Transcript of 104-10400-10316.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== @aaa 60t184007031 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 SECRE [ SECuriTY committers 11 March 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr James M. Potts Chief, Africa Division gs4 Mr Richard S . Sampson Chief, Europe Division Mr _ Alan D_ Wolfe Chief , Near East Division Mr Richard F _ Stolz Chief , Soviet/East European Division FROM John D Walker 0/SA/DO/0 SUBJECT Guidelines for Providing Information to the HouseAppropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Security Services 1 Since members of the S& I Staff will be talking with your Divisions in the near future it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as to what may be said conce rning relationships with foreign liaison services In the broad sense liaison services constitute both a source and a method . 2 _ We are prepared to discuss the following ? a _ The identification and responsibili- ties of the liaison services. in a particular area to the extent that we can draw on sources other than information derived through the established liaison relationship , 1.e , overt information or information from penetra - tions which will not endanger the source b _ In further describing the liaison services _ ) we can provide information on the objectives , personnel , s trength, budget E2 IMPDET CL BY 012860 SECRET for Nazt Ku mrkt: key ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 13-00000 SEGEET and methods of operations of services, provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or penetrations and not from details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves C Agency manhours and funds devoted to liaison with the foreign services . d In the case of SIGINT liaison further details on such arrangements including the scope of funds and equipment provided to such foreign s ervices d We are prepared to provide general comments on the degree of operational coopera- tion with the Station If technical s upport , for example _ provides a useful input we can state that the liaison service provides technical support , using a qualifying adjective to define such as excellent , limited , etc _ 3 _ We have no objection to the provision 0 f foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services Source descriptions should be those used in the disseminated report . 4. We will not make available details on liaison arrangements information on sources and methods of such services which have been obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources or other information which would reveal Agency sources and methods or violate the trust on which the official liaison relationship is based . 5 _ The SGI Staff approves close liaison relationships and believes that these relationships are cost effective John D Walker 0/SA/DO/0:JDWalker:kaw (1542) Distribution Original c/AF 1 C/EUR L C/NE C/SE 2 SA/ DO/0 SECHET ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 13-00000 Guidlc ] incs for Prov jdl In formalt i on t0 Congressiona 1 Overs i ght (ommittecs Om1 Foreign Intelligence and Sccurity Scrvices These guidel ines take into account the fact that foreign intelligence and security: services , when acting in connection with the Agency' s 0f ficial liaison with them , . constitute both a source and a method and thus require the statutory protect ion accorded any other intelligence source or method: The guidelines a 1s0 recognize that the duly constituted overs ight bodies 0f the Congress have expressed an interest in such services and in the genera l scope , nature and extent 0 f the Agency' s relationships with them The purpose 0 f thesc guidelines is to provide a foriula for dealing with thesc two sometimes conElicting objectives . The Agency is prepared to provide , upon specific request, appropriately classified and sanitized information to oversight committees 0n the following aspccts of foreign intelligence andl security services : a _ Thc idcntification 0fF the governmcnts Wvith whose services CIA has liaison arrangements ; b . Agency man hours and funds devotcd to liaison with forcign scrvices;' C In the casc 0 f S]GINT liaison further details on such arrangemcnts including the scope of S3Z57 ine ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 13-00000 funds a ndl cquipment provided to such forcign scrviccs ; d Jnforma t ion on thc objcctives , personnel strength, budget and methods of operation 0f such s-ervices , erovided that such data Will be drawn from open sources or penetrat ions and not from the details 0f liaison arrangement s with the services themselves ; Where relevant, foreign intelligence reports based on iaison with such serviccs _ The Agency Will no t make available to the ovcrsight comimittees the details 0 f liaison arrangements with foreign services , information on sources and me thods 0 f such services obtained through liaison or joint ly controlled sources , or other information which would reveal Agency sources or methods or violate thc trust 0n1 which these official liaison rclationships is necessarily based . In thc evcnt 0 f substantial allegations 0 f improper activities conductcd by foreign intelligence 01 sccurity services with wh ich the Agency is presumed to ma intain liaison ) every c [ fort will be madc to providlc a 11 relevant facts which bc & r on such allegations Wherc this Iould involve departurc froi the above guidel incs thc Dircctor will be preparec to mcet with the Cha i rman or Vicc-Chairman 0 f the committcc to scek a satisfactory rcsolution 0 f such problems _ ECES key ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== 13-00000 MIFur REvIEW STAFF 7s-20/4 24 July 1975, MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Mr. Colby, Mitch Rogovin and Mr_ Knoche met with Chairman Otis Pike at 9.30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike'8 office to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr . Colby left the following material with Pike: 1. 16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B= Staats Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by Mr. Colby. The letter deal8 with the GAO's audit of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached) 2. Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutee and Law dated September 1 970 (without the Ryan Amendment on Foreign Intelligence). (Filed in 6D0120) 3_ Three Groudrules papers: (Attached) ~~Agreemente To Be SouhtBy the DCI With Chairmen of the Select Committees 5 -Secrecy Agreement ~Guide8 for Protection f Claggified Information And Documents Furnibhed The Select Committee 4. 11 March 1975 Letter from Colby to Senator Church: (Attached) Rogemarie R.Hegterberg HSC cUr 1 n Se ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET Checkliet DCI Discusgion with HSC a Your intent to be cooperative and forthcoming. 2. Your responsibility to protect s&M: Will need HSC understanding of particularly sengitive mattere: -~pames of agents and gources-. ~~names of cooperating American organizations and contacts to whom we have pledged confidentiality. ~~material from foreign liaison. ~beneitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection. 3 Will need to work out seeurity groundrules. #~Chairman of USIB Security Committee and CIA Director of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements , compartmented clearances, etc. 4 Importance of gecrecy agreements . Your willingness to suspend them to permit testimony by current and ex-employees_ 5. Will confirm with a letter and an employee bulletin which can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and interviewe. 24 July 1975 Claestlled by 04359 Exompt Irom genorai daclazlficalion schadulo 0 E.O: 11052 exemption schedulo 50 (1), (2), (J) Autmatlcaly deelasblllcd on SECRET Data Impossiblo to Dotormino fOr ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 13-00000 AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committces; 28 has been customary in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, fbat: (a) Departments' and agencies shall have the right to request that testimony be givenlonly in executive session, that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and that certain testimony be heard only by memberg and in bome cases,only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman (6) Witpesses be afforded an opportunity to review and.comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony_ prior to publication.of it: (c) When que stioned about intelligence matters that come under the purview of another organization, witnesses should be permitted t state that a response to the question is not properly within their authority and .to respectfully Suggest that the appropriate party be called to testify on such matters. 2; It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies furnishing documerts 'to the committees be authorized to excise from those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as well as those of other individuals whoge safety Or individual privacy. may be jeopardized by disclosure- AIso excised should be names of sources, operations: specific details of technical devices and systems main- tained in compartmented channels and names of organizations cooperating on & highly confidential basis. 3 In view of their susceptibility to foreign countermeasures, it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details any ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 13-00000 0f thc technology of the technical collection programs- It would 2lso be desirable if the Select Committces adopted the usc of Compart- mentcd Control-Systens to protect documents on these programs 2nd cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-knor- The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise an assist in arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartrented area; 4. Furtber;' it-would be desirable if the:DCI atterpt to secure &n agreement with the Chairmen %f the Select: Committees that will entertain and consider security principles and guide lines which will be provided: any they ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRECY AGREEMENT in accepting employment_ Or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified infor - mation from unauthorized disclosure. I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as 2 condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee_ It is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with .the Select Comrittee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is clas sified in accordance.with the standards set forth in Executive Order: 11652 of March 8, 1972, a9 amended. AlL classified information 50 acquired me in the course 0f my employment remains the property of the United States of America ana I further agree to burrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material whichzas come into my possession a8 & result of my employment or 2s. signment with the Select Committee- I hereby agree that the burden is.on me to' determine if inforrqation is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as 2 result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized reprcsentative. by ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 13-00000 I hercby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committce which is related to intelligcnce and prepared publication by me will be submitted to the Chairman or the President of thc Senate or their duly authorized representative prior to discus: with OI showing to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of detcrmining Whether: said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. Iagtee that the Chairman of the: Select Comrittee, President of the Senatc or their duly authorized representative ha s the authority to make the final determination as to whether information i8 classified 2nd thus should be deleted from the material submitted. I have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S. C_ 793, 794, 798 and 952; and 50 U:S.C. 783 (b); and 42 U,S.C. 2274; and Executive Order. 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified infor _ mation, and understand their meaning: Further _ I agree to abide by such rules and procedures 2s the Select Comrittee shall institute for the protection of classificd material. I understand that 2ny breacl of any part of the obligations in this agree- ment could subject me to legal and/or administrative action- I further agree that all the conditions and obligations irposed on me with respect to the protection of" classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employ - ment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated. I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any mental reservations Or purpose of evasion- Signature Date WITNESS: Signature Datc for sing ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== 13-00000 GUIDES FQR PROTECTION OF CLASSTEIED INFORMA TTON AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES Personnel Security _Clearznces (2) Background Investigetion It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulete that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material, testimony Or information received or generated by the committees without prior receipt of & security clearance basea on a full field investigation. @} Secrecy Agreement It would be &esirable for the Select Committees to require & Bigned secrecy agreerent of employees or indivicuals assigned to the committees staffs. The agreerent should include provisions: 1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations is a condition precedent of employment or assignment; 2) Recognizing US Government property rights to classified information; 3) Requiring prior written 'consent before divulgence of olassified information; 4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the signer to administrative and/or legal action under appropriate statutes; 5) That there is no time limit on the tcrms of the agreement. ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== 13-00000 2. Physical and Document_Security The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be preserved:' These rules should be made kown to the individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials- Among these should be rules Qp-physical security and document security- (a) Physical Security It would be desirable if the Select Cormittees adopt the followving rules related to physical security: 1} All classified material will be stored in safes for Bifekeeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with the regulations of this registry for classified material: 2), Trventy-four-hour guard protection, supplerented by anti-intrusion alarms, should be required on the storage area, 3) Areas selected for use in closed session should be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons- 4) The committees should arrange for the conduct of audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of upauthorized Use-of transrhitters and/or recording devices: It should be noted that & foreign clandestine transmitter wa$ located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973. 5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees, the hearing room should be examined by & cleared staff officer who will secure any misplaced classified materizl or waste.. ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== 13-00000 6) Areas should be designated in which classified material can be reviewed. These arcas shouid be secure against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should not be removed from these areas for the sake Of convenience except when necessary for the work of the committees and should; pot_bertransported overnight to the office or residence. of personnel of the committees. (6) Document Security 1) Committees should select and identify & single location and' specific personnel authorized to sign acknow- ledgement of receipt Of classified materials provided to the committees. 2) A 'sy stem of document control should be established to permit control of elassified documents to provide for accountability- 3} Duplication of documcnts should be controlled 50 a8 to require & record of the dosument reproduced, tbe number of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving personnel- Reproduced classified documents should be subject to the same controls as the original: 4)_ Appropriate arrangements should be-made for the destruction of classified waste. 5) Transcripts. The committees Should give consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate security in the transcription of testimony by committee transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each agency presenting testimony with this responsibility- In bome, if not all cases, this might include escort of materials to the place of transcription, the secur of carbons, waste and notes and the relurn of the transcribed testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance with cominittce rules. 3 ing ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 13-00000 6) Early agreement should be reached on the disposition of classified materials such &s storage under seal in the National Archives- The question of access should be determined by: the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House- 3 Compartmented Information Therc is.some' extr emely sensitive information in the intelligence community which is disseminated only to those who have a very strict "need to know" in order to build, perfect, operate or handle the material produced by extremely sensitive' foreigr-intelligence collection programs. The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulner - ability to countermeasures which 2 foreign government could easily jstitute: if.details of the mezns of collection becate known; Thus,. even individuals cleared for Secret information do not have acces: to compartmcnted information unless they are required to have such knowledge in the performance of their duties- This inforration is handled in Compartrented Control Systems- It would be desirabie if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on these extrerely sensitive collection efforts and clear.only those staff personnel with an absolute "need te know" about such systems, and that documents related to such systems be handled in & compart- mented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departrents and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area. 4. Security Officer It would be desirable if the committees appointed a security officer witk the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted the committee and of serving as 2 point of contact with the depart_ ments and agencies ofinterest to the committee: It would also be desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to identify & single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee. Top by. ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 13-00000, ENTRAL INTECCIGENCE AGEN ASHINGTON; D.C 20505 Leatro ?sty 75 - 22le 16 JUN 1975 Honorable Elmer B, Staats Comptroller General of the United States General Accounting Office 441 G Sireet Washington, b_ C, 20548 Dear Mr . Siaats: My ettention has been directed to a letter &om Mr. Keller General Accounting Office, to the Honorable William Proxmire dated 10 , 1974 , which was placed in the Cong_essional Recordby Senator Proxmire on February 1i, 1975. The letter deals with the- intelligence community and reviews the General Accounting Office'sright to audit and obtain information from the Central Intelligence Agency - Inasmuch as Mr _ Keller has treated 2 subject basic to this Agency's capability to carry out work mandated by Congress_ I.believe it would serve 2 useful purpose to reviewv some of the background concerning the use of confidential [unds and their relationship to the audit o CIA over the years: Mr - Keller notes in his lettes that there are "a fairly substantial number of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a certfication by the hezd of the department or establishment involved 01 The need is clear in the case %f this Agency: The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its directon to the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources 2nd methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility; wvas complemented by zuthorizing certain expenditures "for objects of & Confidential, extraordinary , or emergercy nature, to be accounted for solely on the certificate @f the Director of Centrzl Intelligence. Such expenditures.would apply , for example. to 2 secret agent operating abroad in a hostile climate whose identity must be tected not only s0 that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but 2lso because his freedom--and Qn occasion his life--weighs in the balance. Other intelligence activities do not hzve such obvious security reguire_ ments but are, nonetheless _ within the sources and methods concept. Liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of both positive intelligence and counterintelligence_ Such liaisons to be effective depend on the confidence of each service that the other Ivill protect not the mere fact of the relationships , but also its"sources and methods and sensitive information Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign liaison scrvice, but in SOme cases a lessening Or even cessation its cooperation May pro- only Ai? Eee?x ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 13-00000' Even overt activities have their olvn security problems Thus, many U_ S. citizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligencc units on condition that thejr cooperation in this respectbe absolutely protected _ This need for the special protection of intelligence sources and methods has been" well recognized by Officials in the executive, judicial , and legislative branches of our Government _ Mir Lindsay C Warren , then Comptroller General of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director Bureau of tbe Budget;"addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence tbe power to certify the expenditure o confidential funds by stating that wvhile it provided M for the granting of much wider authority than I would ordinarily recommend for Government agencies, generally::the purposes sought to be obtained in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency are believed t be of such paramount importance &s to justify the extraordinary measures pro- posed therein_ n He went on to:say that the "necessity for secrecy in such matters is apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided in secton .O2() ()-ofEublicLaw 253, that the Director %f Central Inteliigence Shall-Fe7esponsible for protecting intelligence sources and methodg from unautborized disclosure Under these conditioris; he' stated;" "I do riot feel called Ypon to object to the proposals advanced It has been and it remains the policy %f CIA to rely upon vouchered funds wherever possible. (Vouchered furds are those which can be accounted for and audited in;conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies 2nd with standard Government regulations and procedures.) Currently more than half o the Agency's appropriations are disbursed as vouchered funds_ The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr . Warren in his March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for "objects of a confidential, extraordinary , or emergency nature-" From the beginning o CIA records for alf vouchered fund expenditures were made available to and were subject to a voucher audit the GAO _ Use f the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and collectioF vouchers and related documents t0 determine whether experditures were made'legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made- Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of 2 confidential, extraordinary , or emergency nature, i.e. intelligence sources and methods _ Subsequent to the ezactment-of the CIA legislatior, GAO adopted & "comprehensive audit approach; m and raised Tvith the CIA Subcommittee of tbe House Armed Services Committee the desirability % 2n expanded audit of Agency activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated 29,, 1959 to Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did "not recommend any change in section 10 (now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act" and that broadening of our audit activities should not include an evaluation of the intelligence activities of the Agency h only by May "any ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 13-00000 Mr Allen Dulles , ti Director of Ccntral Intelligenc Jgrced that GAO should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller datcd October 16, 1959, cautioning, however that the comprehensive audit would have to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for which by lawv the Director's certificate must be deemed & sufficient voucher :The results of the trial period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1961 were fadeknown to the CLA Subcommittee in a letter of 16, 1961 from the Comptroller General in which he said the GAO planned to' discontinue the audit of CLA activities_ He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA "to plece the General Accounting Office in a position to make & comprehensive audit of the overt activities of CIA 0 Nevertheless, he stated that GAO "cannot effectively reviewv and evaluate activities of the Support Component because the confidential and overt activities 0f this component are integrpted t0 such an extent that we cannot make reasonably comprehensive 2udits_ II He further stated have been given suffciept access to malce reasonably comprekensive reviews of the overt activities of the Intelligence Component, but such reviews, in Our; Opinion,.will not be productive 0f significant evaluations because we cannot 'feasibly evaluate te ertent to Ihich needed overt information is available for collection or determine- the need for the intelligence infornation selected for collation and use in' the pro duction of intelligence reports." In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing the conflict between the philosophy underlying a "comprehensive andit approach" and the Director"s statutory responsibility and authority to protect intelligence sources ard methods _ Both the Director and Chairman Vinson, of the House Committee on Armed Services_ requested that the Compiroller General continue to audit Agency affairs on & limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated his earlier view _ In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 1962, tHe Comptrolle General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness "it would be necessary for Our GAO audit staff to have nearly completa access to CIA activities 0 and that even to' "perform reasonably comprehensive reviews would require "complete access to the administrative activities that are performed in support of both sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA _ J Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General on July 18, 1962 , stating thzt, "the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency are necessary I believe for the proper protection %f its intelligence activities and should be maintained_ ) The Chairman agreed , however that in view of the Comptroller General's opinion that & continued audit ivas not a worthwhile effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities in the Central Intelligence Agency:_ In summary, I believe that several points are deserving of emphasis in essessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to this Agency: 3 May nwe 21, ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 13-00000 (a) CIA coopel ed fully in all respects in extcn: hg administrative support and in granting security clearances and access to information related to vouchered fund activities_ () The Chairman of the interested oversight committce in the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature and status of the activity : (c) This Agency encouraged GAO to conduct and to continue to conductits activities consistent with tbe operational and statutory requirements imposed upon this Agency _ Ca) The: decision to discontinue the audit activities was' made solely by GAO and was approvedlby the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Sincereky Iai Lok W.E. Director Distribution: ~ Addressee 3 DCI 1-,DDCT 1 ~ER 17OGC 1 + DDA } Compt OF 3 ~ OS ~ OLC Subject (GAO) wlbasic: 1 3 OLC Proxmire fle }FOLC Chrono OLC:WPY:cg (13 Jun 75) s = 5 SL Hv hs I} 9 | Hnc Colby Orig 3 ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== 13-00000 25.3 'DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTZLLIGENCE 38 WASHINGTON, D. C 20505 REVIEW STAFF 7;208/ 28 JUL 1w; Hsc_ M& The Honorable Otis G_ Pike Chairman Select Comittee 0n intelllgence House of Representatives Sic+oa Washington, D: C: 20515 Dear Mr _ Chairman: In our conversation on Friday asked for the statutory basis for the compartmentation principle- I wish first to respond to yout inquity and then suggest a manner in which your staff can receive access to the sensitive material protected by special compartnentation systems The curtent basis for the U.S. Government security classification system is Executive Order 11652 promulzated on 8 March 1972 Historically foreign inteligence has been treated 2s. one' category Of classified national security information_ There are nunerous statutory recognit:ons of the importance of national security information > e.g: the Freedon of Infornation Act_ Consequently much foreign intelligence is classified CONPIDENTIAL SECRFT or TOP SECRET according to. specifications set forth in the Order: Not all foreign intelligence however is classified national security information under.the Provisis ons of the Executive Order (e:g. , an American source providing foreign information or assistance) Also, the potential risks attendant: with the compromise of a foreign intelligence source or method differ Substantially from the risks attendant with much classified defense information. Section 102 () (3) 0f the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, des : "That the Director Of Central Intel- ligence ledal]tovis be responsible for protecting intelligence soutces and methods from unauthorized disclosure :" In Tecc= tion of this responsibility , National Security Council Intelligence Directive No 1 (17 February 1972) instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to develop and review security standards and practices -as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure _ You gni ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== 13-00000 2 - Since the National Security 'Act did not provide for an authority corresponding With the DCI 5 responsibility in this area the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. ifeeiligence Board are responsible for: "The supervision of the dissemination and security of: intelligerce material." The Director of Centzal Intelligence acting with the advice of the U.S . Intelligence Board, has 'promulgated a .number 0f directives, regulations and security manuals related to the protection 0f foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods and appiicable to the overall U:S_ {gfelligence community. The' fundamental' security principle involved in the: pro: tection Of foreign intelligence and. of its soutces and methods is ax strict application 0f "need to: know" ~ Principle referted to in Executive Order 11652 Section 6 (A) This 'applies the' simple_ mathenatical premise that the fewer the number of individuals made: privy to a secret; the less likely that it will be disclosed_ The security principle of "compartmentation": involving: Special access and information dissenination controls is designed to ensure that only those individuals whose "need to know" has been specifically approved by some higher authority, Who have been specially indoctrinated, ana who; undertake special commitments to ptotect it are Provided aceess to a particularly sensitive category 0f foreign intelligence sources and. methods Corpartnentation' assists in the of the "need-to- know" principle by ensuring that aBndividio duals are provided: access to oniy that information clearly essential to the performance of their duties_ Compartnentation Was undoubtedly a major contributing factor involved in; the nation's secret development 0f the atomic.bomb during World War II > and the principle is still implicit in security procedures related to. ERDA S "RESTRICTED DATA" as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In the field 0f U.S. foreign intelli_ activities compartmentation was practiced throughout the Yeveiopcenr and operation of the U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign intelligence categories 0f activities us_ formalized con- partmentation procedures today involves the matter 0f foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes i.e. ) communications intelligence_ Title 18 0f the U.S_ Code Section 798 recognizes the special character of this material by providing specifically for prosecution 'for the unauthorized disclosure: of information concerning any communications activities 0f the United 'States without the ing ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== 13-00000 "3- necessity to show intent to harm the United States_ The reason for the application of strict compartmentation Pro - cedures to communications intelligence and other foreign intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerabiiity 0f the sources Once an opposition becomes awvare of which of its comunications Ie: are intercepting, it can teke swift remedial action , and the source can be forever lost- On Friday afternoon ,; . copies of the secrecy oath used by the executive branch: with respect to three compartmented access control systems were made avaiiable to you along with_ the revised forms: developed for and executed by certain members of: the staff 0f the: Senate Select Commi ttee to Study Intelligence Activities_ I would hope_ that the enclosed egreement modified for the House Select Comnittee, combining.all three: compartments into one document would meet your particular concerns For your information in addition to the Senate Select 'Conmittee S use Of the modified secrecy oath dealing.with conpartnented access: the following House and Senate comnittees have obtained compartmented access: for their' staffs , which was:' granted after the norma] briefings and Signing Of the secrecy oatii: Armed Services Committee Appropriations Conmittee Aeronautical and Space Sciences: Committee May. I reiterate the points I made on Friday: a. No. material is being withheld from members of the Comnittee_ b We are prepared to and did brief the staff 0f the Committee on noncompartmented matters 7 based upon Your certification of their security clearance and the fact that_they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement with You, 2 copy of which You provided. c The compartmentation procedures of the Intelligence Community have been established to statute and National Security Council hedellfsence Directives _ The simglest way for the staff to obtain access to this compaftmented material would be to accept the normal sectecy atrangements as modified in the enclosed . This would ensure against difficulties in access to such compartmented material throughout the ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== 13-00000 Intelligence Commiity It is clear that the obligations assued here would run between the staff member and the Committee and in no way would provide any control or influence over them by me or any . element 0f the Intelligence Community _ a. It would: undoubtedly be feasible to develop another procedure to ensure special protection 0f the sensitive matters' currently included in the compart- mented, systems but this would involve review and discussions with various interested parties which would' undoubtedly take: some time and' delay your investigations_ E bope you will agree that this is the simplest and easiest manner of solving 2 practical natter So that we can proceed with the substance of your. investigations Sincerely UEC W E. Colby ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== 13-00000 Distribution: 1-DCI 1-DDCI 1-IG I-OLC 1-E.H.Knocke: 1-SCMDCI Nhite House Distribution: 1-Rod: Hills: 1-Phil Buchen 1-Jay French ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== 13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE INDOCTRIMATION I have been inforned that pursuant to 1aw (Sections 792 793,_ 795, 797 ana 798 0f. Title 18 , United States Code) I am not to discuss: with oT disciose to .any person any infornation relating directly or indirectly to the below identified compaft mented Programs unless such person is currently authorized to discuss 0r receive such informa-ion .0r material of the particular category involved_+ I; &m aware that the responsibility 0f asceftaining that Such 2n authorization for another: person is valid 2nd current rests with me _ I acknowledge_ that it is my responsibility to inforn myself Qf the:: contents' 0f the above mentioned sections Of Title: 18 , U.S: Code_ a5._ they: pertain to performance of mY duties I an avate further that if 2 change in mY status renders: it no Zonger; necessary for me to receive compartrented intelligence, my name kill 'be "removed from the list Of persons authorized to_ receive such meterial_ News Reaia repofts concerning eny of these conpartnented materials does not relieve me of: nY' obligation under the oath Signed below I ackowledge: that I have been briefed 0n the" folIowing compar:nented systens or prograns: OATH ` OF SECRECY I do solemnly swear that I will not discuss sith or disclose to any person , regardless of his official position or status_ 0 any information directly or indirectly to Compartnented Intelligence, relytinfozizeic any derived therefrom, or the nature of the sources of such intelligencc until I have ascertained that such person has been 2uthorized to discuss CONFIDENTIAL E-2 IMPDET CL BY 794, ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== 13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL and handle this material and that his authorization has not been revoked , except in the performance of my official duties on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and in accordance with the requirenents set: forth in the rules Of such Connittee. 77102537- Signature Witness Date CONFIDENTIAL ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== 13-00000 Uuiiuliniiz fil CE RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON,D.C; 20505 HSC Mat . Fuln. Review Staff: 75[2563 20 August 1 Mr. A Searle Field Sec Staff Director '#sc Select Committee on Intelligence D- d/s Room 232 Cannon House Office Building. Washington D.C._ 20515 Dear Mr. Field: Around the end of Mr. Roeder, obviously impressed by your admonitions about the need for security, asked if I could work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified documents _ Our Office of Security this together, and while I think Mr_ Roeder had in mind sornething more applicable to an individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to you for whatever use You care to make of it. Incidentally, we have not carried out the;physical survey of your quarters which you requested o 29 July. Ihave been in touch with Ms. Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recor- mendations for your consideration when that is done. Sincerely, le Jerrold B_ Brown Assistant to the Director Attachment: a/s cC: DOS ATIORAL SEcUITY INFORMATHON Clzcs:icd by_023ILT 9 Unjuthzrized Disztosuc Subjcct lo Exazp: {rori C;n3;,l b3#a Ctiminz} Seactions. Sckes &f E.O_ 1G32. 2x Cuegor;: 53 (V};, i), 43} <r 1778-1976 CONFIDENTHAL Dclcss,;icd' &ly C;) Fprovzi %f ;il9 Direetcr cf Cesirai In; ligels? 975 ecvr Iy July, put yet Revolutiov 1 1 ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== 13-00000 EOUFVEMAL 1 4 AUG 1975 MEMORANDUNM FOR: The Review Staff ATTENTION B . Jerrold B Brown VIA Acting Deputy Director for Adninistration SUBJECT House Select Committee on Intelligence Protection of Classified Materials REFERENCE Meno dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold B Brown, subject: Requast for Security Aids Id accordance with the request in the raferencad nemorandun for a "package" to be used by the House Select_ Committes on Inteliigence for the protection of classifiad material, the attached suggestions are provided for Your assistance In view of the Jack of 8 comprehensive phys - ical security survey 0f tha area which will be used to store the Connittee 5 classified material, specific Tec- omendations must b8 deferred. In this comnection, we plan to have Mr _ Edward J. McGrath Of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate represent- ativas of the Committeo for the specific purpose 0f con- ducting a security survey of the proposed" quarters in the Rayburg Building; For Your Sefectatoittes Mr_ Searlo Field, Staff Dlrector of the Hlousa Select on Intelligence, requested such 2 survey on 29 July 1975 _ Pending the rB- sults of tbis survey and its recomendations_ 9 tbe attached general physical securIty measures aro recomended in an Bffort to provide the requisite protection for the Con - mittee ' s clasgified material. 22pzz; Robert M Gambino Director 0f Security Atts. Distribution: ES . IMPDET 8 2 Adse CL BY 056966 1 ADD/A OS 5 12 065 CONFIDENTAL Orig ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== 13-00000 ATTACHMENT ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== 13-00000 COHFIDEHAL GENERAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OP CLASSIFIED MATERIAL 1 Designate a Committee. member 25 the Security Officer responsible for the overall control handling and protection of the classified material_ 2 Establish and maintain a registar of all Conmittee personnel who are authorized to roview classified naterial and insure that dO unauthorized personnel will have access :o the materials 3 Establish a central document control systei whereby a1l classified docuwonts are properly logged upon receipt and annotated as to disposition_ Dasignate 3 Document Control Clerk wko Mill b0 Specifically responsible for the logging and control of all classified material- Appropriate records should be established to reflect that all clessified material is properly in and out by dato and tine, to authori Ze83ed members of the Committee. 5 In the evont material is designated a5 being 0f 2 codeword Or compartmented nature, special physical security features a5 enunciated by tha Aa Hoc Security Committee of the Unitad States. Intelligence Board and later adopted as policy should ba adhered to (Spacifics regarding these requirenents will be provided in the course of the pending survey.) 6 A1l guards assigned to the physical security control ovBr the Committea ' $ storage area should be U . 5. citizens and possess @PpIO - priate security clearancas 7 , If feasible, a reading room should be es- tablished within the designated storage area CONFIDEMTAL ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== 13-00000 CONFIDENTHAL for the Committee' $ classified material, and all research and roview activities of the material should be restrictad to this area, 8 _ In those Iostances where the Comnittee meets in Executive session , every effort should ba made to insure that the site being used has been subjected to a technical security inspec- tion to negate the possibility of uauthorized transmitting or recording devices _ This area of concern could pose setious security deficien- cies in the event tha sam0 aroa would be used initially in public session and then closed for the Executive session without such an inspection being made. 9_ Adequats safoguards should be utilized in the transnisslon of classified ma terial udar the cognizance of the Committee from one area to another 10 _ Reproduction of portion of the Committee' $ classified nateriat B8o.i8 be Prohibited without the express approval of the Staff Director In this instance , notes_ extracts, summaries, etc-, made fzof &lassified material mus : eIs0 bo provided the same degree 0f protection as that provided to the sourCe matorial. 11. Access controls to the storage and reten- tion area snould bo established to insuro that only authorized personnel are allowed entrance . 12_ Storege of a11 clasgified material should be within the designated area a5 opposed to any areas or outside offices- 13_ Security protection should be provided to 211 Comittee transcripts during the tran- scription process as we1l &5 during the periods while they are in transit: 14_ A security,check procedure should ba estab- lished to inspect the areas where the Con - mittee weets at the tormination of each sossion to insure that no classifiod material 2 CONFIQENThAl ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== 13-00000 CONFIDENTHAL or notes, etc, at0 inadvertently left W - secured. (Attached are examples of Security Chock Sheets.) 15. Arrangenents should ba nade to insura that there ara adequate facilities for the destruction of Classified wasto naterial. In this instance such wasto naterial should be provided protection until its final destruction. 16 _ Only approved classified naterial destruc- tion nethods should be utilized_ (Details regarding this can ba obtained in the coutsO 0f tha pending survey.) 17 . A11 Comnittee personnel granted access to classifiod naterial by the Staff Director should be briefed on their obligations end fesponsibillties regarding tha unauthorized disclosura of such matorial 18 . Specific physical security recommendations applicab le ta tho proposed storage arba for tho Committae's classified matarial, consistent with sound security principles must be deferred until the coapletion 0f the survey This would also includa recommendations relative to tho type 0f storage containers Ihich the Committee proposes to uSe. 19 _ Pending the completion of 2 security survey at tne new storage site, it,i5 suggested that the protective measures currently in effect at tho temporary storage facility: in Room 232 , Cannon Buiiding, not be changed. CANFIDENTIAL ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== 13-00000 ATTACHMENT ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== 13-00000 SECURITY CHECK SHEeT SECUaiTy CHECK SHEET To OfEice of Security IRoom No; BUICOING SAFENo. ThRu: Component Security Officer FROM: To Lock To Lock RotATE DIAL four Consecutive TuRNS IN OnE direction ROTATE DIAL Four consEcUtive TURNS IN ONE directioN To CHECK To CHECK 32E8' DEPREss contROL DrAWER LATCH While DEPRESSING SAFESt DEPREsS CONTROL DRAWER LATCh While Depressing EACH DRAWeR LATCH AND Pull out Both DRAWERS, ON EAcH DRAWER LATCH AND PulL out both DRAWERS: ON 'Herring-HALL-MARVIN' SAFES' Turn DRAWER HANDLE To Right 'HERRINO-HALL-MARViN 'SAFES TuRN DRAWER HANOLE To Right (on now syp0, rleo Iateh) AND PulL DRAWERS OUTWARD: (a nom [Yp0, s4lbo Iateh) AND Pull DRAWeR] OUTWARD: VAULIS AND DoQaSAEES: TURN HANDLE BACK AnD Forth VAULIS AND Door34FES: TuRN HANDLE BACK AND Forth WhiLe PuLLinG Door OUTWARD: While Pulling Door QUTWARD, ALARM swITCHES: TurN To "Night Position ALARM SMITCHES: TURN To "Nioht Position CERTIFICA TION CERTIFICATION 7 CERTIFY, By Hy INITIALS BELOw; THAT HAVE OPENED OR [ CERTIFY, BY MY INITALS BELOY, THAT HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARH Month(s) 8 Month(s) D OPENED BY CLOsED By CheCked BY GUARD check 1 OPENED BY CLOSED BY CHECKED DY GUARD CheCk INItiALs TIME INITIALs TImE iNitiALs Time IniTiALs Time #FNtiats Time {INITIALS TIME fNITiALs Time INITIALS TImE F 1 8 1 1 orm (3) 1-63 108 OBSOLEtE PrEviOUS Editions ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== 13-00000 Area Security Check Sheet Items to be Checked Checker Desks (Including Drawers) Tables (Including Drawers) Chairs Floor Window Ledges Typewriters Stenotype Machines Reproduction Equipment Trash Receptacles Charts Exhibits, Chalkboards Notebooks Paper Pads > etc. (Check to insure that imprints of classified notes not present) ================================================== Page 35 ================================================== 13-00000 UNCLASSIFiED Uss 38 BQNFIQEMTIAL = CONFI . NTIAL SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) House Select Committee on Intelligence Protection of Classified Materials FROM: EXTENSION No_ IzA_tl752563_ 2 Au6 7f Director of Security 6777 DATE 1 4 Aug 1925 TO: (Officer designotion, Toom number , ard DATE building) OFFICER"$ COMMENTS (Number oach comMenf to show From whom INITIALS t whom, Draw lino Ocross column aftor each commant:) RECEIVED FORWARDED Edward Ryan Itucksr 7s8 BBACoxedinator 2_ ADD/A 7D- 26 Hqs _ 3 The Review Staff ue 6 D- 0120 Sey Mo Jr 5,Attn: Mr JerroTd B. BBrown 6 8 10. 12. 13_ 15. FO87 610 Usedir iqus SECRET Dowhanai IMTERNAL UNCLASSIFIED USE ONLY ================================================== Page 36 ================================================== 13-00000 CONFUBEHTHAL 1 4 AuG 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff ATTENT ION Mr Jerrold B Brown VIA Acting Deputy Director for 'Administration SUBJECT House Select Committee on Intelligence Protection of Classified Materials REFERENCE Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/ Sec from Jerrold B Brown , subject: Request for Security Aids In accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a "package" to: be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance In view of the lack of a comprehensive phys - ical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee:'s classified material specific rec- ommendations must be deferred. In this connection , we plan to have Mr Edward J McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with Spec{RRc Purpos represent- atives of the. Comittee for the purpose of con - ducting 3 security survey 0f the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building For your information Mr Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Comittee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975 _ Pending the re sults of this survey and its recommendations the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to. provide the requisite protection for the Com - mittee ' s classified material Robert W . Gambino' Director of Security Atts _ Distribution: E3 IMPDET Orig 8 2 Adse CL BY 05.6966 1 ADDIA 0S 5 12 065 CONFIDENThAL ================================================== Page 37 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET Tepei] frow ^ THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE #Ed:e" 07> WASHINGTON; . C:' 20505 Intelligence Community Staff DCI/IC 75-2620 2 September 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Member s of USIB 'Ad Hoc Coordinating Group SUBJECT House Select Committee on Intelligence Attached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, outlining security arrangements made by the House Select Committee on Intelligence. (wA € -huo Jack E. Thoma s Major} General, USAF (Ret. ) Chief; Coordination Staff, ICS Attachment This Document Be Downgraded to Unclassified When Removed From Attachment CLASSIFIED Si 356793 Eshft F3o4 GENERAL DECL,ASSIFICATIOY Sclisi le CF E 0. 18352, Exe::PIion CaTECORY: 8 58(! , (. (3} or {4) (circle 076 Qt mjro) Ai; maTicALLY DECLASSIFIED UN Date_In2)s sible_to_Determine ualess impoeg ble, inaert dale uI rvent) SECRET May ================================================== Page 38 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE SECOM-D-105 2 September 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS SUBJECT House Select Committee on Intelligence On 29 August 1975 , Mr , Robert Gambino, Director of Security / CIA; Mr . William H. Standiford, Deputy Chief, Physical 'Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence at the invitation of Mr _ A. Searle Field, Staff Director of the Committee. We believe the security arrangements made and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented information. Attached is a memorandum' outlining the security arrangements. '17ac44 )i1czxa Donald E. Moore Chairman Attachment This Document Be Downgraded to Unclas sified When Removed From Attachment ClASsified EY 356793 ExEmiPT Fc3m GENERAL DECLASSIFICTION SCIIEDCLz Cf E. 0 11352, ExexfTion CATEGORy: 8 SE(; (, (3) or {4) (circlc onc or more) Ai;ioi TicALLY DECLASSIFXED ON Date Impos sible to Determine (unless impossible, insert da(c 0r event) SECRET May ================================================== Page 39 ================================================== 13-00000 OLUOLI 2 September 1975 Houge Select Committee_on Intelligence 1 The House Select Committee staff is now located in its permanent space, B-316, Rayburn Building. Ms _ Jacqueline Hess is the Securz Officer, telephone number 225-9696. 2. The only entrance is through B-316 and the space consists of several adjoining offices all served by an inner walkway. A member of the Capitol Police is stationed at & guard desk inside the door and admits authorized individuals _ Visitors must sign in with the guard, who' calls the appropriate staff employee and visitors are allowed access to the space only in the company of staff employees_ Interview rooms are located in the staff area but separated from the work area During non-work hourg two ds are on in the space. 3. All classified material is kept in,a secure area atthe: rear of the space with one entrance to the secure rooma This room is to be locked at all times when specified,erployees are not on in the room. At the present time, Ms , Hess is the only one who will be able to open the secure area and unles8 circumstances change this arrangement will continue_ 4 . All classified material is kept in this secure area, and stored in approved safes with three-way combination locks. At present, Ms . Hes8 i8 the only person who possesses the combination to,these,safes. 5 . R eading of classified documents is to be in a reading area, consisting of several tables, in the secure area_ A staff employee desiring access to a clas sified document must make a request for Ms . Hess then obtains it, the employee reads it in the secure area and it is then returned to Ms. Hess for return to the safe cabinet. Staff employees have been advised that notes.taken from classified documents and material prepared from such notes or the documents must respect the original classification and receive corresponding security. Copying of classified documents i8 to be strictly controlled, is to be done only on a copying device located in staff S pace, and copie S are to receive the same security protection a8 the original. CLASSIFIE; 57 356793 Exemi?1' !rom GEERAL ECi.aSSIFICATION SCIKEJUiE 37 E_ 0_ 11352, {etion CiteCozX: 8 SB(t:, i2;, () of (4) (circlc onc or more) aij cmatically DEZLASSIFIED 0m SECRET Date ssible to Determin- (uuless imfnssiisl, insert tn(e or ovtnt) ity only duty guar duty it, Impo ================================================== Page 40 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET 6 The entire space has been swept and plans call additional periodic sweeping. There is 3 motion detector in the secure area which rings at the guard desk in the staff area and also at the main office of the Capitol Police in the Rayburn Building Tests have been made of this device and the response by the Capitol Police wa s immediate. Two doors which nor mally serve as access to the secure area from space occupied by other House Committees have been secured from the inside and alarms are to be installed on these doors. 7 Mr _ A_ Searle Field, Staff Director_ and Ms _ Hess: advised that staff employees have been alerted to telephone security and this will be continually stressed. Also have tried to instill strong security consciousness among all the staff. Mr. Field indicated that at present it is not expected the sfaff will total more than 35. SECRET for they ================================================== Page 41 ================================================== 13-00000 abk'_StRaThE inTermal USE $8" % House Armed Services Subcomittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear_Energy The Subcommittee on Intelligence and. Military Application of Nuclear Energy is newly established and the successor to the Special Subconittee on Intelligence Chaired by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi_ The new Sub- committee has" picked up the responsibility of the soon to be abolished Joint Comittee on Atomic Energy: and is expanding its staff accordingly Representative Melvin Price S Chairmanship is due to his years of membership on the Joint Comittee on Atomic Energy _ There will be an ever- increas_ involvement by the Subcommittee in military application of nuclear energy and we undoubtedly will be called upon to provide required foreign intelligence_ Members of the Subcomittee are as follows : Melvin Price (D. Ill.) , Chairman Charles H. Wilson (D. Calif.) Jack Brinkley (D. Ga . ) Dan Daniel (D, Va . ) G_ V _ Montgomery (D. , Miss . ) Ronald V . Dellums (D_ Calif.) Bob Carr (D. Mich.) Charles E. Bennett (D. , Fla. ) Samuel S , Stratton (D. N.Y.) Bob Wilson (R. Calif_ William L. Dickinson (R. Ala. ) Marjorie S _ Holt (R. Md . ) Robert W . Daniel, Jr_ (R. Va. ) Staff of the Subcommittee are as follows : John Ford, Staff Director William H. Counsel Adam J. Klein, Professional Mr _ Ford is Staff Director of the full Committee and replaced Mr _ Frank Slatinshek, former Chief Counsel, who retired_ Mr _ Hogan is Counsel of the Subcomittee and will be the principal staff man on Agency matters . Adam Klein is a specialist in atomic energy matters _ AdxANISTTATIYE INTERAL 6JE OaL} long ing Hogan , ================================================== Page 42 ================================================== 13-00000 ADMIMISTRATWE INTERNAL USE ONLY PROBLEMS A House Subcommittee on Intelligence_ and Military_Application_of Nuclear_Energy Former Chairman Lucien N . Nedzi fully exercised his perogatives as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and we could look to him for support in any problems developing with other committees and other members of the House not on the Subcommittee_ Based on the reactions of Chairman Melvin Price in the few instances that we have approached hin in this Congress for assistance it is quite evident that he is not the dominant' personality as was Chairman Nedzi and will not stick his neck out to defend the Agency _ Nor does it appear that the new staff director will be of the forceful personality as was Frank Slatinshek who was very helpful in a number of problems _ A few weeks ag0 former Chairman Nedzi suggested that we resolve a problem involving Representative Donald M. Fraser by going to Speaker 0'Neill. This may have been his indication to us that we may have to look to House leadership to resolve problems _ Mr _ Nedzi also suggested that we contact someone in the White House on a problem. We . may be faced with needed White House support on a problem before we approach the leader- ship. B House Select Committee on Narcotics_Abuse and Control The extent of Chairan Lester L. Wolff' s oversight of .the Agency in Its narcotics collection activities still remains a looming problem. As indicated by the request for the seal, Mr Wolff intends to extend the Agency S activities to where there is maximum effective collection of foreign ' intelligence on narcotics trafficking leading to arrest and conviction without regard to the Agency 5 statutory prohibitions_ The solution rests with the Attorney General and the White House giving the Agency clear and precise guidelines to operate in this area which the Agency can then point to in any disputes that may arise with the Select Comnittee as to what the Agency 8 role should be. ADXILHISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE CHLY only ================================================== Page 43 ================================================== 13-O0000 PMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONT" House of Representatives (95th Congress, Ist Session) DEMcRn TS GEORGE E MAHON, Texas, Chairman pab lccans JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan ROBERT L F. SIKES, Florida ROBERT H MICHEL; Illinois EDWARD P: BOLAND, Magsachusetts SILVIO 0_ CONTE, Massachusetts WILLIAM H: NATCHER, Kentucky JOSEPH M, McDADE, Pennsylvania DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota TOM STEED, Oklahoma JACK EDWARDS, Alabama GEORGE E SHIPLEY, Illinois ROBERT C McEWEN, New York JOHN M. SLACK West Virginia JOHN T: MYERS, Indiana JOHN J, FLYNT, Jr , Georgia J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia NEAL SMITH, Iowa CLARENCE E MILLER, Ohio ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida JOHN J. McFALL; California JACK F: KEMP , New York EDWARD J PATTEN, New Jersey WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland RALPH S. REGULA, Ohio SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois CLAIR W. BURGENER, California FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado GEORGE M: OBRIEN, Illinois DAVID R: OBEY, Wisconsin VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska EDWARD R ROYBAL, 'California LOUIS STOKES, Ohio KEITH F_ MAINLAND GUNN McKAY, Utah Clerk and Staf Director TOM BEVILL; Alabama BLLL CHAPPELL; Florida BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri BILL ALEXANDER, Arkaneae EDWARD I KOCH, New York YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Penneylvania BOB TRAXLER, Michigan ROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon JOSEPH D EARLY , Massachusetta MAX BAUCUS, Montana CHARLES WILSON, Texas LINDY MRS HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana ADAM BENJAMIN, Jr-, Indiana NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington Subcommittees AGRICULTURE RELA TED Whitten, Evans, Burlison, Baucus, Traxler, Alexander, Sikes, AGENCIES Natcher Andrews, Robinson, Myers DEFENSE Mahon, Sikes, Flood, Addabbo, McFall, Flynt, Giaimo, Chappell, Burlison Edwards, Robinson, Kemp DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Natcher; Giaimo, Wilson, McKay, Burke, Benjamin Burgener, Kemp FOREIGN OPERATIONS Long, Obey, Koch, Wilson, Yetes, Burke, Roybal, Stokes Young, Conte, Smith HUD -INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: Boland, Traxler, Baucus, Stokeg, Bevill, Boggs, Burlison, Alexander Coughlin, McDade, Young INTERIOR McbedeceguLongEtong Murthe, Duncan, Dicks, Whitten Armstrong LABOR_HEALTH, EDUCATION Flood; Natcher, Smith, Patten, Obey, Roybal, Stokeg, Early WELFARE Michel, Conte, O Brien LEGISLATIVE Shipley, Benjamin, Giaimo, McFall, Murtha, Traxler Armstrong; Coughlin;, Cederberg MILITARY CONSTRUCTION McKay, Sikes, Murtha, Steed, Long, Chappell McEwen, Regula PUBLIC WORKS Bevill, Boland; Whitten, Slack, Boggs, Dicks, Shipley, Chappell Myers, Burgener, Smith STATE, JUSTICE; COMMERCE Slack; Smith; Flynt, Alexander; Burke, Early & JUDICIARY Cederberg, Andrew8, Miller TRANSPORTATION McFall, Steed, Koch, Duncan, Benjamin, Smith, Addabbo, Evang Conte, Edwards; @ Brien TREASURY-POSTAL SERVICE Steed, Addabbo, Roybal, Patten, Boland, Flynt GENERAL GOVERNMENT Miler, McEwen NOTE: Mr: Mahon, &8 Chairman of the Committee and Mr; Cederberg: 29 Renking Minority Member; are ex ofcio members of all subcommittees of which are not regular members OPo 86288-b Janvarv %0, 1077 . 4e they ================================================== Page 44 ================================================== 13-00000 ~Qusts C aZ~ 524' House Appropriations Committee team: Room 2 D 0117 Telephones : 5848 , 5849 (B) and 1570 (R) 880/ Leonard MJ (Bucky) WALTERS Badge: blue House Committee Clearances: SI TK, BYECOM 8 Charles 8. '(Chuck) HAYNES green nozescort Clearances: SI ) TK, BYECOM Eugene B_ XILHELM Badge: Mue House Committee Clearanges : 1 BYECOM George C BAIRD (Carter) Badge; blue House Committee Clearances: SI, TK , BYECOM Leon F (Frank) SCHWARTZ Badge: blue House Committee Jehn LayteA Supervisory officials of HAC Surveys 8 Investigations Staff (not to be stationed at Hqs bldg, but may visit from time to time) : Cornelius' R_ (Lefty) ANDERSON, Chief Badge: green no-escort Marion S . RAMEY Deputy Chief Badge: blue House Committee OX 7-9371 James Brian HYLAND Badge: XIONWNEX blue House Committee (x*1: Badge: TK, ================================================== Page 45 ================================================== 13-00000 2 August 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Initial Meeting with House Appropriations Committee Survey Group 1 An initial session wa s held on 30 July 1976 of about one and a half hours with six persons from the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee . to-discuss the purpose of their survey of the Directorete of Operations and to propose some arrangements to govern their access to Agency personnel and documents The` following attended : Mr Cornelius (Lefty) Anderson , Chief of Surveys and Investigations Staff Mr Marion Ramey Deputv Mr Leonard (Bucky) Walters who will head the team inspect the Directorate of Operations Mr Charles (Chuck) Havnes team menber Mr Eugene Wilhelm, team member (former Agency employee) Mr George C _ Baird , team member Attending for the Agency were: Mr Theodore Shackley , who chaired the meeting Mr Robert Gambino Mr Lyle Miller Mr Thomas B_ Abernathy Mr Richard Point Mr Philip F . Fendig 2 _ The meeting followed reasonably well the attached agenda which was made available to a11 at the beginning of the meeting_ The following paragraphs summarize the important points covered 3 , Scope: Mr Shackley asked the group to define its mission 9 noting some of the topics mentioned in recent conversations with Mr Snodgrass suggested particular interests whereas the Committee S report on the FY 77 budget Sh ing ================================================== Page 46 ================================================== 13-00000 had suggested a different orientation Mr Anderson ) characterizing the enterprise a5 2 survey rather than an investigation, stated that his instructions were from the Chairman of the Committee : they called for a detailed review of the operation of the Directorate in its entirety. Mr Walters would mention certain particular interests noted below 9 but that did not set limits to the ultimate scope of the survey . Mr Walters then took over: a He expects to do a complete review, from the managerial and substantive standpoint of the Directorate - His initial interests indicated an auditor 5 approach to these questions how budgets are compiled >' examination of accounting procedures for regular and special funds 9 cost systems and the like _ b He went on however ) to the management aspects which they would also pursue to determine the results of the Directorate ' s operations the value of intelligence produced versus the costs involved in procuring it and areas of possible overlap in collection with the military and with NSA C Specific areas which would be explored given = 9 as examples included contingency reserves, the "special retirement fund" (presumably referring to MHMUTUAL ) the procedures for reimbursing the State 'Bepartment for cover and support proprietaries (how created their justification value and effectiveness) safe - houses and "CA cadres _ Mr Anderson reluctantly agreed to Mr Shackley' s request for a memorandum spelling out these objectives in sufficient detail S0 that we could take the managerial steps necessary to resolve any conflicts in the priority of the time of our managers and senior operations officers who would be involved in current operations as well a5 overlapping inquiries from- other groups concurrently oversee the Directorate Mr Anderson also asked for any ongoing studies which the Directorate might have which would aid the team in its work. SFEET 2 ing ================================================== Page 47 ================================================== 13-00000 233 4 _ Duration: The team 5 first objective will be to render an interim report to the Committee by 1 January 1977 _ 9 in order to meet the mandate that the survey be used in considering the Agency' s FY 1978 budget = The team wishes to start work immediately and will consist of either Six or seven memhers who will occupy space in Headquarters building and presumably do most of their work here; it was brought out 9 however, that the team would also interview users of our intelligence and other collectors There was ambiguity in the projection of the total length of the survey; I interpreted Mr Anderson 5 remarks to indicate that he expected the team to be with us for most of calendar Year 1977 _ 5 , Security Mr Anderson explained the arrangement by which the Comittee limits access by even the members of the Subcommittee to the reports of his group; they must be reviewed in a specified area and they are stored in very limited numbers in the tower of the Capitol in the special facilities there for the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress Mr . Ganbino explained the arrangenents for badges , certification 0f clearances and provided for the team S consideration a copy of the "non-disclosure agreement" which we would like members to sign_ There was considerable discussion_ and some objection, to the issuance of blue badges which will provide access to virtually a11 parts of the building but which must be turned in and' picked up at the entrance each day - This arrangement was reluctantly accepted but it was made clear at lunch and in later discussion with the team and with Mr Anderson they are unhappy with this slight infringement on their convenience and physical access to the building_ 6 Access: Of more concern was the Agency position that the SATDOTO would serve as a control point for the team S further access to individuals and documents in the Directorate The requirement was explained in terms of the need to record , against later requirements such as in fact now in progress ste emming from another investigation 9 the names , subject matter and general content of matters discussed by Agency officers with team members The requirement to 'monitor was explained as an effort to keep this type of record rather than to impose a third party from the office of SA/ D0/0 on a11 interviews; the latter was clearly considered by the team to be an unreasonable intrusion . It was agreed after some discussion that we would proceed with SECPET 3 ================================================== Page 48 ================================================== 13-00000 system outlined in the attached agenda and that we would recons ider procedures later if seemed clearly to be unwieldy _ We : ant elpated _ however that once the team splits into smaller groups as is pianned , and pursues particular areas of inquiry it will be possibie to evolve a workable system which meets the objectives. of both parties . 7 Other: There appears to be no difficulty in protecting identities of sources , providing documents in sanitized form" ma intaining notes only in this building and at the appropriate security level and' introducing some officers under cover in alias where necessary al1 these points were noted and none was objected to Space and other facilities may be cramped but it appears to be possible to provide adequate space adjacent to the SA/DQ/0 offices Mr Anderson began by not the outstanding cooperation on the Angola and COMINT surveys done in the building (in which relatively free access to personnel and files had been afforded his team) and ended by stating that the coming survey was not a witch hunt nor an investigation of abuses and that therefore he believed that such access could have very beneficial results fo r the Agency _ It was agreed to begin the survey formally with a briefing by the DDO or ADDO on 3 or 4 August 1976 _ Mr Walters with several team members will however, set up shop on 2 August to review such general briefing papers as Mr , Fendig can make available to them at that time _ (signea) Philip F. Fendig. Philip F Fendig SA/DO/0:PFFendig:j1 (7368/1398) Distribution: (al1 w/att) Orig 8 1 DDO ADDO OLC (Mr Miller) D/ SEC (Mr Gambino) 1 SGAPDDOMr Point) SA/ DDCI (Mr Bolten) SA/ D0/0 E2 IMPDFT SKBEET CL BY 012860 they ing ================================================== Page 49 ================================================== 13-00000 SEc E7 AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMITTEE STAFF: 30 JULY 1976 [ntzla A Request statement from Committee representatives of scope duration and proposed procedure to be followed_by Committee investigators B , Discussion of arrangements for investigation: 1_ Facilities DDO will provide office space, telephones and secure storage facilities for investigators Parking Spaces and cafeteria priveleges will also be provided 2 _ Security: a _ Badges allowing unescorted access to Headquarters building Will be issued 9 to be picked up and left with receptionist. Agreement to be signed when badge issued per current procedures governing a11 Congressional staffs b Clearances through necessary level to be obtained prior to commencenent of briefings or interviews level to be determined on basis of first meet ing _ 3 _ Access: a _ Orientation briefings on Directorate and its subdivisions to be offered . b Access to personnel and docuents within Agency to De controlled by_Qffice_of SALDOOL which will maintain record of a11 interviews and of documents provided . Documents to be provided upon specific request for study_ within_building_ will be sanitized to protect_ sources and methods using_gudelines_previously established for HSC and SSC They ================================================== Page 50 ================================================== 13-00000 d_ Documents to be examined_by_the investigation team within Headquarters building- If copies of documents are des ired . inves tigators will request them from SA/ DO/0 who will see that they are provided_promptly in appropriate cTassified and sanitized form If required by the Committee (outside Headquarters building) same procedure will be followed but will be subject to review by SA/ DO/0 _ Formal questions are to be put in writing in order to provide proper and full context S0 that most complete and pertinent answers can be provided _ f SA/DO/0 to monitor al1 interviews _ g . Discussion of note-taking and reports : (1) Maintenance of proper_Security and classification (2) Notes to retain sane level 0f security @Tassification as documents or interviews on which they based ================================================== Page 51 ================================================== 13-00000 ADMIC STRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONI This notice_expires 31 Jenuary 1978 DON 5-218 DD NOTICE GENERAL NO. 5-218 August SURVEY BY MEMBERS OF TE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMITTEE STAFF 1. GENERAL Members of the staff of the House Approprietions Com- mittee began an extensive examination of the Directo rate of Operations beginning the week of 2 August 1976. They expect that it will teke approximately 17 months to complete this study - They stete their ectivities are necessary to better uderstand the eppropriations process _ They emphasize that their objective is not to dig out evidence of wrongdoing or improper activi- ties. The steff members activities will be coordi- nated through SA/w/o. The following paragrephs attempt anticipate the procedures necessary to exercise orderly control over the staff'8 activities . These ` procedures may be swbject to modi ficetion as future experience may dictete_ 2 _ LOCATION Members of this Congressionel staff heve been issued I1 blue badges bearing the words Comittee" which permit uescorted access to all non-specielly controlled areas of the buile including the main cafeterie_ The staff will be. provided suitable vate office space in Room 2 D 0117, adjacent to the office of the SA/bo/0 , which will be reloceted in Room 2 D 0109 8 of 6 August 1976. It 18 expected that they will initi- elly heve a greater interest in interviewb then they do in documents _ Since they will have adequate office space interviews shoula be conducted within their premises . 3. CONTROL OF DOCUMEWTS a, The staff i9 'expected to make any requests for documentetion to the SA/Do/o. Indivi dual officerg ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL; USE ONLY 1976 to "House ding, pri- ================================================== Page 52 ================================================== 13-00000 ADMINTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY DON 5-218 DDO NOTICEE GENERAL NO _ 5-218 August 1976 who receive requests from steff members for docu- ments should ask that the request be to the SA/po/o_ All docuents provided to the SA/o/o for trensmittel to steff will be logged in by the SA/0/ and logged back to the component after the staff has completed its study . The SA/do/o will not, as a matter of routine procedure, retein a copy of the docuent concerned_ b Ail documents will be properly sanitized to protect sources and methods The steff has indicated thet it does not anticipate any need for such detail and accepts the principle of sanitization_ questions concerning the degree of sanitizetion should be referred to the SA/w/o_ Groud rules for sanitizetion are similar to those applied during the activities of the Select Committees _ General delines will be provided separately. On receipt of a docuent back from the SA/b/ the recipient should indicate the date received, and that it had been made available to the staff The docuent should be retained by the recipient in the form in which it wes provided to the staff for possible further reference; the record copy of the docuent should als0 reflect the fact that a sanitized copy wes provided to the staff further copies of docuents requested by the steff will be made only by the office of the SA/m/o _ 4_ INTERVIEWS 8. A representative from the office of the SA/Do/o will not necesgarily be present during interviews . All interviews shoula be requested by the staff through the SA/m/o_ The SA/do/o will maintain a record of the date of interview; the name of the person interviewed, ard whom; the elias if one is used; and the sujects discussed _ A form will be provided to the interviewee to record 2 ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY put the Any gui Any by ================================================== Page 53 ================================================== 13-00000 ADMIAETSTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONI v DON 5-218 DDO NOTICE GENERAL NO. 5-218 4 August 1976 the essentiel facts . He should retain one copy for possible future reference and One copy should be forwerded to the SA/po/o_ b_ It i8 recognized that the badge access and the length of the btey in the building by the btaff members mey lead to wscheduled contacts . If such contacts are connected with the officiel duties of the staff, then appropriete comments should be forwarded to SA/w/o on the form cited above Officers should be careful not to ellow conversations to drift to area8 of interest not covered by official interviews If this does take place_ however, we shall rely on the officer concerned to inform the SA/po/o of these develop- ments _ 5 . SECURITY The blue badge should be sufficient to indicate that steff members should be treated 08 visitors in the presence of persons not connected with their officiel duties _ Persons introduced uder alias should be careful that the alias i8, protected if 8 chance meeting takes plece in the presence of other col- leagues _ In this connection , persons interviewed should be careful not to expose essociates who have not been interviewed. William W. Wells Deputy Director for Operations a/dbci (mu. &e~) 76 27 ` 3 ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY 18Qus ================================================== Page 54 ================================================== 13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL 27 August 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divis ions and Staffs FROM Philip F. Fendig SA/DO/ 0 SUBJECT Guidance for Interviews with House Appropriations Committee Staff REFERENCE DON 5-218 _ ) 4 August 1976 1 . You have been scheduled at the time indicated on the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations Staff team from the House Appropriations Committee_ The subjects which the team would like You to cover are contained in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting on 25 , August 1976 and discussed at that meeting _ I have explained_ to the Surveys and Investigations team that topic e (personnel policy and practices) wili be discussed at a separate briefing to be given by the Chief Career Management Group _ You should touch on the other topics suggested in the memorandum mentioned above 2 _ General guidelines are; contained in reference notice The following may be helpful , however in preparing Your briefing_ Our general intention is to be a5 forth- coming a5 possible while drawing the line clearly at any information which would lead to the identification of a specific source intelligence method person or group With which the, Agency_ has a ceiaEGOR;hipio of confidence , or confidential matter involving a cooperating foreign intelligence service The fact of liaison with foreign services can in most cases be acknowledged but details of the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared operations should not be disclosed . 3 _ In the briefing contemplated on management policies and practices most of the above sensitive areas would not appear to arise, but You may find that questions will tend to out some more sensitive areas and these should be aeferfed with an agreement of looking into the possibility of: providing further information later The staff has already had access to basic budgetary material, including funds and CONFIDENTIAL ================================================== Page 55 ================================================== 13-00000 CuialVeIWIIAL personnel strengths broken down by component and a listing by cryptonyms and fund levels of ali OPACTS They have been given a briefing on the current organization of the Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff elements will shortly be reorganized . They have a listing of a11 overseas stations and bases If You have further questions on material already provided to the Committee, please check with this office 4 _ Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place in room 2 D if possible a member of my staff will be present - We Owouia fppcecibte however a short Memorandum for the Record, using the attached "Interview Form" as a general guide_ Space is somewhat limited_ but you should bring any: personnel You desire to have participate in your "E,i4PRSEting- The Surveys and Investigations team is aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover status; please advise this office if any persons intend to use an alias during these briefing sessions 5 _ We will be, happy to assist in any way , including follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of these briefings 8 Philip Fendig att E2 IMPDET CL BY 012860 CONFIDENTIAL ing ================================================== Page 56 ================================================== 13-00000 044 August 18 , 1976 MEMORANDUM FORa Mr Philip F Fendig SA/DO/0 FROM L M. Walters Staff Member House AppropSiations Committee Surveys and" Investigations Staff Request arrangement for comprehensive briefings with appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below be provided to HAC SG I Staff members George C . Baird and Leon F Schwartz . 1 Paramilitary Covert Action Cadre Provide in this briefing data relating to the organization_ utilization and cost data for this activity for the periods FY 74 75 76 and projected data for FY 77 and FY 78 Organizat ionai data should include manning and equipment levels for the aforementioned periods 2 . Reorganization of the Directorate of Operations Briefing should include rationale behind the proposed reorganization and manpower and dollar savings to be effected by such a change _ If additional expenditures in either dollars or manpower: positions are involved iusGetifitiox should accompany the presentation_ Explain detail how the Directorate of Operations plans to absorb the FY 77 loss of 100 manpower positions: if imposed in the pending Appropriations Bill. 3 The_Special Projects_Group Explain the rationale behind the transfer 0f Israel from the Near East Division and providing it with special status by placing it directly under DDO _ Additional manpower and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed , 4 Coordination Within the_Intelligence_Community Briefing should show the identity and purposes of the various task groups established (both within CIA and community - ================================================== Page 57 ================================================== 13-00000 wide) which have been specifically established to deal with the collection VS analysis problem _ Impacts and changes brought about or anticipated within DO a5 a result of these groups actdons should be' covered 5 Management Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff and Division (a separate briefing by each) including but not Timited to: a Overview of role of staff or division b Decision-making processes and how coordinated in DO, CIA and intelligence community Organizational structure d . Program. development and execution from initiation to budget to implementation including development of annual plans their flexibility, and degree of autonomy of case officers chiefs of stations ) desk officers and division or staff directors Personnel policies and practices including recruitment training promotion, position classification, establishment of station complements and rotational policies . f_ Management and accounting controls to assure compliance with laws executive orders policies and regulat ions and assurance that funds and other assets are properly used expended and receipted for _ Wh ile the order of arranging the presentations is not critical it is suggested that_ 9 if possible, item (1.) be presented earliest and that item (5,) be instituted the week of 30 _ Please coordinate with either Mr Baird or ayseli"so for prompt scheduling of these sessions Also , it would be appreciated if a copy 0f charts or other documentary material used in thepresentations could be provided to the attendees during each briefing session Z ing ================================================== Page 58 ================================================== 13-00000 BENDER WILL CHECK CLASBFICAH Top AND Bottom UNCLA SSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP To NAME AND Address DATE IniTiALs MI Fe~dig AcIOH DIRecT_ REPLY PREPARE REPLY Approval dispatch RECOWMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CoNcurrence InforMatvon SIenaturE Remarko , Ustrio : To Soeuk, Sum Fot Ynu wo J sur &Eckt06 6 Lw 1,7 2d/o 76-325) 7 26 mra 1916, wra Uu A(dd0m [niln WUa T1 Snodka Ajs 0 MB0 . Gw Meluu 4 4 cen Ien & DcI %9 alm %s Ils bmivbk 01 Ue 4rw nulcr ( m dL ) FOLD HERE To RETURN To SENDER FROM: NAME, Addre3s ANO PHONE No_ Date Walmlr 10 5n6 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET ForU WQ 237 Uso previous edilions (0) 1-67 ================================================== Page 59 ================================================== 13-00000 S E C R E T in attempting to be both 'thcoming and helpful to him and the Committee in understanding the DDO' $ problems. At the same time Mr . Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr _ Shackley, he continued_to_be_irritated_with the totalitr_ef_the Agencys attitude toward providing him with_data Mr Snodgras8 then launched into a litany on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he perceived them in the time frame_February _to May 1976 _ With that as a backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry &s to the Agency wa S not willing to him fullaccess_to _Management_by Objective docu- ments - The dialogue Which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective documents he will not be able to have a firm_understanding_of _DDOman- pewerallocation_procedures_ Secondly, Mr . Snodgrass claims that CIA's position that it win show Management_by_Qbjective_documents_to member 5 of the Committee_and not the Staff is an obstructionist _tactic. His that the members of the Committee do not havethe_time to look at such documents and they thus depend on_theCommitteeStaff for this type of substantive review According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the Agency will not provide_data to the Staff, it is in fact denying_information to the Committee members: Attempts were made by Mr_ Shackley to show now men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley re- iterated the PDO position_that access to Management bY_Qbiective_docu- ments Mr. Snodgras 6 would impact adversely_on_the_whole question 0f sources andumethods as well as the _integrity of the reporting system As a followup to this position an effort wa s made to find out exactly what it wa s about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr_ Snodgrass did not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an examination of the Management by Objective documents. It was hoped that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered which would enable 68 to deal with Mr . Snodgrass problems . Our probes in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can conclude that Mc_Snodgra 88 is committed to finding gome_sort of 2 formula Qr_equation which will enable him to test Qur_manpower allocation syster We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that &0 S E C R E T for long why give point being by only ================================================== Page 60 ================================================== 13-00000 S E C R E T 7 into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower guch as wk t targets are in a country, what arethe_great_power_interests in a particular country, what i6 the operational environment in the country i. e. permissive or not, what are the cover pos Sibilities, what are Qur liaison equities, and what are our needs for regiona] support from a particular country. Thege explanations are taken aboard by Mr Snodgrass, but he is looking for somethingelge which has less variables in it when, in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to commit treason_ This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell him that we haven't already told him: (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr . Snodgrass is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropria - tions Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget: Once this task is completed Mr Chin, OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass will try to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are_the_manpower_issuesthat trouble Mr:_Snodgrass. In this context Mr. Chin has been asked to try to determine if a review, position-by-position 0f two or three_typical Stations within the_ DDO mieht_give Mr. Snodgra ss the insight into manpower cations that he is currently Beeking. 9 _ Comment. In net 2sse8sment terms one would have to conclude that the 25 meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from this kind of an encouter_ On the one hand the attached briefing book which wa$ examined by Mr. Snodgrass wa & accepted by the latter as a first rate product. For this the A gency high marks_ On the other hand, the Management by Objective sybtem, because he can't see the documents leaves Mr. Snodgrassfrustrated and irritated_ This evokes acrimonious complaints from Mr. Snodgra8s with the end result being that the_burden for seeking a solution to a problem created by Mr . Snodgrass is placed @np the Agency: In short, we have ended up where we expected to be _ Put another way ,_ there appears_to_be_no_progpect for establishing_the_type % dialogue with Mr. Snodgrass_whichsa tisfies eiterests 0f both parties. we @e inexitahky doomed to bejng in an adversary relationshie wih although it is incumbent on 48 to continue to minimize to the extent that S E C RE T and allo- May gets him ================================================== Page 61 ================================================== 13-0 MBO Mr . Mahon . Would you please provide the Comittee staff with some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think appropriate? Mr _ Bush . I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with the Comittee off the recora, Mc Chairman_ But I am reluctant to do that, and I am even more reluctant to provide the docuents_themselves or to have their contents described to the Comittee bY anyone Who is not intimately familiar with espionage counterintelligence and covert action operations and with the entire managenent system used by the Operations Directorate_ There are a number Of reasons for mYposition_ One serious concern revolves around; the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry you propose_ One of the primary reasons that our internal' management system is effective is that participation is strictly Limited to_thoge_imediately concernea_ Given that we are all hunan beings _ there is no escaping the fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or at some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their _being Witten with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership_ There will be a tendency for the managers in the Eield to slant_their discussions of problems_and_to_exaggerate accomplishments Inevitably the net effect will be' to reduce the usefulness of the system: Another difficulty involves security_ To be useful for judging per- formance 2 the reports must be very detailed Thus discuss recruitments in terms 'of nubers the specific ccess Of agents to_information; recruit- ment techniquest and so forth. By the time all .this sensitive material On sources and methads is removed, any samples are going to consist primar= oE disconnected bits and pieces or of 'unenlightening generalizations_ And I have a third problem with this request. The reports thenselves are but one part of a very complex &nd thorough process we use for internal management _ It takes a detailed_familiarity with_the_process_to appreciate its effectiveness Thus I feel strongly that someone Erom the Agency who has that intimate knowledge should be present if and when want to consider the reports. X Fb Jx Oel may they ily you ~iT> Dcz Bust mo1 y TESTi Mt"tia Hawe

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