data in
3061 trieval of drug files.
related data
(ORDIs project
~OrTEN
J
Sensitive Projecte
CoruGas Iden 18 Computer file of
ON of drug data. data in
7792 file.
C0133
EYES ONLY
2impcet cl_G, 036490
SECRET
Ag
Type
==================================================
Page 105
==================================================
Sensitive Projects_(Continued)
OJCS Project Officer Nature OJCS;
Project Organization, & of Reason for
Identifica= Telephone Proj Listidg Sp
PROFf-ES John-Winnie Statistical Sourcc of
TSD' analysis of data_ Con-
362-1922 psychological tractors are
(sterile) data, involved
with project.
Sensitivity_Unknow, but Possibly a Mattcr for Concern
TILAQ Robert Hahn Pattern Nature of
SB analysis of data. Tech-
Red 1185/ surveillance niques of
1251 data from eysten 'dis -
foreign liaison cuesed Ivith
service FBI.
SPYEER George Data on Project
Swegman _ radio frequen- originated by
OS; cies used for James McCord.
5071 support of In-
Placc Monitor-
ing-System, a
eystem to identify
unauthorized
transmitters.
DMVREC Iden 48 File of auto- Nature of
OS mobile liccnge data.
Red 9298 numbcrg .
APREGHN Walter File of Agency Nature 0f
Kawalski applicants who data.
CI Staff were not
Red 9338 hired.
EYES ONLY
00133
SECRET
==================================================
Page 106
==================================================
Sensitivity_Unknowm but Possiblv 2 Matter_ for_Concern (Continued)
OJCS Project Officer Nature OJCS
Project Organization, & of Reason for
Identificati Telephone Proje Listng
Iden 187 Cooperative Association
ISDIDDO program wvith with the
Red 1442 Iden 188 named
organization.
in
name grouping
techniques.
lFczkv Cluiess
F
JOHN D_ IAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support
3
EYES ONLY
001377
SECRET
==================================================
Page 107
==================================================
29 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector Gencral to
Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
in & PPI B Memo to DD/M&S
REFERENCE DIPPB Memo to DDIM&S dated 23 1973 ,
Subject: Watergate Principals Dircct or
Indirect Involvement
1. The two notes 0f 13 and 20 January 1972 refcr to approval
by lhe DCI (at that time Mf. Helms) for the expenditure 0f 530-32K
{or a sensitive CS project: No further details wcre given, Mr. Colby
aBked that DDO records be checked.
2, DDO rccordg show that thc [unds wcnt to the CI Staff [or
a_
project called Idcn 99 _ This is a joint operation with thc Iden 100
bervice or thc collection 0f ELFT intelligence. The activity is
handled by the Special Intelligence Group of thc CI Staff:
3 The funds cited in the notes Ivas trensfcrred to CI on
13 January 1972. It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff thar
the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount,ic. 830 to 32K
and not to two scparate allocations_
8s,29 3
C: Richards
RaLos
00145
SEEQZET
~zt C
5r
May
JiNtlb)
Jfa)-
==================================================
Page 108
==================================================
ToctHTT
22
2572 /
1973
MEHORANDUM{ FOR: Dlrector for Managcincnt and Serviccs
SUEJECT: Watcrgate Principals Direct or Indircct
Involvcrcnt
14 This ncnorendum rcsponds the Dircctor'$ requcst for
a rcport of any involver:cnt in.any cepacity Sincc J January 1969
wth Messrs- Iunt, McCord, Liddy, Young.
or Krogh.
2. J havc had none with Ilunt, Liddy or
Young.
3. My McCord contact was intlircct and occurrcd socetimc
duxing 'thc Jatc 1960'9 when J was Dircctor_ Oiiice O Coriputer
Scrviccs _ [ cpposed ior Tcchnical Dirision , Officc of
Security (undcr Xr _ McCora) to acquirc 2 separatc cOInputer {cr
Iden 101_ Tcd Wincs o DD/SZT (thcn ORD)
was lhe computcr individual working with TD and, I think , would
have details -
4. The Krogh contact also was Indlrcct 'and involred his
requcst, first through Oxiz , that CIA Iund <orcicn trzrcl on bchalf
of thc Cubinct Colmiltcc on Internationa] orcctics Control. Indi-
vldual phonc.discussions are noted in the attachcd. Thc Agency
"focal points werc Iden 32 and Iden 3; [ jndcrsiand
Iden 3 has Sorwvardcd releyant documentatiou _ Copics o
mcmoranda {rom Messrs , Krogh, Iden 3 and arc attached
aeo,
5. I heldl a
staff mceling yesterday to pass thc requcst to
all OPPB employccs _ One oificcr who wvas
attending 2 funcral will
not bc aailable until tomoltow
Olbbblcvza8e2} K:: -'#28{537iol_2)
J - DE5? Elvz CDjA E!IF Is] Charles A, Brizas
J - *' E
T J L
3G9'622g6
Charlcs A.' Brigcs
Dl?fIPrwoc:
Dlrectcr of Planning _
(Progranming, and l;udgeting
Attachnent '
As staled
00149 _
SECRET
Xk
impoct CL aya
6l1n
May
Deputy
plans
Colby
8
cojpi
Olje
==================================================
Page 109
==================================================
thz;ent
23 1933
4 Feb 72 Call [rom Jlin Taylor O1{3 re "Bud* Kroch-arid kls dcputy ,
Waltcr Minnick of the Domestlc Council who plan forcii;n
travcl In connection with thciz narcotics intercsts _ Jin Tvis
alcrting
uS to thcir intcnton to ask us for iunds for thc
bravcl.
7 Feb 72 Follow-up Irom Taylor: Plan 3-5 tripa icr 3 individuuls--
all in FY 72 . Cost probably SlCk . %innick ready tu #kc
Irst trip. Iden 32 is plusgcd in. ExDir said Ow re Tebran
vislt _
7
Feb 72 See attachcd mcmo from Egll Krogh, Jr . to BIll Colby and
{ollow-on Flzos rom' Scyrou} Bolton (21 Jul 72) and
(2 Aug 72) _
12(?) 72 John Hurlcy, OXB called, renlicnlng posslblc Krogh/
MInnck attencancc at a Latin Anerican' {den 102
confcrencc on narcotics Hlc &lgo scid Jeil Shepherd .
Ihitc Housc , Izs laying un a
7) with Iden 32 for
hlmscli , Shcpherd Mark Alger , OXIB to Eurcpe .
23 Jun 72 Iden 3 comincntcd on
Krogh/iiinnlck intcrcst
In gclling CA ectiviticy, including largc-gcale Pif,
on narcolics Iront, Iden 3 pushiag smill-scalc PP
6 Jul 72 Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Iurley {ilu _
We wfll scnd,"
2 72 Iden 3 called rc Colby lctler (attached) Sald travel
ordere ready; nced money tis,FA (No record in miy
notcs as to who wis tarcllng Ivhcn, but have falnt
recollcction of its being to Mcxico Cily) _ San Hlincs
and Iden 73. contacted by Iden 3.
1 Nov 72 R Jlatcd? Iden 3 cal. Ageln no:cs are cryptic:
WX /GAO-Grace !Iden 32) ` Survcy CNDD problers/
Mexlco_ 0
00152
SECRET
May
Colby
May
sacl
Aug
==================================================
Page 110
==================================================
On Mr Colby's_copy
13 Jan 72 ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved S3OK for sensitive
CS project no details .
20 Jan 72 Reminded ExDir: re S3ZK he said DCI OK'd.
SFCRFT
00152
only:
(b
==================================================
Page 111
==================================================
19 Jull 972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: 'Conversation witH Jack Bauman Jft)
1< While %n lezve visiting Disney World in Florida, I
in to seel Jack Bzuman}who lives in Winterharen, Florida.
CJacb}etired fronsGhe Agencyfabout five yezrs 2go on disability &ce
to; a serious heart condition: He was with the Oflice f Security for
about 20 years prior to his retirement.
2 . During
a
private conversatiorJackJtol me that he had
been, intervicwed_thrce or four times by the FBI in connection wvith
the(McCord-Hunf affair_ I asked him he had been interviewed,
and he told me that in late 1971 ,he had been contacted by Holvard
Hunt who suggcstcd that he consider an assignmnt 2s Security
Officcr for the Republican Party.CJacklisited Washington in
January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hynt
who appa rently was
actirg on behalf of the Republican Party. Ujacky}
furnishcd a rcsume to Hunt &nd discussed the position Iith him.
Ultimately, he decided not to accept thc position because ke felt
that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in
such activity.
3. According tolJack/ during the meeting wvith Mr.
Hunt
they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that tire
they discussed 2 need for both a positive &nd
a countcraudio program
and a need for a good gecusity system both before and during the
National Convention. JeckJindicated that he sincerely belicved that
the Rcpublican Party did need a security officer &nd a good security
programmcr but felt trat hc could not afiord to accept the job even:
though it was a very lucrative offer_ Apparently , money %as not &
problcm.
36.(34
00153
Esi {31.4 63%84L :SUiwruiea
8 [ @ W:e, {i3m81 Suiii;':
35.14! & (9 (:8 # e
"COKFIcENtwL
M i:i M 3m,3 81
10A_
(edsw ;j82.: J#[sh
5pttea) Aaropped
JQ
why
=
==================================================
Page 112
==================================================
4, WhcntJack)declined, he indicated thz Mr_ Hunt asked
for any other rece mendations hc might have_ kccording toUac?
he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knewv were .still in the
CAgency_but he did furnish the
name JIEN-IU8 who might be
possibly ready to retire [rom theGAgency_
5. CJackinformed
e that he assumed that the Burezu
obtained his nare due to the resume ke furnished.Mr . Hunt. He
said that the Bureau had telked to him on three or four occasions
and that he had written up about & 40 page statement concerning
his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr, McCord,Cieck)
said that he really did not know McCord that wcll &nd declincd any
knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability-
6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not bzen in touch
wvith Mr. Hunt since tkc early part of 1972 and knew nothing of
the Watcrgate operation. He stated that he had g2ined thc impres -
sion Irom thc Bureau interview that the .technical devices were
removed at the time of thc arrest and wcre not installed as
eriginally reported,
All of the above information was volunteered by Mr.
(Bauman,)and I really did not involved in any discussion on the
mattcr othcr than to comment that I hated to scc
theCAgency']
nane
connected with such an incident in any Way. The 2bove conversation
took place during
2 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion
relating to this incident Ivas held. It is reported for the record
and for information Of the Director 0f Security-
Iyd_
WV . Kane
EHZFIRENTLL
00153
EYES DxlY
"ilee)
ofi
IJfll)
being
being
get
being
Jxlk ex:1;
==================================================
Page 113
==================================================
DDIMAS 73-1809
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter
1. I&m addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central
Intelligence}since I doubt that the information contained hercin is of such
significance [0 warrant bis interest and because it has been on record with
the Agency)since July 1972. However , if you feel that tne information is of
such intercst that it should be' forwarded to thc Director I shall put it in the
propcr format to do sO.
2. only contact with anyone namcd in connection with the
Watergate and related matters was througtir. Jack Bauman a former
Agcncy cmployee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida,] In
December 1971r. Baumancalled mc from Florida and adviscd that he
wanted to gct in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not' have Hunt's
home phone number and that it was probably unlisted buc that since Hunt Ias &
former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him t0 givel r. Baumapa' call
Ibad only mct Hunt once about 10 ycars beforc but [ agreed to relay thc message.
I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him_thatllr Baumanfdid roc have his
home phone and requcstcd he callAIr. Baunan:
Mr _ Hunt thanked me for
relaying the message and said that he would calkaI- Bauman This secmed of
lttle consequence to mc in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden [7 of the
Office of Security contacted me in regrd to the FBI investigation of the Wacergate
situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from
Bauman)in December 1971. Atcached is a of a Menorandum for the
Record prepared by. Iden 17 as a result of our conversation.
3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida
and took that occasion tO in to seeJack Bauman) Mr_ BaumaDtold me in
8 private conversation that he had been intervielved three or four tmes by the
FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact
BE? RYTCE
2 017018
0i53
SENSHT#; E 1 :71333
SECREF
~im?jET CL Bx_~
AFd lizil:es iciwz:
53 E21
Jjfna)
My
IJfd
(Mc: copy
Ufu_ drop
==================================================
Page 114
==================================================
(2)
with Howard Hunt: On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported
this corversetion to the Director of Securicy and made it a Memorandum for
the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mc . and & copy of the
memorandum is attached.
4. Other than knoring Mr McCord through his employment with
the Agcncyjand meeting Howard Hunt Once in about 1959, I do not know nor Sk
have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related
matters now receiving attention in the press.
27s
"Charles W . Kane
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director
for Management and Services L
Atts
Ex SECRET
00153
Colby
36
==================================================
Page 115
==================================================
17 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SU BJECT: Charles W .. Kane
-Jfpkka)
Tden 108
1. Lst week Special Agent Arnold Parhm of the FBI con -
tacted the Acting DP/os. He asked .whether or nct the Subjects sY@e
worked foy the Central Intelligence Agency- Previously , requests
of this naturc were followed u? by the FBT with 20 interview of the
subjects.
2. I briefcd Mr . Colby who is thc Agency's focal point on
the "Watergate" case and the Acting DDIS 0f the FBI inquiry.
Mr . Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvercnt
and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their cmployment.
3. When Agent Parham Ivas again contacted and 2dvised YSt e
of the Subjects- employment with the AgencyJ he indicated that
the Bureau does not wish to intervicw them. f@~ad :
4. The office of the DDIPS will interview Iden 108
in7i_
the same fashion &s Mr . True was previously interviewed. 7 7/4'
5. I called@Mr. Kane)both 2t his office &n his residence
and leafned that he is in Florida &nd will return to duty on 17 July.
I called Mr. Kane)this morning to advise him of tae inquiry.
6 Mr. Kane) stated that he has no firm conclusion as to
how the Burezu obtained his name _ Hc stated tnat he hzs seen
Mr _ Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was
the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting Ias occasioned
00163
july
&Z
Jfoja)
==================================================
Page 116
==================================================
by the_fact tha Mre Kane ccompanied a technic )sweep team
to,the Montevicco Station; Mr. Kane stated further that around
Christmas time of 1971 hE received Z call from(Jack Beuman
who wanted to get in touch ivith Mr.' Funt. Bzuman)sked
Mr: Kane/how he could get in touch with him.. |Mr Kane pbtained
Mr. Hunt's telcphone number through telephone inforration chanrels
whereupon he passed the number on tol wr Bauman.
7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information thatkJeck Zzuman)
has talkedto the FB on several occasions in connection Ivith thc
current investigation and that he surmises that tlc Bureau may
have obtzined his name from him.
%0:
signed Iden 17
Deputy Dircctor of Sccurity
00162
Jfla)
Jfzdb
(Mr_
Jp
==================================================
Page 117
==================================================
SECRET/SENSITIVE
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH; Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domesti? Activities
1 As chief of the DDP Systems Group to 1969, [ was involved
in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:
aE CI Staff Mir _ Richard Ober's program for processing data
of U,S. citizens believed to be militants subvcrsives = terrorists
Zetc .
b FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program
for recording data on forcign and U.S, physicians from American
Medical Association records
C A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern
Jisting travel of U.S , citizens to and from Communist countries
2 , In the same capacity my staff and I bricfed police officers from
New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn)
on
Gata proccssing techniques related to biographic intclligence (unclassified)
3. As & member of O/PPB , I have been aware of five programs with
possibly sensitive domestic overtones _
a,
DDSeT/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103
for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction
m System _
b DDSeT/ORD's Project which involved the collection
of data on dangerous drugs from U.S _ firms . Ibelieve Mr _ Helms
terminated this program last Fall .
SECRET / SENSITIVE
CL
5.CSc
Sn
00163
prior
JY
JYA
lz1a;}
==================================================
Page 118
==================================================
C3EZIDE.MTI:L z-2
ay 1973
MDoorAgt; ?CR TEE RECORD
S{ :JZCT; Rescarch Project on Rotert Vesco
1, On 15 Octoter 1972iiessrsy Erzckinridse :~zeintzel-en)
in the colrse of & Survey, were briefed on activities 0f tke
Atlsntic/?acific Division of tze. Office of Econcnic eports One
project cited was a cl'er; {ro;? tre Lirechr, 2 3erentl; at tre re-
quest of Secretery Shultz , to tre effect, "Ahat do #e Xo;l elout
Vesco ," Ii tke Ta !2 tien rlrning IOS, To of Ozit ' $ aral;sts "ere & sisned
to' tue projoct wn4, %orkinz tlircwgh tre ucacstic Contact bervice ,
spent a gping over tre files of the} Securities &nd Zrchange
CoslisSion, Tnere apparcn tl; was sone: contact also wlith Ei? Wivision
Of thc Leputy iirectorate for Plans and with thz Office of Current
Intelligence _
2, Tile infornation atove is based on rough rotes and 'obviously
'1s sketchv - It is cited no:' not to suzzest eny Wronzdoing tut tccalse
of the current 'pullicity atol:t #esco end thc prol bility of continuing
proles' into the subject ty thc press end the coxrts _
Scott D. Freckinridge
C llenry Heintzelclan JfKlA)
00173
dey
==================================================
Page 119
==================================================
22 Ma} 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
Bil--
Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:
Restless_Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68 ,
Secret Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).
This document was produced in two versions--one
with the chapter on radical students in America (pages
25-39) Ivhich: was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,
and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Deferse); the
other version writhout the references to the American
scene Ivas disseminated to twenty people outsice the
Agency. This document without the material on the
US was updated in February 1989 and copies were sent:
to the Vice President &nd Dr. Kissinger. A still more
abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General
in March 1969
2 = Black Radicalism _in_the Caribbean (6 August 1969) ,
No. 1839/69 , Secret No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).
3. Black Radicalism in the_Caribbezn_-Another Look
(12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign
Dissem (Copy 98).
Please note that these are our record copies and should
be returned
2
# T_ A Zhnell_
FEH
Edward WV _ Proctor #/r/3+1
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachments
00171
Mkla)
r_
2_#3 C sY 01332.9
SECRET 'SENSITIVE
==================================================
Page 120
==================================================
CJA
==================================================
Page 121
==================================================
CIA INTERAAL USE ONLY
8 '1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Deputy Director for Intelligcnce
SUBJECT Aclivities Possibly _ PutsidcECIA 's
Legislative Charter
1, This memoranduin responds to your instruction to
report any activitics Ihich might be considercd oulside CIA's
lcgislative charter.
2, All Office ancl Slaff chicfs in thc Inlelligcnce Directoratc
have revicwycd thc past and prcscnt activitics of their componcnts.
I hako rcccivcd responscs from all of thcm_ and nore rcportccl any
activitics relaled to citicr the Matergate affair or thle break into
the officcs of Ellsbcrg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with
three of the peoplc allegedly implicatcd in thcsc incidents here
reporlcd, thcse contacts werc on mattcrs othcr than thc two
impropcr aclivitics:
Hunt: Col. White, Richard Lchman, and I talked
to Hut in latc 1970 regarding his preparation
of a rccommendation in support of the Agcncy's
nominalion of B . Jack Smith for the National
1
Civil Service League Award.
Mitchell; WVhile Mr_ Mitchcll was Attorney General,
an OCI officcr was assigned thc task of
8 providing him with daily briefings
on
foreigw developments_
83 Hila Zd
Zea/e
00183
AFfpoiitt R~? P3} race 1~n3 @a Gne'
Cer 1i
"3328
Cus Jillyryc-!
Nz , iLv nilai
Gwe
(983_
Rssack 3hly J)
821572]1
CIA INTKRNAL USE ONLY
May
Jf1
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Page 122
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Youngi Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS
had frequent contacts with Young during the
summer of 1972 in connection with Executive
Order 11652 and the implementing NSC
directive_ This involved visits by Young
to CIA to discuss information storage and
retrieval 2nd several meetings of &n inter-
agency group dealing with the implementation
of the Executive Order and directive.
3, Ir accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported
domcstic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders_
Tr;;j ~csponscs arc attached. Most of these activitics are clearly
withir the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be
vicvcd as bordcrline_
DCS collects information on foreign students studying
in the US.
DCS collects information on physicians practicing in
the US Iho hare studied abroad (mostly foreign
nationals).
DCS accepts information on possible foreign
involvcmcnt in US dissident groups and on the
'narcotics trade #hen sources refuse to deal
with the FBI and BNDD directly.
DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of
US citizens to cooperate with CIA_
DCS, for Six months in late 1972 and early 1973 ,
wes acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas
calls .
Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques and methods.
NPIC and COMIIREX review satellite imagery
from NASA programs to identify photography
I 6i too sensitive for public release_
-2-
22
00283
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
Mrhdo) "
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Page 123
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CI 1TJZT.TJ 0ul Oc
NPIC has examincd domestic coverage for special
purposcs such as natural calastrophics and civil
disturbances.
OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence
memoranda on possible forcign conncctions Iith
thc US anti-var movement and world-wide student
dissidencc (including the SDS) at the request of
the White Housc.
CRS is rcgularly involvcd with Customs in cxamining
the contcnls of motion picture film cans addressed to
the Soviet, and occasionally othcr forcign, embassies
to acquirc positivc foreign intelligencc.
FBIS has on occasion supplicd linguists to work
dircctly for anolhcr agency, C. g. , to the FBI to
translate Arabic in WVashington.
FBIS monitors radio press dispaiches and rcports
covercd hy copyright. T'hese a1€ circulaled within
the Govcrnmcnt and stamped "Official Use Only"_
This has gonc on for thrcc dccadcs without problems:
FBIS has molitored and rcported On foreign radio
broadcasts of statcmcnts and speechcs of US cilizens
such .as thosc by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda,
and Ramscy Clarke.
FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service
udcr Departmcntiof Commcrcc cover since 1957.
JPRS is a
facility for obtaining tronslations of
unclassificd publications in forcign languages
and contracts with private indlividuals to do this
work. Most of these individuals are not witting
of the CIA-JPRS relationship.
4/14
CDWARD W . PROCTOR
Deputy Dircctor for Intclligence
ttachmcnts
-3-
8
003,0*
CIA INFTERAAL USI ONLY
JfNt lc)
(akce
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SECRET
INTERNAL USE ONLY
T May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence:'
VIA Deputy Director for Intelligonce
FROM Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJZCT Activity Related to
Dorlestic Events
1 OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism
in earnest in 1968 The emphasis of our analysis was on
black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbcan
and as a_ threat to the security of the Caribbean statcs_
Trzo DDI Iemoranda Were produced O2) the subject: I1 Black
Radicalism in the Caribbean Ji (6 August 1969) and "Black
Radicalism in the Caribbean--Anolher Look"
(i2
June 1970)
In each a single paragraph was devotca to tics with the
US black pOfex movement ; the discussion primarily concerned
visits of Stokely Carnichael and other US black. powcr
activists to the Caribbean ana other overt contacts .
2 _ In June 1970 Archer Bush of OCI was asked to
write a mcmorandun with spacial attention to links be 4
tween black radicalisn in the Caribbean ancl advocates of
black poler in the US _ 'The record is not clear Ihere
this request originatca_ but it cane through channels
from the DCI The paper Was to be trcated as especially
sensitive_ and was io include material provided by the
Special Operations group of the CI Staff The CI Staff
material was voluminous but did not providc mcaningful
evidence of important links between militant blacks in
the US and the Caribbean_ This in fact_ Ivas one of
the conclusions of the paper_ The memorandum Kas producea
in typescript form and given to the DCI
Cxa; '[Ga Is J1:s3Z
SECRET Ecmhtu ('3"1 "8.; Mcf a Jln E_ler;
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY; 6: c.:Mflon 6; 73$
{; {1 & "Isa? mC 6 1.s:?
V"e" cI;
Jtole5 UtcJii: 40A:7 (18,L u; 708
00103
Jf1Qg)
461
Je
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SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
3 _ For several months in the first half of' 1968
the; Ceribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda
on Stokely Carmicnael
1 s travels abroad' auring
2_ period
when he had dropped out of public vicw Our recollection
is that the memoranda Were for internal CIA use 'only
although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI _
Richard Lehman.
Director of Current Intclligence
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
00483
Jf1ab)
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Page 126
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7 Sy 1973
XEEMORANDUAI FOR : Dcputy Director for Intelligcnce
SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity
To thc best of my knowledgc ; DCS has not engaged In any
activity outside the CIA chartcr or tha t could bc construcd as
illuga] Sone 0f thc functions that we perform under HR 1-13f
(1) of providing operational support Within the US to
elcments of CIA aud to the USIB-mcnbcr agencies _ howover , aro
perhaps borlerlinc 0r could bc construcd as illegal if mis_
interprctcd _ For examplc:
1, Providc personality and asscssment data on certain
foreicn students and visiting forelgn scicntists and
OIficials.
2 , Idontify forcign students in thc US through collection
Of forolgn student lists from certain univorsities,
3 Provido pcrsonality and assessment data on US citizens
to dctcrmine theiz: suitability and willingncss to
cooperatc with thc Agcncy .
4 Introdluce coopera tive US busincssmcn and academicians
to Arency personncl who are in alias but using CIA
crcdentials_
5 _ Cllect informa tion on possible forcign involvement
or ponctra tion of US dissident groups but only in 8
passive manner ancl only when the source has refuscd
to pass the informa tion directly to the FBI .
.6_ Collect informa tion on thc narcotics trade _ but again
only J.n a passive Manner when thc sourcc has refused to
pass the information dircctly .to BNDD Or' the FBI.
001.8:
Sz8EK/E.m
2__P.IET
CL Dy
00-476
Eenn
3k1ob
a11
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Page 127
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CRETITTC
SUBJECT; DCS Dmestic Activity
Cllect specific 'information and supply duplicate or
master keys for foreign hotels.
8 _ Cllect medical inforation from cooperative contacts
on foreign leaders who have received medical treatmcnt
Or examiia tions In the US _
9_ Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing
In the US who have studied abroad Although most wc re
foreign nationals some werc LS _ The tapcd inforna tion
included school present" business address , da te of birth,
and specialty .
10 , Acquire routing' sllps recording the fact of overseas
telephonc ca 1ls be tween persons in the US and persons
overscas and telephonc ca lls between lwo forcign points
routed through US swi tchboards _ This activity lasted
for approxima - six mon ths but has ccased ,
IL.
This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techiques and mnethods .
Xbls
JARES R_ XIURPHY
Director Dmestic Contact Service
~2~ SEET,
00185
Jfxikc)
tely
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Page 128
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SECRET
EYES ONLY
7 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT Activity Related to Domestic Events
1_ In late spring of 1968 Walt RostOw then
Spccial Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs tasked the DCI with undertaking
a survey of
worldwide student dissidence_ Confronted. by tinult at
campuses like Colurbia ond mindful of the violencc
accomparying stuaent outbursts at Berlin s
Free Univcrsity
and clseihere Rostow sought to learn whether youthful
dissidence was interconnected: spakncd by the sane causes;
financed anc hence mnanipulated by forces or influences
hostil: to the interests of the US and its allies; or
likely
to come under inimical siay to the detrinent of US' interests.
2 The paper was preparcd byifaul Corscaddefl of OCI
with the assistancc 0 the CA and CI Staffs Thc DDI
D/OcI analCorscadaen Jmet with Rostow to elicit the reasons
for his or the Prcsidcnt' s concerns and to agree on the
sources to be examined the research methods to be followed ,
etc_
3 Written during the summer
of 1968 , the most
sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections
The first Ivas a
philosopnical treaement of student unrest ,
its mo tivation histor; and tactics rhis section drew
heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students
for 2
Democratic Socicty end affiliated groups In a sense ,
the survey of dissent emerged fron a shorter (30 page)
typescript study 0f1 SDS and its foreign ties the same
author had clone for Mr Rostol at the DCI s ircquest in
December 1967. (Te no longer copy - )
00133 I
Cirs&J I
3EK?4
#ttv: {m {""1C 3' de fa" %aufon s;itefeis SECRET"
'x_ '}
EYES ONLY ;+*7)
# +i4
f2~
tI8 L.jci | &8 0f We.i)
May
JIK
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Page 129
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SECRET
EYES ONLY
4 Because of the paucity of information
on foreign
student movencnts it was necessary to focus On SDS Rhich
thcn monopolizea the field of student action here and:
abroad , A second section comprised 19 country chapters--
ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stooa by itself
as a review of foreign student dissidence
5, Because SDS Ias a
domestic organization the
full paper Restless Youth incluaing the essay on world-
wide dissenE kent only €o nine readers _ A copy may be
in the Johnson Library.
6 . Followving the paper S favorakle reception by
the President and Mr . Rostcw 'Ithe DCI Ibriefea the NSC
012 student dissent. The sensiEive Version subsequently
was updatcd ana sent to the Fhite House in February 1969 _
7 The less sonsitive text was disseminated in
September 1968 and then updated and issued again in
Marcl 1969 and August 1970
Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence
SECRET
EYCS ONLY
00331
==================================================
Page 130
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SC 33289773
8 May 1973
MEMORAADUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Summary Special Programs Division '(SPD) ,
Office of Connunications Operational
Contacts With Other U .S. Governnent Agencies
1. Prior to
1969 theEoc CONINT intercept unit,
which was then in Xiani had relatively frcquent contact
with the Miani bureeus of the FBI and FCC , Xiani Police
and the Miami Beach Police The staff provided support
to these activities in monitoring_
9
identification and
DF of specific illegal agent transnissions conducted by
foreign nationals and Aerican citizens in the greater
Miami area Arrangcnents for this support were made
through the @DDO' s Chief hH , Miani]
2 . In late Septenber 1972 , NSA, through DivisionCD/
DDO J requested that thc Special Prograns Division initiate
a hearability survey of certain HF distarce comfercial
telephonc circuits bctween the U.S_ and South Aerica
Thc circuits carried dreg related long-distence calls of
interest. to the BNDD and other U.S . agencics Because of
the availability of personnel and technical capabilities
the survey ks conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92
Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-
ceptcd, On 15 January 1973 fornal NSA tasking of the
intercept was instituted _ On 30 January 1973_ 211 coverage
was terninated by Division D because of possible legal
complications
3 The Chief and Deputy Chief SPD and SPD/Special
Electronic Qperations Branch have been engaged in informal
technical liaison with operating components of the FBI
for a nunber of years Initial contacts and arrangements
for support of specific activities have been made by the
Division6/DDo] Support has been provided in the forn of
DOHNGRADED TO SECRET
UPON REMOVAL 0F ATTACHMENT
E2 IMPDET CL ByC061943_
X SECRET
00140
HaHuLE FIA GOKXT , GAMYELS
0e:
Gmi_
Jfki)
JfUl
Jong-
JfKad
#su
OownzzucLk @eck-eg
@sxo c
715791780 Ltzma"
wW
==================================================
Page 131
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T SECET
S 03289/73
8 Mey 1973
exchanges of technical information on techniques technical
assistance and training, and the loan ofCAgencyJequipacr: .
[Sj
In the past several years support has been rendered to
sensitive FBI projects; #CkhK# UFFOV and #tG?LFEL _ SuBRGis
has been and is presertly being given to FBI projects
and ROSE _ These projects are described in the attached
sealed , envelope_
4 < An . operational test of an NSA-developed HE DF
system was jointly conducted by NSA oQDinesionnerd and
OC-SPD personnel in the early part the sumer 1972 ,
A location in Miami Beach , Florida was selected for the
tests because of sinilarity to the actual target site and
environnent in Saigon _ Receiving antennas Kere
placed
on
the roof of the hotel being used
as
the Tccciving/DF site.
A hotel enployec asked why thc Cnteriel #s
placed
on the
roof_ A tean member in effect told him that the group
wa5 an advance security segment for the Denocratic National
Convcntior No furthcr questions were asked; the tests
were completed and the equipnent was returned to the
Nashington area
signed Iden 53
Chief, Special Prograns Division, OC
Att.
I* SEGRET
HAHdLe YIa G27 GANNELS:
00141
2
77
N
SlyT
Oaaacl Eeekas
Khclld
713745783 34107
==================================================
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SENSITIVE
9 1973
MOHARR _ Electronic survey of Iden 63_
This operation was terninated aprroxinately two
months ago . SPD/SEO personnel participated for
two days _
JION: JAen 98 floodirg 0f tie cipher device employed by
the Iden 94 Ecbassy on their diploratic cormuni-
cation link_ SPD/SEO,support terminated two
years ago .
ORKID Electronic surveillance of Iden 64
Washington, Da C, SPD/SEO irvolvea 'only in planning
at this time, (attendance at two Reetings)
-ROSE Electronic surveillance of Iden 62
SPD/CHT personnel perforned an
electronic search of the Iden 62 area and SPD/SEO
personnel corducted a spectrum Search/recording
of the spectrum covering 4 to' - 6' GHz' during the
period 16 to 20 April 1973 _ Plans call for contin-
uea support by SPD in the future as reguested.
WEGRAVEL Division D operation involving a Ider '95 code clerk.
SEO provided eguiprent, trained case officer in
use of device ana stood: by in Iden 97,
Nashington D,C. to back up case officer if neeced.
The operation- took place in July 1972 .
T SET
HAxdze VLI €.Xx7 GANHvElS
'00142
SENSITIVE
Oorsruddu snT,
67 ehtp 'e
oLenbost
71
30545780_
26
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TAP SECRET UNBRA
EYES ONLY
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM Director f Current Intelligence
SUBJECT Activity Related to Domestic Events
1, In late 1967COC participated in the preparation
of scveral short intelligence menorarda dealing with the
foreign connections of US orcanizations and activists in-
volved in the anti-war movanent _ 'The main purpose Of
these rep?rts ~preparcd at thc request of the Fnite House
1
Ias to determine wncther any links existed bctween inter-
national Comunist elements or forcign governments and the
American peace movement _ 'The conclusion reached Fras that
there Gas some evicence 0f ad hoc contacts bctiecn: anti-
war activists at homc and abroad but no evidence of
direction or formal coorcination
2 _ In October 1967 President Johnson expressea
interest in this subject and ordered a high level inter-
departnental survey_ In response to his personal reguest
to the DCI $ir Helms askea theLcI Staff to collect whats
ever information fas available through our Oin sources ana
through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI phich
was directed to prepare a nemorandum from the DCI to the
President_J
3.LA book message requirement Tas sent to all stations
to Rhatever information was on hand rclevant to this tabjecorj Kletovgk dgeotmaerorts
on Comunist front opera-
tions overseas Ivere 'of sone value the primary source of
information on the activities of US activists--and that Ras
quite limited-~Ras sensitive intercepts produced by NSA ,
Which had been similarly tasked by thc White House
Clpcie Ixs
LLZ
prce;: Jer} fqnc"Ji de.imiita:ian sc;icd
G} @_ :6:> "xe_ SECRET UMBRH
EYES ONLY
Jo": ~;: Agri14z3
Pa Eezo deleo_ jnauf,
7,37ysT?o 00132
Jx
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Page 134
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SECRCT UMBRA
EYES ONLY
&'. ` ^ druft memorandum was Jointly inclc epaced by
CoCr arr. CI
Staffland forwarded to
He pasged
this t;z?script memo , dated 15 Novcmber 1967' , to the
Presid iit personally- The Mhite House copy i8 'nOw in
the fi_15 Of Presicont Johnson 's papers at the library
in Austin.
2;'
Brief foilow-up memoranda were
prepared ana
tcrwsiged tc
the Rhite House on 2i Degember ana 17
Jaujue: 1968 _ According to our
best recollection no
furthe
Zinished intelligencc reports on
intcrnational
connect ions. of the peace movcmcnt were
produced.
"3~
Richard Lehman
Director Of Current Intelligence
3ee_SECRET_ UMDRA
EYES ONLY
0018-}
Lt
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Page 135
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7 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR : 0/DDI
SUBJECT Involvenent In Domestic Affairs
J; This nenorandum rcsponds to the DDI 's
requcst for a listing of any guestionable
involvements in donestic affairs I do not believe
that CRS is doing anything thit 2 reasonable
man coula construc 2S improper _
2 CRS does of course , have several programs
to acquirc still pictures movies videotares
and books either privately, sccretly or without
acknowledccnent that CIA is thc actual end user
CRS is regularly involved with CustOrs in looking
at the content of filIg cans aadressea to the
Russian Enbassy in Rashington Custors occasionally
also proviccs access to othcr filn from denicd
areas It nay be edaressed to privatc citizens
or organizations or other embassies_ Thesc efforts
are ained at acquisition of positivc foreign
information
3 . CRS files do not gererally bear on U.S_
citizens Or organizations _ The biographic fiic-
building criteria specifically excludes U,S .
nationals unless the person has becone of such
major importance in the political life of a
forcign
country that the file is essential (T0 my knolledge ,
only 2 persons so qualify One is the wife of
the opposition leader 0f Guvana and the other
is Hope Lang _ Our Cuban files probably include
sone persons who are nOlv U.S citizens but we
have no way to separate then; we have files on
U.8 . defectors to, Cuba. )
L2_ivP?ET CL" DY_:
004050 SEET
00137
May
5
J4)u)
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Page 136
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SUBJEC? : Iwvolvement In Domestic Affairs
4 _ The CIA Library has several informal
snag files intended to aid the librarians in
answering the kinds of questions that they know
they Wili
on a continuing basis . An
appointnents file is 8 collc-tion of clippings
on appointed federal officials: kho holds what
job @hen anc what is his backgrourd? Ze extremist
files are a collection of folcers on a
variety
Of organizations anz a fcw people With intricate
organizational links Any sort of extremism
is grist for these particular files_ Ana a few
persons 0.9 . , Rap Broi ana Eldridge Cleaver ,
have cossiers consisting alrost exclusively of:
clippings fron; public redia These files are
unclassified and consist rostly of,clippirgs
from] the public prcss : U.S
1
forcign, undergrouna
1 scholarly .
5 . I am not awre of any otker kind of
involvenent in dorestic activities that is not
relatea to devclopnent Of techniques
OX logistics
or legitimate training of CRS personnel-
H C, EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service
~2-
SEL:T
00233
get
5
(04)
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SETRET
May 1973
MEMORAADUM FOR : DDI
SUBJECT Sensitive Activities
Jf+u}e)
1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the 'Ellsberg
and Natergate cases
2 , FBIS operations occasionally extcnd
to the domestic arena _ From
tine to time, FBIS linguists arc made availablc to DDO or Office of
Conmunications 'corponents for special operations (usually abroad) involving
closc-support. SIGIXT work or translation of audio take _ 'On one occzsion
recently DDO, on behalf 0f the FBI, requestcd thc serviccs of several
EBIS liuguists skilled in Arabic Lo work dircctly for tha FBI 0n 2 short-
terw project here in Neshington _ The arrangcnents wicre made b5 Mr Oberg
of thc DWO CI Staff. Hc seid thc project Tas vcry highly classified and
that FBIS Participation was approved by Kr _ Colby and the Direclor FBIS
participation was. approvcd by the Director Qf FBIS after 3 check with
the NJDI _ Other exanples of sensilivc linguislic support . Bork are help
in thc landlirg and rescctlcncnt of dcfcctors the reccrt assignment of
an employce to' the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangcrous Drugs to transcribc
recordirgs in 2 rare Chinese dialccl, and thc detailing cf anotker
Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U'S _ military training
of Chinese Nationalist cadets.
3, Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-
missions for intelligencc information, FBIS publishcs and distributes
some naterial which" falls in a "gray" area of copyright prorcccion, Libel,
and privacy of intercational communications _ Prcss services controlled
by national governments and transmitted b; radiotclctype without
specific addrcssecs e.g. thc Soviet TASS service and the PRC S YCNA ,
are monitored by FBIS and thc maLerial is disseninated without restric_
tion_ The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the
Office of General Counsel_ However we also monitor some in-house ,
correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered Private
point-to-point transmissions FBIS thercfore avoids public distribution 0f
material clonitored from these circuits by labeling then with an "OEficial
Use Only" caveat, The sane caveat is uscd on material which we wonitor
from other press agencies which arc protcctcd by internalional copyright,
e,g- Agence France Presse (AFB)
9
the Niddle East Nevs Agency (HENA) and the
Iraqi Nes Agency (INA) _ This procedure has allowed, FBIS to disseminate news
0o203
SECIRET
2_mrbct
CL An;S
013
Jt+
(ila)
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Siczi
agency material for nearly three decades without problens Reccntly,
howewer thc Office 'of General Counsel has ruled that an
"Official
Use
Only" caveac Kill not bar such raterial fron the general public under
the Freedon 0f Infornation Law and wic are accordingly Looking into
alternativc neasures, arong which arc; (1) the purchase of ne;s scrvices
wIth rights to publish 2nd disseninate; and (2) the classification of
those itcns vital to the governzent 5 business which we Dust continue
to monitor and report _ An ultinate decision will be weighcd against
the risk of present procedures_
4 _ The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign fadio broadcasts often
involves statenents or specches made: by U,S_ citizens using those radio
facilities. Examples ere statiwents nade or allegedly nade by Acarican
POw 5 in Henoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Raescy Clark in Vietnan.
At the request of FBI ad the Departient of Justice, and with chne
approval of _ the CIA Office of General Counsel, wc have on occasion sub-
micted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice a5
Parl of that Department S consideration 0f a possiblc trial In such
cases, we have bcen requircd to subait nancs of FBIS wonitors involved _
prcsumably becausc 0f thc possibilicy they night be rcquircd as witncsses.
(In one casc in 1971, an FBIS staEf cmgloyce Ks directed to aPpcar as
an experl witness in the court-Fartial of a Marine. enlisted Ran chargcd
with aiding thc cnemy in a broadcast fron' Hanoi,) FBIS vicws al1 this
vith misgivings _ Monitoring of such broadcests is incidental and we
rue attributicn of lheir ncws to PBIS and we should not be considered
Policemcn naintaining surveillancc of traveling [mericans
5, FBIS is an overt organization, but onc aspect Of its operalions
is under Dcpartnent of Cormerce cover_ The Joint Publications Rcscarch
Service (JPRS) was establishcd in 1957 to providc the Reans' through wlich
great volumcs QE material from unclassified foreign publications could
be translated by largc numbcrs of independent contractors in the United
States on a picce rate basis, Contractors arc mot witting 0f thcir CIA
employmcnt _ This use of cover Is an anonaly in FBIS and contains some
risk of embarrassielc to the Agency and to Comnercc if it becomes public
klowledge. The surfacing of JPRS Was given study in 1969 but after
considcration of all the Pros and cons it Ias decided at the Executive
Director-Compcroller level not to procced at that time. FBIS is prescntly
taking
a sccond look _
Ds8ls_
H _ KNOCIIE
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
-2-
'SECRET
00203
E33
Jfrqd
==================================================
Page 139
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SECTET;,
8 i973
MEMORANDUM FOR: 'Deputy Director_for Science & Technology
SUBJECT TSD Support to Other Agencies
1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires
that it providc tcchnical assistance to bothCIA ope rations and
Other activities as may be direcled by the Deputy Director for
Operations:
2 Over the years thelchief non-CIA } ecipients of this
support have been the Department of Defense, the Fcderal
Bureau %f Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangcrous
Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Scrvice; Department
of State, Unilcd Statcs Postal Service, Secret Servicc, Agency
for International Devclopment, and the White House_
3. While varying widely among the different rccipients, thesc
services have included training and materials, and in a {ew in-
stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillancc,
secret writing &nd related communications personal protection,
disguise,
concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-
tion, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.
4 . In most instances requirements for this support are
received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director
or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved
is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the
Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for
coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels
Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations
or Development
and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is re-
red.
5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to
the organizations named in Paragraph two.
E2 IMPDzT
CL BY 059098
SECRET 00213
May
qui=
==================================================
Page 140
==================================================
TOCOTTCT]
2 -
This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques &nd methods ,
8 _ Provision of forgcd documentation to non-DDO requesters ,
whether they bdCEAJor other Agency requesters, always requires
approval of non-TSD officcs, Support to thc military for instance
would be validated by FI Staff/Deparlmental Coordination Group
Xt Hcadquarters or by thelCOSJoverseas having responsibility for
coordination of thc eperation_ BNDD requcsts are coordinated
witH DDO/NARCOG Requests for documentation of Immigration
and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs
Staff.
9 _ Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must
be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has
been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support
until the documcntation has been returned to TSD; If the matcrial
is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded
of the outstanding documentation _
Attachmcnt Sidney, Cottlie
Distribution: Chicf
0 & 1 - Addressee, wlatt Technical Services Division
00*15
SFCRFT
Jfuke)
==================================================
Page 141
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ATTAC XENT
Department of Defense
Documents , disguise, concealment devices , secret writing,
flaps and seals) counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courscs
have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department
of Defense and certain elements.of the Special Forces. All requests
are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group &t
Headquarters and with thelChief of Stationgloverseas. In turn
these elcments furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities
documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing
systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. €Selected
audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI ~type
cases.
Federal Burcau of Investigation
At the request of the FBI Ive cooperate with the Burcau
in a fcw audio survcillance operations against scnsitive forcign
targets in the United States.
Burcau of Narcotics and Dangcrous_ Drugs
BeaconS _ cameras, audio and telephone deviccs
overseas opcrations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,
SRAC, flaps &nd seals and training of selected pcrsonnel
responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau_
All requirements are sent tdDDO /NARCOG)for coordination
with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.
Requests overseas are coordinated with theCOspr his
designee before action by TSD is taken.
Immigration and Naturalization
(CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in
developing tamperproof alien registration cards_ 'special
fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished thc Scrviced Requests
are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if
technical, wvith the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper -
ational.
SECRET 00217
Jfatc)
Jfkila)
for
==================================================
Page 142
==================================================
Department of State_
Technical graphics dance on developing a new United
States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring
and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been
supplied the State Department;_ In addition analyses and
exposure of black letter operations against the United States
abroad are made_ All graphics requirements are' forwarded
to TSD for further coordination within the' Division. The
Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,
foreign visas .ndin c Fast passports on a priority basis.
Postal Service
The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected
personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has
been furnished foreign postal information and has been thc
recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent
(4
ink typewriter analyses Requircments are coordinated with
thck DDO and DDO/EAJ The Post Office has furnished TSD
with exemplars of letter bombs and mail inscrtion capabilities
for CA material destincd for foreign countries. We also have
an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert
a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United Statcs.
Secrct Service
Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential
campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID
photo systcm havc been furnished this Service. Blankct approval
for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for
Operations . In each case TSD requests approval from theDDO)
U, S.Agency ior International Development
We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical
Investigation Course (Counter Tcrror) at Los Fresnos Border;
Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos , Texas Instruct ors are under
Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation
is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are
given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the
2
00223
guie
Jf
==================================================
Page 143
==================================================
request 0d CI /PG) rrainees represent internal security or
national portce from all countries participating in AID Police
a8sistance programs:
White House
Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Creat
Seal have been furnisled the Social Secretary. The Deputy
Director for Operations is apprised of these requirerrents_
Police_ Reseresenting Washington, Arlington. Fairfax and
Alexandria
During the period 1968
~'
1969 a series of classes
reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic"audio,
locks and picks_ counler sabotage and surreptitious entry
were given to selected members from the above mentioned
cities. Overall training was approved by thcDirector; of
Centeral Intelligencefand in turn validation
was
required for
each course from the Director of Security.
SECRET
00219
{366
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Page 144
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DZY
RouTiNG AND R:CO?D SxEZT
SUbJECT; (Optienal) :si
FROA: EXTENSION NO:
Sidney Gottlieb
Chief, TSD x-2831| DaTE 8 May 1973
203South Building
TO: (Ci,cer dssigrlion, {Oom QuGbot, 0r DXTE building) OFFICER"S COMMENTS (Mumber €och commeni Io skow Iro7 +ts~
INITIALS t whom: Oraw liqa Octos, Golumn at:er €jc0 comcg;, Beceiveb FORWAFDED
DDS &T Attached herewvith are 2dditoni
explanations of TSD support {0
2 other U,S. Government agenciez.
3
5;
6
7
8 SEIES €Y
10_
12_
13_
14- 08223
15_
IOCM 610 Lj} #tf M2us ikte3r:l
J-62 {5'1:3'5 SECRET co.fichitim
USE Oiily
U;c_ssifiz
==================================================
Page 145
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OCOTST
ATTACHMENT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA TION
TSD had a
close: working relationship with the FBI over
thc past few years. The FBI is the only organizalion that has
been bfiefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment: The
followving are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were
involved in operations:
(A) Identity 59 Four masked transmitters were
installed. Two have failed and hvo remain workable
(B) Identity 60 A TSD built masked transmitter
was.installcd to collect emanations from a crypto-
graphic machine; Thc system continucs to function
when ' samplcs of the emanations are needcd.
(C) Identity 61 Two transmitters havc bcen
installed and are ope rating. One is specifically
designed to collect the sounds of typcwriting, the
other is a straight audio transmittcr to collect con-
versations _ A FBI agcnt is manning the lis tening
post. A third system is not opcr-
ating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape_
made fron this roomn was made the National
Security Agency before failure.
(D) Identity 62 TSD furnishcd equiprent and con-
sultation cove ring Identity 62
First masked switched trans-
milters werc used in two apartments 'used as tempor-
ary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters
and microwave transmittcrs were installed in the
permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa -
tiong, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This ins tall-
ation is not opcrational because the full comple -
ment of personnel have not arrived.
SECRET 00222
ha $
fully
by
fully
yet
==================================================
Page 146
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,JCOTTET
(EL Iden This is an operation with additional
participation by National Security Agency; It is
designed in anticipation of the Identity 64
Mk
in Washington. The listening post was
obtained by usinglthc Agency covery mechanisms
for procuring thc property. New systems are
being designed and produced by using TSD's covert
contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.
(F) Identity 65 Ten masked audio devices pur-
chased Irom TSD were installed in Identity 65
by thc FBI, Part of the equipment was install-
ed in November and December 1971, the remaining
equipment was installed 17 25 March 1972. Tests
made by a TSD officcr from a temporary FBI
listening post on 8 9 November 1972, proved that
the target cquipment no longer functioncd and was
believed discovered by the occupants.
(G) TSD has furnished cquipment items which constitule
an on-lhe-shelf capability to engage in photo and
audio survcillance opcrations Ihieh might not be
known to thc Agency: In onc case it is known that a
relatively unsophisticated device
was used against
a domcstic target:
1 2 -
0022,2
SECRET
==================================================
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S E C R E *
TSD/SDB Memo #138-73
8 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief TSD
ATTENTION : Executive fficer
SUBJECT : Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations
1 In December 1968 July 1969 ana December 1970 , SDB
provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for
selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police
aepartments _ The training was given at the Fairfax County
police pistol and rifle range Authorization for the train-
ing cane from DDP and Chief Office 6f Security.
2 On occasion during the past few years _ under the
auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
the Department of Justice ana with the approval Qf CI Staff
and Office of Securityt SDB provided training ana familiari-
zation to police officers of scveral domestic police
departments in the uses Of the Explosives Residue Detection
Technique ana Trace Hetals Detection Techniquc. These tech-
niques had been aeclassified ana are currently available to
the law enforcement community_ The National Bomb Data Center
puBlishes periodic guidance
in their uses_
3 _ In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities
in the fiela of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB offi-
cers have in the past t1o years visited under appropriate
covers , the explosives disposal units Of the Ne York City
police department _
1
Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept and the
Los Angeles Police Dept Also, in March 1973
1' two SDB offi-
cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference
in Sacramento , California sponsorea by LEAA When the
recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972
1 our liaison
with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that Tve had complete in-
formation on letter bomb construction in hours , enabling the
Agency to make worldwide dissemination Within a
Is/ Identity 120
c[Tsb/ops/3 cSEGRET
00223
EZ IMPTET/CL BY 052931
May
6
aay.
==================================================
Page 148
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4 CE2321
ORD- 2328-73
9 HAY 1973
MENORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for science and
Technology
SUBJECT Survey of ORD for Non -
Atao = RepezteanSuzrel?g
cnce Activities
The 7 May survey has been repeated and rcfined
with respect to all(ORD servicesJor dcalings with
other agencics on domestic, non-forcign matters _ In
addition this report covcrs a11 our activitics deal-
4
ing bith thc rescarch and dcvclopmcnt of intelligence
equipmcnt for foreign uSC which has been testcd in
thc Unitcd States and might have collcctcd domcstic
information Again each ncnbcr oflORD availabIc
today F2s asked cither dircctly
or Through his super-
visor to providc the abovc requestcd infornation,
Ivhe thcr he was dircctly involved or not_ I#e have
used al1 diligcncc to search our rccords available
to uS during this tine pcriod to ensure this is a
complete and factual list.
2in Sayre
Ad s 8ns _
Director of Research & Development
Attachments:
1 Contacts with Other
Government Agcncies
2 Domestic Tests
'CL_ss#: ?3Y
3723
EX 1 ?
37
26
{fe)
2ezv47
' 7" Li 4"2J1 (ualas
Sii"t:
8 SEEBET
0023
Jf1lb
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Page 149
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CONTACTS IITH ER U,S . GOVERWENT AGEICZES JAHICH
4
COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA- DETELOPED
TECHNOLOGY In ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
Executive Office of the_President
ORD represents DD/S&T on the RGD Sub-Committee
of the Cabinet Conmittee for International Narcotics
Control that is conccrned With esearch support of
the narcotics control problem _
(Dr _ Leonard Lastcr, OST) (Cianci/LS)
Office of Telecommunications_Policy
Technical surveillance countermeasures and
physical security infornation
was exchanged with
then _
(Noe[TA)
Bureau of Narcotics and_Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
Techniqucs and equipment for navigation and
tracking
wa$ discussed' with BNDD .
(Mr _ Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dcrerker/TA)
(NoelTA)
Technical information wa s exchanged relating
to the development of s imple portablc sensor systems
for the detection 0f
conccaled
bulk narcotics and
narcotic laboratory effluents _
(Mr . John Gunn and (Parker/DSP)
Mr . Bill Butler
9
BNDD)
Audio tapes were processed to improve their
intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.
(Mr . Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Scott/An)
00229
SEGRET
ATTACHAIENT '1
Iftte)
==================================================
Page 150
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SECRET
SUBJECT : Con ts With Other U,S. Govcl ment Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
BNDD (cont' &)
[ BNDD W2s given 'permission in the fall of 1972
to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc. concerning
a Radar People Dctector developed for: ORD
(Mr . Charles Gaskin, BNDD) Identity 125 /LS)
A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed
for thc detection of narcotics for application in
Southeast Asia _ BNDD 1as
given
a demonstration of
thc ins trument
(Dr _ Laster/Ost) (Terek/LS)
(Mr _ Stan Sobel, BNDD}
USIB Tcchnical Surveillance Countermcasures Comnittee
Continuing contacts were maintaincd with the
intclligence comnunity regarding tcchnical surveillancc
countcrneasurs and physical security _ This cxchange
of information rcports and cquipncnt has becn con -
ductcd under
thc iuspices
of USIB 'TSCC and involvcs
State, FBI 'Secret Service, Army , AF , and
Navy .
(Noe/TA)
(Noyes/ PD)
State Department
Two contracts for development 0f counterncasures
techniques were funded jointly with the State Department .
(NoeTA)
2
002,23
SECREZ
?te
JYte)
NSA , DIA,
==================================================
Page 151
==================================================
SEGET,
SUBJECT : Contacts With Other U.S. Governnent Agcncies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problens
Atomic_EneIgY Commission (ABC)
Some of the AEC Laboratorics, e , g . Savannah
River Laboratory , are supported by CIA to develop
radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and
devices . These Laboratorics have used sanpling
techniqucs developed for CIA to mcasurc CONUS nuclcar
plant releases _
(Mr . Bs Benson , AEC) (Walker/DSP)
At the rcquest of AEC Security Officcr, Mr _ Richard
Cowan the wa lls of thc officc of the Chairman of the
AEC (then Mr Schlesinger) Icre X-rayed _ The operation
occurred 0n€ evcning and was an attempt to resolve some
anomalies creatcd by thc use 0f the non-lincar junction
detcctor_
(Mt . . Richard Cowan, AEC) (Noyes / PD)
Law Enforccnent Assistance Agency (LEA)
Reports and information about thc ORD-devclopcd
Adhesivc Restraint, Non - Lethal Incapacitation System
were made available to Dcpartnent of Justice LEAA in
August 1972 _ If they developed the sys:en
it would
be used for civilian crowd and riot
controi_
(Mr _ Les Schubin
1
LBAA) Identity 125 ILs)
Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical
security infcrmation were exchanged with LEAA _
(Noe/TA)
3
00231
SEGETL
==================================================
Page 152
==================================================
SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S, Government Agencies
#hich Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
DevclopedJTechnology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
Ireasury
Dr _ Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Departnent
to a5sist in formulating their RaD program and organization
in anticipation of thc establishment of thc ncw drug
cnforcenent administration The request for his services
was made by Idlcntity 3 the Agency' s Narcotics Coordi-
nator Identity 3 discussed' the request and cleared the
detaiiing through
Mr , Colby.
(Leahy/LS)
Customs[Treasury Department
Tcchnical discussions Ive rc hcld with Customs relating
to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over
the' U.S,-Mexico border
(Mr , Martin Pera , Customs) (Lawrencc/DSP)
Alcohol 6 Tobacco Tax Div/IRS
CAbout five
Years 2g0, assistance Ias requested in
domestic search of "moonsh:ne" stills using CIA infrared
2
scanners. This #as turned down _
(Lawrence/DSP)
Secret Service
We have had nunerous discussions with the Secret
Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques
and equipnent.
(Van Dewerker/TA)
00232
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Page 153
==================================================
SUBJECT : Con ts Kith Other U.S. Gove Inent Agencies
Ihich. Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Donestic
Problems
Federal Aviation Agency (FA4)
The results of our rcsearch work in thc detection
of metals (NOLIR) were reported to FAA for possible use
in the detection of hijacker weapons
(MacAnlis/RP)
National Institute of Heaith (NIH)
At the request ofLORD } OCS assigned a staff technician
to undcrtake to write a
conputer Progran for thc Wisswesscr
Line Notation (WLN) chenical notation method. This Iork Ias
done in coopcration with NIH_
(Ms _ Coniver
)
NIH) Identity 125 /LS)
Arms Control and Disarnanent Agency (ACDA)
Us/ORDlnct_frequently with ACDA personnel in ordcr
to structure (ORD S)BIK / Cl; research programs to support
S&
ACDA needs
Identity 125 /LS)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Technical information relating to detection of
radio nuclides in the environnent Ia s exchanged with
them_
(Mr _ Charles Weaver , EPA) (Walker [DSP)
00233
SZEZET .
SYQ
==================================================
Page 154
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SST.ET
SUBJECT: Contacts Kith Othcr U.S . Goverrent Ag
Mhich Could or Havc Resulted In Use of
{Efies
Developcd Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems"
EPA (cont d)
Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning
equipment to dctect underground fircs in a sanitary land
fill have bcen conducted
(Mr . Gene James, EPA) (Risinger/DSP)
Fedcral Bureau of Invcstigetion
At their request , We described Imagery Enhancencnt
techniques gcrnane to r cmoving distortions from some
photography they had on an alleged bank robber _ Requcst
for spccific support in proccssing thc inagery was turned
down _
(Stephan/IPA)
Sccrct_Service
FBI
0S, Customs
Mr _ C.V_ Noycs' total contact with othcr agencies
in terms 0f assistance with donestic operations has be 3n
in the field of audio survcillance counterncasures , anti-
hijacking, 01 drugs _
(Mr _ Robert Burnell SS) (Noyes /2D)
(Mr _ Thomas Allen, FBI)
(Mr : Martin Pera, Custons)
NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)
We have an on-going Program, Projcct TAMPER to
develop autoated systems for exploiting satcllite-borne
multispectral sensors for eatth resources assessments
(Mr ; #illiam Ruble, USDA ) (Galinaitis/IPA)
(Mr _ Lconard ' Jaffc
)
NASA)
(General Snart)
0023.2
Cn Cz?" X
==================================================
Page 155
==================================================
SUBJECT: Contacts Jith Other U.S. Government Agencies
Ihich Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
Proposed Use of NASA ERTS_Satellite (Agency association
would be SECRET)
Uhc Agency
is prepating a proposal for an experi-
mental Program to aid in estineting the Soviet whcat
crop. A part 0f the- information kould be obtained frOm @
a satellite launched for other announced prograns Ground-
truth da ta Will be collected on North American crops_
(Briglia{PAS)
U,S. Departnent of Agriculture and Burcau of Narcotics
and Zawgerous DIugs
CIA has requested the establishnent of a two-acre
of opiun poppies at a USDA rescarch sitc in Washington
state to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opiun
poppies_
(Mr _ Quentin Joncs USDA) (Lawrence/DSP)
(Mr _ Fred Garficld BNDD) (Cianci[LS)
Army Military Police_Agcncy, Ft: Gordon
Air Forcc Orficc 0i tFc Tspector 6C227al
Orficc 0i Provost FaraTT Gcweral
Ie have exchanged technical surveillance countcz-
measures and physical security information with then _
(Noe/TA)
U,S
Rocky Hountain Arsenal Newport_Army Ammtnition
Toc Ic oranancc Wepot
LS/ORD tcsted environmental samples from testing,
storage and production facilities in thc U.S.
Identity 125/LS)
00235
SCET
JFK:
J
plot
Armx
Army
Plant>
Jfk
==================================================
Page 156
==================================================
SUBJECT: Contrcts Iith Other U.S. Govennnent Agencies
Ihich Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Address Domes tic
Problens
U.S, Army Edgewood Arsenal
ULs/oRDJis sharing
cxpenses with EA in field testing
an IR remote detector of Cl aerosols
Identity 125 /LS)
U.S . Navy
BSD/ ORDJturned over about eight trained dolphins
to the Navy in Decenber 1969
)
because we discontinucd
our dolphin program
(Lynch/LS)
U,S, Coast Guard
About six Years 2g0 CIA infrarcd equipnent
was
made availablc for USCG tests to evaluate IR 25 a means
St
for night search of life boats
(then- Lt. James McIntosh, USCG) (Lawrence/DSP)
Identity 174 Sheriff' s Qffice
LoRD conducted
polygraph tests on
all applicants. S0
Polygraph security findings Tere compared with the
Sheriffi s Olvn security findings_
(Sheriff) Identity 125 /LS)
A study
was made on con-#en techniques and assess-
ment methods in 1967-68 .
(Sheriff) Identity 125 /1S)
8 00235
'SEBZET
ing
pe
Ixxte
==================================================
Page 157
==================================================
SUBJECT: Contacts Hith Other U.S , Governmcnt Agencies
Ihich Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic,
Problcms
'Chief San Francisco_Police
For security reasons , the 'Chief was made awvare of
2 study to evaluate attcmpts non- Chiense to penetrate
Chinese social groups (1967)
(Police Chief) Identity i25/LS)
'SRET 08237
Lby
==================================================
Page 158
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DOMESTIC TESTS FOR
AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
1 As a normal part of ORD ' s efforts in the
research and developrent of equipnent 2nd techniques
for Agency applications in foreign irtelligence
#e
conduct experinents and tests in the United States_
Clearly , the design and dcveloprent 0f ouT intelli
gence cquipncnts can be Gone more cconorica and
more securely in this country _ Although nost of
the tests of our RGd equipmcnts atc pefforned in
closed laboratories or in secure arcas simulating
the foreign environment sone of the tests and experi-
ments, of necessity, reveal donestic information _
2 . A revicw of the surveillance equipnent or techniques which have at sone time or other been
exposed to domestic testing is as follows;
a Laser Probc About 1967 . the laser
probe dcveloped by ORD Tas tcsted by TSD in
San Francisco undcr vcry closely controlled
conditions Thc ORD Projcct Officcr litnessed
portions of thc test Rccordings that #cre
made of laser probc output #ere carcfully
controllcd 25 classified matcrial and it is
believed that thc tapes have long since becn
destroyed_ (#ood /TA)
b; Microlave Intercept System About
1968 this systCH kas Fes :ed in a light air-
craft ncar the Naval Ordnance Test Station
in Identity 127:_ California_ This systen is
designcd to pernit interccpt of microlave
telephone communicacion channels of systems
such a5 Identity 130 It
works cquelly Jcl1 against the Bcll
Telephone
TD- 2 as they are gencrically the sane Re
~ coraings
of these telephone interccpts were
carefuily controlled and were dcstroyed several
Years ag0 ,
ATTACHMIEVT 2 SEBZET
03238
JfKceg)
1ly
==================================================
Page 159
==================================================
SUBJECT: Dome tic Tests for Agency Research and
Development Efforts
C, Tclephone Intrusion_Study The objec-
tive of this current progran 1S to
develop
a
means to utilize foreign telephone systens as
a communication link kithout the knowledge of
the host systcm. In order to carry out this
objective it is necessary to learn the com -
plete supervisory signalling and sequencing
control systcm hicrarchy for tne various forcign
telcphone systens Nany of these arc patterned
after the U,S. systcm and for this reason
limited monitoring to test the
operation o
intercept equipnent' in the United States is
Planncd, The data to be collccted kould be
merely the signal tones frOm which supervisory
codes can bc cxtracted Messagc content is
of no interest and will not be recordcd Over-
scas testing is planned at a subscquent date _
To date_
9
some domcstic testing 0f this conccpt
has becn carricd out at thc contractor' s plant.
No recordings have becn madc of such data Ex -
tremcly brief tests cxcrcising U.S . and forcign
telephone systcms through supervisory tone
nalling have been carticd out to verify initial
conccpts The duration of testing
Jas less
than one-half hour
d ; Other Sensor Tcsting Examples of
enginecring dcveTopnent tests of special sensors
within tle Unitcdl States include infrared and
high-altitude photography , forward- looking IR
(FLIR) flights laser scanncrs
J
industrial efflu-
ent sampling for isotopcs
)
and airborne mnagne -
tomcter surveys for metal (rifles and trucks)
In a11 these cascs the data output "of such
testing has becn used for engineering develop-
ment and the content has been restricted to
disscmination to those in Government involved
with thc engineerinlg design .
2
SEGRET
00230
sig-
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Page 160
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SiBJECT: Dome ic Tests for Agency Res ch and
Devd Ipment Efforts
e Remote_Physiological Measurements
An ORD-deveTopea cryogenic
magnctonetcr 15
being tested at a contractor S site for use
as a remotc cardiograph (magnctocardiograph)
Some test subjects are
Witting, but most tests
are on. naive subjects (they do not know they
are bcing tested) The magnctoneter is com -
plctely harnless to thc subject and the test
results are closely hela
f. Personality Structure of De fectors
Study ORD undertoqF to cctcrmine tie Pcr -
sona ity structure of defcctors during the
period 1966-69 _ The work prinarily involved
an analysis of thc open litcraturc on kn Ol;n
defcctors _ An ` ancillary effort Ias concerned
with 2
study of the phcnoncnon of defcction
itself i,e lcaving
onc rcligion for another,
or changing one set of Political beliefs for
anothcr The kork was conductcd at Stanford
Univcrsity. Identity 125 /LS)
g < Traincd Birds Birds havc bcen trained
and tested 141 che United States to carry smla11
intelligencc collecting packagcs such as audio
surveillancc deviccs sma11 camcras and cur-
rent ncasuring devices _ Any data collectcd
from unwitting iomestic sourccs would have been
used only for engineering purposes and then
destroyed.
ha Comnunications Link Loading In
the period from 1970 througu 1972 various means
were used to check out an intercept system designed
to operate against Iden 93 communications links
Under care fuily controlled conditions somie U. S,
microwave connunications' Iere recorded and passed
through thc intercept systen under test to prove
quality of performance A11 intercept naterial
conncctcd with this kas destroyed #ithin a few Reeks
0f the time of intercept and the material Ias never
chcckea for substantive contcnt . NSA participatcd
and controlled most elcments of the U. S . material:
3
SECHET 00243
63
study
==================================================
Page 161
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SZT
| ORD-2274-73_
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
SUBJECT Survey 0f ORD for Non-Foreign
Intelligence Activities
At 11 a , m =
today , each division and staff chief
or his representative was instructed to query all of
his people and rcport back by this afternoon whether
or not they had provided any services or dealt with
any other agencies on
domcstic, non-foreign matters .
The . attached list is an
inventory of a11 items we
were ab le to uncover . If additional information on
any of these topics is desired,
Ie can provide either
a verbal or a Written report on Very short notice.
(C/02m3-n+
Charles E McGinnis:
Scientific Advisor
to
Director of Research & Development
Attachmcnt:
As stated
CLaSsI;3 :y
3272323,
Dsi
Sc037*
: S::''
"0)
Al
3yax2 + 2zEnz+_
(eake: I.;0;1% #0 i4x 01 eraa()
00241
JUB)
Jfoa
==================================================
Page 162
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Project TAMPER ,
an on-going program which may be
Lpolitically sensitive _
A Proposed OER Iheat estimate program which' may be
politically sensitive .
Narcotics--our foreign activities are . well knOwn Catsosifs_"
A negative report from the Support Staff_
ORD ' s NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about
Lthree ycars ag0 . No action Ias taken, to our
knowledge_
Robert Scott Perforncd intelligibility enhancement
of audio tapes for BNDD . Source of tapes unknown
James M . Stcphan At the request of FBI , ke described
Imagery Enhanccment Techniqucs germane to renoving
distortions fron some photography they had 0n an
allcgcd bank robber _ Request for spccific support
in processing the imagery #as turned down
SEGZET
00243
JfK
3
==================================================
Page 163
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7 197
C V NOYES
total contact With other agencies in terms of assistance
with domestic operations has been in the field of audio sur-
veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking,
or
drugs _ Speci-
fically, I participated in TSCC and RGD Subcommittee meetings
which includcd technology exchanges and some equipment ex-
changes on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial
I also assisted in X-raying the office walls of the Chairnan
0f thc AEC (then Xr _ Schlesinger) at thc requcst of Mr Richard
Coian 0f AEC Sccurity. The operation occurred one evening
(datc unkn oln) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies
crcatcd by the use of the nonlineat junction detector.
Other persons contactcd over the Years havc been :
Mr . Robert Burnett, Sccret Service
Mr ; Martin U . S, Customs
Mr . Marvin Beasley , DASA
Mr . Thomas . Allen, FBI
Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF
Major John Langager , ONI /USN
Mr . Richard Cowan , AEC
'SECBET
00241
May
My
Pera,
==================================================
Page 164
==================================================
Thomas P Noe
5/7/73
1 Continuing contacts with intelligence community:
regaraing technical surveillance countermeasures and
physical security. UThis is an exchange of information and
reports ana has been conducted under the auspices of the
USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community_
State Navy
Air Force 5 US Secret Service
Army NSA
DIA
FBI
2 Joint` funding of two contracts with State Depart-
ment (TRN /LLL) Two electret microphones were furnished
to State Department for test purposes _ Joint funding 0f
one contract with NSA '(Sandia) Participation in DNA /DOD
contract (Bureau of Standards)
3 Other DOD and Governnient contacts for information
collection or exchange
ARPA
LEAA/Dept. of Justice
DNA /DOD
Office Telecommunications Bolicy
Office of Army/Provost Marshal General
Army/Military Police Agency , Ft_ Gordon
Air Force/office of the Inspector General
Air Force/Electronic Systems Division
S6.T 0024-1
only .
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Page 165
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1973
LSJoRD CO.ZACTS NITH DO:ZSTIC COUNCIL ACEICIES
1_ BNDA(Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive
proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Reder People Detector
developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action wes epproved by
D/ORD _
2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the
Navy . Tine : Decezber 1969
3. Developed Adhesive Restraint , Non-lethel Incapacitetion System_
Reports end inforration wes mlede evailable to Departnent of Justice_ LZAA
in August 1972: If they develored the systen, it would be used for
civilian crowd riot control:
0n243
SBEET
Mey
SfKe)
end
==================================================
Page 166
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2 9 HAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary CIA Management
Committee
SUBJECT Reported Identity 61 Burglary
1. Attachcd is a
report summarizing what we know about the
reportcd break-in of Identity 61, An investigalive report
by an ofliccr of thc Exccutive Protective Service slates that the
officcs were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.
2. The attached S ummary also describes a separate audio
operaliog conducled a gainst Identity 61 by the FBI, at the
LAgency'gbchest and with its technical
S upport. This prcsents a
Fclated qucslion that should be notcd. Jamcs McCord' s' tes - timony
indicalcs thal he placcd telephone: calls to the Identity 75 and Identity
61. He says hc picked the numbers at random, hoping
that if his phone was tappcd his atlorneys would be able to challcnge
thc eridcnce as
bcing taintcd. Anolhcr Witnes8, John Caulficld,
says McCord called thc tio namcd Iden 75 and Idcn 61 because he "was sure"
"were subjects of nalional security wirctaps. 11
3. In fact, therc has bcen a
long-standing tclcphone lap on lhe
Identity 75
ru by thc FBI, aboul whickCI Staff)clicves McCord
kncw. It is possible that he also had an inkling of somc sorl of operalion
agaknst Identity 61 and assumed that it was also a telcphonc
Onc must speculatc that he played for double insurance, hoping
that bolh his lclephones and Lhose of thc Iden 75 and Iden 61 werc tappcd, and
thal one way or another his case would be dismisscd or droppcd
because of taintcd evidence or to avoid revealing the scnsitive
operalions _ At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in,
and the leslimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations
may lead lo exposure of the operations _
Aly_
illian V Broe
Inspector Gcneral 00351
CL:_
Attachment:
As. Stated Above
I(:
Ki _
Le; 2
(L-8us 137J:.i:, "334,; c. oc E$&;_
Jfc
they
tap-
3)t
==================================================
Page 167
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24 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT Reported Burglary of the Identity 61
1. The press reportcd a burglary of Identity 61 13-14
1973_ An invcstigativc report by &n officer of the Executive
Protective Service states that thc offices were ransacked and a
number of personal items were stolen. There were sonc lalent
fingcrprints but no idlentilication was madea The FBI, which states
that the incidcnt was on 15 did not invcstigatc becausc it deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61
registcred a formal complaint and American regrcts were expressed,
Identity 61 making it clcar that suspected somelhing olhcr than
ordinary robbery. We have no additional iniormation on the subject.
There had bcen an carlicr intclligencc opcration against the Identity 61
which is dcscribed below.
Sxae
2. On 16 April 197]thc A gcncy)proposcd to thc FBI the instal-
ation of tcchnical covcrage 'of Idoutity 61 Thc opporlunily
for such an installalion camc about whcn a domestic asscl of Foreign
Resourccs Division reportcd thal he had bcen asked to subnit a bid
{or a conlracl to rcnovalc Identity 61 Upon sccuring the
contract thc assct Ivas
Iilling to augment his work forcc as appropriate
or install matcrial which would be provided him. The Agency proposed
to turn this asset over to thc FBI and to provide tcchnical and logislic
support. The value 0f such an opcration lo thc intelligence community
was Cited.
3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoovcr turned
down the Agcncy proposal. That same CIA Dircctor Richard Helms
sent a letter Lo Altorney-General Joln Mitchell requesting that the FBI
turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and
national intelligence nceds to collect positivc intelligence_ On 24 April
the Attorncy-General reversed the FBI decision &nd the Washington
Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operalion.
00352
CL :r8r
Gie_
L, I88f8 &c C( 68741
May
May ,
they
day
==================================================
Page 168
==================================================
4. During the period from 26 April to 18 all the
technical equipment from the Agency.to the FBI was delivered,
installed and tested. Everything seemed to be workirg. No Agency
personnel were involved: in any way with actual installation of
equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency tech-
nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair Work on occasions
of equipment failure in the FB listening post. On no occasion did
they enter Identity 61.
5 . The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 be
stopped on 3 February 1972 after 'FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
advised that: he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and
might have to advise them that the installatior in
Identity 61
was initiated adCIA 's)request. The operation and equipment; to the
best of the Agency's knowledge, was dornant until 8 Decembcr 1972
when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The
request &l this timc was occasioned by the knowledge that & Iden 76
delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions
on
nalionaliration 0f foreign holdings _ While thc FBI was still
in thc process of reactivating lhe cquipment, thc Dcpartment of
State on 20 Dcccmbcr 1972 requcsted the FBI to inslitutc all possible
covcragc of Identity 61 and on 22 Decembcr 1972 covcrage
was partially reinstituled With full coverage in effect by 26 December
1972 ,
6 A review of the take from the operation, wcighed against
the risks involved, lcd the Agency to conclyde that the activity was
not worth continuing. On 16 February 1978CIArcqucsted thc FBI
to discontinue the coverage: On 22 February 1973 thc FBI advised
that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued,
~/s0 Rulad
John C. Richards
2
9~
00353
May
==================================================
Page 169
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o TM
Addendum 4k
ferred to in JCRichards 24 73 memo to IG
$ Rreagwzees 2 re
Identity 6] Break-in
1 The Foreign Division assetfas Identity 77
0 Lt
who owned the Identity 78
u
The Agency had initially agreed
to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to S2500 . The final
amount of remuneration turned out to be $4, 828.53. Another FR
asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79 plumber and
elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972,
2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening
post were: Identity 80, Identity 30 and Identity 45
of TSD and Harold Lcith of Division D 0c253
(FS
O-Y
$i +
Y
kae
77
==================================================
Page 170
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S .E € R E T
ViI. Coordination,
A Internal
In dereloping its cadre of general: support assets
and access agents _
)
the FR Division maintains close contact
JFkck)
with thel Domestic Contact Servicelof the Directorate for
Intelligence _ using their assets wherever and whenever
possible to support FR 's opcrational activities _ To a
more linited degree, FR Bases maintain contacts kith Office
of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives ,
pursuing the occas ional leads surfeced by these officers
and using their entre to specific individueals who can
provide access to targcts of operational interest
B ; External
FR officers in the field maintain coordination with
their FBI counterparts , There is linited cooperation
with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving
Soviet and Bloc officials: and the local FB I offices are
of: occasional help in operations involving ther nationals _
The local field offices of thc FBI arc , made aware of the
presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on
occasion provided backstopping on cases. where there was,
some potential _
Coordination with the FBI of FR Division ' s agent
recruitnent activity is governed by an agrecment between
the Agency and the: FBI dated 7 February 1966 .
The Bascs also have contact with local Inmigration
end Naturalization Service offices although: these contacts
are less frequent and less inportant than the contacts
Ivith ~the FBI offices _
S E C R E T
0c.je
flap