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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
SECRET DD7O
3057
Sw]1995
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman _
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JFR Asgabbination Racordg Review Board
FROM: David Cohen
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : Release of JFK Documenta
1 . I understand the JFK AARB i9 Prabently conaldering the
release of documenta which would identify CIA stations to the
public_ I am oppoged In general to revealing the locations of
our @tationg and Nould prefer instead to gubstitute the Btatlon
nama with a regional designation , e.9. European Station vica
Brugsela I would ba willing_ howaver _ to open certain stationg
during a specific window of tima if they ara subgtantively
relevant to the a88a8bination investigation and provided that tha
document8 in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent
presence of tha btation (S)
2 _ In all but a handful of instances public acknowledgmant
of a station would be a
political embarragament to the host
government and would threaten ongoing aenaitive operationg and
liaison reletionshipg In a faw ingtanceb the damage probably
would be mininal or not at all a8 long 18 tha prebence appear8 to
be temporary _ I have burveyed the involved components and
determined the damaga to national bacurity Which would follow
such releabe. (S)
3 I btrongly urge that you not allow the information
regarding the Congo and Sanegal to be released. The Congo 18 now
Zaire and the station in tha 60 '@ would hava been in
Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our
current relationghip with the Zaireang 18 not a full-blown
liaison type , but more of a limited relationghip with certain
individuals from the services In the past , we have had cloge
CL BX 0695930
CL REASON : 1.5 (C)
DECL ON : Xl
DRV FRM LOC 3-82
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'SUBJECT : Releasa of JFK Documente
relationships with the Zalreane because Of our naed for thelr
cooperation in as818ting with a PreeLdentially-mandated program
and will need to Lmprove our relationshlp Over the next saveral
montho to accomplish our goal8 in that part of tha world. Re
aleo continua to have a gtation in Dakar Benegel Re have
liaieon there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing
with davelopmental contacta , there have been racent ingtanceg
where potential a8betb have voicad concern about our Agency' 8
ability to keep its ralationehipe clandastina To expoba our
btation thera would further hamper developmental relationehipe
and eventual rearuitmente _ (8)
4 , Wi thin tha context of our European presence , I hava the
Zollowing commentB :
Brussela Public acknowledgment Hould Eorca tha
government and liafbon aervice to pay Cloger attention to
gtation operations and- therefore pregent a threat to ongolng
jon8itive operations _ (9)
Helalnki A neutral country _ Public acknowledgment
of a CIA station would embarra8s the government and llaigon ;
thereby inhibiting the clobo and: productiva Ilaleon
relationbhipa wG now . enjoy ag well a8 prebenting a threat to
ongoing bensitiva operatione _ (8)
Pari8 No additional danage . (8)
Bonn No bpacifia danage. (S)
Berlin No specifio damage _ (8)
Luxembourg Public acknowledqmant would embarra8e the
governmant and inhibit liaiaon cooperation; thug endangering
ongoing operations . (S)
The Hague Public acknowledgment would draw question8
from tha pre88 and create poltical problems for tha
govarnment and llalgon _ Thle would endanger tha
continuation OE geneltive joint oparatione (S)
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SUBJECT : Relaabe oE JER Document8
Oslo Public acknowledgment would draw questiona Erom
tha pre8g and threaten very productiva and very benbitive
ongoing joint operation8 _ (S)
Madrid Publio acknowledgment would draw Prabe
attantion and embarra88Ing quebtione for the government and
liaibon bervica_ This would further damaga an already
dalicete liai8on relatlonship which 18 vital to 40 for
Counterterrorlbm OperatLone _ (8)
Btockholm A neutral country - Publlo acknowledgment
would ba politically embarraselng for tha governnent and
liai8on gerviceb Thie would likely endanger any
continuation Of joint oparatlone _ (s)
Geneva A neutral country_ Public acknowledgment
would create political problems for tha government and
liaieon service and forca greater attention to our
operations _ This would create an intangive
counterintelligence atmoaphere for our operatione ; likely to
caube a decreaaa In our operations (8)
London No specific damage. (S)
Ottawa 1
No bpaific damage . (8)
5 _ Our Eastern European gtatlon8 Posa a unique problem when
we congider publla expobure Pregue Station 19 racovering from
operating for almost fifty yeara in an undaclared statub During
the laat threa yeare wa have managed , with much effort , to begin
the establishment 6f good working ralatione wi th the nogt
government and internal/extornal bervicab Ag a reeult, tha
station hab recently begun gma very genaitive and high-level
bilatoral oparations _ These obvlously depend upon tha good will
Of_ tha hobt service _ The Czech citizenry Cama of age in an
atmogphere in which dietrust of intelllgence barvlceb In general ,
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and the CIA in particular, wab thoroughly ingrained, That
dietrust lingers in the public'8 mind aven today. Expogure Of
our otation 8. previously undisclobed presence and operational
activities during the Cold War will necabbarily raise quabtione
about our activities then _ and almost cortainly lead to further
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BUBJECT : Release of JEK Documentb
inquiry about our present relationship. It 18 doubtful that our
relationdhip , and certainly our very 8engitive operations could
withgtand tha regulting public debate. The exigtence of Prague
Btation_ past and prebent , cannot ba gurfaced at thlo tLma
Without gerious damage to national gecuri (S)
6 _ Public acknowledgnent of our stationb in Managua
Ban Jobe , Panama City, San Salvador _ Santo" Doningo , Buenos Alre8 ,
Lima Santlago, and Montevideo would not further demage our
operational Capabilities in a bpecific bonbe _ Overall . any
releabe Of information about a clandeatine Bervice breede
diatrubt in profesgionalism and will put future ' operatlons at
rigk _ (S)
7 We receive Bignificant national colleation ayatems
bupport from Aubtralia which a2fects national system oollectlon
efforta agalnat Tier IA target8 throughout Asia We would
jeopardize thi8 bY releaging the prebence of Our station to the
public. Tokyo 18 a special cage in that thera 10 continuing
digagreement regarding our atation_ We ahould not complicate tha
current "Bpy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo_ There have baen two
incidento regarding our presence In Jepan during the prebant
year_ Any further diacloeure would exacerbate the tension and
create an untenable operational atmogphera for our atation and
parbonnal _ (8)
8 Public acknowledgment of a Btation in India would be a
problem for the 0.8_ Government. U,S_ and India foreign
relations are alwaye delicate; the Indian Govexnment 18 very
gengitive to parceived Blights to its national boveraignty , and
public acknowledgment Of a atation would prove enbarrasging to
the Indian Government which in turn could a8k that the btation ba
cloged . If the etation were cloged Or @ignificantly downsized ,
it would affect a larga number Of important intelllgenca
collection operationg _ (8)
9 Public acknowledgment OE a 0tation In Tuni818 would be
a problem for Tunigia vis-a-vis it8 Libyan nelghbor_ Libye end
Tuni8ia ghare a border whlch meang the Tunisian Govarnment must
act with Bome prudence regarding itb relations with Libya _ The
Libyan Covernmant would almobt certainly respond very
negatively
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8UBJFCT : Raleage of JFK Documants
to a public acknowledgment of a btation in Tuniaia and night well
engage in hareeement/ 8abotagelterrorist action8 in Tunioia to
0how ite displeaeure _ If the Tunieian Government should a8k that
our btatlon ba cloged , the U.s _ covernment would 1obo a
Capability to collect on Libya , north AErican stabili and
Iblamic extremiem _ (8)
10 _ Public acknowledgmant of a station in MorOcco would be 4
problem for Morocco via-a-VIe it0 Islanic fundamentalist
populatlon_ Morocco , like 80 'many Countrioo with a majority
Muslim population,- hae a growlng Iblemla fundamentalst problem,
and Islamic fundamentalibt8 are frequantly opposed to the 0.8. in
general and the Agency In partleuler_ Public acknowledgmont OE a
atation In Morocco could caube It8 Ielanic fundanantalist
population to react negatlvely and demand that our atatlon be
cloged . If the atation wera cloged , the 0.8_ Government would
loba intelligence on the webtern Bahara confllct, north AErican
stability and Ialamic extremi8m. (5)
11- In those ingtanceb where I hava indlcated damage to
operational capabillty and national becurity, I would faal
compelled to seek a revereal OE any daaision to make a publio
acknowledgment. In thobe Cabe8 whera I Indlcato "no bpeclfic or
additional damage" I am prepared to accept your decision yet I
muat call your attantlon to the general damage done to u8 by any
digalosure of operational prebence . Our operational capabilttias
are in direct proportlon to tha confidence placed in our ability
to protact bourCe Identitias and operational methoda Diaclobura
to the public of our pregence, weakene thle confidence _ (S)
Tom+u
AA
David Cohen
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