Transcript of 104-10306-10018.pdf
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14-Q0000 104-10306-10018] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
19 December 1963
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Utdex
SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100
on
19 December 1963
la Included in the meeting were Secretary of State
Ball, Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus
Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson,
General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen,
Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Cha Mr. George Ready,
Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr . Fitz -
Gerald.
2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any
sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible
embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms
cache. We are authorized to continue to forward proposals
for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops_ The
main thrust was
to greatly increase political action with Canada,
Britain, Spain, and others in an effort to promote greater
economic blockade.
3, Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting
was that the President would continue to approve smaller
FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively
unr ewarding if would assist in keeping up the morale of the
troops on shore, Of our agents, and otherwise in keeping the
ball rolling.
Marshall S: Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
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.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963
PRESENT: The President
The State Department : Under Secretary George W_
Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U_ Alexis Johnson;
Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson,
Assistant Secretary for Inter-_American
Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban
Affairs John HS Crimins
The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell
Gilpatric, Secretary of the Cyrus Vance .
Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.
USIA : Deputy Director Donald M Wilson
The Treasury Department : Secretary Douglas Dillon .
The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the
President McGeorge Bundy Messrs _ George Reedy
and
Willians Moyers.and Gordon
Chase .
CIA: General Marshal1 S_ Carter , Messrs _ Richard
Helms and Desmond FitzGerald
1 The President arrived at the meeting approximately
five minutes ear prior to the arrival of several
members of the group including Mr , Bundy _ Without a formal
introduction I commenced the Scheduled briefing
on the Agency
Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the
activities of the Presidential photographer
2 , The President appeared interested in the number of
agents 'inside Cuba but made no particular comuent concerning
the program until the subject of economic denial was intro-
duced He asked to be told what additional measures could
be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the
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2
principal soft spots among free world countries appeared
at the present time to be Canada, the U,K and Spain. The
President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics
concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these
three countries together with recommendations as to what
could be done to stop these leaks . He requested Under
Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the govern-
ments of these three countries as well as any others
engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests. He
appeared particularly interested in the subject of econo-
mic denial and returned to it several times,
3 After hearing a brief description of our progress
in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban
military the President said that it did not seem to him
that we had gone very far along this line and that one
day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself,
would have to face the #1 grand jury' (of domestic public
opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to
find a_ solution to the Cuban situation_ I pointed out
that the program being presented was, with the exception
of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and,
if run at full capacity9 would tax the capabilities of the
clandestine services in other that if new and
broader measures against Cuba were to undertaken, they
wou ld have to be within the overt field_
4, After a brief description of the sabotage and
harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas
raid was discussed _ After hearing the pros and cons the
President stated that he did not feel that the present time
was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude
which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success, He
said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly
on the U,S might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong
direction
with
respect to Cuba , 1.e, increase their econo-
mic aid or their military presence Recognizing that a_
cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within
he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly
lower economic and psychological impact, should be con-
ducted. He further stated that planning for such opera -
tions as Matanzas should be continued, General Wheeler
raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets
by autonomous groups _ This was discussed and it was agreed
that in view of the fact that preparations would take at
least three months, these preparations should proceed and
the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have
been perfected,
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3
5 _ On the question of autonomous groups the President
asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars)
He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current
year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget
6_ The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared
by General Carter for the meeting was examined_
0
7 Mr Bundy then reviewed current U,8 , policy vis-a-vis
Cuba_ He then went down a check list of possible new courses
of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared
for the December 13 Standing Group meeting _
0
Unilateral
actions presented were:
(1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No
further discussion
(2) Selective relaxation of U.S_ controls against
exile groups in Florida_ No comment on
Mr_ Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.
(3) Military feints. No comment on generally
unfavorable presentation.
(4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by
Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the
va lue of keeping open the franchise for low-
level flghts. Acknowledgement of certain
value to the intelligence community. No
decision requested_
(5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world
shipping from the Cuba trade No decision
requested.
(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S_
policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-
Castro dissidence in the armed forces_
Mr Bundy 1 S comments indica ted that there
was room for a stronger statement than that
made by President Kennedy in Miami_
(7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans . Not
elaborated and no comment
(8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified
or elaborated.
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8 _ In connection with bilateral and multilateral
actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations
of the Caribbean, Mr Bundy stated that the nature and
import of the recently dis covered arms cache in Venezuela
constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search
and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine
against arms Shipments. Mr Helms then briefly described
the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those
arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents.
Mr Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indi-
cating the manner in which the arms would have been used
to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election.
Mr Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard
to the arms cache_
0
He said that the committee appointed
by the OAS to investigate had called for additional
evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take
two to three weeks to assemble_ He said that he felt that
the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the
question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges
had not yet been resolved,
0 Mr Bundy referred to the
efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of sur-
veillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred
to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure
on the high seas,
9 Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of
Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more
respectable stripe than the last group which visited
were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas
vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers
planning to do the same thing during the summer He said
that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had
suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel
to Cuba _ Mr Ba1l said that the Department of State is
tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because
of its effect on Latin American countries_ The President
strongly concurred with the Department of State position_
He said that he did not propose to change or relax present
regulations_
(e M
Desmond FitzGebald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff
Cuba ,
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C 1-6
13 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discus sion with the President, 13 December 9:30 a.m.
1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his
responsibilities.
2. Introduced Peer de Silva_ The President spoke briefly of
what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Gove rnmert
in the Saigon community.
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3. Reviewed the Checklist. I emphasized (a) the dangers of the
hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 2l lives are extremely
important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the conse-
quence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands
of people in the future_ In fact I was saying we must not give the
Communists the upper hand in this argument_ I explained the critical
location of the prisoners, and () called the President' s attention to
the international oil sitwtion and the deadlock between OPEC and the
international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the
Italians and possibly the French
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4 '[Noted Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive
sources, Spinelli" 1s observation was incorrect but there was a possibility
of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demon-
stration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold
military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months
NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time_
G
5.U told the President that subject to Rusk' s approval, I intended
to issue a series of articles on the weakne 88 of the Soviet economy,
drainage on their supply, over-commitments on
foreign aid, etc_
for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the
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Soviets or the West, such a8 Sukarno and certain South American
countries, s0 that will understand are not leaning on very
much when they lean on the Soviets.
62 Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General
Eisenhower conveyed to the Pre sident General Eisenhower S
expression of friendship and support:
Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged
the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until
after the first of the year. I asked for the President' 8 approval to
invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.
NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy
felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments,
responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife,
Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.
8_ Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President
asked what the Attorney General intended to that i8, on or leave.
I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney
General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to
become involved in the activities outside the area Of the Office of the
Attorney General, such &8, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter
insurgency matters, etc I explained to the President that I had told
Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the
President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood
relationship, not an official relationship: A type of relationship which
is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials,
either in business or government.
9 I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet
Foreign Aid
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6 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with The President 9:45 6 December 1963
The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk,
McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning
the procedures on MLF
Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General
Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb _ Merchant, Admiral Ricketts
and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a
group Of "'young Republicans" opposed the MLF
Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional
leaders in small groups , but to intimate that no government, including
the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program
8
Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the
most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense
of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a
scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including
the United States
McNamara stated that Mr _ von Has sel had advised him that the
MLF was a "must" or else.the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an
independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons
resources _ Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might
force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons _ McNamara
stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force
will have a military ( ? ) utility and will permit a reduction in
planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is
considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost.
The President then suggested 2_ briefing of Congressional
leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially
along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon.LI brought up
the question of security and pointed out the dangers The President
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asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic
capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I
pos Sibly could without endangering sources and methods _
ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.
Fac
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The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge
Bundy and McCone_ I discussed the foreign aid figures as included
in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet
Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I
would prepare for the President some special graphics which would
show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid_ both extensions and
draw-downs , to non-Communist countries and Cuba .
NOTE: Mr Rostow raised the question earlier
as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with
USSR S aid figures because the latter did not include
aid to satellites _ His position is that since we include
aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece,
South Korea, etc. we should examine USSR aid to their
satellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined.
I do not know whether the figures are available
The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following
comments:
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1. LI expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover
underground tests and it was quite possible would soon make claims
for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent informa-
tion on the LASER beam
98
2 . [ pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation
stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located
in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were
not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were
broadcasting unfavorably against them _
9<
3 noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over
Malaysia_
I then explained to the President the source Of our information
that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was
attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice
Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the
assassination of the President_ I stated that this report comes from a
very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly.
We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon.
I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me= but that
I felt it was a good move if he was to remove Ambas sador
He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be
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tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it
would indicate President Johnson'$ support of Diem rather than the
present authorities _ Therefore he stated he could not move to remove
Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a
candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would
be the nominee _ (Note: I told the President he wanted things too
easy) . I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he
opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to rid of him_
The President said he would communicate most emphatically with
Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write
an appropriate communi-
cation_ I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was
absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted
to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration
and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an
individual or block an action_ I therefore could conclude that if he
was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to with David
Smith a8 Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young
and not' fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request
that the: best and most experienced man we can find be_placed on the
job _ The President said he would exercise the full power of his
office to Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South
Vietnam are s0 great that CIA should have a "'four-star man" on the job and
that is what he wanted _
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3 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday , Dec . 1
10:00 0'clock about 30 minutes _ No one was in attendance_
1 . Reviewed a series of reports _ There was no Checklist.
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2 . (The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly
concerned about Chenault_
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3 , BBriefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means
of indicating sources to CIA not available to thers
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4 Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon
felt a bit critical towards the U.S_ presence; however we are in some doubt
as to whether will include such criticism in their public report =
5 _ Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in
Mexico
6 _ The President then brought up the question of men in government _
Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men_ I urged the President
to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group.
He that meetings would be arranged this coming week.
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7 . [I advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to
pursue the SST problem ]
8 _ [requested the President to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of
Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me
automatically.
Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to
me _ The President agreed
NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr _ Cline .
Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later
with the Presi dent who agreed that such distri-
bution should be automatic except in very special
circumstances in which he wished distribution
held to his own personal files for reasons of
his own choice . I could take no exception to this
decision.
9 _ We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people
sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers _
NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this _
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2 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963
Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a
number of very personal problems and asked my help and also
asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve
some of his problems_
1. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes.
By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by
direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General
to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Adminis
tration.
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2. He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for
a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed
with Sargent Shriver and thou ght he would be an excellent Secretary
of H: E. W_ This was enthusiastically endorsed both Bundy and
myself_
3 He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might
be a very able ambassador
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4. He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned
whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate
with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for
recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that
Embas SY , and more particularly handle Ayub. At this he asked
that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals
who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his
criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job
in his mission to Pakistan: The President expressed the highest regard
for Ayub:
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5_ He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed
criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not
the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be
his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS
positively enough: He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS,
Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for
a
replacement:
6_ Thr 'oughout the conversation it appeared that Pre sident
Johnson i8 not going to be satisfied with the organization a8 it is
now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time
he doe s not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor
does he intend to move in the "'hangers-on of the last 20 years.
Apparently he has had a vast number of approaches from people who
he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of
any of them.
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2 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 1l:00 a.m: November 30th,
in attendance Mr. meeting lasted approximately
1 1/2 hours
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1. Reviewed the Checklist. The President immediately
raised the question of what we were about Colonel Chennault.
He expects most serious public reaction and has a
feeling that
we
are "'drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan
government were all that was possible_ However, he requested
more positive action on a report on the actions being taken:
NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday
morning briefing:
2_ No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.
3 The President again raised the question of what we were
going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled
for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban I pointed out to
the President the statements of President Kennedy on September Sth,
September 13th, and November 2Oth, 1962 and then I showed the evidence
that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from
Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be ma de immediately
to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would
involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade
and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise
it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the
action was a_ Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do
much about it: The President agreed but decided to await the policy
meeting on Monday.
NOTE: DDIP and WH should prepare full recommendations
for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with
the Caribbean states or with the OAS, for my use in the
policy meeting:
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4_ I reviewed the report from Mexico station, 27 November,
advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which
we thought was re sponsible more or less verified our own current
estimates_
5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President
CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We
briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by
the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was
inconclusive and no action required
98
6_ The President then brought up the question of Pakistan
and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community' 9 feeling of concern
and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest
importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting
between Ayub and General Taylor_ The President made no comment
but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States
because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the
great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we
would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack
Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in
Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had
not given him & feeling of confidence in our motive s and that he had
drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India-
He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner
7 _ I reviewed our
Cuban overflight program advising the
Pre sident of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were
being carried on.
8_ Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China ovedlight and stated
these had been stood down since the ls 8 of the last plane but we intended
to resume which the President thought was proper.
ACTION: [ wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in
targets for at least two flights for submis sion to the
Special Group next Thursday:_
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9_ I advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights
had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand
and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn
from Takhli_
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10_ I advised the President that the CORONA mis sion was up
and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an
opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program_
11. QReviewed the Vene=
zu3h overflight
as outlined in
memorandum for the Special Group and President approved:
NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General
Carter and instructed him to proceed
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Suus;
29 November 1963
Late developments on the Mexico City Investigation of
Oswald' 8 activitiae
1 Results of the firat interrogation of Silvta Duran bave been received,
Reveals nothing other than confirmation o Ogwald'8 effort to secure
authority to enter USSR via Havana . Hle requeste were refuged_
2 _ Regult of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not 25 been
received _
3 _ FBI dispatched a man from Waehington to Mexico at the request
of Ambageador Mann.
4 Tho Nicaraguan , Alvarado, bag been turned over to the Mexican
authorities questioning, by the CIA station at the specific requeet
of the FBI.
NOTE: CIA Headquartera refueed this turn-over until
FBI request received becauge FBlia In control of the
invegtigation .
5 7v
Alvaradofe etory-becomlng increaelngly queetlopable becauge of a
public 8tatement carried by Mexico radio and preas prior to
Alvarado' & entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had
received $5, 000 from the Cuban Embasey.
To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963
with Secty. McNamara and Bundy .
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29 November 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
W
SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson
10:00 a m_ Thursday November 28th_
for approximately 30 minutes
1 The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following
comments:
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a Are we all possible to keep Venezuelan
authorities informed ? [ reviewed briefly our penetrations
and our activities.
b_ What is the real future in South Vietnam? The
President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal
and any recommendations that I might have for modification
of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate
of what is the outlook. The President continues to be
concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction
against our activities in South Vietnam_ The President is
obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to
conflicts in the Senate) _ He asked for recommendations as
to who would be a_ good man and who could run the American
team_
He noted Item b_ in the Check list and I pointed out
the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the
New York Times He asked that I personally meet with the
head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted
reports seriously damage the American interests _ I stated
that I would do this
9g
We discussed Item 2.f . having to do with the high level of
communications traffic and I stated that this could be cons idered as an
unfavorable indicator_
The President noted without comment report on Israel USSR,
India military aid and Burma
8
C The President asked what the outlook was with Greece _ I told
him that we
expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to
power _ The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our
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99
withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal
to do with his los8 Of office:-
9g
d. I pointed out to the President that we could expect some
trouble in Brazil.
98
[The President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu
of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall
and that he would lose office soon after his' return:
98
f. repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President
Macapagal which i8 covered in a geparate memorandum prepared by
Mr. Colby:
g - JAlso I raised the question
788
the importance of our
taking
iniative in the Indone sia matter by working with Macapagal: We might
Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem:
2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our
policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the
economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro.
He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that
the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to
evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations_
In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study
carefully various courses Of action.
9g
3 The President then raised the question of the deal between the
Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement
of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good I
replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with
the satellite s would tend to break down the closeness of ties between
the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy
effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian
steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration
of the satellite s and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he
agreed that we should attempt to the satellites away. He then brought
up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best
man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to
"win the away from Khrushchev . 1 He said that in his opinion this man
should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a
Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a
per sonality who could win Tito'8 confidence and allegiance. I responded by
stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could
2
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bring
thing:
pull
girl
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14- QoooQ
9g
Iserve in this capacity and also in others _ In this connection, the
President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect
to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment_ His request
for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and
the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a
representative in South Vietnam
4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill _
I said that were excellent_ The problem was a continual
harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence _ I said that I felt that if
Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and
Hickenlooper and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be to
rest. The President said he thought this was a idea and that he would
speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.
5 _ LIthen reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the
President a broad picture of this development _ I explained that surfacing
of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and
CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara
0
was pres for a rather early release but that President Kennedy
felt that the timing of the surfacing was Of very great importance_ I said
that [ felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had
some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of
President Johnson' s administration _ The President seemed to agree and
suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with hin on F for
a discussion of this problem_
No arrangements were made as to the time of F morning' s
briefing.
JAM mfb (tape)
3
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Page 21
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E}
26 November 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with The President 25 November and 26 November
1. On Monday, November 25th, there"was no briefing of the President,
although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday
evening: The President then expressed regret that events of the
prevented a
briefing and asked if there
was any development requiring his
attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments
came to my attention.
2_ On Tuesday, the 26th, [ briefed the President, reviewing all
items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the
Bulletin. Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about
15 or 20 minutes_
3 The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been
made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had
ordered. I replied affirmatively.
NOTE: I should call J, Edgar Hoover concerning this.
(DCI did this at 1l:2o on 11/26/63)
4 The Pregident asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam_
I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from
Ambassador Lodge.
5. Mr . Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist
State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country
Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended
Mr. Sullivan, Harriman' s deputy. The President plans to have a man in
position not later than January first.
6_ McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in
Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed.
Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names
were mentioned.
NOTE: Apparently the President' s appointment
secretary will be a Mr_ Moyrs. We
should to know him.
day
get
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Page 22
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14-QQQQQ
Lli
The President noted with some considerable contempt the
fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested
to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's
assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys
and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson
rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical was to be
advanced in & lead editorial in the Washington Pogt. The President
felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He
personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally
"killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.
JAMI TMLeelmfb
plan
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14-000QQ 'SEP 2 '98 01 : 46Fm1
25 Novombor 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: South Vletnam Sltuatlon
ATTENDANCE: Tho Preetdent, Secretarleg Ruek, McNemara , Ball,
Me88r0 . Bundy and McCone , Ambae8ador
Nev 14 € 3 pg {xea Okftes
J. Ambapeador reported that the change In government
bad boen J0 Improvement, that he wa ? bopeful over the outlook, that
ha expected @ Opeedup Of the war, he thought by February 0r March
we would dee marked progre8d. Lodge stated that we woro not
Involved In tho coup, though wo put preeauree On the South Vietnare8e
government to change Ito courbe and thobe preseured, moet
Partlcularly on Indcatlono 0f wlthdrewal by 1965, encouraged the
Coup _ Lodge stated that there were Indlcatlone that North Vletnam
mlght be Intereated Ln arrangemente which would be of a nature
eatIetactory to 48_ He did not elaborate He that that everybody
wa0 vaTy happy aftor the coup and bhowed bome Picturee 0l the
crowde In SaLgop. He mentloned that Oen _ Dn would bo hore and
that thogo talking with hlm phould Indluence hlm to Put on all the
pre8 eure he could. He epoke mogt hlghly %f tho Papal delegate and
hle Lntentlon to 000 the on Wedneeday . Ha carrlod wIth hlm 0
letter from the Papal Delegate and alao Irom the Blahop of Salgon,
apparently pralelng the actione In upeotting tho Dlem governmont _
Lodge Bald he B8w dangere of an antl-Chrietlan move and thla wag
hlo puxposo Ln Beolng the Pope - Ho made 0
Polnt that Biehop Thuc
bed engaged In @erloue Pereecutlona Involvlng the Lmprlaonment 0
a great many People_ Includlng threo Cetholle Prleets_ He el8o made
the potnt that Can, Dlem'& brother, also engaged In a varlety 0f
activltleb of Pergecutlon and the executlon 0t tndlvIduale and that
Can had, on hlo.own preml800, 2 burlal ground for hle vctime
Lodge sald that we were $n no way reeponblble tor the death 0f Dlem
and Nhu, that bad followed hte advIce, would be allve
today . Ho gaid that ho oavad Can from aeea88ination and that
Blehop Thuc waa out 0f Salgon under ordere trom the Papal
delegate _ (Note; I queation whether the Papal delegate can order
8
Blahop out 0 & country . ) The tone 0f Ambaggador Lodge 0
Btatemento were optimlatlc, hopetul, and left the Preeldent with
the Impreg8lon that we are on tho road to vlctory .
to the_
M0 intull
0i ol this
Tha
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Lodge
Ditt
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Popo
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objection !
document nas Records Jtaie
Depannene Assassination E deckssifation JFK (PL102-526) release= PoMsits 1992 "
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Revowed M Lig
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Page 24
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14-000QQ Su & '58 WI :47PM1
P,18
At thlo point McCone gtated that our e8tlmate of the eltuatlon
wa} bomewhat more berious_ Wo had noted a
continulng Increaee
in Viot actIvlty elnce the {Iret O November a0 evldenced by
2 larger pumbor of Viet attacke . We aleo notlced with
conalde rablo concern 2 hlgh lovel 0t m0n8ag0 volume on the Vlet
mUItary and Polltlcal networke and thls mlgbt qulto poaelbly reflect
Preparatlona for further guetalned guerrllla proaeureo . Furthermoro
I stated that the muItary wero hevlng conelderable trouble In
completing the polltlcal organization 0f tho government and were
recelvlng Ilttlo X any belp Irom clvlllan leaderehlp_ Indead It beemed
to 4: that the competent ctvlllans were eteytng On the eldellnee and
contlnulng thelr tr adltlonal role of critlc8 rather tban turning -In and
belng helpful. I concluded by eteting that we could not at thla
or tlmo glve & partlcularly optlmietc appraleal of tho future _
The Pre edent then atated that he approached the 0Ituation wIth
bome mleglvinge, He noted that a great many people throughout tha
country queetlonad our couree 01 actlon in aupportlng the overthrow
of the Dlem reglme _ He al8o noted that etrong volces In the Congreeo
felt wo ehould out Of Vletnam . Both ot the8e facte gIve the
Prebfdent conederable concern, He atated that he wa 9 not at all 0ure that
we took the rlght courbe &n upaettlng the Dlem reglma but thle wa & 8
declelon thet he dld not have to make 20 It wa9 & {alt accompll Ho
bald now that Jt wab done, we have to see that Our obfectIve& weto
accompllehed. (Noto: The Inferencee were that, left to hle own
devIcev, he would not have eupported the coureeo Of actlon whlch Ied
to tha cOup, )
Tha Preeldent then etated he hae never been happy wlth our
operatlone In Vletnam He eald there had beon Berloue disseneIon
and dlvlefono within the Amerlcan community and he told the
Ambag8ador that be wa8 In total charge and he wanted the Bituatlon
cleanod Up He wanted no more divlelons o oplnlon, no more
blcke and any perbon that dId not conform to poliey Bhould be
removed. At thle Mr - Bundy sated that we were bearchlng tor
a replacement for Truehart and what we wanted w26 & capable
edminlatrator who could run the Country Team _ The Proeldent egaln
repeated hle Ineietence that the Ambaegador wae the Number One man and
he , the Pregldent, wa0 holdlng the Ambagsador personally reaponelble _
Secretary McNamara gtated that he had examlned the economlc
eItuatlon and that he felt we mubt glve generoubly O economlc ald
and mubt not a8k the South Vletnamese government to do the Impoe s.ble
at thie particular time _
2
Cong
Cong
Cong
polnt
get
ring
Point
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Page 25
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14- Ooooo Cc 3 01 '4(rit P.19
The Presldent then Beld that ho bupported thlo, but at the bame
tlme he wanted to make It abundantly clear that ha did not thInk we had
6 reform evory Aalan Into our owm Image = He ga1d that Ao felt all
too often when we ongaged in the affalre 0t & forelgn ountry we
wanted to Immedtately tranaform that country Into our Image and thlb ,
In hlo Oplnlon, wa 0 a mletako Ho wa8 anxlout to getdong, wln the war
bo dlda % want &8 much effort placed on 00-called Joclal retormo.
Note: I receJved In thla meeting the flret "Pre sldent Johneon tono"
{or acton a0 contraetad with the "Kennedy tone" Johneon deflnxtely
{eele that we place too much omphaelt on goclal reforme; ho h4e very
Ittle tolerance wlth our ppendlng 80 much tlmo belng "do-goodero
and he had no tolerance whatsoever wIth blckoring and quarreling 0
the type that hae gone On In South Vletnam
The meetlng was followed by a otatement to the Preee which wa0
glven out by Bundy to the effect that we would pureue the policlee
agreed to In Honolulu adopted by the late Preeident Kennedy A
Picture wae taken of the President wIth McNamara, Rubk and
Bal -
JAM (tape) Imfb
Referenca8; 1, IN-66988, 23 Nov 63
2 SC No. 11709/63, 18 Nov 63
Subj: The Milltary Situatlon In South Vietnam
Lodge:
==================================================
Page 26
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QoooQ
TOP SECRET DINARJq}
m
Hpkue
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
S(eel ~p
buc
Qxu
scack (zb. &asa
UuL Uy 825Y 23 November 1963
Eue
Colledu
Tuu~~u
Nut Peenle
DAILY BRIEF
cowtusn
asr
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Ril
GuBl Yuc z WMLLLL Aux
Ayuc
Neu;
Lcl
6usl
cL
( bulu *South Vietnam: The accelerated tempo of Viet
~1 Cong activity in the post-coup period continues. ALan Asm
i ~Ml Oualc 0ulltul _
0ae While the 149 Viet Cong attacks recorded during
the week ending 18 November are a drop from the
Zr cbesc_u)
previous weeks record high of 233, the number is in~UI
still about 50 percent above normal for this year.
Aloa _>
The attacks continue to be on a small-scale_ They
Gusd (utuulUlare targeted primarily against strategic hamlets
Sae n
Ass=
emo Re and outposts,
with government paramilitary forces
{lULk
bearing the brunt:
Mc 24 1CZ 485
Continuinghigh message volumes on) Viet Cong Ll 0lh luruluus
military and political networks may reflect prepara- 3
tions for sustained guerrilla pressures.
86l
6uel
doue'aq
~upctr b Sit The Saigon government apparently is proceeding
Caa
Glu
with a purge of military officers holding high mili -
~5L
intelligence, and provincial posts under Diem. 0_
On 22 November it announced the suspension of 31
c
dss_ officers_ Some of these are under arrest. The
~ponible
~lucpurges
may be partly in response to the demands of c8 CecopE
student and Buddhist groups seeking revenge against
prominent figures who sided with Diem during the
Buddhist crisis. (TOP SECRET(DINAR)
99
TOP SECRET(DINAR
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Page 27
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14-QQQQQ
1
26 November 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson Sunday,
November Z4th at 10:00 a.m
I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a. m.
Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes Reviewed the
Checklist and I made the following points:
1 I explained the space event. Soviet ships are in place
which would indicate a range ICBM test. However, the ranges
are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is
that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred.
2, I stated I felt the President should Aldzet an early opportunity,
receive a briefing on Soviet long range dalaibrve capability, their
current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.
3. I referred briefly t our estimate of the Cuban situation,
the condition of their economy and our operational plans against
Cuba.
4 I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with
great care. I gave the Pre sident a copy of the November 24th Summary
of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assa8sination.
JAM:mcm
I/zc
9 &
long
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Page 28
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14-QQQQQ
25 November 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd,
about 9:15 a_ m_ The conversation lasted approxi-
mately 15 minutes _
1_ The President entered Mr _ Bundy's office alone and
no one was present during the conversation_
2 _ The President opened the conversation by recalling a
long background of association and friendship with me personally,
his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues
that had arisen since [ took office a8 DCI he and I had seen eye
to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish
that I continue in the future exactly a8 I have in the past.
3. I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and
support him in every way and my willingness to continue in the
future as [ have in recent months _
4 _ The President then asked of any world developments: I
reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution
of the "President' s Checklist" with which he was not familiar_ I
stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the
future as we had in the past.
5 . It wa8 agreed that for the next few days I would brief the
President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers
would brief the President' s staff each morning a8 [ have in the past.
The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought
to his attention at any time, or night. He designated no inter-
mediary.
day
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Page 29
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QoooQ
6 At 12:30 I went to the President' s office in the Executive
Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico
In attendance was Mr _ Bundy . Following this I had a brief
exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President
Johnson at the time _
7 This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with
him the information received from Mexico most particularly
the holding of
a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by
Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I
explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the
FBI and to the authorities in Dallas _ Rusk had not known of these
developments prior to my communication with him_
8 . I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs . McCone and
me personally and al80 the Agency in connection with the appropriate
handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who
might overwhelm the State Department's capacity Rusk appreciated
this offer and said he would call on me He further said that there
may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if S0 . he would make
appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid
having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States .
Each had their own embassy to take care of them however, he
thought there might be some obligations in which [ could be helpful_
He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon
he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the
form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any
planned activities_ He thought it was quite probable that the President
would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday
and Wednesday.
JAM:mcm
(tape)
City
City,