Transcript of 104-10330-10060.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== AAA 104-10330-10060] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 SECRET 15 October 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR : Assassination Records Review Board FROM: John F Pereira Chief Historical Review Group SUBJECT Foreign Government Information Australia We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below. ) 1 . (S) Issue This memorandum will address CIA S position on the review and declassification of foreign government information that appears in the JFK collection This issue has come to CIA S attention because of the recent review by the JFK Board of <Austrarian Tizisondocuments _ The Agency believes it is important to address this issue at this_ time because this is the first instance that this type of {foreign Iiaisonadocument has been reviewed by the Boara and it is possible that such information will appear again in CIA S collection This memo will_ therefore_ focus on the larger issue of a United States Government (USG) agency S legal obligations in the dissemination and declassification of_foreign government information {but will also adaress Ehe specific issue of the 3ix "AuSEralian docuents (documents 104-10012-10078 _ 104-10012-10079 104-10012-10080 104-1Q012-10081_ 104-10009-10222 104-10009-10224) 2 (S) Conclusion CIA does not object to the release of the information in these six documents _ but is only concerned about protecting foreign government information Therefore_ the Agency does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the redacted form_proposed by the Board _ With regards to the tWO rAustralian Tetters the Agency has no authori to unilaterally agree to their release in any form _ Pursuant to its legal obligations_ CIA ordinarily seeks the consent 0f the foreign government prior to declassifying their information However for reasons described herein it-is not possible Eo even seek ~ the onsent of Ehe Auztralians at this time no-would it Ve likely ithat the Australians would give it Rather than going to the Australians against_its -better judgment or requesting the CL BY : 22.24130 CL REASON : 1.5 (d) DECL ON : X5 DRV FM : LIA 3-82 SECRET ty ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 13-000q0 SECRET SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information Australia {President to agree to Ehe unilaterai declassification of foreign government information CIA proposes that the release of the Australian documents be either_postponed- Eor a short time or that a substitution be madez 3 (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information are set out in Executive Order 12958 as well as Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) Executive Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including (1) information provided by a foreign government or any element thereof with the expectation_ expressed or implied_ that the information andlor the source of the information, are to be hela in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign government or any element thereof requiring that the information the arrangements _ or both, are to be held in confidence- Id_ at S1.1(d) 4 (U) Foreign government information is subject to a classification determination under E.0 _ 12958 section 1.5 (c) When So classified, U.S _ government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure The E.0 _ requires that foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S classification that shall ensure a degree of protection at Least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information Id_ at 1 7 (e) Furthermore_ agencies are required to safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the originating government Id_ at 4.2 (g) 5 (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the uaetlogezed Gomalostr to protect all classified information from disclosure_ the Director of Central Intelligence has issued Directives (that is DCIDs) setting out the procedures for the declassification ana dissemination of foreign government information Intelligence obtained from another government or from a combined effort with another government _ may not be released or authorized for release without its consent DCIDSL6 attachment SC3_ Furthermore _ the release of intelligence that would be contrary to agreements between the U.S_ and foreign countries is expressly prohibited. Id_ at SC.5_ 6 (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S and specifically named foreign countries and government components is classified SECRET unless a different classification is mutually agreed upon DCID LL1O_1 Such infosmation may be declassified only with the mutual consent of the U.S_ and the foreign government whose interests are involved _ DCID LL1O-1 2 SECRET ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Australia the U.S and the foreign government whose interests are involved _ DCID 1L10-1- (U) National Security Considerations The importance of such-Zoordination with foreign governments prior to the release of their information cannot be overemphasized Should CIA , or for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned E.0_ and directives but it woula chill relationships it has developed with foreign services over the Years If such lack of coordination became known _ foreign services would hesitate to share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed it would be released_ in spite of any agreements or U.S _ laws to the contrary_ without their consent Furthermore_ the U.S _ coula not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S _ government information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives 8 (S) According to its legal obligations described herein, CIA coordinates the dissemination andlor release of foreign government information . Its obligation to d0 so is similar to its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency' s documents For example _ CIA could not declassify and release to the public FBI information located in CIA files without coordinating with that agency _ Similarly_ CIA has no authority to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or information in its files 9 T(S) coordination with Australia; As two of the documents_ at issue_here are letters from the Australian_service (104-100og 10224 104-10012-10080)5 CIA is legally obligated by E.0 _ and agreement with ihe Australians to seek the consent of the Australians}prior to their release even in redacted form. The Sissue Of coordinating with the Australian Servicesis a timely one In most cases CIA woula not have an objection to going to the foreign government and seeking their consent for declas - sification However _ several events that have occurred in the last few months depict just how seriouslytAus_eralia considers any [indication that the U_ S . is unable to protect from release their classified information Based on the incidents describea below _ it is CIA S position that even asking the <Australianhfor consent to release would threaten the current relationship_ Within the last year_ a demarche was made by the (Austrarian government expressing strong concern that U.S _ declas - sification legislation expressly_spell out that no information provided to the USG by the Australian gervice} be declassified wirhout its permission A_ copy of this demarche is provided for the Board S review (See attached_) It is worth noting that-Ehis_demarche _iS_not _between-intelligence_services_but 3 SECRET JafA ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information Auswralia rather between governments it was literally delivered the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council and to the U.S_ Ambassador to Australia The manner in which the Auetralians treated the demarche demonstrates that the tection of classified information is receiving top priority in the Australian government and is not just a concern of their intelligence community_ On two recent but separate occasions the Australian service passed to CIA information indicating that there would be assassination attempts on two non-U S citizens CIA requested that it pass this information on to the targets_ but the Australians refused_ They argued that the information was not specific ~enough and would endanger a source The Australians stated that if they believed the information was useful they would pass it themselves The Australians were concerned that CIA had even asked to pass on ehis information and quegtioned what they perceived as CIA S willingness to share their information with third parties Finally_ they stated Ehat the easiest way to protect their information was simply not LO_-pass it to CIA anymore Jus€ this month, a senior official of the Australian service ~approached the .CIA with accusations that a former Agency employee allegedly_may have disclosed their classified information_ The Australians believe that this disclosure may be related to the loss of agent reporting sources in a country of particular interest to them The DDCI promised the head of the Australian service to launch an investigation into the matter TEe ustralian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA about a book published bY an American USG official which alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian service_ Even though-this book was not an official CIA acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians_ this incident called into question the CIA S ability to protect that relationship_ 10 _ (S) Under the circustances . it would be an affront to the Australians to be asked for their consent in light of the above events which have all occurred in the last year The Australians would not only be extremely upset with CIA _ but would certainly deny their consent Should the Australians deny their consent CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of bthe "niormation and woula be obligated to do all it_could to prevent :dsclosure It is crucial not only- to CIA S mission but SECRET by pro all ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Australia also to the conduct of US foreign relations that the USG is seen as abiding by its agreements with foreign 'services as well as its own laws on the release of information_ ar (S) Finally, the importance of maintaining good relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized_ As a Tesult of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison counterparts, the USG_receives a large volume %f finished intelligence_ Due to our shrinking resources much of this information would not be available to U.S _ policy makers were it Snot provided by the Australians Additionally, we work together with the Australians around the- worla on joint collection activities that cover the full spectrum of USG. inteTligence priorities _ Finally, there are several- critical collection efforts vital to the USG where we a not have the entree to collect intelligence independently In these cases we rely entirely on the continued good wiii of the Australian services to provide uS with the assistance necessary to meet U.S policymakers needs 12 (S) In light of all the above , CIA submits Ene following two proposals for the Board' s consideration First the Board coula postpone these two documents from release for a short period (we propose 10 months ) at which time CIA can reassess its relationship with the Australians It is possible that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change SO that it woula be possible: to seek their consent for release in full However shoula we seek the consent of the Australians at a future date and the Australians object EO the release of the docuents _ we would ask-that the Board seriously consider any negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and abide by their desires A second option would be for CIA to coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of summary_of the Australian documents for immediate release This summar woula hide the fact that the letter came from the Australian service, but woula reveal what the subject of the letter was This would avoid the problem of having to go the Australians to seek their consent which we woula have to do even in the case_of redactions 13 . (U) Should the Board reject these proposals CIA is willing to work with the Board to reach another mutuaily agreeable solution We strongly believe however that any approach which suggests that the U.S_ Government ignore its obligations and commitments to foreign governments would seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy 374 (S) With regara to the remaining four documents 104- 110012-10078 , 104-10012_10019_ 104-10012-10081 104-10009-10222 _ these are CIA documents and with the redactions proposed the 5 SECRET may by ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Foreign Government Information Australiaz government As such CIA consents to the release of these_ documents with the redactions proposed by the Board 15 (S) Proposal for Future_Coordination With regards to any Eler foreign government information that may exist in the files CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to request their consent in the release of their information when it would be appropriate to do So Although recent events with Australia make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this iEime this may not be So with other services In cases were CIA believes because of the nature of the relationship_ that it would not be possible to request the consent of the service_ CIA proposes that Ehe 'documents. either be ` postponed from release Or that CIA ana Board S staff Coordinate a summary 47,262 ~&rc &AL John F Pereira Attachment 3r SECRET 3+ ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 13-00000_ Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche o. U.S. legislation On declassification. Tkiswas gived t0 the U.S. Ambassador_toAustra! Ambassador_Perking by_Philip Floo: then Director of the Office of National Assessments (ONA) in September 1995. This demarche was also gived to-Sandy_Berger &t_he_National Security Council by Australian _Ambassador to the United States Don Russell 0. 4 August 1995. 2 lia, ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL AUSTRALLAN COMMBNTS ON EXECUTTVE ORDBR 12958 CLASSIFID NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMA TTON The_Australlan govcmmant wisheg to Iegister IS concern Over tcIZ April Exccutivc Ordcr 0n Classlflcd Nadonal -Sccurlty Infomution and dhe @pparent omlsslon 0f any explicit prorlslon to protect foreiga-sourced informallou Or documentallon ftom guromatic dcclassLilcedon onco it ix Over 25 years old: The Australian govcrment undersunds and 8UPpOrbs Wo democrada priciples and commnlment to open govcrment whictuderput the Exeoudvc Order; Wo too arc improvlng access tq governincnt: Infomadon, bul are malntaining provisions t0 protcct forelgn-souccd Information Includlng U.S, infomtlon Wc do not agrce that thcse prInciplcs can be upplied by onc forelgn govcrnmentto tha information_or_docuncntation of anouher_govemment_wlulout_pdor_consullation-and clcarance Austrellan-succd Infonnatlon W4s and contnucs Lo_be pesscd_ta the US goyetnmcnt on the understanding that It Will 6o protccicd, We adopt prcclsely tha sanzc approach (0 informatlon that tho U,S. shares wlth Ua, Omission ocuch conquudon would; in Wc cyes of Mhe Ausalan govcmnwnt; not bo) in kecping wlth te 1962 U.S.-Australla Gencral Securloy of Infonatlon "uccmcnt Or tho mary othcr _bilutere]-ind-ttttttaterut Intelirgcncc CO- operation und (nformuton sharlng agrconlents The TilurcLo prolccr_sensitive Australlan-sourced nforinatlon Zboul tor exanple OW ~ntellgencc operationg, coud have Tanhincationa (or OUr reletions Wilh Teglonal counuies and compromlsc Intelligence sources &nd methods (upon which tc U.S: dependk in part) Australian concemns could be addressed It provlslon for clearancc wlth originalors ot {oreign-sourced matcrlal Was embodled In tbc Infonation Sccurlly Oversighl Office- Itnplemcntation dutcllve to U,S. agcncles: such &n aPproach should not Impede Or delay the declaslficatlon proccss Austrulia is not secklng thib_For cxample; categorics 0 sensttvity for Austalla could bx idcntlfied: A reasonablc tlmc umut could bzpur on Austrukian {esponse Tn ACr WEHTFc_US;coud 6x frce l0 declasslfy (wC havc 8 slanl urangcmcnl wlu (e U.K) 3+

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104-10330-10060.pdf

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