Transcript of 104-10332-10008.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== Aaa (041033327ooo8] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 AT 7 k ~ D 2 Assassination Records Review Board " ; 2 600 E Street NW Znd Floor Washington, DC 20530 (202) 724-0088 Fax: (202) 724-0457 2 ~ Iye CIA HAS NO TO August 23, 1995 IN OF CIA HANDDELIVERED to John A Hartingh L)a %y F3I Inspector-in-Charge JFK Task Force Federal Bureau of Investigation 0th Street and Pennsyivania Avenue; N.W. Washington, DC. 20535 RE: Foreign Goverment Liaison Dear John: This morning Jack Tunheim, Phil Golrick, and I met with Kenneth Duncan and several State Department representatives regarding how best to implement the JFK Act as to information obtained from foreign governments through liaison channels Wehad a very constructive discussion of the affirmative role the State Department could play in encouraging foreign governments, through appropriate diplomatic channels, to agree to the release of such information pursuant to the JFK Act The Review Board believes that Section 10(b)(2) of the JFK Act contemplates that the State Department play precisely such a role. Asfor now, we will hold in abeyance requests for evidence on foreign liaison postponements to which the FBI has not yet responded This will give us the opportunity in the near future to work with the State Department and the FBI to establish orderly procedures to persuade the foreign governments in question that it is in our countries mutual interests t release liaison information in assassination records: Until such procedures are in place; we request that the FBI not make further contact with foreign law-enforcement or other government officials regarding the release of liaison information in assassination records Board Memeers: John R_ Tunheim, Chair Henry F Graff Kermit La Hall William L_ Joyce AAnna K Nelson Executive Director: Dzvid 6. Marwell 101 : ViE " 0 0 OBJECTION DECLASSIFICATION RELEASE ANDIOR INFORMATION THIS DOCUMENT Prav 'de Copy ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 13-00000 Mr: John A Hartingh: August 23, 1995 Page 2 Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any question. Sincerely yours_ T Jerety Gunn Associate DirectorVior Research and Analysis and Acting General Counsel cc: Kenneth A. Duncan Department of State ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 13-00000 Secret 13 February 1996 Note to: Bob Skwirot , ARRB Staff Subject : Liaison related documents# Reference : Phone call between Ellie and Jeremy , 12 February 1996 Attached are a list and documents (13) which show liaigon relationships between the CIA and host services They illustrate the problem Of protecting liaison while releasing stations_ These Documents were acted on by the Board at the January 5 meeting _ Attachments as stated OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS Secret ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 13-00 SECRET 1 ATTACHMENT 1043IQQIT 1004Q: Although the Board continues to protect the liaison cryptonyu in both paragraphs, the text shows Station cooperation with the Swedish service 104-10017-10058: Although the liaison cryptonym remains protected, Paragraph 4 indicates liaison with the Swedish service _ 104-10018-10089: Board has made a determination to release your lialson" in: Paragraph 1 in addition to identifying Stockholm Station_ 104-10018-10091 : With release of Stations (Stockholm, Helsinki_ Copenhagen , and Oslo) text reveals liaison with the respective local services _ 104-10017-1bo36: Although the liaison cryptonym is protected, the context of the cable clearly shows Station (if released) has a liaison relationship with the Swedish service_ 104-10015-10425: The text of this cable from Rome _ responding to a multi-Station message, states that liaison traces will follow_ Once the identification of the Station is released, the existence of a liaison relationship with the Italian service in November 1963 is revealed. 104-10015-10420: Cable from Oslo in clear text indicates "no liaison Ii traces; therefore, if the identification of the Station is released, it will acknowledge the liaison relationship between the Station and the Norwegian service _ 104-10015-10159: Paragraph 4 contains information that will show that Oslo Station had a technical operation directed against the Cuban target in Norway in November 1963_ Also context of the cable reflects that the following Stations have a relationship with their local liaisons: Paris, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels , the Netherlands_ London, and Ottawa CL BY0563956 REASON 1.S(d) DECL XS; XS DRV LIA 3-87 SECRET Rome ! ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET 104-10015-10225: Paragraph 2 of the cable reflects that Rome Station had a technical operation in conjunction with the Italian liaison Please note: The Board continues to protect the cryptonys 104-10015-10230: Cable reflects that Station had the access to photograph US passports at the Amsterdam Schipol' Airport . It can be implied that_ that capability is due to a liaison relationship with the Dutch service _ 104-10015-10255: Cable reflects The Hague Station had a photo operation in the Netherlands _ When reviewed with 104- 10015-10230, it will be clear that the operation refers to the Schipol Airport operation _ 104-10018-10088: Cable clearly shows that both Oslo and Stockholm Stations have a liaison relationship in their respective countries if the Stations are released. 104-10018-10080: At the bottom of Page 2 of the cable is the phrase "assume Stockholm still planned ask its liaison to interrogate_ Release of Station and this phrase clearly reflects a liaison relationship with the Swedish service_ CL BY 0563956 REASON [.S(d) DECL XS; XS DRV LIA 3-87 SECRET ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET From the Desk of [inda C,Cipriani NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson FROM: @indb C Ciptiani DATE: 04/29/96 04.26.36 PM SUBJECT: Memo re Mexican Liaison (S) CL BY '2224130 CL REASON 1-57(d) DECL ON Xl DRV FM LIA 3-82 The following is a draft memo for Jeff. (Bob Caudldis looking at it now so there may be more changes Please let me know if there is anything incorrect here. have a feeling Jeff will want a meeting with me rather than just the memo. Also, knowing him; he may want to deal with Tunheim on this directly since he was involved in this: will let you know: 1 Action That you advise as per paragraph 7 2 Background: You will recall that you spoke with Chairman Tunheim Of the JFK Board about the attached cable and the importance of protecting the phrase_ WwiEh Mexicans } because it gives away (haison involvement in a Eel-tap operation_ At its 16 April meeting, at which I was present the Board reconsidered its initial decision, but determined that the phrase could be released. 3 It had just come to HRG' s attention that this same cable was released ip full by the Board _ with no objection by CIA, in September 1995 _ CIA probably did not contest this release because an excerpt from this cable_ containing the phrase at issue had been inadvertently released even prier€e-that It is, therefore, no longer possible for CIA to argue before the Board for the protection of this phrase in the current cable or to appeal this release to the White House #c Natonl Archiues in T3 4 4_ CIA is now in somewhat of an embarrassing position because it has_strenuously argued that the release of this phrase would cause "clear and convincing damage W to the national security only to find that this phrage has_ been released with CIA acquiescence for at least seven months wieh neOstensible damage . Conceivably, the Board could see this incident as a justification of their second-guessing our damage assessments , and could give us a much more difficult time in the future SECRET Auj ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET 5 , On the other hand _ CIA could use this situation as a way to highlight the problems HRG has had with the JFK review process that documents are being reviewed and released to the National Archives in such quantity and speed that it is difficult for CIA to. focus on any one document and_ more how seemingly innocuous information in one document icoortcttaliy can be quite Significant in relation to prior or subsequent releases Since September when this cable was originally released, the issue of protecting MMexican Tiaison} has become increagingly important because of other releases on this subject and because of your appearance before the Board in February_ 6 _ Furthermore, this prior release should not impair our ability to continue to protect the fact of (Mexican involvement in this Welztap operation Although we have argued to the Board cl JtL that @wiEh Mexicansiugives that relationship away S+uer the esblecQoeasec not directly do SO In fact , the reason (eloace) for the Board' s insistence that this phrase should be released was thevery fuct thatthe cable did NOT directly state that the Mexican were zinvolvedzn Ehe Eel-tap We should be able to use their arguments to continue to protect the Taigon relationship_ 7 Our only recourse is to acknowledge to the Boara that CIA has no basis to bring an appeal to the President since this cable has already been released in full We should, however maintain our position that we believe this `informationvis damaging especially in light of releases to National Archives 8in3e Septenber; and that we never would have acquiesced to the release in September if we knew then what would be released on this subject in the ensuing months Although this message does not necessarily need to be conveyed by you to Tunheim ana could be handled by John Pereira and David Marwell_ given your past dealings with the Board on this issue_ you may prefer to do this_ 8 In order to avoid problems like this in the future , HRG is immediately dedicating several personnel to the task bf reviewing boxes documents and determining what our releases have been Yubject HRG will also be double_checking iVone documents going to the Board to #ake 341 that #otduplicates of prior releases are-betng gent You should be aware however that there is a rudimentary CIA computer index listing Qur releases and that it is impossible to do-aeeurate computer Hol Mo searches about our releases on specific subjects _ Although HRG personnel are extremely knowledgeable on what has been released, with over 220,000 CIA documents currently in the collection, it i8 suprising that mistakes like this have not happened more often Cv wo ~b so-(ule asslalc [ Ccl Asciv cc: SECRET o1zes&f only hppppexa ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET 15 October 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR Assassination Records Review Board FROM: John F Pereira Chief Historical Review Group SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Australia (We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below. ) 1 (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA S position on the review and declassification of foreign government information that appears in the JFK collection This issue has come to CIA ' s attention because of the recent review by the JFK Board of Australian liaison documents The Agency believes it is important to address this issue at this time because this is the first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has been reviewed the Board and it is possible that such information will appear again in CIA S collection This memo will therefore_ focus on the larger issue of a United States Government (USG) agency S legal obligations in the dissemination and declassification of foreign government information_ but will also address the_specific issue of the Six Australian documents" (documents: 104-10012-10078 104-10012-10079 104-10012-10080 104-10012-10081 . 104-10009-10222 104-10009-10224) 2 (S) Conclusion: CIA does not object to the release of the information in these sixi documents but is only concerned about protecting foreign government information Therefore_ the Agency does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the redacted form proposed by the Board _ With regards to the two Australian letters the Agency has no authority to unilaterally agree to their release in any form_ Pursuant to its legal obligations CIA ordinarily seeks the consent 0f the foreign government prior to declassifying their information However for reasons described herein_ it is not possible to even seek the consent of the Australians at this time nor would it be likely that the Australians would give it_ Rather than going to the Australians against its better judgment or requesting the CL BY : 2224130 CL REASON : 1.5 (a) DECL ON : XS DRV FM: LIA 3-82 SECRET by ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Auseralia President to agree to the unilateral declasgification of foreign government:. information, CIA proposes Ehat: the release of the Australian documents be either_postponed for a short time or that a substitution be made 3 (U) Legal Authorities The procedures governing the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information are set out in Executive Order 12958 _ as well as Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) Executive Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including (1) information provided by a foreign government or any element thereof with the expectation, expressea or implied, that the information andlor the source of the information, are to be hela in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign government _ or any element thereof requiring that the information, the arrangements , or both, are to be hela in confidence _ Id_ at 81.1(d) 4 . (U) Foreign government information is subject to a classification determination under E.0 _ 12958 _ section 1.5 (c) . When SO classified, U.S _ government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure The E.0 _ requires that foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S_ classification that shall ensure a degree of protection at_least equivalent to that required the entity that furnished the information Id _ at 1 7 (e) Furthermore_ agencies are required to safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the originating government _ Id_ at 4 .2 (g) 5 (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the intelligence community to protect all classified information from unauthorized disclosure the Director of Central Intelligence has issued Directives (that is DCIDs) setting out the procedures for the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information_ Intelligence obtained from another government or from a combined effort with another government _ may not be released or authorized for release without its consent DCID_ 5L6 attachnent 6C.3 Furthermore_ the release of intelligence that would be contrary to agreements between the U.S _ and foreign countries is expressly prohibited. Id_ at SC_5_ 6 _ (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S_ and specifically named foreign countries and government components is classified SECRET unless a different classification is mutually agreed upon_ DCID_ 110-1 Such information may be declassified only with the mutual consent of the U.S_ and the foreign government whose interests are involved _ DCID 1/1O-1 2 SECRET by _ ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Australia AR . the U.S _ and the foreign government whose interests are involved _ DCID_ 110-1 7 _ (U) National Security_Considerations The importance of such coordination with foreign governments prior to the release of their information cannot be overemphasized Should CIA or for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where required, not only would it be, a violation of the aforementioned E.0_ and directives but it would chill relationships it has developed with foreign services over the years _ If such lack Of coordination became known foreign services would hesitate to share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed it would be released_ in te of any agreements or U.S_ laws to the contrary_ without their consent Furthermore_ the U.S could not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S government information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives _ 8 (S) According to its legal obligations described herein, CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign government information Its obligation to do so is similar to its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency S docuents For example CIA could not declassify and release to the public FBI information located in CIA files without coordinating with that agency Similarly CIA has no authority to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or information in its files (S) Coordination with--Australia: As--twozof the docuents lat issue here are letters from the Australian service (104-10009_ /10224,_ 104-10012-10080) CIA is legally obligated by E.0_ and lagreement with the Australians to seek the consent of the IAustralians prior to their release_ even in redacted form_ The lissue of coordinating with the Australian service is a timely one In most cases CIA would not have an objection to going to Ihe foreign government and seeking their consent for declas _ Isification However several events that have occurred in the hast few months depict just how seriously Australia considers {indication that the U.S is unable to protect from release their classified information Based on the incidents described below_ it is CIA S position that even asking the Australians for consent to release would threaten the current relationship_ Within the last Year , a demarche was made by the Australian government expressing strong concern that U.S. declas - sification legislation expressly spell out that no information provided to the USG by the Australian service be declassified without its permission A copy of this demarche is provided for the Board ' s review (See_attached_) It is worth noting that this demarche is not_ between_intelligence_services but 3 SECRET spi- any ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Australia rather-between governments it was ~iterally-delivered-by the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council and to the U.S_ Ambassador to Australia The manner in which the Australians treated the demarche demonstrates that the protection of classified information is receiving top priority in the Australian government and is not just a concern of their intelligence communi On two recent but separate occasions the Australian service passed to CIA information indicating that there would be assassination attempts on two non-U S citizens CIA requested that it pass this information on to the targets_ but the Australians refused. They argued that the information was not specific enough ana would endanger a source The Australians stated that if they believed the information was useful they would pass it themselwes The Australians were concerned that CIA haa even asked to pass on this information , and questioned what they perceived as CIA S willingness to share their information with third parties Finally, they stated that the easiest way to protect their information was simply not to pass it to CIA anymore Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency employee allegedly may have disclosed their classified information The Australians believe that this disclosure may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources in a country Of particular interest to them_ The DDCI promised the head of the Australian service to launch an investigation into the matter_ The . Australian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA about a book published by an American USG official which alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian service_ Even though this book was not an official CIA acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians_ this incident called into question the CIA S ability to protect that relationship 10 (S) Under the circumstances , it would be an affront to the Australians to be askea for their consent in light of the above events_ which have all occurred in the last year_ The Australians woula not only be extremely upset with CIA_ but woula certainly deny their consent Should the Australians deny their consent CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of the information and would be obligated to do all it coula to prevent disclosure_ It_is_crucial_not_only -to_CIA_s_mission but SECRET ty_ ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Australia also-to-the conduct of US foreign relations "that tthe "USG iS seen as abiding by its agreements with foreign services as well as its own laws on the release of information_ 11_ (S) Finally the importance of maintaining good relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized_ As a result of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison counterparts the USG receives a large volume of finished intelligence Due to our shrinking resources much of this information would not be available to U.S _ poiicy makers were it not provided by the Australians Additionally, we work ' together with the Australians around the worla on joint collection activities that cover the full spectrum of USG intelligence priorities_ Finally, there are several critical collection efforts vital to the USG where' we do not have the entree to collect intelligence independently In these cases we rely entirely on the continued good wiii 0f the Australian services to provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S. policymakers needs 12 _ (S) In light of all the above , CIA submits the following two proposals for the Board' s consideration First, the Board coula postpone these two documents from release for a short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can reassess its relationship with the Australians It is possible that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that it would be possible to seek their consent for release in full However should we seek the consent of the Australians at a future date and the Australians object to the release of the documents _ we would ask that the Board seriously consider any negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and abide by their desires A second option would be for CIA to coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of summary of the Australian documents for imediate release _ This summary would hide the fact that the letter came from the Australian service_ but would reveal what the subject of the letter was This would avoid the problem of having to go the Australians to seek their consent , which we woula have to do even in the case of redactions 13 (U) Should the Board reject these proposals CIA is willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually agreeable solution We strongly believe_ however that any approach which suggests that the U.S_ Government may ignore its obligations ana commitments to foreign governments would seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy 14_ (S) With regard to the remaining four documents (104- 10012-10078 104-10012-10079 _ 104-10012-10081 , 104-10009-10222 _ these-areCIA documents_and_with-the_-redaetions-proposed-by the 5 SECRET ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Australia government As such_ CIA consents to the release of these docuents with the redactions proposed the Board _ 15 _ (S) Proposal for Future_Coordination: With regards to any other foreign government information that may exist in the files CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to request their consent in the release of their information when it would be appropriate to do SO Although recent events with Australia make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this time_ this may not be So with other services In cases were CIA believes because of the nature of the relationship, that it would not be possible to request the consent of the service, CIA proposes that the documents either be postponed from release or that CIA and Board S staff coordinate a summary - In_E beree~ John F Pereira Attachment SECRET by ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 13-00000 Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on U.S. legislation 0n declassification: This wag given t0 the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, Ambassador Perking; by Philip Flood, then Director of the Office of National Asgessments (ONA) in September 1995. This demarche was also given to-Sandy Berger at the National Security Council by Australien Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995. #4 90 ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 13-00000 AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON EXECUTTVE ORDBR 12958 CLASSIFID NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMA TTON The Australlan govcmnmant wishes to Iegister ILs concern over Uic 17 April Exccutive Urder on Classlficd Natlonal Securlty Inforution and tc epparent omlsslon of any explicit provlslon to protect toreign-sourced informallon or documenttlon from gutomaric dcclasslication onco it is Over 25 years old, The Australian government understonds and support; tha demnocradc prlnciples end comnltment to open govcrnment Fhich underpin the Exeoudve Order: Wo too arc improvlng access tQ governinent infomatlon, bul a6 malntaining provisions t0 protcct forelgn-sourced Information AIncludlng U.S, infornatlon, We do not agrce that these prInciplcs can be upplied by Oc forelgn govcrnmentto tha information or documentation of-another govemment wltout prlor consullation and 'clearance Australlan-sourced Informnatlon was and contlnues t0 be pagscd W0 phe U.S, goyernmcnt on the understanding that It will bo protected, We aopt prcclsely tha sannc approach (0 informarlon that tho U.S. shares wlth Wa; Omnission o such consullatlon would, in thc cyes of the_Auxtralian govemnicng not bo in kecping wltb te 1962 U.S.-Australla Oencral Securlty - of Lntoratlon egrecment Or tho other bilkteral and Inultilateral Intellgence co- operation und Information sharlng agreements: The failure to prolect sensitive Australlan-sourced Inforinatlon aboul for example, OW Intelligencc operations, could bave rarlfcationa for OUI relationx With reglonal countries and compromlse Intelligence sources &nd methods (upon which the U.S dependx in part) Australian concemns could be addressed It provlslon for clearance wlth orlginalors ot {oreigu-sourced matcrlal was embodled In the Infomation Sccurlty Oversighl Offce Imnplementation ducclve lo U,8. agencles: such an approach ghould pot Impede Or delay the declesrLficatlon Australia is not sceklng this For cxample, categorics 0 sensldvity for Augtralle could bx idcnulfied: A reasonablc tlmc Umlt could bx PUt on Austrulian Iesponse ine aftcr which thc U.S. could b free l0 declasslfy (we have 8 slmll Wtangemenl wluh Whe U,K) many Proccsa ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 13-00000 VJcc SECRET Cctal Inlclligcncc Agcngy Woshingln D C 2OSOS 28 January 1997 Mx David G Marwell Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board 600 E Street. NW Washington, DC 20530 Dear David: This is to acknowledge your letter of 3 January 1997 to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning the Assassination Records Review Board S recent formal determinations with respect to CIA Records The appropriate Agency components have again reviewed the documents that the Board has decided to release either totally or with some information postponed: While the Agency does not plan to appeal to the President for additional postponements at this time we ask that the Board reconsider its decisions with respect to six documents These documents contain information relating to foreign government provided data_ foreign liaison relationships , and intelligence sources--information that we believe merits protection under current standards set by the Board _ A list, of these six docuents, together with Agency comments concerning them _ is enclosed _ We plan no further action on these documents pending discussion with your staff and review by the Board _ crt&: John F Pereira Chief _ Historical Review Group Enclosure UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET ENCLOSURE (We request that this enclosure be returned to CIA once the Review Boara has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below . ) (U) The Central Intelligence Agency requests that the Assassination Records Review Board reconsider its determination on the six documents listed below: (U) 1_ 104-10012-10080 and 104-10009-10224 (substitute--language for a foreign country document ) (S) The foreign government in question has expressed strong concern about USG and CIA S inability to keep secrets and current relationships are very tense If we are required to release the date andlor narrow the geographic choices too closely_ the foreign government will be able to identify the document as theirs Because this document is scheduled for another review in July 1997 we request that the ARRB reconsider the inclusion of the date of the document and_ designation of the country of origin as Pacific Rim Country" and accept our originally submitted wording _ (U) 2 104-10051-10106 (release' of location) (S) We request reconsideration of the release of the location identified in the last three words in the eleventh line, paragraph eight This CIA base currently is undeclared to the host government _ (U) 3 104-10055-10072 and 104-10054-10007 (foreign government activity/liaison) (S) Regarding the release of the reference to the passport camera_ on page 3 it is not the USG' s position to confirm that a foreign government undertakes such activity In addition this is an on-going operation _ Further releasing the words in question would establish a strong inference that the two Agency officers were permitted foreign officials to inspect the camera thus CL BY 0185904 DECL ON Xl CL REASON 1.5 (c) DV FM : AHB 70-9 MLTIPLE by ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET tending to confirm the liaison relationship_ We request that the last seven words of line four paragraph "h" be replaced with substitute wording such as the public security facilities (U) 4 104-10004-10213 (source) (S) We request that the ARRB reconsider releasing the word "agent in this context (page 32) 1 suggested substitute_ "contact Nielson was not a paid agent of the REDSKIN project ana does not appear to have worked for the Agency in any other capacity_ To describe him as a CIA agent coula cause danger either to him or his family, especially if they are still in Russia_ ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== 13-00000 TLO N SECRET 62 0 Assassination Records Review Board 4 600 E Street NW 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20530 Q (202) 724-0088 Fax: (202) 724-0457 2 p 0 0 September 5, 1997 BY COURIER Mr: John Pereira Director Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Re: Request,to CIA to contact liaison channels regarding LIENVOY intercepts of Oswald telephone_calls_in Mexico City Some time ago the Review Board requested informally that CIA contact its liaison channels in Mexico for information related to Lee Harvey Oswald. your recent visit here we discussed with you the feasibility of your making such contacts I am writing in response to your request that we memorialize our request and provide some background information The Review Board believes that all reasonable steps should be taken to account for all telephonic intercepts of Oswald his visit to Mexico City in September-October 1963. There is evidence that CIA intercepted some telephone calls through an operation named LIENVOY conducted jointly with components Of the Mexican government] We_ believe that it would be @ppropriate for CIA tO contact directlyfMexico City laison channels toinquire as to Whether the Mexican authorities retained copies of LIENVOY telephonic take, specifically the actual recordings O Oswald s telephone cals to the Soviet Embassy during the period oF September 27 through October 3, 1963 The Review Board previously has sought information from the Mexican Government through appropriate diplomatic channels. For reasons that are obvious to those familiar with Mexico issues, the Review Board could not raise with Mexican officials nor with the U.S. State Department the possible existence of additional tape recordings that might be in the hands of certain officials Thus, at the behest of the Review Board, the Department of State requested that the Mexican federal government and local government agencies conduct general searches of their files for records related to the assassination of President Kennedy- The Mexican government responded SECRET BoARD MeMBErs: John R. Tunhe. Chair Henry F Graff Kermit L Hall William L_ Joyce Anna K. Nelson Executive DIREcTor: David 6. Marwell SiN.^ 1 2 VTE W City During during City im, ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET Mr. John Pereira September 5, 1997 Page 2 by sending copies of the same documentation and correspondence that the GOM had made available to the Warren Commission in 1964. The basis for our interest in your contacting appropriate Mexican officials is found in CIA document 104-10004-10199, which was reviewed by the Board on September 19, 1995. On page 5 of this document (not including the cover sheet) information that the Board agreed to protect due to the sensitivity of sources and methods involved Suggests that the Mexican security forces may have had their OWn COpY of the October 1 intercept On Lee Harvey Oswald: It is unclear whether this statement refers to the transcript Or to an actual tape containing the phone call Nevertheless,it provides enough evidence to warrant additional inquiries on this matter: For your reference we are enclosing copies of the reference documents as well as copies of the correspondence between the DOS and the Mexican government: We would appreciate Your contacting appropriate officials to determine what reasonably can be known about this and related matters, and ask that You providea response tO thS request by November 14,1997_ We are fully aware of the sensitivity of Ths type of request and do not wish to take any action that would compromiseexisting intelligence operations) If necessary, we would be pleased to discuss with you ways in which we might further elaborate on this request, including person-to-person discussions with appropriate officials either hereQr in Mexico] Thank you for your continued assistance and cooperation: Sincerely yours, ZhuJu T. Jeremy Gunn General Counsel and Associate Director for Research and Analysis cc: J. Barry Harrelson, HRG. Enclosures SECRET ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET CL BY,{617632 CL REASON: Section 1.5 € DECL ON: X1 ORV FRM: COV 2-87 15 January 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira DCI Fred Wickham @ DO Lee Strickland DA FROM: J. Barry Harrelson JFK Project Officer OFFICE: CSIIHRG SUBJECT: ARRB 22 January Meeting Agenda REFERENCE: 12 The following items are on the ARRB meeting agenda for 22 January 1998: (S) A, Reconsideration of the (State CovecZJThe ARRB staff has advised that briefings by senior CIA andlor State otlicial are not required. However, the Agenckand StataJare welcome to make a presentation if it will add to the information presented in the "evidence memorandum' The evidence memorandum must be at ARRB no later than Tuesday_20 January: Mr. Gunn has suggested we may want to have individuals standing by for questions The current plan is for Lee Strickand and me to be available at 600 E. St. NW: to answer any questions (AIUO) B Office of Personnel Eles in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm) The ARRB staff will recommend to the Board that personnel files-be_deglared NBR (Not Believed Relevant) and their release postponed until 2017. The Agency position is that the privacy of each individual clearly outweighs the public interest, most of the information in these files has no relevance to the assassination story, and any related information exist elsewhere in the collection: At ARRB staff request HRP is preparing five OP files for review by Board members: The ARRB staff will prepare a memorandum for public release describing the files; their memo will be coordinated with the Agency prior t0 release: (AIOU) C_ Non-related tilesldocuments in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm) The ARRB staff will recommend that the files and documents (approximately 35,000 pages) designated non-related by CIA during the 1994 review of the microfilm be declared NBR and released in 2017 _ If the recommendation is accepted by the Board, the ARRB staff will prepare an unclassified description of the records for public release This too will be coordinated with the Agency to release: D: Other possible items: (Aiuo) 1 ARRB Request # CIA 1 The ARRB staff may request that the DO documents at issue in this request be declared Assassination Records to be released in full or sanitized form: SECRET being - prior ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET (S) iis CrypcLNLUCK} - ARRB staff did not find our evidence memo on this crypt persuasive. are expected to recommend that the Board reaffirm its decision to release. (AIUO) Mi: 1967 IG report on "Castro Assassination Plots" ARRB has requested that an updated version be released t0 NARA by the end of January: disagreements between the Agency and ARRB staff may be added to the HRP and DO reviewers are currently re-reviewing the report. (U) 2 If you have any questions about any of these items please call me. cc: Eleen Wukitch@ DO Becky Rant @ DA ((inda Ciprian@ DCI Sent on 15 January 1998 at 05.24.34 PM SECRET They Any agenda:

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104-10332-10008.pdf

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