Transcript of 104-10332-10020.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== Aaaac 3020333020] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 SEERET ESG 95-02 14 July 1995 MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Historical Review Group FROM : Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr DO, Focal Point for ARRB SUBJECT : Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records 1 At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation in' light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources and methods The issues of greatest concern are those surrounding (Che_ joint] teltap operations run by the AgencyCand the Mexican Services} official acknowledgment of which could have an impact on liaison and foreign relations _ We therefore, wish Eg maintain protection Of this information 2. We are willing to release information which indicates the existence of operational_ teltaps_against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies Tas Tong as Ehey appear unilateral and we can continue to protect the existence 0f any participation of the Mexican Services We are willing to release documents which indicate the existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to the historical record _ These steps will be useful to the historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed against these targets _ We would want to continue protection of the information which identifies coverage of other countries and individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald_ 3_ We also agree to release of the following: A_ Pseudonyms of employees , aliases of employees , and file numbers _ CL BY 624343 } DECL OADR DRV COV 2-87 SBERET ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 13-00000 ~SRERET SUBJECT : Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records B_ Cryptonys , such as those in the LI series, unless they appear in the context of liaison (operational equities (such as LITENSOR and LITEMPO) We need to continue the protection of the cryptony LIENVOY This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the collect to describe the joint activityi from different perspectives _ Individual occurrences may not seem to reveal anything significant but, when looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire collection it reveals the joint activity which we are trying to protect: 4 Regarding the revelation of names of employees who retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final determination until the individuals have been contacted and- informed that their name is being considered for release This will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and convey relevant information _ The Directorate database is not set up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational involvement' s _ Office of Central Cover has prepared and is coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both inform them and solicit their assistance comments_ Ilonat Fredrick C _ Wickham, Jr _ 2 JSEERET ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 13-00000 TECREP September 11, 1995 WORKING PAPER Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept 11, 1995 ARRB Attendees : Marwell Gunn , Mary one CIA Attendees Barry, Ellie Igbue : Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono Item #132 and ARRB document #31 Gunn proposed that the Agency release the information in document 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico City Chrono Otherwise the staff would have to take the document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they felt would undercut the credibility Of the CIA and the staff The Board will not uphold a postponement in a specific document if that information is released by mistake in another copy Of the same document Ellie' s response because the information deals with Mex liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher level [response needed by 16 September] They algo requestea a snew" highlighted version Of the Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released to NARA in the multiple copies Of the Chrono and in the documents referenced in the Chrono Issue: The three documents of concern _ GIBSON Ellie reviewed the Gibson issues the fact that he had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA etc I noted that since the document would not be included in the determination list woula the Board be willing to reconsider Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the Board to reconsider but he dia not think it would have effect on their decision. PROENZA Ellie explained that out goal here was to protect the #asset not the method and that the deletions coula be reduced to those words that could result in the identification Of the agent Marwell said that the Board may reconsider based on the need to protect a source Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING? Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some 6 AM" source ~SECRFT any ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET Mary ask for more information on LIRING_ "PRIVATE LINB TAR" According the Marwell the Board 9 considered the isgue of the private lines but since the paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to releage_ Mary saia i8 was hard to defend the individual released since she did not have any information on the pergon We pointed out that the this release impacted on other documents which dealt with private line taps plus the Board had not limited its release to the paragraph that mentioned Oswald but released the name in other calls which had nothing to do with Oswald. Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part Of looking at similar documents _ The isgue Of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up Mary saia the Board was inclined to releage given the end of the Cold War [Note: we will locate as many Of the "private line tap" documents we can for special review] Iseue: RemovIng the Proenza and Private lJne tap documents form the formal notlflcatlon li8t Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said would discuss) Has no problem with asking the Board to reconsider or giving u8 the opportunity to presence additional evidence since their next meeting was within the 30 days set by the law but felt that the Board was not inclined to keep tabling documents that- had reached a decision on 1 Marwell asked if the Agency plang to "appeal ; he would like a heads up Later in private Marwell said that he wanted Lo_build into the process a loQp that_would handle these types_ Qf situations_ Isbue: Presentation to Board at Sept _ 20/21 meeting It was agreed that SSTATIONS would be the focus of the presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept one hour_ Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm_ Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window _ There are documents from the 508 , SECRFT they they ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== 13-00000 ~SVerT references in sumaries to the founding Of the station and most important _ the visit by the HSCA to Mexico Ellie said there was the poggibility of opening windows Of stations when Oswald was present = however this was a iggue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision _ She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window finto the 703 As for the older documents _ we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents _ Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept _ presentation would be a good opportunity to address the Prlvate Dlne and other Tel Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting_ After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US -Mexico relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight) war-stories did not go over well and neither dia Bill MNair_ He emphagized the importance of using the language of the law_ ~SECRFT City. key ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET September 12 _ 1995 WORKING PAPER Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept _ 11, 1995 Issue: Presentation to Boara at Sept . 20/21 meeting It was agreed that SSTATIONS" would be the focus Of the presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept _ one hour Marwell recommended providing evidence Of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning Strongly toward releaging stations _ particularly those in Europe _ Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window_ There are documents from the 508 , references in sumaries to the founding Of the station and , most: important the visit by the HSCA to Mexico Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswala was present _ however _ this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision She indicated that the DO would oppoge expanding the Mexico City window (nEo Ehe 708 As for the older documents _ we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept pregentation would be a good opportunity to address the Private Dine' ana other Tel Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting _ After the meeting Marwell elaborated on' the; pregentation He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US " Mexico relationship) when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight) 1 war-stories do not go over well He emphasized the importance of uging the language of the law especially when citing harm _ He specifically mentioned Sec 6 (B) {copy attached} which sets a standard Of (interfere with the conduct Of intelligence activities" [Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn , he stressed similar 66 themes including avoiding what he called chicken little" arguments _ He also raised the question on sensitivity_%f acknowledging we had a station in Mogcow during the Gos 66 It would have been logical to have one during the Cold 29 War 1 ~SEQRET City - ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 13-00000 ~SECRZ7 Central Intelligence Agency Weshington, D.C. 20505 FEB 0 2 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR : Director, Intelligence Coordination, Intelligence and Research, Department of State SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUo) The JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently released documents revealing_ the existence of CIA stations in dHelsinki; Bern} (Geneva} and ( The Hague} a (joint Eeltapoperation with Mexican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral penetration 0f a_ Tiaison service It is the CIA S assessment that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by the Board and requests the support of the Department of State should these appeals be brought before the President _ (S) Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of stations in (Rome Madrid Copenhagem OSTo, Brusse1s and {SEockholmd and in March-April, iE will be reviewing a document that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965 It is anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases and requests State Department S assessment as to the damage to foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly acknowledged. (S) It remains essential that the U.S _ Government stand assurances to persons and foreign governments that information they provide and activities they undertake based upon expected confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary_ These releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make those assurances in the future (C) CL BY 2.10.3140 REASON 1.5 (c) DECL Xl; X5 DRV LOC 3-82 DRV LIS 3-82 SECRETI by ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 13-00000 SECPET SUBJECT : Appeal of Unfavorable Determination bY the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO) We have a critically short deadline in which to address issues concerning the release of (Helsinki, Ber Geneva; and The Hague stations the identity 0f the asset, and Mexican liaison The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be resolved over the next two weeks We request your coments and expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on the foreign relations of the United States , and hope to cite State Departnent 5 support as we finalize our appeal _ (S) Dav;z N. Exger" David N _ Edger Acting Deputy Director for Operations CIR-316/ 00293-96, 2 SECRET ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 13-00000 ~SEERE SUBJECT : Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO) C/ IMS /ESG/ F .Wickham/ tdn/x44448/2Feb96 Distribution: Original }~ Addressee 1 DDO/Reg Ac/DDO DCI/CSI/HRG OGC EUR/ LGL 1 EH ILGL IMS IRO ESG 3 ~SECRET ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 13-00000 #BMNISTRATHVE_INTERNALUISE ONLY From the Desk of Linda C_Cipriani NOTE FOR: J.Barry Harrelson FROM: @nda CCipriant: DATE: 03/18/96 06.24:14 PM SUBJECT: JFK Meeting today After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting today; Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the Board's understandings (or misunderstandings} of CIA's position: BobCaud and | discussed what happened at-the JFK meeting &nd the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically Edgesdid not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed his willingness to cooperate with the Board: 1 JerusalemStation was More willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release: CIA wants to present more information:( Edgerwvas not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come prepared to present new information on it.CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity: 2. Open Period for Stations {Edgebagreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period He had no problem with theSept63-84period and opening it up tq_biyn the Oswald file He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this 3. Substitutions for(ordicistations Although(@ge)suggested "ScandanavaStation" as a substitution, he clearly prefered something less revealing like (Noythez European station 1, 2, etc )". Using the former term has far less plausible deniability: The latter option basically gives up what we want to protect: Once HRG hears frontEdgegas to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday morning before the Board Teaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken impression about the above, they will leave assuming we have come toan agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date: Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this FYI, will be in meetings at 1OAM and Zpm (Win Scott settlement discussions!!!) tomorrow. cc: John F. Pereira Eleanor Neiman DO ADMNSTRTHE_ YNTERALALUSE ONLY (Edger ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET From the Desk ofLinda C__Cipriani NOTE FOR: Fredrick Wickham DO Johnny Goins 00 Eleanor E. Neiman DO FROM: (Tinda €. Ciprani DATE: 03129196 11:52.57 AM SUBJECT: JFK release o€ Tokyostation(S) just spoke with EA legal and informed her about the latest release by_the JFK Board oftokystation and the fact that we have a letter from the Ambassador objecting to the release_ She indicated thatGrt Browiwould be a good candidate to g0 down to speak with the Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?) to request that reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange for & State Department person (apandesk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador'$ letter. (S) would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then brief the appropriate people in the DO &nd ' State Department &s soon as possible. (S) CL BY 6224130 CL REASON 1.5lc) DECL ON X1 DRV FM LOC 3-83 cc: RobertD Daudle J. Barry Harrelson SECRET they ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== 13-00000 ~SBERFT 21 March 1997 JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER SUBJECT : Policy Guidance - "Atsugi and 4 'U-2" 1 References to- "CIA base/ Station/representatives at; Atsugi Japan in the U-2 context is releasable 2 Information relating to the station othertbases and Agency representatives elsewhere in Uapan wili continue to be protected. 3 The issue was Coordinated with the DScT (Teresa Wilcox) DO (Lee Carle) the Air Force (Captain Thomas D: Rock) and the Department of State (Nina Noring) 1 all of whom had no objection to the declassification and/or release of ~ "CIA Base at Atsugi Japan and "U-2" project [ effort activities J . Barry Harrelson File: G: HRG JAPOL DOC ~SECRET ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== 13-00000 SECR8T DD/O 9s-3057 5 { 1995 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairan , JFR Aagaabination Racordo Roview Board FROM: David Cohen Deputy Dractor for Oparatlong 8UBJECT : Release Of JFK Documente 1_ I understand the JEK AARB 10 prebently conbldering the releaba Of documenta which would identify CIA stationg to tho publlc. I am oppobed in genaral to rovealing the locationg Of our @tationg and would prefer ingtaad to oubstltute the @tatlon name with a regional designation , e.g European Station vIce Brugsele _ I would ba willing, however to open certain stationa during a specific window of tim if they are 8ubatantively ralavant to the a88a88ination investigatien and_provided that tha document8 in question are sanitized to_conceal the permanent presence Of the btation? (S) 2 _ In all but 2 handful of ingtances publia aaknowledgmant of a btation would be a political embarrabgment to the hobt government and would threaten ongoing aenaitive operationg and liaison reletionshipe _ In a Eow ingtancea_ 1 the damage probably would be minimal or not at all a8 long a8 tho prabance appear8 to be temporary. I have Burveyed the involved componantb and determined the damage_ to national 8acurity Which would follow such raleaca. (8) 3 _ I btrongly urge that You not allow the information regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo i0 now Zaira and the gtation in tha 60 '6 would hava been in Leopoldville now Kinshasa where we are currontly located. Qur current relationghip with the Zaireang i0 not a Eull-blown liaigon type_ but more Of a limited relationship with cartain individuals from tha bervlca8 _ In the pabt, we have had cloue CL BX 0695930 CL REASON : 1.5 (C) DECL ON: Xl DRV FRM LOC 3-82 8BCREI ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 13-00000 8"CRET SUBJECT : Releaga of JEK Documantb relationghipg with the Zeirean8 becaube of our naad for thesr cooperation in e88i8ting with a PreeLdentlally-mandated program and will need to improve our relationohip Over the next baveral monthe to accompliah our goal8 in that part Of tha world _ Fe aleo continue to have- a gtetion in Dakar, Benegel _ We have liaiaon there and would not want to jeopardize it_ In dealing with davelopmental contacte , there have been racant ingtances where potential a8Bete have voiced concern about our Agency' 8 ability to keep ito relationghips clandastina _ To expoba our station thera would further hamper developmental ralationahipe and evantual recruitmantb _ (8) 4 _ Within tho context of our European presence , I hava the Zollowing commentb : Brussele Public acknowledgmant would forca tha govarnment and lialbon Bervice to pay Cloger attention to station operations and therefore present a threat to ongolng 0enbitive oparations _ (9) Helalnki A_ neutral country _ Public acknowledgment of a CIA station would embarra8g the government and lialeon; thereby inhibiting the clobe and productive llalgon relationbhipa wa now enjoy a3 wall a8 prebenting a threat to ongoing bengitive operationg. (8) Parig No additional damage . (8) Bonn No gpacifia damage. (S) Berlin No Bpecifio damage. (8) Luxembourg Public ecknowledgmant would Ombarra88 tho governmant and inhibit liaigon Cooperation; thub endangering ongoing operations . (S) The Hague Public acknowledgment would draw questiong Erom tha pra88 and create political probleme for tha govarnment and llalson _ Tho would endanger the continuation of beneltive joint operations. (s) 2 8BCRET ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 13-00000 8ECRT SUBJECT : Relaabe of JFK Documente Oblo M Public acknowledgment would draw questiona Erom tha press and threaten vary productive and very bonbitivo ongoing joint operatlong . (S) Madrid Publia acknowledgment would draw praee attention and embarrageing questione for the government and liaibon bervica _ This vould further damage an elready dalicate lialgon relatlonghip which 18 vital to 48 for counterterrorlem operatlone , (8) gtockholm A neutral country Publla acknowledgment would ba politically embarraselng for the government and liaieon serviceb Thib would likely endanger any continuation Of joint oparations _ (S) Geneva A neutral country_ Public acknowledgnent would create political problema for the government and liaieon service and force greater attention to our operationg _ Thid would create an intengive counterintelligence atmoephere for our operatione; likely to cause a decreaaa Ln our operations _ (8) London No specific damage_ (S) Ottawa Re No Bpecific damage. (8) 5 , Our Eastern European statlon8 pose a unique problem when we considar publlc expobure _ Prague Station ig' recovering fron operating for almobt fifty yeara in an undeclared statub _ During the laat threa yearg wO have managed , with much @ffort, to begin the astablishment of good working relationg wi th the host government and internal/extornal servicae Ab a regult, tha atation hab recently begun g0m0 very senoitive end high-level bilatoral oparation8 _ Thaba obvioubly depend upon the good will Of tha hobt service _ Tha Czech citizenry cano of age in an atmogphere in which dietruat of Intelllgence barvLce8 in general , and the CIA in particular_ wab thoroughly ingrained, That dietrust lingers in the public'8 mind oven today_ Exposure Of our 0tation 1 8 previously undiscloged presence and operational activitiog during the Cold War will necasgarily raise quabtione about our activities then_ and almogt cortainly lead to further 3 ~BCR5' ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 13-O0000 33er84 BUBJECT : Releese of JEK Document8 inquiry about our pregent relationbhip. It i0 doubtful that our relationghip , and certainly our very 8engitive operations_ could withgtand tho resulting public debate_ The exigtence Of Prague Btation , pabt and prebent , cannot ba burfaced at thle tlma without geriou8 damege to national aecuri (S) 6 . Publlc acknowledgment Of our atationg in Managua, Ban Jobe , Panama City, San Salvador Santo Domingo , Buenos Atre8 , Lima _ 1 Santlago, and Montevideo would not further damage our operational Capabilitieb in 2 Bpaciflc benbe . Ovarall any releabe of information about 8 Olandeetine Bervice breeds diatruat in profeggionalism and will put future operation8 at rigk_ (S) 7 . We receive Bigificnt national colleation eyeteme bupport from Aubtralia which affectb netional syutem @ollection efforts agalnat Tier IA targete throughout Asia _ We would jeopardize thig bY releaging the prebence OE our station to the publtc. Tokyo 18 a special cage in that thare 10 continuing digagreement regarding our atation _ We Bhould not complicate tha current "Bpy Manie" etmogphere in Tokyo_ Thara have baen two incidento regarding our prebence in Jepan during the prebent year _ Any further diaclobure would axacerbate the tension and create an untenable operational atmogphore for our station and parbonnal _ (8) 8 Public acknowledgmant Of a atation in India Nould b a problem for the 0.8 _ Government_ U.S and Indla foreign relations are alwaye delicate; the . Indian Government 18 very gengitiva to parceived 8lights to its national bovereignty , and public acknowledgment Of a 'atation would prove embarrasging to the Indian Government which in turn Could a8k that the btation ba closed . If the Btation were closed or Bignificantly downgized , it would affact a larga number Of important intelllgence collection operationg _ (8) 9 Publia acknowledgment OE a atation In Tunlste would ba a problem for Tunieia vib-a-vi8 it8 bibyan nelghbor_ Libya end Tuni8ia ghare a border whlch meanb the Tunisian Governmont must act with Bome prudence regarding itb relation8 with Libya _ Tho Libyan Governmont would almogt certainly respond very negatively ~8zCRET ty . ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 13-00000 BbeRE 8UBJECT : Raleaga Of JFK Documanto to a public acknowledgment of 4 etation in Tuniaia and mlght well engage in haraggment/Babotage/terrorist action8 in Tuniaia to bhow itb digpleagure . If the Tuniaian Government should a8k that our btatton bo cloged , the 0.5 . Government would 1obo a capability to Collect on Libya / north AErican stabili and Iblanic extremiem. (8) 10 _ Public acknowledgment Of a station in Morocco would be a problem for Morocco vi8-a-vle ita Islamic fundamentalibt population_ Morocco _ like 80 many countrie with a majority Muslim population, hag a growlng Iblemlc fundamentaliat problem, and Iolanic fundamentalibt8 are frequently oPposed to the 0.8 . in general and the Agency Ln particuler_ Public acknowladgmont OE a atation ln Morocco could cauge itb Iblamic fundamantalist population to react negatively and demand that our statlon pe cloged. If tha 8tation wara cloged , the 0.8 _ Government would lobe intelligence on the western Bahara confllct, north African 8tability and Iblamic extremi8m . (5) 11_ In those ingtance8 where I have indlcated danage to oporational capability and national 8ecurity, I would feal compelled to Beek a revereal of any dacibion to make a publio acknowledqment_ In thobe cebe8 where I Indlcata "no ppaclfie or additional damage" I am prepared to accept your decision I muat call your attentlon to the general danage done to u8 by any disclosure of operational presenca _ Our operational capabilitias are in direct proportlon to tha confidence placed in our ability to protact bourca Identitias and operational methode _ DIaclobure to the public OE our prebence weakonb thle confidence . (S) [dmxcl David Cohan 5 OBernu ty/ yet hi

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104-10332-10020.pdf

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