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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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INTERVIEW WITH
SAM HALPERN
Ralph E. Weber 23 October 1987
30 October 1987
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Interview with Sam HaIpern
23 and 30 October 1987
INTERVIENER: As one looks into the background of the Congressiona/
investigations What in your mind do you see as the most important factors for
bringing about the Congressiona/ Investigations in 1975? It is an awfully
Iarge area _
MR_ HALPERN: I think if you Took into the history of the background of why
the thing started it began long before the Seymour Hersh articles_ The
Congress was planning to go into something Tike this anyway for a whole
variety of reasons I think Morton Halperin and his group on the outs ide as
we |1 as the ACLU and Tiberal Senators (particular Senators) were itching to
at this for a long time _ I am trying to think of the name of the (he is
now a
Washington Post reporter). investigative reporter (I'm trying to think of
his name but I can't) who wa$ in Government for a while, didn't Iike what he
Saw largely as a result of the_ Vietnam War _ Oh WaIter Pincus _
INTERVIEWER: Wa lter Pincus?
MR _ HALPERN: Walter Pincus had te a bit, I think . to do in the background
in organizing this whole effort And not many people realize that the title
(it is a long winded title) of the Church Committee was actually
a title that
was prepared by the staff people months before the Church committee was even
heard of or even Senator Church knew what was going on
INTERVIEWER: Is that right?
MR _ HALPERN: It will take Me some time to Iook for it but remind Me to Iook
for it. I put together some anguage on this many years ago in terms of the
inner-workings , what was going on behind the scenes among the staff people in
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the Senate to Iook into intelligence across the board, CIA was just one of
the targets , I guess one of the ma in targets but not 'the only one _ And it
was just a happy (from their point of view) a happy combination of
circumstances Seymour Hersh wa$ Iook at different things and had access
to different sources and wrote those two' stories in December of 74 , which
just dovetailed .beautifully with what they were' trying to do and brought
together what needed and what: they wanted . And that is where the. title
came from someth the 'Church group came up with the title . It wa$ the
staffers and the various other committees who had worked this out months
before _ And by the summer. and early fal1 of 74 these guys were ready to go
and when Views from the 'Church Committee 1 mpetus came there it was They had
the title _ they had the paperwork, had everything done and just
pushed it through _
INTERVIEWER: Do you feel their efforts along these Lines even pre-date the
Watergate investigation?
MR _ HALPERN: We]1 I don' t know if it pre-dates: the Watergate or not. I can't
say _ I just don t know_ I think" there were some possibilities of going in
tandem with the Watergate _ But I don't think that,the Watergate problem
itself wa $ what these guys were interested in but I wish I could identify them
better_ were targeting against intelligence as such and succeeded .
INTERVIEWER: And some of it wa$ disillusionment with the
MR HALPERN: Disi usionment with the Vietnam War No question about that_
There wa $ another guy _ The name was Paul and the reason I .say that the last
name was Paul because we in the working of the intelligence officer ; We had
a hel of a time with two Congressiona/ teams that used to go out for
Congressiona/ committees these were staffers One wa $ made up Of Pincus
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who Iater became the Washington Post guy Pincus and Paul (I am trying to
remember what the first name of Paul was) but we always regarded them Pincus
and Paul: P squared .
INTERVIEWER: That is P_A-U-L?
MR_ HALPERN: P-A-U-L, yes . And were problem chiIdren in terms of having
to advise the field; the State Department 'had a simi ar probIem advi the
Embassies on how to handle these guys and how to brief them, what to brief
them_ We weren't trying to hide anything, or kid them or Mie to them or
anything Tike that, but it was a matter of how 'you rea | ly work with these
to try to get them to understand what you are trying to do_ These guys
were always traveling around Southeast Asia, in particular_ and it wa $ mostly
during the Vietnam War problem: And the second team (we called them L&Ms )
first the L stood for Lowenstein was the L (and I';be damned if [ can
think Of what the M: was) But: I think in loking into The New York Times_ in
1973 and 1974 Iong before the Watergate thing and the Church Committee
business began , these. guys were always floating around as Congressicna /
staffers. I forget if they were the Senate Or the House but anyway they had
these two teams which were rea| problems in terms of the Executive branch of
the government having to deal with; the Congressiona/ branch of the
government _ The 'old conflict of foreign policy that Iives in the
Constitution. I think the Constitution was ` made that way , to. have the
stresses and strains that we still see today.
INTERVIEWER: Were these teams Ioking at the 'domestic?
MR _ HALPERN: No_ no _ This was all foreign_
INTERVIEWER: Oh _ a/1` foreign _
MR_ HALPERN: were a / 1 Ioking at foreign at that point. had
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nothing with the Church nonsense and MHCHAOS . It wa $ a11 in the foreign
affairs field_ And were mucking around &]1 over the place trying to
into stuff which we held as classified both we the State Department the
Defense Department_ what have you _ Including the use Of the Meo tribes in
Laos , it came out some money was involved, people were using Air America was
used , a/1 that kind of stuff These people were not representatives of the
then Intelligence Oversight Committees and with the advice of the then
Oversight Committees the four of them we had) we had to be careful as to what
we told these people from 'different committees of the Congress The four
oversight committees were jealous of their prerogatives yoU could imagine
particularly in the days when you had rea/ strong Men running the Congress and
they did not want a/1 of these other committees, in.terms of jurisdictional
fights _ mucking around in what they were supposed to be handling it. And So
somehow we were caught in the middle of the jurisdictiona/ fights in the
Congress at the same time we were hand] ing classified stuff we didn 't know how
far can go with these people _ They weren t cleared for a Iot of stuff _
So were rea/ problem chi ldren. And these two teams were the precursors
to what Iater became the Church and Pike Committees
INTERVIEWER: WeI1 were these teams attached to particular committees or
subcommittees?
MR_ HALPERN: Yes , we | 1 were representatives of particular committees . I
just can't remember what the committees' names were_
INTERVIEWER: OK , right .
MR . HALPERN: It didn't really matter to us _ were not part of the four
oversight committees .
INTERVIEWER: were not?
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MR_ HALPERN: were not .
INTERVIEWER: Ok _
MR _ HALPERN: And the oversight committees , maybe that was one of the
prob ems _ didn't do much oversight as you 1 know _ And as a ma tter of fact
I remember these reports: from DCI 5 coming back saying, "I got nobody to talk
to.up on the Kiul They won t isten . AII want to do is give Me money
and personnel And say , you know_ "Go 'do your job And so this is
true I have heard that from senior officers in the jobs I have held at staff
meetings over and over aga in . The Director came back and he doesn t
have anybody to talk to_ Nobody wants to isten_ Nobody wants to: know And
there is. Senator Stennis and SaItonsta/] and a/1_ of those others _
INTERVIEWER: And Russe11?
MR_ HALPERN: And Russel1 who sat on the floor of the Senate _ You know there
are certain things yoU have to just accept and not know about _ Or Goldwater
even today, when he wa$ cha irman of the Senate Committee said, 1i This Committee
shouIdn 't exist. So the four oversight committees never gave uS any trouble
rea/Iy except toward the end , they were very clear about one thing I think
it wa $ Russel1 who told I think Dick Helms , DCI: and you can check the
record on this one I 'm sure who told him, "this is the last year, 0 (I
forget what it was I guess it must have been '71 or something Iike
that.) This is the Iast year we are going to fund those Meo tribes for you .
It'$ getting too big. Turn it over to the military, you know "and lose it
in the Defense budget _ It Because it,got to over a
hundred milion dolars and
a/1 that kind Of stuff I guess in those days that wa $ a ittle big.
INTERVIEWER: WeI1 did you have the impression besides Pincus that Paul and
L&M were a Iso Vietnam veterans Or _
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MR . HALPERN: don t know if were Vietnam veterans as such _ I think
they did not Tike what wa $ going on in Southeast Asia _ And the so-called
Secret War wasn t a secret in Laos It wasn't a secret war for God ' s
sakes _ How could it be secret if the press was Wri- about it?
INTERVIEW: Sure _
MR _ HALPERN: It wa$ the press that gave it the name Secret War _ The Senators
and the Representatives knew what the hel1 they were appropriating. L
mean, at Ieast the committee members did when they down money into the
budget _ and a/ 1 the budgets and a11 that- money was cleared by Congress_ The
CIA doesn t print its Own money for God ' $ sakes _ Somebody had to appropriate
the money , and it was there _ And as a matter of fact it wa $ (what the heck is-
his name) Sa /tonstal1 , I think.
INTERVIEWER: Symington?
MR_ HALPERN: Symington _ I'm sorry_ Symington was the guy who Iater Dick
He Ims in trouble in '73 in front of the Church Multinatioa/ Corporation
Subcommittee of the Foreign 'Affairs Commi ttee and not his own committee It
was Symington _ Christ, he reviewed the troops out in Laos _ Bob Jantzen who
wa $ then Chief of Station, Bangkok _ arranged for (I forget who the heck was
Chfef in Laos and Vietnam) but anyway , he went up to the Meo tribes and
reviewed them and then he goes , "[ never heard of things Tike this_ 11 What are
you going to do with them when they do when' they do that? So, but that is
much later _ I mean , earlier than the Church Committee itself the one we a11
know about _ But this was a/ 1 background - in terms.of I think, it was the
Vietnam war basically that got people upset_ the probIem of the war
INTERVIEWER: Did you aIso have the feel ing that there was a different
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attitude that threat of the Soviet Union wasn't as great. Not necessarily
seen that way in the Agency but outside the Agency?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh _ By- that time people were Iooking at Vietnam weren' t
looking at the Soviets _ There is no question . I am talking 73, '74. There
was no questio about that. The spirit of Detente may have something to do
with that_ The spirit of Glassboro, do you remember Glassboro, NJ?
INTERVIEWER: Sure _ yes .
MR . HALPERN: Johnson , which began even before Henry and Nixon and what have
YOU _ But I think that a/1 , I think, was totally overshadowed by Vietnam_ I
think that wa $ one of the big problems _ the Vietnam War
INTERVIEWER: And you saw this not oly in the public 'but a Iso in the Congress_
MR _ HALPERN: Uh huh_ No question_ No question _ I don 't think Congress ever
really understood
L
we 11 , T know never understood what Jim Angleton was
talking about on counterintell igence _ HeI1 for that matter very few people
in the Agency I think really understood that One _ And I didn t have any
appreciation of it either until I got into the job as the- Exec for the DDP
Because unless you see an overa] 1 world picture it is hard to imagine this big
thing happening around yoU when you are worrying in one ittle area _ But
anyway , I
honestly think it wa $ Vietnam that upset the apple cart. Watergate
just added to it.
INTERVIEWER: Just added to it_
MR_ HALPERN: The frosting on the cake I suppose or the `whip cream on the
banana split_ Whatever you want to cal] it. But I think with Vietnam that
hurt most of a/1 .
INTERVIEWER: So even if Watergate hadn t occurred, it wa$ moving toward
investigation _
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MR _ HALPERN: It wou Id have been . No question_ No question _ Because if I
remember it correctly, the P&P and L&M teams were concentrating on Southeast
Asia and loking into what the US Government as a whole wa $ doing, not: just
CIA but they didn t Iike anything that was going on in that area and I think
that is what began gnawing away at the thing and broke it apart_
INTERVIEWER: OK_
MR_ HALPERN: You know in terms of an operation these guys did a magni ficent
job in terms of their objectives _ in effect_ were able to the
whole machinery of government and wreck the inteligence system in the entire
community , not just CIA: And it is going to take of couple of generations to
rebui Id it. If we ever can You can't go home again_ That is for sure _ But
to rebui Id what we had at one time is going to take at east a couple of
generations . Hel _ it took uS 25-30 years , that' s a whole generation to
the thing organized and then it came apart. It rea / Iy came apart. And a Iot
of this_ because of the Vietnam_ also had an effect not just inside the
government but it had the effect of the recruits you got _ Even as early Or
Iate _ whichever way you 'want to Iook at it, from about 1970 on _ we had been in
the war in Vietnam for five years by then _ The recruits _ the new people
coming in, who passed a/ 1 the tests and what have you _ and been through the
first training courses and what have yoU _ and they were on their first
assignments from the desks Or some of them even going overseas for instance _
The ones that I saw, and I made it my practice sitting in the DDP ' s office as
the Exec , to talk to' as many young officers as I could . Always had an
excuse: a cable who was coming up for release by the DDP or going up to the
DCI coming through the channels , I always wa $ able to ca/ ] the guy who wrote
the thing. I didn't care about the guy who coordinated , I wa$ interested in
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who wrote it_ And to talk to them. If you have to stop Iet me know _
INTERVIEWER: we are . fine, keep gojng.
MR HALPERN: Anyway , I to talk to these fellows and women to see what
made them tick and it was a very difficult job listening to them many times
when they had a11 these bright ideas about intelligence how you couId do thjs
and how you could do that_ And I had to bite my tongue and say , "Wel1_ wait a
minute _ You know_ we tried that 25 years ago Or 20 years ago and it didn't
work _ 1i And you couIdn t just dampen their spirits by pouring cold water every
time would come up with an idea , and somehow you had to to get
them interested enough to Iook into the history of what happened and how you
did this and how you couldn t do this and how _ why certain things would seem:
beautiful when you dream them up and write them down on a piece of paper _ In
the rea1 world it just don t work_ And we learned the hard way _ A11 of US _
Trial and error But you hope that the next group coming up didn t have to go
through that same torture if they would Iook at the record. And my concern
was that very few people were borrowing stuff out of the regi few
people were interested in going back into the history of what took place and
certain activities . And you can't get it a/1 out of a classroom
INTERVIEWER: Right _
MR_ HALPERN: And this wa $ one Of the things that bothered
Me while I was in
that job for those Iast few years is that: how do you on the experiences
so that people understand and learn without feel that are being pushed
down without feeling that they are being squashed? Because you want
initiative . Half the bus iness in deal ing with human beings is initiative and
I don 't know enough about the technical side but I know enough about the human
side _ But you have to stop them. Why spin wheels? Why push a Iot of paper
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through if they're going to be di sapproved .anyway? And keep them
interested enough . And that S a tough job _
INTERVIEWER: And were these recruits_ say, 70 ' s were much different
from those that you wou Id have had In the 60 ' s ?
MR . HALPERN: Yes _ the early 60 ' s .
INTERVIEWER: The early 60 ' s ?
MR_ HALPERN: Before the Vietnam war A Iot of people were coming and I
blame the educational system for this_ in terms of the teachers had _ And
I discovered this to my horror as I mentioned earlier about the Colorado
business the teachers there were worse than the students _ Facts don t mean
anything to them_ For example in Colorado it seemed to be _ it wa $ perfectly
a/1 right for the students and the faculty to use the Church Committee
documents to prove one of their points about how bad CIA was or how: bad DIA
was or what have you _ But when I tried to use the same documents quoting
different pages , that was wrong . I wasn 't a / lowed to do that "That' S just
junk . That doesn't mean anything. And I looked at them and I said, "I
thought I wa$ at a university where you are supposed to be able to argue from
text. it was, a/1 right for 'them to do it but not a 11 right for Me to do
it.
INTERVIEWER: It fit-in their pattern _
MR _ HALPERN: Yea _ and So, you know_ what do you do?
INTERVIEWER: Were these recruits coming in in the early 70' $ and So . On
MR_ HALPERN: The early 70' s _
INTERVIEWER: Are more questioning, are they
MR_ HALPERN: No, that wa$ one of the things that bothered me One of the
things that struck me both ma le and fema when came in most of them,
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when we into discussios about operations or what have you, they seemed to
be more concerned about, When they were going to become a division chief _ a
station chief _ and when were going to become DDP and then eventually ,
'0t do I get to be DCI?" And finally after a /1 of that is over "What about
my pension rights?"
INTERVIEWER: That' $ already coming?
MR_ HALPERN: Yea , in' the very beginning in '71 _ 72_ 73 _ and at Ieast 70 ,
71 and 72 when I was more concerned about talking to them because by 73 we
were having difficulties with the Schlesinger turnover and what have you . But
this was one of the things that struck Me very strong, and I was bothered by
it, and these were the best of the appl icants . had already been through
a /1 of the machinery and a/1 the screening processes and what have you and
these were the shining stars from the academe and I was concerned about
that_ But again, what do you do?
INTERVIEWER: Were others troubled as we:] 1?
MR _ HALPERN: Yea _ some of my co] leagues were . picked it up the same way
I did except on a different Ievel _ were doing it in the branches Or in
the staffs most in' the branches , Or in the area units and I wa $ loking from
across the board . But it wa$ the same idea _ We used to kick this around at
Iunch . How do you get instiled into the new group , the upcoming generation,
the guys who are going to take over from uS that there is more to this
business than worrying about your pension? I tried. to tell some of them, Iook
some of uS are going to be in this business their whole career and never see
the DCI ' s office let alone be the DCI _ And So I said, "In 111 organizations
not everybody can be the field marshal1 _ Some of them have to be privates and
stay as privates our whole career _ I And that didn't go down at al1.
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INTERVIEWER: It didn't go down?
MR_ KALPERN: No way . No way You know it was frightening then and I guess
it is even more frightening now I don" t know what the situation js now but
its a bad show . I don ' t know _ Maybe we were: brought up in a totally
different generation_ I don t know different backgrounds I 'don t know
whether it was, things Tike the Depression or World War II or what_ but we a11
had a different
~te we a/1 wanted to promotions; sure _ we a]1 wanted more
money; sure , we a/1 wanted honors and titles and God knows what else and
meda I s but_
INTERVIEWER: I wondered the same thing.
MR _ HALPERN: You didn't sort: of aim what the heH1 you were doing. if I
do this right I'M1 get a meda 1 . Or again, you may have thought maybe a
couple of these good things I do I'11 get a promotion or some thing Tike that_
Yea, but that 5 norma | But you didn't do it for the purpose of the
promotion _ And here these people are talking to Me about: how do I get to
this and how do I get to that. I guess it' s, called career planning or
something _ I have been through a lot of that_ by the way , on career planning
from a personne] point of view, trying to chart out people' $ Whole careers ,
and I thought that was for the birds _ How do you sit there and say in 25
years from now he is going to be in X, Y, and 2 Maybe you can 'do it.
INTERVIEWER: That Will come in with Schlesinger?
MR _ HALPERN: That came in with Bi/l Colby _ Management by Objective and a]1
Of: that kind of nonsense _
INTERVIEWER: I've some questions on that coming up _
MR _ HALPERN: But I remember specifically, and you had better cut and paste
this tape I think, but I remember for example, when Colby' s Management by
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Objective started coming out , one of the articles that was given to US
written by a Britisher I bel ieve had a whole series of things things not
to do if you are going to go into Management by Objective And we a11 Iooked
at this thing we I mean , a/1 of My colleagues every single one Of these
points , things not to do before you go. into Management by Objective , we had
already done So how can we go into this thing? We went into it anyway.
INTERVIEWER: Damn the torpedoes _
MR_ HALPERN: Oh yea _ It was great stuff _
INTERVIEWER: And wa $ their a feeling again when you talk' about these new ,
these young officers coming on in the early 70' s
CS was there stinl a feel
of family Or is that a term that realy.
MR_ HALPERN: Yes , that is a good old term_ "Band Of Brothers" i5 a better
term. We realy felt, a/1 of us did, we were a Band of Brothers_ Oh sure
we had arguments and fights and a/1 of that kind of stuff competition on who
was going to what job _ who was gonna be chief Of station or who was gonna
do this, but we stim felt ourselves a band of brothers . I Iike that term
better than fami ly_ Maybe ,other people use family but we were different. We
were guys . who had gone through the war and had started from scratch, building
an organization and building a concept which was 'ma inly an intelligence
service _ And particularly us in the Clandestine Service, Iong before we
into this covert action nonsense but anyway we were interested in how you
collect intelligence using human sources and with technical support but
anyway , we were building a service _ We thought we were _ An important one_
And even though it oly produces a very sma/ / percentage 'of the total take of
the US Government we thought it wa $ an important take _ It was never going to
ma tch something Tike Ultra or this overhead reconna issance _ You couIdn't
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possibly_ But we were zeroing in what we ca/led the hard targets and the
intentions and plans more than anything else_ And as that kind of a group we
were a/1 "We came up the hard way" kind of thing_ And we felt closer
together as a result of that_
INTERVIEWER: And did the Band of Brothers include everyone i the Agency Or_
wa $ it
MR . HALPERN: it was just the Clandestine Services.
INTERVIEWER: Just the Clandestine Services .
MR_ HALPERN: And as a matter of fact a Iot of us in the Clandestine Services_
[ wasn t one of them, a Iot of uS felt that we should not be part: f CIA _ We
should be separate. Totally separate and not be involved with anybody else _
And that wa $ one of the fights that went on for a Iong time between the DDI
and the DDP in that most of the DDI people felt (and the brass
particularly. felt) that the ODP should be an adjunct of the DDI responding
only to DDI requests for informatio and in effect be the DDI S ibrary and
research staff _ You know, find out if the bridge is Stim standing between
"x" and "y" in the middle of Uganda Or something Iike that. And we felt
differently. The . DDI felt that were the nationa/ intelligence analyst
group and we felt that we were the nationa / intelligence collector S group
human sources _
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR _ HALPERN: And drew big arguments on that_ Big fights . And DDI always
felt that we (DDP) should disseminate intelligence that we collect only to the
DDI would decide who else was going to get the information _ We thought
that was a farce _ We were everybody' $ collector from the President on down
and it was up to the President to tell us who else to give the information
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to_ And sometimes did, Tike the Cuban missi le crisis_ And the President
stopped the distribution a11 across_ Completely.
INTERVIEWER: Was there any feel ing you talked about the Band of Brothers
in Clandestine Service wa $ there any similar feeling in the DDI ?
MR_ HALPERN: I don t know. You 'd have to ask somebody there that could tel
you _ Because I am in effect the Johnny-come-ately to the DDP because J
started out in OSS and R&A _ and then moved from R&A over into the SSU _ the SI
s ide the Secret Intelligence side _ And I know when I was in R&A our
feel ing then wa $ we were part of OSS , the whole thing, and even though the SI
people didn't always tel uS what they were doing, we found out Iater that we
shou Idn' t know_ At Ieast I found out Iater _ There wa $ a good reason why we
shou Idn t know_ We could work with them and we worked we| 1 with them in
terms of providing intelligence support for their operations in the field in
Southeast Asia, which wa$ my beat , and we would sit and work with the officers
who were going out (not the agents) but the officers going out to do the job ,
and when I was in Ceylon (again R&A) we worked very closely together with them
In terms of planned operations against various parts of Japanese held
territory. And we wrote a/1 kinds Of papers for them and pul ed together a/1
kinds of stuff and the question was in those we felt more Tike we were
a11 part of OSS and OSS was a brand new thing. At Ieast that is the attitude
1 felt from talking to my friends about it, even as a part of R&A . But Tater
when it became a bigger outfit (a peacetime outfit) it was more 4 we ]1 , we
were part Of CIA in DDP but we felt For and sufficient reasons that it
would be better if we could- work out some decent cover So we d be on the
outside totally devoid and divorced from the government _ I don t know _ the
number of times we had study groups planning on how to do this, to have a rea/
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clandestine outfit working outside the government_ with proper communications
obviousIy and clearances and what have YOU . We talked about Colorado before
in one of the papers go out to Colorado somewhere . You know_ way out in
nowhere _ This was in the 40' s
Lee
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of the country and hooked up by telephone Or wire or what have you
before a/1 of this computer nonsense - Or even buried in New York City,
Wa]1 Street, or one of those huge monstrosities that existed even then as a
vate company somewhere _ And do actua] company business be a rea |
business , but also run your operation. WeI1 _ this has been tried so many
times in terms of study groups and nothing has ever come of it. Nothing.
INTERVIEWER: Didn t even come close .
MR _ HALPERN: No _ You couldn' t people willing to provide you the money ,
the ma terial work out a]1 of the Iega/ aspects and it wa S really a hel1 of a
job when you consider you have the salaries and socjal security: and workman' S
compensation and how do you work out decent pens ions for people and mak ing a
career out of it and a11 that kind of stuff _ You could do it for a few (as we
have . done over the past years) _ We used to do anyway _ We 'd have decent
proprietaries _ We 'd run our Own insurance companies and a / 1 that kind of
stuff and provide Tifetime pensions for' people and work on a system that wou d
work . But you could do it for a few and we did . I don t know what they are
doing today, and I am not interested in knowing_ But to do it for a ma s$ , it
would be tough
C
very, very, very tough_ So when you talk about brothers or
family, as we got bigger the DDP_DDI was Very evident and_ as a matter
of fact, at one time = be Ifeve it or not, in the very early days DDP case
officers on the desks were not even a / lowed to talk to DDI analysts because we
thought, in those days , We thought the DDI analyst would be able to convince
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the clandestine operator enough so that pretty soon the clandestine operator
was captive of the analyst and would be doing his research for him. And we
had plenty of ca] Is from DDI analysts which in effect, the answers were in the
Library Of Congress, for God S sake go get them. We are not going down there
and them for yOuU and we are not going .to burden the field people with
going to get those kind of figures for you _ are right there _ Go get
them.` And we had Iots of fights about that_ Oh :yea _
INTERVIEWER: I suppose there must have been a lot of tension?
MR_ KALPERN: There was _ There was _ Because we kept saying the DDI analyst
was supposed to do thejr Own research; do own job _ And I sa id in the
first place _ and I remember I into some arguments with some of them, and I
am sure my col Ieagues did too, that collecting intelligence via a clandestine
mechanism is the most expensive, time-consuming way of col lecting a piece of
information _ You have to have Iong' Iead time you don t have a whole bunch of
agents in various departments of foreign governments so that you can just
press buttons and get answers out of them_ And it takes time to identify what
you are Iok for And our job is a selected job and you have to go for the
hard targets . I am not interested in finding out the rai Iway statistics for
you or the tonnage of wheat that goes through ports , for God " 5 sakes _ We can
get that from the Department of Agriculture
or Commerce r some thing. This is
a very, expensive way to do business_ This is why we had to set up
actually a requirements staff which screened requirements so that we wou Idn t
floded with this nonsensical stuff that shouId be done by somebody in the
US Government don 't get me- wrong, but not the Clandestine Service _ The
collector has got to be so fine-tuned that it is oly after you ve tried
everything else that you go for this particular thing. And don t expect the
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answer tomorrow morning. So we had a whole mechanism just in the screening
process _ As a result the orders went out _ "Don ' t talk to each other. We ]1
over a number of Years we finalIy broke that down which I thought we should
have _
INTERVIEWER: When would ou say what point of time wa $ it pretty we/1 broken
down?
MR . HALPERN: It began. to be broken:' down let me give you two examples . One
in. 1957 and 58 when I was involved as the Exec then for Far East Division of
the DDP _ We were involved in an operation in Indonesia with the Colonel from
Sumatra and Iater the Colone] from Celebes . I told my .boss I was going to do
this and he said fine _ I personaIIy knew from the war from the OSS
the analyst 'in the DDI_ and I think it was OCI who was on the Indonesian
desk . And I kept her very we11 clued o important developments in the
operation as it was going along so that she wou Idn t be caught short by things
and would be able to watch what went into the President' $ Daily Brief and went
into the daily stuff and I mean 1t worked fine _ But that wa $ on a one-to-one
basis _ And how much she told the DDDI persona] Iy, that wa $ up to her _ I
wasn't going to tell her how to run the show. But it never wa $ on a DDP_DDI
basis, you see , the two together and sa id, "Here S the operation_ t6 No
way - The second time we were breaking it even more wa $ after the Cuban
Missile Crisis. After the Cuban Missi le Crisis . 1963 now we have moved
about five or six years _
INTERVIENER: Right .
MR _ HALPERN: Des Fitzgerald was transferred from Chief of the Far East
Division to take over from Bill Harvey on the Cuban operation _ Under Bil1 it
was ca/Ied TFW (Task Force W) and . under Des Fitzgerald it was ca/ led: Special
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Affairs Staff This was after Operation Mongoose and Des had an uneasy
feel ing that the intelligence we were collecting on Cuba was just not being
accepted by the analysts_ And it wasn't. We I 1 it wasn't a picture and it
wasn t COMINT _ The analyst only believed pictures and: COMINT _ And maybe
today they bel ieve te leme or something, I don 't Know _ maybe if it' s not a
picture it is something else _ Anyhow _ if it wasn't technical in one way or
another_ Cuban sources , the he]1 with them. And they were Just being washed
out - And Des took it upon himself (and he was the kind of guy who would do
these things without getting approval or clearances) . He . decided he would ask
the DDI to send a senior Officer down to (I say down because we were in the
basement of the bui lding) to come to us on SAS_ and De s would make avai lable
to this one man (a very senior guy I don t remember who; my memory has gone
bad) wouId make avaj lable true identities of a/] sources= and that created
he] 1 within the DDP because _ obviously, it went up and down the Iine and
Des co] Ieagues (as division staff chiefs) thought he was crazy, and it wa$
just a really big battle roya] on this thing, but Des bejng Des said, "The
he]1 with it, I'm going to do it. They're my sources I'm responsible, it' s
my operation , and goddamnit you have to give credit where it is due Dick
HeIms supported him against the argumentation by a /1 the other senior
officers. Nobody else wanted to go along with this.
INTERVIEWER: Is that right?
MR_ HALPERN: So this guy came down and he sat for weeks _ [ don t know
and he had access _ believe it or not - I thought he was crazy _ I thought Des
had lost his marbles . The one thing you protect is sources. AHen Dulles is
supposed to have said_ he would even Tie to the President if necessary to
protect a source And that was sacrosanct . You don't telT anybody your
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sources , for God 5 sakes . You don " t even tel1 the guy who' s sitting and
working next to you who your source is _ But anyway this was done and after (I
wish I could remember his name ) anyway , after this feHow had gone through
a/1 this nonsense and a/1 the information_ he came up with a report that
simply, in effect, said to the DDI people involved , "You don t know what you
are missing. These are honest bona fide sources by and Iarge and, he said_
"[ think yoU are crazy for not using them. So from that point of view it
starts to break down _ The animosity , the differences of approach on how you
work this thing, and it was a good thing from that point of view, and I must
say not one Of our sources wa $ ever revealed by this man . He kept it, you
know integrity
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR_ HALPERN: And he became one Of us in effect_ Ok _ he knew the sources _
He knew more than I did and I was the Exec . I never asked for sources _ But
Des also had another thing a5' part of this program_ Des started to expand
what is called the source description on the disseminations We used to have_
just a one Tiner or some thing Mike that, the guy had access on it_ And we
ended up by wri- a short paragraph about the source _ without identifying
the source _ which in effect gave the reader some idea of the source S
reliability, his access to this particular type of information how Iong he
had been around with uS , and , in effect, we re telling you this is good , bad
or indifferent_
INTERVIEWER: were a tested source
MR_ HALPERN: Yes . And without going into that numbering system or the
grading system which is hard to work with. And this wa$ a departure _ And
this wa $ a test again. And On the' task force we. began that before it
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became DDP_wide and the DDP hierarchy was opposed to that too_ Because if you
work with us long, enough and you don t change these by-] ines often enough _
somebody can sit and pretty much zero in on who the source is _ And it.is a
hel 1 of a Iot of extra work. Be I ieve me a he/1 of a Iot of extra work_ But
Des insisted. Again being Des , and then when he became DDP = he that
system in effect throughout the DDP _ And unfortunately he wa $ in the DDP
a short perio before he died in July of 67 _ So when you re talking about
the time frame of breakdown it began in 63 . Des took that system into WH
when he became the Division Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, as it' s
called now LA And then he took it into the DDP when he became DDP in 65 .
INTERVIEWER: My goodness_
MR _ HALPERN: And he rema ined there until 1967 _
INTERVIEWER: Gee . That S good background .
MR_ HALPERN: So best when you are talking about breakdown of the dispute _ or
the fight between the two, there were very valid reasons for both sides to
ma intain the position that they had at the time I can see their side_
Having been from RBA , I can understand what their problem was, Iike I
understand our prob Iem on the collecting side _ And So, but gradua y, I don ' t
know what the system is and how it works but anyway we began to break
it down _ but it took_ we | 1 it began in 47 and took unti] 67 _ 20 years .
What you ve got 1s' two different worIds_ And this is one of the reasons I
tell journal ists who talk to Me we re both in the same business _
are collecting information_ and you want to protect sources _ That' s what we
are doing. You do it' to a Pulitzer Prize and we do it to protect the
United States.
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It took a/1 this time because of the very firm tions held by both sides _
It took a/1 this time to get a better approach a more reasoned approach _ to
talk to each other _ and both sides stim ma intained their respective jobs
INTERVIEWER: And Des was a figure .
MR_ HALPERN: Des wa s a very figure in this and he wa $ doing this mostly
on his own _ He had a hel` of a Iot of opposition_ And , as I say , even his
closest allies, and I was his Exec, and I thought he wa $ crazy. And I told
him SO. I sa id you know you are giving away the store _
INTERVIEWER: And Helms backed him?
MR _ HALPERN: Finally- It took a Iot of doing, but Helms backed him. He Ims
said , "A11 right_ Iet Des try as an experiment _ He 11 be the guinea pig.
Let' s see what happens . 01 And [ must say if the DDI man who was chosen (it was
a very senior _ goddammit) , he 'd been around a time and had a marvelous
reputation. And a man Of integrity and a/1 of that and he proved it_
But if he had broken, if he had s] ipped even just telling the DDI himself the
identities of some of the sources _ the thing would have fallen right flat on
its face _ But s imply because of this one individual being who he wa $ in terms
of an honest man knew what the job was he knew what had to be done and he
kept it a11 to himself .
INTERVIEWER: Great.
MR. HALPERN: He knew more about our sources when he was finished with the job
than Des did _
INTERVIEWER: Is that right?
MR _ HALPERN: WeI1_ Des didn't know what the sources were _ He knew them by.
cryptonyms You know, "Radiator yea he is the guy from the army . You
know_ Or "Lamb , he ' s the guy that gives the stuff on the Mig-22 Or 21 _
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know that's a/1 you needed to know_ But this guy knew who the sources were _
He: knew them by name rank and serial number And it was an unbelievable
thing that wa S done _
INTERVIEWER: And no Ieaks _
MR. HALPERN: Not a bit. That was the most important thing. And I guess he
knew what he was up to and he knew what the consequences of Ieak ing were _ The
experiment would have dropped dead in its tracks and nobody would have ever
tried it agajn _ Ever _ So it worked . But that' $ what finally broke it.
as I say , you: were up to 65 , 66 , 6.7 when Des wa $ DDP _
INTERVIEWER: Earlier we were just touching o Congressional committees
and there are some critics who say the Congressioa1 committees overseeing the
Agency before 1975 were "blind and toothless watchdogs; that members of
{ Congress were unaware or unconcerned about Agency excesses _ What are your
views with regard to Congressiona/ oversight of the Agency?
MR _ HALPERN: WeI1 in those days the four committees were not blind_ were not
toothless and were not whatever the other phrase you had there _ The four
groups were- largely controled by senior members Of Congress who rea y ran
the Congress in those days_ And their concern was: a) not themselves
getting to know too. much of the secrets that went on; and b) felt
argely , you pick people; you give them a job to do, you give them the
tools to do it and don t muck around with them. Particularly, in this
particular field. Maybe it was ignorance _ [ don t know _ But that wa$ the
genera1 attitude As I say and as I have said before , I have had enough
reports from my bosses _ The DCI was dying to talk substance with some Of
these Ieaders on the Hil), and they did not want to listen And that, I
think_ was wrong _ Maybe could have helped . Maybe it would have been
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different_ I don t know But they weren 't blind and weren t toothless _
were deliberate on that part. And they didn't deliberately blind-
themselves . They were taken in a Tittle , I think, sometimes when we used to
show: them al1 kinds of little goodies and fancy gidgets and gadgets and secret
devices and what have you , just Iike show and tel And I used to have to
prepare some of these things or the stuff from the agent or from rest of
the DDP for the goodies and we: ca] led them good 1es to show the Hil.
We11 weren t always interested in seeing even those things _
INTERVIEWER: Is that right?
MR _ HALPERN: We11 know you re doing a good job _ Go _ Go_ Go _
INTERVIEWER: These goodies might. be radios or
MR _ HALPERN: Could be radios , could be concea Iment devices _ secret writing
devices
L
a/1 kinds of gadgets With different kinds of bugs in them. And
obviously they sma | Ier _ and sma / Ier and sma / Ier and sma I er they
more and more. heisted into loking: at them, but it als0 meant goodies in terms
Of intelligence we picked up . I differ completely with Admiral Turner
who said that the years he was a DCI he never saw a piece of intelligence that
wa $ worth the life of anybody _ I. differ with him about that. There was some
intelligence which I think was worth more than the Life of a person . I can
give you an example" of that Iater _ But . the committees , I think, deliberately
didn't want to' get involved . weren' t Tined up or held us for fools . I
don ' t think they were fooled a bit. They knew what they were doing.
wanted it that way _ And .they kept it that way _ And even in the staffs in
those days of those committee people were Iimited staffs who were cleared for
a/1 this kind Of stuff and they: Were not interested in jogging, or pushing,
or 'goading their bosses into unnecessary mucking around Of what the hell was
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going on just weren ' t. Usua /y the staff directors of each f the
sma / 1 units were the only ones cleared for most of things and sat in on the
meetings
INTERVIEWER: They were cleared by the Agency?
MR_ HALPERN: Oh sure _
INTERVIEWER: went through the whole , the background .
MR_ HALPERN: I don t know if weren t given polygraphs _ That' s
for sure _ At Ieast I don ' t think So _ How they did the clearances I never
asked . But anyway , they were cleared . So that_ peop le say were taken
into camp. I don ' t think that is the proper phrase _ My own feeling is there
was a .different attitude weren' t out to do investigative reporting, in
effect for themselves_ They weren t Ioking for titles, they weren t Iook
for televisio headl ines _ They were just trying to do an honest day- s work,
quietly, peacefully and enough informatjon. to know about the budget then
they a/1 the budgetary informatio they wanted , a/1 the budgets went
through them without an exception. No question about that _ they knew exactly
where every penny wa$ and approved it and. what have you and a/1 these
so-called covert operations were always cleared with the proper committee _
The committees had to alert the OMB in those days _ the BOB really, the Bureau
of the Budget . The BOB wou Idn't release' money for some of our activities
until they the word from the committees on the Hil]
INTERVIEWER: Is that right?
MR_ HALPERN: Yes the four committees So we didn't have a full of money
that we could just wily nily use _
INTERVIEWER: Did you: have a contingency fund? Modest_
MR _ HALPERN: WeI1 the contingency fund was up on the Hi])_ I mean, it was
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control led by the Hiul_ And it is today , I believe _ But before you money
released by the BOB , somebody up there had to say OK _ And that happened on
every one Of the operations I know about. In the Far East, I don t know 'about
the European ones, I am sure the system is the same It was a welI-0j led
machine _ Sure_ didn't ask the kind of questions that are asked today,
but they knew what the operation was
INTERVIEWER: There wa$ a feel ing between the Agency and: the Congress that
there was iaison?
MR. HALPERN: Oh yes _ It was overt Completely. Always _ It worked very
we.l 1 indeed . And the system worked so that the Legislative Counsel whether
it was Pforzheimer or John Warner or anybody else, they knew who to ca]1
within the DDP_ for example_ If they were sitting up on the Himl and one of
the members could be a Senator or Representative Of the committees
wanted to know something, they knew who to call; and when I had the job they
usua lly called me for the DDP because I was able to get them the answer and it
worked very wel 1 In case someone didn t know everything, knew where to
get the information _ And when Congress asked you gave it to them_
INTERVIEWER: Do you think this was aIso a reflection of the view that the
Agency and the Congress both saw the Soviet threat as a rea1 threat?
MR_ HALPERN: I am not sure that was part of it. It my have been . But
that' s a
conjecture
on my I think it was more the people we were
deal ing with on the Hil] had: also been through the same things most of us had
been through . are a/1 part of the same generation _ We: were a/1 working
together in terms of protecting the country_ At Ieast we thought we were
protecting the country- The business where some Of this falls down is when we
started , because we had start working operatios more in the United States
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in order to assets to go abroad_ and once you start that yoU re touching
a
very sensitive area.and we a/1 knew that_ And we ' 11 talk about that Iater .
We 11 talk about MHCHAOS .
INTERVIEWER: Yes _
MR _ HALPERN: But until then the consensus wa you know_ we ve got to have a
united front_ we ve got to find out what' s going on in the world , we re
getting more involved in the world, and we a/1 need to help each other And I
don' t think yeah, the Soviet threat wa $ there but it wa S different, T
think_ it was a different
3~ I mean , we weren ' t expecting the Soviets to march
over the border except very early in the Iate
C e
right after the war in the
40 ' s when you had the Berlin blockade and that kind of stuff_ Yeah at that
time people were expecting the Soviet troops to come marching not oly into
Bonn but &lso into Paris _ But that didn't Iast into the 50' s _ It was
a
totally, sure there was a Soviet threat abroad and Iater a Chinese Communist
threat in Southeast Asia, no question of that _ And there wa$ a matter of _ I
guess when Dean Rusk said years later in the 60' s , something about ,
there is a_ dirty war going on in the alleys of the worId in which we don ' t
see , but he said it's important and , yeah , we were there _
INTERVIEWER: Was there much more cooperation?
MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah , it wa$ total _ What broke it down was the Vietnam war
aga in and I guess Watergate _ When: '74 came around I mean the Congressiona 1
elections of '74 came and ` you had a totaly different bunch of guys coming
in, and Congress became 435 on one s ide and 100_ on another side _ Totally
independent kingdoms and principalities _ And you had no cohesion and no
control I think that S when it a/l broke _ You couIdn't go to two Or three
guys on the Congressiona / Him and say , "Here are the facts , this is what we
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think we ought to do about it_ If you .agree_ fine; if you don t agree, fine _
Tel1 uS 1i But these guys could sit up there and could say ,
can commit the Congress . As a cohesive unit, they could those votes when
they needed them_ And if somebody , some freshman Congressman said, I
want to know about this. "We ' 11 tel1 you Iater buddy _ you can t vote _ 10 And
it worked. Today , there is no way you could do it_ We haven't been able to
do it since the Congressiona/ election of 74 . But coming back to what I said
ear] ier though , those guys who were working in the commi ttees in advance of
what: Iater became the Church Commi ttee on Intelligence, were with the old
crowd but they were beginning to break apart then and were working within
the framework, and. what helped them,. obviously, was a totaly new Congress in
75 . And a/1 hel1 broke loose _
INTERVIEWER: yes , and it still.
MR HALPERN: And it sti)l hasn't been back together _ Even Tip 0' Nei11
couldn t control' it. In a/1 what_ he had 30 years 'up there or more . and he
couIdn t control it. And until you get I'm not even talking consensus
now but until you get back to some kind of a better hold on a Congress So
that you don t have' these independent kingdoms and ' fiefdoms and they work
together more as a cohesive unit on various activity
Sa
talk about' special
interest groups that' s where they need them up there _ have to get
together_ I don t care whether it's a special interest group on social
security and on medicare and on inteHigence and on something else and on
something else but you've got to have better control
INTERVIEWER: It' s rea] y Fragmented
MR_ HALPERN: It's very fragmented. You can t run a government that way -
Impossible _ You don't know who to talk to_ And even with the Intelligence
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Committee = I remember for example , Senator Huddleston who was on the Church
Commi tttee and Iater wa $ on the Intelligence Committee _ During "the days of
the Church Committee he wa $ talking about, "You can't just have CIA Or the
intelligence people talk to a couple of people up on the Himl and that' s it.
You ve got to talk to everybody _ After he 'd been on the Inte] Iigence
Committee for 2 whi Je, and I've his clippings somewhere in my stack of
clippings_ Huddleston said, Ii The Congress the members of Congress" he was
addressing his own buddies 1( the members Of Congress have to accept us on
the Intelligence Committee as your surrogates _ And that is a/ 1 we were
trying to do_ In_ an intelligence community to have an intelligence committee
be the surrogate
L
and there was four of them be the surrogate for the
whole Congress . But Huddletson when he was on the Church committee said , "You
can t do that_ you can t do that. We a]1 have to know_ Wel1, he found out
persona ly _
INTERVIEWER; He finally changed .
MR_ HALPERN: He 'changed his mind
INTERVIEWER: That S neat.
MR _ HALPERN: So you know _ that' s a/ 1 were saying And it 'finally, it
took him a Iong while to 'get around to it, but he finally did it.
INTERVIEWER: Some get educated faster than others _
MR . HALPERN: That' s right. So when you talk about. The '74 break, I
think wa $ a big thing, a big' thing_ And I think if the election of Congress
in 74 had gone a ittle bit differently, and there hadn t been that total
break and disorder up on the Hil), the disarray I ca/1 it, which a// began
with the Vietnam: business and aided by the Watergate
INTERVIEWER: And Nixon resigning in 74 .
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MR . HALPERN: Yeah he did in '74 . He was pardoned in, what, August of 74_
But I think if the election had gone di fferently , and there had been some
control under the Congress more cohes ion the Church Committee and Pike
Commi ttee might have been prepared a Tittle better . [ don t know . I'm just
guessing_ Obv iously we can't rewrite history.
INTERVIEWER: No reruns _
MR _ HALPERN: No 'reruns, no reruns None at a/1.
INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about some indications that younger Agency officers
were. troubled by certain domestic practices such as ma j 1 openings in the years
before 1974 .
MR. HALPERN: That S correct.
INTERVIEWER: Were .you aware; of these tensjons?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh sure _ They were a /1 over the place _ When `the MHCHAOS
program began , I think it began in what
F 4
I'm trying to think now L
69 , 70
something Iike that?
INTERVIEWER: Yes .
MR . HALPERN: 70 , someth Tike that. Anyway , yes, this was very much felt
by a11 the officers _ we/1 not al,] but a good majority of the officers _
didn t Iike the idea of folowing Americans abroad unless we had some rea|
hard evidence that such "and was happening with an_ American and Soviet
agent or wha tever: But then you had the old question of the chicken and the
egg _ How do you find out whether the guy is alone until follow him?
Where do you begin? How do you get to the point where you 'know he is involved
Until you start somewhere?- Obviously it out of hand in terms of the
number of people we started to follow and Iook: at_ But it basically began
as
a Way Of getting support and finding assets in this country (leftists assets)
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who could go abroad as bona fide leftists as reporting .mechani smS _ It was a /1
targetted abroad _ We never targetted it here in the United States I think
the record Of the Committee proves that, even the Rockefeller Commi ssion Or
what have you _ And this was something new , we d never tried before on a
massive scale _ and we worked very closely with the FBI on this. And most of
the files we opened up_ were name $ the FBI gave uS with duplicate copies of
what they had in their files on a lot of these Americans with leftists
Ieanings and what have yoU . The officer corps in the DDP didn't Tike it,
thought we were. going beyond our charter _ obviously thought we were trying to
become a Gestapo, in effect _ in the United States _ And that was never the
case _ The appeaI $ from various officers from various Ieve Is and it was
intensive argumentation, both here and abroad , the appea] s went up the Tine _
There was no intention of trying to dampen down the arguments Or the
objections Or the concerns _ The appeals went up, not once but several times
right up to Helms _ the Director
S
each and every time these things were
examined aga in , Ioked at again, and orders came down to continue in terms Of :
our target is abroad , not the United States_ Everything we are doing here has
to be geared to something abroad . And we even changed procedures on a Iot of
this stuff It was tightly held information, the cables were tightly held,
and MHCHAOS itself as an indicator (The MH wa $ just a digraph of the
DDP-wide activity.) Everything wa $ done on special channels, special cable
channels, special pouch channels _ It wasn't given wide distribution at a]1.
We 11 everyone knew the program was going on _ We had many a staff meeting
about this , DDP staff meetings . There was a lot of tension_ no questio about
that_
INTERVIEWER: And was the tension just with the young officers or 2
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MR _ HALPERN: No_ It wa $ up and down throughout.
INTERVIEWER: Throughout?
MR. HALPERN: Including some Of the old hands who didn't Iike the system,
didn't Tike the program_ And even those who understood that this was
basically geared abroad as a counterinte/l igence operation _ just didn't think
that we should be involved in it. We preferred to have the Bureau or somebody
else get involved in it. But aga in, you talk about turf battles and equity or
what have you , a Iot Of the Tiaison services abroad the foreign Maison
services
L we had a dea1 with_ Many of them didn t want to work with the
Bureau and wanted to work with uS And you can t have both agencies
suddenly hitting the same foreign service and asking the same questions _ It
just gets sily. So there were Iots of problems on this: one and the officers,
as I say , even some of the old hands _ didn't Iike it_ They wanted to go back
to doing the norma / collection job and not go ooking_for what amounts to, you
know_ Bolsheviks with bombs under the: bed _ And that tension wa $ there and I
think it continues , and even under Bi11 Colby who modified the program even
mre in '73 _ in ate or middle '73 with Schlesinger and Colby But the
program by and large continued in a slightly reduced fashion and a different
terminology and with much more emphasi s on doing that over there than in the
States. I think it's the kind of thing that you know _ You re damned if you
do and you are damned if you don't. I don ' t think we ever convinced everybody
that what we were doing was within bounds and _ obviously, we had the
information; the information wasn't going anywhere _ Nobody was going to court
on it, nobody was going to get shot , nobody was going to get put in jail. I
mean we were` just pul ing it a11 together
INTERVIEWER: Would you say dozens Of officers knew about this?
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MR _ HALPERN: Oh _ hundreds of them_
INTERVIEWER: Hundreds of officers.
MR_ HALPERN: Sure _ I think everybody in the DDP knew about it_ They didn't
see the traffic, but they knew about it.
INTERVIEWER: knew about it?
MR_ HALPERN: Oh It wa $ common ha/ 1 gossip and Iunch room gossip and
what have you _ And as I say , there was lots of opposition to it by senior
officers as we |1 as E=
we / 1 , in the first place a Iot of the senior officers
thought that we were taking our time and effort and our assets away from the
important job _ which was the Soviet target. You know, it takes time it takes
people, and it takes money. And you Only have so" much that you can do in 24
hours a day, and you can t do everything. That' s why end up with what we
used. to call a Re lated Mission Director for the priority trying_ to do things
in some kind of priority order . And you can t just pick the easy ones _ You
know you would get a bad report card if you pick only the easy ones _ You ' ve
got to pick some of the hard: ones too.
INTERVIEWER: Where was it thought that these orders came from, relative
to
MR_ HALPERN: Oh , they knew_ people knew where the orders came from_
knew it wa $ a Presidential directive _ Nothing was hidden from them. Oh no
question about that. This was a part of the Johnson presidential
requirement_ What he was looking for was evidence of Soviet or domestic
upheava] in the United States We couldn't find it_ And no matter and every
time we told him that _ he sa id, "Intensify your efforts_ You know , and as
Dick Helms has said you know "I oly have one president at a time _ That' s
where I my orders_ So what do you do? And if Dick said that I ' m not
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going to do it, there would be a new DCI in 24 hours or thereabouts _
INTERVIEWER: And I think your nt that it went up and down wa Sn t just the
younger_
MR _ HALPERN: no It wa$ up and down on the entire hierarchy . There were
pro and con argumentation and what have you _ Now say a Iot of the older
hands are saying, you know_ "We haven " t time to do everything for God ' $
sakes _ Which is more important: the Soviet target or to find out if there
are a couple of bucks coming into the country? People are going to be in the
streets anyway whether get Soviet money Or not . I mean , it doesn't take
very much to get people into the streets in this country, as you can see _ And
that is part of the breakdown _ And that; is Vietnam_ Not Watergate _ You
know Kent State didn t happen until 1970 . We 'd been in the war since 65
basically. And I remember arguing with my Nationa] War Col ege colleagues _
the military and the State Department guys and what 'have you and I said when
we went in_ Let' $ see the Marines went in In March of '65 in Danang _
The class didn't start until August of '65. I was with the class of '66 _ So
we d been in there a few months _ And we went to a briefing in one of the
secure rooms down in the bowe s of the Pentagon And this was DCSLOGS (Deputy
Chief of Staff Logistics) DCSLOGS _ and they had a briefing' for uS We
were a11 senior officers in the War College with clearances and what have you_
and they were telling US this is October of 65
T
had the usua |
ColoneIs with pointers attached showing Us the charts for what were
planning for Vietnam_ And the graphs were going Tike this for five years.
The number of troops that were going to be in Vietnam five years! I Iooked
around at my buddies and I said, "What the hell 1s going on here? We just
there! How the he] you are panning a five year war? You guys are crazy! "
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I said, "This country
5
the only time it's had a war: longer than four years
waS the American Revolution_ You are not going to have the support of the
American people if you go that It' s crazy' can't plan five years
ahead . had half a mi lion men _ Five year plan. This wasn' t out in
ic_ obviously, in October '65_ If the American public or the Congress
knew about that- there wouId have been a revolt right then _ And I told them,_
I argued with my buddies who were members of the State Department not
military, State Department _ "Oh _ Sam, you don t understand the American
people. They' 11 go along.with you as long as you do it. It'I be slow _
sure _ I sa id , "No way You mark my words If you plan that way , it's
crazy _ If you're going to go fight a war fight a war Don t tickle them. I6
Anyway , what you had 'there in 65 when we went into the war and I think
Johnson thought with the American flag flying nobody was going to dare do
anything with him, and everybody me 1ted in the background _ But by 70 you had
lost the consensus in this- country_ Totally. And Kent State just added to
it_ I don t b/ame Nixon for Kent State . Obviously nobody can Crazy
Nationa/ Guardsmen with young kids, sensitive triggers and unfortunate
deaths _ But that just added to it_
INTERVIEWER: And you have a 11 the street rioting and civil rights issues _
MR : HALPERN: Civil rights is another one in 68 . But that wasn ' t really part
of the Vietnam problem. That wa $ a totally separate issue And when you add
it a/1 together_ t was just bad So that when Johnson says, 1i I want to find
out about Soviets supporting a/1 of this stuff I think he was crazy . But he
wouIdn't isten . And So we had to keep going _ And So the Officer Corps in
the Clandestine Services didn't Iike being taken away from their job _ And we
didn't Tike being. know this was a big problem the Vietnam station
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got bigger and bigger and bigger and bigger it waS crazy_ We even had what
was called a Vietnam Des Fitzgerald decided when he became DDP he was
going to have each divisjon and staff charged with producing so many bodjes _
And I mean bodies .
INTERVIEWER: To go over.
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah _ To go .to Vietnam_ Because it bigger and bigger and
you had to have men a/1 over the bloody country_ And so he wanted some good ,
some bad and some middle But he didn't want a/1 bad _ You know and that
kind of stuff_ And SO, We were putting our assets into' one Tittle place and
it was the most important thing, sure _ I understand but that wasn't the ma in
target Or what the :hell CIA was in business for We weren't, at Ieast the
clandestine side wasn t supposed to be out there fighting a war It's crazy.
And so the people were objecting to that_ The officer corps was objecting to
the Vietnam Ievy. On' top of that comes CHAOS and CHAOS really takes us away
from more Of our norma 1 activity and who the hel1 is going to worry about the
Soviet target in terms of intel1igence collection_ And by that time more
than just Soviet targets , a ot of other targets too. So yeah _ there wa$ a
lot of: opposition-
INTERVIEWER: Do have any feeling about the Presidents Do you feel
that knew about the maj / opening program?
MR_ HALPERN: Oh ; in a general way.
INTERVIEWER: In a genera/ way.
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah, Presidents don t ask detai led .questions _ They don ' t
norma 1 Iy ask" that kind of stuff _ They just want to know_ want to see a
piece of paper _ want to know What is going on And if he is bringing in
something hot he might ask_ how'd you this?" But , Iet me give you
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another example , not a Pres ident but a Secretary of State_ Dean Rusk _ We
out at one point_ Des was DDP at the time we out a very report from
an asset from behind the Curtain, if I can sti)l use the old phraseology _ And
SO, it was a report_ And suddenly we get a ca/1 the DDPs . not the
office but the DDP 'mechani sM, gets a ca/1_ a requirement he get a ca/1 from
somebody in the State Department asking for the identity of the source The
guy comes hot footing it up to Me and says "Sam, the State Department wants
to know the source . I said, "Who in the State Department? State Department
wants to know_ Tel1 me who. "Secretary wants to know_ I said, "Oh _ okay.
You have whoever. you were talking to tell the Secretary to ca// Des FitzgeraId
or Dick Helms _ It's simple. " " can 't say that. T said, "We|1 if you
can't, I wiml_ The man is crazy. We don't give sources_ Ii And So, I go in
and tell my boss that such and such is going to happen = He might get the cal
from Dean Rusk on . the secure Iine _ I tell him what the,story is, and he says,
I wiml wa it for the ca/l." And sure enough, I happened to be in the
office on something else when the ca/1 came ater that and it wa$ Dean
Rusk_ And I could tell from the conversation what is going on_ And it points
out that Dean Rusk didn t want to know the identity Of the source, never asked
for the identity of the source A11 he wanted to know wa $ how good is this
piece of information _ And Des said , "T'1 my arm in the fire up to the
shoulder blade _ It's a good source Knew what he meant- End of
conversation You know Presidents don 't ask, Secretaries of the State don 't
ask for 'details that they shouldn't _ They know that _ And they've been around
Iong enough _ I mean , I don' t know about Jimmy Carter but the other guys
don't. And so, I think Presidents knew in general terms that there wa $ ma j 1
opening, wire tapping, and that kind of stuff . We | 1 engaged it
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themselves for God' s sake _ not the ma i | opening but the wire tapping, and
bugging offices or somebody elses or tel1 somebody to somebody . He] 1
it started with Roosevelt: himself_ you know_ nothing new_
INTERVIEWER: Was the ma i | opening program known very extensively in the
Agency?
MR _ HALPERN: No. I'm1 you an example _ I didn't know it_
INTERVIEWER: You did not know it?
MR _ HALPERN: I did not know it and even when I was Exec to the DDP I knew
some operationa/ cryptonyms and a/1 I know was that they were . good . sources of
information _ I never asked beyond that_ And nobody ever told me beyond that
and I had no reason to know. I didn't. As a matter of fact, to give you an
example of na ive I was_ when I was called back, right after I retired in
early 75 to on getting ready for the Congressiona/ investigations _ which
we didn't even know was going on at the time (this was January Of 75) , the
newspaper stories were talking about ma i / openings and that kind of stuff .
And I wa $ slly enough and foolish enough to say to the security guy I wa $
deaI ing with the security officer the Office of Security ran HTLINGUAL)
that what we were doing wa$ in support of trying to get informatio about how
the Chinese Or the Russians were operating and what it took to get
documentation and a/1 that kind of stuff
St
what you needed . He11, perfectly
honest_ I didn't know what the he] 1 was going on _ And a/1 I know is that the
security guy said, "Yeah Sam yeah that' s a idea _ We ' 11 think about
that yeah Sam that
S a idea yeah yeah we ' |1 think about that. "
never said anything at that" point that they were running a rea | ma j 1 coverage
and what have you _ And I didn't know that I was doing the norma | you know_
This is what you were in an operation for _ But it wa $ more than that,
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obviously. So, it wa $ not widely known _
INTERVIEWER: No . No_
MR_ HALPERN: Information _ You might have had access ike I did to
information and you knew a good source Or a bad source _
INTERVIEWER: And you might know the information came from HTLINGUAL =
MR_ HALPERN: No_ I never heard the cryptonymn _
INTERVIEWER: Never heard the cryptonymn_ Okay.
MR_ HALPERN: Didn t even need that_ AII I knew is that It was a good source _
INTERVIEWER: How wouId you characterize mrale in the Agency in the
two to three years just prior to the Church and Pike Hearings _
MR_ HALPERN: Oh I think it was largely unsettled because in 73 you had the
turnover under Schlesinger .
INTERVIEWER: Right .
MR _ HALPERN: And it was unsettling, totally unsettl In the end of 72
when Schlesinger was announced as the new man on the block and everybody knew
He Ims wa $ out from: there on it wa $ utter turmoil and debacle _ Both In the
DDP and God knows where else _
INTERVIEWER: The worst you had seen?
MR_ HALPERN: Oh Totally. Never had anything that bad before _
Unbel ievable . It was bad _ And we had had reduction in forces before
throughout the Agency from time to time_ We had a "701 Program_ it was
ca/ led , ne Of them I remember _ And severa| others from time to 'time _ You
had reduction programs and it was bad in those days _ But noth- Iike 73 _
Absolutely nothing. A/I he]1 broke Ioose _
INTERVIEWER: Bad in the sense that he was going to cut a thousand or two
thousand?
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MR _ HALPERN: Bad in terms that the Ieadership had no trust in US _
INTERVIEWER: Which Ieadership are you referring to, Sam?
MR _ HALPERN: Schlesinger/Colby , obviously Leadership no longer had any
trust in uS _ They were treating uS Tike dirt. No appreciation of what we had
done or what we could do _ No reason and no appreciation that we even exist.
wanted to wipe Us out _ Then , of course the persona/ aspect of it
Ge my
job and where am I going to go from here and do I get a pens ion or don t I
a pension and So on And it was awful _ Unbel ievably awful both here and
abroad _ And I don t know what happened when the Ha/ Ioween Massacre under
Turner came around . That I guess have been equa y dramatic. But in 73
none of us had ever seen anything Iike that before _ When _ you know
everybody' s Mife work was suddenly up for grabs . And it was just a horrible
mess _
INTERVIENER: We I 1 wa $ there a feel ing that President Nixon, while Helms was
Director that President Nixon was supportive of the Agency?
MR _ HALPERN: Yes , there was Largely because , I don t know if it wa S
Nixon _ but it was Kissinger who supported the Agency. And most of US knew
that most of the foreign policy was coming out of Henry anyway. But with
Nixon S support of course And he had Nixon S chops to do what he had to do
or wanted to do_ But by and large we worked very closely, as an Agency with
Kissinger _ We provided a 1 kinds of support, assets, did &l1 kinds of things
at his request and So On _ I wa$ on the phone to AI for example,
a1 though I never met him, but wa on the phone almost daily when he wa$ still
a Colonel on the Kissinger staff doing al] kinds %f things - And exchanging
papers with him via the: new (I forget what it was called in those days) Iong
distance xerography but it was totally encrypted. We had one machine up in
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the Ops Center and- he had one machine up in his Ops Center in the Whi te House ,
and at first we were standing at the machines separately waiting for the piece
of paper (nobody else was a / lowed to see the paper) _ you know_ we worked
together as a team. And the Agency , I mean at Ieast the Clandestine Service
side of it worked closely with them. And I remember right after Nixon
wa$ sworn in in January of 69_
INTERVIEWER: 69 when he came in?
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah_ he came in in 69 _ There was a meeting Nixon _
Mitche/ 1 Kissinger He Ims and Tom Karamessines in the White House .
INTERVIEWER: Was Rogers there?
MR _ HALPERN: No_
INTERVIEWER: Rogers?
MR _ HALPERN: You mean the Secretary of State? No_ Who is he? He didn't
count _ You know that. I mean the history books are full Of that now_
Mitchel wa $ there . I don't know why but he was the Attorney General but I
don t know why he , at. Teast _ the Attorney General nominee. But anyway, he wa $
there _ I this from Tom . As Tom 5 Exec; Tom came back and reported on the
meeting. And there was a very close: bond right there establ shed _ Nixon then
Kissinger asked a Iot' of questions as to' our capabilities, our assets and what
we could do to and what have you on different aspects_ and Tom was asked
to give the details . Dick knew some but he didn't know a1/ the detai ls
because he was ut of the job for a number Of years _ When they came back
they had marching orders . It worked _
INTERVIEWER: So that in 73 when He Ims is out, that' s the big big change?
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MR_ HALPERN: Yes . As I say that began in 72 right after the election_
Nixon had his Own raid but that is another story_ But there was when
Schlesinger came in it was just a traumatic, really traumatic, experience _
INTERVIENER: Was Schles inger known to the Agency?
MR_ HALPERN: just by reputation.
INTERVIEWER: Just by reputation_ And that was?
MR_ HALPERN: Bad . Because of the things. he had done in the Atomic Energy
Commi ssion and the Bureau of Budget . And his whole approach _ Totaly
impersona / The new "machine man" kind of thing, you know_ the ma thematica]
brain or whatever oh I guess machine is a better stated cause
INTERVIEWER: So that reputation wa $ known and therefore .
MR _ HALPERN: Oh yeah , not only known but it was, you know
L
immediately the
phone ca/ls went out al1 over town asking, "What about this, who is this guy ,
what' s he Tike?" And everything
we got 'back wa $ bad _ Bad _ bad = bad , bad ,
bad .
INTERVIEWER: And then Colby wil/ support Schlesinger whi le .
MR_ HALPERN: Oh _ he not supported him but he was one: of the guys who
made inputs of the information for whatever attitude Schlesinger had on the
whole thing Now Schlesinger S attitude about what he did totally changed
since he ' s out of government , since He Ims out: of government and 'everybody
else _ It was 180 degree switch_
INTERVIEWER: For Colby?
MR_ HALPERN: for Schlesinger
INTERVIEWER: Schesinger_
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INTERVIEWER: Yeah _ And I tried to tel them. See I was Exec to Colby for
about 3 months_ and I tried to tell my friends
7
who wouldn't believe it
don t blame Schlesinger for what is happening to the DDP _ Blame Colby _ It
wa$ a/1 Colby He 5 the guy who was pushing this _ And in effect even says So
in the bok _ if you read the book where he says he told Schlesinger he 'd take
care of cleaning up the DDP _ You know_ he knows that function _ We)1 yeah
that' s true
INTERVIEWER: What three months were serving Colby?
MR _ HALPERN: February, March April and part of of 73_ When I was his
Executive _
INTERVIEWER: And did the tensions simply grow after Schlesinger and Colby are
working away.
MR _ HALPERN: Oh It Iasted unti). We]1 Schlesinger Ieft early.
He Ieft in June of '13_ And it lasted even afterward The thing didn't get
settled down for a Iong while.
INTERVIEWER: Continuing on?
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah_ it continued . Became ic.
INTERVIEWER: And then people being separated from the Agency?
MR _ HALPERN= And I saw how some of those separations of some senjor officers
were done _ And bel ieve me it was brutal _ Bruta] and awfu]
INTERVIEWER: Brutal in the context of?
MR_ HALPERN= No sense of personalities. No sense Of humanity _ No sense of
the dea / ing with individua] problems We used to be a Band of Brothers _
INTERVIEWER: Right .
MR _ HALPERN: I think I said that before _
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INTERVIEWER: Yes _
MR _ HALPERN: That stopped with Schlesinger and Colby _
INTERVIEWER: Now that stopped throughout the Agency or
MR_ HALPERN: I don t know about the rest Of the Agency.
INTERVIEWER: But it stopped in the clandestine
MR _ HALPERN: Let Me talk about what I know about.
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR_ HALPERN: I can conjecture about that other
INTERVIEWER: Right; yes _
MR_ HALPERN: My conjecture is a lmost as as yours _ Maybe a ittle bit
better having 1ived there a/1 these years .
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR_ HALPERN: But _ no , I am talking basically what I know about clandestine
subjects _ It was awful; _ I mean , even old friends were just, you know ,
ignored , Ioked down upon _ GIven no consideration whatsoever In the old
days we took care Of' each other as a 'Band of Brothers does _ We helped each
other _
INTERVIEWER: And this included what sorts of things ?
MR _ HALPERN: You mean the helping?
INTERVIEWER: Uh huh_
MR _ HALPERN: Oh , if a guy had a family prob em, we d worry about his next
ass ignment so that the family problem was taken care of _ If a guy had a
medica/ probIem he didn't want people to know about talk about; we helped 'him
with that_ People with husband and wife prob lems_ we d help On that. There
were even prob lems with kids _ We 'd he Ip with that. Drugs , somebody
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impregnating somebody what do you do about that kind of thing_ We 'd to
Iook out after each other. That didn't mean we didn't have professiona /
rivalry and a11 of that. There was a lot of that, beI eve Me Who got what
Job and who got what promotio_ But basically, when 'the chips were down we
were helpful to each other _ We tried to find interpretations of rules and
regulations to assist each other _ even financially, So that you weren' t So
out-of-pocket on a Iot things and the government might be' able to help. If
somebody had a prob Iem you know_ if he was abroad for example, and something
happened to a fami Iy member back here, we d suddenly cal1 the guy back on TDY
we had a big important problem to worry about and discuss with him. You
know_ that kind of stuff _
INTERVIEWER: Yes .
MR . HALPERN: AI1 perfectly Iega] and it wa$ aI1- we used as a matter of
fact_ we in the DDP used to Iook at some of our support officers and
administrators and what have you in terms of how we 11 were able to
interpret the regulation in order to us out with a job_ whether it was a
persona] thing, or a professional _ Or an operation Or what have you. and I
remember one of them. I'd pick up the phone and say _ "Char]ie, here ' $ my
prob lem: I've got to get from point A to point B and I've to do it
fast_ M "Jesus Christ. AII right. I'1 ca1) you back_ And within the hour
or whatever it: took him, he 'd say , "You go from A, to A Prime = to A Prime 2
to A Prime 3, and then you end up in B over there, and you ' 11 get there and
you ' 11 be fine and it won 't take you any time _ You ' 11 just go_ Just do it my
way . I said , "Fine _ You "prepare the papers . I'11 sign them_ And that' s
the way it worked . You know, a Band of Brothers _ We knew what we were doing
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in terms of trying to get the job done and within the bounds of the
Agency _
INTERVIEWER: And if somebody came up for retirement , and they might need
some
MR_ HALPERN: I think, we 'd to, we11 _ in the early days when you didn- t
have the bulk of people suddenly coming out . you'd even try to help them find
a job. Pick up the phone _ ca// friends _ connections , what have And it
wa $ done _ Now Iater when it came into the hundreds , you couldn t do it,
obviously. And then everybody fell by the wayside_ But it wa $ a
totally
different attitude; instilled right away when Schlesinger came along . Some of
his language is even being quoted in the newspapers and magazines _ I don ' t
Know if he said the words that way but anyway things Iike: "I am not
interested in people I am interested in the United States taxpayer _ We 1 1
we were interested in the taxpayer too, but that didn't come first: Maybe
that wa $ wrong but at Ieast we didn't think So _ Considering the time and
effort most of us into that place, I don 't think Uncle Sam waS ever on the
short end of the stick.
INTERVIEWER: And So someone being separated might not know he was being
separated until
MR _ HALPERN: Unti it hit him_
INTERVIEWER: Until it hit him.
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah I remember Colby _ example, taking home with him,
which he shouIdn t have done but he did , stacks Of personne] folders you
know, be the great decider. This guy goes , this guy stays.
INTERVIEWER: So the mora le was- not very good?
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MR _ HALPERN: Oh , it was nonexistent _ Nonexistent, Iess than nonexistent.
INTERVIEWER: Gee
MR_ HALPERN: 73 wa$ a bad year. A very bad year _
INTERVIEWER: 74?
MR_ HALPERN: We]1 I don t know_ In 74 it probably got a ittle bit
better Things were settling down a ittle bit under Colby_ And we weren' t
te so much under the gun _ About that time most Of the people had been
separated .
INTERVIEWER: And wa $ that harshly, that separatio issue is that Agency
officers were coming back from Vietnam.
MR_ HALPERN: Partly that _ But oly partly. We had: a program under Tom
Karamessines and under HeIms _ We knew that we were going to have to bring
back a Iot of people from Vietnam gradualIy, and we started actually, be lieve
it or not, we started earlier than most. people give us credit for to plan for
this kind of reduction in force in Vietnam, the Far East Division, and-
gradua ly try to sort %f spread the officers back to their proper divisions
and areas , and we knew it was going to take a Iong time And we knew we were
going to have to reduce the total' strength
we were getting budget wise
anyway and personne] slot wise _ But it was a Iong range program_ We were
going to do it over a period of time We weren' t going to do t in a
And it was a totally different approach _ One with humanity , one totally
without humanity _ And I think we were right in feel ing that we owed the guys_
after a/1 of their years and effort, some consideratio _ And you know there
are perfectly Iega / ways and means of using the personnel rules and
regulations and financial rules and regulations to ease the passage _
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INTERVIEWER; And make it more gradua]
MR . HALPERN: Yeah _ and make it more gradua] and make it easier on people _ and
what have YOU . And _ Iook _ even Schlesinger had to go to Congress to get the
number of retirees positions opened under the CIA Retirement Act Ke had to
get those numbers raised to take care of the ma ss of people he was suddenly
getting rid of _ And he didn t even know that initially. And that was finally
brought to his attention, that a lot of these people could take uS to court if
you just throw them out without giving them the CIRA benefits _ And So
went to Congress _ and Congress upped the figures (with a Tittle bit f
doing): [ mean that wa $ one of the things _ you know just sheer humanity _
INTERVIEWER: Sure
MR _ HALPERN: You know_
INTERVIEWER: The Ramparts article on the Agency and the National Student S
Association _
MR _ HALPERN: 67 _
INTERVIEWER: Yeah : Was that very harmful to the Agency?
MR _ HALPERN: Yes _ much SO_
INTERVIEWER: The was ?
MR_ HALPERN: It wa $ a big flap obviously. We had to cut back on a Iot of
operations _
INTERVIEWER: Involving students?
MR _ HALPERN: WeI1 the students was only one Of it because if you remember
the Ramparts exposure went far beyond student activity_
INTERVIEWER: Yeah .
MR _ HALPERN: It covered a]1 kinds of things Iabor unions women S
organizations _ rel igous groups you name them and we were involved in some
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way or another And practically a/l of those had to be di smantled. The DDP
then Des Fitzgerald, just before he died as a matter of fact, came up with a
term cal1 "Surge Funding S-U-R-G-E funding _ And what we were able to do_
a11 Iega 1 . and a/1 checked out with Katzenbach and the Attorney Genera/ and
everybody se wa $ in order to ease the way for a lot of these activities
that we were involved with, we gave them extra money , a pile of mney kind of
thing, you know you are on your Own from now on _ Here, get going_ Start up_
And So we rea/ly did a big di smant] job _ And it was very, very pa inful _
Not oly for the people involved in the activities , and including the' officers
who. were the case officers running the thing from inside _ but it hurt the
overa]1 effort_ And one Of the things_ for example_ even Congress finally
recognized the need and picked up the RFE and Radio Liberty or Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty and is now run by the government instead of CIA
funding it. It' s still the same money from Congress except now ca/1 it
some thing else and they have a broadcasting committee that oversees it. You
know_ no difference except it doesn't have those nasty letters
b
CIA
involved .
INTERVIEWER: Right _
MR . HALPERN: So that' s the running of it. And that used to be one of the
biggest costs: Of our covert actio operations _ Those and the any parami ] i
activity you get into_ That S where the money goe$ .
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR_ HALPERN: Inteligence operations don t cost much _ propaganda operations
don' t cost much and So on _ So it did have a tremendous impact _ no question_
67 Ramparts-
INTERVIEWER: And this was fairly new in He Ims term of office wasn''t it?
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MR_ HALPERN: Yes , Heims wa $ the DCI then. Yes , 67 _
INTERVIEWER: How about _ the question is raised sometimes: how are
reforms and rea1 or potential abuses processed within the Agency in the
decades before 1975?
MR_ HALPERN: In practically every case that I know of at Ieast it went
through the entire chain of command_ Usua lly the IG was involved_ then
the Lega / Counse] got involved _ And people were demoted , people were fired ,
people were
reassigned . It a/1 depended on what the gravity of the situation
was and there were
a/1 kinds Of different activities including
some people who
did nothing more than try to swipe: a few bucks _ And some of those went to
court actua/ly_
INTERVIEWER: Is that right?
MR_ HALPERN: And _ in those we could do, with the help of the judge .
have the trial jn camera so it didn't a Iot of publicity. But we went
through a/1 the ins and outs on a Iot of this stuff and: depending on `what the
situation was the General Counse1 would take it over the Attorney Genera] if
necessary _ It aI1 depended on what happened . But there was every effort made
first to to clean it up inside the organization, inside CIA if possible _
And if not you went outside and whatever help you needed and invoked
whatever Iaws were necessary to make sure something Tike this didn't happen
again, and people were told. Usua y you didn' t get the names of the
individuals involved, we always tried to protect that_ And it wasn't just
because of privacy or anything Tike that, it's the nature of the bus iness_
You don 't talk about names _ But the kind of activity were usua lly we| 1
icized at staff meetings and passed down the Tine _ So you tel1 people So
these things don t happen agai0. You can' t always be sure they don't, but
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INTERVIEWER: And how about the comment I had earlier that Helms wa$
betrayed by Nixon that if Helms had gone along on Watergate and a1 that type
of- thing he would have kept his job?
MR _ HALPERN: We/1 that sounds . it's a plausible theory, but I don ' t think
So _ I don't think it wa$ in the cards because my own feel ing is that Nixon
was ready for a change and he was ready to just lean house _ Because Iook at
the rest of his changes on:' personnel throughout the government after the '72
election_ I mean , it was just: a/1 those crazy things. He just felt he wanted
to have a new team_ I persona| Iy don' t think that that, would have made much
difference with He Ims _ mean , Nixon and He Ims In terms of keeping him on the
job, I think he was ready for' a new guy anyway -
INTERVIENER: Did you ever hear how Schlesinger happened to be chosen?
MR_ HALPERN: I don_ t know except that in 70 r '71 he was the deputy in
OMB and he wrote a directive _ we] 1 he wrote :a study and not a directive _
changing the intelligence community relatioships and the Director' $
relationships_ to the intelligence community and therefore I think he was
considered an expert on the intelligence community and nationa ] security
pol icy and So on And when they were Iook ing for a new boss_ I wouId think
that there he was sitting: over at Atomic Energy which Nixon probably didn't
know what he wa $ doing over there anyway _ And so he did in 1970 or '71,.I
think it was a study and a report and moved him over
INTERVIEWER: Had it ever been mentioned that maybe he was Kissinger' $ choice?
MR _ HALPERN: I haven't heard that_ I would doubt it_ I would doubt it.
much _ I just hadn' t heard that one before _
INTERVIEWER: Okay. 'A11 right _
MR. HALPERN: That' $ a new one _ [ presume some of your other sources
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mentioned that to you _
INTERVIEWER: I don t know _ There was 'simply speculation.
MR _ HALPERN: I don ' t think So . I would be very surprised jf that turned
out to be the fact.
INTERVIEWER: Okay.
MR _ HALPERN: Henry doesn't take credit for it in his books . That S for sure _
INTERVIEWER: And he would _
MR _ HALPERN: And those are nice, big, two heavy tomes . If you forgot I've
them right down here _
INTERVIEWER: I haven t worked my way through a/1 of them yet _
MR_ HALPERN: He was supposed to have written a third one you know _ But he
never has -
INTERVIEWER: Is that right? A third one is coming?
MR _ HALPERN: The third: one is going to be on intelligence and nationa]
security _
INTERVIEWER: Oh realy .
MR_ HALPERN: But he never did it.
INTERVIEWER: It has not been written? Not yet anyway _
MR. HALPERN: Not
INTERVIEWER: How about the Schlesinger memo of 1973 regarding improper
practices in the Agency?
MR _ HALPERN: That S Colby' $ memo . Schlesinger: put his name to it, but it' s
Colby S memo .
INTERVIEWER: Okay . So, written by Colby?
MR _ HALPERN: Yes _
INTERVIEWER: And signed by Schlesinger?
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MR _ HALPERN: Yes _
INTERVIEWER: And the results of the Memo are sometimes called the "Family
Jewels" Or "693 List"?
MR _ HALPERN: That S right . That' s right .
INTERVIEWER: How wa $ that memo received?
MR_ KALPERN: WeII , I think in several ways _ One of the ways was scme people
were shocked and surprised that anybody would it al1 on a piece of paper
Number 1 Some accepted it as just another order and filled out a/1 kinds of
stuff . I accepted it in terms of reading the words that were in there _ I
never responded to it. Because it didn't apply to me as as I was
concerned , because none of the things that I had ever done were _ as far as I
wa $ concerned , beyond the pale, beyond: the Iaw beyond interpretation of the
Iaw or anything Tike that_ And So it depended on how you wanted to read and
interpret the Ianguage Because if I remember correctiy it said something
about things that you did that you thought were beyond the charter or utside
the regulations Or something Tike that. But I don t remember anything I ever_
did beyond that_ So. [ didn't respond to the thing. I never answered it. And
I m sure that I wasn't the oly one who didn t answer it_
INTERVIEWER: Was there much talk about it at the' time ?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh yeah, a lot of talk. Obviously . What' s this a/1 about?
Why?: AI1 that kind of stuff _
INTERVIEWER: Was it. thought that it was related to a management style Or
related to Watergate or related to
MR _ HALPERN: I think it was written in terms of the Watergate bus iness ,
in terms of a CYA-type activity "Cover Your_ Ass" Activity_ I heard , aga In
obviously, I talked about it to a Iot of people, and they talked to me about
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it_ And I told them what I was doing. I told them I wasn 't going to reply to
the thing, I didn't need to as far as I was concerned_ but I left it up to
each individua 1 that talked to me to make it up in his Own mind. I don t know
how many did or didn't, but I think it wa $ in terms of a CYA thing, in terms
f : here' s a new Man on the block , Schles inger _ and he wants to know what
happened since Genesis_ You know doesn' t he have anything else to do? He ' s
got a whole Agency and a whole new worId to conquer _ What the hell is worried
about &/1 that stuff for? So, I think it was basica lly in terms of at Ieast
the guys I talked to Or talked to me it was a CYA activity on the part of
Schlesinger who didn't want to get blind sided by something that might have
happened that CIA would, be accused of _ But the attitude was _ what the hel 1 is
he worried about it is not on his watch. If there is something is wrong , and
even if CIA is accused Of it, it' s not on his watch. Nobody can hold him
responsible for It. If it happened , even two years ago, what the helI. L
mean , So _ It might have happened under somebody elses aegis, and CIA takes
the heat, but he could say, you know_ it wasn't me I wasn t around_ So that
was the general attitude And as I say, a ot of people responded Tike good
soldiers and wrote a/1 kinds of tomes about things they thought were wrong ,
and not a/1 of them were accepted. I mean that 690 whatever thing.
INTERVIEWER: it's a Tist which is simply the number of pages that .
MR_ HALPERN: Yes _ and these things were each on a page if I remember
correctly. And these were the ones that Bi]l Colby finally accepted as going
quote_beyond the pale_unquote But even then when Biil issued his kind of
after action directives , there were a whole bunch of stuff _ He said, you
know_ these don t count. Even though I've got them, these don ' t count because
they are not beyond anything
7 are perfectly Iega/ and a/1 that kind of
stuff and perfectly proper In some of these he said, we are going to stop
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these completely, some of these we are going to modify (and CHAOS wa $ one of
them) _ He didn't stop it completely. At Ieast not initially And these , he
said_ have no bearing. So his own orders_ later after he got a/1 this stuff
together when he finally tallied them al1 up, they were just, you know _ 11
"maybe _ "yes .
INTERVIEWER: At the time the memo came out , was it known 'that Colby wa $ the
author or the drafter of it? Do you reca /1 by chance?
MR _ HALPERN: My friends wouldn't;bel ieve Me I knew _ But
INTERVIEWER: You knew that he drafted it?
MR _ HALPERN: His hand was there a/1 the way _ Now maybe he didn't do al1 the
draft- but it was his initiative or what have you _
INTERVIEWER: And your friends thought it was Schlesinger?
MR_ HALPERN: Yes . Oh Schlesinger was getting a11 of the rap, which I
thought wa $ a/1 wrong - A)1 wrong. From. the firing of everybody
C Or a Iot
of people to this kind of stuff And it was Biu1 who was the guy who was
pushing Schlesinger into this kind of stuff And Schlesinger was' willing to
be pushed , don t me wrong , and he wanted to do a house cleaning and a
sweep, and a// that kind of stuff_ but without Bil) it wouldn't have gotten
half as far_ I' m sure _
INTERVIEWER: Why was Bi11 doing that?
MR _ HALPERN: That' s a good question _ People have asked Me that continuousIy
and I don t know _ Some people have said that partly it was because of his
daughter S problem_ And you know she died very early on when he was DDP
DDO; sorry: I get my terminology confused by the' dates And I don t be]ieve
that because his daughter S psychologica/ problem wa$ there long before , even
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when he wa$ in Vietnam and she wa$ in Vietnam_ So I rea ly don t know _ other
people say that Bi 11 was just being a good novice _ Some people said he ' s
going to end up in the monastery some even though he s 'got a new . wife and
a/1 that, new company, and what: have you . But , Inve had a11 kinds Of
interpretations , but I don 't even know {f Bi 11 knows why _
INTERVIEWER: And at that time it was as much a mystery as
MR _ HALPERN: We/1 , at that time everybody thought it wa S Schlesinger _
INTERVIEWER: Oh _ I see
MR_ HALPERN: That Schlesjnger wa $ the Big Bad Wolf _ And_ sure he wa $ but he
was aided , and abetted, and goaded by one Wi lliam Colby . And why Bill did it,
I just don t know_
INTERVIEWER: Was there any sign of that before Schlesinger came in? In other
words while Ke Ims was sti there? Was Colby
MR_ HALPERN: Not to the same extent. But Bi 11 first came ~ A
when I first
to know him
5 was in 1956 .
INTERVIEWER: That early?
MR . HALPERN: '56 , yes _ 56 . Des FitzgeraId met Bi1/ Colby when' Bi11 was a
case officer in the Rome station _ And Des came back thinking Colby wa Iked on
water _ The greatest thing since- ittle apples. And he wanted him in the Far
East Division right We I 1 he made some arrangements and he got Bil/
into the Far East Division and assigned him as Deputy Chief of Station 0f
Saigon _ The Chief then wa $ Nick Natsios _ And Bi 11 went out as Deputy Chief_
And Vietnam then' became his career God knows many years_ Ten years Or
more And we in the Far East Division we the case Officers and the
operators in' the Far East Division, the troops
L /
while Bil1 was here in
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Washington getting accl imated to what FE was a/1 about . who the people are and
what have you and the various talks and the various comments,and what have
you _ and ater while he wa $ out in Saigon _ we regarded him as a great "nation
bui lder" quote unquote _ That he wa $ not a clandestine operations officer
in terms of espionage Or counterintelligence _ He never understood
counterintelligence _ Even to this day I don ' t think he understands
counterintelligence _ And I don t think he knew what a recruitment of an agent
wa $ even the fact that I haven't recruited many:myself _ But if you Iook at
his book he: the first agent he recruited in Italy was a member of the
Communist Party. Ke recruited him as a reporting source _ as strictly an
intelligence agent, not as a propaganda CA officer_ And you read his' book and
he talks there about his, Bi 11 '$, probIem whether this is the right thing
to d0, and: how can he Tive with himself , and manipulating a human being and
a/1 that kind of stuff . And it' s very clear. that he js not an inteligence
operatios officer_ He is a great scout and he is a great guy for quote_
nation' building unquote _
INTERVIEWER: When you say nation building, what do you mean by that, Sam?
MR_ HALPERN: He wants to help other countries become Iike the United States _
He wants _ you know_ the Declaration of Independence and Thomas Jefferson
INTERVIEWER: Democracy _
MR. HALPERN: Yes; and everybody vote_ One man one vote _ Without any regard
at a/1 for the history and the social mores and background and customs of the
country. Where votes in most cases don t mean anything_ And it' s silly. You
work by chieftains and what have you and triba] systems and the Whole business
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
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MR _ HALPERN: But Bi11 wants to buiId natios . And its very Iaudable and
maybe some government agency ought to build nations_ And maybe he ought to be
in the AID; or ICA in the old days _ Or the Red Cross or wherever _ But not as
a clandestine operations officer trying to collect intelligence and recruit
human beings to be your agent, your spy . A lot of us in the old FE Division
on the. working Ieve/ thought_ there is' going to be trouble with this guy .
INTERVIEWER: Did you meet him in 56 then?
MR_ HALPERN: Yes , sure . I wa$ Des Exec then too.
INTERVIEWER: I see _
MR_ HALPERN: In FE. So, a Iot of uS thought this was a problem guy but Des
wants him around _ and Des is the boss, so what the hell_ There S nothing we
can do_ You know maybe he ' 11 Iearn something under Nick we used to say .
Nick wa $ a tough old Greek, old hand and he knew the business _ In fact_ he
was a poet.
INTERVIEWER: So it was thought that maybe he 'd change _
MR . HALPERN: Yes , but he didn't. Bi 1 never changed _ And So a lot of Us
we/1 for example, Bill, when he was Division Chief in FE I wasn t even in
the Division at that point
4
but Bi 11 had an idea , for example, on how the
OCI' $ Daily Intelligence Report should Iook _ He thought it ought to be Iike a
tabloid newspaper and even had a dummy made up for this thing. Wel1 _ it wa $
Iaughed out of court at the time_ Bi1 kept that dummy until he became DCI
and he it into effect. It became what is now called the Nationa 1
Intelligence Daily a/though I am told it js no longer in the newspaper
format_ That was changed a5 soon as Casey came aboard_ But that is Bi 11 for
you . Once he something in his head you don t change him.
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INTERVIEWER: Tenacious?
MR_ HALPERN: Oh very , very_
INTERVIEWER: WeI1 did you have much contact with him after '56?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh _ I didn't have too much contact with him in '56 until 1961
when I was shot down by Dick Bisse]1 and Des FitzgeraId . Bissel1 wa S then DDP
and Des was Chief _ FE . I was enjoying Mfe in Tokyo my one and
overseas ful1 time tour and I was having a good time In Tokyo_ And suddenly I
shot down to a place-ca/ led Sa igon _ Which I had known about before during
WorId War II and a/1 that kind of stuff but anyway , I got shot down on a
special operatio to with the ASA teams which is the version of NSA
(Army component rather) _ And this is because Ed Lansdale = who wa$ then in
General Erskine' s office at the Pentagon _ had a bright idea _ This was before
the US was fully committed . There were 3,000 Americans men women and
chiidren from a/1 agencies ncluding the military in Saigon in the
summer @f '61 when I got down there _ Sa igon wa$ stiml a nice , sleepy , old
French town_ It wa$ a lovely place . There were parts of Saigon that you
cou Idn t go . And you couIdn t go to parts of Chalons because there were VC
a/1 ver you . but anyway it wa $ a nice area _ But this was a crazy idea that
Ed Lansdale had sold the brass in Washington and it didn't make any sense, but
anyway , there we were And I was shot down to work as Tiaison officer between
the station and the ASA teams I got to make some very friends _ as a
matter of fact_ as a result of that and Bi 11 Colby was Chief of Station.
INTERVIEWER: Oh?
MR . HALPERN: And one of the things we did, and the first thing, the first
place _ I built the first war room_ Or officer room (if you want) in the
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Embassy . It didn't even have one at the time The only one that was in town
was the one on G-2 under Genera1 McGarr_ And what the hell wa$ the G-2
officer, Colonel someone I can t remember Anyway , So I built a war room for
Bi11 So we could plot and have handy our Own operations (we were running into
the North at that time and none of them worked but we tried) and at the same
time decided to take a Iook at what the hel the target was , what the enemy
wa$ And I built a second war room Or had built rather a second war room in
the Embassy where me and my military friends the head f the ASA team, the
SSO in Sa i gon , I forget his name Major something Or other and we sent
down to us from Japan , from the Army in Japan, an order of battle specialist
whose specialty was actua y the Chinese Communist , the PRC a military
breakdown _ and he came down to go over the order of battle aspects of the VC .
And I had up on the wa | 1 a ] 1 four wa /s in this room that we built in the
Embassy , a 1-50,000 set of 'maps of South Vietnam oly: And then we took al1
of the information _ from any source whatsoever good , bad , Or indifferent,
including COMINT, and a /1 the Hiaison junk we were getting from the South
Vietnamese government _ any of our own reporting, the US , a/1 agencies and we
actually physically plotted every piece of information on maps _ And the order
of battle specialist made his usua] 5X8 order of battie cards and correlated
to the maps _ So that you could Iok at the map and go to the card Or take the
card and go to the map_ And we came up with a figure of VC effectives in the
field of over 18,000 . That doesn t sound Tike much today, but this was the
summer of '61 And the agreed-upon figure was 10,000. Everybody in the US
Government used the figure of 10,000 _ I think they've been using it ever
since the war began with the French _ But anyway , 10,000 was the figure . And
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we came up with almost double _ A1 holy hel/ broke Ioose . Bi11 Colby and
I was on TDY from Tokyo. Dick Bissell had offered to have my fami ly come with
Me and a/1 that kind of stuff but I said uh uh _ I'11 go down from Tokyo, the
fami ly can go home _ And they did_ But when this 18,000 figure hit, the G-2
in Saigon refused to accept it, General McGarr refused to accept it,
Ambassador Nolting (I guess it was ) refused to accept it, and Bi ] / Colby
refused to accept it_ And I said to Bil] and they wouldn t Iet uS send the
information out . They just refused. They thought it would be best to
transmit the information to our respective Headquarters _ That is the NSA
type , the SSO type , and back to CINCPAC &nd So on And I said to Bill , I
said, "Bi], this is silly. First of a/1, I'm here TDY _ I've got my own
ticket, airplane ticket , I've my own passport. I can be out of here
unless: you shoot Me on the way out. I"11 be at Tan Son Nhut whenever [ want
to_ And know Me we / 1 enough , Bi 11. I'1 to the first ava i Iable CIA
station_ which is either Hong Kong, 'Mani Bangkok , or Singapore . I get into
the Commo shack, and my message winl be in Washington within minutes. And I
think you know that my relationship with Des is such that he wil at least
isten to Me he' may not accept what I am telling him
Ct
but he will at
Ieast listen_ And I know in' the meantime you can say , 'Get the guys with the
white coats and what have you to get Sam_ He ' s gone crazy,' he S mad , he
doesn t know what he is talking about, he ' $ gone beyond the vejl. I know a/1
of this, Biu). But I think Des wi give Me a hearing even wrapped in one of
those
I B
INTERVIEWER: Straight jackets _
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MR_ HALPERN: Straight jacket. He looked at Me he knew me we / 1 enough and
I knew him and he says , Sam, what do you want to send?" "I want to
send , back we 18 , 000 _ You know , and tell them how we it. And give
them the facts I'm not trying to make pol icy. I'm just here to the
information . We re the intelligence officers _ that' s what our job is_ 1i He
said he can t send 18,000 _ I said, What is this? Some kind of a Persian rug
merchant barga ining or something? What; do you want to send? We can 't go with
10 anymore _ That S . gone _ We ve 18 .." We|1 , to make a long story short,
we ended up , just Iike Sam Adams later, many years later = but he wa$ in the
hundreds 'Of thousands I wa $ in the tens of thousands and So we ended up
whereby, I think we said something Tike we compromised , no question about
that something Tike 14, 15 ,effectives _ plus support troops, just Iike Sam_
it'$ exactly the same play as Sam Adams except much sma I er figures and much
eariier _ This wa$ 1961 But the total figure , if you add it &l1 up, you
ended up with an 18 , 000 . That much I through . But aga in it was a
stretched-out thing _ So when: the message finally went out _ it went out in
several channels: I mean , to CIA the mi1 itary and to State Department _
Everybody it_ When it got to CINCPAC I'm told that almost Iike a bomb hit
the place . And the next thing we knew was a message saying, "Colone | so and
so from CINCPAC Staff is arriving to discuss this latest nonsense_ or
something Tike that. It was just . you know_ crazy _ And thjs Colone] had been
on the Vietnam desk for CINCPAC, but he served in Vietnam
T with the French
when were there _ And he was: the expert as far as CINCPAC was concerned.
So when we" were saying 10,000_ we were in effect flying in: his face _ We were
becoming idiots . It was Off base _ We didn' t know this guy from Adam. And to
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show you how we felt, me and my buddies _ these three other military guys , when
the Colonel arrived
T I wa $ the oly civilian and these guys were a/1
majors They were know_ "There' 5 a colone/ coming _ So I wa $ the guy
chosen to, and I. volunteered too- Okay , we meet this guy and we bring him
in_ And I said, "Colonel here S the war room_ there are the maps _ there are
the order f battle cards _ A11 the information is cross-indexed , So if you
Iook at the cards you can find it on the map , if you Iook at the map, you ' 11
find it on the cards . We ' 11 just Ieave you here See where we went wrong .
We went off and got drunk _ And I mean drunk_ It was a bad one But anyway ,
we said, "The hell with this nonsense . I I my mi ]i buddies out of the
range of fire _ And the four Of uS went off_ We came back I think it wa $ the
next but anyway , when we came back the Colonel said something to the
effect of_ "I wouldn't have beI ieved it_ And I said__ "We didn't make it up .
It' s a/1 there : You had it in Honolulu. Everybody jn Washington has had
the same information _ We didn t make up any new stuff _ It' s the same stuff
everybody is using _ We just added it up.and you guys didn't_ That' s a/1.
Everybody was using pieces, Using the magic figure it appeared wa$ made up
some years ago. Times have changed . The enemy has doubled its strength right
under our very noses . That wa $ My one nice big session with Bi// Colby._
That' $ what we started out on _ And so that' s when we finaly sent the
messages out after this Colonel was here _ then we sent the me$ Sages which had
that 18,000_ It was a long total, but anyway . And Bi11 and I have been on a
fighting relationship ever since; I think _ I never mentioned it to him and he
never mentioned it to me again. It was done and that was it. Then: I left.
INTERVIEWER: You Ieft?
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MR _ HALPERN: Oh yeah, I left at the end of '61 we 1 1 not the end because I
arrived back in Washington. We11 even after that, Bi 11 Colby made Me in
effect the third man down in the station because he and his Deputy , Ed Barbier
who is now dead were just swamped with paper release of documents _ release
of cables_ relief of dispatches , what have you _ They were working 20 hours a
day and it was getting crazy . I said, "Bi 11 if it is one thing in the world I
can do
S
and everybody knows I can do it 35 I can move paper for you _ Get it
out of here _ And you know damn we11 you ' 11 see the ones you are supposed to
see And Iet me get rid of the junk _ 11 And so he gave Me releasing
authority_ And I sat there as a statio officer because I sa id , "Bi1] you
know my job with the military is finished. And _ yoU know what do I do
next?" He wanted Me to on and I didn't feel Tike staying on And So I
sent a wire back to Washington _ and he agreed . I sa id , in effect, "My job is
done here , I did what you asked Me to do. What is my _ next assignment?" Just
Tike that_ And finally said, "Come on back to Washington _ And I came
back to Washington and briefed everybody. But anyway ; that was my
relationship with Bi ]1 . I knew him we/1 enough then . He ' s just a different
kind of a guy . A nice guy _ Easy to talk to, easy to along with, but very
opinionated , very firm in what opinions he holds _ he holds period _ And it's
a hel of a job to try and get him to change his mind . I'11 give you a
simpie
thing. He was running air operations _ dropping agents into North Vietnam.
And one night I remember we were in the communications shack (communications
room) And he had sent an immediate" and didn t an answer The
plane was warming up on the" field, wai ting to gO . And they had to get a "yes 0
or "no" to go _ I said, "Bil) , haven t answered in over an hour for
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God S sakes _ hit them 0t Ke said, "Oh no, you can t 'do that_ "What do
you mean you can t do that? Send another message _ What the hell it doesn't
cost you anything. It doesn't hurt. TelI them you are stim standing by. I
And he said, "Weh1 they know that_ And I said, "Bil] send them a_ message _
The message could have gotten lost in Mani Ia_ II He said , "Nothing ike that
ever happens at Clark Field, 1i_ actualy. He said, "Nothing Tike that
happens WeI1 in this case it did, it actually did get lost because of the
way they had to handle, "man handle _ these tapes in those days_ And I've
been there and saw the way these guys were working, down to there skin, I
mean, they didn't have their shirts on _ even undershirts _ And it was sweaty
and hot even with the air conditioners going in those days (room air
conditioners) And these perforated tapes were around their necks and
what have One of them got lost and if it happened to be an "Ops M" then,
it wa$ too bad _
INTERVIEWER: An Ops M?
MR _ HALPERN: Operationa1 Media was the precedence _ You had "Routine_
"Priority, "Operationa1 Media sIash" some thing Iike that.
INTERVIEWER:
MR_ HALPERN: There were several routing precedences_ basica y. And we
to cal1 them Op M 'simply because you didn t want to say Operationa] media alj
the time _ And one of them got Iost. You know they weren 't "FIash"
messages , which I hope won t get lost ever _ But I finally had to convince
Bi 1 just to send another message back saying, "[ need an answer And it
took a hel1 of a Iong whi le: It took longer than it should . It took almost
two' hours for me to tell him, "Get the goddamn message out. = And we a
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message back_ and the first thing it says "Didn't get your reference
What are you talking about?" So we had to hit them again. You know expain
what happened _ And _ but that' s an example of _ He ' s reluctant_ You know=
If he s got a firm view of some thing, it's tough to get him to change his mind_
INTERVIEWER: When did you work with him again after that?
MR_ HALPERN: Oh _ actua /ly
INTERVIEWER: Saigon _
MR _ HALPERN: That wa $ '61 and I guess the next time I worked with him again
very closely was when I wa$ for three or-four months his his Exec _ When he
came back from Saigon _ and Dick make him the Executive Director Comptroller, I
had some dea/ ings with him because I wa$ the Exec in DoP and just working with
him. It wasn't that close in terms of the way I did in Saigon_ the way I did
Iater in his own office _ I just saw him the other day as a matter of fact
at a meeting I wa$ in.town _ We re stil friends _ We say hello to each
other _
INTERVIEWER: And you were his Exec for three or four months _
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah he took over from Tom in February of '73 and I was
reass igned out of his office , I think it was 73_ So it's March, April
May three months for sure and a couple Of weeks in February and a couple
of weeks in So it's roughly three, three to four months
INTERVIEWER: So: you were there when that memo was being prepared?
MR. HALPERN: Yeah _
INTERVIEWER: Uh huh _
MR . HALPERN: That' s why I keep saying, I keep telling my friends_ "You 're
blaming the wrong guy! "
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INTERVIEWER: You have reason to know_
MR_ HALPERN; Yeah . And YOU see part of my problem too was and this was true
ater when BilI took over and even that summer and Iater when he took over
as the DCI _ he was talking in terms about one Agency _ He wanted one big
Agency . He didn't want this split between DDI and DDP and the DDA and the DDS
then and now have S&T _ One big Agency . Everybody know everyth And
I said, "What are you going to tack &]1 the cables up on the bulletin
board? Put &11 the operations up on the bulletin board SO everybody can read
a/1 this stuff?" And this lasted for a ittle while, 'like a couple of months ,
I think_ And finally it even finally began to s ink in on a guy cal led Bi /
Colby_ Jesus_ there have to be some compartmentations somewhere _ And
we ve got to stop a/1 this, everybody know everything. He wanted one Agency ,
one Agency . AI does not run a - That was part of Turner S prob lem. Read
Turner S book _ And read my review Of Turner S book if_you haven t. I'11 give
you a copy . Turner could never understand it He cou Idn t understand why he
had a11 these different Directorates , which he for some crazy reason ca/led
branches _ And he still talks about it as branches He didn't understand that
they're simply separate activities: Each one of those things _ except the DDA ,
can be its Own independent Agency. Literally. And the DDA s imply supplies
the men money , materia] the three m' s) for everybody _ And at one time_ at
Ieast in the early days = 80-85% of what the DDA did for a iving, did for
the DDP
INTERVIEWER: That high a percentage?
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah and that was before DdS&T came along _
INTERVIEWER: Right ,
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MR_ HALPERN: And [ said, in those days I said , II] We 11, why the hel don 't we
just absorb them_ make them part of US you know, as part of our command?"
And that Ied to another big hoorah but we never did command _ But
did. Eighty-five percent of their activity was for uS
INTERVIEWER: Did you , at the time Bi11 Colby was talking about oe big
Agency .
MR . HALPERN: 73 , 74 _
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, why?
MR_ HALPERN: WeI1 because of what we were talking about before_ The
difference of views the different' cultures involved, in both: what the
collector and the analysts_ And then of course you had, the new thing caled
technicians technical peop le which is a
totally different aspect,
even
for uS' in the DDP Our technicians were our TSD types Or the commo. types
And we did some SIGInT of our Own and that kind of stuff _ but with the use Of
the commo guy , the operators of the machines . We weren't into overhead
reconnaissance and things Tike that, for God ' s sakes _ and other black box
activities_ except even the black boxes , they asked us to deliver in
parts of the worid. We: had to do the drops we had to get them in either by
hook or by crook and things Tike that into the right Iocation and &/1 that
kind of stuff _ So there wa $ a marriage there _ But basically, as I said , each
one of these three Directorates could honestly , and you could come up with
rationale for making separate Agencies of each one of them _ And So when
Bi ]1 talks about one Agency , one big 'fami ly , he wa $ trying to merge us a/1
together and make us Tike Turner says in his book , he wanted to make
everybody be able to do everybody else S job _ WeI,1 that is kind of silly.
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And as I point,out in my review of his book I said, "You don' t take an
artilery officer and make a
submarine captain out of him. Or vice versa_
Sure_ you can do it over a
period of training, but if a guy wants to be a sub
captain, he goe s into the sub service _ He doesn't join the artillery. And
01 vice versa And I said, "You know_ people are not that changeable."
INTERVIEWER: Were you surprised when Colby tried to' do this?
MR_ HALPERN: No_ Not really. I am never surprised at anything Bi 11 Colby
wants to do_ Never _
INTERVIEWER: And that dates back to '562
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah . That dates back to 56 . And I wasn't the oly FE officer
who saw it in 56 _ Be I ieve me
INTERVIEWER: Is that right? That early on?
MR_ HALPERN: You could it. We did_ I am not unique in this. Talk to
some of the old FE hands and see what they tell you . Just don't take it from
Me
INTERVIEWER: How. about the _ we Wimi come back to that Iater how about, did
you have much of anything to do with the Rockefel er Commi ssion?
MR. HALPERN: No . I didn't have anything at al1: None of it_ I read their
report. I'11 show you my copy _ It' $ a /1 marked Up _ They've got So much
misinformation in there , it' s 'not even funny. I mean , even they're screwed
up_ I mean the nature of the business _ It's Tike Robin Winks , he 5 a Iot
of misinformation in there, Ranelagh got a Iot of misinformation _ People just
can't If I wrote a book , I'd have a lot of things wrong if I
started to go outside of things I persona]ly know about _ You know , a11
can do is conjecture_ And how do you sort the wheat from the chaff? You are
going to have a he H1 of a job _
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INTERVIEWER: I think So _ How about moving towards the Hearings _ One
writer said about Mr Colby that Mr Colby bel ieved salvation for the Agency
Iay in cooperation with the Investigations , while other intelligence
professionals thought intelligence secrets were forever _
MR_ HALPERN: I'm with the second group.
INTERVIEWER: You are with the second group
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah. And I wiu) refer you to Colby' $ own book in which he says
this is before the Church Committee wa s created January the ISth_ 1975 .
Colby went to testify in public before the , I think it wa $ the Armed Services
it might have been' Appropriations I forget now_ T think it wa$ Russel1 Or
Vinson, I forget the exact person _ But anyway , and he says in his book after
he testified, after he testified in which he exposed for the first time even
though the Iaw didn t require him to do that, by the Iaw , as a matter Of fact,
you " re supposed keep secret the organizational structure and breakdown Of
CIA_ Colby blew it the first time exposed 'the whole organizationa
structure in ic and went far beyond even that for the first time in public
testimony . And he says in his book _ on the way back from the Him going to
his office in Langley , it suddenly dawned on him that he might stop off at the
White House and alert them to what 'he has. just done so .that the news doesn't
hit them cold_ And in my book , that in effect damned the helI out Of Bil1
Because as a serving: officer, as a serving DCI _ his first port of cal ]
even before he went near the Hiul wouId have been to go into the President' s
office, I don t care who the President his boss and say , Boss , this is
what I've been asked to do, this 1s what I intend to do. Is it with
He never did. By the time it got to the White House . it was too Iate
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to do any kind of damage control or approach it a totally different and
the President may not have wanted to, because Ford wasn t the strongest guy in
the world . may not have wanted him to say anything. He may have wanted him to
invoke Executive immunity Or whatever But Colby by doing what he did , by
testifying first, cut the feet out from under: the President_ The Pres ident
had no choice except to continue _ And after that Colby just went on and on
and on and on and on And never held back_ And he had every reason to hold
back_ particularly in the public hearings _ Executive hearings, 'it might have
been different . But in public hearings _ you know_ in 'my book he went far far
beyond what he needed to do-
INTERVIEWER: Was there ever any talk' when these .
MR_ HALPERN: And I wa$ out of the Agency by then _
INTERVIEWER: You were out?
MR _ HALPERN: By '75 .
INTERVIEWER: When the ma terials were gathered , "Family Jewels_ ever any talk
about why that didn't get over to the White House Or apparently he had
briefed , he Colby, had briefed some committee, but did not finl the White
House in_
MR _ HALPERN: I don t know_ I don t know_ I was back in the Agency in
January 75, because I retired December 31 , 74 . My sidekick and buddy ,
Seymour Bo] ton who is now dead, unfortunately, may he rest in peace , a |so
retired December 31 , 74_ but he went back to work right after the new year _
To start, we didn't' know that a Church Committee and he didn t know that a
Church Committee was being created and what have you _ but he knew that there
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was going to be prob Iems in terms of the two Hersh articles _ And Seymour
convinced severa| of the powers that be in the Agency, including Bill, and
then he finally convinced Me to come on back to the Agency to help out,
pulling together the stuff_ because they kind of felt that I knew where the
pOOp was_ I knew roughly 'where it was hidden, perhaps even what safe it wa $
and maybe what the he] 1 the color of the paper was _ And So I agreed to
come back and So I wa $ in there in January of 75 and stayed on until about
March, I think, maybe 'April 75 when it dawned on Me that this is silly, a
waste of time on my because I was getting responses to my queries from
a/1 the Directorates , I mean , I was getting substantive responses from &l1 the
Directorates except: one the DDO_ And I knew damn we /1 where the hel1 the
information was that they had the information _ In most cases I did. And I
wa sn t getting it. And the rationale I was given by several Of the officers
in the DDO was that = "We re not sure" or roughly ike this
33 "We re not
sure what Bi 11 Colby is going to do with this information . We . don 't trust
him_ What do want comment for?" So I mentioned this a couple of times to
Bi ]1 and he kind of said, okay.' I thought , "This is crazy _ And I
finally wrote him
a Ietter and I sent it to his home not to the office_
because I know what the hel/ happens with paper shuffl Because I've done
'enough of it in my And I said to Bi]I , "I quit for a s imple
reason _ You are no longer the DCI I said, "I agree with the guys in the
DDO in that nobody knows what you are going to do with this information . But
in my book you are still the -commanding officer _ And it is up to us as troops
to give you the information `you ask for What yOU do with it 's up to you
It i5 conscience not ours _ So since you are not acting as the DCI and
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insi sting that you get the information you need or you want, there S no point
in me hanging around . I'm retired and I'm going out of your life. t( And I
walked out _
INTERVIEWER: My goodness . Was it Scotty Miler also, didn't he retire in
December?
MR_ HALPERN: 31 1974 and Bi 11 Hood did too and Rocca did too We ! 1 a
Iot of' guys went out . I think there were over 200 of us from the DDO that
went out December 31 _ 1974 . Largely , there was a Iot of reasons but one of
the big reasons was the fact of the numbers _ the retirement numbers . Just
turned out to be right because there was a big increase coming up and if you
eft by that date you got a Iittle bit extra and that kind of stuff . So
everybody wa Iked out at the same time _ I was surprised when I the figures
from the retirement people what the hel1 I would be getting _ So I figured I
might as we11 go out in December then, too_ And this -was long before the
Hersh articles appeared that we our papers in.
INTERVIEWER: That you had made your decision?
MR_ HALPERN: Yes _ we a /1 did. Of course you had to have your papers in at a
certain time anyway . And in my case _ see , I wa sn t on the CIARDs initially.
And I had to write a special memorandum to try to convince the powers that be
in DDO and in personne/ and in the Director 5 Office that the things I had
done which were not overseas I didn't have enough to qualify_
I had to explain and get their approval for the activities I had done earlier
done a Iot of it in the States _ even while serving in Washington to equate
X number of years abroad that I needed _ And I forget the exact figures. But
anyway , and that paper had to be in long before the Hersh article
appeared . And Iow and behold , they wanted to get rid of people and I was a_
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super grade _ I wa$ a GS-17 . They figured would another slot_ and So
they Iet Me go _ made Me a member of CIARDS . And as a result of being
CIARDS when I told the retirement people what would happen ' if I was CIARDS ,
then they gave me a new figure on my retirement which went up by a goodIy
proportion_ 1 said , "I have no idea .
INTERVIEWER: What is CIARDS?
MR . HALPERN: CIARDS is that Central Intell igence Agency Retirement and
Disability System
INTERVIEWER:
MR_ HALPERN: C-I-A-R-D-S . It' s the name of the bi]) in 1964 which set up
this earlier retirement for certain people with certain qual ifying service:
And So it's called CIARDS _ And I can take it right out of the. title of the
act _ It has been amended a number Of times since then _
INTERVIEWER: What wou Id yOU say the' most difficult demands were in conducting
the Congressiona] investigations in '75 as you may have sensed at the time?
MR_ HALPERN: Sensed is a good word and aIso when I testified. I aIways felt
that when proper people in Congress ask questions _ you gave them the answers
That'$ why I'm opposed to this 01lie North/Pointexter nonsense and: what
did was wrong in the way you; know_ handled the Congress_ And Bi ]1 Casey
wa$ wrong on that_ Congress_ for or bad _ for good or evil are the
ones who set it up _ are the ones who make ` the rules . You ve got to live
by. the rules . Otherwise d' have chaos _ And so the biggest prob Iem I
felt, and stim feel ' today _ and felt at the time that I wa S testifying, is
that yeah _ I am giving you 'the. truth and it is up to you, Mr Congress to
keep that informatio privileged. I don ' t want it al1 over the street. And
one of the worst things that I thought that Frank Church did was after every
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single executive session up on the Hil including the
one I was at, he had a
television show right after the meeting broke up _ were waiting for him
outside the door with cameras and |ights . And we you and I as American
citizens for a11 0f the electricity involved because were al1
plugged into the wa / 1s . But I saw it there as I came out _ Fortunately,
nobody ever stopped me going ut _ I don t know what the hel I what it was ,
but maybe it was because I looked so nondescript. or so ignorant or 'whatever ,
because when I Ieft that meeting, I thought there were in the hall and
walked right by them. And they were waiting for some big shot: and I wasn't a
big shot . A ittle shot_ or a Iittle punk anyway . And I wa lked: wa Iked
'right by them, stepping over a11 the Wires and a/1 their; Iegs because
were sitting there Ieaning against the wa /1 Tike this, you know and snoring
some of them_ And I went into the men S room _ and I didn't have on my award
pin from the Agency and had just an ordinary dumb oldblue suit, [ think it
wa S _ And I went right by them, went into the. john did my business 'came out,
wa Iked by them the other way , and got out of there _ And that night I see
Frank Church on televisio teling .about al1 this stuff had just heard.
Not once he never mentioned my name My name was never mentioned except_ I
was told Iater in the Iate edjtion_ a Iate city edition of The New_York Times
in York , in one of the stories my name appeared . And I was in the
executive session . Nobody should have known my name Somebody gave somebody ,
somebody inside gave somebody outside _ my name And it wa $ there on one
Tine _ Except I have gone to Iook at The New York_Times index a couple of
times and they've got my name Msted in that year , 75 , but the page number is
a /1 wrong . So it' s one of those historical things that you wiml never find.
You' 11 never find it unless you know exactly where to Iook_ The index wiul
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not Iead you to my name even though it says that you should find it there .
It's not the oly time I have had trouble with The New_York_Times index _ So
when you talk about the biggest prob lem, the biggest: prob lem is security and
Ieaks _ That is the biggest em on the Hil] And the Hil), I think_ is
beginning to real ize that maybe they have_ and I think the more they talk
about the joint committee with a sma H1 professiona/ staff they wiml be going
in the right direction_ I've argued for it and have written about that_
about a single committee, a joint committee _ for years now and maybe they' 11
get to it. It' s going to be tough but maybe they'11 to it_
INTERVIEWER: What was your feel ing in the executive session in which you were
be questioned?
MR _ HALPERN: I felt that I wa$ deal with a bunch of nincompoops and idiots.
INTERVIEWER: On the part f the staff?
MR_ HALPERN: Staff and the Senators present_ Goldwater was the oly one that
I thought had a feel for what was going on _ Schweiker wa $ an ass
Huddleston and Monda le were totaly incompetent on this particular subject_
maybe because he wa $ new _ I testified In June of '75 . I would have thought
by that time would have gotten some briefings from their Own staff as to
what the heI1 was going on About what wa $ going on _ I'1 give you an
example _ I mentioned somewhere along the way , I forget What the specific
was
but I mentioned something about female case Officers _ And I was interrupted ,
by Monda le and Huddleston with kind of a learing kind of a question _ "And
what do female officers do?" I just Iooked at him and I said, "What any other
case officer does _ do exactly the same thing. No more , no less .
re Chiefs of Station, they're Deputy Chiefs of Station_ they're ordinary
Case Officers , pound the street, they write reports, they handle paper
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do everything everybody else does _ recruit people. They handIe
people, they manipulate people . What else did you expect them to d0?" You
know_ the whole approach wa $ , "Fema Ie case officers?" That really set Me off
and if I hadn t been constrained to where I was , I would have realy Iet go in
my better language and I didn't. I tried to hold off _
INTERVIEWER: How did they happen to have you come and testify?
MR HALPERN: I don t know for sure _ I think it was because He Ims wa $ being
ca lled back so many times for the various committees , that he was almost ike
a yo-yo from Teheran as Ambassador And I think he practically had a commuter
ticket on some of the airlines the way he was coming back and forth And on
one of his he asked Me to brief him, and Tom Karamessines , a matter of
fact_ about the background on the Cuban Missile Crisis and some of the
activities during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The whole Operation MONGOOSE
thing. Particularly MONGOOSE which was very hot at that particular point.
And a few other 'details_ The brass isn't suppose to remember details _ That' s
what they guys Iike me around for That S what I for . So I
talked to Dick and talked to Tom and gave them as much as I could. And I just
guessed that somewhere alog the way in their private discussion or private
testimony the stuff that wa sn t the public stuff _ before you get in front of
the public television and what have you Dick must have said or Tom must have
said, "and if you want any more detai l get a hold of Sam. 1i Or something Iike
that, I guess And So sure enough , I get the ca/1 I didn't care _ I
nothing to hide _ Because I'm proud of what I did al1 these years _ And So if
they don 't Tike it, that s tough . Change the system. And that' s how I think
I got picked . And I remember when the Church Committee began , one of my
retired col eagues _ and his wife who is a Iso a retired col eague = his wife wa $
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on the Committee staff _ She arranged a dinner party with severa| of the new
staff types this is the Church Committee not the Pike Committee _ Seymour
Bolton called the Pike Committee guys a bunch of young whippersnapper ,
snot-nosed kids_ ReaHly _ The staff on the Church Committee was a ittle bit
better . Anyway , at this dinner party, my wife came along too_ But anyway , [
wa$ the target of the night, obviously, and everybody zeroed in on Me before
dinner and after dinner and everything else_ In terms to the approach to this
whole business , where do we go from here and how _ And I pointed out that
were in a
totally different environment than they' ve ever been before ,
teling them this wa $ a different kind of a game _ and [ said, "You are going
to be surprised at the fact that you are not going to find very much paper
around And you are not going to find: whole treatises Tike yoU do in aw
cases and what have you _ And I said, "You are going to see my name and my
initials on. Iiteraly thousands of pieces %f paper _ But I'd be willing to bet
re 'not going: to find more than a smattering of any substance before that
initial Or before that name are going to find a/1 kinds of references to
as we discussed' and why don ' t we talk about this' and you know Iet' s see
what we:can do about this' why don t we talk about this some t ime in the
future You are going to find very meaningless comments 01 And the guy said ,
"Don t you guys ever anything in writing?" I said can but if we can
avoid it, no _ And: he said, "Well, how do you get approvals for projects?"
And I said, "You te a project, and that you 11 find . You 11 find lots of
stuff lots of projects that we did_ Some of them are one pagers some of them
are ten pages . But that S not what makes the whole place operate And the
whole purpose wa $ to try to get me _ I suppose to tel them how to find things
and what to Iook for know I don t have to tell them. . First of a/1 ,, I
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wasn't witting there under oath _ in the first place - And: when I under
oath_ yeah I told them the truth. They didn't Tike to hear it. I into a
big shouting contest_ with a guy ca] led Gary Hart_ was sitting in the
background_ He wasn't even 'he was sitting with the staff_ as :& matter of
fact. I guess that was . part of his popularism or something. And he made some
remark in the back there and I shouted back at him. I didn't give a damn . I
made some remark about the Operatio MONGOOSE we were talking about at the
time and I said this was _ as far as I was concerned , this wa s American foreign
icy made by the President _ And this voice in the back_ I Iater found out
it was Gary Hart, said something about_ we]1 that doesn' t make American
foreign icy _ 11 I sa id, far as I m concerned if the President says that
is what we are doing and the Attorney General agrees , that 1 S what we are
doing_ That s, foreign pol icy _ Ii You know_ and Church cut off _
INTERVIEWER: Was Mathias there, do you remember at al12
MR _ HALPERN: Yes _ yes he was there _ He didn t bother Me much . I think it
wa$ Mac that was there_ I know Schweiker was there and I know Goldwater was
there .
INTERVIEWER: Tower?
MR_ HALPERN: Yes , Tower wa $ there _ He didn't say much .
INTERVIEWER: No_
MR_ HALPERN: It was mostly Church and , of : course , F.A.0_ Schwarz as the Staff
Director Yeah , that wa$ a funny one too_ I'd been called to talk to Schwarz
on the Staff first in the morning;
a crack of dawn kind of .thing. And I
down there _ And this wa$ ih. the old, oh, what the he/1 is the building, the
Senate building, not the Rayburn Building, the other one
INTERVIEWER: Cannon?
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MR . HALPERN: No_ No_ The one next to the it' s on the corner _ Big
building, before they built the Hart Building_ We/1 I forget. It wa $ the
guy who came up with that
S
from Indiana ,_ I think it was, or [linois
T "
but
anyway , had taken over the audi torium in that building and they were a
so-caled secure area _ They had safes and what have you a/1 over the place
and had taken the seats out and what have you . And 1 wa $ in there _ [
went in there . talking to Schwarz and some Of his cohorts, then suddenly out
of the clear blue sky he. says , "We] 1 _ let' s waIk over to the Capitol
BuiIding_ The Committee is going to g into session and want to talk to
yoU . And I said, "You mean just Tike that?" He said, "Yeah , you got nothing
to hide, have you? II And I said, I got nothing to hide. m He said, "Yeah _
I was thinking you might as we] 1 go and talk to them directly _ So after
spending a couple of hours with Schwarz and company , I was ushered across the
street and we wa Iked a/1 the way over to the Capitol Bui Iding and went up to
the fourth floor or whatever it wa $ and .testified that night . I was told to
stand up , and sworn and we went to town
INTERVIEWER: And you didn't know that you were going to do that before? Oh
my _
MR . HALPERN: I had no chance to talk to a Iawyer or anything Iike that: Not
that I cared . It didn't bother me _ But it wa$ a Iousy way to do business _
and it wasn't according to the rules at the time because I had the rule book _
procedures , and what have you and it wasn't what I was supposed to be able to
do_ And were supposed to give Me a notice for that and that kind of
stuff . But I didn't want to stop the proceedings _
INTERVIEWER: Was it a very long session that you were in?
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah , it was al1
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INTERVIEWER: The executive?
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah, it was the executive session . I think it waS _ I don 't
know several hours . I mean _ I out Iate in the afternoon . After five
0'clock Or Iater _
INTERVIEWER: Bil1 Mi er involved at a/1?
MR_ HALPERN: Bi ]1 was there Bi11 wa$ there . And Schwarz wa$
there, and a lot of the other staffers were in the back_ That S why I thought
Gary Hart wa $ a member of the staff He was sitting with the staffers_ And
it shouid have dawned on Me that a staffer wouIdn t have dared shout that way
across the heads of the guys in front of him the Senators_ And Schwarz was
at the table , too_ But the rest of the guys were in the back _ Why Hart
sat in the back I'M1 never know to this
INTERVIEWER: Did you have any impression that what you had said in that
session went beyond that session?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh yeah _ Because T started to open up on MONGOOSE , on Ed
Lansdale 5 connection _ and the fact that this wa $ not a CIA operation,
regardless of what anybody might want to tell them_ that it wa $ a
government-wide operation and it was run right out of Robert Kennedy' $ office ,
by Robert Kennedy , and even Landsdale was not in charge _ He was the chief of
staff to Kennedy_ Robert Kennedy. It wa $ run right out of Kennedy' $ office
and Robert and Jack Kennedy were one practically, and that McCone McNamara
and Rusk had each refused to go along with one of Landsdale' s ideas that even
Kennedy couldn t force on them_ And that wa $ origina ly, Landsdale 's idea
for MONGOOSE was for each Of the agencies in town to detail men , money, and
material out of the Agency to what amounts to a new MONGOOSE agency under
Landsdale and Kennedy _ And McCone wa $ the first to have said, "He ] 1 no . " He
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said, "That money wa $ appropriated by Congress under my command my
responsibility. It stays with Me We 11 work with you and we 11 he lp you and
we 11 be part of your team kind of thing. But I can't rel inquish control over
men, money , and ma terial as appropriated to me _ m And McNamara said the same
thing 'and Rusk said the same thing so that they didn t achieve creating
a
brand new Agency in effect _ And this was a]1 brand new to the guys sitting
around that table. It might not have been new to Schwarz who seemed to
understand some thing about Landsdale" S role, because when I started to talk
about Landsdale being in command and being in direct communication with us and
issuing orders directly in the name of Kennedy , etc. etc._ I remember Church
saying to Schwarz "Is General Landsdale avai lable anywhere?" And Schwarz
saying some thing, "Yes sir_ We have tracked him down he ives in. I think
he said Falls Church or some thing. He Tives in Virginia anyway , "and we re
trying to in touch with him to have him come here And a little Iater on
he did come and testify. But this was seen Iike: brand new stuff to them.
This was June mind yoU . And one of the things were after was Rogue
Elephant running operatios against Cuba _ And it had been tten about te
a bit and a/1 that kind of stuff _ And they didn t have a clue _ And they
didn't Tike the idea' that _ as far as I wa $ concerned , the Kennedy were in
charge _ And they were running the war And we were fighting a war aga inst
Cuba , undeclared or otherwise , but we were fighting a war I said if we were
sending people in to create sabotage activities inside Cuba we were blowing
things up, people got ki led on both sides, on their side and our s ide And I
said that' s when I into a fight with Hart. [ remember that now And
that wa $ foreign pol as far as I wa$ concerned . And that' s Hart said, "It
wasn't, the Congressman is involved . " I said, "The hell with that. " I said
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Congress was providing the money. And we didn't create our own money - We
didn't create our Own weapons _ And knew what we were doing And SO,
that was, I remember now , that wa$ the fight with Hart.
INTERVIEWER: And did the issue whether John F. Kennedy knew about
a]1 these activities?
MR . HALPERN: Yeah, with me as far as I was concerned. Yeah , [ said I assume
that the Attorney General reported to the President and Landsdale reported and
Landsda le did not Ieave his office He wa $ in General Erskine' $ office in the
Pentagon _ And he didn't Ieave his office _ He stayed. there physically and in
that office but he directed activities from there i0 the name of the President
and the Attorney General That was MONGOOSE I said . And it is a/1 written
up now in the Church Report_ They finally got
a ]1 the stuff straight, pretty
much straight_ There are some errors in it. But I try to correct them_ It
doesn 't always work . But that was, one of the things that bothered me the
Senators themselves were being Ied around as usua ]ly are, I think, by the
staff_ don t have . enough time in the day I suppose to do a/1, of these
things _ And the staff even by June _ is just beginning to get their feet wet
on something Tike this _ And they were ook ing into ther operations . One was
an Indonesian operation which was brought under Eisenhower S aegis . And I
think they were hoping to use that again as another example of a Rogue
Elephant _ But my 'own feel ing, and never talked to me about that_
although they should have _ They talked to a lot of other people and I guess
they figured by the time they talked to enough peop le didn t have to talk
to Me because the record on that is so complete You talk about paper Now
that one we had plenty of paper on _ because everything was done by cables and
memos And it was So complete and So accurate_ in terms of starting with the
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President' s approval Eisenhower S approva] and a/1 the things that we did
through the then 5412 Committee _ and the 'papers on that were clear _ and a/1
the cable traffic was clear that figured there was no way were
going to pin that On CIA as a CIA operation because that was aga in , State_ CIA
and Defense a11 working as a team_ We were carrying the ma in Ioad at that
Ievel but everybody wa $ involved. No question. And a/ 1 the record was
there _ So I guess they couldn t use that as a Rogue Elephant operation_ The
reason they hit the MONGOOSE one I think, wa $ because _ Cuba being Cuba the
assassination efforts and that kind of stuff they had to keep it back.
INTERVIEWER: And it seemed to me that there was some mention along the way
that the_Agency was not going to cal/ back people from retirement to
participate in the investigations .
MR _ HALPERN: That 1 S correct_ And the Agency did nothing to help anybody_
even serving officers without giving them any Iega / assistance were
told to 'go get their Own awyers _
INTERVIEWER: They didn t support?
MR _ HALPERN: And that also broke the Band Of Brothers and there wasn't
anything Ieft by then _ This waS 75 now _ But the Agency made it very clear
in their memoranda and the: Notices _ the Headquarters Notices they issue to a]]
emp loyees that you are On your own you get own lawyers _ etc: _ etc. You
no help from the Agency . Which wa $ not true in the old days. Not true at
a]1. There wa $ a
completely adversarial relationship that was developed .
INTERVIEWER: So no Tega 1 support.
MR_ HALPERN: None whatsoever _ You can, hel1, go ask Paul to you the old
Notices' that was put out on the Committee_ No Iega] support whatsoever _ Not
even advice. Colby released everybody from their oaths by the way B s
from
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their secrecy oaths in terms of testifying to Congress _ We ]1 _ hell , first of
a/ 1 I think that wa$ a silly thing to do because when you ,' even the oath
itself that you sign , the secrecy oath _ Iook at the one you s igned . It
doesn t say anyting about withholding anything from Congress . In addition to
which Congress has made` it very crystal clear in the Iaws passed since
then that nothing in here is to' imply in any 'way you were to withhold any
information from Congress _ through duly authorized Congressiona] requests
Correct_
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR _ HALPERN: So he shouldn t have issued that one about releas ing you from
your oath when testifying before Congress. That' s nonsense utter nonsense _
INTERVIEWER: And I imagine the peop]e were really, I suppose , surprised that
they didn't get any Iega]
MR _ HALPERN: Oh,' very much surprised. Particularly the retirees _ Every time
a retiree , you know_ tried to get in touch with the Agency to get some kind of
he |p or guidance, what do I say , what do I don ' t say . You nothing . You
were on your own
INTERVIEWER: Were there any Iawsuits that you were involved in?
MR _ HALPERN: No_ There were lots of Iawsuits that other people were in. I
think Tom K's estate is still involved in severa] and I think Dick HeIms is
involved in severa/ So on, there goes it_ I cal led them the kook cases _ but
they are Iega 1 cases _
INTERVIEWER: And . they are rea1 _
MR_ HALPERN: And ' they are rea1 And are going through courts and what
have yoU _ no question about that The courts have not thrown them out_ But
in terms of testifying before the Congress , a Iot of the people were called
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in. Like me I'd never testified before Congress_
INTERVIEWER: It was your.first time
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah . First time And so far my only time thank the Lord_ But
I don t care about going before them again- wa Ik on water they don't
waIk on water any more than I do_ And the old story about they put on their
pants one leg at a time Tike I do _ WeH what the hell
INTERVIEWER: Did they contact you at a/1 after the Hearing relative to any of
the testimony?
MR . HALPERN: No_ No_ You are given copies of the testimony and then you are
a / lowed to make corrections on it because: a . the tape doesn t aIways work
and b the guy who is istening and talks into it doesn 't always get it_ And
sometimes the repartee is so fast nothing can catch it. And that happened
with my argument with Gary Hart_ That is totally missing from the written
record. But you know SO, Iife goes on _ But that is what you and then
you are a/ lowed to adjust it and send it back or you can take it back and
argue with them, or what have you.
INTERVIEWER: didn't give any indication that you might have to come to a
public hearing?
MR _ HALPERN: No. I'm not big enough for that_ I'm a/1 over the Church
Committee Report . I'm Tisted as the "Executive Officer to" or the "Executive
Assistant to" or whatever phraseology _ And that has been blown by Tom Powers
and God knows how many ther people _ I didn t blow it but a lot of other
people did. it doesn' t take long to two and two together
INTERVIEWER: How about some people say that the intelligence
col lection and analysis were seriously impaired during the year of
investigatio because of the man hours spent in preparing and transmitting
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responses to the committees . Did you
MR . HALPERN: I wasn t in there So I can't say . But I would say based upon
what I know about the bureaucracy, it had to have a bad impact, a very adverse
impact on : a the morale of the people, b _ the initiative of the people _
which goes to zero or Iess than zero, you know why should I stick my neck out
kind of thing. It' s got to then' badly impact on any prospective agent you
might want to recruit. A foreigner S to have rocks 'in his head to be
willing to work for the US Government these days in a clandestine capacity _
And if I were a Case Officer .today , I'd have to.think about the sanity of the
guy I am trying to recruit. Doesn t he read the newspapers? Doesn' t he watch
television? In my day , we were able to protect the identities of a source _
Really protect the identity of a source _ And there were really, Titerally, no
more than a handful of people who knew the true name of an individual They
might know something about the guy' s background _ his capabilities , his access,
that kind of stuff _ A person' mjght never ask but even if they did it would go
in one ear and out the other _ We usua ly 'referred to sources by their
cryptonyms _ And that was good enough for uS And that a /1 the way up to
Director True names were things that you just don't talk about_ And So in
this and age though , I 'm not sure can protect the true name of an
individual _ [ was told, this is a/1 hearsay , I was told that during the
Carter administration that true names of agents were requested by and given to
staff members of the White House staff _ They obviously had the authority to
ask for it and somebody gave it to them_ [ don t know often that wa $
done _ but it was done enough _ The mere fact that the cryptonym_ mind yu the
cryptonym, Of Hussein King Hussein, from Jordan was front page of The
Washington Post and that scared the pants off them_ And , that was early on in
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the Carter administration_ That scared the pants off Carter and , what the
he/1 was his name F
Jody Powe 1 1 who wa$ the press officer and Brzezinski
to the point where they even made public statements about, you know_ you ' ve
to protect al1 this kind of relationships and what have you and what have
Where Senator Moynihan said Jimmy Carter suddenly discovered CIA_ which
he campaigned against. You remember his litany about Watergate _ Vietnam and
CIA were of Jimmy Carter' s campaign 1 itany. Then Moynihan said some thing
to the effect Of: "Jimmy Carter despite the campa ign , has suddenly
discovered that the CIA is now his . You know_
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR_ HALPERN: But , I think, so when you are talking about the impact inside
and the impact on operations_ Iet alone what you do i0 terms of the amount of
paperwork that had to be generated to supply the requests from the Hiul God ,
we 11_ Scott Breck inridge _ I guess you want to talk to him about that?
INTERVIEWER: Yes I wiml.
MR _ HALPERN: Scott and Seymour Bo]ton were the team and they had a staff_
And it was created by Walt Elder _ was part of that, to help funne] papers to
and from the Hiul And that became an industry a11 of its Own _ I M sure , I
mean_ just without even having been there , I know enough about the bureaucracy
as to how it works _ And it had to be And it wa $ a continuing operation.
And it creates a helI of a Iot of trouble among the troops and the secretaries
and the clerks and everybody else involved . You don t have time to do
anything else _ So how do you carry on the job of collecting intelligence?
INTERVIEWER: Was there any; in Iast year or two with the Agency , that
you knew of comments by intelligence services of other countries?
indication that they were becoming anxious or apprehensive about
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MR. HALPERN: Just the bare beginnings of that because you see the Freedom
of Information Act wasn't actua/Iy amended until '74 and didn t go into effect
until_ I think it was_ December of 74. Just as I was getting ready to
Ieave _ And we a / 1 knew that was going to be a problem. rea] prob Iem. And
it became a prob Iem. A11 you ve got to do is read the testimony of George
John McMahon Admiral Inman _ WeH you can go through the old great
hearings _ The amount of bad impact adverse impact _ it had with various
intelh igence services around the worId . Particularly our old friends And
I M sure it's gotten worse rather than better_ With books ike Woodward' s
book and So on and the continuing Ieaks. But I must say from where I sit on
the outside and I am only guessing, most of the Ieaks seem to come from the
Executive Branch of government. I'm not just talking the White House but I 'm
talking the whole slew at a/1 Ievels rather than the Him The Him has got
its prob lems but the Hil1 is doing more in terms of protecting itself _ and
protecting the information that'$ given than the Executive Branch has been
able to do_
INTERVIEWER: More recently?
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah_ And over the Iast ten years . It' s te clear_ You
just you know_ you .do 'this with a sixth sense and a feel ing_ You can
tel1 what S right and what 5 wrong and what' s true and what' s false . More or
You can't be totally right but you get a pretty good estimate or a feel
on this thing. And me the Executive Branch is a rotten sieve a 1
over the place _ Much worse than in my day.
INTERVIEWER: Is that right?
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MR _ HALPERN: Oh It' s not just Me or My guys , it's a / 1 the way through
the government. The Executive Branch everybody talks, that' $ a/1 . On a/1
kinds of stuff It's not just_
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, we re going to come back to that.
MR_ HALPERN: AII right It' s not just one Agency _ By a long shot_ And I
think the Hil_ is making better strides on this and think they are beginning
to realize and have for a number of years , a number of them anyway _ Even what
I told you about Huddleston _ You know_ you Members the Congress _ trust us as
your surrogates_ We I1 that' s a step forward. Instead of trusting 535
guys _ you gonna trust 135 . We |1_ that' $ a big step forward _ And I say 135
because I am adding up staffs as we]1 as members Of Houses and both
committees _ And don ' t forget, and people
S
most 0f them do forget _ that
in addition to the two intelligence committees _ you stil) have Appropriations
in,both Houses, you have Armed Services in both houses, and still
jurisdictionally ain't going to give up. But they get clued in about what' s
going on_ but it's far more than just a two bit Ieak. Remember that.
INTERVIEWER: In practice .
MR_ HALPERN: In practice _ Don t kid yourself. Far more people know and
are better they are beginning to Iearn, they are handl ng themselves much
better have control of the stuff _ Look at the Iran/Contra stuff
ittle stuff Ieaked from the Hil). What you ve is what want you to
are controlling that stuff . we ] 1 indeed . are
controlling the pieces of paper = are control the reproduction
machines _ the xeroxes and &11 that kind of stuff_ Much' better than the
Executive Branch is doing. Yeah , sure, are a sma / ler group _ know
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they've 18 or 19 thousand people on the Himl to begin with and it's a
heH1 of a ` lot better than what CIA must have: at Ieast 16,000 probably _
Alone _ So Iook at the Pentagon _ Iook at: the State Department _
INTERVIEWER: Isn't it interesting that time after time when one talks about
Ieaks Or when one reads about it, frequently an article in newspaper stories_
the Congress is oftentimes the bad guy , the executive department is not very
bad.
MR . HALPERN: WeI;, that' s why I'd take another Iook at that article and it
Ieaked the information in it and read it again _ And sometimes you wonder
it probably didn't come from the Congress, because are tightening
up _ Not every staff member_ for example, on the committees has access to a|1
the information anymore. That S been true te a while _ Not every
Senator or Congressman can come and we11 better not' take anything
away from the Hil None of them can: take even their_notes away _ They' re not
supposed to make notes of what the hel1 are reading _ So the days of
Iooseness up on the Hi]] have long. since gone on this' kind of stuff .
INTERVIEWER: There have been some , rea / improvements on it_
MR_ HALPERN: They have Iearned the hard way _ And they really mean it. And
real ize that their Own reputations 'are at stake Which I think has a big
thing going for it_ And I hope they get to a joint committee someday , and
remember that the House committee staff in effect_ a sma ] 1 professiona/
staff now_ It" S not run the way the Senate committee is run_ It's a sma | Ier
group , they' ve been there a longer time and the staff director_ Latimer Tom
Latimer has been there from the beginning _ It's his second career _ I knew
Tom when he was one Of the guys up On the seventh floor in the Agency and over
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at the Whi te House with Kissinger _ And he worked his way up, but anyway , that
is another story. But he ' s been there as a pro, minding his P's and Q' s. He
has a very sma 1 1 staff . I think there are a tota] of a dozen people, a/1
told_ They are a]1 pros I mean _ former professionals from oe agency or
another _ Which is unlike the Senate committee which is stinl more or Iess
beholden to each Senator and the staff guy really 1s a Senator S appointee .
And the staff director doesn't have much control over him_ It' $ a different
story. So it Winl give yoU some - thing to watch_ And maybe as a result of the
Iran/Contra stuff; must be having a he / 1 of a time coming up with their
report_ Oh God_ they must be fighting Tike cats and dogs!
INTERVIEWER: That' s the impression I get from snippits in the newspaper
column
MR_ HALPERN: The reports now are at Ieast three weeks overdue And you know
they could have had a mjnority or majority report_ must be having
a rea]
go through on that one
INTERVIEWER: I just happened to think when ' you were mentioning the earlier
and , I'm not sure that it may be coming up a ittle bit Iater , were yOU
surprised when Mr Colby agonized for a time over Mr _ He Ims testie and the
decision to turn the testimony over? Were you surprised at that?
MR _ HALPERN: Uh huh Rea I y something.
INTERVIEWER: You didn't think he would?
MR _ HALPERN: I didn't think he would . [ didn't think he should . But I ' M
told by one of: the principals involved; namely John Warner _ who was then Lega /
Counsel or Genera/ Counsel
INTERVIEWER: Yeah_ Genera]
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MR_ HALPERN: that Bil1 had no choice at that point. I've talked to John
about this, I Histened to his argumentation. I 'm no lawyer _ And I stim find
it hard that something couldn t have been done about that.
INTERVIEWER: Yes, he spoke about that to me and put it on tape _
MR _ HALPERN: Yes , John is an honest Man_ I 'm not saying anything about
that_ John said by the time it to that point he couldn't advise Colby in
any other way from a Iega1 point of view. He had to tell him to go_ And that
I find very hard to accept. Although again, as we said before , times have
changed _ And times: change and poor Dick was caught in the middle _ Absolutely
caught in the middle _
INTERVIEWER: He sure was _ What about certain issues raised by the Church and
Pike Committees? What are your thoughts about certain of them such as , ma j 1
opening?
MR_ HALPERN: WeI1, I think did not prove the case = that it was
iVlega / And take as my text the fact that the Justice Department, in looking
into this after the Church Committee and after spending God knows how many
months and years looking into this thing, had to decide even under the Carter
administration there wasn t anything we could do_ There wasn 't enough
evidence one way Or the other and when had Postmasters General who
testify. Some testified it wa $ totally iIega) . But some say it wa $
perfectly Iegal . Nothing wrong with it. We knew what was going on and we
agreed . And that' $ got nothing to do with whether the Pres ident i5 approved
or not When you have a difference of view from postmasters themseIves , how
the hell can you go to court on that? oh sure it was another one of
those headl ine grabbing things _ And as somebody said, I don ' t know of anybody
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who was hurt by the fact that the ma i 1 wa $ opened . Either physica lly , or
Iega Iy, financially or any other way _ And in most cases we didn't even know
it happened unti) years afterwards _ And in some cases I think they had
perfectly justification to go Iook at somebody' $ ma i 1
INTERVIEWER: AI right . And how about the drug experimentation. Did that
come as a surprise to
MR_ HALPERN: That wa$ a surprise to Me and it was a surprise to a lot of
people . And a lot of people, I think, took very great persona / affront in the
fact that because they were a part of CIA, were now and forever more
tarred with this kind of thing. I don 't Tike it. I didn't Iike it when I
heard about it for the first time _ Particularly some Of the nasty detaj Is
about the two-way glass and getting a drunk in a bar and giving him some thing
and fol lowing him to see what he. did and that kind of stuff _ But I aIso know
the people involved in some of it and I know Sid Gottleib very we 11 and [ know
Knoche very we11 and I can't imagine them doing this because are a bunch
of sadist Or a bunch Of Dr _ Frankensteins who Iike to pull wings off of flies
and watch the flies flop around . Nothing Iike that at a/1 and I think if yoU
Iook at Sid's test at Gottleib' s testimony , before the Kennedy HeaIth
Committee a couple of years after all this nonsense , in which he pointed out
that we were really trying to find out what the hel1 the Soviets might have
been up to when they used drugs _ LSD was a completely new and untried
substance _ We didn't know what the he | 1 it was _ Al1 we knew wa $ that the
Soviet were buying up a he]1 of a lot of it out of the Swiss drug houses _
pharmaceutical houses We didn t know what the he/1 it was going to do_ We
didn't know What the hel1 it was going to do to anybody. And we had to find
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out _ Sid' s example of American diplomats being disoriented when they were in
Moscow coming out and not knowing what the he]1 hit them. And I think that
what we were trying to or what they were trying to do rather was to find
out what the hel1 it was a11 about. And what was this new weapon that wa $
going to be possibly used against us : a _ How could we defend ourselves, and
b_ how would we use it if it was. a proper weapon _ And yeah, I was surprised.
But I didn't take it the way a Iot of guys took it. I remember during those
severa ] months when I was in there in early 75 in the bui Iding trying to get
some answers for Colby, which he kind of didn't want, when some friends of
mine stopped Me in the ha 1 and started to berate the Tiving hel1 out of Me
because since I worked in the DDP 5 office , therefore , I knew everything _ But
obviously I didn't. didn' t know that_ But anyway , and therefore , I was
part of this thing _ 'And how could I and how dare you and a/:1 that kind of
stuff_ And realy a shouting match in the ha]1 .
INTERVIEWER: And 'they figured' you knew_
MR_ HALPERN: Oh WeI1 _ that didn t bother me But I Knew I didn't
know_ And were also attacking Sid through Me and they knew I was a good
friend of Sid' s. And I was trying to defend the point as I did just a few
minutes ago with you . wou Idn't isten_ And these were old friends _ Go
way back _ I mean , a part of my generation_ It was just something that they
felt was beyond the pale. And maybe are right , but I don' t think SO. I
was asked once without knowing it at the time I was asked by Sid if I would
partake in a drug experiment where I would be given someth and I wouId not
know what I was given or when I was going to be given it_ And I said, "Sid,
I've got other things to do with my time I've to be responsible for the
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forces _ the people who are down there _ I can't be out of action_ I don' t
know what' $ going to happen . Maybe nothing will happen _ But I can't take a
chance _
INTERVIEWER: And he was talking about you taking the drug at work then?
MR _ HALPERN: Ke didn't say.
INTERVIEWER: Oh that' $ right .
MR _ HALPERN: He didn't. AT1 he said was , "If you are willing to take part in
the experiment, you Wil be given a drug. You won t know what it is and won t
know when you get it. I said, "Sid, I can't take a chance _ I've too many
important things here . Not that the world is on my shoulder or anything Tike
that_ But I've a job to do and I can't take that chance _ II
INTERVIEWER: Was the 01son case new to
MR_ HALPERN: Totally, absolutely totally.
INTERVIEWER: You knew nothing about that ear]ier?
MR . HALPERN: A1] I know is what I have read. It wa $ te clear _ O1son had
agreed to do exactly what I had agreed not to do_ He wa $ a scientist for
God ' s sakes . He wa $ a medica/ guy or something _ At Ieast he knew drugs and
he knew what the hell he was getting into_ He Iet himself in. He was going
in as a guinea pig jn an experiment_ And sure, I M sorry that something
happened to him but he knew what he was Ietting himself in for ,
INTERVIEWER: But you had heard nothing about it until the case broke?
MR _ HALPERN: No. This was one of those things that everybody assumed because
[ was in the job I held for seven years that I knew everything in the
Clandestine Service _ And it was the furthest thing from the truth. Quite
often , yoU can ask my wife about this , te often I'd be held in the office
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long after , without even being able to: do my own paperwork, because my door
was always open_ everybody knew it. And people would come in at a/1 hours,
particularly after hours and they'd want to sit and talk And I was told
more things about things I should never have 'known about . Had no reason to
know . Didn't want to know _ Had plenty on my mind . And I couldn t do
anything about it_ But they wanted to talk_ And in a way they were Ietting
off steam_ And in a way expected me to screen whatever their problem was
to give to the DDP And ittle did they know that very Mittle of what
told Me ever to the ODP He had plenty of things on his plate _ too_ But
in any case _ it is the kind of a job where you have to be avai lable to
everybody At Ieast the way I ran it. And yoU Iearn a Iot of stuff _
unofficially, you know_ But it never went anywhere _ And so my head wa$ full
of a Iot 0f stuff but not everything _ And I remember once my boss came down
from the HihI this was Fitzgerald_ And this wa $ that time that Colone
Grogan who was the public affairs officer had written a Tetter in Helms name
attacking Senator Fulbright. Remember that crazy thing?
INTERVIEWER: Yeah .
MR_ HALPERN: Wel1 anyway . Dick had $ igned it or Grogan had signed it or
something Tike that_ A/1 hel1 broke Ioose and Helms had to apologize and Des
came down from the morning staff meeting and he ca/ ed in me and he called in
the secretary and he said, "[ don't want to ever see a piece of paper that Sam
hasn't seen first. 1i And I said, "That 5 crazy , 1i He said, "What' $ the
ma tter_ can t yu take the work ?" And I said , "Yeah you know better than
that. But that S wrong . I said; "Your staff chiefs and your division chiefs
have got to know that they've a private Tine to you persona y without my
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kibitzing. After you ve seen a piece of paper if' you want to gjve it to Me to
staff out I'M1 do whatever you want Me to do with it_ Fine _ But they've got
to be: able to talk to you privately_ And he Iooked at Me and he said, "Yeah,
And he never said anything about it again_ I didn't know
everything _ But I didn't need to know everything. That S crazy _ Oh sure_
while Des was there I ran operations for Des as his case Officer and case
officer for him. He didn't tel1 his deputy, Tom Karamessines , who didn t know
anything about it. It was up to Me after Des died to go in and brief Tom On a
bunch of activities that Tom may have known about but not officially and to
clue him in_ And then he had to do the same thing in turn to Cord Meyer when
Cord became the deputy. So no, I didn t know everything that went on And T
never claimed that I did. The only thing I couIdn t do was that I couldn t
stop people from unloading on Me _ had to have somebody to talk to So I
let them talk.
INTERVIEWER: Nice to have somebody _ How about the assassination. Did that
business surprise you when It came out?
MR _ HALPERN: because I wa $ involved with one _ Some of the others that I
hadn t known about _ yeah sure , it wasn't In my area _ So I wasn't involved and
I didn' t know _ The one I was involved in wa $ the one I guess the (I' m
forgetting the crypts for these) the one against Castro. One of the ones
against Castro_ [ did not know about the use of the Mafia by Bih Harvey.
INTERVIEWER: You didn't know about
MR _ HALPERN: Bi 11_ you think I was tight 1ipped . He could run rings
around Me
INTERVIEWER: I can imagine _
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MR_ HALPERN: He ' 11 teach you lessons in how to keep your mouth shut. Oh
brother that guy was great. but I wasn t the oly one persona / Iy . I was
the one who testified on that to the Church Committee _ 1 wa $ one of the guys
that testified about that to the Church Committee _ AMLASH_ And I know the
case officer involved the doctor involved who prepared the hypodermic pen
etc. So, you know, yeah, that didn't surprise Me at a/1. And the fact that
there were other attempts on other people around the world+ that didn't
surprise me what had happened . Because I knew enough about what the hell the
system was al1 about and I remember that one of the reasons I was even less
surprised is in those severa| months that I came back in early 75 , I saw the
original papers about the ZR/RIFLE activity and the fact that one Of the first
things that John Kennedy , John , not Robert asked Dick Bissell for in January
'61 after he had gotten inaugurated , one of the first things wa $ an
assassinatio capability. Nobody in particular in mind. Just an
assassination capabi ity_ "Create one please _ 16 And that' s when Bissel1 got
ahold of Bi/1 Harvey and ZRIRIFLE wa $ created. I didn't know _ I'd never heard
of it until after the thing hit in 75. But I had seen the origina1 paper _ So
by the time the Church Committee had announced it a/I, yeah _ I was aware f it.
INTERVIEWER: And LASH You involved in that one?
MR: HALPERN: Oh yeah. I remember that one _ I didn't see , I didn't know
LASH_ [ don t Spani sh . But I know the case officer , and I was the one
who tok the case officer to see the doctor and there wa $ another thing the
Committee_ the Church Committtee guys , when I was talking to them, couIdn't
understand a medical doctor getting involved in the preparatio of a
hypodermic to kill somebody . And they wondered , was he a medical doctor? I
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forget which one of the guys said that_ But I said, "Yeah , he wa $ an MD _ 01
His job was to help uS in operations from a medical point of view. He wasn' t
a Ph.D, he wa$ a medical doctor "Oh really. You know_ they just had signs
of and visions of' Buchenwa Id and Auschwitz and God knows what else . But yeah
I took the case officer to see the doctor because I knew the doctor pretty
we1. A lot of activity. A lot of assassinatio activity. We needed medical
support of a/ 1 kinds You 'd be surprised how much you need medical support in
operations _ And it was the doctor who came up with idea of the Black
Leaf-_40 _ I don t think the Church Committee should have publ i shed that. As
it was I don 't know whether it' s still, avai lable but it wa $ a_ publicly
avai lable son that you could buy in drug store And to tell the whole
world how to use it to kill somebody I thought was crazy. Totally unnecessary
to get their point across_ They did not have to reveal that I thought that
was iI1 advised on their part. But yeah, I took the case officer there and
the doctor who spent _ I think he was up a/1 night making that damn acid, which
LASH didn t take anyway to begin with. He thought it was crazy. It may have
been _ But you know_ the assassination didn t surprise Me
INTERVIEWER: Had there been any f that kind of talk before Kennedy, in other
words= the Eisenhower Administration?
MR . HALPERN: Oh yeah, sure . If you Iook at the Church Committee report
you' 11 see it' s there _
INTERVIEWER: Last time we Were talking about_ just as we were winding up, we
were talking about assassinatios and LASH and So on _ and wondering at that
time _ that time being discussing: LASH_ was there much of a sense of anxiety
about this kind of approach?
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MR _ HALPERN: Oh , if by anxiety you mean concern that the thing
might Ieak
INTERVIEWER: Yeah.
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah. There always wa$ and this is whyut wa S So
tightly held. If you are think about 'using anxiety in terms
of morality, no _ Because a5 far as we were concerned , I think
most of the guys On the Task Force = we were at a war with
Cuba _ I mean , when you
start sending in, peop]e to shoot up
somebody else 5 country and blow up parts of somebody else ' s
country and they take losses I mean human Iosses _ and we: take
human losses , that' s war as far as I am concerned. I don t
care what YOu call it, calt it pol ice action, ca/1 it something
else but anyway, we were at war And of course some people
cou ld even ca/1 it by today' $ terminology , terrorism_
International t4rrorism. We weren't targeting market places ,
though _ and bus stations and things Tike that obviously_ We
were going after industrial' plants , power plants _ sugar
plants _ Things Tike that. But people did: get hurt on both
sides _ So yes , there was that kind f an anxiety in terms Of
keeping our hand out the assassination plots as much as
possible_ Having been involved in oly one of ' them, I have no
idea ,_ for example, if Bih Harvey wa $ mucking around with
Rosselli 0f the Mafia. Bi 11 knew how to keep a secret. And
even though I wa s his Exec, [ had no idea and I know his deputy
had no idea at a/1_ And as a
matter of fact the deputy didn't
have any. idea of the AMLASH operation_
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INTERVIEWER: Did not?
MR _ HALPERN: Did not . There were four people that I knew of
Oh I think the deputy knew 'that the case Officer involved wa $
meeting with AMLASH sure _ But that was strictly as an
intelligence operation _ And maybe as a itical action
operation _ But not assassination _ There were four people who
knew about the assassinatio aspects_ I think I mentioned to
you . The case officer _ Me the doctor to whom I introduced the
case officer to prepare the pen, 'and my boss _ Fitzgerald .
Those were the four _ And I don't even think that Des told
Helms about the pen . That' s a technica/. detai] How much: else
he told him, I have no idea _ I never asked him, he never
mentioned , So we went on ahead and did our business_ But yeah,
there was anxiety in terms of trying to maintain a secure
operation_ a sensitive operation, and that was it. I mean, we
were really trying to hang oto what the heck we were doing.
INTERVIEWER: How about when the Hearings occurred. Suppose
those Hearings, this is an iffy question
MR_ HALPERN: Go ahead .
INTERVIEWER: Had occurred back in 62 or 63 _
MR_ HALPERN: We I1 it would be into 63 because that 5 when we
started _
INTERVIEWER: 63 _ '64 . You think the .quote outrage
unquote would have been different?
MR . HALPERN: It' s hard to say - It would depend upon the
circumstances in which the Hearings were heId . And what kind
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of a circus atmosphere there wa$ . If it were a s imple
executive session kInd of Iook-see and the Senators Or the
Representatives involved were not running for President
Sa some _
of them Tike Church did, and others depends on a whole
a tmosphere. It' s hard to say . [ think, and if our own
President hadn t been assassinated , with or without attribution
to Cuba or Oswa Id or KGB Or God knows what else _ If it were
just simply an operation gone bad and Congress was looking into
It, I just doubt in the 60 ' s _ the early 60 ' s I'm talking
about 60_'65 _ whether there wou Id have been quite as much
brouhaha about the whole thing_ PeopIe wouldn't have Tiked it
when you talk about assassination _ obviously, but remember when
it took place in '75 , ten years ater you' ve got to remember
there is a whole Watergate , ten years worth of Vietnam_ and a
couple of years worth.of Watergate involved . The Vietnam thing
worst of a/1 changed the attitudes completely. Because we only
went in with Marines in 65 . Sure we were in Vietnam long
before that; we ve been there ever since 54 , for God S sake,
but actually before that_ from 45 on until the end of the
war But I think it would have been a totally different
atmosphere _ You know, conjecture _
INTERVIEWER: Sure
MR _ HALPERN: A "What if kind of thing_
INTERVIEWER: But I think your point about the assassination Of
Kennendy is
MR . HALPERN: Made a big difference_
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INTERVIEWER: Yes .
MR _ HALPERN: And Vietnam made a big difference _
INTERVIEWER: Yes .
MR _ HALPERN: After 10 years of that stuff people were fed
up
INTERVIEWER: Were you surprised in 75 , 76 about the
Congressiona/ reaction, to this topic the assassination?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh yes , yes , yes _ But only surprised in the
sense of its vehemence more than anything else _ And not a/1 of
the Senators and not &/1 the Representatives involved had that
same attitude_ There were some Of them, Tike Barry Goldwater ,
for example _ for Or for bad _ and others. You know I
understand that this i5 what sometimes has to happen with
governments_ And: even .when , we1 take it up to today when you
have Metzenbaum,_ this great Iibera] that prides himself as
being a Iiberal of the Tiberal _ And he says , "You know _ it
might not be a bad idea to knock Off Qadhaafi Where the he) 1
is he coming from? You know _ And who the he/ is going to do
it if not something Mke CIA? But you talk to him about the
morality aspects of it, it's Tike Church being pro-covert
action and anti-covert action_ So is Metzenbaum for
assassinations or isn't he for assassinations? If he is going
to pick and choose then that Isn't a] 1 right. I mean , this is
shly: But that kind of attitude has always' bugged the hel 1
out of Me
INTERVIEWER: Me too.
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MR _ HALPERN: I don t mind , Tike Hersh, you re against using
human spys? Fine _ stay that way al1 the way through .
INTERVIEWER: Right be consistent .
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah_ that S right. But don t go saying it' s a /1
right to shoot somebody , but not shoot somebody else _ Or
whatever_ however the hell else you want to do_ And I remember
we were arguing even at the time of 75 and 76 when we were
discussing, how do you think Admiral Yamamoto died during World
War II? We picked up, us ing COMINT where the hell Yamamoto
was going to be _ And we deliberately sent out P-385 at extreme
ranges ` of the P-38s with just enough ga $ maybe to come back on
if they were Iucky enough with no maneuverability rea]
had to know the exact spot to go get them- And the orders were
"Get Yamamoto_ That' s killing
a guy _ That 5 deliberate
murder _ Sure , we were in the middle of a war where people get
killed a/1 the time _ WeH1_ as far a$ we were concerned on
Cuba _ we were at war_ Castro wa $ a target . I don ' t see no
difference _ [ don ' t see any difference between going after and
specifically killing the Ieader of a
country, or killing some
poOr Joe private at the end of the ine and I don t even know
his name And I'm shooting at him and he is shooting at Me 1
mean , that' s ridiculous _ I mean _ what the he | 1 you are going
out there the ki somebody _ I don t care what you ca/ it.
INTERVIEWER: They look ing for a declaration of war
MR_ HALPERN: We 11 that went out with the Indians a thousand
years ago _ The Japanese didn't use it against the Russians in
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1905 they didn' t use it against us in 1941 _ I mean , this is _
you know archaic that' s a)1 . Life doesn't work that way . And
the Germans didn't do it against Poland in 1939 either. And
the British and the French' did it against Germany after that,
but that was silly. People are, you know You asked
about _ wa $ I surprised? Yeah _ I was surprised because I
INTERVIEWER: You didn t expect that?
MR_ HALPERN: I didn't expect that kind of hypocrisy_ That' s
a/1 _ On the part of so-called leaders of a country. And these
guys claimed to be Ieaders of a
country. And that' s being
sheer hypocrites _
INTERVIEWER: That theme continues on
MR_ HALPERN: As I say , Metzenbaum what was it 1985 when; we
hit Lybia, Or 86 , whatever? And Metzenbaum suddenly, of a11
people , to suddenly say , "It'd be a good idea to knock Off
Qadhaafi
INTERVIEWER: How about employing journalists _ Did that
topic
MR _ HALPERN: Journalists to uS are the same as any other human
being _ are a source . Or an access to the source _ And if
the guy wants to work for you_ why stop him? I think any
American citizen or non-American citizen, I don't care who he
is _ if want to the United States Government _ more
power to them. I don't care whether he wears a collar turned
around or' whether it' $ a woman Or a chiId or anybody _ If you
start break up and defining certain groups of people that
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you don t touch, pretty soon you can fine-tune that to the
point where there Isn't anybody in the world yoU are a | lowed to
go talk' to, do any work; for you _ And- that is crazy- From the
very beginning, we always had rules against using Peace Corps
Ford Foundation Red Cross , I don 't know a whole bunch Of
hunanitarian organizations _ And that we understood So we
didn't. You know we fol lowed orders _ No problem with that_
Because certain activities were just off Timits_ But we never
sorted journalists _ Journalists and clandestine operators are
in the same business _ We re' trying to get information _ We
protect sources That' s the . whole purpose You know_ that' s
the first thing the journalist says protect the source .
That' s what we do Except we don' t use the terms _ you know _
talk on background and al1 that kind of stuff _
INTERVIEWER: What about the reaction to that? Did that
surprise
MR: HALPERN: No that didn't surprise Me I knew the hypocrisy
on that was going to be te clear and always wa$ It' s Mike
academics _ I mean , that 5 crazy.
INTERVIENER: That wa $ the next one I was going to bring up _
Same thing_
MR_ HALPERN: Same thing_
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR_ HALPERN: I mean , an academic. We re not forcing people to
do these things _ No point in forcing anybody _ If you get an
agent that you are forcing to do something, I'd question the
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value of the information that he gives you . But if somebody
volunteers and wants to work for you , I don t care what he does
for a
Tiving. Except if you are keeping him we are staying
away from the humanitarian, eleemosynary organizations _
that S a ground rule _ We 11 Tive with it_ And We stay away.
And we ve had people from those kinds of organizations come .and
offer help and we tel1 them "Sorry, we can t do it. If you
want to go give the State Department whatever information you
pick up, go ahead . wil be glad to have it. But we can't
do it_ 0I
INTERVIEWER: Good _
MR _ HALPERN: You know the thing that the whole 75 , 76 circus
era, and I ca/1 it circus 'era_ confirmed to Me is that maybe T
am just being a cynic. It just confirmed to me the hypocrisy
of the tical worId. It's just unbel ievable.
UnbeI ievable . They hold executive sessions they mean
executive session S
they re supposed to_ And Frank Church
come s out after every single one of them for the cameras and
gives a brief summary of what took place _ That S not , in my
opinion _ that S not executive session _ Executive session
you know _ no comment . You wa lk away from the cameras _ You
don t go near the cameras if it's executive session . If not ,
what the hel) make it a
public session . He ' s doing it
anyway _
INTERVIEWER: What about the Church Committee and its focus on
covert action? One view that was expressed is that there wa $ a
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worIdwide network of offices engaged Iargely in what
7S
this
aga in was a critic'$ view largely excessive, self-defeating
work_
MR _ HALPERN: Oh that' s nonsense _
INTERVIEWER: Nonsense?
MR . HALPERN: Utter nonsense _ Most people didn t go near
covert action in any sense of the word. Not even pol itical
action Most people were trying to do a s imple job of
intelligence collectio basically. A few were trying to do
counterinteligence _ but it wa $ a tougher job_ much tougher
job _ And these others who were involved in covert action in
terms of planting editorials or news stories or working with
itical parties in foreign countries and what have YOU . It
wasn t work_ None of this stuff was made up by anybody _
These are a/1 approved activities up and down the Tine _ Sure
not a/ 1 the nitty-gritty, the details of everything were
approved up on an upper Ieve1 then what are you going to even
approve back here in Washington by a desk officer _ The guy in
the field has got to have some Ieeway in what he does and how
he does it. You can t tell him where to meet an agent and you
can't tel1 him how many drinks to have when he goes out to
dinner with him and things Iike that_ Although some ` people
tried. And it pretty soon backfired. Particularly it
backfired if the guy who was on the desk before was trying to
tell somebody what to do Or not to do when he got out in the
field. He found out soon enough on his first tour of duty that
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you don t do that_
INTERVIEWER: Memory was there .
MR_ HALPERN: But I'11 tel1 'you_ But on the other hand I
don t think 1t was busy work any more than it was work to
try to col lect intel) igence Most of the stuff was done
against requirements Somebody wanted some information _
somebody wanted something done _ And the guy in the field had
to figure out how to do it_ And some of it was very wasteful _
It' s Tike a war War is a wasteful bus iness _ And this is a
wasteful business_ As I think I mentioned the other
collecting intelligence by clandestine means is the toughest,
most expensive= most time-consuming way to collect
intelligence. But it has to be done _ And you are going to
make a Iot 0f mistakes And yoU are going to Ioose a lot in
the way . And you are going to waste a lot of time and effort
and money , no question about that_ to collect the ittle bit of
information . And a Iot of: the information you are going to
collect is going to be useless _ totaly useless . But there is
going to be a few nuggets somewhere along the way . I think we
have figured out, people have estimated
Lt
God knows he can't
do it
35
for the non-denied area countries_ I think it was
estimated that clandestine collection produces no more than
5-10 percent of the total take . That' $ a sma / 1 percentage when
you cons ider the amount Of information that rolls into this
government _ And particularly with overhead reconnai ssance and
with SIGINT . That' s a hel1 of a Iot; of stuff that S pouring
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in. And maybe Seymour Hersh is right. Maybe you can do
without that 5 percent_ I don ' t know _ But I don' t want to
He is wi]ling to But a Iot of it is wasteful _ No
question about that You got an Army , you a you got
an Afr Force . If.that ain't waste , my God . But when you need
them, oh need them.
INTERVIEWER: It takes time
MR_ HALPERN: You ve got to have Iead time And this is why I
remember We were talking in terms of clandestine collection_
Why we So damn hard_ particularly in the beginning, being
purists to not even talk to the DDI analysts because we might
get captured by them and become their researchers or their
Iegmen , running around in the middle of Africa finding out
where the hell the wheat fields were Or the bridges were up or
down Or the rai lways weren ' t operating or what_ And you can go
to the Library of Congress and spend two or three months and
dig it a/1 out_ So we d try to keep away from those guys for
years _ And the whole requirements mechanj sm was created to
screen a/1 these requests_ And from al1 over the government
for information on things happening abroad . And: I 'm sure the
ana | lysts thought we were a bunch Of nuts not wanting a// these
things to do _ But we didn't. You know clandestine collection
is a tough goddamn job if you are going after hard targets _
It's not cocktai gossip. In fact; the Russians used to say ,
Me a piece of paper _ get me a document_ That' s what you
want. You want some foreign government s document_ You don t
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want somebody' s opinion or ideas of what the he]1 he thinks is
happening in a cabinet meeting- You want the minutes of the
cabinet meeting _ And we are theoretically in business for
strategic intelligence _ not even tactical stuff_ We Ieft that
for the mili and the State Department _
INTERVIEWER: So just strategic?
MR_ HALPERN: We were designed as a collection of strategic
intelligence _ That means the stuff . That means
intentions._ Much more 'So than counting trucks or counting
airplanes . And we did both_ We pulled the overhead
reconnaissance_ And it' s the worst kind of way to collect
information _ That' s a/1 I saying. So, this So-called
work, I think is a misinterpretation of the fact that a_
ot of the work that wa $ done was utterly useless _ But that' s
the nature of this business . And it still is to this
INTERVIEWER:
MR _ HALPERN: Sorry_
INTERVIEWER: very good _ What about any reflections on the
competence of the Senate members on the Church Committee?
MR_ HALPERN: Of the Committee members themselves?
INTERVIEWER: Uh huh _
MR_ HALPERN: We ]1 I don t remember a ]1 the Committee members _
INTERVIEWER: Church , and we ve Monda Ie
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah, go ahead .
INTERVIEWER: And Goldwater and Philip Hart and Gary Hart,
Huddleston _ Mathjas _ Schweiker _ and Morgan and I think I
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Very good ,
No,
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mentioned Mondale _ Koward Baker
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah , Baker
INTERVIEWER: of those at the time strike you as
MR_ HALPERN: We | 1 I can't talk from persona/ knowledge except
that one time that I testified before them. I think I
mentioned to you _ Huddleston and_ this was in June of 75,
maybe they were just new guys on the block for al1 I know , but
they theoretically were on business since the end of January or
early February at least. And maybe they didn't have decent
staff officer to brief them. But the impression I was that
this wa$ being done by these guys solely on feel ing,
emotion, thinking in terms of James Bond _ and no rea| knowledge
or feel ing, even, for an appreciation of what the business wa$
a /1 about_ It was a ] 1 out Of books In terms of Ashenden_ the
secret agent , goes way back. But it was that kind of fiction
stories , and MOVe impressions that these guys were using in
terms of asking the questions and in terms of what they thought
intelligence was a/1 about. had no concept _ I would have
thought by June = at Ieast, they would have had some chance to
have talked to people
7
knowledgeabIe : people and fair people
to just Iearn what the he]1 the bus iness is a/1 about _ What
are we talking about_ including covert action . But it wa $ a11
in terms of a circus a tmosphere , I think _ I mean , it was just
I was appa ] ]ed. I shou Idn 't have been _ I should have known
better _ Basically, in terms of some of the guys who never even
bothered to find out what they could , Or even the few members
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who were on the four committees that were or
theoretically,
doing oversight And it waSn't there. No appreciatio at
a/1 - And every time something came up, it was always "OH _
it REALLY? You know great astonishment when you were trying to
tel them a fact_ Like ` when I mentioned the fact YOU know _
we ve fema Ie case Officers as deputy chiefs of station and
chiefs of station_ And that came as a great shock and surprise
to them. I don t know what thought. I wasn ' t able to
into their brains and find out- But this was not true Of
Mathias though _ Not true of Barry Goldwater .
INTERVIENER: Tower?
MR _ HALPERN: I don t know_ Tower didn't sit in the I was
sitting there _ This Ts based with the guys around the table _
I mean they were in kind of a horseshoe and [ wa $ in a Iong
table facing the horseshoe . And I was alone _ And here were
a /1 of these guys with their staffers and what have you arouna
them_ behind them, mutterings and what have you . Schweiker
oddly enough, Schweiker made some sense _ He seemed to have a
better appreciation than Huddleston Or Monda Ie _ Gary Hart was
just a
flitting in and out, kind of He didn t rea / ly know
what the hell it wa S a11 about. Phil Hart, again, was . very
moralistic about the whole thing, including colecting
inteligence using human sources _ He wa s quite sure that that
was the way to go. At Ieast that wa $ the impression I had .
Maybe [ am wrong, but that wa $ what I felt. Monda /e wa $ the
worst, I thought , in terms of his approach to the thing_ Then
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aga in, I don t know who his staff officer was' or' who was
briefing him beforehand .
INTERVIEWER: When yoU say worst, you mean; informed or not
informed?
MR _ HALPERN: It seemed to me 111 informed .
INTERVIEWER: I11 informed
MR. HALPERN: Im informed And by the time they were talking
to me as I say , I think it wa $ June of 75, he]1 I'm a junior
officer of al1 of the brass that went up to that place for
debriefings or' testimony Or What have yoU _ I Would have
thought by that time they would have, had a better appreciation
of what the: he]1 the world is a H1 about_ And how foreign
pol icy is made and conducted . And what internationa/ relations
is a/1 about _ And just, I'd send them back to Internationa]
Relations 101 in Political Science 101 Or some junior col lege
somewhere _ It was just pathetic. ['m.no great brain_ But at
Ieast I went through City College in New York where I had some
decent professors who taught me what the hel 1 the worId was
Iike _
INTERVIEWER: What about the . Pike Committee?
MR _ HALPERN: I had nothing to do with. the Pike Committee _
INTERVIEWER: Nothing at al1?
MR _ HALPERN: Thank the Lord? Nothing _ A)I I know is what I
heard from friends of mine_ including Seymour Bo] ton who had a
Iot to do with them because he was the Agency contact with
them_ And both committees as a matter of fact_ He and Scott
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Breckinridge and , I guess _ Wa It Elder were involved , too-
INTERVIEWER: Yeah _
MR_ HALPERN: And just to Tisten to the kinds of
Laa 4a
we | 1 the
Representatives themselves were bad enough but: on of that
they hired, I think Seymour used the phrase something ike
"kids with drippy noses who weren t even out of their swaddl
clothes _ 1i And these were the staffers who were running around
Iike crazy. You know _ they were having fun in their bare feet
trying to upset a// the apple carts and what have you. And it
was just_ he sa id it was impossible' to talk to any of them_
You know _ intelligence officers_ my God , they were worse than
the devi) . Which wa $ not te, true` of the guys on the Senate
staff_ The: Senate staffers were deliberately involved_ [
think, in wrecking the intel 1igence community _ I think_for
whatever reason political Or Whatever but I think, a$ I
said before _ in terms of the buildup as to what was happening,
including in December of 74 even before the Hersh stories
having a bi11 to create the same committee that the Church
Committee finally turned into with the same title, were
doing this deliberate work_ And so the Senate staffers aIways
seemed to be better read _ better educated, better organized .
They were deliberately doing something. They knew What they
were after _ And I must say ran a good operation , A
good covert operation. go to the head of the_ class .
Whereas the House staffers, the Pike Committee _ they were just
a bunch of kids muck ing around causing trouble _ Didn't know
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what the hel1 they were doing-
INTERVIEWER: And: the motivation of the Church staff members?
MR_ HALPERN: I wish I couId prove one way or the other _ I
just don t know_ It a/1 seemed to end up at one point, which
was destroy, destroy, destroy. Muck up , muck up, muck up _ And
did . were very effective at it_ And a/1 I say
you Know , if it looks Iike a duck , acts Tike a duck, squawks
Iike a duck , it' s to be a duck _ And I don t know whether
they were involved with the far Ieft or the far right or what
have you _ but there sure Iooked Tike some itical motivation
there somewhere _ 1 can t prove what I am saying. It s just a
conjecture _ It is a theory _
INTERVIEWER: And you felt that at the time?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh yeah. Yeah_ Felt that very much at_ the
time And since , I have never gotten that out of my head .
They were deliberately active in destroying something _ And I
think my theory, and it is a theory, in reference back is
probably correct because it's quite clear that after the circus
and after_ the Senate and the House both created their
respective committees the Senate in 76 and the House in 77 _
in very short order _ wiser heads prevai Ied among the Senators
and the Representatives _ I don t know about the staffers But
the. staff some Of it changed_ There S some of them still
there _ And if you take a Iook and you' 11 see that even under
the Iater years of the Carter administration_ talking about 79
and the Commi ttees started to give the Inteligence
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Community more and more and more budget and personne/ slots.
More money and more people. I think were trying in some
the damages that they saw themselves
Se
finally when
saw and new faces that had been done and I think they were
kind of feeling Ity about the whole thing _ As a_ body .
INTERVIEWER: You think the hostage situation in Teheran?
MR _ HALPERN: I think that helped _ That helped in terms of
getting concerned _ But it wa$ more than that and it happened
before the' hostages began. They started to come around in
terms of and I know just from friends_ in terms of the
Intelligence Community as a Community was starting to more
money and slots than they could handle than they really
needed _ Congress was just "Use it, use it, use it." And so by
the time Casey comes alog in 81 and he gets lots of_credit
for more money the community _ Ba loney . We I 1 maybe he
did. He did. But the momentum wa$ there beforehand . You
know And Congress was pushing stuff into the Community _ Not
just CIA _ but the whole Community. Look the Pike Committee
and the Church Committee _ I think both of them, maybe just the
Church Committee recommended abol ishing DIA_ We I1. take a Iok
at DIA today with a brand new building and everything else _ T
mean Congress insisted to keep it that way after the circus
perio_ And So there is a whole new attitude that came after
this 75/'76 circus era _ And it was just a bloody Mess _ But
the damage was done _ And you don t build intelligence
organizations overnight. Aga in, you need time _ It took us in
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my generation a
whole generation. And we had a war to start
with. to help Us go and get off the mark a make connections and
contacts and friends and al1 that kind of stuff abroad_ And
that one was destroyed _ Whether it' $' ever _ I don t know, maybe
It wiml take another generation to rebui ld . Who knows Or
more _ So the attitude , I think _ wa $ that maybe we in Congress
went too far And we ve got to redress to balance _ Which is
what were doing for a Iong, while_
INTERVIEWER: You sense any role 0f' President Carter in this?
MR _ HALPERN: I ' m not sure _ I don t know _ Al1 I know is the
end result was the money started to come and the slots started
to come We ]1 example, I think it was in 77 , Congress
refused to the FBI additional slots for
counterintelligence officers _ And that is public' $
information _ It was brought out in hearings and what have you
and you ve got to be a nut to read a/1 that crud . But when you
get interested in a subject_ you browse through it. I've got
some I haven 't got anywhere near what Walter' $ got . I may
have 1 percent of what he ' s But you read it in the
newspapers . You know_ you don" t have to go very far _ And
Congress deliberately and iterally said "no" to the request
from the Bureau for more personne| to watch &/1 these Soviets
and satellite countries &nd their offices in this country_
INTERVIEWER: In 19772
MR . HALPERN: [ think it was 77 _ And Iater on,. of course
were part of the Intelligence Community , they their
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slots_ got their money_ Just Iike CIA did, DIA did_
every. NSA did, everybody . But now I guess with everybody
tightening up the' belt they Wi/l suffer too. And maybe it is
about time _ You can do just So much . It takes , for example_
you talk about rebuilding. I have estimated , and I think other
peop ]e have estima ted s iminar figures , it takes about seven
years before a clandestine service Officer in inte]ligence
collection , Iet aloe counterinteligence , can be considered to
have been around long enough to be a decent officer _
INTERVIEWER: Seven years?
MR_ HALPERN: We11 Iook at it. You come in_ You about a
off hand about a year of training. You ve a first
tour of duty on a desk or maybe overseas _ But anyway , and
that' s a two or three year hitch. That gives you four years _
You ought to have a
ittle bit more training somewhere &long
the way . Like another half year , at Ieast. That isn't much _
Preferably another year_ That' s five years _ Your second tour
whether on a desk Or overseas You can t do both at the same
time_ So one has to be here and one has to be abroad . Another
two or three year hitch _ Have I my seven?
INTERVIEWER: Sure
MR _ HALPERN: And then some So it doesn't happen overnight.
And you. can t expect_ particularly in this and age you .
can' t expect a guy you bring in, I don ' t care if he ' $ got a
Ph. D and he S Phi Beta Kappa and he ' s everything else
under the sun _ And he' s a great academician _ He S been
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through everything- He knows it al) . And he knows a/1 the
sixteen languages you need to have before you bring him in.
You don't have to waste time teaching .him a language _
can't suddenly throw him overseas and say , aboard
operations, Iect me the intel igence on what the hell the
Saudi S are going to do about 011 prices tomorrow_ 1( It won 't
work . It just won' t work. You " ve got to have a feel for what
the he/1 is going on _ They ve got people on the desk now I' m
told, who've never been in the country that are assigned
to_ don t even know what the hell is , going on there _
may know it from books But that is not enough .
INTERVIEWER: You have to build up your contacts .
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah _ And take over contacts from somebody else
and be able to prove to the foreigner you are deal ing_with that
yOU are as good as the guy who recruited you . Things Tike
that_ You see I make one of those points in that book review I
gave you on Turner' s book. You can t do it overnight_ It won t
work _ And it didn't work_ So when you are talking about seven
years for an fficer _ that' s a minimum seven years before he
is' even ready to rea ly do something' and become a decent al1
around officer , both Headquarters and field_ You ' ve a
way to go before you rebui ld when you suddenly Iose 200 people
at one pop _ Or with Turner , 800 slots get Wiped out Jike
that_ 820 as a ma tter of fact.
INTERVIEWER: Was that the number that Ieft?
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah_ you' 11 see why
Sa=
I've got to make a note
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They
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on that number _ I'm not going to give it to you now _ You' 11
read it_ And when people up on the Hiu) or other people say ,
you know , 16 'What' s so tough about going out and collecting
intelligence?" Try it. It just doesn't work the way It is
done in the MOVies .
INTERVIEWER: It takes a lot of experience
MR_ HALPERN: You need experience_ you need to have somebody
you can talk to, somebody who has been around before _
INTERVIEWER: Judgment _
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah _ And initiative . Lots of initiative And
that S where you people who. say , because of that_
initiative M1 Look at that idiot. Ke six months and
nothing has come out of it." Yeah, it's wasteful You ve
to But I wou Id rather have a guy go out on his own trying
things, than me having to sit at a desk or using a bu]1 whip to
him out_ or dragging him out by the ears _ He ' $ got to
have enough initiative to go out and do it on his Own _ This is
what a/1 these things that have happened . And are sti1
happening . And a1 the attacks on the. Intelligence Community
people and what have yoU _ I don ' t care whether it is CIA or
FBI or what have YoU . It' s all the same prob lem. You know
the officer who has to start saying, "You know_ why should
I stick my neck out? You know; if I could just do it the
careful way I'11 get My promtion _ I'11 move ahead s lowly .
I'11 push the paper . 0 But collecting intelligence is not a
paper job . You've got to go out and talk to people . It' s
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talking to human sources . It' s working with humans _ It' s
different than sitting in the laboratory coming up with a black
box _ And some of the black boxes _ at least _ we used to have to
have humans the black boxes in the right places_ Some of
the operations that we had where we were trying to drop them in
the right places from overhead as a matter of fact, to give
you- some idea of the prob Iem, one of the operations was ca led
JAVELIN_ You know what a javelin js?
INTERVIEWER: Yes , sure _
MR: HALPERN: And that' s what we were trying to do at one point
for our operation with black boxes _ To get the black box in
the precise point where the black box had to be _ Technical
stuff is when it works . But it'$ to be so damn
precise of the times that it 1s aImost impossible. It
works in the laboratory _ Fine _ Beautiful And you can set up
experimenta/ conditions and demonstration conditions_ Easy
when you have ` total control to do it in the rea | worid.
INTERVIEWER: Yes _ with it's traffic ]ights.
MR_ HALPERN; Just use your imagination.
INTERVIEWER: Sure _
MR_ HALPERN: to do it in the rea1 world. And so the
problem of training an Officer and experience of an officer and
getting people back into the business and making your contacts
and a/1 that goes with it. Yeah , our generation was not bad .
INTERVIEWER: It' s truly a profession isn't it?
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah . That' s what we have been trying to tel/
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people _ And that is why we have been trying, I think with a
Iittle bit of success, very Tittle, starting to get in academe
in this country at Ieast
Ee
it's pretty hard in some other
countries but in this country to try to academics to
understand government, history, itical science courses
international relations courses you name it. After a/1 these
years they have been missing abet in terms of the impact of
inteligence by a/1 governments , 1 don t care who they are on
foreign and foreign activities _ You read history books
in the 1930' $ , 40' s , '50' s , 60 ' s _ And then in the '70' s
beginning barely to mention the fact that there might have been
some inteligence action, that some information a government
didn t know or did know, which made a big impact. And until
ULTRA broke in 72 , I think it wa $ nobody had a clue. And yet
thousands' and thousands and thousands of people had been
involved in ULTRA
INTERVIEWER: Yeah_ somebody cal ed it the missing dimension
the intelligence rolee _
MR _ HALPERN: That' s it. Sure it's a profession_ It has been
a profession for a couple of thousand years that I know Of
The people haven 't regarded: it as such _
INTERVIEWER: Textbooks just
MR_ HALPERN: Totally ignored it. off in Timbo _
INTERVIEWER: I still, from time to time _ Iook at different
diplomatic textbooks _ There is no mention in them about the
Black Chamber that Yardley was running out of New York City in
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the 1920' s . don" t mention it.
MR_ HALPERN: It wasn 't mentioned . It wasn't thought of _ It' s
impact on the Washington Nava Conference _ We knew what the
he ] 1 the outside was: going to do_ And the fact that, for
example, we had some operations in terms of and not a]1
intelligence is strictly itics or military. Economics is a
big one We had some good , but I won t even tel1 you which one
it even though it' $ on a classified tape_ But you can find
it ater_ We had a good penetration of a foreign government' $
economic delegation through a conference of ours on trade _ And
we had dead to rights , we had the text of their negotiating
positions, what they could say , how far could go _
Everything. The whole II shmear _ The State Department
Ambassador and the Deputy Chief ' of Missio from that particular
country, our Ambassador from DCM , refused to believe the
information we gave them_ Literally, said, "That' s
impossible _ You couIdn t possibly have gotten this . Somebody
is making it up for yoU _ And you are paying them good money"
and a/1 that kind Of stuff _ But we weren ' t paying him any
money . The guy didn t know and we weren t about to tell him.
This wa$ one of those things where the agent, it wa$ done
simply o friendship and Ioyality of the case officer which had
developed over a long period of time
Ta
family relations_
family friends . and a11 that kind of stuff _ Anyhow _ the State
Department said this is nonsense The US Trade Representative
said this is nonsense _ "If the Ambassador wou Idn t believe it,
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why should I be I feve it. 46 We] 1 the negotiating went on bit
by bit, bit by bit, day after day. It developed everything.
A11 they had to do wa S Iook at the information and the guy wa$
following the text. It was unbelievable _ And fortunately,
fortunately, before the conference wa $ over the US
representatives believed what the hell we had told them and
were able to work out a deal in such a way that the US
benefi ted ' by it by $700 mi]lion. It's a s imple ittle watering
operation. So it takes time to work these deals in terms of
not a11 sources require lots of money - And not al1 sources are
the kind of people you just wa Ik in and say, "You work for
me It takes time to develop and what have And the guy
was doing it simply out of friendship and loyalty to an
individual It wasn't the US he was concerned about And it
wasn 't his Own country he was concerned about_ Just mutua |
friendship. Maybe they have got them today , too_ Maybe they
have got that operation, too. I hope So _ It takes time
INTERVIEWER: Yeah_ I think some textbooks almost present the
worId as though everything that' s said in the United Nations _
that' $ the sum total of what' s going on about al1 the
backstages
MR . HALPERN: We I1,, it's more than backstages , too, Ralph_
because I remember Professor Janowsky at City Col lege _ He
said you know we a/1 sit around and we study things_ Great
documents_ Mike the Monroe Doctrine- And as if: somebody sat
around and thought this up one And it' s Iike coming Off
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of Mount Sinai You know And he said_ "Most of these things
are done by people Tike you and me It He said , "I don t know
what you had for breakfast. Whether you had a fight with your
wife _ Whether you had a cold and a headache that And a
lot of these decisions are done this. way _ And are made at
the spur of the moment _ are human decisions by human
beings _ And I remember very clearly, I was stiml wet behind
the ears, this is 1948 or 49_ 49 I guess it was _ I happened
to be the desk officer in Indonesia (Clandestine Services) _
And we had very operations . This was oh yes the Dutch
pol ice actio_ I guess , in '49 . And we had a very good agent
in Indonesia who was able to follow and keep uS very current =
a Imost minute by minute _ actually hour by hour the location of
where the Dutch were taking the Indonesian itical Jeader
that had captured in Jakarta _ And where they were mOving
from city to city to city to city Or town to town to town
to town and where finally him. And I was going over
regularly because I dIdn't want to trust the telephone _ And I
was going over
from the old buiiding around the we | 1 known
Reflecting Pool I was grabbing ,the intelligence and It wa$ in
raw form_ We didn t even bother going through the Reports
Board in those days which had to clear everything go out, be
sure the commas and the semicolons were in the right places and
what have you . And I had some hot intell igence that I got
permission from my boss just take it over to my opposite--wel1 _
he was more than my oppos te number _ he was the Chief of the
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South East Asia desk
5
a11 the Southeast Asian countries
S
Wi ]iam S.B. Lacey, W.S.8 . Lacey . Nice guy . Nice big
moustache _
INTERVIEWER: L-A-C-E-Y?
MR _ HALPERN: L-A-C-E-Y I think. Yeah , Bi ]1 Lacey . And I wa$
al1 of 26 r 27 at that time _ And I kept bringing this stuff
over to him. Piece by piece _ As we got it. I wa $ wearing a
between uS and the State Department and the Reflecting
Pool where we were _ And I saw US policy toward the Dutch
and hanging oto Indonesia, how that changed Mike that. Bi)
Lacey said to me he said_ The Dutch should have told Me
not the US should have told me that they were going to do
this and what were 'going to do with the political
Ieaders _ should not have surprised Qe- Sure , Bi:]1 . I
said, "I'm not involved in that, I'm just giving you the poop _
You are making the icy_ He says "You' re damn right,
Sam_ He says , "As of now Indonesia 1s going to be a free
country And: we are not going to stop the Indonesians _ We are
not going to help the Dutch anymore _ didn't tel me that
were going to do this."
INTERVIEWER: Oh Wow _
MR . HALPERN: There S American foreign icy.
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, exactly.
MR . HALPERN: Right there . You know; Bim1 didn't have to sit
around with a Iot of people _ a Iot of staff . I 'M sure he went
and whatever he needed to do to get the thing approved and
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nobody knew the difference _
INTERVIEWER: Good point_
MR _ HALPERN: So. You know _ And the academics In this country
have never caught on Maybe they are catching on slowly now _
INTERVIEWER: Slow _
MR: HALPERN: Yeah, very slow _ That there is an impact on this
stuff _ You got humans and humans and humans And that' s a11
there is _ And I think, for example Godson started in
1978 , at Georgetown on the Nationa] Strategy Information
Center _ And he has a number of academics come, almost every
up in Ma ine .
INTERVIEWER: And he is running another one this summer
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah _ that s beginning to have an impact_
I don t know how many thousands of academics there are in the
colleges and universitles. But he is just barely scratching_
the surface _ And it has taken him 10 years _
INTERVIEWER: He ran the first one up at Bowdoin in '81 _ I wa $
up there _
MR_ HALPERN: Okay . There is one I wa $ one of the guys
G
he
asked me to come to tell them about the intelligence of 78
which I did_ And unfortunately Angelo Codevila got
a hold of
him too and So changed Godson S views _ but at Ieast we
started on this thing. And I attended a Iot of those seminars
that he started in 78 and 79 and SO _
INTERVIEWER: Were they Iocal?
MR _ HALPERN: were a/1 here, but he brought in people from
a] / over and had a good foundation_
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Godson was the first guy to get a group together _ And you
know he is now regarded as a
great intelligence expert And I
keep kidding,him about that. But he doesn' t
S
you know , he
knows something. But he has never been in the business _ He
doesn t really appreciate it. Anymore than Angelo Codevi la
knows what the hell is going on _ But at Ieast he had the
foresight to start some thing Iike this going- And he got a lot
of people involved . From former intelligence officers, to
current intelligence officers , he a Iot of people with a
lot of experience to write good papers and mediocre papers and
bad papers . Mine' s a Iousy one that I did, the first one on
clandestine collection _ because it was being done Ce I Mean, I
did it Te
for the lowest common denominator _ You know , it's
ike trying to teach somebody ABC" S There' $ no point In using
a Iot of high "falotin" jargon So it from an
intelligence professional point of view, it's a very weak paper
mine on clandestine col lection Because it just barely
skims the surface _ It doesn t go into the details at a11 Tike
we ve been discussing: But at Ieast was very good in
pushing this idea, trying to get academics to Iook at this new
dimension _ And it has to be _ There has been a tremendous
gap _ Just Tike there was a gap on the mi 1 aspects of
Wor Id War II until you got a hold of the ULTRA aspect. And as
somebody said , they have to rewrite a/1 the history books
Sure they do- And they ought to rewrite a/1 the.history books
for everything else in terms of the missing dimensio of
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inteligence and its impact throughout history. Whether it's
Moses or
INTERVIEWER: Or George Washington _
MR _ HALPERN: Anybody And people are beginning very slowly to
pick it up . slowly_
INTERVIEWER: Yes , I am encouraged. Slow
MR . HALPERN: It' s is going to take a generation in there _
Easily_ Easily. And I am told that there are sti1l academics
in this country who won t touch inteligence _
INTERVIEWER: [ am told that too_
MR _ HALPERN: think it js a dirty name and a dirty
business _ You don't have to be involved in it, for God ' s sake ,
to do some research and Iook at what the heck happened . And
what made people come up with certain decisions or not come up.
with a decision . You know_ it' s been there
INTERVIEWER: Strange _ They sometiImes will dea ] with Congress
and Congressiona 1 elections and there is an awful lot of
skulduggery that goes on in that process _ And don t seem
to realize that that happens .
MR . HALPERN: That happens a/1 the time _ And I guess maybe
what you need is an Ida M. Tarbe/ 1 to do a study 0n politics or
intelligence or foreign affairs Tike she did on Rockefeller _
You know_ wake people up _ Or even do a Beard economic
interpretation of the Constitution. Do an intelligence
interpretation of foreign affairs. I don 't care what you cal/
it. But it is there _ Nobody is hiding it. Not any more we
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aren't. And yoU can go back, Tike you did in your book you
can go back , it's there in the record book _ Go find it. It' s
a hel1 of a job _ It' s a Iot Of work _ A tremendous amount of
work . I don ' t envy anybody wanting to go into the OSS records _
those that have been declassified in the Archives now
Horrible, horrible _
INTERVIEWER: will. Little by Hittle_
MR _ HALPERN: Little by Iittle _
INTERVIEWER: What about this Sam_ Earlier _ weH1_ the Iate
'70s in an interview one of the Agency Directors said that the
Agency is part of the President 5 bag of tools _ and my question
is ; Do you see the Agency as also part of Congress of
tools?
MR _ HALPERN: it is the President" 5 pretorian guard and
everything that means . It' s an executive tool. of the
government. WeI1 it' $ a tool of the executive branch 0f the
government. It is not a tool in my opinio _ of the
Iegislative branch of the government anymore than it is the
judiciary branch of government_ You ve three branches in
this system. And I know a Iot of my friends do not agree with
Me And a Iot of my close chums have testified on the Hill
about , if the Congress should be in with the President on
directing: a . foreign b. intelligence , C the
mili etc. , etc. I don ' t think you can work that Our
system can't operate that way - You ve to have an executive
on top who js. answerable to the people and to the Congress for
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his actions . But yoU can't have 535 SO-caled elected
representatives plus 18,000 staffers second-guessing what the
Pres ident and his entire government bureaucracy is doing day by
hour by hour _ minute by minute second by second . It
won t work, it just can' t work. The 'Executive has to take the
responsibility in my opinion_ For what it does, the good , the
bad , and the indifferent _ Not everything the Executive does is
right in' my opinjon_ For example_ I think that the mining of
the harbors in Nicaragua was the siliest goddamn thing those
guys ever did. And: I was involved in operations s imi lar to
that
C
deliberately and directly. But you target. If you
want to go for ships target the bloody ships . We did. We made
some successes, we had a lot Of failures A Iot of waste
motion _ No question. And I remember some of my buddies who
had been retired were called back
Ce a few of them had been in
Latin American affairs_ and also covert action_
9
parami itary
affairs _ and covert actio affairs and itical action, a Iso
covert action
_
were called back for a sessjon with the guys
running the Nicaraguan activities _ And among the things they
were beating the bu]1 about wa $ _ what about mining the
harbors _ And without exception_ I am told every single guy
called back for consultation in this meeting
L e 4 , 5 ,
a: ha lf dozen every single guy said, "Oh Christ, don 't
go anywhere near that_ That' s silly. 11 At the end of the
conference were told the mining of the harbors had aIready
started_ And as one
of my friends said, "What the hell did you
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ca]] us in for then?" So not everything the Executive does js
right _ Obviously_ At least I don't think it is right.
Nixon' s forcing the Agency to go after Allende in 1970 'without
any kind of Iead time at the Iast second was absolutely
stupid. And we told them that_ But the orders were to go, So
we went. And there are lots of other examples of that_ But
again, under our system you ve got to have. the Executive make
the errors .
can't have Congress sitting around and
deciding what the President_ what the hel 1 he is supposed to
do _ It's Iike; take Metzenbaum and Qadhaafi So one
Metzenbaum says "Yeah _ we go after Qadhaffi Iet' s go
him. tt The next day there is another problem with somebody
else , Mr _ XYZ in some other country, and Metzenbaum says to the
President, "Oh no, you can t touch him, he ' $ a friend 0f
mine! WeI1 what the: helI You can't have that kind of
nonsense_ The President is responsible. I don t care who the
President is _ Whether it is Reagan or you or me Or the next
guy _ That' s the system we ve And I don 't think that CIA
Or the Intel igence Community has to or should be part of
the side pocket of the reference Tibrary of the Congress_
Sure give them the intelligence reports that you give
everybody else You go up and tel / them what s going on in the
world. can have NIE' s if want to read NIE S _
can have Special NIE' s if they want to read those _ But when it
comes to decision making, based upon that stuff . uh uh _ That' s
the President 5 responsibility_ And whether it's covert action
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or whether it' s collecting intelIfgence , that 5 his job _ It
wa $ up to Ike Eisenhower for example, to tell them,
the U-2 . I know I'm going to see Khrushchev in Paris. Go fly
that U-2 . 16 And he did. Can you imagine trying to ask? Who do
you talk to in Congress? Which committee do you go to? In the
old days, at east_ you, had maybe a handful of guys in each
House who had some kind of control over the House or the
Senate And you could work with them_ Who do you go to
today? Look at what happened yesterday . Jim Wright couldn't
even a bill through _ And he had to muck around with the
clock
L s
Titerally change the clock of the calendar day o the
business of the tax bill. So one minute have to announce
that the vote is, I think, 206 to 205 against_ and Jim Wright
stops the day' s activity
~7
iterally stops it on the: clock
gets ahold of some guy I forget the Representative's name
twists his hands or his arms Or his ba/Is for all I know and
the next thing you know' there is another vote _ And the vote is
now 206 to 205 and the bilI Is passed .
INTERVIEWER: In favor
MR_ HALPERN: You know _ But who the he]1 do you go and talk to
in Congress when you say , should the Agency be part of the
Congressiona] team? it can't be _
INTERVIEWER: Then how about this statement, this is a
statement someone made : "Since the mid-1970'$, some say , the
CIA 1s poised nearly equidistant between the Executive and the
Legislative branches and Congress may actually have more
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influence today on CIA priorities and how much money is spent
rather than the Executive Branch . II
MR . HALPERN: I've seen that statement. T know who made it and
I don 't agree with it. It may be the truth. He may be
absolutely right in what the situation 1s today . I think
that 5 wrong . I real ize CIA and every other member of the
Community has to go to Congress to get his money , his men , and
his| material I understand that. And you ve got to play
favorites and you've got to butter-up people and al1 that kind
Of stuff But as far as being in between the Congress and an
Executive in terms of running an Intel ligence organization,
it's dead wrong . It belogs to the Executive _ It's a part of
the Executive _ And it is in every other country that I know
Of _ It' s not the Congress that runs the business _ It's the
President that runs the business . You can't be in physicaly ,
and 'literally, and actually may be in between _ He is
absolutely right _ But that' s a wrong system_ And if that' s
the way it is going to continue you are not going to have an
intelligence organization _
INTERVIEWER: Rea1y in trouble _
MR . HALPERN: I think So _ Who is your boss? If Congress tells
you to do some thing and the President says don t do It, what do
do?
INTERVIEWER: Your re equidistant Tike the old story of ancient
times that if you a mu Ie midway between two stacks of
the mu e wouId starve to death
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MR. HALPERN: I am serious . What do you do? Congress says do
this_ The President says don t do that_ What do you do? Do
you go to the Congress istening to some of the guys on
television and reading what they say and Tistening to some of
their speeches , Or If the President teHs Me to do someth
that I don ' t think is right_ I'11 come running up here to the
commi ttee right away and tell you a11 about it. Okay , then the
President has no confidence in the man and there is a new
Director Okay. On the other hand if the Congress tels the
Director to do something and he doesn' t tell the Pres ident_
then what? So, if you' ve a strong President _ that Director
is out on his ear too. And I use specifically Bi1/ Colby in
1975 . On January ISth, 1975 ; and it' s in his book _ So I am not
saying anything.special . 8i11 Colby goes to the HiIL before
the Stennis Committee . the Senate Armed Services _ and blows his
gut a/1 over the place The entire organization of CIA men _
women and chi Idren are a/1 Iaid out for everybody to see
despite the fact that the Iaw , the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 says he doesn't have to do this. So he just gives
the whole store away _ Maybe 'no great damage was done but
anyway , he does it. "On their way back from the Hih, says
Bill in his book, 10 something dawned on me Gee _ I 'd better
stop off at the White House and te| 1 them what I've done _ Now
if I had been President Ford, there would have been a new
Director that afternoon . Bim worked for the President _ He
doesn t work for himself _ His commanding officer is the
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President of the United States and not. the Congress of the
United States_ And he shouId of at Ieast had the decency , the
plain ordinary decency and courtesy, on the way to the Hill, to
stop off at the White House and say , this is what I plan
to do on the way up II He does it in reverse and there isn't a
thing that the President can do at that point_ His hands are
tied. He may have agreed with Bi 11 He may have disagreed.
don t know _ But that S not the way you run an organization.
INTERVIEWER: He had no options by the time he found out about
it_
MR_ HALPERN: That' s not the way you run an organization _
INTERVIEWER: It's a good example _
MR . HALPERN: So coming back
Se
if that' s where are today
and if Judge Webster is now equidistant between the HIu and
we /1; Gates is in between . I know who' s involved . If they are
at equidistant now , are nowhere . Absolutely nowhere _
They either work for the President_ or they don t work _ And
I've used the term "pretorian guard, and I mean that. And it
may be the wrong way to run the system. Then my comment is ,
"Change the system_ 10 That' s a /1. And I am perfectly willing
to take a Iok at any system want to propose _
INTERVIEWER: What about this statement: "Sharing intel1igence
with Congress is one Of the surest guarantees of CIA ' $
independence and objectivity.
MR _ HALPERN: No way. I don 't understand that at a/1 . I don ' t
see how the two have anything to do with each other _
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INTERVIEWER: I think that was made in a recent speech_
MR_ HALPERN: Yes, it was _ I know _ But I stiml don ' t
understand how. that can fol low _ If the comment is meant to
refer to the fact that a DCI can Cook the books Tike Casey has
been accused Of in terms of; presenting the information
to the President, I don t see how that is going to wash _ If
you ve got an analyst who bel ieves in one view Of a certain
event - and the Director tells him to change his view _ you = re a
Iousy analyst_ Sure , he might want to keep his job and a/1
that kind of stuff but going up to the Congress and telling
them, I think such and such and My Director thinks differently ,
is not going to keep things honest in any sense Of the word _
The Director can still tel1 the President what he thinks _ And
that's where the .decision is made on any particular activity.
I don' t think even the crazy people in Congress say are
going to make a/1 the decisions _ Take a Iook at the case of
John Horton on the Mexico business . I don t know the details
at a /1 I know John. very wel1 and he has never talked about
any of this stuff except what he said in the public press .
read that and I've seen him on television and what have you _
But even when the House Committee , the Intelligence Committee ,
after the brouhaha of John having Ieft when the House
Intelligence Committee examined the situation to see whether
Bi1l Casey actually did cook the NIE as was a/ledged John
never a/ ledged this but other people have if I remember
correctly, and I think I've got the clipping somewhere = the
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they
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House Intelligence . Committee said had Iooked at a11 their
drafts_ they Ioked at the final version_ and there wasn't any
cooking. So what the hel 1 are people talking about _ the best
way to insure objectivity is to bring Congress into the act
This is nonsense _ That' s the trouble with a lot of this
stuff_ People think that you have to the Congress to
Iook at things _ and therefore everybody be careful
otherwise somebody is going to say , "Wel, you didn't do it
right . We I1 this is nonsense .
INTERVIEWER: do you think there is So much more talk about
the Congress being involved in the process?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh _ Congress has aIways been, a Iways wanted to
in the history of the coun- ever since the Constitution
was written they've wanted to be involvved . Go back to the Jay
Treaty, when the House of Representatives insisted on seeing
a / 1 the documentation of the Treaty. And the President
said , "No way, the Senate gets it." 16 And the Senate got it_
The Senate everything they wanted: It wa $ months Iater
before they decided what to" do with it. But you start with
Washington
INTERVIEWER: And they debated that whole treaty in secret_
MR_ HALPERN: Oh yeah _ That' s right _ But the House wanted to
into the act_ And thank the Lord we had a strong President
who said, "The Constitution is very clear _ I have to work with
the' Senate on advise and consent. Not you _ the House . Go
11 away .
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INTERVIEWER: Do you feel the Congress is more involved in the
ast 10 years?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh they've been pushing harder and harder and
harder and harder_ Now again, Iet'$ change the system if you
don t Iike it. It's been a rough one starting out, you know _
200 years. have been battling the same fight _ Nothing
has changed _ If you haven't seen it_ you ought to take a Iook
at three volumes done by Professor Goldsmith ca ] Ied The_Growth
of__Presidential Power
INTERVIEWER: I haven't seen them_
MR . HALPERN: We /1 I've got them if you want to Iok at them,
take the time later _ You can browse through them: And it
starts out with this business of the Jay Treaty and goes right
on through . It doesn' t cover every minute of the government' s
history
INTERVIEWER: The tens ions between .
MR _ HALPERN: This book is dated 1974 So it stops with the
Huston Plan _ But I don t see Congress, at Ieast the way I
understand the system and the way it operates Congress has a
chance to do more than they have been doing. I think It's
wrong for them to get into the act_ always have the power
of the purse_ That is very clear _ And can what they
don 't want to see happen. haven t the most"of
the time to do that. Th;js is what happened , know _ In
Vietnam. 'Nobody declared war_ You know _ Vietnam conflict, I
suppose , is a fancy word for it, 'Or
the Korean ice action or
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Or whatever you want to call it_ Ask the poor guys who were on
the other end of the line who are dead . But whatever you cal]
it, Congress didn't have the ba / s to cut it off when they
wanted to cut it Off It took them until 75 , 73 first, to do
it. We |1 , by jingo _ yoU can t run governments this way . You
know; you ve the power of the purse, use it. If yoU want
to get into the act of being an executive, goddammit, stop
paying the President of the United States. Don " t send him any
checks _
INTERVIEWER: I bring this up in class.
MR_ HALPERN: Sure . Close his bank account: Take away his
credit card Don t give him any money _ Close down the White
House _ Paint it black_ You know make up your mind what you
want. to do _ If you want.to fol- this system, there'$: going
to be tension between the two branches of government forever _
And the judiciary sits on the side , and Iook at the tension
that was there initially before you had the great decisions
about whether or not the Supreme Court is going to declare
some thing unconstitutiona/ or not - Nobody wa $ sure how that
was going to work . And that always hasn " t worked smoothly
either Now we 've come to accept it more and more. and more and
more _ And everybody has ca Imed down about it. In terms of the
role of the Supreme Court, it wa sn t written into the
Constitution_ It developed. Now as far as executive and
legislative, nobody has come up with a simple way of handl ing
that one
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INTERVIEWER: Do think that more intelligence data and So on
has been going to Congress in the Iast decade? Is it your
impression?
MR . HALPERN: My impression Is that it has_ Just by reading
the newspapers you can tel that the stuff has been going up
there by , not by.the bushe] basket loads it has been going up
by the truck load _ And I wouldn t be surprised if their
computers are hoked up so the stuff goes instantaneousIy _ So
I 'm sure _ First of al1 they are on distribution for the NID,
The Nationa] Intelligence Daily, as I am told, I mean , I read
in the paper _ Even that shouldn't be avai lable to Me and the
press _ Why the: hel 1 should I know about it? It doesn 't do Me
any good as a citizen to know that my Congressman can read the
Na tiona ) Inteligence Daily along with another 1,000 or 1,500
people in the Executive Branch _ What the he]1good is that
going to do? And I don t know how many people on the Hill have
access to it_ And I shouldn t know. I hope they don t get the
PDB . At Ieast in my we used to use the: PDB as a vehicle
for providing the President and a handful of other people, Iike
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense _ with
intel igence which didn t norma Iy get into the norma /
distribution channels _ It was a very simple, convenient me thod
for doing that_ And we did it specifically with President
Nixon _ From the very first, we / 1 he was inaugurated on the
2oth _ The 21st there was a meeting in his Office and it was
agreed right then and there that we would certain: sensitive
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information in the PDB only and he would be able to tell by a
certain phrase we used . And nobody else except those several
people in the room knew it_ So that even the other people that
got copies of the PDB didn't know exactly what the hel/ that
phrase meant _ And it wa $ hot intelligence from a good
source _ You can t know_ If they give that kind of stuff
to the Congressiona/ people, including the committee_
specifically just the intelligence committees, I don ' t see
why . There is no reason for it. They are not involved with
the to running of the government as much as they'd Tike
to be _ In which case Ieave the Senate and' become President.
INTERVIEWER: Maybe more of them are trying to play a Iarger
role in making foreign pol icy
MR . HALPERN: Yeah, okay. They've a perfect right to give
their advice to the President of the United States .
theoretically, makes the policy, whoever he may be _ His staff
doesn t the Secretary of State Isn t supposed to do it_ and
nobody else is _ According to the way I read the rule book the
Pres ident of the United States makes foreign
INTERVIEWER: What about this 'statement_ Sam, an officer. said_
"Congressiona / investigations in 1975 especially were Tike
being pi llaged by a foreign power oly we had been occupied by
the Congress with our files rifled _ our Officials humi ]iated,
and our agents exposed. "
MR _ HALPERN: Right on_ Absolutely correct.
INTERVIEWER: You feel that is an accurate appraisa] ?
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MR . HALPERN: It wa $ exactly the same way as when the Soviets
got into the Tsarist' $ files and exposed a/1 the secret
treaties and everything else. It'$ exactly the same thing. I
'have no objection to their coming in and Iok at the stuff _
I have great objection to their taking a bunch Of stuff and
spattering it &11 over the television tube and the front pages
of a11 the newspapers _ There is a big difference _ I see no
reason why you can't clear the necessary people on the Hi11 to
do whatever is necessary in terms of the oversight _ But that
'doesn t mean they' re coming into camp but then damn it, handle
the information exactly the same way the rest of us have always
handled the information _
INTERVIEWER: How about the Church Committee Report?
MR _ HALPERN: I thought that was awful And if you read: the
Congressiona/ Record, and if you haven t you should take a Iook
at it_ but the Congressiona/ Record Of the executive session
it wa$ first an executive session Of the Senate to discuss
whether the committee' Report: should be released. And as one . Of
the Senators , I forget who he was now_ maybe I can dig it up ,
said that when yoU ve got a hundred copies of your Report
(printed Report) already on each one of our desks, there is no
way that this Report is going to secret even if we vote to
keep it secret. And it was that kind of discussion that went
on a/1 morning_ To show you what finally did,
finally released the Congressiona| Record right away , after
made their vote _ And pointed out, this Is silly, you
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can t stop this thing. It should have never been printed .
The point was made that this thing should never have been
printed until we had voted . And we should have read this thing
kind of in draft, in typescript form_ Not even everybody
having a copy . I mean, some of the Senators had some sense _
If you= ve got this kind Of decision to make whether a
Congressiona] document is to be published, don t publish it. I
mean _ don t print the damn thing first and then ask us Ask uS
first. And Church' s view was "As a committee chairman _ I had
a right to do it." We I1 under the rules of the Senate that' s
true _ You know judgment We H 1 obviously, this stuff came
out and it shouIdn't have come out. I use a very simple
example _ There is no. reason under God" 5 green earth why
had to. talk about Black Leaf_40 being the chemical to-be used
by AMLASH Why couldn't they just say some commercially
avai lable insecticide or pesticide_ whatever it wa s ? Why
specifically name that thing? I don t know how many people
even read the thing. But _ you know_ some idiot could pick up
BIack Leaf_40 and' decide , 00 this is a good way to kill
somebody . ' It's nothing to do with intelligence And
that" S why I think that it was irresponsible_ and I think that
statement is an absolutely good statement and is absolutely
correct_ And: particularly as far as the Pike Committee is
concerned . That thing wa$ a shambles . And those kids were
running around in their bare feet not even their stocking
feet, in their bare feet having a ba ] 1 _ Throwing the stuff up
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in the air_
INTERVIEWER: How about a couple of the Senators _ Church and
Mondale, have emphasized that accountability to the President
and to the Congress was needed. And they were referring to the
Agency _
MR HALPERN: Yeah , I think you have to have accountability.
And we always thought we had accountability. We went and
our money from Congress to do a// the convert action that
everybody is objecting to now_ They didn't object then. I
mean , those handful of guys didn t I mean , the so-ca/led Laos
Secret War _ provided every penny _ We don t make our Own
money . We don t print our Own money _ We might print somebody
else - S counterfeit money but that is another story_ But the
Congressiona / Ieadership knew_ Again, under the ground: rules
that the Congress Iaid down we always had oversight. Four
oversight committees _ We reported to those four oversight
committees . If they' didn t want to Misten, jf didn't want
to ask questions and if they didn't want to know more _ that' s
their problem, not ours _ We ve got a war to.fight, kind of.
But we keep on going _ When they stop uS , we stop: And yeah _
you ve got to have Congressioa/ Oversight _ The system we ve
got , fine _ But oversight is oversight. Oversight does not
mean management - Not in my opinion anyway. Oversight does not
mean daily running of the office . And I am told that there are
guys on the Hill and they've badges just Tike the next
guy - They' ve a/1 the clearances _ They've got badges and
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go in_ run around _ have access to
everything_ And I think that' $ crazy. That is micro
managing. And there is no reason for that. None at a11 . I
just don't bel ieve in mucking up the system. If you want to
change systems _ say SO . AI1 the way around . If you want to
run the government get rid of the President and have it_ We
a Iways didn't have a President running things . There wa $
something In the old days , the Continental Congress . ran
everything _ The President of the Continenta] Congress was in
effect the President_ And you had Congressiona] Committees
that ran things But even they operated in secret when it came
to intelligence _ Look at the record . And they didn't tel1
everybody everything in Congress _ The Congressiona 1 people
knew in the Continental Congress that the sma / 1 commi-ttees that
they created to handle the confidential and secret stuff were
their surrogates . And hell _ I thfnk I mentioned to you the
other Huddleston finally, on a committee the Senate
Intelligence Committee _ turned to his CongressIonal col leagues
and said, "You have to accept US on your Committee
(Inteligence Committee) as your surrogates and you 'can t know
a/1 the things that we know_ 0i WeH1 , that S what we have been
saying a// along. Not everybody can know everything_ And yoU
can t have it that that' s a/1 . And I must say , the: Senate
Committee _ I think which is better even than the House
Committee in some things , does not a/low its staffers equa /
access to &l] papers , even now _ They've learned . It' $
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compartmented. Thfs is the way it should be _ Yeah , So talking
about Congressioa] Oversight , yes , 1f it's oversight_ Not
management _
INTERVIEWER: Bob Woodward in his Iast book Veil says the
Church investigation plus the Carter Administratio crushed the
spirit of the CIA_
MR _ HALPERN: We]1 not having been inside during the period_
it' s hard to talk. In terms of being on the outside Iok ing in
with some vague Idea of what the hel1 it is Tike inside , I
would say yes . There is no question about that .
INTERVIEWER: Did you see it, did you witness any crushing in
75?
MR _ HALPERN: We]1= I was on the outside _
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, that s right. You went back_
MR _ HALPERN: This has to be impressions and gut feel ings and
that kind of stuff in talking to people _ Yeah , it was a bad
time no question about that. bad _ Including guys who
were retired Tike me who were under the gun for the kinds of
things we did. And aIso I have been talking to people inside
who felt that if it wasn't for guys Tike uS the new guys
inside wou Idn't be under the gun now _ And therefore they
turned their venom on uS And I waS specifica] ly attacked by a
couple of' guys_ I mean, verbally attacked , for some of the
things_ in terms of you know_ if you guys hadn't done a/1
those nasty things , we wouldn t be under fire now_
INTERVIEWER: And these were Agency officers?
MR _ HALPERN: Agency officers _ Serving officers at the time
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And that' $ te clear Read Harris Greene S book , Inference
of Guilt. And if you read that you get a feeling 'for what some
of the insiders felt about uS former insiders. I think his
Iast job was Deputy IG before he retired . He ' d been around for
a long time He S written a Iot of books AI1 fiction So
far_ AII except for one he hasn ' t pub]ished it He is
trying to find a pubI sher _ But this gave you _ this Inference
of_Guilt gives one a very: good feel ing, I think, of how the
insiders, serving officers_ ma Ie and fema Ie , felt about us
old-timers who were now out_ And it was a very strong feel ing
that you know_ if they hadn't done it we would be a /1 right .
So there wasn t any great love lost between
INTERVIEWER: That must have been a miserable time
MR: HALPERN: Yeah , it was pretty rough . And I think -for both
sides _ And a lot of the officers , even the retired guys _ as
we 11 as the serving guys_ who didn't know a lot of the
activities_ And I didn t know Of the activities either He 11 ,
I didn't know about the MKULTRA the drug thing at a/1 , even
where I sat. We used to have compartmentation in those
because even as the Exec to the DDP there ' $ ots of things I
didn t know about until I read about them in the Church
Committee and other places _ I just had a better way of putting
them into context. But anyway , yeah, there were lots' of things
that were going on that I didn't particularly ike when I read
about them_ I have a better feel ing for why the people 'had to
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do what they were doing at the time _ What they did and why
some of these things tok place_ Where that' s not true of many
of my col leagues and friends who even in a kidding way wouId
say to me things Tike "What the he/1 did you do that for_
Sam?u And I pointed out_ Number one I didn't do it; number
two, I didn't even know It was going on ; but: number three ,
yeah , [ approve now and I know what happened. And I gave
them a defense for it. That didn't wash at a/1 _ So it's kind
of rough even among
INTERVIEWER: Was this in the period 75 , 76?
MR _ HALPERN: 75 , '76 , '77 _
INTERVIEWER: There is practically none of that feel now?
MR _ HALPERN: I don t know what it is now _ I know Harris
Greene stayed on unti] the Iate 70's , I think, even the
early 80 S And So Harris book , Inference_of_Guilt, wasn't
even ished then _ Could you cut that off for a second _
Inference %f Guilt came out in 82 , SO he probably stayed on
until at Ieast 80 something Tike that.
INTERVIEWER: Okay . Good , I'11 Iook at the book _
MR_ HALPERN: It will give yoU some idea _ I wrote a brief
review-Of that somewhere , I think it appeared in Periscope or
something_ But you' 11 get, I think, a
feeling for this
relationship of the serving officers versus the old hands_
INTERVIENER: AI right the Church Committee believed the
overa| 1 inteligence budget should be shed . Wa s that
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viewed as a serious issue in the' Agency? By those
MR. HALPERN: Who were then serving? From what I gather it
was And the Agency even under Turner objected to it. The
Carter Administration even objected to it. And even going back
into that period, Colby objected to it when he testified . AII
the Directors have objected to it_ You can't do it even with
an overal 1 figure . The oly budget figure that I know Of that
is actua lly ished every is the budget figure for" the
Intelligence Community Staff_ And that doesn t matter whether
they have a hundred people Or a thousand people. What the
he]1 That' s simple enough because they don't get engaged in
any activities _ can't split the CIA budget up into this
much for DDI , this much for S&t and this much for So on and So
forth. The minute yoU start mucking around with that, you take
the next year and theyear after that and the after that,
peop le start asking: lots of questions _ And foreign governments
try to figure out , why is it going up , why is it going down?
And pretty soon there is going to be demands for more and more
more and more breakout And you can t have that kind of stuff
if you re going to run an intelligence organization. I
remember many years ago the British Parliament use to pass a
one penny , a one penny, budget for confidential matters .
Period . And the British penny , not our penny _ But anyway , one
penny . That 5 the best way to do it_ The country wants a
budget figure, we 11 give them a budget figure _
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INTERVIEWER: That was their solution _
MR_ HALPERN: Yeah give them a one cent figure- I don ' t
care _ Or a dollar figure . One dolar No more _ But you
can't start putting out a bunch of figures Iike that_
INTERVIEWER: I don t know if we touched on it Iast time or not
the murder and funeral of Richard Welch and it' $ impact on
the Congressiona/ Committee S work_ Some say this lessened the
Committee pressure and won public opinion over to the s ide of
the Agency. Did you?
MR_ HALPERN: We I1 being on the outside and having been at
Dick' s arriva] at Andrews field that night when his plane came
in, I don t know whether it Iessened pressure from Congress_ I
think it did have an impact on public opinion, and I think that
can be checked by look ing at the old tapes in the old news
broadcasts and looking at the headl ines and the stories in the
responsible newspapers The Los_Angeles_Times , The_Chicago
Iribune The New York Tie The Washington_Post etc. and
ordinary papers across the: country and WaIter Cronkite 5
broadcast and things Tike that. And I think ou will find
overall. there waS a ing back from the constant drumbeat of
CIA being evil_ CIA evi1 CIA evii I 'm not sure if it had too
much of an impact on Congressiona/ Himl. Particularly the
Church Committee and the Pike Committee . Particularly the Pike
Commi ttee more than the Church Committee . It had some but I
don 't think it really stopped them_ kept going.
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INTERVIEWER: AI1 right, what about your impressions of Mr _
Colby S cooperation with the Church and Pike Committee
MR _ HALPERN: I knew you were going to ask that sooner or
later _ I think Bi 11 was wrong . Dead wrong. Obviously he
thinks he was right . Two different approaches, two different
men Iok Ing at the same prob Iem. I don ' t think Binl had to go
out Of his way in effect, open up everything without by
your Ieave from the President_ It was his way of doing it from
the very beginning from January even before the Church
Committee began from January ISth with Stennis He did it.
He carried on that way . Why he did, I don ' t know _ I never
asked him_ He probably feels if he hadn 't, things would have
been worse rather than better_ But I don't think So _ Henry
Kissinger held the ine On the Pike Committee getting access to
a Iot of State Department stuff He gave in some But there
was a big fight about it. And I would have preferred to see a
big fight made by Colby on getting access to al1 the stuff on
the Agency rather than just give 1t away _ First of a11 I wou Id
rather have seen a President. take this to the Supreme Court.
The whole business And maybe he wouId have lost. Who
knows? Aga in, we are at a "What if question. But I
think Colby wa $ dead wrong to go as far as he went_ Absolutely
dead wrong. To this day there are a Iot of people who think he
was wrong _ A Iot of people defend him. And I have friends on
both sides _ And everybody knows where I stand. And I stiml
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see Bi 11 from time to time We are stiil friends and a/1 that
kind of stuff_ We say hello, sit at the same table _ and
everyting else _ We just have a different view on how to run
the show in other words .
INTERVIEWER: And It never did go to court, did it?
MR. HALPERN: No_ No President had the guts. We ] 1 talking
about Congress not having the guts to use the power of the
purse _ The other . side, the Presidents don 't Tike to g to the
Supreme Court for this kind 0f stuff . Particularly after Nixon
lost on the tapes . It' s a tough one _ went to the Court
the Pentagon Papers and they lost that one And they might
have. lost the next one _ I don t know _ But that s the only
way you find out in this system. And we ve to find "out_
Otherwise we are just going to keep on this ba let we were
involved in forever_ And you know, I can ballet with the next
guy _ But sooner or Iater you re going to have to
INTERVIEWER: The ba / let is stiml on ?
MR_ HALPERN: Oh sure _ it's still on _ But somewhere _ somehow _
you 're going to have to make a decis io someday _ And I'm
afraid we re going to make a decision oly after some great
catastrophe _ And that 5 not the way to do it_ I don t think_
If we have to wait for a catastrophe every time we are going to
be rea/ ly down the tubes . I11 give you another simple One
Lincoln suspened habeas corpus . The Constitution says you
can't do this. He did it. And he said, you know_ "Sooner or
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Iater, if we Iose the war, there won t be any country to worry
about anyway _ And I'1 take my chances with Congress
afterwards He had the guts, the fortitude to be President
and make a decision Nobody stopped him during the war_ And
after the war it was approved. Don t give a damn and a/1 that
kind of stuff but anyway, it' $ the same thing here Somebody
has to decide _ You 've got to go and find out otherwise
you are going to have this ballet a/1 the time _ And I can't
see Judge Webster standing up better than Bi h/ Colby on
something Tike this_ Maybe I 'm wrong . I hope I'm wrong.
First of a/] _ I hope we never get to that again. But it's a
possibility. You ' ve to fight it. I'm glad to see , for
example that the Administration and: Judge Webster has come
forth and objected to the Glenn Bi ] 1 on putting the GAO, in a/1
of its glory and majesty, right in the middle of CIA' s
finances I don t know where that bi1] is going to go but it
is somewhere in commi ttee now _ But at Ieast initialy the
Administration said, "No way . But we M see what happens _
INTERVIEWER: As far as the cooperatio by Colby at the time it
was going on _ In other words _ it was going to the committees ,
you were surprised?
MR _ HALPERN: I am never surprised at anything that Bi // Colby
does _ Never _ I've been around Bi/ / long enough and close
enough not to be surprised: I objected to it. I mean , I
couIdn- t go ahead and grab him by the scruff of the neck or
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anything _ I was in no position to do that_ But I wa$ Ioud and
vociferous in my statements to the people who were Wi/l to
listen among my colleagues _ Some of them said, "Bil1 had no
choice _ He had to do that." 0i And I kept saying, "Not that
way . He may have had to reluctantly and over a period of time
give up a piece Of paper and another piece of paper and another
piece of paper But you don t suddenly open the door to the
11 safe and say , "Go felas _ and enjoy yourselves _ He took
stuff up there by the bushel barre] full It wa$ crazy .
INTERVIEWER: Now some of the records had been gathered for the
Rockefeller Commission and then were moved over to the Senate
Commission wholesale _
MR_ HALPERN: That' s true _ That was by Presidentia] Order .
The President runs' the show _ It's perfectly okay. It' s Tike I
said in early 75 when I was trying to collect stuff for B111
Colby , the DCI _ information in answer to a/1 the charges that
were coming up in the press in those 1 didn't know what
he was going to do with them_ And I had the same qua Ims that
my buddies had , n terms of_ if we give it to Bill God knows
what the hel he will do with the stuff . My answer was simply,
"He' s the boss . You 've got to give it to him_ And jf you
don' t, you might ruin your . job . the stuff_ just give it
to the Rockefeler Commiss ion- There was a Presidential
Commission reporting to the" Pres ident. The documents belong to
the President_ It' s up to him if he wants to them on a
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bulletin board out in front of the White House _ That' s up to
him. That' s his job_ He S got the Iega 1 power to declassify
every piece of paper in the government_ Fine go ahead and do
it. You are the boss . I think you are crazy, but go ahead and
do it. And the same difference between the Congressional
Committee , Presidential Commi ss ion I m sorry _ Maybe I 'm
simplistic in my approach:.to the Iegal i sms involved or the
operation Of an organizatio. Somebody has to make rules
and regulatios and procedures _ And somebody has got to fol ow
them_ Not everybody can be' a11 things to a/1 Men at a/1 times .
INTERVIEWER: What about the suggestion by someone that Mr
Colby was responsible for expos the CIA to the ic?
MR_ HALPERN: WeI1 that' s just the consequence of what he
did. That' $ a/1 . It' s easy _ He did that , as I say , from
January ISth, 75_ when for the first time the entire
organization of the Agency wa $ Iaid out for public view _
INTERVIEWER: Do you think he was hopeful that the material he
was supplying wouId. not be icized , would not be given out
by the Committee?
MR _ HALPERN: He wa $ in an open session _ He knew it
INTERVIEWER: Wel1 that one
MR_ HALPERN: The Stennis Committee _ He knew exactly where he
was Open session _ And that S why it dawned on him as he
Ieft, as he says In his book_ "On the way back from the Hi]I it
dawned on Me that S probably on the ticker tapes now , on the
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wire services now _ I better go stop by and te] somebody what
16 I have just done
INTERVIEWER: Did you see any s igns of that sort of attitude
earlier on with Bil/?
MR_ HALPERN: With Bi]I? No, not to that extent. Not in the
sense of kind of freewheel No_ that never came through _
But I wouIdn't have been surprised at whatever Bil) did on that
kind of stuff _ It always surprised the hel1 out of Me _ I
mean, it never surprised the heI1 out of me what he 'did. It
was strange in many cases, but he wa$ a strange man Probably
stim is .
INTERVIEWER: how about relationships between Colby and
AngIeton_ Strained?
MR_ HALPERN: Oh strained . Very strained. I don ' t
know how far back it goes as far as the Italian business is
concerned , because Italy was one of Jim' $ early bailiwicks _
INTERVIEWER: I mentioned before Iunch ; Angleton-Colby
relations _ Angleton-Helms relations?
MR _ HALPERN: very
INTERVIEWER: very
MR _ HALPERN: Always have been _
INTERVIEWER: Good working relationship between the two of
them.
MR_ HALPERN: Oh sure _ had their differences in views On
lots of subjects including the Nosenko case and a lot of
others , but by and large it wa $ excellent_
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INTERVIEWER: Other than Mr _ Colby, who wa $ the, most
influential person from the Agency in deal ing with these
Committees?
MR _ HALPERN: I have no persona/ knowledge of that So I am not
sure_ I would guess that the three guys who were set up to be
the Tiaison _ Breckinridge , Bo] ton and Elder 1 presume Were the
most influential guys because they were in daily touch with the
staff as we | 1 as the Senators and Representatives . I forget
who wa$ technically the boss . I think it was probably Scott.
The boss of the office on the paper And Seymour was a
consultant or contractor or rehiree Or whatever it was because
he had retired .
INTERVIEWER: Oh _ he had? I didn't know that_
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah , he had retired with Me and 250 other guys
from the DDP on December the 31st, 1974 .
INTERVIEWER: Oh he had too-
MR. HALPERN: And then he 'got cal ed back and rehired on
January the Ist or January the 2nd whatever it turned out, to
for this kind of stuff even before the Church Committee was
created. So I guess Of a/1 Of those in terms of staff
officers , 1 guess those three were the guys who were more
intimately involved than anybody else _ But I may be _ you know_
dead wrong on that_
INTERVIEWER: And that was 200 plus that Ieft at the end of
December?
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah, regular retirement_ I mean , the retirement
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computations as a result Of the cost of living a/lowances that
were then growing along every six months or SO made it so that
it was economically crazy not to retire _ You were better off
to do what Seymour did, which was retire one and come back
on contract the next because it worked out that way much
better Better financially, that is _ So a Iot of guys just
took advantage of it Iong before the business of the Church
Committee came ` Into existence _ And you had to have your papers
in te a while before the December 3Ist retirement 'date So
that they could do a/1 the processing and everything, get the
approvals and processing and what have you because it wasn't
automatic You had to go through the usua] bureaucratic chain
Of command to get approval to retire _ So most of these people
had: been thinkIng about retirement for some time It had
nothing to do with the Schlesinger cleaning up in 73 , this wa $
a year later in '74_ So a Iot Of guys were planning it and
just kept on loking at the: financial statistics from the
retirement branch to see when the best time was to go_ And So
it suddenly ended up with about 200 or 250 from the DDO alone .
And we a/1 went out at the same time
INTERVIEWER: You served Tom Karamessines until February of '732
MR . HALPERN: That S right And then Bi 11 Colby after that.
INTERVIEWER: Then Colby after that?
MR_ HALPERN: Until about of 73 _
INTERVIEWER: Until May of 73: And then what Sam?
MR. HALPERN: Then my next assignment was as the Senior
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Personnel Officer. Ma inly, my job was worrying about
assignments for senior personnel _ That means the super grades _
GS-ISs" and above for the DDO _ I prepared a/1 the necessary
paperwork and make recommendations to the DDO as to next
gnments and what have you . I did that for, well, sorry,
correction _ I first was given a job by Colby and Bi11 Ne I son
who wa $ then the DDO while Bi/ wa $ in Timbo wa j to
sworn in. I mean , Colby was in Timbo _ My next assignment ,
actually_ wa $ to do a study Of DCS which Colby had just
incorporated into the DDO _ It had been under the DDI for
years _ And the DDO , that the Directorate suddenly had
another component totally new component_ didn't know
what to do with it_ For years had been trying to get
their hands on it, we
had been _
even under Tom K. And no
decision had been: made _ And one. Of the first things he
did was to just transfer_ The same time he transferred TSD _
the technica/ people into the DDS&T _ he transferred the DCS
into the DDO _ And SO I wa s asked to Iok into it and come up
with a paper saying, you know_ what' s this anima / we now Own?
What do we have here? And So I did it and I think it took me
two Or three months to a study. And I visited quite a
number of the field bases = field offices throughout the
country Talked to a Iot of people and talked to a lot of
people in Washington and wrote a paper _ And then it was after
that that [ wa $ made the Senior Personnel Officer
Se
or officer
for senior Officers
L s
in the DDO _ And one of the conditions
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that I had made in doing the study on DCS , that come what may
with my report, whether it was a report or a Iousy report,
I didn't want people to assume that once I made the report that
I would move in and take over DCS , you know _ Being charged
with having doctored the report, I said, "I want it clearly
understood I am not going to be assigned to the DCS when this
is over _ And everybody agreed. Scouts honor cross my heart
and hope ' to die, a /1 that kind Of nonsense _ Hand on the Bible
and what have you. And after I did my personne/ job , which I
am not a personne/ officer and I didn't Tike it but I did it
as as I wa$ told to do it. And so and behold , when I wa$
stirring around saying, you know_ "This isn't my job _ There
must be something else you guys have for Me to do. And
behold , when Jim Murphy retired in 73 and Jack Horton was
moved up from Deputy Chief Of DCS to Chief of DCS , I wa $
detailed as the Deputy to Jack Horton _ And So in early 74 ,
Iate '73 , early 74, I wa$ made Deputy Chief of DCS and then
made another trip to the stations for other reasons _ because I
was loking at them from two different points of view: And
that' s what I wa$ doing. And then when I retired_ I retired as
Deputy Chief of DCS _
INTERVIEWER: Good , I didn't have that gap _ As you Iook to the
past how was counterintelligence affected by the Hearings?
MR_ HALPERN: I think that were affected , I'm just guessing
again, because on was on the outside _ but my guess is it wa s
probably affected even more drastically than the rest 0f the
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shop Iargely because of the MHCHAOS program_ the ma j 1 opening
program, and because of Jim Angleton being charged with being
the gray eminence and ` spook and God knows what else. I think
it was probably badly hurt: Much more so than the others .
INTERVIEWER: Badly damaged?
MR _ HALPERN: BadIy damaged _ And particularly with Colby
saying that he never got anything out of counterintelligence _
Jim Angleton couId never convince him about
counterintelligence . Bi11 just didn't understand . it, that' s
a]] .
INTERVIEWER: How about Mitch Rogovin? notions as
to' how he influenced the
MR_ HALPERN: I have no idea _ No persona] knowledge whatever _
What I would be giving you i$ hearsay _
INTERVIEWER: how about Director Schlesinger' $ relations
with Congress?
MR . HALPERN: We I1 _ as far as I know Jim wa $ only in the job
from February 73 to June 73. I have no idea what those
relations were _ First of a11 I was bouncing around mostly as
Colby' $ Exec and we had enough troubles worrying about what to
do with Jim. Colby knew pretty we1 1 because it was mostly
Colby' s ideas that Jim was Signing-off on as it affected the
DDO _ I just don t know What his relationships were rea / ly. 1
wasn t close enough to get near _ I can give you a
feeling. But that S no helps
INTERVIEWER: And how about during that time Colby' s relation
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with Congress?
MR_ HALPERN: I don t know _ I don 't think there were very
many . I think everything was handIed through Jim. Because in
those officers below the of the Deputy Director and
Executive Director _ very few officers as such ever had any
direct relations with the Congress . Bi11 Broe as the IG, under
Schlesinger_ wa$ the first guy , first officer be Iow that top
Ievel who was directed to testify in Congress on the Chi le
affair because Bil had been Chief of the WH Division: when it
a11 took place _ And SO, Bi 1/' s contacts with Geneene of Itt _
for the substantive of issue _ I bel ieve Bi 11 was the first guy
who Schlesinger changed the ground rules right away _
And I think he was the first guy _ Other Directors had taken
officers up there with them to testify in executive session ,
classified hearings ad briefings . Dick Helms took Ted
Shackey, for example, to testify about a number of things _ I
think one Of them was. the Laos war and another one on Vietnam
and So on _ But aside from that kind of the Director doing the
briefings with a staff officer to assist him, in effect, I
think Bil Broe was the first, I 'bel ieve he was the first,
officer to testify in his own right under oath_ etc. And then
his testimony was declassified a Imost immediately and ished .
INTERVIEWER: And the Director was present?
MR _ HALPERN: I don 't remember whether he wa s present or not
INTERVIEWER: So this wa$ a <
MR_ HALPERN: It was a change _
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INTERVIEWER: Big departure?
MR _ HALPERN: Vast change . I bel ieve Bi 11 in 73 was under
Schlesinger _ the first guy. I m almost certain of that.
INTERVIEWER: Do you happen to know who wa $ Congressiona /
Iiaison at that time?
MR _ HALPERN: It would have to: be I don ' t know who the
heck I don t know offhand . I don t remember . John Warner
would know . Give John a buzz and ask him. Or the record would
show in the Agency who the heck was on what job _ I'm' trying to
think and I don - t remember offhand _ It may be in the public
hearings for that matter _ [ just don t know . I've them in
there somewhere . But I think it would be easier for you just
to check_ Because that waS : wide thing and it was an
unclassified officer _
INTERVIEWER: how about _ some suggest I approached it a
ittle bit differently a
ittle bit ago, that Mr_ Colby' s
cooperation saved the Agency from very serious harm_
MR_ HALPERN: Run that by me aga in _
INTERVIEWER: Some suggest that Mr _ Colby S cooperation saved
the Agency from very serious harm_ Some going So far as to say
it might have been di smantled . Is that a common view?
MR _ HALPERN: Wel1; I'] tell you if it is . it's a new one on
me I know it' s a view, but a 11 I can say to those who hold
that view what the hel do they regard as damaging to the
Agency? If Bi11 'didn't do the damage to the Agency, what the
he]1 did? I don 't think the Congress wouId have di smantled the
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Agency under any circumstances . If by dismantling, basically
you say get rid of the clandestine side _ because I think even
the si]iest guy on the Hill always said you ve to have
analysis_ research and analysis That' s DDI - And I think
are a11 pretty smart enough to say , "Wel1 we ve got to have
those bloody things up in the sky. And we ve to' have
technical stuff_ It You know everybody i5 for technical stuff
And the DDA simply provides the the money and the office space
and the paper clips_ So the oly thing that would be
dismantled would be to wipe out clandestine activities. And I
don t think anybody on the HT seriously considered Wiping it
out completely_ Controlling it, reducing it, putting it under
some kind of further Congressiona/ constraints_ yeah, that wa$
going to happen . Moving it out 0f CIA and making it a' brand
new agency by itself_ yeah , there was talk about that kind of
thing. But where the heli would they it? In the White
House? Wel1_ that' s possible _ Look at the nice mess with
with North and you can imagine that in spades So those people
who hold the View that Colby' $ frankness if that' s the word to
use or cooperation with the Congress, saved the Agency from
rea / damage , I don 't know what the he// damage is then _ Sorry
Ra Iph _ you asked.
INTERVIEWER: I asked_ you bet_
MR. HALPERN: I think' people Mke that have rocks In their
head . Idon t know what the hel/, they are imagining.
INTERVIEWER: TeH1 on a scale from 1 to 15, with 15 tops,
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how would you rate Mr _ Colby' $ work in the investigation?
MR _ HALPERN: In the investigation?
INTERVIENER: In the investigation
Cr
Congressiona| Pike,
Church_
MR_ HALPERN: In relation to what? I am,not trying to hold
back_ In relation to what? In relation to harm to the Agency ,
harm to the community? He lping in Congress? Hurting the
President? I'm not sure _
INTERVIEWER: In relation to the Agency, and if you will the
health of the Agency , the strength Of the Agency _
MR_ HALPERN: Oh I'd give him no more than a 5. No more . My
Lord. I think he did a lot of damage _ I think he aided and
abetted the kinds of anti-intelligence activities, and
anti-intelligence feel ings on the Hill. And I forget whether
it was Kissinger or Rockefeller who made that maybe it's a
apocrypha/ remark, to Colby about you know_ do you have to go
to Confession a]1 the time ? That' s my attitude as far as Colby
is concerned .
INTERVIEWER: I'd Tike to read a statement and see what ou
think of it_ This is a statement that wa $ made to Mr_ Colby in
December of 1975. And I am quoting, "It has been my experience
and judgement that if You , Mr Colby , are asked precisely the
right questions you Wi]I give an honest answer You do not
Iead us into those areas which would us know what the
right question was to ask_ You do not make it easy for us to
ask the right question _ (0 This is a Congressman , Sam.
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MR _ HALPERN: T know _
INTERVIEWER: "Anyone who thinks you have been running back and
forth to Capital Himl with briefcases bulging with, secrets
which you are: eager to bestow upon us hasn't sat on my side of.
the desk.
MR_ HALPERN: Do you want Me to comment?
INTERVIEWER: Yes .
MR _ HALPERN: I think the person who made that comment didn't
realize how much he was getting _ He may have been ignorant of
what the intellicence business was a /1 about , what the
profession waS a/1 about_ what the Community was a/1 about _
And he may have thought that Colby wasn't giving: him the
to the guardhouse . But in fact I think he was , Aga in, I
wa sn t there at the time So I am only guess But I think he
did give them keys I think the Congressman who made that
comment thought that there should have been a hell of a Iot
more _ I think he wa $ Mving in a dream worId: He didn't
realize how much he was getting from Bi)1_ As I said before , I
would have preferred if the Congressmen really had to dig and
burrow and argue for every piece of paper _ That' s a persona /
view and I think' that I would , if I had been there I would have
tried to see what we could do to keep it that way . I must say
[ can image Seymour Bolton trying to convince Bill Colby about
not push things forward and not rushing things _ And maybe
he succeeded in holding back some stuff or at Ieast delaying
production of some stuff _ But I can imagine Colby totally
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overrul ing Seymour most of the time or some of the time
don t know_ But I can't imagine Bol ton knowing Seymour very
we/1 indeed , that Seymour would want to go rushing foward with
this thing because if nothing else, Bo] ton was a political
anima | He had the best tical sense of many guys there _
INTERVIEWER: He did?
MR. HALPERN: Oh _ he was terrific on this_ He wa$ basically
a
political action officer and always wa$ And particularly in
Germany , he knew the German scene very well indeed , And the
German Ieaders very we |1 indeed_ some of whom were on his
payro] 1 _ But that is another story_ Or had been on his
payrol1, Iet Me it that way _ Years ago. Anyway , I can see
Colby saying, "Oh I know better than that Seymour _ I know how
to handle those guys _ Let me handle it my way . And I'm1
handle it my way . But Seymour would be a good staff officer
and provide Colby with a/1 the information that Colby should
have _ And it wouId be up to Bil/ then to make the decision on
what to do_ That Congressman , I think, thought there wa$ much
more and thought that probably Bi11 was holding out on him. My
own feel ing , and it i$ purely that _ was that Bi)1 did not
hold out. And he wasn ' t trying to hold anything back . I think
he really bel ieved, probably to this that he did the right
thing by making things easier by showing a cooperative spirit,
by putting things forward, and I think the other apocryphal
statement I made _ you know, about _ do you have to go to
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confession everyday is the other side to that same question _
And the Congressman, I think, was just full of delusions _
That s about a]1 I can say.
INTERVIEWER: How about your reflections on media coverage of
the Congressiona/ investigations? Do you feel were
objective?
MR . HALPERN: We11 obviously not _ were not objective _
They were a11 Nothing but hype _ If you looked at some
of the stories that appeared in: the print media and the radio
and. television media, the headI ine always had to have those
three nasty Ietters, CIA. I don t care what t wa $
always dug up a CIA headline You take a_ Iook at the obituary
pages Of The Post &nd New York Iimes and invariably if somebody
died God knows where and God knows how Iong they'd_been
sick, with cancer or had an accident _ killed in a car crash
and if they kappened to have been in CIA even a$ a logistics
officer Or a finance clerk Or a courier and jf could dig
out the word CIA that would be in the headline_ "CIA Courier
Dead" Or "CIA Officer Killed" Or so and SO _ It wa $ a Iways the
CIA. It use to make Me sick to my stomach to watch these
things on television_ To this day I can't watch Tom Brokow
without remembering some of his absolute awful asinine
statements that he made as a
great pontificator on a11 of this
stuff_ Dan Rather waS bad enough but he wasn' t on then _
It was Wa Iter Cronkite _ But Dan was always covering
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this thing. He wa S bad , but he wasn't quite that bad . I think
Brokaw was the worst.
INTERVIEWER: Daniel Schorr wa$ he
MR . HALPERN: Schorr was a bad one a11 the way through.
were always loking for that CIA headl ine _ It could have
something to do with some other Agency but if it was
intelligence, CIA always got the hook _ Let me give you a
perfect example of what I am talking about _ You remember I 'm
sure the famous picture of that so-called assassination
The dart gun
INTERVIEWER: Right _
MR_ HALPERN:
Ee
that Church was holding
up and Tower was
look ing over the side and what have you _ And first of a/1 ,
Bi1/ Colby should never have brought that up on the Hill. He
shouldn t have taken it up there _ But it wa$ Iabeled to this
and it's even in the John Ranelagh book _ and [ tried to
him to correct it in the paperback but he couldn't because _
I think, because of the fact that there wa $ a
captio under
a
photograph and to change a plate Iike that is very expensive
for a publsher _ John tried to make some changes in the text,
not the caption under the photograph, but in the text itself to
indicate what I wa$ trying to tell them, that by dammit, it wa $
not the CIA gun . The gun happened to have' been found in one of
the safes at CIA when these young kids were running around in
the safes in their bare feet. And in the testimony on the Kill
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before the Church Committee _ it appears in the bloody same book
that the testie of Colby' s in, two days later_ two Or three
days Iater _ Dr _ 'Senseney of the Special Operations Division of
the Department of the Army at Fort Dietrich, Maryland Dr
Senseney testified. And in high dudgeon practically when he
said, "That' s not a CIA gun _ I'm the guy who developed .the
gun _ I developed it and not for CIA _ I developed it for the
entire US Government and it had nothing to do with Operation
MONGOOSE Or Cuba _ It wasn't even developed then_ I developed
it for the Special. Forces in Vietnam in 1965 . It' s my gun _ We
did it_ It' s an Army gun. But no _ you 11 never find it in
history today. It's always a CIA gun . It's going to be a CIA
gun until you and I are dead:and long after_ can't
correct the history books And it' s a/ 1 in the same bloody ,
green covered set of hearings where Dr Senseney says, "It's my
gun .
INTERVIENER: How does Senseney spel1 his name ? know?
MR_ HALPERN: I'1 give it to you . Hold on
INTERVIEWER: The machine is back on
MR . HALPERN: I M not making this up _ This is Volume I of the
Church Committee Hearings and oddly enough the title of the
'Volume is "Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents And that
subject has nothing to do with the dart gun_ Anyway , Bi 11
testified with that dart gun nonsense and he had with him at
the time Sayre Stevens and Mitch Rogovin on September the I6th,
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1975 . On September the 18th, 1975 , two days Iater . Dr Charles
A. Senseney, spel ed S-E-N-S-E-N-E-Y . He was Department of
Defense employee formerly in a Specia/ Operations Division at
Fort Dietrich; Maryland . And If you' 11 wa it a minute I'11 give
you the actual page number Of that. I've been trying to get
this damn thing. People won t isten to me and nobody wil] .
INTERVIEWER: We11 I am and the machine is and we ' 11 get it out
to the public.
MR . HALPERN: If you'11 hang 'on one minute here it is . This
is what I wrote to John Ranelagh and I sent it to him in this
form. He took 80 percent of these 38 pages when he out his
paperback . Anyway , I'm saying this, "Re the photo of Senator
Church holding
a dart gun _ The gun wa $ not a CIA gun It was
not developed in the early 60' s . It wa $ not deve loped as part
of Operation MONGOOSE _ See Church Committee Hearings , Volume
I, Testimony of Charles A . Senseney , Department of Defense _
Special Operations Division, September 18 _ 1975, Pages 159 to
177 _ The gun was developed . long after MONGOOSE which was
run from October 1961 to October 1962 _ It wa$ developed in
1965 for Special Forces in Vietnam and was avai lable for a/1
interested government agencies _ m Quote unquote _ And there 5
the text_ But the media two days ater never mentloned a word
about "Two ago we gave you a report.about that dart gun _
We cal led it a CIA gun _ Oops we made a mistake _ It's not a
CIA dart gun _ Iu You think Colby as DCI even tried to put out a
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correction to the press , a notice saying, "Hey fellas, please
even a
Tittie half-inch box in somewhere on page 55. CIA
didn't do a thing. And I hold B1I responsible for that and
I'm sorry to be so strong about It. But that is Bf1I's fault.
He brought that bloody up there . He knew what they were
doing. He saw the headlines as we]1 as you and Me and the
print media and the television media, the electronic media and
the radio. He never did anything at a/1 to to correct the
record_ At the time it might_ big might, big question mark ,
might have had some impact on some of the media to say , "OOPS ,
it wasn't a CIA gun , it wa $ a Department of Defense gun .
Never_ Never! I tried to do it in my own ittle way _ I
didn't have a chance to even start. I've told everybody that I
could think of including Bi// Colby the same story I am telling
you . I said, "I am not making it up _ It' 5 a/1 in the same
green document.
INTERVIEWER: Does he: mention that in his book? I don't
remember that. Doe s he mention that in his book? Does Bi11
Colby mention this? I don't think SO .
MR_ HALPERN: He never made any attempt to correct the record _
Sure the gun was there _ I'm not denying that. But it wasn't a
CIA dart gun or the CIA assassinatio gun _ Nobody in the media
tried to correct the record . Church didn t_ obviously_
Never _ But the guy who should have done something is B111
Colby. And I hold Bi]] persona | Iy responsible for not doing
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anything about it.
INTERVIEWER: I'm glad to it on the record_
MR_ HALPERN: It' s on the record. I've had It on the record So
many times with people - I've told this to Seymour Hersh . But
he didn t be / ieve me until he did his Own homework _ He didn't
even believe in loking at my copy _ It wasn't here jn this
house . I wa $ out with him. I do my homework _ And when I've
got , you know_= I said, "I'm not saying this_ Here , you read
it." He had to do his own homework and he finally told me at
another subsequent session, he said , "Yes , you were right,
Sam_ I sa id , "I didn't make it up." And I don t know
Senseney from a hole in_ the wa/1 You got Me at the wrong
moment _
INTERVIEWER: I'm glad to get it.
MR_ HALPERN: I'm getting hot under the colar_
INTERVIEWER: That' s fine _ That' $ fine _
MR_ HALPERN: I don t mind , you know_ taking blame for
something we did. And there is no blame in having a dart gun,
by dammit _ I think Senseney was right to have perfected One
The fact that we didn't use it and nobody else used it, that' s
another one of those wasted things, wasted efforts maybe _ But
if suddenly somebody needed
L
we /1 we did use it, I 'm
sorry. But not as an assassination weapon _ We used it against
dogs .
INTERVIEWER: Right, guard
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MR _ HALPERN: The guard dogs were put to sleep in at Ieast one
operation.
INTERVIENER: You know in Spy_Catcher there is mention of a
dart gun _ And I wondered .when I read that whether the 'British
had worked on it and then we did? I wasn 't sure _
MR. HALPERN: According to Senseney , he did this on his own
He and his laboratory types - I don ' t know Senseney . It's al1
in here _ Read the written report_
INTERVIEWER: AI right. I'm going to_
MR. HALPERN: You know it's Tike this business I told you
about my being out in Boulder Colorado at the World Affairs
Conference Perfect. example _ It's okay for somebody to use
the Church Committee Reports to damn CIA but I can t use the
same bloody report to defend CIA: So where the he]I do you
INTERVIEWER: In one hel1 of a circle that 5 for sure _
MR. HALPERN: That' s for sure _ Round and round and round_
Anyway , you caught me at a wrong moment
INTERVIEWER: it's fine _ Te11 me why do you think the
press was playing al / CIA up and paying CIA
MR _ HALPERN: I think of the same business of being
anti-establ ishment _ anti-government _ Remember , this is after
Vietnam_ after Watergate . It al1 adds up . Attack, attack ,
attack, attack_ attack.
INTERVIEWER: Anti-secrecy?
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MR _ HALPERN: We | 1 partly. Sure _ Remember the Freedom of
Information Act was just beginning ,to be used _ And it's part
of the whole business, it's against the estab] ishment - And one
of the guys who wa$ on the Church Committee staff one of the
staffers Rick Inderfurth, I think is his name
INTERVIENER: Yeah .
MR_ HALPERN: you know that name ?
INTERVIEWER: Yes , I do_
MR _ HALPERN: WeH1, after the Church Committee business , his
next job was in the media on television as a correspondent _
INTERVIEWER: Oh I didn t know that_
MR _ HALPERN: Guys were Ioking for other jobs . YOU know
Iook out for their future _ I don't object to that but I
hate for them to have gotten ahead over the dead bodies of the
Intelligence Community. I mean, . it' $ a ittle bit beyond the
a$ far as I'm concerned .
INTERVIEWER: how about the writings of Seymour Hersh_
Significant factor?
MR_ HALPERN: Yes . If nothing else The_ New York Times and
The New York_Times still has an impact and when you have two
big front page stories Iike that it'$ going to make an
impact _ And it did make an impact_ And particularly when he
had the help, and he admits it, and Colby admits it, he had the
heIp of the DCI_ Colby, who confirmed to him a lot of the stuff
he had about some of the activities in New York, some of which
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were wrong _ And Colby didn't even know they were wrong _ But
Colby went ahead . This.i$ part of Colby' $ problem again
giving away more than he has to give away . Why the he/ he
talked to Hersh' beats the hell out Of Me _
INTERVIEWER: How about certain newspapers . Were they
especialy harsh in their treatment of CIA during the time?
MR _ HALPERN: Yeah . I don t know Of any that wasn't. There
may have been some around the country_
INTERVIEWER: Christain_Scjence_Moni maybe?
MR _ HALPERN: Oh no, no, no, no . The Monitor was along
with everybody else were a part of the pack_ And I've
got al1 the clippings _ The_Monitor was of the
INTERVIEWER: WaU Street Journal?
MR _ HALPERN: That I don t know _ [ don ' t read the WallStreet
Journal rel igiously _ I used to read The_Monitor The_Post_ and
The New York_Times rel igiousIy. I found that I: a _
couIdn't afford them a/1 and b _ my clippings were overflowing
the room anyway, and I just read Ihe_ Moni tor and The_Washington
Post and , of course _ Iime magazine _
INTERVIEWER: Washington Star? Was that
MR _ HALPERN: TheWashingtonStar was going but they were a/1
on the attack_ Nobody wanted to be Ieft out _ Everyone_
a/1 wanted to be part of the show _ And that S why you had the
television and the radio, al1 the different channels . I don ' t
care what_ al1 the news broadcast. It wa$ a Imost as if
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everybody said , "This is the time. felas and we are a/1 going
to make head) ines_ m And were a/1 Iook for headl ines no
Matter what it was Good _ bad _ Or indifferent_ They didn't
care about the facts _ This wa$ one of the reasons that AFIO
was created
F
we called: it ARIO when we first began under Dave
Philips
Co
to try to some kind Of moderation and some. k ind
of factua] sense into some of these guys who had absolutely no
concept of what the he// Were doing, what they Were
talking about. It was just Tike the Representatives and the
Senators who didn t have any idea 'except that they al1 thought
this was James Bond fun and games stuff _ And there was no
Ieavening of any kind Of criticism. And what we were trying to
at Ieast in the AFIO s ide or the ARIO side was to have a
place where the media could come and talk to us And we
weren 't going to give away any secrets_ And we didn't. But to
put things in perspective things in context_ to
explain to them what the hel/ that terminology was what the
definitions were, what covert_action was _ You know nobody
knew _
INTERVIENER: AFIO Or ARIO ran a questionnaire with its
membership. Do you know whatever happened to the questionnaire?
MR _ HALPERN: The questionnaire wa $ out at the request of
One of the members who wa$ doing some kind of a study a
Ph. D Or a Masters or something. He was doing a paper _ And
this wa$ a part Of his paper . And I don t know what the
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results were _ I never saw the finished product. But you can
check' with the office and see if they have it_
INTERVIEWER: I saw some mention in one of the Congressiona/
documents _ Dave Phi in testimony , maybe for government
operations.
MR. HALPERN: WeI1 it may have been _ But again, Dave wasn't
running the questionnaire _ That wa$ an individual member' $
effort and using AFIO as a means of getting it out to the
membership in kind of one fell SwOOp He didn't have any way
of getting
L en I don t know what the membership wa$ maybe a
thousand or fifteen-hundred something Iike that
S
he wouldn t
have any way Of reaching that many people as a private
individual . So we sent out the questionnaire that he
prepared. And as a ma tter of fact I don t think I even
responded to it because I thought some of the questions were
sily. And I didn't see any point in answering sily
questions_
INTERVIEWER: You didn't save it?
MR _ HALPERN: I.didn't. I'm sorry _
INTERVIEWER: I'm just curious because from the testimony there
are some percentages _
MR _ HALPERN: Dave may have _ You might ask Dave _ Dave may
have saved it. I don t know if the office itself saved it.
They weren't very history-minded in the office .
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INTERVIEWER: How about your impressions regarding support from
the White House during the Congressiona/ investigations?
MR_ HALPERN: Again, from the outside loking in
INTERVIEWER: Right .
MR_ HALPERN: I don' t think the White House was very
supportive, or at Ieast as supportive as they might have been _
But I think I've always thought that they might have been more
supportive if Colby had been more honest with the White House
in the very beginning_ And the beginning to Me i5 January 15 ,
1975 , before the Church Committee And read Colby' $ book about
that_ I mean , he himself says you know _ says he was out of
step, basically. And if I were sitting in the White House _ why
wouId I suddenly think that this guy was going to work with
Me You know , he cut my feet off at the stumps , at the
the first time around_ And there is no way I can. pul ] him back
now _ I think the White House wa $ concerned , I think Henry
Kissinger wa $ concerned about the fact of the loss of emphas1$
and the Ioss of capability in the Intelligence Community and
how to stem that particular Iem _ And if you remember Ford
came out with his own plan of reorganizing the Community and
took a bit of the ` wind of the Sails of the Church
Commi ttee which I thought wa $ a smart thing to do_ It may
have been cosmetic and it may have been $ imply a dea1 But by
that time he wa$ dealing with Bush in 76 , a different kind .of
a guy . And we 1 1 an Executive Order came out under Ford in
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February of 76 and it's called the Bush paper _ It wasn't. I
mean , Bush couldn'tpossibly, even with his staff have written
a new Executive Order in the couple of weeks that he wa$ in the
office_ It had to be the one that wa $ prepared by Colby and
his staff Or his staff officers _ So that was basically the
order .that came out in 76.with a Bi 11 Colby related order_ an
attempt to do some thing_ But- again, why should the White House
and a/1 of it's parts gone out of its way to work with a guy
they weren't sure of? Now when Bush took over in '76.it' s a
different story. But by that time the damage had been done _
It was 75 when the damage wa $ done _ not 76 _ because by 76
'the Hearings had died down , the coverage had died down _ and it
was only starting to come up aga in when started to show
these green books and the reports and the Hearings and by that
time it wa$ the middle of 76 . But it doesn't take long to
destroy an Intelligence , Community You know boom _
INTERVIEWER: Did you ever hear anything of the role of Mr
Haig?
MR _ HALPERN: Not much _ Not 'much . At Ieast I don t remember
T think by that time A1 wa $ out of town Wasn 't he in Europe
at that time? By 762
INTERVIEWER: By 76 , he would have been .
MR _ HALPERN: Yes , he would have been in Europe by that time
So I don t remember hearing;:of Al very much_
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INTERVIEWER: That' $ right _ He went Off to Europe _ How about
this: A number of observers believe the Congressiona/ Hearings
in this year of investigation were a rea/ watershed in CIA
history_
MR . HALPERN: Oh sure _ Before the deluge and after the
deluge _ No question_ No question_ We thought we had a_
prob]em in '67 _ That' s about nine years ear] ier, eight years
earlier when we had the Ramparts And that was a
tremendous flap_ And I think we discussed that Iast time and
I'm o tape on that. But that was the first big rea problem
we had , war issue _ I mean , the of Pigs was bad enough ,
but that- was limited, by: comparison, to the Ramparts which
was worIdwide in its significance; and covered a whole variety
of subjects _ in terms of the different covers we had used and
in terms of the 'different things we had done _ Even though it
was a/ covert action _ But by 75 we weren't just talking
covert action _ The ~Of. Pigs was also covert action. It
just happened to be paramilitary activity of covert action, but
it was covert action _ But by 75 yoU are. getting into
intelligence _ you are getting into counterintel 1 igence, you re
getting the whole "shmear Iet a lone the CA stuff the covert
action stuff . So 75 wa $ the first time there was across the
board from A to Zed and back again And it was the kitchen
s ink, soup, apples_ nuts, everything. And it wasn't just CIA
it wa $ the entire Community , which even hurt worse than that_
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It included things Tike NSA, which up until then had been
rea lly sacrosanct_ And they blew stuff in NSA ike I wish I
knew the detai] But a/ ]you ve to do is read the stuff
and can have a feel what the hell went wrong there . They
blew more than they should have _
INTERVIEWER: There was a comment by Bob Woodward in Veil that
Bi /1 Colby in the' Hearings , his real success wa $ that he
protected NSA_
MR. HALPERN: Oh _ I've got hearings in there about NSA and NSA
being on the firing Tine and' I know the staff officer who
helped prepare most of the testimony by the Director of NSA at
the time Genera1 something or other I forget his name right
now _ The guy who did most of the work had been a col lege
classmate of mine at the: Nationa] War Col Iege , Jack Harding.
And ithurt very badly al/ the way. around. And Colby couldn't
have possibly protected them.
INTERVIEWER: Woodward overstated it_
MR. HALPERN: And as a matter of fact, I think part of the
prob Iem, again sitting
on the outside , was that each of the
agencies in turn had to protect their own doma in and their Own
activities _ And no OCI I don 't care who he wa $ , could' have
been able to coordinate and alter the extent of trying to come
up with a solid: front _ I think if he did there might have been
Some Iaw. Which said you are: in col lusion. So you can't, you
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know you are not' a/lowed to defend yourself together _ I don 't
know _ I M just guessing _
INTERVIEWER: How about the Congressiona] investigations
affect Agency morale a Iot Or
MR_ HALPERN: We]1. I can only assume aga in from the outside
that they had to. I know people talked to me about it from
people who were inside; talking to Me on the outside _ in terms
of what its done in terms of morale _ I think as I said before ,
the feelings of if you guys who had been here before hadn t
done those nasty things _ we wouldn t be under the gun . We are
back to square one on that.
INTERVIEWER: Sure _ The issue of oversight_ Do you
bel ieve that oversight by two select committees is preferable
to the earlier oversight by six to eight committees?
MR_ HALPERN: We never had six to eight as such _ There were
four committees of Congress which had oversight, two in the
House and two in the Senate There was under the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment six to eight committees we reported to. I wasn't
involved anymore _ But anyway , the Agency had to report on
covert action _ It was a separate subject_
INTERVIEWER: Right _ good distinction _
MR _ HALPERN: So that there never were more than four oversight
committees as such _ And now we are down to two_ And I have
been on ic record and in print favoring one committee _ As
as you are going to have committees , have one But people
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forget that even when you have only two now we stil have to
remember the Agency still reports to Foreign Affairs briefs
them on foreign affairs _ The House Armed Services Committee
stinl gets special reporting. The Appropriations Committees in
both the House and the Senate are always involved with
everytiing. So you " ve four commi ttees right now anyway _
Minimum. In practical: daily ife . You've got to go to
Appropriations and nobody in Congress is ever going to keep
Appropriations out of anything. And 0n top of that_ then there
is Government Operations I couId go on forever _ So boi l ing
it down to even one joint committee, it'11 he Ip some but it
won t solve the prob lem; But it is better than having two,
with two separate staffs _
INTERVIEWER: how about do you think it 1s practical for
the Congress to be informed of the covert activities of the
Agency?
MR _ 'HALPERN: Yes , within Timtts, within reason _ are not
as I said before are not part of the Executive and
are not going to be I hope they are not going to be
5 in
charge of Or as part of making the decisio whether you are
going to do something Or not And ` whether that Is cover action
Or whether that is sending the Marines In, you can't have them
sitting there telling you can do it Or you can't do it_
Not if yoU are going to be. a Pres ident.
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INTERVIEWER: Okay, what about this one Sam, and you" ve rea ly
been very, very patient . I rea ly appreciate it. What are the
Iessons that you think are to be Iearned from the Church and
Pike investigations? Either institutional Iessons , that Is the
Agency Or _
MR. HALPERN: I think first of a11 you need one , I think if you
are going to have an oversight it should be one joint
committee _ a sma 1 1 oversight committee not very many numbers
either in staff Or i0 Representatives and Senators The
Director has to be honest With these guys He has got to tell
them lots of things that he norma I ly wou dn't tell them, I
think_ And what he 'tells them has to be cleared with the
President before he tells them, except for the norma | mundane
things Iike norma / budget stuff and norma / personnel figures.
No President should get involved in that_ It's silly. But in
terms of specific activities, whether intelligence collection
Or
counterintelligence
or covert action, don ' t dummy up with
Congress . On the other hand , you ' ve to buiId a rapport
where there are
certain things they
are not going to ask yoU
about they shouldn t ask you about 25 such as identities of
agents; and that kind of thing. Such as the kind of Maison
arrangements you make with foreign governments . Yeah, they
might consider it as a treaty and_ therefore it comes under
the treaty making power _ It S advise and consent powers of the
Senate _ But I think they've got to bite the bulet themselves
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and realize that certain things are not for discussion even at
that Ievel - I think a DCI has to glad-hand the people on the
Hiul not a/1 100 of them in the Senate or 435 in the House
obviously. But the House and the Senate have got to have some
delegation of their responsibilities _ their authority and what
have you to a handful of people And that can' t change every
six months Or every two years. There are going to be some guys
who are going to stay there for a While - And that 5 the
arguments against the joint committee because the House of
Representatives has an election every two years. But a Iot of
guys .are in there for life , basically_ come from safe,
what the British would ca]1 safe boroughs_ you know_ safe
districts. It's oly the rare thing that'$ going to change
it_ So there has got to be some kind of give and take on
this_ And they've got to grow into this rea1 worId, on the
Hj1, that certain things you just don t ask about particularly
in the intelligence and the counterintelligence field. You
know if a Congressman says , "Te11 me who the Soviet spies _ who
the Soviets have recruited on my staff . II Uh uh_ You don't
tell them that if.yu' ve any hard information , not
until you: are absolutely certain and not until ve got some
kind of an operation running to control the damn thing and play
them back or whatever the situation is _ because these guys_ the
first thing they do is fire the guy _ That' s the ast thing in
the worId you want to do if you are running a
counterintell igence operation_ So ve to have and
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take on this kind Of stuff You ve to play games with
these guys on the Hil). You ve to wine them and dine them
and breakfast them, or whatever the phrase is _ I think the
DCI whoever he has got to be able to work with a select
group of people on the H1lI who have got to have the confidence
of the rest Of their col leagues , whom can trust and who
can understand , Tike Huddleston says that not everybody In
Congress is going to know everything that these guys are going
to know _ These guys in turn are going to have: to understand
that they can't know everything either _ There are some things
that you just don ' t talk about. 'And I M not talking about
these big covert action operations and what have yoU _ They' 11
hear about those when it comes to passing the mney for a
particular itical action operation or a parami ]itary
operation _ Those things take lots of dough . It' s Iike in the
old the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty took lots of
money to run those radios _ And Congress knew what the helI was
going on _ And Congress knew that RFE and RL were advertising
in this country from the very beginning for American donations
by.American citizens to fight Communi sm via the radio
airwaves And I don' t know if that was Iega 1 or not to this
but I guess nobody: objected. And they didn't object in
the Church Committee to this thing. Except that now that it is
run by another part of the US Government_ that makes it
It' s the same thing.
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INTERVIEWER: Same government .
MR_ HALPERN: Same government _ Same people involved . Same
appropriatios and a/1 that kind of stuff _ I don t understand ,
honestly, as a citizen, what the he]I the big difference is
but in terms of the future , there has got to be some ' k Ind
of better rapport than developed as a result of the Church and
Pike Committee which was strictly adversarial . And you can't
have that and run intel ligence . I don t care whether it's NSA .
DIA, CIA, the FBI_ the Secret Service= Drug Enforcement
Agency _ of them_ And what is it, there are 11 or 12
components in the Community at the mment and a1,1 of them have ,
you 've to understand_ what in the hell the world is al1
about _ And you can t have a/1 of this stuff going up on media
coverage _ And you can t,have it be.used to help somebody' $
electio prospects_
INTERVIENER: Both in the Executive and in the Congress:
MR_ HALPERN: And the Congress. And the Ieaks, I am sorry to
say , most of the Ieaks come from the Executive side . I'm sure
of that. And I 've been wri on that, too- And at Ieast
from sitting on the outside _ and I don t know whether I am
right or wrong , but my own gut feel ing is. that the Ieaks as
they appear in the press and I don t know for the Iast 10
years what_ you know_ what realy is classified . I've got a
feeling for it, that' s all.` After 32 years in the business you
kind of understand some of this stuff. But most of the stuff
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is coming off of the Executive Branch _ Somebody is trying to
get some kind of yea Or nea . Or some pluses _ And yoU can't
run It' that way. I m sorry. I 'm not Iook Ing for an Official
Secrets Act_ but something that has a better control over who
says what, how _ where and when _ So Church and Pike Committees ,
if there is going to be any pluses' out of those two circuses
and they were nothing but circuses Te it' s to be along
those Tines . A greater confidence_ greater working together
and a better understanding between the two branches of
government that this is a serious Mife and death business _
particularly these days _ And if You ve got some decent
intelligence_ I don ' t care whether it's technical Or human
inteligence is.intelligence
T
it might save us a/1 in the
long run if we know In advance and then can use it in advance _
Lots of times Presidents have misused good intelligence _ Or
wouldn't bel eve good intelligence _ I gave you one example,
not a President_ but senior officials at the State Department
refused to believe intelligence: And I can give you plenty of
examples within CIA, the DDI wou Idn't beI ieve human source
intelligence because It wasn't a picture and it wasn't SIGINT_
And chapter and" verse, over and over again _ And plenty of
times the human source reporting was wrong _ I 'M not saying
it'$ right every time _ But there are Iots of examples where t
wa$ and it wasn't accepted. But there has to be a better
acceptance that this is a profession not just in CIA_ I ' M
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talking about the Community . Around the world there are
thousands of people involved and they are a/1 not out 'to butter
their own sides on this thing And they are trying to help.
And you ve to give them a chance_ And you ' ve to work
with them and you've got `to trust them_ As I said many years
ago to somebody , I forget_ and he put it in the newspaper and
he shouldn't have , but he did, I used the: phrase some thing
about _ "Someday somebody has got to trust somebody ,sometime hi or
something Iike that. And that may come out of a/1 these damn
hearings_ Take a Iook at the Iran-Contra Hearings which really
just blew you away on the kinds of things that were going on _
And partly because the people involved in the White House staff
had no concept Of what the hell it was a11 about what the
intelligence business wa $ a/1 about, what covert action wa $ a]1
about _ And when you had Senator _ oh_ who the hell was it_
Senator Nunn, I think it was Senator Nunn _ try to explain to
Admiral Poindexter what the principle of plausible deniability
was a/1 about, so help Me Poindexter didn't have a
cotton-pickin' clue! I sat here watching this thing and
sick. Watching it_ He had no concept of what he was talking
about _ Senator Nunn knew a hel1 of a lot more than he did.
And he was trying gently to Iead him to the correct conclusion
of what the definition is _ And these guys were from hunger
Neither North nor Poindexter had ever had ay experience in
intelligence work at_all And here were running this
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country' $ separate intelligence network _ And it was
unbe/ ievable and . frightening. Very frightening _
INTERVIEWER: You think also, in these Iessons to be Iearned
that the relationships between the Agency and the press of
course _ the Agency can only offer_ I suppose offer and what
I am suggesting here is how one develops trust between the
Agency and the press .
MR_ HALPERN: And the press?
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, and the same thing maybe with the ic .
MR_ HALPERN: It' s hard. It' s hard . I think it's easier for
something Tike AFIO to do that kind Of creation Of trust
because AFIO has no ax to grind. It' s true we know less
and Iess about what' s actually going on inside specific
operations _ And that is as it should be Even though a guy
might retire one day and come into AFIO the next day and start
talking to the press, he has enough sense not to get
involved in fics. And it took AFIO a long time to develop
a spirit of cooperation and integrity with the media that are
the_ more or less, sol id media _ the honest med ia ~5 not the
kooks to accept an AFIO statement about some thing in terms
of you know, good; bad _ Or indifferent. At first
didn't_ It took uS severa/ years to develop this rapport and I
give Dave Phillips a lot of credit for this whereby you talk
to these guys and to prove , you know_ we ve no axes to
grind. We re not trying to hide anything _ We ve nothing
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to hide _ And try to help them understand why some of these
activities go on the way do_
INTERVIEWER: And the same thing with the universities and
colleges?
MR . HALPERN: You You try wherever you can. But that' s a
tough job _ Particularly if you get universities and col leges
that don't want to have anything to do with intelligence _
That' s a
dirty thing. And there a lot of them Tike that_
Wel 1 you heard Bob Simmons at the 'AFIO conventio talking
about the use of academics and intelligence work and a]1 that
kind of stuff as if they are a separate breed of cat. We]I,
are not , not in my opinion anyway , even though they might
think are _ know_ dirty their Iinen and tar one
academic , and no academic can go abroad anymore because
everybody wil] assume that are &/1 intelligence agents _
Nonsense_ Nonsense_ If you are going to Russia Or you re
going to Africa Or wherever you gO , if you start asking the
wrong questions even if YOU are an honest-to-goodness, nothing
more than a tical scientist trying to do a research job in
the middle of Wagadodo you ask the wrong questio there,
yoU re : going to get your head handed to you. You don 't have to
be in any way even near the United States Government Or any
other government _ Sure_ the easiest way the Russjans have It
is if they charge that everybody in the Peace Corps s a CIA
agent, which did at one time_ And a Iot of people
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believed them. Or everybody in the Red Cross is a CIA agent or
everybody who is an academic from wherever is a CIA agent . And
pretty soon know _ everybody 1s a CIA agent . One Of the
prob ]ems I think Casey had with the Congressiona] HTml and
agaIn this is sitting from the outside _ is he kind of gave them
the back of his hand , which automatically creates an
adversarial situation_ I don 't know how much time he spent
wining and dining them. T mean , having them out to breakfast-
I remember Directors ike AHen Dulles or Dick HeIms Or McCone
and others used to have members of Congress up there on the
Agency top fioor at the dining room where they had Iunch, Or
breakfast in the Director' s dining room _ And _ you know, tried
to talk to them man to man_ And tel them a thing Or two that
they'd want to know and ask them questions _ And to work
out some kind of dual relationship without having them become
co-equa/ managers _ That' s the big problem. I've got no
objection to telling a guy who is an elected Representative of
the United States , if he is one' Of a handful of people picked
by his colleagues to be privy to al.l the secrets they need to
know to run the place within Mmits _ without
micro-managing the thing. Yeah , bring them into the thing
Tel1 them a thing or two. to teach them what it is a/1
about and why it Is important that keep their bloody
mouths shut_
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INTERVIEWER: Do you think, again from the outside_ in the Iast
10-12 years _ in other words _ since the investigation, do you
think the Agency has changed much , has Iearned much?
MR. HALPERN: We| if Casey is the example_ no. I don t know
what has happened since . but I would hope that somebody is
trying to work out some kind of better relationship_
INTERVIEWER: Do you think Turner?
MR. HALPERN: Oh I don ' t think Turner had any real _ maybe he
did . but I can 't see it.
INTERVIEWER: It wasn't evident.
MR: HALPERN: I thjnk Turner is such a blow-hard that I don' t
see how in the hel1 'he could have 'done it, really. I watched
and listened . I was up there severa] times when he wa $ up
there testifying on a number of bis _ 0n: charter legisJation
and things Tike that, which: 1s a tough time to be around.
think that AFIO, with a/1 due modesty AFIO people Tike Wa Iter
Pforzheimer and Larry Houston and John Warner: and others who
had good connections on the Hill going back to the year one on
the subject and who were bel feved up on the H11] and accepted
on the Hill L_ even some of the staffs couIdn't dent that
particular characteristic.of these three guys
Ta I think they
had a very chance and they did influence some people
because were listened to_ didn't have to be accepted
a/1 the way through, obviously, but at Ieast when these guys
talked,. people on 'the Hill mst of the staffers
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they They:
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particularly on the Senate side_ not the House side, which was
a mess and the Senators themselves understood that these
were three men of integrity and honesty. And who were trying
to explain things to them: And who Iiterally had no axes to
grind_ weren t going to get a promotion out of this.
INTERVIEWER: And trusted them.
MR _ HALPERN: And ,they trusted them_ And were honest_
And my own feeling is _ you know_ you don t Iie to the
Congress_ Literally, you don t tell them a bald-faced Iie _ I
would never have done what North did or what Abrams did. I
mean, it was absolute nonsense. It' s not oly heresy; it' s
suicide _ If you can t tell them, you say , "I can't tell you .
Pure and $ imple. "I cannot tell you _ And if you want to know_
please talk to my boss- Ask my boss that question _ WeI1 , I
know the Iaw says that I am supposed to tell I've got to
tell Wel1 okay sometime along the way you have to take a
chance and say , "I can't tell And if I go to jail, I go
Ji to jail But that is not easy to do, obviously _ But you
don t deliberately Iie to these people. That' s a11- And the
system if you ve got to tell them &nd then blow it,
we | 1 it"s on their head and: you 've blown it. This is
one of the things about it Ts, hard, to be an
inte] igence
officer in 'terms of these trying to be sure you can
convince the 'guy you are 'trying to recruit Or the person you
are trying to recruit, ma I e or fema Ie _ that you can protect
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They
they
they
you .
you _
you .
they i5 ,
okay,
days ,
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their identity _ And I 'm not So sure that' s possible these
days . Maybe it is. I hope it is . I knew it was possible in
the old But I'M not So sure after what I read so much'
these whether it is Or isn't.
INTERVIEWER: Which is' again an important observatio relative
to' the Iast 10-12 years -
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days _
days