Transcript of 104-10301-10001.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== DOOQ 104-10301-10001] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 SECRET CIA Internal U8 e Only Acc e8 8 Controlled DDO Hi SToRICAL STAFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENcY WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION 1946 1965 DDO HP 324 by David R . Mcleaf Approved; 424 David A Phillips Chief Wes tern Hemisphere Division Directorate of Operations December 1973 VoLUME 1 No . 1 : WR No - 2 : 0 /DDO SECRET by Copy Copy ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== SECRET Latin American officers in Panama ) and also supplied material for the US Army Intelligence School to use in training foreign students on Communism Nine CIA officers lectured at a Fort Holabird course for senior Latin American officers in 1961 , capping their presenta- tion by producing a Soviet defector who spoke on the Soviet intelligence service . 267/ CIA maintained a station in Havana throughout 1960 but faced increasing operational difficulties -_ Some of CIA' s own making. Probably the outstanding was the capture of three TSD technicians caught L Kevs "5 Ageney ofpicatina" nilyophoae this thopeext Coin China made when the technicians were released 18 months later, showed that they had ignored many of the basic rules of tradecraft. On the other hand, the Cubans had given 26 8 / them perfunctory interrogations In 1960 the Havana Station consisted of James A< Noe17 chief of station; Arthur Avignon deputy; 9 about six case officers and as many secretaries _ Life was unpleasant ; Castro agents shadowed American Em- bassy personnel , monitored their te lephone conversa- tions and tried to pump their children about what 233 SECRET Ipe flap only ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== SECRET was doing . As relations between the United States and Cuba deteriorated the station concentrated on support for the Cuban invasion then being planned , and on developing stay-behind assets _ Frank Belsito and later Ralph Seehafer were designated as "stay - behind officers" and regularly reported on a dozen or S0 agents and nets , a few of which survived the station' s closing. * 1 was ptediceabiea bIegkaa dupiog Ehe fellt8o3 "196d Fafabay dependents were moving themselves and their house - hold effects back to the United States _ Avignon made a special trip on the Havana-Key West ferry to take out his personal silverware , and a S1,500 violin. Station files not absolutely essen- tial were crated and shipped back to Headquarters . Case officers were working 15-hour 9 seven-day weeks . When the break came , the Embassy had three days notice that it would close on 4 January 1961 _ The CIA station had just installed a new incinerator * One stay-behind agent 2 AMFOX -1 , was still report - in 1973 but WH Division believed he had been doubled _ 234 SECRET daddy car, days ing ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET and managed to burn what files it could not ship to Key West on the attache aircraft . When they we re not burning papers or smashing te chnical equipment , case officers were caching radios or making advance payments to agents left behind. On 4 January station personnel met at the EmbassY , rode in convoy to the ferry , and sailed to the States A few , like William J Murray , had main- tained houses until the end and lost everything in 269 / them . * This was the period when Fide 1 Cas as ye t unrestrained by his more cautious and practical Soviet L Mdvfec | Hemisphere 9 was besd I3nd Roping U31nf Gzoubae phna%h the "exporting the revolution A typical target was Honduras the poorest and most primitive country in Central America _ CIA" s reaction was als0 typical of the "nation-building' and "institution-building" approach to counte ring subversion When Castro began his propaganda campaign in * Two years later Congress authorized the Department of State to reimburse its employees the depreciated value of furnishings left in Cuba . Paymen ts fe11 far short of replacement costs 235 SECRET tro , ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== of assets commencing with a close per- s onal relationship be tween the station chief and the President of Mexico, high - leve 1 telephone taps photographic sur- veillance unilatefai intelligence as sets and a broad scale of covert action capabilities_ Within a week of the inspector' s visit Frederick W . Cole was relieved as chief of station in La Paz , partly because of comments made by Ambas sador Ben Stephansky , a former labor attache wh0 had not worked closely with CIA_ Lyle T. Shannon COS 9 Panama City , left WH Division (perhaps coincidentally) 8 few months after the Inspector General had described him thus : The chief of station is a GS - 1 8 who has served in many different posts in the Agency He has been in Panama for about five years _ A wide gap in human relations exists between the chief of station and his staff He is coldly aloof and is reputed to brook no dif- ference of on even on questions of operational procedures He is a hard-driving administrator His tal- ents along this line are granted even by the Ambassador who bluntly dis credits his ability a5 an intelligence officer 275/ Although the separate Task Force W (TFW) was = not officially established until 8 March 1962 , the planning and execution of the Bay of operation 242 SECRET opini Pigs ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET were for al1 practical purposes conducted indepen - dently of WH Division and therefore are not covered in this history . There was an informal but under- stood shortcut in the chain of command; basic deci 7 s ions were made at the DDP ) DCI , or Pres idential level. Although S ome of the personne1 were de - tailed from WH Division , the Cuban Headquarters unit was in another building and no one pretended that J . C . was running the show . Jacob D Esterline a veteran WH Division officer who later became deputy chief of the divi- L aa; invasion OnLeftozpt] the acabtookhE; dordez theohihdup DDP When the Cuban unit was made officially autono- mous a5 TFW and later as the Special Affairs Staff (SAS) 9 it was headed first by Willia K. Harvey and then by Desmond FitzGerald Bruce B . Cheever and John LS Hart , none of whom had previous service in WH Division_ It was not until 1965 that the Cuban unit really lost its autonomY and again came firmly unde r WH Division Actual expenditures in FY 1961 illustrate the disparity between Cuban operations and the 243 SECRET key King ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 14-000QQ SECRET parent WH Division In that yYear total ob ligations 99 for Cuban operations were /s41,498,743f or almost 99 four times the 611,003,991] spent in the rest of Latin America. Except for Cuba 1961 was a repre - sentative year, and these we re the obligations for regular stations throughout the hemisphere: Brazil 81,498,101 Colombia 8301,389 Mexico 1;384,505 Dominican 261,148 Vene zue la 922 ,424 Costa Rica 231 351 Argentina 802 ,302 El Salvador 222 ,037 Chile 646 768 Honduras 103 820 95 Panana 579,310 Nicaragua 92 , 0 88 Uruguay 521,082 Haiti 77 6 75 Guatemala 418,778 Paraguay 54,606 Peru 380 , 422 West Indies 41 864 Ecuador 336 ,36 7 Puerto Rico 24,37,7 Bolivia 303 ,210 276 Until the nearly 1,200 prisoners taken at the of could be ransomed with shipments of maceuticals 9 CIA regularly supported their dependents in the United States. In the opinio of the General Counsel , if a dependent had sued , courts would probab ly have found that Cuban Brigade members were entitled to the bene fits of the Federal Emp loyees Compensation Act . Thus by mid-1962 CIA was disbursing 8311,500 per mon th to the dependents 9 plus bonuses and medical care for invaders who managed to return These ex- penses 9 however, were from special funds outs ide 244 SECRET 3 /zc| Rep . Bay Pigs phar - paid ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 4-Qoooo 277/ the WH Division budget Probably Castro' s attempt to export his revo- lution reached its peak in 1962 _ The first Castro- inspired guerrilla action in Latin America occurred in March of that year, when Indians in the interior of Peru attacked the towns of Huampani and Satipo . A Lima Station penetration agent identified their leader a5 Cuban-trained and reported that radios and weapons_ had been smuggled in from Cuba to start the 278/ attack- At year' s end the US Government planned to as semble for the Organization of American States a white paper on Cuban subversion in Latin America, and in February 1963 WH Division chiefs of station met in Panama to discuss their contributions with the DCI _ From this meeting came a picture of Castro' s campaign of subversion Argentina reported that left-wing Peronists were an attractive target for Cuba; police had cap - tured a group of terrorists organized and directed by John William Cooke 9 an ex-Peronist then in Cuba _ Bolivia knew of 217 activists trained in Cuba within nine months and was looking forward to debriefing 245 SECRET ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 14-000QQ SECRET Everyone breathed easier _ and the Chief, WH Division, described the operation as "one of the most tightly held of our Cuban activities Two years later the hold was not S0 tight , for on 26 March 1965 the' New York Times front-paged a' re asonab ly com - plete and accurate account of the great sugar-sabotage operation under the headline: PRES IDENT KENNEDY BALKED CIA PLOT ON RUSSIAN SUGAR Press services picked up the story United L V,8aa= GIGttg,athonan but addodfcqaf #wate FRougatinpeiveng tion' foiled the Central Intelligence Agency S Carib - 283/ bean melodrama CIA, as usual had no comen t For across the-board coverage of Cuba in the early 1960 ' s the Mexico City Station was tops Reporting on the Cuban Embassy , the COS said in Feb - ruary 1963: We intercept their mail,_photograph a11 the people who go in and out of the Embassy cover their telephones completely , and within a few hours of the conversa- tions have resumes of al1 the phone calls We cover their trash , and this has been found to be useful And included in the usefulness was the discovery of a man who : wa5 goaoupeactostion 8f the?Embashought was 252 'Inj SECRET 98 ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 14-00ooQ CIA had seven different microphones in the Cub an Embassy , one hidden in a of the coffee tab le in the Ambassador' s office Like most audio operations this one produced a lot of chaff but it als0 yielded bits of operational information showing connections be tween the Embassy and local Comunists and students At the airport the station was getting photographs of a11 trave llers to Cuba, about 300 photos per of their passports and documents 24 Included in the take from the Cuban Embassy were the serial numbers of weapons bought by Commu - nists for smuggling into Guatemala, plus the names and positions of the sellers Complicating the ex- ploitation 0f this information was the fact that the we apons had been sold Mexican officials 9 and while the station wanted to stop the smuggling and appre - hend the Communist smugglers it had no desire to upset sensitive relations with the Mexican Gove rnment Two high-level officers of the Cuban Embassy , one of them the cultural attache were recruited CIA penetrations The station had sent three agen ts into Cuba and was getting reports from them by secret 253 SECRET 2/z| leg day plus by ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== 14-0000Q writing. Meanwhile it was servicing 17 accommoda - tion addresses for Headquarters and Miami In spite of a11 this there was little exploi- table evidence that Cuba was using Mexico as a base for subversion in the rest 0f Latin America _ Mexico was the only Latin American nation to maintain diplo- matic relations: with Cuba in the face of an OAS reso- 1 lution intended to isolate the island. Anxious to retain this bridge to the Western Hemisphere Castro had ordered his Embassy to do nothing which might be 284/ considered offensive by the Mexican Government No such restraint was applied to Venezue la , where Castro-supported terrorism was rampant . On 2 November 1963 , on a tip from a campes the Servicio de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas 46 (SIFA) found a cache of more than three tons f Cuban arms on a beach on the Paraguana Peninsula in northwest Venezuela . CIA learned about it promptly through liaison_ Jonathan G . Hanke , a Caracas case_ officer, brought sample weapons to Washington, where CIA was able to raise the serial numbers and Cuban Army in- signia which had been ground off_ Richard Helms , 254 SECRET in0, IRI ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== 14-0000Q SECRET blocs in the country: Barrientos supported by the campesinos; General Alfredo Ovando Candia , supported by the army ; and the Communists and leftists sup- ported by tough mine and factory workers _ To have Barrientos elected, CIA first had to proote a_ credible election by underwriting the campaigns of both the selected winner and his token opposition at the polls The real question was whe ther elections would be he ld at al1. In 18 months the La Paz Station spent $585 ,00 0 , first to persuade the armed forces L Eatrietod clamp doxo cu ,hehenftoscoj convince 9 then Gvando hads] should not interfere and finally to promote enough politi- cal opposition to make the election plausible _ In a ` genuine tour de force, COS Lawrence M. Sternfield produced what OAS observers called a democratic and honest election- -and got the results from the elec- toral tribunal four days be fore' the election On 7 April 196 4 President Lyndon B. Johnson presided at a White House mee ting which laid down general guidelines for CIA action against Cuba _ Others at the meeting included Secretary of State 279 (Ihl SECRET ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET De an Rusk , Secretary of De fense Robert S .. McNamara > . General Maxwell Taylor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Presidential Advisor McGeorge Bundy , DCI John A McCone _ DDP Richard He lns and FitzGerald. There was no question about charging CIA with the following types of activity: E 1 Collection of intelligence 2 Covert propaganda to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance 3 . Cooperation with other agencies 1 in econante__ ranfendeait8 Ldentify and estab = lish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba _ 5 _ Indirect economic sabotage . There was sharp disagreement , however , over whether CIA should continue infiltrating sabotage agents into Cuba _ McNamara , Taylor and McCone favored more s abotage. raids but Rusk and Bundy feared that 1 CIA raids might undermine the US "clean hands" 91 pos - ture in the OAS or give the Soviets an excuse for delaying turnover of their surface-to-air missile 280 SECRET ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET (SAM) sites to the Cubans Finally Rusk recommended that CIA' s raiding assets be ' kept in being but not actually used--at least until the OAS and SAM sites prob lems could be clarified. The: President accepted this recommenda - tion _ Although CIA did try to keep: its sabotage ready , the White House decision spelled the agents end of the Agency' s. sabotage (though not support and 306_ inte 1ligence-collecting) infiltrations of Cuba. Agency-sponsored radio propaganda aimed at Cuba reached its in early 1965 with an actual expenditure of about $1,500 , 00 0 and expans ion still planned . The semi-notional Cuban Free dom . Committee [ Gasved a as totcovof fot hoadio eckay ( Cubon Kficbnbroeds in Miami 9 Key West , and New Orleans Started in 1961 , the Cuban Freedom Committee retained a public relations firm and spent: $7,000 annually to establish its cover by soliciting bona fide public contributions In its first year these totalled: $5,000 , but by 1965 lic support had dwin- dled to $200 _ One of the difficulties: was that any widespread US appeal for funds for Radio Free Cuba 2 81 SECRET peak pub ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET would perforce have to attack Castro, and might there - fore be considered domestic propaganda exceeding CIA' s charter _ Outside the committee , CIA operated a trans - mitter calling itself Radio Americas and broad - cas from Swan Island and bought time for anti- Cuban broadcasts from three commercial stations Programming on these four stations totalled 119 hours_weekly in addition to the 77 on Radio Free 307 / Cuba_ Swan Island roughly a mile and a half long and three-quarters of a mile wide , lies in the Carib- bean 125 miles north of the Honduran coast Both the 1 UIsicnd Siatbe 1960 Fo, Fonduthe G3 KaedhecyGuciau h had @.a88 a weather station there since 1949 9 and CIA first set up a covert transmitter in 1954 to support its propa- ganda against the Arbenz regime in Guatemala _ * Apart from the question of its real impact-in Cuba and the psychological problems of a . staff living * Under a 1971 agreement the US relinquished .its claim to sovereignty but retained the right to operate a weather station 2 8 2 SECRET ting ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 14-000QQ SECRET in almost total isolation , the Swan Island transmitter raised a nightmare of cover complications , Operating as Radio Americas it was supposedly under cover of the Vanguard Service Corporation 9 an Agency proprie - tary which offered no services , and the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation , another proprietary which operated no steamships _ A Boston millionaire who claimed to Own the island collected rent from the Vanguard Corporation , which could not afford to argue, but not from the Weather Bureau ) which disputed his claim_ Vanguard contracted with Coastal Air of Miami for one light-aircraft supply flight a week and with the Logistics Service Corporation of Phila- delphia , a Philco subsidiary , to maintain the island facilities and transmitting equipment . Al1 of this enabled CIA to play tapes and broadcast the commen - taries of the three Cuban announcers stationed on the island , but it did not prevent Radio Habana from pinpointing the transmitter and calling it a 308_ CIA propaganda mechanism _ Nevertheless in early 1965 Congressman Roman 96 C. Pucinski (D- I11.) , a member of the Cuban Freedom Comittee executive board , was press ing CIA to saturate 283 SECRET (J1U ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET the Cuban airwaves and smuggle or airdrop transistor radios into Cuba to expand the audience Inside the Agency FitzGerald politely rejected the congressional advice but pointed out that WH Division already was planning the University of the Air," which would broadcast college - level courses to divide the loyalty 30 9_ of Cuban students Another congressional critic was Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn .) , perennial sponsor of bills to create a_ CIA Watchdog Committee and author of a January 1964 Saturdey Evening Post article entitled "The CIA Is Getting Out Of Hand . Wv In April 1965 FitzGerald and Seymour Bolten of WH Division met with the Senator to discuss the Christian Democratic social and political programs of the Catholic Church in Latin America. After this mee ting McCarthy , a devout Catholic, considerably tempered his assess - 310/ ment of the_Agency US relations with Cuba entered a new phase after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when Agency * This project was abandoned following press expo - sure of CIA S relations with Ame rican universities and student groups 284 z// SECRET ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET facilities provided the Kennedy administration with pos itive information on the buildup of Soviet mis - sile capability on the island _ This episode is docu - mented elsewhere and is outs ide' the s cope of this present paper One of FitzGerald' s major successes' against Cuba was in the field of economic warfare --called the MHVIPER program in CIA After a hurricane ripped through the island in 196 4 , Castro' s econo- mists and publicists began a campaign to persuade free-world sugar brokers that the Cuban sugar crop had been badly damaged and exports would be low _ The object , of course , was to drive up sugar prices L bard dlcuroeio heins Einance Yiapo Ca Castro depended for At first the campaign worked and sugar prices did skyrocket. But FitzGerald was not convinced, and sent Natalie Scott to London to study economic reports from the British Embassy in Havana . Partly on the' basis of her research , the US Government! s sugar-crop forecasters concluded that despite the hurricane Cuba would harvest more sugar than ever. FitzGerald arranged to have a- Department of 2 85 SECRET ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET State official leak this general conclusion to the New York Times: Sugar ces dipped, but rallied when Castro indignantly denied the Times story . The Department then officially announced the US Govern - ment estimate that there would be n0 shortage of Cuban sugar. As it turned out , the US estimate was right. After the official announ cement world sugar prices dropped several cents per pound , and this time they stayed down _ At a time when fluctuations of one cent a pound meant millions of dollars to the Cuban economy 9 publication of the essentially L Iateeth the ntkato_Eet Castro 's attempts to manipu - Late in the summer of 1964. the DDI told Fitz- Gerald that the . Department of State was inquiring informally about the possibility of setting up a CIA channel for plausibly deniable clandestine con- tacts with Cuba. FitzGerald replied: It seems to me that the establishment of a continuous two-way conversation with Fidel Castro at a time when we have noth- to convey to him would_ be a serious mistake It may - be that Secretary Rusk feels that the present establishment of conversations with Fide1 Castro should 286 SECRET prit ing ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET be considered in order to make sure that we will have the ability to speak to him when or if the time comes On this score I do not feel there is any reason for worry . There are a number of ways in which we can communicate to Fide1 Castro virtually at a moment ' s notice 312_ Part of CIA:' s economic warfare against Cuba involved an elaborate scheme to supply tampered pet- roleum additives through an Agency mechanism in An - twerp _ This was planned as subtle sabotage ; after mixed with Soviet petroleum the additives would 7 Gfortuhat ypeche Z6.y_ docto,edcaoaftiyta Crbee;"acyining: but subtle and the Cubans promptly discovered 313/ were unus able Als0 a: failure was an attempt Francis S . Sherry and William C. BoneT , Jr. 9 of the Cuban Oper- ations Group (WH/ COG) to persuade Detroit automobile executives to produce spare parts: deliberately de - signed to break down _ Sherry and Boner went to De - troit in early March 1965 and explained to manufac- turing vice presidents that the defective parts could be sent to Cuba through third-country suppliers _ But_ the automobile executives refused to cooperate; feared that their companies reputations would 287 JN SECRET being ly , they by they ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET be ruined if the doctored parts accidentally got in- 314 to the wrong channe ls In the wake of the ill-fated Bay of inz vasion of 1961 and the active years of 1962-1964 , anti-Castro operations began to diminish in 1965 . Operations continued but at a s lower pace _ John L: Hart had the title of Deputy Chief , WH Division, for 1 Cibh Cocrho/ Jutond?, ) andmpperated cdai]2 8afahousa; in Miami ) training sites and boat-moorages stretched through the Florida keys to West. From these CIA launched maritime operations which regularly placed and retrieved agents from the Cuban coast , but whose intelligence product often did not justify the 315/ effort. Meanwhile CIA ran a dwindling number of on-island intelligence agents , including some handled in cooperation with the US Navy base at Guantanamo , where hundreds vf, Cubans still worked by and returned to Castroland at night _ As the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) improved and expanded under Soviet tutelage , CIA agent networks were rolled up and even singleton 1 288 IR SECRET Pigs Key day ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET agents dropped out of contact_ Typical was Radio Habana ' s 12 1965 announcement that "31 counter- revolutionaries > members of a CIA espionage network" had been arrested. Of the 14 actually naned in the broadcast , WH Division identified six who had worked with Juan Bautista Perez Luis (AMTAUP - 10) , chief gardener at the naval base and principal agent for CIA_ Although he had been debriefed in Miami in Jan - uary Perez' location and status were not known in 316/ Probably the most successful political oper- ation in WH Division ' s history was the Chilean elec- [ the CfistSen 4 Sap Beboct1964 Parky rxhiGaciduvcdy defeated Salvador Allende Marxist leader of a Communist - dominated coalition_ * Dr awing on covert mechanisms established by Santiago Station Years earlier, plus new procedures and assets deve loped for the election the campaign to assure Frei' s victory cost CIA about $2 ,600 ,0 00 . Its success kept Allende at until 1970 , when no such intervention by CIA was authorized. * For a full description, See "The Chile an Election Operation of 1964 , a Case History , 1961-1964 .' 11 CSHP-l - 289 'IRJ SECRET May May _ }f bay ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== QoooQ SECRET that FitzGerald had won the President' s confidence in several meetings Freeman 9 who had been in Mexico only a few months apparently simmered down after his 318/ talk with the assistant secretary The Mexico City Station devoted a major part of its time to running or supporting operations against Cuba; 47 percent of its cab le traffic con- cerned Cuban operations Mexico was the only Latin American country maintaining diplomatic relations with Castro and had the only direct air link to Ha - vana WH Division assigned top priority to recruit- agents in place in Cuba , and Mexico City Station not ran its own operations but supported the tentative plans of other stations The variety and volume of technical operations created a heavy workload managing safehouses ) listen- ing posts , and vehicles - For photography_ alone the station had six base houses comman ding the entrances to target embassies two mobile photosurveillance trucks and three agents trained in photosurveillance on foot. It was such projects that provided informa - tion on the visits of Lee Harvey .Oswald 9 President Kennedy ' $ assassin , to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies 293' L SECRET Ira ing only ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== QoooQ SECRET 319 in Mexico ; CIA' s clandestine information on Oswald , in- cluding a photograph showing him in front of the Soviet Embassy , was turned over to the FBI which promised to safeguard Agency sources and me thods Instead , the Bureau showed the photograph to Oswald' s mother in Dallas and told her it was a_ CIA photo. The mother gave the press a garbled story about the photo, the FBI gave the press the correct story , and eventually CIA' s clandestine information became part of the voluminous Warren Commission report on the Kennedy assassination _ In the process Mexico City Station had to abandon its photosurveillance 320 base houses _ which had been thorough ly blown In the early 1960 ' s WH Division built an ex- tensive political polling mechanism around the Insti- L tute [ofoietac E the Cohoge PojeGt GrypEoFpixis ] JNIUBAens = From 1962 to 1966 the institute conducted 20 polls in nine Latin American countries _ Their cost cannot be computed because many of the expenses were charged to other projects _ 98 In FY 1965 , for example , tical polls in 294 SECRET poli

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