Transcript of 104-10306-10010.pdf
==================================================
Page 1
==================================================
Aa 0 60t,1030870010}
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
18 June 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting 18 June 1964
1 . Item I: Autonomous Operationg
This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for
$25,000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to
Cuba in a chartered ship _ Various courses of possible action with
were discussed, ranging from .cutting him off altogether to giving him
the money._ It developed that i8 acting inconsistently with the agreement
with him which was that he would operate outside the United State8 _ Therefore
it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement,
that he must find.a base of operations outside the United States and if he does
we will endeavorto secure the release of his which is now in Puerto Rico,
and that we will give him financial support.
2
2 _ With respect to Artime, it wa 5 pointed out that Artime's
operations are very costly_ CIA has put(s4.6 millionfnto this operation
this year the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald
reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted
he would be lucky if he could off one every 3 months _ Bundy seemed to
feel Artime was more 0f a threat than an operator and should be maintained
for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is
not practical. It wa8 agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U. S.
or CIA support of him would probably be "blown" Furthermore it was_
suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless
courses Of action.
3 _ There was & long discussion on the implications of the CIA
Jun e lOth memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading
Cuban government leaders_ This report was taken most seriously by the group_
It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to
us on notice and therefore we- should not fail to take appropriate precautionary
actions to see that no assas8ination attempt of which we had knowledge was
carried out_ It was decided that appropriate authorities, 1. e Department of
Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action
against the individuals involved.
I took the position that we are ove exercised, that I was
inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than
definite plans _ Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed,_ I would have
investigated the source8 and the credibility of the whole before taking
action_ However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to
discus s the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr _ Hoover _
Ilv
Ray
Ray
ship
pull
put
rly
thing
==================================================
Page 2
==================================================
13-00000
AWV
I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent
to the Attorney General' and the Department of Justice but there had been
no conversation on the subject_
ACTION: Discugs with General Carter and Mr . Helms
steps we should take to establish the
cre dibility of the report; also communicate
with the FBI through Mr _ Papich. Also I
should call the Attorney General personally_
4 Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using
the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadve rtently had been printed on
U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all a5 reported in MACV
cable MAC SOG 5050.dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143) . I told Vance that I felt
We should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of
those things that & person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation
might overlook . He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release
of the leaflets_
an/mfb
2 -
==================================================
Page 3
==================================================
13-00000
6J IQ2_ez012
NONCIA TELETYPED: MESSAGE 04143
ACTOH
FE /-81
TE IF034
i8Jw 03 !8=
C0 RUEPIA_
DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/064 1Z
0 180627Z
4-DI
10-DDcI
COMUSMACV
1/- DDP
To RUE PCR /WHITEHOUSE
1
2-AbLP
RUEPDA /SECSTATE
I3-SoD
RUEPDA /0 SD I4-FilE
RUEPIAZCIA 1S-Vr
RUEKDA/JCS
T5 44/_
16-RF
INFo RUHPACINCPAC
ZEN/AMEMB SA ICON
RUHPA/CAS HONO | &Jun 64 IN 0 9 | 43
ET
TT 0 P. S E C R E T MAC SOG 505 @
LIMITED D ISTR IBUT ION SPECIAL HANDL Ing SPzCAT
EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULL IVAN, 0 SD FOR MCNAMARA ANd ANTHIS
WXITEHOUSE FOR MCGEOR GE BUNDY , CIA FOR MCCONE CARTER ANd
HELMS, JcS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFo AMEMB SA IGoN FOR AmB LOD GE
AND_ NE S, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT
A, OPLAN 344
In ORDER To MEET 0 PERAT IONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND
JUL Y Psyops LEAFLET DROPS; TWENT Y TWo" MILL ION LEAFLETS
#7
IO2 _eeuem
==================================================
Page 4
==================================================
13-00000
ciASSIFIED' MESSAGE TOP SECRET IN PAGE_
8i3.
WERE PR INTED on SIXTEEN PO UND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE
PA PER THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE To UNAVA ILABIL ItY 0F
OTHER PA PER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS .
2 , UNLESS THESE PR INTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHOR IZED FOR
DISSEmINAT Ion OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHED ULED OPLAN
34A OPERAT IONS NUMERO US PSYOPS 0 PPORTUN IT IES EXPLO ITABLE
UNDER PRE SENT LIGHT 0F THE MooN PER IOD W ILL BE M ISSED AND
TIMEL INESS 0F SEVERAL 0F THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST
3 REAL IZE SUBJECT 0F PLAUS IBLE DEN IAL BECOMES INVOLVED
FERE BUT FEEL In THIS CA SE PROBLEM 0F PO SSIBLE ATTRIBUT IoN
To UN ITED STATES TEUST BE JW GED In LIGHT 0F FOLLOW ING CIR-
CUMSTANCES :
A PAPER STOCk USED IS STANDARD US MANUACT UrE OB-
TA INED' THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMA STER SO URCES AND IS
ASSUMED To BE A VA ILABLE on WORLD MARKET FOR SALE To ANy
CONSUMER MAP SUPPORTED FORCE S SUCH As ARVN OR OTHERS
COULD HA VE ACCESS To SAME TYPE PA PER
B . ANy DESIRE TO ATTR IBUTE oPaN 34A ACT IONS To US
COULD BE MORE READ ILY SUB STANT IATED BY DRV PRODUC ING AGENT
FERSONNEL OR MORE CR IT ICAL ITES LO ST IN SOME PREV IO US
TEAM OPERATIONS .
C PA PER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONL Y ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM ,
BUT ALSO OFFSET PR InT InG PROCESS EMPLOYED WIth OTHER TYPE
FR INTED MATTER
D In ESSENCE ALL 0 PLAN 34A ACT IonS ARE DESIGNED To
IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BE InG APPL IED BY MAJOR POWER
USE 0F US PAPER AND 1'' IRECT IND ICATION 0F US INV LVEMENT
TOP SFCRFT
==================================================
Page 5
==================================================
13-00000
443 3
CLA SSIFIED MESSAGE TOP SECRET IN_ PAGE
TEND CQNTR IBUE TO THAT BASIC 0BJECT IVE .
E. ONL Y CHEMICAL ANALYSIS CO UED ASCERTA IN ThAT PAPER
USED IS U,s; MANUFACT URED STOCK;
F IN ANY EVENT _ U;s; BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL 0PLAN 34A
ACT Ions THEY CKOOSE To PUBL ICISE AND US; IN EACH CA SE
COULD CHOO SE To DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSAT IONS:
4 REQUEST PPRO VAL To PRO CEED W [Th D ISBEM INAT Ion OF PRE =
PARED LEAPLETS At THIS TIME AND UNT IL SUITABLE FORE IGN
SOURCE PA PER STOCK CAN BE OBTA INED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN Two WEEXS .
5 In ORDER To MET CURRENT JuNE SCHED ULE REQUEST REPLY
WITHIN; 48 HOURS .
GP- 1
BT
TOP SECRET
==================================================
Page 6
==================================================
13-00000
3 April
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Ah1y_
SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) 2 April 1964
1. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A
All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing:
I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of
or zation had past, we might get some better_results_
98
The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except
for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this
flight on the grounds that were nearing agreement for the release
of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.
ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld USIB
and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting
On Wednes the 8th.
4g
2 Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT
and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries
and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must. It was agreed
that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an
interim basis_
AcTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appro-
priate actions by the Department of Defense through their
representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement,
compensation and care of these_captains
9g
3 [Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnais sance which was approved
after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia.
It was agreed that the field would be instruded to carefully observe
operation of this radar to determine whether the U-zs were
being picked
up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians,
the matter should be resubmitted for: reconsideration.
A CTION: The field should follow this_carefully_with_MACV-
4 Review of ground rules for U-2 in North Viet Nam as outlined.
Secretary Vance 's paper was approved'
'Hfoc
I: 3
gani=
they
daY,
==================================================
Page 7
==================================================
13-00000
98
: 5 _ The recommendation to ove Laos was held in suspension_
DoD was asked to' in specific details of the particular 34A operations
which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing
the operations by means of ove rflying Laos State held very positive view
against Laotian-overflights
6_ The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba
were approved_ Mr _ F 'itzGerald
was warned not to cache arms with
agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular
Cache involved money and other things, but no arms The caching of
small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved.
Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no
instructions were' given to restrain these operations The overall question
of future sabotage operations was discus sed _ Mr _ Bundy agreed to
the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly
98
The Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of
April lst was approved _ It was pointed out that since the paper was
drafted , COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about
the handling of funds
9g
8 Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved . Mr _ Waller
gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the
British. Understood thtat implementation of this paper was to be
coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in
London _
OTHER MATTERS:
9g
Statement was made that a.CIA U-2 was "painted" with radar
on February 24th, implication being that the CIA U-24 in the vicinity of
Phnom Penh _
ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this _
96
2e [Question was_raised about need for continuing the 30 mile
intrusion into Cambodi and Laos _ Indications were that the photography
had produced no useful information for MACV _
AC TION: This question should be studied and brought
up for discus sion at meeting on April 9h_ I should cable
Carter to investigate
2 -
JAM/mfb
{J
rfly
bring
bring
fully _
==================================================
Page 8
==================================================
13-00000
27 February 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group
98
1 The question of the extent of the SAC planeg operations in South
Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr_ McMillan's
Iletter of February 26th.
1_ Overflights of South Vietnam
G
O.K.
2 . Overfly that part of North " Vietnam which is within 30 miles
of South Vietnam or of the coast line
3 That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South
Vietnamese border_
4 _ That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles
from South Vietnam _
With respect to 4. instructions were to be given that the primary
purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot
is provided to give range and operational flexibility I felt in reviewing
McMillan ( 5 proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the
Zlst parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the
proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the
question of whether civilian or m ilitary plane S
and pilots should be over
North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained a8 being "off
course' All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either
limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country_ It was
decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision_ I interposed
no objection to SAC'8 overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the
position that if went as far north as proposed by McMillan,
should cover the entire country_
2 . The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved
with the exception of one operation operation #434 about which
Mr . Cheever explained that he thought the agents
we were re supplying were
under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of
deception. It was agreed that the re supply should be confined to money and
'/zc
they they
==================================================
Page 9
==================================================
13-00000
medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached:
Otherwise the operation wa8 approved.
Alexis Johnson and Mr_ Bundy raised questions of the conse quences
of finding an arms cache or "knocking over an infiltration at the time of the
OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem Arguments were persuasive that
we
should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th
Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the
feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy
toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for
slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba _ I said that I thought our
Cuban program was in 'complete disarray. had no policy or covert
operations _ We now are he sitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our
economic denial program wa s failing, while Castro is making significant
'progress _=
98
3 _ The 'forcast of NRO activities for March was approved_
9 8
4 . The status report on political action in Kenya was approved,
JAMImfb
2
%c
We
==================================================
Page 10
==================================================
13-00000
ETE
TKE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D.C.
February 10 , 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR MR; McGEORGE BUNDY
Attached is a paper which [ would like to table for
di8cu8 8ion at the next meeting of the 5412 group
@ua 4ie
Cyrus Vance
Attachment
T
lata
Lsixt h1-
Aiaua
k Mnk ~,
mit ba {sansnsa %
M
6a .
Lu LUU 0'
JOP SECZZT
'SENSTTZ
25,
F
Uwr '
(ere Ovm
hnob~
~Gil ciq
==================================================
Page 11
==================================================
13-00000
TCP Sceisv EYES U.Ly
February 10, 1964
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Againgt Cuba
The objective of the U. S: Government is to overthrow
the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing its
objective, the U, S. is not willing to risk nuclear
war Or, at
this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its
Allies, Or
significant escalation in tensions between this
country and the Soviets. Thus,
any covert U, Sa program
should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks.
Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine
program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba.
In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when
it is directed against Cuban gubversion of Latin America.
Actiong Against Cuba
la Sabotage: A low level campaign of sabotage and
harassment againgt Cuba might include such targets a8 the
Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such.as the
one at Pilon), . the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships
(such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible,
it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have
come from within Cubaa Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged
by discreet means (such a8 placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel):
20 Haraggment of Free_World_Shipping_to_Cubae
a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of
overt and covert pressure against Free World firm8 trading
with Cubaa' In this connection, develop.a comprehensive list
of firmb business with 'Cuba, check them against known
DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers 80 that
appropriate retaliation can be against those suppliers.
1) Place uactivated incendiaty and explosive
devices in cargoes and on ships bound for-Cuba and subse-
quently off"' port or shipping officiale 80 that they will
Bearch and discover the device8 with.the attendant publicitya
SZSZHET IYES E3Y
COPY No. 0f COPIES
doing
applied
"tip
==================================================
Page 12
==================================================
13-00000
Juc: sEeh ETES U.Li(
3. Covert Economic Activities.
a) Intensify covert activities directed against
critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if
necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclu-
Sive buyinga
b) Make it known discreetly through the press
that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing
with Cuba, suggesting without gaying 80 that these records
constitute a potential 'blacklista "
c) Form a group of responsible and qualified
Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms
trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have
no future in a post-Castro Cubaa
40 To the extent possible, encourage dissidence
among different factions in Cuba
4
Peking, Moscow,
Nationalist by spreading rumors, internal and
external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose
(such a5 actions against homes of leaders, etc)
Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America
1o Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin
America against whom a concentrated program of bribery,
blackmail and coercion can.be instituted;
2. Carefully select key Latin American members of
the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping,
and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to
attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute
the reverse process a8 a retaliatory program against Moscow
'supporters.
of the foregoing activities would be conducted against
a
background of U_ S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and
political activity designed to increase internal dissension within
Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting
with our allies over the Cuban issue and.to reduce, and perhaps
eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin Americaa In addition,
surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.
2
RxLd {828 J1LY
copy No. COPizs
Any