Transcript of 104-10307-10006.pdf
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T Aaaac 607,1036770006
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
EXES 9zV
SEGET
CONTRMUTIONS To TE INTELLIOENCE. COMAUNITY ' $ REVIBW OF INTELLICENCE
ACTIVITIES RELATIC To THE CUBAN ARMS BUIID_UP
1L APRIL IHROIGH 14 OCTOBER 1962
Taak Foroe W
Forelgn
IntellLgence
Branob
Zi35 6
SdZz7
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III MAT TARGETS MAS THE AGENCY ABLE TO COVER AND KITH RHAT
FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY?
The following romarkb apply to agent coverage tbat 18
coverage by meanb of Indlviduels on the Leland of Cuba , or elsewbere
In tbe world. Aud.o devices or telephono teps on Cuban Installatzona
abroad or Cubans Iving abroad have produced Intolllgence whIch hae
served oporational ends In other words _ Informatlon whIch ba8 pro
vided critical data used Jn the spotting assossment and recrult-
mont of agents _ Due to the standard security meagures taken In
'8m} most officiel Installations ; thoso technical operatlons have been
able to provide only 2 limited anount Of pObItive Intelllgence In
general, agents bave produced Infornation essentially 1n accordance
wlth thelr known accesb at the time 0f recrultnent _ ResponsIbllity
for many Of: the agents dealt With during the prosent reportlng period_
was simply assumed by TFW from pest efforts aganst Cube - In many
instances theso agents had been recruited strIctly on a0 "avaIla-
bility" ba81s, and indeed had no particular aCC0bb A maJor effort
was made at the Inception of TFW to winnow out those pergons who
could mako no contribution and to redirect those who could_ Thls
process 0f redlrection which was conducted vIa tIme consuming and
generally Inefficlent s/w channels robultod Ln the convor8Lon of
a number of heretofore unusable agents Into sound, portinent report_
Ing sources: Though , In most Instances, TFT operations offIcers
bad never bad personal cogtact with these agents tbey succeoded
in Inducing many of them to spot, develop and recrult sub-agents.
This technique succeeded _ despito the obstacleb Involved In
vetting candidates and advising agents vla S/w means In regard
to tho recrultment of new agent ass0ts during tbe reporting perlod,
TFI was able to bo guided by speclfic, prlority needb _ Accordingly ,
the many new asset8 acqulred were chosen becauge Of BpecIfic aCC0gb
to targct perbonalities or Institutions. The a8S1gned target8 and
extent of coverage are Indlcated below_
A. MLlItery
During the reporting perLod, Jn the latter balf, the Agency '8
major @ffort to obtain Intelligonce from agent sources centered
on Cuban mIlltary affetrs _ The reporting Obtalned covered mattere
ranglng from military policy to dotalled OB_ Almost every agent
contributed to thls effort With the consequence tbat the coverage
Of military mattors wias wIde-spread and contInuous. Despite the
fact that 95% of this Information was provided Vla s/w (much of It
fron totally untralned sub-bourc0s who bad no m1litary experLence) ,
Buch wag the dotail and volume of the data _ that our .agents were
able to give us highly 81gn1ficant InformatJon on troop and ma ter1ol '
movements, locatIon and nature of @illtary Biteg, etc: The follow-
Ing agents Berved 08 the major sourc0b of mIlitary IEformatlon
during the roporting period:
only ,
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6g
1 Cuban
(nsurance) exocutive,
wbo bad a large and dIversLfled
net , provIded intelligence In late June 1962 which epeclflcally
enticipated the massive Sovlet nilltary bulld-up whfch ultimately -
took place Ln Cuba . Throughout the bulld-up Itself tble agent
provided an almost continuoug stream of OB intell gence On @1E6LIo ;
maritim and afr phases Of the bufld-up_ He provided the Inltlal
reporting On dellvery of IL-28 to tho Islend .
2 _ A relative Of a formor Cuban president whose government
connectiong provided bm on geveral Occag_ons wIth inforatLon Op
attitudes of various mflltary factions toward Castro and the
Sovlets. Agent aleo provided some detailed m18sile OB.
3 6.s. Citizen) who establlshed contact WIth 2 resigtance
chlef (1n PInar del Rio)during July 1962 provIded in the cour8e
0f several reports}0 an Inventory of Soviet
insteliations throughout
the province_ The maLntonance of communLcation With thle egent was
extremely arduous In vIrtue of hfs most exposed posLtion.
4. A Havana Gurgeon) wbo took speclal horseback trLp8 to Cover
tho Soviet Iostallation at Torrens Reformatory .
5 _ A former lawyer , resident 0f Santiago provided Information
on - Cuban armymnae LayIng along road8 In Santiego area, a8 we1l 48
on Soviet troops and materiel movement8 .
6_ A westorn diplomat who provided photographs 0f Sovfet-
occupLed hotels In Havana Soviet troop and materlel movements In
the Havana area.
7 A Cubana offictel who provided comprehensIve data on atate
readiness of Cubana a1r materiel_
8 merchant In Camaguey who had provlded general observa-
tional reporting On milftary activitles in hlb area ,
9 A formor wLfe of a Cuba AlrlInes pIlot who bas contactb
among Cuben Airline pilots from wbom she obteined bome elr OB.
10_ A shlpping clerk at Cardenas harbor reported OporadIcally
on activitfes at the port.
11- A construction company ` employee at Guantanano Naval Babe
reported On Cuban OB Ln the environs 0f tbe bage .
12_ A public accountant In Havana who 1s the leader of a
counter-revolutionary group, reported mIlitary Informatlon aoqulred
through b18 group contacte .
13 _ A Havana bartender who reported congIderable quantitles
Of OB data obtained from hle large circle Of varled ecquaIntances
In Havana area,
14. A retired rellroad offIclel reported deta on rall bhLpmente; YinJ
19
'8
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15 _ A In Havana reportod on Rancho Boyerog Alrport
In Havana where
levze€ Zertaya
afrline) 16 one of hi8 cllents.
16_ A pineapple) f1rm manager in Plnar del RLo recrulted-
In July 1962 reported on military dovelopments In b18 area.
17. A Cuban employee 0f a foreign embassy recrufted Io July
1962 1n Havana roported bom0 OB InformatLon which wab obtaIned
through casual contacts.
(o
18 _ A
custong InBpector @t Joge Miart1 Alrport In Havana
was the bource of good reportIng on Sov /Bloc cargo Bhlpmente to
Havana , Including mIlitary cargos .
19 . A physician In Havana who reported On milltary movements .
20 _ A Cuban Airlinog Offlclal, WIth linited Acce88, reported
Atr OB .
21 _ A forelgn Intellgence sorvlce staff officer In Hevana
reported mIlitary OB.
22 . A second forelgn Intelligence sorvico staff officer In
Havana reported mIlitary OB.
23 _ A number of maritine ags0ts wbo have reported on Sov / Bloc
military cargo delIverleb to Cuba.
b Political. Throughout the reporting pertod the Agency wag
able to Droducc TIntelligence on Cuban political affeirs at tbe
ministerial level and above _ Thle Intelligence Fab derived
esgentlally from sources who bad but limfted access to pereonb of
bfgh rank or 1n key positIons. Thls type of access placed 2 premlun
On Agent elictation sk11lb and the abllity to dIstingutsh between
rumor and fact, Plus an
aptitude for remaining afloat In dengeroub
waters_ The most S1gn1ficant political InformatLon was provided
by the followIng agents :
1 An offIclal
Gn tho Minfstry of Cconomics)wbo (in
capaclty of advIsor to Ernesto GUEVARA) was able to giean Jnfora-
tIon on
Cuban political affalrs.
2 _ A relative of 2_ former Cuban president wbo through this
connection and bis own social positIon 1s able to maIntaln contact
With hlgh-level OffIcale In Cuba _
3 A Cuban doctor glve8 medical troatment to Cuban
officials and)who 18 reporting IImited Intelligence = by direction,
until be 18 abl0 to, develop direct aCc0bb to Important hIgh-level
02**64425.
oln
20
theo8
Gho
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4
(A cultura] attache Of 4 West European Embasey Ln Havana who
picks up informatIon from other dtplomats and from Cuban contactb On
political matters_ A sub-agent Of this asset bab al8o @een 2 bource
of medlum-lovel pollticel InformatIon .
5 A West Buropean Ambassador Ln Cuba who provides political
Information he obteinb from forelgn and Cuban contactB .
6_ A (Cuban Ambagsador In Nestern Europe) who bas been reportIng
wItb utmost detal1 and frequency on blgh-level political mattere of
whlch he 18 aware .
7 Tho Ambassador to Cuba of a Latin AmerIcan country who reports
political IntellLgence xobtaLned tbrough hls Cuban and foretgn contacte,
8 , A
former protege @f Raul CASTRO)wbo retains contacts WItb
government leaders and who 18 a new asset developing b1s reporting
capabflities on political matters.
i0
9 The Anbassador In Cuba 0f North African country who bae
provided bigh-level polltical Information _
10. A' Cuban Nawyer_ In Santlago wbose brother-In-lew , a hgb-
ranking official provIded Intelilgence on GOC / Sovlet relatlon.
2411- A staff offIcer of 2
foreign Intelligence servIce a881gned
(o a covor pOsItIon 1n 8 Havana Embassy who has produced Bome
political Intelligence rosponsIve to our requirements_
12_ A Cuban manager Of an Intervened U.S_ company who bas
relatives In the PSP and In the government _ To date, bls reportIng
bag covered. general political developmonts
0
13 _ A librartan and toacher wvho 18 a relative of a (former justice)
of the Cuban Supreme Court) and who has hlgh-level government contacte_
Thls agent hab been reporting politicel pereonallty data and g0m0
political informatlon.
C
14: A Cuban Ambassador 1n Western Europe) who ba8 reported politIcal
Information to whlch he bab accesb.
15 _ In addition, there are a number of agent penetratIon8 In
Cuban diplomatic ostablishmente overseas who provide a variety of
miscellaneous politicel Inforatlon concern:ng Cuban actIvIttos In tbe
ereab concerned.
08
4 Ii
2 [
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C @conomIc. The Agency was able to produce 2 contLnuous amount
Of IntelTIgonce Trom Agont sourceg on tho Cuban sugar 011 end treng_
portation Industrles_ much of whLch was In the form-Of atatistical
summarle8 _ In 0 number of Instances , thls Intelllgence wab pro-
vided by agents who had direct access to thlb InformatIon by VIrtud
of thelr Jobs. We al80 have been able to get contInued reportIng
on general econom:c condltlons and forelgn trade . Among the moBt
Blgnificant agents reporting economlc Lnformaton were :
06
1_ A
Cuban (insurence) salesnan , prevlously noted, wbo
tbrough his extensive contacts and sub-agents has beon able to
aXx provide InformatLon On Bugar production _ (nsuranee) affalre and
the Cuban banking eyetem.
6€
2 An Offtcial of the Ministry of Economy) a close associate
of Che GUEVARA)) wbo bag provided useful economlc Intelllgence.
3 A relative 0f a former Cuban president , prevLously noted,
wbo bas provided detalled Import-export figuros; deta1led docunentary
reports on Detroloum.
4 hlgh-leved) off1clal of Cubana Airlinos wbo reportedly
provlded hlgh-level Informatlon on Cubana AirlInes , particularly
fInanclal and materiol affalre.
5 A
regident of Hexico and ( director of a0
Itallan-controlled
pharmaceutlcal firm who travels to Cuba wbere he has good contacts
In the Minlotry Of Industry , wbo has reported economLc InformatIon.
6_ A Dutch bus_neesman wbo hab access to Cuban economic
Officlals and wbo bas provided useful economlc Information.
7 U.S, tratned Cuban engIneer who provided detatled reports_
on
(etroleum) Lndustry .
06
d Soclologtcal and General Conditions. The Agency has
provided a steady and reTativeTy hoavy FTow Of Intelligence
coverLng such matters a8 the state 0f resistance actIvitle8, mood
of the populace, l1ving condItions etc. from agents Lo nearly
every Cuban provInce, A survey 0f agonts reporting thfs type
of informatlon has not been conpleted, because elmost a11 of our
agents have reported on thib low priorIty topic from tine to tLme.
4, Fithin tho Terms of the Agency '8 MIss-on, Whet_Terget
Ras It UnabIe to Cover anTTy2
8 , Paragraph 3 above set8 forth In' general the degree to
whlcb the major Cuben targete wero covered durIng the reportlng
Zht
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perlod: The military political and economlc targets were
clearly defined and a8s1duously pursued by TFT The immenge
pressure of tIme must continuously be borne In mInd Lf the attack
on the Cuban problem 1s to be granted Its full perspectIve_ Evep
before TFW assumed responsibility for collectlon agaLnst Cuba ,
1t wa8 clear that Intelllgence on Soviot Satellite and Chlnese:
Communlst Cuban policy and maneuverg
wouid
be formulated and
planned at tbe: highest Level In tho respectlve governments _
Equally clear was the fact that the clandestine searcb for In-
sights Into the Cuban policles of these' governnents would enjoy
only 48 much success a5 the clandestine search for any Intelllgence
regardlng any polLcles of these governments. Time restrictlons
a lone ruled out the hope that adequate coverage of tbeso key
denlod aroa targets could be achleved _ As: a consequence , every
facet of the TFW collection progran was goared to the search for
top priorlty Cuban Intelllgence; fron sourcB8 In the free world
and on the Jeland every agent or agent candidate was evaluated Jn
torms Of blg access to such ' Intelllgence . Translated Into
espionage terms_ thls meant that every agent or candidate was
examined Sharply to determLno whether and how be could help
penetrate the GOC tho Cuban armed forces or the managerlal and
policy levels of the Cuban economy _ Below 16 an account of the
success of this effort; It wIll be seen that most major terget
areas were under dlrect , speclflc assault.
b_ Pollt-cel.
6
1 Cuban Communlst Party: 0 In late Mey a close relatIve
and confidant x 7b6 ChTe@ of 7b6 Cuban CommunIst Party was
sIngled out and doveloped by a Cuban principle agent _ The
candidate provlded blghly valuable Information throughout the
summer of 1962 _ Thougb the InformatLon was obtalned Indirectly
by the agent It w2s but a portion of what he could produce - Thue
the ultimate aim of the operation was to effect the candidate 8
direct recruitmont . The drive toward this goal continues , and
though We ar0 optimlstic that the 6 Monthe 0ffort thus far In-
vested WIll result ln the d1rect recrultment of a hlgh-Level
29 Communist Party )member It would be Inaccurate to say that 28 of
Ehe clobe of the
reporting
period, the @arty) had been penetrated
at a significant level 29
2 GOC_RulAng_CArcle:
(a) In May 1962 TEW spotted a Cuban legal
traveller whose brother-In-law has been 2 membor of tbe GOCr
from 1ts Inception_ The agent was recruited under specIfIc
Instructions to attempt to Induce bfb relative to report on GOC
pOlIcy mattere . Though TFW bad only 12 bours WIth the agent
3l1v
:1xic 2- 3_
key
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beforo dlgpatching him to Cuba_ hbe has attempted to carry out
bfg Instructions. By October he bad succeeded In eliciting
signlficant information from the ttarget and was confident hls
full' recrultment was Simply 2 matter of time _ One Inhibiting
foature affecting tho pace of this Operation 1s the fact that
the agent lives in Santiago whfle his relative , the target 18
0 resident Of Havana . Unquestion: Dly the full recrultment of
tbe target could help f1ll an Important gap In our reporting
on GOC activities.
(b) In June 1962 TrT obtained 2 lead to 2
person very closely related to Fidel CASTRO _ Throughout the
summer extensive but neccgsarily circunspent negotiatlons were
conducted to bring this person to Mexlco where full recruitment ,
tralning and briefing would be possible The negotlationg
culminated In Buccess _ The agent was met and trained by Agency
personnel in September and early October and d1spatched to Cuba
on 15 October with the" specffic mission Of.reporting on the
thoughts plans and activitles of the CASTROS and other leading
GOC flgures _ Since the target_ prior to recrultment did not
possess the KInd of political awareness which would have led hfn
systematicelly to observo tbose GOC personallties to whom be
had matural access the Agency was denied any
prIne political
Intelllgence from tbis source during the roporting period.
(c) Throughout the summer 1962 , TFW
received various reports, the tenor of which were tbat Ernesto
Cho GUEVARA would like to defect from Cuba _ Each report proved,
upon closer Inquiry , to bo groundless, until we learned In late
September that a
Mexican Industrialist had claimed GUEVARA bad
asked hlm In 1961 for assistance in leaving Cuba _ Though many
of the facets of thie disclosure tallfed with other known data,
exploitation 0f tbis exceedingly Important lead was hamstrung by
the inability to aline a_ qualified agency officer wItb the Widely-
travelllng Mexlcan. Thls lead illustratos well the frustratlong
Involved In pursuing hLgh-level targets within a rlgid time
framework and with a limited number of avaflable personnel.
It el8o
Iilustrated
the need to.persist when the target Ls of
gufficlent Importance , in the follow up of "far-out" leads .
3, Milltary
(a) - In late July TFW recrulted a Cuban
legal traveller expressly because his close relatlonship WItb
4 member @@f the Cuban Goneral
858293t
Once again only a few houre
was available 1n which to train tbe agent - Nevertheless durIng
August , Septenber and October the agent persietod In hfs effortb
2 9
4 ,
Y
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JJa ^ ~
C3-R
r (
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to develop tbo target and was able to provide S1gniflcant OB
at the same tIme _ Neither thle, nor the other effortg to
penetrate the Cuban nilltary at hLgh-level_ however_ had pet
wlth full succos8 by the end Of the reports period.
(b) Tho Cuban lawyer recrulted ` In 1962
(aee 'paragraph 24 abovo) developed a second target Ln September
a former membor (@: tho Cuban General Staff now aweItIng reageLgn-
ment The egent wa8 Anstructed to recruit and traln thls
Military Officer In s/W At tho end of tho reporting period
It wag not pogsIble to determfne tho success of th1s potontlally
excellent operational devolopment .
(c) Included In thls dIecusslon 18 tbe
partlally succegsful recrultment of a Cuban army engIneer wbo
1g stationod In Santlago_ The agent cIted In (2b abovo) bas
beon In contact WIth this target 2 Bince July 1962,
but has not succeeded In completing
Sbetaifi
tbe rocrultnent_ He
bas Obtained OB from tho captain, but we feol the operatlon
W1ll not bavo rexched Its full potential until the captetn ha8
beon trained Ln S/1' and 18 reporting directly to 45.
(a) Sinco mid-August the Agency has been
pursulng 4 lead to the G-3 of the Cuban Arny . The basis Of thfb
pursuit was fItted together from Innumerable reports,
1
and f1nally
centered, In early Octobor_ On a plan to try to effect the rearul:
ment usIng a letter from 0_ former army and prleon conrade _ By
cut-off the developmental activity had reached the polnt
#here tbe
18at9iy
remaIning matter was to deliver tbe letter Jnto
the hands of the Officer.
3 Economic. The Agency has strivon to Identify key
flgures In the Tubon oconomy and to develop askess to them a8
rapidly a9 possible, wherever the opportunity bes arIsen. 011,
NIcklo and Sugar Industrios have boon ass1gned to u8 having the
hlghost prlorlty.
(a) Petroleum ;9 TFW recrultod and to
Cuba In January a .yound U,5; zramned enginecr_ In (ay)
'%ez87
he had obtalned 2 posltion Lo the (InstItute Of Too
lowly hlmself to be of major valuo Wo havo steadtly guided hio 24
In an entorprlee a1mod at rocrultment 0f the( chler of the petroleum)
Industry _ The famillos 08 the two man had bedn close frlends_
The @ffort Involves many Lmponderablee and must be carrled out VIa
s/W St1ll, tbe major a1n 19 'deemod worthy of the Invostmont,
Meanwhle the agent ba8 been ablo to provido Intelllgence of
Increasing value .
May
PetroleungFeported
Sil
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(b) Hicklo Indugtry: Tho beat of thle
Important Industry unfortunately 16 In {wo small towns In Orlente
province . Llghtly populated aroag whIch are of strategc Importanca
always poge rugged Oporational obstacles_ The nlckZe towe aro
no exceptlon _ Numerous well-neanIng persons In the U,S. have
attemptod to help 48 obtaln access to thls crItical target_ Yet
not untll late September 172s the Agency able to turn up (by
virtue Of a Now Orleans recrultmont) 4 source of vlable leade
to key personnel. By cut-Off date_ howvevor we bad not boen able
to bring any load to function. Most promlsing J8 4 lead to tbe
Cechnical supervisof)Of tbe' NIckle complex.
NN
(c) Sugar: Two former hlgh-level penetrations
of the Sugar Indugtry defected to the U.8. sOOn after tbe Inceptlon
of TFT Throughout the sumner lt wa8 not pOSBIble to Identify
a suitable cand_date to replace them. A New York gource In
October succeeded In plecLng ug In touch WIth the (chlef
'640420817
tocbniclan Jin Cuba . Tblg operatLon Should be fully productive
by Cbristmag 1962 .
2/i
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To 1llustrete the results of thls opecatIonal data , w bave
recently been preparing the recruitmont In placo or defection Of
one Of tbe prLncLpal OffIcers of tho Cuban Forelgn_Service In
Europe Fe have been able to develop tho proposa le through an
already defected dIploma t and tbe effectIveneb8 of b18 @pproaoh
and 2 readLng On the dIplonete reactiong can be provlded to 4
Independently by tbree other agente In close oontact wi th hfe a9
we11 a8 tbrougb a technical gurveIlZance operatIon_
G Llafeon
The mobt frultful lieieon relatIve to the Cuban target bad
been conducted wIth (Curopean)and 2 few of tbe LtIn Amoricen) I&
servIcee Speclficelly , the tbe Mobt
cooperatfve and helpfuli
233a7:
(taltan
73674
@Danish) (eet Ge rman Mex
@rugyayan}
Some of thebe gervIcee are worklng clogely with the Taek Force
both In WashIngton and Miami cutting cornere on procedure
protocol end actually oxceeding thelr own offIcial Ins
tructions _
This ha8 been particularly true after the announcement of: the
Pregidont on 22 October 1962 _ The degree of thls affort i8
renarkablo and rus a11 tbe way from full cooperatIon to an
outstanding exertlon Of personal commltment, regourcefulnese , end
Imagina tIon to fIod way8 to belp our effort
To 'cite 'only
2 few of the FI operatlons deveLoped
through servIces the
Guxz8a8l
has lgIven us
(4z4
resident
Zages88
(includIng (2 ` diploma-
8a58t Ece _
The (French) Bervice ba8
provlded u8 WIth one (resident dlploma communtcate8. directly
WItb us
Gy, R/92Y The' @antsh and @utcb}
#auhcices,
have gIven 48
control 6fC marltime 2350 calllng at Cuban porte) and they bave
also particlpated In
Joetz-{po=
rationg using (legel trave ] lere_ 24
In addItlon to mountIngzyoperations against Cuba _ Beverel (Europeen) (0
bervlces bave provlded securo dlplomatic courler)servlces for tbe
transmtttal Of our ow @gents communicatlons and for the 1nftl- 24
tratIon of s/w and W/T and other materials )to our agents Ingide
Cuba Serviceg In (Belgium)and (Holland have been partIculerly
In the
development of an
operation to deny Cuba @ccosaJ 24 te gyfGrgenthe
to needed Golvent for petroleum products Tq date
It tnat @fforts to ma ke tbi8 @roduct unobta Inable to
the
#gxba58
ba8 been auccesgful z 4
10
In general ; the
(est European-
gervices bave been cooperatIve
In ass1stIng ug to mount operationg agaInst Cuba and agaLnst
Insta]la tIons In their own: territory.(okatin Americau BervIoe8 ,
have been most belpful Jn developIng operatlon8 age Inst Cuban
targets Jn thelr Owd countrie8 epparently becaus0 Of the Latinp
Americang IncreasIng concern WItb the threat- of Cuban gubverelon
on thelr territory.
2s7
been/lt
Wi
SIpa
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SIGNIFICANT CHANGES EITIICR POS ITIVE OR ] NEGATIVE IN
THE AGENCY 'S COVERAGE
CAPABILITY ,
HHIICH TOOK PLACE DURING TF
PCRIOD .
The Initlal SlgnifIcant change effected by the Agency to
Increase and Improve Its Cuban Intelllgence coverage capabilty
was to ostablIsb a Cuban Task Torce at Headquarters and to
staff It WIth experlenced Intelligence offIcers These OffIcere
wero selected from other operating DvIslong WIthin the Agenoy .
Many 0f them spoire ' SpanLsh and a11 of them have had extenglve
experlence In var_ous Intelligence a88ignments both et Headquartere
and Lo the Flold_ Thls nemly created Task Force was charged WItb
tbe responsibility to dtrect, advIse bupport and/or coordInate
411 phases Of the Agency 9 Intelllgence opera tIons dtrected
agaLnst Cuba
At the: sam0 tIme the Tagk Forco Fleld Station Io Mlamt waa
strengthened considerably WIthb Increased numbers of experIenced
staff officers and facflities for mounting Intelllgence opera tIone
agaInst the Cuban target. Thls concentration of experlonced
personnel Into the Cuban Task Force both at Headquarters and at
the Mlaml Field Station , was 2 positive and S1gnlfIcant effort to
increase the Agency '8 Intelllgence coverage capabilty 1n order
to satIsfactorily fulf1ll the priority requlrenents and taskg
wbLch bad been levfed on the Agency 45 a regult of tho CommunLgt
takeover In Cuba _
To further Improve our-Coxerase Capabllity, the Agency communLca-
tlons offIce set up a Speclal facllity In Mlam to(Intercept
#electronically Internal communlcations WIthlo Cuba These (Inter-24
cepted communLcatLons Jare processed Ln Hianl and then forwarded
directly to Headquarters Mlami Fleld StatIon, (and to NSA for ectIon 24
and/or further disseninatLon The NSA dlssem_nates to the other
nenbers of the Intelligence comunlty-the InformatIon tbat hag been
intercepted and processed by thls gpeclal Agency communLcatlon
facllity_ Thls facility cooperates and coordlnates 1ts oporatIons
closely Witb [NSA) and 18 used @y NSA) to ass18t In tbe (nterception) 24
0f (nternal communlcations) 1n Cuba _ 29
24
In addltion to setting up withio the Agency an organIzatLon
whose prImary mLssion L8 concerned witb all phases of Iutellfgence
operatIons d1rected ageInst Cuba 411 other operatIng DIvlBlons
within the Agency wdre d1rected to gIve top priorty attentIon to
the development Of Intelllgence operatlons agaIost Cuba _ Thla be0
resulted In the dlversion of certalo as8ets who bad the requlette
acce8s to Cuban targete 28 eell 8 tbe experlence or capobllIty.
Thv
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The response Of the varlous Agency components
1
both by Head-
quarters Degks and by the Fleld Stations has been @ost BatLs-
factory and ba8 aided the Task Force cons1derably In tbe perfora-
ance of 1t8 ass1gned mIesion _ WIthn the Task Force , belected
fflcers have been destgnated to as81st advIbe _ and coordInate
on all phases Of Cuban intelllgence opera tIons WItb the varIoub
geographlc dlvlsion desks Thls arrangement bas provided for 2
contInued Increased coverage capabllty of the Cuban target by
Insuring a regular revlew Of current_ developmental, and planned
Intelllgence operatIons Of a11 avallable Agency Intelligence
a8sets whIch could b0 dfrected against Cuba
The above points aro ones tbat reflect 81gnIfIcant changes
whlch bave takon place during thls period . In additlon , It
sbould be pointed out that there has boen an Intensification
and concentration f a11 opera tional technlques appl cable to
the particular type and character of the Cuban target _ There
has been a substantial Increase in the recrultment and traInLog:
of agent as8ets There has been an oxtensive Increase In the
establishment and use of clandestIne communlca tIong methods and
channels The use of S1 one way volce radlo
0
and WT a9_ methods
of communIcatIng witb agents Inslde Cuba has been greatly: expanded _
And s1gce certain (Western Natlons) St1ll maAntaLo Embass1es In
Havana '(ourter) channele for the delivery @Qf lettere and packages) 24
by the diplonatIc pouch bave been developed and are beIng ugsd
extensfvely:24The above polnts are dIscusged 0lbewhere Ln thls
paper but they are mentIoned bere briefly In tbe context Of belng
clobely related to B1gniflcant changes 1n the Agency 8 Intelllgenoe
capabIlty,
i5 &
3 9
Girv
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Page 15
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VI WHAT SUPPORT FOR COLLICTION FACILITIES_WAS RBQUIRED
FROM OTHER AGENCIES? FIOW WYAS IT SCCURLD FROM THEM? MAS IT TIMELY
AND EFFECTIVI? WHAT , If ANYTHING , WAS LACKING?
The' conduct of Intelllgence collection operations often
has depended on timely and effective support from other U.8 _ govern-
ment agenciee Several government agencies provided Bupport to
Intelligence operations dlrected ageInst the Cuban target on both 8
reguler and a standby basis _ In fact _ each and every requebt for
policy approved support was granted and carried out rapldly and
effectIvely_ For example the Department of State ha8 expedited: the
Lssuance of viba8 on
belected
Case5 at our request 26 well 48 grantIng
vIba walvere to individuals of operational interest to the Agency
In additlon, Forelgn Service personnel intervlew_ debrief and attempt
to establish the bona-fide8 Of potential Intelllgence a88etb who
voluntarfly contact a U.8 Embassy or Consulate_ Thle: 18 often done
alone and some times In collaboration with an agency OffIcer prior
to introducing the agency officer for further development and Ox=
ploitation as the ca80 may rcqutre - These types of support are
provided regularly by the Department of State and contribute conbld-
erably to the effectivenese of many complex intelligence operation8 _
Another U.S government agency which ba8 gIven Invaluable
Support to the Agency 8 Intelligence collection operations 18 the. FBI ,
The FBI hag provided blographic data Invebtigative reports and
operational leads to Individuale of known or potential operatIonal
Interest Ths support has been maintained on 8_ regular and continulng
ba8is_ Close lfa1s0n relations between the FBI and thib agency are
maintained at Headquarters and at verious Field Statfons_ The cloge
Ial8on hab resulted- In a
better understanding of the neede and
requlrementb of each Agency In the successful accompllehment8 Of
their beparate respongibllItles a8 well a6 providing 2 rapid channel
for provIdlng Gupport and a881stance when requested .
The U.S Immlgration and Naturalization Service hab facil-
Itated the entry Into the U.S_ Of persons Of operational Interegt
to the Agency; and hae provided ,guidance and support for cabe8 wbich
Involve unusual allen residence and/or naturalization proceedInga.
Liaison with the U.S_ Immfgration and Naturalizaton Servlce i8
particularly cloge and harmonfoug at tbe Miami Field Installation
where the bulk Of the cabes Involving pereons of operatIonal Interest
to u8 origInate8.
Reporte provided on a regular ba8is by the Netional Securtty
Agency bave boen a bource of operatIonal leade whlch have been followed
3 0
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Page 16
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13-00000
up the development Of collection as8et8 , The deseminations by
the G.s.AYalso bervo a8 an effective means of checklng selected
Information and that heb been provided by other bourceb Of
Information _
dh8itX #1
alwo collaborates 1n the4dlesemtnatton Of
fA"
certaln Information WIth the CIA (communlcation factlity) In MLanl _ n
Agency unlt engaged In the (electronlc Interceptiod) and proce8Blng O1
Cuban Internal ConnunIcations) 4
24
Llelbon wIth the aforementloned U,S. government agen1es
18 maintaIned On 2 contInutng and regular ba818 both at the Headquartera
level In" Washington, D:C_ and. et appropriate fleld Ingtallations by
deslgnated Agency componente_ It ha8 been our pleasurable experfence
that these agencles , in addition to othorg Such a8 the Department Of
AgrIculture Wbere SpecifIc, operatlone requlred guldance In thelr par-
ticular ffeldg Of competence_ bave provlded tImely, effectIve, and
profesglonal support and guldance, In support Of polIcy epproved
Intelllgence collection operatlone 28 required In tbe national Joterebt .
WIthout such Bupport, the tabk Of: Intelligence collectlon would Seve
beon 1n many Inatances much more.dlffIcult and, In many Cabee, LepobbIble
5ih1
3/
for?
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VII; AGENT S UHIMARIES
The scope and nature of the Agency 8 Forelgn Intelll-
gence operations Is most clearly 'Geen In the character perbonal
ambltion and caprice 0f the huan ma terlal present_ pamely the
egents Involved _ The following sketches Of tbe Individual agents
engaged In these oporatlons have been Compiled In recognitlon of
the vital Ingredlent whlch these human beings bring to an apprecle-
tion of the Agency' 8 FI operatlons It WIll be noted that a
majorlty of the agents work , or have been worked , out Of Mlamt ,
the cIty whlch has bcen the center Of antl-Castro Cubans the
major pool of potential agents bince 1959_
Otber geographical arers aro repregented in ma thema tIcal
sequence in fact according to the nunber of Cuban exlles 1n
residence at a
given place _ This same ma thema tIcal order applles
wlth reference to tho jobs these agents hold . Thus If a Cuban
has a function , the perfornance of Which 1s Important Jo sustatn-
Lng the Island hence Important to the Cuban Regime the Agency
has sought the services of thls man 25 Lts agent 24 For thls reabon_
several agents are in the employ of the @Irlines and Of merchant
narine Shipping busInesses So too, wIth diplomacy _ Every forelgn
dlploma t now aceredited to the RegIne In Havana has been examlned
by the Agency as' a
prospectlve agent. Forty percent of these dlplo-
ma t8 were approached . Of this number about one half took our balt
and have accepted as8ignments which range from margInal Involvenent
Ln "Intelligence" (e.g usIng their d1plomatic Immunfty to carry
our ma terials) to active participatlon in our operations
Finally, one type of Cuban wbo played an influentlel _
though linited, role during the past s1x months was the defector
(who is not mentioned elsewhere Ln thle' paper) The defector 1s
the offIclal who for one reason or another cannot remaIn In or be
persuaded to reina In In place and report on bis job _ Owng to the
nature of this particular person , It Is dlfficult to draw bard
IInes be treen thoso who genuinely reject thefr Government and tbobe
Who merely qult In 'self-Interest but during the past 3Ix montbs ,
the Agency tapped In On the defectlons of aout ten Cubans Of
consequence pr-fIting from their Information In a 11 cases end
from
their psychological. exploltatlon when cfrcuns tance would parlt,
32 ~n