Transcript of 104-10306-10016.pdf
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AaaaA @0223088001
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
26 March 1963
ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WI TH THE
PRESI DENT:
The Pregident and I engaged in a brief diecu8Bion of the Soviet
plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the
Soviets would withdraw all of their force8 from Cuba, but that he had
now reached the conclubion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered
that at no time had gaid epecifically that were to withdraw all
of their force8, in fact their particular wording wae gomewhat vague_
McCone stated that were conflicting On the one hand, certain
information such @8
indicCcent
the Brazilianlintercept jand report of Castro'8
own gtatements would lead one to the: conclusion that a gradual_and
continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubang were tralned and
became proficient in operating advanced gophisticated Soviet equipment,
This would take many months, probably the balance 0f the year and
Castro welcomed thi8 perlod of time becauge it would mean a continuing
Soviet interest in Cuba: On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building
of permanent ingtallatione and the arrival of undieclo8ed but apparently
sophisticated equipment, although In small quantitiee, neverthele8e
important volume would indicate a conclugion that Soviets were there to
but perhaps on a 8omewhat reduced gcale.
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STCHE,
The President then guggested a meeting be held this
afternoon to determine a number of matters .
1 We should establish what our contacts are with the groups
s0 that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down
the operations_
2 A policy statement which State is undertaking.
3 The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake_
4 _ Discus with UK since there is evidence that much of this
originated in the Bahamas_
5 _ The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union_
At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone = Catrell,
Douglas Dillon, it wa8 decided to send a group to Miami thi8 afternoon
for discuggion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA Immigratio:
iudater officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:
1 Find out all we know about the groups _ who are, where
are, what can be done about them_
2 . Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami.
Apparently there i8 not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami_
3 , and meang of using Customs and Coast Guard for some
of this _
4 Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions
we
intend to take against them _ Algo warning 'the guppliers of explosives ;
arms , etc_
5 _ FCC shut down illicit radio stations provide a truck equipped
with DF-equipment to locate the stations _
6_ Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from
Soviet targets _ In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown
before any attempt was made to guide the groups _
7 Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane
matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize
the plane.
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Excerpt from President' s Press Conference April 3
THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is
that did not come from the United States. We have already
indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a
useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen
the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba
and justify repressive measures within Cuba which mi other-
wise not be regarded a8 essential. So that we have not supported
this and,these men do not have a connection with the United States
Gove rnment. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate
the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to back home and
who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases
the chances of freeing Cuba.
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CQNIBMZAL Attecheznt
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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CONFIDENTIAL Group I
Exc luded from
automatic dow -
THE SECRETARY OF STATE grading and de-
classification
Washington
DRAFT_LETTER
TO BE USED AS, A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT TH NSC EXECUIVE
COMITEE NEETTNG _FRIDAY MARCH 29 at 12:30 P.u.
Dear M - President:
I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles
may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our
national, interest _ Increased frequency 0 f these forays
could raise a host of problems over which we wou T d not
have control_
Actions such as yescerday S exile attack which
ccubed substantial damage to a Soviet vesse? may
complicate our relations with the USSR without net
advantage to uS
I therefore propose several measures which cculd
impede or deter further attacks of this nature.
First , the intelligence comunity could increase its
efforts in Miami to deveLop hard inforwation about
projected raids This is currently comunicated to Customs
authorities charged with investd gation of viol ation of
arws control_
Second Customs and the Coast Guard on the bas; s
of this information can stop and search the vesse] s _
(They now do this, and picked UD about 50 men and four
boats last year . ) Arms and vessels are confiscated_
and participants arraigned if a violation of 1 aw has
The President
9
The White House_
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
2
occurred. Bail i8 set in accordance with the severity
of the violation_ An increase of one or more vessel s
to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations
in the Miami area would be helpful
Third CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami
could quietly inform suspects in the exite 'comunity
that the United States intends to intensify enforcement
of violations of pertinent Laws relating to exiTe raids
Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down {1 Legal
radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in
connection with these raids
Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our
pLans to try to control these activities and express
our understanding that the British Covernment has
become increasing
Y concerned about the possibiljty
that British territory in the B- hamas may be used for
these raids and may be considering action to police
these areas more effectively_
These measures have not been discussed with any 3f
the senior officials of the Departments concerned , but
if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I
suggest that a meeting Jf the interested Departments
be ca lled to' discuss the problem_
Faithfully yours,
Dean Rusk
CONFIDENTIAL
March 28 , 1963
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29 March 1963
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids
1 < Organizations such a8 the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66,
and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto
Rico _ Their plans are discussed openly , are
picked up by CIA and
reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins .
2 . There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida
and Puerto Rico. The boats _ outboard motors, guns , ammunition and
explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or
unlicensed sources (of which there are many)_ We believe that the
operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non- U, S. areas _
3 _ The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious
courage and dedication _ Apparently the organizations are building up
and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future
4 _ Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with
Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and , from that standpoint,
are desirable _
However, successful harras sment will create very
considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dis sension, will
complicate Castro'9 problems and will have very considerable effect
in discrediting Castroism in Latin America Inability of Castro to deal
with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of
his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba _ It is
impos sible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand
it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other
to reinforce and finally, might cause them to open up
a discussion
of their presence with the United States _
5 _ Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the
Intelligence Community, it.is my personal view that a concerted and
publicized effort to " stand down" these operations would probably draw
more public and press criticism in the United States than would result
from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government
from them through denial of both responsibility and control_
JOHN A McCONE
Director
it;
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IEEI
29 March 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting 12:30 P.m. 29 March 1963
IN ATTENDANCE: All present, Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and
others
The President raibed the que stion of what should be our
policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views _ Ireported my
views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary
Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized
raid8, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and
would immediately take counter actions such as escorting
etc_ On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselve8
and do all posgible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized
raid8 _
Dillon stated that we could not them because of
the number of ports, small inadequate coast guard facilities,
etc McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them' by
utilizing military resources As a second alternative he suggested
we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should
disassociate ourselve& from responsibility. The Attorney General
outlined various Stepg that could be taken to identify the leadership
of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them
from the country through immigration procedures_ Thompson and
Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane
that wa s ready to bomb Soviet Practically all in attendance
thought that we should and guide the operation away from attack8
on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets _ The
Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting
them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other_ He felt
the military should immediately study that which should be done to
stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized
raids
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SRET
Notes On Renark8 by Presldent Kennedy before the Nationel Securtty Councll
Tuesdey , January 22, 1963
I will gtart by revlewing
areag of policy which will be before 48
in the coming months and Indicate the general attitude which I have towera
them and to emphasize where wa might our emphasis In the next few months.
The responglbil ties of the United States ere worldwide and the U,S,
18 the only country which L8 recognizIng Its wide respon8ibilitie8. We are
pert of NATE, SEATO, etc, end Bupport other pacte even though Ve are not
a part of them. Other natione are not their share .
Woula 11ke to 8ey a word fIrst about Guba =
The IndicatIons are that the Lmportence of timing 18 of paramount
Importance In reaching judgnents both by the USSR and the OS. Our blg
problem is to protect our interests &nd prevent a nuclear wer It wag 2
very cloge thing whether we vould engage In a quarantine or an air gtrike ,
In looking baok, it wag rea ` ly that It pregented u8 with an imediate crises
and the USSR had to make their judgment and cowe to 8 deciefon to act In
twelve houre _ In looktng back Over that four or five: perLod, we all
changed our vLewe somewhat , or at least eppreciated the advanteges and
disadventages of alternate courceb of action. That Is wat we 8hould do
In any other struggle with the Sovlet Union end I believe ve will be
In one In the future. We Bhould have gufficient time to consider the
alternetives. You could 8ee that the Rusoians had a deal of debate
In 0 48 hour pertod. If had only to act In an hour Or two, their
actlong would have been epaemodlc and might have resulted In nuclear war ,
It 18 Important that we heve time to study their reaction. We should
continue our policy even though we do not Europe to go along with 4s
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The time w1ll probably cOme when we will have to act again On Cuba .
Cube might be our response in some future s1tuation the samle wey the
Russians have used . Berlin- We may . decide that Cube might be a more
satisfectory respon8e than a nuclear resronse , We must be ready elthough
thi8 might not come. We Bhould be prepared to move on Cuba ff it should
bo In Our national Interest. The plenning by the US, by the Mlitery,
in tho direction of our effort ghould be advanced always keeping Cuba
in mind In the conlng monthe and to be ready to move with all posstble
speed . We can use Cuba to limit their ection8 . Just 88 have had
Berlin to linlt our action8 _
8
In thematter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGeulle' 8
pogition. nuclear veto by Frenoh President Eisenhower
reviewed the problem' and took the position that it should be. revlewed by
the NATO natlon8 tbe NATO natlons would not act no agreement
batween the Three. That decisfon thls AdmInistration elso supported.
However, thle decisfon ha8 not produced the pregent contentIon with the
French . Even When I was In Paris last June, de Gaulle sald he ioula
make 8om0 proposal In regard to NATO itself 4ll through hf8 epeeches
and hla memoir8 . he indicatee it 18 hi8 desire to have a Europe In wich
France vould be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western
World 48 an equal. If we had given him atomic weapone he vould be difficult
to deal with _
98
De Gaulle(did not question our support of Western Europe beceuse Wa
have maintained . gtrong representation there, but the French have not ,
They have not been aggressive 08 we have been and, therefore It 18 not a
diatrust of u8 that we Will desert Burope but it 18 that he feele thet Frenoe
Bhou d a8gert a posItIon 06 a strong France and Cea8e It8 growing reliance
On the 0.S,
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SECRET
3.
98
Having made such proposels to the US and Great Britain and been
turned down, he hes made the 8ame turn to Germany _ Thts is not s0 bad
as it has prevented Germeny moving to tbe East , And, historically ,
Germany 3 trade ha8 been to tho East . There 18 not much ' harm to 48
In this position. with Great BritaIn Joining the Cormon Market , thia
would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this tfme .
If GaB. doe8 g0 it will oet us a deal In trade, but it wll
be good for the otability of Europe . Frence keeping Britaln out 18 a
betback for 48 , but 8 more Bevere setback for G.B, ere going to
have a diffioult tJme In Burope It 19 our interest to strengthen Europe
and the unilateral-concept , and-deGaulle-+g- opposed- to thf8es -By
strengthentng /he multilateral concept , it gtrengthens NATOand Lncreages
4.35
their dependence
On uS Thls gtrengthens our invluence In Europe and
gIves 48 the power to guide Europe and it strong: The events of the
pest two weeks makes it ' Jmportant for us to support the' multlateral
concept and thet is why deGeulle 18 more oppoged to 1ta It will ba
difficult to work this out, but it 18 Important that we do 80 . But
we should not be wolly dLstressed_
After ell Wa have 'done for France in 80 many weys , deGaulle has 'opposea
uS In many places throughout tbe world In NATO, in the Congo end other
98
Plecea but he 18 there and we bave to live with Ita One wey wa can &0
80 18 to strengthen /the mutilateral force and NATO.
Our negotiatore On trade natters will have to be very careful to protect
our interest8 . Our trade balance. 18 of great concern and Is not under control_
If Ve doi to the 812 billion coverage of our natLonal regerve Ve will 98
be In trouble . We will have pressure on the dollar and preggure from the
Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will 7
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FOn SFCREE
4, 98
We 4ll- be very tough about. tha actions that Europe take8 . We maintain
large force8 in West Germeny . If West Germany does not maLntaln sufficlent
forces but Ingtead concentrets On agricultural production for instance to
our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present Vo are peying
helf Of Norway' 8 air and 8ea power for Instance end supportIng NATO, and
they are "Iving off the ' fat of the land" wIle we' ere peying for thelr
protection. In tbe coming months Ke must concentrate on howl can
protect the Intereste of the United Stetes . We have pursued 0 very ' generous
policy. We have loet our econontc power over thege countrLes . Now WB
are running out and ;f the French and others atonic cepecIty they
will be Independent and Ve Wll be On the outgide looking in. D not
think that the Europeens Wtll do anything for 18 even though we have done
a lot for them _ So wa must have al1 our repregentatIves lookIng out
very: 8trongly for the 0,S, Interest8 . We must be sure our econonLc house
i8 In order and u80 our mLlitary, policitel power to protect our Olmn Interest8.
Regarding our attitude tovard the neutral8 There 1s critlclsm &bout
9X
our lack of difference betveen the Allfes and the neutral8. the Pakistanis
are criticel, but we . must recognize . the importance of the Indlang, If
they joIned tha' Chinese we would have no free 8outh Asia . The Pakistannie
are strugglIng agalnst the Indians and the Afganlstans . will 4s0 or
attempt to explolt. our power_ Our Interest 18 to make a 8trong sub-continent .
We wll u90 the country that cen help further that alm , Wa have used India
letely . We do not like thelr present leadership, but We can use them, While
doing thie we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer
to the Chinege and 'agalnst the Indians. We heve not been eble to persuade
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98
the PakIstannis or the Afganistans to chance thr policy on Indla.
Thege forces Yere there long before we came on the scene and We cannot
do much about It We cannot gettle 0l1 the disputes, but wa want to
keep then free from the Communists . We cannot permit those wo call
themselves neutrale to be completely taken into the CommunIst camp .
We must our tIes Wlth Nasalr end other8, even though we do not
like the leaders thenselves _
With regard to AD/which i8 going forvard under General we
Ve can tie this whole concept of afd to the safety of the United
States , This Is the reason We give &id_ The teet 18 wether It Will
serve the United States and ff we can equate it to that, AID 18 not
a word = Perhapa we can describe it better a8 Mutual Assistance
though thls 18 an old term. Some countrLes can go 1t alone, but We
must do &l1 wB can, We must make every. effort to a country out
of the communLst bloc . It Ls nore difficult to a country out of a
communLet bloc once it is Ina It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congre88
mey cut the heart out 0f Foreign Aid and thls Is a great danger to the
sefety of tbe United States . Even the French give more aid than wa do
on 8 per capite besis. He will probably take a but We do want
to hurt our Dafenge effort. We would not like four or fIve countries to
suddenly turn conmunist just because we did not give a certaln amount of
aid, We muat look thls over very carefully and aid on the besis It
will bogt Berve our Own Interest _
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6
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Turning to the domestic scene we Will have a deficit of 0 bout 812
of $122 billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit dow and
we have In the past three years . Except for Defenge end Space and
Interest on the Dbt ve have 3* increased the National Budget but It
hes baen increaged le8a than It was under the prevLous AdminLatration .
With the tremendous movement from the country to the cltles, Ve have had
many problems _ while the coste have Increaged, the recelpts have dropped .
We have only Increased about 1g 0 year In the growth rete during the paet
ten years . Thie 18 gerfous, particularly Wlth the greet increege In pOp
ulation.
98
I think this Tax Bll /is very Lmportant , If We another recessiOn
in this country It wlll *axbutxi bave a bed effect on the seserve
It will heve a bad psycological' effect on the people of the 0.S. And when
Ve 800 the strong position that Mr, Khrugchev 18 taklng with regard to
egricultural and other domegtic gectIons of the economy 8na ff wa Juet
drift, we will look very bad to other natlong
Furthermore , the deficitiis a reflection Of the fight In hot and
cold war we heve been fLghting during the past fifteen years . If wa
go to a deficit of 12 bfllion, this would be a most gerioug affair for
the Unlted Stateg . If wB can go forwerd with the present Tex Btll, wO
will be In much better shape. All of these metters the tex program,
AID, defense, etc. are &ll related _
The Mltaryllare d1sturbed becauge of Our
{eilure
to g0 forward With
Certain programs . For Instance: The B70, Nike_Zeus, Skybolt. A8 a
matter of fact, wB ere goIng forwerd with a large. progrem and there 1s 0
limlt to how 'much Ve can and If the noceasity develops we w4ll do more
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This Administration hag spent a many millions more than hes been
appropriated for Srace and Dfense end perhaps We should spend more -
44 [oae
Of our big jobs will be to persuade]our colleeguee In Europe to
to do a better job themgelves . If we maintain s1x divisions In Europ
and only maintain a force whlch will permit them to fight two
q8
or three ff we have sufficient force to fight and supply for
ninety days and thoge around us can ohly fight for two or three
then we should take another looka France carrie8 their burden abroad,
but not in Burope . We should consider very herd the narrow intereste of
the Ontted States 08 . Hell 08 ` the interests of the Free World _ If wa
grown weak econontcally, our influence will grow less &d 1ose and f
that happens, our. Free World '8 positlon will grown weaker. Da Gaullo
18 baging his whole posItion on the positzon Of the United States. Fe
can do thig. because he feel8 we will meintain our mflitary power In Europe
and ho can bank on ita
-8
Mr _ Foster 18 engaged in the Test Ban. We might be succeseful here
if the Russiang need t and ff know that Wa w1ll change this ff the
Chicoms develop an atonic capecity. If do we will have great difficulty
In protecting Asla . If the Test Ban Treaty L8 succegeful it will inhibit
the Russians fron starting a puclear wer ond ff 80 We should make every
effort to conclude the treaty . But jf the nuclear test ban Include8 only
the Rugeians and the U,S, it 18 not worth very much . We should support
Foster all we can untfl we 8e0 whore It 19 going. If Ve a successful
4B w1ll g1ght It through Af 1t will help 48 - (On the Hll 2)7
Thank8 for your , cooperation. A11 worked well together end hermoniously.
Hope wB can maintain the mutual relations whIch have been 80 In thie
Adminletration .
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T l
23 March 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces 5:30 P.m.,
22 March, 1963
ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric,
Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant,
Mr McCone , Mr Kaysen and several others
The purpose of the meeting wag to receive Ambassador
Merchant'8 report on his visits to the Capitals _ Merchant reported
qualified success, indicating reservationg by the German,
Italians and British for various reagons the two most prominent
ones being:
a Problem of control;
b_ Use of surface ships versus: submarines ,
long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there
was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance a8 to the
extent of the control of the United States versus control by
European countries since it seemed to mean that control should
shape up s0 that missiles could not be fired without United States
clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able
to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles _ However, no
country or group of countrie8 exclusive of the United States
should be likewise able to fire them_
There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant
on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether
Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign
Relations_ Foreign Affairs , and Joint Committees at this time _
The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress
at this time Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed
to the President's directive.
It wag felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be
sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to
draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a
similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion
should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election _
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SEEEz;-i.23 Uxiy
With respect to submarine versus surface
McNamara restated the opinion that gurface were better
and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in
coastal waters where several thousand ships of: all types would
be operating and therefore the missile 'ships could not be readily
identified and attacked_
The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral
forceg idea was not going to go any place; 28 he wound UP, he
seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without
its failure being used against the United States or his administration
to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who. held stricly to the
"European control" idea _
No action was required on our part. I expressed no
viewpoint at this meeting _
JOHN A McCONE
Director
JAM/mfb
ships ,
ships