Transcript of 104-10332-10009.pdf
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
^ot Ceeaeai
OG€ 78-3s95 ~SECRET fIdr /
5-31-78
Bxecutive' Registry
APRROHED FOr RELERRE 1993
VE?432ML
CIa HISTORICAL REVFEW PROGRR 893819442/8
Juk 5 I0 04 AH*78 _
SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE JN FULL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence2000
VIA Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM S D_ Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator HSCA
Office of Legielative Counsel
SUBJECT House Select Committee On Agsagsinationg
Request for Accesg to the Hart Report"
14 Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at
paragraph 14 Tor Timited accegs Of selected House Select Committee
on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized
version of the Hart Report-
2 Background: As you know the HSCA Staff Director_ Mr Blakey,
has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab to provide: access
to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's
handling of the Nosenko case- This request is part of an inquiry into
hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend in which the.view is
presented that Nosenko was a_ dispatched agent with the mission of
concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald_ Central to HSCA interest;
is the question of Nosenko'8 bona fdes _ Additional to that isgue , interest
has developed in the manner in which Nosgenko was treated during the period
that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately
below
3 _ The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nogenko case
addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These
matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's
bona fides , s0 there also is considerable review of the methodology employed
and the analyses of those handling the matter . Mr Blakey states in his
letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on
the issues of bona fides being concerned instead only with personnel and
internal procedures _ This understanding on his part is incorrect, and
his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it=
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SETREF _
4 - The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted
in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division both of which guestioned Nosenko's
bona fides _ A subsequent Study by the Office 0f Security in 1968 has also
been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding
studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides Other Soviet defectors have been
interviewed by the HSCA staff , as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and
retirees As a result_ much of the information On the case has been
revealed to the Committee.
5 < The two SE Division studies_ concluding that Nosenko was a KGB
agent were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed _
The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two
studies could be rejected 80 shortiy after their completion _ As a result_
the HSCA seems focused on the issues a3 viewed at that time The Hart
report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period_
during which experience with the validity 0f Nosenko'9 information provides
the basis for an objective Te-examination _ It is relevant to HSCA interests
that the Hart Report congtitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides
of Nosenko_ Accesg to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden
and complete the understanding Of the HSCA of the matter
6 _ Because of the above _ the Agency hag everything to and nothing
to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's
bona . fides
II
7 _ In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides _ Chairman
Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the
period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided
the HSCA with some detail on this We have made the point that how
Nosenko was treated was a result 0f the issue not a part of it- When we
questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter
HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct
of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which
includes this The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms
of the real issues _ How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned
CIA was with the man's bona fides , but so far 28 relating further to the
inquiry concerning President Kennedy' s assassination , it seems marginal
best_ The rationale is S0 far-fetched that we have been led to Consider tbat its
dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this
coming September _ It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public
criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr
Blakey as hostile to the Agency-
2
~ECREF
gain
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SECREF
8 If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of
Nosenko' $ treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real
purpose of the Committee as we believe it to be= it should be faced
in those terms No one would disagree with there being relevant
inquiries_ but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn_
it against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose Of the
inquiry _ The HSCA staff position is tendentious_ and reflects on its
face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be
so obvious_ The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant
to its charter but the Agency should also assert a Similar right to defend
itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions _
9 Therefore _ while we believe that the Hart Report should be made
available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be
taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained
in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides-
III
10 _ There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on
foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA _ There is,
therefore a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the
Report's being made available-
1l_ A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the
names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain
modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in
other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides a working basis
for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the
HSCA _ as the Directorate of Operations has had a
continuing policy of
selected sanitization_ Extending this practice to the Hart Report would
be consistent with the extant wor rela tionship with HSCA The Report
will remain classified.
12 If the paper is made available classified and sanitized, it should be
on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have
access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide
research purposes _
13 _ Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the
paper, in classified form available to 2 limited number of the HSCA staff
representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley- such
release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use O the
material by the Committee- The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)
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DEbtttt`
'iat if the paper is withheld, and a court test results the Agency
mlust expect to fail in withholding the paper _ The Office of the General
eounsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the
paper available under the conditions set forth above
14 = Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited
"umber 0f Staff members of the HSCA to a classified_ sanitized version of
he Hart Report- Such access shall be conditioned on agreement to limit
"se of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the
'uestion of Nosenko's bona fides .
S. D. Breckinridge
Attachments
CONCURRENCE:
3 1 MAY 1978
General Counsel Date
Chief , SE Division Date
Chief , CI Staff Date
Jun 1978
Director of Security Date
Is/ Frixk 6, Sar7720
APPROVAL:
(Y Director of Central Intelligence Date
"ISAPPROVAL:
Director 0f Central Intelligence Date
~SECREF _
SIGNED
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SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinatiozs
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"
Distribution:
Orig Adse
1 DDCI
ER
OGC
1
EISE Bivff
SA/ DO/0
D/OS 3
OLC/ Subj
OLC/ Chrono
OLC / SDBIksn (30 May 78)
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CIA SFECIA LL_RCTIONS
RELEAY IN FULL
200 11 March 1993
NOTE FOR : Deputy Director for Operations
FROM: Peter Earnest
Chief_ Media Relations
Je
SUBJECT : WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination
#AG |
The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on
the occasion of the 3Oth anniversary Of the Kennedy
assassination_
With the help of CIC , we recently arranged for George
Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview
former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee
Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet
Union To ensure that Nosenko S resettlement identity and
location woula remain protected, I made the arrangements for
Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview
The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a
S250 consulting fee_ The interview was done on Wednesday
3 March_ at the POST offices downtown _ I did not remain for
it Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which
was attended by Ben Bradlee _ Lardner and Pincus were very
pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative_ f
our making it possible_ I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko
who said he was satisfied with how the interview was
conducted and with the financial arrangements
Shortly after the interview_ Lardner faxed me a list of
the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves
to use in checking out Nosenko S information They asked if
there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the
individuals named _ I told them' that developing information
in response to-their questions would,probably take a good
deal of research ' and: that I doubted the Agency would be able
to take on such a task at this time for the POST However _ I
said I woula take it up with the appropriate offices
Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone
would be willing' to undertake research on their quest ions _
I m wondering if there is anyone around who might be
knowledgeable of Nosenko s information who would be willing
to talk with Lardner and Pincus on backgrouna based on
his/her existing knowledge_ I think Lardner and Pincus would
be grateful for making such a person available even if
ele z
SeeeEZi _1
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SUBJECT : WASHINGTON POST Request
all their questions aren t answered _ Considering that they
are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy
assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them
would be seen as a gesture of good will
Pete# Earnest
Attachment
As stated
Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background
about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is
available _
No do not want anyone from the DO talking about the
Nosenko information_
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SUBJECT : WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
specialist in the Kennedy Assassination
DCI/PAI/Earnest :ncbx3 7758 (11 March 1993)
Distribution:
Original Addressee
1 ADDO
SA/ DDO
DO Registry
DI PAI
DIDOICIC
7
E/DO/NROC
CICSI
CIHistory Staff
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Nemes of Rustians we skould ty t tack dorn about Lce Harvey Osweld, Yuri Nosenko tnd tbe
JK uutstioe:
1@ucnLDkeM Grbarot bead ofthe Second ChicfDinectorte of the KGB in the carty 1980+
sberNorcnte *10o Borted primarity against Amcrican tourigE , @s dcpuby chief of the Seventh
Depart ent_ Notento detcrbed himself 4s srt %f favored by Grbbanov and be said Grbbanov tn-
nbucted hbm; deer tbo JFK wosaination; t retrieve the Osweld @1o fom tba Mngk KGB rght
MNv
2 Anatoliy Korzkento deputy chief %f the Second Chief Directorate 0 one of ita dopartmcnta, %t
tine oFJFK aaattn Nozento gaid wbeu the fk 2nived from Minskike &nd Korelonko Wero
going Over te _inpartant @ret volume-and fiding KGB had nothing t d with Osrald-then
KGB affcar bom tha Et Depantent Gne In tnd picked it Up 0n Gribanov'! orden; to Tevierv it
1d Nito44mmary OTkl
3. The oiicer wbopicked it up Was CoL Matveera_deputy chied think) of Firetfor American) Do
PartmcatSecpnd Che{ Dbrectorto: Unbave @rt ume
4 Cbbf of tki Fint Department wes CoL Sergei MFedogeyer or Fedogeev and Presumably be
would have hadahand in 0r tupertised Azeparation 0f the epraka O5 J4ODa:
5 Grbanovand more than 40 otber KGB officen Fere ticked out because of Nosenko's defection
eeoding tNotento Tht rightz Wkxet Krfemas
6. Mol GeomRastul_Was m 1959 4 scnior Gsc officer in KGB responsible Br Intourist mat-
ten; Noxentouy tEt#Cas Rastnusln who told him about Ooweld and how be wanted to IY in
Soviet Udlon Noxcnto gaid Raotrusin said Oswald "docsa't predent interest" to KGB end Noeento
checkedout with bis superiord: Word came back not to bother with Oswald_ Nosenko wvas told @ tel
Bastnuai t0 tel Ltourit t deal with him
7: Rastrut retred next day and @id 50 1 Oswald tried to hl sell ecc KGB
vashed bands 0 him, decided 0 let Intourist deal him: Intourist then part of Miniotry of For-
eim Trde Nocenko Lid he believed queation 0f what t0 d0 with Oswald 12s run to top of that min:
btrysd beyond to Khrwechev or One ofhis deputies._I any Gse; decision was made t0 let Oswald
sv bMt Butggt _Noeepto E4YLbY KGB
8.bteend19? CKGB wicague MT Turlin Service No: Z(counterintellgence b frelm
Otntries) Fiet ChefDirectordte told Noeenko prelly that Mexio station had fust tent : cable
abopt request by Ouwald fr $ visa t0 gc-coter Soviet Union Wbat should ba dopel
Noteatotaid ka gid tait a second. How cme be' back in Americal' At that point; Noscnto said
kbdot *or Ouzeld had g0p0 back
9.Nocento eU he mid kts go to chief of department wbo be identifed as A.CoL Cheteko O
Chelentobut Eter teemed tosay bis timing might be of and smebod eleo DayEavo chefof
Noeentoh departnent #t tetime) In eny Caee; Nosenko quoted chief a8 saying, in effact; Tremem-
ber ti Can nut No No-No Tell tem we dop't havo acy interest '
Cabb bck @ Mexico edvising KGB there rd %1 Oswvald by tetling him to g0 back to his
or Oountry tnd apply @E 4 visa at Soviet Embassy b Washington etc , etc
10. CoL Cueder res chiel of the KGB department in Minsk that 6zo fesponsibl fr foreignera
tere
11. Okex Nechigoreqko oe of three KGB officere &tationed in Mexico wbo rcportedly intcr-
socatcdor deat dhOxrald 0n his visit to there; Nouz kving in Moscow UCa
Otbher tro Mexdo City officer; both stil alive m Ruooia;_Veleriy Kotttor_ and Pavel_Yatztov:
tviB rbler 8ot
City
Boca
City Bet
City-
Embaoy
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f.l
3 March 1994
Memo to: C/HRG
Subject: Mangold Litigation
Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox Ranttr; Ramze that
the JFK collections contains a significant nuber Of
documents On Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the
Mangold litigation_ As I understand it the Mangold
Litlgation is over the Angelton files and is several years
old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI , documents on
Nosenko S defection and treatment are part Of case I
talked with Theresa Wilcox who i8 the para-legal handling
the litigation however , she was not familiar with the
documents involved , She will consult with* the
lawyer
on the case , and get back to me
I consider the ball in OGC ' s court . I propose that we
continue to review the Nosenko files_ If there are Mangold
or other consideration to address , we can do So after the
HRG review is complete_
Barry
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INTERNAL USE ONLY
23 March 1994
Memorandum For: C/HRG
Subject: Nosenko ana the Mangold Litigation
I received a call from Kathy Kelly; OGC , thig morning
concerning the Nogenko files in the JFK files_ I degcribed
the files again (about 4000+ pages that include trangcripts
Of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona
fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and
Hart reportg and an 835 page comprehengive gtudy) Since
Nogenko 18 an important figure in the JFK asgassination
story and the files are part Of the sequestered collection,
HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Asgagsination
Records Collections Act However we were aware that some
of the documents were part Of the Mangold litigation and
wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.
rathy Kelly said that the Mangold litigation should not be a
factor in HRG 8 review If the files were subject to the
JFK Recordg Act, they ghould be processed under that Act _
When the review i9 complete, a ligt Of the documents
released shoula be provide 80 that OGC can treat them the
same in the Mangold case
I also talked with Kathy stricker (yesterday) to get some
background on the handling Of Nogenko fileg and what were
the II gecretg" given what we know 18 publicly available_ She
said for yearg the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the
Oswald information: however once Goliteyn became public
that ended _ Today = the battle over his bona fides and how
he was treated are public knowledge The Agency up until a
couple years ago had not released some Of the studies (she
mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the
case or if it was posgible to continue to deny them . DO has
protected the information provided by Nosenko on other
Soviet sources and leads for pogbible recruitment Thi8
type Of information shoula continue to be protected.
Kathy Stricker 8 comments are consistent with HRG 8 handling
Of the Nosenko' fileg We are considering all Of the files
as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and
there was a large amount Of information including parts Of
the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard
copy collection_ We have deleted information provided on
other sources and operationg not related to the JFK story-
We are also recommending release Of the rest Of the studies _
Although contain potentially. embarragging information
for the Agency (ag dia the IG report on the Castro plots)
there doesn t appear to be, grounds for denying under the JFK
Act _
they
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8BCRBT
CIA INTERNAL O8B ONLY
Restrictions on Declassifying Material
on
Yuriy Ivanovich
NOSENKO
The following should be used as guidelines in
declassifying material files pertaining to the career and
"bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
1 CIA Knowledce_ 0f Russian intelligence tradecraft_
Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of
American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence
service our knowledge of their tradecraft_ Since the
Russian services continue to target Americans this
information should continue to be protected.
2 To_protect_ a CIA asset_ Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
remains an asset of this agency_ and is under contract_
Moreover the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR)
remains interested in NOSENKO S whereabouts and activities _
Russian intelligence services since the Second World War
have tried to track their defectors There are indications
that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO
case_
At the time 0f his arrest Rick Ames had some
NOSENKO files (AESAWDUST) jn his possession_ The US
counter IntelTigence community is unsure if this
material was passed (€Q the Russian service
~Following NOSENKO 5 brother and mother S visit to the
United States_
1
both were questionned by the Russian
service about NOSENKO ' s activity and place and
residence _
pos. M
CI.
8ECRET
CIA INTERNAL OBB ONLY
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SEP 16 '94 09:50AM
P.34
Mr Robert EEnmgia
'2909Rodk MenorQourt
(Hernaon Vemz 22071
Dear Bob,
It wae very good t0 ceet wtth you agefa In iasbIngton on June 12.
I am wrIttng to confirw or recent Convereetlon ebowt the CIA'6 releeee
Of docuents about d0 ta the Nattonal Arabives . Lb I explalned to you et
cuI reeting: I am very diepleaeed thet this was done wIthout @y krowled-
ee end eapeClally EInoe my pbotogreph wab
offcfelly releaeed Dy the
Agency fcr the ffret time Jn thirty yeere_
40 you kow, it bag oome to @y ettention thet tho CIA releesed thege
weny hundreda Of pagee to the publlc WIthout coneulting
me 0r teLling
m8 that thls Web eoing to be done. I have already 80er copiee 01 two 0f
theee ' reports totelling Core than 700 pagee Ope 1a the Ootober 1968
report bunporting me by Bruce Solfe; tbe other wes a Februery 1968 re-
port by the CI Steff whlch attacked *y credibility. (Tble letter report
Contasns_ 8 Cofy Of my pboto from tbe lete 19608 , I cons_der tbib a
breaah
6f @y pergonel geaurlty.)
I 4lbo coneider pany Of tbe detasls in both , of tbege reporte to be 0f 0
very perganal neture. Otber pegee deal wlth wIth Bome very sene1tLve
caaes whlch I geve the Ageroy ebout other people. The informatIan In
tbege rerorta was glven freely and accurately y de to the CIA Officera
In tbe 196C9 uder t0rza OI strict confidentialItya Although 1t 18 very
difficult for @e to Bay' th1e, I feel thet my trugt in the Agency hae now
been ber_ously deneged.
Thfe releeee particularly troubles @e becauee for the paat tbIrty yeare
I have rezaInee very lozel to tbe Agency and congiderete af itg wiab0b 0
Por instance, deepite many requeete , I beve only; apoken to a few Jourz
nelist8, and when the Agency advised ma
txo.
I have Qevar Bought only
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SEP 16 '94 09:S1AM
P.4/4
Page 2
Gb my Ow ta publlsh *y 8tory
J an artIcle 0r took, Sut tbe CIA
hab not returzed tate' courtesy Inateed , 1t kec releesed bBneItIve
informetLon to the publio wlthout gpeaking
to ne fIrst.
Oader the circungtances , I mould 1de to reopectfully requeet tbe
follcwing:
Thet you akow tble letter to DDOO Ted Price, Director Jene8 Woolaey
end tre current beads of the .CIA 'g Freedom 0f Information Office and
@iotoricel Revlew gteft
Ta Ve 80 thet are eware cf whet bee happened _
2, I woula Like to receive, In wrItirg,
an explanetian from thes0 r0b ~
PonsIble. 0f whr this release web done.
5, I weuld like to receiye a ligt ef tbe rejor reporte about me waLch
have elready been releaeed . A8ide fron the two reporte thet I alread>
have geen, I would like to rece1ve OopIes f any other pejor etudiee
tbat have been released . (For Ingtence, f tbere are reporte releesed
by Peter Beglej, Newton Mtler, Jamee Angleton, the CI Steff end Jobn
Hart, tben I would 1ke ta s0e tbem es well.)
4, I woula like ta be gIven the Agenoy '6 WrItten a8surance thet further
releeees wfll not @cour without consultIng we fir8ta
Bab, you should know thet befare I wrate thte letter I heve epoken
abeut tais matter WIth MJ friend George Kalarie . He too wae troub-
led what I told him, and he advised me that I should abk tke Agency
for an erplanatton.
Bob, I apologize for troubling you wfth this matter, but I heve na ope
elbe t0 turz to fer ab818tance .
Pleaae Let me know if there i8 any resperse a0 soon as possLble.
Respectfully yeurS ,.
now ,
tbey
gead
by
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SEP 16 '94 09:S0AM C04
Sna#
Draft letter to Nosenko from the PYpECUAL COLLECTONS
RELEASE IN FULLE
Dear 2000
The Dfrector ha8 asked m0 to respond to your letter
expressIng concern that US Government declaseifIcation Of
materlal could compromise your privacy and becurity.
In regard to your question about the documents that have
already been releaged, rest agsured that I have directed
OffIcers responeIble for FOIA requesta to take speclal care
In reviewing information concerning You in light of your
epeeial circumgtances We will make full ube Of a1l
poEGTble Jexceptions to FOIA-mandated declassiflcation in
order to protect your prIvacy .
As you xnow in 1992 Congrees passed the JFK Aggagsination_
Records
Coliection
Act , which regulred all US Government cf tk
agencles to release any recordg related to the asgageination_
Of President Kennedy
As Deputy DIrector for opezations,
I
am Of course comitted to supportIng the DCI in
meetIng thls requirement , but also appreclate your concern
about the ffles on you that are related to the
aggagsInation. I have therefore dlrected a senior officer
(Rateeteolt the DO to meet with the officlals In the Agency' 9
stafe who are Jnvolved In the declassification
program _ This OffIcer hag had extenelve dlscussions with
6vo' Dembere of the Itarg and has worked closely wIth them to
Identlty those portIone Of the files that Include personal
64 and operational Information.
74 Spxc /& SV > Y0
As a result of thls effort; we have
(oatpened Freiease-of-anyy
3e
information touching
on your prIvate life or on operational
Information pertaining to your debrlefIngs _ Under the JFK
law_ a Presidentlal Revlew Board will make the fInal
decision on the diepoeltion Of the material. This Agency
values the sacrifices you have made for our country_ and we
will present the Board with the strongest poselble cabe for
protectIng information that could affect your privacy and
Gecurity.
Best wishes ,
2ve
7nvet19e42
Exily
#nsleica
Rcvicu
prdsct
";04,Y6
Plt74t
==================================================
Page 17
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UNCLASSIFIED
17 April 1997
Sue Amiano} SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry
Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825 , 2 soft files
entitled:
1 "WARREN COMMISSION/ OSWALD"
2 MI DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/ OSWALD"
found by Al Bonner in the vault_
7 ^
Aees_5 #
Received
I Kcewewra
UNCLASSIFIED
ijA
==================================================
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Adninietrative _ ##RO Interral ~Uge Only
CLA SPECIA COLLECTIONs
RELEA E IN FULL 30 April 1997
2N0
Note To : ARRB Staff
Subject : CIC Soft files:
1 Warren Commission/Oswald
2 Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald
The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft
(or working) fileg containing information OIL Nosenko , Warren
Commission: and Oswald_ It is not clear if the files date
from the Warren Commisgion period_ or were created in
1975/76 (latest. date of documents) in response to a request
or investigation
Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection
(OGC folders) The other documents may be in the Norsenko
material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the
Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the' Microfilm is
not indexed document document)
Administrative HRG Tniternal Uge_Oaly
by
==================================================
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Administrative HRG Internal Use Only
30 April 1997
Note for the Record
Subject : CIC Oswald/Nosenko: related soft files:
1 Warren Commission/Oswald
2 _ Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald
1 I advised Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, that most of the
documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in
the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA - The other
documents are related to Nosenko but do not mention Oswald_
These documents are
probably dupiicated
in the Nosenko
material set aside for discussion with the ARRB I
recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB
staff She concurred_
2: Documents will be made available to. Michelle Combs
ARRB staff, on her next visit
Barry
Administrative HRG Internal Use Only
==================================================
Page 20
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fil
SECRET
TO: Eileen M. Wukitch
FROM: James W. Zirkle
DATE: 08701797 09:54:03
SUBJECT: Re: The Nosenko Papers
CL BY:(2034442
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM; HUM 4-82
Eileen: Let me introduce myself. am CIC/Legal: CICIC asked me to touch base with you
concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are
aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's 'discretion, we do believe that the
Agency , when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such
information to the maximum extent possible. If can be of help in that regard just let me know.
Jim
From the Desk of Dennis D Lamb
NOTE FOR: Ron L. Seckinger
FROM: Dennis D Lamb_
DATE: 07731/97 10:44:28
SUBJECT: The Nosenko Papers
CL BY:(0790429
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82
At about 1020 hrs 0n Tuesday, 31 July, received a call from(Gileen Wukitchof the Agency' s
External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs'$ interest in reviewing
the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)
on 5 August: Wukitch Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages 0f the Nosenko
material with her. (VVukitch wants to know whether we would Iike copies of the material Combs is
taking: said yes. (Wukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case ad to
this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch 0n our concerns
in explaining our position to the ARRB.
1 . Is Nosenko married? (No one in CICIAG knows:)
2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but can't see why she or the
ARRB needs to know.)
3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one
in CICIAG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)
4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CICIAG knows off hand. Henry's observation was
that Combs can find this out from open literature.)
SECRET
said
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SECRET
According toWukitch: Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair:
the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted
or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible
would be done to prevent further release of his papers: don't see any problem with this since the
papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.
Wukitch said she told Combs CIC would have(Bob_Pringle) former Chief of AGIFIOB currently
serving as Officer in Residence at the University 0f Kentucky__flown in to address the ARRB if this
appears necessary. Combs will pass this 0n to the ARRB: (Wukitchmoted that Combs alluded to
the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.
CC:
CC: John B. ENGBERT Nancy T_ BRUNQNE,Edgar C. BAUML Dennis D_ Lamb} 'Curtis L
MACKIAN) ( Jacqueline_ Frankfort DCI; Ron L Seckinger}
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM
August 5, 1997 CIA HAB NO OBJECTION TO
DECLAssIfICATION ANDOR
To: T. Jeremy Gunn release QF This DOCUMENT
From: Michelle Combs
Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
Ihave prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the
Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.
Summary and Recommendation
The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts ,
memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the
as open in full or with only minor redactions Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy
assassination:
After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our
judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President
Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as "NBR These NBR records
consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet
intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to
Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence: I suggest that we review carefully
these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the
"1 extent this is correct; we should process them as "NBRs
Background on Nosenko
KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in
Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4,1964,he defected to the
United States for what he said were ideological reasons His case became the single
most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency' s history to date: Nosenko' $
information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more
importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the
prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.
The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in
public
==================================================
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2
December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would
dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence
agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described.a
darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence
agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these
fake defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko' s
bona fides would also be false Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence
Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn's world view. Golitsyn argued that any
CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves
Nosenko's first four meetings with the CLA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an
intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley)
who met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his
debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey
Oswald's stay in the USSR which, he said,had come across his desk routinely asthe
deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for
watching American visitors in the USSR
With Golitsyn arguing Nosenko's bona fides, plans were made in March 1964,
to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his
information: On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division
Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal
approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not
communicate with his supposed KGB controllers On April 4, he was imprisoned in an
attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary
confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile
interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then in a
specially built cement house in Virginia: Despite over three years of severe treatment,
Nosenko's original story remained unchanged, no "6 'confession was
forthcoming, and
no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed;, a fake defector:
On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of
Security specialist During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told
the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found
only positive responses to the questions Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a
comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko's information, to
date, and concluded that he was what and who hehad claimed to be all After a
review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA
custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA
File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e: Inosenkowpd
against
along:
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Page 24
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3
In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no facie
evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent
defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector: Hehas identified many hundreds
of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on
the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special
studies on Soviet subjects . Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a
contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married,and living quietly in the
Sunbelt:
File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e: nosenko.wpd
prima
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Page 25
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6 October 1997
Note To : DO
From Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
Historical Review Group
Subject
: Nosenko records in JFK Collection
The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA' s
designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK
6 sequestered collection as not believed to be relevant
(NBR) The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK
Board at the 14 October meeting The Board requires a
description of all NBRs to be made available to the public.
Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff
member , Michelle Combs for classification and public
release The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if
possible HRG /DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with
the draft and recommend release If you have any questions ,
call me on 31825 Thanks
Barry
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==================================================
Page 26
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13-00000-
Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK
Assassination
Reel 45,Folder 3
During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector; conducted a series of
interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona
fides: This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions
which cover Nosenko*s family, background; early career and Komsomol experiences
ReeL 45 Folder 4
This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which cover Nosenko ' $ career; Party membership, Komsomol personalities and
procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA
Reel 45 Folder 5
This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and
procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.
Reel 45 Folder 6
All the documents in this folder; but one, have been released to the public. The NBR
document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division
(CISR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans
to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR 's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant:
Reel 45_Folder 8Aand B
Folder 8A contains the 263 page "Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security
Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be
believed; A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public The
NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by
N: Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DCICL/SIG) based on the comments ad
questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn: The report contains Golitsyn'$ comments on
inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for
further questioning; Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent:
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2
Reel 45 Folder 13
This folder contains one document; The document is a ten page extract from the 835
page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" by Peter Bagley. It records Peter
Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.
Reel 45_Folder1Z
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer; his marriage, and KGB
buildings, personalities, and procedures A two page to abbreviations in the
transcript is also included:
Reel4s_Folder l9
This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study 'The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work; and responsibilities as a Soviet
intelligence officer: The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent
under the control of the KGB.
Reel 45_Folder 20
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer; and KGB buildings,
personalities, and procedures.
Reel 45 Folder 21
This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko'$ experiences in and knowledge of Komosol and
Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures
Reel 45 Folder 24
This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study <The Case
of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB)
in 1967.
ReeL 45Folder 25
This folder contains pages 85-348, part of the 835 page study 'The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
by
key
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3
ReeL 46 Folder 2A
This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII; VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The
Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division
(DCISB) in 1967.
ReeL 46 Folder 2B
This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the
public The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter
Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief; SRICI on the
3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist; an unsigned May 1965 paper
analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported
conclusions of the psychologist; and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to
Chief; SBICIK on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts
Reel 46 Folder 3
This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA
in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing: The report is a
reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques f
handling Soviet agents defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services=
handling of the Nosenko case The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in
October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide
defector:
ReeL 46 Folder 5
This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area
during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents have been released to the
public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 <homework assignment"
prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum
on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's
Reel 62 Folder 2
This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.
Reel 62 Folder 3
This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its
impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB:
and
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ReeL 62 Folder 5
This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions
by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation
targeted against an American tourist
ReeL 62 Folder 6
This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American
tourist.
Reel 62 Folder Z
This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko' $ education, Navy career; and a particular KGB
operation targeted against an American tourist
Reel 62 Folder &
This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB
control and to think about becoming a double agent; Nosenko says that he has been
telling Deryabin the truth all along:
ReeL 62 Folder 9
This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with
Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes
information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts
ReeL 62 Folder 1Q
This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the
59 handling of Nosenko and is labeled 'TS Material from Deryabin Safe. This folder was
not examined by the HSCA staff: Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released
to the public The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US
Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko'$ to
handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a
report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko'$ request for 'political
asylum, copies ofhis subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor,
and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his
handling:
day day
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13-00000
10409/91 mU JJ : uu rAX Zuz 7(24 0457 AKKD I@J0u4
MEMORANDUM
CIA KAS NO OBJECTION To
DECLASSIFICATION ANDOR
October 9, 1997 Release 0F ThIs Doculent
To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
CC: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director
From: Michelle Combs
Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection
Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
The information On Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,
memos, and reports: Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the
public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President John F Kennedy: Although all of these 800 pages have been released in
redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of thc
JFK Act before we submit them to the Board:
After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my
judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the
assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR" These NBR
records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family
ad professional contact information Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,
and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information to Nosenko's early career
in Soviet Naval Intelligence Much of the information consists of various attempts by
the Agency in the 1960s to establish Nosenko's bona fides The October 1968 Solie
Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the
JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides The conclusions of the Solie report were
reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart A brief summary of thc conclusiong of the
Hart Report will also be processed for release:
The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed
carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of
the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,
which may add t0 an understanding of thc Nosenko story , was marked relevant and.
identified for processing and review.
Z1C
dating
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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
16 October 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham DO
DO JFK Board Focal Point
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
OFFICE: CSIIHRG
SUBJECT: Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997
REFERENCE:
The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:
1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting:
If you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010,
please provide them to me by 23 October:
2 State cover
This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting: recommend that you review the
material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if vou want to provide additional "evidence" _ Are there other
components that should be consulted on this issue? (Sue Burggrarwas involved in discussions in April
3 DRE Monthly Reports This is a long standing request from the Board staff Please provide a status of the request by October 21
cc: John Pereira @ DCI
Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM
ADMINISTRA TIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
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FAx
Rec' & (6 /3u/93
Re Nasenko
CLA SPECLAOOLLEC FFONS
RELEA)X INRULL
28 October 1997
2000
SUBJECT : Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
1 The Board intends to deglassify and release for public
consumption, approximately 2400 pages of counterintelligence
staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews_ and bona
fides studies on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko These studies contain
sensitive personal and operational materlal completely unrelated
and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President Kennedy_ It has been officially stated and documented
that the remaining Nosenko records have been Carefully reviewed
to confirm that they contain no materlal helpful to a deeper
understanding of the assassination. Mr Nosenko has adhered time
and time again to the stipulations of his Menorandun of
Understanding not to divulge his relatlonship with this Agency,
even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency
forced upon him during his early resettlement . Public disclosure
Of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted
Invasion of hls personal and professional privacy not to mention
the breech of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his
right Of privacy and above all, nis security_ This trust was
reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDO , Ted Price,
in September 1994, stating that we would take 'special steps to
protect any sensicive Information touching on Mr Nosenko' s
private life or on operational information pertaining to his
debriefings _ The letter further states that this Agency valued
the sacrifices ne made for our country, and every effort would be
made to protect information that could affect his privacy and
security The question has been asked before_ Should we not
show the same Integrity that we expect from those who put their
lives on the line in defense of our national interests?
2 Furthermore, the recruitment Of sources of high
intelligence value has always been this Agency' 5 top priority-
Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage
to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might
be disposed to collaboration . Disclosure of cooperation with the
USG would cause any potential source to think twice before
placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot
protect his Informatlon _ For those individuals such as Mr
Nosenko , who placed their trust in this country in the past
entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the
Indiscriminate release of Information, some of it very personal
CL BY (0489514
REASON 1.5()
DECL Xl
DRV DEF 2-82
SECRET ~
~Ts Bay
N
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Page 33
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a~SECRET-rco
SUBJECT:
and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously
erodes this Agency' s credibility and undernines our Resettlement
Program _
SECREP=
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Page 34
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13-00000
SECRET
CL BY: 611637
CL REASOE: Section 1.5 €
DEcl O1: XI
DRv FRM: LOC 5-82
5 November 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira DCI
Fred Wickham DO
Lee Strickland DA:
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
(Linda Cipriant@ DCI
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
OFFICE: CSIIHRG
SUBJECT: 17 November JFK Board Meeting- CIA issues (update)
REFERENCE:
1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:
(S) Reconsideration of the release ofaWarrenton Na. as the location of the CIA Record Center.
In addition to written evidence prepared by DA, the Agency has been offered the opportunity to brief the Board:
Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR (Not Believed Relevant) material from the 2017 per
the JFK Act to the year 2010:
The ARRB staff disagrees with the Board on this issue and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not
confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency
opposes the 2010 change in the date;, will need a memo from the DO explaining why: We could offer & compromise--accept the 2010
date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as-2017 t review and appeal the release of the records: have ask OGC for a legal
opinion Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated NBR" by ARRB: The documents declared to be
Assassination Records (AR) will be re-reviewed and released, either sanitized or,in fuil, during the coming year.
(S) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under (integrated State cover
We have provided written evidence (00 note coordinated with State and copyotMQAbetween CIA and Statet: According to the ARRB
staff, some Board members consider CIA use oE state cover as an "open secret" and are inclined to release: We have been offered the
opportunity to brief the Board.
SECRET
being '`
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13-00000
SECRET
Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records
ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR;
Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO; &nd DCIIRO. If you have any comments or objections, please forward them
to me by COB Wednesday:
Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc_ These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA
staffers (FYI no action required at this time)
The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR The staff considers
them marginal to the story and believes that are not worth the time involved
(S) 2 We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesdayl, if we plan to brief the Board on Warrenton
andlor State Covea Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday): need at least one day to review the
material and prepare their presentations for the Board:
cc: Eileen Wukitch@ DO
Becky Rant @ DA
SECRET
they
They
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13-00000
SECRET
CL BY; 611637
BEASOR: 8er6aa 16 €
DECL O@: X1
DBy FRM: COV 2-87
21 November 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR; John Pereira DCI
Fredrick C. Wickham DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
(unaCipriaw@ DCI
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
OFFICE: CSIIHRG
SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November Results
REFERENCE:
1. Reconsideration of the release of (Warrentonas CIA Records Center:
The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.
2 CIA use of State Cgvee:
The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.
This determination affects 16 documents 3 duplicates) that were pending Board action Future documents will be impacted by this
decision Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsiderationlappeal review.
3. Release date of_ Nosenko NBR records:-
The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the righi to review and appeal at that time.
4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:
The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month' records
for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, &nd that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of
financial records be declared to have believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination;
5. Ramparts Damage Assessment Document:
The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant
SECRET
"no
==================================================
Page 37
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13-00000
SECRET
organizatior- be proEessed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA Ramparts Memorandum be declared NBR. The
meznorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in Ramparts the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support
and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations: Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the Ramparts article. The
relevant organization is theliernetionel RescueCc_iritee; the IRC aided Oswald on his return to the US:
6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists:
The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain stations
that are releasable:
7. Document 10410072-10232
The Board rejected the Agency's request t protect the full crypt (Uiuck) / The document has been sent to the DO for
reconsiderationlappeal review.
8. Other Documents:
The Board accepted the Agency'$ and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents
Reconsideration and Appeals:
If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has
requested that it be notified prior to the letter t0 the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision We expect the letter on or around
Dec: Ist; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register on that date: As mandated by the White House, the
Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision t0 the President.
cc: Eileen-Wukitchy , DO
Kathryn-Dyer DCI
Becky Oyer DA
Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04.45 PM
SECRET
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham DO
OFFICE:
DATE: 10/10/97 12:10.24 PM
SUBJECT: Nosenko Records
have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While see this as a success to have them support our
position &nd have some concern about the detail included within the descriptions. We had an occasion in the past to ask for a legal
opinion about a former employee's access rights to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act: Nosenko
has already personally expressed (in a letter to the Agency) his concern and objection about potential release of information about him;
think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy
Act:
trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and
classification but | just want to raise a mild concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder content: wiil not object to
the these if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved as long as they are determined to not be in
violation of his privacy rights:
In future efforts to protect NBR information, would like to see less detail in the description if at all possible:
cc: <Eileen MWukitch @ DO, Lee E: Carle;Y- DO
Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10.24 PM
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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13-00000
Classification of Material Transmitted
HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
Phone # 703-613-1806
PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIA TELY
***rrrsrrrssrstrrrprr*srrrrrr#srsrrsrrsrrrrsrssrrrxrrsrrxxsr*r*
CLASSIFEDFAX
SUBJECT:
Zxezb
FROM:
damzl
SENDING FAX NO_ 703-613-3060
DELIVER TO: LALOVz
RECEIVING FAX NO.
8V3-1342
DATE TRANSMITTED: J0] / 0 PAGES TRANSMITTED:
(including cover sheet)
TRANSMITTED BY:
ttZsta
****rr#rrrrsrrfrrrrrrxrxr**XXXX*XrrrX**rXrrrrr*rrsrxrrrrrrtrxrrrx
MESSAGE:
Classification of Material Transmitted
Bawd
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THU 15 : 00 FAX 202 724 0457 AKKB Wuv+
MEMORANDUM
October 9, 1997
To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
CC: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director
From: Michelle Combs
Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection
Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,
memos, and reports: Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the
public as open in full or with redactions: Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain inforation directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President John B Kennedy:; Although all of these 800 pages have been Ieleased in
redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of thc
JFK Act before we submit them to the Board:
After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my
judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated t0 the
assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR:' These NBR
records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family
and professional contact information Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,
and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career
in Soviet Naval Intelligence Much of the information consists of various attempts by
the Agency in the 1960s to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie
Report; which has been released in redacted form and willbe re-reviewed under the
JFK Act, establishes Nosenko' s bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were
reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart: A brief summary of thc conclusions of the
Hart Report will also be processed for release:
The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed
carefuliy to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper: understanding of
the assassination: During the review some additional material, not previously released,
which may add to an understanding of thc Nosenko story , was marked relevant and
identified for processing and review.
13-0000Q0/.08291
279
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13-000q0/09/97
'IHU 15: uu FAX Zuz "(24 045 ( Akd 4 uuj
2
NBR Folder Summaries
Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet: At least one member of the HSCA
reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.
Reel 45 Folderz
During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of
interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CLA efforts to establish Nosenko' $ bona
fides This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation
sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career, and Komsomol
experiences:
Reel 45 Folder 4
This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko'8 career, membership, Komsomol
personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then
current) incarceration by the CLA,
Reel 45Folder 5
This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities
and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.
Reel 45,Folder 6
All the documents in this folder, but onc, have been released to the public The NBR
document is a five page February 1964 memo From the Director of the Soviet Division
(C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Flans (DD/P) Richard Helms on
plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet
Reel 45Folder 8B
This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N Scott
Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and
questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn The report contains Golitsyn'$ comments on
inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko'8 testimony and his recommendations for
further questioning: Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent;
Party
plant:
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10/09/97 THU 15;01 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB 1uu6
3
Reel 45Folder 13
This folder contains one document; The document is a ten page extract from the 835
page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko' written by Peter Bagley of the
Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967 . The document records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on
Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko:
Reel 45Folder 12
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko'$ carcer as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB
buildings, personalities, and procedures: A two page to the abbreviations in the
transcript is also included in this folder:
Reel 45Folder 19
This folder contains pages 349-602,part IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" Prepared by Peter Bagley in 1967. The analyzes Nosenko's
biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer: The
conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the
KGB:
Reel 45,Folder 20
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career a9 a KGB officer and KGB buildings,
personalities; and procedures:
ReeL 45_Folder 21
This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and
Communist personalities, buildings, and procedures
Reel 45_Folder24
This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, I, I, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case
of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" Prepared by Peter Bagley-
key
study
Party
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THU 15 : 01 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB 4 uu (
Reel 45Folder 25
This folder contains pages 85-348, part V, of the 835 page study 'Thc Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley:
Reel 46Folder2A
This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VIL, VII, and LXof the 835 page study "The
Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.
Reel 46 Folder _2B
This folder contains a variety of documents, s0me of which have already been released
to the The NBR documents include; 14 reports of interrogation sessions with
Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965; an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief SR/CI
on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigncd May 1965
paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutcs the reported
conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to
SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts
Reel 46 Folder 3
This folder contains most of the 186 page Ieport by Hart commissioned by the
CLA inJune 1976. Chapter X pages 159-176 inclusive are missing: The teport is a
reinvestigation 0f the Nosenko case in the context of 'Ieviewing the techniques of
handling Soviet agents and defectors It is highly critical of the handling of the
Nosenko case by the Clandestine Service: The Hart Report endorses the condlusions
reached in October 1968by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a
bona fide defector:
Reel 46Folder 5
This folder contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area
during Lee Harvey Oswald' s residence there: Some documents in this folder have been
released to the public: The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework
assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces and a four page
memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 19708.
Reel 62 Folder2
This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce:
13-00008/09/97
public:
John
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09/97 THU 15;01 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRH WJuuo
5
Reel 62 Folder 3
This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which detail Nosenko'8 career progress and a disciplinary problem and its
resulting impact on his promotion schedule:
Reel 62Folder 5
This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions
by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation
targeted against an American tourist
Reel 62 Folder 6
This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Perter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American
tourist:
Reel 62 Folder Z
This folder contains one 84 pagc verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB
operation targeted against an American tourist:
Reel62 Folder 8
This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by
Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent
under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent Nosenko responds
that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along:
Reel 62 Folder 9
The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with
Nosenko in July and August 1965. The inforation in these reports summarizes
information detailed in the actual intertrogation transcripts.
Reel 62Folder 10
This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the
handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe: " This folder was
not examined by the HSCA staff Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released
13-00008/
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10/69/97 THU 15 : 02 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB 0009
to the 'public The 9 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various
US Government agencies &nd the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to
day handling emergency procedures for Office of Security assigned to Nosenko,
a_ report to the CLA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for
political asylum, copies ofhis subsequent contracts with the CLA as an independent
contractor, and additional reports, memos; and briefings concerning the Nosenko case
and his handling:
Combs e: InosenkoAwpd
File 4.20.5,4.0.2,and 2.4
guards
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P.z
DEC 12,/92 09:47FM
MEMORANDUM
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR
September 22, 1998 RELEASE CF C'4 INFORMATION
IN THiS DOCUMEivT
To: Laura Denk
'Executive Director
CC; Bob Skwirot;
CIA Team Leader
Rrom; Michelle Combs
ZboLLLE
Associate Director for Regearch and Revlew
Subject: Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Contalning Information Not
Believed Relevant to the Agcassination 0f President John F Kennedy
Previously the Review Board voted t0 declare NBR approxmately 2400pages of
materialon Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in CIA eequestered collection
microfilm unrelated t0 the assassination Of Presldent John R Kennedy
The Review Board staff has gince examined an additional two boxes of working fles on
Nosenko produced-asa result of the search for records_related t the Kennedy
assassination Tlus material either duplicates or is the Original cOPY of the gequestered
collectionmicroflm material previously declared NBR-For example;many ofthe
tapes Fom which transcripts were produced ate found In the Working files::
The Board previously declared the transcripts; which are found in the sequestered
collection microfiim;to be NBR: The files contain no new material which Would add to
the understanding of the Nosenko story:
Irecommend that the Board declare the contents of the two boxes Of working files on
Nosenko tobe NBR
e-Icombslnbrinosenko;wpd:
File 24,4.02,and 4.20.5
the
orginal
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SECRET
CI-277-94
31 August 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release Of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko
1_ On 3 August I had a series Of discussions with the
staff of the Center for the study of Intelligence (CSI) at
the Center s office in the Ames Building. Our discussion
centered on the disposition Of more than 3 200 pages
relating to the career of former KGB officer--and current
CIA independent contractor--Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko _ The
documents are being reviewed for declassification and
release as required by the JFK law_
2 The Declassification Problem: CSI's de-
classification staff has carefully reviewea the Nosenko
material Ellie Neiman--a career Directorate of Operations
officer--is representing the DO in the review process .
MS . Neiman notea that the material can be divided into two
parts:
Approximately 80.0 pages that deal with Nosenko' s infor-
mation about Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union
and his relationship with the KGB _
A
body
of counterintelligence staff studies inter-
rogation reports, file reviews and bona fides studies on
Nosenko totaling some 2 400 pages_ These studies contain
sensitive personal and operational material. For
example:
Information on how CIA conducted operations in
MOscow ("sticks and material on how
bona fides analysis
bsiconducteat
is and details on
how we evaluated the KGB S operations_
WARNING NOTICE CL BY SIGNER
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES DECL OADR
OR METHODS INVOLVED DRV HUM 4-82
SECRET
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SECRET
SUBJECT : Discussions with the Center for the study Of
Intelligence
on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko
Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB
assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases)
and on Americans Moscow Station used as assets_
One US citizen the KGB developed is now a
senior professor of history in California_
3 Nosenko'9 Sensitivities: I discussed with
Ms _ Neiman Nosenko S concern about the impact of the release
Of information on his personal life_ I informed her-of
Nosenko recent letter to the DCI complaining about ` the
release of material related to his association with CIA, and
of his concern that future releases would endanger his
privacy and security_ The bona fides studies dwell in great
detail on Nosenko' s personal life, including his problems
with venereal disease and his relationships with women .
Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses Of
Nosenko' s life, their release woula reveal modus operandi Of
sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man
who has servea as a CIA employee for more than three
decades _
4 _ Following my discussions with Ms _ Neiman, I met
with John Pereira, Acting Director of CSI_ and Barry
Harrelson _ a member of his staff_ I recommended that CIA
move to release the material dealing with Oswald but_-
citing the operational costs embarrassment to prominent
American citizens_ and threat to Nosenko ' s privacy--strongly
suggested that the other material be held back . Mr Pereira
agreed to take these points into consideration, noting that
the law dia allow CIA to withhold certain information to
protect national security or for reasons of privacy _ He
tola me in closing that later this year the Agency woula
have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board
the reasons
for withholding I promised that I would raise
the issue with the Chief of the counterintelligence Center
and said I believed we could provide the justification.
Robert 'ingle
SECRET
's
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SECRET
SUBJECT : Discussions with Center for the study f
Intelligence on the Release Of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko
CONCUR:
S 2 724
John Pereira (ADI CST ) Date
5 2 Satt 14 _
Barry Harrelson (CST)
Seet_%
Ellie Neiman Dawe
SECRET
Saet
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the. study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko
DO/CIC/AG[FIOB /RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94).
Distribution:
Orig John Pereira , Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman
for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG
ADCSI
CSI (Harrelson)
Neiman
1 5
CIcIC Chrono
CIC/AG Chrono
1 CIC/AG Defector File
SECRET
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530
531
'e8f tezactori
1 had to conslder In EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BE
nogopiiloontinue to accept Souettion
GORE THE HOUSE SELECT- COMMITTEE ON ASSAS-
1g8'tbat Nosenko stetes Is 'that J
dldnt Interview tbe KGB SINATIONS ON: AUGUST 9, 1978
ey
"dnt nintateerle OOsalaTrherer Oswa8e
d sent him:to Minsk INTRODUCTTON
your voowledge %2 Nosenko
i; Im
'd o your kuo eledge OC RGBbroceon zour Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence oficer who
credlble when nee Oyg GBeprocverraa
and tear tbelieved him to be bone fide the committee spoke to the_CIA .oficial
KGBt t meant by Interview, 1634
Tvho had overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko dur-
EGB headquarters, [teates e formal ing the 196467, when Nosenko was kept in solitary confine-
"oele #ECE oceretela 1g face "Te%ac
mentz other - he was: asked about the reason Nosenko
g himself: a8, 8
KGB ofices but BpcetoCace Gia
mn solitary' confinement,, about why he , questioned No:: Shcocedibieosenko
8ay8 - that; never
epeeking t Ra senkoh
credibility, and 'about Nosenkos charge that his statements
best Of bls knowledge; I wi
to the Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the
to~I will Agency Portions of that trenscript follow.
scept that?
ppen_ ExQERPTB OF DEPOBTTION Or DAVID MORPET BEroBE Hooer SELEOT COMMITTEE O8
the KGB didn't beve & A8488INATIONB ON Agauer 9, 1978 eF dope to check out the book On him
tocee whet the experiences
Teasibllity of Mc: KLEIN: When Nosenko defected in 1984, when be came to the Onited States,
debriefed by KGB oficers? Of other wag hetn the custody Of the Central Intelligence Agency at that tlme ? Was: that ever MI: MuRPAY: I don't want to be cute:by eaying I belleve 80. I am not exactly hedovlduai bad been Interviewed_ Bure Of tbe legal_I mean What: hls legal status wa8. Insofer 48 phygical facts,
the Oswald Cace becausetene foi' come other, be Wa: Ln the custody Of theIO: Oswald investisation:_ Mr; KLEI. What dlvlslon Or untt of the Central Intelligence Agency had pri-
aome who were In Ruseia In mary regponsibllity for Nosenko?
d,It,18 very poseible; a proxtmate perlod Mr MORPEY: The Bovlet Rugelan Diviston
rriod %f time because wouid glmost have to MI: KLEIN: Of which yop were the Ohlef?
1e comparison &od tbevntein doonateituvdon Mr: MOBPEx. Yes, 8lr:
approxlmate Mr: ' KLEIN. And wbat year atd yon leave the Soviet Russta Dlvsion ?
bow many Ile detector tests, to_ Mc: MUBPHY Beginatng In 1988
your knowledge? Mr: KLEIN. And wp wnt what year did the Soviet Russia Division bave
JeOf &Il Of these tests to primary respongibllity for Nogenko? Stest to be a cceapletelto JalG teen; Yalid?
Mr: MORPHX: I don't recall the exact time but it was certatnly up until the Ju belin actuat apsetelsiova toncert that Is, the epring Of 1887.
sefron our ofice because I concerning the polye
Mr: KLEIN: The investlgetion by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1987. At that
ind I wU only confine am not an operator; time did the control Or responsibity over Nosenko change from the Soviet De detector _ntoomateonyseO totquections relat: Rugsla Division to another dlvlelon ?
onsider tbem to be Into your report Mr; MURRHY My recollection 18 that 1t changed in the epring Or early summer 1ly to not be to becc 18 that correct? of 1987 and the responelbillty was turned over to tbe Ofice Of Security of whlcb
1y that Harvey completely Invalld Solle Wa8 4 member:
bona fdes? Oswald was a minot aspect
Mr. KLEIN_ As Ohief Of the Soviet Russla Dlvision did you bave the primary
responstbiuty for what happened to Nosenko? And When I say bappened, wbere
Icterize the Oswald _ he wae kept, what he was asked? urtto be conoidlered aspect? Mr: MORPET Iwa8 responstble for the case
It received the full Mr. KLBIN: OK
Lee Obhealdusptaideration
and the Mc: MORPEY Although the case was handled by oe Of the groups within tbe
48 amount Of Investigation Divlelon
en that Nogenkoewesa.ot dote tn 1964 Mr; KLeTA: But they would report to you?
ervey Ogwald,; would truthful @ his rela- Mr: MUBPHY. Yes-
48 bona @de? that be Bigulicant
to
Stbelade he to consldec; Mr: KLEIN; There came a tlme In 1984, Aprll 4 I believe; when the treatment tbat he could be
about Oswald and received by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogationg began; is tbat
correct?
e wa8 lying ebout Oswald Mr: MORPHY_ Iam not 8ure I agree with the formulation of the question.
Mr: KLEIN. Well elaborate
he wa8 Mc; MUBPHY , No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under ehetberite bott Oswald; do you thlnk tbat consideration-changed and Nosenko wa8 not permitted to evade questions O to
be was bona fde? declde wben he_wouid Or would not Want to respond
Mr_ KLEIN: Could you describe for u8 wbat the pattern Was before; &8 far a8
conditiong and how It wag changed?
connectton:
ndence,
Teu:=
They never
wbed thbey deddede
knon
Interviewe
intervieiy years
'ring things: Among
placed
bappened: MY
bave
large
ring statements
defectora
done;
You
the
the
valid,
Lee
Harvey
48
lying
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13-00000
532
Mc: MOBPEY. Well, the mttern before wag one Of pretty much permttting.
Nosenko to call .the &hot In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we
wanted to discuss these things jn a reasonable manner; but hle preference Wag
not to sit gtiIL for 8 full days briefing, to want to g0 out soclelly all the tlme
which made it dlficult the nert day to continue to work And the most important
aspect; I think; Of the change wa8 the declslon to confront hlm with Inconsisten-
cies 48 opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.
Mr KLEIN. What about the day-to-dey' lving conditions, were they changed?
Mr: MURPHT: Well he wa8 not permltted to leeve, He Fas not permitted to
depart
Mr: KLEIN. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment; not the actual interroge-
tion Besglons, but his food intake; hls recreation, wa8 that changed at that time?
Mr: MORPEY I don't think 8, not-that' early. I don't remember' that:
Mr: KLEIN . Subsequent to April 4, i8 it correct that Nosenko WA8 interrogated
by people from the Soviet Russia Division ?
Mr. MURPHY That i9 right
Mr: KLEIN . And bow were the particular subareas on wbich he wag interrogated:
chosen ?
Mr: MURPHY: I am not sure: I don't know. Subject areas? Thls Ig 4 gue88, this ts
9 recollection, but I think the decision wa8 made based on what the CIA people
thought Offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break o that
In otber' wordg, I think it,was baeed On points that they.bad collateral on.. By
that I mean other information whlch &ald what ths man I8 gaylng I8 pot the truth
or this man does not know about thls and, therefore; let us hit hlm bard On thie:
And 80 It wag 4 fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to pos-
session, Of information in the hand8 Of the interrogators which then Offered the_
best opportunity to through and get the trutb:
IOne breakthrough it was felt, 98 i8 normally the case, gives you otber break-
throughs The decision On what subjects to be interrogated was essentially & fac
tor O the tactics Of the debrieing:
Mr: KLEIN. Would it, be fair to say tbat after April 4 the subject arees were
determined by 8 desire to try to catch him; to break him, 48 oppoged to # desire
to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role a8 an Intelligence
agency ? In other words, knowledge Of the operation
Mr: MORPHY. That ig an acourate impression. The answer i8 yes because Dy
the end Of April there wa8 a view that the man was not telling the truth, that
parts of what he wa8 saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore; made
no sengse, and although the reasong for hls behavior and his Btatements were
not clear, it made Do sense then, 1t did not appear to make Bense to accept &8
valid any data he might provide unless you could be sure that tbat data wa8 In
fact correct; and there were S0 many doubts about this leaving aside the moti-
vation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented It, that the
inforation was not considered acceptable
Mr_ KLEIN. Were you aware Of the gubstance Of what Nosenko had to eay about
Oswald ?
Mr: MURPEY. From the very @rst; I mean, when be first gaid it back in February
or March:
Mr: KLBIN: Do you recall now the gubstance of it?
Mr: MURPHY: No; not exactly; anything I gald would be polluted by 80 much
back and forth. I know that the thrust Of the message wag that Oswald wa8 never Of interest to the Soviet Intelllgence Servlces, that he was never debriefed
by them, and I can ` guarantee that because I wa8 pergonally Involved In tbe
afair: There Ig more detall, but I can't really pin It down
Mr: KLEIN. Did you accept this gtatement by Nosenko?
Mr: MURPHY I did not I did not believe that It would be possible for the
Soviet Intelligence Services to bave remalned indififerent to the arrival In 1939
in Moscow Of a former Marine radar operator who bad cerved at what wa8 an
active U-2 operational base: I found that to be strange. It was only later; I think;
that, as the Nosenko case end Ite other, ramiications began to emerge that It
seened to me that the Oswald story became even more unasual;:
I think [ mentioned the Other day It seems to me elmost to have been tacked o
Or to bave been added a8 though It dldnt seem to be part Of the real body Of
get
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sefore Wa8 one Of pretty much permltting the other thlnga that be bad to S8V, many O Which were true You understand
wordg, we wanted his cooperatlon and we tbat Nosenko was much Of what be gald was true:'
reasonable manner; but bis preference Wag Mr KLEIN. You are talking about other areae?
Dg, to;want to g0 out soclally &ll the ME MORHTo ese &. This oe seemed to be tacked on and didn"t bave muc
0 conttnue to work And the most Important relationship and It Beemed to be 80 totally dependent o not Just %e cotncldence
3 decision to confront hlm Fith Inconsisten- Fhole series 0f coincidences for him to have been there and aLl that &ort
id and passing It on. but a
of thing: That I8 what I mean: living conditiong, Were changed? rmitted to leave He wa8 not permitted to other epectfice about what you could not accept
Mr: KLEIN: Do you recall any
~today treatment; "ot the ectual Interroga- In Nosenko8 etetements about Oswvald? of the firgt one -no contact Was recreation; was that changed at that time? Mr: MORPHY- Yes; that tbey just _thls Is part;
and well with no contact tbat early: I dont remember thet; ever made; that he went up to MInsk and Lived beppily
Is the only person Tbe Sovlet Union with_forelgnere don"t do that f mearhe
to Read the accounta Of what happened to thls poor gentleman; what happened
i8 it correct that Nosenko was interzrogated' Ctaevfordun Moscow and thelr intensive debriefing % him o the layout o
ision ? Jae Gzeriford}inboscowt #un teecnnto beposaible
Nowegat thet doe; not constitute proof; doesn t constltute any breakthrough:
ular gubareas on which be wa8 Interrogated It seemed to me to be etrange; ' MCemecE o , Would you distingulsh between frst the fect tbat nobody debrlefed
kuow: Subject areas? Thls is A guess, this Is Oswald when he first came to tue Soviet Union, nobody triedto find out what be
n was made based O what the OLA' people
knew 98 a marine; 88 a redar operator; and, second, the fact that once tbey
to get an.admisgion: and to break on.that decided to allow him to Btajs nobody debrieted him; to fnd out If be was some
On points that- bad collateral 'on. . By kind Of & Western Becurity egent or working for OIA ?
aid wbat this man Is eayIng I8 not tbe truth_
Mr:
MURPHteryes they_woud be two diferent points ' Tbe frst Point cleurka
andtherefore let us hit him hard o this Involves {he KGB ana GRU. Thls (s Bimply g chap arriviug with thtsibackground
rere tectical considerations releting to pos and no one taklng the time just from a mllitary Intelllgence technical polnt of
f the Interrogetore which then offered the siewncelileg u hhow It worked when thie thlng cane in et 00COO feettoheEandlhe
et the trath: look like' I dontt think they had many American radar operator8 hanaling
normally the CaSe glves you other break- blipsalookallte_Icdowolving U"e7
ts to be interrogeted was essentially & fac
MI: KBmN: How woula you react to & statement by Nosenko that elthough
the KGB knew Oswald wa8 a marine they dia not bother to ,question him,
that after April 4 the gubject areas were
and becauge of that, never kew that he wa8 a radar operator Or tbat be
to break him, &8 opposed to & desire worked at the base trom_wblch the 0-28 took off and landed?
4se to you [n your role a8 an tntelligence M MORPET. I think I would be strange
the operation otber point; golng back to your #rst question thatee the frgt aspect %
impression Tbe answer i8 yes because by JoM" ateseionointue0inS taciinitizioarrivai andack % debriering, Thetefectoo
1t the man was not teling the truth, that
Indication here that tbe GRO wa8 advised, whicb In tbe case of 9 defector,
WA to be untrue and that, therefore; made there I8 no operational Interest in a defector: GRO would be:properly the out-
his bebavior and hls Btatements were ft that would want to be talking to any marine: Tbey wl talk to amarlne
id not eppear to make cense to accept a8 about close order drilL You follow me? It doesn't require that he be know to
"8 You could be sure thet that data was In
have been a rader operator Or that he be known to have been a--they would
doubts about this; jeaving aside the moti talk to blm ebout bds mitary afiliation just &8 we would
0 Way in whlch be presented _t, that the I rCobize tbot there iS & body of thought which GAy8 that some people think
able: the Soviets are 10-foot talL I don't 'belleve they are I think they are very,
veey, cere mucl the other Way; What I ind dlicult O the part %f many Ameri:
tbstance Of what Nosenko had to eay about cens' I8ethat tbey Wii not ascribe to the Goviets the came eleneetal competence
thbat we have: TThat j8 all T a8k: And, therefore: we In Germany wil talk to a
tean, when be fret said It back In February privateein the Bast German Border Guards pertoa The GED would be Intertated
Bittalieing toea private He Was a corporar in the Marine Corpsotwhooad ebcted
stance 0f tt? to a consul in 2 consular omce which 18 manned by the Goviets,_Soviet locale
I eald would be polluted and wbet have you, Tully acceesible to the Sovdets unlke the blgher foors of the
st Of the message - wa8 that
by 80 much Eobassy, that he wented to talk about hig experiencesthet he wanted to tell &lL
ence Services, that he Oswald wab I guess K found t dlfcult to belleve this Is oe 0f the thlngs tbat madeOr many
ecauee I
Ceas betsooalg; Heovaebiiefae otber aspects of the case, but thls Is one Of the thinga that created an etmosphere
eally pin It dom Involved In the o1 diebeilef that tbere mast be eomething t thls case that I9 Important, vitally
lent by Nosenko? Important to tbe: Sovlet Unlon and we can't understand It
relieve that Jt would be posstble Yur may be rght, he may be rlght, but et the tlme It wa8 very bard to
for the
mained indlfferent to the arrivai In 1859 belleve
'perator who had served at what was an
at to be gtzange It was only later; I think, Mr: KLBIN. And O tbe basls of Jour experience andknowledge galped over
'20 ramlications began to emerge tbet t elmost 30 year8, ie thet wbat I8 gvlng you tronble with Nosenko8 gtatements
me even more unusual
eemg to me almost to bave been tacked on
abcu Ouze1d? And other thlngs
dn't seem to be part 0f the real body 0
Mr: KLEIN; Do you know Of comparable eltuationg where_gomebody
questioned Ike thls, wes just left alone; &8 Nosenko gay8 Oswald wis?
tme:
Jay they
they
him,
'or
1lng
wam't
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534
Mc: MORRHT; I bonestly_couldn't fnd anyone; or I am not eware Of enyone
that the division or tbe CI Staf, that 18, those ofcers concerzed With thte
case, were bandling It 'directly. I don't know Of any former Soviet Intelligence
oficer Or other knowledgeable ` source to whom they_Bpoke about thls matter
who felt this would bave been possible: If gomeone dd, I pever heard' Of IL
Mr: KLEIN. During thts Interrogation eriod, beglnning In April 1984, would
it be fuir to suy that tbe questions rela to Oswald and the problemg which
You bave Just been diecussing, relating to Oswald ` constttuted a major ate
for questloning and In Interrogae Nosenko?
Mr: MORPEY Probaby not
Mr: KLEIN. would tbat bave been ?
Mr. MOBPHT. Because there were many other areas which posed: equally inter
esting aspects yet about which we knew mach more and which had occurred
abroad and` involved collateral knowledge, which obvlously 'i8 not ea8y, for 08
to obtain fn the Soviet Unlon:
Mr. KLEIN: Who in the Soviet Russia. division made the decision 48 to wbo
would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?
Mr. MORPET: (OLA employee], chief Of thegroup:_
Mr: KLEIN. And do you know Of any criteria that be used to pick bls Inter
rogators ?
Mc MURPHT . Some knowledge of Russian, &s Nosenko'8 English wa8 not good,
the fact that be had been exposed: Well, that i8 one of the aspects of the CLA
interrogation: not to use too many people because'you then loge: In the
frst: place, you are dealing with 8 potentially bostlle guy who ts Hable to 80
back to the Sovtet Onlon, Or return to 'the other slde; and ,80 don't want to
expose too many ofcer8, plus the fact It Is not & good Idea'to Bimply bring & lot
of people In; Yon have to have people who gtudled the case and became In depth
know it In depth and therefore; s0 use the ofcerg that they had avatlable
and there. were a varlety Of criterla:
Mr: KLEIN. 4s I mentioned to you In our conversatlon8 about & week ag0, It Is
our information that the pergon who interrogated Nosenko about the Ogwald
matter bad Do background whatsoever In Oswald, be didn't know anything
about Oswald'8 background or really about, Oswald at alL Is there any reagon
that Buch a person would be uged that you can tell 08?
Mr: MUBPHY_ Iam not gure I understand I thought the point was that he had,
he wa8 not & man %f & lot Of background In the CT debriefings O interrogations
I wa8n 't sure of the point he dldn't know about Oswald_ I am ot gure very
many Of us kew very much about Oswald than wa8 available at the time:
Mr: KLEIN. Two points
Mr: MUBPEX. The reason that the chap was chosen wag because be wag level-
beaded, extremely toughminded, and wa8 golng to be with the cage for the
long He wa8 not golng to be changed: That 18 why he Fa8 u8ed. And hls
career since then has borne out the judgment of many, is a very good ofcer:
Mr: KLEIN. But wouldn't
Mr: MOBPET_ I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't what you are gaying;
he knew nothing at all about Oswald8 case: I fnd that dlfcult to believe: But I
don't know.
Mr: KLMN_ Well, If I asked you to consider & hypothetical gituation, where I
told you tbe ofcer who Interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Ogwald other
than what be learned from Nosenko, would you thiok that wa8 unusual that
they would not, If they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald,at
least given somebody 4 thorough brlefing from 4 to 4 everything that tbe OLA
knew about Oswald, would you think It was unusual; that didn't do that?
Mr: MOBPHY. I would certainly think: 80_
Mr: KLEIN. The gecond part of my question was the other point I made to you
a week ag0 when we spoke; to our knowledge; let me be frank; we epoke to the
particular Ofcer .In a deposition, 80 that our knowledge lg gained from .that,
it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I gay
mlght not be eractly what the deposition .84y8, but my recollection Of It 18 that
be also had kittle Or no prior interrogation erperience; and my queation Is would
that be
Mr: MUBPET That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people;
relatively few people, In the Divislon or Indeed elsewhere who had a lot of
interrogation experlence: We hadn't done 9 lot f very many hostile CIA debrlef-
People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,
tiug
ting
Wby
You try
you
tbey
pull:
be
tbey
ings:
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535
one, or I am' not aware Of anyone
mlght have bad experience but I know #t_mlght cound strengan TbGre enoerienced
those 'oficers concerned wth thls
glebdshand quedediehigbiy trained Huent Rueslan speaking OI experlenced:
of any former 'Sovfet Intelllgence tnterrogatore: I would point out to you i8 thet I bave llstened tot
iOm they_ spoke ebout thts matter Mr: KLEIN. Ope thing
bave Istened-to were totally In' Enguigh, omeone did, I never heerd Of /t. namber Qf tapee;'and a@1 of tbe ones 1
>d, . beginning: In April 1984, would tbere was no Russian
"0 Oswald and the_problems whlch Mr: MURPEY. Yes. of Nosenko congidered & major Oswald constituted a major area
MI KLEIN. My question Ie Was the questloning
operation In the Bureet In 10842
ca8e: @r MUBPET: It was an Important operatlon, en important
experlence who
Mc; KLEN. And there wa8 nobody with interrogation
er areas which poged equally tnter- could be used to Interrogete blm? had Interrogation,experience ' I
Ich more and whlch had occurred Mt; MOEPRX: I am sure some o;the people
feld I can' t explamn
rhich obviously I8 not easy for u8 mean
[OiA employee} himselihad _ lot %i bockgrotna Ve thio
briedng o Oswala Meyrheomer bo debrieredhln OH Osweld dd uothuse Eiot
that sion made the . dectsion &8 to Wbo: except wbat I mentioned to
the other day Gecause iteweret veahing
tbat
42 we 'thought We were golng to get: through 0, because we were weak
owp: area at that tme:
ria that he used to pick hls inter-
48 Nosenkoe English was not
ME KLEIN, Wag Nocenko eveg given eny druge?
t is
%see 6"hengspects 82"Oteg83 #EVEE;Wvoe tberc erer leayeconversationg in whlch took; part about
eople because you;then lose- In the Mr; KLMIN: Were therc erer any him to tell the truth ?
Ly bostile guy wbo :is Jable to: g0
whether to give Hhe druerenarder_toretcoireto teong ettuhe tine about various
ber eide; and 80 you dont want to Mr; MURPEY; There were mapy, many
that are known to bim to talk,_
tt & good idea to gimply 4 lot
thlngg that could De done Au decuscionguwithl
the medical Oficer wbo bandled
dled the case and became In depth; but: 08 far &8 I Iowagd In' decusioionadetor 42,/ttempt made to use these
oficers that they had avallable the case, there wa8 never any dectslon to produce results and they &ll would
because none Of them appeared to be Hkely
nversations about & week 9g0, It Is
beverzharnfuend heretorendot g3caneregdts ost control over the: case; : In
'gated Nosenko about the Oswald
Mc; KLEIN: Between '1984 and 1987 You were given to him, to him
Jswald, he didp't know anythlog
those years it J8 YOur etatement that f ARBOGE EG wed no v1chO thing happened ?
)swald at alL Is there any reason
tootell the truthyou would have kown about it,
en `tell 08? Mr; MURRET That is cOrrect
thought the point was that be bad, 4 lie detector test in 1084, xe CI debriefing8 Or Interrogations. Mr: KLEIN: Are aware tbat Nosenko wa8 given
bout Oswald_ I am not Bure very
1an wa8 avatlable at the tlme
LArLURPEy. Yes, sr
ME KOE Do kuow the result Of that test?
chosen was because be wag,level- MEKuh Dotondicotedhe astying 94 severalkeypoints:
to be with the case for the
MEKIDOtoulcveeany reason to believe that test was invalld?
[hat i8 why he was u8ed. And htb
ME KUEH Dec
detector 'test in ff many , he ig & very go0d ofcer: Mr: KLMN: Are you eware tbat he wa8 given 4 second Ie
Jat he wasp't what Yon are eaying: 168E.MORPEZ: Yes
fnd that dtfcult to believe: But I Mr: KLBIN. Do bow the result of that test?
8 hypothetical gltuation, where I
EEEIEI Kaeohiou heve any reason to believe tbat test: was invalid ?
knew Mr: KLEIN. And do you Who gave him the test In 1988 was the nothing about Oswald other M: MOEFEk. No; I believe the operator
you think that was unusual that "operator Who geve him the test in 1884
lready who knew about Oswald at
Bame %erato Thaf f correct
0 4 to % everything that the IA
unusual; that they ddnt do that?
BXCERPTS Or DEPOSITION OF JAMES C MICHAOLS
wa8 the other point I made to you
ADCALEKSO POPTANICE, AOGUST 1,,1978 BEGORE
let me be frank, we spoke to the HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINA-
r knowledge ig galned from that, THE
ped up deposttion that what I e8y TIONS
8, but my recollectlon 0f It Is that INTRODOCTTON
Jerience, and questlon I8 would
cauge there
Ina further effort to clearuP the_tacts srroundiag Nosnkoisicleias
were very few people; to the CIA should not be used to impeach
leed elsewhere who bad 4 lot of that his statements from FBI and CIA
of many hostile CIA debrlef-
enbt testimony; the committee took depositionse
These agents were probably Otherwise, either abroad, egents who were present during the 1964 interviews
yet'
you
yQu"
get
bring
be
get
you
you
jing
yon
my
pres-
very
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He
INVESTIGATION OF` THE ASSASSINATION
6
OF : PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY 842.1
Wz
43
HEARINGS
BEBORB THB
SEEECT : COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS:
OF THB
U,S: HOUSE `OF' : RPPRESENTATTVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND . SBSSION
8EPTEMBER 18,' 19, 20, AND 21,.1978
VOLUME III
Printed for the uge Of the Select Commlttee on Assassinatlons
%
0.8. GOVBRNMENT PRINTING .OEFICB
41-872 0 WABHINGTON 1079
For ,eale by tbe Superintendent o Documente. U.8. Goveroment Prlntlng Ofce
Waehtogton; DC20402
'12
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7i8 749;'
On September 25,1978, Mr: Katzenbach mailed to the committee
the following etter cupplementing iettestimonya sp0b jebualezazl
{R 3iEzer-thet coredons Eohr rerntetaa} TontteotlKE Sncd
"11977s] 4d9383 34 onornard Bop 70507
#E55 apmME14'
ope throngh 8L3ty J0xx ictu ve;
5} 57 1,*3oli
~Ich 66b641 corredt
64 s?9f7 062 Ot-tike; asteezs lake-E;
0 "tbe 1978, Septeraber 25 ,
queettons tbareiz-recorded ; '4etgnature
: : Le ` bubject ' to' correctjona_
ME4icholib Ratzzenbach {The Fonorable Louia Stokee
Select Committee on Apeaeeinatione "J6~t
S Houee 0f' Reprecegtatives
rchig_anki peary:Publtein' and for the: 331 Houee Otd Buuding ZAnnex 2
30
do -bereby certify that I mu
'notariting Waehington D C' 20515:
re for' the: depoettion & Mr . : Michoiaa
#Z
DearMr Chairman:;
bh_acy" o8 Februarv 19121
Io my testimnony betore the Committee on Thureday September
21 1 etated that I bad ebeclutely no Fecollectiog ot qeeting with MF
'Ismori A: xarch-glini HeimeVith reepect 0the Nosenko caee I underetand that Mr: Helme'
8nz Publlc Jp and Yor the Eaid there: was Guch meeting,-end jt took Place on April;2;1964
'68 Westchester
"'Siate: Qf Fer Yor
On my return @my office this morning I checked On the notea_
of meetinge which were keptby my Becretary and they confirm Mr
Helme' recollection . Fam' attaching e CopY Of the relevant page of the
calendar _ Altbough it ig clear from thie page tbat there wa8 Buch &
meeting, I continue to have ebeolutely nO recollection of it, and there-
fore cannot tell you what /wae diecuesed beyond what i8 6tated in the
calendar iteelf _
It wa8 not my custom t0 make notee on euch meetinge, end I
doubt that there are in the filee of the Department any noteg made by
me However it is pogeible that Mr Yeagley or Mr _ Foley made Buch
notee . Ibelieve Mr : Foley ig pow-deceased; but MI _ Yeagley i9 now
a judge in the Dietrict of Columbia_ and perhapa he wwould have bome
recollection &f the meeting _
{
I nad; tmy testimony ' checked my calendar for the
period dealing with the aega8sinatiop and the creation of the Warren
Commiseion, but bad not thought it relevent to the Committee'8 investi-
gation t0 go a8 far &8 April. Hence I was unaware of this entry . While.
3#8dakerlpe: 3_
#to
U+
diery prior
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750
isc;> :unss %mi
thie calendar' doe8 not fefreEb my recollection U= "'Ind tbereiore 4olid not
change my teetimony, it did geem to me that_in fairpese to botti the
Comiittee and Mr . Eelme ! ekouid take it available t,you'
Reepectfully youre,
{aLL As
Mr;Gary Cornwell
Hon Richard C - Helme
Edward Bennett-William8;
[G(
Eeq:
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750` 751
'{Igsdsll . M ,1I ,4 %xmedia3 n6
h
ny d Lieaiieetior-and terefo2a E84a 587 Thursdav horil 2,1964
Bairolu Kers 9 : 35 2*M6 SAi
xeem t0 methat in fairpesg to both the
Jouia: H je,avsiiabie A Sol Lindenbaum Civil 9 : 35 aam. Sa
make
7i
to you: Joseph' Dolan . Riehts 9:35 " a,R, SAN
David Filvaroff ) briefinc 9:35 a,m; SA;
Reepectfully youre; Jonn Douclas 3 9 : 35 a,m , SAN
Jack Rosenthal 9 : 35 aoM; SAN
{aLL As
Burke #larshall ) 9 : 35 ,a:m. SAi IdH
David Filvaroff 11:55 a.n- SAN
Nilian Foley- 12 :27 P.n: SAil
#illian Orrick 1:50 P.m' SA%
Harshal McShane 2 37 P:R SN
David Filvaroff: 3 :10 Pa m SAM
Jiliian GeogheEan 3 :25 2 n SN;
Edfer Cahn O.L:" 3 30 R;n; 'SAii
Burke: Earshall) 3 : 32 SA:;
Burke' Marshall; #:07 PE: SAH
(Lairence Liaton IGIA 4 :0.8 SA:;
[Echard iezns CIA 4:08. R n: Sa
[Qavia lurnhyCID 4 :0 8 P:m: SAH
DJ: ' alter Yeagley 4:08 Pan: ST;
[Niilian Foley_ Crin Div 4;08 P.n: SA4
[Defector Case ]
Acdressed Brandeis_Wniv _ 4:40 R.m; 5AH
Stucents 40). in NGrs; office
Sol Lindenbaun 6 ;45 P.a: SAN
John las 6 :56 P.F, SAit
Ailli
'894g.asck
am 7 :06 2.m. SAN
David Filvaroff 7 : 12 Pam . SAI
Joseph Dolan 7:15 P. m . SAwv
Fridav Anri 1 3 J1964
Tohn Durrner (enire' Notor) 9 : 15 a,m, S^N
Sol Lindenbaum 9 :30 a,m, Sn?
Harold Reis Civil 9 ;30 2.n; SAw
David Filveroff Rights 9 : 30 a.na SAM
Burke Iarshall Jbriefing 9 : 30 a.M SAY
Jack Rosenthal 9 : 30 a.M . SAW
Joseph Dolan 9 : 30 a m _ SAW
Nde BK to Puerto Rico: 10:15 8 , J .
Eeq , Pan?
Pam::
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Hc
€
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
841.
OF PRESIDENT ` JOHN F: KENNEDY
~Lc
0A.4
&y >
HEARINGS:
BEEORE THB
SEEECP : COMMITTEE ON : ASSASSINATIONS
OF.THB
US; HOTSE : OF ` REPRESENPATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH:' CONGRESS
SECOND: SESSION
SEPTEMBER 22,' 25, AND 28,*1978
VOLUME IV
Printed for the uge Of the Select Committee on Assagsinatlons
2
U.8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-378 0 WABHINGTON 1979
sale by tbe Superlntendent ot Documente, U.S. Gorernment Prlnting Ofce
WasbIngtop, D.C: 20402
Btock Number 052-07004908-5
For
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have & say in what happens with respect
"nisa
information were to be believed, then we could conclude that
ertainly was involved with decisions on
teKGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey_
to end; but I was not the controlling Owald in 1963 and' therefore had nothing to d with President
Kennedys murder:
re were three major agency reports that b I6; On the_ other hand; Mr. Nosenko had been programed in
the Nosenko case; specifically there was radvance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald if
by the Soviet Russia Division, another Mr: Nosenko was giving us false information. about Oswald's con-
[the Office of Security report, and then a with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for uS to surmise
red to as the Hart report that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November
sther you are familiar with all three of 1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent
when he shot President Kennedy:
I any whether [ read the first two Tf it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as' a Soviet agent
'riefed on their:contents The Hart report when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United:
the agency: in early February 1973 'and Gtates ' of: America and, indeed, to the world, would have been:
onnections with jit Since_ staggering: Thus it became a matter of the utmost importance to;
his . defection _in` 1964 and upon his this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr: Yuri Nosenko
tes was . Yuri Nosenko.in the custody of Mr_ Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end
of March it was clear to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosen
missed:the question. kos would not; be easy
asking_precisely during his defection in On April 1964, as Deguty Director %f Plans I, &iong with;
in the:United States, was Yuri Nosenko 'David Murphy; Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr; Lawrence
R;Houston , the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr.. Nicho
That was an accepted procedure under las Katzenbach; then Deputy Attorney General of:: the United
eragency Defector Committee -that 'defec SStates; Mr: J; Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Divi-
intry_were handled by the CIA, through Bion of;the: Justice . Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who_was:
esettling period, whatever had to be done 'then Mr_ Yeagley's First Assistant in the Internal Security Divi:
sion; and Mr: Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in
iat the legal authority under which he the Justice Department:
The meeting took place in Mr; Katzenbach's office in the Justice
k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman;, if you Department; The purpose of the_meeting was to define Mr: Nosen-
like to answer that question a little bit ko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind
dulge me. of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agencys
nly. ongoing custody of Mr: Nosenko
g0, un September 20, 1978, I received a The Agency provided me a copy of the_ memorandum for the
before this committee in executive ses- record written by Mr: Lawrence Houston describing this_meeting
reviewing that transcript [ noted that, On April 2, 1964 , and a second memorandum which reflects the
"er, I characterized Mr: Yuri Nosenko8 'bubstance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following
between 1964 and 1969 in a number of April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the
is an area of obvious interest to the Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part
take this opportunity to describe my orthe record of these proceedings
t greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen- During the meeting 0 April 2,,1964, the Department of Justice
entral Intelligence Agency
was: Nas informed of Mr. Nosenko s status with the Agency and
a lawyer nor a judge, SO [ was not the Department's opinion was ` requested as to the scope of the
conclusions about Mr: Nosenko's tenure Agency $ ongoing authority with respect to Mr: Nosenko;
>e Agency;-Im sorry, I am not prepared As Mr: Houston's memorandums relate; Mr: Nosenko's technical
Geneva;, Switzerland, Mr: Nosenko re etatus in the United States was one , of "exclusion and parole,
2d to defect to the West. Mr: Nosenkos which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had
npanied by a claim that he could give a technically excluded Mr: Nosenko from the United States but had
ee Harvey Oswalds contacts in connec- elso temporarily 'paroled him to the custody of the Central Intel-
Oswald's in the Soviet Union be
It is my
Eederstanding
that the terms of the parole provided that
2 the significance that Yuri Nosenko Vas Nosenko_would remain in the custody 0f the Agency unless it
1vestigation of President Kennedys as was determined whether Mr: Nosenko should be deported or
turned out to be a bona fide defector; if whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States:
tacts
longer
ing
'credibility,
day,
fully
ligence stay
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statement of some employee or eomething; He was designated by; the present Diec-
tor to come' here and present the' story because' he was "eupposed to be the ,most
familiar with:it since he had reviewed it for the CLA
He_etated in;substance; Mr: Nosenko was taken into custody; in' this country by
the CLA after defection or after alleged defection, held in & 8o called pafe house m a
diet Of tea 'and porridge twice & was allowed no reading material The guards
were instructed neither to talk to him %r 8mile to him. He Was subjected to 48 houra
at,a crack interrogation: This while they built a separate facility bomewhere
else in' the: country; namely, 0 device described by him as 0 bank"vault; and then
built & house around the bank vault to this man in and then kept him there
under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind: of thing, 1,277 b be
specific; at ,which point finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put
him on their payroll and let him go.
And.then: they gave as their--I questioned on the euthority to do a like
that;-Did have any kind of process, and said other than the fact that Mr
Helms ` had : conferred with you _and gotten: your OK; that: this would: be_Jegel;
And I just-found it awfully; difficult to believe 'that; And that is why and' I, dn't
imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that
you would not-rather_clearly remember the incident if it had occurred:
Mr: KATZENBACH; If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman
had' ever. been made' known to me, [ would recollect it,; I am certain; and I would
hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that: is claimed.
Mr: SAYwER It makes me feel better about it. Thank you:
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman:
Having;heard Mr. Katzenbach's testimony of yesterday, can you
reconcile-his: testimony to this committee with your statement just
read to this committee?
Mr; HELMs: I can only say, Mr: Stokes, that it is' very hard to
reconcile: [ think the basic point at issue here is really whether the
meeting with him took place at all: What happened after the
meeting. is something he was. not responsible;for as. far &s I am
aware:
Let 'me read to you the memorandum for the_record which Mr:
Lawrence R Houston, the General Counsel. of CIA, wrote on April
3, 1964. I have & cOpy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for
the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case:'
It reads:
Mr; HelmsMr: Murphy, and [ met with Mr: Nicholas deB Katzenbach; J_ Walter
Yeagley; Wiliiam E. Foley: and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr: Helms outlined
the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opin-
ion of the Justice representatives on what we: could do to control the situation: I
pointed out that his technical status is one of exclusion parole or more
technically, deferment and parole:
Paragraph 2:
After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representa-
tives could take any action to out the terms of the parole Mr:
Katzenbach asked Mr:
Reccheck
to this
scana %
me know and Mr: later
confirmed this position by telephone.
I in turn; after the_meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an
interpretation thereof for Director of Security; a of which i8 attached hereto
Also, 1 informed Mr_ Foley o this interpretation.
coPgigaed;]
Lawrence R_ Houston;
General Counsel
The:attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is
signed by Lawrence R Houston, General Counsel. It is & memoran-
dum for the director of security: That would be the officer: who was
the director of the . security office of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:
On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status
of aliens whose inspection by INS
day,
being
put
dayb
they
thing
they they
and
Foley Foley
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PAGE 6
LEVEL 1 20 OF 80 STORIES
Copyright 1993 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc-
All rights reserved
ABC NEWs
show: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)
August 27, 1993
Transcript #1337
TYPE: Show; show
SECTION: News; Domestic
LENGTH: 8240 words
HEADLINE: Case Closed
guests: MARK LANE , Author/Attorney; GERALD Author W Case Closed" ; Dr .
PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas;
POGNENoSEHtb;
URI Former KGB Agent;
ROBERT OSWALD, Brother
HIGHLIGhT :
Lynn Sherr reports on a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews
author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove LeeHarvey Oswald
acted alone, and was not a Mafia or KGB agent.
BODY :
BARBARA WALTERs , ABC News: 6ood Evening. I'@ Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is
on vacation _ This 15 20/20-
ANNOUNCER : From ABC News_ around the world and into your home, the stories that
touch your li- with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters F
this is 20/20 .
Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, Will a powerful new book end
the controversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he
has the answers about Oswald the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to
come along. Lynn Sherr 5
"expios
ive report Case Closed.
And _
SELMA 'ScHIMHEL) Breast Cancer Survivor: [sp?] Who is equipped to think of dying
in your 20 ' 5 or 30 ' 5 ?
ANNOUNCER : ~if you think it: only happens to older women, you re wrong -
KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told Me I was too young to
have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.
ANNOUNCER : It' 5 happening more and @ore, and doctors adwit the younger you are,
the harder it is to detect-
Dr_ TIMOTHY JOHNsON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography can have an error rate
of up to 40 percent in young women versus: a rate Of less than 15 percent in
older wowen _
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20/20 (ABC) , August 27, 1993
ANNOUNCER : For women in their 20 ' 5 and 30' 5, Dr . Timothy Johnson has some
shocking news It Could Happen to You.
Plus
}
can gay wen be @ade straight? This therapist says he transforms
homosexuals This man once preferred Men_ Taday, he 5 happy with his Wife_
JOHN stosseL, ABC News : And now is sexuality an Important part of your marriage -
RICHARD COHEN Nicoiosi Patient: yes . We have good sex, if that 5 what
you re ask-
ANNOUNCER : Others claim treatment is helping them-
'ALEX, Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30 years of
Ny life, I feel alive.
ANNOUNCER : ~but in the gay community, backlash.
GAY MAN: This 1s not a disease . There 5 no such thing as a cure-
ANNOUNCER : John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay @en . Are they Born
or Bred? Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.
(Commercial break]
Case Closed
BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this
week when mare than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were
finally opened after nearly 30 years _ And while close to half the current
population wasn " t even alive at the time, the controversy surround- that event
continues to haunt us .al1.
The fact 15 a majority of Aqericans don t believe the Warren Commission, and do
believe sore form of conspiracy was involved . But now, 3 powerful new book
claims to have the last word . Its conclus ion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act
alone . The book 15 titled Case Closed, but is it?
[voice-Over] Whatever s ide you re on in this still-raging controversy , you' 1l
want to see Lynn sherr 5 report now_
LYNN SHERR , ABC News : [voice-aver] No period in an Anerican presidency has been
as controversial, 2s thoroughly analyzed or as freguently written and speculated
about as the final six seconds in John F Kennedy 5 life:
Ist NEWSCAsTER: [?] Three shots were fired at the President 5 wotorcade 35 it
passed out of the downtown area of Dallas_
sherr: [voice-over] No detail about the final @odents of the President s life
has been spared scrutiny. Every evewitness account, ballistics test, photograph,
aedical conclus ion and investigative fInding has been challenged , reinterpreted
or dismissed, then woven into countless theories_ For three 'decades an already
skeptical Anerican public has been left wondering if we would ever
'iearn the
truth about what happened in Dealey [5p?] Plaza on November 22 , 1963.
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20/20 (ABC) August 27, 1993
MAN: [2] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead.
Let us pray .
sheRR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor
corner Window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of
which ended the life of America 5 3sth president- But that 5 too simple an
explanation for a great Americans and for conspiracy theorists, Far toq
convenient that one Qan alone did it.
boubters
insist that the shot or shots
that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or
from 2 railroad overpass just beyond.
MARK LANE Author/Attorney: Shots came from at least two directions . A bullet
hit the President in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat_ It cawe Froa the
front. A bullet hit him in the head . It came] from the front. That was three
shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connolly (sp?], One bullet @issed,
struck the curb.
sheRR : [voice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the @ost persistent and
prolific Of conspiracy theorists, has Long insisted that the Warren Commiss_on
Mas
9
and covered up critical evidence that might make it poss ible to
identify the President 5 assassins _
Hr_ LANE: Today , With hundreds of thousands of documents in the vaults of the
CIA, the DI [?1, and the FBI and the National Archives which we can t see
the cover-up is continuing.
sherR: [voice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says
evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led: him
directly to the Only person who could possibly have shot the Pres ident.
GERALD POSNER , Author, Case Closed ' : Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy ,
acting alone _
sheRR: [voice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culaination of a
three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the Kennedy assassination, concedes that
in identifying a familiar culprit, he 5 not likely to Win over many conspiracy
buffs. But he says the evidence didn t allow for any other suspects-
Mr POSNER : Most people who have written conspiracy books started with their
conclusion already done _ knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and
went around to prove that case _
SHERR : [voice-over] One of the @ajor assassination controversies Posner seeks to
resolve is the number of shots fired, where cawe from, and which Ones
struck the President. 'Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home
movie taken ` by Abraham ZafoudenicRc Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was
able to count the 5 hots, for he says Oswald had more time than the Warren
Commission believed_
Mr _ POSNER : Oswald 5 first shot, which missed, was fired @uch earlier than
anyone realized L just after the car turned the corner. Evidence Of this 1s
overlooked by most experts. It' $ in the file. In the upper righthand corner of
your screen, yqu ' 1l see a little girl; She 5 heard that shot and turned _ In the
car, the President ad Mrs . Kennedy and the Governor also heard the shot and
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August 27, 1993
turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had over eight seconds, not five, for the
next two-
The second shot is fired . This bullet 'hits both Kennedy and Connolly . After
pass through Kennedy , you see it go through the Governor as his suit lapel
flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that
cruciai detail just last
year_
sherr: [voice-over] This is the s0-called @agic bullet that seemed to zigzag
through the two Men .
Mr _ POSNER: This computer aimation illustrates that the second bullet needed 'no
magic. Because of the way the two Qen were: Lined 4p, this bullet passed directly
through them. It turned Only after it slowed down and shattered Connolly" 5 wrist
no z1g5, no zags .
sherR: How could that bullet have ewerged s0 clean, with no flaws on it, really ,
whatsoever?
Mr _ POSNER: 1 was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing
that stops people from believing Oswald did it alone It emerged 50 clean
because that it went through Kennedy, it slowed up. When it went through
Connolly' $ chest, it slowed 4p. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist,
which everybody thinks would damage it, it was traveling at half or a third 0f
its speed fast enough to crush the bone, but not fast enough to deform the
bullet.
sherr: [voice-over] The sudden backward wotion of the President 5 head as the
third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his Skull, has: led many to
believe that the shot cawe from the front, but Posner says normal neurological
reflexes make the body stiffen When struck, causing it to @ove back .
And Dr _ Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the Pres ident at
Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace Pres ident
Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain-
Dr _ PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the @etal coming
up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace
bandage
SHERR : In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures We ve seen- well, how do you
describe what the body 15 doing, having seen the brace?
Dr _ JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn t fall forward. I think you'd have
to fall backwards or aside _
SHERR: Because?
Dr _ JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.
Znd NEWscASTER: [?] At approxiqately one 0' clock, the Pres ident is dead . The
doctors were working too frantically to revive hlm to natice the exact moment.
sheRR: [voice-over] Dr . Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs . Kennedy:
sowetime stand next to: him.
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August 27, 1993
Dr _ JENKINS: She had such a drawn look _ I really feel Like she was in shock, and
she was just holding_ her hands _ one above the other. And one of the times, she
nudged Qe with her elbow and handed @e sowething in her hand, which is of
his brain that obvi was in her lap- With his head in her lap as the car
came to Parkland _ Bad woment.
SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer aniwation of the pres idential
1imous ine and its passengers, Posner sought to show where In Dealey Plaza, the
shots came from,
Mr POSNER : Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer aniuation, and working
back from their wounds, the computer determines the Only possible location for
the assass 2s indicated by the yellOw shading. Notice that Oswald 5
sixth-floor Window is right in the center of it.
Mr LANE: Posner believes the wagic-bullet theory- Next, I guess, we re going to
hear about the Tooth Fairy- It 5
just mathematically impossible_ No one has ever
been able to recreate what it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did
SHERR: Well, they ve done it- he 5 done it now with a computer enhancenent-
Mr . LANE: I know that.
SHERR: ~and he claims the computer shows that it'$ absolutely the way it
happened .
Mr_ LAnE: Well, he 5 entitled to his computer The Anerican people were there,
and_ testified, and two-thirds of them said know shots caae From the
wooden fence_
SHERR: [voice-over] What about that reported fourth shot fired from the grassy
knoll? When the House Select Commi ttee On Assass inations concluded in 1978 that
there was 2 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were
heartened, but the committee 5 finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles
[sp?], was based on a
static-filled Dictabelt recording of a Dallas ce
motorcycle radio stuck in the On position The sheriff says the motorcycle
wasn t even in Dealey Plaza, but the commi ttee heard four shots _ We couldn t
hear any .
[interviewing] You have a copy of that tape, right?
Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas : I certainly do.
SHERR: Why don t you play it, and let' 5 take 2 listen- Is that a shot?
Sheriff BOWLES: that 5
the motorcycle slowing down, see?
sherr : I didn't hear any shots.
Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else . They listened to the same belts Ne
listened and clalmed to hear four shots .
sherR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select
Committee 5 tape?
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20/20 (ABC) , August 27, 1993
Sheriff BOWLES: have to ask them .
Mr _ POSNER: clearly went doun the wrong path- The National Acadeny of
Sciences reviened their work and pointed out all the flaws in it_
just wade an error On that
bicateeita
There is no fourth shot. There 5 no shot
at all, even, to hear.
SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey
Plaza, and agreed that It tended to support the Warren Cowmission 5 findings,
that would not end the speculation_ Surveys show that wost Anericans doubt that
Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone; belleving instead that he was either part of or
himself becane a victim 0f a conspiracy .
LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody , no, sir.
3rd NEHSCASTER: [?] Oswald has been shot!
SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-organized crime connection? Clearly,
there was a connection there .
Mr_ POSNER : No question . As a watter of fact, I think the Warren Commiss Lon
underplayed Jack .Ruby 5 organized crime connections .
SHERR: Isn t there some evidence, then, that he @ight have been acting On their
behalf to wipe out Oswald?
Mr _ POSNER : Right- No. If he had a contract frow organized crime, .why didn't he
shoot Oswald when he' saw hia for the first time two days earlier? On the
Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed . He
was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own
aotivation, this desire, 2s, he thought, to be a hero in' Dallas, that he would
erase the stain and the stigma attached to the city that had been done by the
President' 5 @urder.
SHERR : You re saying Jack Ruby acted all by hinself , .a Lone-gunnan theory . once
again?
Mr POSNER: Without any doubt-
SHERR: Evoice-Over] Posner also explained his vews on the @any conspiracy
theories about the assassinatlon.
ROBERT F KENNEDY : Did say , That 5.0.B., I'11 break his back 2
JIMMY HOFFA: Who?
Mr KENNEDY : You _
Mr. HOFF A: Who 1 5 the who 2
SheRR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of
Bobby Kennedy, who was going after Organized crime.
Mr POSNER : I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or 63, sat at a
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20/20 (ABC) , August 27, 1993
table with som8 of its henchman, and discussed killing President Kennedy
did hate him. Right have even had a conspiracy afoot. There 1s no tie
between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime_ There 5 not opportunity for him
to have been their assa5sin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy-
sherr: How about, 2s in the Oliver stone movie, JFK, the @ilitary industrial
complex?
Hr_ PosnER: The movie; JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink_ If you can t
just have one of them, let 5 have everybady in the plot, because all have
some reason to knock off Kennedy-
JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassnation Of the President solved,
and there 15 no guestion about it.
sheRR: What about the Garrison investigation?
Mr _ POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination . L think it' $ a
disgrace . It was a travesty 0f justice, a @iscarriage of justice Garrison knew
it. I discovered files 0f nis investigation documents, affidavi @eqos from
his investigators Which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled on the
American public. Here was a qan who knew better- I think his behavior actually
crossed the line to being criminal.
sherr: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all1 that Lee Harvey Oswald was
working on behalf of the CIA to kill the Pres ident?
Mr _ POSNER: No. I don ' t believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the
Pres ident, but had no connection to Oswald at al1. And the reason that [
can say that s0 confidently to you is actually an unusual soucce_ It' 5 the KGB
files _ The KGB files, Which had surveillance on Oswald for day in and day out
for nearly two years in Russia, cawe to the conclus ion that he Was not 2 sleeper
agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.
SHERR: (voice-over] So Oswald wasn t working for the how about the KGB?
After all, he spoke Russian, defected to the Soviet Un ion in 1959, carried, 2
Russ ian, and Lived in Minsk for two years .
Mr_ POSNER : A popular early theory, popular that We now see in the documents
just released this past week in Washington_ The KGB was high on the CIA 5
possible list Of targets : The KGB did not want Oswald From day one
realized Oswald had problens, ` psychalogical probleas _
URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent: [sp? ] I do not think that Oswald 4ill be trusted
by any inteiligence.
sheRR: [voice-over] Uri Nosenko is someone who might know . Before defecting to
the United States in 1963; Nosenko was Oswald 5 KGB handler, and had access to
his file_ He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB . still concerned about his
Owin safety, Nasenko asked 20/20 not to show his face .
Mr _ NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was nentally unstable .
SHERR: [voice-over] But unllke Posner, Nosenko says he doesn t believe Oswald
could have shot the Pres ident for a very simple reason -
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Mr _ NOSENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. 'Would you belleve
it? He never shoot a single rabbit. And here we see person
shooting rifle
on a
long distance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds
Mr _ POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that'5 used a5 evidence that
he couldn t k1ll the Pres ident? But talk to those Who actually knew what Oswald
was like with 2 gun, his brother who used to go out with him.
RoBeRT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits With .22'5 On the
okay? We ve shot sguirrels in the trees with .22'5.
sherr: [voice-over] Robert Oswald says his younger brother was always interested
in guns - He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when_ he was' 16.
Mr _ OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun oc a .22 was he
usually his game -
sheRR: [voice-over] And Lee Harvey Osuald used the same rfle that killed the
President only weeks earlier in a failed attewpt to murder to retired Army
general Edwin Halker . In other according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald,
a loser_ in 1i wanted to
FaCcompidsk sacetaing.
MAN: [?] Lee Harvey Osuald, 0, 5, W, 4, L, D .
RePORTER : Did you fire that rifle?
LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That 5 the facts that you people have been getting, but I
emphatically deny these charges _
sherR: [voice-over] If, 2s yqu say , Lee Harvey Oswald Was not working with the
mob or with the CIA or with the K6B or with the mili industrial complex, why
did he kill the Pres ident?
Mr POSNER : 1 think that Osuald killed the Pres ident, because this was to be
almost his fulfillrent, his mowent in the sun _ Three *days before Kennedy arrives
in Dallas
9
he'5 given a on 2 silver platter. Jack Kennedy " 5 going to pass
in front of the Depository- It' s. not idealogy, it'5 not because he' 5 communist,
but it' 5 because he has that opportunity to place hinself in history . Here we
are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was: success Ful. He his wish.
HALTERS: Well, there' 5 a lot of proof. Is the case closed?
SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes 50, but out experience 15 that
people on the other s ide are 50 dug it'5 unlikely aything is going to
change their aind _ You know, even at Dealey Plaza, there are people just walktng
around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, Dealey
Plaza-
WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.
shERR: ~Which is Where it took place-
HALTERS: Yeah.
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20/20 (ABC) , August 27, 1993
shERR: It' 5 so much smaller in real life-
WALTERS: Really?
sheRR: ~than it appears -
HALTERS: I think Of it 25 a huge -
sherr: Right.
HALTERS: ~kind of highway -
sherr: It 5 quite swall, and Posner points out that if all the evewitnesses who
have core forward were In fact there that
J
it would have been elbow to
elbow: In fact, it was not very crowded that day -
WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 Wore
to come . Is that going to settle anything?
SHERR: ' Unlikely- That, however, 15 the one area where both sides agree
unclassify all those documents _ Otherwise- and even 50, this 1s going to be
argued for' generations to come .
WALTERS: Probably . Probably- Thank you, Lynn_
Next, Bost people feel that breast cancer only attacks wowen over the age of 50 -
[voice-over] But Dr . Tim Jobnson reports that more and more oung women are
discovering have a special battle to fight. What should you know? After
this.
[Commercial break]
It Could Happen to You
BARBARA WALTeRs: The Anerican Cancer Society'5 neetings On breast cancer are
taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference cOme reports of a_
disturbing new trend younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing
rate_ Though diagnostic tests have ieproved over the years , breast cancer in
younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problees _
[voice-over] And as Dr . Tim Johnson reports, if you are under 60, @uch of what
you previous learned about; the disease may not apply to you .
teREsA roberson , Breast Cancer Survivor: I had Lumps before, were all-
turned out to be cysts- But I knew this was different.
GAYLE RUssELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in
My family, 50 1 was very surprised.
KER I DEARBORN , Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to
have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.
Dr _ TIMOTHY JOHNsON, ABC News Medical Editor: [voice-over] A disease they
thought were too young to get, but more and more, the wowan On the
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LEVEL 4 15 OF 80 STORIES
Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune
October 3, 1993 Sunday; FINAL EDITION
SECTION: TEMPO; Pg . 1; ZONE: C
LENGTH: 1969 words
HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY ;
GERALD POSNER , ACTING ALONE, HAS Wounded _THE JFK COVER-UP INDuSTRY
BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.
BODY :
The rendezvous was arranged for 2 weeknight last fall at a Turkish restaurant
near CIA headguarters In Langley , Va. The proprietor would be expecting hie.
When author Gerald Posner said he was there to meet George &nd hs wi a5
he had been instructed to the proprietor Led Posner and his Wife, Trisha, to
a private table in the back room .
George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected to the
U.s. in 1964 and now lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the
country- Posner was researching a book about the assassination 0f John F
Kennedy and Nosenko had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively: about
the
Soviet intelligence agency
5 surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his
stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962 . Nasenko had suggested
that he and Posner bring their wi Posner said, because the sight of two
couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.
II Yuri supervised the Oswald file In Moscow and was familiar With the KGB
files On Oswald 5 tine in Minsk, which I had seen, Posner said. "[ knew he
could be extrenely helpful in recons tructing that period Jf Oswald 5 life. U
chapter in Posner 5 new book, Ii Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the
Assassination of JFK, 1 is devoted to Nosenko and his assessments of Oswald _
As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald to be Kennedy'$ assa55in, acting
alone, just as the Warren Commiss ion said. Further, he was not a CIA agent, not
a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a sociopath and loser who had grandiose
notions Of making a wark in history-
Posner is 35 surprised at the book 5 conclus ion as the conspiracy buffs are
riled.
"I'0 getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people
If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here 15 the
final answer, here is who did it, Posner said during a visit to Chicago-
Posner' 5 intention was to write a prider of sorts about the assassination
after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and
what wasn t.
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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993
Poking in the garbzge
I When read all the conspiracy books, it'5 apparent they can t all be
right because they flatly contradict each other, 4 he said. m[ knew: there Was
garbage on the record. I didn t know how much. "
After he debunked as many inaccuracles and false Zeads as he could, he
assumed there would be some Issues that would reguire further investigation;
perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or pOssible Mafia involvement.
Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bob Loomis, his editor at
Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn_
Ii I was convinced the Warren Commiss ion had gotten it right- The evidence was
overwhelaing, he said.
Posner also was ahare, 0f course, that a Zarge majority of the populace
thinks the Warren Commission had gotten It wrong, maybe on purpose _
He a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive
editor of Random House, took his own poll at the next meeting of the publishing
house 5 top editors, who perIodically gather to report on works in progress .
"Bob told them about what ['d found and asked how many believed the Warren
Commission was right, V Posner said_ "Remember , these are soqe of the brightest,
best-informed, best-educated. people in New York and no one raised a hand
except Bob Loomis _ U
Posner was not dismayed . "When people cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90
percent of the public as believing the assas5ination was the result of a
conspiracy , I say I'0 surprised it 5 not 100 percent when you consider that
people have essentially heard only one side for three decades .
'JFK' an 'abomination
1978 congressional investigation estimated that 2,000 books including
those that are self-published, had been written on the subject. All but a
handful present a variety of sometimes-elaborate scenarios about plotters,
motives_ killers and cover-ups, and as a the conspiracy books make
bes
tselier lists,
while the others don t.
"Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy, 0
Posner said_ "A recent one was a five-hour British file for Arts 8 Entertainment
called The Men Who Killed Kennedy.
And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver stone 5 $50 million movie,
It JFK, released in late 1991 .
"Half Of our country' $ present population weren t born (as of) November 1963 .
stone 5 movie 15 a historical abomination that 5 filled With demonstrable
falsehoods , but to young people, it'5 2 documentary.
"Even if read articles criticizing it, they say, 'Well, Stone may have
exaggerated, but there' 5 got to be something there. Believe it or there' 5
not
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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993
What 5 especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the
investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his
prosecution Of businessman Shaw as an alleged conspirator_
"Garrison 5 prosecution Qf Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been
thoroughly discredited_ There was coercion of witnesses and of
testimony , Posner said_ u The jury took only 65 minutes to find
changhag
not gutlty ,
and one Of the jurors said it would have been 20 @inutes but that several jurors
had to g to the bathroom , 0t
stone has said W JFK" Was a 4 counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren
Commiss ion _
The no-longer magic bullet
Among the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by 0 JFK, Posner
noted, is that the s0-called magic bullet found on Texas- 6ov . John Connally' 5
stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn t have struck Kennedy
and Connally, as the Warren Comm i 55 Ion said it did, without zigzagglng in
aidair, and was probably planted.
"If ballistics tests didn t prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy and
Connally, which do, use Common sense, Posner said. "At the time the
bullet was found, the conspirators wouldn t know if the bullets fired at
Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered .
" If they wanted to shield the conspiracy , there can only be three shots .
More than that, and the single assassin doesn t have time to shoot. So why risk
exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn t watch
ballistically with remnants of the other rounds ? "
And what about Jack Ruby, the chicago native who moved to Dallas to run strip
clubs ? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov - 26 and shoot Oswald on the
spur of the moment?
I 'Ruby 5 murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting
the truth out than anything: else, Posner said_ "First; it prevents the trial of
Oswald, where the evidence would: have convicted him: It also gives uS a second
assa55n, With ties to organized crime It 5 hard for people to believe this was
a coincidence, s0. you re off and running with a conspiracy . 0
Posner 5 account Of Ruby' $ life and his actions during the assassination week
demolishes any notion he was a conspirator-
According to the trade journal Publishers Weekly, six books by major
publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 3th anniversary of the
assassination, with "Case Closed s standing alone in its anti-conspiracy stance _
Posner has been heartened , by promis ing sales and positive reviews "Many
readers are off by conspiracy books that select anly material that 5
favorable to their position, Whether it checks out or not. I think these people
are buying the book _
Thuwbs up from the critics
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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993
Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national
best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune 5 list of chicago' 5 best sellers .
U.S. News 8 World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed, writes :
00 Posner achieves the unprecedented_ He sweeps away decades of poleaical smoke ,
layer by layer and builds an unshakable case against JFK' 5 killer Lee
Harvey Oswald _ It guotes. Stephen biographer of Dwight Eisenhower and
Richard Ni " The chapter on the
Anbzgsc;
bullet is a tour de force, absolutely
06 brilliant, absolutely convincing.
New York Tlmes book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "Posner
effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up to conspiracy
theories _
In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is
"utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems in llght Of all that has
transpired over the past 30 years, almost
cevoiutianary:
W
Posner , 39, didn't set out to be a wri- instead complying with the Wishes
of his father, a union official in San Francisco- "My father dealt with a lot of
lawyers . He said, these fellows charge fees you can t believe.
So Posner attended law school at the Unie versity 0f California at Berkeley,
where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious Wall street law firm,
leaving two years later to form his own fira.
In 1981 he represented Jewish victims of Dr . Josef Mengele, the notorious
Nazi war criqinal who escaped from Germany after World War II and died in hiding
in South America.
"It was a pro bono case, and sued the Mengele family and the German
government, Posner said. "Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 25, 000
documents about Mengele, so I thought I'd write a book _
0 Mengele: The Complete Story, which ' he CO-wrote with John was
published in 1986, prompting Posner to Zeave the law 'and urite
Warii
time.
M Case Closed" i5 his fifth book . "A weakness of mine 1s that I tend to
underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake_ This was true with
this book, but a5 [kept going I kept' finding answers to things I didn't think I
could get answers to.
The real cover-ups
Posner agrees With critics of the Warren Commiss ion who say its investigation
was flawed _
"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren t attewpting to
conceal their involvement in the murder of the president but rather their own
inefficiency and bungling, Posner said. " [ g0 into detail in exposing these
cover-4ps , but they can t be Interpreted as evidence of conspiracy. 14
The Warren Commission 5 work also was tarnished by 2 dubious finding of the
1978 investigation by the House Select committee on Assassinations, Posner said.
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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993
It The committee 5 acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radio
traffic on Dallas police channels- and said they Were 95 percent certain there
had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and 2 conspiracy . 'I
A retest by the National Academy 0f Sciences discredited the comaittee'$
experts, cancluding that the recording was wade a Winute after the shooting;
Posner said.
Half of "Case Closed" 1s a weticulous examination of Oswald 5 entire life,
culainating in an aleost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two
Bonths before the assassination_ conspiracy books alwost ignore Oswald .
But he 5 the and It 5 arazing how Much is known about Posner said.
"It'$ certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spY or a
patsy .
"My technique was to go to original sources _ Too @any books guote secondary
sources , some 0f which are passing Qn @isinformation, which means the garbage is
disseminated again and again, becoming fact-
"Here 5 an example. JFK' opens with Rose Cherarie, a prostitute, warning her
doctors that the Kennedy assassinatlon is going to take place in Dallas and
nawing Ruby as involved_ I found her doctor, who sald she was psychatic and
didn t mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until
the day after he k1lled Oswald . 1t
Posner paused . m I can g0. on . "
GRAPHIC: Photo GRAPHIC
PHoto (color): Gerald Posner_ debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Smyth
School on West 13th Street, Which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles
cherney.
6RAPHIC: The three shots , From: JI Case Closed : Lee Harvey Oswald and the
Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 1, 1993.)
See microfila for coaplete graphic-
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH-
LOAD-DATE-MDC: December 7, 1993
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