Transcript of 104-10301-10011.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== ~QQOQQ 104-10301-10011] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 SEp,28.1998 3*23PN A NO. 279 P.2 4 S E C R E T The Special Investigations Group of the CI Staff (CI/SIG) CI/SIG (the Special Investigations Group) did not exist prior to the establishment of the CI Staff in early 1955 , Its major functions as described in CSI No = 70-1 of March 1955 are much more modest than the functions 'ascribed to it in a write-up by the Staff in eatly 1973 _ The 1955 description of functions is as follows "Special Investigation Unit "Major Functions "Performs the CI investigation and analysis of known or potential security leak in the Clandestine Services or_ zation, whether' in headquarters r in the field, from the standpoint of its effect on (1) existing Operations and (2) the Covet of personnel In_performing_ this function_ maintains close working relations with the Security Office the latter being primarily concerned in such cases from Agency security rather than an operational security stand - point By 1973 the description 0f tasks which had been assigned to CI/SIG or which they had absorbed during the course 0f events over a period 0f nearly two decades provides a much broader range of functions and responsibilities _ They are listed as follows "CI/Special Investigations Group "1 Conducts research into the long-range velidity of CIA operations in terms of known or Potential hostile capabilities , includ= penetrations , and of Agency security. "'2 _ Catries out coordination with the Office of Security in such cases _ "'3 _ Maintains and uses sensitive counterintelligence holdings including certain Conint and defector materials , to match these ageinst operational and personality da ta and thus to derive operational leads _ "4 . Coordinetes and cooperates with counterintelligence and elements of other departments and agencies of the USG to tabulate, and take counter-action against hostile plans '0r approaches abroad for the recruitment of American officials (American Targets Program) S E C R E T 144 any gani= ing secur_tdetect ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 14-0000Q SER28.1998 3:24PM 1IU.1' ? S E C R E T "5 _ Plays a direct role in sensitive counterintel - ligence liaison with closely allied foreign intelligence services on hostile penetration Plans and operations_ "6 _ Reviews: compatibilfty between cover and assfgnments of CIA staff menbers . "7 _ Ma intains central' data on leaks to the news media and assists the Office '0f Security, as necessaty , in determining the sources of leaks _ "'8 _ Maintains central data on the nature and extent %f knom compromise of 5 taff personnel co intelligence serVices , whether heenf_aison OI hostile_ "9 Prepares studies of individuals including 8 [ournaiista whose foreign intelligence connections ate 2 source o concern _ "10 _ Carries out additional and sensitive tasks as assigned by the CtCI_ The first chief of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) (es it was called in CSI NO _ 70-1) was Birch 0'Neal, a_ former FBI officer who had transferred to CIA after World Wer Il, * In the mid-fifties_SIG had rather slim picking and appeats to have spent most of its time investigating vatious aspects of the LcMAYFOWL 5 complex (the Boris Morroslcase) as it affected US interests based on information the Agency acquired from foreign sources Then in_ 1962 SIG received its biggest shot in the arm with the defection of Golitsyn who brought with him several dozen leads to American citizens including some supposedly in CIA_ The handling of these leads was assigned to SIG by Angleton, including the information emanating from Golitsyn, which related to foreign countries . Thus 0 ' Neal and his assistant, Jean Evans _ played a major role in directing the handling of the Golitsyn leads (or "Serials" a5 Angleton invariably called them) _ The activity continued through - out the sixties reaching its apex in the period 1964-65 when the HONETOL investigations (of CIA staff officers) was at its most #The term SRecsixtieyebttgaciorscGrape (SIG) became common usage in sixties but no exact date can be assigned for this change. S E C R E T 145 AC ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== Qoooo SER.28.1998 3:25PM NO.279 P.+ S E C R' E T 98 Israel, and 8 contract agent in New York_ In addition to the Office of the Chief (including two special assistants and 2 Secretariat) the Staff was composed of seven "Divisions" and four "Groups 24 For fiscal year 1958 the CI Staff was s6,650 ,0og: 24 The Sum of 8,800,ood wes allotted for Fiscal Year 1959, and 24 sh,066,000 was to be requested for 1960 , Specific figures were quoted in the appropriate sections for projects or support, such as travel_ Otherwise the budget was almost solely for salaries 0f Staff personnel_ The survey next brief attention to deception , egreeing that it had to be carefully compartmented and that it best belonged in' the CI Staff. On the subject of the YSpecial Investi- gation Unit however " the survey took its first serious exception to the organization and operation of the Staff stating: "Hence , in order not to contaminate a senior staff (CI Staff) with Agency employee investigation and/or exploitation, this should be done by individuals with CE ability within 8 special section of the Office 0f Security. It is "Recommended that: "a _ The DD/P release for assignment to the Office Of several individuals as may be appropriate 0f proven ability to handle and exploit al1 cases o2 CE aspect involving Agency personnel; "b SID and its function be eliminated from CI Staff; and The DCI approve the above recommendations . It The survey tean took special note of the Projects Branch 0f CI Staff, the section that handled the mail opening project. How it was operated and viewed in 1959 is not without interest in view of its subsequent role in the ""Family Jewels" issue when it was revealed to the Rockefeller and Church Committees. Thus it is revealing to note the 1959 survey found no- thing wrong with S E C R E T 49 Yc budget gave' securitYCE "C- ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 14-00000 M71z SEP.28, 1998 3:26PM #EdE-B;' 1t the mail opening program except they worried about its security and als0 thought it would b@ more @ffective if expanded. This is how the survey described the project in 1959 : "a The Project Branch conducts a project 0f censorship within the US of mail from the USSR which is called HTLINGUAL Orifigecur this project was der3}oBedibiox the Office Security at the request of SR in 1952 Its purpose was to identify and to obtain samples of handwriting and basic back - ground facts on established corre_ spondence between persons in the USSR and the United States _ Such information was to be used operationally to sustain any comunications with secret Wri- which would 'likelkeE pass the Soviet censors and could be Bickeer Up in U.S.A= The interception is done at central Post Office in New York, and the Ietters are delivered to the Agency for processing ana return. As the need for Soviet communication camouflage lessened with the increase of legal travel to and from the USSR the Project was re- oriented and expanded toward direct CI and FI goals in September 1956, it was taken over by the CI Staff, 24 "b At present this Eivel employees in New York and dI9uHcludea at Headquarters Those in New York are under the Office 0f Security;_ those in Headquarters under the CI Staff The Yearly cost is the total of the various salaries , "C= The primary purposes %f this Project are to produce CE information operational leads and Positive intelligence that can be gleaned aExe me il "d_ The operation in New York photographs about 50 _ 000 envelopes per month out 0f a total of about 200,000 letters coming_from the USSR to in- dividuals in the U.S.A. via New York, These films are forwarded to Headquarters and examined in the ~Projects Branch and some 10,000 of them are selected on the besis of Agency interest in the areas of origin in Russia . These 10,000 negatives are then made into prints ana the nanes of the addressees are recordea aiphabetically on IBM cards From the IBM cards RI makes a continuing record and a copY 0f this record of names is returned to the Projects Branch _ About 1,000 of these intercepts are opened Per month in New York by the Office of Security the letters verifaxed and_copies sent to the Projects Branch at Headquarters There is a watch list of some 500 names on file both in the Branch at Head -_ quarters and in the Security Office in New York and any letters coming from or going to any of the names S E C R E T 50 Hjc long_ ting and Erom "e ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== Qoooo s @ C "R E T on this list are opened _ This watch list is revised quarterly_ It i8 made UP of names of interest princi- pelly to CI SR Division ana the Security Office, and includes names iisted by the FBI . "f_ There are trained linguist-analysts in the Branch who extract information 0f interest from the intercepts _ and the "23ij2 of this information is deterninea by the Chief of ects Branch _ At present the rate of dissemination from" Projects Branch runs at an, average of about' 150 per month and the puber is. increaSing _ Sixty percent of these dissemina - tions are Positive intelligence The disseminations are controlled by the Deputy Chief of CI Staff_ 11 g. SR Division' has obtained valuable operational leads from this Project, and the FBI wants as much information 2s it can get by this means "h_ There are 40 individuals in CIA who are officially cleared to know ebout this Project. These include members of SR Deviecords Office of Securi DBig , CI Staff, and RI Machine COPS DD/P , Director of Personnel sfdue to his previous service in the DD/P) - and the Chief, Staff_ The DCI, DDCI and the IG Staff also have access_ to the Project. t"i It would appear 'fron present results that much more_value could be obtained from this Project if more intercepts were opened _ Project Branch is at present 2 handl four times as much volume as it did in the past with the same number 0f personnel and at the same cost Its staff at Headquarters 1s capable of handling 2,000 per month with the present T/o= but the New York staff coula not that number of opened intercepts unless its [petGonneRPly was increased _ It is felt by the Branch that a rate of 4,000 intercepts per month would be 2 future, goal - It is estimated that this would require an increase of one interceptor 2 one secretary ana one letter opener in New York and an addition to Project Branch at Headquarters of four linguist-analysts, four clerical personnel and one reports officer. "j_ The Office of Security which works With Project Branch, is agreeable to the ' gradual expansion of the" operation_ It would be in favor of expanding at Present to the extent of opening more intercepts and taking samples of these intercepts for S W This could be done by the aforementioned increase of Security Office Personnel in New York without an immediate increase in the Headquarters staff It would beoperationally much more feasible if a secure room could be obtained in the Post Office in New York for theit sole use Since the DCI made the original arrangement for this {Ee-Syscer with the Chief Postal Inspector any changes in system of operation should be made in the same way This is the only level at which such arrangements could be accom- plished securely _ S 6 C R E T 51 ing good ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== Qoooo Cot? i ECd;EN 65 versus area division prerogative in the conduct of operations _ Noting that there might have been some imediate reasons for the CI Staff to take on operational aspects in its efforts to increase CI activity, nevertheless it concluded these reasons were not necessarily based on the best operational and organizational pro- cedures and methods _ The normal staff functions, the survey opined, coula be carried out effectively with a much smaller but highly experienced staff whose impect and counsel would more favorably be received by the operating elements of the DD/P _ The team also concluded that there had been insufficient attention given to penetrating hostile intelligence organizations and recommended that; "Chief , CI direct the efforts of the CI Steffttoward the development of programs for the aggressive pursuit of penetration activity against hostile intelligence services , " In_a forward to the report, the 'Inspector General of the Lyman YKirkpatrick, directed special attention to one particular espect of CI work, "The Speciel Investigatiog_Division assists the Office of Security in using_DD/P assets to trace leads concerning CIA employees This is probably a necessary assist to the Office of Security but should be handled with the utmost of discretion and security It would be very seriously damaging to the efforts' of the CI Staff if it ever becane know that it was engaged `in any activities involving CIA employees An analgous S ituation is the stir caused by the occasional misimpression created abroad that CIA reports on other US Government employees . Thus within CIA the; Office of Security must be the sole unit to bear the stigma 0f being concerned with fellow 11 employees _ Unfortunately this sensible warning was not heeded by CI Staff management, or by the management of the Clandestine Service as 2 whole for that matter . Instead, in the mid-1960s the CI Staff, with SIG in the vanguard, hypnotized by the allegations of Golitsyn, launched HONBTOL the active investigetion 0f, numerous Agency employees (five in particular) with generally S E C R E T S51 day , ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 'SEP.28;1998 3:30PM NO.279 p.8 BBCRET BENBITIVB NOPORN had written a provocative analysis that found Nosenko bona ride and challenged as incorrect the Monster Ploc asbebsmenta to the contrary_ Even more provocative, he haa provided 4 copy directly to then DDCI Richard Helng when styuied within the Soviet Division in pronoting his viev. Kalaris first learned of this Vell after McCoy joined the staff, ynan nimgelf told him. Angleton, on the other hand , was certainly not unaware of this part o1 McCoy s background , and fc 19 iKely that ne and Rocca and Mler interpreted Kalaris's selection ot MCCoy a8 evidence that Kalaris Vas Out to diacredit them . Kalaris, originally having been sunmoned hong to take over temporarily until a replacenent for Angleton could be found , had a Eitle in the beginning a5 "Accing Chiet_ CIOPS . " In March , Nelson told him, haven t found anybody yet and a5 tine vent on it looked increasingly 85 if he and Colby vera not going to find anyone - But by thie time Kalaris was becoming intrigued with vhat he was dolng, and vith the potential of the job_ He went back tofrasilijlo to Bee his family Jn late March , and when he returnea he told Nelson he vould take the Job on a permanent baafe In June _ the "Acting" va8 aropped and Kalaris became Chief , CIOPS _ What_Kalaris Found The Stace8f_Affalrs As he Iooked around , Kalaris found what struck him a8 a desolate situation_ Mountains of traffic Here coming in to the staff, but none oE it seened to be of much importance. The ataff had no relationship Nlth the Soviet Division or B2CRET BENBITIVB NToRW Inc_ Mccoy "we ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 14-000QQ Sep.28. 3:30PM A NO.279 P.9 BECRET BENBITIVE NOFORN any of the other geographic dlvision8 _ If the dlvisions had any significant cages , Kalarie Vas unavare of them bacause the divisions Vere giving hin nothing of substance _ McCoy 8 arrival in the staff made thie picture unmiscakably clear since , fresh from SE DivisJon and a posltion therein chat wade him privy to Virtually 411 the division 8 sensitive cases , he Yas able to tell Kalaris what he Vas miseing on the SE front, It also before Jong becane evident that there vas an element O2 a two-vay street in thie 6Ituation. Sovlet-East European cases vere aiscovered in CI Staff files that the area divisions had never been informed of or had only linitea information about, These included such casee as MORINE (a Past FBI source of voluminous GRU operational documentb vho Was known to the Soviet Division but whose operational leads had been shared neither with thac division nor vith the Other geographic dlvisions in whose territory the Soviet agents uere working) KITTYHARK] (a XGB officer who had contacted CIA during a Visit to the United Scates several Years back and wha igured in a double-agent gane befng ru by the FBI) [GRrDIRon Leslie Janes Bennett', former senior oEficer in Soviet counterespionage in che Canadian RCIP who had resignea Erom that service in 1972 under a cloud Of suspicion engendered by the Angleton staff and it6 guru Anatoliy Golitsyn--a case never briefed to either SE or EUR Division) and Cpivod also known as [ZoNEJ C) 8 Eonstantin Dumitrachescu , a RomanianJintelligence officer 11 Yho defected in Esraejin 1972 and subsequently cane to this country and Vas debriefed by CIOPS officers , buc Yhose information and leads had not been furnished to the area divisions) Many of the people in the staff had been hand-picked by Angleton . They had been in their jobe for a number of years and were VeIl settled into their way of doing things. So BECRET BENBITIVE NOPORN dc 1998 ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 14- QoooQ SFp.28.1998 3.31PM OCLRL"' OBNDJPAVB MUKURW NO.279 P.10 wel] in fact that' wost nad given up hope of ever golng anywhere else Or accomp]fshing anything nel . Compartmentation Vas 3 way of life. ana managenent Was remote Erom the rank and file- Kalaris Was appalled to learn that hi6 chief of support, Yho had worked in the btaff for {our Or five Years , had never net Angleton; he had only seen him from a distance . The overall atmosphere seemed to Kalaris to be conditioned by doublethink and mirrors Comparcmentatfon in the Angleton staf? had been carriea to such extremeb , hotever a8 to become counterproductive With Angleton not disposad to be forthconing vith his successor . and Rocca and' Miler taking their lead from him (And Hood already having lefe the staff and tha Agency some months earlier) St Vas difficule for the Kalaris team to find out what the staff had been doing. Like the blind men and the elephant, the parsonne] belov the top leadership had never been exposed to more than thair Own narron slice Of Btaff aCtIvities_ and accordingly even with the best or will they were linited in Yhat they were able to tell the nev panagenent _ The MORINE case (see belov) provided a vivid illustration of this point. McCoy _ vith his Soviet DivieIon background_ vas particularly struck at the alnost total absance of Soviet expertise in che staff_ There was no Russian language capability and no realistic area knowledge , and what experience there Vas in soviet matters was dated and limited. This Vas the case not only in REA , but in the Operations Group 4s vell_ One Of the first things Ka laris had to do afcer assuming office Vas find out Yhat vas in the 6afes ana vaults In the Anglecon premises _ Thfs ultinately cook months , 46 there vere Beveral vaults and many safes containing among thea Jarge quantities of Paper . AIl this 9ECRBT BENBITIVB NOPORN ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 14-000QQ SEP. 28.1998 3:32PM N0.279 P.11 BECRET BBMBITITE NOFORM had to be revieved_ ana not Only for the purpose Or decermining what it wa8 411 about significant seguente of thls paterial, it was dlecovered , were unique to the CI staff ana had never been integrated into the DO file and records system _ Infornation from the mafl-intercept program, for example, Vas indexed ingide the CI Staff , but reflected nowhere outbide_ Other material largely duplicated files naintained by other elenents _ Some files contained @ostly presb clippings: Decisions had to be made ana action taken , item by item, on indexing, transfer Of files, determinations of what needed to be retalned and shat could OI shoula be destroyed , etc. As the pagnitude Of this cask became evident , arranganants were made for personnel from IMS ta be detailad to the staff on a long-term bagie to go through the materfal In a vaulted area across from Angleton'8 office a couple or safes Vere found for which no combination could be located, and which accordingly had to be drilled by specialists from che office of Security_ Kalaris rejects as untrue the inage conveyed in Mangold'5 book about Angleton that has him personally leadlng SWAT teams of safecrackers 3s Vent about opening the Angleton safes, but it 1s Correct that he was present during the drilling. He had naver s8en this operation perforned before, and was interested to observe hov Jt Va8 done _ Some curious and some disquieting chings turned HP 48 the neu team gradually made Ics way through the CI Staff premises _ ~~on the lighter side, in one safe two Bushnan boNs and some arrows Were found _ Concerned about the poesibility that the arros might be 'poisoned , Kalaris had them sent-- Tom_Mangola , cold Werrior, Simon 0 Schuster, 1991, PP . 327-J30 BPCRET 8ENOITIVE NOFORN they ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== 14-00ooo SEP.28.1998 3*33PM BBCRET BEN8124Vg Hururn NO.279 P.12 very carefully--to OTS for examination. Mhen vere returned, with a judgnent that they vere harmless _ Xalaris gave them to Angleton as a Persona ] memento . CI Staff Memo CI 136-75 , 10 July 1975 10 BECRBT] BENBITIVE_Noporn they ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== 14-000QQ SEP.28.'1998 3:33PM1 NO.279 P.13 BECRET BEROITIFE MOFORN I-In & more Gerious Veln, files uere found on the assab8inations Of PresIdent John P. Kennedy and his brother Robert F Rennedy - These included autopsy Pctures of the remains of Robert Kennady _ Although Nosenko ' $ account Of the KGB 0 involvement uith Lee Harvey Obwal and his denlal that the KGB had anythIng to do Vith the @urder of John Kennedy pight reagonably explain an Angleton interest in the John Kennedy assassination, neither Kalaris nor Blee , vith whom Kalaris consulted on thI6 blzarre finding, had any idea why Angleton had the pictures _ Nelcher could they think of any reason why it was appropriate for CI Staff files to contain then . vero accordingly destroyed. ~~Angleton S dogged pursult , Inspired by Golitsyn and his theorjes , of Sovfet Intelligence penetracion of CIA had led co secret investigations, stretching over period of many years , of over forty serving CIA officers . Known 46 the KONETOL caseb _ ana later bometimes referred to in the popular literature 43 the Great Molehunt , this activity had produced extensive files in the CI Staff. In addition , Bevera] hundred files Were found On Anerican cieizens who Wcre not CIA personnel but on vhom Golitsyn analysie nad similarly cast some sort of KGB shadou_ Anong the Most notevorthy oE these Vere files on WS Averell Harrlman and Henry Kissinger _ Most of these files were composed entirely of nevepaper reports and 8 few FBI reports _ ~-Classified materials, in quantities that ultinately filled several packing boxes , were eventually found in 10 Golitsyn S possession at his upstata Neu York] farn house_ Some of chis material consieted of personnel-type files on CIA staff officers. Golitsyn, who resisted returning these documents when Kalaris sent people to retrieve them, The term ~HONETOL . useq 85 an acronym, allegedly derives from comblnation of parts of the last nane of FBI Director John Edgar Hoover and the firet name of Soviet KGB defector and Angleton guru Anatoliy Golitsyn. 11 BBCRET @ENBITIVE NOFORN Yyc They ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== 14-000QQ SF.c8 13ys 3:JapM A NO.279 P.14 BECRET BBNBITIVE NOPORN maintained that Angleton and Miler had given thege {ileg to him to revied and to Keep a8 long as he needed them, ana he was not finished Nich them yet_ Ultinately, al] the ffles that were found Vere retrieved from Golitsyn, though it nas never been possible to be certain that this represented a)] the files that he in fact had_ ~~A potentially explosive find surfaced in June: a of maf) frOm the wail-intercept--HTLINGUAL--progran. It had been the public expose of HTLINGUAL and the MHCHAOS program , infiltration of donescic leftist and dissident groups in search or insidious forelgn sponsorship, in a front page story by Seyeour Hersh in the_NerYork Tinee On 22 Decenber 1974 that had precipitated Colby '8 decisfon to force Angletcon 8 retirement_ and led to establishment in 1975 Of the Rockefeller Comm_ssion On CIA Actfvities in the United Scates, and the Church (Senate) and Pike (House) committees to invescigate CIA and its activities. Boch these programe naa been CI Staf? responsibilltiee . CIA Vae receIving letters from citizens who believed CIA had incercepted their nafl, a CI scaff represencative had just finished briafing the Senate Select Committee Staee on the ubject, and CoIby on 10 July would be maklng a etatenent on che mail-intercept program before the Pastal Facilfties, Mafl, and Labor Management Subcommittee O2 the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee _ The bag of mail Has a hot potaco. Kalaris 6 memorandur to ADDO Blee dated 3 July 1975 tells the story. ## In the course of preparing for a move of CI Project materials from one vault to another we found_ on top of 8 shelf , dispatch (dated] 27 March 1972 from cOS 27,16-7 Panama to Chief AK _ This dispatch forwarded 114 items mailed from the Soviet Union to varioue persons in the U,5. 3 Ernest Toikerdanoa CI 088-75 , 17 June 1975 CI 113-75 , J July 1975 12 BECRB BENBITIVE NOFORN 2 bag "1- cicy xw ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 14-000QQ NO.279 P.15 'SEP.28.1998 3:34PM1 BECRET BBNBITIVE NOFORM Theee bad been In 8_ Package delivered to a doctor In the Id [canal zone} Yho turned them over co the Etleiog whlch in turn forwarded then to Headquarters. The dlopatch Was passed to CI Staff by WH Division in 1972 _ A note on tha dispatch indicates chat CI Staff took no action other than to process the materials into itb files; but the CI Project continued to hold the originals- At the time CI Projact theorized that a mailing label on a package tronl@iyayo 29 Corporationin Ne Hyde Park , New York , to tha [canal zong], doctor had fallen Off the package for the doctor, and been erroneouely fastened to che package contalning the Sovjet mail . #2 . This is the only case 48 far a5 Ke know in whieh the orlginal mail has been hela by this Agency . In 411 other caseb we examined the nail, opened It surreptitiously, photographed it, And Pyt ft back into the Dail channels for delivery to the addrebbee _ Thus , this presants uS wich a peculiar problem _ The letters nave 41l been opened vith a letter opener. we do not Xnow at what point along the way the letters Vere opened _ "3 Ne solicit your advice. There seams to be at least tuo courses vhich we @ight pursue_ Ne could send theee items to the people to whom they ara addressed_ under cover of 4 letter explaining nov we had acquired the mail and apologizing for our delay in forwarding it_ Another course of action would be to reinsert the mail into the postal system by forwarding it under cover of a memorandun to the U.s. Postal Service. In the memorandum we Jould state that che mail came into our hands overscas ana Vas inadvertently held_ The memorandum woula further state that chfs Agency docs not know at Yhat point the mail Vas openea _ "Attachments: 114 Items hungarian cuszen = S [sic] Declarations BBCRBT @ENBITIVE NOFORN MC 13 ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 14-000QQ GEP.28.1998 3:35PM1 A N0.279 P.16 @BCRET BENBITIVE HoboRN 1 U.S- Regietered Mail/Return Receipt 0 5 Post Cards 25 Letters 24 1 (Svedish Custom 5 [sic} Declaratfon"] ~~The Person Yho brought the letterb to Kalarie, the supervisor Of the bumner employee Yho actually found them _ va6 knorm Co be an Angleton loyalfst , and Kalaris could see a trap unfolding in front o2 him if he mishandled the matter . The deliverer could be expected to tell Angleton just vhat U2s done with the lettere_ and Angleton to EInd Yays to exploit any i1l conceived decibions _ After due deliberation che staef of the Senate committee Yas informed , and on 16 July, not quite tuo weekb after the initial memorandum on this subject . the DCI sent the mail co the Postnaster General under cover of a letter explaining the situation. The Postmaster Genera 1 in turn Bent a copy of this lettar_ along with the actual mafl and a letter of nis ow , to each addreesee _ The Postnaster General ': letter referred to "apparent incerception and acknouledged retention of this mail by the CIA, ana described the matter as "a serious violation of your rightsm and "abuse of the mail8."+ In due course some of the recipients wrote letters co the DCI asking vhether CIA had dossiers On them . In April a folder with some MORINE , material was found in an RGA safe and dellvered to McCoy , &ho _ believing that he had stumblea upon an overlookea vein of counterintelligence gold , brought the matter to Kalaris's attention_ MORINE in ract had not been overlooked by Angleton, but this was not apparent at the tIme _ The discovery of this folder led to a memorandum to Nelson a few days lacer , entitled "Skeletons In the CIOPS Closet, m CI 180-75 , 15 August 1975 BECRBT]BBNBITIVE NoPORN Ytc ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 14- QoooQ SEP.28.1998 3:36PM NO.279 P.17 BECRET BBNBITIVE Noborn the ataft, on It8 Oum and without coordination with the 24 divIeion, had passed to Goretgn 14a18o2 a copY Of a FIES containing division-controlled NOFORN information . Paper and_Records: Disposal and_Reiategratiqn The paper-and-records problem Va8 high on che agenda of issues that needed co be addresbed _ The quantity that the Angleton vaults and safes conta_nea was almost overvhelning, and much Of this nad never been Aade available outside the staff. Integration of this uniqua data into the Do records systom not only nade conmon aense; it vas an Obvious prerequlsite to the staff rejoining the directorate. Kalaris had no problem in principle vith the concept of keeping certain information vithin the staff, as SE did uith its LESToRAG] byscem _ but the Angleton team haa gone overboard , whether for reasong of bureaucratic style Or fear of penetration of the Agency , information of al1 xinds and from all kinds Of sources had been held privately- Al1 this haa first to pe reviewed to identify Yhat Va6 appropriate co recain And what wab not, and the appropriate then made retrievable_ In the vake Of the Rockefeller Commission InveetIgation ana the Church and Pike committee hearings , the Agency and the DO uere busy wr = iting regulations and providIng guidelines to operating elements on what was ana vas not proper activity, particularly vis-a-vis Us parsons . For the CI staff , this heavily involved definition6 of subjects and actlvities that @erited staff atcention_ Executive Orders would later provide a framework , albeit often maddeningly imprecise, for these questions_ but che firet of those addressing US foreign incelligence activitites, E.0. 53 BBCRBT]BEXBITIVB_NOFORN Yc ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 14-000QQ SEr.28.1998 3:36PM NO.279 P.18 BECRET BENBITIVB NOFORN 11905, Vas not issued until February 1976.# In the meanuhile, advice from the Hill and the lawyere supplied the framework And there appeared to be hundreds , perhaps thousands of files in the Angleton staff chat nad been created and ma intained according to criteria, e.9. anticonmunism , that did not fit these gufdelInes _ Establibhment of 4 gu_dellne that counterintelligence {1le6 vere not to be established and maintafned solely on the basis of iteme in the prege provlded for alimination of a Jarge percentage of the material that had been collected by the Anglecon statf prominent among this being files on Henry Klssinger 0_ Averall Harriman, and bome J0-40 US congressmen , among others . Conmon sense provided other vorking guidelines such as, for example, the sinplistic role of thumb: if a file h8s some linkage to reality, retain it; if not , destroy it. People fron RID Here brought in to help decide what should go into the overa]l records sybtem, and Dhat did noc belong there. Sone Of them effectively poved into the staff. And they vere not the only outsiders to do this. In July 1975 the Departnent Qf Justice sent somo lawyers to review the HTLINGUAL naterial , and Yhen they d_acoverea that there were 27 boxes of it in one of the 6taff vaults it was decided that the best place for them to do their work vould be right there _ Three desxs Vere set uP them in the vault. Some stacistics fram monthly reports at the time give a glimpse of the Augean task of dealing wfcb a11 of this paper and records. January 1976: Five Branch personnel spent 2-1/2 days revleving al1 files hela in the branch for a count Of Signed by PreaIdent Gerald R. Ford , February 18 , 1976 . 54 BECRET 8ENBITIVE]_NOFORN for ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 14-000QQ SEP.28.1998 3*37PM NO.279 P.19 how many of these files vera on US citizene _ Total count vas 2,018 Efles on Adericane _ Mareh 1976: AJl (41 Ilnear feet) Golitsyn fIle material held in records center been raca lled and a review begun . In six more feet vere acqulrea from SE _ July: CI/RGA Index currently contains about 255,000 cards , down over 11,000 in last ten months Augubt: Golitsyn material nas now been consolidated; about 15 linear Eeet have been destroyed _ September: Approxinately 40,000 carde vere deetroyed; they duplicated a pore complete {ndex paintained by SEICI_ October: CI/RGA index has been purged ot a1l cards duplicated in DO main index-zover 12 O00 cards vere removed and destroyed. February 1977 : Four ISc analysts vere aesigned to REA to assist in the processing and integration Qf CI Staff records into the DO central system . The "HONETOL" filee appalled the nev CI staff in their numbers and, as chey were read , cheir scope and the hollowne6s of the reede upon which they had been built-* HONETOL had not yet become natorlous to the outeide world, but inside it Nas perceived as 4 problem of major proportions . If , on the one hand , chese files actually The term THONETOL meant @oTitsyn leads to a penetration of the Onited States--CIA as Yell as other US institution8 _ This led to tuo kinds of files: the leads thenselves _ 15 Golitsyn provided and described them (e.g._ a Eile on the Jead "Sasha") and files on suspects_ 1.e persons suspected Of being the subject of a lead , Actual leads Were very few; suspects were very wany _ 55 BBCRET BBNBITIVB NOFORN ha6 May ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== 14-000QQ SEP.28.11998 3*38PM N0.279 P.20 BECRET BENBITIVB NOPORN contained evidence OE a penetration of CIA, this clearly was of vital Importance . If_ on the other hand , did not, it vas importanc that chib be recognized and the files and 3 ouspicions appropriately dealt with. Julian Foxl lawyer by education who jolned the Btaff in late sumaer 1975 , was assigned to study chese filee. A procedure Vas developed Yhereby he revieved each One by one And prepared a Bummary of its contents . This vent forvard to Kalarfb wftha Jn each instance, a reconnendation on the Cover sheet for dieposItion _ On file after file these cover eneets ended up saying the Bame thing; that the file had been revieued _ that che conclusion haa been reached cnac there Vas nothing of aerit in it, and the file should be destoyed . The reviev of the file on Richard Kovich, for example , which was eght pages long , was dated 22 December 1975. Kalaris , concurring , sent Jt to ADDO Blee uith 0 handvritten note thac the material in this cabe would be packaged and hela Dith instructions that it should be destroyed a5 soon a3 the Senate released CIA from Its embargo on debtruction, and that the 6ududary @edo and CovBr sheet would constituce che only future recard _ The HONETOL files received steady but not priority attention. It took somewnat over 8 year for 3 FoxJeo make his vay through all of then. Nothing of erit wg found in any of them _ A specia] approach Vas developea to get the MORINE] daca into central indices _ As a result Qf the conpartmentation applied to,' KORINE in the Angleton Btaff much of the existing MORINE information vas aquirreled avay and not immedfately appreciated. The rejuvenated exploitation program produced 4 flood of [ZRTAFFY] correepondence vith field stations but this was slow to yield indexable macerial. It was not until the end Of 1975 that a focused RIchara KoviZh Vab One G: the threa CIA staff officers most severely afrected by ehe HONETOL vitch-hunt_ 56 BECRET 0BNBITIVX NoPorN 3/c they ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== 14-00ooo SEP.28.1998 3*39P1 N1O.279 P.21 BECRET BBNBITIVB NOFORM analytical effort On KORINE got undervay . Beglnnlng then 29 with the cabbette materfal fCc cpsgInternational Department trainee nanes) and later vith country sunmary reports when analy61e and liaison feedback flashed ouc an underscanding of GRu ras idency pereonnel operat_ons . HORINE" data vare provided by the Btaff to SE Division, vhich in turn conveyed chan on to RID under SE Division docunant SX) numbers a3 LESTORAG] infornation. Nanes Of GRU officers , code nades and true names (where Knoyn) of agents and developnentals_ support absets , etc. wera inaexed in this fashion_ Beople_Responssbilitie? The Kalaris staff Inherited responsibility for handful of defectors and certain contract personnel who had been vorking for the Angleton staff_ This responslbility Vas not particularly velcomed , but ic had to be dealt vith: The defeetors vere Golitsyn, Nosenko , Deryabin, and 6) g Rastvorov , and a former Romanian intelligence by the 6 name o [Constantin Dunitracheecu] also xnoen as MHPIVOT / 1, The Soviets were vell knokn _ at least by reputation, to the 8 SE aluwni on the staff, but the Ronanianf was 0 total surprise. had never heard of him. 24 In early 1972 che Israell internal service Shin Becy had approached CIA through Angleton and asked for aseistance in arranging che defection and resettlement of ChTef , SE (Blee) nad been avare of [Dumitrachescu 8 defection at the time, and had deduced = and ultimately obtained confirmation from the DDO that Angleton had arranged to brIng him to the United states and had hin squirreled ahay . %pC ana officer They ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== 14-000QQ SEp.28.1998 3:39PM N0.279 P.2z BECRE? BENBITIVE NOPORN This would suggest that Anglaton may hava lacked the opportunity thac others haa had to observe the kinds Of behavior Soviet defectors have displayed in sortIng out who the Jnportant players are in natters affecting their future, and figuring out how to deal with them _ ~~In the eyes of bome who knew hIm, Angleton viewed hingelf more a5 chief of an operacional encity than Df 2 staff_ Few gave him high warks as an effective staff_ as oppoeed to operations, officer _ His secret travels Jn Neetern EuropeE not to mention to Israel , to meet with senior liaison offfcials with whom he had developed confidential relationships constituted a form of independent operational activity. The proposa] , uleimately stillborn, in 1965 for Angleton to develop specIal counterintelligence units in Vietnamtt displayed certain parallels with his conduct of counterintelligence abroad as Chief of che CI Staff in the way in Yhich the Jocal station voula be effectively cut out ana command channel and comunications vould run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in Nashington_ The proposed special counter intelligence (SCI) units for Vietnam were nodeled arcer SCI units employed by X-2 , che counterintelligence arm of the wartime Oss_-Vhere Angleton began his intelligence career. Perhaps those early experiences shaped in sone way Angleton 6 later preference for conduct counterintelligence--by himself, without involvement of the araa divisions and stations _ ~and nar_To Do About Iti Game plan The_Plan In assessing tne state of affairs in the staff, it did Angleton may nave nad Gone exposure probably during the 19505 to pre-War (1938) RGB defector Aleksandr Orlov . 01-AS described in Cleveland C Cram ' $ history of the CI Staff (to 1974) ,(vol.X, 1004 ff, 22 BBCRBT BENBITIVB NOFORN Yoc Ing 32 ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== 14- Ooooo SEP.28.1998 3:40PM BECRBT @ENAITIVE NOFORN NO.279 P.23 streamline our procedureb . By 2976 the office of the Executive officer of the Staff included a Privacy Act Section Vith four poeitions in addition to 8 three-person Records and Registry Sectlon. (FOIA and Privacy Act requeste were handled together-) But this by no means solved the problem- In the fall of 1977 _ a6 DO ceiling and personnel reductions Vere being meted Qut and the gtaff vas trying to gear itself to getting along vith 1es6 , the DDO Va6 advised that the staff 3 Privacy Act Saction vas 60 scrained and It6 personnel under So much pressure that henceforth it would not accept deadlines imposed by elenentb oucside the staff_ When requirenents cere received, che section would advise the requester how much tine vould be required o corplete the work . But noxna) FOIA and Prlvacy Act requests vere not all; there were a1so @pecialty raquestb that had to be met . AJ1 had the conmon denoninator of the staff'8 unique fllas and records . These included such matters 86: FOIA requests for information concerning Lee Harvey Osvald.** Kandling these required the creatien of 0 task foree of 1J operations officers and analysts, plus clerical personnel and their full-time efforts for over 4 aonth = Requests for intervieys and/or information from the Senate and House Select Intelligence Connittees and the Department of Justice _ A review of the Rosanberg case by a Federal court, which caused problems Vith regard to related VENONA CI 131-75 , 9 July 75 0 Nosenko S assertlon that ne 4a6 famlliar with the KGb ' s asseesnent of and involvement with Osvald in the Soviet Union had Jed to enaless debrlefing, analy6is, and Cxoss - check research on this subject. 67 BECRET SENBITIVE NOPORN "6 ing ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== 14- QoooQ SEF.28.1998 3:41PM 0BCRBT BENBITIVE NOFORN NO.279 P.24 Untted States ; "In each Cabe You Open a file on thera muet be a denonstrable_SI interest _ Please as6ure that thl6 guideline i8 folloved' wetIculouely. pouble_Agent Eranch Nas Chargea uith the conduct of and coordinatlon On double agent operations abroad _ since the vast majority of DA Cases were run bY the US military gervice8 , che FBI , or--in somc instances-- Toreign-liaison services , the branch Vas very heavily a coordinator rather than active runner of operations _ 98 Area Operations_Dranch Was charged with coordination with the area divisions on matters of CI interest, ana with stimulating CI dlsciplines ana practices In the area divisions and field stations_ The centerpiece of the branch 8 accivity Vas management ana conduct of the CI Survey program . ConsJeting Itbelf only of the branch chjef and two clericals, the branch staffed its survey tears with detailees from the arca divisions and CI Staff officerg borrowed from other branches of the stafe, both Ops and RGA Sosuteroperations _ Branch Was charged Vith operations designed to counter and disrupt the activicies abroad of roreign intelligence services inimical to US interests _ Charles Anderson , an LA Division officer who Vas brought in to the staff by Sternfield to head the branch , had had considerable experlence In CA operations _ ana the branch s activities reflected thls background _ Virtually all had a clear CA character from promotion of 8 book about the Tupamaros and terrorism in Uruguay , to a press campaign in Burope designed to expobe the Curiel apparacus as an inetrument of Soviet intelligence, to a paper che Cuban intelligence residency in Chile dur the Allende regine _ Primary Orientation was toward Latin America , with heavy focus on terrorist organizations and activities. Anderson 5 operations tended to be highly imaginative , often complex_ 71 BECRBT BBNBITIVE NOPORX 'Ic on ing ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== 14- QoooQ SEP 28 '98 05:20PM1 P.2 0 % C R 8 T / NOFORN PAPER: THE IMS TEAM FINALLY GOES HOME In May 1980 the IMS analyst group detailed to the CI Staff to deal with the paper inherited from the Angleton Staff finally completea its work and returned to IMS _ In all, during the preceding four and a half years some 600 feet of CI Staff files had been reviewed _ about 375 feet by IMS and 225 feet by CI Staff personnel The Analysis Group maln index had peen reduced from 500,000 cards in 1975 to 28 , 000 _ DERYABIN RETIRES Peter (Petr) Deryabin retired in January 1981 on the eve of his 6oth birthday, One of the early group of KGB ofricers to come to the West following the death of stalin in 1953 _ he had defected in Vienna in 1954 _ Since that time he had been continually as8ociated with, and in effect a ward of the CI Staff. For a number of years he, along with other defectors , 114 8 B @ R B T / NOFORN

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