Transcript of 104-10302-10024.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== Date: 11/29/99 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY CIA RECORD NUMBER 104-10302-10024 RECORD SERIES JFK AGENCY FILE NUMBER CIA-DI-FILES DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR CIA FROM OCo/CIA TO TITLE DRAFT OF PAPER ON INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS WITH THE LBj WHITE HOUSE DATE 00 /00 / PAGES 30-3/ SUBJECTS LBJ WHITE HOUSE DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS 1B CURRENT STATUS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF UAST REVIEW 09/22/98 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS JFK-M-02 :F2 1998 _ 09.22.16:16:07:576120 : ARRB REQUEST CIA-9 _ {eleased under the JonnF. Kennedy ssassination Records CollectionAct of 992 (44USC 2107 Note) Case#:Nw 38603 Date: 03-18-2025 CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT [R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED NW 88608 Docld:32401332 1 Page ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== ROUTING TOP SECRET To NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS] (Security Classification) 1 2 3 4 ACTLON DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROMAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDAtlO@ COMMENT FIE RETURU CONCURRENCE WNFORMATION SIGNATURe CONTROL NO. REMARKS: COPY OF V FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, ANDPHONE NO DATE Handle Via COMINT h Channels Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: V NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions TOP SECRET (Security Classification) NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 2 2 ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 7f Treeet tlhLatena_ For Moat Omployooo 0 tho Fadorel Bovornmont, vork continues unchanged when a new nan moves into the White House. Employee8 of the Bureau of Reclamatie the Labor-Management Services AdminLetration, or the Camodlty Exchange Authorlty ell g0 about their jobs in thefr accustemed waya, D though changes af Even edninLstration pollcy can ultimately have an effect. Fxhe pattern af most Intelllgence work--colloction and the production af fInLshed Intelllgence udlgturbed: for a conelderable nuber of offIclele--rema:ng xrttatu But for thoce wbo ere turning out 'Intekllgence spectfIcally for the Pree1dent, &T OT? - Il @J tates 0vh; ininedhate / * new Chlef Executlve #kelJtbola ~nhdlezrer blrm- Hoa wlde-ranging will the new President'8 be Eoreign coutries and in internatioal reletiansi? w. |( interest in srnntkx Hon muchxInteLlLgence wt BaDIUEgree1 Be Mtetste Kave me-'~? and frequent BervingHs or modebt portiono as abbolutely @rded? Will he vant 0r fecte plus Interpretation &nd analyais? NW-88608-Docld: 32401332-Page 3 Dtll on, 9+ Mm~ lce K1( sr Jec ( only cereltecte, =t ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 2 Seperated or homogenlzed? Is he willing to read a reguler intalllgence docuent, or doos he prefer to be brLefed? In each af the prevlous administtatione, OCI had establtehed a setisfectory channel directly the Presldenta However , the system had never carrled over {ra one incubent to the nexta Eisenhower dd not went the' perganal veekly brlefing fran the Dlrector that Truan had the General recelved; be/preferred to be brlefed $n the 8etting of weekly meetinge not of the Netional SecurLty Council. Kennedy did/lke to 080 the NSC with any regulearlty. Ingteed he found just what f vanted in the Checkliet pergonal, dally intelligence 3 devilged for hlm five months after be entered offIce. The. CheckLigt system worked 80 well with Kennedy that CCT and the Dlrecta naturally hoped to continue 1t wlth Lyndon Jotgo} especlelly 88 it became apparent that Johnsan, like ht8 predecegsor , wa8 not going to have regular NSC meetinge. Eventually OCI. gucceeded; TK; $ La } but after many months af frustration. It was aly when cortet NW-88608 : Docld:32401332 Page 4 to ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== 3 he had a firm hold of his adminlatratian and when certaln foreign 81tuatlang forced thengelves wo hi8 ettentian that President Johneon dlacovered the ubefulness of a deily current Intelligence docwent, Pregident For a few after the asga8s1netion of 1t Kennedy , Ruu *exxtttti R, J, Smith took the Checkligt to x& McCone at East Building et 8:30r a.m. The Director then held a staff meeting, after which R.J. personally Smith/took the Checklist to Bronley Smith and Gen. Cltfton in the White The brlefing of President Johngan fro the Checklisto however 9 House . Fuanabout thnat#oeltze Ater #horeb Ginidbrabice was done by McCc who saw the_President deily for about three week8 Mecene #etodeily tk "MItrhborpurnose_Af _hrdefing after the assassination: 4 him$c Srndtete Although OCI bad provided more detail &nd ound informatian * than uaual In its first intelligence books for President dn 14 Wovcmly #thtyVo &J ~~ &kli ( Johnson, McCane/paseed tbe word through DDI Cline that be_hould Libe te` s03 more but ghorter Iteng. (Tsoweeke Later-brtutoy Jntth Ves sutt andtuburttoTormr ChedkT16t> } (Og1 Ulav OI TelvU" 6ut " Vhe Tackgrou5-data McCone said the President expected that topic8 appearing in the Checklist would be followed W In later Ib8ue8; theref OCI should make even negative reports. NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 5 days ane, backgr ore, ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== CLine, presuably reflecting the Director '8 wishes , 8end that the Mhecklbst that Bhould CovBI military activity in South Vietnam, the fighting in Iaos , 7 Soviet ICBM developments, and problems, In the BerLin air corridor8 and x Venezuela. Around tho niddle of' December , se1err8rr8 WbIte takeroter thet FoenEE EE _u8ing bhe-fheckttst bried-to ptekarrxtnz Intefltgenoe when McCone stopped seeing the President datly, the White House staff ctaetoee; tpiedabo Oc They tried to in to read the Checkkists tatAere largely unsuccessfuly sskd although McGeorge Bundy wa" able to do * soma oral briefing, Checklist in Ocl's handa 0n 16 Decenber, Gen. Clifto told Glock bter Johm Heidenann *kak "Tf w0 can 't penetrate thle 'gort; of wall today or taorror, we !1l just have to 8omething elses n In this clpudy etmosphere, the sw came out occasionallya On the 18th, Clifton se1d that the gtaff had finally managed to the President to read t nthe booke" _-probably two or three isgues . At Christmagtime, the President wont to hig Texas I ranch and ghortly after Christnas had Chancellor Erhard a8 8 visitor for 8everal The PICL wes cabled to the ranch each The report NW-88608-Docld:32401332 Page 6 day Tr0 st Je_~ Ult get try get day. dayo , ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 5 was Limited to noteg cbvering important developments and any informatlon that mght be useful in the talks with Erhard. The Pregident returned to Weshlngton on 5 January , and the nert day Cen. Clftan, who had been et the ranch, n told Heldemann that hbe had been abla to the CheckLLst to the Pregident with 90e regularity once Erhard had gone _ On 8 Januaty , however , Clifto was having difficultie8 not again--the Pregident had/read tbe intelligence docuent gince leaving Tex8. 1e_ Clifton thought there would be a Tet-up in the presg at busineg8 after Hiatwas Evtddntly_heppening #aothatbho Prestdeut Tound tlme fov thet day'8 State Qf the Unton gpeecho He tha-ghewklist_ whenthere abn! 8 pre3o-of-other bUSInUss?""Uliften asked Phillp Kennedy for a special report, briefly treating important and still-current xutr problems thet were covered In thel' books the President Kadc '+ ~6177t0n #ktr read. BhZnztho-probLom- of' 8ho Pregfeav Lin facty that Nt~ettdes -#tv udbg doc+ Clifton thought) t would be to try the syetem of glving the President a gwary of slgnificant intelligencer twice a weeke NWV 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 7 get onlz good ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== OC qulokly Put togothor an oxporlmental Preg:dent' g IntelLigence_ covering the perlod L-9 January: This was taken by Reviershitrk Richard Lehnan, t Asststant for Special Projects, tukxto Gen. Clifton on 9 January. Clifton thought the Revdew was the bebt golution to the problem of the President intellLgencer wol reedinga He and Bndyzegreed that the Pregldent vould not accept 2 dally Intelligence briefing. The Pregident had Inatructod Clifton that the DCI was to see him whonever he wished but that otherwise the President relied on Bundy and Clifton to on of the intelligence. Because the Pregident with no warning vucj wag Hkely to &sk them/for the Latest inbeLigeneo} the daily Checkliet had to catinue. Clffton aq8ret Tecepuive CO Og_ repnoal t~ sitoSugt gendthe Gheckltat_ba_azraxd addEtsone} suggested that the Checkltet periodically Include a bpecial bJue-m or green-bordered page containing an operationnal report. 2 Tbe nert morning Gen. Clifton called Lehman to report that the White Houge was 7Lt5: vanted continued. very pleaged with the Revzev,/It had been *t tried on - the Pre8ident at breakfast and 1t had "vorked Like a 0 charma 3 NWV 88608 ocid: 32401332' Page & I9 stey top ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== Extem Because the Presldent was not reading the ChecklEst every it Sent a fev nuc 400 BentanteIom torea DCI MCone wanted *rebth #-#/high-level of ficials tr_.oE5r opbenBendtttvo Kontento-beyend the Jmall circle of readers in Kennedy' 8 time--the Secretaries of State and Defense, McGeorge Bundy at the White House, and the Chairman of the Joint Chlefe. Theref ore he obtained permission in afaik~z' February to extend the dissemination to fou Toro top officialo in the ls State Department, two more in Defense, one on the Joint Chiefe staff , 844 the Secretery of the Treagury &nd the Attorney-deneral. W/ z oel 6as Ms'de $ So @_J6 4 4cs; TLg ZrenezaTong t#6 b0810 of-*ixr 0854 prodttetion+f#henex_ ~ca-) nemarad~ X ~tCnfc t ratnerts Kv T_ WAk HaJe ItLE 4 ( centEweatdy #EZuuat, the +rco4denE[ZZ2iona]_reading 0 dci Mco &_ Lk $ @L=k tbtu briefingq the President from tie to time The CheckLlet writers still took the publicetion to Brauley Smith &nd Gen. Clifto each morning and received their coments plug occasioal playbeck fran the President. When attnr uusually in the PIOL interesting itens /caught hls eye, Clffton would make a point of bringing them to tho President'8 attention: On 21 January, for example , he NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 9 dey , Qosa ~ekl- ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 8 reacted Lmmedhaely to the nquotable Khrushchev" item and sald he would right to tho President wIth thle. A few daya later he instructed OCI to the White House to the minuten on Cyprus developnent8 . "Howrs will mako the differenc," he 8a1d, Gen. Clffta told James Hanrahan 0n 28 Januarv that he had talked wlth the PregLdent about the [estietla_Intelltgence Jsunl Revdew and M Johngon had Bald 1t Yejust Etne. He #nds 1t 0 very valuable gupplement to hlo ooceaLonal brlefinge fran the DCI and he It continued wIthout change. Early In 1964, the Pregident drew hi8 aide8 Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti into tho intelligence picture. He wanted one af them present when he read the Revlew at breakfast and he wag reported occagimnally &s discussing Checklist items with thema Although the PICL writers continued to meet and talk with Br= amley Smlth &nd Gen. Cllfton, 1t begen to NW 88608 Docld:32401332 10 get iup keep vanted Jnsert * natt44S to Page ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== 9 Iook 80 though Moyere and Volentt wera *trk taking the douento to the Presiddnta plans to spend 2 veekend On 25 March the President '8 peptinxaxdx in Texs comment 8 atxtxut pre Gen. CLifton to that M _ Johabin ready hlg Wp WOs intelligence while bev at the ranchy he 18 often rtby % Vas 8.15 8,Ma @esking fa 1t But it,jo hard to catch him in Washington. The next Cltfton 8atd that It was not neceggery fa the OCI repregenta- tives to meet hlm at 9830 a,M.S Tha book did not MovO tpsteirs that fasta He F esked that the maeting8 take place at 10 in the future. DDI Jemea Ca Graham, Acting AD/ACI, took m witb/Rey CLine the Possibility of" Aia invlting Moyer8 to CIA headquartere for lunch Ko = and 8 brlefing. Cline wented to dlecuss the Whlte House problem ask? Graha_fc with McCone, but ftrtr taneora Lttle memorandu a hou things were goinga 5} OCI #n drew w 8 statement for Cline making the principal points that Maj meeting mxr had no way Of koving whether IoMore-#t the President'8 needs because Jad no feedback from in contrast to the 81tuation ocl's under Kennedy. The roa8on for thlo wag that contacts at the Whlta House NW 88608 Docld: 32401332 Page 11 lnsectr 'ompted day hin, ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== 10 dd L.ot deal directly #lth tho President 0n intelligence matter8 . OCI wondered how It oould e8tablleh cloge Lnko to the Pregident'0 LmmedLato etaff, 6/ ~cl 08 NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 12 MLer Xa, (c € , (07- VAC 6&l 90* Di Kic Jcc $ lbuLr 2 ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== esnfwsaJ Thlhgs remalned In 4nunprodtotably gtete for tho only next few months, witb/occasloal indicatians that OCI'8 presidential coc~mta publications had hlt the mark: Clifton penarkea In May tbat the Review Saw wab the begt meang af reaching the Pregldent, elthoigh the PICL reglstered et tLog when Valentz weg Interested Ln an Itam.4 One when tbe PICL was , heavy 0 the sLdo of bed news, Clftan eald} "It'8 no wander tha PresLdent doagn't want to reed thts atuff--1t annoye you, There were deya whon tho Presldent read and initlaled both the Revdew and the PICL: Fram mid-year op, tuor M, Johnson made frequent Ssnltoat trips aroud the country. Clifton, who was usually with 8ald he had more luck getting the President to read hlg intelligence on the return flights than 0n tho wey out, wben Mr Johngon was reviering hle speeches. A8 the election neared, Secretary of State Rusk expressed 8ome concern to Mdone about the gecurity of the Checklist and seemed to prefer that dissemination be Limlted to the pregident, mc Gna 0A $ se4l A Jav Secretary of Defenge McNamara and himself = TheDDT nuy uoted bofollor#PP NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 13 R day hbi, vurd ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 12 ~-[ Asi cunretea Ho TGer 1a0##tformed bte Saue "Jle trt" McCone folt that the PresLdent ghould read the ChecklLgt daily, I or have it read to and ghould not depend 0n the Bemt-#eekly Revder: 3 Aplei R, J, Smith responded in a memorandwn of 5 November 1964,+0 klteve { s He Tolt that the Agency would have 8 graceful reader8 way af droppIng 8Que Of the Checkllet axtaa ff the publication wer to undergo & transformatla In Uhlch It %ould adequire 8 new name, 8 dew CovBr , end a new formata It would becoma President Johnson'9 publication, bpeciftcelly deslgned to meet hls needs . To Increase the puxatr chances of Its being read by the Chlef Executlve, it would be #alteratr produced DvA wfAc to conform to the President !8 working hebit8 Borbeing deLtvered In 4r late afternoon d1 ttab ~oout oio eventng ouding Smith noted that the Revier, vhich Mr _ Johnson "ugually reads, I0 wab #~o proruceu dubdx for his evening perusgl. Smith al8o noted the Lmportance of finding 8 wey to establish direct contact with the a ( Ac aroif Preeident 80 that CCI could feedback Meaddenpt writiin a vacuwd: 8/ NWV 88608 @Docld:32401332" Page 14 h;s feelins hi, pe get ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 13 Tl 702. c 5 Smith's proposal for 8 new publication was eccepted and wa8 repidly Into effecta The last Checkl-st was dated 30 1q64 November &nd the next the firgt Lsgue of the President'8 Daily Brtef (PDB) was delivered to the Whlte Houge. In gubatance 1t resembled the PICL, but it had a fresh appearahce, and 1t It came out late in the afternoon '^ d instead of t%# early morninga Jeck Velenti gent this first issue back to McGeorge Bundy seying that the President reed 1t, Liked 1t, and wanted it continued. Dissemnation wa8 cut back, 80 that the persons the receiving the PDB outside the white Houge were/Secretary % and Under Secretary of State, the Secretary 0f' Defenee, the Deputy Secretar and on0 Assistant Secretery, the 'Ireasury Secretary, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs &nd Gen. Carrolla Irplece_rf theseni cheekly-Revier_tbo#ighzignue o tk The gem-~#eekly Revdew wes dropped, but by 16 December Wee a OC | 's the DCI ordered that ti gumary axtx of te Current Intelligence with Weekly Revier be included _ each Friday'8 PDB: The gunary, titled Highlighte of the_Weeks lagted until 26 February 1965,.&45L NWV 88608 Docld:32401332 15 Lne put day only cLix/k only Page ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 1 failed to erouse pre8identlal Intereet. In the ensuing weeks and month8, OCI wag naturally watching for indications of the succes8 0r fallure of the restyled PDB writer dally for the Pregidenta On 13 January,/Thomag Pattonzx pritt loi noted that Branley Smith wrote "the Presidentu In the upper right of No. 1, Patton asked whether Smith vould like OCI to type thfi1b o. Muxatkxiatti Bald Smith, Putting 1t on In long-hand it 8 human touoha On 19 January, the format Of the Brlef was changed a8 a result of discusslan8 between McCeorge Bundy &nd Cline. Bronley Smith 2+ L/ 8e1d he. R liked the new format &nd he thoug"t the South Vietnam Item wag naxectly right,n The Pre8ldent was not Interegted in the name8 &f generala end mnlatere and dldn't follon guch detaileo page size Further experiment8 in enat followed a talk McCone had 6-+ ca~6 with the There wa8 even & 8ample Ertef that the President could in hi8 pocket, though the thought of having geneitive natertal handled thia way made Bromley Smith groan. NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 16 Ac{ Copy No, geve Rey no*acs # Pregident) put ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 15 In mid-February, Br 'omley Smith said that the Vietnam ituation Keport, which CCI hed begun gending to the White Houge daily et 8 a,m. 1 wag proving to be very useful; it waa going u to the I+rLi Ie ~h^ 8-=2 President every morninga Pdg k 4U #anjaefet smsmcss Lt Ermly Smisl . tx _1 (Occasianelly was a certain amount of camotion * whon-te PbetUte Herethore aroud 8ety Sntth'8 offIce/because of' people contng &nd gong to different meetinge in the White Houge. One Snith closed his exppledning that RBHOTOOHIXX Bundy mlght be able to work this way with all tho Indiane cherging in all the but I Ben 't, espec- Jally 9ince I was here till after 1l last night weiting for the President to leave. one . dey ppuixlnxdt Smith uburdened higelf /about abert problems for hlmself and the Agency. One of them was the occasiaal flow a rav clandestino Informatio directly to thc Pregident, who "eat8 ,up informe- Si St < A921/ tr ni _( 'Xt '6 X` AndJotetdre_HaB of-bhe688en06 7_ C~xd ^ 2 ; JJ` frba 'kos ^ tion" and hes 0 "very short reaction fuge. Srath falt -fiarblabonn"456z4 Hlw Bk~LE {6r trolla & timely "city edltor" ganewhere who could meke &/package of ell} the many'types 0f to PDBer Joseph 0: Metthews inf ortatio, including the]operetianal. At &nother he: reiterated /hox short the reactian 4 tinos had becane at the White Houge. He also NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 17 ^+ t;c cAwev1' ~ there 'Ve< ; dey door , time, X fF tu:set time, ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 16 TL 1~ecEef Sin # Dom; On 2h April 1965 events took place that resulted In an iprovement in the standing of OCI publicatios in the White Houge. On thet an upriaing began againat the provlelonal govortaent of the Dominican Eepublrc. The US fear that Comunlata might 8iz0 control of the cpuntry Led to the prompt dispatch of Marineg to Santo Domingo. 'President> tudkd 3-28 Aprtl-- Bx_coincidence do the Landed/waa elso the J6NxTIFr Dee35 167 Zebutelitjeue8 that Admiral WilLiam Raborn was sworn In 88 DCI, gncceeding John McCone. Dominican President Hohnson natad could hardly enough Intelligence on the Euu situation, and Admiral Raborn was determined to provide the begt seriice establishment of I possible. The after he took office, the Admiral ordered/a CIA task force on the Dominican Hepublio uder E. Drexel Godfrey, chief Qf OCI's Western Area. Aa dlrected, 1t provlded "oomplota and around-the-clock CIA IntelL genca ghpport Ita {lret task eech wag to brlef Raborm to hlm ta tho Whlte Houbo,0 1 * muoetrln readinebo to deal with tu calle from the whlte House .=txttpttu Perlodlcell} throughout tho and night 1t Lsgued round-lq f1tuat1on reporte, &nd when neceebery) reporta Q parttoular developments All thege reports were teletyped to the Whlte 94 were read by the Mr _ Johnson, who wa8 degcribed by Bromley Smith a8 8 paxx Pregident "who eats NWV 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 18 24 dey day they day get the day day put dey apot Chey House0 ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== 17 up {nform4tlon: " OOI,%r & aouad , Gondinuaa 10 Pub Ou6 100 Tabuild Dominican publications . It was during the Baxtrtm crisis that wordx wag received that the President 5 Daily Brief had taken fJrm root in the Whibe House . Er on 21 Mey thet Bill Moyers. ga1d/the President read it "evidly." Ii 9 Chief The increased tempo of intellLgence gervice to the xtu routo Xnar Executive pre "ompted further consideratio of the proper sxt to Ks~. Anduattt (4 6d / CIn the NeLretdpb and DDCI RLchard HeTmg agread thab a "greaged channel" through sare - Bundy ghould be eetabllahed for the PDB and any other reportb tha DI vante to be bure tha Prebldent 8008, 10/ on]20 AD/CI Jack Smtth comented/that a "greased channel" already appeared to exibt for the PDB_ 12/ t N $ @ StaA (Mc Gro m Sm;t 4 #cdevrve-Bundy) a tho Trovtdently Assistant_for_NattenalSecuttty #ffairor wk; k I4u Jntlto~ @ax) 7 CaJe7 bhould be the place-of: entry for intelligence for Ma Jehnaay, although informa- Helms and CLine 8ald thx_ coples could be 8ent to Moyera and Valentio Iut NW-88608 Docld:32401332 19 M1 Mey ZuaJw len1 kescse Page ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== 18 hectic The haxtbr atmgosphere In the spring of 1965, with the Dominican situation coming 0n of growingt dlfficultiee in Vietnam, ceused the men in the White Houge to ask mote of Intelligence and to tanded to poaduanabarpRenctic 'bue Ioase GO Itetttge end +0 react to it more sharply. Br Smith 8ald the PresLdent has a "very 8hort firgt from official bources and not fron the pregg reaction fuse. # He want} to hear/about major cievelopments,XAX 80 rapid WAS Sr; 4 dlsbeminatio io easentlel teals0 warned that OCI would so0n bo asked to report On every coup and to cover ell present and potentlal troxble gpots with high precLsion. He said that in the % future, OCI' s reports would not that bay the Valencia regime 18 but that "Valencia i9 going to be overthr OwmD by a Coup 0 the upteenth July by X In foonerville. n Since thi8 would be the impogsible in mogt cage8, Richard fehman, OCI'8 Assistant for Special Projects, went to 8ee Bill Moyer8. He explained that # pobotbiore OCI Cuxl 4 write 50 pages of intelligence warnings a thereby takdng out insurance ageinst any pobsible contingency, but that the offlce dld not believe thb this would really 8erve the President. Lehnan said OCI tried to be hlghly gelective In werning of ri coups and the Like. Moyerg expressed inderstanding Qf m NWV 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 20 top 'omley shaky, asking dey, ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== 19 OCI'8 difficulties, and the fire died dowm. 12/ Thi8 episode had an amusing sequel about eight months later when Braley Smith pondered the series of army coups in the republlcs of West Africa. He said he didnst think the President wanted or needed to be informed in advance of every threatened cou. "Otherwige," be said, "you could fill the book with that bort of thing. i Inssrt tr (4q~ kl ch8 system nox geemed to be worktng satgfactorily. CCI wa8 fairlyconfident thatethe PDB was being read regularly by the President; writerg on_the thePDB team rtm and reactions and/t* received weful guggestlonsyiid criticioms. ,usually Bromley Smith, the when t detivered_tke publiletion each day Yone day in June 1965 *axiis firat parageaph Qf the nead Item in the FDB 8a14 "Accumulating informatlon guggeets that Hanoi 18 bringtng North Vlatnam tq 0 atata Qf bemi ~mobilLaatla," The gecond paragraph eplatned >adthat Hanot '0 ection vas far short Of clegsic mobilization fa of fensive operetians; #utur OCI Considered the movB defenseve and was theref ore Rndik axpd Inclined toi discount the ven of one Briten who thought 8 large-scale attaok and Gen. Clffton would 8oon bba made acros8 the 17th parallel. Pregident Jobnson/at the time NW 88608 Docld: 32401332 Page 21 Ascl Afom they ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== 332 Oyw The 8yaten for gupplying current intelligence to bw Johnson President/wa8 now vorking better then # previously Xarexxdo Ioosnaran0xx Ocr !Ftt cendtdent thet bhe Proe-dente n readtng"the-RARregutarlyr To be sure, (Erce tho Pregidenticl budz Munttadeltz ICI did not bonefit fra the gtead7playback it under yuallyr had enjoyed #rLx Jobn Kennedy. It did_net _inLect Ireceire_thedirect reactil80:thonent Zoyonoand_Volenty whe On the other hand; taottux OCI was fairly confident that the President was reading the PDB regularly, and the writers 0 the PDB team received useful Suggestiong } crIticiems , and reactiong--ugually fran Braley Smith-- when delivered the publicatlon each NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 22 0' '5 day. they ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== 20 were at the LBJ ranch. Late in the afternoon, the PDB recdived a phone call from Bronley Smi who 8eid that Gen. Clffton hed celled from the ranch: KaJ 51 a~5 firgt bentence of the VLetnramese Item- ')rd abaken -flft w $ concerned ebout the whole piece. The PregLdent wa8 out on the Lako and was not expected back far 8everel hourg. Clifta et firot felt ho ghould gumon the Presldent to Bhore. Snith discugsed the matter with the PDB writer , Thomas Petton, and there wag further convergation with Clifton, who decided tkabxddu gimply add the word nbutn after the firet sentence and con tinue with Vs 5 ~ vvi& the jn4 somewhbat reagguring 8econd sentence. The casd Illustratee 280 the potentlallty of the PDB fa causing excLtenent In the Whlte Houso natl entourage. Forolgn dovelopmenta often Ed provaked soa (ol( 8pirited reactiong Eran thcditt Bronley but It waa not Qften that na tr ' 4 Cln he expresged eurprise mrabtattu at the }nd_of Intelligence he wa8 reading, Bubstance apart: Ona Buch occasiol, horever , cama when the` PDB ran an item about dLegengion betieen Ruania and the Soviet Union. An inter 'cept revealed NW 88608 Docld: 32401332 Page 23 tb, ba f v Jk Kz to Smtth; ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== 21 that Ceausescu and Maurer had camplained to Shelepin that the USSR acts on the internationel 8Cene nithout congulting its ellies, just 89 in Stalin'8 time. The Rumantans oLted the 1963 mto9ilo adventure In Cube and Sovlet positlons on dbarmament. Shelepin agreed thet More coordination was needed. Smith ws perticularly Interested in this item and ,remarked tktx ottekxxx to PDB writer Archer C, Bush that It was "fantastic" that wB could this kind of information: Bromley Smith now and thon modified or rewrota items when he felt that might confuse or unduly alarm the Presidenta In December 1965, fo examplo, President Jobnsan ordered e balt n tba bambing of %ati Vietnem m In tho of gottlng negotlatlond otartad, ^ PDB Item reported that HenoL had proadoast 0 tough rootatoment Q It0 pobltian, maklng no referenco thle would b0 to the peuse In &tr strikee. Smlthstaxtrttx afrald that tnxrrate taken _xemut 2s a rebuff to the Pregident '9 efforts, revorked the text to avoid thlb interpretation since the mkuato#ttderbroadcabt did not constitute offIclal government statement. NW 88608 Docld: 32401332 Page 24 In_ get they hopo LIlyl_ ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== 22 Ib Fas 2lear at variouglttmoy tht therc w Quite cleaely, the White House gtaff cringed at bed news fran Vietnana When the PDB reported In April 1966 tbat "the political 8ituatia averred to be rapidly worgening" In South Vietnany and #uaxt that Ky appear8 mlght soon have to take draetlc meagures to restoro authorlty or make major concegsions to the Buddllsts, Smith renarked that the article was pessimistic and that ormationa It of course, one of the perild of the Herdt he had leter inf PDB operation that the White House gometimes had Iter fresher reports fra the fleld, Smith handed John Heidemann cableg reporting that Ky wag going to 4SS formulate a new constitution and that the State Departyent looked wpon this hopeful. Heidenann egredd that' OCI had written in ignorance af this information, but added that offhand he would not be optimistic. A few days later Smith read that "There wa8 no real improve- ment in the situation todaya.S It and gaid "You're going to break the President'8 whole heert; he thinke things are much bdtter todey." When he fintshed the/dis heartening he toSged the book in the whletled, and 8aid, nwe ' 1l xeatrenta report, NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 25 was , e8t, ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== 23 have fun tonight. But that's no reason for not writing 1t, a8 You see ita" Smith hed cense for unheppLnes8 egetn when the PDB had to- repprt that/Pekdstan officials felt that his country was srieaty ie ~temprrartly) drifting epart from the US and would probably establish closer PDB writer reletionships with the Soviet Union, Smith told/Allen Valpey that this article was a "shecker" and that Walt Roston vould be digturbed by it. (Roston had repleced McGeorge Buridy In April 1966.) +lous< Xzcaxtt Although Jogn McCone had not taken up a/suggestion in that the President'8 daily give occagionel coverage to CIA activities, REI Admiral Raborn a8 DCI did edopt this practlce. Bronley Smith reacted negetively to thege reports, however, apparently bellevilng that President Johnson did not Hike thom, Ho particulerly objected In 1966 ta t PDB Annex explaining 9 1/7 ho CIA used a portable ultre-violet light device In Vietnam to detect guerrillas who I had recently handled weapons before mlngling trortontlf S: J4) co+ Ya~~ + ta 4,2-*1 3 with innoronb villagers. H Vee_I_LC 6 advestisee 0+u P)k, TU Tres Je~r rkta S< 1n formcd Ssn < Cia ackwbes; ~lz 'Da rh z Ssww Kw} 4 me~ caR= m, NW 88608 Docld:32401332 26 kk; h: Sr(le Fn+A_ o Page ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== %5 2h tLs 4mx ()6tl ~^ [ 2 , Dcarel 670 $ 2/dc1 L~ [ Zlar Lk~~~ Lf M)/c6 Bom I21 M~ltl witl tl~ 6-4 IL P6r wikf Late in July 1966 Bromley Smith gand that he_ had gone ideas about the PDR and would like together with all the writers. Ho-mob 4i a6/u)adcreklr bben Etho-eg/in the' Langley building on 3 Augusta He prefaced his turaktx remarks by mtrxxthbxuuxtkkae} expressing his 8atigfaction with the way He explained, however , the President was being gerved; Me had no criticismg , #AxERerrkexxuutkrarx ano suxry thet while the President "tolerates" Auaruxymoug docuent8 , he 18 much mure 1 regponslve to 4 personalLzed docuent. He wondered whether the Dow Oci, Brief could be Blgned by Mr . Helme ) Then t 1t woula becone 8 perbonal Link between the Pregident and the firector. In regard to content, Smith said the PDB dd not have to alert the Pregldent to Ipending crLge8 Over which he vould have no control Rather , Smith thought # the PDB could be most useful by Qrirjends_that-giret pithy judgmentspn gitutions with which the President 19 or will be feced. % Smith said these judgments would be accepted; OCI did not have to gupport them with argunentation or evidence. Smith emphagized that the Brief writers had to be fully up on US policies and should adequatelf read presidential gpeeches . He felt the Pregident i8 kept/inf ormed Qf NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 27 Gn86o1 Ddi ) ~1 to get ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== 25 Vietnamese military development8 by other mean8 ; the PDB should carry more Vietnamese political and econonic items . XSnith urged that the Brief have more coverage of suxto Europe and said that Panama was another gubject high on the priority Ligta 13/ OCI prantly get about adopting Smith'8 guggegtions as to Sobc content, and Smith,comrented that he noticed the change. W (Llaa 4lw~r Helms ~rrhatuee >) gaez 6 Delyec:t _ altratw majar phenge in the PDB gystem occurred at the end of February 1967 . Seemingly &ll that wa8 involved wes that President Johnson decided that he would rather the Brdef in the morning than in the evening: time However , thi8' change In delivery/forced other changee. The President wanted: the BrLef at 6:30 Juat before he begen reading the newgpapers. This meant that OCI'9 cloging time on the book was 5 a.mo Nonetheless , the PDB had to NW 88608 Docld:32401332 28 Mernet get a6Mo, Page ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== 26 be written in full kowledge of tu what was in the morning pregs. 4788F As[E, Drexel Godfreyr comented, the schedule %put "the highest premiu on making the publicetion u to the minute. " 15 / BcE Because the P5S now had to be delivered to the White Hoube Situatlon Room by 6 e.mo, tho PDB writer8 *ut no longer had a member of the President'8 staff up and available to receive the book and coment on 1t, heving make This meant that there was no in/the writers mkt the trip to the White House . From thi8 tune On, the ' PDB was delivered by couriers. To make up for the loss of the morning convergations wlth Broley Smith, an OCI btaff nember would visit hlm occasionally to check on hon thinge were going, and thero V88 elao comunlcation by phane. fa + Pde Shortly after tho changeover to tho n6v Gbodule ommenting 0 the Pregtdent'9 reaction; Br 'onley Smlth,uttxtabxeshtsdt Be1d emphetically that Ilwe are much: more certain now thet he'8 reading 1t.n He alst made a point he was to make several times gubsequently, which wag that he disapproved annexes to the Brief. He was afredd thet ff the Brief were burdendd with an Anner, the President vould 1t asid0 for later reeding--and then not NWV 88608 Docld:32401332 29 point pat Page ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== 27 S:+ '1 WAf ~rre((eO fXca 4 # BE 3 jhm~^cil TU (aclxmf ,1 (~fetanc s 67- < s+,m#t, 1et beck to 1t. In bualutaxtr Smith'9 the PDB 8hould be of 4 Zongth whlch tho Preoldont could It vould bo whlp through qulckly- ttxtangthteraturkkx be better if annex-type reports were sent dow geparately. Eoaet Smith continued to admonish OCI writers now and then *rx *nuxku about the worde and phraseg employed in the PDB. He admitted that $het 1t was hard to knor whefe to draw the but he Laubio d-axt Ax1xakix thorstafe-shouldtba oraful-ebrut did not Like "hopptng mad, It As a rule of' thumb, he gald the wrlter8 ghould avo1d geening frivolous or light_ hearted. 0n another occagLon;dld he care for a degcription Qf Indle a8 an "uwilLing bride_ At the President'8 request, OCI on 7 September 1967 begeb to attach to the Brtef. & Spectel o_North Vietnen that ,dealtiaat mainly DCIED 6 with the effects. of the wer _ The only to go outeide of the Agency was eddressed: "For Bromley Smith M Eyes Only for the Presidenta" with the issue of 6 October , thle Spectal carried a new . gectibn on North Vietnamese treatment of Politicel attitudes tovard the expressed in state- ments and demonstretiong. NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 30 A-k get view, they line, nor,n Report cppy Beginning Repart war , ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== 28 In Novombor DI Hojna taLked wiah Drexal dodfrey and Richard Lehman about the PDB: sxk The Director expressed greatsatisfaction the with both the Brief and/8pecial_Report: He said the .latter _ wes "realLy hitting the marka" He urged that OCI try harder to praktx cane up: with Items IlSxDs on the personalltlee 'Qf men famillar to the President, vhc( thinke In term8 of pebeonelitloe, Helog el8o asked that the PDB give more attention to condng vielte a worldr VIPe to Wabhingtan and to each other. No major changes In the PDB were made during President Johnson'9 time after the introduction of the Special North Vietname @ To allz appearances , the Brief had evolved into a docuent satiafactory to the President, amd 1t kept gerving it8 purpose throughout the rest of the adminibtration. All CI analysts who have worked on the PDB are familiar in the White House x holding with a photogreph of Presfdent Johnson sittinghith Ladv Bird and/his first grandso. In hlg hendr ig an Issu0 of the Presidentg Daiky _Krief,*tlta _ ebbeer_ Eo; reaug-t This hamney picture epita.zeg the positio Occdiry mr OCI hoped the Brde_hed In the White Housea And perheps it dtd, NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 31 Izet ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== 29 J R.Lk~: The importance to 8 President of" a steady flow af first-clasg intelligence 19 self-evidenta Whatever scope and depth of in- formation he can obtain fra the public medie, he stiLl needs the intelli- gence thet comes from the utilizetion of sensitive technogical meang and clandestine operations. He i9 entitled to objective appraisals based on &ll sources, public governmental. In planning American positions and action8, JAo-Id K K ). ~ 5as (2 62~(v0mtr of 766 Rot % Dcs he the most goudly baged est mates G foreign situations are likety CIA and its predecessor , the CIC, have met these pregidential InteLl gence needg , What they have furnished the presidents hag been determined by Jne interp between the Intelligence organization and the White House. learn what each The Agency has been paretxanu eager to pruttxdttt President wanted and 4 4 Ass Jrraa( in termg of gubject matter , timing, format,/style) Fertho-nest-per mae ( Jre Tfntts ~c ^t'. t0' has trted-to give each Teoident Juot what ho wantad;andahot bother-him -' Dias kas Kusik 4 1, ethlng 0l8rs At the sama E 01-+ng-tke ~belrzenoe +n itr_pogsession ~Zzez) beforetho Preotdent, Keebl-gatad-€6:Seo that {Lp-recelves-Bha r porte NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 32 and ley 6Sk5+ time , Kll t = "64 ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== 30 6 L /-5 J.1 '5 <mZn- Ac Jsc"F K2 S.0 ~wA C(A C880 7 14 / n.;, J. mttfh X #& 16-has_-not boon-forobaon_and_roquaatad he_Justbava, Oxen_if #Ao nut falt Tithin an;y dategoryOf-requeotod = ~nformation There has probebly never been complete agreement between CIA and the White Hoube on what the President really needs to knon, but a degree exxttituk of mutual toleration ugually prevailsr 80 that a President wi.Ll Gce &0 Tead sone thibgs he isn't partlcularly interested in and CIA will rdt carry on certain lpnes of reporting gimply out @f regard for a President' 8 ~pply President with opor bing idiosyncracie8. In gerving Presidents Truman, Eigenhower , Kennedy, and ~slc + f Jar Johnaon, CIA '8 Of fice of Current. Intelligence found ~e Ereel Iine +0 'the Iros+hn flief Zrecuttve ~<fs~Te 7 ~ZL EKicl Ere cwJac, elthough the method was adjusted to accard with each Pregident ' 8 prefetences _ NWV 88608 Docld:32401.332 Page 33 tknjs 3 &~5 13,0 "A^}ce War

JFK Declassified Files

Back to Search

104-10302-10024.pdf

Released: March 18, 2025

Download from Archives

Page 1 of ?

This document is provided for research purposes only. For official versions, please visit the National Archives.