Transcript of 104-10210-10009.pdf
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14-Q0000 104-10210-10009] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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1 October 1463
CONCLUSIO:S AND COMIENTS
IN THE CASK OF
YURIY IVANOFCI AOSENKO
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SEi_(,
Ocicbor J'68
MZMORANDUV FOR: Cirectcz &: Sccurity
FROM Dczety Ciicl, Sccuzity Rescazch Statf
SUCJECT AQENO, Yuriy Xvaaovich
1, Ja accorcancc %ilh L.o rscucs: of th Dcpuly Circetor
of Central Intclliccacc, iinckze I3 2 cumrssary/w:k ccccli5io35
coacorolnz tha bonj {iecs of Yur y Ivanovich NOSzNi;O. Sub-
concluelona ar0 Conialucd ia tic finraJty ccscersi?? scveze[
major area8 whlch WCro €iver prirsazy cocbldczatioa [n i42 Diaetcr
of 'tho bopa [ldoe of_NCSZ;KO:
2, Includzd In lbio € wnxtsiry :rc co:cmcats conceraice
conclueions in tho pacvicec #ranzzy ard an ZGCCX: conta%aIr; %0-
arkc Oa throo €cjazat0 #ebjvcic reiatcc to t3c NOSINKJ 6a30.
3, Id bricf, {4u conckibica 0.388 :EtZf} %0 {8} NOsfiXo
{8 &h0 porson ho claicas {0 bc, Lhj: kc %eid bic clalrncu posiiioz} In
lho KGE durlug 1 953 ~Jaruazy ]%u<, lcar NCSE;Ko was Jct dis-
Patchcd by tho %Gz, Jcc Gct %s Orevicua Jlcs &Ed exag:cratkon?
aro not Jctwally o: raJtcrial clgniicancc 3t tbis tkmnc.
Bruco La Solio
Attachment;
"Sumrary
CO01CC?
BLS;ko
"#
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IA312Cf CCWZENTS
I Inircduction
D. "Surmary o: Developmnezis i3 NCSZIKO Case S:rce
30.October 1967
XI; Arakytica] Correzts Corcezairg t.e 3ona Fides 0 Yuriy
Ivanovich NOSZNKO
A. Is NOSENKO Idericai to te Person Wkom He Clai ns
to be ?
B. Is the Claimed *3 Careez c: NCSENKO Piausible?
C,- Has NOSZNKO G:ven az Acceztable Explaza:on oi
Fis Moiiva;:oz in Coziacting CLA in 1982,and Fo:
His Defectior: in 1964?
D_ I8 the Infozration Zurziszed by NOSENKO to CLA
Concerairg KCB Ozeraz:ozs , Persoralities, arc
Organizatior Reasozas y Cormensurate With Es
Claixed KG? Career?
E: Can tne Iniorratior Zurnisked by NOSZNXO be
Consicered Ir Toto &s Havizg Resulted in Vaterta:
Damage to t.e KG3 azcloz %as the Zaiormatioa
Fuznishned by NOSZNKO 3een %f Signiicazt Berezt
to Western Irtelligerce?
F I8 Therc Eviderce of KGB Deception or "Give-Awzy"
in Jformaton Fursiszed by NOSENKO Which Wozed
Warrant a Cozclusica that NOSENKO was Dispazczed
by the KGB ?
CO61CC3
SECBZT
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iJ
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G. 18 Therc Evicece 0: & ?o.ii-cal or O;`_c7 Type
Objective Wric: Could Juziiy & Sispaich 0 AOSENKO
by inc %C3 Wi: ?uz.ssion [0 Speak Frecs; t0 CZA
Conceraizg %is Xnow_ecge 0 #e KC3 and Wi:hout
NCSENZO 3cizg Civc: & Specific Vission 0 Vissions ?
H. Is Tiere Zvicence ZkJ: te Coniacts 0f ICSZNKO ir
{962 0r i: .964 Wii: CIA Wc:c Known to t.0,%C2 ?-07
t0 Fis Jeieciior Or Tha: NOSZNO Was Zver Zriefec
by tie KC3 Relatvc to fs 3eravior or KG? Objectives
During Tkese Cojiacta o: Ater Ks Dezecic??
IvV_ Comments Concernisg Previous Conclusions in Regazd t0 ACSZAKO
A. NOSENZO Did No; Serve in tke Naval Ri in of #c
Cajacitics or af thc Places azd Zimes Hc Caircd
B_ NOSENKO Did Not Erier tke KGB i& the Marrez or af tnc
Timc He Claimed
C._ NOSENKO Did Not Serve in thc American Embassy Section
Throughout the 1953 1955 Period a8 Hc Cxaimed
D. During the Perioc' ] 955 1960, Ke Was Neithez a Sezior
Case Oiicer in, Tor Depity Chief oi, Sevezth
Departmeat Arsericar-British Cornmorwvea.h Sect:oz
E. NOSENKO Was Neitaer Deputy Chief of the Arnezican Embassy
Section nor a Senior Oficez or Sizervisor j the Secton
During tae Period:R9o: 1962-(sic)
F NOSENKO's Ciaims, Tra: & 1962 Fe was Crie: 0f the
Arnericar-British Corcmorwealtz Section 2za Was
Thereafter & Depity Chicf Of tae Severth Dejartrent,
Are Not Credible
G NOSZNKO Has no Valic Cla:m to Certainty That the KGB
Recruited No Amezica; Embassy Personrel 3etween
1953 and His Deiection in 1964
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V . 3
fnex 6 Siieze: o: Sovic: Ozcia.& Abour NCSZTKO
Anacx 2 Si;:. 7128 0. Cibej No: Zxastired in Fext
Arnex C Trl C.itzizanor ?upers
GO010C5
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SECKEI
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6805
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Ehtd 6 uttt SECRET
6uanaus.ud
(eehstnentbt
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INTRODUCTION
The following 8ummary and analysis i8 not intended to be
all inclugive , tbat i6 to contain a specific comment on all organi -
zational, operational, perbonality and case type information furnibhed
by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO: To attempt to do 80 would be repetitious
and confubing to the reader and would not be o material benefit in the
formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited area8 o
primary concern.
Thie summary will not contain a detailed peychological
a88e8ement of NOSENKO nor will it contain'a recitation of the numeroue
theories which have been-promulgated in 'the past concerning varying
abpects Of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily
directed toward the question o whether NOSENKO wa8 or wa 6
dispatched by the KGB , wbether his claimed KGB career i8 relatively
plausible and whether he ha8 since late October 1967 been cooperative in
a 'reassessment Of the entire cabe for or againbt NOSENKO. NOSENKO
ba8 admitted certain lie8 and exaggeration8 in the past but claime that
tbege were of a personal nature, intended to enhance hib own importance
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SGREI
but not to miblead tbis Agency in any material matter8 of an operational
or policy nature.
In order to avoid any misuncerstanding of the phrase "bona
fides" a5 considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged ?rimarily
on whethcr be voluntarily defected to this Agency witbout KGB knosledge,
and whether hie 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representative8 of thib
Agency_were known to the: KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent
aspects will be considered, but hi8 admitted previoub errore, lie8 and
exaggerationg will not per 6e warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO i0 not a
"uona fide" defector.
There i6 not an accurate standard or scale of mcasurement
against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or
correlated to determine if be i8 i8 not a dispatched KGB officer. For
purpobes Of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary liet of area8
considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may difier in regard to
whether this arbitrary 8tandard i8 a completely accurate etandara, but it
i8 felt tbat the information from NOSENKO and information from other
bources derived througb independent investigation will permit the reader
to 866e85 the information-in toto against any etandard be considere
appropriate.
The Previous summary on NOSENKO entitled;, "The. Exami -
nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, hag been conbidered jn
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E10 P*epataflon of tblo bummaFY- It stJI bo cornmentod on [n part
erd ulo summsry #IL Include concluotona correlaled wits &r soven
Ptlmery conclustons bot forth On Fag0 358 of tho ebovo #MMra[Y .
Rennarke concernlag cortel# srrore, tncons(atenclee, omlaalons and
uneupparted copcluslone In"Lbe prevloos summary ia rogrd to bpectfic
Cajed or bab-eroa0 WLL be lecluded Lp thle summLry. However, mle
Jummary WlL pot loclude e polot-by-potot comperibon ol #U aroat oL
Bbteamo1} Or dlsagreemene Mtb Lnlormetion contatned In tbe provloud
aummast:
poeltvo doclolon In rogard t NOSENKO beeed on all
evetlable lnlormatlon.ghoald be mada bn tho Irimedlato future. Taore
0T0 80 %ord boujce 8 curreruy a@llaale-to pronido new Poeitlve
Latormadlon concornlog NOSENKO and bte bopa {ldee. It Ie recognlaed
t886 thore d0 alwaye @ Poosibullty ln &b0 future 4 Dow BoWrCB 0} BouTCq8
Si be abla to turnieh aaditional tnformatlon in regard t NOSENKO.
Howover, thbld poeelbillty f0 exceedlagly tenuouo and It (0 {Olt LAore
J0 cafflclent Inforratlon avallable O0 vblcb to boeo a conclusloa b
to NOSENKO matter .
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SECRET
II SUKVARY O7 DEVEC?)ENTS Z1 JCSZNKO CASz
SIACE 30 OCTOBZR 1967
6600
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S3CRE;
SUVNARY QF DEVELOPVENTS IN NOSENKO CASE
SIACZ 30 OCTOBER 1967
Since 30 October 1967 , interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
bave been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to
NOSENKO but wbo ba8 been aware 0f the NOSENKO case Bince June 1962.
Interviews have been detailed and very extenbive in bcope, hbave
been recorded and transcribed, and bave covered the entire life and caree:'
of NOSENKO without regard to whether & particular aspect had been
covercd during previou8 interview or interview6 .
NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during tbe firet
interviewe, ba8 been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and
the interviewer bag noted no 6ignificant reluctance to discuss any abpect
of hie life, careet, or activitie &. On occasion NOSENO ha; indicated a
reluctance to make positive statements in certain area8 previously
considered at a minimum extremely controversial. Thib reluctance
wa8 underbtandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the
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interviewcr would not Cispule 0r disparage his statemente without adeguate
rea bon, tii9 rcluctancc on the part 0 NOSZNXO, in tfc opinion o: the
interviewer, totaiiy disaPpcared.
During the interviewirz ?eriod, particularly in the first 5ix monthe ,
~OSENXO naterially assisted tne intcrviewer by ?reparing approximately
memoranda on such diverse subjects a8 his lie, motivation ior de-
{ection, individua] cases, notes which nc furnished t0 CL in 1964, KGa
organization, and KGB officer and agent personalitie8. Ae an example
of the 8co?e Of thi8 work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included
remark8 concerning approximatelyfez5]KGB officers, [ogKG agents,
35{GRU olficcre, and[ooother Soviet nationals _ Theee liste were aJpha -
beticaliy arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO ha8
ma terially a9sisted in the orgagization and evaluation of iniormation
Iurnished by him during current interviews_
Copie8 Of transcript8 0 interviews with NOSZNKO and relatea
memoranda have been dissem:ratcd to the FBI and the CI Stafi. Special
Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent Jane8 Wooten of the Washington
Field OfficelFBI in particular have given great assistance in research
and compilation o new or additional information and the FBI hag inter-
viewed or reinterviewed a number 0f United State8 citizene concerning
whom NOSENKO has furnished ?ertinent information.
2
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addluon, thraa proloeelonale Irorn (be SB DlvIelon beve
rovlorved 8na current [nformatlon and sblarod In tbo retrloval o
prevtona Ialormnallon {rom NOSENKO and collallon 0l current
Infertoallon wIt& Prevloue [nformatk 1. Tba lattar !$ a tramerdous
tbk bocauao 0l 08o volurae of mtertel; te pumber ol Indivlduel
cesa8 {rvolved} apd &he axtenalvo Lnlorretlon [n regard to XGB
Porocnalltlee, Preceduret, orgenleatloaal etructure &nd activItfos.
Tbo BB Dlvelon elgo provldod €4o perricee @ 40 orpott
treneletor t0 tenalate tba lepo8 0l tbe 1965 Interrogallon of NOBENK?)
by Potr DERYABIN and oRa o tbe prevlouoly mootloned three pto-
Lobolanala complelad 0 new tranolatlon 0 t0 1962 Latervlawo wt
NOSENKO. In addluon, transertpttone 0I cortaln odkter portlcwlarLy
pestloaat Prevloas Intervlerza of NOSENKO have bean complotod by
eho Offlce 0l Socurlty .
Approelmately 7000 Pagoa 0[ traaecrlpta and rolatad matortal
bavo booa comptled and dlegomluated ateco late Ocbober 1967 . Com -
ienta coneoralng tha valua ol tba Informetion contallned tn tho eboro
metertal a50 contaled In anotber pectlon 0{ tale qurnary- Ao 0( to
Prob8p} ttrno, 0 complote analyoie (o pot posolblo gince 0 conelderebla
Portiod a( tho matorlal hao not beon fuUy Procoaoad. M taa Proporatlod
0I dte emmary all asea8 0f malor blalilcance have btoa eramlaed:
Bocanso 0L tbe volamlnoue 'lnlormatlon . AJl analytlcal end colketlon work
bas ao8 boea complatod; but &t Io pot coneldored that, baged o0 eu ,
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arllablo Lalormallon, the remalnteg work will materbaly alloct
0.9 conclelone drewn [n thlo numrnary.
Te polygraph lntorvdav &t NOSENKO wa8 Lnltleted o
8 Aeguet apd concludod on 6 Auguet 1968. Approalmstely bkrty
quaddone 0I & Pertlpont pature were [ncluded In &a polygrapb Lator -
vow , No probleme wero &ncouatared durlng ta polygrapb Laterrorz
a5 n0 e#eItlon l teatlng 0t NOSENKO {e aatlelpatad. Atacbed lo 0"
copy 6[ tis BOL_Orplanaloty fepor} Op tbo retelte 0[ tbo polygropa
lntorvou_
Lotarvlowe wIta NOSENKO have-coatinued alnce tbo polysepa
togorvlov 0n temporarly redaced bcilo' (d order to pormlta rovew
0f prevtoua Anlormatlon and proparatlon %Laehfe bummasy: Tnore 10,
Do dopbt tkae Ipturo Mntezvd0ve 1lts NOSEMKO wMll rereal [nforaedoa
0t Intolllgenco valbo, but taformatton devoloped tbue Lar FIU porralt
dockelon ln tbo caee of: Yurly Ivenovlcb NOSENKO:
Atteehment;
1 68 Polygrapb Rp}
00010i4
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70 Cnic: , Seciizit Reccerch Staff 12 Rusust 1968
ZiC Izterroztzoa Zegearcn @.viaion
SUZJE Yur Avezcvich EQEXzC IRD # 67192
I2ZEZEG DAA
Subject {6 0 Lo yesr Ola fOrcer KC3 Staffer Wco dezected %o tre
U.S. in 1964 % Gezeve ,
@CZCROUN@
#ir. Brucc L. Solic o thc Security Rcccarch Staff ha8 been de-
"oricfIng &rd Interrozatirg Subject g.nce Octobcr 1937.in order to
Icgolve ` tke Issie wzetze: Subdect w3s 0 aLspatci:cd azent Of the %G3:
ic hao conductea 0 vast bzolint 0f rescarch and checking wita sourced
In @r Cffort to cstabiish tke VeracIty 0f Subject '8 staterentb.
2UR2CS2
Tbe primary purpose o2 the polygraph test wac to @eterrlre;
1, Whetber Suoject %as 0 d.6patched Azent o tbe XGB;
2 whetier Sibject had Inteztionaliy &tven Mr . Solle
an felsa Inzormetfon .
PRCCEDURZ
Subject wae &-en a polygrapr examination on 2 fucust 1968 et
8 eafesite In tre vicIzity Of Wasiinston, D.C. Zre exanintion was
conducted In tie Znziish language _ Suoject 6 cozprenersion ana tae
ebility to expres: hizself In Zng ish was completely adequate for
purpoces Of poiyarapn testing. Subject Vas completely cooperative
in 0ll respects. Suoject aisplayed no evasiveness ana] @ppearea to
be completely Zrank wzerever ke was cuestloned or gave Inforration
0n 8 topic.
The followlng relevant questions Mere asked during tbe first tebt;
IB your true nane Yurty Ivenovich AOSEIO? Ye8 .
Were you bora in tse year 1927? Yes .
Besideg tbe A-erIcan8, d1d you tell anyone elee ebout
Intentson to defect? Noa
0001015
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{uehees 617 #tar %
(iv5-d} ni
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your
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JcckZ?
Iz : 614,
7use 2
D.d you evcr teii OtiOr@ in tne Ki3 about jOur contuct with
Ker;car IntcillGerce; ;0,
#cre you Gtvez Icstructiors by tre 7o3 to {0 coctact wita
Ierican IntellGerce? jo.
%czc %ou told dJ tie XCJ to Gefect ir order t0 carry Out 0n
Igteiiigcace ui68fozz Xo,
Zae following relcvert quest:ors "ere @6*cd Guring tre Gecora test:
Did tre KGJ actualiv serz 4 conziin cation for your recall to
tne USSR On the Of your Gcfection? Jo.
Were you acquainted witi CHZ ZZA;OV? Ycs ,
Did you actually trevel to Goraiy In ;iovesber 1963 to hunt for
Ciizzzitov? Ycs .
Are %ou delfocrately uitrholding frcn u6 axy InfortatIon ebout
tne %Ca recrultzent Of Arcricars? ;o.
Doeb tbe {G3 reve XZXZXA @nd {zrTi.Z &0? Yes ,
Wcre you the responsfoze Case Cfficer for Joka Ablaian' in 1960-612
Yes .
3o jou %row tde triie ncze 0f K;DIZY or Siszci? Xo,
Did you ever dsve tucercilQsis? %es,
Zge foilowinz relevazt Guegtions Kere a6icd Op test taree:
Dia you Berve In Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 19537 Yee ,.
Wee]
S58k3]
In the USS? during tke perio 1957 to 1959? Yeb,
To the bebt Of your irnovledgc, vere you in tre Seventh
Departient at tale tIce? Yc6 .
Did you telepaone tbe GRU about [Suuzz7at tule ttse? Yee ,
7o tbe bebt Of your rnowledEe wab ?oPOV coqra Ised beceuse
Of tae letter Nr. Xiaters raLled? Yeb .
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7o cac Ocst 0: your {j*_ceCC) La; ZcR3GY c3oosci to tnc
{J bccelge O: tte 5 753 civciiia;cc 0j tic Brt.tn Z-be6by7
%cc,
%e3 trcr #r Eiglcad::3 :=foriit:or in t.c cotes %ou_brougnt
out {roz tke Sovict iikc3; io.
Dia you Intertfonally exazzerate your perzonal a66oclat:on wlth
CR@i;;ov? So,
Are you aldInz &qy acvczse Izorrstion about your backaround? Ko.
Subxcct'0 poiycrapa tez: reficctcd 1o 6.znl:Icant responsed irdicatzve
of dcccption regaring trc ricvjat Gucstiors asKcu. ;0 further polygraph
tegts verc oiatntstercd 03 643 Gatc occauce tre cxirirer 6i6 not vont to
run txc riox O: fatigue sCtt ns %n ard tnub posbibiy ceusInz edrenalin
exrauscIon,
Zoiycraph tecting %as rcsii-cc on 6 Aucust 1963. Zuo foilovins
rclevant guestiors ver 06*c6 6j tegt four;
Dia You JoIn the XG3 ia ;arch :9537 Ycg ,
Were you 3 KGB Officer : ca 1953 to ig6l? Yes ,
Weze you @ Dejuty Chie? C: tke Seveata icpa;ccezt; Yee .
Kerc you only 0 Coptali 0+ #ris tice? Yes,
#ere en Officer_in #e U.8. Eroassy Secion Iron Narch
1953 to Xay 1955? Ye6 .
In 1958 and 1959 #ere Ycu tCC Dezuty Ciic: Of' the imerIcan-
Britieb-Canaalan Secticz Io tre Severth ~epartaent? Ye6,
7roj January to Eece_ber 1931 werc Jou tre @cputy to tre
Caief of thc Zirbt Sectzoz of trc Zirst Dozar ent? Yes ,
Zror January to July 1982 #ere you the Ciiiez Of tbe ZIrst Section
of tbe Sevcnita Departzez:; Xe8 ,
Vere you an Officer In tze Zirat Section, Zirst Departrent SCD,
@t the tize O' tbe Statrzred operatzon egainst Fenson,
aige%i
[Stroua? Yed . 06,0
06
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Zac folioing re.cvant Gucotiono wcrc agkcd on tecz {Ive;
SInco 1953 &o %ou know 0 &5J Otkcr 3G3 rccru:tzcz:8 Ip tne
Anericen Ebassy beeldes KZiI ard @o.izo}
to.
06
Did tte KGB 7no about tre zotc6 you Drouzs: 7 {o.
Jlovc you told u6 thc complete truth about your %i3 'cercer? Yes .
Did you Intcntiorally Cxojiczate your >crcoral irvoivezcrt In
coges In 1962 aad ij oncer to Glo_cac 4G? i;o.
DLd you Intcntionally give Us anv fuco opcratiora;
InforcatIon? {o.
Dia GatatiioV offer you tke >oeition 0 Deputy Chte? of tae
Zirbt Dopartrcnt; Yes ,
Was ap order ectually preercd promotinc You to @ezuty to the
Cnier Of tbe Zirst Departiezt? Ycg ,
In early 1960 &a GRIZL;OV celi you tiat jouir prizary regponglbility
wab to vork @gaznst Awcrzcan Code Cicrks? Yc6 .
Other than you centtoped, Lse You nia:ng eny Otier reasons for
your defectioz? iio,
Are you delioerately witnho d:ng any Inforration C: any foreiaera
rccrulted oy tze K73? So.
Znc foliowing re.evant Guest.ojs Wcre asked 0J tes: Gix:
Dia you enter tze' KC3 throvzh tbo In luence of Cezerel 3CGDAlNi
Ko3uiOv? Yes ,
Did you succeed ZAXHVNIOV 06 Deputy Cniez of 'the ZIrat Section?
Yeb.
Did GzYAZAOV succeed you 08 Deputy Crief Of the Zirst Sectfon?
Yee,
Here tbe CHERZATOV peperb jassed to the Arericans ith XGB
sowledse? No.
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3J
?uic. 5
70 xowlcdcc Vab there arv Cloicnd;Iz inforwatiod Jd tbc
Ciel:,,Jv waper6? s0,
DId yoii ever pcrboraiiy Lcct GOjzISYG? jo=
Kas thcrc a cable se3+ t0 Ccrcya for Yol to a68.6t ;TFCV
In the 3ZiITKIY cese? Xc8 .
O6
Did you pergonaiiy @aze Gi
approach to]xszg]et tbe #oacov
^irport? Yee,
Fde, foilowing relevart Gucgtiono vere oBkca on teot beven:
Did you ectualiy reviev tke XGD :Ilc on 038i14? Yee ,
DId LEC FARVEY OSHALD reccIve anv XCB training Or 4801Zurente?
Noa
Were there any micropkonee Inbtalled In tre Morth #ng 02 tre
U.S, BubeB6y %a Xoscov? No_
Wae the reviev Of pIcropnonc reports ore Of your Gutle8 In
1960-617 Yed,
Are you withholding GrV Informtion Inowa to you concerning
%G3 micropkones Or electronlc activity ajainat the V.S,
Ebas6y? io_
Before your OffIcial traneer to the Sevcath Deprtzent iia
you reaa tnc survefllance report on the visit O1 NiDiA;;
PUS;AI;; street? Xej,
Did you personally conuct 0 certain irvestization O Siinkov
in 1962 in Cereve? Yc6 .
Wao te rartk O2 Leutezant Colorel on your travel docuent
to GORKTY only 8 ui6take by %iS;izOV? %c8.
The followlnz relevant guestions vere asked On test efzht:
Wfle In tie U.S. Eabasby Section did you Obtatn e typewriter
{Or BO3OjZ; for tbe preperatron O: 0 letter-to Zawara Zile
Svz? Yes ,
CO01019 _
crodcT_
i(Rr
611.
to
==================================================
Page 21
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14-000QQ
Uct
34
0
Did %ou rcac # of.icinl rcjOr: 0f %r;o,m7oy on %0 contact
Kital ES3o 6 trar& frc_ {cig rki to %oacow? Xce , 0C
KGG {O0 etent:cree;y viteke i;s % {zortion cobcernirz
Kc3 Knowieage O: CZA DCrSozc_ I RoGcow?
Xo,
{6 tocrc A1Y Doggf t exkc Xod vouic aibzutci an of.icez
to Gczect to tkc IJsericarg? :o.
Sui ect '6 ?olyzropa test 0 & Auzuct :ikerzse rezzeoted to
Iddicatioz8 of decejizos.
CCXCLUSECA
Jaeed Bolcly O tne overall Arniycis 0 Subycct '& polygraph
bcctesuoatas the 83Hior % #te L "Cryiteco; Saircce '5u062487226
ocsea Gubstantiaiiy trutaat %5 azg-crina trc reievnct_Goceciona
agkea .
CO0U1(20
SECRET
kr
61422
?330
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14- QoooQ
SECREi
ZI, AALYTICALCOVVEATS COACZRAZi ZZE 2Q14 E2EZ
07 YlRiy IV:ACVECZACSZAKQ
EBv /
Erbesd I utaukl C001021:
snptvu 4 SECRET
6236150t2 tmt
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Page 23
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14- QoooQ
SECRET
ANALYIICAL COMMEXTS COACERAING THE BQAA ZIES Q2
YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
As indicated in the itroduction to thie summary, iniormation in
regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi-
trary but realistic list Of area8 considered pertincnt to the question of
whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to thie Agency without KGB
knoivledge; and whether hie 1962 and early 1964 contacto with represent -
ative8 of thie Agency were kown to the KGB.
It wa8 noted that motivation and certain other pertinent a8pects
woula also be considefed but that hi8 admitted previou8 lies and exag-
gerations would not per 5e warrant a conclugion tbat NOSENKO i9 not a
"bona. fide-defector. 1f
The follow i8 a list Of the area8 considered pertinent and which
are given specific consideration. Attached i8 a separate section
containing remark8 in regard to the designated area8 o A - H,
Ag Is NOSENKO identical to tke pergon whom be claime
to be ?
B. I8 the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?
SECRET
0u01022
Fc35 bti bw' tuBtr
Bnnll Li
#E-utinina
ing
being
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14- QoooQ
C Hab NCSZNKO given an acceptable expianation of
his motivation in contacting CLA in 1962 and for his
defection in 1964 2
D. Is ine information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA
concerning KGB operations, personalitiee, and organi-
zation reabonably commensurate with hi8 claimed KGB
career?
ES Can tne information furnished by NOSENKO be con -
bidered in,toto a8 having resulted in material damage
to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by
NOSENKO been 0f bignificant benefit to Western Intelli-
gence?
2 I8 there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in
information furnished by. NOSENKO which would warrant
a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB ?
G I8 there evidence of a political or any other type objective
wbich could jubtify a dispatch of NOSENKXO by the KGB
with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his
knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given
Bpecific mibbion or missione ?
2 C001023 _
SECRET
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Page 25
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14-QQQQQ
SECiXEz
H I8 there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO
in 1962 or in 1964 witn CLA were known to the KGB
prior to hi8 defection or that NOSENKO wa8 ever briefed
by the KGB relative to hi8 behavior or KGB objectivee
during these contacte or after hi8 defection?
LuC1C?L
3
SECRET
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Page 26
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14-000QQ
SECRET
IS AQ53A.032C:ZC ZEZZERSC4
WHCV #E CLAzVs ?o.BE?
pu+era 0001025
Lxtt SECRE
Suuttatius &0
ehslaika
jiist
Je
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14-00ooo
SECkE?
A: Is AQSENKO idcntical to tkc Person vhom he claime to be?
During interviews NOSENKO has iurnisbed detailed information in regard
to his family, hig activities a8 a youth, the 8chools he attended, a8soc -
iateg of hi9 father and rlother, and hib own as8ociates. The period
under consideration in this section i8 tne period preceding his entry
into tne Firet Department, Second Cnief Directorate, MVD, in mid-
March 1953.
Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and
mother and his early: life, together with other information such a8 a
comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph.os his father
and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with
Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that hei8 Yuriy Ivanovich
NOSENKO, the Bon of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship-
building in the USSR prior to hig death in 1956. This i6 al80 satisiactorily
bupported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concern-
other as8ociates of hi8 father and mother.
Since, a8 indicated above, there is congidered to be no doubt
that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the 8on Of the former Minigter of
Shipbuilding, a detailed study 0f his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of
SECRET
0001026
659m.
Ecated 6ta Jeoslle
628 wratie} 334
tralss ts:%1
ing .
==================================================
Page 28
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QoooQ
SEC i
iittkc or n0 value in a 85e8sir; &.c bona fides or non-pona fidc8 6
XOSEO. An expose Of his yoltniul :rdiscretions, of wnich }e %a6
admitted a number, i8 of no inport in a discuasion Of whelher NCSZNKO
wa5 or wag not dispatched b; lhe %GB. Obtaining any coixaterai first-
kand iniormation in regard to NOSENKO bciore 1945 would be of
negligible value, but there actually is suppore iniormalion {rom
Nikolay ARTAVONOV , a defector from the Sovict Navy, concerning
the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-nava] prepa ratory
echool in Leningrad.
NOSENKO, during current interview8, has Btated that he
uated Irom the Institute o International Relations in 1950 and had
attended the Inetitute 'Gince' 1945. He ha8 explained that he shouid have `
graduated in 1949 since it was a {our-year courbe, but failed the final
examination in Marxism and therefore wa8 required to attend the Institute
{or a Jonger period Of time and again take his final examinations.
Bascd on information urnished by AOSENKO concerning co-
students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he acrualy
attended and graduated from tle Institute 0f International Relatiocs in
1950. The previous controversy in this matter wag complicated by
NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that
he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually thi8 etatemet
2
00U1027
ting
grad-
SECRET :
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14-QQQQQ
SEC.EI
by NOSZNKO in 1964 resulted in conllicting information Bince NOSENKO
on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CLA had stated that he
"completed the Institute of International Relationg in 1950." NOSENKO
ha8 given the explanation that he changed the date of hie graduation to
1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in
1949. NOSENKO explained that thi8 change in hi8 date of graduation
caubed him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950
instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952 .
The above action by NOSENKO i8 included in what NOSENKO ha8
characterized a8 hie "Btupid blundere. 1i The latter i8 & rataer apt
characterization of his now admitted lie8 and exaggeratione but i8 not
evidence tbat NOSENKO was dispatcbed by'the 'KGB. It i6 evidence 'of
a certain pereonality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past bis Own
admisbion tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically
portraying his personal participation in KGB activitie8 concerning which
he had knowledge but did not personally participate_
The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intellizence during
March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic area8 ha8 been
seriously questioned in the past: Specific comments on this period of
3
0001028
SECRET
+
by
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14- QoooQ
SEL,
4
time are contained in a separate Bection of this summary, but it i8
congidered that the recent interviewg of NOSENKO sa tisfactorily sub-
stantiate his claimed eervice in Navy Intelligence during March 1951
to early 1953.
Attached is a typed co?y of a handwritten memorandum completed
by NOSENKO on 3] October 1967. This i9 a biographical statement con -
cerning hig Jife and KGB carcer. No effort hag been made to correct
grammatical errore or spelling 8ince to do 80 would be in' conflict with
the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give
NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life_ activitiee to permit a re-
examination 0f the entire case. The comprehenbion and fluency of
NOSENKO in the English language was adequale for interview purposee
in October 1967 both have materially inproved since that timc.
Intergews of and memoranda preparcd by,NOSENKO since
31 October 1 967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the
statement8 0i NOSENKO in the attached memorandum_ One change that
has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his tranefer {rom the '
First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh
Department, SCD, a8 occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather
than June July 1955 a8 indicated in the attached statement: NOSENKO
al8o now dateb the period in which an unbatigfactory "characterization"
'60010z9
SECRET
~5t>/ : #
-and
and
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Page 31
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(pereonnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March April
1955 rather Uan Nay June 1955. Since thc unsatibfactory personncl
report wa8 directly related to kc transfer to the Seventh Department,
neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature,
An- effort hae been made during current interviews to differentiate bctween
errorb due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by
NOSENKO.
Attachment;
31 Oct 67 Memo
5
'0001030
SECRET
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Sic;z:
Operational Mcmo # N-2
SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich
The foliowing {8 a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum
furnibhed by Subject o 3] October 1967, following & requeet on
30 October 1967:
{ic,.
1, NOSENKO, George; wa8 born 30 October 1927 in the city
elc
Nicolaev, Ukraine.
>dt
My family: the father NOSENKO, Ivan, ba 1902 , wab working
at the ehipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding inatitute, which
he finiehed in 1928; the mother NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI),
b. 1908,, a houeewife; the brother NOSENKO, Vladimir, b 1944, a
etudenta
In September 1934 I began to study in tne school (0 claee) but
etudied & short period 0f time becaube in October with the mother went
in Leningrad where the {atner was working at the 8hipbuilding plant,
"Sudamech" from eummer 1934. In Nicoiaev I waa living at the Street
Nicoleki 7. ~ All relatives of my family were al8o in Nicolaev.
In Leningrad I wae with parente in three placee till 1938:
at the Street Stachek (1 934 summer 1935), St.. Canal of Griboedov ,
154 (1935-1938), St. M: Gorky (Bhort period in 1938). From 1935 till
SECRET
ddu1031
Grnw
Ercbeed 631 #lspallt
WJu_Ittned} Jtt
living
living
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14-000QQ
oiu ,la
1938 I Gtudied at the gchool6, which wcre close to my places of living.
In 1938 the father bcgan to work in Mo8cow and goon I with tne mother
went to live in Nobcow in the end of tilis,year.
In MoBcOw we were living at tnc St. Serafimovicn, 2. Here
I wa0 continuing to study at the school 585 (St. E. Polianka). In 1941
I finibhed 6th cla88 and went with parente to regt to the 8outh (Sochi)
but Boon began the war ard we returned in MoscOw,
In October 1941 [ with my mother went in the evacuation in
Cheliabinek (Ural), where I finished 7lh clae0 in spring 1942. In
Cheliabingk I lived in the poaelok ChTZ, bcizg there [ tried to run to
the tront with my playfellow BUSKO, but:Ie were caught and returnea
home. In 1942 (oummer) I went with the mother.in city Gorki and in
July-August We returned in Mogcow.
In Augugt I entered in the Moscowite military-navy #pecial
Bchool, which wa8 evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finibhed 8th cla8s
in 8ummer 1943 and after that I arrived on a,leave in MoscOW , Thia
echool mubt be evacuated Irom Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I
did not want to g0 there. With the help 0f father I wa8 accepted in the
Baku'0 military-navy preparatory bchool and in Auguet went in Baku,
where I wae etudyi-g at the eecond couree (9th 'cla8e). in thie Bchool
I'twice tried to be @ent a8 a volunteer'to the front but failed. Soon
00U1032
SECRET
Lle
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Vi_u. 06
after that I run with a friend (RADCIENKO) home in Mo8cow (January
1944). In Mobcow I studicd at the courecs (Ruesian word), finiohed
9th cla88 and wa8 acceptcd again in thc military-navy preparatory
Bchool; which wa8 located in Leningrad. In Augubt of 1944 [ wert in
Leningrad.
All cadete Of thie echool were 8ent to Iorest (about 200 k.
from Leningrad) to prepa re wood for winter, where we havc been two
monthb. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and wa8
in the navy hogpital. When I wa8 in the hobpital I decided*ot to return
in the Bchool,but to finish 1Oth cla8e in Lcningrad about what I have
writter a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with guch
my decieion, With the help of thc father'e friende I Guited with the Bchool
and entered in the ehipbuilding college on the 8econd couree in January
1945 and atudied tnere tili tne end of The WWII finisaed and I
decided to resurn to Noscow . The director of the ghipbuilding college
had given me a document that I 8tudied in thie college at the gecond
courbe and finished thi8 course (though I wa8 not 7a88ing exams): in
Leningrad [ wae in the-hogtel of this college (St. Tolmachev).
Mn May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and wab living with parente
(St: Granoveki, 3}.
0001033
SECRET
put
Nay .
living
==================================================
Page 35
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Oiuiiii
In summer 1945 there wa8 crcated thc inetitute 0f the irter-
national relatione in Mogcow and in July I entered in this inbtiture.
In July my father went in Germany with the group of ergineere
and he took me (I rcceived a temporary rank 0f a genior lieutenact,
documents and a uniform).
In. 1945-1950 I studied at the ingtitute. In 1946 [ acquainted
with a girl +0 Shichkov FLAVIA, student 0f the medicine ineiiiute. I
wae.in clobe rclalione with this girl, bccaube of the pregnancy { married
her and 8he made an abort. My parente were againgt the marriage and
we did not live together and
we 8oon divorccd, In the end 0f 1946 [ wae
acquai nted with Telegin AUGUSZINE and; wa8 going marry her, re-
ceived a flat in 1947 (St. Mira former Ist Uecyehckad, 162/174}. In
November her father, General TELEGIN, wa9 arreeted, but I married
her. The marriage wa8 not succesaful. I foundout about her cloge
relatione with the brother, and the child-girl wa8 born with patnological
changee . Iwag not the father of thi8 child. After that I broke with her
and we were living geparately (end of 1948 beginning 1949).
In Bpring 1950 before state exams in the institute wa8 working
the 'commisbion, which wag .deal with future worke Of the studente of
my 5th course. I exprebsed a wieh to work in any military organization
0001034
SECRET
to
ing
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14-00ooo
YLJ,l'
and eoon I wae invited to visit pcreonncl department o MGB (Ministry
of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the
help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the
intelligence of the ministry o military navy concerning my future work:
Pabbing etate examg [ failed Marxiem-Leniniem and with a
group of faile Iwae paeging etate examg once mor e In October 1950
I {iniehed the inetitute and reccived a diploma.
I wae accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 o March 1951
'and in March 17 went by a train to Sovict Harbour (intelligence of 7th
Fleet, 20 an interpreter Of the information department). Before going
'to the Far Eaet I began my divorce with the former wife.
At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Mobcow_ Immediately
after returning in Moecow I had a blood cough out; 'J the middle of
I went to a tuberculou8 Banatorium not far from Mogcow, In July I
finished my treatment and returned in Mobcow . Becaube of the health
I'could not return back to the Far East and the pereonnel department of
the navy intelligence 8ent me to Baltic Sea (8 a senior interpreter of
the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of Ath Fleet in Sovietak,
Kaliningrad'8 dietrict).
When I gtudied at the instituteI a0 all the etudente received a
Tank % junior lieutenant of adminietrative Bervice after finishing the
0O01O25
:SECRFT
May
==================================================
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14- QoooQ
6LUb,
Becord couree in 1947. In 1951 thc ministry 0 navy nad given me also
the rank o junior lieutenant when I was acccpted in the navy intelligence.
In September-October 1952 I received a rank 0f licutcnan:.
In Sovietak the work wag not: interceted and for me it wa 8 nothing
to do. Bedide8 this tnc clim tc wj 0 not for my health and I decided
to change' the job. With txie purpoec bciore newv year at the end of 1952
0 U;
I took a Jeave and went to Mobcow. January 1 I wab with my parcntb
J
at the evening farty at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I
A:
did not kow before, but I knew hio 8on-in-law Vahrughev Vabili 0 a
former btudent and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I
wab thinking about,change of the job. KOBULOV wa9 0pea) with mo
on thib theme and propobe We work and his help in MGB, but nothing
more definite wa8 8aid about my work. Thi8 month I reported to the
hcad of the personnel department 0f the navy intelligence KALOSHIN
about my decigion and that I will bc working in MGB,
In the end of January [ wcnt again in the tuberculoue 8anatorium ,
where I wa9 in.1952. I the of funeral 0f STALIN I ha8 come to
Mobcow nd vigited 'the ministry where my father wa8 wor There
I have Been General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he gaid
that he would gettle my question concerning my job:' After beveral day8
in the middie of March I have received & telephone call from MVD to
0001036
SECRET
good
king
days
king.
==================================================
Page 38
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14-000QQ
Sei;i
come to KOBUiOV . Thcre I havc spcnt about two houre in the rc-
ception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his a88istant
SA VITSKI gent me to the Deputy o thc Chief 0f the Second Directory
SHUBNAKOV , who told me that thcre wa8 8igned an order and I wab
accepted in thc 1 department of 2 ~iucf jireclory a8 a caee Officer.
SHUBNAKOV invited the dezuty 0 tnc chief o 1 department GORBATENKO
(who wa8 acting a8 the chief of 1 Department becaube the chief 0 tne
department KOSLOV Anatoli, wa0 appointed to the epecial department
of extraordinarily affair8 (invebtigation) ). SHUBNIAKOV and
GORBA TENKO eaid to me that I would be working in the 1 ection of
the' department. Then I with GORBATENZO went to.the 1 department,
waa -acquainted with the chief o section KOSLOV, Veniamin, KCSLOV
told me that I will be working againgt the American correepondente
ehowed me room, my desk &nd acquainted with the officer9, who were
working in thie room; KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORVOSOV ,
The laet officer mubt give files on, the correspondent8 and agents. I
wa0 Baid to come next and began to work:
When I waa reating in the tuberculoue eanatorim I acquainted
with KOJEVNIKOV , Ludmila, a Btudcnt of the Mobcowite Univerbity,
and in June 1953 we married. Before it I wae living with my parente
at St: Gorky, 9, but after marriage was Living with the wife at
COG1ls7:
cradrt
day
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Page 39
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14-000QQ
Ulu.il'
St. Sorafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I reccived a flat
at Sta Narodnya , 13, where wab living With my iamiiy.
In 1954 I contracted a digease (gonorrhea) and on thc advice
of the {riend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya . Doctore
aeked to ehow a document, I had with me Only MVD certificate and an
operative pageport and showed them the paeeport. Doctore had given
me a.treatment, after that twice they made teete and aaked to come once
more, 'but I did not come. wanted t0 Bee once more and ent a
letter to tne place of work, which wae written mn tne pa08port: The
with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNAKOV ,
wa8 @peaking with me. Ihad written my explanation, and punished by the
chief of the 2 directory, zEDOTOV 15'= of arrest. Tne %omeomol'9
organization aleo puniehed me. I received a 8trict reprimand and wab
{reed of the head of komsomol'8 organization of the 2 chief director.
I wab a member 0 kombomol'8 orgarizationfrom October 1943.
In the end of 1954 before leaving komgomol (becauge 0f#ge) tne komeomol
organization of KGB took off thie strict reprimand.
In 1955 on all officere o the 2 chief directory were written
characterizatione (May-June). In my characterization wag written that
I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-
July Iwae appointed to the 7, department 2 chief directory a a cage
0001038
8
croDct
They
plant
aaye
==================================================
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14- QoooQ
i_jbx
officer 0f 2 bection. Tnie gection wa8 new created (the work agains:
touriete). The chief of 7 department PERFILIZV , the chief of the
2 Bection GUSKOV .
In 1956 I wab accepted a8 a candidate in the Communiet Party,
Boon received & rank Of a benior lieutenant and got a promotion ~a
Benior cae e officer.
In } 957 I wae accepted in the Party &8 a member.
In Auguet 1956 my father died.
In 1957 or 1958 _I wab promoted a deputy chief of 2 gection. In
Ith department I wa B
working till 1960 and in January 1960 wae 0ent to
work a0 a deputy chief of the 1 bection in the 1 department 2 'chief
directory (chief,of the 1 departmcrt, XLIPIN, Vlad, chief 0f the
1 Bcction KOVSHUK).
My family wa8 conbigt of tae wife and two daughter8: Okgana,
born in 1954, &nd Tamara, born in 1958, Oksana wa8 ill (bronchial
abthma) from 1957 and almogt every year till 1963 2-3 monthe wab in
hospitale. In 1960 Fwas thinking about change (temporary) place of
and there wag a pobsibility to go to work in 2 departmente KGB
in Lvov and Odee8a. But there wa8 another quebtion if I g0 from Moecow
Iwould loee the flat in Moscow At thie time te chief of the gection of
2 department, PIATROVSKI, propobed to me to g0 to Work in-Ethiopia
'0061639:
SFcRFT
livin g
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14-000QQ
~Ezi
(counter-intelligence wor k arong Sovict speciaiibts in Ethiopia). The
chiei of 2 chief directory agreed and the qucstion wa 8 almost decided
but in the laet moment the onnel dcpartment of KGB did not agree.
The reabone were the cabe Of 1954 (illncs& and u8e 0f the paesport for
"cover) and a 'checking in the place 0f my (eorn e of agente' report
that drink and on thie bage have Guarrel8 with the wife).
I wae working in the 1 dcpartment till 1 962. In January 1 962
I,wae appointed again in the 7 department a8 the chief cf the 1 8ection
(workagaingt touribte Irom the USA and Canada).
In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain.
When 1 began to work in the 7 departmcnt I knew that 8oon I
must be promoted a chief of the departrent, when would free
place tne deputy cnief of.department BALDIN wa8 preparing to go
to work in €gtern Germany.
In July 1962 I wa 0 appointed the deputy chief of 7 department
(the chied of the department wae CHELNOKOv) and here I waa
wor
til January 18, 1964.
During my work in MVD-KGB I did not 8tudy in any school,
only in 1953-1954 wa8 vibiting coursee-0f foreign language8 of MVD-
KGBat St. Kieelni.
J0 OOO1Oio,
SECRET
Perse
iiving
deputy
king
==================================================
Page 42
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4-Qoooo
Siukk:
Five timee 1 was acnt abroad: in 1957 [ wae in England with a
eport delegation; in '1958 wa6 in Engiand with a eport delegation;
in '1960 I wa8 in Cuba with a delegation oi specialists of nickel indubtry;,
in 1961 I wab bent in Bulgaria with tne aim to help to ] department 2
directory MVD; in 1962 I wa0 in Switzeriand the conference of die-
armament,
Working in MVD-KGB every Ihad Jeavee for rebt. In
1953.with the wife I wa 0 reating in the tuberculou8 banatorium. In 1954
I wae with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I wa8 resting at the cottage-
In March 1956 I wae rebting with thc wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoelovakia.
In 1957 I wae in Leningrad two week9 with the wife then reoted at
the cottage. In 1958 I wa0 reeting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife
reeted in Sochi: In January-February 1960 [ rebted with the wife in
Kielovodeka In' 1961 Auguet Ireeted with tke wife and daughtere in
Nicolaev. In October 1962 [ reeted with tne wife in Sochi, In Juiy 1963
I reeted with the wife and daughtere in Anapa.
CCO1C41;
SECRFT
again
Ycar
and
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14-000QQ
SECRET
3 ZS TZE CLAIVED Ko3 CARZE3 OzACSEAEO R4LSI3L2}
{83-' Exkrs %57 Itteatk
0001042
SECRET
*wawje} J6
Lthrztn
==================================================
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14-000QQ
Skuola
B,' Is the claimed KGB career of AOSEAKO plausible? In the
past the theory has been advanced that NOSENO wag never an officer
in the KGB. information Of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern-
the KGB, ?articularly the Second Chief Directorate, ha8 'been 80
extengive a8 to invalidate contention that he wa8 not a KGB officer.
It i8 considered that NOSENKO wag a XGB officer in the claimed _
Departments during the claimed periods of time and eerved in the claimed
pobitiong in' each Department. It is interesting to note' that NOSENKO has
not ma terially varied in his 8tatements in regard to the above Bince hie
original contact in June 1962 (with the exception o hib change to 1952 a8
date of hib entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given
in 1962). There have been Bome variations in datee of a minor nature,
a8 indicated elsewhere in this gummary, but these are of month or day
2S
Of trangfer irom one Department to another and not considered critical
Or evidence 0f deception. NOSENKO has admitted previougly giving falee
intormation in regard to rank and medals, but his bagic btory concerning
SECRET 0001043
CloD Enckii rutv
%56..4
ing
any
Ved
(araerzcaj!
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hie KG3 career today i8 not Bignificantly different from the fragmentaryi
version he gave in June 1962.
Basically the {ollowing is now considcred to have been the KGB
career Of NOSENKO:
Mid-March 1953 Jate 1955, Firet Section,
First Department, SCD
Late May 1955 December - 959-(1958 December
1959 Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh
Department, SCD
January 1 960 December 1961, Deputy Chief of
Section, Firbt Section,: First Department,
SCD
January 1 962 July 1962, Chief of First Section,
Seventh Department;. SCD
July 1962 ~ January 1 964, Deputy Chief of Seventh
Department, SCD
(NOTE: The term: Deputy Chief is being used throughout this
summary , but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief: 11
The position of "Deputy Chief" in United State8 Government parlance,
including CLA, i8 not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chie:" a8 u8ed
2 '0001044
SECRET
May
==================================================
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QoooQ
UCU"t
in Soviet organiza tiong and more specifically in the KCB. As an example,
a_ Chief of Department in thc KGB or the Cinief 0f a Residcntura abroad
may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one 0i whom i9 given the title of
First Deputy. This particular deputy act8 in the absence of the Chief
of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all tbe
Department sections_ The exception to the latter i8 when the Chief of
Department retaing direct supervision over what he may conbider the
mobt important section. Other deputies have supervibory functions only
over deeignated sections or organizationa] components. )
During current interviewvs and in prepared memoranda, -NOSENKO
has furnighed detailed information which it i8 considered 8ubgtantiates
bis claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are
contained in separate sections of this summary.
It i8 realized that GOLITSYN, although ccnfirming that NOSENKo
Ia8 2 KGB officer in bolh the First Department and Seventh Department,
SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department util
circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the Firet Section_
Firit Department, in 1960. It i8 impossible to correlate this information
with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the Firbt Department
in late 1955 and wae Deputy Chief of the Firet Section, Firgt Depart-
ment, in 1960, nor i8 an adequate explanation of these variance8 available
OOU1C45
3
SECRET
Ttl
May
==================================================
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QoooQ
#+hi7 io4
&.G?
at thi8 timc. On the other hand, it is not reabonable that NOSENKO
would claim to :he titkc of Deputy Chief 0f thc First Section, First
Department, i{ this were not true when he clearly knew of the vibits 0f
GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 ' - 196} and of his conferences
with officers ciobely as5ociatcd wvith NOSENKO al that time.
NOSENKO has al8o mentioned a number 0f Officer8 0f the SCD
or former Officers Of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom
he wae perbonally acquainted and Ivho were also known to GOLITSYN.
number 0f the8e officer8 were officer8 {rom whom GOLITSYN ha8
Btated he obtained certa n information or through whom he became aware
of ccrtain activitie8 including Vladislav M: KOVSHUX, Gennadiy I.
GRYAZNOV , Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I GUK, Vladimir
A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV_
The statemcnt of NOSENKO that although ke had hcard of
GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict.
with the Btatements 0f GOLITSYN that GOLITSYN, had met and
talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950'8. Tae deecription
of GOLITSYN of tnis meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halle
rather than a specific oflice visit. In light o this, the absence of apy
reabon why NOSENKO {rom hib of view should remember Buch
an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie On thio
0001046
SECRET
~~r
lay
he,
point
==================================================
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14-QQQQQ
LCuia
issle, it i8 eminertly reasonable conclude that the encourter took
place but that NOSENKO gimply hag no recollcction of it. Trerc i8
no reason to attach sign:icance to this lapse o memory-
The previous Opinion that NOSENKO did not hoid the claimed
posilion Of Deputy Chici, first Section, First Department, during 1960
196] has had the most mer t in the controverey over hie statements
relative to hib KGB carcer. This particular aspect will be covered in
detail in another 8ection, but of note at this time i8 tne controverey
over what duties the position 0f Deputy Chief o Section in the SCD, KGB;
entails or does not entail. It i8 a fruitles$ exercise attempt to judge
whether NOSENKO wa8 Deputy Chief 0f the First Section in 1960 3 1961
on the ba8i8 of whether his kowledge of the total activities o thc Firet
Section was commensurate with the knowledge O a Deputy Branch Chief
in CIA in regard to thc activitieg of the entire Branch.
Whether NOSENKO wa& a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD,
KGB, must be judged on the basi8 of what were the dutie8 of a Deputy
Chief of Section in the SCD ard in particular what were his dutieb in
the particular &8signment. The organizational etructure 0f the KGB
may or not have 8ome similarities to the organizationa] structure
of CIA, but any Bimilarities are surely not Buch a8 to permit a judgment
5' 0001047
SECRET
to
t0
may
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QoooQ
4}
EGii
a8 to whether NOSZNKO held a certain claimed position on the basis
of a comparison 0f his activitic8 and responbibilitieg with that inherent
in a Bomewhat sirczlar pobition in CIA.
One Of the most important differences between United States
agenciee or organizations, inc uding CLA, and 'the bureaucratic 6tructure
of , agencies Or organizationg in the USSR, including the KGB, is the
Balary structure. oi a KGB officer is-baged on military rank and
on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity
and language qualizication: Actual position held i8 important {rom a
monetary-viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the
difference in montaly 8alary between a caztain and & major is twenty
rublee and the difference in galary between a Senior Cabe Officer and
a Deputy Chief 0f Section i8 also twenty rubles An increabe in miiitary
rank alone has limited pay advantages , as for example a Lieutenant
Colonel who i8 only a Senior Case Officer receives le88 pay tnan a major
who holdb the position of Chief of Section.
During current interview8 , an eifort hag been made to obtain
from NOSENKO statements concerning his respongibilities in the varioue
claimed pobitions. The judgment on whether he held did not bold
the varioug` claimed pobitions, in view of tae abeence of any factual
COO1C 48
SECRET
Pay
or
==================================================
Page 50
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14- QoooQ
9upporting or relutirg information, ha8 necessarily been babed to a
considerabie degree O the logic o the Blatements made by NOSENKO.
Admittedly this i8 not the most satisfactory way of resoiving the
questionb , but it i8 the oly method possible at this time.
0001049,
SECRET
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SECRET
C HAS JOSENZO CIVZNA1AECzZZK3LZ ZrzZilizoiCZ
HS VOTIVATION" IN CONIKCTIC CZA Zn 1562
AND ECR HIS DZEZCZZCAIA 19642
Gbp1u
0001C50
SECRET'
Eetee ;ea tatxrntk
Gregedts Ld
tmJssuiim;60
==================================================
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QoooQ
SECRET
G: Has NOSEAKO given an acceptable explanation of_his
motivation _in_contacting CLAin_2962 and_for his_defection in 19642 Of
the eight listed categories wbich are being given specific consideration
in the matter of tbe bona fides 0 NOSENKO, this category i8 probably
the most difficult in which to present a logical position with iactual
support. Tbere are too many intangible aspects involved altbough
motivation i8 an important factor, full resolution of the motivation
problem i8 not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO i8 or
i0 not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted thi8 Agency in
1962 and defected in 1964' without KGB knowledge and even at this late
date have failed to disclose some important events Of a perbonal nature
which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision.
Defectcrs are bumans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit
unfavorable information which_tbey consider of a personal nature.
On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a
handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of
which i8 attacbed. The memorandum, altbough not grammatically correct,
ie quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor 0 tbe memo-
randum 'i6 'one 0f increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.
SECRET
0001051
bi: :; #7m
and
yet
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14-000QQ
Scex:i
NOSENO and Others 0f bis generation have lived in a Soviet society
throughout their entire lives. Tbe envirorment i8 an important iactor
of iniluence in the lie o an individial and true Gisillusionment is at
best usually a gradual process in which many factor8, some recoznized
j < 6.
and some not'
recognlzed by tbe individual, bave played a
role in varying
degree8.
NOSENKO, util 1955 ard ?36Sibiy until 'the death of his iather
in Auguet 1956, could be compared to the profligate son 0f wealthy
parente in the United States who finally graduate8 from colleze and obtains
employment perhaps in the firm of his fatber Without actually earning any o
thei luxuries he has' enjoyed: Tbe' fatber of NOSENKO wa8 not only wealthy
by Soviet standards but also beld a high government position. Tne
influence of his father and the name oi his father undoubtedly was an
important j{ not the mcst important factor in NOSENKO even
Permitted to enter the Naval RU and;the KG3 even' thougkh NOSENZO i8
particularly reluctant to admit, perha?s even to himself, . that tbis was
the primary reason.
The above. should not be construea a8 any reflection on the
actual intelligence ot NOSENKO, but rather a8 an explanation of how
NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. Hie
2 0301C52
SECRET
being
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14-000QQ
SECRET
Periormance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that
be probably would have been summazily terminated i he had not been
tbe son 0f the capable, respected Ninister 0f Shipbuilding.
K a-certain amount of speculation i8 permitted, the
disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages
following the death of his father inciuding a personal automobile, may
have actually started soon after tbe death 0f his father. Tbat NOSENKO
i8 undisciplined i8 bupported by hie admissione relative to his lie in
the 'USSR 'and bis bebavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period 0f time
after his defec:ion in 1964. NOSZNKO was' addicted to women, liquor, and
tbe material-things which can be purchased with money or obtained througb
influence.
question has been previously raised regarding his motivation
in contacting CIA in 1962,. particularly his statement _that he needed money
and would sell "two pieces of information. 16 NOSZNKO bas stated that he
wanted.to make a contac: with the Americans, tbat be vras not emotionally
ready to defect, but that be subconsciously believed tbat if he made &
contact be would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could
no longer retreat.
00C1053
SECRET
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14-000QQ
NOSZNKO na8 Stated that he gave considerabie tnougat to the
beat way t0 contact the Americang 50 tnat hc would be believed and not
rejected and came to the conclugion that he would ofier to gell bome
information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the
Americane stating ne wa$ a "KGB counf €y intelligence officer who wanted
to give information, " he would not have been believed and would have
been peremptorily rejected, NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding
how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally
decided 'to do it taroughfaina MARKwhom the KGB considered wa8 with
American Itelligence.
The .above gtatemente by NOSENKOare not in confiict with the
record. NOSENO did offer to 8ell "two pieces-of information, " almost
immediately gave more information , made no bignificant deniande for
morey, ana in fact his price for "two pieces 0f information" wa8
ridiculougly low by American 8tandaras_ NOSENKO ha8 during current
interviews gtated, a8 be first 8tated in 1962, that he nad spent excessive
amount8 of money' in One or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO
has during current interview8 8tated that he could have covered his
expenditures by _Other mean8 without receiving_any money from the
Americang.
0001054:
4
Ikr
SECRET
SECRET
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14-000QQ
SECRET
NOSENKO hab ptated tbet tbe pight belore blo departure (rom
Gopor to tbo USSR bo gevo aorlons thougat to defactlon but wab not
'emodonally adepted to deloct at 'tbat tdtna. Followtpg hle ratura to tbo
Bovtoe Unlop: NOSENKO, durlng a perlod 6 Ume, made Mlo Ilnal
deelelon t0 defect at tha {Irel opportanlty , reallelng tbat At moant
Ieavteg Bls wtfe,chuldrod, &nd otbar membere 0l ble fer.Uy [n &ho
08BR.
Somo abpecte Ol tbo motlvetlop of NOSENKO ar0 obecuro and
wlu probebly $0 ramala: * would be praferable U @n Oract datellod
chronalogy 0 all tbe Lactore [nvalved: could be prepared or [f ovoa
cortsln obvlono factoro could ba accuratoly deltneated. Tncd0 ar0 both
Lpoeelblo at tkie (one and probably At.any tme (0 ,the futuro. Wat
La. [mportant &8 thle dma %0 9 declelon e0 to 'wbethor tbo motivatloa a
NOSENKO we9 beood o0 pereonal reseone wita no [mpllcatlone ol KGD
dsspatch It Io conelderod tbat the explanatlon 0l NOSENKO concoralng
blo motsvetion Ia eccoptable And Lhet Me etatemgat tbat no O30 CRCOP}
Be Americeda wae @war0 Of blo contecto vlth tbo Amorlcane In 1962
0s ble Latont ko deloce [n 1964 lo oupported by ota3r Informattloa' 08 0
collategal patare. (S00 Soctlon ML 4.)
Aeachoodt:
Typed epy Memo Irom NOSENKO
5 60u1055
SECRET
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Operationa} Nemo # N-4
SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich
The {ollowing is a typed copy % & handwritten memorandum
{urnihed by Subject on L November 1967, following & request on
31 October 1967:
What were the motif and the reasone which have led me to
the decinion to breake with the Soviet Russia ? The only definite i8 an
underetanding 0f the eituation in the Soviet Ru8eia, the knowledge o
the methode.of the communiet regimc, thc knowledge-of.the real foreign
and interior policie8 of the Soviet government and the iaith in the right-
neg0 Of the Ireo wor)d.
It wa0 not & decibion' which wae accepted' or could bc acccpted
in & month or a Year. Thie decision wa8 &lowly growing in me. I
think that the beginning wae in the 8tudentship.
Living with my parents and being in the circle8 of the parent'0
and my acquaintanceb Iknew more then there wa8 written in newepapere
and periodice and that wa8 propagandized by radio and TV. Working in
the Far Faat and later being in tripa in different regione and citiee of
Rubeia I found out much better the Jife and conditione 0f the life 0f the
People of the Soviet Rueeia.
SECRET C061O56
GrJW
Thein 6c: oxtcaallc
Jad
Ma
"Tfla;
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Wnen [ worked 1l years in MVD-KGB i underetood and found
out very many thingB, detaile and thc rcal deal of the existing regime,
about methodg of the work O MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings,
about hundrede of thougande of tne pcople o Ruseia who were (and
etill are) congidered "politically" dangcrous and around whom wae
(and atill i0) going an active work of all, organ8 KGB.
At the Bame time when I wag several timee abroad I have
Been pereonally the 8O-called "decay" at the Weet: Ihave Been in
27
reality how i9 living people.
Several time8 when I wag abroad [ was thinking about Btaying
at the Wcet and not returning in Rueeia, but_only one wa 8 keeping_
me 50
my family.
In 1962 in Switzerland Imade the accuaintance with the
Americane_ From my part "the 6ell of the information" wa8 a real
Bhow, Iwab thinking that would not beiieve me otherwioe, In
that period of the time there wag going & atruggle in me to etay
abroad Or to return home till the lagt daye o in Geneva and even
when I wae returning home in Vienna.
In 7962-1963 I decided definitely tbat I did not want and could
not Jive more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done
all my beet to g0 a0 8oon 30 pob8ible abroad:
OUUIC 57
SECRET
thing
they
big
living
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ULuMli
It wae 'not ea8y t0 make this decieion, it wae very difficult
to leave the family ior ever,
And now in spite %_everYthng Ldo not__egzet:
8€0:$
0281058
3
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D IS Trz INTORNATICN FURNCKZS 2y JCSEJKO ?o CLA
COACZRAZNG KGB 02271ZEC1S, PERSCTALITIES,
AND ORGANIZATION RZASCVABLY COVVENSURATE
WITK HIS CLAIVED KGB CAREZR ?
Ert: =
0001059
SECRET
00778764;
Ger
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SECREZ,
Da I8 the _iniormation furnished by NOSENKO to CLA conc
KGB operationg personalities__and_organization reagonably commen-
surate with hig claimed KGB career? The conclusion i8 that the infor-
mation furnibhed by NOSENKO concerning KGB operation8, personalitiee,
and organization i8 more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed
career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to hie defection in early February
1964.
In reaching the above conclueion, consideration ha8 been
to his-ciaimed: departmental assignments and claimed positions in each
department. Certain allowance ha8 been made'for faulty memory with
conbideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception
Or whether the failure to recall a particular item of intereet can logically
be attributed to the vagaries of the huran mind. Tnere Of courbe, no
accurate gtandard of measurement which would permit a pobitive deter-
mination a8 to whether inal bility to recall certain detailb or eventb is
actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all evente
or could be attributed to willful deception.
SECRET
GOu1ceo
Gj
Beut 603 Utzatk
bun6k %1'
(LA EtN)
erning
given
i0,
paet
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'~0l^
An effort has becn made to determine i{ there are ary particular
patternb or areab wnere NOSENKO hag indicated he did not recali
epecific matters or certain details, and no pattern or bpecific area8
have been noted. NOSZNZO, in iact, hag an unugually memory
a8 evidenced b% the cxtensive iniormation iurnished by NOSZNKO purely
Irom recollection. In addition, there ha8 been no material reluctance
op tbe part of NOSENKO i0 diecu88 his entire life, KGB officere he ha8
kow, KGB organization and procedure8, or Oth er topice of interest.
NOSENKO ha8 furnished congiderable detail concerning KGB
officere whom he ha8 known at variou8 period8 in his entire KGB career.
He ha8 been very consistent in information furnished and ha8 frequently
added certain details which he recalled atra later date.
Certain remark8 will be made in another Bection in regard to
the volume and 8cope 0f iniormation furnighed by NOSENKO. This in-
formation i8 not 8elective, but is am excellent indicator tnat NOSENKO
was 28bigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD,
during the claimed periods 0f time and held the claimed positions _ Con-
Bideration has been given to hi8 variou8 claimed KGB a88ignmente in
evalua the information furnighed in an effort to a88e6s whether-his
indicated kowledge wa8 commensurate with his claimed pobition during
2
COUIC61
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good
ting
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a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not
occu?y the,pobition wnich he claimed to have held:
It i8 considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supportb
bie claimed position8 in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially
confirm turough collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed
pobition8. Neither has it been possible to obtain from otber sourcee an
applicable description of tbe dutie8 Or responsibilitie8 of an individual
bolding any of the pobitions NOSENKO 'claimed to bave beld after 1958. It
i8 felt thefo can be no question that NOSENKO served in the' capacitie8 of
junior ca8e officer, case officer, and benior ca8o officer 'during 1953 = 1957 .
As regards the dutie8 and respongibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section;
Chief 0f Section, and Deputy Chief of Department; and whether NOSENKO
beld these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of pereonal
judgment ba8 been necessary- This personal judgment hae been made in
a9 judicial a manner
a6 possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in
re to'the above is largely dependent upon intormation from NOSENKO.
NOSENKO hag compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offic88
he claim; to have occupied and surrounding office8 during the four
mary periods of time: 1953 1955, 1955 1959, 1960 1961, and 1962
'1963. He hag prepared bpecific memoranda concerning hib co-officer8
3
'0001C62
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gard
Pri-
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and othcr personnel, ard changes of personnel, 38 wcll 38 diagram8
of the oifice8 of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during '1956
1964. Thi8 material i internally consistent: Furtbermore NOSENKO
could not' po8eibly have known that thie detailed information could not
immediately be checked for accuracy,- at least in part, with a source
or another officer who ha8 defected gince mid-1964. U tbeee diagrame
and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, wbo i8 quite
aatute in matters 0f counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily
prepared the material in such detail. Thi8 type 0f information i8
Peculiarly adaptable for analysie by a knowledgeable source or by another
defoctor and could, if not relctively correct, permit a rather positive con =
clueion that NOSENKO wae lying or fabricating information.
NOSENKO ha6 fuznished quite specific information on KGB
operations during the 1953 1955, 1955 1959, 1960 1961,. 1962
1963 period8 of time. A8 might be expected, hi8 bpecific knowledge i8
legg dor the 1953 1955 period; but hie own perbonal Bituation and,attitude
until 1955 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given
congideration: In any event, be ha8 furnished adequate information 50
tbat his claimed a8signment during 1953 1955 i8 considered suificiently
eubetantiated even though hie actual job periormance undoubtedly
deserved & low rating:
C001C63
SECRET
and
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14-000QQ
Tbe knowledge of NOSENO concerning cage8, KGE operations,
and other officers can conbistently be related to his claimed department
and position as8ignment during the 1953 'to January 1964 period. The
8cope of his knowledge of his
own department when coneidered in toto
i0 broader after 1957 tban before, which i8 compatible with his claim of
increaged responsibilities. Hib knowledge of the work 0f otber departmente
of the SCD from the late 1950i6 on i8 also more-extengive, which i0 also a''
further indication that NOSENKO actually beld the claimed pobitione
during this pericd 0f time.
5
0c61d6f
SECRET;
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SECRET
2. CAN ZHzAFOZVzz Z1737222YACSZ1Z022
COLSDERZZ JTozoE#AC {ESiLTEZ'
IA_MATERAALDiLGE Z0TEzKCB A1DQR 245
IHE INZQRWLTCAFURNSEZZYACSENKO BZZAQ2
SIGAZFICAAZ ZZAZFIZ TO NZSTZRAAAZZLLEGENCZZ
0001C65
68v SECRET Ethrsi 63 #tetr
ammen} u
teeemx
==================================================
Page 67
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14-QQ0QQ
2 Ci0eil 32444342 A 13333022c9114444
40522680413284221L54224380 tceZC2aze/e 2ey
#iu 9n-on #Z2e24121133213240444222: 223-32
Wesgcza-zellzezce? Zrc cozc isioz 1 :232z4 t0 6oei 0: E20 _3cv2
ciesioso {5 afz7jv2, evc; 23651 %{> Riljec 617,itzaze 322
To #e %CZ 'azd tizlaze 3ezez: t0 Weste3= Ijelligesce 23e 334- 72738
6f ax i zar-3iblc nazuze Zz8 Ao: Sisco;er_e [0 LcurZie {Ceasize=_e=+
NCSZNKO %a5, 63 2-eviciisly {=clcztce, :zaste: votzkJE}
iniozmation Curisg cuzzezi &=d previois :zezviews. 4 cCi:sic &ot'
o: speciic cases i5 =o: ?9ssib.e af t2is : ze a38 woz : &: des: %c €z
27 Iztezesiirs #guze, 62 aciiz; s3/*i22z20 0 wzicz Woile 30 2273_41
Priciically evezy isierview wize NCEZNZZ, cva;j a7 3632.3, :vez-:
Iniorrazioz 0f coizzezizzellzezce irzezeg3 ZEC€12 -ezzecec Ze1e4i2
prodtctior can cobsizie %z & CO2s cege? eZezod c #=d: Tcs s2ozle .
co: be consiried as a7 {rclcation #a- ICSZIKO i6 irzenEozzlly wZ-
colding inozratoz, 3i: ratzez #a: sa_iitior 0 6 %is #ezzozy #70"32
normal ques-ions azc discussiozs has beez 2zd can coztzie to be
productive.
SECRE
5x7 }
0001C66
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QoooQ
O8
Xoz)) .A4a :ie 63 coscern:ng ?e 6P*E'oj
3C3 028;
#Es
822.:, 6 ~,iive Coriac:3 {e7c t0 {27z
6363;, & 2 7ii 62;i.:, 67 iScu -0 :eer [0 Scvie: ziiora :),
#6;00Seco.d Cile: Z*eei-:? o:rai Z32 0r542222.028,
{owevez, :e Rs {Cczied 4p/x=i.l;Esdiormcr 0r clffezi 7:;3;
Caie: Directorazc criicers ard : cre is a corsidcrabie exchazge &
3ricera 3eiweea i.e ZCJ ijc S*Z 3-ceo, nuxefois 3c-33
6f the SCD azd Oi.er iezna} K33 ozgarization8 travel abzoad wita
delegatiozs, tolrist gtol?s, anc 25 vis ozs to varicus rrajor cbibitiozs
sica as Wor:d'6 Faiz3. 3s{rposob c &: ihis tme to esiraie &c
aunbc? 0: X{3 o.ceza idecizicd by NOSZNXO Ivho %ave beea Ousice
6c Sovjet 3.oc s.rce #:5 Ccfectoz 0r I*J wEi be out sosetie {. *
fitere.
Trere has bee: vert I::c efempec exzloitatioz of iniornceoz
trsishcc"sY NOSZNKO concezz:=g O..c= 333 oiiccrs azc, rerezoze,
the ?ossi5.e valle 0 & .5 iiozsiato f0 iriied Siates #telligezce
caazo: bc esfimatcd :o; cai :e zo*ezia] Carage t0 the KC3 b2 est -
zated.
Disclosure 0: _a.ozration Cozcersi=z certain KGB ofcezs Icilad
be a pecessary ?azt Of any Gisjatch 0 a KC3 agent Or cificez to :2e
West eithez for ?urposecs of cortact wita Western Intelligeace ior &
2
OOOLC67
SETZZT
S/br
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Eiied ?e.i8. & iisc u: :0: i,310 #iesc:vctai & u de:eciu:
siutis. fever, iceaeci 0u:4Gz O ers or u3e3[s {0 #es:era
s@3erce {9 Icccjaarey & iufic? c: cczcefz j %* X3 a. ~ Cxa
Posi;ze 0: tae {Centities c #ppzox...cE, o.ficers azcEevvzalOd .
XuzcregkGB a3ents cou.d zoi
Gc coxs Cezed 0: ag igablc imnpoztiece.
Obiainisg speci:c ioznii:.os 7 >e3zd [0 %G? o2cczs 0:
KGB a6scts is important {0 iricd Siuzes ieiligence'axc' a coxsicer-
abe rnourt 0: mampowez ara Giozcy is b3cr8 0n lnis activity. Zvea
acknowlecging tat it i3 muca rore &.cuit %oF CiA to obtai: tkis sy?e
oi iniormatior abou: KGB, waca cjcrates in & cosed 3o2c7/, &=
it is {07 the %3 to obtaiz te {Ccai:; 6 CjA ejic;ecs, {;is bc.cvee
Goibitwl any zcacer Of :kis sura:y #cic corsidez that the {Cc3.-
cat:on ol, GJcL: erpioyecs arc Eeveza: {ase:s {0
tke XGB wouia be &3 .ess tnaz: & seicus comjror:se O: riialle
iaorraton.
Prioz to %k€ Gciect:cn 0 NZSZVKO, }tie was kcwz G: #
organizatior of the SCD or Otier ::crra] %G3 ofga;izatiora 7ce
inormation proviced by NOSENKO cozcerzzg botn as becr detzzled
ard cxtcrSjvc, Tkat this informaion :S 6f valte t0 thc Unitcd S:atcs
Intelligence community is harcly subjecr %0 Gispite, althouga azalysts
3
C001C68
SECSET
41br
Bsycs
Srcreqagent
ver}
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14- QoooQ
can Cifer as to trc Wci;:t wEich s.oid b2 givez to :0 value of this
iype 0f {niormation.
NOSENZO kas firnisked inioziation cozcerzing SCD, KG3,
reczuilmerts of inited States citizeza ard :orcig: nationals coverizz
the period of 1953 through 1963. Tnis skould rot be interpre:ed a5 a
statement that NOSENKO has iurniskcd Intormation in regazd to a4
SCD recruitments , even 0 Americans, Gurinig tnis period. ds irioz -
mition' based on pcrsonal knowlccgc is in gcncral limitcd to thc First
Department and Seventh Department: He kag Itrrished infornation
concerning cases 0f several oter departrents in the SCD and sorne
FCD case8, but this -iniormation Wa3 in generai acquired indirectly
{rom social or busincss corversaiiors with Othez KGB Oificers.
NOSENKO has furnished information in rcgard to & rumber 0f
cases which were previousiy krown to United States Irtelligezce. Wrile
the value of such inforration canno: be considered high, the additioral
detadis which NOSENZO hi8 provided in & rumber 0f cases caznot be
dismissed as being of 1o value t0 Weszerr Inte_"gerce, even if the
iniormation cannot be regarded as damagizg to the KGB. Furthermoze.
inasmuch a8 there is no reason to Guestion bis sourcing 0f informatioa
already known, there is po basis :or suspicion Of NOSENKO for his
having: provided such information.
0001c69
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4-Qoooo
TcszRO has furnished i=ozmz::on in rcgard to a nurbr oi
recrutmert s by the KGB 0 Ior-B.oc eorals wko weze known by
Westezr Intelgence to bc pro-Cornmuzis: or even coznected with
Commuzist organizatios. Tre identizcaticr a recruitec K3
agent 0f an indivicual previous.y known to be pro-Comiaunist is of
considerable value to Westezz Xrteligerze and may be Co:sidezed to
have resulted in some damagc t0 :e *3Z. Acrittealy , the potenzial
to the KGB of an agent who is kown as pro-Communist is less than
that of a "politically clcan" individual. Xowever, "pro-Commurist"
or even "Communist" are not syroryrois wvith "recruited KCB agent.
NOSENKO kas furnished additiozal information on cases in
which there wa& soxe previous but lirnifed information. In & nurbez
0i these instances tke acditional inormat:on from NOSENO Ras per- Maht
mitted identification of the individials & irierest and the clositg of an
"Unnown Subject" case. In sich instazces the inforration froz
NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligcnce since
the ince omplete information kowvn previously would in many cases not
have permitted ultimate idertification of te indivcual 0 interest.
This category of cases must be considered a8 having resulted i= damage
to the KGB and in benefit to Western Iptellgence.
5
0001C70
SECRET
45
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NOSZNKO %as fizaisaec _oiton &: regard fo & ZiKbc? €
kdvidua%5 , bo Amezicaa a7c Jor-_.oc :oreizn, wvho weze -eczeed
by tke KC3 amic cozcerzing Wkon: Weszerz _tc ligerce Zad _0 &:3Auc3:
iornation. It i8 recognized E.a: Cereaix Or #ese Cases =eaio.2d L
AOSENKO, particularly i tac torrist cz:egozy, woi.c >f sisy=eve?
icv < uclual7 materializcd as prozjcev: KCZ agezts. 72s ccii 3e
or various reasonis iaclueizg la:ez :ctSz zo coozerite 3303-
gfaphical inaccessibiiity to tae Kcz, o3 rot being eitker c; tc Iize
6: SCD recruitrcst Or Xater in & ?o3it.03 t0 furnish ii.orrzzatior 6.
interest to tke XCB. _this regaze, NCSZNKO kas siicd :i J: .cast
until )962 there was a defirite; tenccacy & #e Sevezth Dezuzzzer: t
make a "'recruiimcni" 25 a Satistic {ox &e exd-oi-year feporr evez
though it wa 8 appares: #ke agent €: t.c #me iad jJ0 potesta; ZX8 +2ei
i was-highly ulkely &here Wouic 30 & Zotenzia: in tke :zre.
NaSENKO kas furnishcd irozrito: on or icads jJ & Zu.jcr 0:
cise8, primarily third aationals bi: soze Americaz, jwXch e %25
been unable to furnish Suiiicient Geiaiis t0 periit iCestiicatioz &i #.s
time.. In certair irsfazces it is bereved tzat ar iCeatiicatizz wil: De
Possible after acditional research &8 {zveszigation. Uaz a icezi-
fication is made, the value 0f any Zarticelcr lead to. Westezz Irie.ki-
gence cannot be estimated, but tkat there may be & poterzial value
OOU1C71
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14-000QQ
caxaot be igrorec. is &7 eXissoe G...is Caicgory, NCSE)KO {as
furnished & Lead, stix] Lacer res: gii.cz, [0 &: uniccrieed #3e3+,
7robabiy Io: an Americir, wzo : !962 was i & Positoz t0 ferove
tae "NATO ExeriCrCY Ccccs, Mf ccvez & coces {0 iRe 3G3 iCr
photogzapki:g, aad ten siccebofiiy Fezace &c codes. 3ecaise 212
agent is a8 yer unidcniiicd, his cerren: &ccess to iozztion :.€ctinz
the security 0 tc iaite: Sties cazc: be Zaiged.
In all, tke intormation {ro: NCSZNKO in t.e category 0 c2se3
where'Western Irtelligcnce Cic zot previc_sly kave sign: cart irzor-
mation must be consicercd 0 bularce a3 kiving rcsitited aieziai
aGamage t@ the-KGB and'of $ignacar: beze: : to Westczr _te ligerce.
Quantity alonc 0 CI or 7 i=forriaticn :om a KGZ deecior is
no: a sancard on wiick t0 judge boza ices. Tie Guesticz {3 wherhez
flc amoua: 0 %is iniormaio: is reisczab.y corarersura:e Ivita kis
claimed-Zositions.ia tie KG3. Tnis Gueszios €5 regards ICSZIKO
has 'been examined, wjth affirarative din35, in anotker section of
this paper.
examples from the aboVe citec cazegories 6 =ormat:on
jurnished by NOSENKC are listed below. Trese cases aze Siven &s
illugtrations and are' zo: necessariiy listed i order of imaportance.
0001072
SECTZT
few
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~ Cise 0; Zoluri ~-oRiNizd ~: ;eo L: 6:
ja.c {ea)Z SAiK re 8Lj cce: V
sL GrY. j <a; & Cuce?ed ic: *v_: #j ~asa1 n: 4 {eac
o: & Jead {ros NOSE)RO w..c: .(2 :6 :607 .2 L o.aO::.
Arotiiez frezici: 22,2 :s :: ~Ew8Z3,
2
7406, bx
exployce wGO spcni cossicezabc tine = & iss? & !962 " 1983.
06
1oszO ider;:iecEEvzi-ss*ir .i3-X~~Liv:zuez_-izi >
&c Firat Seci:oi, Zizst Dezizeca:, SC?, : 982 a32 wia Z e.i.ve
#a-Eowhgziaiea
Ya iib2 Eozzzecz i0 %e KCZ. #ez
0L
iaerviewved in :964, Eowi3e:e 3o: iCz R kcd beez %*c2~ic,
bu: s1s?icion
oE8k.;2]was
3rei: ezoigr &0 {2. 3) Cexic%::
21
NSZA )was not rercwed
% iraeec @owaz3waa recrus:ec %; :e K33, 8i .pos2:34e
to Cetezmine Zow ilci: i osatioz weic Mav~ lees corr? osiscd ET
06
€23we i tke iSSR, Ge C:cEepc Ceriis 0CcC,3 i0 i*0 %ec
Siaies Znbassy- Trere :s reiscz :2 36..1 e [.i
"Eo#Oksis
recriited, it Was fe wio was res?O.s.Mi0 :Cf &6(6?0..64 €f 2
poteztiaiy va.labic Sovie: wazk-b:f: weor: CJ: was atie?g {0
06
establish cortaci usinz] @ozz]s iezzediazz-
NOSENZO in 1964 :uzaisked Iozratioz := zezard :0 & "ZKAZ"
(appareatiy a KGB code _axe; ale*oig* NCSENXO #oizet % was a tzce
Cou1C73
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id/bR
Gocz
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Ji' 'i;
Mmwo). H losptllod "ZHARI" (pborarlc) 00 &0 Amoricaa code clorb
Teo dalected [o tho USSA ln 1961. An Intornal a8urnptlon wao made
Babed o 650 ordglnal Icad Iulornatloa NOSENKO tbat "ZHARM"
Ve Vlctor Norrlo HMILTCN; s Fcv"( Ailtri HDNDALY, fommor
NGA amployae wbo delocled t Lbs UESR In 1962, e4 0u Inlorntloa
Lsom NOSENO 78 nover dlesemloatad OT lnvestleeted.
Prdor to Lba surlecleg 0l Joba Dlacoo SMTH by &bo Sovlots
u Lnil 0I J967 , EzZ lnlormetlon coacerelng KGB kpowledgo
0I Arnorlcaa eode clork m belez levoidlgated; snd Joha Dlecot
82OTH wa 0 Leadlng cutpoct. Afeer &bo ourleclog 0 SMITH by &a
8orlou, It b8ckmj0 aPpetede Lbat SMITH, retbber thaa XAMILTON, 780
Wdonttcal t "ZHARI. m Lavoatlgatloa dlecloeod tnt po deflalto Lnlorml -
tloo could bo oetabllosod In regerd 1 tho actual ebotoaboutb 0I SAUTH
aftar clrce mld-1960 . It cendOt bo poeltlvoly 'tated that oppropatita
Lnpedtgetton (n [964 & tbo "ZHARIr Joed would havo led to &o Idoott -
Ieadon 6 Joa Dlscoj SXITH 4 "ZHARL: 7i Howevof , edch (doetl -
catlon Vowld bavo been o[ coneldoreble Intereet to tbo Depertssnt ol
61t and CLA , and could rory wol &vo pormlttad cortala acllon rtlcb
Vould bevo at Ieaot Loeeened tbo Propagtnda elloct of 84o. eurprlao
acnouecomen: by tha Sorlau In Wa @U ot 1967 .
NOSERKO, (n Juno !962 , turnlehed Idormetloa Irom #iuch
FWbm VASSKLL could bt qulckly ldantlflod. GOLTSYN, @ Jto
1980
6 erly 1961, bed {urulebed Lnormatlon concornlns So5t podo -
tratloq 0/ 0 Br:oh Gororamont 0n 0ka bablo slddfs? # Brlutb
Sclat
(IOI
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14-000QQ
Sorvlco: kad complled & Mlot A lwenly eugpects, (ncludlng VASSALL.
Even tbough It may bo pregumed tbat [nveatIgatlon 0l tho twenty bu*pects
would ulttmatoly bave roeelted (n & detesmlnatlon tbat VASSALL w2e
tao #gont 0n whom GOLITSYN had furnlehed cerlein Informarlon, te
Lnlozmatloa Irom NOSCNKO [n Juzo 1962 redulted In tbo carller terml -
peelon by to Brlelbh Servicee $ 4 edlL valuable productire KGD ege8t.
Althongb nol tbe ceeo o[ 4 XGB a38nt, to matter 0I ta mlcro -
pbonoe [n &be Unlted States Embabey ahould :lbo bo montloned.
GOLITSYN, Lollowipg hle delectlon In Leceraber [961, furalshod
certaln Inlormatlon Ln regard to mlcrophonoe In.the Unlted Statce
Embabey (Checcory): Stnce In Lect te mtcropbonaa we 6 conprcled
t contral cablos, locatlot o on0 mlcrophone would leglcelly beve led
t0.&ao oxpoeuro of lhe on:iso bot of Inlcgophono8. Howaver, #Ppro-
prlate action wee not takon on thla {nformatlon and the KGB would have
beon w/eg0 Ciet po actton wee takon prlox to Juna 1962 wben NCSENKO
Iled{ Contactou CMA .
L NOSENKO [9 & dfepatehed XGB agen6, Le (0 Fot clost &by tbe
KGB wowld attsacl #Paculc ettondon to a eystem o mlcropbonoe whfeh
must Aero attl had Bomo valuo 40 0[ Jupe 1962_ Preeumpelon may
b0 mado Wat u NOSENKO 70b 2 dlepatcbod a80pt, te KGB had, 28 0f
1962, a advancad syetem ot monltortng dovicee wblch rendered tbo
abov0' mlcropbope eyeter obbolete. Howovof, no conctora evidonco
of Buch ap adreuced eretem It avalleble ana 'It phould be potad that It
10 6001C75
SECl
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#a5 Ji iii ; cifci Apri: i91 6 06{Ve #ciic; 1~? Ric:;0
:oca:?zzc rerrove € :c ,d5st " , "5 #RGci"fs?_
giver a Jead % .a:e - jL: 49 . fui? {962.
A feW %c.cfu: J: { Ceziio;;
aiskec by NOSZNXO wacc be &77*8;: 5 3irs Qazi Cuii? be2363,
As rezirds *eads Iuzaibked &y AC-E. Aca: 2asc3, 3ou;
oi ikesc lcacs tavc been rez:icicd 4 Xvoiis birta;' Ci;;:
icterviews with NOSE KOkve 74?ei #P7ncrzifely seveftee
;ew Azcricar jcads wnich are ~rizzec M *2 ?3., 7%3r-
vew5 Kave alsv rcsu.ted in 707e 32c2#8 1.orzdgo: {= FC34f8 f0 _
riirber 0f Caj:s ?rcv;ois;y feied ~j ~CSzRO, 681> 76
icditioza] Ceve oztezi 620 C6j2s X; trc ?32
NOSZNKO %3 proviuicc Icacs :C Cver Icc Ad-ccizy #CE
#gemis. Geosre_cafly #.es? :eics #fe wize A 5coze, 1.2.-233
riticzaia 0: Such coirir es 23 z0ze3a, Aistri:, Ur-juay, #c Ciez
25c0m, 7rerce, West Cer-any, Zcoiu5 , Swecez, Austzeli, >232_,
VexcC, Aa:y, a5d a ruricer 0; 0..ez coijir cs.
includec ir tkc .ore ixportaz: 6: t.ese #g2r: Or Orier leada
are leads to higk Jevels % governrezt axc intellizerce to code clerks,
to acce8s agents for Arerizia tafgcca, to actia] Or zoss.b.e Elegal
0001C76
1)
EECT
L:Z 6;
b4:e
o;
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2-?233: isSe:2, A.0 rc:_Lt& i:46: F~7:ev?u:t::? 7;e-
#-Ziubve) &: %3208 id-z b:82
074,Y ~aoi: oi3-
sizary U il :e Ce:e i8 0:%."
2:3aci.ce s.ow3 Iiae:ees :~ils 0X0 c; :3.3Mkah
2Eed e: Owr Bufezz:ei :0_ 7~c 23 1 023* 2230& {02 _1
:ezieter cit atefcs:, 232 ;227 Zcc-8- 2_8663 3ci;_ 1:2086
s.3a :ise is:a.ccs 0 cazcesiz R~ ixY #3ai12: {636857 =.18_104
Vosccw, ircludirg aciial Ri3 c.i.ceji_ze iccss :0 Ceria:z 837
Zbu,5fe3 ibi: %ot tke Sriiis}o Aaeci_ Zsbass e:;.
NCSZNKO :as &.60 fizzg.CC .eics {0 ffiaTC) :oreis::
Ziiorai a3ezis, {s ior:aioz 03 Scvezi: 3.=3 Cezivec Cirirz :ls
#8 Ko.ins :n Gercva ir 9cz.
ii i73ssib.C f0 Give &2 ex1c: cvije_ic 0: : se_3C224
6: :. ioreg: iea6s :ur: b.ed %; NOSZNRO. 722: 272 c: s:3z-
Eci2f vaziie to #este:r =elge.ce _zC Cazz;ng lo #e %33 Is kazes;
siojcct to Cisz-te. 7i.s eva iaecz %is: be _ez evez t oie &ez2
2re tuerois toreign leacs wac: %ave zc: 322= adeciaie:s exzlo::ed
2; tnis tine.
As a fzal nofe, #e inpiicd coze:isio: {= &2 ?reviois Surafy
Is accejted tbaf the failtre 0 NOSZN7C 0 >zwvide usab.e ?ostive
12
oao/o7e
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:23
6
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SECFET
bnfellleopeo lnlormation I: R7 0 sigalflcant tactor La & detormlnadsn
ol hlo bonn {ldos . 7 qualulcatlon sbould, boworor, be 6dded tbat
le &0 pot telt tiat MOSENKO bee, 08 ol thle tlma, beoa lully debrfalod
t3 Mady esBes 0[ pob[dve Istellgeaco Intereet:
V 0001C77
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SECKE/
iS 7RERZ ZVISENCZ 07 % :ZCZ?-O)Ci "C-BZAW
ZIOZVATO} ?Er1XEZ 3rN3*C Z22
WOEzD WARZNZ A CGACEEQZiiz ACEZ1Q
WAS DSZACE2Z2X7222322
{6:2 Ei: F7 Eterk SECRET
3l8 l
0001C78
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SECE:
F _ Is_there evidence_o KGB dc:G2tion or "Givc_away" in
inorrgation furnishcd by AOSEAKO wkich would warrant a conclusion
thatAOSENKO wa8 dispatchcd by the_KC22 The conclusion in this
summary i8 that NOSENKO Ivas not dispatched by the XGE. Jni
rea ching thi8 conclusion, a full examination of the above /,v8 `ion hag
been both a necessary and integral part.
It i8 inherent that the volume of information furnished by
NOSENKO i8 only one of the factor8 which should be given consideration
in arriving at a conclusior: that NOSENKO wa s or wa & not dispatched by
the KGB. K NOSENKO was dispatched b; the KGB, the KGB would have
Burely been willing to gacrifice certain iniormation of value to the KGB
in order to support the bona fides of NOSZNKO. However, if NOSENKO
was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB
purpose or mission, the nature of which hag been and continues to be
unknown;
An examination Of the circumstances under which NOSENKC first
contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his benavior Guring these contacts is
particularly pertinent since during this period 0f time NOSENKO would
burely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications
of KGB diepatch in the NOSENKO case.
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NOSENKO has stated that hi8 original approach to "sell
pieces 0f information 1i wa8 his own idea a6 to wbat was most likely to
be succe85ful. NOSZNKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact
with the Americans , was not psychologically adapted to defect at the
time, and felt that if hc merely stated that ke was a' "KGB counter-
intelligence officer who wanted to give information, 11 he very possibly
would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his
first contact did not limit his remarko to the "two pieces of information"
and began to talk quite freely on other matters.
If NOSENKO was dispatched, it i6 felt that he . auring his 1962
contacts, would bave bcer very carefully briefed and tiat his remarks
or statements would have not been of a nature wbich could cause any
suspicion in regard to the bona fideb cf NOSENKO. Instead, a current
review of his 8tatements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962
indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual liee were quite
likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO
and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO
that he usually had a few drink8 of liquor before each contact in
Geneva.
2
0001080
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S6
NOSENKO, during his five contacis in Geneva, made mary
statements wbich in retrospect were impossfbie, the investizatior
0f which could only have raised ccrtain questions coni 3rning NOSZNO
Tre following i8 a list of tbe more obvious areas in which NOSENKO
made exaggerations or made incorrect Or impossible statements.
(a) NOSENKO claimed he Personally was with
M. GRIBANOV , Chief of the SCD, during the
recruitment pitch to(James storsBzzd (This wa5
lie and an interview with
Erox!iznajuita display _
of photograph would have disclosed that NOSZNKO
did not participate. )
(b) NOSENKO was involved in tke recruitment
approach to Russell LANGELLE. {Zhis was a lie and
LANGELLE was available for interwiew. )
06
(c) NOSENKO said he recruited Euvz (Forace
LUNTJin Bulgaria. (Actuaily NOSZNKO never met
Zunz)
&
3
0001081
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ara
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Oleg
4uke
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S_i3Z{
(d) NOSENZO claimed personal contact wita/ Zdmund 06
STEVENS]ivbo, according to NOSENKO, Lad, been recruited
by the KGB. (NOSZNZO actually had never personaiiy met
06
STZVENSand only bad
seen STEVENSkonce at a disiance. )
(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "'ANDREY"
in Moscow a8 1949-1950_ At the samo tine he furnisbed
information that "ANDREY" iwbo is considered identical to
Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time
that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, wa6 as6igned to
Mo6cow 1951-1953 _ "ANDREY" (SMITH) wa6 actuaily in
Mobcow 1952-1954.
(f) NOSENZO said hc, GRIBANOV , and anotzer officer
met Eaward Ellis SMITH. (AOSENKO has Bince stated he did
not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining & ioreign
typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH
operation. )
(g) NOSENO in & number of instances spoke in the
first person, saying "We did this , M1 or "We did tbat, II in
reference to a particular KG? activity in which he now 'admite
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he wa8 not involved but had some knowledze. (I
NOSZNKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he
ard hc f GB should kave known that these indicated
exaggerations would eventually lead to & quebtion
concerning the bona {ides of NOSENKO. )
In 1962-1963 a number of similarities werc noted between
information furnished by NOSZNKO and information which had been
furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These 8imilarities were
quite striking and gave riseto certain buspicions of NOSENKO because
he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered
already compromised a8 a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain
Of the Bimilaritie & at the time could only be explaincd in lerms of
NOSENKO being & dispatched agent. The following are some examples %f
tbe Bimilarities noted.
(a) Both furnished information in regard to
Johan
PREISFREUND} 0L
(b) Both iurnished information in regard to a
military code clerk case (Jame8 STORSBERG}} 0x, OL
(c) Both furnished information in regard to a
trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name ,
to the United States. (GOLITSYN wa5 bute it wab
connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in
5
A-d
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Noscow, or a recruitmcnt 0f an Arerican formerly
with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENZO
related it directly to thle "iADRZY"' case, giving the
a8sumed name whick KOVSHUX used. )
(a) Both furnished iniormation in regard to
microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.
(e) Both furnished information in regard to
Edmund STEVENS]and isaac Henry HA?IRQ}
The abovc list i8 not complete nor does it indicate the actual
differences in the amount of information furnished on any partic Jlar
topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in tbi8
8ummary i8 believed unnecesbary since the only of real interest
i8 whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, case6,
0t 6ituations of which GOLITSYN was 2lso aware raises a legitimate
question concerning the bona fides 0 NOSENKO.
The above area 0f concerr ba8 been thoroughly examined and
it i8 considered tbat the fact that NOSENKO furnished somc informa-ion
on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesger or
greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed a8 evidence
0001084
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SzCZ::
that NOSENKO wa6 dispatched by the KGB. NOSZNKO nab auring
current interviews Batisiaciorily sourced his iniormation in alr - st
every instance. In a few izStances he kas said ne did not recall
how he learned 0f a particular piece of information but these
apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are
congidered to be in no way Bubpicious.
The general area in which there was a similarity between
information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 early.1962 and
information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have
been the mogt significant insofar a8 the security of the United States
Government wa8 or is cozcerned related to certair activities centering
around Or in the First Dejartment, SCD.
It i6 the conclusion f this summary tnat NOSENKO wag an
officer of the First Section, First Depariment, SCD, during 1953-1955
and wa: Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 1961. Zherefore,
the fact that NOSENKO furnisbed information concerning certain cases
or situation8 in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN
furnisbed information concerning the same case or Bituation i8 not
unusual or necessarily 6uspicioue. NOSENKO ha8 stated that GOLITSYN
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Zcw &zC was I coriaci: w* Oike: 6ce?} 0 i 7rot Secio i32
Goizzsy: &68 aarioifcd %is i.ow_~e $ % cizii ^ Cascs €f i_.viees
6 e Zirs: Dezezicest, SC?, >ti;:01. iascc.a.or W:::
Cezia = ozcezs k #ke Zirsi 2ojurtzei, SC_
I i3 zecosazec :uf #kcfe i:e Cczii CoZic;e 03
tzis.ed by GOZITSENaad NCSZ)KO25_ af 6*5 :. ::*6
Zo3s.~.2 :0 3af.6 ctozey corre ite ~eriil: iozsZeion { 63GCzs:
wiz: {corration {ror: NOSz:o 7+329 .62 ~ :i3 &: i&e 7revcis
slzaz} reier i0 {iorzizio ff0x: COLITSYN wv.cz i5 ciez_ciezzec
as " orrazios aboit KCB Operaiio,s A3a.rst Zlissy Coce Cczks =
196;. 01 Thc reicrcrccs aze ;0 {orziicz {-&i Co_TSN i~bcc
Or zemarks by Gcsadiy Ivarovich GRYAZACV azc Vadn Vekicrivick
Kiso_zo 0f t.e 3.:s: Seciior, Zirs; Dezitnez:, SCD, azc <=
oizer of tne Spconc Seczion, Zirst Departez:, SCJ
NOSENKO kas siaiec ta: rc Izs Dezit; Cxei o. #he Zirs:
Scziion, First Dejartrne.i, SCD, Glri=g 1966 !961, taa: }is 77saz;
zes?ozsibility was Wor< agairst coce cerks at t2 United S-ates Zeass]
i Koscow and that both KOSOLAPOV arc' GRXAZNOV weze en3aged i
the same Work a1c Iicer his supcrvis:or. Tne statcnent by GOL-TSYA
SEC3ZT
196g
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that NOSENKO wa8 not Depuly Chief of the First Section in 1960 hab
been noted and commented on in another section Of this bummary.
GOLITSYN ha8 furnished certair iriormnation wrich he re-
ceived Irom officers 0f the First Section, first rtment, SCD.
In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could
not be immcdiately correlated with iniormation Irom NOSENKO, it wab
previously considered to be evidential of deception or Jying on the part
of NOSENKO. Thi8 position, however, {ailed to allow for the poseibility
that the discrepancie8 between the two sourceb were, at leaat in certain
instance8 , more apparent than real.
In certain jJistances it has now beer Posbible to correlate
mentary information from GOLiTSYN with information Irom NOSENKO,
ma it evident that in these instances the differencc8 could cot bc
construed a8 in any way reflecting against NOSENKO: The four examples
cited below represent two probable correlationg, (a) and (b); one possible
correlation, (c); and one ingtance where,po correlation i6 possible at thib
time, (d):
(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he
received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV
that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an
SECRET.
Depa =
irag-
king
0001087
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Z-
Amcrican icmale employee 0f the American Zmbassy
in Noscow through a male Soviet fricnd, but tbat tbe
attempt had failed, GOLTSYN also furnisbed information
that tbe woman had left Noscow by the time he iearned of
tbe information but that the Soviets hoped she would return
to Nobcow 80 tbat further work couli be urdertaken to
efiect ber recruitment. He did not recall the name of the
secretary, but did recall that it wasla long and "German 08
Bounding'" name_
NOSENKO ha; furnished information in regard to a
recruitment attempt against(Collette SCHWARZZABACH, 04
whbo it is considered is identical to thc "American secretary"
reicrred to by COLITSYN. Howevcr SCITWARZENBACH
was not a female secretary in the American Zmbassy, but
had been employed a8 a secretary to the wife of Ambassador
DS
BOHLEN during 1955 1956 and from 1958 1959 wa8 employed
as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow The
recruitment attempt against(SCHWARZENBACH according to
NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and wa8 an operation 0f the First
Section, First Department, SCD.
0001088
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(6) Page 163 of tie previous summary con{?:r.6 infor -
mation tnat GOLIZSYN alo lcarned [rom GiyfANOV in
the 8pring Of 1960 that GRYAZNcV had developed an cperation
against an American Zmbassy railiiary code clerk in which the
KGS was "99 per ceni #ure" t.at tke targct would be recruited.
This i6 believec to undcaiiedly be a reference to the case 0f
James storSBzrdkwno was actually te gubject 0 a recruit-
ment approach in 1961.
There is congidered to be a poseibility that
GOLITSYN actually learned o the above iniormatior {rom
GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when hc wa8 in Mogcow
rather than during tne spring o 1960 when GOLITSYN wab
preparing ior his a8signment to Helsinki, Finland This
theory is bupported by informatior on page 163 of the previous
summary that GOLITSYN has 8tated he learned in January
1961 from Vladisiav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section)
that(Johan ?REISFREUNDhad recently been used in the
Buccessful recruitment of an American employee 0 the
Embabby . Johan PREISF REUAPlwag u8ed in theSTORSBERq
operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also
O801089
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aware that GOIZSYN had a conversation wiih XOVSHUX about
06 06
PRESFREUND since GOLITSYN wanted t0 usc [REISFREUND]
in Helsinki. NOSZNKO has Stated he was not preecnt auring
tae above conversatior. It is very pogsible that KOVSHUK
exaggerated a liitle in his conversation with GOLITSYN in tne
06
matter Of wry GOLITSYN could not usefPzZ SFREUND as an
agent.
NOSENKO has furnished extengive information in regard
to thel James
STobSBERa
case and with Gue congideration to
the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not
appear to be an adecuate bagis for questioning the bona {ide8 of
NOSENKO on the basis Of the diifererces between the report-
by GOLITSYN of information hc received {rom GRYAZNOV
concerning what i8 congidered to have been the James 0 6
STORSB ERGcase and detalled information furnished by
NOSZNZO concerning the James STORSB= zRC)case. The
exact date f the recruitment attempt againgtJSTORSBERG
06
ha8 not been positively established, but it is consicered to
have occurred before earky May 1961 and probably in the
March-April 1961 period. The statement byfJames] 06
0001C90
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oiirk
SToRSBzRC]kat it occurred in October 1961 is
coi
pieiely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other
statements by
Drox?lsag
tinsei:.
(c) Page 163 of tne previous summary cortains
inormation {rorn GOLiTSYN wviich he bad received from
GRYAZNOV in April or Nay 1960 t.at an American
employee of i.e Embassy in Noscow was either recruited
or prepared {or recruitment on the basi8 Of & homosexual
compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960_
The previous summary also state8 :hat according to
GOLITSYN, the KGB had photograpned the American in
va rious hornosexual act8, but SHELEPIN, who had just
become Cnairman 0f the KGB, wa 5 at the time btres
iceoiogicai rather than Diackrail recruitments. SHELEPiN
Gid not exclude future use 0f tne photograph8 which tne KGB
would hold i3 reserve.
~OSZNKO hag furnished information concerning the
bomosexual compromise o Robert BARRET7] who wa8 a
guide at the United States Exhibition in Mobcow in 1959, and
with wbom "ISHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY two homosexua]
0801091
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1J L
agente of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against
the United States Exhibition was the respon ibility' of
the Ninth Depariment, SCD, but various Departmerts
werc ?articip ting under the direction of the Ninth
Department.
One of the above homosexual agente gucceeded in
involvingGBARQErzlin homosexual activities which were
photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO,
although the photograprs were 0f a quality, the KGB
was unable to us e the photographs in 1959 because of a
general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment
of the United States Exnibition guides due to the planned
visit Of Presidert EISENHOW ER to the Sovict Union.
NOSENKO also btated tat the compromi materiai
06
and information on) BARRETTJwas later given to the First
Department and that]
@AR{tJ
wa8 recruited by the Second
Section, First Department when he returned with another
Exhibition in 1961, and that NOSENKO, wa8 not involved in
the recruitment operation. BBARRET]} follow hi9 return
14
0001C92
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Iia
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SECZZ_
to the Uniied Staics in January 1962, confes8ed to the
FBI tna t he had bcen recruited ir 196 } on the basis of
compromising photographs #hich had bcen taken
during his 1959 trip to Nosco_
Although it cannot be established at this
time, it is possibie that the inormation furnished
by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV
actually refers to thef Robert
BkRRErt]
kase. It Bhoild
08
be noted that Robert BARRETT]could not actually be
charactcrized a8 an "American employee of the Embagsy
in Moscow . 41
(d) Page 162 of the previous gunimary contains infor-
mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring Of 1 960 when he
visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned
from GRYAZNOV tnat GRYAZNOV had a8 an agent an Enbassy
code clerk who was scheduled to be trensferred t0 fielsinki.
GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had
already furnibhed the KGB with some inforrnation, that he was
15
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considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if ,
the tranbicr of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN
might have the codc clerk as an agent in Heleinki.
NOSENKO has furnisbed no information which ca:: be
correlated in any way with tke above information from
GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN
reeulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation
which ha8 been conducted in tbe matter. Although thie is
congicered 'to'be a, valid lead, it need not necessarily refer
to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in
Mobcow_ during 1960 1961. It i8 al8o possible that the previoue
remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who
might be transferred to Helsinki a8 well a8 his cited remarke
in a-C could be clarified or at least additional information
obtained if a bpecific reinterview on tbese matters wa8 Posbible.
The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in
November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information
from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN: Thie conflict i8
16 OOOICE4
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ECRET
considered by the KGB to be & "real" agent and that if
the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN
might have the code clerk as an agent in Heleinki.
NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be
correlated in any way with the above information from
GOLITSYN, but neither bas the information from GOLITSYN
resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation
which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is
considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer
to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in
Moscow during 1960
~
1961. It is also possible that the previous
remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who
might be transferred to Helsinki a8 well as his cited remarke
in a-C could be clarified or at least additional information
obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.
The trip of Vadim V_ KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in
November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information
from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is
16 CO01024
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SECREZ
al8o mentioned ir another section pertaining to the 1960-196] career
of NOSENKO GOLITSYN statcd that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki
to accompany an American Embassy code clerk On the train to
Nobcow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance
with the code-clerk which could be continued:in Moscow.
The American Embassy code clerk referred to above wa5
06
undoubtedly[John GARLANland the train manifest liste(John GARIAND]
and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V_ KOSOLAPOV) a8 passengers on the
Bame train from Heisinki to Moscow NOSENKO i9 aware of the
identity ofJohn
cAlhaxzJbur =
claim8 no knowledge of the above trip
of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although well aware 0f a previous trip.
NOSENKO; as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically
charged with work against code clerks, should bave been aware 0f the
November 1960 trip of KOSOLA?OV to and from Helsinki. His lack of
knowledge may or may not be explainable in termg 0f his other activitie8
such a8 his trip to Cuba in November -December 1960 but it cannot be
interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if
he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO On the trip 0f
KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, a8 thie wa8 an event the
KGB knew GOLITSYN wa8 aware of.
0001Cs5
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~_i3
A theory which ba8 previously been given consideration and
warranted full conbideration was that if AOSZNZO was dispatched,
his mission was to confuge lead8 furnisked to American intelligence
and/or to denigrate tbe value o information {uznished by GOLITSYN:
In connection with tbis theory, it sbould be noted taat NOSENKO during
current interviewe bas not made any remarks which could in any way
be construed a8 derogatory to GOLITSYN: In adaition, NOSENKO does
not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently,
wben some tozic peculiar to the FCD ba8 been broached with NOSENKO,
his immediate reply has been to tka effect that "I didn't work in the FCD,
or M You Bhould ask GOLITSYN about that.
In-connection with any consideration of whether the contact of
NOSENKO writh CIA in Geneva in June 1962 coulid bave been initiated by
the KGB 26 2 result of tne defection 0f GOLITSYN, the timing oi certain
events shotld be noted. GOLITSYN" defected on 15 December 1961.
NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerlana,
whera he remained until 15 June 1962.
It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not
imposfible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the.actual or
potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN,
18
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SG€
select NOSENKO a5 the individual wno would be Gispatchcd to counter-
act tae ?ossible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to
bis departure for Geneva in Narch 1962. Thereiore, i NOSZNKO
was dispatcbed by the KC3, it would appear tbat pians for this would
have predated the defection of GOLITSYN" and that any COLITSYN
aspect could only be a related aspect and not the bagie for the original
plan to dispatch NOSENKO: In addition, #f NOSZAKO wa8 dispatched,
it would hardly seem necessary for tke KGB to send NOSENZO to
Geneva twro and one -bakf months before hie first contact witn CIA_
The theory ba8 also been considered that NOSENKO could have
been dispatched to confuse and ,divert American intelligence and thus
to protect an important KGB penetration Or penetrations of the United
States Covernment, particularly CIA. This i8 & tbeory which should
and has been given full consideration, but it is no: Possible to factualiy
substantiate Or_refute_this_theory in the absence of specific information
that high-level KG3 penetrations do Or do not exisa.
Actually, 25 regards NOSENKO, the Primary area which should
be' given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from
NOSENKO is accepted, what effect woiuld Or could it have on the efforts
19 0001C97
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of American counter-intc igence t6 determine the identity of and
take appropriate action againbt KGB penetrationg of the United
States Governmert. The only answer to this question seems to be
that there would be iittle consolation or a3surance to American intelli-
even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.
The only bpecific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-
Bidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow.
In thie area Hie Btatementb could be construed a8 absurance that there
were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embabsy
in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with he exception of "ANDREY"
(Dayle Wallis SMTH) and Herbert HowlRd The basis Ior this
expreseed. opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary
and analystg may differ a8 to whether a recruitment could have occurred
of which NOSENKO did not have knowleage, a8suming that his statements
are made in faith. It Bhould be noted, however, that at this time
tbere .i8 no specific information which is in direct conflict,with the
expreeeed opinion 0f NOSENKO.
NOSENKO, 29 previously mentioned, ha; never claimed any
particulax knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he doe8 not claim
to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an
OoO1cs8
20
Ce?det
147-+8"4:
LRR
gence
good
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example, he ba8 made it clear that his knowlecge of SCD activ ties
against member8 0f Geiegations _ Ioreign businegsmen, foreign students,
ard individual8 in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet orzanization or
component of the Soviet Government i8 extremely limized and at best
mainly of a collateral nature.
NOSZNKO does not even claim any detailed krowledze of
activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD,
Dot doe8 he claim to know all 0f the case8 of which the Chief of the Seventh
Department wag awatB. The latter i8.specifically supported by certain
note8 brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number
o: Seventh Department case8 which are identified only by 'the KGB code
name. These note8, according to NOSENKO, were made wben he bad an
opportunity to review a notebook beld by the Chief of the Seventh Department
and constitute tbe only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.
21
SECRET
~rvr Utemo IlX
OO01C99
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SECRET
G XS TTERZ ZvWD_ICZ 87 4 POLITICAL OrAny
CTZER TYPE OBJZCEVE EHICH CZUID JESTIZY 2 DZS?ATCH"
0F NCSENZO 3y TZz KCZ Iit; PZRMESSON" TO S?Z4X
FREELY To CIA CONCERNNG HIS KNOWLZDGE 0F 7E2233
AND WITZQUZ TOSZAR0 223G GVEN A SPECEZC
VZSSOA" OR VSSIONS ?
Cboe Ecltes 6 !itattle SECRET 376
0001100
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Gi::: :: 4222
#888 c:",ac} } 3' Ku; 32414
*0 { Tc GaG. E414420221k81
~CEzAKO e*ieA2C @iEai 310 i*ove /63_.-
bZ:} kas Seef 3ivez: Cozscozzei: cve: i20i3h E0 @eite Z422C__e f
27e Zzicici xy {ii Ci _blc. ILC Cosc_yoioz {s ike: 2z {~36782 XiEZXZO
with #he s.-gle exceziion detuzlc _iow, 2070 i3 ;o evcezcc Cf &
political cr ctzez iyze objeceve wi_zz coiic 32 CozsiCezed 02 si2cle3:
irporiance by tz0 KGZ {0 Wirrar: &_ Cxzazc: ~: a KCZ Ozice: Wiez
tha kowlecse 0: AOSZNZO 50 szezk #eely wita CLi witzoi: ais bei:z
8 ven & speciic risson 07 ...is6.0415 te KC3_
f{9 accez-ed #21 #c Soviet 1eicers:i? woud 3e ctzeiy caz_Lle
c::nzicti:s #0 ZC3 to lspitze & #i2z: GEce: :or 3e752.c3: Cezcezz
to Uzited Siztea autaoziees wetz =0 s7ec*c iszelligezce _issic: &.8 =0
iiziia-ions Cz ibz KGS {ziclgcrce irlozzsatoz ke _ge: zeveal zzovicirg
eka: Sica ac: wollc, Ite csaircze 0 :Re leadlezs2i?, ~e 'lt i 2 Zer
political Ior tze USSR. Fo: Sicz 2 zossibi+] to be sericiay
entertaized by t.e Soviets, Zowevez, i: woi_d zave :o irvolve ar isSie 0:
major intportance to tLe Sovie: lcaccrssi? and zresiiraby would Zave to
0O01101
SZCEET
224
bj
ga:n
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cazs.cezed by iziz. a3 6c Oziy: _: A~isi :al desi Zeazs 0
Le28ving E0 Geszcd cid Aac 0.147.+5 vern&g2 ?7834386;
0: 5i28cs3_
Zze Ozly <7ea io_ered ii: : Lf";yTSZNZC vec
nije:iee: tLG _bove zeqiizezz=Es {& 1ssasbi230= 0 Fesies:
Xezzecy: tbe involveziez: 6 Zcc %7v; Osge_d i:e 6s3258322562
228 %is associaiion with tse Sovie: izlz: C.ver {6) szeci2azc.
obtairing at tae tire %za: there Wzs Sove: {rvolvezez: = &.
assassiratior, (j {e prezise %zat {x {aci #eze Wa& zo Sovie:
irvoivemeni, and (c) a byzoikesis #.1: #zc Soviet lcacersbiz Was.Zeezly.
corcerned jest erroneous Cozc isions 3c Czawz Wzice coulc Leid t0
irreversable actors, it i6 corce:vable iiz: #.c Sov,e: leadczsz?=l3it
bave been prepared +0 take extzeznc Stc73 :O convince Iitec Szl722
attborities Of theiz zor-ixvolvezcz: iz ire a530552.2703. (Zze 312323c
to tce United States Covernrsez: 0f tze a cgecly cors?.epe Scvic: cozsiiz:
file On OSWALD wa; {z{#s2li , a; uzzrecedenied &c6.)
The NOSENKO case Warrasts exarsizatics in &e above zezazd ir
light of the fact thaz amonz the iniczrsation NCSENKO 2roviced was
"inside" KGB inforra-ion on OSWALD: intozmation wzice ?uzzo7*dy
OOO11C?
2
SEC:_
32
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revealed €0 Sibsizace 0:&4 cee : oi ie %G3 {:les &z CswiL)
Tzis iniozraiion cleazy ieccic: :c72 wa5 ro Ki3 ze'2i6zs2.?
w;:a Cswii), tbaf %2 KC3 34. or2f03a2 {riczcs:ez CSMAZJ
zad tLa: 65 @ mnaiie? 0: {Zc: Os;:LI 2i2 ?es22.28 #e 333 Wz 2
contirii-g sezies o: 2*0018.15.
Uzon exazra:oz, hcwe Vez, TOSZN"C Coes zc: ec? Ze
zequiremea:s prer sed above io= sezicis Scviet' COrscezzii8z 0f & :fee
KCB defectioz. Tze Iolowing rezsozs rezcez this uzacceztable;:
a, Tle chzozoiogy, in #sel, presezis viriially {possisle
Probiemg;for.such & :2cses, viz . NOSZAKCl3.initial #2zoet2Cz
% Jure 1962, 17 moztzs pzicz {0 :28 as5a33i_.on 0; 7zeeident Kezzecy.
b. Wrailc :ae i-ozraton i-o IOSZNZO 03 CskALD :s
isteresting &zd 207782-, it{& Soj, {1 ;2t725 sccpe, azi Ccije;",
stifciently ccnvinci:3 icr United Stazes ettcorities :0 zeasozab-y >e
expectcd to concluce #2a: if rezresezzed izeceivocal proo: 0: Sove:
zon-iavolvement.
C It is irplaisible no: to &ssume tka: te Sovie-s worlc
assume that United Siates autborites, in ary exarinatioz 0: +2
possibility 0f a Soviet (KCB) hand in the 65525sination, wou& ?re3i8
3
CO011C3
SECET
44
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eszer.ey zazruw Sovie: cuf77.L. Eo; 5i2} &1 cjerciloz C t
~oz?izzentition Waies woi-c ~eiii owlecgcasi; by asy3C
ozrce: o+bez iian ve:; Dizio? 7i7o0.2 LZC 6-iv cii. 0 370473
Lctor irevicials specc..; cozcezz-& WeZisezs 0i #_3 727i=
3'
Zz2 %C3 cazec: 0: NZSZNZC woi Z Ei= 2875- ev83 scr.cie
cozs cezaeon iiat NOSZNZO CoiC eivc :~jici; beea Zsec {io Ze
a3ove very limited categoz;-
It is accordirgy cozcluded *: j22 3os_b6Y 0f & polucaEy
rotivated free dispatch can in t.e Cz3? 0 NCSZNZO b2 Satiszaciorey
eliirated.
Tbe' possibiliy %as als0 becz Cons cezcc &i: the KCZ riz-:
cave tbeorized tna: by dispaickirg &2 a3ez:, in &3 case 82 ozic27,
with curerois leads to Ion-Viluable &7 :or-CEzzea: KC3 agents 0=
c2ses, tke facilicies 0: i2 Eriied Stc-es Atezigence coxririn:ty Wor &
be ?ractically reutralized :0z az exzczzed 7erib8 0: #ine. Zzis coiic
ozly b2 based on &2 a8sur:jtion tka: Z18 Unite€ Szates Itelligezcz
comraunity would irvolve a majoz porzion 0: :5 Zersozrelazd eziczts
in tbe investigation and zesoiction 0: cases weich kad little 0 ~o Cizfez:
or potential value to tke KG3_ Zhe above 2os5i3 1+y cannot be
Zarbirarily eliminated witzoit iull coasidezation
I is ro: believed jb2=
00011C4
SECRE?
3Y
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NOSZ1ZO i: i&c a5scic0 €; ~V_cLace #it ze %ad _Ay KC3 %.ssi03
o: rissora to iLlfil} Cors.cs V... eibcve cz;esot, purtcularly si.ce &n"
ovefall &8323S1e7f 0f _i3 izozzion icd5 jo Ee corclusic: tiit =22
exploiti-ion 0 %is ilozzseicz woile' Lc <iize Garrag1g [0' #e KCZ.
Cozsidezatioz & :.2 €bovc ?052288] zist a s0 irclide z0
evaluation 0: tke Ceiorze:: czic: Or 2hc pzospects 0: ftrure fecriienicai?
by &e KC3 caused by %234l _C..07 take= #3eins: i=Civicizls expozed &y
iniozrction from thc Ciszaickcd agcn: Or oificer. Tkc detcrront &iicc:
or Otbers 0 ibe convicion aic Seste:cing 0: persons Wco bave comizizd
3 crine or crincs,bas lozg been & zar8 6f tke legal tzeozy 6f why pezsozs
wbo commit & crime skould be Lprisoned or' zuaisked.
Tke dete rert ejc: Or Otlers 0; iLe trials arc ccrviciions o:
William VASSAiZ, Rcbert Lec JSKSON _nc Zames Allcn VNTKZT -
3AUCE bhoilc alot e inccrestirztec, Tbe KC3 ais0 cclld rot _ave
krowa tbat inormation :izaiskcd by NCSZNKO would zot result in t..c
trial and conviction 0f Oiher ICB agents 02 recruitments concerning
whorn NOSZNKO had sore know edge.
OOO1105
Lw #d + 4 :X8
Xtk
238
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SECRET
A. IS THzRZ A1y EVEZIcz?3t 22 CO1zACTS Cz
NOSENKO A'1962 03 I1 : 9: 7XC3 WZRE{cw TQ ZEZ
XGB PRIQR TQ HIS DEFZCEEOACRZHATACSZNKQ
WAS EVER BRIEFED BY ZHz XGB R2:ATIVZ TO Es BZE4VIOR
OR KGB OBJECTIVES DRINC FZZSE CONTACTS OR
AFTER KS DEFZCZION?
(I?
Excltul 170 etzalic SECRET
0115714 LI
Gaci wxitm
0001106
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SECREI
H. Is there ar evidcncc that thc contacts 0 NOSENKOin 1962
OT in 1964 with CIA were_known to the ZGB_prior to his Gefection 0
that NOSENKO was ever briefcd b} the KGB relativc to bis behavior
or_KGB_objectivee during_these contacs or after his defection? The
conclusion i8 tbat tbere i8 no cvidence that the contacts Of NOSENKO
in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were %nowa t9 tke KGB prior to his
defection and that NOSZNKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.
Thc bagi8 for tbe above conclusion is substantially contained in
previous sections. It is being treatec bere as a 8eparate area of interest
since it is a sufficiently important area a5 to warrant individual consideration.
It i8 recognized that Bince positive factual confirmation such as
the KGB file on NOSZNZO is not available, any conclusion concerning
whether NOSENKO was or wa8 not Gispatched by the KGB can be
based on the full review of available information from NOSZNKO,
collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the
individual analyst concerning the siguificance or non-significance of
each item of available information:
The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962
and 1964 prior to hie defection were not known to the KGB i8
Euaist 6 3 uhaare
(rprc"}{ 188 SECRET
aim
#atr'# L4, 4J!~C
only
0001107
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Scu;.c:
necessarily based in part on a judgment a8 to whether any of hie
activit ies or information logically
warrant a @ubbtantial 6u8picion
that were or could be in any part the result 0f KGB direction
or control. One of the particular area8 considered wa8 hib apparent
behavior Guring his contacts with CIA in Junc 1962 and the conclusion
wa5 that it wa8 incomprehengible tkat he could have been under KGB
control at that time.
Consideration ha8 been given to the poseibility that his 1962
contactb with CLA were not kown to the KGB,, but became known to
the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It wag con -
cluded that' there was no basi8 for or iniormation which' would warrant
serioug congideration of the above pos Bibility aside Irom tne eparate
conclueion that the IGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitcr in
KGB eyes by bending him again to Geneva where he would be free
to defect.
Worthy of comment in this section i9 the iact that NOSENKO,
dur ing hib 1962 contacts, expreaeed considerable concern over hi8
perbonal security, requesting that knowledge concezning his identity be
kept to an abbolute minimum that no communications be 8ent to the
SECRET
they
quite
0001108"
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J
:
~aaed Sicics,Z02sb; vojec: ~cz2 Cor_ic?N;2 03:234
#2-_e €2 K0: wies #0 Si Ci_hietZ 042 #Joiid _ot feccs-ze &5; Le.uz37*d
cozizc: wizliz ie Sove: Eaioz. 3ZS3ROalso :izoied %czior 23
jo :1 Fees03 {O7 %io Cozcez; enizion fe327233 3: Cc3203
wie CAAbecozi _.oV/a ik142 Ziie] Zobisst:-1olccs_2 3
dazg2z5 to NCSZIZC & _ny Cor-Zc: &: Et5e.ap-c2 coet_c: We:: AZsCnZO
32& iSSR.
~15 zecoznized' Z2-E0 _3*Ve edicd Cozcezz 0: XCEZNZO
abci:: bis persozal secuzity {s :o: cess Etial erieezce {bi: JCSZAZO
was zot rrcer KC3 cozizl ; Rowveve:. ::{s evCezce :LZ: YCSZNC Wz3
no: % azy way ercouraging cizzZestse cortact 0: NCSZIZO wie n &2
USsz; ivhich very %ikely Woila Zave See= 2. a c& e KGz TZEZ1ZO
was ECer KC3 control:
Tbe 'ratcrial waick NCSSNKC {izaisted jo CLi i: 1764 228 bcer:
cazeslly reviewed to Cciezzsire % #eze {s-ary evicezce zia: #c KCE
pazticizalcd in any way in t2e €3Se7.bii13 of this razzer uicuc co_leczon
0f raterial. Nono 0 tke zatezial 272e378 to have been & z7 €ccoiziablc
tyze axd on the contrazy, it 272ear3 f4+ NOSZNZO ~oiic Lav? #zzis_ed
all 0 tLe matezial to CLA azc retiirec r0 tbe Sovier Ezizn wizeoc: tbe KC3
ever at a later date becozai-g awaze #af #be mazeziaf was 2czzely #ssing:
The latter staternent cvea iccluces tLc sravel docursect whics ertkorized
tbe tip 0f NOSZNKO to Gozkiy in Decezaber 1963 . OO011C9
SFCRF?
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Tee + iJeeaie: isic, iccc?is:0 AZSZAKC, Kzs :0
zeri ciziie i0 beareij: AxLlid: CZiERi`OV. #crcdi-z #
1CSZNO, 36 zeetli: Gocizezi Was .o: acccizeabie {n : 28 {: Wi3
only Lecessary jo t zr %: % Wzez fecec- zrzizseziz: {o: #avel
0x2e3562_ XOSznK 6+4i&2 3-2222 _0:citlc fi.ie? B2i1
Zrcolni € rioiey t0 vizcz R2 wzs Lail_Ll zE2 25 _.s0 &iztzcc &i732
zeally brougat #e GoCiz:es: &0n8 uuczi-l :: jivi &io E0 XClzzeec 22*
0: Lieltezar: Coloacl.
NCSZNKOba5 cornpleiery zetzaczed &.6 &a1n1 :c ~X-3 &C 610
rank 0f Lieutenant Coluzel, statng #a: evez &5 6 Di73 Cy32vr-
ment be was only & Caziain 312*0432 Le Wzs ezezed t3 a2C exzec-cz o
receive tke zank 0: Xajoz % eazly 1564. NZSZNc*25 5f+e8 :e:
giving kim *e rank 0. _euiezar: Colozel &*e aboye Cocezez: wZ;
tje erroz 04 KASHPZROV , #0 Oiiice: Om Etty % te SCD On Sirzay, &nd
tba: practically all Dep-ty Caieis 0i Dejazerer: in #he SC? 2+ Jczs:
tbe rank of Lielienazt Coiozei.
Tle above explaratior by NCSZIZC zay Weil be cozsicezed Ey
readers wita at leas: a Cezzee 0 skept-s_z. Zcwevez, % NCSZATO
wzs dispatcked by the KCB, it woila seer tzat %e colld Zave bee: Zro-
vided witk something & li-tle more Sibstar-a: :c cocuzzeat 2is clzim ci
the rank 0f Lietterart Colozez. 1 2cdizoz, it woilc seezn jaf tke KC3
CO0111o
SECREL
6+
&c
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iij
ciic &ive ?rovce: NCSEAZC fize :?e 0: (.Ociniezi w_ce
woicC Sij77orf a: Aeis: Oze O: z.e &L__cc pobt01is % :ic ECL, ZC},
Zve: #2c Cberejizov 7+7e75 Co _3.e_3 Way Jiszjorf tic cizl: 0f
Azz)o ta2: %e Was ?-ziw Czii: _ e4e 7izb: Sececz) fi767
Dv?zaec:t, SCD, :*G30 - .91., 3o: &c eVe; si7237: ci
Of TZSZNKC ibit i270 %is sicz & !O_iso-t in i.8 Fizei Secilcs _
i960 3 196: 07 evez iJ 2953 07 2536.
635 &:
0001111
CEZD:?
Z6y 0
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SECRET
IV_ COVVEITS COECERAEC PREVOs COACLLSCAS
LREG4RD TO NOSZAKQ
0001112
637 SECRET: Ucteu: 57 trratk
Ct7"; %4
Is'ast 3Ns _
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ScCRET
COVENTS_CONCERAING PREVIQUS_CONCLUSIQAS
IN REGARD TONOSENKO
Attached is a verbatir copy 0f pagcs 357 360 of tbe "Examina -
tion 0f the Bona Fide8 of a KGB Deiector" which contain8 seven (A G)
'primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence)
and KGB career 0f NOSENKO. These conclusiona Or findinge are
independently: treated in separate attachmente
With the exception of "G, J the conclusione in tais Burmary are
in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically tbat
NOSENKO served .in.the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, wab
2 KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964,
and held his claimed pobitions in the #XGB during tne March 1953
February 1964 period.
# For purpobes of clarity, tbe term KGB i8 ubed to refer to the
Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations_
unlese otherwise indicated.
Attachment:
Pgs 357-360 of "Examination
%f, the Bona Fide8 Of a KGB Defector;
Fes@/ udhaits #;> 4nir
tterzcis} 31 SECRET
cechatit Jlica
'Cpy
0001113_
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Seimr;
PREVIQUS CQACLUSIQNS RE AOSEAKQ
As CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 360 OF
"THE EXAMINATION QF THE BOAA FIDES Q2 4 KGB DEFECTOR"
The foliowing i8 a Guote 0f the previous conclusiong in the case of Yuriy
Ivanovich NOSENKO_ (The specific conclusions have been given the designation
of A G for purposee of easier correlation with Other sectiona 0f thi8 summary- )
"SUMMARY @F CONCLUSiONS
CONCERNNG NOSENKO'S B014 FIDES"
"NOSENKO claim8 that he served for a decade in the KGB in
successively: senior positions 0f aunoriy from which he derived
extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results 0f KGB
operations against Americanb in the Soviet Union in the period
1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provide8 an inpreegive,
array Of information about KGB personnel, organization and Opera -
tions which, to the extent that it hag been confirmed, i8 presumptive
evidence of hi8 bona fide8. Various Soviet ofiicials, including
intelligence ofiicer8, have generally corroborated NOSENKO'8
claime. A ccording to some of these source8, NOSENKO wae a
senior KGB officer who occupied a serie8 of senbiive: Pobition8, who
0001114
CECRFT
4
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Stl 'zi
enjoyed coniderable authoriy ald trust dcs persona] short-
comingi, and wbose acfection, 'tnc grcatcst 1o8s cver Buffered
by Soviet Intelligencc' Paralyzed thc work of KGB
Legal Reeidency, and jusiified the formulation of plane to a68as -
Binat0 him.
"The examination hae ccrpared cach element of NOSENKO'e
biography relevart t0 his claimed KGB eervice with known
facto and reabOna ble surmise. The examination reflects the
tebt to which hie accounts were Put: whether hie accounte are
internally coherent and consisteni with known fact, and whcther
be actually gained Ihe information iie has from occupying the
KGB positions he claims to haveheld. In 8hort, i8 he what he
Baye he i8, according to his own accounte ? /0
"This examination had led to tile ioilowing findinge , arrivcd
at independently:
A_ NOSENKO dic not 6erve in the Naval RU
in any 0 the capacitiee or at the placee and timee he
claimed.
B NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the
manner 'Or at the time -he claimed.
C. NOSENKO &id not 8crve in the American
CO01115
Embissy Section throughout the 1953-1955-period a8
he claimed
~roort
738
Pite
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4 LV
D. During tne ?eriod 1955-1960, ne was nciiher
a 6enior case oificer nor Deputy Chief 0f, the Seventh
Department American-British Commonwealth Section.
E. NOSZNKO wa8 neither Deplty Chief 0f tne
American Embassy Section nor a senior oificer or
supervibor in the Scction during the pcriod 1961-1962. (0ic)
F NOSENZO'9 claims,, that in 1962 he wa6 Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section and wae
thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are
'not-credible.
G. 'NOSENKO ha8 no valid claim to certainty
that the KGB recruited no American Zmbas8y personnel
between 1953 and nis defection in 1964.
These findings differ somewnat with respect t0 degree of proba ]
or certitude, but reflect tne preponderance of available evidence
in each instance. 1
"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumnptive evidence
of NOSENKO'8 bona {ideg: The contradictions in NOSENKO'8 accounts
of hib life and KGB service are 60 extensive a5 to make hi8 claims
28 a whole unacceptabie. While truth fact in this case frequently
'C001116_
SECRET
in,
bility
they
and
MY
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UlJi-
cancot be estabiisbed with certainty, it is evicent that truth and
fact re not what NOSENZO rejates. abnost any test, virtually
any of NOSENKO's abovc claims are impugned %y iact or probability,
O contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NCSENKO is
not what he claimb to taus he is not a bona [ide deiector.
"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide
defector, it i8 necebsary to attem?t to determine his true motives
for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the iniormation
he ha8 given. Here, it mubt be recognized that the evidence, largely
consisting of NOSENKO'8 own a8sertione, does not permit unecuivocal
conclubiong. Nevereies9, the question cannot be ignored The
character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that :
some Of his false € laims ha ve been corroborated by Soviet officials,
and the necessity to make decisions about NOSZNKO'8 future all
require that at leaet a provisional judgment be madc. M
"Of the reasonable explanations advanced ior 4mt NOSENKO'8
misrepregentation8 , the caief ones are that he is a swindler posing
ag a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he
1
suffers from a deranged personality Or unbalanced mind; that he ha8
greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and acce88 in the KGB, for
Perbonal reasons; O,: {inally., that he is a dibpatched KGB
0081117
agent.
SFCRFT
347
3y
and be ,
simply
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6
Nzu;izi
"The iirst two possibilities are casily dismissed. That
NOSZNKO is not simnply & swirdler wao Ialscly claims for personal
'advantagc to have been a KG3 ofiicer i8 evident, we believe, from
the confirmed detailg 0f KGB organization, personnel and operations
which he ha; provided and which couid only derive from within the
KGB itself:
"Second, a8 noted in 'tne @ext, extensive psychiatric and
pBychological examination by Gualified specialists rule out the
posbibility.that NOSENZO'8 actions and testimony are the product
of a deranged personality Or unbalanced mind."
"It i8 somewhat more plausible tnat' NOSENKO is & KGB
offcer who berved in at least 8ome of the components for 8ome
or all 0f tlle time periods that he clairns, but who greatly exag-
gerated his positions , rark and access to intormation, and
invented some matters outright, to achieye greater status with
American Intelligence. This explaration, however, fail8 to
accommodate tke fact that several KG3 ofiicers have asserted
that;NOSENKO did in iact aold senior positions in the KGB. Also,
NOSENKO'8 a8gertions with respect to aie rank, GRIBANOV'e
Patronage the 'recall telegram, and the like, cannot be jubt a
product of hig own invention, since these Were the gubject of 0001118
comment;by-other bources.
SECRET _
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~El;icl
"Because none of tne above explanations i8 conbiatent with
the data developed in interrogations and investigations , wc at0
left with the hypothesis that NOSZNKO wa$ dispatched by thc
KGB. Wnile this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalie8,
none 0f them renders it untenable. "
"In the absence Of further revelations by NOSENKO, or
other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that tho
evidence egtablishes a presumption that NOSENKO wag dispatched
by the KGB, 'and believes that prudence requiree that he be
regarded a8 gtill respongive to KGB control, and that hi8 infor-
mation should be a8sessed accordingly- 0i
'0001119
SECRET :
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SECRET
A. AOSE)KO DID1OT SZRVz THZ NAVAL Ri
IN" ANY OF TKE CAPAC-ZZES 0R47 TPLiCzs41Q
TIVES HE CLAZZD
0001120
cegr?
uchcei 6 Ltejtka
bejroh,130 SECRET
(ohuusbi
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QoooQ
SEC?ET
A. NCSENKO cic not serye in the Aaval RU inany 0f thc cazaciticg_
or at the places and tines he claimed; (Previou8 conclubion)
The above i8 conclusion "A" in the previoug bummary in regard
to NOSENKO. The current conclusion i8 that te claimed service of
NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early
1953 in the Far Eaat ard the Baltic area8 i8 adequately substantiated
and should be accepted.
The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated
by NOSENKO changing the date 0f his graduation from the Institute o
Iriternationa] Rela tions from 1950 to 1949.because he did not wibh to
admit thathe had' failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of hie clase.
However, previous efiorts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1 962
statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted_
significance wa8 given to the 1949 early 1953 period of time.
It is considered that NOSENZO has adequately explained his
"stupid blundere" a8 relate to the above and t0 certain other personal
matter8 and that his claimed 8ervice in Navy Intelligence from March
SECRET
625
bcate: 607 *eulk
Oucsas4! %i
8e;sij:J;;1
uetsy
tbey
0001121
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14-000QQ
Clu,5
195] to earky 1953 boti i the Far East and the Baltic area is
acceptabie. It i9 not cons cered necessary t0 comment concerning all
of the remark8 in thc previoug summary regarding the claired Naval
RU Bervice Of NOSENKO &5 reflected 0n paze8 49-59 and remark8 will,
Ior purpobe8 0f brevity, be }imited in scope.
The statement is made in the previoub summary that "Tne Bole
Hcadquarterg Ri officer NCSENKO identificd wag the Personnel Chief,
Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officere in either the Baltic
or Far Eabt Intelligence Staffs . Some 30 GRU officers he did identify,
by hi8 own' admiseion, NCSENKO knew not [rom hi8 Naval RU service,
but through Bocial acquaintance, later, in NoscOw, or through hio visits
toGeneva.
Attached is a coPy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily
prepared by NOSENKO in late 967 containing the names of a number
of GRU personnel Of whom ke had some knowledge. The attached wag
not prepared a8 the result of any inquiry concerning hie claimed Naval
RU bervice, but was only & small part of the material prepared by
NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by
OX
NOSENKO regarding approximately/875 KGB officere,(ookKGB agente ,
35 GRU officere and 4oo other Soviet parionale.
2
SECRET
8y8R
fully
6001122
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14-000QQ
lt is interesting to note that the atiached list contains thc names
oi approximately 20 GRU oificer8 Ivhom NOSENKO relates to the cariy
1950'8 period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviewe
and in Other memoranca, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelii -
gence personnel whom he knew in thc 1 951 early 1953 ?eriod.
Page 52 of the above summary and other related page8 question
whether NOSENKO ever gervcd in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence
and even quebtion hi8 geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a
copy 0. a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrama prepared by
NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his.assgnment with Navy
Intelligence 'in the Far East and the Baltic area. The; memorandum wa8
compieted by NOSENKO without reierence material and & review of
his diagrams indicates are accurate.
NOSZNKO had previougly Btated that his Bervice in the Baltic
area wab at Sovetek Primorskiy and durirg current interviews recalled
that the former name 0f the place, an aimost deserted fisnermen'0
village, wa8 Fishaugen. The previou8 designation given by NOSEN0
for thi8 place a8 having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had
caused the conclubion that his alleged place of a8signment wae non-
existent; further check in the matter would have discloged that the
place wae not nonexistent, that it is currently known a8 Primorek and
that the former German name of the fishing village wae Fischhaueen.
3 6u01123
SECRET
any
they quite
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QoooQ
OcUtic;
Tne previous summary a.50 Stated that degpite ni8 claimed
active cornmiggioned Bervice in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of
Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedureg. It
shouid be noted that there i8 a considerable difference belween being
a merber of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet
Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee
of the Oiiice of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States
Attachments :
List of GRU Personnel a8 Prepared by NOSENKO
Diagrame and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO
6001124
SECRET
~toyf 4
Navy-
==================================================
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14-QQQQQ
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14-000QQ
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Page 132
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14- QoooQ
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Page 133
==================================================
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==================================================
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14-000QQ
SECRET
8 AOSEAKODAOT ZIZz? THE KGB IN THZ
VAAAZR QRA7 TEE TZLZ #E CLAIZD
Eesded {r7; 37198,' SECRET
tT5i6% {04
C001131 _
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14-QQQQQ
SECE;
B NOSENKO dic not enter the KGB in the manrer or at the time
claincd. (Previous corclusion)
The above i8 conclusion "B" in the previous bummary in regard
to NOSENKO_ The conclusion in thie summary is that NCSENKO entered
the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and tnat his
entry wa8 not only facilitated by but ,due to the influence of General
Bogdan Zakharovich KC3ULOV.
Previous statements by NOSENKO and change8 relative to date of
entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary
and will not be repcatcd here. His statements during current interviews
that he entered on in mid-March 1953 as a czse Officer in the Firet
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con-
sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.
The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that
NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed
wa8 primarily based on conflicting gtatements by NOSENKO a8 to when
he entered the KGB (MVD): In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in
1965 NOSENKO said March 1953, boon after the death of STALIN:
SECRET
0001132
57;t?
Ecladed Ute Jpteeutle
Iprpgra:iaz Jod
Sedtassittaotica
duty
again
==================================================
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14-000QQ
Siuni:
in 1964, NOSZNKO had given two dates in 1952 a5 jis tine of entry into
tbe KGB in an eiort not to 'admit that he had faixed to graduate from tbe
Institute 0f International Zelations in 1949.
The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statemente
of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (NVD) under what
are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances Were not
given for position of the fataer of NOSENKO, the Minister 0f Shipbuilding,
and the' influence-of General KOBULOV: An analyst can either accept or
reject tho etatement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through
the influence of_Gcneral KOBULOV;but, if the statement i0 accepted, then
thbe failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KG3 proceduree
should_also-be-accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet intelligence
organization i8 not and could not be immune to induence by a bigh official
General KOBULOV @5 of mid-March 1953 wae First Deputy to BERIYA,
the Minister Of the then NVD_
The previous summary raise8 several pointe concerning the
eligibility of NOSENKO ior the KGB (MVD) It pointe out on' pige 67
that other than bis undistinguished period 0f service with the Naval RU,
he was no more eligible for & KGB. appointment in 1953 than he was at
the .time' of his previou8 rejection in 1950. This statement i8 not contro-
Vetible and-i8 fully accepted with' the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO
0001133
2
SECRET
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14-000QQ
wa8 not sponbjed by any person of influencc a8 wa8 tne case in 1953
with Ceneral KO3ULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy
to BERIYA.
The previous summary also States that according to KGB
dcfectors familiar with the Standarda in torce at the time, no candidate
was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat 8tatement
which it i8 doubtiul any Gefector or' series 0f defectors could fully
substantiatei_namely,_that_it_never happered. Until and unle86 it i8
medically proven that NOSENKO did not havo tuberculosis, it i8 accepted
tbat be did have tuberculosis in 1952 and 'was at a sanitarium 8 # rest:
place in Kubinka. It i8 al8o accepted that he wa8 an officer_in the KGB
after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly
bave permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously
had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate wa8 accepted who
had ever bad tuberculobis i8 not and cannot be sufiiciently substantiated.
The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks
and conclusion8 intended to shOw that NOSENKO was not eligible for and
therefore could not bave entered the KGB (MVD): Comments concerning
thebe 'will be brief since there i8 conbidered to be no adequate basi8 at
thie time on which to contend that NOSENO did not enter the KGB
(MVD) a8 an officer: in_mid-March 1953 . A comment was made that
6001134 .
SECRET
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14-000QQ
ULJ
NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his
processing ior XGB entry, and that such a medical examination was
a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate.
This Statement makes no allowance Ior the influcnce 0f General
KOBULOV; but, in addition, doe8 not ccnsider the fact tnat, the Naval
RU dossier on NOSENKO was avadlable to the KGB (VVD).
The previous summary also failed t0 note that tbe MVD would
have had independent iniormation in regard to NOSENZO 8ince the XVD
would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the
of NOSENKO into. the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also
had a 'd088ier &n the father of NOSENKO since thi8 wa8 gtill the STALIN
era,
The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the
necessary Jengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not
8peak to any_personnelofficers or visit the personnel office. It wouk
eem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the
elimination of most if not all 0f the necessity Of complying with normal
procedure8 , but NOSENKO ha8 during interviews 8tated that he com -
pleted the Anketa while sitting at his debk after entry into the KGB (MVD):
Page 70 of the previoue bummary stateg that NOSENKO did not
kow-the debignation of hie Own Directorate either at tEe time he allegedly
LUU1L35
SECRET
entry
==================================================
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14- QoooQ
S.
entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While
NOSENKO has claimed that thc designation of hie Directorate at the
time he entercd the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second
Chief Directorate ard that it subsegucntly was redesignated the
First Chief Directorate, DER YABIN %a8 stated this reversal of
designatione occurred in March 1953 .
STALIN died in early Narch 1953 and that game month the
NVD and thbe MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA
a6 Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June
1953. BERIYA wab succeeded by KRUGLOV, who beld office for les8
tban a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently, Gueried concerning tbe
date of the reversal of the.designation of the FCD,and SCD and places
it as the end of April Or early May 1953_ GOLITSYN has indicated that
the change occurred "soon after the advent 0f BERIYA 48 head 0f 'the
MVD in April 1953 . 16 In the light O our inability to fix the eifective date
of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the ZCD, it i8
unreabonable to impugn NOSENKO on bi8 statement a8 to the designation
of hi8 Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD)-
There i8 a disagreement between NOSENKO and others a5' wbo
was responbible for the reversal' of designations, of the FCD and the SCD.
NOSENKO i8 of-the"opinion that-it occurred under KRUGLOV, which i8
5
(ui136;
SECRET
to'
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14- QoooQ
in cortilict with tfe Staterenis Of DER YABIN, RASTVOROV and
GOLITSYN, all 0 wbom maintain that BZRIYA wa& responsible for
the changes. As Ior tbe ibfie 0f who wa; responbibie ior tbe reversal
of desigrations, it would appear that NOSZNKO is in error. However,
the fact tbat he wa6 a new junior officer and that this was a period 0
upheaval in the KGB (MVD) efiectively eliminates apy significance in
tbib i6sue.
NOSENO i8 criticized in the previou8 8ummary for not knowing
the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the
KI (Committee of Informatioa): NOSENKO ha8 btated tnat he had no
contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there ie no adequate rea8on
to disbelieve this,8tatement. He i8 not aware of when the KI ceased to
exist (1951 given in tae summary, but other information indicates the KI
continied to exist in a nomiral capacity until the mid-1950'6}, but care
Bhould be used in stating wba: NOSENKO should know if he held a certain
position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own
memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at
any given period of time or wben Agency components Or related organizations
wete organized Or ceased to exist.
COU11z;
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Tbe point ha8 also been made that any career 0f NOSZNKO
in tbe KGB snouid bave erded or be Bhould have at least encountered
difficulty when ais benefzctor General KOBULOV, together writa tne
brother of Ceneral KOBULOV, wa8 arrested with the BERIYA group in
early June 1953. NOSZNKO ha8 during current interview8 stated that he
encountered no difficulties but i6 aware that the KOBULOV connection
wa8 digcussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an
official of the First Department: Under other circumstance8 NOSENKO
would very possibly bave encountered ditficulty; but, it should be noted
that the {atber of NOSENKO retained his'position, tbat NOSEAKO only_
met General KOBULOV tarough hi8 father, and that NOSENKO bag. stated
tbat although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no
way be considered a member o the BERIYA group.
~ic1i38
SECRET
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SECRET
C NCSEIKO DI? NOZ SERVE I" ZEE AVERECAXEvzASSE""
SZCTION THROCGHOCZ T4Z1933 -,1955 PER-Q2
AS E2 CLAEED
'C001139
633w? SECRET
13 Izlic
C171388 JeJ
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S_75
Cs NOSENKO did rot serve in_the American EmbagSY Section
througbout the 2953 1955 pcriod a8 Kc claimed: (Previous conclusion)
The above i8 conclusion "C" in thc previou8 8ummary- The
concludion in this 8ummary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the Firet
Section (American Embassy Section), Firgt Derartment, {rom mid-March
1953 to late 1955 when ke wa6 trangferred to the' Seventh" Department,
SCD.
This period of time hag been covered in detail with NOSENKO
duriug 'current interview8. The conclusion i8 that NOSENKO was an
Oiiicer in the First Section but was not a effective officer and that
both hi8 work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he
wab the: 8on Of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO ie reluctant to
admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in hie work auring
this period of time, but is not hegitant to admi: that his personal be-
havior wa6 &uch a8 to cause him to be removed a8 Secretary to the
Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"
SECRET 0001140
{ut+/ Exc"?ed Ir(7 &:Iseits
abauoa Jb &6
(e i:jjc c1J)
#t0rilu: 0n04tsonlnehty +-
Nay
very_
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be Prepared in early 1955 which neccssitated a decision &8 to whether
he would be fired Irom the KGB OT transierred t0 some other component.
The influence of his family is Guite apparent in the above 8ince
hi8 fatber wa6 advised 0f his difliculties: in 1954 by an official of the
KGB and his mother interceded Or hi8 behal in 1955 with the Caief 0f
SCD. Zhe result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to tbe
Seventh Department ard not fired from tae KGB.
The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remaia
in the KGB when after 1954 be was not a member 0f the Komgomol and
was not eligible to become a candidate Ior the Communist Pirty. Thie
i8,a valid question but a plausible explanation is again tbe fact that he: wa8
tbe bon 0f the then Minister of Shipbuilding:
NOSENKO has stated curing previous and current interviews ta?
following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he wa8 respon -
Bible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not
claimed tbat he had any successes and has stated tnat the work with newvs-
paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers.
NOSENKO ha8 explained that during this time he was & "'new officer,
indicating he could hardly have been expected t0 act a8 an experienced
officer.' His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during thie
of time; together with-his knowledge 0f otherKGB officere and his
2
0001141
SECREC
to
Period
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information concerning his own agerts i8 believed of sufficient weight
to acce?t tne statement of NOSENO that work against American cor-
respondents was bib assignmen: Irom mid-Varch 1953 to mnid-l954.
From circa mid-l954 until his transier to tbe Seventh Depart-
ment in late 1955, NOSENKO c.aims and has claimed be was an
officer of the First Section with tae responsibility of work against the
Nilitary Attaches (Army) at the United Siate8 Embassy in Moscow. It
i8 considered, based on his knowledge 0 zbe various Military Attache
perbonnel and other collateral iniormation furnished by NOSENKO, that
NOSENKO wag an officez. 0f the First Scction during the mid-1954 late
1955.period of time, that his primary work wa8 againgt membere
of the Oifice Of tbe Military Attacbe, but that the quality of hie work
undoubtedly left much to be desired.
In circa mid-l954, NOSENO was removed a8 Secretary of the
Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance wag such that at least
certain officials in the First Departrent desired his removal from the
First Department, jf not the KG3. Under these circumstancee,
NOSENKO could be criticzed a8 baving been a very poor if nct
undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during
thi8 period of time and hie knowledge of tbe members of the Office of
3
SECRZT
{4+3
May
May
6001142
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SECRET
the Military Attache supports the clairn o NOSENKO tbat he was
oiicer 0 the 7 re: Section with the indicated assignment ab related
by &im.
NOSZNZO has Stated that the work against the Nilitary
Attacue8 wa 6 not primarily directed towvard development 0 recruitment
possibilities, but wa8 directed toward control of the Military Attacbee
on trips in order to prevent observation 0f sensitive area$, senbitive
sizes or sensitive activities in the USSR_ This attitude by the KGB
wowld' appcar t0 be compietcly plausible and NOSENKO noted a8
exceptionzi in thi8 regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter
MTLE. NOSZNKO explained thi8 exception a8 retaliation for approache8
to Soviets in tze United S:aies in tha: perioz,
NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the
details corcerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he
skould have knovn i he bad the specific responsibility for work against
the ilitary Atrache8 during the indicated period of time. it i8 bubmitted
tha: thi8 may be evidence 0: his failure to satisiactorily fuliill his
0001143
SECRET
an
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4 >.1972028*0.51 3 f_es :982 02.72 & #e i:ceziaii ?ofs AX
sta-j5 & >JEIARX W}os _cei~:i0' ~#e XGB Wab:: : ;203a;8;
3-.S54.
Tc_IAKC _1 >~~ibay _Gicaied _ic , rdicates 2 dei_ilie
:ack&&cwledze corcerzi:_ 3i5 &ssij7ed .33eis durisg ppros.
Vazcil Vay 1955. 71. accorGing 7o AOSZNKO, wa8 wher &n U;: ~
Eacie.actory "chazacteziza:on" was prezared on NOSENKO, a
dic:sion wa8 beirg race on Rs case, anc a period of;tine ir w:e: &e
merz O; & "ig drzk" whih curninated in %+3 spendirg abzit 4C
=ee: *0s7.a] care ~ecause 0: the possibilty of recurrence c: his ; ~vV.i-8
~bezcikos;6,
7a3e5 84 - 87 0f ike 2revious slrrzzy Si3zes: :.i: ACSZ __
LJ% firaished s *cent dezafls abou: :o a leged.&gen: .e7:c- <
:86 #_t *2 Viiiary Attzekes. It is corsidered txa: ACSENEC :.
~izreri __-rveWs has f 7_.shed adegia ? zcceptab: 2 aC 66
43 e_ole flrniszed _-~: Mozraior cczcezaing_ ~JDz:
ZZ: 34 60' 85;. #<_.< a7382f#kat inere ,wa& 70 =j
1o zC
0v
wiik_ic_e _il _iz81 2652273865 &83e _ev culo = bi;
;2:3 3t. 12 was Zevez i .& ~Y 6y xcevio__ C8- `,r 76.e: e
t~R2e ize.vidl:-'.
C001144
5
1# AuAl t 4
77
J2-g
days
:
8
bj
SECRZI
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'cuic:]
Tne effectivenese or non-effectivene8 & 0f.NOSENKO Gurz hie
a58ignment to the First Section, Zirgt Department, from mid-March
1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the:queetion of the
bona fides o NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually wae an officer
in the First Section during this period of time: It i6 felt that iniormation
furnibhed by NOSENKO in current interviewe and in ?reviou8 interview8
i8 of 8ufficient ecope and detail that his claimed service a8 an officer
in the First Section during thi8 period of time ie completely acceptable.
SECRET:
ing
0001145
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8801146
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QQQoo
SECRET
D DURING TFE PERIOD !555 1982 , Z5 Wis NETKzR A
SENIOR CASZ OFFICER' IV, ACR ZZPUTY CEEEr 02
THE SEVENTH DZPARZVEAT 4LERICAA-BRITISH
COVMONIEA:TX SZCTION'
0001i47
CBE??
Exctte: 602 oalic SECRET
(*69*0gu} 50
Gecto:l ttty
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SEC.T
D. During_thc_Reriod_of_1933 1960, AOSEAKO was neither
scnior case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief 0i,_ the Seventh Department,
Amcrican-British Commonwcalth Section. (Previoue conclusion)
The above is conclusion "D" in the previou8 summary. The
current conclugion is that NOSENKO wae an Officer in the Seventh
Department, SCD, from latc 1955 to December 1959 ana wa8
Deputy Chief of thc American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventa
Department from 1958 to December 1959.
During current interviews, NCSENKO has furniehed extensive
iformation concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department
during the 1955-1959 period Interviews 0f persons who were the subject
of KGB intereet collaterally confizm that NOSENKO wa8 personally in -
volved in certain claimed activities Guring 1955 to December 1959.
Tbese activities include among others the recruitment ofRRichard BuRG] 0C
6 06
in June 1 956, contact withfSir Allen LANEand[Arthur 'BIRSBin the
summer of 1957, the recruitment
oJGisel SARRIS n 1958,
the
cruitment o George DREWin the spring of 1959, the recruitment of
0001148
SECRET
Extcdudet 6;3 c4uianslia
61G9;: J: Ji
{8.67 #$
5/84
Nay
re-
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SC.E'
William Stanley WIZBY in Junc 1959, fne rccruitment David TAYLOR
in thc summer of 1959, the recruitment oikGerard MzRTENS in July
06
August 1959, and the recruitment oJrsere PRIPPESJ]in 1959. Thc
foregoing i8 not a complete list oi all cases in which NOSENKO claim8
personal invoivemert, but i8 rcpresentalive 0f case9 in wnich his alleged
participation has been conirmed by intcrviews with the indivicual who
wa8 the KGB target.
O6
[Sir' Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILB]: and
Dav_ TAYLORlwere
GARiiJcitizens
and the Othcr above-namcd indi-
viduals were)
Uniteg(Statedcitizeng.
This would 8eem to substantiate
the claim o NOSENKO that curing 1 955 Deceiber 1959 he wa8 an
officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common-
weaith tourists in the USSR.
in addition, NOSENKO has furnished 8pecific information about
an operation against) artin an American touribt who was in
the Soviet Union from approximatcly September 1955 to December 1 955.
MlEuAL
has not been interviewed ard wvizl not be interviewed, 50 at this
time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement
or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview 0f the
individual involved.
2
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4
Ioek
MALi
cOC1149
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ici S
XOSENKO nas iurnished imormalion On tre travel of certain
United Siates Govcrnment Oiicia.9, inc uding Congregsional represent-
ativcs to tne CSSR in 1955 1956; and thc tri? of eme Court Justice
William 0 DOUGLAS in 1955 whicn, waen cons ered with tne previously
mentioncd specifics, adcguately substantiate his nimed 9ervice in the
Seventh Department and work against Amcrican-British Commonwealth
tourists during the late 1955 Dccember 1959 period:
NOSENKO nas Stressed that wnen he transferred to the Seventh
Department, the Tourist Section kad just been established and an agent
nctwork was not vailable {or opcrationg against American and Britigh
tourists. This bcers quitc logical Sincc the infiux 0f tourists into the
USSR was ju t in,a forrative stagc.
NOSZNKO has spoken in dctail about an agent network he &e-
veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted o Itourist personnel
and two homosexual azents , "SHKELEV" and "GRIGORIY 1 (KGB code
names), whose extensive use in KGB operations na8 been confirmed by
interviews with individuals who were the subject 0f homogexual con-
promise operationg.
The previous summary contained remarks on pageb 101 150
in regard'to the claimed 1955 1959 Seventh Department service of
NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those
2248350
3
SECRFT
Supr
Nay
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SzczZ:
pages would be repetitiols and in many ASlances superfuous. Kt s
considcred that even fi thc Btatcmer:s were accepted in {oto, there
wolid stili ro: be ar adequate basis :or a corclusion thai NOSENKO
was not an Ofiiccr in ihe ciaimed p0s..i018 in tae Seventh Department
during the ?eriod of late 1955 December 1959. Nor is it CoI -
ceded that, K all the sub-conclusiors aTd the interpretationg oi various
area8 Of information were accepied without quaiification, there is any
evidence that NOSENKO wa8 dispatched by the KGB. However , tnere
are certain a8sumptions and interpretations which appeared in the
previoug sunary whick are particularly wortky of comment arc which
are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.
On page 145 it is Stated that the evidence 8uggests that NOSZNKO
was an English -speaking specialist in sexual entra pment, not 2 counter-
intelligence officer respongible for the identification o {orcign agents
among tourists or for the development, recruitment, ana exploitation
of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate KGB, ard the
MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous
kown (and presumably unknowr) successful recruitments and recruit-
ment attempts. This activity ha8 not been limited to the Seventh Depart-
ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO wa6 "only an English ~
speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB pag4-eien
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Nay
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SEicz:
conbidered with te Cetaicd irforn:ation NOSZNZO has proviced on
Seventh Dejartrent ?crsonrcl, activities, procedures, ara topic8 of
2 similar tature is not considered t0 Kave any ioundation in fact.
Page 145 oi the above Burnrary lists cleven operations which
were Seventh Department cases prior t0 1960 and which were included
in the notes furnisked to CLA in 1964 by NOSZNKO. The named operation8
were those & Bcrrara PECHTER , Patrick PRZSSMAN, Jonn RUFE,
06,06,06,06,06,06, 06,04
Gerald SZVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER_ (inu) KARLOV, Norman FISK,
Ralph MATLAW _ Varvin KANTOR_ Michael GLNSBURG, and William 66,06
TARASKA The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cabea
wae that NOSENKO could not describe the irdividua] operations ' other
than to say that ne had recordcd the name 0f the target and such detaile
a8 he could acquire when he reviewed,the activities of the Seventh Depart-
ment in 1962 {ollowing his return {rom the Firet Departmert.
The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another
section of this summary, but it snould be noted here that a iull review
of all of the notes 0i NOSZNKO currently available indicates that his
statement8 a6 to how and why he obtained the information in the note8
are completely piausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished
by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi -
mately 150 cases or name8 mentioned in tae note8,
0801152
5
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During curres: irierviews, NOSZNXO furnished 6pccilic
irormation on ceriain of the above clcver casc6, includinglWiliiam
TARASA, Bernarc ?ZCHITZR, Vichaei GINSBURG and John
3uz3 06,06,0644,p4
I: skoula a.s0 be noied that ceriain 0f tre cabe8 such a8 Narvin KANTOR
ara Filiam TARASrawere case8 in wiich the tourist was visiting
0
relatives in the Soviet Unior and that NOSENKO ha8 given a 8atisiactory
expianation Oi how hc iearned of the KANTOR' cabe. NOSENKO in
discussirg hi8 cuties as Dejity Cxief Of the American-British Common -
wealth Section, aiso explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended
to visit relative8 in tae CSS the case automatically wa8 a8 Jigned to a
group 0f officer8 in thc Section who reported directiy to the Chief of
Section and were not under tle supervision of NOSENKO.
NOSENO Stated that he noted the name8 of three 0f the
indjviduals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY I1 and "ISHMELEV , Ii
two horosexua] agents oi NOSZNKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO
ba6 expiained that "SHMELEV" and "GRGORIY " had the assignmcnt of
identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencie8, that
had contact with numerous Amcricans _ and that they had homogexual
activity with individuals On wbom reported but On whom overt
action wa8 taken by the Severth Department: In gome case8 the individual
SECRET
Ir"
nag,
has
they
they no
0001153
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1
1
SzCrZ?
p
was not corsidcred & woriswhile target and in others the iniormation
Ia5 just rraintained for ?ossible use at 3 later date i tre individual
rejurned to thc USSR_
NCSENKO has also explained how he learned of thelPatrick
PRE ZSSMA]andGerald SEVERAZases; and, tne iisting oi theJSoiia
SHATTAUER kcase in connection wvith the 1955 1959 period i8 in com -
plete error Bince page 427 0f the previous surnmary containg information
from NOSZNKO her recruitment in 1962. During current interviewe
the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discubsed in
detail with NOSENKO. He ha 9 a detailed explanation of the material
which he brought out and his explanation' 0f all aspects i8 very convincing.
The previjous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement
of NOSENKO in cerlain cases beirg handled by other Sections in the
Seventh Departinent or by ihle KGB D.rectorate of Moscow was uinusual.
An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation
wab unusual, but rather tiiat his explanation of why he wa8 involved i8
logical and normal. No considcration wa8 previously given to the English
language capability 0f NOSENKO or the fact that hie own homosexual agent8
were used in two of the four cited case8.
The summary also.noted that there was a queetion concerning
whether]Gisella HARRIS a8 necessarily a Seventh Departm = cabe,
0001154
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4/6k
on
given
ent
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Szi .;
b
Tri8 question seems superf;lious sinceliiA: va8 in the USSR
on a touris: visa ard "rcal" iouists are tkc rcspoiility Of thc Seventh
trnert. rlincrlal responsibility within ne SCD ior an indi-
vicual traveling in tie USSR is decided Or ihe basi6 of how the indivicual
is traveling; i. e. wictner on a tourist visa, a5 a member 'of a dclcgation,
as tke irvitee of an organization in Lhe CSSR, a5 a former diplomat
slationed in Voscow, as 2 ciplomat not previously stationed in Mobcow;
as a member 0f the Cuitural Exchange program, a6 a btudcnt attending
a utiversity in the USSR, etc, Tnere are also various othcr {actor8
which affect the determination of which Department Or organizational
component of the SCD has tne responsibility {or a tourist case. Thebe
factors includc waether the individual is already suspected o foreign
intelligence cornections and whether thle incividual i8 & businessman.
In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the
responsibility 0 the SCD if tne individual i8 of specific interest to the
FCD.
On pages 148 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at
least some of the substance of the information furnished by George
BLAKE in regard to the CLA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents
in tbe USSR_ This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO
made Beverai references in 1962 to the KGB having information
0301155
SECRET
Jsr
Guite
Depar' Depa =
such
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S_izz?
althougn ke dic iken anc still s1spects thai William VASSALL wa3 the
source_ The rcercnces DY NCSENKO 10 tac KGB ha such inior-
matior were not developed in 1962 or later irterrogations , ard :t was
not util currert inzerviews ifa: it was estabiisned that NOSENKO had
actually seen excerpts of iniorralion passe by George BLAKZ.
According to NOSZNKO, the inormation which was obvious.y only
partial wa8 furnished to the FCD by the SC) and could onty Rave come
from an agent.
The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CLA
acquired a lengthy Secret study on the subject of the ube 0f touristg
by American Intelligezce for espionage and operational Bupport in the
Soviet Union (document was iuznished by GOLITSYA following his de -
fection in December 1 96 1). It was noted that tne summa ry contained
reference8 to certain 1958 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-
infelligence identified as Amirican agents and notca that NOSZNKO
claimed he wa 6 Deputy Chief of the American-Britibh Commowealth
Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified
no American Intelligence ager:s curing this period of time. Bat later
i8 described a8 & claim by NOSENKO is Geither an accurate reflection
0: what NCSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said 8ince 1967.
0001156
SECRET
143 Tots - 36#~4 60 804
ving
Top
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NCSENKO %as rcver clairncd {0 kiow all activitieg a
American traveiers in tae Sovict Uxion 1958 7 1959_ Nany
o:f tnese iravelers woilc have bcen the redponsibility of a Bection in
tre Seventh Departrert, othcr ihar tnc Amcrican-British Common-
wealtk Section, or aroiner Dcpariment ia ihe SCD. NOSENKO wa8
aware that certaia 0f the American :ourists in 1958 1959 were
actig su8piciously irom a KGB point of view.
NOSENKO bas stated he was awarc that a document which the
Seventh Department Gad preparcd and iurnished to the FCD in an effort
to obtain further assistance from tne FCD in tne work against tourists
had been compromised by GOLIZSYA. NOSZNO stated he wag not in
the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not
review the documeri util after tnc defection of GOLITSYN and {oliow
advice from tke FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the
document Ead been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN
kag never been reviewea with NOSZNKO to determine if it contained
acditional information not in the document which he Ia8 aware haa
been prepared by the Seventh Department ior the FCD.
NOSENKO bas been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with
a number of cases cited a8 examples in the document furnished by
GOLITSYN: In current interview8, however, the descriptigOUftSENKO
10
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gainst
curing
quite
ig
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14- Ooooo
cizee -3idsa 3CS m
12:-0l3 Clic o6*216 0%3~.3' Vi Jof- ~ j 13s? F8Kl~,
4 wic:
6v6 3 ^0 5 ~203_/010.1 :2*i ~o-r
73-; :o _ive s za~i 3 16- 0. 2n ~
icz"c5?" Z3 &~iZ3033. 280.ao6l?298i 2/23
33 6Seziai 13-~:3~0%o _22;3se ;) 2 "joi;s?: 7
:rei51e: #ave_3 ~3 2E32 €3 2 rlo: Vi0i: Sich _ 783
wis #ze F~sp036.3.t8 O.&i Zoizs: E-2_#0ge Sc1 _2wx--
70.: 4 1i730 Guzbez 6: irev2lefs 220 ~ZSR, '_2.286;9u6260od -
r.e: 2e-sc_s #aves-S Ito2 & & Sovil: O*322e2i.05, oiLZc::s
2i"838.+3
0
Z.ve:_]' c-C., Zr~ =: ioeii" :-2 %C} Ccjce?? &.1
woild _ot be &e fes?O.BISEET & #C Zoizisi Sectos 0: i& Serez:
Dezarirezi.
7z O; irese Vej zrob.er: C3--_cezed 0 258 #_Al21582
1 3ezaze io #e :955 ~ :959 ?ericd ia Ze _2c855. bY IZSZNKC ~ ize
06
22SezCe 0; fsericaz cezcz) [ozi s-z-J-#e tss 13 & iociisi
i22 Yaje 2G5C*s. Zze zrevicus simzft 7e__zed Cii: *.2+, s2.c0
06
Eoun szsz Jeia no: zave
a vzlz Ialzez Svaies 735330F- betce: 143
6_2 Jie .931, {6 Wis #rzoss.3l2 Zor ern j3 zave beer 3 zoi; st iize:
#zie name in ike USSR and, tbezezoze, a #7get of the SeVezth Deziz:-
Zea:, as NZSZNKO clairs. Alaotgz sevezel aveziies 0. 23ss38-Y
Iriivil ivestigatiom bave rot b2ez explored,
020043158
ZS -0
4
SFcRF;
Tkq
33
#y Yet
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soi:farCe tisi: iEig _.oray Kix ever be cxzi:ed. Aiz:
justisiably ci i b8 si2 6f i0 ?r0be.i8 {5 ;2at, cver # t&c story
of NCSZNZO is i.eccc7zi, A8 :5 2 evceaiia] reas0: wzy suck
izaccurac} &.ollC 3e {=ierpretec 13 {zEicaivc 0: dcceziio: 0 Cspazcz,
or ic> tba; riattez a5 C:cazve #it ke WZS =o: 7eji:; Czief c60
Amezicar-Zzliis;: CorOsWea::: Secio: 0 Ze Sevez:: Zejisenez:
ir 1958 -1959; zeifhez woid Sic: &2 iaccizacy reZec: 0n Eis clatzec
service io .962 ~ ;963 { *e Seveztg Zijirinea:
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SECRET
2 TOSETKO WAS NEITEER DERETY CHZZ 07 THZ 4KEICAN
EVBASSY SECZIO)NCz 4 SZNO3 CZZECER QR
SUPERViSoR ITHE SECZZQON DURAC THE
PERIOD 1961 4 1962 (sic)
0001160
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Erette} :7 Itvaxtk SECRET
v$: Nrd} 40
J+ {
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2 ACSE.2= Ta:: 3cs: Czle: 0f tke Azezici:
ZmbasS! S-cion Ec s23or JEEELSEetzviboz ie%22 SecEc2
cuzieaike 22zi2d o01231 1962 's:l {Zzevcis coac ls:o:)
I: is te coielision 0 *23 siizy €: ICSZKO %elc Ze
2osition 0: Deputy Crie:, Zirs: Seciic: (zezicaz Zzbassy Sec-icz;,
SCD, from Januazy 1960 Decez-be; 1962.
Tae caim 0f NOSZNKO za: &e Zeic #2 above ?os 6ior {= :s6C
1961 bas been +ae most &icu i_claitacd Rosition 0: NCSZAKOE
satisfactorily resolve ard accezt. Acceptazce 0r _oraccejtance 6}
his claim to Jave held tbis particilar p3siic7 is & critical facrcz :=
2 decision €s to whetker :ke rerainder of kis clained XC3 catee:
is valie. I is belfevcc :casoneble to presune thzt % NCSZNKO KEs
Deputy Cbicf o tbe Arericar-Bzitisa Comzonwealzh Section, Serezth
Department, prior t0 Decerber 1959 : ie 2bsence 0: a3y indicaziox
that he wa 5 GerOtec, ze should bave been &f least a Dezuty Clie: o
Section curing 1960 1961.
Position in ;be SCD, KC3, and througaout tae KGB i8 izportant
from a ronetary point 0i view as well as a prestige poia: 0f view- g
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AOSZIZO was Oaly {r i&e7*oSe3i.0318 a Scror Cuse Cz.cez %
ISoc - ;96;, ;kis WoiAc' kate bee; # &ezotion % positioz wie resitzzt
'6ss &: bo: moiey G.c ?res sc. Zo: #: >easc3 i.o5e, 23 {adire %
haVe held tie pos.ilo: 6. 3czi Cxere :93i 196 } Woilc Fa.s0 co -
siderabie Coib: &s t0 Waec.ez &e he.cAi3 clairged posii0z prior :0 :Sic,
as wel; a8 waerner kc ne.c' :is claized 2o3iti6-3 in :962
5 1533.
It i8 ajparea: #.a: &2 low ecse 0: NCSZNKO cozcez.irg a"
aspects 0f activity in *# Zirs: Sectios, First Deparziez:, Curing :963
1961 i5 incornpiete wkraGeged by wha: are considcred the zormal
'responsibilltes of & Deji:y Ckief in CLA: Duzi:g cizzez: {=erviews,
an eiiort waf Irade to Gefermine wkat t.e reb?onsibixtes NCZ)O
actualky were in :960" 196 ; anc wretbez %is stafereris : #is area
were imposs ble couC 3e accejted 45 :o: zegatinz his ciaim to Rave
been Deputy Crie:, F:rst Sectioz,
According
to NOSZNO, in tke early 1960's taere were oly
approximately fiiteen Dezity Caie:s 6: Section in tre entize SCD arz
"%certain departments sone 0 tse sections ad & Deputy Chie: of Section:
In additior, transier & a Dezuty Caie: 0 Section Was {o: always followed
by a replacement in kird, according to NOSENKO wio stated that he was
not replaced by anothez Dezuty Chie: Wzea ae transferred to tke First
Section, First Departnezt.
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4l4ty
o;
or
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Accozdizg :0 AEZ:KZ, if 9] soi & %ob dezczizic c €
Dezity @cifSeciueiscec_u_tc &..0 7ufuciiar 0c7y C1e
weze % aciiarty Wiaf & 3.ef 0 7ezimesea:_.C C.ie 0. S6 i.31
ceciced woic' bex.s i36i5-ed Eiics,
Tae previoua suzar Cew Z7e3.0= f0 L7 a?pa783: caEZce
betwee: eariy Siazereris 0: NCSZAKZ Kaf Ze replacec :0 Cne W.en h2
entezed 0n Crty & #e Zizs: Secrior, 7i-3-7ejartses:, 228 :3 sibseciez:
claim tzat %e replaced Nrhail BAX-VALOV a3 Dezl:y Clie: in t.e Zizst
Sectior. Along with #is %e &ad #rs: czecizec KCVSXUK :.& varicus
otner oz.icers ia tke Sectioz wich previois reszonsibility {0= Ceztail
matters which weze a8si3red to him 1zon _is arrival there, tzer la:ez
Stated that BAKZVALOV kad been reszorsaic tor tnese ratzcrs. The
previous sitmary roied that iterroga:ioz _ad rever resoved tfese
contradictions .
In the liga: 0: tbe %resert clcarez Ziciire 0 #ee. atlre O &
Deputy Chief of Section, tae Siateretits c: NCSZNKO 0n 3AXHHVALOV
ard on the issue Of wbo NOSENKO, G.c; 03 dic aot rezlace &re not
contradictory. There i5 no reason to ciesiioz that 3AKHVALOV, with
whom NOSENKO, ixcidertaly, did rot overka?, was 2 Dezity Chie: of
Section in the First Section bezore NCSZNZO,.and taat ke was respon-
bible for certain area8 which later fell to NOSZNXO. Ox tke other
3
ScczET
he,
0301163
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Zazc, #ccoz.is i0 :CSZNKO, &7rsezii Teison {6z m 342 2-345-~d
10 i&e fzz: Scctos wa3 t0 Cozcc;c 0; a ;cW :e2 0 e5,2i5.8 icode
clezks). Zreze Coiid ji coizse %avc beez _o s36c..< ?eiece_s~icr
a slosiazive y tew &fca, Zrcze.ore, iz67.2 &e.se3AViO} w2S
}ne prececessoz 0 NCEZNO &.i {= ZzO..c3 $2252 _e Wa3 {o. 3:
irterpreia Or o ike variois sizicen73 0; CSZNC 0 *3 0512 &3
being i coaict a7zears to be &e fese O; conis.o_ O= &s >o= By
all concerzed.
Accozcisz %0 NOSENKO, at iac &:e 0: %.] trizsicr to &.0 fi-st
Section, Fizs: Dezazirezt, in carly : $ed, ne Gac zor beez tolc az8 i0>
a skort peziod #kerea:ter was Iot told "vkat his actii' Cuties woiz€ 32.
KOVSHCX, Caie: 6 the.Zirst Section, Wartec to &8s.33 NCSZNZO :o
supervise #e Work 2g.nst Service Artackes et &.e Ezkzed States Zrbassy-
NOSENKO .e : t.at z2 proposed assigrrzezt by KOVSEZZ Wis =:aced
to NOSZ.TZO Oczlzied with zonproclctive work si-ce KG3 zelicy
for work a3 st tie Service Attaches was primary oze 0f Coztzo? On
trips atd noi aceve work towarcs poss ble recriitzeri.
After & snort perioc of time, NOSZNZO was {=ozred by
GRIBANOV ta: he, NCSENKO, had been traroferred :0 supervise &2
work agains: code cerks (also code mackine mechazizs) at tae Uzied
States Enbissy. GRSSANOV defired th:s work as beicg o the g-eatest
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Iportixce, azc i*e >cczizesi 0: cjc~ cie:ks 23 a prioz:y af: 6
6 KGB. XiX? , w.J #is Ce: of _ke Zrzb: Dejartre;:, iatc? --
peatec the above am2' 3 370i) C0z..6263 o: NOSZIO, Cezad:y %
GREAZNCV azc Vzciz: Vxs3_izcv wis i3zzed wil NCSZXC
zesponsible {Or Supervisioz 0 t.e woz<: GRYAZIOV azc KCSO_ZCV
weze not rew ZGB ozicezs, bi: izsicad weze exzerenced o cezs
afkough bo:: &5 Sezoz Case O.cez? wera c: :esse: razk #kez NCSZ)EC_
NOSZNKO coes rot claizz t.a: %e ac :0 traic eer Oizce? or to fizi:e '
scrutirize evezy actior 0z proposed actor 0: GRYAZNCV z3d XOSO_AzoV.
NOSZNO Coes Clain ke was zes?oxsibic.oz sizervisiox over tke::
work.
Accordicg to NOSZNKO, GRANOV -7*asized that wor<
#3ainst code clerks was io be his ?rirsary Wor< & t.e Zirst Sectcz
and that it Woiid take precederce over, exy Oz.ez activity- Other traz
work against coce cerks, NOSEIZO kas gezera ly defired his reszoz-
sibilities as {oliows:
(a) Resporsibzlity ior file of (woz< agains:) John
ABIDZAN, Secuzizt Oicer at United Siazes Embassy.
() Resporsibility for prelinnirazy review o ze-
ports :om OTd iXC3 technical uait; o: "ta*e" ior
microphones.in &e United States Exnbassy-
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(c) Respossibzy {0: =ais:ezaxce O: #.e eys Cal
seciriy flc on t%c iicl Siiies Zbassy.
ic) Actng ir 2.ace & Vacsiav KCVSZCX, Crie:,
Zi786 Seciioz, waez KCVSXiZ #is absen:.
As caz be sccn froz: t.e above, 68 reszonsfoilities & NCSZNKO,
by his Cezinitor, wzica are bozze Oi; By ,7eceic {ziorraoz itzziszed
by NOSZNKO, woulc mo: coiscice"w:h =8 nor:al 7252033.b2.85 6: 2
Deputy Chief 0f Brasch or Sectior: i CZA. in ana.ys: Ca eeke: 2ccez:
or reject tne thcor; tha: tnere is necessaziy an eqtatior berweer te
resporsibilities 0.& Depity Caief ir Czi ;nd tne R3z, bu: # &e aza.yst
acce?ts the tReory, ne Iust offer sorle s12porting evicence & t223 poizt._
Pages }5} 261 6 ie previols Siimnazy Contai:ec conirreats
and conclusions ard sub-cozcusions i3 regard to thc ciaircd servicc
Gf NCSZNKO &5 Deputy Csief oi Zirs: Section, Fira: Departn: e:, 196c
1961. The previous prirarY conclusicz was that Ge was aeitzcz Dezuty
Chief o the First (American Zmiissy; Section ror a supervisor in zkat
bection: Tne conckusiox of this furary i8 that he was Deji:y Ckie:
and had supervisory resporsibilities ior work against code cerks_ Tke
matter of the respoasibilty 0 NOSZNZO for work against coce clerks
will be' considered later. Comments will first,be made O1 the reszon-
sibilities listed in (a) ~ (d) above.
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Pagcs 2os 222 & _C 7rev cis slriazy cosiain 3 Zezziied
babis or &0 prcvioiis CO.icii_io i.66 ~SZNKO was zci iRe KCs ciSe
ofi:ccr {or Jobn Abzix 7re cinet Cjsclis:o: 13 #22: ke WZ> 36
resporsible Case Oiiccr {or A3.-41. #66c: or :ot %.s work asai.s1
A32AN" co.pared {avorably witk wzu: {5 cozscezed.o b2 Ee Ko o;
a resporsible CLi case Oi.cer i5 imrsa;erial; Wzzt i8 mazezia: {s
Aw.etaer NCSZNKO zeasonably fMilcc #c zecirerezts 0 ze 3C3
'for work agairst the particizr targe:, Jok HBIDZLV. 1 is felficar
tze arswer toiks is tkat NCSENKO dia.
iccording t0 NCSENKO, ie work 23a..st ABIDZAN was #:e
direction %f deterrning if ABIDZAN would :ead te KG3 to "azozeez
POPOV_ and .0 consideraiion Waf given tJ active &gent work #3ainst"
ABIDIAN for possible recruitrs ert. This expianation by NCSENKO
appcars reasonablc and logical and his knowledge o ABIDZAN and is
description of his Work agains: ABIDLLN skould be coxsidered ony
within tbat framework:
Aamittedly NOSENZO was cnawaze O a cors:derable &molzt
of details regarding the background of AB.DIAN, but On the Otker bard
i the Btaterents of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of tke
KGB was to see jf coverage 0f A3IDIA" woild lead to "arcther POPOV,"
it follows that: such personalia iniormation on ABIDZAN would have bad
0001167
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Etilc .iieria valie ior &.e SCS. Z3CD hac acvsei :2 SC3 ?*8>
to tac arz.vil 0f Abzji:izike %332 _:aiAin#2: cosice-ez ;0
be "Arericas ;felege:ce, ijC {iccicz K334. 26 3imec ;e
Sectrit Oizicer ?osi::n {orrscz *e. ~; Zisoe2 A ANai_z,
wno was I&iowz Dy #ke %33 io 32 CAA. 1c Lvesiigaroz b; Ae SCZ
wa3 :ecessary to Geferzize % f3ZZ:1" wZs "Aezicar Ztei_gezce 51
or Xioi,
Tke previous summazy, 743es 213 216, coztaiz: S0f & care
speciic Statemeats relztive to Ab@uNazc & Sovie; >.e, a *C3
operational cortact accordizg to AOSZIKO, w:ch aze #zozccis:
This irvaldate8 one 0 #e bases Ior *2 zreviois cozc:ision #:
NOSZNXO wa 6 Io: tre responsizie Case c ce: {Or A3>oXA1.
NOSENKO :ad previous % siated i ai %1 cizca Ocicber [96~ %2
prepazcd 3n Opcratonal plaz 03 A3i_ix #iizr #ceicez coseziieoz
of tkc placing 0f Metka o.the clotrirg azd efiects 0: AazDiAN" by =s
maid who is mertiozec above, Tatyana TZDOROV CH: Zze Sraterez:
i8 made in the summazy that tais coiie co: be tzue becaise FZCOROVCH
did not work part time :or ABIDLAN" I] 2z less: Jicly 1961. A33AV
has recently been reinterviewed concezzi=5 t.e above arc #e restl:s
invaldate the previous conclusion .that FZDOROVICH could Ic: Rave
treated the clothing anc effects 0 ABIDLAA" wita Mezka prior to July
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43u1%a5 %o;; S je8 iii 2ir7ve2 -koscam n Vazch
I9uC Ficie irtczto e- *e wo_i _i e3lct & Sovie: Ialc. 473*082-
rete y &rec rosiis Jiier;: cibe isz3.i.85 3egarve: Nyra
KZIVZR, a Jezartirez: 6: State 052 87;22; 4.8 #s)ccazon Cozisied
wcil s;e lez; Moscow _ xc-.96}. ZZXIIZX2C Tajyazi ZZ3o3OVCZ
a5 a maid and tsrolg: >utzal a3-c272z: wel KZVVZR, 7zDozOvC:
beczzte fxe ?arisiise %a c ior AZ_3_.1"3e33-z 3o2eez8 % Ae z:
o; { 960. From that tize 03 FZDORCVICE, accozcizz :0 A37D141, k2
uncontrolled access t0 Eis livirg Cuazzeza sice s.e &ac & to Pezz:
eztry fOr cleaning purposes.
A3IDRAN did zo: ma:] any ozerat oza: .eitezs wiesir the Sovie:
iriOr util after Narca I96l aac #erezoze & view of E2 :bovc, #keze
4k-
{s ro reason t0 cortracc: :re Staterez: 0: CSZIZO #.a: 22 tRree naLl ?
operatioral letters {rtezcepted bj tke KC3 azc z.afzed by A3-LAN az
bfowed evideace 0f Vezka. I i5 i ierest=g { Zc:e :na: NCSETKO
Juce 1962 warned CLA aboi: the KG3 ise C: Meika iOr s2o8i.3 istezral
letter mailing8 by i~ied Siates Erbassy gersozze:.
ABIDMAN, accorckag to NOSZAZO, was &e subjec: 0f a 24-}cz7
Surveillance with tke Seventh Directoraze 253.37.1.3 2 szeciic suzveilazce
brigade to cover ABIDZAN The aciia} Sirve ilaxce 0f A3IDMAN" was €2
responsibility Of the Seventh Directozate wzich Sibmniited reports to te
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Fizst Seci.on, First 2eja:_es:. 1CSZIZC, 25 ;62 {espozsib e Cisc
oif:cez {oz A3i3iix, Vi3 exzic:ec' to :ev.ew 8e32 ?ezofi8 a72 give
aty appropriaze guicazce o Cirec:c: z0 e Sevezir bizecioziie, bii.
under #c XC 0rganizaton Re wouid Jot Zafec:paie {= 22 sizve__ezcc
aciiviiies 0 &: Sevezi Zeczoraie_ NZSzNZO 512.22 #.ai ric Se7-
Veiilazce c; 3 ri.i iIiozratioz Cscioscd €7y 7izbosal weikesseS c:
ABIDIAN, 4XG3 woic Xave atzerrp-ed f0 exlo : #ez. No zefsc32f
weakesses *ere disc.osec, accordirz :c NCSZNZO, axc tke ?awzezz
of coverage to see # AZIDZAN" woulc :ead .re ZC3 ;3 "ajozaez Pozov"
rema:ned uchanged_
Pages 210 2iz of tae previoi;s Simrarzazy Zotes # at NOSZ.KO
wa$ Lizaware of coiatries visited by ABiD-AN dri-z #i78 Outs:ce the
USSR ard taat no effor: was mace by NOSZNKXO #roiga &e ZC) to find
out suck inforratoz. Accozding to tre previcis sumzary, ACSZNKO
stated tra: the FCD "woiad Mot accept" Such & fecuest {O> "#?erational
action against &n Americaa Ciplomat comicz I:07: oscow. 1} Tae
surveillance which Woic have been regwized Cz #re Zazt 0f &c FCD
to achieve ary sozt O: zeasonable coverage 0 A3DZANabroad would
certainly have placed a severe burden cn,tke ZCD: Zeriker, NOSENKO
conterds that the results which Iight reasonabry be expectec would be
of_little or no practical value to te SCD. 0O01170
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Pa3c8 2!6 22: 6 +c >fevcis z5Kafy ccaei 2 sizziry
o: &e fafer 0: Ec Zisekz Sizee- Ceacc:o? jize Wich Josc Ab iil
vis:ied 0 30 Decer?ez .56 . IS*0_.C~0 zoied izI & Cizzez: Fevieiv
oi ice }564 1966 istezrosatozs 6 AjSZIKO # *3 Ie5c? Ielzite:
thcy weze Lzible fo claziy ic afic: &.2 E.c Iics io ozese_{ssie.
Cirrent irtervews, 65 kcczied _bove, &ave zc: %Aly fesolvca
:e p-obers, bi:: Rave as3 3.ed % af 12is:=..i2-3e02r825 0;
cozlic: Or Coniusion. It iS #23are2- *e5 AoSzNXO wa5 =o: {n.tle Zizs:
Sectioz, First Depazimerz, ior azy raiterial period 0: #xe after
30 Decezber 1961. It i5 also clcaz iait ke eitzez reac :.2 stzvefllazce
on ihe visit 0 ABIANto the Zuskkin Street Ceaccro? s:+e 0=
wa & jully brie:ed on the Cetails 0 tke visit. NOSz:zo S.sis tha: &e
rcad tke surveillarce report at t.e tre Or slortly afez :he evert,
Tnere is no reason.to question &i3 assertio tnat ke read #e repor:
sixce nis accurate kowledge 0 t.e zoite c ABIDZAN azc _s aciions
in coagection with the visit suppor: re.s claim. Howevez, ris cozsistent
inabixity on his own to approxinate the date of tke visi: ox relate:: to
his caange of assigamerts raises a cuestion regardizz wkez he actiaily
read the report.
NOSENKO claims trat tae visi: of ABWIAN to #ke Push_ Street
'deaddrop area ledto the KGB settirg up & stationazy stzveillance post
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xear ike 5..2 wick waj #Gie.ciei j0: i.red 7onikis &.8 i.ar Ac H~3
i.ormcc Or & Gaily bas:y 0f :c ?cjiat& O. _4.8 siakc ci: (a weys
:esative). 7o take #is stafeser: %teraly woile raiaa *rzez zzobicr:
skce, ir acdiiion :o ks ira.5 e: i-or i 7.*st Dezizeries: to &e
Sevezth Departrer: 45 oi eary Jaziary : Si2, NCSZIKO wesi tj
Gezeva i2 mc-Varch 1962.
x{5 corceivab.e *na;, 23 %e biz-*z31 maisie zs, Xe was e?:
advised of developmer:s or norceveloprez:s followirg #e visit 0
A3IIAN to &e Pusakir Street bi:lding %y Veaiamin KOZLOV, 3 Chic:
of Departmeat in the Severth Directorate wao kad been krown ti
NOSENKO since 1953, or Viadis.av KOVSZEX or Gexraciy GRYAZNOV,
Chicf and Dejuty Ciie: respectively o she Zirst Sectcz, Firs: Dezzzt-
ment. Ever s0, iowv ever, his {aflure fo call Oiir atieztioz :0 this iat-ez
i Jinc ! 962 wculd seer to regure explaza::om, especially in view ci
tre fact that he did wazn us abou: the dangez 0 ozeratiozal lette: ma:l-
ings by ABIDIAN 33 a warning Waich would appear cleariy to have beer
derived from KGB coverage of the activities o ABIDZAN in the spricz-
summer 0 1961_
It is to be nozed that during the June ]962 meeticzs NOSENKO
was not specizically askec for ary additiozal informatoa regarding
any kaown Or fuspected intelligesce actvities 0f ABIDZAN: 3eyozd
12
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t..6 NCSZNKO %mse.f 28> Siuicd _i: {i Cidzoi Occir to %i tc [cl:
u3 beczisc i3e Siake Ou: ;zc s.ce bccz @rozzed, i:kad reveilec
Roezing Sus?iciois O Ae Z*t 6f AZ.Dli:" 0f Zxyohe else, urc . icxeicze
ke %ad regarced it a8 insigaijicant:
This {s at implausible. Lockez DCssib e explazztion, Riweve?,
der:ved fror #e akrcacy :ozed iabZy 0: NCEZNKO i0 pn Cokz & Czze
ior the visit, i3 #ka: ke Icarned_o,ce statiozazy surve:llazce Qost # z3:
of tae visit itself after Ris.meeticgs with us in Zune 1962_ ii skoclc 3e
notec in this costexz tha: With the piblic exzosire of #ke PZNKOVSRY
case in the Iai: of 1962, thc Pusnkn Strcc: ceiccrop urdoubted:y becaz:e
the subject 0: #-idespread irterest witzin tke KGZ.
That NOSENKO is.at a minimim Stil} corused aSout the vis::
oi ABiDIAN to &e Pushzin Street Ceacdro? azd its cosecuezces is c ezr
fror the record, While it is entirely poss:ble that NOSZNKO %s coz-
sciously exag3erated his involvement With the visi: and i:s affezrnazc,
it is also possiole that the evident distortiozs 0 his accourts 0 the
afair derive zom honest contusion.
Currect interviews and a check of the tpes 0f previous intez-
views 'leave zo doubt trat NOSENKO Iva8 awaze 0 the visits o ABzD:N
to the upper Gorkiy Street area cizca March 1961. These visits by
ABIDIAN were for cover purposes ard preceded his start of operatiozal
GO01173
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jeiier 28mix NCZO ce.sbeaek;?ezies, aEcas :uirs.e?
crawizgs wich fibbia=it1, G"i.3 0 A3.jiNio & corss on
a :ext-Cour arr 5.02, &6 & Joca. Zcst Ozce % &2 #r82 Vezc
zOxvT: F0 &rd cosicezed Suszicioiio % &e %CB. 7ie cntrazce ~i%c
art accorcing :0 NCSZNKO, 1Zs 5< Siziafcz €8 jo be &2 iCeci
place for picking U? 07 piaciz & Ceiczzo?' azd & =obic Susve_azce
wa$ placed on the aff s20p %Oz & peziez € #e {O_owir3 Ee vs:: 6
ABIDIAN, Oificia; recorcs coniirm <4 visit3 oi..3iDANaf #ze tine
and to the buildi-gs Gescribec by NOSZNZO.
Pages 216 ZzJ 0 ie previoiis sizafy conta:n no re.ezezce
to the specific statereats 0 NOSZNKO relative to KCB interes; in the
visits 0f ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Szzcet area. % i3 also c_ear
fror .2 review 0f certain taascripts 0: zreviois irtcrrogatiozs thai
no diiferentiation was race crcernisg .is Siaterents relatve j K33
coverage Of the activities o ABILAN i1 t.e upze: Gorliy Sizect &fca
circa March 1961 aad his Statements cozceraing &is: owlecze 0: tae
Pushkin Street deaddrop Bite ater tke visit 0: ABD4Vto tka: s.te
(30 Decembez 1 962).
It is impossib.e at txs time to Siate tnat a Ceta:led cebziefrg
of NOSENKO concerning ABDDZAN prior to hostile intefrogation would
have permitted the clarificaton of all issues' inckuding the above, biit
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:re 16 20 Cocb: ixd: # Kos: e $e::03iecz %i& Ccr_sec Ijz ic;5 :c
# 3o64 wzere Con;? eie €@ifiicitv: 27761.8 }2o8s.ie. 3&57 eVeze,
Gie :s clear 55 380 % >iy #d: . Xve {rZ:sered Ci: 0: iie ?inst
S-ci:on, 7.3s1 Dejariez-, 6% $1 3ecezbcz {9if aic Ios; Ceriaizi; _c
:riz3.cred by er*; Jazify .982, 2%c:%2: NCSZNKO _a3 5upp ez
cozrused imort:aio:: 72ji.8.3 i&0 76sr*X Sizce: al*056.b0 %sec
:0 inipugn ki3 claim t0 ving bee:: zisc czicez Iox A3@i:1*or: e#ly
1980 izii} 1aie [961, fxzecrio?e, Ze {cci _ L: NZSZ1ZO :, zii 23.2 %
2r87eziy Cete the visi: 6 ABIDANio ?us.k= Svree, is % .0 Way =icaz.ve
6f XGB dispatcn. If diszatchcd, NOSENKO presiirably wai C Zavc Z22 &c
date right.
In regard to (b), #e reszoxsi' {ity o: OSZNZO 0z pregrnnazy e-
view 0f reports from C-i (Technical izi: 0*C.; # "zake"i iro riczo-
Phones in the United Sta:es Erbassy, the previOus cozcis:oz was &.a: ris
ciair that he personally reviewed &e KG3 .onitozing rezoris wa5 rot
ststa:red,
It is zot felt t.at t&e previoi$ corc iisioz rade jicient alcW -
arce ior the explaratioz 0 NOSENKO of wha: &ke respons_bilty acfua ly
eatailed; Iniormation {zom micropsores i= the Czited States Zzbassy,
according to NOSENKO, wa& kaaded very specially. Zelezhone inter-
cejts were given to & designated oicer foz Cistribution to tne azpropriaze
case officer, but micropkone reports, to prevent wice dissemination even
withir the First Sectioz, were browget to the Depity Czief
9001175
ris
absence-to the Chiei and a.en were &stributed t3 the indivicual responsible
15
43
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cese oifccr. 1tis wa;, iccord_g :0 NCSZNZO, ro Czc Se_Ow €
fzk 6: Jejuty Cic: was iwirc O.&1 toia. Iicropaoie "tke" fro
c ialcC States Zi SiSb7 45 zeceivee * L.e sec:ioz
Aa regares joZitica" tze i.oz2.atics, Er2 Licczciigto AOEzZO
tis was corSicered t.e Ios: {rmpoztaz: By &0 <C3 &d Cfi, NCSZIKO
had _0 resporsibility :or revicw or i.iraze Cissezceica 0; ic iic:-
raton t0'tne Csie:, SCS, 60 6a:, X37 or tk2 Cezirel Cozmittee
sice tnis was tne respors bi:iy 0f & Lzt = %.2 cce 0: *0 Ckie:, SCD.
NOSZNKO has a.60 stated tz: #2e Gitzut frori Ceriain Of te
woz&irg microphoncs was "cytrg" azd tat QTC ir acd:tion to havi-z
reception difficulties was also kaving digiculty obtaini-g &_sutticiez:
nunber 0f Gualitied moaitor-tranalators. As a result, according to
NOSENZO, OTU was _o: provicing corpleze verbatim transcripts Izom
most microphones , bit acrually was repoztirg ozly those ?ortioxs whick
OTU considered pertirezt. Despite tfe Iac: that jull transcripis o: 241
coxversations in area8 covered by active micropzores woild have beea
of interest to resporsibic officers ofthe Zirst Section, OiU, according
to NOSENKO, did not provide full trarscripts and Whe: askec to prov:de
more gave the routize answer 0, could &o s0 % we kad more
personnel. According to NOSENKO, the tapes Were maiztained at
OTU and could: not be furaished to the First Sectioa. An oificer
16
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Firsi Secicn cOl.c %sica i0 i Firhc_ipe Bi: Re _ic to 30 tC OtU
iG Co 50 azc &5 & reoi ih.j Mis :ose Vert nrecdez.
3{8 belevec & it _#Y Presiz cs &.: #c 333 recivezed G:
{azsczibed &. cozVersaiozs evez i: 6. t0ez &7ei& Es.2d 5y
NCSZNKO &s kaning #ciive #cropeoncs {8 Zo: fezsOzablc 03 evez
realistic. It is a.80 tzFeilistc t0 ?*esi72 #af &78 CorVezeatcz co:-
cucted witkia rcasozibc Cste:ce O: &n Eciive _icfo}Ecze %is :C;
compromised to #e KG3. Zze jatter :s & {actor t0 be COEsezezed {n'
awy dairage a3se5sment; i: :s not an 222o2ziate basis E03 2 7resir;jcoz
tbat NOSZNKO R2c t0 %ave bcez aware 0: :.S ox tais iis; 3ecaise S0te-
one had a cozversaiioz in Ore 0 tre root:s {c Wkich &eze was 22 aciive
miczophone and AOSZNZO kas claized ka ;eviewed _e "take" Ior:
microphones in tze United Statcs Zmnbassy-
It i8 apparent that #kere 'are a surber 0f inporcerable {actozs
to be considerec such a8 Waetker the coaversation coi.C be zicked #2
by the microphoze, wketner &e xonitor could recovez Sizicert portozs
the cOrversatior t0 understand the gist 0: what was be:-z sa8, azd
even if he did, wietaer he would consicez i 0 Suiiciezt iportance 0=
interest to incluce in bis rezort in vezbatim Or in surcmazy ior28.
In regard to (c), the claim 0f AOSZNZO tha: he wzs reszonsible
for maintenance 0f the physical security {ile on the United States' Erbassy,
17
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:::s Z3: CcEb cered i%f icrc :5 2; &c-+Liie basis {O7 €ie5eos-3
# claz.
Tre previols Siirstrary cortaise: _ Cezclls:c; :af i&e &e =
o: NOszNO :ai %c Wis Cistociaz 0 :.2 Zzbessy secifity %2-Was
€'; iverion. Tie 2a5is :0z i;i5 Corciizz was IcF iez aces_afe Z€
curez: {erv ews wf: NOSZNO Lave :ziez incicatediZE5 &is ck=
Cx this point s0id be accepted.
1 regard to (C), tse claim 0f NOSzNZO ikat %e #cted : piace
of XOvSEEK, #&e Caief 6 Fizsi Secicz, wzen KOVSZiX w2s a33ez;,
it i6 consicered #.at Ei3.clair: {5 acccziiele provicinz % %S zor coz -
verted into & presunzion tZat_tkereiore ICSZNXO evezrzrz
tbat KOVSiik new.
NOSENKO c.aims that &e was rc; 723zorsible :or #e direc:
supervision % approximately two-thircs # the officers in t.c First
Section. These oicers zormaily rezored directly to KOVSHii% 2za
would only report t0 NOSZNZO wzez ZOSZUK wvas abs2nt. As &n
example 0: this, AOSENZO %as shown 2 Zck of deta:ed knowlecge c
te work againat Giplorsatc pezsonnel : _e Urited Szates Exbassy.
He has stated he is sure ke Would kave `CSwn of anything "iinjoztan:"
buch a8 a recruittaent or attempted reczerent, but he does zo: claiza
to bave zeviewed all the reports 0 tae vzrious officers of the First
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Section. fs {ecogeiion 0.6638b 0. {viceal3 et #e izied
Staies Zrlib5y : 89e: i: ~Ve. isc:x ussiguieats scer:s
adecuaic.
The p-eviois criscisz: _a: NOSZNZO kzew Oz.y &e Z.es
o: mos: agezi3 Or 0jcrafive Coszucis WaO wveze_Zaz;O #e KCE zezwvozk
am0x3 the incigerois exzloyecs 0: #ke Amezicaz ExbzssY, e:c :o:
recognize tbeiz Pbotogripks, Zzc &.c no: S.ve sicezi Cetiels Ccz-
cerning treiz specific actvities {3 cozsicezed to be &= umwarrazted
criiicism. ~OSENO indicaes [az i geaera: &e hizcling ofagezzs
in the Firs: Sectior was t.e resporsibility o &civicua case oicezs,
It is also apparent that #.e pkilosophy % tke KCB waS to maixtain
single harcler-agent relationsk:? &3 ruch 83 possible, and that respon-
sibility for an agent would zot be transfcrred rerely because the agezt
had access.to & target wbo was *0 fesporsibeat of & case ciice? Oibe?
than the hancler 0f the agezt. Tris apparezt Zrilosopky i8 Of particilar
interest in connection witk NOSZNZO, wko evez though he was tne case
Qiicer reaponsible for A3IDii: azd togetzer wich XOSOLAPOV ard
GRYAZNOV worked activey agaiast code clerks , did zot Kave &x agent
network which he specificaly haxdled. Mere use 0f an agent :ox rezort-
on or a specific activity aga:nst a particular trget was normally
19 0001179
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ro: adeciaie fcisoz {o #razse: %<-73322.6 {or ike #gezi &zd :
6222a78 tze KGB coasiccrs iku; i%e Coz zieicz &: &n esiab skec
2.Cer-#3c3: felatiorsk? %in cozaiGezble sei:
NCSZIKO, 45 prvous: #e.cized, Xa3 Siited i 2; &e _a2 -2
res?oss bilitt tor wor< #8i.25: coce cexks 2f &e iatec Sizies Z_b23s},
cuzing ; 960 1961. Zxcep: for ike zer.8 6. te t.at he c.aim] 783282 -
s.b.ity {or supervision of work &gi48: Ae Zezvize firiczes & carsy
1960, ne was, accorcing to NOSENKO, 7eszo3se3.e iOr Sizervison o
the wozk 0f Vadim A. KaSOLAPCV Ceracy - CiYAZACV, Vad:zi:
DEVXIN ard Yevgez:y GROVAKCVSKIY_
GRYAZAOV ard KOSOZAPOV worked ozy #Zainst code clerks
'and therefore were supcrvised sole.y by NCSZNKO, whereas DEVXZ)
azd GROMAKOVSKY . who kandiec' idigenors a3ents in American
Fouse, came uncer tke supervision % NOSZNKO ory In tkose C2325
where these azents were d:rected against code clerks.
It i8 quite ciear that the knowledge c NCSENKO concerring #a2
coce clerks, code mackine mechazics axd pouca clerka Who, accozdicg
to NCSENKO, were {ncluced in his targets in *960 1961, was riich
greater than kis knowledge of any Other categozy 0 American erployees
at the Cnited States Erbassy Guring this perioc except {or ABIDZAA :
#;
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T.e {oiowir? coz.ezib ufc cizzczzed wi: severa] s7ecific
cases :r wkch, accorci-g : NZSZ.E.Z, :ere was 27 222roac. by :nc
KC3, izteresti:s iozriatioz wag Cev-.zez, or ir wzich z[ ezs: &
cors Cerab.e aroiz: 6 s7e.C woz% wis Czzried Oi:e &y NCSZNKC,
KOSO_i?OV and GRYAZAOV.
0
Fke first case,|-a;..2s SfoRS3_ 23 {5 covezed 3 7eses .23
177 0 the previous surrz Ft . Z3le addiiosal corziez: {8 Cozs cczec
Tecessary On this CaSe $ice tzere Cods Zo: #72ear fC be a2y Zeequaze
reasor to clestion the gerera: S.ory o: NCSZNZO % regarc to :e %CZ
efiort agains" stoxszzaa 06
It i8 recogrized ard rezioned esewlere tha; NCSZAKO #, !562
exaggerated Kis persoral involver:ezf {= t.e case, particularly & Zlaci-z
himsek &6 present wit: GRBANOV wzez: :8 recrutaiez: ?ich wva; race
0b
to[sroRS3 ERa NCSZNXO Zas rezraciec *is pazticilar clas:, but
there is no reason t0 Coijbt t.2; %e WZs 23323ed fox &7proximafely &
in the planning and activities wbick preceded the ixSuccessiil azzroach
to(sToRSBERA}
An issue was previously made ovez the timirz 0: tne azzroack
to(STORSBERG sirce Erozsszadkatec #s
as October 1961, NCSENKO
has indicated about Jure :96}, azd iriczzration from GOLITSY), basec
on remarks by XOVSHUK to hirn, kad beea interpreted a8 :zdicating the
21
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aProach occurred a: &2 "ez2 & :Jej. 1
~aSzNKO, &_tin3 ci;er: ziervicws, ha3 givez 2n accepicble
accolt; 0; #s-ozsgz38 case. Zeks s7afed +ka: %e Cazzci ?-eczze y
daie tke &7pr0ach fo"
EFoxlkaq
~ii i f t Oecizzec beozei.e
~27roack a: ikc Aosccw 2.r207: ic-ares
~8-5k6_
:8982)
Lecatse Otnerwise %o acion Woi C &ave beez ken &3a2:
Exesy
06
When recenily reintervicwea, S-oRSSERGkoz-:iec to raintain
eat the &Pproach occirred in Oc:obe: .961, bit tke iezza: eviceace i7
Xis description O co utera: everis #rakes i: clear #.af i.e a?pr3ac Kad
to have taken place cozsiderably eazlier.
Joseph another code clezk at tae Uriied Ztares Zzbassy,
wao will be tne-sibjec: o: furtker discission bcACW , kaj beea isiervewed
on the basis of statezrents by (STORS3zRC]
Itha-[o.877
was ?resezt i7
American House #he ight of the #pproack. Aralysis & #e staiemests
0l
o]MORO Eclearly izeicates tha: te evezts(szozszzzddescribes
could not have taker pace later thaa the perioc Febriazy t0 early Nay
1961.
The best estirzate possible at this tire i3 traf #e approach to
SroRsggra
occurrec in Marck April 1 961, whica is Guite compatible
with the approximate dazing 0f the approzch by NOSZNKO. In tke Iace
o: thig approximation 0: rhe date of the approaca tolSzorsgz3@ i is
0D01182
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belevez feasosa9.c {0 asbie &27267k6 0: KCYSRCX:O
GCztSN % Janiary :Ge2, 20 feiied by GiizSYi cozceri-:
O&
a siccess:i 07eraon Z3a.=5 Exzry czce cen*#= Kosccw ai #2
06
czd 0f {G6j, reiezred :cszz.3 232 :i.ZOVSKTK e0 was
reiezziz3 to & corsproraisc ?*ise O f1 Ojefieioz faezer #zax txe ZCzual
app7oach, Or was ?rerzazirely clat:t-3 antcizzied siccess.
?ages !78 18} 6 &e Zrevoi] 3inrzaz; coreae: %orinaicz
ix regard t0 &.e affezziec Geieztioz 0jezazo= 2ja..stFaz:es
ezrsz33
48 0 tais time, it {8 cozscerec :a: &272 27420 Cscrezazc.es besween
recozd iniorratior axd inormation I:on NZSZNKO weic: a ary way
refiect agaizst NOSZIZO. KzisERS e:d zot zecogrize & pketcg-aze
Of NOSENZO as tHe Sovic: wko Irace & fast azproach to kir at t.e &.7-
Port,;: but tis does Iot provice & val C reasom f0 €isbeleve tke Staterezt
Oi NOSENO that it was ke wko tried :o tlk dzxszzs}
0b
Tnere *are ceriain Staterezis relative ;0 #Ezxszas] czsc 25
set iorta in tke previots Surnrazy Wzich recuz? szeceic cormeri.
(a) Tne Stsfezer: {5 #ace tkat z0 333 Gicez
0k
directly connected wita t.e case could regard KZYSzRS
as tae replaceraeat for[ [Sro3SBza3 ~ {ac:, Kzxszzs 06
actually wa& being trained by[STE
o3s9237]
as a substitute,
not a replacerent, even tzouga bis prirary assignment
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4
4
1
wZs zoi #af Of a coce &F: NSSIXO k$ &inz
{
cuztezt %icfviews fe.eec kow &'fecevec Ec %pessic:
iror €.e O78 :cpor:e 6. Cozvezsiticzs Zieked 1p &] Ee
micropkone % &e ~eir; coce fio= Zi i22 Uz:ec S-ate}
Ezabassy
t-Elig-A8
~25 ;c 2 cCce clezz 0:
had beez away iroz: coce work {c7 2 cozsicezable zezioz
3
of ;ire. In azy evez:, 22 sp7es3.02 0: NCSZNKO wZs
06
trad StoaS3zR9vas %avi= 5 2 &eict : #e exzai-z
the pazt.culaz work tEz+sz 3 Tke cbservatiozs 0:
NaSzNO are 0: {sierest
sc[xsgkghcuazy
36
not been a coce cierk as :o.ez, was traized
by[Sroxs8l
tat %2 coi_d act &s a slssiizite_ tzcer
the circurrstazces, it is corsicered Ao3ical that t&e
KGB woiilc asburre at tre time
AE8i_]
wwas t0 b2 the
eventual replace:ez:
~4zoali_g
(b) Tne previous Sirirary Siazed :Ae:, "prior :0 &is
06
departure from Voscow,Ezyszzgacksowleaged zo 2is
06
supervisors [olozei u33443 rs horosextal tercezc:es
and he admitted icvolverent %n tbree hornosextal irccects _
all at the Americar Hoise" (zage 179).
COC11e4
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Costrary fo t*.3 &o317.c5, a revicw G: t
ozcia: Eerorazctzn, citec 1 zixe .96., c[Co.onel 06
jaaAAFezects :af]
[z-eias]
fwas ra. aoaec by
@23417 &e "aileguiioms o o.z.osexie% 7 & ozcer
Xoi t0 aSgravate t.e Pos_.b.Y 6 & ~is3 ac: %Tri
waile wickia :he Sovie: Ucior. Ii
(c) Or 22ge 236 of t.e ?revici} Sizra?, 28'
staterez: {3 rrade that, "In #2 s=3 e case & wiich he
IoSzAO assert ed #aat &e Zexec 03 inozzation 2r0-
cured from miczophones
Fz!gaa
iarvze j0 zeport
receip: 0 tne deiection invizat:on) ke was ix ezror. 1i
Wxile the ojical record s.ows tna:]
REYSER5] DL:
did izceed zeport receip:t 0 tke dezecton i fzer :o "
@olorel 06.
URBAJin xe oiiice o(Cozo:el' it s2oud be zoted
06
that this occuzred less thaz one nouz beforelZzYSzzS lezt
the Embassy ior the airport: NOSZNKO %aa Stated ta; in
the abserce 0f information to the coztrazy :orn miczczlone
06
and telezhone taps, tke KGB had concluced ja [KZYSzRS]
had not reported receipt of the defection lerter and there-
06
fore had decided to approacn[KExSzzs]a: #e airport: L
view of tke short time betweez[KEYSzRSk-ezort of receipt
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14-000QQ
0: _e iclicz a3.2.3 Cczn-ie :r *oscoi, i: wcilc
{iye bec;: >erizkib.d:ic *3 &2 _ei med t:8 i-
{ozsation {n i.ine {0 Cal Oi.e 6.z733 #7pr0cch. %
accoiir: Oi NOSZNKO i;
~E=.84.]
Ziiie? #herelore
{6 coxsiderez corsj ee* cred.ble.
Pages 18] " :84 0 tke ?revicus Sizzfy Coriain %8rna: 3a
Xreurc
a_-DGrnig}
wzo sicc~ee-lazes
szJQEzza
arzived in Noscow {n Sezierbez : 96;. GxYAZTOV Wa5 #ze
reaponbibic case Ocer 0r Izz: _cco?c:zs to ACSENO_
Tae previous sirarnafy states {page *33)
f44286w3
curtzz &
routine debziefing, coniirred aj EmbabSy rezort trat in #6 Sunze: oi
1962 le %ac been int:mate with an Austrian woman, "LILLiAN, wo
visiled the Ancrican Hoise with somcone {ror: t.e Unitcd Azc? Rezebiic.
"LILLIAN" wa; intezviewed by t.e American House manager arc s.e
claimed to be fron Vierna bit traveling wien Kez ernployer, a Czeer.
Zuruhcr izquiry revealed zhat %o Austriar passzort nad been isSied : ,
"ULLIAN, 16 and ske was Jater asked ior ker zassport. "LILLIN"
replicd tLa: she had {orgortea :t, then Jeit, 2zd Cig mt retern,
Tke previous Bummary Stated that the above ircident had beez
described by NOSENKO but in conrection with attempts to entrap >osezh
@okexg" J
1960, aotlzujus in 1962. G801186
26
SFR7T
kvlns
8s
X
7i6r-
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Page 190
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14-000QQ
Reze .5+; 0: &e7**floi,0 s5.--: relaies inorra:or iromn
NCSZnKC _a: GiriziSM Fea :~ 2- 84:n erly .S60 :0 obiai:
Two Cerraz wozscz WX) Coic Le ised #i@: re res cesis o: Azerica:
Hotse, Duzizz cizzez: _ervieW", 2.0 #aticz %is becr aga. covered
wi:k NOSZIKO. Accorei-3 to JOSZKO, CiriZNOV a*72f6ed ior
te5e fwo Woj2z, a3er.2 c: tke Berir KGZ Zesiceztuza, to visit Noscow
ircer false cociceziaioz, one &3 & West Cezian a32 iic cifer as a7
Auatrian. NaSzZO fizezer iCezeked t.e "Wesi Gerran" azezt,
"KANNA, a6 kavirg tke cover 0f & jouzralist, arc stated ke believed
"HANNA" kac =e-lozenz}: Arezicaz Hoise. in& rece;: irervicw,
Mox8kzkoziizmed ta: carly 1961 ke had met a Wes: Gezzian gizl
at,Axnericar Hoise who claimed to be a joirnalist. Tre 3fafenerts 0f
wo?gz]
ttherefore apzeaz to Substa.itiate tne repor: of NOSENKO.
Concerai-g tke agent docur:erted as an Austrian, NOSENKO -e-
ported that she was cuezied about zez passport at Amezicaz House ard
as a result t.e KG3 retuzzed her to East Cerrkany withoit :urther
atrempts to use Bez at Azerican Fouse.' NOSENKO placea this ixcident
in tiie same tine period as the "HANNA" Case; i. e. 1960 1961, He
06
has never suggested azy connectioz wit} zUjts; nor i5 tnerc reason
0b
to assume tbat he could be referring to the experience o [Zujissince
this took place in the Surnmer of 1962, after AOSENKO had left the
American Embassy Sectioz.
0001187
27
SOrT
1~r V
167
sibr_
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Page 191
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14-00ooo
wa& :Ae Coc usoz % ec ?fcv.ois Sirary t.eF JZsz1O
06
G :c: 'ow ezolj: ab-:[Ziig:
4 94c*,*0i.2 tJ Jive excrcsec
ary si7erv:.ioz i= &0 deveiozrcz; %
[E?ty
Czaried ..a; NSSZKO
06
did ;; oiv fazy Zeta:.s 3es4-2*2z.3 { %7 :s {7NCSZTKC
leit &e Zirsi Secios, 7=s: 2zzirtest, at &8 &z8 0: .96: 27 W:c::
6
time #ny supervisory fuIceo.s @f AOSz)KO iezzated. E. 3 wio
cid zo: arrive i= Moscow iZti Sejterbe: ,55:, 7ezaizec & Voscow
unta Jazuary 1983. NOSZNKO coclc Zarcry 3e Ee.d respozses e {or
0E
kowizz anythi-z aboi7/ze-eSlafze: 1 Jartary :962.
?ages ;63 - :69 O: &.c ?rsvious sunarraty Coztain & %yco7s.s &
previous irforma:ioz {ror NOSZNKO in regazc toBaul
911z3
Basicaiiy, NOSENZO had rezoried tna: waez &2 %C3 leazaec tsa:
Pau}
Oexxza}
wo was #oijht to be & cace clez<, was coricg tc
Moscow through Kelsiaki, a plan was made :2 3eza Vadir V. KCSOLA?OV
to Helsicki to travel on te same train as JZT zr/to Voscow- 4 iez.a.e
agect G GRYAZNOV was :o be placed 0n this #air a: Vybozg after te
trair eriered te USSR. The ferale agent was To becatie 2cquaintec
with Jz)NERas a part 0: a iuture operation agains
0286_
:n Vosccw ,
ard KOSOLAPOV was also to becorne accuainted wi:EZAz?} 06
AOSENKO has stated that the operatioa wis successiul, trat bot}
KOSOLAPOV ard the fcmale agent made the acquaiaiance oJEANZR} b3
3:
28
0001188
SECRET
izrk:
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14-000QQ
iZC trai.C, NCSZAKO, read :e >czof: bizited b} KCSC_?o1 0
#e irip isom ficlsssk :0 A.oiCZW.
OL [zxvzn
ae> 3fv-3 Kasecw, F@7oriez Ea8 R0 wes
approacked On &C tziesor >2492*~; wo Yousg Risc a3s , ":
arc & gir:, probab uvers::% Siice:s, wiO Sizic i? 2 0 ozVezziii0z.
06
Accordkng to/JEANzR Gey bo.h s2f2 :2f siahi
s8zxiz7-
Voscow. About tbzee Ior;ka
#e-Elk=zrepozted
seisz #p773ic -4
py the Sanc gi.l, tM8 #ine a: je Voocow a.rzozz W.ezc &e Red
On courier busijess. Teze Wa3 2 sEcz: cczvezsaiicz a2C s2C
E-lkzq-
2 phone #irber, insis.in+3 #:*1 cir Rcr; ke Wozez 2230
OG
advised| [EAAER %o: to %eation the cozversation to asyoze. NaSzNKO
has stated that in an cifort to fo@ow iip the 1itial trai: acquairiaace,
06
the,KGB had arranged :or tke female 23C2: to encoizter [xEz]at
thc Moscow railroad station cr a.rport wnen ne Wez: alone to reet
colriers.
Insofar a8 is kiown, JE)AERJ as :ever beez skown & protograpa
o: KOSOLAPOV . Atkoigh KOSOLAPOV wa3 appzoxi.a:ely 34 yeaz8 0f
age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate *at &
appearance he was Inuch younger azd that he could Rave passed as &
university student.
0001189
29
'SECRZT
Fm#
S/8r
X}
&y
again
gone Sve
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Page 193
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14-000QQ
Dini-z ClrrCzi iie vews TCSENKO zi$ >ezeiie- &c S0;;e
3ezezz: st0F7 &8 reg-esEiw' 3si zsisia ZiiKCso_PCV
wi 07 fe Sajie ;a _
KAE=lk2
{ebak. Co._ie ilioz-
raioz ra.ses d%ici ies :fe, Rc#ekc:: 7a.o:za _ta.iesis
incicaie was i.@ Ox; Bo_Cowv-boizd 7a5522527 o5 ie
31 Mazch 1960 train :zomn Z.zlazc jo foscow, azC i.at 0ze V:r:oz
KOLOSSOV ia Tame NOSZNO Aiwizescied €5 i2 a%23 i2ed by
KCSOAAPCV) was 07 #e 2 Apri I9e0 ,rain ic %oscow.
Tle above Obvois Ciscrezarcy kas Ici beez axd Cizzc; Sc claz-
Zec witn-@va iable infoz;ration. KOSOLA?CV {KOICSSO]; wis eze=
on .the same train a5
Ezlzgor
k2 WaS 7cj. Traiz raziests {rdicaie
tkat KCSOLA?OV was *ot. Neveriae ess, 6 azd &iri, probably
tniversity stucerts" wko, accordi:z tzkz3 siruck :? & conves-
sation with him on the train Woi C #ppear clearly :o be 227; o: the
operat:onal etiort dcscribed by NOSZNXO, pazticiazl; % view 0f trc
later approach 0: this same 3ir} { Ezizzha: te a.-7078. There is
ro reason :0 Glestion :kat tzis g-1 was the ferale agez: o GRYAZAOV.
L view 0f the COrflict beswecn t.2 train rnizies: azd Sia emerts by
NOSENKO, however, it i5 rot cieaz who the Studerz" was; whether
this Somerow wa8 KOSOLAPOV or whether % may have been sox.e
other pcrson entirely- COO11sO
30
SECzZT
7/RR
Ak-]
#:Ez8r3
"bo
"boy
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Page 194
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QoooQ
:s Zc: accczied' &f #1 #riiEei%esis #3@ {corroe?e b.e
evicezce # KCSOiA?OV coi_z Go: eeve 3ee: C5; 6 Bare ;a.= Zj
06
Eziz3 Neitier is It {cccjiec & ai e::rileaniesis afe = efrc;.
Tzere {5 just zof & saiis aciory &m.3w27 {37 %ze {zeicaied Zsc7c7=CT
Derween tke irain rraziicsts azc ;2 {3.0322; 0: NCSZTC &:
06
KOSOLAPOV azc [zzz}weze # t.2 six.e train I ideed KCSC_AZOV
dic zo; trave; wiz
[zxxzz Q6 <oes
z0 estebr52 E5..MZsofe #a=
#:ACSZNKO is wrong; i: is evicerce : a: k0 2oes Zo: COW s03: e26g
be, 25 the supervisi: 0f KasO_APOV, s.ciilc ;avc &owZ accorci=g to
hs Owj statemezts,
Pages 190 192 cortain & Surrzy o prev Ois {riormazion :
regard to the
Eoha &{axgJcase EAxbk.gvas
iceztiged by
NOSZNKO &s & coce clerk wior thc XC3 was stucyi--g, bit 0 whor:
no derogatory izormation was Gcvelopec. NCSENKO provided practically
no defails in rezard tolGAR: oihez E an :0 {Centiy him &s a ccde
clerk.
GOLITSYA has reported on aa izcident wbch it {6 cozsicezed
relates to the tri? 0]
FAR2kwn;=
ror fezsizki to NoscOw 0n }6 Ncverber
1960. GOLITSYN reported that in Nzvember 1960 the Ziels:zki KGB
Res:dency rece:ved a Cable from Mosccw advisizg that &n American
code clerk would be arriving in Helsiak ea zoute to Xoscow ard tbat
0O0119L
31
SECRET
26=
7gr.
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14-000QQ
14 reszonsible SCD Case Oce:, ICSCL:?oV, wcilc 32 se= to Fe sek
icdez &.63 t0 $irike #? &; aCC_iricewGi0 Code Clexk Wc.ee
SCD _oped :0 costiiie { Ncsccw, GCZS"N jked :0 KCSC_?CV
in %els.ki &f that +c, _#0 fes dezcy 7zocized :0: Koso_A?CV
a place ir the comparies: Of &e Azeficzz: Ox t.e ira _ %or Ke srk
:o Voscow.
The previous suramary als0 5i704 GOZZTSIN &4 _Gvised t2ai
Jater in Zelsirki he ircurcd 0 a.ot.ez SCZ ozcez "roz: #e Zb2ssy
Section" (Zirs: Section, SCD} abou: &e case or; wa:cs %c kae kczzed
KOSOLA?OV . Accozeirz to GOLITSYN, &e ocez reiibed t0 Cscuss
che case and GOLITSYN, corcluced irom tis,reaciio :ka: it mis:
kave resulted in a successiul recrtitnezt_
It has becz Geterrined tka: COL_ZSY), i7 af irierview with t.e
FBI o 20 Narch 1962, referred to the above "SCD oicer fror tke
Embassy Section" as (za) ZZNXIN 0 #e American Dezartrnent:
GOLIZSYN also stated that te oiiicer was ix Helsizki ircer te ala$
o: SERGEZV (SERGZYEV), bit wa; urabie zo furzesk & Srst garze ard
patronymic for SZRGZYEV. GOLITSY)" refezred to (i.u) ZENZCV €8
being from the American Department, SCD:
It i8 cons:dered that there is no Cowbi that tbe (irt) ZZNKA"
referred to by GOLITSYN i8 the individtal 0 the same Jast nare
32
02(1192
SECRZT
Th a
he,
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Page 196
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14-00ooo
coxcerai-? Wzoin NCSZ.7O :63 {i73i.Re2 {ofiaeoz. AZSZ1O
kas {Centiec ZZNICN {#*0b2 %d zie 6C 10es zof reca . bit
2oss.3*Y {s Yiziy; a8 i= Ozce: 6k2 Sccoz: Seciioz, Zzs: Dezaz -
mez SCD. Accoret:3 i0 NC ZNZO, o.e &r0i? 0: &e Secczc Sec:c:
both bezore €C afie: :9ic {S6: Wa3 c7gesed & "o7ezi..ve garzes"
a3ainst Aerican Lstellgence azd &: ZZNZIN was a ferber 0: .3
groi;?. NCSZNXO %as acvisec E2; ZENKN {eve ec abrcad % Cczeciic?
wita activiie3 0f #.e Secozc Sec:oz, i: &2: ze Rad zu 57ec&c ow ecse
regardirg #e actvees 6 ZZNXA 0 tesc #ips. NOSzNKO ha fur-
nisked sorie {ragneatazy inioraafion waich kc learzcc : to
ZENKIN" arc whez tze ul; nare 0 SERGZYZV (ZZNZI) tvo-her with
416 photograpa is obtained, this {ragreztary inforraton {ror NCSZIO
ray prove Guiie use.ul.
As rezards te KOSOLA?OVIGAR_ADkrat:ez azd #ke opirion
expressed py GOZITSYN based oz &0 reiiisal 0f ZZNX to ciscuss #ke
cas e
EARZAND} tnat # must have resuared in & successiul rccruitnest,
there appears to be an inadequate basis for tis ?resurziion. Accorcing
to NOSENKO, arc :ere is jo rezsoz t0 disbeleve NOSZNKO 02 tz:s
point, ZENKEN was in tae Sccoxd Section, not tze First Section, ir
1960 1961, He wa8 not Chicf 0f tke Section, but Only & Senior Case
33 0001193
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rezaza
0l
216R
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Page 197
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QoooQ
Of.cez. Since Kosoi?ov wZ; 2< Z_Ecez Oie Zizii Sceicz &a
&e 'wor< #&2
Ls-@0L_g-
Ias & 7e3zo5s.3y 0: &2 Z::st Scciioz,
i: Coes zo: a77eaz #a: ZZNZE] wo__e eicesjazey Kave kzouzof &5y
06
Ceve ozrezts in #e KisZ_?o; E:_iSh-iter.
Zhe Zinnis: ira.= _cariies: 0 -8 November 9ej %07 &2 %&.s=&
06
to Voscow tza z Xisis foz:: GARi:a-zc Viksoz KOzCSSZI' (azias &
XCsO_A?Ov) #5 ?as5235273.
@Az.963
#rer ezvewec & .562
{ollowvirz tie Jead :rom COLiSY), &ezed Ravisg %c: azy Soviet wizh
te peysical Cescription o KOSOLA?CV or ..2 He.sink-ij- oscowv
tri?, ard denied ever beiag approaczed by Sovie: Ltelzizence. Late:
intezviewa by &Le F3and a poiygrap: inrezview did not indicate tka: he
kd ever met KCSOLAPOV ,or that ze zad evez kcowirzY beea coniaczec
by any foreigr iitelligezce agert:
It i8 accezted #hat KOSOLAPOV wezt from Noscoiv :0 Helszki
in Xovember ; 960, tiia: xe talked wid COZITSYN tk272, 278 tha: ae
was Ox the 6amle trair &
sTaxkwzk -
0r fielsiaki t0 Voscow. It :5
also accejted that NOSZNKO is unawaze tzat ROSOLAZOV zade & #i?
to Helsinki in Noverber } 960.
Travel {or an SCD officer oi;is de tke USSR or Bloc couatries
reguires higb-level approval, accordizg to NOSENZO. It Coes not
0801194
34
SECRET
A~w+
5/gr
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QoooQ
natter tGat tke {~C:viciua; %ia >cke_sb%aveed 0 & S .a: :ssi0E,
cach tri? mis: Ssve 57ec.E-&zev2. &p2ov44 The, m?e w_ch
thus rust inevitably iave beez invoved =: prezafiion ior Sich & Iri?
furtser $uppozts #Le #s517ton * a: NCSZIKO s20id Rave .ciz: Zecl:
tke KOSOLAZCV {4r4ka-+.
The pos sion takez 5 NOSZNKO % ihis zoscis 042; %e 2c227-3
the siatenCz: by t2 inierviewer tha: KCSO_AZC} ace sici: & #2?,
but he siys #A:@e:-NCSEAXO, simzly 2ves nc: CSW azythisz abe:
it. Ee adds onsx_that had a ything %.3-81c23: deve e2c8 in the siucy
of
@ARGxg};
ke wollc kave Jeen aWare 0: it.
NOSENO, a8 supervisor_% the 3-012 Worki7g agairst coc e
713@
clerk8 should kave known % any tri?_oKOSOLA?OV to Fixazd :
1960.or 1 961_ NOSENKO hinself was out % Noscow 0x a tri?t& Ciba
from 15 Noverber 1960 to circa {7 Dccez:ber G6d. Tre poss b iy
exists that t.is Coild nave accounted ior his jack,c aow ecze 0 &.2
trip 0f KOSOLA?OV to Felsicki anc rezuzn to NoscOw On 16 Novezzber
1960: However, ~OSENZO Hagnot atterpted to.use #is Ctbaz triz #8
a Possible explaration for no mowi::g o the Novembez_XOSOLAZCV
trigi.e
~~3 '06
As with teJJENNER-KSOLAPOV case, it :5 not sibie at 2986
this time to rebolve the Giscrepancies 2eztaining to ael@ARLA~}
KOSOLAPOV triz: The_fact that NOSZNXO denies azy knooffss
35
red
418k
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Page 199
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14-00ooo
tnis' Ozerational acrivity o XOSOLi?OV i5 a5o.ker #pzurent inbiizce,
06
as % reEz zz]case, of A3 zot zowizg boruthisg Ke, by his cwa
statererzs; Sxould have 'uioivn:
Viewed: in-the corrext o thc tozal `<: cw.cdze 0 NOSENKO c
Operat:ozs azainst code clerks, #owever, Ieieker lhc problers & :2
06_
TSEXNER case nor t.o3e in thc
[kz
singly or cornbizec,
in ary' way represert conclusive evicezce rzet NCSZNKO was nG; Bu?er-
v3o;-0:-KCSOLAPOV.cr tha: he wia act reszcns bie for the coce clezk
operations describec by NOSENKO. Tiis Stafement, cowevez, Wzs roz
Subbtartiatec in the previous' Surrary.
Pages 193 5 199 0f the previous Surrrary Co.tai; an accouct 0f
XGB activisy agains: code clerk[Joseph various solrces,
including NOSENKO: NOSENKO first reziozed tne case in' 1962.
According to NOSZNKO, the respors:ble case officei' for work
against[MoRoNE]was KOSoLAzOV. Ihen :t was learned thatl woxoxz] 06
06
ana an Enbassy coleague, a Marire guara by the name olBzccs] were
planaing & vacation #rip to Warsaw, arrazzements were made with t.e
~UB (@ie-Polish Security Service) foz & iemale Zolisk agent to corze to
08
Moscow ard travel froni there to Warsaw the same train a8 Mozova]
SanFO8g
The-intent was fox the agent, either O the train or sub _
06
Bequently in Warsaw;- to meet and comprozisel MORONEsexually. She
13
0001196'
36
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ngoxejrom
oz
Jo/kr
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Page 200
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14-000QQ
succesb:ully accorzlis:ed _1s, bi: Cle :o ceziaia preblezs ia KCB-iB
liaison relations , { was _ot Roosa5,e :or fke %G2 to exzost t.is &recty.
Tbe previous Sizrary Staicd tka: with .res?ec: to the {crale
UB agert, there was persiasive evicezze #za: rcther NCSZIZO nor
ZOSOLAPOV ?*aycd #e zo.~s in
#olbzk-se
cesczbed Sy
NOSENKO_ That summazy citec' tke :ravel 0 NCSZNTO to Ciba &z2
&: KOSOLAOV to Firlazc apzrorimatel; * s272 #e 2s #emoRoNz
tri? to, Wirsaw a8 evicezce Of te ijosb.3i-y 0 NOSZnZO axc
KOSOLA?OV being irvo ved persoxaly Ix #i8 par: 0i
teMoxcx3] 06
case.
NOSENKO ha stafed t.at KCSOLAPOV met tne ?olisk female
ageat and made the &rrangemerts to' place :er on the tzain to Warsaw.
@o?azhnExlezaezartea
Voscow 0n 12 November 1960. It {3 rot
'town when KOSOLAPOV leit Moscow for Felsiaki, bu: he was on t;e
16 Novcmber 1960 trair mranifest &5 Ceparti-g Zelsink: {or Moscci.
NOSENKO rted Moscow 0n 15 Novembez ]960 Ior Cuba. Tce
activities described by NOSENKO aze thereore possibie witkin te
Iaown time {rame.
It is clear that NCSENKO in 1962 exaggerated &is persozal role
in
th[olbxs]
case, particularly wnen he stazed trat he, NOSZNZO,
placed the female ageat on the train. NOSENKO zow clearly states t.at
C001197
37
cld_
a:
depa =
SECET
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QoooQ
Kcsoii?ov was & O. R? Oce? cosiict wi:% tre ?8.82 #geni.
NOSENZO previoisly Siafec :at & 2C3 tccizician W.O was o: i e tzii:
from Moscow to Warsalv zezoetcc back {0 NCSENKO #e affer the
train arrived ir Wasaw. Lzer NCZNKO said #Lai insteac O: ta
to the tecknician persosally, ke mzy Kive read #e report 0 E12 techrcian
a.ter re returred Iror Ctba,
The activities cescriec' by NCSZNZO witk rezard io #13 riatte:
are according-y pOssib e witsin :2e KrOwvz #re :rare. I is tot cor-
sidered that tae retractions NC ENZO kas Irade iror: Ris origial
3tatements on this operation are 0 suficient sguEcance t0 materially
discredit him.
Page 198 .of thc previous summary contains te statezsent that
MORONE when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana
IVANOVA, & KGB agent employed at t.e Americar House. NOSZNKO
had stated that IVANOVA WZs instructed to report evezttkirz ske S&W
or neard concerning] 194}. Tne suraary , owever,
cited a rumber Of reports tka:WVoz been {ziirnate with IVANOVA
and with Ella UMANETS, also a KC? agezt erployed at tre Arzerican
House, and commeited that NOSZNKO therefore Ivas apparently uraware
of the sexual involvement
04[o48x
witk "IVANOVA 's freads .
0001198
38
SECRZT
4/8/
eay
lkir
TO8xz]lage
Okg-a
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14-00ooo
NCSznO, &u erevo1s, %aj inclceted :ivarcse3s
06
oi at Jeasf' sorr e invo vcrier; 0: IWAo}a %t Coxawz {e m5 %7-
Zis ed iriorzaiion ,07 a ceve.opins Ozera:ie: aja..s6 Aazie 55474
0 6 66
[GARCZA (Antsony A. GARcZA} 92381 o.i0 itvo Verez: o[4c4]
with IVANOVA. {e 625 als0 >fafed & : te ?8,, il:7 waa co3seezcc
06
0f using IVANOVA ageins [oRo a}o cbiei- cozzzoisizz pnotcgrapas.
This was serous:y afec:ec Wser { wis !eazzec {0 :ke
militianan/KGB guazd at the Uaited S:azes Zzbassy #at IVANCVA,
ker gir} friezd,
Colexzhra
a Vazise gizzc, poss b.y
@8L:y
*aa
been "in tke city, ther returzed ;o &e "a;" 6: Oze 0: i.e Nari-os
where the grls spcr: the nigkt. This a?pareztly ?*ced tke reliablity
of IVANOVA in Guestion i the eyes o ie Zzst Seczon.
According to t.e previous Sliinary, NCSzNKO sfafec :a: Pictro
CZCCHI, Italiar cook &t tle American Zr-bass; ard azez: o KOSO_APOV,
rerorted on Americars at tke Exnbassy, bi: NCSZNZO zecalled zoen.:g
06
specific that CECCHI had reported aboudNozox2 7r2 sunzra-y 2150
states tha
oz8wEJwas
said by Other Amezican Eabassy exployees
to be a close friend of CECCZz &nd tza:
Eokx3
had ad itted Back
market money exchargea with CZCCHI:
During current interviews, NOSZNKO %as statec that CZCCFI
66
furnished "pieces" of inormatior conc ernirgh Moroxz} but he, NOSENZO,
GD01199
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06
&ew & G0 black Za;ke ivuvene: AKoxoxzia CZCCEZ
NCSZnZO hag &.60 {sicciied &a: & RC3 g3 neeres slbpezied,
422 02 Occasius acililly 3ccan:c #Wafe #%ii Vizicis #3Csis Cc Io:
Iuiy report cvcrye_*3 0 itcres: :? &. %C3. 32 KG3 @; ccizse
was aware 'tha:'CZCC.Z Ias irvolved i i0 b.ack zarket. Roweve?,
wzeezer Ke reported to the XG3 Je &d jc with whoz: :s
opez {0 qlestiut; viz. #elalrice
ZEEa
cise Sciow,
The corient Wa5 Irace in #2 ?revois Siinazy tbat NOSEIRC
wa5 Lawvare
maColbgna:
so..e Sovie: %ezrales in the sprirg 0
196] at thne apariment o: Sariva: cl S:iazry, a7 Zzyztan-zatioral XC3
agent Of the Sixth Depar:ment who Ias also rcporting on Arericans,
ard was irtirate with Ore in thig ajazinent,
review 0 ozc al records :d:ca;es
#-Goleza
*epo3;
having met 6ome Soviet g -.s a: the azrineat 6: Sarwa:, biit there is
2o ird:cation trat he acritted ox tia: aryose cise has reported tkat Re
was intimate with any o them. Tke cozcius:oz of t.e previols Sinr:z7;
i tbis regard was bascd on a misizzerpretatioz. Accorcingly, 6irce
tere is no reason to beleve that azy compzor::se incidert took Place
in tze Sarwat apariment, the story o: NOSZNKO 0n this matter is coz-
sidered completely acceptable.
40
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Jew coiitcsts JTc #77*opfic[e comcerzi-g fema:ks & :c
previors Sirrar} on pagcs 4$9 " 204 . Coznicr:: Were Ifile Lkcre
concercingEve code clerks, XacFice Z}ANG, Jonr TAYLO?, Frzrk 0S, 06, 06, 0,06,0
DAY , Robert DWZ_LY &3c Jose?: CAFZZ] ard a.ougk it {5 <ot
sper ficaliy stated, #e sugzeseon i8 #pjarent tka: :e rejorts-S 6f
NOSETKO on these cases was corsCerec eviccrce :.a: NCSzIZO wa3
not supervisor 0f a3l XGB opezatiozs & 3aiz.sf coce clerks. Tre :c _cw-
ing observations Iray assi8t i7 ?iacirg tcse cases i their prczer
perspective:
(a) Xalrice ZWANj ZWANC Wwas iceztizicd by:
NaSENO a5 a code clezk wko wa3 actively "wozked Oz"
duririg 1960
9 196}. Tze previous surmary Slggested
ikat tze owledge o NOSZNKO regarding XGB activity
agains4 ZWAGwas inadequate. Frst, repozting of
06
NOSENKO on GwAacoztainca 2o reference t0 the
06
relationshi? olwAdwvith his =aid, whom NOSENKO
in anoiher case haj iCezifed a5 a KGB agez:. Althouga
ZwANG dented sexual relations with his nia:c, Je did
admit to some irtimaces with Rer in her apartment:
During polygraph examination
Ewka
reacted when ke
GO01ZC1
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;es7oiced & #c rcgi-ive :0 & Ciesidr f~giGhs Sexla:
Te 6i.0zs wiin%a nic. Zio: Njszvro :0 ~e-
por: Om &bi6 fe.ai.0mbl? Cii: iC iocz be2' i0 %Afe7c0,
bi; &.50 Can be ?icesebly ezzed 8] %ily%ecor; 6n
Ks patt Or falire On :n4 ?i?: Or & _aic :0 rczor: Ceta; s
0: tbis reiationshi? t0 tke KCB.
Secorz, NaSZRckaj {C? {ezortea
AExlka
was izvo.ved {a t.c currcrcy cperaeozs O: Picifo CZCCK
(A fact inat previous 61riinizy lcc k0 s.oi.d Rave
xowz {rom XGB agcnt CZCCZ. ; 7-om tke record, now-
OL
cvet, it appcars that the cealinzs oZwz~awere sot
directy witn CZCCFII, but rathc: &rcuzs oter Erbassy
crrzloyees, Iraking # plausibe _: CZCCR: was eiiher
06
uaware 0f tkc involvem(:t 0F lzwgjor, as NOSE)KO
kimsel: 6tated ke suspected , CZCC:: did _Ot report all
cetails 0 his currency Opezations :0 &is K33 Kander.
(6) Joha ZAYLOR {deridzied
EAx-oa]0b 8azko
agh State Department code clergazd trzet o KCSOLAPOV.
06
Tke KG3 was aware Of the irvolvcrnez: o EAvLorjwith
06_
his Soviet maic, but no atternp: was made t0 recruit TAYLOR
befcre hi8 departure in early !961 since to do s0 might
42
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endarser tke Parb {1
{1 reczeiezt ap3roacr to jres
stoxsbzxd wio Ruc Seez ice: dceiojrert ior &umOo:
a yea> wnd wa $ corsictred -oc va.iable_
Tac Ipicatoz 0 &e zrevicus Slnirary #.a:
tne explarat:on 3ve: by NSZAKO was Subject :o ccestic:
failed ;0 take izio #ccounf ik2 iact t2f aithowgA[S-oxS3z30 66
was rot approaczed until a.er the' Gcparture "EAx~o3} 06
OC
the operation agairst(stozszzzdwas underway beiore
FAYLobecaxe involvec witi his maid Furthez, i: is
apparezt that the XGB did rof abancon irtercst
-EArzcz6
6ince he was appzoached at a later date outside tke USSR
on the basis 0 &is previou3 a.iai: with hi3 raid i Noscow.
06
(c) Frark DAY NOSz)KO
ideniiniedEran?
08
State rtrez: codc c er who was ise target o: c.ihez
KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. Accorcing to NCSZNXO,
nothing "interesting" was learncd aboitDAr]azd no opez-
b
ational measures were taken agains (DAy The previouis
summary noted tmat in July 1961,[ DAYltrave:ed to t.e
Caucasus with hs frierd iormer overt CIA employee,
08,06
Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWA It was also
stated that tae two were urcer surveillance by five persons
0801203
43
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a3} i.es 0. :*2 ibove =}, tk2: :OLzc & "-27i:;rz 7M
{1 the:z Koie: ~oox W:e: & #cxpececy fefezzed, azi
that 6 Zmoize? OCciSo; i3 "iirecive &c availaie Scvei
{emale" was bexcved f0 .ivc becj ? rcd %:ze? iaer
corpartr:eat,
Accozdinz :0 ACSZNKO, s1rvciazce arc o:e;
local coveraze of a3y erp_oyee a; the iaicd Szates Zsiassy
who travels in the LSSR is tke respoasibry 0f t.e local
KGB organization, zot tkc SCD. I: woi C ap7ear #af the
loca; orgarization wa8 trying to d0 a thoroush job oGax]ol
andGRow] bu: it apparen:ly was norprocuctive. It coes
not 8eer justiziab.c to exzec: tha: NOSEAKO s.Ould Kave
recalled a irip which procuced no resul:s.
O
(d) Robczt DwELX] - NOSENZO kis rc.ated ic cor-
siderable deta:i the eiforts of NOSENKO_ azc
06,0"
JRYAZXCV
KOSOLAPOV to involvelRobert DWELLY , a coce ciezx
Noscow irorn April 1959 Jely 1960, {2 Gorosextu: corn ~
promise operation. According to NOSENIO, a bomoserua}
agent o GRYAZNOV was of tke opinion Dw
{267
wa$ &
homosexuai,
GH012C4
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Trerc {6 %0 zeinc {0 c0_3f ibc Safezez} 0:
TiSzNKO occezzcs Kz &1332 f0 Cetezrze Wren
azc
wae:d5w2267
wis 30..3 ' zo &hc ciy" (Voscow)
50 that & horr.Osexia corczse s tuation cor d be
arrafged: Zrere were Ko specezc Gevelojrnezis trom
tGeir e:ioris, :ccorck-g :o JCsznKO.
Bvh7-
ca:egorcz_i denied bei-z a Kozo-
sexual; NOSZNO kas rot ,a.d 62 Was , but ozy tha: te
homosexza} azez: 0 GzyizaOV
1ssessedwOL_ga
a homosexua%. nere Coes zct 2372a7 :0,be #2Y >ea507
i0 consicer tre Siaferents 0; NCSzIO
abo-Ewzii; 0b
a3 reflectinz acversely o NCSZNKO.
(e) Josc2: NOSzTO kas iderif:ed
06 d8
Josepn GAFZ EYlas 2 (ode cez3] The previcus surrary
noted that NOSZNKO had Siated tze KGB kad tried to kirc
TGAFFzy iato downtown Noscow, using Svetlaza IVANOVA,
an agent 0f DZVZCN ir the Arezicaz House.
By way 0 commezt, the previous Surnzary Stated
thad GAFFEYlarzived i Mcscow i7 September !961 azd
06
taat Fred KADZRAJhad repozted #a GAZZzxbad tola him
be had been iztimate with a Russian girl 'at the Andrf[2C5
45
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0
fo-se, It was %ifinez ;oiec ~Eizzzis zecaiied
iror: Voscow in : Si.er 3; : 32 Deciuse 0f cri;ker-
ress arc curi:g #czvicw &ad _iiiicd being iniitite
with IVANOVA afrie fserrcaz %3ise aad af; .er #jart-
mer: axd that skc had cliined pregazcy.
As to wketker i.e above izorrai.jn ra:ses &
question concernirg NCSZNKO, #e ic owvi:g :aczczs
should be casidcred:
(1) NOSENO %as Statec' taf Ctrirg tke
latter part 0 December 156} %e was part tiz:e
in the Firs: Department anc zart time in tie
Severth Departmert, azd tzat he reported :ull
time to the Seventh Department after New
Years 1962 .
(2) In addition to the inoration previously
Ientioned a8 fuznished
b[GA?zcuring inter-
view, GGAFf SYalso stated tka: he was first
intimate witn IVANOVA in ks room on 27 December
1961 and was also inti ate with her later on three
06
occasions at her apartrent. According to[GAFFEY
IVANOVA told &im of her pregnancy abou; 3 0001206
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1962, Izc: .6 i77r31miies; foir mortas affe;
1oSzNO %6J'Stzicc %c ifizsierzed tj tKc Sevezi:
Deparorer:_
Tne fatter o: zeview by NCSZIKO cf OTU :eports {for. %cro_
prone coverage on &e EIied Siates Zrbasay &as previoiszy beer
mentioned ix :ni8 sumrar;. ?6ges 226 236 0: :e ?rcviois Slrrrrafy
confained a Ceiafled acccin: 0f imorraiion iror NOSZNKC 37 #e :nzi:er
of microphones , courierieaSures taker bJ tke Anericars in !964, azc
Carnage estinates Prejared Yy i.e Arericazs. The previous corclusicz
wa8 that his iriormation did ro: Sisiain %ia ciaim to have been Depusy
Cnief, First Sectior, c; kis c aim that he personally reviewed the KG3
ricropkone monitoring reports. Corments %ave been mace ;7 this
summary in rezara to tnis previous corclus:oz.
fev remarks, % is beicved, wizl zs5is: ir 2 fullex unders;a:?:-~
of the micropkone matter. 1n the material brcuznt out by NOSZNKO 34
1964, there wa5 3 single sheet 0 pipez coztain:zg on ore sice hazd-
written notes wrich NOSENKO ideniiied 25 a list Of the active micro-
prones (tbose which were nonitored) in <e Urited States Erbassy_
This list is given on page 227 0f the previous surmary ard need not be
repeated here. The acquisition 0f this list by NOSENZO was character -
ized in the previous surarary &8 singular &zd % was stated tha: NOSZNO
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xever Plaisie;y expe.sec Ac circizstanc-s wiick ?ramz:ed :s
rcciicn 0 &.e iis: Uriix {si4, WAcz &e produced &1 i07 CIA % Cezcva,
Jurin3 cirrezt %icrviews, ieraten 0; .c above 1s; zas Jeca
covered in consiccrably greaier Ceize wh ACSZATO 2r zac bce
cone b.ore. fis explanaiis, boi; 0 :2 circimsiz:ces w:ic: I&d to
Xis acquiring t.e list as We:: 63 0f h.s s.i.i navirz # in Gis ?o3sessio2
af tre :ine 0f nis Ceiectiozg {s cozs cczec .aisib e, coztriry :0 €e
judgrez: 0f the previous surirary.
NCSENZO nas Statec traf :. ,30 5 '96] Viadimir _. PzZROV ,
Cziei 0 the Second Section, Fizst Departres:, cesred sore "zoints"
for se against targets 0 his section: NOSE1ZO Lses t.C fezr "poirt"
not 26 meaning jus: a micropnone, biit &s reierrirg to &n Ozl sub-rnit
which izcludes microphones a8 weli as the necessary moritors ara
trans ators to cover the miczophoe &rd translatc tke "'take_ '6 7re
targets & PZTROV were prinariiy Arericazs anc, tkere.ore, tsere
wa$ a transcripiion-translation probem.
According to NOSEAZO, most O the available "points" were
assigred to the First Sectior to cover ricropkones in te Crtec States
Embassy. The Chief of the Zirst Dezaziment, Vladirir A. KLVPIN,
held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Crie: o tne First Section Viadislav
KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, anc NOSZNKO, tae ?urpose 0 which 0ou1208
48
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wZs i0 escisj tZ2 ?osa.. 6; 6iepozi; ciscoriize? cezia.::
Enbissy "?onis" coz-zoled 3] &c Zirs: Sccioz, ard zezsiiitn:
M1 PZTROV :0 Lse tnese ':70r.is 25ai.6: lazgets 0f &is seciica
Accozzinz :0 SoSz.KO, ?Z7.0v bzoight to &2 reeting & Zs:
o: names O certa:s :af6c:3 t~ uicr %c W shed t0 give iecnzca: covez-
age. Durirg the mee:-z, KOVSZUX a3zarezily fook & ziece 0: pa?e=
wzicn PzzrOV %ac &z8 wroie oz {: a Js: @: activc raczip.ozcs Ir +.2
United States Erbassy azd zes:cences. Waea tse meetzz encec,
NOSENO bad this peper ard 22 took back i0 ris Gce.
Cortainea Or t.2 reverse sige O &8 Qapez were *e iolowizg
names
in Russiaz: [Zian),
8604,*6
Wie;
atxTz} (A-Gipe 38k-z?
The nare 4. A Vixy_ov was Xistec zex: ;0 the Taz:e
~zzz] 06
azd the name 0f %. 2. CHZRNZTSZV wa: %sted next t0 #ke zare of
0l
SMITH] NOSZNZO %as explaised that Li3z), SNITH, W:1 Bixzz] 06, 06, 06
and Sipe BCRTEwere arozz tae targeta of PETROV; azd MIKHAYLOV
ard CHERNETSZV were Oiicezs 0 the Secozd Sectioz.
NOSENKO Siated ae kaew nothir:g more about ike :ou: non-Sovie:
cixe5 exce?t that weze fazgeis 0f PzTROV, NOSZIZO siatec €a:
he could not be positve 6: the Cate 0f the meetirg Othez t.ar tnat it
occurted while KLY?ZN was Cnie: Of tke F:rst Depaztmez:. (Accorcizz
to NOSEIO, KLYZZT" was succeeded by Sergey M. FZDOSZYEV &s
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Cze: 0 ;.c Zizs: Jezafies ea *c-'9i1.) Reseazz: {r >eG2rc
{0 #.0 iOiz ZC-Sovie: ;.s 've> 20 ioib
~Ezzv
2
8ko-;"
-j3_ Gxa _: 2.8 sin-_7re coffec: Zeres, 66,08
wthlSipe ie W.e 6; % 3iz-3 Ki2e afe Azezican
06
cizezs wko weze in E ESSR Cizca Jize *56r. sa a; &5 tire,
2a5 Sti4] coi 3eez {Cerzi:ed.
Ir view 0 tzc _bove, :axa3 3eez Zo3sbi0 :0 Cecice &e Cate
6 #e meeti--z callee by Ky?i1 as Ci:ca ~lze "561.
Accozd:zg :0 NOSZNKO, :ze 6. 7apez Cesczibed abcve
was Placed b; NCSZNZO wite 0i.cr no:es xe {ept besweer &he pages_
o: a bourd voiiire wzch NOSZNKO cails a "woricz cozy. W This,
according to NCSZNKO, wzS ax accoiztab e, registered zo.ebook
issied to all oificers i7 wzich were supzosed to wri:e a.] their
sotes, Cestroyi-g azy Ozhc: %otcs.
Accordizg t0 NOSZIKO, ke, lke mazy ctker Oicers, did rot
completely foilcw regilatiors azc #e fercency was to irectertly pr
loose motes ia ize noiebook Sc t.a: tke nofeSook O.fen acfec &s a ile
razker than beizz used in #e way required by regulatiozs. NCSZNKO
Has stated tka: wker ke Xe:: tne First Sectioz %e zook variocs Jozes
with bini to &e Sevezth Deparezert; these incliced notes ke kad drafted
coacerning ceriain First Sectior activities ior rse in brieszz FEDOSZKZV
C801210
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62y
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wie: ZZDCSZYZV slcceeccd %1"?I ZC .oi2sRe zad ?rezittd :0;
iecicres to ii@ Seveze:: Si:ecioiic. Accorce:} f0 JOSzNKO, k Gic
Io: grentiozi_y iake :Re Z-recili: 77ef 7eriisig:o microzkozes;
it was jus: {:e 5708? 0.zo.c3 R i3ok a.0;3 Wzez Ke Wezi {0 :C Seveze:
Depaztesi:
Lr corsiceration 0: tke above exzlazztoz ?; NOSZNZC, {s.cild
be norec that e ais0 brou32f wieab5. 1984 R.s fcje3 Icr :e sziens
of FZDOSZYZV ceria:n rojes Ke #y &C 4.50 prezafed W_zie
in tke First Section; e:3. , Zs {oics 4ctire f0 &2 Severth
Directorate in regazd To 3 "mass surveice" Cr 3 Arerican
Zmbas6y -
By inciudirg 6 section {pages 236 239; 0 tze aow eage &
NOSENKO of the KGB crypiologic attick o Uzired Szates Embassy
commiications, the previois surmary irrpkes &&a: tere is sorne
reasoz to sueston his in.orrraior 0 .is Sib;ec:.
NOSENZO kas asserted na: tze KGB %ac zever Sicceeded in
readirg enciphered cormunicatiors 0 the Service Attaches; however,
he said that the Egnth Directorate (tke uinit 0f tke KCZ responsible {or
communicatiors intercep: ard cryztologic azarsis) was reading some
United States Embassy traizic. Waile # is opez io Guestio to what
extent kowledge of successes O the Eighth Direczorate would be knowa
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to a3y6se & fe Ziro: Secieiosi ~: &1 #3r: Dv7a7tseai, wihit
sccpe paismi; availaoAc f0 NOSZVKO {..R8 claired ?osiie, iefe
13 . 0 Teas07 j0 Gleseion R.3 Siaiezes:.
68 2revicus 6_,2#f5 [>518 2*6 2*0;, ie akes 0:
seccesses 0: NOSzNKO : deztiG C_:: oriceza 672 zored. B;;:
thc cxcezion of ABIDEA), NOSZNKO Cocs ro: cla -io rsVe 3ee; 2
resjoxsiblc Case CziCC: :or atY 0: Z _sicc CAA oz.cers. Accoze:3
:0 his claim, NCSEKO s.uid kave bees awvare &ra: Wizam 1. NOizl_
was CLA, biii he %aszever iCeziizied VCRZE_ as CAS Surely KOVSZX
Raew MORZLL wva$ CLA bu: wky NCSENKO :s Jo: aware VORZLL wz5
CIA is rot krowri. It Xa 5 already been 3iab1sked, Rowever, t3e;
NOSENKO, 25 Jeputy Chiei, was no: awaze Of ali 0; tzc activi:es C:
KOVSHUK:
As regards sonle O the Other Iisted incividtals, aKew rererxs
are appropriate.
(a) NOSZNKO has never irdicated ary kcowlecge
Pail GARBLZR wa: CIA, axd ye: GiR3LER was sire.y
xown to the FCD &s a CIA errp oyec before go73 to
Voscow . It i8 presured trat tne FCD furn:sked the SCD
at least basic iniormatioz that Paul GARBLER was
"American Intelligence. I GARBLZR, howevez, did rot 0001212
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azrive in Noscow %st: Navesbcz 156:, ozly & rJoz:h
beicze NCSENO .c im8 Zirsi Secicz {Jr ike Seveath
Dezazin]ert.
() Tne previous sur:zary Stited :.it accordicz
to NOSENZO :e KB Z zo: suspec: t.ad Zugere 03
NA:ONEY wa: a CZA cicer ke wa s a CAA cer.
It was also Stztec
tha-E4ozy-epozted
tie presecce
0: {ziezsive XG3 survellazce wki.e :r Voscowv iror
Ociober 1960 to September 961 . Tre "ntensive KGB
05
burveillance" is basea 0n statemer:s oJNAFONEY}
may possibiy be more a reflection of Ris persora] corcezn
over surveillance ratner taan wbat was actually kappening-
(c) [Steve WASHENKOlwas correctly idertiziec by
NOSZNKO &5 CLA. William HORBA:Y was CJA azc
idetizicd by NOSENKO 28 suspected 0f being & CAA oficez
or cooptee.
ia) Lewis BOWDEN, who was .o: CIA, was, accordizg
to NOSENKO, suspectea 0 being & CZA officer.
George Payne WZNTERS, Jr._ ha; Sfated that
KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOIDEN was t.e "TBI
officer" in the Embassy- Tne Cherezarov Papers indica:e
0801213
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La
ye:
ana
4jer
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t46 & KGB Rad roseone lo conoldor tho actlvtlos o
BOWDEN wiea g4eplclop.
It Ie pot belleved ebat tho Ilated Lallures ot NOBEKKO to Idertlly
CIA effcoro az0 O[ parllcular Blgnl{lcanco In astablleblng Qzt be was
68 w80 Dot Depaly Chlef ot tbe Firet Sectton. Tero 6r0 too mary Dn-
saora [actera #alch would naed to be corsldered. Dagpito Our BdBump-
tono &e to Wbat the KGB Anov0, It (e pobofblo bat (0) @bo KGD dl pot
Eno5 0{ @e CLA alIMlatlon 0f 08sa0 poople, (b} t8o talorratton kowp
t @e KaB wae Dot avalleblo at tba flrat Sectlon, Tlsot Doparlmneat.
Jovol, or (c) Anformation eveflablo to the Cblol oK tha Pltot Baeton or
to 0 Bpectdc C080 O[Ilcez waj 0/ no oflclal concota to NOSENKO ap4
7aa Do} mado evatlabl to hlm. Tbo Jact 0L tbooe Poeblblltloo [o
euegostod {p Of clelms by NOSENKO taat ho kad to hava koorn
Wratovor wae aort In tha Sectlon regarding CLA Identiflcatlone; 0
Peopgrelty On Lho pare QI NOSENKO t ereggerate tha erca af hlo ow
aoouoledgeabillty baq boen ceen eleowBere In @Ste ceee.
Pagee 252 258 0[ &6o previous onmmary Contala & repost ((
B0 1960 trip 0( NOSENKO to Cube Bt8 1961 trlp t Bulesrke. Mib
segard to tte Cuba trlp, taoro [0 collateral ev[dence 0 bo trarol 20
deacrtbad by NOSENKO, and thero le no bubbcantivo rodeoa t0 doubt
Mo eccoune 0I po actlvIrloa on" chlo tlpa Tbe statement 5ad mado Lp
54
0001214
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eplta
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tke prcvicus sunitary tkat &c :ravel &: AOSZNO io Clba in !S6d
camagec' &.s clairn #.a: ke was sixrvising Ozcrdions agairsr E.bissy
code clcr<a af #ie iine. To ccc ji i.0 vala.ty 0f #L.3 judgnezt :8 to
say t.at %0 supcrvisor % t.e SCD Wol: C be perasitied t0 make & #i?,
abroac unrelated to his supcrvisory fizctios, a judgzert ior whick
tkere :s no supporti-z evidence.
As rezards *c irip 0 NCSZNZO io Bilgaria in ]96l, scr w.ick
thero is ro Collatera: irorrnaiioz:, tke prcvious surnary conclicec
that ki8 accoint Of the tri? was urtrue azc argued that such a tri? to
3ulgaria, # it did take place, at a timc wnen ne claired the operation
agains {SToRggzxawas reaching
a ciimax ard his subordinates were
"apparenty planning to expioi:[KzYsZRS' newly-discovered vulrerability , 01
it would incicate tzat the preseace 0f NOSZNXO :n Moscow wa 5 c:s -
pensable. Thcre wa 8 , however, ro evidcrce :rat NCSENKO &ic >ot
travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasozing as to wly h.s
account 0f the puzpose of the trip Ias urtrue_
As to thd STORSBERG kase, while it cannot at present be ?roved
that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENZO leit for Bulgaria ,
it car be btated, on tne basis O: reporting
tronEQ6xy;
that it nad to
have taker place before the tine NOSENKO returned Iror Bulgaria.
Since no serioua question has ever been raised concerning 'Ebii2igice
55
SZCZET
Pt
Ygg
Vn
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of NOSZIO :r Vosccw &i {e_e i%;s was ace, :woilC appear
tat NOSZNZO Was ciz aratively ired i0 8o to 3ulgazii bccause ihis
o; tnelST0333 Rxalozerai: 0x kd 3een cor?e:c2.
As €o
A[Q.g]e:e,
&r2 {s ro appirez: ?rob.crn sizce
#is clear thaf tke apzroack to
E-865*
place after NZSZNKO
returned izom Bulgaria, &2d iuztserrore :.at tke %G3 probably cic
ro; becor:e aware
A-EPkzzgs
1 Konosexual, ard trere.oze
potentially vulnerable, until just before t.e pitch was :ace.
In skort, there {s no reason to bclieve tnaz &ke accourts by
NOSZNKO 0f nis tri?s fo Cuba and to Bulgaria are roi esseztially true,
or that { are tri;e neccssarily rezect On %is clair to having
been supervisor 0f coce clerk operations.
0001216
56
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X 4 C~
4/er
pilch
phasc
they tey
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SECRET
7 ACSEAQ'5 CLLAVS, 3392 KE W4s ClizZ
OF THE AVERICAN-ZR ZISH COVVC.EZALZH SZCTION AND
WAS TFEREAFTER 4DE?EZY Chizz QE TEE SZVEIZH
DE?ARTVZNT, RZ AOT CREDIBLE
0301217
SECRET
Ee=uut
%3 Jeuusife
458377
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SECRET
NOSENKQ': claimg,_that_in 1962 hc_was Chief of the
Anerican-British Commonwealth Seciion and was iiereafter a
Dezuty Chief o_the_Seventh Departmezt,_ are not credible: (Previoug
conclusion)
The conclusion 0f this summary i8 that NOSENKO wa8 Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) {rom
January 1962 to July 1962 and that he wa8,a Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department thereafter.
NOSENKO ha8.stated that, although be was offered the position
of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by M. CRIBANOV _
Chief, SCD, and although an order bac been prepared and was in the
Personnel Directorate, he declined tbe profiered position.
According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich
FEDOSEYEV , the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO
as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK,
then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was
63};
C801218
SECRET
Erete: #37 #injik
Gvjre " &} 3
(hisiiEiic]
3
Oleg
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EEiizf
willing to promoie NOSENKO to tke position of Chicf, First Seclion.
However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO
considered tnat under tke circumstances it would be better ior him to
return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to
FEDOSEY EV who wanted XOVSHiKas a Deputy .
Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the
Position of Chief of thc First Section, Seventh Department, pending the
reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSZNKO would
become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDINS The
above explanation of NOSENKO seemg plausible and credible and indi-
cates that GREBANOV , the Chief of the SCD, {or reagons beBt known to
GRMBANOV , wag as8isting NOSENKO in hi8 career in the KGB.
This -gection actually covers two pcriodg in the claimed career
of NOSENKO; namely, January July 1962 a8 Chief of the First Section,
and July 1962 January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-
ment. Since NOSENKO wa8 in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to
June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de-
tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January
July 1962 . The previous summary (pages 268 291) contain8 remarks
in regard to the Japuary July 1962 period, including the period o
March June 1962 wben he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cabee
0801219
2
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Tt" 8041 {L per
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(Vaf_
are discussed in the previous bummary: the cases ofl Wailace Everett 06, 06,06,0&
JO;INSON , William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIZNSTOCK, and Horst
BRACNS) Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and
information Cerived [rom subsequert interviews with thcse individuals
were cited a8 evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the
previou8 comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial
evidence that NOSENKO Cid not hold the claimed position 0f Chfef 0 the
First Section, Seventh Department, during January July 1962. That
there were KGB operations against-JOHNSON, JONES , BIZNSTOCK and 06,06,06,06
BRAUNS Jha8 been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four
individuals .
few additional remarks in regard to the above four case8 are
warranted, not because it i8 considered that there are any substantial
discrepancies betwecn what NOSENKO ha8 said and what each individual
stated when interviewed, but because provide additional clari-
fication.
In thel Wallace Everett JoHASO case, it wa8 previously notea
06
that[JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 3] December 1961 and that the KGB
operation againgt him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary 8ug-
gested that the ghort lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend -
encies
oFonQSov_
were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary
to the gtatements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during curddiffzztviewe
3
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they may
5/6/
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Vi L
06_
ha8 stated that the KGB learzed of ihe homoscxual tendencies oFjozxsox]
"by chance" 8oon after his arrival. "SHVELEV" and "GRGORY _ two
homosexual agents of NOSENZO, were at the time Operating Ot,0f a room
at thc Metropol Hote;
whez-[oQkoz]=
stayed. They met(JOziNSOA there
and reported his apparent homoscxual tendencies.
In regard to thel William Carrol JONESJcase, NOSENKO durz
current interviews has 'furnishcd additional information on the KGB operation
again8 JONES including the woman Iudmila BUGAYZVA who wa8 recruited:
a8 an agent to work against(JoxESand was used in another case. The other
detailg furnished by NOSENKO concerning the) JON case are compatibie
with his claim to having been Chief %f the First Section, Severth Department:
06
In regard to the]Aataiie BIZASTOCK case, NOSENKO iid not claim
to hare been the responsible cage Oiiicer but Ias able to provide erough
specific information concerning tke case to bring about & confession when
she wa8 interviewed b; the FBL. That he did not know all the cetails con -
cerning the
BIENSQ8cr
Icase coula be explained by his claim to have been
Chief 0f Section and not the case oificer directly involved wita tne case.
In regard to thef Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary
the criticism was levied that NOSZNKO did not know whylBRAUNS visited
the USSR and was not able to ideptify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS
met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that
0801221
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ft #K 3777*
06
ing
12i8r
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QoooQ
the Seventh Department wa 6 noi concerncd wita ioreigners visiting
relatives in the CSSR nor wiza Soviet expatriates. NOSENO, accord-
to the previous summnary, wa g aware tbatl
[3Gxs
Iwa8 a former
Soviet citizen ard the summary stated tbat hig ?lan to visit relativee
wa5 information available to the KGB iarouzh his visa application.
In regara to the statement that the Seventh Deparinent wa8 not
concerned with foreigners visiting relativeg in tbe USSR nor with Sovie:
expatriatc8, this is not in agreement with current information from
NOSENKO. # Cases of "'true" tourists, which were normally the respon-
bibility 0f the Seventh Department, could become the respongibility. of
another department or KGB component wherc Soviet relatives were
involved. However, if the case wa 6 not taker over or a88igned by higher
autbority to anotber department or compopent, it wa8 and remained tbe
responsibility o the Seventh Department. Tbe fact that BRAUNSIwas 2
{ormer Soviet citizen could well havc madelBRAUNS] of intereet to
the Second Section, Firbt Depariment, or a direction in the Service 0f
the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher
autbority, the case would remain tbe responsibility of the Seventh Depart-
06
ment since BRAUNSIwas visitirg the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The
previoue summary also indicated thae BRAUNS histed on hig Yisa appli-
cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS had a
# 1962 there bad been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the
Seventh Department. The situation wa; not the same
00(+333
SFGRFT_
31*
ing
very
By
6/6r
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14-00ooo
06
relative or relative8 in Lcningrad: Although BRAUNS when irtervicwed by
the FBI, mnertioned & number 0i item8 0 wnich the KGB wag aware concern-
his background and occupation iron his visa application, there is no
specific reierence in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose
in visiting te USSR .
Page8 282 286 0f the previous summary revit w8 remark8 by
NOSENKO on the Boris 3ELITSKIY case and Gtate8 that' ni8 claimed role
in the case was not plausiblc. There are several 8pecific points made in
the summary which imply tat NOSENKO wa8 Jying about his knowledge o
the case. Taere i8 adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated
his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he w"a8 to give a89istance
to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling o BELITSKIY in Geneva
in 1962 and cot to gupervise ARTEMOV.
The more imnportant aspect and the primary one i8 the difference in
what NOSZNZO epecif:cally reported about the BELITSKIY cag e and inior -
mation from the aclual CIA record 0f the case. There are mnajor difier -
ences and without going into all the details of the cage which i8 very involved,
an effort ha8 been made toward determining wnether these apparent differ-
enceg necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or i8 lying or whether there
i8 a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case_
NCSZNKO has stated that BELITSKIY wa8 a KGB agent whom
American Infelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the
0001223
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449n6m 44446 ~*1&i ~~Xon
ing
Vsr
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KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligerce
into meeting BELITSKIY insice tbe USSR . Tbe previoub summary stated
that NOSZNKO did know wben tbe BZLITSKI: oporation started
(Brussels, Belzium, 1958), did Xow the rature of the British
involvement, did n:t know the operational details and contact arrange-
ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, ard did not kow BELITSKIY'8 pattern
of activity in Moscow Or Geneva.
NOSZNKO during current interviews ha6 indicated an awareness
that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use
BELITSKIY against thbe British: However, he still bas dated the recruit-
ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the
primary ?ur?ose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in
contacts with BELITSKIY witnin the USSR. Tbe latter wa8 considered
completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in
Brubselb, Belgium, in 1958; that tbree letters bad been mailed to
BELITSKIY in tbe USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and tbat BELITSKIY
had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.
There are at this time suificient unresolved questions in the
BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis-
crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY
cabe and the actual record are a redlection again8t NOSENKO 'u081224
SECRET
not
not
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QoooQ
the other band, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO ha8
furnished the actual KGB version 0f tho BELITSKIY case and that the
XGB, least a6 0 1962 , did not now the true story of the relation -
ship of BZLITSKIY wvith CIA. There i6 a distinct possibility the
KGB believed tbe BEZITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London
and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB
Lis as8ociation with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium.
As a Possible reason why BELITSKIY would bave told the KGB in
1961 a partial story of hi8 contact with American Intelligence, some
at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused
BELITSKIY to believe his security was cndangered and a8 a result
be told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these
evenfs 38 being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA_
The followving are certain of the points which suggebt tbe KGB
actually considered tbat BELITSKIY was rocruited by CIA in Jondon
in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the
developments in his case prior to 196l:
(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which
time be wa8 in contact with a British citizen who was al9o
reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information
received from BELITSKIY wbich may have been a lead to
0001225
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at
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George BLAKE. (It scems highly ulikely the KGB woula
ever have directed BELIZSKIY to iurnish information which
may have been a lcad to George BLAKE, or at least could
have caused the employees the unit in which BLAKE wa 9
employed from Jue 1959 to August 1960 to 'come under
Buspicion a8 having pagsed information to Soviet Intelligence. )
(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY aiter he went
to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA"
rather quickiy because he met a girl he had previously known
whom he was sure wag an American Intelligence agent and
that she must have rcported his presence in Geneva to American
Intelligence. (K the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the
KGB from its inception in 1958 , the KGB would have known of
the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY
had a cover aadress outside the Sovie: Union through which to
initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB
anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and-then
gave only a partial story Of what happened in London in 1961,
BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail-
inga to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he had
a cover address outside the USSR: 3ELITSKIY therefore
0001226
9
SECRET
3
Of
long
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woilc zio: .ave io.C #2 %C;i~w Ze aczily .icl Coiiict
wiiz Azezicer 1t23czzc i Ccnevi
3 1562, bi: Ve?; We:
coild Zcve io.c iZe KCZ _ %12 8c27 & 37%Ciar worz:
wzor: be bid ?rcvioiis y *:owz, je was Si72 #4e wozkec
Amezican %telllg-Ace Z58 #: WzS #7oiah#5 worzn
Arcricam Ite gence becap.e iwzze ZZLIZE.Y W2s
Cezeva. )
(c) BZLZS CY Isz *Ce_evi ~3reed fo Eec;
witlin the USSR az inc.vicial 00j7csesz--3 C_A. Joweve?,
bis agreemer: Was. orly Undez ceziei: siizilaied coxc.iiozs,
the most rtere of waicz Wa3 &i2; ie inCEieial res?
be urwitting 0 the true zatuze 0f tae zelatiozsii? of
BELITSKY with CiA. 01 adc:tor, az; ressage to
3ZLITSKIY or ary ind:vicual w.o re: 3EL--SRY rus;
make %o refezerce to azy previois meeti-g 0: 3ZLiTCIY
wich CiA_
The above conditions are suite explainabe #
BELITSZZY bad rot been inder KC3 coztrol betweec 1953
ana 1961 and in 1961 gave tbe KG3 ozy & partial story 6
tbe 1961 events in Loncon.
0001227
10
ccmar
fo:
sting
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SEcezi
As previoualy indicated, the conclusion is there are a gufficient
number 0f unresoivcd Guestions in the BELITSKZY case 6 0 that discre?-
ancies between information {:om NOSENKO and the actual record ir tne
BELTSKIY case camot at present bc cosidercd as a reilection against
NOSENKO, and there is a distinci possibility the KGB actua did not
know the true facts 0f the BELITSKIY case.
The previous summary nloted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGNA
wab an Intourist irterpreter rccruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also
noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB
that CLA had warned BELITSKIY agairst SHULGINA. 1I The previous
summary Btated BELITSXIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB
agent and "CIA did not warn BZLITSKIY . "
There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by
NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY
against SHULGINA, M1 is a rcas 'onably accurate description of what actuaiy
happened in 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva.
The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially
told him of her status 38 a_ KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by
the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence
whik previously in Paris, France.
6001228
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May
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U ~Uj~^
It wa6 detcrmined thcre Ias no collatcral inormation which
would indicate that the statern cnt by SHULGINA had any factual basis
and BZLTSKY Ivas warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behaif
of:the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY shc had been "orcibly recruited by
American Intelligence" at a previous date_ It Was also sugzested to
BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB a: 0 loyal Soviet citizen and
report tne apparent indiscretion of SHULG} A_
Pages 282 286 of the previous summary, in connection with
the BELITSKIY case, made refercnce to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV'
It was stated that ARTENOV had been involved with a beries of America.
tourist agents in the Sovict Union and although NOSZNKO was alegedly
familiar with ARTEMOV , he wa8 uraware Of the involvement of ARTEMOV
with American tourist agents in 1958 1959, The summary noted this
wab during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Serenth Depart-
ment. Although not specifically stated the above suggested ARTEMOV
wa8 actualy in the Seventh Department in 1958 1959 and that NOSENKO
wa8 not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department: NOSENKO
hao consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section,
First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi-
mately 1957 .
12
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A cloger examinatior of tke cases Cescribcd in the previous
summary a5 "CiA American tourist agents , reveals there is no con
flict in the irvolvcment of ARTEMOV in tbcse case8 and tne statement
by NOSENKO that ARTZOV wa8 with the First Section, Firbt Depart-
ment. As an 'example, one of the cases i6 tne case ofl Edward McGOwAN 06
NOSENKO has {urnished information conceraing thi8 case, stating it was
originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter
by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the
Firgt Department. There i8 adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only
became involved after the case was transierred to the First Department.
Another 0f the case8 involved the contact of ARTEMOV withja CIA 08,24,14-1
officer who wa8 under Department 0f State cover in Helsinki,
Finland]
and visited the USSR on a tcurist visa. Such an individua: would under
no circumstances bc considered & true tourist or the responsibility of
the Seventh Department, particularly since ap2arently the individual was
even traveling under a diplomatic passport: it assumed the individual
was 0i interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the Fi1st Chief
Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally
request the First Department ior such assistance and it is extremely ur-
likely that tSe FCD would request the Seventh Department ior a88istance
in a case involving an American diplomat.
0001230
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V Y e4
Pages 332 333 0f the previous summary contain the basig
for the previous conclusion that thc clain of NOSENKO tbat he was a
Deputy Chief 0f thc Seventa Dcpartment from Juiy 1962 to January
1963 wa8 not credible. It is considered that a dctailed rebuttal is
not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate
information. During current interviews, NOSENKO ha8 furnished
details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position
which substantiate his claim to baving been a Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.
An example in support of the statement that the previoue conclu-
Bion was based on inadequate information is te matter of the written
noteg which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.
The description of these notes on page 319 0f the previous 8ummary is
inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,
an effort bad not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed
ation of his notes or Of boiv be obtained the information in the notes.
During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed iniorma -
ton concerning ail aspects of his notes. Tbis information supports his
claimed position of Deputy Chief o the Seventh Department and include8
collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of tbe First Section,
First Department, in 1960 1961. 8O01231
14
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8
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CcJ:
Primariy tkc notes 0 NOSENZO can be categorized a$
follows:
(a) Snort case summaries bY the Chiefs of the
First Scction, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventa
rtment. NOSZNKO ha8 Stafed tnat he wa8 in 1962
1963 responsibie for supervision over these Section and
that Fili? Denisovich BOBKOV , Deputy Chiei, SCD, wbo
supervised the Seventh rtnent, requested a iist 0f all
recruited agents of the Seventh Department. Accordinz to
NOSENKO, the order from BO3KOV wa8 to only retain the
files (cases) of agents in tourist firm8 and that the files of
Other recruited agerts should be sent to the FCD or Archive8.
NOSENKO has 6tatcd that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of
the tnree Sections the requirement of BOBKOV , but also ex-
panded tke request to include al 1960 1962 case8, nor
excluding previous cases or cases which had already been
given to the FCD. The notes Of NOSENKO included hana-
written reports from the Chief or Aicting Chief of each Section
on recruited agents , with information varying from agent to
agent and even including some human errors.
Many of the above cases had previoubly been trans-
ferred to the FCD, but the rernarks of NOSENKO about thei01232
15
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9+ut"
Depa =
Depa =
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inclusion 5 upport his statcmcnt tha: he had expanded
the origina} request irom BOBKOV 50 that he would have
some "pieces of irjormation l0 givc CLA _ 1i
(b) Notee by NOSENKO on Other ca8e8 waich he learsed
of: during the 1962 1963 period. Certain of the notee were
made from a rev ew 0f a notebook kept by the Chief, Severth
Depa rtment, to which NOSENKO had acces8 on at Jeaet two
occaSions . Vost 0f his notes were not detailed but were
sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at & later
date and yet were gom ewhat innocuous to maintain before
his defection:
(c) Notes for lectures to officer8 of the Seventh Directorate
prepared wvhile with the First Departrent, 1960 1961, and
the Seventn rtment, 1962 1263.
(a) Drait report fOr the briefing o the new Chief, First
rtment, in the latter part of 1961.
(e) One of threc copieg 0f an unregistered report pre-
pared by the Cnief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs,
including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the'
Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance beiore the Collegium
of the KGB which was reviewing the activitieu of the Seventh
16
0001233
SECRET
68$: 8+
Depa
Depa =
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SECRZT
Dcpartment. According to NOSENKO, the prepared
report was nevet typed a8 a forrna] Cocurnent_
The view hag beea 6et forth thaf NOSENKO took undue risk in
carrying written notes with him out 0f the Soviet Union. An examination
of thi8 material guggests #hat NOSENKO was using extrerne care in
collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the
pos bes8ion of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought
out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con-
siderable amount Of valuable information which he could bring out with
little Or no fear that a Jearch of his effects in the KGB after hie depart-
ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None
of the material wa8 registered and all could have previously been des-
troyed by NOSENKO:
The previoug summary Btated that NOSENKO brought three KGB
documents to Geneva. Tkese were typed papers but none wab registered
or actually accountable. The reference to three documents wa8 to:
(a) The draft report for the briefing 0f the Collegium
which has been mentioned previously.
(D) A typed two-page report on several cabes. Actually
a Chief of Section had typed his notee on cabee instead 0f
Bubmitting in handwriting a8 the othere did:
C001234
17
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(c) secong co?y 0f a bumma ry on a XGB agent.
NOSENKO statcd that there were two copies in the file
kcpt by te Ca -=f which he reviewed and that he kept one.
Of interest i8 the act tkat the co?y wab not & registered
documen: and did not contain the usual information a8 to
number 0f copies typed.
6O01235
18
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SECRET
G ACSZNZQ ZAS No ValeezikTOCEZZAAZYZ23
THZRj3 RZCRLIZZZ NIAKZR-Ci) ZL34SSY
PERSOAJZL BZTWZEA 1952 A1 FS DZZZCEIO) I1924
0001236
6rq1
B%: #estks SECRET
(7:Tcs8 1:]
"i7'M1
~
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c_u;izl
G NOSENKO *s no valid claim to certainty that the KGB
recruited no Amczican Embassy personnel between 1933 and his
defecticn in 1964. (Previou8 conclusion)
The conclusion in tuis summary is tbat NOSENKO is 0f the
e2inion tbat there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy
personnel in Moscow iween 1953 and December 1963 with the exception
06
0f "ANDREY" (Dayle Wailis SMTH) and [erbezt HOWARD] wbo actually
wa5 a (USLA] employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy-
The question here is' whether or not the expressed opinion of
NOSENKO i8 suiiiciently based on actual knowledge 80 that this opinion
can be acccpted ag absolute eviacnce that there were no other KGB
recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time_ The
only logical conclusion is #hat thc opinion of NOSENKO cannot be
accepted a6 absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that"
a recruitment could bave occurred and NOSENKO be aware in any
way Of the recruitment, This should in no way be interpreted a5 a
suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying. but rather that an unbiased
observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to
accept the expressed opinion 0f NOSENKO in this particular area.
The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO be NRibeyla
examined and can be cited a6 follows.
Ciuw}
bditts k5a Ixttrti
6ru**r(iog jes SECRET
8'3sl: ,73)
I ' #1l' 02+t2
be=
not
T/gr
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(a) During Marca 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO
was a case Oificer in the Zirst Section, First Department,
SCD. NOSENZO does no: claim that he would kave known
the detaiis concerning ary recruitments (other than
"ANDREY") in this period, but states if there hbad been
Le would bave heard "something-
(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO
was in the Seventh Dezartment, not tbe First Department,
but continued to bave cortact with certain officers in the
First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the
opinion that if there bad been a recruitment in the United
States Embassy during this period he would bave heard
"something" even though be would probably bave learned
few details.
(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period
NOSENZO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First
Department, and he bas made tbe categorical statement
tbat there were no recruitments by the KGB of United
States Embassy personnel during this period of time.
He ha8 also stated that if there had been any recruitments
during tbe 1953-1959 period be i8 sure be would, during
1960-1961, bave heard or learned some detaile of +b301238
Case Or cabes. There is merit to this contention by
2
oranrt
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NOSZNKO since the Cbief of Section wa6 Vladislav
KOVSHUK wno had beer an ofzicer 0f the Firet Depart-
ment Since 1953, actually working in tne First Section
excejt for tbe periods 0 time that he was in the United
States to reactivate "ANDRZY" in 1957-1958 and &
period 0 tirne that he was Deputy Chief of the First
Department:
(d) During 1962-1983 NOSENKO was again in the
Seventh Department: However, he continued to maintain
contact with certain officers of the First Section, First
Department: in particular, Gennadiy I: GR YAZNOV ,
wbo succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First
Section, then becamle Chief of Section, and in the latter
part 0f 1963 became & Deputy Chief 0f the First Department:
According to NOSENKO his relationship with
GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that
he is sure GRYAZNOV woula Save furnished NOSZNKO
some iniormation in regard to any euccessful recruitments
of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed
out that he learned of tbe existence of the[Herbert
B8wARD]
cabe from GR YAZNOV in 1962, altbough it wa8 not until
1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually
0001239
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t7DXiLt
VBR
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earned 0I tho oamo whon the Flret Sectlop, Flret
Departnent, needed tha gorwlced 0 tbo Scvcnth
Department (Thlrd: Sectlon) Ip obtainlng a room In &
06
certatn botel for tba Sovlet glrl Iriend oBOWARD}
Lo gonaral tha abovc conbtltutae tbe babio for &ho stated opinion
06
of NOSENKO bet "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARDlrere the only
Bucced8[ul KGD recrultmenta durlng 195) December 1963 . It showd
bo poted that there ar0 no othar Identufled KGB recrultrente durteg
thle perlod 0 tme whlch wculd bpeckflcelly refuta tho oplnlon 0
NOSENKO: Howovor , tn vlew of the citod actual baote for tbo oplnlon
0I NOSENKO, acceptance o[ tho oplnlon 0 NOSENKO 40 belog an
boneet oplelon bhould pot be convorted Into & gtatement tbat {t Ie
abeolute proof that another recrultment could not bave occurred.
NOSENKO mey be completely correct In ale oplnlon, bot ence
NCSENKO wae ouly tn tha Flret Dopartment 195} 1955 and 1960 1961
bls optnlon that he wolld have beard "eomethlng" about a recrultment
Ln 1955 1959 or 1962 1963 €annot bo accepted 88 Infallible.
0001240
SECKET
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V f1zX
0001241
La %(
Enchtet 6ra Ltx: SECRET br@-I6t %I
69*io %1
SECRET
64
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AlZX
The previous simmary contaired an Azzex "A"ard an Arsaex
"3" cove pages 3.6 435. Limited cozmezzs concersing Anxex
"A, Mi Statererz3 0: Soviet Ofcials Abcrt NCSZIZO, azG Arzcx "3, "1
Summaries 0f Cases No: Examincc in Tex:, are attached, In addition,
tbere is ar Anaex "C"l to tuis summary Wkich is entitled, "The
I} Chereparov Papers.
Aitachments :
Anrex A
Annex 3
Arrex C
0001242
SECRET
5cm Edt1 945 :#73i;
"rn} &
IEE00
I~UnY
tirg
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SECRET
ANNEX B SuiVARZz 2Z_CASZS 1Q2
EXALAZR AZZIZ
C001243
3
SECRET
Exctsk d rJ
Gtemae%} EJ
tensioce N
7
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41433
SLALARIES OZ_ CESZE LOT 223Z0azz
7a8e5 399 435 0i # 0 pcvois s4.1nafy Coaiziz Staz_e;
88
on tkc cases oEzezicazs w2o, #ceozang to intorziazio: =o=
NOSENZO, were 0: KGB interes:, Wczc #pproacicc by &c KC3, 0:
were actually rccruited by thc 3G3. I: was Stated iha; *252 C23es
did no: clearly relate to tc szecizc KC3 posicons %eld a: paziciir
times by NOSENKO &3d thus coud zo: b2 #sefully employed :r exrnining
bis claimed KGB service. Zz2 soizci:z o these cases kas beez exp.ored
in detail curing *e curren: inzerviews wi:` NCSENZO, ard {* {s Zowv
possable to establisil a certain relationshi? beiween these Cases aaz
certain claimed positions 0 ACSZNKO i: te KCB.
I i5 the coaclusion of :is Suniary that any groi? o[Egkasee.
a8 well as all Otier cases concerning Waica NCSENZO kas fuzzished
informatior, must be fully considered, co: necessarily for #ze izortance
or unimpoztance 0f the information, but to Getermize how NOSZIO
Claimed to bave learned 0f &e case and whetaer his statemezts
Cot-
cerning each idertitied case aze supported by collateral inforrzation.
Tbese factors are irportant in assessi1g te overall validity 0 :nior -
mation from NOSZNKO a8 well as beizg supporting evAL2AAs
"claimed-positions in the KGB.
Enctt 3z34e" CCCcET
2ire
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C
To corniert Szec rca_ly o% eacr Of L-EgJcase 5 wotld fecize
a Vcty leagaey ?aper. C_zzes: intcrv eWs rave Cevciopec
acditional iiormiz rom NOSZ KO % -227xma:- yEaJo: =-Es
cascs, Oi even more significonce :s #c {ac: #at AOSZ.IZO %as
05
logically souzced 1.s #orrsaton i; 24l cxcez: 2ez*1 {Eoc-]ccses.
0X
The irdicaied inabili:y 0: AOSENZO to corsz ezcly boirce af(%o:
the case: :s cons.Cered si3iiiczz:, 23zucilzzly s.Ce %is hav==:
knowledge Of all :e cases i8 Guite cczszaaile with _io claimed pos..055
in the KCB. In adcition, criecism o: JOSZAKO for zo: being ab.e to
bource a}l of his irformaiion would be unzeasojable sircc it rakes
no allowance for normil lapses of .emory O: faflure to recal: somne-
wiich was {ns.3.k8ca.f a: &e tiro #: occurred,
08
Witaoct citirg ir derail ary 0 #e Edcases, #e ways in whice
NOSENKO learred 0f a rumber of the cases 6ze corsicezed inpozta::
Bince there is a direc: relationsh:? to kis c.aimed positon5 in tke KC3
during 1960 January 1964, speciicaly tne 2o3ifon 0. Deputy Ckie:,
Firsr Section, Fizst Departmert, 1960 196*; Chief, Firat Section,
Seventa Departrezt, January July %962; ard as Deputy Chief, Sera:k
Department, July 1962 G Jaruazy 1964. Ceztain exarples of the above
are 38 follows:
2
0001245
SECRET
'{IRR
Operiizezt
not
tniz-?
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(a) NOSENKO Jezzzed 0f i #bc? 0; [.c Severi:
Deparircnt cascs wkich %i2 occiizrec % :960 1S6 }, 63
we}} as sevaral 1556 :959 cases .r0m; ;0f2s 274purec %y
tiic Cici or Actina Csiei 0 &c Fis: Seetios, Secczd
Seciioz aic Sixik: Scction = 963_ Trese *ojes were 7f2-
pared at :he reguest 0f NOSZNZO wzo a Dezity Chc:,
Sevezith Department, Wa 5 responsrele {or Srjerviscz o
these tnree 6ections; azd tc recies: Was acilaliy an ex-
pansion of tne original rccuest from BOBKOV, Jejuty Ckief
uf the SCD, for informa:ion on recziimeata 0f ie Severtn
Dezartment; NOSENKO brougkt wita kim in }964 #ke noics
preparec by thc Chie: or Actirg C:ie: of tke Zirst Scction,
Second Sccton and Stxt: Section azd nis know edge 0: ma::j
Of the caceg which had occurred prior to 1982, zari cular'y
1960 196 } , was lin:ited i0 iniorrration contained in tfe 1
notes. Fron these noics, NOSZ)ZO %ad Prezared Ris
port to BOBXOV eiimirating those which were net ap3licable
to the request.
(b) NOSENKO learred 0f sevcral 1962 1963 cases Of
the First Section, First Departmeat, fror: Gernadiy 1
GRYAZNOV wao succeeded NOSZNKO as Dcputy Chiei,
3-
0001246
SECRET
##u0+h 40
35
re-
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0
8
Zirst Seciioz, Zizs: Departczt. 25 imozzzeioz wis
iuznisied io NOSZNZO >rini*.ly becaise 0f %is izie.cez^?
1
witi GRYAZNOV arc zoi &s ie resui: O: iizia] 0perai ozs,
fowever, NOSZNKC %cezcd 0f Ceziae:; Y1 :8 cajcs 0f
was iurniszed idditozal ccia:ls 6s a resil 0: 2 :egies:
fro.il #Le Severia Dejiz__cn: te tze 7 =s: Secton, 7i7s:
Departmer:, for asbi5taxce 0z Vice Versa,
8
08
Certain 0 :2e/49 Fases Estcd were cases O: tbe Szveztl Jezaz:-
ment prior to 1960 or in }982 1963 wkcz NCSZNXO wis iz tze Seveztz
Department. Ceziain 0f the cases wcre cases % waicb te Zizs: Seczon,
First Department, wa8 involved prioz %0 l9o0 or {963 1961. Tte
kaowledge of AOSZAZO corcerning these two groijs 0: cases does ro:
materially suppor: his claimed positiozs in thc Fizst Depaztzez: and
Seventh Departmens:, but does Sizport kis claimed assgnmez: to #e
Seventa Departmeat prior t0 .960 ard in 1962 1963 , azc %is claimed
assigament to the Zirst Depazinert ir .960 1961.
f8
It is diffcui: to speciiically corment concezaisg tbese EgJcases
since they do not iall irto one 0z two s2ecific categories. Iacead,
constitute a rather motley grou? of cases remaining after completion of
the detailed sections of the previous immary: Lacleded are First
Department and Seventh Department cases covering a peziod 0: approxi-
mately five and one-half years- It should be zoted, botBUfxat the
cronr?"
key
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expiaration 0f NCSZNZO concerzi:_ 1.3 know_ecze 6 ~Epases
{8 bota plaisible aa2' corspatiole wizn &is cizized 2ositions i. :e
Zirst Dezazinent &aC Severts Depirtent Curizz lge3 Janua:y :564.
0201248
5 _
CFi'pET
RR
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fNNEX C ZZZ CZE?EPANQV ?APZRS
4
0001249
SECRET Excttit; {l #ua3cs; C}
bert~tm
0854 L 7/m14v2, 44
1
62
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33.3_
AVZX C
Zz CiZ32Z413V24223S
Pages 309 316 0f i.e >revioiis Sisllary Cozizes: a cesc:zor
Oi the Chcrepanov Pazers, azc %Owv Aleksazdr N%kolayevic:: CZZRZZANOV
passed a package 0f documests to an Aaericar toirist in Nosccw {= early
November ]963. Tze conc iis on, howevez, was tXa: &8 # sertiors 0
NOSENKO with respec: to tfc CZERZPA:OV cabe were zot material t0
the claim oi NOSENKO that :e was Deputy Criei, Scvcnth Depaztrert,
in Jate 1963,
The definite relationski? Of the Chcrepanov Papers to the bona
fices o NOSZNKO cannot be igzored azc rist be jiven specific cozsic-
eration. K CHEREPANOV was unaer KC3 cortroi WAcn he passed ike
papers to the Arezican tourist, or if the papers Cortain "deceptior
iniormation, 1I the bona fices 0: NOSENZO are Sibject to very serious
question.
NOSENKO kad personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV wko was,
according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Depaztment,
SECRET 0001250
Exelde; #17 slerntc
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durinz 1960 mic-So} wkez ke wza forzced i.io refreziezi *.e
KG3. During tbe above peziod 0&e, NCSZNZO ciaizs to Zave
becn Dczity Czief, Zirs: Seciios, _.eo132 32 Goes Io: cli ~_Ve
zad a Girect s1pervsozy feszons b.ify Ove? CNIZRE?AACV e3ce?:
in :%e absencc 0f tze Czic: o Secilcn, Vlac:siav KCVS:K 3CEZNKO
Zlso claims 3 nive particizatec' in ibc uza %o7 CEzRZ?ANZv &
Decerber 1963_
Considezetion kas pzevously beez zivez to :e Eeor =2f tie
Cherezanov Papezs Weze passed to Amezicazs by #.e KC3 :o13h
CHZRZPANOV to s1pporf txe Sora #C2s 0: NOSZAZO. 7Ais Zeozy
seerG6 to have liatle credibil:ty sirce #ie ?apera Coritzin .o {ziozrnazioz
which would ever $up2ort tae clairn 0 NCSZNZO tha: Se was iz tbe
Zirbt Section, First Depazimezt, 1960 i961. Tle papers als0 corta:r
no iniormation waich Ivould indcate theze was evem; a Deputy Czici 0
the First Sectior Curing 1958 ,- 1960.
Statemerts by NCSZNZO are ezpzatic tza: CliZRZZiTOV Wzs
not under KGB control, tbat Ze ?assed iie Qapers Waich it Jaser cevelopec
be had taken irom tzc Zirst Section prior to &is retirenen: becaise he
was disgruntled with his treatrnent by te KGB, and tbat #be action by
CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.
Tbere is no collateral evicence which contradics any of
the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV . Further, tere is
C801251
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3oizinz % eizser t2e iOrrn Or s_9si2.Ce 0: tkc 2upe73 weich 0787.223
a ba5i5 fr suspicioz a5 to :%eir circerticiiy. I acdiior, i0 %0721
axd substarce Of tfc ?a?ezs are . *ecjing wi:h te Cescripiio: by
NOSzNKO o. &e Cay-io-Cay 07ezszio: 0: the Zirs: Sucilon, 3.zsi
Deparien:.
Dizing cirrer: irterv ews, 62 CKZIZPAnS} casc 2i3 3ee:
covered in Cetail wiz NCSZNZO. Zie Cberepazov ?apers, Wzicz
weze originally sbown t0 NOSZNRC := 1964 a.iez 2is Zefecticr, %ive
also been Covezec in Zetail
0x 0 sex-zate itezn-Sy-iezi 3asis. Aough
NOSZNKO coes %ot clain to bzve szec fca ly 52e3 azy Darticulaz item
prior to 1964, his Stazemerzs iZ Iejazd to tre vazious Zandwri=-g;,
tyze5 0f note8, and Graft jernozarca leave zo Colif ia: NKSz)KO
was very famiiiar wita Qersorzel i #e Fire: Seciic:, Zirs: Dezart-
ment, ard wito Firsi Dejarimezi ?rocedures.
Certaiz addidonal researc_ Zs been conctcted i regazc Fo the
papers and & Cetailed analysis will Je prepazed &f & Iazer Gaze. x-
should be noted tnat & considerabie &.ont 0: persoz6] judgriez: &as
been Lecessary in malding an &sses521en: 0: tde Caerezazov ?ajezs
since tkere are To exemplars wiza wach t0 comzaze azy of #e rzaterial.
Howevez, based on inforratior Ceveloped thus faz, &ad tkere {5 ao
reason to believe addtional work will alter tre cozclusion, theze is
not an adequate basis for an opinion tat CHEREZANOV was uzcer KGB
control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive infedJUjz32"
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Or tbat the papers wctc Oi.cr #iz 0 colicction 0: matezial *y &
asgruntled erployee wiick ke vezy carefully selected or icclnLazec,
tze removal 0f waich would Oz.; &ve corisiiciied' & ;zzaf :isk :
CKZRZPANOV_
Tbe entire Chczczazov ?-ccs bave Dccn evicred # Cetezziie
d eze i3 ary iiorration Ikics ccr e be coscicerec "Zecezive _l6z-
mation" either by direct statcrnez: 0; implicazion. Two poss.b.2 azeas
kave been aoted ard iul} Cozsceraior. 7kcsc arcas &-e;
(a) There is To s2ecizic Indorration &at #ere
weze any recruiaents te KCB 0: Azrericaz Zez-
sonnel in tke Unitcd Siates Zzabassy uzisg 1-58
3 1960,
Ior {6 there any inorra;ior Slggestirs the KG3 &ad an
American 6oirce Oz Arerican azent in €e Zmcassy
during tuat period of ti-re.
(b) Petr S. POPCV , a GzU oficer wio %ad 32en
an extremely valuable Czi solrce Irom 1953 wa5,
according t0 tae papers, exposed to the KGB in Zazuary
1959 as a resul: 0f a letzez mailing by Ceorze Payne
WINTERS, Jr, WINTZZS was a CLA erployee trde:
SC
Departmen: 0f State covezkssigned to the Embassy in
Moscow Tbe letier, wbich Iva5 to POPOV , was Obzaized
by the KGB aiter mailing by WINZERS and was & dizec:
result of KGB surveillaace of WINTERS.
0001253
CECDET
siven
by
on,
Mer
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1 rezara :0 (j, &c >ioezs 4f2 orly a rafzc: &inite pir: 0.
thc toia' papers ?n4:? {n tae Fizst Seci.o.l Gurisz 1958 1S80.
Zhe 1az 6 any %ioz diio: is ticSe papers Wiich dizcctly or izereciy
indicizes Zaf tie KC3 ricc a recriitent 0f &7 Arsezicaz i: :h2
Znibas;; Or kad &; Axccrica: souzce % :.0 Zmbassy Ctzing tc :958
1960 ?eziod 5 ory a %a:: ; for coxs_ceziiiun, It {s zof cozc ijEVc
prooi tzaf a recriimcn: Was rot >ace Or irat a; fimeziciz So_rce
Gid %0: exisi. Tze ?ajcrs Co not Comiiin & pojitive siiiemcz: Or
eitker fatter.
Ln regard to (), te spcciaic iniormatior in the 2apez6
that Pe;z S _ PoPoV Wi$ uncovercd by &c KGB 25 & resuit oi KGB
surveiElance on Georzc Payre WINTZES, Jr., wio mailed a letter to
?OPOV in January 1559, tbs irlormation should be considezed as
possib.y iniorration Of a ceceptive %atize urless an adequafe exzlarizoa
can be Iade ior its presence in the papers. POPOV was recaled to
Voscow' from Eas: Germany in November 1958 ostersibly %or TDY.
The circumstances linder waick ie was recalied and coliaterai inior-
mation bave given adequate ground8 for a belief t.at by Noverber
1958 ?OPOV was suszected bj tue KGB 0f cooperating with Western
Intelligezce or tbat the KGB may even bave been sure POPOV bad
been cooperating with United States Intelligence.
It may be presumed tat ary lead to the XGB in regard to
POPOV Or the fact that United States Intelligence , more
spe88owz54
5
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CIA, had a sourcc in i.e Gri woiiic %ave coiic iom a7 aSer: or
sourcc 0f tke FCD, #C3, cof ie SCD. It caz aiso be ?rcsurned t&at
solrcc agcnt of inc FCD % # posi:io: i0 %uznibu a lezd zo a
pcnetraition 0f txc GRU by Western EzclligerCe woulc be car~feily
protccted even witsi:: tke KG?. T.e ?oss_b.l.7; 0 cor:52 cxibts # at
a leac #0ni George BLAXZ, 47 ZCD #zer:, resulted ix &0 e./Cbiirc
of POPOV to tbe KG3, bu: i: is zo: esiabkstecd Zaf it &d zor is :_cre
any reasor to believe tae ZCD cou.d zo; Or Gid no: bave anotiez #gert
0I agents Who furnisked irformation to tke XG3 ?ertineat to develop-
ment Of the case azainst POPOV.
The primary queszion, however, as regards the Cherepanov
Papers i8 whetuez, even i it is pzesuned t.e KG3 Obtaized irozmation
from an FCD source or ager: Which Icd to suspicion oi ?OPOV cr
identification of POPOV , 11s Woiid 5e {ncornpatible Witk irorration
in the papers and cotld oz; lcad to *&e comciszon tha: tae 2228r8 contain
"deceptive iniormation. 11
The concluson in regard to the above i$ ;hat t.e %ac: tbe papers
attribute the exposure of PO?OV to the %GB to surveillarce 02 WINTZRS
when ke mailed the Xetter to POPOV in Jaruazy 1959 is not incornpatible
with the distinct possibility taat the KGB had previously obtained infor -
mation from an FCD agen: Or agents which actually led to suspicion in
regard to POPOV or actual identification 0f PO?OV.
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L iniormiiion was reccivcd Iromn ar iportunt 7CD #303.
such a6 Georze BLAKZ or i.roiz: &noiber Va.uable FCD agent Wzcz
led to KGB suspicion 0f POZOV prioz to his refuzn to Noscow in
November 1958, .it is kighly uml.kf ; Suca i.orraation wciid rcce:ve
wice 'distributior witl:n tle KGZ, &:ler % e 7C3 0r &22 SCD. j
is als0 possiblc &nc lirnited gr0i;7 wskin te KC3 Wko woiid be awaze
tbat the KGB had reccived inforrition lcadinz t0 Siszicio: 0 ?878V
irom a valuable azent would be viry intezeszed in a#tzibu=n1g tke
exposure 0f POPOV to the fortuitois matiing 0: the lettez to PO?CT
by WINTERS. The possibility szoiic be corsicezed tha: prior t #e
retrieval by thc XGB of thc lcttez j0 ?OPCV &ere was only a dev?
suspicion ot POPOV but that the Zetter com?-etely solidiied the case
against PO?OV.
Considcration bas bccr gvcn t0 the posoibflity #2: CZZRZZANOV
Ia$ under KGB control wlen %e pased tle Zaper8 to #2e Amezcz:
tourist and that it wvas done by tke KG3 with #ae hoze 0 isvoivinz ZJA
in a KGB-controled operation witzia the USSR. In tbat event, te
papers passed by CHEREPANOV would mos: likeiy be gezuine sizce
this would have been tae initial si2? in what #a8 KGZ hoped woild become
a successful operation.
Tbe above thcory bas beez rejected since tbere are a number
of factors which militate agaiast % Tbese factors incitce the fac: tbat
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[68 .iies: {rorizizon % 68 723878 #iv &; .cis: #ree Yeizs & c,
wacl *oic iicizite CjEIZ? Ovi:iO ci:?e access azc Eefe ,
wi& {0 {.dcaioi CZZRZ?AAC} h4" Lezested i: _ %tiire ccziacl.
8
8001257
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SLCRET
INDEX
ABIDIAN, Joln IV,2,5,7-15,19,20,52
"ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) Iv,G,j-4
AR TAMONOV , Nikolay II,A,2
ARTEMOv , Vladiriir Lvovich IV,F,6,12,13
BAKHVALOV , Mikbail 3 IV,E,3,4
BALDIN, Boris Ardreyevich IV,F,2
06
BARRETT, Robert] II, F,14, 15
06 [Beccs, Frank]- IV , E,36,37
BEL: TSKIY , Boris IV, F,6-12
BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich IV,B,2,3, 5-7'
BIENSTOCK, Natalie] ~ IV,F,3,4
BBIRSE , Arthur IV,D,1, 2
BLAKE; George IV, D, 9; IV,F, 9; V,C,6,7 p
0
BOBKOV_ Denisovich IV,F,15,16; V,B,3 6
'
BOHLEN, Ambassador II,F,10
BOWDEN, Lewis IV,E, 53,.54
BRAUNS , Horst}- IV,F,3-6
C BROWN, G, Stankey} IV,E, 43 0001258
(B% inLaN V} #ctJlit SECREi
4567
~3a
5,6+
Filip
6/Gr
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BUGA YEVA, Luamila IV,3, 4
06 BURGI, Richardj IV,D,l
06 BURTIN, Sipe |- IV,E,49,50
06 BURTIN, Will IV,E,49,50
CECCHI, Pietro IV,E,39,40, 42
CHELNOKOV , Vladimir Dmitriyevich IV,7,2,16
CHEREPANOV , Aleksandz N. L,H,4; V,C,1-4,6-8
CHERNETSEV , Y. 5. IV,E, 49
CHURANOV , Vladimir A. I,B,4
6 DAY, Frank IV,F, 41, 42
DEMKIN, Vladimir IV,2,20,45
DER YABLV, Petr Sergeyevich IV,B,5,6
DOUGLAS, Willian 0. IV,D,3
06 DREW Geezgel] IV,D,]
DwELLY, Robert] IV;E,41,44,45
FARMAKOVSKA YA, Olga A. 5 V,A,1
FEDOROVICH, Tatyana IV,E, 8, 9
FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M:
G IV,E, 49-5l; IV,F,l
06
FISK, Norman IVv,D,5
06 FRIPPEL, Arsene IV,D,2
0C01259
06 [GAFFEY , Josepb IV, E,41, 45,46
2
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'4473
'9/80
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SzCrzT
GARB LER, Paul IV,E,52
GARCIA, Anthony A IV,E,39
06 GARLAND, John' III, F, 17; AV,E,31,33-36
GINSBURG , Michael]} IV,D,5,6
GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich II, B, 3, 4; I, E, 9-H; II,F, 5-13, 15-19;
IV,B,5,6; IV, C, 9, 10; IV, E, 21,23,31-34;
V,A,]
GRBBANOV , M: II,F,3,4 IV,6; IV, 6; IV,E,4,5,21; IV,F, 1,2
"GRICORIY" I,F, 13; IV,2,3,6; IV,F,4
GROMAKOVSKIY , Yevgeniy MI,B,4; IV, E,20
GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. I,B,4; III, F, 8-13,15; IV, E,5,12,19-21,26-28,
30,43-45; IV,G,3; V, B, 3, 4
GUK, Yuriy I. IU,B, 4
HAMILTON, Victor Norris J,E, 9 _
(aka: HNDAL, Fouzi Nitri)
"HANNA" IV,E, 27
HARRIS , C:sella IV,D, l,7,&
HORBALy, Wi Iliam IV, E,53
HOWARD, Herbert III, E, 8; I,F,20; IV,G,1,3,4
IVANOVA, Svetlana IV,E,38,39,45,46
66 JENNER , Paul IV, E,28-31, 35-36
JOHNSON _ Robert Lee II,2,8; II,G,5
6 JOHNSON _ Wallace Everett IV,F,3,4
66 JONES , William Carroll I,F, 3,4
0001260
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06.
KADERA, Fred IV,E, 45
KANTOR, Narviz IV,D, 5,6
KARLOV , {cu IV,D, 5
KASHPZROV, Vkkail ~ II,H, 4
KEMMER , Myra IV,E, 9
OblKEYSERS, James IV, E,22-26,55,56
KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich IV,E,5,48-51
KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) IV, B, 1-4,7
KOLOSSOV , Viktor IV , E, 30, 34
(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)
KOSOLAPOV , Vadim V. II, B, 4; IN,F,8,16, 17; IV,E,5,19-21,28-32,
34-39,42-44
KOSYGINA, Madame III, A, )
KOVSHUX, Vladislav M. II,B, 4; MI,F,5, 41, 12; IV,E,3,4,6,12,18,21 _
23,49,52,53; IV,F,1,2; IV,G, 3; V,C,2
KOZLOV , Veniamin IV,E, 12
KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich IV,B,5
IANE, Allen IV,D, 1,2
LANGELLE, Ruesell II,F, 3; IV, E, 8
"LILLIAN" IV,E,26
06_ LUBIN, 'George IV,E,49,50
06 LUNT; Horace] III, F, 3
Db MAHONEY , Eugene] IV,E,53
0D01261
~6CMMALIA. Martin] IV,D,2
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MRK_pavidj III, €, $
L?iaw; Ralpy]- IV,D,5
06
MMERTENS, Gerara] IV,2,2
MIKHAYLOV , A. A. IV,E, 49
MINTKENBA UGH, James Allen III,E, 8; IIL, 6,5
MORELL, William N. 3 IV,E, 52
MORONE Jobeph IV,E,22,27,36,37,39,40,55
MULE, Walter (Cap:. ) IV, C, 4
6
Mc COwAN, Edward]- IV , F,13
PECHTER, Bernard IV,D, 5,6
PENKOVSKIY , Oleg Vasilyevich IV,E,13
PETROV , Vladimir Ivanovich W, B, 4; IV,E, 48,49
POPOV Petr S_ IV,E,7, 10; V,C/4-7
PREISFREUND, Jchaa]- D,F,5.%,12
6 [PRESSMAN,Patrick] IV,D, 5,7 `
"RAKETA" 5 IV,C,5
RASTVOROV , Yuriy IV, B, 5, 6
RHODES, W,F, 4
04 RRuFE, Jobn IV,D, 5, 6
Ob ISCHWARZENBACH, Collette]- I,F,10
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SERGEYEV {SERGEEV), Fvl IV,2,32,33
(Very pobsibly Igor Alekscyevich ZENKIN; but is now coneidered also
identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevlch SUKHOV
Ird very Pobbibly Igor A. S.iiRNOV. )
SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry] LI,F,6
0 SHATTAUER, Sofia | IV,D,5,7
SIAZLY, Sarwat cl IV, E, 40
SHELEPIN, Aleknindr Nikolayevich II,F,13
"SHMELEV" LJ,7,13; IV,D, 3,6; IV,F, 4
[SHUBIN, John IV,D, HI
SHULGINA , Nataliya IV,F,1, 12
SMITH, Dayle Wallis L,F,4,26; IV,G,1
SMITH, Edward ELis 1,2 , 4
SMITH; John Discoe II, 5, 9; IV,E, 49,50
STALI # IV,B, 5
STEVENS, Edmund II,?,4,6
STORSBERG, Jamcs I,F,3 , 5,Il-I3; IV,E,21-24,26,43,55,56
TARASKA, William IV , D,5,6
0b' TAYLOR, David IV,D,2
TAYLOR, John IV, E, 42, 43
UMANETS, Ella 3 'IV, E,38 0001263
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t ~F+: ~t
S.
06 URBAN, Colonel} IV,E,24,25
VASSALL, William II, E, 9; G,S; IV,9,9
06 WASHZXO_'Stevg) IV, E,53
0 (WILLY, Wiliam saney] IV,D,2
WINTERS, George Payre, Jr. IV,E,53; V,C,4-7
ZENKIN, FNU IV,E,32-34
(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevica ZENKZN, buc is now considered also
idcntical to Igor Alekseyevich SZRGZYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUXHOV
and very Pose Igor As SMRNOV . )
ZUJUS, Matthew IV,E,26-28
ZWANG , Maurice IV, E, 40-42
CUO1zrt
SECRET
II,
sibly