Transcript of 124-10168-10040.pdf
==================================================
Page 1
==================================================
124-10168-10040] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY NNFORMATION
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NMBER: 124-10168-10040
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 62-116391-41X
DOCUMENT NNFORMATION
ORIGNNATOR: FBI
FROM: PAPICH, SAM
TQ: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE: 03/13/1970
PAGES: 85
SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGNNAL NEW Secret
CLASSIFICATION: CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 11/03/1998 UPDATE_DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact
RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (1)A)
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)
JFK Act 6 (1)C)
COMMENTS: EBF, INC ADMIN PAGES
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 1
==================================================
Page 2
==================================================
II) SKS (;()| EK:
ilemorandum er:%
Ezlease Qas
nade to
Rxtefeller Conmassdev
[(> Te Direetol VATe:
z/sk
CLASS . & EXT
2433837
REASON-FCIM II 4.2 3
XROM SA Samn Papich DATB 07 REVIEW 43[42
#z, 330
ALL INPORHATION CONTAIB@
CiA Idfs 0N 214 27
St Wc:|' RZI,T;O:S MITM CI4 HEREIN IS UNCLASSLFLED
Bohe;
WLy
seckz2i
Per
EXCEPT WHERE SHUWN Bacov x/76k0
OTHERWI SE
Rcfercnce is 2ie to mV letters' dated Marcli 2 aand
Narch 5 197C In Ey 1ctter 0f #arch 6 , 1970 , 1 stated "it
is impcrtaili: L0 cmphzsizo that the Buzcau czn also producc
an cxtensive list of justified sricvances_ Il is # under-
stendiws thzi th: Cireer: cesired tha: thig lis1 be identizicd:
Enclogec lici'c Fiih i: 8 1i.t cf #Pprorirziely 75 itezs.A
This list should not be considered absolutoly conplete.
Prcnaration WRs prcdicsicd 0n ry personal recollection cnel ?
rcview 0i Curcnu recor ;- 10 nake this list tore conplete 3i
speciiically {cciate Fowld nccc sitatc tho reviei of thous?nds
0f {iles. '4410 enclosea list can Ie supzorted by 8urC?u recpres.
Fixiei cin rceufd:; feiieci U: it8 S: ile is UIRJiO::ii '1is
als0 Rust ho kcvi in mina in comcetion with our cvrlunticn
0f the allered CI: s"evances mhici I previously listed.
I realizc that it is prcsuintuous on Jy pari, hut
if the Director fcels th:i our Curciiu Fork: can benefit by 3
person:l discunision betwecn the Director ana nyeelf, I a
available unti ipril 3 _ 1070. I plan to lcave ihc area
imgieeliately thcreafter for 311 extendcd period .
AC: JON:
REC: 8;i
63-,f7.50 - Y7
Gm #7 10#77; For inforantions "S^ hA5 N0 oBJeCtionvpl$ (
{0 ApR -1 08
Enclosure DECLASSIFICATION ANDiUR
RELEASE CF CIA INFORM:
LIr 1 Xr = Deloach
ur _
Sullivan.IN THIS QOCUMEN
1
XIr _ Pepich
SJP
Aeyang
(4)
Cla3lifies
3on @in
byu
Clue'tiod b
3ro5_Z Qecterony"Onf OADR "
@y)
Exempt (rom
Date of Decranetrication udlefinite
Zi-(i-18
xels:
{e 23
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 2
j02
#CLOSUIc_
seolce _
==================================================
Page 3
==================================================
Sltici
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFice OF TKE DIRECtoR:
k @@teveteo k,3 20 Narch 1970
p Velr
The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Fcderal Burezu cf Investigation RTfI
Weshington, D C. 5tt} StD/Gc _
Dear Mr . Hoover: (F)
4X8
We have completed cur review of domestic positive intelligence
collection engendered by your letter of 1l March 1970. We warmly
welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implemen-
tat1on 0i cne iy68 agreemell G1d cviiclllu4 Ui positit- {=t2lg2222
which Yo1 proposed. I concur also With your conments that there is
a need Ior close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and
counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, [ agree tkat it
i8 e8sential for tkis Agency, tcgether with your Bureau, to conduct a
continuing analysis 0f clandestine collection activity. The product is
0f growing irnportance to the national security and to the United States
Intelligence Cornmunity. Therefore we erdorse your proposal for a
reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be
conducted.
With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to
the then Director, Vice Admiral Willian F. Raborn, Jr, the compe-
tent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an
effective and realistic agreement. I welcorne your statement that no
major problems have been encountered Since its adoption.
I feel strorgly that there are other related subjects , of similar
2
8
importance to the national security, which warrant periodic reexzmina -
tion since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine_collestion
of positive intelligence- 8 8
MAY 6 1970
0
6ijj?
Excltt I:J wuomatic SECHET
6Rr3* 3 35J
tr:k;.ii:-'i:n
H 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 3
~ak8
Lc
REC
==================================================
Page 4
==================================================
OTVTtc#
As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe
that the following subjects are
deserying of your personal consideration:
8(1) Audio coverage: Audio eoverage provides timely
intelligence of inestimable worth to U.S. officials for
policy planning, early warning, and accurate guidance'
necessary for the improvement of operational and collec-
tion activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique
production because it:is readily subject to local cross-
checking and evaluation which is far m0re difficult and
costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on
targets which affect directly the national interests.
For several years your Bureau had been recep-
tive to requirements and leads which resulted in valuable
coverage.
The quality of your production proved that
jcur Burcau &lozc pocsesecz capzbiltzg ind cxpcriczcz
which cannot be duplicated by any other UaS, agency.
On 2 October 1969 iwo related requests for audio
coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to
positive intelligence targets, one of whon had KGB connec-
tions . (I refer to the case of and
Your Bureau replied that henceforth the
Agency should refer all such cases directly to the 'Attorney
General for approval.
It is suggested that the question of audio coverage
be_reopened between representatives of your Bureau and
this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observa -
tions on this subject.
I wish to assure You that I believe that this sensitive
type of collection should be implemented under rigid and
stringent controls_ This i8 absolutely necessary in order to
maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting
the coverage and for the exploitation of the product: (An
excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective
and secure
production ofECOPE:JG)
2
SECRET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 4
==================================================
Page 5
==================================================
SECRET
'"(2) Mail Covefage: Another much needed intelli-
gencc:tool is nail coverege: Its importance has been.
proven in the past: I have the impression that it has
Seen' dis continued, and I would suggest that our represen-
tatives should confer and examine together whether this
assct might be deployed against communications of the
{Soviet New Left, and identified foreign agents. Bloc la}
(3) CIA Technical Services: A
significant expendi-
ture of this ency' $ moncy and personnel has been com-
mitted to research and development for the improvement
of technical aids_ This Agency has provided -your Bureau
with an apprecietion of our resources and capabilities, and
has offered You at cost or gratis our most ticated
equipment:
EeaS )
Although We Will continue these services, we would welcome
any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the
technical field including proposals how these assets can be
betier employed. Your comments will be particularly
appreciated in view of Our mutual interests in implementing
Operation 3)
(4) Courses_in Positive Intelligence_Requirements and
Reporting:
Since the collection and reporting of positive
foreign intelligence a s
You say, only incidental to your
main internal security and counterintelligence responsibili-
ties , I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a dis -
advantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting
processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence_
At our' 1966 conference we offered to institute positive intel-
ligence training courses, including reports writing and
thia ~tn ceenikc 2a~rtb
tk tel ~ 3
CuMLaEw
SECRET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 5
As
sophis
i5,
Ar
==================================================
Page 6
==================================================
SECRET
analysis; for FBl personnel: In soliciting your views on
the: desirability Qf this type of training,: Iish to reiterate
our willingness to provide such instruction: It would be
designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community
in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting
List (CIRL) more meaningful to your personnel.
(5) Semiiiars on
Opposition Services: Given 'the
growing tication and increased capabilities of hostile
intelligence services, it is suggested that CLA and FBI
experts in this field meet as required at our respective
Headquarters; the Washington and New York Field Offices,
in order to keep abreast of new developments modus
eperandi, operational ta sks, and diverse missions of
opposition services I know that you will agree with me
that no opportunities for improvement should be over-
Jckw #inhmicht helz
4
nefate +he efforts of hostile
Bervices who are charged with undermining the 3e= curity
of the United States. These sessions should also provide
an opportunity explore and devise new means to pene -
trate and neutralize these inimical forces.
Live Bloc Sources: The record of our coopera-
tion and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defec-
tors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual
effort.
I believe that there is room for substantial improve-
ment in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation
of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these
sensitive sources- I would invite your thoughts on how we
may better coordinate requirements for these sources and
establish
a
more thorough evaluation of their positive
intelligence production before it is given general dissemina -
tion within the Government. Our review would suggest that
there are reasons for consultation to explore the
development of higher quality live sources, for example
code clerks:|)
SECRET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 6
sophis
t0-
to
good
==================================================
Page 7
==================================================
SECRET
(7) Live Sources in the_Nor_Bloc_Area: Sources
such asfcode clerkg hd diplomats
are a fertile field for
(procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the
activities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern
countries which are
expanding theii subversive and
terrorist activities, even to.the United States : I d0,not
feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited
the full potential of this field, and would urge that this
subject be explored by our respective representatives.
(8) New Left and Racial Matters. There i8 already
2
substantial exchange Of information in this field. Limi-
tations of manpower raise a
serious question &8-to whether
both agencies can
keep pace with future unpredictable
developments. The increasingly close connection between
these forces in the United States and hostile elements
abroad has been well established by both of our agencies.
I feel it would be in our rutual interest to determine how
wt EaI Desi tiwplov more wigely ouz Ziimiited iuhaipowcz,
kowing that this problenl, which embraces bombings,
hijacking, assassination; and the dereaning of law enforce-
ment officers , is international in scope.
(9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices_and Legal
Attaches. I do not feel that there are any serious conflicts
in this area but there may be room for improving the quality
of liaison in order to
expand positive intelligence collection:
Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic
re- examination of field relations could assist both agencies
to make mutually-agreed adjustments.
Mr . Hoover, I wish to as8ure you that I value highly your personal
judgrent in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your
experience is derived from a
unique lifetime of dedicated service to our
country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the
foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item
which you deem wor
thy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.
Faithfully yours,
JAUULll
Richard Helms
Director
5
SECHET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 7
==================================================
Page 8
==================================================
SECRET
CASzS AD / SITUATICNS
INVOLV;G CC LICTS {ITZ TE Wv
CEITTRAL IEZEULIGEGCZ AGZNCT (CI. )
KP
(1) KOCfSE (T' PORIS EQBBCS CLSE) .
This Bas 3 seumitive Sovict-espionage cace
which originatcd in 1943 and termicated for the most part ft 1957 The C238 lind many ide forcig: ranifi
cctions and historically hzs been_
}
and undcubtedly
mill be ,
} ope 0f the most inportant and involved cases of Soviet operzticrs in this courtry ard abroad _ Ie did not disscininate any iuformation of Significance
ip this czse until 1954 _ On virious occasions Fhen
the Lisizon AGen? has becone involved in heated argu-
ments with CIA officials_ they have geen fit to raise this ca8e as 3n
outstinding exanpic
of FBI failure to
cooperatc: with the AEczcy _ The position taken by CIA
Fes that it Should have been advised regarding the
Sovict operstiomal activity in foreign counltries
claining that the Agency Fould have bad thc opportunit;
to develop Zore inforration 0f significance idcntify
Soviet 'ts, and possibly preparo conditiojs for
recru_ tnC:€ or doubling of Soviet operatives. Te did
not dlsseminate Our: reports to CIA because of the
extrene sensiti:ity 0f the case We actually did not
pernit CIA to handle any iovestications relating
to
the KOCA SE unti} 1957 _
Io 1957 CIA conplained that it certainly had
every risnt to have reccived thc infornation carlier
because nzny aspccts Of thc 1CCAE portained to CIA
employees and opcraticns _ CIA further argued that it
had bccu steaily handicapped i0 effectivoly carrying out
the leads in 1957 because the leads mere given to the
Agency at the san0 tine that the case Fas publicized .
The Agency argucd-that the failure of the Bureau to
coordinate with CIA those Frecch aspects of the case
pcrnitted tkc French = rather than the U . to play 2 dominatirg tole in Europe.
Remtkolo Qelere (ek &8 --
Sl8 Sulocz _ SECRET
OG6)
(Jrx) ~he 4/1798
@h-
kiia
H 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 8
'l8
T;
S . ,
I8*6)
==================================================
Page 9
==================================================
SECRET
Hoi Diuch 'Information Cif has developed over
the ` Years concerning Oli:
operational activity in
Mexico City is uxknOln . However, we should
mind that* forimer: Special*Agent (George -Munra
{endiea
many of our operniicua in %czico, including key infor_
mants, end subsequently began' perforning services for
CIA after be left thc Eureau _ Me also shou la not
forget that Americans operating in Latin Americen
countrics for 0ne agency are hcavily exposed to the
resources Qf-another Se: intelligence Orxinvestigative:.
igency This Agent knoms fron persona l epericnce that
operating in these areas consiitutes 2 "very sial1 Ior ld"
and tle exposure to leeks and errors is considerable .
(3) TKE ABEL CASE
Althcugh CIA j1s no: raised the point for
sever?l years, the preveiling attitude vas, and probably
still ezists, that the FBI did not play it square withl
CI4 in tke 4bel 229 by not r2kfeg certoin tnet the
Agency TZS given the proper recoenition for it3 contrie
butions CIA fcels that in the first place there would
not hzve been any U . 3 iccess or
availebility to the
source in this c.se Reino Hayhanen , because CIA took
the full
rcsponSibeiity
for moving Iayhanen frcm France
ito the U . S in 1357 _ CIA cleims it took tne risk end'
responsibility of doing this after the Burczu declired
to become involved in anv operetion designed to transport
Hayhanen to the U. S, It should be noted that Hayhanen
was an alcoholic 2nd thet his first contacts, with CIA
in Paris rjised questions concerning Hayhanen'8 mental
Istability.
After Hayhcnen crrived in the U. wC
arrRnged access to. him for 2 period , the purpose of
which was to obtain 2 complete story of his intelli-
gence activitics in the U . S_ and we were particulerly
interested in identifying al1 of his associates, es_
pecially the Tan Iho later was identified 8S Rudolph
Abel_ ffter 2 short handling period in the U _ we
dropped Hayhanen because he beczine 2 problcm, It wzs
an cxtrencly critical situation because We had not yet
lidentified Abel_ CIA agrecd to take the responsibility
for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but Rc
SECRET
4 -
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 9
05
S. ,
S.,
==================================================
Page 10
==================================================
SECRET
countries Pith far better irpressions than in the
paat _ In acdition, we have lezrned more about these-
couatries
9
their scryices, and their securi chfefs
by Sperdig 4 fcv minutes mith them _ Meedless to:siy;
this krind 0r trentment_hs alua inneasurably helped
our Legal Attackes_
(7) (CIa @Urcr INTEREST In SOVICT ESPICMAGE ACTIVITY
Ip 1885 ,, the @utch Internal Security Serviceks)
Fas in process of investigating individuals in
0722EE7
had been engaged in Soviet-espionare
@ctivity _ The to heve
in the U, S _ interviewed and #pproached
Ged @igs_aduv_duals
make
inquiry at the At that time, our relatics
with the been practically nonezistent because
the @utckenad faiied to ioncstly with us in the
case of Doseph Petersen, 8 Dutch]
Nexlc3ii}
Fho hac bcen
clandestinely at the National
Security Agency.
SollGnc" @I frenrozcncd
uS, we told
(he Agenczeihat
the@utenould submit their request
{hrough diplowatic cherers_ Ye subsequcntly
638:416)
w@ would xot hndle the ewS for tke
stuck to our' positicn
@itosvzc
surrendered
"beRait
that
we were impairing their efforts to gather inforration
Iconcerning Soviet-espionage activities in Zurope_
(Malter G, Krivitsky, Bufile
L
100-11146}
(8) COEOREL JCIEGROMIBACH (PAT 0 'DEIEN)
Colonel Jobn Grombach was 0. retired U. S ,
Arwy officer M:o, during Tor ld War If, established a
private: intelligence network, operating throughout the
world but prianrily i0 Europe. His sources included
any number of Europcan exiles Rko came to thc U . S _
#hile he was in business, he was financed by the State
Departnent then tbc Departnent 0f the Lruy , and in the
later 1540 s aod into the 1950 's by CIA_ Grombach
established contact with the Bureau through on@ 0f
his subordinates, Pat 0 'Brlen, who periodically called
SECRET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 10
tY.
@utcesuaeba
==================================================
Page 11
==================================================
SECRE
A
on uS and furilshed" infcrration which Gronbach felt
Mas 0f intcrest i; This disscmiration througi
Pat 0 'Srien continued during the period 0f Grombach ' s
relationship' tith CfA; We: never inforned CIA that we
mere: rcceiving such infornation which 21s0_ WRs of
interest 80 tie Agency_ It is' possible %hat Grcinbach
had given the Sam3 detm to CIA ba : we do not Know, CIi
and Gronbach clashed and the relationship Was severed
in Zi} atmosphere of Severc bittcrness Ic the
ears:Qf.its .CeplingS-with Grenbech G1o:Agensy
KSked
succcssfully penetrated the latter 5 organizatzon aid
allegedly had identified meny of tne sources. CIA
hinted *o the Liaison Igent that it had become 2wrre
of the relationsh_ between Grombach 3 organization
and the Burezu Hcw Iiuchl CIA really learned about
this relationship is not known but if its penctrations
were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence
to justify 2 charge that the Buresu had mithheld infor-
mation from psrticulerly Then we: were receiving
the data fron an organieation Fil ich was financed by
t2 {20f1l2 82-77306)
(9) COMMISSION O3 TNz ORGANIZATICN Op TIE
EXECUTIVE ERANCI Or 2E2 GOVJNNENT
(Herbert Moover Commission 1954)
In October, 1954, {N task force 0f the captioned
Coimlssion initiated 3 survey 0f CIA S operations under
the Ieadership cF Gencral Wark XV _ Clark_ In January, 1955 ,
we were advised 2 represenltative of the tesk force
that Senator Jeseph UcCirthy had furnished the group 3
list of CIH cmployces Fho were ccnsidered subversive&
CIA becace cognizant of tiis developnent and there was
talk within: the Agency that the Durcau had furnished
the names to the 8enator_ When the Liaison Agent W2S
informally approeched 01? this, he flatly told the Agency
to officially subnit its chzrges. The Agency never did.
What infornaticn CId may have had on this matter 25 it
pertafned to the Bireau is not xnown It is possible that
the Ageney 5 attitude WzS
strictly predicated cn 3 knowledge
that Fe maintainled liaison with the Serator 5 Committee.
(Relations with CIA, Bufile
L
62-80750)
SECRET
8 3
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 11
ip
CIA :
AE2-45)
by
==================================================
Page 12
==================================================
SECRET
(10) INTERNAL SECTEITY LEADS_ IN FOREIGN: COUNTRIES
During' the 1956i&,
we
give our:" Legil Attaches
numerous Icads stemming frQn internal security cases in
the U;.S_ In many Instances we dia not See fit to
notify CIA althougil the fgency elways maintained that
you could not separat? "intornal Security" frOin "counter-
intelligenee 11 nanely 2 lcsd in France pertaining to {i
commtrrstyintmemU} jrriied:_ eadvistng CA; if'noty
@t least asking the Agency to handle the lend, In the
last sevcral yeera it is not believed that there is
any basis Icr ccmplaint since we have regularly been
notifying CIA ccncerning subjects 0f cases mho travel
abroad_ If the Legal ittoche is inveatigating, CIA is
notified in order to avoid duplicte efforts. There
have bzen exceptions where we have taken the position
that CIA should rot be rotified becsuse 0f the sensitivity
of tho matter . Kow mamy such exceptlons
@re kerown to
CIA canno t be esteblisbed from our files; however we
Siivuici ibi r i8 mifd 1lae : 52.04 Oui 16863 iiialildy {ifvtso
tigate they contict Zeny 0r the Skme foreigm Officials
norGiliy
conticced by CIA How many of these foreign
officials 2r2 CIA inioran or 0n the Agency payroll,
is unknowi _
(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS In CUBA
We operated informants in Cuba when ie had a
Legal Attache 8 Officc in Havrln: Informants reported
on activities of communists and other swbversives in
thet country. Durini the period wc operated these
informants we did not coordinate our operetions vith
CIA
Te did
not edvise the Agency that we had such
source3 K liorever in 1860 , #fter Castro ceme on the
scene , it becane
infeisibie
to handle certain inforzants
in 3 secure capner . was Eranted to turn certain
infornants over to Mnat these infornznts nay have
subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is
unknown . This item is bcing cited in the event CIA had
evidence to cstablish that we had been operationgl in
Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pu: zuant
to Directive: Memorancum Donahoe to Belront February 5 ,
1960 re; "Partido Socialista Popular , " 64-200-210 2377
and !enorzndum Frohbose to Welront, 3 ,
1980,
re:
IMNajcisco Tzuler 3eneficto
[g"+655931157"
SECRET
9
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 12
t3#
dapproval
==================================================
Page 13
==================================================
SECREZ
(12) BUREAU, OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL; 1959
In*1959' the ia S . 'Ambassador in "Brizii accused
our Leral attecbe 0f enfein ~in uucoordizated covert
intelligence activity "0f 3 nsture Which f balieve
excceds hi3 ter?s of rererenco. I The Amlasszdor Iwrther
indicated tbat CIA wes umieppy over the Lcgal Attacle' s
activities end the Ageucy allegedly had told the Ambassador
that- the.Legal#tterevhaddisscminated information: froi
3 source who TYas 2 fabricator or 2 provocator _ This
situation @rose &S 4 r8sult 0f the Attaches
operation 0f 1n2 inforwant in
%E,t2848F825
Sone of the
infornetion that he received fron €he informant
of 2 derosatory natur2 end releted to a
Grazilian
was 'being touted a5 a Presidential candidate_ CIA
asked for the identity cf the informent and Fe told
the Agency that the perzon coula not be idertified
beceuse ne cdid not Wish tnat his identity be disclosed .
This Cise 18 being cited because_CIA bave evidence
cila t We nd becn opersticral in not ccorti-
nated purouent to Dircctives, and the matter was
further %Ersvated because 0f the alleged unreliability
of the infornation_ (Hemorandum Roach_ to Belmont
Kay 1 , 1959 re: "Williem I Friedman, Legal Attache,
Rio d2 Janeiro 67-429340) and (Hemorantium Roach to
Belront, Hey 1959 re: "Soviet-Satellite Activities 554-[86429517
(13) BORDEIR]COVFCAGE
In June , 1957 O12' Phoeni: Office presented 2
problem concerning the Buresu'8 handling of informants
0n the Hexiczn border _
0
These informants were operating
insice Hexico. The problem Wzs predicated or situaticrs
wh ich mig t arise as the result of CIl '5 endeavors to
devclop informants Fho alreacy Rere being handled by the
Burezu_ It Rs poigted out that CIA logically could
come in contact with such sources and could make epproaches
for recruitment _ It w2s reconrended and approved that
in order to protect our coverage in tile border area, a
valuable, trusted and reliable confidential source wou ld
continue to be utilized even if he merc contaced by CIAS
Our policy was that we would not identify
our sources to
the Agei ~y .
SECRET
10
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 13
ajeio
0 u0s_
824z1A3)
==================================================
Page 14
==================================================
SECRET
HOw miicli' CIA lcerned about oir' border coverage
is not knoin Agiin it pointed ou t that forner
Bureau Ageut @eorge
iuigs4}
have been kmowledgeable_
As indicaked he -later began: performing services for
CIA If CIA learned that Te .Feie operatinf inforriants
in Koxico, it 'couid use such infortation 28' additiorl
evidence 0f Bureau failure to ccoperete xnd coordinie
with the Agency pursunnt t0 Directivcs, (Kemorandun
Roach to Belmcnt, June 14, 1957
9
re"Conmunist Covcrage
Along, 1882S36323462383 ~lezican Boz,der
"J_
Relatio4s itb CLA
(14) (CAPORT CASE Ja
Iq Hay , 1957 the Burcau's double Agertsin the
captioned cnse Eas
2avisedcby Gis
'Sqrerifontha } "that he
Rs to neeting in (witzerlang the period
Dune
iq-ilfkeue
1 question arse ~S to metherCIA
ShonT 4 he nforred concerning thaxonble Agent'
to Cw: tzerlanag)it 72; recoimended and approved
GEnY?3
We
not cdvige CIA
What is irportont is that CIA established
contact with ur double one point _ The Agency
nay bave_had further contact thout our knowlec e. The
Agensy may have also picked up the contact with the EovietjS
in (witzerland_SThe cese 1s being highlignted Since we
cannot exclud the possibility that the Agency
to demonstr: that 6e were operational@n
ECyohgf Eqidence
Ie
did not coortiinate wiih the Agency: (Memorendum Branican
to Belront , June 10 , 1957 , re; MCARPOET , 105-25453-18252]6)
(15) CIA REQUESTZ FOR b ZEAU LECTURE ON COXMUNISH IN TEE U, 8,
On Septenber 25 , 1958 _
}
CIA inquired if #, C,
Sullivan could give 3 lecture on the communist movement
in the U. S . It Was recomcnded that Sullivan give the
lecture _ Such lectures were being @fforded in other pzrts
0f thc Government_ The Dircctor iade the notation "He
cannot make Su lliven avRilablo t0 this outfita 0i The
Agency accepted this :5 an affront 2nd 2 blatant refusal
SECRET
11
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 14
Gl8588
==================================================
Page 15
==================================================
SECRE
to cooperate: on a most important: subject' 0f interest
to both.agercies. (Henorandu Sullivan to 'Belnont;
October 1, 1958 , re; "Zequest for Lecture on Corcmiunisin _
by.CIA,")
(16) CASE Or
On July 9, 1956 an official of the Atate
'Deptrtmtnt 'ecmfieantiaiiy atvised tre Bufeiu thatt
a CIA employce in }oscow , had been
involved in an 2fiai2 Tith 2 Soviet girlo According
to our souree , alleredly hed furnished information
to ttie { {viet Girl_ Me checked [ith the State Derartrent
end CIA end we confirmed that had been involved in
an affeir end that he had been recalled, According io
CIh &nd Siate Deprtrent , there M2S no indicetion tlat
hed bean involved in any espionage agcinst the
U; 3_ CIA gavc consideration to requesting the Buretu
to identify its scurce ced tlen changed_itc mind_
Whether CIA hs documented thiz 83 an instarce chere
the Burezu filed to cooperetc by not volunteering the
source is 2 ratter of conjecture but, it is 1 Cwae that
should be kept in nind. (Dufile
(17)THE OPZRATION
In April, 1963 we becam iavolved {ith CIA in
tiat Agency'& efforts to sensitive informtion
relaticg tofrench
Govcr cel}eite
cntions to conduct
espionage #gzinst the U. 82 CiA had access to a sensitive
sourca wizo in 2 position to make
available highly irportznt
@rehca 3cunantB?
On 11,
1963 CIA informed V5 tbat cur Legal Attache in
iricall
locaily
cortacted CIA coucerning this Gitter CIA Hc:d~
quarters was highly disturbed because its office in @aris7s)
had not been cit in on this operstion #nd the Agency winted
to be informed regarding the nature and the ertent of cur
dissemination of CIA inforration to our Legal Attache. Me
12
SECRET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 15
==================================================
Page 16
==================================================
SECRET
that' thc Lcgal Attackehzd nadc inquiries in" Geaijezed
responsg to" Icias #iieh 'had Vren *sent frori-Burcitr
Headquarters. Tnis mattel is being hiGhlighted because
it #25 4 vitnlly important operation to CIA and: tha ngeney
had receivedl indications thal t infornaticn had been leakcd
to (reieh Me :iave no evidence: or resson to
befieve thet
arthoc Lics s
the fttache Office ever involved itself
in &Dy such Jeak . Hoizever , we should ngt , under any cir-
curstcnccs, the fict that CIAQes penetrated
Ereuch
Sesvid8s3336
haghcd 'ccesa +o Scnsitive infermation
T Coris ) The Lrencr ive alijaya had 2n outetanding cap~
ability of tapping pmones &nd instelling microprones in
@arisJS)Such coverego on U, S officials, including their
residences shoula never be excluded. The information We
had conveyed to our Attaehe possibly mnay have been
acquired by the
creucis}-ctga
clandestine coverage CIA
possibly could Charge us vith handling their sengitive
informaticn in 21 im2ocwr0 manner by trangnittin it to
@ariqgh thont conferrirg with the, Agency .
Ie connectien 7j th nllegedGrench espionage
activity in the U a S& , CIA has never Teen stisfied with
the efforic made by the Bureau , Tle Agency possibly couid
take the position thzt Fe looked lightly &t the allcgetions
ana did wot pureue 8 I} 'er which in tneir eyes merited
2 more aggressive approi.eh , (Bufile
For some tire , CIA has .held a
position that
the French Intelligence Service
(bezasje_? pesctietedt
by
the BovietsKhe Agency has pointed out that if theGrench]6)
ar2 Zollectinz sensitive in the . U , the
product is ending UP inMoccow
[OEfoF Sfic"
Jantery = 1964
revieied the status of our" invcstigaticn 0f
@ercqeGtel-
ligence activities in the U, S, The Director conented
"I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the Qert
of .CIA Mhich nzs becn played 25 2 sucker
I would waste no more tize on it at least until 211 CIA
restrictions are removcd. 00 . CIA dia impose restrictions
by not Pormitting uS to pursue certain lcads becguse it
feared that its sensitive sourcc woula be jeopardized,
(Bufile
13
SECRET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 16
S. ,
by
==================================================
Page 17
==================================================
SECRE/
from CIA_
0
@e did not obtain cleerance from CIA for
the inclusion ofthis inforntion in our ronograph
Clezrance #pproval Ras not obtaired becsuse of the
urgency 0f tle @ccuaent CIA Was irritoted because
1 considered our #ctfon 1 'distifct Violition of the
third gency: rule. Tne Jgeney never made any protest_
(21) BUZAU INFCWNTS INGu4t2)AJs)
In '1966,amd 1967 "Ize ' #ere operiting inforinants
in Guatcmala %S)A t thle inception of our
opcrationel 2C"
tivity CIA was not informed In one c#se, we finelly
were ab1e to effect the nocesvary arrapgerents With CIA
whereby the Bureau wouze be peziltted to run the infornant
in Gvaiemala ]S)In the secona instance we established #11
#greenent With CIA in October
2 Fe could coil e
tiue handling 2n inforrcnt in
Co6tcntly ieh"
the under-
standing that the Bureau Agen t , on the
8cCic3i8-
0f each
visit, vould ccnfer withGie local CZA offica politicel
inforneticn collected from te inforant_ These two cascs
had al1 the %aking? 0f 2 conflict. Ci wils under ine
definite impression inat we haa been rurning these
inforuarts before we had 'c4ic341g @ocEdinitcd & with them .
It iw true that @he CIA ema lal much
incensed but no issue Tizs made at CEA Headquarters' anc
themttcr Mas to rest.
CIA may _ nave concrete evidence that
we were operating 1n
Y@udeeol?}esec?iGr
in. mind that in
2 placo such as Guatcnala
Citysit Vouid not be difficult
for &
'CIA intelligence ogficer to spot an F3I Agent in
contact With @uatemalansJG)0ur Dotetial vuluercbility 1s
that te wcre opertinz 12 Guaterela] tbout coordinatina
wi th CIA
(22)
The information emznating fron the caption:
sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA
and other agencies foi sevcral years: The sensitive
suurce has traveled abroad nunerous times 2nd his trips
15
SECRET
H 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 17
put
==================================================
Page 18
==================================================
SECREt
(25) ESTABLISHIENT OF DUREAU` LIAISON WITH
MDUTCI IXTZRNAL SZCURITY SERVICK 1980
S@cliuageol 1960 , our Legal Attache.
9
Bonn ,
traveled to the purpose of arrange-
ments for lijison with appropriate
@etctelcitE;
uthorities_ The
U, S Ambassador raised questions pointiug out over
the ycars 2 11 relations Vith theDutchl Zuthoritie3
been
handied
through CIAJ He indfeated that befora there
Was any change ib procedure, it would be necessary for
CIL and FBI to come to 3ome form of *02 afreement Allen
Dulles subsequently expressed dlesppointnent Ln that bis
Agency had not been contected by the Bureau prior to
exploring the lfaison arrangcment . We. eventually conferred
with CIA ana came to an agreement satisfactory to 211
parties concerned ,
Agein , CIA could cite this as &m instance where
we failed to coordinate Rith the Agency iu line with
Nationar-Security Council nirectiwes (Homnrndun #rohhose
to Belnion t , Berchh 3 , 1980
; re: "Legal Attache Operations
Norwey , 1 cnnark, Sweden, end the Retherlanae, 0 66-18973-123)
In the latter part of 1959 Re gave ccnsideration to
establishing 2 Legal Attache in Copeniagen, _ Denmark . The
purpose 0f the assigrent was to follow Burezu leeds i4}
Dennafk , Norma: , Sweden , aEd Holland . We did mot inform
CIA of olr intentions (Henorandum Frohboze to Belzont,
January 14, 1960 , re: "Lezal Attache Operations, The
10 Netherlands, 86-18973-113}
(26) BUREAU DIFSEMINATION OF COUNTZRINTELLIGENCE
INYORMTION TO FORZICH SERVICES 1862
By letter dated November 1962 , CIA raised
questiong concerning the' propriety of Burzu dissemination
of aounterintelligence infornation to foreigu intelligence
services _ CIA, at tha:t tire, had particular reference to @reolsGiolligeoce Ehich our Legal Attache had transmitted to the
Greei Service concerning- KGB operations _ CIA
Fook the position that_ pursuant to the coordinating
17
SECREL
H 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 18
the tthaa
7 ,
==================================================
Page 19
==================================================
SECREL
Directive, the Burcau MzS obligated to coordinate mith
CIA prior to such disscwiwation The particular data
had eranated from cne 0f our sensitive sowces
We resr: {ded to CIA- by statinz tit the
inforzation w2s tne product `0f.3n internal security
operation and did not rciate to any operatioual activity
abroad CIA agJin surrendcred The Igency could argue
tlat it Was for following Soviet matters
with the
YGrceg utoiblecce
Service aud that me bad an
obligation or coordirating with the Agency _ (Hemorandum
Branigen to Sullivan, Movember 9, 1962 , re;
(27) "THZ INVISIBLI GONERNMENT "4 BCOK AUTHORZD BY
DAVIB MISZ AND_TEQ A3 ROSS
In Ausust, 1963 , #e received infornation indi-
cating that Wise #id Ross were in the: proces; of gathering
material for 4 book pertaining: to activitics of U. S .
int?llicenc2 Acipithe?
2
Poth Roc _ and Mise contrcted
the Bure:u It Mas recozcnded that Iiqison orally edvise
CIA that these two individuals Fere prepering 2 book come
cerning U , 8. intelligeres agercies _ The Director: noied
11 "I see DO reason doing So
It is not known if CIA was aware Qf the contact
with the Burcau Wise and Ross subsequently published the
book shich contained extrenlely derogatory infornation
concerning CIA (Hemorandu Jones to DeLoach, ro: "David
0i Wise of the "NeW York--Heraid Tribune" and Thomas Ross 0f
the "Chicago Sun Tines"')
(28) . CQiWNIST_ACTIVITIES
5 AFRICA
In April, 1560 CIA ioquired if the Bureau would
give any consideraticn to ac8isting the Agency toward
developing coverefe iu Africa_ CIA was lcoking for the
serviccs of any Negro inforwant who might be available .
The Agency aIso inquired about placing a Negro in the
Communist Party, USA , under 2 plan Rhich wowld have a3
an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to
18
SECREL
H 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 19
==================================================
Page 20
==================================================
SECREJ
In the sane month, CIA inquired if the Bureau
woiild recstoblish t eciinical surveillarcc coverake on
who CIA felt was a key figure in tho
tjusmitf 140# scientsfic dati:toithe
@"telligerce #ervicc_
cota}jceacci
declined to reinstitute
the: coverage CI: considered the matter important because
0f its relationship to the(ideast Crisis .JS)
On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future
requcsts from CIA for technical surveillance coverage
shonld be transmitted by the Agency directly to the
Attorney General_
CIA bas never made any official conment or
protest but it has considered the aforo-meiltioned acticn
by the. Bureau 2S unfriendly 20d uncooperative_ The Agency
has lcoked to the Bur?wu as the logical point 0f contact 2nd
8s the only orginization h3ving the regources and capebilities
of adequately detormining if such coverage_ 18 even feasible.
{22} #ZCIEECCC ItS
Htan
The Liaison Agcnt recalls fragnents of oth
situations
or conflicts which occured over the years e0d
which resulted in the voicingcf CIA diwpleasure OI criticism,
The Agcnt canuot recall the names of the cases which is
necessary to acquire the required datm. There Was one
instance carly in the 1950 1 5 Fhich involved information
received: frcm 2 source of unknown reliability charging
Allen Dulles with having been 3 cCruni:t and 2 spy mhile
in Europc - We disseninated tbe information to several
agencies _ Dulles exploded but never lodged 2 protcst.
The Agent also has recollection of instances when
CIA .alleged that itS source 01: informant Fas corpromised by
Bureau revelation ,0f CIL information during the ccurse of
interviems conducted by US . Techuically, this Fould be a
violation of the third agency rule if CIA had hard
core facts Fe mould be vulnerable, particularly 18 an
important inforwant mas lost. CIA never made any official
issue or protest.
24
SECRET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 20
and,
==================================================
Page 21
==================================================
SECRET
LIST' 0f Bi:?l CRITFM:CZS
ATTiCs ~CINST EURFAU ('EEICO CITY 4XD TRAMCF 1951)
Altk:ou;h i7cnt Fepich did not bcrin handling Linicon
with Ci: Util 1652,. it is inportant to cfcr to hicnly sifii-
Iiciule diffcrcnecs Fith C14 #hich culuinated in 3 sericus
conflic in tac: Fail of 1951 Our Leral #ttccles in Zezico City
and P:ris reported #2t CIA representatives Ferc attacking thhe
Burcau mcra endeavoring io jiace us in an unfavorable light,
wer e qucstiorin? 0u1' juricdiction_ amd were na.ing disparaging
remarks coilcerning the Fureau Scre of this waS sunwcd #p by
charcterisin; it aS covert hostility Rithin CII , stemning
largcly from disgruntled iorner cmployees of the FBI _
In October 1951 Genernl Walter Beddil Scith then
Directar of CIA asked to mect with thc Dircctor anc} otner
Bureau rcpresentatives foz the purpose of discussing the
exicting differences_ Gcner?l Swith donied that there En3 any
covcrt hnostilitv ~meinst thve Bure:u and mnaintaincd that thcre
was 71 gerc :} fc2ling 0 { resncct Kor WS He adzittcd that
there m2d been isclated irstanc: of friction for which CIA
must accept itE share 0f rcspoasibility
It 1s my recollection that tho Director and other
Buresu officiais did mect #ith Ceneral Smith at mhich tice
guidelincs were sct forth for ncintaining future relotions
between tile tio ifencics. I #zs not able to {intl 2 mcmoraen
of record covering tlis meeting.
2 PROSELTT:C GW EU?3iU PER:OYZL BY CIA
The Agent clcarly recalls that carly in the 1950-s
Te encourtere:i iifficultic: #ith CiA becauge thc Agercy allcedly
was rccruitins Burezu~ciployed personncl Ne vigorously pro-
tested and subsequcntly a0 Acency adviscd that it would follow
a policy 0f "ot having 0"7 contact with 2 Burcnu employee Util
the inlividupl had been sejzrated fr'om thc Cure?u {or 2 period
of at lenst tiirty drys_ The Acent could not locate the bzck-
grourd 0f this matter in the filcs reviewed by him. It is PoS-
sible that the pertinent informtion lies in the pcrsonnel filc
of somc formcr Burezu isent .
SECRET Siss Sclcc _
(~R) zhlg 25X0(6)
3orS;MU_:
Ke khx
62-&6
H 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 21
Inlv
7504784
==================================================
Page 22
==================================================
7 , CA,E OF POLIZI SEAMEN DEZCTORS
S
1954
By iatter "dited Octobtr 13, 1954,
a very stror letter
protcst_ ws sent to General '(' J Bctts of the Intcre Sency
De fectop 'Commttee *t*CIA: Tlra lattep Eidj -efcremce
to
tical #sylua which wis being consicered for ccrt in Polish'
sailors Mho lad been seized the Chinese Nationslist Governrent ,
General Betts disscineted 2 menorandum indiczting that members
of the Comittec nad agrced that in viewy of cOzinitments made
by the Unitcd States "nd Chinese officials that feilure to
arrarge reeen for thc Polish seasen
Fouia
have am adverse
effeet on the over-i1i United States Defector Program, We
emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been
officielly presented before the Defector Cosnlttee- He was
inforned that his #ction Wz2 not conducive to iutuel cooperation,
8 , CIA INTERVIET OF ALIENS IN TIE UNITED STATZS
30
DISCUSSION
MITH ALLEN DJILES 3EPTENBZR 27 _ 1955
On September 27 , 1955, the Liniccr Agent met Fiith
Allen Dulles, at Which time the CIA Director 'S attention was
referrti to 22 meiter ;hich ;2d not yet @eveloped into 2 serious
situation but 1f not propcrly followed conla lead to corflicts
between the two agencics_ Dulles wes referred to the contacts
of aliens in tne United States nede by CIA pcrsonnel without
first obtaining the necessary clesrnce fron the Bureau The
requirement for such clezrence 1s clear-cut 2nd pursuent to an
established agreement (62-80750 ; #erorandum Roach to Belmont
Septenber 28 , 1955 , "Relations with CIA")
9 . CIA APPROACH OF A NATIGNAL ACADEKY GRADUATE (1955)
In November , 1855,
211 incident arose when_CIA appreach
2' National Acadeny rradute to utilize his ccrvicestin Guatemala
Thig epproach Ies mace while the graduate FaS attenaing Natiomal
Acadeiny clesses_ A protest W?8 made to key CIA officials for
not having advised uS prior to establishing contect with the
Academy graduete. (xe:
10 .
In December , 1955 we receivcal information 1.dicating
that CIA was in contact with an indivicual whom the Bureau Wa 5 developing ior utilization in # double agent operation _ We
learned that CIH representatives had established contact with
and had given him sone advice ind guidance withcut
first chccking with the Curcau _ Fe protested to CIA_
SECREL
3
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 22
SECRET
0f
poli
py
try
==================================================
Page 23
==================================================
SECRET
uS that he had been 2dvised hy
CIA officiai thit the FBf
would Be furriighifg-operetionnu uinencetochim: We had*never
become involved in {8hy Euch arranfement
2
and we later determined
that .: CIA-vfrierobhu- beer:d]) ;
Cxlr #4#,Wulinp the,baves
described misrenresentatioil . We protcsicd tie CIA official's
hardling of this mitier (Re: Er
15_
On July 20 , 1353, we determine one
had been in centact Iith the
Zneilhii
Hilitery 4ttechexl
mashington D. C: #e further aEcertaiped that 5R8
CIA employce Me were inforned by CIA 0m
July 21, 1960, that
the Agency had4o :sfcnaofe concerning reported
contacts withe the Czech later intervieved and
it Mas indieated that in fact, had been dEccGsiiii= i0 with
8 CEA official concerning his meetings with te tary
Wc prctested and CIf suomitted 2 ettai 0i wpolofy Atcmonc ky
Va Beluot to BoerGman July 21, 1956
407l )
16_
In July , 1956, 2 statement Wzs made by 2 state
Department official to the effect that 2 CIA Jereloged allegedly
hadi edvised that the subjject,% Soviet agent being per=
mitted to enter the United States sO thet his actfvities
cowld be covered and} So that tle Burezu would be i1 2 position
to promote 2 defection Thne Eurezu Was not in possession of
information indicating that we had sinctioned the entry
of the subject for_ the purpose described above _ 'The State
Department official ws unable to reenll the name of the CIA
employee involved; inguiry @i CIA TFie8 negative: We were not
in 3 position to identify tine CIf employee without conductilg
investigtion within the #gency or withoui the Agency coming
up with the identi (Fe: 4)
17 _
letter dated November 8 , 1956 , we strongly prO-
tested to CIA boreuse represcntztives of that Agency had inter-
viewed an #lien in the United States without first obtaining
clearance frOlm the Burewu It should be noted tnet there Was
a well-established 2/cewent: whereby it Wiis incumbent upon
CIA to first check Ii th the Burcau beiore interviewing any
#Jien 1n2 tie United States. (~etter to CIA November 8 , 1956 ,
SECRET
5
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 23
any
+y.
By
==================================================
Page 24
==================================================
SECRET
18 DARRZLL PATICK [ER
6 )
Gannc_as' & foriict' studcnt nt C61dmb1a UniverGity
with wham #e haa been in contact because 0f assocition
witlr "" @Eevcgteesicned xto
E21
Dacember
1,966; trip:te pe_ was contaceed py
an Unidentfii iAuividual ind w2s
letter Indiceting
that the mritcr Wes (a Coloncl in the
Site3y44
that he was
interested 171 cocpcrating Mith the United Statesa Fhen
Lannor]s)
returned to the United States, we pernitted CIA to interview
the subjeci bscause of the Agency 8 intelligence inter_
ests, We subsequently interviewed
GEcne-aet5
wkich time ho.
informed us that he badl been eautioned by CIA not to furish
pertinc: t information t0 the Bureau CIA denied that any such
statenent Ves m:de . (Ile: @errell Patricl: Ilemner Fs)
19 CIA REQUEET FOz INFCRMATION CONCERNING A MIGH-SPEZD CABERA -
1957
The San Francisco Office furnished information
indicnting that CIA had requested & firm in California to fur-
#ixh Lifi fbercy iiformaiiun redrdi" 41i fureie: ilquiries
perteinirg io 2 hignespeed C%ere manifactured by the conpeny .
The metter w2s reviewed becaus? we wzoted to be certain tat
CIA was,not inveding oui' jurigdictiona Ie did not develop
evidence tht CIA Jd overstepped its jurisdiction . The Director
did make 2 notation; "O.Ke
}
but it does seen to m8 we give CIA
2 pretty wice e"thority to explore such 3 fielde H"
(Menorandun Beluont to Boardman ipril 10, 1957 "Flow of
Intelligence Information to Soviets a1d Satellites through
8o-Called Channels" )
20 &
On . kay 28 1957 , CIA advised tbat one of its repre-
sentatives in the
field
hed interviered' the ceptioned
alien who had a8reed t0 cooperate with the Agency after he
returned to CIA conducted this inierview without
first obtaining clcarance froi _ the Bureau Such clearance WiS
necessary pursuent to en est blished agreement _ f vicorous_
protst Ias made to the Agency . (Re:
SECRET
~ 6
Jr7737
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 24
4
==================================================
Page 25
==================================================
SECRET
21. CIA REQUEST FCR TOUE ron CCLOXBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
REPRESENTATIVES
Vt
1957
July 1957, CIA requcsted a tcur for several
(Colombian
Su1:Jylyis]
Tho were coming to this country under CIA
CIA wrs told that no tours be Given to the @ojato; Cisbcri"EC
in thie past a (Colombi2n
ioustbesgic
dor had
grossly insulted th1e Burezu after we had arrested the
ambassado; 's chauffcur OIJ
White Siave Trafiic Act charge.
If Ge So desired, we could 'Give consideration to
accusing CIA 0f trying to impose upon Us individuals whon Re
congidered undecirable in light 0f the foreroing_
(WeroranGUn July 15 1957 , Rtosch to Belmont @'Representatives
of Colombian Intelligence Servicel ~ Request for Burezu Tour
by CIA") G
22 , REQUEST FOR SZCURITY SUVEY CF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
6)
RELATIONS 0 XEM YORK CITY
6
1957
On Novenber 1957 , our New York Office Ias ccr-
tacted by the local CIA representative who desired io be in-
formned if the Bureau could corcuct 2 security survey of the
premises of the Council on Forcigw Relations which_were located
across the street from 3 byilding occupied by therSoviet
United Nations Delegation]AThe CIA representative indicate'
that his visit t0 Oui office was purcuant to instructions
received frcm Allen Dulles was conecrned about:
the possibility of
thullovietg 3lisg38}l.n3
coverage of
conversatione and discuszions which might be held at the Council_
6
It should be noted that the Council included 25 rembers xany
wcll-known personalitics, including Officials 0f the United
States Gover ont-(SJcy'
Pursuant to instructiors
>
Allen Dullcs T29 informed
on Noverber 18 , 1957 that we did pot like the approach used
by CIA in that such 2 sensiiive matter had been taken up at
the field level rather tken through Bureau Headquarters
(Benorandum Roach to Belmcnt November 19 1957 , rc "Council
on Foreign Relations" 'CY)
SECRET
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 25
15,
==================================================
Page 26
==================================================
SECRET
23 _
In October 1957 we
reccived informition from
indicating thab2
Polish seientist
tren visiting in the United
(S)
States might delec Te followed develcpnenis through
and ie. kept. ClA 1dvised- The, Aganey was fully' awarc 0f the
situction and particular kncw tht we were in contact mith
T0 suhscquently received information indicating that
1 Ci: Clployee
8
establieked contact with
the qurpese ,0f developing information concerning the
worhlof Poliskseientists_ 4 protest was made to CIA for not
propcr ly coordinating their interests with uS, bearing in F'.d
that the action talen possibly cculd havc jecoperdized
2 Bur ezu operaticn . (Re:
24 _
By letter dated February 10 1958 ,
we directed 2
protest te CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the
subjecter : [omanian #lie, without lirst obtsining the nec5
cesary Cleerance from the Bureeu (Re;
25 _ ALLEGED IXPEREONATION OF FBI IMPLOYEE
On April 23 1953 we received information indicating
that 8 CIA employee
ailegediy
had represented herself 25 being
with thc F31 when she tried to arrange an intcrvicw Fi th
an officizl of thc Interrationel Association 0f
Machinists in Mashington
9
D_ C. DaE gave 2 signcd statement
in which he clained that he h2d received a phone call from a
Miss 02527737who said she wrs with the ZBI_ Upon checking with
CIA , #e were inforned that Higs denied thzt she nea madle
such representatic:n (Memorandum Roicn to Belmont April 25 ,
1958 , "Unknown Subject;
26 .
By letter dated Nay 12, 1958 the Bureau protested
to CIA for intervicving an alien in the Detroit ar6a mithout
first obtaining the necessery clcarance from thc Bureau _
Such elczraneo 939 neccssar} pursuant to cstablished agre ment,
(Re:
SECRET
8
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 26
1v
for (s)
by
==================================================
Page 27
==================================================
SECRET
30_ GENERAB REEALARD GEELEN ds)
The.Legl Attacbex: Bongs dvised,ky: letter deted
June 10 1953 tmat he hd beeh invited to visitGereral
Gehl-
cigtheshcud %5.
the esi-Geruian Intelligence
@eercs-henhard
beceme awar@ of this invftation, and an2 Agency representative
informed our Lesal Attacl:e that i: Wa8 not desiredl thai the
Legat visit witb Legat W35 instructed by the Bureau
to accept the
infthlfolepour Licst
of the CIA position
He could evelucte the CIA position in this matter aS
being uncooperative- (Hemorancun Roach to Delmont June 17,
1958,, "Relations with CIA")
31_ CIA INTEREST In ICIIINESZ ALTENS
In June 1958 , we raisd the question concerning
CIA S failure to adhexe to a2 agrecment relating to CIA 's (S)
recruitient ofl Chinese eliens in7 the United Stntes for over
58ap {#oTJiganac operntions- Wnder the ~0rcczent CIA Wa&
not to approaeh any Chinese elien withont first chccking with
uS. 1 situaticm developed iI} Illibois indicating tiat CIA
allesedly had bceone interested in recruiting an alien and
even took scne iction without first checking with uS, We
expressed our dlisapproval in 2 letter to CIA June 12 1958
(Memoxancu Belmont to Boarritan June 9 , 1958 "ccruitment
(S)
oflChinesg]Aliens in the Umited States for Overseas
Intelligence Operations')
32 . CIA OFFICIAL'8 CRIZICISH 02 "MASTERS ON DECIIT"
Our Legal Attache Tolyo
9
obtained 2 copy of 2 mewo-
randum sent to an official in olr Embassy in Tokyo by
Chief of tne CIA Offic? in Jepen E In his cormunication
Belittled the valuc of "xasterS O3 Dcceit"- as 2n anticonmunist
weapon in foreien countries. He claimed that the book Dertained
only to the Coanunist party , USA , which he characterized 2S 2
sma11 ineifcctive fidction-ridden orgenization He siated
that t 2 author of the bool was not an intellectual but rather
a policcman_ (Remorandum Iioaech to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958
2
"Hasters of Deceit.")
SECRET
10
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 27
==================================================
Page 28
==================================================
SECRET
33 _ CIA DEYELORNENT 0?? INDONZSIAN COVRENNENT SOURCES IN
E' UNITED*5H123
In.Hay,,*1958,, CIA furnibmed identifying and back-
ground dlste ecnccrning thrde indivicuals
Wir "Znd all cmpioyees or the
Inonesian Slovernent &nri aSnisned to the United States
hacpeen deveicped 23 2 source of infornation by CIA
in cne io CIi in Washington DS C ,
and volunteered lis Services: Jad been: developed &s
3 source CIA: #nd Jac been furnishing solne information to
the Agency _ Im 7 letter dated June 1853,
wa told CIA
that in the case oi we {elt that the Agency should
have notified us at an ecrlicz date in order that we could
have considered cxploitaticn for internal security
a t the outset. (Re: IndonesialActivities
D
"fo6-5647451S)
8
34_ MICHAL GQLCNIENSII AKA DR_ HZINAICM SCHUTZE
The suhic3: 2 fCr2s 23b23 c € th-B-l4= ~Sl-tcll-szzzc
Service, defectcd to the United Statcs and furnished extremely
veluable infornaticn The bezinni.gs of this cnse. include
infornation raising gucstions concerning CIA cooperation.
In June , 1953
2 we developed_inzorma indicating
that CIA Ney have opened 2 letter in
Biitcrsitigshindi
had
been adbessed to the Director an who had
identified hinself a9 Cr lein:ieh Schu
hadgseho
Thc further
indicated tht he mighz be connectcd mith the
Tbaljzi ertclitsonce
Service The letter addressed to the Director hed placed
in 34 envelope which in tuxm , hed ended in tnc office of
the United Statez Anbissedor intwitzerlandgSWe subsequently
receivedi 0 co}y of the particular ccumunication from Ci4,
anc thc contents were sucn 4t rhnat time that no action Wels
required ,by the Bur02u We asked Cii for particulars lending
to the allesed openin of the lettcr wich had been addressec
to thc Director. CIA clained that it had not opened the
letter_ Te Were informed by 2n Agency repre-
sentative that the
c kudcgzdosl_d'
opened the letter ana then
referred the matter to CIAC The contents were such that inves-
tigative action 0f an ertensive nature ias required by CIA
in Europe _ What actually happened a t the United States Embassy
is sonc thing we ray ncver know. {(Ziichal Goleniemski
T
65-65192)
Ke)
SECRET
11
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 28
by
24,
by
Scen
uP_
==================================================
Page 29
==================================================
SECRET
35
By letter dated June 26 we_oiced our
regarcinz;CJ 's- ayleged Xmtervic lcnesanljen Ahom.E1A
was considering #or over:eas rccruiiment - CI: denicd that {12
apprcach Qf.#he lign ,had becnwmnge Our;investiention cortr-
cieted thc sttcments emanating from :CTA _ (Re:
Burefi filc 154279)
36 . CO,PROWISK Cr FBI TBCMMCAL SURVSILLSWCE COVERAGE
(s)
on_ July *18, 1958;. CIA jequcsted the Burenu for
pernission t0 play 3 recording of a telephone" (Qversa tionks)
ohtined the Bm2*8r0 ta Mins Hussein 0f The @cc0538844
heen Enbdosg}ed througn 0u' Gonsitive coverage
8f the zxyntian Kashington , D C , On Jume 5 1958
wc had oht?ined the contents of {1 (convcrsation between Xahmoul
Rousan of the Jordanian Embassy and the Air Attacha Ts)
The conversation etrongly that @ouean & scrkin;
clogely Rith the CIf dcveloped
informxtion indicnting thit
Gousa3tyGstl
3 key figure in 2
revo plot, the cbjective of which Wzs to ovcrthrow
Yi:s K
6) 6)
Rousan retuneal t0
Cordaj ird
was imjrisoned by
Ring JShased mjo n infornition made available. throussh CIA. Ecus }eicoxaa
3my implicaticn in any revolutionary activity :nd
hc Was ly suported top offieials im the
Gorcanial}
"y8o4lr,epe;
@he
SanEoia
1d CI: ke Wa8 on the
spot {nd tht hc neered Droof
ingf
(owsan
g83tepir4
toiia]
activity_ CIA J9ked if #e woulcl pcrnit fne Gecording to bc
played to the Ki stressing that this Mas the only way @ing
Iussien could be convineed
On July 18 1958 ,
a CiA officil was advised that
the Durenu positiyely wonld not grant pcrmissioi} topiaying
Of thc
rccordinas)
IFe maintained that if we grentcd uch
permission our othercoverage of: 2 sensitive 1a turdkould
be seriously imperiled
On July 21 1958_ Allen Dulles asked jf the Pureau
would reconsider its position in view of the critical sitution
in Ithe Midah lc ZastC) Pursuant
t0 instruetions CIA Was then
tola tht in vicw of thc Position in which the Bnre?u had bcen
placed wC Jcceded to Dulles request. CIn was further told
that WC wer0 seriously considerin the (termination of 3 11 of
0uI' teciic?l survcillance37oecausc wc did not intend t0 bc
placed in sueh 3 position In the f#ture
On July 22 1258 Dulles told thc Liaison Aecnt
that hic #is very m !ch disturbed ovcr the Director 9 rcaetion
He stated that he was not interestcd in] holding a to1 to
SECRET
12
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 29
488 , ceG878)
Jordang)
Elyptige
Erzetfwgudicnted
16on32)
by
"3s)
pis
==================================================
Page 30
==================================================
SECRET
anybocy lcad and hc" further indj ted tiat 6a Was dciihei-
(
ating ~wnethr not theliceorrhing hox kd bc' useds 'It'Ws
recomrended that the Jiaison igen the matter for the
piirposc ot dotermining %f 'tnG Cccbrging 6e" iised HyCIA;
Tho Dircetor'$ notation Was The Tat is in the~fire now
ed i*.1.Wgeless 20 #stcyny morz tinc"on it. We Wfll
probibly of 0" dctils in /erson'9 coliun H _
The Strcls ponition we took in rcsisting the
disserination of such sensitive inforsation to 3 foreigi
governient Wi: fully justified (alemoandun Roach to : Zlc Jmont
dated July 22 1953 re "CIA fedjucst foi Permission t0
Technicnl Survcillcrce Recordin to King Hussiel, Jorden
37 CIA AILIGED PABTICIPAZION IN UEXICAn GOVERNAENT
DJPOn :Iow 0r AENICiY CC EUXISTS
(Yw"
In 1953 CIA officjally informed US that it Wes
engaged in. 2 procram dcsigmed t0 disrwpt overll communist
activity in Nexico We becnie ccncerncd because this prorren
Ias to involve dcportation of undlesirables, including American
ccmmunists residing iin Wexico The implerentation of sich 3
prosfe "olc inave 1c9iicd i0i iiie retiici 0i fiefidiim} cmiisis
to the Unitcd States CIA dlenicd that it Wa &, engaged in anv
opcration apecifically de;igned to cuat Aericen communists
In September 1958 we werc informed ihmt tle Wexican Covernment
had embarked on a strong anticommunist program and certain
Americ Ins were ordered deported We checked "ith CIf and tle
Agency S in Hexicc City clained that his Agency Wa5 not
involved
&Stu;
The Linison Ascnt subsequently was informed o1} 3
strictly confidential basis that the incrican Ambassador had
heen in) contact with certain Wexican officials concerning
possible anticomwist activities The Ambassador had consulted
with the Jocal CI: chief and had asked for a list of Americans
who could be ccnsidcredl 39 being deportable Thie CIA cfficer
rcportedly fwrnished 7 list of approxinately 40 names (#emo-
randun Roach to Be lnont Septenber 17 195& "iezal s
Office, Hexico City, Relationship with Embassy and CI:)
cf4)
38 .
Fc expressed Oi' displeasure to CIf
ifSentenber_
1958 ,xbecause of that Agency s_ Jun3"thorized investigation ir
the United States 0f tizen sho here in connec
tion With 2 n exchange
#ogni."Fh
Thoy
Gcnanho_yind CxEcd'
to an
ncric:n friend tht he Wa? interestcd .in stiying in #lc United
States,- bm wRs not rcady for actual defectiou because of {41
SECRET
13
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 30
foll9hs t,
NQ-
hen.
Eile)
==================================================
Page 31
==================================================
SECRET
to" notify tlc 'Dtircati ictter dated Septembcr IG 1959" wis
also;scnt t0 ahd e:was told that the:' Bui cat wrs
disappointed in hiiu because hc had failed to make awy objection
to' thc' ifticle and had "not aleited us coucerning 'the . impending
attack aginst the Burenu (Blemorandum Frohbose to Se lnont ,
August;_ .4959 "Allen Dullcs; Americn'5Global Sler locl ,
Ti e_ Ebgnzine, Septenbei'
9
1959 anc lemorandum. Frolboge to
Ee lmont , septenier 4 , 1959 "illen Dulles")
45 _ ACTIVITIZS OF CONTACTS DIVISION Oz CIA
D
1959
(5)@)
#e receivec information in Septennber, 1959 that
the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with Amcricsh
businossmen in thc Boston are dealt with meetings beticen
the businessmen "nd visi Govie
%igt eilt worteai;
Was inter-
ested in developing positive intell ence information dut it
SO happened one of the
Bovtctascs
invo lved in a double
agent operat
tousbeing
handled by the Bureau _ The Bureau already
had notified CIA of our interest in the Boviet:] By lotters
dcted September 29 , 1959 wC voiccd our' oljection to the miamer
in which CIA had nndled this _ (Re Burenu
file
46 . APPBAR: CE OF COLONEL FRLNAISEK TISLER BEFOKE THI
JOUS%' LOHMITTTEL ON UNAMERICAN ACIIVITTZS (HCUA )
t
1959
On Novenber 6 1959 information was received
indicating thzt ICUA was interested in obtaining Co Jonel Frintisek
'Tislel ? Czech defector, to testify before the Committee _ HCUA
adviscd us chat it had contacted the State Department who in
urm , had conferred with C14_ fllen Dulles allegedly informed
HCUA that Tislel Was agreeable to #ppearing bezore the Committee
and that he would be macie available pursuant to certain secvrity
instructious
The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority
to maife 2 dlefector availcble to 2 congressionnl conmittee without
first checking with othei interestec agencies The Directoi W"s
informcd that CIA did not hzve such authority because 3 Na ional
Security Council directive made it very clear that this coulcl not
be done without prccessing the mattcr through the Inter-Agency
Dcfcetor Connittee In this particular cese the aforementioned
Comittce had no t called 2 mecting, but thc chairnan , 3 CIA
officinl, had mace certain phonc c:lls 4 Bureau representative
was contacted by phone on November 6 , 1959
but & that time WC
had not formulated a posit:on _ Allen Dulles allegedly contaetccl
the ehirman of thc Comittee ana was to ld that thc Committec
hac #O cbjet:on ;o Iakin;; Tislcr ava ilablc
SECRET
17
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 31
27 ,
tinlg
==================================================
Page 32
==================================================
SECRET
On1- Noveilcr ~13;*1959,} Cl" rcpresentitives iVere`
informmed tlxtae:EorAoppofed t aking: %hc. defector: cwailablc
to ICUA 0n tht s212 da ie TC we1c told tiat CIA wa informin
HICUA it.wJs reverseng:ita posaton ajc that ~pon reConsideriti
it dic mot feel' thst Tislcr cou ltl : be made ivailable
By:*menora nckum datcd Novembcr: 14,"1959;` the dcvelop-
mcnts in} this iatiel Wc1'C reviewed and it wis recorinended tlat
a t the next Inton-Ascncy Dcfector Committee mecting we stronsl%
protest CIA's dereliction in thc haudling 0f thc HCUA requesi
(Buren file 10s-38808)
47 CRITICISH 'QP DinZCTOR
On April R1
Reiceo
Company Carscas Vcnczue
17888455
l: thc Bureu that h1c reccntly
Jela 2 conyersation 3n7 @fficial of the U:s:
Enbassy 1il Caracas
'3
wasia Ci4 cmploycgS)
DEE toolr excentsen
to complimentary statcments made hy concerning the Dirccror
anc thc FBI statcd tht th0 Dircctor should heve rctired
five years ag0 fO1 thc gooc of :11 concerned A protest wa: madc
io Allcn2 Dulles ow. April 20 , 1960 (Licmorendum Frohbosc to Be lnont ,
4p741 21, 1842, 45477127555363554875
74nrxant
48 _ CIA OFFICIAL AjLSGEDLY ADVCCATING
RECOGNi?IC 07 "3 CNIRA
G
JS60
Name Zesilled
Iw Fobruary _ 1S60,
3223 for the Richardson Foulation vo luteered infor? L ion
coneerni;b stotemcnts alleredly Wade 2 top
CIA official_ allegedly acivocated reognition oi Tcdl
China
'This matter was called to thc attention of All.
Dulles and 001 Rpril 1360 Duilcs infoied thc Linison At
that h8 jiocl conducted an inquiry, hed revicwed 7 tape recorlin;
of tal, ana1 Fas enlisfied that had not made (a'
statcment attributed to hin
The above _is being citcd in the event we cesir {a>
dispute the position takcn Dulles _ If the evidence c ]e' (
established thnt had madc such 2 statement , we couldl 1! *
th? infcimationn io suppori :} position that wc wouJd have fvoi!
warrantcd in heing most circumspeet with CI:. (Nemorandum
Frohbose to Bclnont , April 21, 196,0 ,
49 _ ALLZGZ INSTALLATICN OP MICRCPHONES OX U.S _
PREISKS ADRROAD) TY CTA
f1 state Denartent 1'€ prcsentative_ inforned tl www<8;
that a mi-rophone had bec" iound in the U.$ LenbDuiYes Hic % i '.'
that it had been planted CIA; and that A1len 3 / "
SECRET
18
L
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 32
03;
11,
by
20 ,
by
1.' Dy
==================================================
Page 33
==================================================
SECRET
had:mxintnined' that iF'cti Wis' to opeiato effcetively it mnd
to kow. what was going .Otl: 1u: U,8 establishunts Thc implieation
Wals leit that CI: XfaI;5 Jctivitics of other .U.S agencics
throuh teciie:}
ingtciycrion
#ionc_ Inquirics' cicveloped: infong
tion indicatiig the} 'CI: hag installed a inicrophonc in tho' Embassy
in 1952 it the. request 01 3 State Departmeut ofiicial The Office
0f-Sccurity im 'Stato Pepafteirt W2G contactecl" in aI' effort: to
this down in] 2 none speciiic "22er Fc wcr*C told state
that the ix" records (id not' comt?in any infore;tion conecrming
thc microphone
'Subsequeitly: 0 letter was %fagmitted.:to a11' Legel
'Attaches instructing ihc to be 0n the #Ielt for iechnical
instullations Fhich may nffect Ture:ii opertions, (Henorandum
L'Alli01 to Belmont , 2 , 1060
9
"installation of Hicrophones
0n . U.2. Premices fbrond by CI:")
50 _
Mexeceived informa iccting that thc subjeci
fornerKCuban ntclligcrc;
'EctiA
#h0 suhject of 4 Bureau
investipation had plannedio
dcfeciau,
New York City._e
324t*20 { Ci:rFrcec: :3 h sibjcct 17 ord:i
to orient hiin So that bximi 'propagauda effect woulc bc cierivcd
throu;:h "elaper Re were tolel that thc CIA 1'0pre_
aentativarin Xcw Yol:
5524
he:cil instructed by his headquarters
to tell tne subjcci that nle woulc not be prosecutccl by the Wa$ .
Goven nment _ We complaincd to CIA strcssing thst tle' Agency
hzd IJ0 powex' 01' cuthority to px'Qmise the suhject immuity _ (w)
(Kemorandum L'Allicl t0 Be lnont , Ecptember 1060 ,
51
liiss 2 CIA employee
}
obtained {1
positioil 38 ? accrctaiy in the Office 0i7thex Delesniion
to the Uxite Nntions. Prior t0 receiving this jol, 5If ehecked
with the Bure?u_ The Liaison Agcnt subscquently lenrned tht
haecl infornee_the that she WZs leaving her job
The incuired 13 #he could recomnend soncbocy e Jse
Ehc gaFC tice the n8NC 0f another CIA employee , miss
The Liaison Agent informed CIA that thc Ag ency Wis
out 0f linc by not first ehceking with the Jhureau beforc recom-
mending torthc > thet the Burcau Fals interestcd
in deve loping intelligence iniormtion which night be uscfu}
to the U.S _ Gevernen andl thiat in this instance CIA Was
olstruetin oper:tion; by not appropriately ccerdinating Wilh
thc Kurowu neus L'Allie1 L0 Cc Iuont , Octoler 1860 , I(}e
SECRET
19
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 33
pin by
%iay
'4i":
30 ,`
i;
91,-
==================================================
Page 34
==================================================
SECRET
52 . rCEN [Si: QF' TInEAU INFORMIATION IN:
4 U_8 INTLULLJGLNCE UOARV_CociET
On. Brch 30 1861, the Linison, 4gent contacted_
Alleh Dullcs' concermins. CL:' $ failwre to oktain) Bureau clearzice
for use; of oui' information in 2 V.$ . Intelligenee Boafd docunent
No; ~knowa; Uaia#e bp4_
"
een, done but tlie Acent sticgeod tle. sensiz
tivity 0f tlie Eurewti `inforeution fulics requcsted ohe; .of ni3
'suiordimtes t0 estollish 3 precedure to prevent 2 recurrence
0i such errors (`emorandm L"fllier to pe Jmont , Kerch 30 , 1961,
53 , "SPY IN 'FNZ U,s BOOx 1Ut} "TED BY PATT . NONAT
In' 1961 0u1" Chicago Office received galley
pronis of the book 'Spy i0 tho U. $ "1 written by Pawe 1 Monat .
A review of these proofs disclosed scvern l references which
portrayed Oli'
ccunterespionege cRpabilities in 2n2 unfavorable
light. Since CIA wis responsible ior Honat a m)d for &my riting
which h1e mixht per*or:, 'tli natter 1as discuesech with CI:. 1t
tuined ont tha t CIA had not bcen following the preparation of
the book We were told ihat stcps "ould be talen to protect
BWr?)m {ntenent: The punlishers hau indicnted to CIA that tney
Tould ccopernte 01 chanses A}thourh some chawges were made ,
the book still came ont with some information whieh was not
entirely favorable to tine Buredu_ (Pawel Honat , Bureau file
105-40510)
54 . CONFLICT, NITH LEGAL 4TTACE NEXICO CITYX 1961
On Oetober 1861 , oiir Legal Attache , @lexico Ci*y3 Gw
received information indicating lhat thedzech Embassy}in chat
city Ws nning- to protest noressmcnt of its personne1 by U.5
Intelligence 'The Lega 1 ittache ws told by thexiocal CIA officehlzu);
that the ene" 12s not involyed C1 October 12
}
J*51 the
Saine Cf^' offier changed lis Dosition and admitted Net
ZIA
had
been involved to 8 certain extent The Lijison Agent objected
to these tactics It wns injwortant to him to know the facts
So he could be guided accrrdingly _ (iicnoand-
(un'Allic:
to
Sullivaln Qctober 18 Cczechoslovakian Diplomatic
Activities Mezico
2851,
55 _ CIA TECEICAL SUV #ILLAXCK ACTIITY In THE UNITED STATES 19*1
When he defected in December , 1961
furmnished in: ration eoncernin; allered penetration of Ame1 i(ae
intelligenee _ Inquiries and rcvicw conducted by CIf within thxc
Ageney sWrested thai,a CIn intelligence officer
was Z loxical sispcci We conferrcd Wi it41 CIA an8 on1 February 9
1962 we' advised the Nsency tlwt We would takc' ove]' the investi
gation _ 2t SECRET
20
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 34
July,
(Ya)
6 ,
pla
==================================================
Page 35
==================================================
SECRET
~btniwvtions ycif scntyto the field:ana: we then learned im'-
KNcW York Cityl hat C1A allckedly planed to Inatke_ 2 reeruitment
appr oat ch Ti mattcr i2s takcn with' CIA headquarters and
7 protest ws #?do becao of.the wide discrepancy in thz
repOi'tS we received (1 Cfi intentions (Mcrorancu Brean to
Sullivan April 18, '1966
9
4)
67 . PisSinG OF BUREAD DOCUTNIS TO
SKNATOR 4o34n C- PYRD Sy CIA SPIOYZE
Ln
1366
in Sentembel'
}
1936 we deve loped imformetion indicating
that cepies 0f IBI ciocumcuts jad been pissed to; Senator Byrd by
CI: The mattcr WZs (iiscu2scd with the Directol 0f CiA 2n1d the
Agency subcquently conducicd TW investigetion ed estaulished
that one of its eaployce: hacd sumitced
2 name check renucsi to the 1w'onu corcelning one
who was the subject 0i the P?terial in gwestion At thnt iicu
had a responinility 0i handling mnnO cheek request: iox
C1A and in this connection , Wa$ 1n contact witli Cur Nane Chock
Section Ro aduitted ihnat ne instituted E . name cheek 0n a2 "off
thc cuif basis" fol' {woiher CI: ewployee 213 m e d
It 19 "y rerollentio" tWwt Om2-2r both CIA ecplcycee
Ier'@ subseqnently ffr0d 0}' askud to rcsign_ (Hemorandum
Brennzn to Sullivn Senterber 21 , J966 "leak; 0f PBI Documents
Concernitg, io Jcnntor Robert C. Byrd")
68 XALLEGEQ CCEEECAISE Cz BUREAU DQUBLE_AGIENT
KdYu)
In March 1967 Fe protested to CI4 ip
Wj #h a'matter ralutin to Oui' mutual interest 3
{cnnc:tijg
(chenis
connected with PCo
"pcgkioc5 Iew Terscy;
Fe were utilizin Ene chcmistl 8 adouble afent in 3n opertion
directed against tn? Sovie {6)CIA ac estillished 2 1elation-
ship Fith thbe swe pcrson 1o} the purpose of aoquiring
intelligence relating *0 ihe field 0i Ouiz
LEBCsf
Office received informtion indicating that 2 CIA officer
thorizntiol, compromised our' relationship Witllthe Ckch24t gl
discussing ihe matter with the president 0f the
i1'mn _ (Nenoraudue Sulliven to DeLoach , Harch 15 , 1967
69
In July 1967 I protested to CIA 1n2 2 case where
thc Ageney
allegcciy
Jrd fai)ed to rcport to us concerhing 2
communieation which # Cubzn exile residing in thic United States.
had: rcccitd {rOT1 the Cuhan Intelligence Scrvice 'Xhe partieular
comunicaltion hia" instrueied the exile to initiate preparation:
SECRET
25
HH 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 35
up
14