Transcript of 104-10431-10006.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== T 13ot18433oo08] aaaaa 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 laud ecudad: h Jexy SECRET /SENSITIVE "ce: Feb 4s 31 January 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secre of : Defense James R. Scnesfngefe SUBJECT Analysis of Soviet Policy towards the United States by an ex-Member 0f the KGB Severa] weeks ago I talked to Bill NeIson DDO _ regarding a more thoughtfu] use 0f. our Soviet KGB Source' s know] - edge of fundamental Soviet Bloc The information relates to the clandestine programs 0f the KGB sponsored by the Central Commi ttee in its reorientation in of 1959 against the United States as the "main enemy _ My suggestion was to submit a number of your speeches and solicit Source 5 critique as seen through the eyes of an ex-KGB offjcer_ Mr_ Nelson stated that he had no objection as Iong as there was a description 0f the Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily repre; sent the views of CIA I should add that the FBI and other serv- ices are on record to the effect that have never been able to disprove Source 5 factual information' although do not necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A) 2 . Attachment B sets forth the highlights ad chronology of his professional career in the KGB _ This aTone does not convey the true significance of.his defection to the Agency in December 1961 . From 1953 unti1 1961 various circumstances and events Ied to his disaffection with the system and hardened his determination to defect should his fami ly be reunited_ His concern was for his #Bi1l has taken sick Ieave for the next ten, and has not_054311_ seen this Ietter. SECRET /SENSITIVE ~mnpossible h Drtemie 03 034 Po] - icy. May they they days ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== SECRET /SENSITIVE 2 young daughter who Iived with her grandparents in Russias In 1961 she was permitted to visit Source and hjs wife abroad, and this triggered his defection _ OveraI1, the case is one where we unwittingly had an agent in place in the KGB who was breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB , both in the First.and in the Second Chief Directorate_ His purpose was to obtain information of great va]ue to the West should he have the opportunity to defect 3 By Way of special talents he is essentially an analyst and historian_ He was frequently called upon by senior members 0f the service to' study and make recommendations where there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one depart- ment_ In his drive to more know edge outside 'of his par- ticular sphere . he managed on one occasion to be appointed to the Inspector Genera1' s team which gave him access to the logs of KGB production indicating the overa]1 .espionage production obtained by the KGB _ The' investigation was initiated by the Politburo who: complained of the. delay in receiving the product derived from espionage, such as' British.Admiralty , Cables and Plans 9 NATO documents; etc. This gave . Source freedom to spect the processing Of secret information and to trace its hand] ing from 'the moment it arrived in MoSCOw, the translaion of the product and its preparation for: the Politburo. Unfortunately, the names of agents were not indicated, but it enabled Source, after his defection, to identify the actua] documents which were identified by Western services on the basis of his description. This in turn, Ied: to investigative action and important counter- inte ligence successes in the West. 4 . Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and security services under Our aegis_ He has imparted first-hand know Of major covert political programs from the days of LENIN to 1961, This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply into the archives and records 0f the activities 0f Soviet intelli- gence services beginning with the Revolution Equa] Iy important was his Iong tenure in the Higher Counterinte1 igence Schoo7 where he was able to milk,KGB officers from many departments of the Service abroad who Were brought back for short periods of retraining: 5 . Because the Administration the State Department and the Agency , in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their views the po]icy of Detente, I believe that a pre] imi-_ nary unofaicing teed?og & these materials by an expert in your Department might generate an interest in.the Source and his views. SECRET/SENSITIVE O0000-E1 ga in in- ledge ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET /SENS ITIVE 3 This couId Iead tc a symposium -in wh ich he would:be-invited: 'to participate and respond to adversary views _ His reaction to such a proposa] is unknown _ He has always_ resisted control in the sense %f being an agent of any given coun Further he does make demands for classified information and position papers including the nature of the sources before addressing himsel f to any particular problem; Nevertheless his paper on speeches were obtained from him using only unclassified information_ 6 His production has run into severa] thousands of pages of transcripts Of interviews including meetings which.he had with other: foreign . inte] igence and security services. The range 0f his inforation is So vast and detai led that we are hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet events _ We have learned fram experience that if we: give him a problem with an adequate data base, he Wil) computerize and re- arrange his basic information to support his analysis of" any new subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting his thesis, he often reveals new information of value 7_ Attachment C is a sens itive report received from our Israel i Iiaison; Attachment D is an assessment regarding .the activities, role, modus_operandi and reason for Ambassador DOBRYNIN"s success vis-a-vis the United States (which is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated) ; and Attachment E is a rough draft 0f. his review 0f the fol lowing books SOVIET . STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET:POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM A SOVIET VIEW submitted to uS during your tenure in the Agency by Mr Don Cotter We intend to follow up on this at some future date_ This 9 and other attachments 3 are partly drawn: from a draft manuscript which he has in his posses- sjon. The manuscript runs to over two . thousand pages . He guards it jealousIy and is reluctant to publish it at this time_ He has permitted Me to read severa] chapters, and they are: 0f unique interest because 0f .the classified information (based on documents) which :he read in Moscow _ 8. By way of digress ion, a bird' s eye view is set forth below of Source" S theme _ 9_ The major reorganization (which produced the KGB Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN suc- ceeded Genera] SEROV as the chairan 0f the KGB . (Genera1 SEROV who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head the GRU) This development climaxed two years of inspection by a SECRET /SENSITIVE try. your ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET /SENSITIVE 4 specia]- committee headed-by: SHELEPIN .Who worked under.the Central Commi ttee to investigate activities and policies of the KGB and GRU _ concluded that the Intel Iigence Services had not carried out deStalinization which required that the services fol ow the Leninist concepts of intelligence ,and its role in tical action _ By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was accompI ished by suppressing enemjes at home, mounting successful penetration operations into Western governments the manipulation of agents 0f influence and conducting massive disinformation pro- grams by feeding deception to :the West through their intell igence services . Under STALIN `the services degenerated into instruments of persona] terror to preserve his cult of personality &nd lost sight of the overal political,.economic and military objectives 0f the Soviets 10_ Before STALIN's death, there were anti-Stalinist ele- ments who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find a Leninist solution to post-war prob]ems continued after his death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into the KGB ad other police_organizations by enlisting the talents of the Leninist/Marxist Institute_ It was his objective to have the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the crimes of STALIN and the activities 0f .the ice state. The course which was set would have ultimately Ted to the trials of KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the Ieadership who were prominent It in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and boot- Tickers . 11_ MALENKOV was . unfortunately outmaneuverd by the co] Iec- tive which_voted against him on issues_ 9 particularly regarding Germany _ Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide Iet Ioose by MALENKOV; therefore in order to survive: he had to 0i stea]" the process of de-Staiinization and' shape it to his Own ends and the survival 0f himself and his friends _ This Ied eventua Iy to the "secret speech" regarding STALIN s crimes in which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his fo] lowers _ This Ied to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which frced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs which represented a return to LENIN_ 12_ In 1959 a secret, six-day series of meetings was held for Government bureaucrats possess a COMINT security clearance _ It was attended by approximately two thousand members from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand down and explain in Leninist terms the decisions the Central Commi ttee relating to the deStalinization 0f the intelli- gence services and to set forth pol icies which would result in their reorganization and reorientation. SECRET/SENSITIVE They poli po] - May ing of ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET /SENSITIVE 5 13. The principa] speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by Genera1 GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as wel 1 as many other senior officials 0f the Government and Services: SHELEPIN gave a broad analysis' of the world situation: stress ing that the USSR &nd the USA had reached an atomic stalemate _ Accepting this to be a fact, he stated that al1 plans for war such as stay- behind net-workers should be abandoned_ He out ined.programs and reforms for the Intel igence Services which were accomp] ished under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be in harness with 'al1 other departments: of the Government_ He: stressed that each intelligence operation should be des igned to help achieve broad politica] objectives_ Noting that the letter "Pi Politika) had: been 0b1iterated from OGPU by: STALIN= SHELEPIN announced the Creation of the Department of Disinformation wi thin the KGB but subject to the control and direction 0f the Centra1 Commi ttee_ The Department' s task was to use a/1 organs of Government to implement strategic disinformation in accordance with directives This was meant to include a11 channels to the West; namely diplomatic, press military, cultural and economic. This was in addition to the use 0f double agents and provocateurs_ 14. In discussing the various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded on the wisdom of pursuing peacefu] coexistence in the developed countries and wars 0f national iberation in the underdeveloped countries, noting that these courses of action were not contra- dictory. 15 . Shortly thereafter, the Central Committee charged the KGB with the recrui tment of two thousand additional S8T staff officers in order to exploit on a broad basis the opening to the West, The purpose for this increase was to gain Western` technol ogy as we11 as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents 0f: in- fluence in the Western scientific world. It should be noted that one 0f the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and GRU had a Iways been their successfu] acquisition 0f scientific secrets and R8D from the West_ SHELEPIN noted that the change of balance 0f mi Ij power could oly be achieved through this addi tiona] strength of acquiring the technologica] and S trategic secrets 0f the West. This would also strike at the USA and hasten its isolation 16 . According to the Source he learned in 1961 that the KGB had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that about one thousand slots rema ined to be filled. In 1961 he and some six hundred KGB officers attended an important Iecture given by a senior general of the Defense Ministry_ The Iecture was to outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake: SECRET/SENSITIVE tary ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET/SENSITIVE 6 He stressed that the objective of the.Soviet and the Bloc was not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the United States 'and swing the balance of mili- power to the Soviets_ 17 _ The genera7 stated that the USSR was fourteen years behind the United States in electronic technology but that the gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the following fields: a _ A greatIy increased espionage effort because 0f the addition 0f one thousand staff officers to the s&t of the: KGB and the Academy of Sciences; b Disinformation, i.e. programs to mis- Iead the United States and the West regarding Soviet technology which would Iead the Western scientific comunity into expens ive and time- was ting blind a] leys of R&d; C To acquire new technology through trade agreements; and d To make treaties and other diplomatic arrangements by: which the Soviets and.Bloc would acquire inforation and which would permit Soviet scientists to gain access to the United States scientific comun for the purpose of spotting potentials for the KGB 'and GRU Most important, he sajd, was that treaties could be used to block the natura] technological growth 0f the Western powers , in particular, the United States_ 18_ As noted above, the Iecture On shortcomings 0f Soviet technology in electronics was delivered in 1961 _ Attachment F is a National Intel igence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated 16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's inforation regarding the aforementioned Iecture_ The National Intel Iigence BuTletin begins with the fol lowing: "Leading officials %f the Soviet electronics indus have told visiting US experts that the Soviet Un ion is four or five years behind: the United States in integrated circuit techno]ogy. The US experts 3 who tested Soviet equipment in this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment . SECRET /SENS ITIVE tary ity try ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET/SENSITIVE Integrated circuits are needed to meet the size, weight, power, and reliability of modern military equipment as wel 1 as the needs of many .civil i1 eectronic systems_ Admittedly: the questio of electronics covers only oe phase of the tion 0f mi]itary power, and we have not been able to pursue this question of technology further; given our ever-shrinking assets_ 19_ Since my are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to dispatch these papers for analysis and comment by your expert before my time runs out_ 20_ As. previously noted, this package represents a : unique dis- semination, unofficia] in character_ It is requested that this exercise be tightly held and that We cons ider modalities for the future exploitation and/or discussions of the product and the Source_ We and our al 1ies regard Source to be the mos t valuable Soviet defector since World War IIS 21 _ At your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledge- ment of the above and a reaction from your reader_ In the event that these Papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would ap- preciate their return for the use of my successor Kindest persona] regards from, 7r Gatrt James Angteton _ Attachments: as stated SECRET /SENSITIVE ques 'days ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 13-00000 Us S.R Report_No-: 1*6444 Subject: MISCELLANEOUS INFCRMATIon Source: Born 1938 In RIGA, has an academic education and is a soclologist by profession. He acquired his academic tralning In Moscow and Baku _ In 1962 he worked for about six months with the M,V.D. In Baku and aftcr that; unti l 1963, he worked as a lecturer In ph i osophy In Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the University *of Moscow _ From: 1967 unti i December 1973 when he left thc U.S:S.R.. he worked In YarosIavl and In Baku . He was a member of the Sociology Asso- ciation of the: U.S.S,Ra From 1964 he was an active member of the CommunIst Party in Azerbaydzhan and was a member Of its Central Commi ttee . He was closely associated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhani Party _ He cooperated wi lingly and made the impress ion of , being a highly intelligent and educated man with analytical abi lity, good perception and excel lent nemory _ VaLidity of Informat Novenber 1973 Reliabtity: B/2-3 ion : ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 13-00000 18 US S.R Subject: THE U.S.S.R. AND CH INA On thls sub ject_ Source can report on the opinions of people Ike KIALIPOV , ALiYEV SUKHODEYEV CV |SHYANI (xosycin's son-in-Iaw) , OS IPOV and Polkovnlk-General BYCHENKO (FNU) (Commander of the P.V.0; In the BAKU Area) The fol loing is a gist of the main ideas : a The danger of war with Ch ina Is not taken seriously in official circles of the U.S.S.R. and particularly in mi|itary clrcles _ Ceneral KHALIPOV said more than once that common interests outweigh the di fferences betleen the two Communist countries The majority In those circles are of the opinion that the spreading of warnings about war with Ch ina is a deliberate of dls-information by the Soviet authorities in order to justify the keeping of a large mobf /zed force I+ was often sald that nei ther Ch ina nor the Soviet Union fear an attack by the other s de . Ch Ina needs anti-Sovlet propaganda for her Oln Internal purposes and the U.S.S.Ra, in order to keep 'mi | | Ions of mobi | Ized soldiers. b In those circles It Is thought that war with China is impossible for the 'fol lowing reasons : (1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons , It would.take a tremendous effort to destroy just the mi | Itary potential of China. KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 200. atomic bombs_ 'plece ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 13-00000 19 (2) War with Ch ina wou |d in fact be a war of mutual attritlon and even In the case of a formal Soviet victory and a change-over in Ch inese Ieadersh ip the U.S.S,R. witl be unab|e to feed the hungry masses of China_ According to GV | SHYANI _ there are a hundred mi | |on huncry people in China, and in the U.S.S.R. there Is not enouch food for the population. Sovfet victory wou Id thus doub {e the needs of the Sov iet Union In this respect and wou Id too great a strain on her economy 2. Fro Some conversations mainly with KIHIALIPOV Source concluded that I30 Sovlet Union is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than #ith ChIna; here are his. reasons : a The substitution of old weapons for nelv ones takes first and foremost in the western parts of the Soviet Unlon, and not on the border wi th China, except in the VLADI VOSTOK area, and this not be- cause I+ Is near to China, but, mainly , because i+ Is near to the U.S,A_ 6 'According to KHALIPOV two or three days wi// be enough for the Sov iet to conquer Iestern Europe and he elaborated: Eng land has about 920 tanks and 1 500 Planes; France about 900 tanks and about 500 planes; Cermany about 500 tanks and about IOOO Planes; Ai i this together Is but about a sixth of what the U.S.S,R, can put in the field against the Ilest within 2 or 3 days; and unti the West decides on counter-measures i+ wili be too late _ According to Source, who bases his opinion on his conversations with the /n pcop le, not only is the Soviet Union in_ no fear of a war with China, but 0 cven thinks China wii| ioin her in 7 anainc+ +^ bor+ put Place Army put WaF ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== 13-00000 6 US_S.R: Subject: ANDROPOV _ GRECHKO AND 'CRJMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLLTBURQ Many Soviet personal ities, close to Covernment circles, are of the opinlon that ANDROPOV CRECHKO' s and CROMY KO's inclusion in the Polit- buro should be examined agalnst the backgroun of two tendencles current within Soviet rul ing circles with regard to U.S.S.R. pollcy towards China and . the U.S.A. a_ A policy of detente with China Is supported , accord i ng to these persona| ities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN . These two think. that the Sovfet Union should strive for closer relations with China by adopting: a pol Icy towards the capital ist countries; a Policy of detente with the West weakens the Soviet position In the Internationa | Cammuni st Movement and at the same time strengthens the ideologi cal attitudes of Ch ina: b A poIey of detente with the West BREZHRIEV KoSYCIN, GROMYKO GRECHKO ANDROPOV and particularly KIRI LENKO on the other hand support a Icy of detente-with the West In general and wIth the U.S.A. In particular . This group_ stresses the' need for the modernization of Soviet production pro- cesses _ After thls vItal obJective Is achieved _ the U.S.S.R. should adopt an even tougher policy towards the Ilest than In the past_ 2 Thus the' merbersh ip .of the three In the Politburo Is des Igned to sgrengthen-BREZHNEV 's- pos ition. It should be remembered that these three a personal debt to BREZHNEV : it was BREZHRCV who made them what nOxl . i+ showId also be kept In mind that the membersh ip in the 'S, ~tough pol 049 they Cc ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== 13-00000 blltburo of the Minister of Har , the Head of the K.6,B. and of the Foreign wlaister _ has a special signi f icance; It Is an indication. that BREZHNEV is bsout to make most important decisions and necds the support of the Armed forces , the K.C.B. and of the Foreign Office _ me general opinion In circles of the intel ligentzia, and particularly in scientific circles, is that a war aga nst the West Is, being planned _ Iccording to this opinion, BREZHNEV 's admission of these three Ministers t the Politburo is a very unusua| act in the history of the Soviet Union . slai lar step was taken only once before, when `STALIN admitted VOROSHI LOV BOLoTov and BERIA to the Pol tburo about two months before the outbreak 0l war between the.U.S.S.R. and Germany _ ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== 13-00000 DEVELOPMENTAL AND RECRUITNCNT APPROACIES TO AMERICANS THE SOVIET SECURITY THREAT, IN THIE DETENTE PERIOD 1 The aura of detente in the Soviet and Bloc relations dur the last year and a half, we believe has created a favorab le clinate for recruitment and" penetration in the West. This papet deals with the prob lems as wve see then _ There are related counter- itelligence issues which involve internal security the leakage and exchange of economic_ scientific and political infornation the sale of te chnologicai information; and: the impact of' disinfor- mation and agents of influence on Anerican policy As has been noted: in our previous forums ) since 1961 when KAGO brought uS documentary evidence: that Soviez inteTTigence had launched a' full- Jt scale penetration effort: agamst The main Enemy ye#have seen. a steady and continuing Soviet effort to e ffect penetrations Qf thhe_ U.5 Government Dertente s aone Nozhing to_ blunt this effort Soviet inteTligence has worked steadily on_The American targett-and 7a5 Deen Tuict tO Se1ze won The OpeningseAA DTZ ZINrE NZEZ KRUSHCHEV Was the rirst to Tabe TDetente " BREZHNEV has made the wora the crtcne JOe It has been clear to Soviet intel- ligence as it has been apparent to Western coun terintelligence that Soviet policy designed to exploit Wester technology and; hopefully. change the balance of military power: has created new opportunities for Soviet espionage These new opportunities may be characterized as a plethora of: choices a harvest almost unprecedented since the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) period and the 1958 Central Committee decision to assign to the KGB a_ nelv vital role in the Policy to exploit the West by returning to the principles of LENIN Soviet intelligence now finds more Americans both official and unofficial: a Anxious to exchange a11 types of information ; b . Willing to discuss vi rtually subject; C Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and potentially viab le dissident movenent in the USSR which can be influenced if only the Arerican people-to-people concept could prevail; #Re ferred to -and quoted in Attachnent A SFcrtt Pote6{ 227572 . ing any 0.3936' ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 13-00000 ocUKD d Convinced that there is a bonanza for the American businessman in the USSR and that "business czn 2lter the Soviet lifestyle and reduca gove rnmental ) i.e CP control; Believing that the Cold War was a myth created by Ame rica; f Anxious to atone for the "sins" of Vietnan 'and interventionist policies g Anxious about China and nuclear weapons ; h_ Believing there is more merit to direct USSR-USA negotiation if America attempts to negotiate in tanden with its Western allies or other nations ; Ready. to believe there are many 'if not legions of Soviet citizens particularly the Young "intellectuals who are willing to cooperate with the West to advance free - dom for the Russians j: Ignorant about Soviet ideological consistency and purpose 3 Addressing ourselves on ly to manifestations of the Soviet security threat outside the U .S_ 9 We are concered that the clinate for penetration particularly for the recruitment of Anericans has become too permissive The attitudes outlined have not only nade America more vuinerab ie but have made the counterintelligence . job more difficult Not only has Soviet-American contact increased in geometric proportions but there is: also increasing evidence that the always relatively loose security check rein on official Ameri cans has lengthened even more As discussed elsewhere , it is ap parent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence > when coupled with domestic attacks of Ivhatever origin. against Ane rican intelligence and security organs have had a_ direct bearing on opportunities for Soviet intelligence to attenpt to develop and re cruit. Americans 4 In an at tempt to cope: with the . prob lem 0f Soviet and Bloc recruitments and penetrations we have since August 1965' collected statistics and case data on a governnent-wide basis of recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and foreign employees of the United States Governnent Our objective has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such infornation in order to: a Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc Cuban and Chinese Communist services ; SCCRET ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 13-00000 3 b Identify U.S. Government: employees who are being targetted by these adversary services; Determine the scope of activity of these adversary services by area , date and modus; Qperandi;_ d. De termine the scope of targetting against. any specific U.s Governnent agency ; Help uS understand the extent of foreign intelligence_ efforts against the U:S. Gove rnment and to obtain other per- spectives about possible disinformation and deception operations ; f Facilitate management of doub le agent cases 8 Furnish counterintelligence and operational guidance to our field stations in their efforts to nou t. aggressive operations against the adversary ; h Provide the AgencY and other U.S Goverment agencies , as appropriate information about the scope and type of pene tration efforts being: made against U.S. Government installa-: tions abroad. 5 . Our evaluated cases* of penetration and recruitnent at- tempts over the last nine years by the. Soviet, BToc , Cuban and Chtnese Comunist services are as follows 1965 117 1966.- 131 1967. 72 196 8 97 1969 86 1970- 60 1971' 56 1972 78 1973 45 Total 742 S67 ~ec 774z77 QlL #The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is the single case of penetration or the recrui tment incident as es - tabTished by evaluation of confirmed reports unconfirmed or cit- cumstantial infornation , and other specific reporting and informa- tion _ M cz, ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 13-00000 6: Over the whole period the penetration and recruitnent ef- forts have been fairly stably distributed by service 2s follows Soviet 585 of the cases Bloc 379 Cuban 4% Chicon-re 19 7 Over the range of cases re Cruitment and penetration ef- forts have been directed at U.S officer personnel in 30%..0f the- cases , other staff in 58, comnuications' personnel in 59 enlisted- ranks in 99 > local employees in 309;* others in 229 of the cases 8 Looking more particularly at our information On 'Soviet and associated recruitnent and penetration efforts for the Detente period--the past four Years 3 ~ there is the following distribution 0f adversary service case effort: Yearly Soviet Blec Cuban CPP Totals 1970 d41 29 60 1971 32 21 3 56 1972 47_ 28 3 78 1973 31 12 1 45 9 It.is clear that: Soviet penetration and: recruitment opera- tions Wp to and including the last year, against U.5 . Governnent ins tailations and.Tepresentatives abroad have not been materially affected or inhibited by Detente " Some representative cases since 1968 are cited in Attachment B . The cases have been sani tized to protect the innocent They are included solely to suggest the range precision and persistence of the Soviet; Bloc Cuban and Chinese Communist penetrations effort 10 This is not the end of the problem_ Our data consists es sentially 'of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily reported American personnel The 1973 case figures (and those for 1974; thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators 0f the persistence of Soviet and Bloc penetration: efforts in spite or because of Detente permissiveness However we acknowledge that we have no way Yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the reporting mood of the official Americans who a1e being targetted . #This covers only local employees outside 0f Iron Curtain in- s.tallations Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the con trol of their respective security services and are: therefore not con - sidered in this calculation SECRET by of,` ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 13-00000 5 11. Soviet Bloc modus cperandi 3 ~ the operational techniques used against Anericans incluzc ai thc known gambits and have changed little over the past decade There have been slight tacti- cal shifts both ab road and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of the "spirit of De tente for example 9 but the basic Mjo renains Ihat it was: in the 1926' $ and 1930 ' s . 12 In addition to diplomatic and official access to U.S. officials Soviet Bloc inteiligence officers frequent the places- - bars restaurants , clubs and other international national and locai organizations that Provide them With opportunities to meet American personnel or U.S_ Gove rnment employees In' their recruit- ment efforts ) Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the theme of peace friendship )" and mutual cooperation and they. have offered the bait 0f exchanging information to develop "common" I1 interests and cooperation to obtain information They have utilized: the ploy of professional advancement or business interests for One or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy informa - tion to try to remove the 5 tigma of espionage in their_ development negotiations as well as in some recruitment attenpts They con - tinue. in their efforts to obtain access to both American and in- digenous female employees throughout the world by using officers or local indigenous_ male and female agents to cultivate these target personalities_ Recently they have used the language lesson gambit- even with CIA personnel Local personnel ) ranging fron servants to higher officials have been recruited and targetted either to 0b tain with Americans or to develop personal as Ie 11 as SHcagpiocces; access to American officials have attenpted to recruit foreign local enployees to report about the interests and activities 0f their Anerican employers They employ sex and financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat, seek out: personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportuni- ties 3 make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate 0r nationalistic grounds 7 utilize audio and other technical mechanisns etc. 13_ This S ummary examination of the recent case' evidence '0f the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort against official Americans abroad is not the whole De tente story There is also a great interest by the Soviets in recruiting U.S students abroad . The primary objective of that recruitment effort is to guide the student eventualiy to obtain enploynent with the U,S_ Government Such efforts are only indicative of the fact that_ the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S_ Governnent, via students 9 as a continuing and long-range program_ 14. A recent additional dimension to the problen of Soviet and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access the Soviets have developed to American businessmen - 3 many of whom are privy to SECRET They ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 13-00000 U.S Governnent secrets through defense-re lated Contracts # ~Who travel to the USSR and entertain Sovjet trade de legations in the U,S. The concern we have previously expressed about the role of Lt. General Yevgeniy N . PITOVRANOV and the Soviet intelligence officers in the foreign trade business wa5 wel1 founded and, in Fact We believe was somewhat understated. It is nOw evident that PITOVRANOV controls most if not a11 of the activities going on where American business encoun ters Soviet trade officials in the Interational Trade Center to be built in Moscow in exhibits in the USSR and abroad in the patents and 1icens agreements in_ the supervision of the travel of trade delegations to the U.S and the like 15 _ Reports which reveal that the . KGB is active" among` American businessmen are beginning to: surface Not too surprisingly these reports indicate that their techniques are both subtle and blatant. One of the- most blatant approaches to American- business involves Igor ARTEMYEV , who is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington_ ARTEMYEV clains to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships between U.S_ companies and their foreign subsidiaries and licensing agreements between U.S: and foreign companies In the course' 0f his research , ARTEHYEV . sends detailed questionnaires to U.S. COm~ panies The tionnaires are the kind required. by our Securities and Exchange Guesiigioni #hile some companies do not respond there are those that do _ ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to talk with officials On one occasion he replied to_ a question about the level of classification of the meeting by saying it was "confidential_ V' With that kind of access who needs to recruit in the classic sense _ 16_ PITOVRANOV' s people aTe very evident in various trade de legations under their Chamber of Conmerce cover and they are applying what appear to be classic assessment te chniques _ It has been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range and. are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick tch although these devices are being employed against some American businessmen who visit MosCOw There aTe also strong indications that the Soviets are uS recruited agents anong the rapidly ex- panding deni-monde 0f fixers many Russian-speaking, who employment as the. in-house experts who "know how to_ de al with the Russians" and who find employnent with Anerican fitms as guides and advisors accompanying U.S delegations to Hos cOw Attachnents Gtontm ing pi ing gain ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== 13-00000 The fo]lowing are high]ights of the chronology of Source's. (Subject' s) professiona] career: September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where he remained until July 1945. At that tine Subject Jeft the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a Counterintelligence . School 1945-1946: Student at the one Year course_ Military Counterintelligence School _ GUKR "SMERSH Moscow _ 1946-1948 :: Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony security 0f Soviet officials abroad) Depart- ment (gtdel) of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of MGB Head - quarters in Moscow During the period November 1947 to September .1948 Subject held the title of Referent and his office was designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI (Committee for Information)_ but his functions were unchanged . 1948-1950: Student at the two-Year course; Higher Intell igence Schnol 0f the KI Suhject studied gcictal subjects ajid thc; English language; he was one of 30 students who specialized in counterintelligence during_ the second year of the course 0-30 3s ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== 13-00000 1950-1951: Desk officer, Operation: Case Officer, supervising SK activities in China assigned to 'lthe SK Section, Eastern Depart- ment , First Directorate of the MGB Head - quarters in Moscow the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949_ September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred a5 a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, Counterinterrigence Department of. the Fitsz Directorate MGB Headquarters in Moscow _ November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational Case' Officer December 1951: The KI was dissolved . and former state security elements were returned to the MGB Subject '$ functions continued the same 9 but, in the reorganization, he was assigned to the CI Section of the American Department 0f' the Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the MGB _ March 1952: Subject and an unidentified Young colleague wtote a joint letter through the Central_ Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of Soviet foreign intelligence &nd counter- intelligence work. September 1952 : While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour meeting , with his friend, with STALIN, MALENKOV _ and BERIYA . STAL IN thanked the two officers for their suggestions = 9 discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with Specific proposals ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== 13-00000 for necessaty reorganizations _ together with the names of recommended chiefs_ In 2 subsequent letter they recommended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV then_ in prison for "political ctimes ; and Yevgeniy Petrovich PITOVRANOV , then chief or deputy chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR STALIN met Subject and his friend a second time . OGOLTSOV" was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo- rate , with PITOVRANOV as his deputy . A Chief Intelligence Directorate 0f the" MGB was then formed , containing a Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and seven graphical desks Subject was appointed by OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk,- supervising approximately 15 staff persons _ March 1953: When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control of the State Security apparatus; which he combined with the WD into a unified MVD, he replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own "appointees. Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the Russian Emigre Desk 0f the CI Department of the' Second (new designation for foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany - October 1953 : Subject was assigned to the WD residency in Vienna , Austria, a5 an operational case Officer in the Emigre Operations Group _ August 1954 : Subject wzs transferred to the British Sub- Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the KGB residency in Vienna His duties were of a counterintelligence nature_ i.e_ concerned with penetration of foreign intelligence services geo= ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== 13-00000 1955-1959: One_ of 170 students at nding the four Year internal security-counterintelligence course, the KGB Higher School_ Juridical Institute_ He presented end successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK activities among Soviet delegations and tourist groups traveling abroad _ He re - ceived his diploma in August 1959 . During his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in 0n-the-job training as a student assigned to pertinent elements: of the KGB S Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate, with access to operational files on 'foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow who were KGB targets_ September 1959: Subject was assigned a5 a Senior Operational Case officer responsible for NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, Information (Reports} Department; First (Foreign) Chief , Directorate KGB Headquarters_ Moscow. His function was_ to translate edit and summarize information reports obtained by KGB agents abroad_ and to disseminate the pertinent information to the Central Comittee 0f the CPSU _ members 0f the Presidium including KHRUSHCHEV , and, in, the case of information with military aspects, to MAL INOVSKIY , the Minister of Defense. At one time during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation_ Thus he examined registry logs showing. the titles of agent information reports, the place acquired , the date received and the date of dissemination of the finished Russian intelli- gence reports t the government 4pr!i J960 : Subject was transferted t0 the Ameriean Sectiun ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== 13-00000 or tne CI Department of the First Chief Directorate, KGB , to pr-pare for &ssign - ment to the KGB residency under Soviet Embassy cover in Helsinki Finland, a5 the CI officer working against foreign intelligence services _ August 1960: Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in Helsinki , under the name KLIMOV (his true name was 'compromised through the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna) = and with the cover title of Third Secretary _ 15 December 1961: Subject, with his wife and young daughter defected to the U.S. Government which granted them political asylun _ 28 December 1961: Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY along with Mr HELMS , DDP 1962 : Subject was' debriefed by CIA Officers, officials from other US Agencies and teams of Intelligence Officers from Free WorId nations Subject provided much valuable information on the KGB, its organization, personnel , operations_ aims and efforts against the Free World. Subject, however _ proved to be a difficult handling problem, especially as a result Of his personality and his constant demands for regular meetings with high-level US officials such as the President , the' Attorney-General, the Directors 0f CIA and the FBI and for 2 policy role in the US: Intelligence Community _ 16 February 1962: Subject nad another meeting with the Attorney-General _ 2 July 1962: Subject met again With the Attorney-General and Mr _ HELMS _ 9 July 1962 : Subject had a conversation with Mr HELMS 22 August 1962: Subject had interview with Mr SORENSON of the White House Staff and Mr Edward Ra MURROI _ Director of USJA _ ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== 13-00000 15 Nov_ 1962: An FBI source reported_ hat the KGB was aware of' Subject' $ presence in the U.S;A. and ordered a1l Soviet IS personnel to report immediately any information which may obtain regard- Subject_ 27 Nov. 1962 : Subject met Mr _ McCONE DCI, and protested treatnent by the Agency . 14 December 1962 : Subject met again with the DCI _ 21 Feb . 1963 Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on SS Sylvania for England _ Spring 1963: Subject worked with the British_ 8 August 1963: Subject returned to the U.S.A . 22 August 1963: Subject met the Attorney-General again: 23 August 1963: Subject met the DCI again- 4 Sept : 1963 : Subject met the DCI again and stated that he wanted to becone an advisor to the DCI .and the Intelligence Comnunity _ October 1963- April 1964 : Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in the N.Y.c. area _ Subject was cooperative to some extent. 1964/1965 :. Subject, according to a Dutch official, visited The . Netherlands _ June 1965: Subject interviewed by the Canadians (CMP) in the N.Y.C. area. August 1968 : Subject in contact with the British regarding possible publication of his book. October 1968 : An FBI source indicated that he had no current information concerning the KGB attitude regarding Subject but the source stated that if the KGB knew 's location it might undertake to eliminate hin_ July 1970 Subject was in contact with Agency personnel and visited Florida 6 they ing Subject ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== 13-00000 March 1972: A KGB defector, LYALIN_ reported that he knew that Subject had been sentenced to death by the KGB_ An article regarding this sentence appeared in The_Chekist sonetime after 1964 . April 1972: Subject was in touch with CIA officials_ Septenber 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN _ pravided a copY of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign_Intelligence Services Defectors Members Of Anti-Soviet_Organizations Members 0f Punitive_Units and ' Other Criminals_under Search_Warrants: In this List the KGB listed Subject and . his wife as under the sentence of death for revealing_Soviet State secrets ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== 13-00000 The fo]lowing are high] ights of the chronology of Source 5 (Subject' s) professiona] career; September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the Frunze Artillery School in 'Odessa where he renained until July 1945 : At that time Subject left the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a Counterintelligence School 1945-1946: Student at the one Year course Militaty Counterintelligence School, GUKR SMERSH Moscow _ 1946-1948 : Desk officer, Assistant Operational Czse Officer , assigned to the Eastern Section (etdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony secutity 0f Soviet officials abroad) Depart- ment (gtdel) of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of MGB Head - quarters in Moscow During the period Novenber 1947 to Septenber 1948 Subject held the title of Referent and his office was designated the Fifth (Sb) Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate Of the KI (Committee for Information) _ but his functions were unchanged . 1948-1950: Student 2t the two-year course, Higher Intelligence Schoo] 0f the KL Suhject studicd zcictal subjec-s zad the English language; he was one of 30 students who specialized in, counterintelligence the second year- of the coutse. 0 30 35 during ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== 13-00000 11950-1951: Desk officer, Operationz Case Officer , supervising SK activities in China, assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Depart- ment , First Directorate of the MGB Head - quarters in Moscow_ 9 the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949 _ September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, CounterintelIigence Department of the First Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow . November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational Case Officer. December 1951: The KI; was dissolved and former state security elements were returned to the MGB- Subject's functions continued the same , but in the reorganization, he was assigned to the CI Section Of the American Department 0f the: Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the MGB March 1952 : Subject and an unidentified Young colleague wrote a joint letter through the Central Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of Soviet foreign intelligence and counter; intelligence work_ September 1952 : While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour meeting , with his friend _ with STALIN , MALENKOV _ and BERIYA . STAL IN thanked the two officers for their suggestions 9 discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with specific proposals ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== 13-00000 for necessary reorganizations ) together with the names of recommended chiefs: In 2 subsequent letter recommended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV , then in prison for "political crimes I and. Yevgeniy Petrovich PITOVRANOV then chief or deputy chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR STALIN met Subject and his friend a secona time _ OGOLTSOV" was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo- rate, with PITOVRANOV 2s his deputy . A Chief Intelligence Directorate 0f the MGB was then formed , containing a Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and seven geo- graphical desks _ 'Subject was appointed by OGOLTSOV a5 chief of the American Desk,- supervising approxinately 15 staff persons . March 1953: When STALIN died and BERIYA took 'over contzol of the State Security apparatus, which he combined with the WVD into a unified WD, he replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees _ Subject was reassigned as deputy chief' of the Russian Enigre Desk of the CI Department of the Second (new designation for foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD- Subject supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany . October 1953: Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in Vienna , Austria, as an operational case officer in the Emigre Operations Group _ August 1954 : Subject was transferred to the British Sub- Group of the Anglo-American-French of the KGB residency in Vienna _ His duties were of 2 counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned with penetration of foreign intelligence services they Group ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== 13-00000 1955-1959: One 0f 170 students at the four Year internal security-counterintelligence course, the KGB Higher_ School Juridical Institute_ He presented 2nd successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK activities. among Soviet delegations and tourist groups traveling abroad _ He re- ceived his diploma in August 1959 , During_ his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in on-the-job training 2s 2 student assigned to pertinent elements: of the KGB 5 Second (Internal Counterintelligence} Chief Directorate, with access to operational files on foreign diplonatic personnel in Moscow who were KGB targets. September 1959 : Subject was assigned 2s a Senior Operational Case Officer responsibie for NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, Information (Reports} Department , First (Foreign) Chief , Directorate KGB Headquarters, Moscow _ His function was to: translate, edit and summarize information reports obtained by KGB agents abxoad and to disseminate: the: pertinent information to the Central Comittee of the CPSU _ members of the Presidium, including KHRUSHCHEV , and 9 in the case of information with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY , the Minister of Defense _ At one time_ during a CP cell meeting, ctiticism was voiced about the delays in translation and process_ and Subject was assigned to study the situation_ Thus he examined registry logs showing the titles of agent information reports, the place acquired, the date received and the date of dissemination of the finished Russian intelli- gence reports t the government . Aprii 1968 : Subject was transferted :o the American Section ing ing ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== 13-00000 Directorate, KGB , to p1 re for assign - ment to the KGB residency under Soviet Embassy covet in Helsinki, Finland , a5 the CI officer working against foreign intelligence services _ August 1960 : Subject w2s assigned to the KGB residency in Helsinki, under the nane XLIMOV (his ttue nane was compromised through the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna} and with the cover title of Third Secretary _ 15 December 1961: Subject, with his wife and young daughter_ defected to the U.S, Government which granted them political asylun_ 28 December 1961: Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY along with Mr _ HELMS , DDP 1962 : Subject was debriefed. by CIA Officers, officials from other US Agencies and teams of Intelligence Officers from Free World nations _ Subject provided much valuable information on the KGB, its organization, personnel _ operations aims and efforts against the Free Norld_ Subject, howevef _ proved to: be a difficult handling problem, especially a5 a result of his personality and his constant demands for regular meetings with high-level US officials such as the President, the' Attorney-General_ the Directors 0f CIA and the FBI and for 2 policy role in the US Intelligence Community _ 16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the Attorney-General _ 2 July 1962: Subject met again with the Attorney-General and Mr HELMS . 9 1962 : Subject had a conversation with Mr . HELMS _ 22 August 1962 : Subject had interview with Mr . SORENSON of the White House Staff and Mr Edward Ra MURROW , Director of USJA - July ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== 13-00000 15 Nov_ 1962 :_ An FBI source reported: t the KGB was aware of Subject' $ presence in the U.S.^_ and ordered a11 Soviet IS personnel to report immediately any information which they may obtain regard- Subject- 27 Nov . 1962: Subject met Mr . McCONE , DCI , 1 and protested treatment by the Agency _ 14 December 1962: Subject met again with the DCI _ 21 Feb . 1963 Subject and his family left N.Y.C. On SS. Sxlvania for England_ Spring 1963 : Subject worked with the British, 8 August 1963; Subject returned to the U.S.A 22 August 1963 ; Subject met the Attorney-General again: 23 August 1963: Subject met the DCI again_ 4 Sept: 1963 : Subject met: the DCI again stated that he wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and the Intelligence. Community _ October 1963- April 1964 : Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in the N;Y.C. area Subject was cooperative to some extent. 1964/1965 : Subject, according to a Dutch Official, visited The Netherlands _ June 1965: Subject interviewed by _ the Canadians (CMP) in the N.YC. area . August 1968 : Subject in contact with the British regarding possible publication of his book. October 1968 ; An FBI soutce indicated ' that he had no current information concerning the KGB attitude regarding Subject but the source stated that if the KGB knew" Subject' s location it might undertake to eliminate him. 1970 Subject was in contact with Agency personnel and visited Florida. ing and July ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== 13-00000 T that Subject had been sentenced to death by the KGB . An article regarding this sentence appeared in The Chekist sonetime after 1964 . April 1972: Subject wa$ in touch with CIA officials_ Septenber 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN , ) provided 3 copy of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents 0f Foreign_Intelligence_ Services Defectors Members Of; Anti-Soviet Or _ z2- tions Members 0f Punitive Units and Other Crininals_under Search_Warrants: In this List the KGB listed Subject and his wife as under the sentence of death for revealing, Soviet State secrets gani ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== 13-00000 The fo]lowing are high] ights of the chronology of Source's (Subject' s) professiona] career: September 1944 : Subject was mobilized and sent to the Frunze Artillery School in 'Odessa where he remained until July 1945 . At that tine Subject Jeft the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a Counterintelligence School 1945-1946: Student at the one Yeat course_ } Military Counterintelligence School, GUKR / "SMERSH Moscow: 1946-1948: Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case Officer , assigned to the Eastern Section (etdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony secuzity of Soviet officials abroad) Depart- ment (gtdel) of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of MGB Head - quarters in Moscow During the period November: 1947 to September 1948 Subject held the title of Referent and his office was designated the Fifth (Sp Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI (Committee for Information) 3 but his functions were unchanged . 1948-1950: Student at the two-Year course, Higher Inteligence Schno] af the KL Suhject studicd gcictal subjec-s aid thc English language; he was one of 30 students who specialized in, counterintelligence during the second year' of the coutse. 0 30 35 ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== 13-00000 1950-1951: Desk officer, Operation Case Officer, supervising SK activities in China 1 essigned to the SK Section_ Eastern Depart- ment , First Directorate of the MGB Head - quarters in Moscow_ 9 the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949 _ September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as a_ desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, CounterinteITigence Department of the Firsz Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational Case Officer "1 December 1951: The KI was dissolved and former state security elements were returned to the MGB Subject 5. functions continued the same , but, in the reorganization, he was assigned to CI Section of the American Department of- the Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the MGB March 1952: Subject and an unidentified young colleague wrote a joint letter through the Central Committee of the CPSU to STALIN mnaking suggestions for a fundamental reorganization 0f Soviet foreign intelligence and counter- intelligence work. September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR: Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour meeting , with his friend, with STALIN_ MALENKOV and BERIYA. STAL IN thanked the Iwo officers for their suggestions _ discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with specific proposals the ================================================== Page 35 ================================================== 13-00000 for necessaty reorganizations_ ) together with thc nanes of recommended chiefs _ In a subsequent letter recomnended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV , > then in prison for "political crimes, and Yevgeniy Petrovich PITOVRANOV , then chief or deputy chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR STALIN met Subject and his friend 2 secona time _ OGOLTSOV was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo- rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy . A Chief Intelligence Directorate' 0f_ the' MGB was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and seven geo- graphical desks _ Subject was appointed by OGOLTSOV a5 chief of the American 'Desk supervising approximately 15 staff persons March 1953: When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control 0f the State Security epparatus; which he combined with the WD into a unified WD, he replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees _ Subject was reassigned as deputy chief' of the Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of the Second (new designation for foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, WD: Subject supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany - October 1953: Subject was assigned to the WD residency in Vienna , Austria, as_ an operational case officer in the Emigre Operetions Group _ August 1954: Subject was transferred to the British Sub- Group of the Anglo-American-French of the KGB residency in Vienna _ His duties were of a counterintelligence nature, i.e _ concerned with penetration of foreign intelligence- services _ they: Group ================================================== Page 36 ================================================== 13-00000 1955-1959: One of 170 students at the four Year internal security-counterintelligence course, the KGB Higher School Juridical Institute_ He presented 2nd successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK activities among Soviet delegations and tourist groups traveling abroad . He re- ceived his diploma in August 1959 . During his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in on-the-job. training 2s 2 student assigned to pertinent 'elements 0f the KGB 5 Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate, with access to operational files on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow who were KGB targets. September 1959: Subject was assigned 25 a Senior Operational Case officer responsible for. NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, Information (Reports} Department , First (Foreign) Chief , Directorate;-KGB Headquarters _ Moscow - His function was to translate, edit and summarize information reports obtained by KGB agents abroad and;to disseminate the pertinent information to the Central Comittee of the CPSU _ members of the Presidiun, including KHRUSHCHEV , and , in the case of_ information with military aspects, to MAL INOVSKIY , the Minister of Defense At one time, during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation Thus he examined registry logs showing. the titles of agent . information reports, the place acquired, the date received and the date of dissemination' f the finished Russian intelli? gence reports t the government . Aprii 1968 : Subject was transferred to the Averican Sectiou ing ================================================== Page 37 ================================================== 13-00000 OI Ine CI Departnent of the First Chief Directorate, KGB , to PI for &ssign - ment to the KGB residency under Soviet Embassy cover in Helsinki_ 9 Finland, as the CI officer working against foreign intelligence services _ August 1960: Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true name was compromised through the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna) and with the COVEr title of Third Secretary. 15 December 1961: Subject, with his wife and young: daughter defected to the U ,S. Government which granted them political asylum , 28 December 1961: Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY along with Mr HELMS DDP 1962 : Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers; officials from other US Agencies and teams of Intelligence Officers from Free World nations , Subject provided much valueble information on the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations ains and efforts against the Free World. Subject, howevef . proved to_be a difficult handling problen, especially a5 a result 0f his personality and his constant demands for regular meetings with high-Ievel US officials such as the President, the Attorney-General, the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for 2 policy role in the US: Intelligence Comnunity _ 16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the Attorney-General 2 1962 : Subject met again with the Attorney-General and Mr HELMS _ 9 July 1962 : Subject had a conversation with Mr HELMS _ 22 August 1962 ; Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the White House Staff and Mr _ Edward R. MURRON Director ot USJA . ~hre July ================================================== Page 38 ================================================== 13-00000 15 Nov_ 1962 : 'An FBI source reported it the KGB was aware of Subject' $ presence in the U,S,4 . and ordered all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately any information which may obtain regard - Subject- 27 Nov . 1962 : Subject met Mr _ McCONE DCI } and protested treatment by the Agency . 14 December 1962 : Subject met again with the DCI , 21 Feb . 1963 Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on SS Sxlvania for England _ Spring 1963: Subject worked with the British. 8 August 1963: Subject returned to the U.S.A . 22 August 1963: Subject met the Attorney-General again. 23 August 1963: Subject met the DCI again . 4 Sept: 1963 : Subject met the DCI again and stated that he wanted to. become an advisor to the DCI and the Intelligence. Connunity . October 1963- April 1964: Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in the N:Y.C. area . Subject was cooperative to some extent_ 1964/1965 : Subject, according to a Dutch official, visited The Netherlands _ June 1965: Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP) in the N.Y.C. area _ August 1968: Subject in' contact with the British regarding possible publication of his booka October 1968 : An FBI source indicated that he had no cuttent infornation concerning the KGB attitude regarding Subject but the source stated that if the KGB knew Subject' s location it might undertake to eliminate him_ July 1970 Subject was in' contact with Agency personnel and visited Florida_ "i" they ing ================================================== Page 39 ================================================== 13-00000 March 1972+. A KGB defector, LYALIN reported that he knew that Subject had been sentenced to death by the KGB An article regarding this sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after 1964 _ April 1972: Subject wzs in touch with CIA officials_ Septenber 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN 1 provided a copy of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical_ List of Agents 9f Foreign_Intelligence Services Defectors_ Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations Members 0f Punitive Units and Other Crininals_under- Search Warzants' In this List the KGB listed Subject and his wife 25 under the sentence Qf death for revealing_Soviet State secrets.

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