Transcript of 104-10337-10014.pdf
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Aaaac 7041033770014
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Cif ? ITOiYO
RELEhSE MNV FULL
2000
24 November , 1998
Memo for the Record
Subject
: JFK Records Review Lessons Learned
The CIA 8 JFK Collection is made up primarily of
records pulled together for the Warren Commission_ House
Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the
Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB) It contains a
significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related
material The current index is flawed and contains gaps
Release standards were liberal; bagically only source
identities and information_ names Of agents , employees under
cover Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were
redacted There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate
that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong _
I The JFR Act
Mandated review and declagsification projects can be
two-edged swords The JFK Act forced the Agency to review
records that should have been opened years ago The legal
requirement to presume release _ backed up an independent
review resulted in the opening of documents that clearly
woula not have been released under other programs However _
the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un -
realistic deadlines . inflexible standards and procedures
which created a major drain on all Agency review resources
and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency 9 release
program _
Unrealistic Deadlines
: The release dates set the
Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs
(searches _ inventorying and indexing) of a project of this
magnitude_ nor the time it would then take for a page-bY -
page review and- sanitization of classified documents _ For
example, initial indexing Of the collection was done On a
crash basis uging overtime employees and resulted in a
flawed database The revising, re-indexing and updating of
that database took several thousand man-hours and continues
today_
Mandated Procedures: NARA s and ARRB S interpretation
of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review
process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by
both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were
marginal_ to the story and to processing decisions by the
Board _ For example:
a Under the JFK Act every
piece of paper in the
collection was considered a "unique assassination record.
The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication _
Or
by
by
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For example_ one cable was files and processed 58 times in
the collection_
b The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be
reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion)
be acted on individually Even after the Board changed
procedures and accepted staff recommendations ingtead Of
reviewing each document _ the detailed tracking_ recording
and coding Of every deletion within each document required
processing resources well beyond what would be considered
reasonable for such a project A most sanitized documents
contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600
deletions and many over 100)
InflexibleStandarde The level of evidence required
by the Board to postpone what was generally considered
protectable information was extremely high and usually
required docmentation Of current harm Defenses based on
general principles such a8 official cover or sources and
methods were not acceptable_ This required the Agency to
dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to
support recommended postponements Again, much time was
spent on issues that were
marginal
to the JFK story For
example , several major evidence packages involving several
offices and presentations by senior agency officers and
officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect
Agency physical locations and names of employees and other
persons not related to the JFK story-
Three times during the six years of the project_ including
most of this past Year the JFK review effectively shut down
all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had
to borrow additional resources from other offices and review
projects to meet deadlines _ The JFK review will continue to
require a significant portion of HRP 8 resources through
FY99
II_ The Proce8b
There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review
that are applicable to other historical/systematic review
projects
:
We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which
can be either managerial or substantive
We need to establish early on what information is
already in the public domain and address the issue of
"official release in the context of each project _
Develop a strategylpolicy with the IROs concerning the
release Of information Be smart about it; do not accept
stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be
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released . At the same time_ avoid confrontations with them
on marginal or non-relevant information
On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective
way to handle the internal coordination requirements Of a
large project _ Without the DO' 8 JFK team on site it woula
have been impossible to complete the JFK project _
Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third
Agency documents ; include other agencies in discussions ; do
not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies
FOIA offices without this advance discussion
Maintain written,up-to-date project-specific
declagsification guidelines _ This is no small task _ A
9 "declassification guide must be flexible; no guide can
anticipate all the issue8 which will arise in a review
After six years_ we were still revising the JFK guidelines
in the last month Of the project
In establighing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do
a thorough , professional job as required by the project
activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above)
Ensure we have adequate support people for routine
processing tasks ; declassification involves both tough
substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing _
If possible inventorylindex all materials before the
review and procesging begins Experienced indexers are a
must Identification of duplicate documents should be a
part of any inventory or index _
III The Requebt8
(being drafted)
Attachment I [incomplete draft attached]
Description of the JFK Collection
Attachment II_ [being drafted]
[statistical summary of collection including size and status
of documents (RIFs , SANS , DIFS , NBR , etc.) ]
key
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CIA SRECuVLC~LFETTONS
RE_:
Fcll
DRAFT
Zuoo
12 December _ 1998
Memo for the Record
Subject : JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned
The CIA S JFK Collection is made up primarily of
records pulled together for the Warren Commission _ House
Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the
Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB) It contains a
Significant amount Of duplication and non-JFK related
material The current index 1s flawed and contains gaps
Release standards were liberal; bagically only source
identities and information,
1 names of agents _ employees under
cover Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were
redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate
that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong _
I Background (1992-1995)
The setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI
Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in
Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records
related to the assagsination Of President Kennedy DCI Gates
decided to start declassification process before Congress
passed legislation:
testified before Congress on 12 May 1992 about CIA 9
new openness policy and announced the declagsification
of the first folder of Oswald' s 201 (also known as the
pre-assassination file)
six boxes of the Oswald' s 201 were reviewed and
transferred to NARA by Oct_ 1992
The John F _ Kennedy Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992 :
it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination
Records Review- Board composed of non-government
individuals;
9 established' "a presumption of immediate disclosure
for records relating to.the aggagsination_
For first two years of its existence , the Historical
Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK
assassination records :
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there were two major releases of Agency records (August
1993 and August 1994)of approximately 227, 000 pages ;
joint HRG / DO teams reviewed additional assassination
related collections at National Archives (Warren
Commission) the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford Presidentiai Library
(Rockefellow Commission) plus
numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI ,
State_
1
Army etc. )
Due to delays in the appointment of its members and the
time required to hire and clear a staff the ARRB did not
actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995 It became
clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release
of far more information than the Agency had released in the
1992-94 review In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review Of the
previously released sanitized documents
approximately 808 of the 227 , 000 pages release in
1993-94 contained deletions
resources were taken from other projects and added
to JFK project to meet Board ' s monthly deadlines _
II_ The JFR Act and the ARRB
Mandated review and declassification projects can be
two-edged swords The JFK Act forced the Agency to review
records that should have been opened years ago The legal
requirement to presume release _ backed up by an independent
review resulted in the opening of documents that clearly
woula not have been released under other programs However _
the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un -
realistic deadlines inflexible standards and procedures
which created a major drain on all Agency review resources
and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency S release
program -
Unrealistic_Deadlines
: The release dates set by the
Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs
(searches , inventorying and indexing) of a project of this
magnitude _ nor the time it would then take for a page-by -
page review and sanitization of classified documents For
example_ initial indexing of the collection was done on a
crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a
flawed database The revising, re-indexing and updating of
that database took several thousand man-hours and continues
today _
Mandated Procedures NARA S and ARRB 8 interpretation
of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review
process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by
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both the Agency and Board staff on isgues which were
marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the
Board _ For example
:
a Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the
9 collection was considered a "unique assassination record .
The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication_
For example_ one cable was files and processed 58 times in
the collection
b The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be
reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion)
be acted on individually Even after the Board changed
procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of
reviewing each document the detailed tracking_
1
recording
and coding of every deletion within each document required
processing resources well beyond what would be considered
reasonable for such a project A most sanitized documents
contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600
deletions and many over 100)
Inflexible Standards The level of evidence required
by the Board to postpone what was generally considered
protectable information was extremely high and usually
required documentation of current harm Defenses based on
general principles such as official cover or sources and
methods were not acceptable _ This required the Agency to
dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to
support recommended postponements Again, much time was
spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story For
example , several major evidence packages involving several
offices and presentations by senior agency officers and
officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect
Agency physical locations and names of employees and other
persons not related to the JFK story_
Three times during the six years Of the project including
most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down
all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had
to borrow additional resources Erom other offices and review
projects to meet deadlines The JFK review will continue to
require a significant portion of HRP S resources through
FY99
IIIS The Proce88 and Lebbong Learned
There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review
that are applicable to other historical/systematic review
projects:
We need reviewers with broad Agency experience_ which
can be either managerial or substantive
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We need to establish early on what information is
already in the public domain and address the issue of
"official release in the context of each project
Develop a strategyIpolicy with the IROs concerning the
release of information Be smart about it; do not accept
stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be
released _ At the same time_ avoid confrontations with them
on marginal or non-relevant information
* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective
way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a
large; project _ Without the DO ' s JFK team on site it would
have been impossible to complete the JFK project
* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third
Agency documents ; include other agencies in discussions ; do
not drop documents into the black hole Of other agencies
FOIA offices without this advance discussion.
Maintain written, up-to-date project-specific
declasgification guidelines This is no small task . A
"declassification guide must be flexible; no guide can
anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review
After six years we were still revising the JFK guidelines
in the last month of the project _
In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do
a thorough , professional job as required by the project
activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above)
Ensure we have adequate support people for routine
processing tasks ; declassification involves both tough
substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing
* If possible inventory/index all materials before the
review and processing begins Experienced indexers are a
must Identification of
duplicate documents should be a key
part Of any inventory or index_
IV ARRB Requeste for Additional Information and Records
(see attached draft)
Attachment I Description of the JFK Collection
Attachment II [being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.]
[statistical summary of collection including size and status
of documents (RIFs SANs DIFs , NBR , etc.) ]
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9:Irs
doc
Iv
DRAFT : Section Il, ARRB Requests for Additional
Information and Records
1 Unlike most declassification projects the Agency' s
involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates
of a Federal statute= the JFK Act , and the powers it vested
in the Boara it established the Assassination Records
Review Boara (ARRB) In particular under Section 7 _ the
Act armed the ARRB with the authority to for records and
information, specifically:
(1) The Review Board shall have the authority
to act in a manner prescribed under this Act , in-
cluding 'authority to
7
(C) (ii) direct a Government office to make
available to the Review Boara and if necessary
investigate the facts surrounding, additional
information, records or testimony from
individuals which the Review Board has reason
to believe is required to fulfill its functions
and responsibilities;
(F) hold hearings_ administer oaths and subpoena
witnesses and documents _
This substantial authority provided the ARRB and its staff
with almost unlimited access to' Agency records and
personnel _ It also was the basis for a number of specific
requests from the Board to the Agency for additional
information_ document searches and explanatory papers HRP
designated this ARRB activity, Special Requests During
its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three
special requests _ CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37 _
2 Categories of Requests:
Krp
red
dig
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Although each request had unique characterigtics,
all began as a request by the Board or an
ARRB staff member
on behalf of the board for information _ The requests fell
generally into five broad categories as follows
a Requests for access to basic information which
would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational
structure and how it operated around the time of the
assassination which included: Requests for organizational
charts briefings , mission statements_ etc. ; review of over
histories of CIA offices and projects; a review Of the
so-called 0
'Breckinridge files; and , a search for an IG
index of Oswala reports
b Requests about methodologieg which included: How
cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time
period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source
registry; and, the assignment and use of alias s pseudonyms
crypts _ etc.
C Requests for subject specific matters which
included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the
existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald' s pre assassination
files; and_ a search for any documents or information
detailing the Agency- s involvement in transporting and
processing the Zapruder film_
d. Requests for project_speaific information and
files _ which included: Requests for information and files on
AMWORLD , QKENCHANT an index to the HTLINGUAL materials , and
the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes
Requests for individual specific information
and files which included both CIA and CIA associated
individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on
individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia
Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular
"George Bush; and, the files on William Pawley _
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3 How a Request was Worked Following receipt of a
request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component (s)
to conduct a search , the materials found were first reviewed
by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB
staff_ ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials
and identified those which it believed were relevant to
their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal
queue to be reviewed and processed for release However
the mere
identification of materials dia not equate to
automatic release _ Rather _ if particularly sensitive
information was involved, negotiations took place and, on
occasion, a written statement about the materials was
provided for release vice the actual document (s)
4x. The Agency 8 written responses to each request
either a letter or memoranda included, of course_ the fact
the materials designated were to be processed for release
according to then current guidelines The ARRB staff then
wrote its own version of the request_ search, and response _
Both of these are a part of the public record on this
project .
S. Lessons learned: A nuber of things surfaced as
HRP worked to complete these requests which required
considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution_
a_ First among these was the fact there existed an
outside Board which asked for information and carefully
monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with
subpoena authority) without doubt caused documents and
information to be founa and made available that woula not
have been provided to an internal declassification project _
b Second , for any large project such as JFK to be
successful, there is an absolute requirement that each
directorate and independent office identify two responsible
persons a senior management official who can ensure that
deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external
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authority) are met; and , a senior focal point officeri who
has the substantive knowledge and background to both-locate
all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity_
Third, the individuals identified and appointed
in sub-paragraph "b" next above must be fully versed in the
guidelines which pertain to each specific project _ They
cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of
their searches or the conditions' governing releasel
redaction/denial of materials_
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ATTACHMENT #1
CIA'S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION
Oswald Files
Pre-assassination "201 " file ~approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of
the assassination: Released in 1992 with minimal deletions.
DO.201 File_(Approximately 26.000pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing
with the assassination Or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre-
assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the
Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials
plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A
microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select
Committee on Assassination (HSCA):
The DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a
declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer
deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB Additional documents, filed into the
201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998.
Office of Securty File (2041pages):; Contained Oswald documents, FBI
investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201,,
was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the
Agency's JFK" collection: The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997 . A
declassified version of the file was released in 1998.
DCD "A" File (41pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered
collection. ' The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release.
Marina Oswald's.201 fle copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection
was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original file be
reviewed for release by September 1999.
The ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files
be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to
NARA in October 1998.
The Sequestered Collection
At the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files,
documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc ) collected or prepared in response to its
investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not
reviewed by the HSCA staff.
JFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency's JFK collection:
are the working filesimaterials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of
issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include
key
They
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approximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its
staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA
including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight
boxes of security files and Mexico cable chrono files: The boxes contain a
significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple
times in this part of the collection) A declassified version was released in August 1993,
then re-released under ARRB in 1997 .
JFK Microfilm (72 reels): These reels are copies of Agency files that were made
available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion
of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes
approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of
AntilCastro Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and
production files from Mexico The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald
files except for the security file.
DCI Morning Meeting Minutes
This file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI's Moring Meetings
that refer t0 JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search
for the minutes was in response to an FOIA The material was turned over t0 HRG in
1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection:
Russ Holmes' Working Files (19 boxes)
Russ Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination
records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agencys Iiaison officers with the HSCA
during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered
collection He continued in this role until 1992.
As the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK
reference file know as the "Ancillary Collection" (13 boxes) The contents are primarily
duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the
sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains
some non-related material reflecting Holmes' involvement in other FOIA, etc requests.
There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his
office transferred to HRG when he retired: These 19 boxes became know as the "Russ
Holmes Working Files" and were declared assassination records as a collection by the
ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998.
The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in
early January 1999.
LA Division JFK Task Force Files
The survey undertaken in response to Executive Order ###### located seven
boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban
material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force
City
City:
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documents and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as
assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in
October 1998.
New assassination Records
B
"M" [Miscellaneous] Series
The ARRB submitted 53 numbered "Requests for Additional Information and
Records" (CIA # and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and
subjects in their search for additional assassination records_ Theses requests
generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from
the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO
cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer Were declared
assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes
have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA The remaining records and
tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999,
DX
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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000
JFK Assassination Records Collection Act
Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended
Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ "non Precedent Setting Releases"
Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took
direct action:
Transfered t0 the National Archives over 10,000 redacted pages for
the JFK Collection:
Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act with a detailed
accounting of CLA actions in response t0 the Board'$ requests .
Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the
JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and
processing of all documents resulting from the fve year Teview.
"The Review Board considered the CLA '$ compliance with the JFK
Act___to be one of [the Board' s] highest priorities. It is particularly
significant that the board fully accepted the Agency'$ Declaration of
Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency' s activities in
response t0 the Board
During FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act
absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources HRP completed necessary
coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the
Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency
focus for a process which:
Coordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on roughly
250,000 pages (many duplicates)
Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action
Transferred t0 the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK
Collection:
Prepared CIA 's Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting
of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests
Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CLA, the JFK Board
and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all
documents resulting from the five year review.
The Board'$ report of 30 September 1998 states that 'The Review Board
considered the CLA 's compliance with the JFK Act___to be one of [the Board' s]
highest priorities:' 9} It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the
Agency' s Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency' $
activities in response t0 the Board.
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JFK Act Process
ScopeDDeadlines/Decisions defined by Jaw and outside Board
Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator
between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3)
Consistency Keeper:
Everything Ieviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate
component (Often many times)
Components often take strong initial position but recede in
face of strong arguments.
Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process
unless problems come up:
Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management:
Cover;, Employee Names, Facilities Stations
Without making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act; it is possible to
characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA
The scopeldeadlines and decisons were defined in the law and by the
Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body: Over the course of the
history of this effort (S years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and
redeveloped) processes ad responses to the Board For the most part the
detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers
unless a major problem arose.
When problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make
presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved No issues
from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act
for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board,
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JFK Lessons Learned
Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient
Requirements to declassify All drives out focus on important
Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different
Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned_
Structure and Planning
Good Communications with Oversight Body
Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management
Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood:
Guidelines (flexible) ,
Deadlines (reasonable);
Responsibilities
Understanding of Final Product Desired:
Media, Databases, indexes, etc.
Support of Senior Management
Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient: The specific
requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to
Address al possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant
Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents
Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow
Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs -kt 4d ~
Lstbua}
Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs fer iiizt we bzdkno legal
4 ^
mandate.
Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi
War Crimes Disclosure Act: _ Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in
central america What we have learned from our JFK experience is tbat:
We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are
not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts.
We have found that annuitants "who know the territory" can be extremely valuable as a
resource for finding and understanding the senstitivity of material:
Weknow that we have to organize within the Agency and to agreement early on with
Iegard to strategies for managing the effort; including agreement on what the final product is to
be and how we are to get there.
We also need to senior management attention on what we are SO that are not
surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to
significant misunderstandings between senior participants.
We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure
Act.
gain
keep doing they
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SECRBP
OIM 99-0281
29 October 1999
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Information Review Group, OIM
FROM: Charles A= Briggs
JFK Declassification Project , OIM
SUBJECT : The JFK Declassification Experience
1_ assumption in preparing the attached is that
I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been
involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assign-
ments _ including being the first DO Information Review
Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification
from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate-
oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of
II 0i allowed exemptions) to a corporate Agency-wide strategy
to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should
remain secret _ My comments and conclusions reflect that
experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP
management _
2 . Historically, the Deputy Directors have not
paid much attention to information management unless
there S a problem _ Then the approach has been: what went
wrong; who S to blame ; how can we ensure that this doesn t
happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK
experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just
reactive flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction
through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers
And the IROS , who , in essence, deternine credibility and
resource impact , should be supergrades, with experience
in at least two directorates _ Because information release
has become a major management issue, the Executive Director
is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed
implementation of release policy.
AIUO When Separated CL BY : 0611637
from Attachments CL REASON : 1.s (a)
DECL ON : X5
DRV FRM : LIA 2-82
SEEREF
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3 . Considerable skepticism in the public, the media,
and , unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house
conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of
"official acknowledgment" of Executive Branch information,
even though such information is already in the public
domain, from senior Agency officials publications ,
Congressional investigations , books by former Cabinet-level
NSC members , even Presidents This inflexible legal
strategy may win the battle and lose the war Lawsuits are
a lot more expensive than negotiation_
4 The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered
some of the aspects of DCI Gates "openness 1i philosophy
did not have the benefit of the JFK experience _ I sugges€
that a senior-level panel be established to consider an
objective look at the need for continued classification
of generic versus specific sources and methods information,
particularly that already in the public domain and when
dealing with matters of high public or historic interest
HR 70-14 _ referring as it does in paragraph e (4) to
11 "Guidelines for Declassification" in Executive Order 12356,
does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested
in the Comments section on page eight of the attached:
chalies; 4gaf
2
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OIM 99-0282
29 October 1999
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Information Review Group, OIM
FROM: Charles A Briggs
JFK Declassification Project , OIM
SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience
1_ (AIUO) BACKGROUND : The impact of the JFK
declassification law on Agency resources and information
release decisions was dramatic and to the DO, traumatic. The
resource trauma stemmed from the unanticipated number of years
required to complete the project In a memorandum for the DCI
dated 11 June 1993, the then-Director of the Center for the
Study of Intelligence outlined a plan for implementing the
openness philosophy" espoused by both DCIs Gates and Woolsey
through a series of 4i Cold War Declassification" projects He
noted that priority, by virtue of a Congressionally-mandated
deadline of 22 August 1993, had been given to declassification
of the JFK collection; however he said, 0i with the end of the
1i JFK activity in sight, resources could be applied to the
other projects_ Six years later (actually seven since the
project got underway) we are almost finished.
2 _ (AIUO) The substantive, versus administrative,
trauma stemmed from the fact that the JFK Act superseded
all other existing laws , including FOIA, the Privacy Act,
the DCI' s authorities , as well as Executive Orders and
1 Regulations The Act presumed release _ It did allow for
appeal but only to the President from the DCI It allowed
postponements" but only if clear and convincing evidence
was presented for each requested postponement and that
release would demonstrably impair the national security-
The net effect was the release of names , crypts pseudos,
methods _ station locations (within specified dates) , file
identifier numbers and tradecraft generally, which are
protectable under the other laws and which the Agency had
See OGC-92-5325, 14 Dec 92 and OGC-94-52916, 19 94 (Attachment B)
AIUO When Separated CL BY : 0611637
from Attachments CL REASON : 1-5 (d)
DECL ON : X5
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learned to live with (See Appendix A for the Assassination
Records Review Board (ARRB) 0i Standards For Review" and $0
Distinctions Between Those Under FOIA, Executive Order 12356
1i and the JFK Act , with examples)
3 _ (U) Finally,
a Presidentially-appointed
assassination review board (the ARRB ) had the final say
both on postponement and on relevance , subject only to a
successful DCI appeal to the President Although a few
appeals were considered, particularly in the early period,
none was made
4 _ (U) The JFK Act called for each agency to review
and transfer its relevant material to NARA by 22 August 1993.
Thus . a: significant set of materials was transferred from
CIA to NARA in 1993_ reflecting CIA' s then-current judgment
on the redactions permitted_ Subsequent Board reviews and
ARRB staff inquiries resulted in the addition of material to
that original set of documents , as well as adjustments to the
original set, to reflect Board actions generally to release
more information. Although many documents have been adjusted
or added to the collection, requiring substantive HRG and DO
reviews as well as administrative actions_ the net number of
pages in CIA' s JEK Collection at NARA is about 260, 000 _
SIZE AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION
5 , (U) The material reguiring line-by-line review
included 17 boxes called the Oswald 201 File; 64 boxes called
the Segregated Collection" File, containing those documents
made available to the House SubCommittee on Assassinations
(HSCA) during its 1978 investigation; 23 boxes of HSCA
referrals staff notes in longhand and type , draft sections
of the HSCA final report, correspondence on HSCA letterhead,
trip reports anything referred to us by the National
Archives (NARA) for review of possible Agency equities;
19 boxes called The Holmes Collection" a reference
collection used by the then-DO focal point for FOIA and other
JFK gueries_ Russell Holmes ; Presidential libraries material,
Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission testimonies ,
National Security Council papers_ PFIAB Minutes and other
Community papers made available through the ARRB staff; and
0i 17 13 boxes called Miscellaneous_ including follow-on
questions from the ARRB , a previously overlooked Latin
American Division working file, DCI calendars , some DI/OCI
2
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Dailies 1i Box 64 of the 0i Segregated Collection" consisted
of 72 reels of microfilm of complete files from which the
material reviewed by the HSCA staffers was drawn: CIA staff
personnel and security files; a duplicate Oswald 201 file;
26 reels of 201 files on Cubans , Russians , and Americans
linked with Oswald, the JFK assassination, and the several
investigations; DO project history files, and SO on
6 (AIUO) Included were printed text, almost illegible
Thermofax, photographs _ computer listings , typed 3X5 cards ,
buckslips routing sheets handwritten scraps 1 every
imaginable form of documentation, with a tremendous amount
of duplication, in one instance, 54 copies of a Mexico City
cable Every one of these pieces of paper had to be handled
according to NARA instructions_ as a_ unique document for
inclusion in the NARA collection for public access and with
an Identification Aid for research assistance and retrieval:
Among other things_ the collection reflected little attention
to procedures propounded by NARA itself for Records
Management , including destruction of duplicate copies _
7 (AIUO) The pressure to meet an initial Congress -
ionally-mandated release date of 22 August, 1993 with the
NARA-required Research Identification Forms resulted in a_
crash effort at indexing done , mainly, by individuals on
loan from the directorates on an overtime basis and generally
unfamiliar with the collection and the subject matter Thus ,
a major factor in inconsistent redacting of multiple copies
of the same document in different boxes was a function of the
quality of the indexing and the effort of the reviewers to
cope_ with constantly changing guidelines _ Inadvertent
release was inevitable.
THE REVIEWPROCESS
8 (AIUO) The majority of the reviewers were
independent contractors with many years of experience,
in some cases senior management experience in at least two
directorates_ Two HRG reviewers had been Information Review
Officers thenselves as supergrades _ one in the DO , the other
in the DA After the HRG review with suggestions for release
in full or with redactions, the documents went to a DO review
team The DO agreement or disagreement was reflected on each
document , and the package was returned for a senior-level HRP
review prior to forwarding to the ARRB _
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9 (AIUO) As complicated and frustrating as the
process was , it wouldn' t have worked at all without the on-
site presence of the DO team with their link to DO/ IMS and
the area divisions in Headquarters _ Not surprisingly, the
DO Headquarters tended to use the familiar FOIA standards
under which much more information could be withheld than was
defendable under the JFK law A major part of the JFK story
was Oswald' s trip to Mexico City; it took several months for
the DO to agree to allow acknowledgment of the existence of
a station in Mexico and many more months to release the
name _ pseudo, and tenure of the chief of station
information, except for the pseudo , long since in the public
domain.
10 _ (AIUO) Another long time debate concerned
acknowledgment of teltap and photo surveillance by the
Mexico City Station on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and
consulates R both discussed in open literature but disguised
as unidentified sensitive source materials in the Warren
Commission report, along with a
cropped photo and transcripts
of telephone conversations that came to the station from
somewhere One issue_ for a long: time, was acknowledging
that the teltaps were station activities The ARRB insisted
on nearly total release of Mexico City Station traffic_
history, personnel , and project approvals because
Oswald' s
trip to Mexico City remained one of the most controversial
conspiracy theory aspects of the JFK story_ Proof of
Oswald' s presence there, of his contact with the Soviet
and Cuban embassies and consulates_ and the reasons
therefore, of the station' s unfamiliarity with him prior
to the assassination became evident through release f the
detailed information on the teltap and photo operations
11_ (AIUO) After the ARRB staff received the Agency
reviewed material discussion of the validity of the
deletions (the Jv postponements" ) occurred_ In the early
stages there was a
tendency for the Agency Information Review
Officers in the directorates to deny rather than release, to
test using FOIA standards until challenged, then back off-
In a couple of instances , assertions were made that the
information that the ARRB said should be released was SO
sensitive that an appeal to the President would be made but
it wasn' t _ The net result of the deny-until-pushed approach
was an absence of credibility, leading the ARRB to include
the following statement in its Final Report to the President
on 30 September 1998 :
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"A small number of CIA staff officers, almost
exclusively in the Directorate of Operations,
unnecessarily impeded the process and damaged
the Agency' s interests by resisting compromise
with all-or-nothing positions
12 _ (AIUO) As time passed and both Agency and ARRB
staffers became better educated in attempting the balance
between the public interest and the legitimate need for
secrecy, credibility improved; the ARRB members delegated
the negotiation process to the staff_ Previously; every
postponed word, phrase or paragraph had to the approved
the Board. Toward the end , only remaining disagreements
were passed by the staff to the Board .
THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE
13_ (AIUO) The ARRB , under the law, determined
relevance of file material F
the Agency could not do SO
although it could and did, eventually quite successfully,
negotiate_ Because of the impact of the Oliver Stone movie
0 JFK "1 reflecting
a 70-808 public view that the Warren
Commission conclusion that Oswald acted on his own was wrong,
the ARRB pursued all the major conspiracy theories_ Thus ,
Agency files on the USSR" S
handling of American defectors,
entry and departure controls on foreigners_ alien employment
and marriage with Soviet citizens , and, particularly, KGB
interest in Oswald, and Nosenko' s clain to have reviewed
Oswald' s KGB file in Moscow were declared relevant as was
the whole Nosenko bona fides issue _ Agency contact with the
Mafia to arrange for Castro' s assassination not known to the
Warren Commission, were obviously relevant and, by extension,
assassination as" an Agency activity was considered relevant
hence , all such testimony before the Church Committee had to
be reviewed_ Of particular interest was the plot against
Lumumba because of the involvement of the former Chief of the
Technical Services Division, which division was also involved
in the Castro assassination planning
14_ (U) The major conspiracy theory of interest
to the Board concerned Cubans : either alleged Castro
involvement because of his awareness of plotting against
hinself or Cuban exiles furious with JFK for the of Bigs
failure_ Thus , all files on Agency support to the many Cuban
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exile groups and CIA involvement in Project MONGOOSE were
declared relevant _ Hundreds of JMWAVE cables. Mexico City
Station documents , and Cuban names , and many with their
crypts , were released.
15 _ (U) Those records that the Board concluded
M 'truly had
no apparent relevance to the assassination"
were designated not believed relevant" (NBR) Cooperative
negotiation resulted in about 50, 000 pages being declared
NBR _
INADVERTENT RELEASES FOREIGN LIAISON CONCERNS
16_ (AIUO) As noted above , inadvertent releases were
inevitable_ The contributing factors included: guidelines
that changed almost continuously as negotiations with the
ARRB reduced the clains of current sensitivity; inaccurate
and incomplete records on the cover status of retirees; an
initial tendency_ consistent with FOIA practices_ to deny
crypts but to release true names- the crypt implying an
Agency relationship- if the text did not imply same (Later:
duplicate copies plus mosaic pattern analysis made linkage of
some crypts and true name quite easy. ) and a surge of
inexperienced reviewers loaned during the closing days to
meet the agreed NARA deadline for the remaining files _
17_ (S) The inadvertent releases of former employees
names resulted in a few individual complaints but no known
foreign government or liaison service complaints _ Four
foreign governments opposed release of their information_
when queried, but no inadvertent releases were involved_
(See Appendix C.) The worst slip appears to have been the
name of a former NOC , living abroad, who, upon being
informed, demanded and received compensation for the
violation of his confidential relationship with CIA and the
FBI _ The other outraged former employee, also living abroad,
threatened to contact the President if it became known in his
adopted country that he had been CIA_ His true name , on a
great many documents , is the only redaction; he was of
considerable interest to the Board as a key player in the
HSCA investigation because he was the Mexico Branch chief
and was initially appointed by the DDO to be the focal point
for JFK assassination information and briefings The HSCA
allowed him to testify in alias_ and the ARRB allowed the
substitution of his alias wherever his true name appeared;
however , the Board ruled that his true name should be
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released in 2001 or on his death if before that date_
Given the volume of the documents in which his name appeared,
there were inadvertent releases of his true name
IMPACT OF THE JFK RELEASES ON FUTURE DECLASSIFICATION
PROGRAMS
18 _ (AIUO) Whether the JFK Act is, or should be
considered, precedent-establishing has been argued since
its passage It addresses a unique, highly emotional event ,
of obvious interest to the public; and it should serve as a
catalyst for future declassification policy discussion _ But
it should not be considered to have set a legal precedent_
What should result is what the ARRB directed in the case
of exact duplicate documents: that they all be handled
consistently, with the same _ or no, redactions Other
documents concerning the same or a similar event not exact
duplicates but relevant to the issue_ and not subject to the
tight legal demands of the JFK legislation, could be reviewed
in accordance with the exemptions allowed under the FOIA or
the Executive Order However, the basic factor in deciding
on release or denial should not be the avoidance of
embarrassment through inconsistent or inadvertent release _
It should be the current need for protection of sources and
methods
19_ (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a
traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always
necessary, defendable, or smart - Instead of being negatively
reactive, it may well be tactically smarter to be proactive
to better ensure protection of important secrets_ More on
that below
20 _ (AIUO) LESSONS_LEARNED:
Don' t cut costs on indexing _ Use experienced indexers _
Aim for indexing all materials before review and
processing begins _ A focus should be identification
of duplicate documents .
Use retirees with broad Agency experience under staff
supervision_ Because the most common release problems
usually involve DO material, seriously consider an on
site-DO team
7
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Develop and keep updating written guidelines, including
those for coordinating third-agency documents
Establish early what is already in the public domain.
Take a fresh look at the "official release" philosophy,
particularly as concerns former DCIs_ Cabinet Officers ,
Presidents , and Congressional investigations
Develop better information on the cover status of retired
employees _
Avoid confrontation on marginal or non-relevant
information. Avoid stonewalling on relevant information_
Because the Information Review Officers are the
implementers of information release policy, ensure that
the guidance given them by their Deputy Directors has
Agency corporate equity_
21 (AIUO) COMMENTS: Information Management ,
Information Warfare, Information Handling, Information
Declassification: at least three of these terms have
elicited groans from senior Agency management and a
preference to have someone else, some staffer, deal with
the subject= keeping the boss out of trouble and minimally
informed _ But inflexible insistence on continued
classification of dated information, particularly that
known to the public, ignorance of what has already been
declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling
these factors have caused trouble and will cause more
trouble as the Information Age" matures _
22 (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI_
01 1i citing the need to rationalize the classification process
A 1977 memorandum for the Agency' s Executive Committee by two
of the current HRG contract reviewers urged the development
of an 0/DDCI level (the Executive Director position having
been abolished) policy review of flap potential in
information release and a computer-supported index to
released documents _ At various times in the 1970s ,
consideration was given to establishing
a fifth Directorate
of Information Handling_ After a good bit of internal
agonizing, DCI Gates in April 1992 signed off on HR 70-14
to make 1t significant historical information available without
8
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damage to national security Subsequently, a central
management focal point was established in the office of
Information Management and a system that addresses part of
the indexing goal and, with its mandatory declassification
metrics" (millions of pages of released documents)
modulates some of the outside criticism alleging that CIA
0i 1i is reneging on openness _
23 _ (AIUO) What is missing is a Year 2000 look at
secrecy- When the FOIA law was passed and the Agency was
traumatized by receipt of 150 public requests a for
information, we were able to make case law in the courts and
protect sensitive sources and methods by non-arbitrary and
non-capricious use of allowed exemptions _ It is obvious
today that a more forward-thinking strategy than the "no
comment" of the 1950s and the 0 answer the question only as
asked" of the 1970s is needed the JFK experience
demonstrated both the counterproductive result of an all-or-
nothing defense and that credibility and compromise can be
gained without current sensitivity loss _ And the fact that
Chairman Porter Goss has joined: with Senator Moynihan in
proposing the existence of an outside group on the model of
the JFK Assassination Review Board as arbiter in the
government declassification arena is a very clear signal _
24 _ (AIUO) In my view (and as was the case, briefly,
in the past) , this extremely complicated, frustrating, and
ubiquitous topic requires the personal attention of the
Executive Director with corporate" Agency focused guidance
to the Deputies for their personal attention and policy
guidance to the IROs _ And because the IROS , as the
implementors of their Deputies policies determine the
credibility and resource impact levels , they should be
supergrades and experienced in at least two directorates _
25 _ (AIUO) The eventual development of a credible
association with the JFK ARRB was a function of: (1) the
patience and diplomacy of the HRP / JFK Project Officer,
Barry Harrelson and (2) the presence on site, of the DO
team, without whom this exercise could not have been
completed: Ironically, as is SO often the case when an
individual or group is between a rock and a hard place,
as the DO team was between the DO desk officers, the DO/IRO,
and the HRP reviewers, there were allegations of their having
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been co-opted. Both the DO team and HRG were seen, at times ,
as the enemy . 1i That kind of in-house idiocy needed instant
quashing
26 . (AIUO) CONCLUSIONS : The JFK Project cost far
too much, took far too long, produced no information to
change the conclusion that Oswald acted alone _ But it did
make available to the public previously withheld operational
material to negate what DCI Gates had called the most
heinous of the conspiracy theories: that CIA was involved
in the assassination of the President of the United States _
The resource impact was a function of: the unique
requirements of the law; the crash nature of the initial
release; the National Archives decision that every duplicate
must be reviewed and indexed as a unique document ; less than
satisfactory indexing, contributing to inadvertent releases
and time wasted in checking for consistency in the handling
of duplicates; problems in determining the cover status of
retired employees; and stonewalling_
27 _ (AIUO) Although there was inconsistency and
inadvertent release and some resultant retiree anger , we
know of no
significant national security breech Previously
withheld information from the Church Committee hearings and
from the Presidential libraries declared relevant by the ARRB
will be titillating and may stimulate FOIA requests but the
variance from FOIA rules was not a legal justification for
withholding under the JFK law _
28 _ (U) If this experience leads to a serious
objective look at the theory and practice of secrecy in
this changed world, perhaps the cost will have been worth it
Kakss
Charles A
Attachments:
A Excerpt from Final Report
of the ARRB (Standards)
B_ OGC Memorandum
C _ Foreign Government Information
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FINAL REPORT OF THE AsSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD:
closure-oriented than President Reagan'$ 2. Key Distinctions Between Standards
order The current Executive Order applies to of Release Under the FOIA, the Execu-
all Executive branch records and, unlike the tive Order; and the Act
JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a syS-
tematic declassification of all records more In considering whether the JFK Act was nec-
than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives essary to guarantee public access to assassi-
agencies five years ~until April 2000 to nation records, Congress evaluated the effec-
declassify all classified information that is (1) tiveness of both the FOIA and the
more than 25 old, and (2) is of perma- then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the
Ii nent historical value unless the agency House and the Senate concluded that the
head" determines that release of the informa- FOIA and the Executive Order; as adminis-
tion would cause one of the nine enumerated tered by the executive branch, had failed to
harms: The Executive Order provides for guarantee adequate disclosure of
continuing protection for sources and meth- assassination records:
ods where disclosure would damage the
national security: It also protects, inter alia, At the time that the JFK Act became law, the
information that involves diplomatic ` rela - largest collections of records the
tions, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans assassination were under the
cooceroirog
control the
that are still in effect, and protection Of the FBI, the CLA,and the Congressional Commit-
President 8 tees who investigated the assassination. The
FOIA provides special protections for each of
The JFK Act guidelines these entities, and thus could not serve as the
We
Tiadh %o
Toxgepurate aSources that governed the disclo- mechanism for maximum disclosure of
hrorriethods Thiscglld be the sure of records relating to assassination records. First , the FOIA
_OSE effect @f the Board the assassination of Pres- exempts CIA operational files from disclo-
Suven Carfinkle
ident Kennedy were sure.1o Second, the FOIA provides broad-
Ipnln4 1998 detailed in section 6 of based protection for law enforcement files
the JFK Act:= The JFK Act and therefore allows the FBI to protect a sub-
allowed the Review Board to postpone the stantial amount of its information from dis-
release of assassination records only where closure" Third , the FOIA does not apply to
the agencies provided clear and convincing unpublished Congressional records."2 Con-"
evidence that one of five enumerated harms gress found that the FOIA did not require
would occur if the Review Board released adequate disclosure in those records that it
the record. and that the harm outweighed did cover: Thus, Congress believed that the
the public interest in disclosure: The statute FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for
allowed protection of intelligence , agents guaranteeing disclosure of assassination
and intelligence sources and methods if the records.13
agency could show that the agent, source,
or
method currently required protection President Clinton did not sign Executive
The statute further allowed the Board to Order 12958 until April 17, 1995over two
protect the identity of persons who years after Congress passed the JFK Act:
provided confidential information to the Clearly; the terms of the Executive Order
government if the agency could show that applied to most assassination records Since
disclosure of the person's identity would were of permanent historical value and
pose a substantial risk of harm to the per- were over 25 years old Even if President
son. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board Clinton's Executive Order had been in effect
to postpone release of information if release to 1992, it could not have achieved the
would constitute an unwarranted invasion maximum disclosure accomplished by the
of personal privacy or if release com- JFK Act: The problem with the Executive
promise the existence of an understanding Order is that it allowed 'agency heads" to
of confidentiality between a government make the decision to exempt records from
agent and a cooperating individual_or for- automatic declassification provided that the;
eign government. Finally, the JFK Act "agency head" expected that disclosure of
allowed the Review Board to protect cur- the records would result in one of the nine_
rent information concerning protection of enumerated categories of harm. As many sec
government officials. tions of this Report explain, the Review
42
JFK
years
public
lastinge
living
they
prior
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CHAPTER 5:#THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW; REVIEW:BOARD @OMMON LAw"
Board found that "agency heads" tended to sumption Of immediate disclosure;"1 The statute
be reluctant to release their agencies' further declared that "only in the rarest cases is
secrets. The Executive Order; while well- there any legitimate need for continued protection
intentioned, failed to provide for any inde- of such records."15
pendent review of "agency heads ""i decisions
on declassification. Thus, although the Exec- b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear
utive Order's standards for declassification and convincing evidence.
appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Exec-
utive Order failed to hold agency heads If agencies wished to withhold information
accountable for their decisionmaking: in a document, the JFK Act required the
agency to submit clear and convincing evi-
The JFK Act did require agencies to account dence that the informa-
for their decisions. To ensure such account- tion fell within one of the
Congress included four essential pro- narrow postponement
The bill_createst@ Stiong {pr
visions in the JFK Act: first, the JFK Act pre- criteria.16 sumption; On Teleasingsdocu
sumed that assassination records may be
ments; The ontis ii be onatose
released; second , the JFK Act stated that an_ Congress selected the
who_wowdeatthhad doringn
agency could rebut the presumption of dis- clear and convincing evi- to prove tothe Revredi Boordlnnd
closure only proving, with clear and con- dence standard because the"America peope Quiy fhose
vincing evidence, that disclosure would result exacting standards, documenis mustbe ieHafron
in harm and that the expected harm would such as substantial evi-
public scruitity
outweigh any public benefit in the disclo- dence or a preponder-
~~Senator John Glenn
sure; third, the JFK Act created an independent ance of the evidence, '12;1992
agency_-the Review Board__whose mandate were not consistent with
was to ensure that agencies respected the the legislation's stated of prompt and
presumption of disclosure and honestly pre- full release."7 The legislative history of the
sented clear and convincing evidence of the JFK Act emphasized the. statutory require-
need to protect information; and fourth, the ment that agencies provide clear and con-
JFK Act required agencies to provide the evidence:
Review Board with access to government
records, even when those records would not There is no justification for,perpetual
become part of the JFK Collection. Without secrecy for any class of records Nor can
these accountability provisions, the JFK Act the withholding of any individual
not have accomplished its objective of record be justified on the basis of
maximum release of assassination records to eral confidentiality concerns appiicable
the public; So, while the FOIA and the Exec- to an entire class. Every record must be
utive Order each expressed the of judged on its own merits, and every
obtaining maximum disclosure, the jEK Act record will ultimately be made available
ensured that the would be met: The two for public disclosure."
accountability provisions that relate directly
to the Section 6 grounds for postponement When agencies did present to the Review
the presumption of release and the standard Board evidence of harm that would result
of are discussed in detail below. The from disclosure, it had to consist of more
third provision discussed below is the than speculation.
Review Board's obligation to balance the
weight of the evidence in favor of postpone- The [Review] Board cannot postpone
ment against the interest in release release because it might cause some con-
ceivable Or speculative harm to national
a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of security; Rather in a democracy the
assassination records: demonstrable harm from disclosure must
be weighed , against the benefits of
The most pertinent language of the JFK Act release of the information to the public 19
was the standard for release of information:
According to the statute, 11 all Government The Review Board's application of the clear
records concerning the assassination of Pres- and convincing evidence standard is covered
ident John F Kennedy should
carry a pre- in more detail in Section B of this chapter:
43
quite
ability,
by
"less
May
goal"
vincing
would gen-
goal
goal
proof _=
public
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Page 35
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FINAL REPORT OF THE AsSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
Section B includes a discussion of the "Rule 3. Federal Agency Record Groups and
of Reason" that the Review Board ultimately the Standards Applied to Them:
adopted with regard to receiving evidence
from the agencies. The JFK Act defines assassination records"
to include records related to the assassination
C JFK Act requires the Review Board to of President Kennedy that were Ii } created or
balance evidence for postponement made available for use by, obtained by, Or
public interest in release otherwise came into the possession of" the
following groups: the Warren Commission
Assuming that agencies did provide clear the four congressional committees that inves-
and convincing evidence that information tigated the assassination, any office of the
should be protected from disclosure, the federal government, and any state or local
terms of section 6 required that information law enforcement office that assisted in a fed-
not be postponed uniess the threat of harm eral investigation of the assassination "
outweighs the interest in disclosure:
1i As used in the JFK. Act, 'public interest" When it passed the JFK Act, , Congress
means Ii _ 'the compelling interest in the prompt intended for the JFK Collection to include the
public disclosure of assassination records for record groups that it identified in section
historical and governmental purposes and_ 3(2), but it also intended for the Review
for the purpose of fully informing the Amer- Board to consider carefully the scope of the
11 "1 ican people about the history surrounding term assassination record" and to issue an
the assassination of President John R interpretive regulation defining this crucial
Kennedy:' "930 The Review Board interpreted term:2 The Act requires government agencies
the balancing requirement to mean that agen- to identify organize, and process those assas-
cies had to provide the Review Board with sination records that are defined as assassi-
clear and convincing evidence of the threat of nation records in section 302). Chapter 6 of
harm that would result from disclosure this report explains how the Review Board
However; to the extent that the JFK Act left interpreted its responsibility to: define and
1i room for discretion in evaluating the histori- seek out additional records and informa-
cal significance, Or interest, of particu- tion: Set forth below is a description of some
lar assassination records, it was the Review of the core government holdings on the
Board~not the agency that originated the assassination which were released under the
documentthat was to exercise this discre- standards of the Review Board.
tion: The burden was On the agencies to make
1/ the case for postponement, not to judge the_ The FBI's core and related" files:
level of interest in a particular docu-
ment: The JFK Act established the Review The FBI's "core and related" files consist 0f
Board as a panel of independent citizens with those records that the FBI gathered in
expertise as historians and archivists pre- response to FOLA requests that it received in
cisely in order to secure confidence in the 1970s for records relating to; the assassi-
such determinations.21 nation of President Kennedy The "core" files
include the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald
d. Segregability and substitute language and Jack Ruby as well as the FBIs Warren
Commission files and the JFK assassination
When the Review Board determined that the investigation file: The related" files include
risk of harm did outweigh the interest FBI files on Lee: 'Harvey Oswald's wife
in disclosure, it then had to take two addi- Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald's
tional steps: (1) ensure that the agency friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the
redacted the least amount of information Oswalds' Dallas friends Ruth and Michael
possible to avoid the stated harm, or 1i 'segre- Paine: The FBI began its processing of the
the postponed information, and (2) core ,and related files in 1993. The Review
provide substitute language to take the place Boafd applied strict standards to its review of
of the redaction: postponements in the core and related files
44
against
public
public
public
public
public
gate"
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Page 36
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13-00000_
CHAPTER 5: THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: REVIEW BOARD COMMON LAW'
b. CIA's Lee Harvey' Oswald '201" file.
C FBI records on the congressional commit-
tees that investigated the assassination.
CIA opens a 201 file on an individual when it
has an 'operational interest" in that person: The JFK Act defined 11 assassination record"
The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee to include records relating to the Kennedy
Oswald in December 1960 when it received a assassination that were used by the congres-
request from the Department of State on
sional committees who investigated events
defectors. After President Kennedy's assassi- surrounding the assassination "
nation the Oswald 201 file served as a depos-
itory for records CIA gathered and created Before President Clinton appointed the
during CIA's wide-ranging investigation of Review Board, the FBI collected and began to
the assassination: Thus, the file provides the process its administrative files relating to its
most complete record of the CIAs inquiry in involvement with each of these committees
the months and years immediately following In large part, the records contained in the
the assassination: Bureau's administrative files related to topics
other than the Kennedy assassination. To the
C The FBIs House Select Committee on extent that the Review Board found records
'Assassinations" (HSCA) Subject Files: in these files that concerned topics other than
the Kennedy assassination, it designated the
records not believed relevant (or "NBR" as During the HSCA's tenure, the Committee
that acronym is defined infra) and removed
made a number of requests to the FBI for them from further consideration:
records that the Committee believed might
be relevant to their . investigation of the f Requests for Additional Information.
Kennedy assassination: In response to the
HSCA's requests, the FBI made available to Congress included in the JFK Act a provision
the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages that allowed the Review Board to obtain
of FBI files The FBI began its processing of additional information and records beyond
the "HSCA Subject" files in 1993, The Review those that were reviewed by previous inves-
Board . applied ' its "Segregated Collection" tigations Chapter 6 of this report explains
guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA the requests that the Review Board made and
subject files: the assassination records designated as a
result of those requests.
d. The CIAs "Segregated Collection" files.
B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS
HSCA investigators gained
access to CIA
files Upon completion of the HSCAs work The Review Board's primary purpose, as out-
the CIA kept separate the files that it had lined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to
made available to the HSCA and retained
determine whether an agency's request for
them as a segregated collection This collec- postponement of disclosure Of an assassina-
tion is divided into two parts: paper records tion record met the criteria'for postponement
and microfilm: CIA made 63 boxes of set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted ofan
records available to the HSCA
'stofpapee introductory clause, which established the
Ii paper records consist, in many cases, of par-
clear and ' convincing evidence" standard,
ticular records that CIA culled from various
and five subsections that set forth the criteria
files The 64th box_of the CIAs segregated
under which the Review Board could agree
collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and
to postpone public disclosure of assassina-
tion-related information:
represents the entire set of files from which
records were made available to the HSCA 1. Standard of Proof: Clear and
Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files Convincing Evidence
contain material well beyond the scope of the
HSCA investigation and may, for example, Text 0f Section 6
cover an agent's entire career when only a
small portion of it intersected with the assas- Disclosure of assassination records Or par-
sination story ticular information in assassination records
45
Harvey
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Page 37
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13-00000
FINAL REPORT OF 'THE ASSASSiNATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
to the public may be postponed subject to the attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the
limitations of this Act if [agencies provide] Board asked the staff to present the records
clear and convincing' evidence that [the: on an issue-by-issue basis For example, with
harm from disclosure outweighs the FBL records, the Review Board first sched-
interest in release _ uled a group_of FBI records for review and
notified the FBL of the meeting date at which
a. Review Board guidelines. For each recom- it intended to vote on the records: The
mended postponement, the JFK Act requires Review Board invited the FBI to present its
1i an agency to submit clear and convincing evidence: Second, the FBI requested that itbe
evidence that one of the specified grounds allowed to brief the members of the Review
for postponement exists 2s The Review Board Board: At the briefing the FBI presented its
required agencies to submit specific facts in position to the Board--both in an @ral pre-
Mi of each postponement, according to sentation and in a 'position paper: The FB' s sheRevtiev
the Board's guidelines for post- Ii _ 'position papers' summarized the FBI's gen-
ponement type eral policy preferences for continued classifi-
cation of certain categories of information:
b_ Commentary: Although the agencies Third, the Review Board staff researched
argued that the . clear and convincing evi- existing law on each of the FBIs 'positions"
dence standard could be and determined that the arguments that the
Eihnk exists
satisfied by a general FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act post-
oday a grent glf explanation of those ponements were essentially the same argu-
berueen | people ana; their agencies" positions in ments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA
electedl offfiowla Doubtscabout
support of postpone- cases. Of course, in legislating the declassifi-
Is 'padicvlr'matter are a ments, the Review Board cation standards of the JFK Act, Congress Dvitpton ofthatyandlso Iithink
determined that the clear intended for the JFK Act standards and not
hepuose @f this hearng is to
and convincing evidence the FOLA standards--to apply: Aware of con-
questions Whyedoes requirement was a docu- gressional intent; the Review Board rejected
Iifonatoncneed_-to bes zith-
hern Uhis
ment-specific one; Thus, the FBI's general policy preferences on the
moment iniime the Board required agen- basis that the arguments did not constitute
wnatEconpelling'interests Qre cies to present evidence the clear and convincing evidence necessary
tzerefor _ Jackiof
that was tailored to indi- to support a request for a postponement
Rifjonmdtion? Free legitiz
vidual postponements under section 6 The FBI did appeal the
milte aeed Iihisrespeci? Who
within individual docu- Review Board's decisions to the President,
ndt "aaeis protected?
ments: but the Review Board's document-specific
Wzh inahviduals iwich
interpretation of the clear and convincing
akgenclesz Wjch Irstitiitzansare The JFK Act clearly evidence standard ultimately prevailed
Ithemeed Q) rdtecttor and; required agencies to PrO- when the vote was withdrawn:
sateuhonail securiiy iiterests; vide clear and convinc-
[iekenana? evidence in support 2 "Rule of Reason. Of course, some assassi-
SenqrrWillaiS0Cohenz of their postponements, nation records are of greater interest than
May J12 1992 but it did not establish a others. With regard to records that had a
mechanism for when and close nexus to the assassination, the Review
how such evidence should be presented. The Board strictly the law. For example,
legislative history provides a clue as to Con- the Review Board voted to release in full
intent: "[TJo the extent possible, con- nearly all of the information in the FBIs pre-
sultation with the government offices creates assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the
an understanding on each side as to the basis bulk of the information in the HSCA's report
and reasons for their respective_recommen- on CIA activities in Mexico City_the
dations and determinations "26 The Review "Lopez' report-because of the high
Board did consult with government offices to interest in that material With regard to the
determine fair, efficient, and reasonable pro- FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments
cedures for presenting evidence: were compelling enough to merit appeals to
the President on nearly all of the Review
The Review Board began its review of assas- Board's decisions on the pre-assassination
sination records by considering pre- assassi- Lee Harvey Oswald records: The FBL, the
nation records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an Review Board;, the White House Counsel's
46
public
each
Kisome
he Toling
Mheret
hewg
ing
applied
gress"
public
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Page 38
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13-00000
CHAPTER 5: THE STANDARDS FOR REVEW: REVIEW BoARD %COMMON LAw
Office, and ultimately the Department of to provide evidence
on an informant: (See
State spent a substantial amount of time illustration) The form allowed the FBI to
resolving the issues that arose in the appeal simply fill in the answers to a series of ques-
process, and for those important records that tions about the informant in question, which
were at issue, the Review Board considered in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on
its time well-spent; The Review Board simi- those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in
larly dealt with other records and spent a particular document: This approach had
as much time as was necessary to deliberate the added benefit of providing consistency to
and decide upon those records. the Review Board's decisionmaking:
The postponement-by-postponement review large number of records that the JFK Act
at each early Review Board meeting proved defined as 'assassination records" proved to
to be a slow and careful process The post- be of very low interest: The JFK Act
ponement-by-postponement review proved required the Review Board to process all
11 to be a necessary educational process for the records that were made available" to the
Board members. The Board members were a Warren Commission and the Congressional
group of five citizens who were selected not Committees that investigated the assassina-
for their familiarity with the subject of the tion, whether or not the records were used by
assassination, but for their professional com- the Commission or the committees. Many of
in history and law. Thus, through these records, while interesting from a histo-
reviewing individual documents at its early rian' s perspective,_are not closely related to
meetings, the Board essentially educated the assassination. For those documents that
itself about the assassination: were of little Or no interest, the Review
Board modified its standards in the two ways
While the Review Board did need time to edu- described below:
cate itself and to develop its policies, the
Board's pace eventually increased. In an effort A "NBR" Guidelines: Records that Review
Il " to streamline its work, the Review Board con- Board judged were 'not believed relevant to the
sulted with federal agencies such as the CIA assassination For those records that truly had
and FBI to work out an approach for review of no apparent relevance to the assassination,
records that would allow the Review Board to the Review Board designated the records
make informed decisions, but not require "not believed relevant" (NBR): The "NBR"
agencies to hundreds of hours locating Guidelines allowed the Review Board to
evidence for and providing briefings on each remove irrelevant records from further con-
postponement within an assassination record sideration: Records that the Review Board
designated "NBR" were virtually the only
The first step to
developing
a reasonable groups of records that the Review Board
approach was for the Review Board to for- agreed to postpone in full Thus, the Review
mulate general rules for sustaining and Board was always extremely reluctant to des-
denying postponements The Review Board's ignate records "NBR" and rarely did s0.
'guidance" to its staff and the agencies
became a body of rules -a Review Board B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those
"common law:" Once the Review Board noti- records that were not immediately relevant;
fied an agency of its approach on a particular but shed at least some light on issues that the
type of postponement, the agency learned to congressional committees that investigated
present only those facts that the Review the assassination explored as potentially rele-
Board would need to make a decision: For vant to the assassination, the Review Board
example, with regard to FBI informants, the created the "Segregated Collection Guide-
"1 Review Board notified the FBI of what it con- lines: The segregated collections records,
sidered to be the relevant factors in its deci- although marginally relevant, were not
sionmaking: In other words, it defined for the for "NBR" designation, as the
Bureau what it considered t0 be "clear and
#RrprGtec
Guidelines would have resulted in
convincing" evidence. Then, the Review withholding records in full: Instead, the
Board worked with the FBI to create a one- Board passed the "Segregated Collection 1i
page form titled an "Informant Postpone- Guidelines, which ensured that the Review
ment Evidence Form" "1i that the FBI could use Board staff would review every page of the
47
key
public
petence
public
spend
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Page 39
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13oqooo
FINAL REPORT OF THE' ASsASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
marginally relevant records, but would not a. CIA officers.
require agencies to present the same amount
of evidence in support of postponements: L Review Board guidelines The Review
The regulations that the Review Board Board usually protected the names of CIA
adopted on November 13, 1996, define officers who are still active or who retired
regated Collections" to include the following: under cover and are now in potentially
(1) FBI records that were requested by the risky circumstances The Review Board usu-
HSCA in conjunction with its investigation released names of deceased CIA officers
and the names of CIA officers whose connec- into the assassination of President Kennedy,
tion to the CIA was knowledge When
the Church Committee in conjunction with
the Review Board postponed names, it usu-
its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy
ally substituted the phrase, "CIA Employee ~
assassination, and the Pike Committee and
Rockefeller Commission that investigated
ii, Commentary: Names ofnumerous CIA
issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA officers appeared in the CIA's assassination
records including the CIAs segregated col-
records. The Review Board and the CIA had
lection of 63 boxes as well as One box of to confront the challenge presented by the
microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes statute, which requires name-specific evi-
Ii of CIA staff "working files: " The Review dence, but gathering such evidence proved to
Board adopted revised guidelines on April be time-consuming and burdensome for the
23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the CIA and the names of CIA officers in the
review process of postponements in the seg records were not always relevant to the
regated collections, and ensure a page-by- assassination: The statute, of course, states
page review of all documents in the segre- that the only way that the Review Board
collections. The guidelines state,
could protect names of intelligence agents
even with the assumption that our oper-
was if the CLA provided clear and convincing
ations may be extended through Fiscal Year
evidence that the CIA officer's identity "cur-
1998, the Review Board cannot hope to com
rently" required protection.
plete review of postponements in the Segre-
The CIA initially believed that the solution to
Collections under the current method
the above-referenced challenge_was for the
Ii of review. Where the Review Board's stan- Review Board to agree with CIA that the
dards differed between core files and segre- names of all CIA officers within the JFK Col-
collection files, the guidelines set forth lection should be postponed until the year
below note the distinction 2017. The CIA supported its request for blan-
ket postponements with two arguments: first,
Thus, throughout its tenure, the Review since many CIA employees_ are Ii _ under
Board sought to be vigorous in applying the cover; CIA argued that its intelligence
law, but; in order to complete its work, found capability depended on employees
it necessary to employ a 'rule of reason:' maintaining cover; and, second, even though
the majority of CLA officer names in the Col-
2. Intelligence Agents lection are names of retired CIA employees,
CIA is bound by a confidentiality agreement
Text of Section 6(1)A)
to protect the relationship: of these for-
mer employees objected to release f their
clear and convincing evidence that the former Agency affiliation, complaining that it
violates this agreement and suggesting that
threat to the military defense, intelligence
release might jeopardize business rela-
operations, or conduct of foreign relations of tionships or threaten personal safety:
the United States posed by the disclo-
sure 0f the assassination record is of such Mindful of the JFK Acts requirement that
gravity that it outweighs the interest, agencies provide name-specific evidence,the
and such disclosure would reveal Review Board would not agree to CIA's
request for blanket_postponements of CIA
(A) an
intelligence agent whose identity names Instead, the Review Board requested
currently requires protection. CIA to provide evidence for each name
48_
"Seg
living
ally
public
gated
gated
gated
gath-
ering
Many
such
public _
public
public
==================================================
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13-00000
CHAPTER '5: THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW:REVIEW BOARD COMMONLAw
The CIA, however; was reluctant to produce was of sufficiently high public interest that it
name-specific evidence and, on occasion, would require the CIA to provide additional
CIA failed to furnish evidence when it evidence before it would consider protecting
to do SO. CIA's initial refusal to the name_ In these cases, the Review Board
supply evidence on , individual names was asked CIA to provide information on the
met, not with the wholesale release of names employee's current status, his or her location,
bv the Board, but with a firm insistence that and the nature of the work he or she did for
the' Agency meet the requirements of the Act: the CIA.
Thc Review Board released the names of a
(e"W individuals who were of central impor The Review Board determined that names
tance to the assassination early in the were of high interest when the CIA
process, but gave the Agency a number of officer at issue had a substantive connection
Jdditional @pportunities to provide specific to the assassination story or where the CIA
cridence on other names officer' s name appeared in CIA's Oswald 201
file: By July 1997 _ the Review Board had
For example, in December 1995, the Review determined that where CLA officer names did
Icard designated one of their meeting not fit within one of the "high inter-
"Ilme and invited CIA to provide evi- est" categories, it would require CIA to prO-
dence for names the Review Board had vide significantly less evidence in support of
encountered in CIA records during the previ-- its requests for postponement Given the
(us six to seven months. On that CIA large number of CIA officer names in the CIA
requested the Review Board to sustain records, the Review Board determined that it
the postponement of all CIA names: The had to adopt the practical high public inter-
Review Board did not want to jeopardize the est/low interest approach, particu-
personal safety of individuals and gave CIA larly since it had limited time and resources
more time to provide evidence: The Board set available to complete its own review of CIA
(ther "i 'name days" in May 1996 and records. The Review Board would have pre-
[997 . As deadlines for submission of evi- ferred to review each name at the same high
dence approached, CIA agreed to release level of scrutiny that it used to review names
sme names, but in most cases, continued to of high public interest Nevertheless, the
offer less than satisfactory evidence on those Board"'s approach compelled_ the CIA to
they wished to protect 'Gradually the CIA release many more names than it would have
did begin to provide supporting evidence of desired:
the postponement of individual names
b. "John Scelso" (pseudonym):
By 1996, the Review Board had decided
what evidence would meet the clear and con- 13
Review Board guidelines The Review
evidence standard: If the CIA prO- Board protected the true name of the individ-
vided evidence that the individual retired ual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso
under cover or abroad, Or evidence that the until May 1, 2001 `Or three.months after the
individual objected to the release of his or her decease of the individual whichever comes
name when contacted (CLA agreed to attempt first:
to contact former employees), the Review
Board would protect the CIA officer's name: ii. Commentary: The CIA employeewho
Moreover; where the CIA specifically identi- was head of CIAs division "Western Hemi-
fied an ongoing %peration in which the indi- 3" during the immediately
vidual was involved or CIA could demon- after the assassination President
strate that the person_ was still active with testified before the HSCA and the
eKchec
CIA, the Review Board would protect the Committee under the Ii 'throw-away" alias
name: Because the JFK Act . required the John Scelso: His true name appears on hun-
Review Board to balance the potential harm dreds of documents in the JFK collection,
disclosure the public interest in many of which were the product of the
release, there were cases in which the Review Agency's extensive post-assassination inves-
Board determined that, even though the CIA tigation that spanned the globe. In reviewing
had provided the required evidence, the this particular name, the Review Board's
Review Board believed that the individual desire to satisfy the public's interest in release
49_
promised
public story
public day
day;
day,
again
public
May:
May
vincing
oPeriod sphere
from against
==================================================
Page 41
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13
INAE REPORT 0; THEASSASSINATIONRECORDS REVIEW BOARD:
clashed with the CLA's strong evidence in
ii Commentary: Whenever the Review
support of postponement: Initially, the Board Board voted to protect the identity of an indi-
was inclined to release Scelso's true name, but vidual throughout federal agency assassina-
the Agency argued convincingly against tion records, it had to be realistic enough to
release. CIA provided evidence on the current realize that some information about individu-
status of the individual, shared correspon- als is SO specific that release of the information
dence sent by him, and even arranged an would reveal the individual's identity: Exam-
interview between him and a Review Board ples of specific identifying information include
member: As an interim the Review home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names
Board inserted his alias "Scelso" as sub- of family members, and other less obvious, but
stitute language: (See illustration) Then,atits equally revealing pieces of information.
May 1996 meeting, Board members deter-
mined to release "Scelso's" true name in five d. Names of National Security Agency
or upon his death employees.
13 Review Board guidelines: The Review
CUASSiziED LS:GE B0
Board protected the names of all National
Qus - 'HIRCH O'NEAY AxtR Unt CIcIisIc U Ixcg 817n7
Security Agency employees that it encoun-
0 5367 Ao Ixcdx
07E 3NQY 62 ~0hl#qu4@ tered: The Review Board would have consid-
To MEXICO CITY
22k61 0 ered releasing names of National Security
RoMI DIRECTOR Agency employees if it determined that a par-
OOHf{ ci/si
385
ticular name was extremely relevant to the
boumtx Mo,Ci Dfpci , @OP , @oPl cllas, cllic 2, fl, SR7, W 7, assassination:
05 %,R DMEDU TE
1 MMMEDIATE MEXI INFO
CIA HISTDRESAE REVIEW PRGSRAI 8.4 & 8 6
ii. Commentary: Due to the nature of NSA
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
REF; MEXI 6453 (MN J6017Y 1995 information, few NSA employee names
appeared in NSA's assassination records.
I. DPORTANT You REVEw ALI LDENOY TAPES AND Even though the Review Board did not often
TRANSCRIPTS SNNCE 27 SEPTEMBER TO LOCATE ALL MATERWL encounter NSA employee names; it did have
POSSDBL PERTIENT TO SUBJECT REF _
to vote on those names that it did confront:
2. DISPATCH SOONEST BY SPECIAL COOROER , STAFFEB [F
NSA's policy of not releasing the names of its
NBCESSARY, FULL TRANSCRDTS AND ORIGNAL TA PES [F
employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of
the JFK Act that presumed release of such
AVALLABLEALL PERTINENT MATERLAL. information unless NSA could prove that
MARE ORIGINAL TAPES AVaLABLE ? QUsarxtir Raa individual NSA employee names required
16ARR %
Oiouaied 0 protection NSA argued that the release of =
EN) OF MESSAGE
euzsro 9 names, other than those of publicly
akowy
CS Comndent:}#Reported that op October 63, J Amoricaa male wbo etd edged senior officials, jeopardized the
alo 01mo 0e Lao Oswald wac at Soviet Embaeey in Mexico City .
201-287
tial' security % U.S cryptographic systems
Document Nutabdr
40-54 and those individuals: As it did with the
D*aco-s-4 ( for FOIA Revlew 04 ApR 1976
~0-5-4t
names of other intelligence agents and offi-
231v63
cers, the Review Board considered the names
of NSA officers on a document-by-document
Scelso
Tuu basis. Given the nature of NSA information
cIleatirg Ottic(4 Spo4d4uatiwo 0r( iccri a#hie_tune the Review Board members agreed that none
Officec bCIwu 7yF
M
of the few names which appear in the docu-
RERODUCTION BY OTHER THMAN THE [SSUING OfFICE IS PROthBIed. Cr ments, and for which NSA requested protec-
tion, was of high enough interest Or
central to an of the assassina-
C. Information that identifies CIA officers. tion story Thus,
us,deptoteated
it the names:
1 Review Board guidelines. For specific 3. Intelligence Sources and Methods,
information that, if released, would reveal and Other Matters Relating to the
the identity of an individual CIA officer that National Security of the United States
the Board had voted to protect, the Review
Board protected the information. Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)
50
staff step,
prior
years
CStOel
0aLL?6
poten-
the
244
CSECOPV
public
==================================================
Page 42
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13-O000
CHAPTER '5: THE' STANDARDs FOR REVIEw: REVIEW BoARD COMMON LAw
clear and convincing evidence that the considered CIA employee names, and
threat to the military defense, intelligence encountered the same problems as it had in
operations; or conduct of foreign relations of the review of CIA employee names: As with
the United States by the disclo- CIA employee names, CIA was reluctant to
sure 0f the assassination record is of such provide name-specific evidence to the Review
sravity that it outweighs the public interest, Board, opting instead to offer general princi-
and such disclosure would reveal supporting CIA's request that the Review
Board redact all names:
(B) an intelligence source or method which
is currently utilized, or reasonably expected The Review Board ulti-
to be utilized, by the United States Govern- mately decided to protect The Review Board shoidiEcon
ment and which has not been officially dis- the names of sources,
sider:a variety @f factors eltedh
closed, the disclosure of which would inter- assets, and informants in to the reed t9 ostpone fiezlo
fere with the conduct of intelligence cases where the identity sure %f; intelligence SS9v925 7i
activities; Or of the source is of methods tincluding ihe 4ge50
reduced public interest the record, Whethenthetvse oFa
(C) any other matter currently relating to because CIA sources live
particiilar _source-orsnethod"[a
the military defense, intelligence operations in countries other than alreadywell knowr bythepun
(r
conduct of foreign relations of the United the US: and were more
lic thatithe Soviet Enhissy
Statcs, the disclosure of which would likely to face harm if the in Mexico Cilyewag_bugged
demonstrably impair the national security of Board disclosed their the: alleged visti 0 Tee
tlie United States; relationship with CIA In Harvey;Oswald) andewiether
those records where the the source ornethodiis iihe
0_ CIA sources: source's identity was Of
ently secret; 0r Whethernas te
possible public interest information; dcollected-_hich
LS
Review Board guidelines. The Review in relation to the assassi- was secret:
Board handled CIA sources, assets, infor- nation story or was
~Senate Repont 0rTEKCalL
mants, and specific identifying information important to understand- July 22,1992
under standards similar to the Board's deci- information related to
sions for CIA officers: Where the Review the assassination, the
Ioard believed names held a high level of Review Board required the CIA to provide
public interest; either because the name was additional evidence to support the protection
central to the story or because assassination of the source's identity;
researchers expressed interest in the namer
the Review Board . subjected them to close When the Review Board postponed release of
scrutiny The Board generally protected the source names, it did s0 for ten years except in
identity of foreign nationals unless
were cases where a foreign government might
of high interest and then the Review accuse the source of committing treason for
Board required CIA to provide specific evi- assisting the CIA In those cases, the Review
dence in support of its claimed postpone- Board protected the source's name and iden-
ments. The Review Board protected domestic tifying information until 2017 .
sources, assets and informants where CIA
demonstrated that release would jeopardize b. CIA pseudonyms.
ongoing operations Or harm individuals. If
CIA did not provide evidence f one of the 1 Review Board guidelines: With only a
two above-referenced harms , the Review few exceptions, the Review Board released
Board released the name at issue In addition, the pseudonyms of individuals: In some
where the already knew the names of instances, the Review Board used pseudo-
individuals who were connected to the CIA, nyms as substitute language for the individ-
especially if the government had previously ual's true name:
released the information, the Review Board
released the information ii. Commentary: Very early in the review
process, the Review Board determined that,
ii. Commentary: The Review Board Since pseudonyms were a sort of 'throw
addressed the issue of whether to postpone O away" identity for individuals who were
release source names at the same time that it under cover; the Review Board could release
51
posed public
public ples
(eg
during
ing
they
public
public
==================================================
Page 43
==================================================
12-80980
FINAL' REPORT OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
the pseudonym without harming the indi- records. CIA argued that its use of crypts was
vidual The CIA did not object to the Review an operational method that should remain
Board's policy to release pseudonyms: ` The secret; even though CIA had replaced most of
CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it the crypts at issue years earlier CIA believed
believed to be particularly sensitive, and that if the Review Board released the crypts,
demonstrated t0 the Review Board with clear researchers would be able to piece together
and convincing evidence that release of those the records and determine the identity of
pseudonyms would do irreparable harm: operations and individuals. CIA further
argued that the burden of locating evidence
C. CIA crypts on each crypt was to heavy
i. Review Board guidelines The Review The Review Board, conversely; believed that
1i "1 Board released sOme CIA 'crypts" _code CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the
words for operations and individuals. The identity of an operation Or an individual, and
Review Board also generally released CIA so the Review Board could release the crypts
I6 'digraphs"_the first two letters of a crypt and not compromise the operation or the
that link a particular crypt to a particular individual: As with CIA agent names, the
location. CIA often created crypts to refer to Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to
other U.S: government agencies; for example locate evidence on each crypt Finally, the
the FBI was "ODENVY The Review Board Review Board released a group of CIA crypts
made a blanket decision to release all US: from Mexico with the "LI" digraph CIA
government crypts The Review Board nearly eventually agreed to release its crypts and
always released CIA crypts where those digraphs in assassination records, and the
crypts denoted operations Or individuals Review Board eventually agreed to protect
relating to Mexico City Or Cuba: (The certain sensitive crypts
digraph for Mexico City was "LI; and for
Ii Cuba, it was AM") For all other crypts, the The Review Board recognized that it could
Review Board protected the digraph and not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for
released the remainder of the crypt: The every CIA record that it encountered: CIA
Review Board established a few exceptions, records contain hundreds of thousands of
and where exceptions , applied, the Board crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the
required CIA to provide crypt-specific evi- Review Board decided that, for all crypts
I1 Ii dence of the need to protect; except the "LI, AM; and "OD" series
crypts, it would agree to postpone the loca-
ii. Commentary: The Review Board had tion-specific digraph and release the actual
to determine whether it believed that release crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most
of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations crypts in the collection and the most relevant
and individuals Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of digraphs. The Review Board did make three
the JFK Act provided the standard for_post- exceptions to its general rule: it protected the
ponement of CIA crypts The Review Board digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt
required the CIA to provide crypt-specific appeared next to a true name that had been
clear and convincing evidence that CIA cur- released, () when the crypt appeared next to
rently used, Or expected to use the crYpt and specific_identifying information, and (c)
that CIA had not previously released the when CIA provided clear and convincing
crypt: Thus, in order to convince the Review evidence that the Review Board should pro-
Board to sustain postponements, the Board tect the digraph:
required CIA to research each crypt to deter-
mine whether CIA still used the individual or d. CLA sluglines.
the operation and provide that evidence to
the Review Board: 1
Review Board guidelines: "Sluglines" are
CIA routing indicators, consisting of two O
As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially
more crypts , that appear above_the text in
requested the Review Board to sustain post- CIA cables: (See iliustration ) The Review
ponements of all CIA crypts_even Board released CIA sluglines according to the
"ODENVY"_the CIA's old crypt for the FBI same criteria it to crypts and
that CIA had already released in other CIA digraphs.
52
City
applied
==================================================
Page 44
==================================================
13-0
CHAPTER 5: THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: REVIEW BOARD "COMMON LAw"
ii: Commentary: The Review Board rent CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the
nleased CIA sluglines because the Agency Review Board recognized that certain CIA
ne"er offered the Review Board any evidence surveillance operations in Mexico City in
tt
why the Board should not release 1963 were already well-known to the public
them. An of a CIA slugline is because the U.S. government had disclosed
"RYBAT GPFLOOR "1 "RYBAT" is a CIA details about those operations CIA surveil-
cript that meant 11 secret; and GPFLOOR lance, particularly telephone taps and photo
M.l: the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey operations, was a major element in the story
Fuald during its post-assassination investi- of Oswald's 1963 trip to Mexico City (See
CIA initially asked the Review Board illustration:)
to
postpone the CIA slugline even where CIA
huldd released the individual crypts that made The Board, therefore, concluded that the
"p the slugline elsewhere For example_in lic interest in disclosure far outweighed any
1i the' case of "RYBAT GPFLOOR, the CIA risk to national security and directed release
to release the crypt "RYBAT" in two of the information: However; in records that
elsewhere in the document at issue, CIA proved did contain information about
Jl the CIA agreed to release the crypt current operations, the Review Board voted
(AFFLOOR when it appeared in the text; CIA to postpone the information:
Iokl the Review Board that it could not, how-
('C, release the slugline "RYBAT
(;"'NOOR " CIA offered no substantive
arguments to support its request for post-
Olt CLAssified MeSSAGE mment of the slugline; Given the statute's
Oth Dat 29 Nov 63 dand that CIA provide clear and convinc- Saldt
Acuud
Mc
Ix &vidence in support of its requests for
GImart) ptortt Fwr
Gottimt Ornarovat 28227 696 P(
"lponement, the Review Board voted to Myediatt
CIA C Ioku1se' CIA sluglines.
IRIDIATE NET Mra Protkamtse
In FULL 1995
Bteat OiLoor OF
( 'I surveillance methods. "T IM 0617
0
230- 650
CbbFr Or
0
1 Review Board guidelines: The Review
1, F02 BRTKIROID Sould Go IDIT {e; Thoueh_ALvaRaDo Fay]DE
Iwlrd generally released CIA surveillance IR WeICAN HntuS: NssuI rE can Be Uswd ^s Consultant At LEAST,
Trat KE VILL INrt Mretrd Kc Can Ard_ Siould coxtact MIICAR AUTHORITIDS, mthods, the details of their implementation,
And That NZT VILL GldR Ant_ICTIvE Usc Vc MXT Ot HIN VIth_Txe
and thc product produced by them where the Odnt Rd- OddnT rDr5 {Nons HE IS coink To MDI 10 KOP.
20 N 188 VASHIINTON TINE; WICI I$ About]_Igy Tour Tine, YE HAVE Rview Board believed the methods were rel-
M JurIxer NlVS OR RIQUDST3+ c are GOIK RCHE But "Valnt to the assassination. The Review Board
Or The MBE On Sort ROTICI:
sustained postponements of CLA surveillance M
methods where CIA provided convincing
eidence that the method still merited prO-
tcction: Where the Review Board sustained
Ihe' CIA's requests for postponement of sur- AgH)
rcillance methods, it substituted the lan-
201037
}i :
16 " *27 Kllge 'surveillance method; "operational Oicokim aetails;' or Ii 'sensitive operation
ii. Commentary: As with all its sources
Jld methods, CIA initially requested the f. CIA installations.
Review Board to postpone all of its surveil-
lance methods since; CIA argued, CIA cur-
1 Review Board guidelines The Review
Tently conducts surveillance operations: The Board used date "windows within which it
Review Board, on the other hand, believed released the locations of CIA installations
that it was not a secret that CIA currently where the location was relevant to the assas-
conducts surveillance operations Moreover; sination; Specifically, the Review Board
the Review Board did not believe that its released the location of CIA installations
votes to release CIA surveillance methods in relating to Mexico during the time
Mexico in 1963 would jeopardize cur-
period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review
53
eplain
example
tion.
pub-
"Er" 'd
pes
HiSOrICAL REVIEW RELEASE
Dup
TVRarrs
O.
City
City
==================================================
Page 45
==================================================
13-00000
FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEWABOARD;
Record revlewed anllalerally by CIA In 1992. Same record altcr Revlew Boxrd actlon in [995.
Utsh Iallswl : Jke;: mzHRUvUbIU
PRIFIEH ED Irdhibig
GU
In Fu1 1995 85tf
*JIT: @fqw' Ip cnsbee te {7 caMe Oit sc JtO} Zacu" Lx 'Blee 04 {o (JWe {pr€
rea 08 De GI:le #buvc d2 Jeic cud 6r 0 { Stat{00) 04 Gtl< ice ea) IluL dly (W 0& Mexleo
Lgo 84545: 0 87 3E 8 24 88 faw" crece L8 "los" 9 97 [ndIaut ca 10{44} ca o2 sto €u G4
#dr 843r*e*ta%yS 8 vlev 64822
K8t Iadicere 4] Dava Dnt 0' O1ki5I :eac)
74444 2 8485 %t# 38+ 0' [
Gta= 01 0, Den Snt Et53t132
Ttae Dotad 4e 5b
38 D0 tovdat < 97u4c05 9R Me
0 0 #tak na# San Doe
0
37
Ostobt 5 B1 Za 5 dex 8a "Brolrty 6# 47a Yeid8174 4qi Nctob
Et # 44: 5# 30 {Urare Soit "-8
I0II U:{FI4 M1ti] 4 607P1jtwy 4(d [k 0 Or (osr aq'
M 14go eauld @408 6o0 Ie 444 }i 63 $ 2 Mejs 5} 04 wn' 9' Du GT4ce Cot}d T94t 104 M gega465. 3
ou .
;r7re Re 328 "0 nc L4 VLo Jevl[ rId 88
Mud 0 #8tIttt :t E6 M d0 4< 4 5 400 JIrc_Ol "awaaD {L7e c5
@
Se: JMina ua W"c3nti; 50770"7
39 nbt 01 0J Mitca& a&a 03 I T 489 Ae5r 40 "4r0? #Ral8&t #0 01 0S paed3
#nU_St
UOStSt
4520144
EcAst
Srrtf:
BEEzoUetion "
~r Riprewustaon
Prahietew
"PRGHBIED
0p73
Board generally released the location of all the Review Board divided the world into five
CIA installations that were relevant to the regions: Western Hemisphere, Western
assassination during the time period Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia / Pacific,
between the date of the assassination and Africa/ Near East / South Asia. Then the
November 22, 1963_ -and the date that the Board added a number t0 refer to each differ-
Warren Commission issued its report in ent location in the region; Thus "CLA Instal-
Ii tember 1964. Finally, the Review Board gen- lation in Western Hemisphere 1 serves aS a
erally released the location of all CIA installa- place holder for a particular installation in all
tions that appeared in Oswald's 201 file CIA assassination records:
during the time January 1, 1961
through October 1, 1964. The Review Board ii Commentary: Initially, the Review
did grant CIA a few exceptions to its Board released CLA installation locations in
rule; and except for the specific time win- CIA documents relevant to Oswald's visit to
dows described above, the Review Board Mexico CIA did not raise significant
protected all information that identified CIA objections to the Review Board's release of its
installation locations: installations in these records.
The Review Board created substitute lan- When the Review Board began to vote to
guage for its postponement of CIA installa- release the location of additional CIA instal-
tions to enable researchers to track a particu- lation locations, the CIA did object, but did
lar CIA installation through the JFK not offer evidence of the harm to national
collection without revealing the city or coun- security that it believed would result from
try in which it is located: To accomplish this, disclosure of the information. The CIA
54
~ProGRAM REVIEW' HSTORICAL
RELEASE
88= 8x "8i_ 00
Cara
{6
048 Bco 64
coa 0.. 8"4
SAE
pin2 .
Sep-
period
general
City:
==================================================
Page 46
==================================================
13-00000
CHAPTER 5: THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: REVIEW BOARD CoMMON LAW
threatened to appeal to the President to over- h. CIA job titles.
turn the Review Board' s votes, but the
Review Board's position was that the JFK Act 1
Review Board guidelines. The Review
required release of information where CIA Board voted to release CIA employees' job
did not provide convincing evidence to sup- titles except when the Board's disclosure of
port their postponements. The Review Board the title might reveal the identity of an indi-
allowed the CIA ample time to and vidual or CIA installation requiring
its evidence to support its requests tion.
for postponements as both the CIA and the
Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal ii. Commentary: Although the Review
to the President: Board did not believe that it should vote to
protect CIAjob titles, standing alone, it some-
Ultimately, the CIA determined that it would times voted to protect titles if revealed
trust Review Board members with the infor- other information that the Review Board had
mation that the Review Board required to voted.to protect:
postpone the release of the location of a
small number of CIA installations: In an L CIA file numbers.
effort to balance high interest in the
location of CIA installations and the need to 1 .
Review Board guidelines. CIA organizes
protect certain installations, the Review many of its files by country and assigns
Board decided t0 establish date "windows" "1 'country identifiers within particular file
within which it would release CIA installa- numbers The Review Board released nearly
tion locations: all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico
City: The Review Board protected the "coun-
The CIA never appealed a Review Board vote try identifiers" in CIA file numbers for all
to the President:
other countries with the exception of country
identifiers "15" and "19. The Review Board
Ii g: CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report). generally released all CIA "201" Or person-
ality" file numbers where the files related to
1
Review Board guidelines: CIA cable, dis- the assassination:
patch; and field report "prefixes" are identi-
fiers that CIA uses on its communications to ii. Commentary;: The CIA rarely objected
indicate the installation that generates a par-
to the Review Board's release of its file num-
ticular message: Where the Review Board
bers:
had voted to release the location of a particu- j. CIA domestic facilities.
lar CIA installation, the Review Board also
voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and
2
Review Board guidelines The Review
field report prefixes that the installation gen-
Board released references to domestic CIA
erated. Likewise, the Review Board protected
facilities where the CIA has previously offi-
cable, dispatch, and field report' prefixes
cially disclosed the existence of the facility:
where it voted t0 protect the location of the The Review Board did not release informa-
CIA installation: tion that would reveal the location of domes-
tic CIA facilities where the CIA provided evi-
The Review Board replaced the prefixes that
dence that the facility was still in use:
it protected with substitute language similar
to that used for CIA installations. An exam- ii. Commentary: The Review Board rarely
Ple of substitute language for CIA prefixes is: encountered the issue of whether to release
"Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western the location of CIA domestic facilities in
Hemisphere 1.' assassination records, as CIA officially
acknowledges most of its domestic facilities:
ii. Commentary: Once the Review Board When the Review Board did vote to postpone
voted to release the location of a particular the location of CIA domestic facilities, it
CIA installation, the Review Board and CIA required the CIA to_provide extensive evi-
did not disagree that the Board should release dence as to why theCIA had to the loca -
cable, dispatch and field report prefixes. tion of those facilities secret.
55
gather protec-
present
they
public
keep
==================================================
Page 47
==================================================
1390000
FINAL REPORT;OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDs REVIEW:BOARD:
k. CIA official cover researchers. The Review Board members
accepted CIA's arguments, primarily because
L Review Board guidelines: CIA "official agreed that the interest in the
cover" is a means by which a CIA officer can specific details about alias documentation
operate overseas in the of an employee was low< The Review Board determined that
of another government agency: In congres- it did not want the CIA to spend a
sional documents, the Review Board released amount of time gathering evidence in sup-
general information about official cover but port of postponements that were of low
protected specific details. With regard to exec- lic interest and, thus, it did not require the
utive branch documents, the CIA convinced the CIA to provide evidence in support of
Review Board that, while Congress might postponement relating to alias documenta-
reveal information about official cover; the tion:
executive branch does not generally reveal
information about official cover because to
m. Foreign intelligence cooperation.
do s0 would damage the national security:
Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA s 1 Review Board guidelines: The Review
postponements regarding official cover in Board postponed references to foreign intelli-
executive branch documents unless the US: gence cooperation with the CIA
government had previously . officially dis-
closed the information at issue: ii Commentary: The Review Board vigor-
ously debated the issue of foreign intelli-
The Review Board inserted the phrase "offi- gence cooperation with the CIA and
1 cial cover as substitute language when it demanded extensive evidence and multiple
postponed such information briefings from the CIA on the subject:
Though in some instances Board members
ii. Commentary: The Review Board ini- judged that the information might add to the
tially considered the issue of official cover to historical understanding of the assassination,
be an "open secret" that was well-known to the Review Board, with some dissent, deter-
the public Thus, were loathe to withhold mined that the evidence to postpone the
such obvious information The CIA, however; information outweighed this potential value:
supported its strong objections in briefings
and negotiations with the Board, and eventu- n. Human sources in FBI foreign
ally convinced the Review Board that the counterintelligence (assets).
harm in releasing information about official
cover outweighed any additional information
1 Review Board guidelines. The Review
that assassination researchers might gain from Board evaluated the need to postpone the
knowing details about official cover: identity of human sources in foreign counter-
intelligence operations on a - case-by-case
L Alias documentation. basis. Where the human source was a foreign
national, the Review Board generally agreed
4 Review Board guidelines. CIA employ- to protect the individual's identity unless the
ees and agents use aliases and the CIA cre- individual's connection with the FBI was
ates documentation to support its employ- already known to the foreign government at
ees' and agents' aliases. The Review Board issue: Where the human source was a United
released information that revealed that CIA States citizen interacting with foreign
employees and agents used aliases. The ment officials, the Review Board sometimes
Board 'protected specific details about how released the identity of the individual if the
CIA documents particular aliases interest in the name of the asset was
high Where the human source was a United
ii. Commentary: The CIA argued that it States citizen interacting with other United
currently uses alias documentation and that States citizens, the Review Board tended to
aliases are vital to CIA's performance of its evaluate the release of the source's name
intelligence operations The CIA also argued more like other domestic informants:
that the Review Board's release of specific
information about alias documentation ii_ Commentary: In its position paper; the
"1 would not be useful to assassination FBI defined 'intelligence source as "any
56
public they
guise
large
pub-
every
they
govern-
Public
==================================================
Page 48
==================================================
13Q0000
CHAPTER 5: THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: REVIEW BOARD "COMMON LAW"
individual who has provided or is currently nation records contain information that
providing information pertaining to national reveal many of the FBI's foreign counterintel-
security matters, the disclosure of which ligence activities during the cold war
could reasonably be expected to result in Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board
damage to the FBI's intelligence and counter- considered how it could release as much
intelligence-gathering capabilities. information as possible in the records with-
out jeopardizing operations that still require
The FBI offered the following arguments in protection:
support of its request_ to intelligence
Sc )urces' identities secret: (1) Review Board In spring 1996, the
In all cases where thezRepiew disclosure of intelligence sources would harm Review Board considered
the FBI's ability to develop and maintain new and voted on a group of
Board is_ considering postpone
and existing sources, because sources would FBI records relating to the ment; it should Ake wjh
held information to aiubsolte
reasonably believe that the government FBI's foreign counterin-
minimum;; and: ensure tnat the
reveal their identities, and (2) disclo- telligence activities. In
sure' of intelligence sources may subject the response to the Review
postponement is nanrowli;
drawn for the shortest pogsible
srces, their friends, and their families to Board's requests for
duration: In SO Ihe physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism: dence on the foreign
Review Board shovd elease as
counterin telligence
information Fom the
The' Review Board' s interpretation of the records, the FBI had prO-
is_ records as_ ~possible
"clar and convincing" evidence standard vided its "position paper"
~Senate Reporton JFKAlce; it to reject the FBI's general policy on counterintelli- 22,41992
arguments, and ' instead required the FBI to gence activities. In its
July
present asset-specific evidence that explained paper; the FBI defined
Uhc' particular harm that the FBI expected the 'intelligence activities as
asst t0 face if the Review Board voted to dis- 1( 'intelligence gathering action or techniques
close his or her identity. As a general rule, the utilized by the FBI a targeted individ-
Keiem Board usually protected the identities ual or organization that has been determined
"1 (f nationals who could be prosecuted to be of national security interest: ' The FBI s
in their home countries for espionage: Like- primary argument in support ofits request for
wise, Ivhere the asset was a United States cit- continued secrecy of intelligence activities
inn interacting with foreign government offi- was that disclosure of information
cials, the Review Board considered whether describing intelligence activities would reveal
th' individual was in a position of trust with to hostile entities the FBI's targets and
tl' foreign government and whether he or ties, thereby allowing hostile entities to
she might be in danger if the Review Board develop countermeasures
disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI;
Unlike the above-referenced scenarios, the Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act pro-
scurce who was a United States citizen interact- vided the standard for postponement: In
with other United States citizens was addition, the JFK Act s iegislative history
evaluated according to the Board' s instructed the Review Board to consider a
dlomestic informant standards. variety of factors related to the need to post-
pone disclosure of intelligence sources and
(_
FBI foreign counterintelligence activities. methods, including the age of the record,
whether the use of a particular source or
13 Review Board guidelines. As
a general: method is already well-known by the public,
rule, the Review Board believed that most whether the source or method is inherently
aspects of the FBI's foreign counterintelli- secret, or whether the information collected
Kence activities against Zommunist Bloc was secret 27
countries the cold war period were
well-known, were of high interest, The Review Board considered the FBI' s evi-
and were not eligible for postponement pur- dence and weighed it interest
suant to & 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act: in the records. After careful consideration,
the Review Board decided to release some
ii. Commentary and overview Of foreign counterintelligence information. The
cwnterintelligence appeals.
The FBI's assassi- Board's primary reason for releasing such
57
period.
keep
keep;
mould
evi-
doing
much
foreign reqquired
against
(oreign
specific
priori-
ius' gener-
ally
during
public
public against
foreign
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FINAL REPORT OF THE"ASSASSINATION RECORDS REViEW BOARD
records was its belief that the FBI's evidence by employing the sources or methods at issue
did not enumerate specific harms that would since the FBI did not cite the laws Or treaties
result from disclosure to which it referred and the Review Board
could not locate any laws or treaties that
A. The FBIs 1996 Appeals to the were in effect at the time that the records
President: On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI were created. Third, despite the FBI's asser-
appealed to the President to overturn the tion to the contrary, the Review Board had
Board's vote on
17 records relating to the evidence that other governments do acknowl-
FBI' s surveillance of officials and establish- that, in past years, conducted for-
ments of four Communist countries _the eign counterintelligence operations against
Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and other countries:
Poland during the 1960s. The FBI's overar-
ching arguments were that disclosure of the The Review Board believed that the FBI had
information would reveal sensitive sources not provided evidence of a "significant,
and methods that would compromise the demonstrable harm to current rela-
national security of the United States, and tions Or intelligence work Thus, the Board
that disclosure of the targets of the surveil- asked the President to the FBI's requests
lance the four Communist countries _ for postponement: The White House did not
would harm the foreign relations of the expressly rule on the appeals: Instead, after
United States. several meetings involving_representatives
from the Review Board, the FBL, and the White
The FBI sought to postpone.five types of House, the White House directed the FBI to
source and method ` capabilities: of provide the Review Board with specific evi-
funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs), dence in support of its postponements. The
mail cover; electronic surveillance, and type White House requested the Review Board to
writer and fingerprint identification: The reconsider the Bureau's specific evidence: The
Review Board's response briefs to the Presi- FBL, in turn, withdrew the first two of its
dent dealt with each source or method in pending appeals, including some Iecords in
turn: Specific details regarding the appeal of which the Review Board voted to release
each issue are discussed below. information obtained from a technical source:
In response to the FBI's overarching argu- B. Post-appeal decisionmaking: After fur-
ment that disclosure of the information ther negotiations, the Review Board and the
would reveal sensitive sources and methods FBI agreed to release most information
and compromise the national security; the regarding its foreign counterintelligence
Review Board responded that if the national activities against Communist Bloc countries
security would be harmed by release of this a8 1i consent releases." In those few cases
information, the harm would have already where the Bureau believed that foreign coun-
occurred, since the FBI had already released terintelligence activity Communist
both the identities of the target countries and Bloc countries still required protection,,the
the sources and methods that the FBL used in Bureau submitted for the Board's determina-
its operations tion postponement-specific evidence:
In response to the FBI's arguments that dis- To the extent that the information in the FBI's
closure of the targets of the surveillance proposed redaction did not meaningfully
would harm the foreign relations of the United contribute to the understanding of the assas-
States, the Review Board responded in three sination, the Review Board allowed the FBI
First , the information that the FBI to postpone direct discussions of ' foreign
sought to protect is widely available in the counterintelligence activities non-
public domain, from both official govern- Communist Bloc countries: With regard to
1i ment sources and secondary sources, so if the FBI' s 'segregated collections, the
foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of Review Board stated in its segreated collec-
the information, then the harm has already tion guidelines ,
occurred: Second, the FBI simply did not
prove its argument that it may have violated It is presumed that the FBI will, at least
international law o 'diplomatic standards" partially, carry over its post-appeal stan-
58
May
edge they
foreign
deny
tracing
against
parts:
against
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B
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OGC-92-53256
14 December 1992
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief , Historical Review Group
VIA: W George Jamesq
Associate
dounsel
Litigation
SGielsicd
OGC
FROM: Robert J_ Eatinger Jr _
Assistant General Coungel
Litigation Division, OGC
SUBJECT: Declassification Guidelines Established by the
President John F Kennedy Asgagsination Records
Collection Act Of 1992
1 The enactment Of the President John F Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("the Act" ) has
created declagsification guidelines that are to sOme extent
different from the Historical Review Program guidelines
established by the Director Of Central Intelligence_ In the
continuing review Of material related to the assassination of
President` Kennedy , the guidelines established by the Act must be
used .
2 The Act S most fundamental changes are the burden it
creates on agencies to justify continued classification Of
information and a requirement that agencies balance the national
security concerns against the public interest _ Under the Act ,
information must be declassified unless a Showing is made by
clear and convincing evidence that release Of the information
would demonstrably impair the national security-
3 _ The Act 8 guidelines for declasgsification are found in
its Section 6 and are as follows :
Sec 6 _ GROOND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF POBLIC DISCLOSORE OF
RECORDS _
Disclosure of assassination records or particular
information in assassination records to the public may be
postponed subject to the limitations Of this Act if there is
clear and convincing evidence that -
(1) the threat to the military defense_
intelligence operations_ or conduct of foreign
relations Of the United states posed by the public
disclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that
==================================================
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13-00000
it outweighs the public interest _ and such public
disclosure would reveal
(A) an intelligence agent whose identity
currently requires protection;
(B) an intelligence source or method which
i8 currently utilized by the Unitea States
Government and which has not been officially
disclosed , the disclosure Of which woula interfere
with the conduct Of intelligence activities;
or
(C) Any other matter currently relating to
the military defense_ intelligence operations or
conduct Of foreign relations Of the United States _
the disclosure of which woula demonstrably impair
the national security Of the United States;
(2) the public disclosure of the assassination
record would reveal the name or identity Of a living
person who provided confidential information to the
Unitea states and would pose a substantial risk to that
person;
(3 ) the public disclosure Of the assassination
record could reagonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion Of personal privacy, and that
invasion Of privacy 1s 80 substantial that it outweighs
the public interest;
(4) the public disclosure Of the assassination
record would Compromise the existence Of an
understanding of confidentiality currently requiring
protection between a Government agent and a cooperating
individual or a foreign government and public
disclosure woula be 80 harful that it outweighs the
public interest ; or
(5) the public disclosure Of the assassination
record would reveal a security or protective procedure
currently utilized, or reagonably expected to be
utilized, by the Secret service or another Government
agency responsible for protecting Government officials ,
and public disclosure would be So harful that it-
outweighs the public interest _
4 The Act therefore superseded the guidelines established
for the Historical Review Program to the extent the Historical
Review Group (HRG) is processing information related to the
agsassination Of President Kennedy _ The specific changes are a8
follows
a The most basic change is that you must applya
balancing_ test before_maintaining the classification Of any
information You must balance continued classification
against the public interest in the inforation_ Therefore _
the greater light disclosure of the information would shed
on the assassination of the President . or on the
2
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13-00000
government ' s investigation into that agsagsination, the more
serious must be the need to continue to withhold the
information for classification to be maintained_
b_ HR 70-14.e(2) states the reviewers Of information
advocating continued classification Of information will bear
the burden identifying any damage that disclosure coula
reasonably be expectea to cause to the national security
The Act defines that burden as one Of "clear and convincing
evidence 11 Further the Act changes II reasonably could be
expected to cause" to "demonstrably- It Therefore_ unless a
showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that
release of the information woula demonstrably impair the
national security, the information must be declassified_
HR 70-14.e(4) addresses the standards for
maintaining the classification of foreign government
information_ the identity Of a
foreign source_ and
intelligence sources and methods It notes that Executive
Order 12 356 presumes that this information 18 classified.
Under the Act with respect to these categories Of
classified information found with records related to the
assassination Of President Kennedy , you must still find
demonstrable damage by clear and convincing evidence
regardless Of the presumption in the Executive Order_
Further with respect to intelligence sources and methods _
the Act requires that they -
(1) be either currently utilized or reasonably
expected to be utilized by the U.S _ Government ; and
(2) that they not have been Officially disclosed;
and
(3) that their disclosure woula interfere with the
conduct Of intelligence activities _
All 0f these factors must be met by a
showing Of clear and
convincing evidence_
d. HR 70-14.e (4) also discusses CIA personnel and
organizational information_ The Act only permits the
continued withholding Of the identity Of an m intelligence
agent if_ by clear and convincing evidence , it can be shown
the person 8 identity requires protection_ Further, the Act
does not permit the withholding of organizational
inforation unless by clear and convincing evidence . it can
be shown the disclosure Of the organizational data woula
demonstrably impair the national security
HR 70-14.e(7) states that the HRG will determine
whether information warrants continued protection purguant
to statutory or other requirements _ The Act supersedes al1
other statutory authority for withholding information except
3
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13-00000
for a provision f the Internal Revenue Code dealing with
tax return information_ This means the Act takes precedence
over 50 U.S.C. 8 403 (d) (3 ) and S 4039, as well as the
Privacy Act when determining whether to release records
related to the assagsination of President Kennedy _ The Act
also makes no provision for protecting information on the
basis of executive privilege such as deliberative process
and attorney-client communications
5 _ Certain categories of information may fall into more
than one of the grounds set forth in Section 6 of the Act We
recommend that you review all of the grounds when determining
whether to release or withhold specific information For
example= a_ human intelligence source may fall into grounds (1) (A)
("inteliigence agent")
(1) (B) ("intelligence source" ) (2)
("living person who provided confidential information to the
United States " ) and/or (4) ("understanding of confidentiality
currently reguiring protection between a Government agent and a
cooperating individual") At this point _ we do not know how the
Assassination Records Review Boara will interpret each of these <"
grounds Therefore_ if determine the standards of the Act cC 4
are met to permit
eithholdinge
Of certain information , you should
assert as many grounds as may arguably apply as authority for
that withholding
6
6 _ Although the Act severely limits what information may be
withheld from disclosure_
1
it may be possible to protect
information not expressly covered by the Act However such
information may be withheld only with the personal authorization
of the President When the President signed the Act , he issued a
statement that included the following:
My authority to protect [executive branch
deliberations _ law enforcement information of the
executive branch, and national security information]
comes from the Constitution and cannot be limited by
statute_ Although only the most extraordinary
circumstances would require postponement of the
disclosure of documents for reasons other than those
recognized in the bill I cannot abdicate my
constitutional responsibility to take such action when
necessary
7 The Act provides individuals the ability under the
Administrative; Procedures Act to challenge in court final
decisions of the Assassination Records Board _ We can expect ,
then court challenges to the Board 8 decisions to uphold any of
our determinations that certain information meets the criteria
for postponement of release Additionally as you know there
are FOIA litigations for this same material Plaintiff S counsel
has indicated in court pleadings and orally that he wants the
court to review our redactions not under FOIA standards _ but
under the standards of the Act Thus you should apply the Act 's
standards knowing your judgments may be questioned the Board_
NA-|
Saftuly
Wmi}
aulbaw;. 3
Hant-
'0L4
acc&
Yedochi
by
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13-00000
subsequent court challenges to the Board S action, and the FOIA
cases
8 If you have any questions concerning the application of
the Act to your review of the assassination records _ please call
me on secure extension 76105_
Qalsk
Robert J Eatinger
5
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DCI/OGC / RJE: ig 76105/ 15 Dec 1992
OGC-92-53256
Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 DO/ IRO
DI/IRO 1
DSET_ IRO
1 DA/ IRO
DCI IRO
PCS PGG
ERR
DPH
Lit file
L
ES
Soft file
OGC Chrono
RJE Signer
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ASENY - IN-ZRNAL USz ONLY
7t6 1
PRIVILESZ) A?-ORNEY WORK PROC CT
allor
OGC-94-52916
19 Sepcember 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR : David P Holmes
Deputy General Counsel
FROM: Robert J. Eatinger _ Jr .
Assistant General Counsel
Licigation Division, OGC
SUBJECT : DCI Sources and Methods Auttority With Respect
to JFK Assassination Records
1 Per your request, I have attached a copy of the
President John F Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Acc of
1992 {ARCA ) Pub_ L_ 102 526 106 Stat 3443 - 2458 _ repricced at
44 U.S.C_ 5 2107 noce_ For ycur convenierce , I have higrligkzed
the perzinent provisions thac will aid in reszondizg Co a3
inquiry regarding the statute' s effect on the DCI' s statlzory
auttorezy to protect intelligence sources ana methods
2 The clear language and intent of the law is to supe-sede
stazuces that prohibit d.sclcsure of informaz:on except for SOme
irrelevant subject areas such as tax records The stacuce
provides that ic shall take precedence
over any other law
(except section 6103 of the Iscernal Revenue Code) judicial
decision const ruing such law or common law doctrine thac would
otkerwise prohibit the disclosure of information subject to the
Acc _ ARCA S 11 (a) This language _ taken with the provisions
discussed below which limit the intelligence sources and mettods
thaz ray be protected and set a strict proced:ral scheme by whick
inforation is to be reviewed under the ARCA _ effectively
supersedes the DCI 'S National Security Act authoricy with respect
to ic-elligence sources and cethods inforat:on subject co tre
ARCA .
3 Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which che
release of information may be postponed _ Tne statute
cont emplates that all information will eventually be released _
Indeed , it specifies that all inforation will be made available
to the public no later than 25 years after the: passage of the
ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president
certifies that continued pogtponement is necessary ARCA
S 4 (g) (2) (D) With respect to intelligence-related information_
ARCA allows postponement if:
M (1) the threat to intelligence operations is
of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest , and
such public disclosure would reveal
PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
AGENCY - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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13-OO00Q
AGENCY INTERNAZ JSE ONLY
PRIVILEGED ATTORNZY KORK PRCE: CT
SUBJECT : DCI Sourceg and Methods Authority wich Respect to JFK
Aggasgination Recordg
(A) an intelligence agent whose identicy currently
reguires protection;
(B) an intelligence source or Zethod which is
currently utilized or reasonably expected to be
utilized_ by che Uniced Staces Gove-nment and which has
not_been_OfEiciaLly_ disclosed _ the disclosure of which
would interfere wich the conduct of incelligence
activities; or
(C) any other matter currently relating to
intelligence operations the disclosure of which
would demonstrably impair che natiozal securicy Of the
United States_
ARCA 5 6 (1) (Emphasis added . )
4 The originating agency is cZ make tke first review co
idezzify inforation that meets cre s-andards for postponement _
ARCA 5 4 (c) (2) (D) (i) For CIA, chis effort is being undertaken
by tre Historical Review Group in consultatizn with che
Directorate of Operacions and other appropriaze Agency
components _ Inforation the originacing agerzies identify for
poscponement must be transmicced to che Reviex Board ARCA
5 4 (c) (2) (E) The Review Board "shall consider and render
decisions on a determination by a Government oefice Lo seek to
postpone the disclosure of assassina:ion recc-ds ARCA 5
7 (1) (1) Specifically, the "Review 3oard sha-1 consider and
render decisions on whether an assassinat:on record or
particular information in a record Gualifies :or postponement 'of
disclosure under the Act _ ARCA 5 7(i) (2) (B)
5 _ If the Review Board deter:-es co o-zer the disclosure
of information that the originating agency feit met the criteria
for postponement , it "shall notify the head cf the originating
body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination
in the Federal Register within 14 daye after the determination is
made ARCA 8 9 (c) (4) (A) If the inforation contained in an
assassination record 18 "obtained or developed solely within the
executive branch , the President shall have the sole and
nondelegable_authority to require the digclosure or pogtponement
Of the information under the standards set forth in
Section 6 _ 8 ARCA S 9 (d) (1) (emphasis added) The President '9
decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of
the Review Boards determination _ Id _ Records postponed by the
President must be re-reviewed every 5 years _ ARCA S 9 (d) (2)
2
PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
AGENCY INTERNAL USE ONLY
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AGENCY - INTERTAL USE ONLY
FR-VILESED ATTOR:Y WORK PRZZUCT
SUBJECT : DCI Sources and Methods Authority Wich Respect, co JFK
Assassination Recordg
6 I would be happy to discuss this further if you So
desire_ You ' might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373 )
since he has Met wich some or all of the Review Board members
Robert tinger_ Jr
Attachment
3
PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
AGENCY - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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13-00000
SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Auchoricy w/Respect
co JFK Assassination Records
OGC- 94-52916
DCI/OGC/RJEat inger:76195 (19 Sepc 94 )
Original Addressee ~latcach) irand cel:vered)
OGC Registry (waetacb) 1
Lit File
RBB ((Gc/Iz))
C/HRG (J.Pereira-404 Amnes )
RJE Soft File (w/attach)
1
POE Signer
KK -fyi
PAS - fy:
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{233 8d 941
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~EeREF
Attachment C
Friday, October 29, 1999
Foreign Government Information Contained in JFK Collection
CIA s JFK Collection includes Foreign Government Inforation (FGI) in a number of forms:
First, some CIA documents in the collection contained FGI but, by general agreement with the
Assassination Records Review Board, the source could be protected by redaction even when CIA and
the Board agreed that substantive information could be released:
Second, documents were provided by foreign governments in the aftermath of the assassination in response
to requests from the US Government for information about the assassination or individuals whose
names may have been associated with it Such documents subsequently became a part of CIA '$
{( 66 'sequestered collection" and thus were automatically designated by the JFK Board as Assassination
Records; subject to declassification review. A number f such documents were released in full in the
early years of the project (1992-1994), with the concurrence of the DO/IRO, but OIM has no
documentation regarding coordination with liaison.
Third, in a number of documented cases, the DO consulted with liaison services regarding documents that
were clearly identifiable as from a liaison service, and handling of both the substance and the sources
was discussed with the liaison services and their views obtained In all such documented cases, the
BOARD agreed to protect the foreign government source ad, as appropriate, to postpone the release
ofredacted portions or entire documents until the year 2017, reflecting the language of the JFK Act
The information below reflects those instances of coordination with liaison services that are
reflected in OIM records:
Australian
1. (S) A 1968 letter from Charles C. F. Spry, on Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
letterhead, to DCI Richard Helms objected to the proposed release of a Warren Commission document in
which reference is made to the Australian security service.' [The Warren Commission document (CD #97)
was a memorandum to Mr. J. Lee Rankin from DDP Helms dated 22 1964 reporting an anonymous
caller To
who described himself as a Polish chauffeur for the Soviet Embassy in Canberra to the US
Embassy there. That memo was sanitized to delete the Australian security service. '] The Board did not
accept the Agency's initial action to "deny in full" Sir Spry's letter and the Board's acceptance of
substitute text provided only additional time to pursue the possibility of full release. Consultations between
and among EAPAMSI, OGC, and others and queries to the Australian desk, and, in tum, the Station and
the Australian Goverment brought an acceptable compromise. ASIO authorized the release of & redacted
and retyped version of Sir Spry' s letter that did not reveal Sir Spry as the writer and that did not reveal an
ASIOICIA relationship, and ASIO further stated "this should not be seen as setting any precedent in
releasing ASIO documents The Board postponed release of the original until 2012:
2. (S) Helms' response to Sir Spry and two related CIA documents were released in sanitized
form that protected the liaison relationship. The release of the redacted portions are postponed until 2017:
3. (S) Cables exchanged between Headquarters and Canberra_over_the issue_in-[tem-|-were
declared assassination records,_but releaseofthe cables was postponed until 2017:
SECREF
LIA 2-82
X5
1.Sd
May
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SECRET
British
1. (S) The BOARD wanted to release the 1963 British Security Service's (BSS) interview of the
spouse of a West-East defector (Sloboda) The BSS advised the Station that release would be a violation of
privacyrights in the UK The BOARD agreed that the document was " not intrinsic to assassination story"
and that the document could be postponed until 2012.
2. (S) Another British document in the collection provided information that as of 1982
"KOSTIKOV was posted in Beirut in 1978 and may still be there. (The author EPSTEIN in
Legend claims KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey Oswald's KGB case officer in Mexico City-) The British desk
accepted the release of the one pertinent paragraph (one of five paragraphs in the document), and the Board
agreed to postpone until 2012 the release of all other text and source originating information.
3. (S) The BOARD learned of the existence ofa British document that the CLA possessed from the
BOARD's examination of FBI files. One member of the BOARD reviewed the entire document and
declared one portion of the document as relevant to the JFK assassination. The four-page section of the
document regarding KGB Active Measures was released in full and further noted that it was from a foreign
government that specifically requested not to be identified
Canadian
(S) report received through Canadian liaison channels on West-East defectors (Martin and
Mitchell) is in the collection. As consultations with the Canadian desk were underway, the BOARD
determined the document as not believed relevant and postponed its release until 2012:
Dutch
(S) The BOARD wanted to release two attachments (teltap transcripts) to a dispatch from the
Dutch Station. The matter was coordinated with the Dutch desk, the Dutch Station, and the Director
General of the Dutch National Security Service. As a result translation substitutions provide the
information from intercepted conversations on the topics of"Mr. Lee (sic)" and Richard Gibson; but
redactions obscure the source of the transcripts, according to guidelines in a letter from the service. Release
of the redacted portions is postponed until 2017:
2
SEERE T
LIA 2-82
XS
1.Sd