Transcript of 104-10150-10136.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== 14-Q0000 104-10150-10136} 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 to Top Secref Documlenf-_Automatically downgraded or declassi- Rea" SECRET when attached Eltesirife orblas detached from controlled document; when CONTROL AND"COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT 9 REG STRY pEsch Pt ion cia CONTROL No RCE 3ZFZ DATE DOEUMENT Rece | VED Doc Gate 3022/ 222 1 copy No 02 Ep*io Number OF PaGeS HZ NUMBER 0F_ ATTACHENTS Wt Top Secret document recetved bi 'the Central Intelligence Agency Thlowory ,,ttll be Iplaced on top 01 and attached to each document unttl such tinie 178 It is downgraded , destroyed, Or ATTENTION: Sectet withln' the CIA and wtll rematn attached to the Control personnel oud those Indivtduals whose oficlal Ot classifled Top to Top Secret matter Is Umited to Top Secret Secret material will slgn thts form transmttted outside 8KCIA: Access oflcers who recetve and/or release the attached Top ond dutles relate to the matter. 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TOP SECRET 18-73 blank_TOP, DOCUMENT appropriate ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== J400GQp:_ DOCUMENT' 4 U TOP SECRET 14EV[ JEWN: H) AT cr; IIEAHIQIARTIRS IPY MInH;RIAI CO;#'itTE:: OY ASSASSIMATIONS STAFI: MEIEIES IQUISI: STLICT II: : The_Examination_ of the Lu TITLI: /NUNIJLR / VOLLi Bona_Fides_ of a KGB_Defector 1 Document dated February: 1968 ICLUSIVE . DATES: ITQIIAL UNIT/LOCATTON: CI Roo: Luttons , TF ^Y: GJzT)J) STGNATTRH 0F QATT MMATT TWTHD BY REVIEWINGOFFICIAL ZCKIVEIRETURNw (QRINI NNI ~1-2f Yen 'Xleth F CmaeL Uein_ YeiJ Ia1 bht ~~ezi hiL lwv z_ '284 ZlinwA Sm ItV L_Jb 704+626- 6_Ilosenr Rynked 44275 s+ cn~ 22 Hi_Z s L-S i7s Lit S~RES BAD 8ac KAS M18 Maes_EzJacks1 446oay Y +Ji S: l Soka~s L- Mak ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector OLCU#] ly #/0 TS No. 197124 Secret Ne 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 14-000oo TOP SECRET 1 Attached is copy number 10 of the February 1968 CIA study entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of ( a KGB Defector Yuriy I. Nosenko : 2 Please note that the CIA finds this study to be inaccurate in many important details and to contain the results of faulty judgements leading to unfounded conclusions_ 3 . We have deleted certain portions of this study containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations ) or is related thereto_ 4 We request return of this study when it has served your purposes _ TOP SECRET C761266 ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ The Examination of the Bona Fides 0f a KGB Defector Yuriy L NOSENKO February 1968 0001267 TS No. 197124 10 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 14-000oo Top Secret CONTENTS PAGE Introduction Summary of Case 3 I FOUNDATIONS 0F NOSENKO ' S CLAIMS 11 NOSENKO ' s Statements About Himself 11 Soviet 0fficials Statements 20 The Product of NOSENKO ' 8 Debriefing 21 Positive Intelligence Information 21 Counterintelligence Information 22 Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to NOSENKO ' s Claimed Service 2 4 KGB in Paris" (Sgt _ A8ezee#Hokasos)" 2 4 "SASHA" (Identity Unknown) 2 8 KGB Agent in the British Admiralty (William VASSALL) 30 The KGB Audio Attack on the West German Ii Embas sy 31 ANDREY" (Dayle W _ SMITH) 33 Edward Ellis SHITH 37 II EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO ' $ BONA FIDES 41 Notes for the Reader 41 III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPIIY 45 Birth to 1945 45 Moscow Institute 0f International Relations (1945-ca 1950) 48 Naval RU Service (Ca . 1951-ca 1953) 49 Summary and Conclus ion 58 0001268 (1) TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 "The "The Copy ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret CONTENTS PAGE VI SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960) (Cont.) Operational Activities (1955-1958) 113 Entrapment of [MALIA 06 114 Recruitment of @urci] C6 115 Attempted Recruitment 9 € GEHRCKEN:] 66 121 Contact with ZANEL and[BIRsa] 66,06 122 Recruitment of [SUNDAR} 0b 123 Travel to London (1957 and 1958) 124 Operational Activities_ (1958-1960) 127 Recruitment 0f HARRIS] D 128 Compromise of KRAFT 129 Recruitment of @DREW 130 Recruitment of LUKis 0 131 Recruitment of WILBY 131 Recruitment of TAYLOR 132 Recruitment of (MERTENS 06 133 Compromise of BARRETT] 134 Compromise of WILLERFORD 0 6 136 Recruitment of TRIPPED 137 Lee Harvey OSWALD 143 144 Summary Knowledge of other Seventh Department American Tourist Operations 145 Seventh Department Counterintelligence Operations (1955-1960) 146 NOS ENKO ' s Information 146 Information Furnished KGB by George BLAKE 148 KGB Tourist Study 149 Summary and Conclusion 150 VII AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTTON 0F AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960-January 1962) 151 Deputy Chief 0 f Section 151 Transfer to Section 152 Predecessor is Deputy Chief 153 Responsibilities 154 Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief 156 General Supervisory Duties 159 0001263 (iii) TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Ib'S& ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret CONTENTS PAGE VII AMERICAN EMBASSy SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960-January 1962) (Cont.) Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications 236 Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy 240 Suspected CIA Officers 241 UnsusPected CIA 0fficers 244 Personal Handler of Agents 2 48 Temporary Ass ignmente Abbroad 251 Planned Travel to U . $ _ 251 Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960) 252 Travel to Bulgaria (April-May 1961) 254 Compromise 0 f LUNT 256 Promotion and Transfer to Seventh Department (January 1962) 259 Summary and Conclusion 2 6 1 VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964) 263 Introductory Comment 263 Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (January 1962-July 1962) 2 6 5 NOSENKO ' s Agents 2 65 Operat ional Activities 268 Entrapment of Fonnsono 26 8 Entrapmen t 0 f UoNE3 06 272 Recruitment 0 f BIENSTocr06 273 Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962) 275 Purpose of Trip 275 Investigation 0 f SHAKHOV 276 Security Escort for Delegation 278 Visits to KGB Legal Res idency 279' KGB Officers WIthin Soviet Delegation 279 Association wIth Other Soviets 280 Supervising Cas e Officer for BELITSKIY 282 Contact with CIA 286 Operational Activities (continued) 288 Attempted Recruitment of GrAuN:] 0 288 Summary and Conclusion 290 0001270 (v) TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 SIRG Top Copy ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== Top Secret 'CONTENTS PAGE VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT` (January 1962-Januaiy- 1964) (Cont.) Deputy Chief 0 f Seventh Department (July 1962-January 1964) '291 292 KGB Operetiong ~06 292 Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIYL Investigation of JSLES TNGERI 2 9.3 Arrest and Interrogat Ion of KOTEN PL 295 296 GRU. Agent SGHUBINho 2 9 8 Arrest 0 f BARGHOORN 0f- OSWALD 30 3 Investigation 303 Regidence In US SR Request': to Return to: USSR: 305 Post-Assa88Inat ion Revew of KGB File 30 7: The CHEREPANOV Papers 309 314 Content8 _ NOS ENKO' & Trave l Documen t 315 Return; to Geneva (January-February 1964) 316 317 Purpose of Trip Viaitg to KGB Legal Res Idency 318 Availabiltty for Meet ings with CIA 318- NOSENKO' s Written Notes 319 NOSENKO ' s Defection 320 Knowledge :of Other Seven th Department Operatfons 325. Operatfonal Activicies (July 1962-, January 1964) 326 KGB Counterintelligence Operations Anong- '326 American Tourist9 Informetion Furnfshed the KGB by George BLAKE 3.2 7 KGB Study 0f Awerican Intelligence Tourist Operations 327 NOSENKO 's Informetion 330 331 Suenary 331 Sumwary and Conclusion (vi) TS No. 197124 0001271 Top Secret 46r Copy ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret CONTENTS PAGE IX OTHER ASPECTS 0F NOS ENKO ' s CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335 Reletionshlp with General GRIBAnov Communist Party Status 335 Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 3 3 8 Awards and Decorationg 342 Soyrcing 345 Renks 34 9 350 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT 35 5 XI' SUMMARY AND CONCLUS IONS : NOSENKO ' $ BONA EIDES 35 7 Annex B Summaries 0 f Case8 Not Examined In Text 399 Index of Personalitie8 437 (vi1) TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 CoCi272 ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== Secret D J 0 0 Introduction 0l The judgment 0f NOSENKO, 8 bona fides entailed the distillation 0f the huge vo Lume 0f counterintelligence_ Il information as 8emb led in connection with his case, including the product 0f his lengthy interrogations the analysis of KGB operations which he related , the results 0f file checks of thousands :of individuals involved comparison of his assertions against collateral information from 21l sources and with: counterintelligence records on: the KGB and related matters _ The examination herein reduces this volume; of- V material t,o manageable: Proportions,: to essential- elements of NOSENKO S claims in order to Permit comparison 0f his statements: with matters '0f- known fact and to permit' apeli- cation of; reasonab le judgment. Conclusions are drawn from the examination of' each major period: in his; claimed biography The final conclusions represent the aggregate' of: conclusions independently drawn from the; examination 0f 8L each major period in_ his claimed .biography 0 0001273 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 11 Top Copy ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== Top Secret CONTENTS PAGE Iv KGB ENTRY (ca . 1953) 6 1 Date 0f Entry 62 Role of General: KOBULOV: 6 4 Eligibiiity_ 6 7 Processing Entry 68 Initial Service 70 other Aspects Relevant to KGB Service 72 Summary and" Conclusion 74 AMERICAN EMBAS SY; SECTION 0F AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (ca 1953-June 1955) 75 Operations Against American Correspondents 75 KGB Files: 77 NOSENKO ' 8 Agents 7.8 Operations Against" U:S : Attache Personnel 81 Custody 0f Case Files 8 3 NOSENKO' s Agents 84 NOSENKO S Largets 8 7 MICKELSON]Lo 87 MEARNSL 88 RICIiARDS] 89 FELCHLIN 06 90 BENSON STROUDI 706 9 3 9 3 MULE 06 06,06,06 94 BENSON MULE_ and S TROUD Expulsion 9 5 CARDELEA 06 9 7 VAN LAETHE] 06 97 Additional Reporting 9*9 Summary and: Conclusion 9 9 VI SEVENTI: DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)" 101 Introductory Comment 101 NOSENKO ' s Agents 104 Soviet Citizen Agents 104 Iomosexual Agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 110 Summary 112 (ii) TS No- 197124 Secret for Army Top Copy Idrk ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== QoooQ Secret CONTENTS PAGE Introduction Summary_ of Case 3 0 I FOUNDATIONS OF NosENKO ' s CLAIMS 11 NOSENKO S Statements About Iiimself 11 Soviet Officials Statements. 20 The Product of NOSENKO ' s Debriefing 21 Positive Intelligence Information 21 Counterintelligence' Information 22 S ignificant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to NOSENKO ' s Claimed Service 24 The KGB in Paris (Sgt A8eg6e-oEnson)" 2 4 SASHA" (Identity Unknown) 28 The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty (William VASSALL) 30 The KGB' Audio Attack on the West German Embassy 31 ANDREY: (Dayle .W 'SMITH) 33 Edward Ellis_ SMITH 37 II EXAMINATION 0F NOSENKO S BONA FIDES Notes for the Reader 41 III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPIIY 45 Birth to 1945 45 Moscow Institute 0f International Relations (1945-ca 1950) 48 Naval RU Service (Ca . 1951-ca 1953) 49 Summary_ and Conclusion 58 0801268 (i) TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top 41 Copy ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== Secret Summar of Case The NOSENKO case "opened `on: 5 June 1962 in the of the: Palais des Nations in Geneva corridors Disarmament Conference during_ the United Nations A Soviet 'official approached- an American diplomat with the suggestion that they get for_ a. talk the following The together the appointment , diplomat advised CIA 0f explaining that he thought the; approach S 0 unusual that; it might be an offer of He said he believed the Soviet cooperation or defection. a member 0f the. Soviet: to be Yuriy Ivanovich' NOSENKQ Disarmament Delegation_ Later meeting with the Anerican_diplomat, the Soviet official identified himself as NOSENKO_ and stated he KGB counterintelligence officer was a security 0 f the sent to Geneva to' ensure the had Soviet delegat ion_ He knew that the American previously served in Mos cow and erronedus ly believed he was the Ii American Rezident I1 that that he needed in" Geneva NOSENKO stated cover KGB approximately 900 Swiss francs: immediately to operational funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva He offered for this to sell: two items ~of information to American: amount These were the identity . of a former American Intelligence in Mos cow who; wa8 a KGB agent Embassy employee area, and the identity of a 'Soviet ciphers_ in the Washington_ ostensibly a CIA in Moscow who although In agent was actualiy controlled by. 'the, KGB _ reply; the Anerican, explaiped that he was not an intelli- gence officer but that he could pIace.NOSENKO in with an 'appropriate JU.$ official in_ Gene- contact va- later that; same That: evening NOSENKO' was met by a CIA officer and hour' meeting followed a t a CIA safehouse a three- hinself as a KGB in Geneva Describing American major experienced in operations against the Embassy - in Mos cow and agains t tourists and other travellers to: the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell 0001275 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Top day . "near day, ~12_ Copy ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret Ivanovich NOSENKO TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top Yuriy 0001274 Top Copy ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (Summary o f Case) the cwo items of " informat ion He sa 1d thac the need f0 [ money was his immediat e mo r 1ve fox conra-ting CIA , a ] c hough 1n che ensuing discuss ion he a16 0 expres sed dissat 15 fa-1ion With the Communist regime in the Soviet Union NOSENKO met CIA" rep[ esentat 1 ves four mor € cimes in Geneva in June 1962 _ Wich the second meeting on 11 June , his earlier expressed reservat ions disappeared a lmos t entirely He answered most ques cions Put co him on KGB organization and operations . His know ledgeability was almos € exciusively limited to the KGB Second Chie € Direccorate (respons 1b le for counterintelligence and securicy within che USSR) NOSENKO seemed to be what he cleimed t0 be : a KGB officer 1n a sensirive Pos it ion with knowledge 0f importan€ KGB operat ion8 _ NOSENKO returned to Mos cow on 15 June , having Promised to do everything within certain limics c0 colle< € information on matters indicated t0 be o f interest €0 CIA The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operacional contact wich him ins ide the DSS R and his request chat n0 mention 0 f his coilaboration be communicated co the American Embassy in Mos cow He Promised co notify CIA via an ac camodation address when he came to the West again NOSENKO aga1n accompanied the Soviet delegation to che Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964 S ince l2s€ meeting with CIA he had been Promoted tj the rank of lieu- tenant colonel and had become che Deputy Chief of che largest department in. the Second Chief Directorate . At che first of the new series of meetings on 2 3 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United Scates He cited a8 reasons his concinuing dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime and the fact- thac he. probab ly would have n0. further opportunities_ c0 cravel co the Wes € in the foresee- ab le future Although he implied thac he wanted to defect as soon as Poss ible he agreed to rema in in plaze in Geneva while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington _ NOSENKO had brought a large amounc 0f new information, much of' it in scribb led notes , on KGB opera _ tional activity which he had collected in the 18 months s ince his last meeting with CIA 0001276 TS No. 197124 Secret Top Top Copy ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== Secret (Summary of: 'Case) On 4 February, four days before the selected forNOSENKO ' s_defection, date tentatively received a cab le from KGB he reported that he had return to Moscow EcodaKcicipadd"{zte Kcirdeter his immediate foreign tourism to the in a KGB conference on plans were implemented Soviet: Union_ That night exfiltration border to Germany and NOSENKO was driven across the Frankfurt Gefehoysehereheidedebfiefing was resumed in a to NOSENKO The decision was reached: on 11 February to the' United States and in the evening of 12. February he and: his CIA Washington via commercial escorts arrived in in the: Washington aircraft, thence to a safehouse area . At: the request of the Swiss : and Soviet NOSENKO met on 1.4 February With Governments respective Washington Embassie8 fePteeenfitives o€ the their Immigration and Naturalizat offices of the U . S_ he had defected on his ion Service _ He told both that ation and that he had own free will after careful 'consider- Union. In n0 desire to, return to the Soviet answer; to the questions of the' Soviet 'tatives 9 he orally renounced his represen- citizen of the USSR status and rights as a CIA completed its initial debrie 18 ' Eebruary, and on 24 of NOSENKO- on representatives of.` February. he was introduced to same time, there the FBI for questioning. At about the ment Whiie was: a marked change in NOSENKO:' & sessions it outwardly cooperative during most 'debfSZ8GE; respond to {peeidie Queseio1igl7 difficult to get' him to and nearby cities was questioning His free time in Washington behavior, aidtdespueesPVichuateds by drinking bouts crude his behavior by saying that hes; security escort He explained a result; of: hig defection, was: under great tension as children and the abandonment of his wife and nane and on this' disgrace that hee had brought to. his family a vacation.: basis CIA acceded to NOSENKO ' s demand for On 12 March, NOSENKO left CIA "case officer and two CIA Washington with a visit;;to, Hawaii There his: security guards for; & two-week further- He drank heavily behavior deterioriated still consorted with a number and' almost constantly; he in Pub lic places ; and Ieof Prostitutes ; he was loudi and crude conspicuously_ spent money extravagently and 5 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 310 Top bring early. fings 8.0127q Copy ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (Summar y 0 f Cas e) Dur1ng NOSENKO ' s absence from Washington , consulcations were he ld with che FB [ regarding s teps co be taken to restrict his movements and activities This Agency was concerned chat his behavior would attract undes irab le atrention and pub licicy , Perhaps police arrest , and that doubts about his bona f1des, which were becoming known to a widening group in the U < S Covernment , might be inadvertent ly revealed t0 NOSENKO himself The FBI on 1 April indicated ic would Interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO ' s freedom 0 f movement , and the Acting Actorney General the Depar cment of Stat e, and the White House were advised On 4 April NOSENKO was driven co a new safehouse in a Washingcon suburb , and told that this safehouse chenceforward would be his regular Place of residence Since that time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard , and has not been Permitt ed access to news media Intens ive interrogation of NOSENKO including a polygraphic examinat ion, was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to divulge earlier, and to clarify contradictions In what he had already reported _ The polygraph examination results were inconclusive This phase 0f the interrogat ions was terminated on 24 April 1964 . Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts 0 f his veracity , NOSENKO asserted that he was willing to answer, or to try to answer 2 11 questions put to hin< Because more information pertinen c to the question o f his bona fideg was needed , a new series of interrogations was begun in mid-May 1964 . Different interrogators were introduced 2nd questioning was' resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner The Period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964 _ After further consultations with the a round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January Between chen and 5 March NOSENKO was quest ioned for a cotal 0 f about 140 hours by individual interrogators and interrogat ion teams and he was directly cha llenged on many of his previous assercions . He admitted that certain of his earlier statemen t s: had been incorrect , and that he could not explain contradictions 0001278 TS No. 197124 Secret "not 2B1i965- Top Copy ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== OooQQ Top Secret '(Summary 0 f Case) in his testimony Nevertheless , NOSENKO maintained he had been_basically truthful, and that hee had come to . the United- States solely for the reasons he had originally given Thes e interrogations. were suspended on 5 March 196.5 Questioning of: NOSENKO. during the summer and autumn' of, 1964 and the interrogaciong 0f January and February 1965 concentrated on the Period of his claimed service in the American Embassy Section of the American Department KGB Second Chief Directorate from January 1960" to January 1962 Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral informarion available against which NOSENKO"' & statements could be checked; the importance of. the Embassy and its Personnel_ as critical KGB Second Chief Directorate targets ; their importance from the standpoint 0f American .8ecurity; and the extent of NOSENKO ' s claimed knowledge 0 f the activities of the Embassy Section; 0 f which he claimed to, have been Deputy Chief In keeping with a Soviet Practice with 'which_ NNOSENKO was familiar; CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965. to a series of interrogation reports , so-called Protocols II most ,` 0 f which concerned the period of his claimed service: in the American Department . These were written by the CIA interro gators and they:were designed to set forth NOSENKO ' s exact- statements and meaning on various specific subjects The protocols were in n0 Presented to NOSENKO 2s documentary portions of a "confess ion I but rather as distilled and final statements. of- what he did and did not know. concerning Particular topics . NOSENKO was asked to read each Page of each Protocol carefully and: to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he _ understood and agreed with its contents ; he was allowed the use: 0f a dictionary and was Permitted to ask any questlons and make any changes that he wished (Anendments were entered by the interrogators and' were initialed- by NOSENKO, ) NOSENKO: was asked; after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was_ written there and whether there were any: more changes: he wished o make He 'as then asked co sign and date the statement , "I have read and underscood this report and certify it as correct" at the end of the final Page With one exception , he: did S 0 calmly and Without objections In one or two instances he remarked chat his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them_ 0001279 TS No: . 197124 Secret "10 sign way: Top Copy ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (Summary of Case) Jok foolish, but he wa s not ab le t0 fa<t or Presentation which wou ld sugges € any 0 f Commenting on the use 0 f make them more accurate: Jn 4 March 1965 : 3ffensecrogagion reporcs = ) NOSENKO said Anything I have signed is story i8 absolucely correct_ understand what I am absolutely correct I absolutely This is an official when I am signing any Paper _ I: m when I document , and I unders cand what 8ign it as absolutely 1i correct . Further ques tioning was conducted from 2 6 1 4 August 1965 with the until former KGB officer_ feegerticepetio of Pe_tr DERYAB IN, a were for the Purpose 0f interrogations_ held in Russ ian , obtain a clearer us ing DERYABIN ' s KGB experience to and understanding o f NOSENKO ' s claimed professional background Personal the period 19-25: October 1966 , NOSENKO questioned for seven days on specific was copics ranging from his identity aspects o f selected knowledge of specific KGB co his involvement in and boch Russ ian and operations Questioning was in identified English Although the interrogations which topics and time Periods in NOSENRO ' s contained the greatest number of accounts discrepancies 9 neither the contIbdicffomotoediceidis and ancies could be resolved nor the discrep_ Because of the incidence 0 f encountered among would-be deranged Persons CIA has NOSENKO ' 8 mental stabldibe defectozet_ the question 0f after his defection was 2 matter considered early United States in in Geneva _ From his arrival in the observation. 1964 NOSENKO has been under Psychiatric A' CIA Psychiatrist and a CIA both with: extensive experience with Psychologist , monitored many of NOSENKO ' s Soviet Blec defectors , the Psychologist for three veeke goestione In 1965 life from birth until 1953 = questioned NOSENKO on his the in an when NOSENKO claimed he joined which might adexfeaPtE to identify Psychological factors accounts The NOSENKO ' 8 contradictory and inconsistent observations Psychiatris t has continued his Periodic of NOSENKO to the Present time _ and che Psychologist concluded The psychiatrist 0 f cheir observations , that independently _ on the bas i8 NOSENKO was men stab le - 0001280 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top changes "My doing fully d01ng being July During May KGB ; tally Copy ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== OQooo Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated s ince October 1966 The Period: since: has. been devoted:to the examination and. review of the accumulated interrogation notes , transcripts and other materials and in the preparation 0f the present_ paper 9 6001281 TS No:: 197124 Top Secret 110 Top Copy ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== 14-QQ0Qo Top Secret CHAPTER I FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' S CLAIMS Evidence of NOSENKO ' 8 bona Edes is comprised of his own s tatements , the corroborating statements of Soviet officials , and the counterintelligence information he has provided _ NOSENKO ' s Statewents About Hiqself In his meetings in 1962 and 1964 with CIA abroad and in the course of the interrogations s ince, NOSENKO has' made numerous statements about hims elf _ More than any other 9 however, a statement written in July 1964 (after the initial hostile interrogation was concluded) is a thoughtful and well-expressed exposition o f how he wished CIA to regard him. It is quoted here in its entirety. My life, my childhood and outh passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave 4S- the' opportunity to live without lacking for anything . And the only difficult periods of my life before the death of my father were at the naval schools attended in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad , and at the beginning 0 € my working life, when_ I wa8 in the Far East In 1950- 1952 _ The opportunity. to be always well-dressed , to have a 8ufficient amount of money to have @y own car, to be able to us e the car given me my family and al80 my father' s car, the opportunity to trave1 to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums dachas and S0 forth; all this unquestionably Terz it8 mark on me and became something of a habit After the death 0f my father, my s uccessful Progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have ali that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties But already I wanted to live s till better. 8001282 11 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 by Top Copy ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret FOUNDATIONS 0F NOS ENKO:' S CLAIMS ) Up to 1953 over the course of my entire life--at school,- in the Institute, at Work, at home in the family-;it was always pounded: into @y head that Stalin was a great genius that he: was good keen etcv; and the thought: never occurred :to me to question his words or his deeds because everything Ekionbeica saidfhendreeersthidg Ehealadonlere-Colveately 1 traitors and it: was considered and explained that che betrayor of the people wa8. Yezhov,the head of che NKVD . Not even: che shadow of doubt fell' on the_ name of Stalin. Soon after Stalin'8 death: in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father . This was a . Secret letter of the Central Committee 0 f: the CP SU on: the case of the doctors ; it was not: addressed :o all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central 'Committee I was deeply shaken this letter which described in detail how these people , important specialists in the' field; of medicine were brought: to such; a condition that they condemned themselves; that is they confeessed :tos- things which had never happened co: things: which they had never done They were s imply forced to give the evidence which was needed the investigators. The secret letters on the cult of Stalin" and :much that; K heard in the KGB about the reign of Stalin al1 this left its mark and forced me to think deeply: about the real truth and to: look at everything more- critically: I no longer; had faith in a11*hose idees: which for years' had been Pressed- into my - head The_ new leaders (Khrushchev and Cowpany) used- the Same methods but 'already: diluted with the water of democracy; with Playing up' to the people and attempts to convince them that a new era would arise, a new and better life; and :that now the Party was always going to : concern itself' with the welfare 0 f the People In fact , it was a s truggle for power and the use of al1 means in this struggle . even micro- phones they: listened to- the 'conversations 0f Beriya and his friends ; later they listened to' the conversations of Molotov, Malenkov Kaganovich, and others) Khrushchev S endless b labbing 'about" 12 0001283 TS: No:197124 Secret by. by' Top Copy. ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' S CLAIMS ) successes , when in fact they didn 't exist , the figures about how the USSR had pass ed the USA in the Production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were availab le only infrequent ly . The endles s promises o f a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place A11 this s imilarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party , its external and internal course The events in Novocherkassk where 20 ,000 to 25 ,000 people ros e uP and the way in which this popular indignation wa8 suppressed by troops with many casualties _ This a ls0 wade a impress ion on me When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father' s brothers_-I understood well the real relation 0f the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole At the same time I saw how the workers really lived how they eat , what have and what they can with their wages . I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of Khrushchev in regard to the deve lopment and the course 0f construction in industry , about his comp lete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics , about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries , and this was not only the opinion of my father but als0 of other important leaders in various fields of industry . But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried as an engineer, to prove that a certain decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from Khrushchev that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness and death in Augus t 1956 _ The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with abs0lute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology . What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a_ Protest not of individuals or groups , but 0f the 13 0801284 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 deep they buy Copy ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== Qoooo Secret FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO S CLAIMS ) entire People who 'could no longer endure a: regime imposed on them by. force: Here it is. necessary: to= emphasize that the life; of the People in these countries was much better than that of the: people in_ the USSR (I saw for myself how, people live 'in Czechoslovakia in Germany and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire People of. the Soviet; Union) menfhbecane srnetfo Eleaifez:aficaln fact andocolfismeaove 1 Opinion. that the theory of Communism is, 'a theory built on s and 'and that it 18' Practiced according to the needs of the leadership -0f the Party at a given s.tage:of life and that 1n reality- full material welfare would 'ever be. enjoyed the people but 'only by' the leadership: and the Party and the government Working' in the KGB; I came to understand much_ and became conscious 0f. the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR_ Such ques t ions as disarmament thee ban 0 f atomic: weapons. the: position of the USSR in the United Nations--all: these are' used only in the interest '0f Propaganda and as a S creen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist Party (I was myself' Present at the negotiations in Geneva and :saw the politics of; the Soviet delegat Lon ) trips abroad' opened my eyes: Wide*to the; true: reality: With my own eye8 , I saw how people live how much; they: earn , how. they Can dress end live on their wages and I paid: special attention-to athe life f ordinary People and: not to that of scientists: engineers, etc, And al1 the Propaganda about: the enormous armies of unemployed in the: countries 0f the West, about the heavy exploitation and the unbe 1ievab ly difficult life was immediately dispelled And what I met in my own work, how which Soviet citizens sent: where abroad--chis_ finally debunked this propaganda _ Many of my. KGB acquaintances think back with great Pleasure about life abroad - 14 0001285- TS No::197124 Top Secret Top by: My get Copy: ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS ) I entered the Koms omol completely without thinking about it - The time came , the right age , and I became a Koms omol member like a 11 the others It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party ina 1956 after the death 0f Stalin and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me My father continually insisted on this , saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have succes s in life But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member 0 f the Party. And if I worked Somewhere else I would truly never mOve ahead in my career uniess I entered the Party _ But from the very beginning 0f my entry into the Party , I deeply hated a11 the Party taludism and dogmatism _ A1l the Party meetings were literally a torture Especially when I became the Deputy; Chief and then Chief 0f a section , and then Deputy Chief 0 f a department , because then I had to speak at these meetings Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course: In 1960 my oldest girl' 8 asthmatic attacks became worse . The question 0f a change 0f climate was raised_ 0 At that time the Second Chief Directorate needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there It cost me a great deal of effort to Personally talk Second Chief Directorate Chief General GRIBANOV into letting me g0 : The Party and work references had been confirmed , all the questionnaires were already filled out , the photos had been subnitted ; that is , al1 the forwal- ities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel office of the KGB began to protest aga1ns t my going with my family to Ethiopia_ The reason for this was that from the house check made at my Place 0 f residence they received information that I sometimes came hone in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife A tour abroad with wy family was necessary because of the health 0 € my daughter 15 0001286 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== QQQ Secret FOUNDATIONS 0F NOSENKO ' $ 'CLAIMS ) (since 1963 che illness has become better) and als0 J6118 1culd Viee begfondvhieagenes time oftzm uGderstoad Sfoaacihlt 1 Personnel . would not let me g0 abroad: with my family Knowing many officers in the First (Foreign Intelligence): Chief Directorate I began to under- scand that being sent- abroad: is entirely determined , not knowledge, experience in work and success , but only by the abs0 lute 'cleanliness 0f the Person S autobiography and complete as s urance as to his limitless" dedication to the Party and the government But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of, personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and: the; 'entire: KGB 'depends on the reasons indicated by me and als0- on_ relations with_ the leadership 'and connections with workers: in Central Personnel: I lived about 11 years with my: wife and: our life aa8 595,caley lellthejtboiled_ ed"dowhatotreee fzefethua_ Juarse8s 1 took an extremely unfavorable `attitude towards my delays at work and: als0 when: I would be delayed with 'Some_ 0 f my friends and acquaintances after work and would: come home With: a" few drinks under my belt 0f course I loved and- love my children and only the fact that they are taken . care of financially until they grow up: and havve_ received an 'education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR: What d0 I have: in?mind when I . speak of financial security? After the death 0f my father che family received a large monetary allowance ; Plus the money that my. mother had saved' and valuable Property etc. My mother many times offered to divide a11 this in three parts for: me my brother and for her but I suggested that we not do this before: her death And , of course, my mother will no€ leave my 'children without attention and my share of the property and the money will be given' to my children 16 0001287 TS. No. 197124 Top ' Secret Top by good good. Copy ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS ) If the defections of [former KGB officers ] PETROV , RASTVoROV and DERYABIN pas sed without evoking any Particular thoughts the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN , whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capab le officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply . Because to act thus , it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness , but a1s0 great strength 0 f will. And already I Put to myself the question , will I be ab le to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me ? Being in Geneva in 1962 , not long before my departure I myself 0 f my own des ire entered into contact with you _ The reason for this was the 1088 of money received by for operational expenses I would have been unab le to accumulate such a S um of money before @y departure and there was nobody to borrow from. To tell the truth about the 1os8 of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances It had been lost This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, t.o think up some sort 0f a story--they wouldn t believe 9 and worst of all, they might think: that I had appropriated the money , that is , stolen it _ And this would be for me the worst of al1, and I would , of course, in such event have told the truth. To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began full to realize a11 the seriousnes8 of my contact with You and its full meaning . And although I did not give promises 0r assurances about our continued contact in the future, I under- stood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact_ And here it was that weigh ing up a11 the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I s tarted to work towards being sent on a trip abroad _ 17 0801288 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top we any you Top Copy ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO S; CLAIMS Of cours e I' wanted co come abroad 'with 8 ome. 'sort of baggage that #s, with materials which could be useful and necessary for: You . In this entire: Period up to, January 1964 I tried: to collect infor- mation which would be of the maximum value for you My assignment to the position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in- July.1962 gave me a: greater" epportunity than before But at the_ same time this as signment almos t excluded the possibility 0 f 'a trip abroad and it was ronly with great difficulty that I was able to get away: for_ the :trip in January 1964 It was necessary to convince my superior CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince others In chis I advanced many. reasons : that I-had not spent: a11 the money. (1n foreign currency) ; that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had Proven very success ful and that I needed to buy some.more medicine to carry: out 'one more series 'of treatments that this trip' would not be: a one and that 'Since I was already the Deputy Chief of the Department: I would not be able ~to travel abroad any: more and therefore; this would probab ly be last' 0f course' all this was, said at- convenient mowents and outside of. work Things; were. ea8ier_ With the Eleventh Department (which: deals: with trips abroad) because" I was on good terms with the:: KGB officer who : covered- Switzerland besides which when I came back from Geneva. in 1962 I had brought him a number of_ Presents: The Publication in 196.3.by the: foreign Press of che VASSALL case Put me on my 'guard since In the newspaper Times: it safd outright thac: the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL; 'in' the spring 0f 1962 Fortunately, the leadership :of the First Chief Directorate, as: I. learned from my colleagues came to the conclusion: that here the Americans had been- helped by :GOLITSYN But at the s ame time che First Chief Directorate was not completely' sure of chis. But the publication in the American Press o f Alsop ' s articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely_ This article in: one spot said Plainly chat as fr as. 18 known the KGB 'does not have any sources in the 18 0001289 TS No: 197124 Secret long S0 , trip my Top Copy ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== Ooqoo Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS ) CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KCB . From this moment , I d0 not conceal this fact , I began to feel afraid that the KGB would s omehow learn of my contact with you. This article. deeply 'interested ' the KGB During the closed trial 0f PENKOVSKIY I got a pas s from the Second Department and went , in order to look at him myself . For 8 ometimes it 1s enough to 8 imp ly look at a man , to s ee how he holds hinself and to hear how he speaks In order to form some sort of an intial opinion of him. Personally , I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself a the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been s aid In the KGB about him and the sort o f person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that a 11 his was nonsense , bluff_ and chatter_ And PENKOVSKIY , the same as GOLITSYN gave me a feeling 0 f greater confidence in the correctness 0 f the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Unfon, 26 July. 1964 Signed : Yu. NOSENKO 19 (8C12E0 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' s CLAIMS ) Soviet Official8 Statemente About NOSENKQ The portrait 'of NOSENKO which;'emerges from Soviet officials s tetements about. him since- his defection coinz_ cldes markedly WIth NOSENKO s' self-degcription. Accord t0_ the commentg 0f Soviet officia18, Principally intelli- gence officers mos.t lkely to be 9peaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son' of che deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, hls Persona 1 shortcomIngs were overcome through the Pa.tronage of KG B General, GRIBANOV and In connection: with operations aga Inst Americans he occupled :Positions 0f Progress Ively greater trust and responsibility; ultimately becoming; Deputy Chief of the largest department:' In the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According:to theee sources his defection wrought severe- damage' 11 for years to: come" to che KGB because of hIs knowfedge of KGB operat lons against- American target 8 , and hfs treachery Prompted the expulsion and disgrace of nuderous senior KGB Pereonnel, the recalleof many others from abroad, the virtual Guspens Ion 0of: KGB: operations In the Unfced States and ex traordInary Plans to e88a881nate him_ 2 0 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 4QAQQC Top 1ng 03C1291 Copy ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' S CLAIMS ) The Product 0f NOSENKO 'g Debrief ing Positive Intelligence Information At his first meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO asserted that he was acquainted with Ministers 0 f the Soviet Govern- ment , who were friends 0f his father, and he heard what was said in their circles His debriefing and interroga - tions did not bear out his assertion that he was informed of the attitudes and aims 0f the Soviet leaders His responses to questions about the viability 0 f the then Soviet Government 9 for example , were couched in vague and general terms and did not reflect any specific knowledge _ From his debriefing it emerged that NOSENKO had spent his entire adult life either as a student or as a state security official 9 and he stressed that since the early 1950 ' s he had had few interests and real contacts" outside of the KGB itself. Questioned on a wide range of topics including various aspects of nuclear weaponry , missiles , electronics , communications , unconventional: weapons , military industry , military units and equipment 9 and research and development ; NOSENKO repeatedly said that he had no knowledge of such matters and that his responses reflected personal opinions Because of his two 288ignments to Geneva with the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions were Put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground tes Soviet 9 efforts In the fields 0 f chemical and biological warfare, Soviet disarmament aims and Soviet views o f the corresponding attitudes and intentions of the United States _ Becauee his 288ignments to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation were for cover Purposes only , NOsENKo disclaimed any special knowledge _ He explained that he took no Part in the substantive work of the Delegation nor did he have any connection in the USSR with officials or organizations concerned with arms control or disarmament Policies NOSENKO ' s failure to provide any useful positive intelligence Information was not unique , although Previous KGB defectors did not have NOSENKO ' s claimed access either on the basis of his family ties or on the bas is 0f his KGB counterintelligence position within the Soviet Union KGB 21 0801292 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 310 "no' only ting Copy ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== OoooQ Top Secret FOUNDATIONS 0F NOSENKO ' s CLAIMS) officers who defected . earlier to' Western services provided n0 _ significant military economic ,or scientific information on the US SR _ and the Poiiefcad information: provided a few `(usually relating to the personalities and relat ionships In the ruling group of the Communist Party). was 'of marginal value CounterintelLigence Inforwation NOSENKO.' s knowledge' of_ KGB foreign intelligence; operations was limited, for his whole career had been spent in_ the Second; Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate concerned: with : KGB operations within the Soviet Union _ His information on- Second Chief: Directorate operations however, was apparentLy' a counterintelligence windfall, because most 0f his KGB : as8ignments involved operations against American targets either Viisitors-to the Soviet Union or members of che Embassy staff in: Moscow . From this circumstance he; represents himself as an authoritative source on KGB 'success: and failure in, recruiting: Americans in the USSR during the years 1953-1963 NOSENKO has described scores 0f KGB operations mounted against American Embassy personnel 'during that ten year Period: Because of lasting relationships he established with" KGB colleagues NOSENKO kept_ abreast" 0f KGB operations against the Embassy , even while serving elsewhere than in the Embassy Section NOSENKO has stated that he would know: if_ the facts Were otherwise. and he. has asserted unequivocally: that no American stationed Permanently_ at the Embassy' was recruited between ther early 1950 ' s and his defection In 1964 NOS ENKO named six members of the Embassy- staff who rejected KGB recruitmenit overtures = and a1l have confirmed his as8ertions_ He provided information on the vulnerability 0f a significant number of Embassy personnel ; in particular two- Foreign Service 0fficers were consequent ly withdrawn from Moscow _ Physical search has confirmed: the information,he provided regarding the KGB audio surveillance installations;,in- the Embas 8y . Among Americans other than Embassy. Personnel whom NOSENKO described as KGB targets he Provided: information: leading to the identification 'of' 51 KGB 'agents including seven correspondents in Moscow the Moscow representative- of: the American ress Company the former code clerk "ANDREY" TDay1e SMITH see P: 33) and: Sgt' Robert Lee JOHNSON; 22 0001293 TS No:' 197124, Secret Uer by Exp Top Copy ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== 14-00OOQ Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS) Mrs JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH _ Twenty-five of this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after NOS ENKO ' s information was received. In fifteen other instances NOSENKO ' 8 information has been corroborated in Part by the indjviduals admission8 0f contact with (if not recruitment by) the KGB or by other sources reports of their recruitment Besides these 51, NOSENKO Provided leads to four other American KGB agents including an officer in an American military intelligence organization, none of whom has : yet been identified_ Lastly, NOSENKO identified 22 Americans whom the KGB knew or suspected to be American Intelligence agents . From NOSENKO ' s information 6 8 non-American KGB agents have been identified Although investigations are still inc omplete , in 39 0f these cases the individual' s KGB recruitment has been reported by other sources or the individuals were suspect other reasons Among these 68 individuals were a French and a Canadian Ambas Gador to Moscow , an Austrian and an [Indones ian Arwy Attache a 6/ Director and a . Deputy Secretary of the Endian} Foreignil Ministry , and a British Adniralty emp loyee (William VASSALL , see below)_ In addition NOSENKO Provided leads on 22 other KGB foreign' agents , yet to be identified _ NOSENKO ' s infor- mation about the KGB electronic attack on the IGerman Emb in Mos cOw was confirmed by subsequent technical and physical search With respect to the KGB itself, NOSENKO named (if not completely identified) approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens who are or have been affiliated .With Soviet intelligence and security organizations _ These included over seven hundred active KGB staff officers , of whom 435 were serving In the Second Chief Directorate_ 0f the 165 KGB officers he named as belonging to the First Chief (Foreign Intelli- gence) Directorate, over one hundred had been Previous ly reported to be KGB personnel , as reflected in CIA files NOSENKO ' s information permitted updating CIA holdings on previous ly received reports of the 1959 KGB reorganization , particularly 4s it affected the Second Chief Directorate He described further refinement of responsibilities 9 the Second Chief Directorate S absorption of previously inde- Pendent directorates , the creation of new units from elements 23 6001284 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 4/rr forall assy| ( Copy ================================================== Page 35 ================================================== Secret (FOUNDATIONS: OF NOSENKO S CLAIMS) formerly belonging to: other numbered directorates , ~and individual officers Prominent in each NOSENKO was not as Productive with respect. to KGB operational methods and Headquarters procedures lthough he furnished: numerous examples , particularly regarding operations_ mounted against' Enbas sy personnel, Which Provided useful insight on these topics Significant KGB Operationg Not Directly Related t0 NOSENKO S Claimed Service 411 '0f the KGB' operations which NOSENKO has: described: are favorab Le evidence; 0f his bona fides, but they break down into two qualitatively different groups: Operations which NOSENKO related t0 specific KGB , positions he held at particular times are described in the following section in_ connection with an examination 0f his KGB career The remaining operations are thos e which NOSENKO said he learned of informally, or- accident or even .despite (not because 882 theeKGB]e KGB Position his cleiheddpos_thos the siae vafioce theee i5e 1 the KGB are summarized in Annex B (NOSENKO ' s leads to most non-American KGB; agents_ belong_ in this latter group, but: for reasons of, brevity: are omitted from this Paper:) Among the items of information which NOSENKO. Provided but which do not relate to: specific KGB positions he held at Particular times , there' are several: which merit- special note here These which are among- the most Significant_ 0f his- revelations are the leads. to Sgt Robert Lee JOHNSON "the KGB agent in the British Admiralty 'M (William VASSALL) "SASHA (the KGB agent: in American_ Military Intelligence)' 'ff ANDREY (Embassy military, code clerk Dayle W.: SMITH) Edward SMITH (CIA officer) and the' KGB electronic attack on the West GermangEmbassy in Moscow "The KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt, Robert Lee JOHNSON The first item o f information given by NOSENKO upon meeting CIA in 'Geneva in 1964 was' a lead to a KGB agent who was an American serviceman: stationed at a sensitive : U.8 . 'military installation in the Paris area The agent had been the source; of documentary intelligence which had been 24 _ 0001295 TS No. 197124 Secret (8r Top by' they: they Top Copy ================================================== Page 36 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ El Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS ) shown to Premier Khrushchev personally_ Although stil1 active, the agent had lost access to classified documents. some months earlier , in 1963 NOSENKO characterized the lead as the most important s ingle counterintelligence item that he acquired during the year and a half he was a CIA collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow NOSENKO ' s Information Shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962 , NOSENKO first learned 0 f a KGB agent ' s successful penetra- tion of a classified documents vault at an "important American military installation" in the Paris area. Because the documents included information on strategic targets in France as well as in the Soviet Union , he assumed that it was a "strategic planning installation" 11 The installation had its own airfield and that there were "precedures for bringing Secret documents in and for taking them There had been six successful entries of the vault, four in 1962 and two in 1963 _ On each occasion Special Section technicians travelled TDY to Pari8 under diplomatic 'courier cover to assist the local KGB case officer in the technical details of the operation . Their function was to advise the case officer concerning the entry to the vault and later surreptitiously to unwrap and re-seal the documents The case officer, on this ba8is would give appropriate instruc- tions to his agent , and the technicians probably never met the American. Although this was a First Chief Directorate operation, officers 0f the Special Section 0f the Second Chief Directorate were used The Special Section was comprised of technicians transferred from the KGB Operational- Technical Directorate, and usually it handled surreptitious entries to Wes tern embass ies in Moscow _ Among these officers were S , A_ IONOV , L,A LEBEDEV , S .D _ ILYIN V.V _ SINITSYN V.2 _ KARETNIKOV , Me I. PREOB RAZHENSKIY and Fedor FOFANOV _ IONOV, LEBEDEV and ILYIN took Part in this operation , and FOFAnOV was later involved The specialists were not the ones that carried out the operation . It was carried out by the case officers 0 f the Paris Lega 1 Residency . The specialists just opened and then 6001286 25 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top Top out" Copy ================================================== Page 37 ================================================== Top 'Secret FOUNDATIONS 0F NOSENKO S CLAIMS ) resealed the packages LEBEDEV said that they: als0 placed S ome radioactive substance, with the help of the American agent , in_ the: lock of: the vault door; when the substance was removed = they could pick the lock_ did the' same thing (used S,ome radioactive substance ] to' the safe: in the vault Before everything was finally: ready,.the Special Section technicians had to' visit: Paris several times The first t'ime was the beginning 0f 1962 :_ The Paris Res idency couldn- t have Launched' the operation before_ 1962, because they couldn t d0 it without the of, Special Section techni- cians 'and the latter did not travel: to Paris in 1960 or 1961 Entry into the vault area was first:: achieved after the agent. used: some radioactive; substance to determine the combination _ The agent: a1'80 photographed_ the lock for KGB study: Subsequent entries were always made between: two and five' '0'clock in the; morning- The egent removed documents from' the vault and delivered_ them to his' KGB cas.e officer who in turn passed: them to Special: Section technicfans The envelopes were then: opened, photographs: were made;, the documents were repackaged and the envelopes were given. back to the: case officer for return to the vault There = after: the Paris Legal" Residency Pouched the films to Moscow' and the technicians themselves Left Paris until the next opPortunity for entry The KGB officers: were able to complete the whole operation during the agent ' s night During this time they: had to- Pick up the materials- drive some place ("maybe the Soviet Embassy" ) open the documents photograph them, close them again just_ as were, and return chem: to the: agent The KGB coild n'ot sPecffy which documents the agent was ` t0 bring out; the fact that a1l the documents had to be opened shows that were; sealed when were received from the agent Since he heard that: almost' al1 of the material obtained was of . interest to the Ministry of Defense , NOSENKO concluded that it came from a military- ingtallation_ The agent couldn't bring out a great. deal of waterial: only what he could hide on his person . From what the KGB technicians said , NOS ENKO thought the agent was not alone on duty_ The technicians said that "the agent explained [to co-workers] that he is going out for coffee 'or . & sandwich and that is- gone for only 5 or 10 minutes 0001297 2 6 TS No: 197124 Secret They_ help duty: they- they Ehey "he Top Copy ================================================== Page 38 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS 0F NOS ENKO ' $ CLAIMS ) The last time the vault was entered was in the fali of 1963 _ At about that time the agent , a military man received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch duties (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with his promotion , he had obtained an extension until May 1964 .) Although the agent was still active in January 1964 and was still assigned co the same military post , he had lost access to the classified documents _ The information obtained from the agent ' s vault was highly sensitive and S 0 valuable to the KGB that the Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there had been rewarded for their Part In the operation Before leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964 , NOSENKO had been told that the technician FOFANOV had been sent to Paris in_ the KGB hope that the agent would be ab le to rerenter the vault again before his transfer to the United States in When NOSENKO visited the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to Geneva , FOFANOV was on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO chatted with him. FOFAnOV said he not doing good" and he "would probably be sitting there until but he had' hopes hi that_ something might happen 6I The American' agent was getting Baid by the KGB and he was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of money: NOSENKO didn t know 1f he_ was recruited in Paris or 1f_ it was even a formal recruitment, nor what Plans the KGB had for him after he left Paris . NOSENKO learned of the case little pieces M at separate times from various members of the Second Chief Directorate Special Section who participated in It, principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV In Moscow, and FOFAnOV later in Paris [Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has also alleged he learned 0f the case from IONOV, the Chief of the Special Section_ ] NOSENKO explained that he knew LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV from their visit to his office to discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels , when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief 0f the Seventh Department . 27 68612c8 TS" No. Secret 191334 May _ "was May "in Top Copy ================================================== Page 39 ================================================== Top Secret FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' S CLAIMS ) Comment NOSENKO: s: lead was identified` as Army Sergeant Robert Lee JQHNSON who served in the Period 1962-1963 at a military courier station at Orly Field;; Paris JOHNSON' confessed to KGB recrui:tment: of himself and: 'his wife his recruitment of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH and the latter 8','subsequent collaboration with the KGB Mrs ~0 JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH have corroborated JOHNSON _ S statements NOSENKO is apparently unaware 0' f JOHNSON 8 earlier (since 1952) involvement with the KGB in Berlin the United States , and in Orleans France With respect to the 1962-1963 surreptitious entires of the courier station 3 EZG1 adaib3iGOSENRo;cdeh 1 "SASHA (KGB eryptonym identity unknown) When NOS ENKo announced' in Geneva in 1964; that he: was going to defect, he: was told that as a consequence additional persons in CIA would be informed 6f his 'case and he was. asked to search his recollection for any evidence of a KGB: Penetration of CIA NOSENKO knew of none in CIA; but he recalled: a KGB agent an Anerican known a$ "SASHA who was a member of -a U:S_ military intelligence organization NOSENKO ' s' Information NOSENKO learied' of SASHA from M;A_ SHALYAPIN the KGB officer who while 288igned to;the First Chief Directorate and working: in Berlin; recruited the agent in 1955-1957 "SASHA 1i who had been: recruited financial inducements had officer status ; he wore civilian clothes to his meetings with his KGB handler and he could have; been either- a civilian or military intelligence officer "SASHA" returned: IT: to the United States "in the 1960 ' s " or in 1962" "SASHA" was stationed in the United States at the time 0 f: the Cubaan missile crisis but had been unab le to provide the KGB any 28 0001289 TS No. 197124 Secret by Top Copy ================================================== Page 40 ================================================== 14- Ooooo Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS 0F NOSENKO ' S CLAIMS) relevant intelligence of any s ignificance_ NOSENKO thought that "SASHA" served as a department chief in intelligence when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 1963 _ NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or October 1962 [after NOSENKO ' s first visit to Geneva and initial contact with CIA] through his friend Yu . I. GUK _ GUK had known SHALYAPIN when they had served together in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow . SHALYAPIN had served in the United States 9 Uruguay , Berlin, and Cuba In 1962 he had been assigned to the Latin American Department of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer. He retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO ' s' intervention with Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, SHALYAPIN obtained a position with Inturiet- Presumab ly out 0f gratitude to NOSENKO SHALYAPIN felt free to talk, and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treat- ment by the First Chief Directorate which without him, would not have had the agent "SASHA I1 in Germany "at that II time [1963]: NOSENKO heard 8uch details as he knew- o f "SASHA" in the course of several such talks with SHALYAPIN _ Under intensive questioning on the "SASHA Ii case NOSENKO retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case from SHALYAPIN 9 though maintaining that he was sure he had discussed the ~case with- SHALYAPIN some time" Pressed t.o identify his first: source NOSENKO then cited Several officers--some First Chief Directorate 8ome Second-who could have told him about it because they were likely to know 0f .it though none 0 f them was actually involved in the operation _ Ultimateiy NOSENKO refused to . commit himself. on. this Point saying he did not remember from whom he first learned of "SASHA Ii' Comment : "SASHA" has not been identified _ 0001380 29 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 early "at Copy ================================================== Page 41 ================================================== Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS 'OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS) William VASSALL ("KGB Agent in the British Admiralty") Asked in the Jufe 1962; meetings with CIA if he was familiar with the case 0 f George BLAKE the former KGB agent in MI-6 , NOSENKO replied that he knew of another, more important; KGB agent who was empleyed in; the British Admiralty_ NOSENKO S Information The KGBvhas. now in 1962) an agent in a high government Position in London who Provides most valuable_ information , s ome ffrom NATO intelligence services conferences The agent was recruited in' Moscow in 1956 or 1957. on the bas i9 of a shomosexual compromise In Moscow he was a First Secretary" or "chief- of Protocol"_ 0 f: the British Embassy - After leaving Mos cow he became an assistant to the Minister or- something like that" in the Aduiralty; "He may be an assistant chief of the secretariat, but he S . close to the: Minister AA11- Papers for the Minister: g0 through him_ He ' s not an intelligence officer He is mee ting with" the :KGB now several KGB officers received the" Order o f Lenin for their Part in the operation including the London Rezident RODIN NOSENKO learned of the;agent existence, but not of: his identity, from his; friend and colieague in the Second Chief Directorate' V,A CHURANOV. who had made the recruit- ment while chief o f a section in the British- Department _ Comment GOLITSYN had: earlier Provided a lead to a:' KGB agent who was the source- of Adniralty docuwents which GOLITSYN had reviewed in KGB Headquarters On the basis 0f thac lead British security authorities 'on 11 June 1962 passed to = CIA a list of twenty suspects including: VASSALL On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities a preliminary report on NOSENKO '8 : information , on the: basis of - which the tventy-man list was reduced to VASSALL and one other suspect _ Fuli 30 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 's 0001301 Copy ================================================== Page 42 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 3 Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS) Comment: (Continued) details 0f NOSENKO ' s information were Pas sed to British authorities on 20 August , and on 12 September 1962 VASSALL was arrested . He promptly confessed VASSALL 8 confession confirmed what NOSENKO had reported _ He had been recruited in Moscow in 1955 , after a homosexual entrapment 9 by two KGB officers , one of whom he identified as CHURANOV _ He continued to collaborate with the KGB after returning to London , first in his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, as. clerical officer assistant to the Civil Lord ' s private secretary 9 and finally; as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval staff. In London he was- met by KGB officer "KOROVIN" who has been identified as London Rezident RODIN. VASSALL 8 last meeting with the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962 At the time of his arrest In September he had' in Preparation for his next meeting on 30 October, fifteen rolls: of film containing 140. photo-: graphs of classified Admiralty documents . KGB Audio Attack on thelWest Gerwan Embassy In 1962 and 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones concealed In several Western embassies in Moscow Aside from the American Enbas 8y '(see" P s 225 ) he furnished the greatest detail on the mIcrophones: in the West Germnan Embassy . NOSENKO 's Information The KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy in MoscOw , with the exception 0f the American and British Embas8ies _ It had been particularly success ful with respect to the | West German Embassy . KGB microphones monitored the West German Ambassador as he dictated his reports or held discussi0n5 with diplomatic colleagues _ 9 including American Ambassador Thomp go* _ The microphones were operative during the period 1959 through 1961, and the KGB monitored then- Ambas sador Kroll]' $ dictation of cab les , dispatches and 0b 31 6801382 TS No. 197124 Secret ~1L Top Top Copy S/6r ================================================== Page 43 ================================================== Top Secret FOUNDATIONS' 0F: NOSENKO ' S, CLAIMS) conversations as" well as Pas sages of a book he was' writing on the Soviet Union NOSENKO learned: 0 f the KGB microphones either from 0 .'S BUBNOV; Deputy Chief 0 f the Second Chief Directorate' s Third (Austria and Germany) _ Department , or Mikhail SKORIK , Chief of_ that Third Department S First Section In 1960 - 1961 Tatyana GRISHNYAT brought from the Operationa1 Technical Directorate t0 NOSENKO in the American Embassy Section daily monitoring reports_ from microphones in the American Embas sy . On such occasions she had a much larger volume 0 f material addressed t.o the Third Department , from which; NOSENKO concluded' that the KGB was even more success ful in monitoring the k West GermanV Embassy than it was the American Embassy . Comment NOSENKO ' 8 : information was substantially correct Independent; 0f that information however West I7 Geruan]authorities learned in 196,3 that their technzcal security officer in Moscow had been recruited-by -the: KGB They: surmised that the recruitment may have taken Place as early a8 19.56 In /August 1964 the leader 0f a technical search team' was serious ly disabled by mustard ga8 Poisoning;; presumably at the hands c0f. the KGB n 19.6.5: finally another search team completed a tear down of the ) West German Embassy , in' the course 0 f which two separate audi0 systems with: 2.4 microphones_ were_ found as well as 27. microphones in the residence of the Ambassador In addition evidence was found indicating that the Embassy had been the target, of a sophisticated electronic attack against its cipher machines and its ~acoustic room = NOSENKO S assertion that the KGB microphones were "operative in 1959 and his sourcing of:.his information to the periodic visits 0f Tatyana GRISHNYAT to; the American 'Section, are contra- dictory. NOSENKO claims he was not in the American Section until 1960 _ 3,2 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy '3/b2 0001303 ================================================== Page 44 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (FOUNDATIONS 0F NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS ) "ANDREY" (Dayle W . SMITH) When contacting CIA in 1962 NOS ENKO offered to sell information about two KGB operations one of which he knew only under the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY" a KGB agent recruited in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in 1I Washington "near ciphers" NOSENKO ' s Information-1962 "ANDREY" was a U.S _ Army sergeant who was spotted for the KGB by "QUEBEC" (Roy RHODES ) [RHODES served in Moscow from April 1951 to July 1953_ He dated his own recruitment by the KGB as January 1952. ] RHODES. was still in Moscow "I when ANDREY" was recruited the Second Chief Directorate, # " although RHODES was not aware of ANDREY ' s: recruitment m The KGB approach to ANDREY" was based on "women and money" ANDREY" worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the" KGB , Ii Ii Providing materials and information on ciphers . He promised that he would 'cooperate with the KGB in future a8signments abroad , but: would not work with them in the United States a8 he did not want to "sit in the electric chair"_ He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow_ The KGB wanted to Pay him more but he: refused ; he said he could not Plausibly explain the Possess ion of .too much money . When the KGB offered him diamonds and: other gems for later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers that possession could arouse the attention of the American Polices In 1950 the agent left: Moscow for the United States . The KGB waited for him to reappear in some other country, but he did not . Finally, in 1955 _ 9 the KGB sent V , M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embas sy Section of the Second Chief Directorate,. and a participant in "ANDREY ' s" recruitment in Moscow to the United States to find the agent _ KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV" under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington _ 33 60013C4 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top by Copy ================================================== Page 45 ================================================== Secret FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO 's 'CLAIMS)_ KOVSHUK , with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in Washington learned where the agent was living, identified his automobile and contacted him at the end of 1955 or the beginning of 1956. KOVSHUK had iooked for him a long time = He found where_ "ANDREY" parked his car, but "ANDREY" lived in' a place where there were many other People and it Wa8 difficult: to get close to: him_ At first 0 ANDREY" was frightened and refused to_ work but when at the third contact he was offered s1;000; the agent accepted the money from KOVSHUK because due to his gambling , he was again in f;nancial straits From that point on he worked well with the KGB _ He again Provided. good :1nformation, information considered Important by the: KGB When KOVSHUK found him, ANDREY" was working_ in the Pentagon and he was 8till working there in 1962 In reference to his modus operandi for; meetings with Mi ANDREY KOVSHUK knew_ he was_ under: surveillance by the FBI: : His meetings: always took Place_ in cars KOVSHUK would lose his surveillance: thex before' the meeting and travel outside 0f Washington where he would wait by the highway; ANDREY ould drive and stop KOVSHUK would sit with him in the: car receive; ANDREY' information; and givet him: the uoney; Then KOVSHUK would get out, and the Anerican would drive on The KGB officer who compromised; Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL [Reino HAYHANEN: who defected: in Paris in 1957 ] als0 Provided the: Information' leading; to_ the 'arrest of Roy RHODES' When RHODES was under investigation, "ANDREY" wa8 called a8` a witness because he had worked with RHODES in Moscow. ANDREY was the sjuch witness called and; he was called upon s.everal times to tell how RHODES- had behaved 1n 'Moscow_ ANDREY" couid be: identified as the 'only person who testified at the trial- During ` this investigation_ of RHODES , Ti ANDREY" stopped meeting 'KGB officers because he was: afraid: he: too. would be exposed and arrested "ANDREY" have feared- that RHODES was: involved in' his' own recruitment or- he merely have been: panicky because he knew he . could be accused of the same thing_ a$ 34 TS No: . 197124: Top Secret Copy Top day by 5" May only may may 0001305 ================================================== Page 46 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS ) RHODES Little by l1ttle, hovever, "ANDREY" resumed his meetings with the KGB , "having little other choice" KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member 0 f the Washington Legal Residency and returned: to Moscow_ NOSENKO did not know who succeeded KOVSHUK as the handler , but KOVSHUK s successor eventually turned the case over to N , G . BAGRICHEV , who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961_ NOSENKO. did not know BAGRICHEV' s successor, but asserted that there II must have been one since. ANDREY" was still working with the KGB in 1962 NOSENKO ' s Information-1964 While continuing to ass0ciate "ANDREY ' s" recruitment with RHODES presence in Moscow , NOSENKO in different discussions of the case asserted that ANDREY" was recruited I1 in "1948-1949" "in 1952 or earlier or "in 1953" "ANDREY" had been recruited by KOVSHUK and N .M< BORODIN 01 After returning to the United States 9: ANDREY" worked at I the Pentagon in codes but by the time KOVSHUK: recontacted him in, the United States he was nearing the end of his enlistment , and he was vorking in an Army recruiting office He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV took over the case from KOVSHUK _ It was not; RHODES trial at" which I ANDREY" Ii appeared , but he was among Persons called during the pre-trial investigation . I( ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death_ "ANDREY" did not testify at the RHODES trial- In Moscow _ 3 ANDREY" had explained to the KGB how the code machines In the Embassy worked and may have given the KGB parts of code machines such as "discs [sic, meaning rotors ] Aleksandr SELEZNEV, :a deputy department chief in the Communications Directorate 0f the KGB , had: been involved in the "ANDREY" cas e : NOSENKO first s aw him in 1953 during the period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow_ SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to Ii discuss and Plan KGB meetings with ANDREY" The reason for SELEZNEV ' s presence was that the cas e officers were not technical specialists , and SELEZNEV would s upp ly them with 35 68013C6 TS No. 197124 Top Secret ~1 Top Copy ================================================== Page 47 ================================================== Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' $ CLAIMS)_ questions to be asked 0 f ANDREY S ince' SELEZNEV came t'o thes.e meetings: in civilian c lothes , whereas NO SENKO later saw him in uniform_ in his visits to che American Department , NOSENKO: speculated that SELEZNEV may have attended s ome of the meetings" with "ANDREY" Although NOSENKO did not know how the KGB exploited him, he repeatedly emphas ized "ANDREY ' s great importance to the KGB during the_ time he worked for them:. in Mos cow "Thanks t0 his help. they were able to read your State Department_ codes To; date we have never been able to read. your' military codes. "ANDREY" brought no mflitary code material to the KGB only State Department material Mainly ; he described: the operation 0 f code machines and what daily or other periodic_ settings were made 11 ANDREY suppiied valuable material from the time that che first; recontact was made in the United States until he ceased meeting the KGB because of the RHODES trial Aga in, afrer the trial;_ he: was ab le to furnish" 'good material This was true both while KOvSHUK Was handling him and while BAGRICHEV; was the case Of ficer; Between June' 1962 and January: 1964 , while NOSENKO was in Mos cow , he heard that something is going wrong with this operation Comment: ANDREY"; was. identified:as former U . S. Army 'Sergeant Dayle W . SMITH who served as 2 code machine: mechanic while; assigned to the office of the .0; S . Military_ Attache in the Embassy in Moscow from April 1952 to April 1954 NOSENKO:" S information has been confirmed as, substantially: correct by admissions 0f Roy: RHODES: and - Dayle: W _ SMITH ("ANDREY") : RHODES informed the FBI in; a 1963: interview that among: other American enlisted personnel of_ the EmbaKGE KGB i Afcecoden}ing geRovcivezen€ SMIIEhtche 1 KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and 1965_ SMITH 'admitted that he had been approached by the. KGB' in Mos cow in late 1953 that he had been offered a large S um 0 f cash and gems in exchange: for classified information concerning Embassy _ cipher systems and that he had Provided 36: 0801307 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top a Copy ================================================== Page 48 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO ' S CLAIMS ) Comment: (Continued) the KGB with a mock code machine rotor. He further acknowledged that he had been recon- tacted by the KGB in the United States in 1957 where he met KGB officers regularly until September 1962 _ He identified by photo- graph_ all of the' KGB officers described by NOSENKO as having taken part in the operation _ NOSENKO "cannot be certain" that he did not know about "ANDREY" while he served in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955 , and when Pressed to describe specifically the source of his information, he invariably indicated that he learned 0 f the American agent later, informally from KGB colleagues _ Edward Ellis SMITH NOS ENKO ' 8 Information In_ the context of a 196.2 discussion of KGB operations agains t the American Embassy in Moscow , NOSENKO was asked whether he knew "about: SMITH" He answered : "SMITH? The red-head . Listen, he headed the . FBI, he .was a colonel and headed counterintelligence ii NOSENKO went on to describe the mounting of a blackmail operation , 0 f which he was the: cas e officer, against SMITH (whoge KGB cryptonym was I RYZHIY" or "REDHEAD" ) SMITH had been sleeping_ with his Russ ian housemaid , who was an agent ; Planted on him by the KGB _ When the KGB was unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs , she was instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH S bed . Thes e were then combined. with photographs of SMITH to Produce photomontage8 , copies 0f which were delivered to S MITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with the KGB SMITH came The KGB was represented at' the meeting by GRIBANOV , NOSENKO one other officer. At this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked for clas8ified information _ SMITH agreed to come to further meetings . 37 TS No. 197124 Secret -10 Top and 08013c8 Top Copy ================================================== Page 49 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (FOUNDATION 0F NOSENKo ' S CLAIMS) When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting with GRIBANOV , NOSENKO sought out the maid to find out what had happened _ She reported that SMITH was in a state 0f desperate indecis ion; he had Paced his room al1 night as if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance - To increase the Pressure on him, the KGB sent him threatening letters on each of the succeeding three days Finally, on the third instead 0 f meeting the KGB , SMITH went to Ambas sador BOHLEN and reported the b lackmail attempt . SMITH was immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he was "still in intelligence work" In 1964 and a fterwards NOSENKO denied that he had p layed any Personal role in the case _ He explained that as a junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time , working on correspondents , he would not have taken part in S 0 important an operation. He said that he had heard about the operation from V . M < KOVSHUK , SMITH S cas e officer. (On a later occasion NOSENKO said that his only personal role was being a88igned to a phone-watch to' receive surveillance reports connected with the initial KGB approach t 0 SMITH . ) GOL ITSYN' s Information In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1957 he had read a two-volume KGB S tudy which gave examples 0f successful operations agains t the Embas sy in Moscow One case concerned an American, Probab ly 8 ingle who was either the Security Officer 0r the counterintelligence representative in.the Embassy . He had a- and lived in an apartment in the cicy or a country hous e outside Moscow _ His Russian maid or cleaning: woman was his mistress The KGB concluded that the American would not succumb: to ordinary blackmail and consequently the ma id a KGB agent, was instructed to confess to him that 'she had been recruited the KGB against her will and would be arres ted if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks The American agreed to help her, and GOL ITSYN believed that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters_ GOLITSYN als0 recalled that the American first suPPlied only misinformation to the KGB , but when the KGB complained he Provided a mixture 0 f truth and misinformation_ GOLITSYN said the case study he read was based on a true incident 38 0801309 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top day d0g , by. Copy ================================================== Page 50 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOS ENKO ' S CLAIMS) which took Place between 195 3 and 1957 , but he was not sure that the operation actually resulted in a success ful recruit- ment , as was alleged in the study . Comment: Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead) 9 Embassy Security 0fficer (and CIA employee) from July 1954 to June 1956 reported to the Ambas sador on 5 June 1956 that he had received four letters from the KGB The first, received on 2 June 1956 _ enclosed incriminating photographs 0 f himself and his Russian maid and requested him to come to a personal meeting with KGB representatives outside the Embassy . When he did not do 8 0 , SMITH s ubsequent ly had received three threatening letters In reporting the matter to the Ambassador , SMITH admitted having been intimate with his Russ ian maid SMITH was recalled from Mos cow on 8 June 1956 , and he left CIA e mployment a year later_ When interviewed in March 1962 on the basis 0f the GOLITSYN information , SMITH admitted that he had maintained his affair with the Russian maid during mos t of the time 3i#o 0 f his Moscow a88ignment , 20 July 1954 to 8 June 1956 and confirmed that to help her he had in fact pas sed unclass ified information through her to the KGB for many months NOSENKO clearly ascribed the SMITH operation. to the period when NOSENKO was in the American Embassy Section, in 1953-1955 . SMITH S state- ment that he reported the b lackmail attempt to the Ambass ador in June 1956 is confirmed If NOSENKO was , as' he say8 transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have played any role in the KGB approach to SMITH If he played s uch a role, he was in the Embassy Section in 1956 not in the Seventh Department as he claims If he played 2 role in_ 'the SMITH case as well as in the Seventh Department recruitment of BURGI} (see P . 115 ) it remains Pos8 1b le that he was neither an officer in the Embassy Section nor Seventh Department and was acting in s0me other KGB capacity. 39 0001310 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 0 !Qr Top 04 Copy ================================================== Page 51 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret CHAPTER II EXAMINATION QE NOSENKO ' S BONA FIDES What NOS ENKO has said about himself , the information about the KGB which he has provided and the apparent ly corroborative statements which Soviet officials have made since his defection represent prima facte evidence that NOSENKO 18 a former senior KGB officer To permit a conclusive judgment that he is a bona ffde defector, the information NOSENKO provides about his life and related persons and events must be coherent , and his accounts 0f important events mus t be cons istent _ Allowing for personal vagaries s uch as lapses of memory and S 0 forth as well as for factors of accident and coincidence the information he relates must conform within reasonab le limits with that which 1s known from independent and reliable sources to the United States Government about Soviet: realities and about the events , topics and individuals NOSENKO describes Lastly, the information NOSENKO Provides mus t "plausibly relate Primarily to the KGB positions he held . and his account of how he functioned in these Pos itions must be substantiated by verisimilar detail. The following portions 0 f this paper, organized in chronological fashion insofar as Pos s ib le s ummarize this examination of the s ignificant aspects of NOSENKO ' s claims . Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as Presented the reader- should note the following: The examination tests the validity 0 f the Presumptive evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms 0 f coherence, consistency , and compatIbility with fact and plaus ibility_ 0001311 41 TS No. 197124 Top Secret _1 Top Copy ================================================== Page 52 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO ' $ BONA FIDES) Notes for the Reader (Continued) NOSENKO ' s claims are judged in the light of his own assertions and in comparison with collateral information . It 18 not the function 0f the examination to about Poss ib ly credible alternative efpiaoefionecloste the paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO S statements when such explanations are advanced by NOSENKO #imneefept If there is n0 immediate exp lana note Pointing out the relevance or significance 0f some item in the text , the reader may expect that the item S relevance or significance usually will be developed in the immediately-following Otherwise seemingly minor Points are included because ofext . their aggregative significance : they will be a matter 0 f comment in the Summary and Conclus1ons section following each major Portion 0 f the examination Direct questions and NOSENKO ' 8 replies about his contradictions inconsistencies _ amb iguities , retractions omissions and the like, are reflected in the text . Where during his interrogations it was not Possib le to Pose direct questions without furnishing NOSENKO information or I7yt insight into the interrogators Purposes the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectily, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question _ When the text indicates that NOSENKO was not asked about a Particular aPparent ly matter , or that "he didn t say or "didn t comment" or "didn 't indicate Ii and S0. forth , the reader Properly awareness may assume that the matter was covered extensively. In instances in which NOS ENKO contradicts or earlier assertions no more weight is necessarily retracts to his final assertion a8 opposed *o earlier given contrary claims To assist the reader in following what are sometimes lengthy and comp lex accounts 0f events NOSENKO ' s narrative is broken from time to time a clearly identified editorial comment which seeks to draw the reader' s attention to the relevance or significance 0f NOSENKO ' s assertions or to what conclus ion is drawn _ 9 0801312 42 1 TS No. 197124 Secret Top tory by Top Copy ================================================== Page 53 ================================================== Secret 8 (EXAMINATION 0F NOS ENKO S BONA: EIDES) Notes for the Reader (continued) d At the end of .each episode in NOSENKO ' s biography there appears a conciusion resulting. from the examination of NOSENKO ' s : c1aim8 with respect to that Period' of his life The ' judgment_ of whether NOSENKO 1s a bona fide @8 defector 1s the sum of these indepedently drawn conclusions 0 # 0 4 0 43 TS: No. Secret 128124 Top 0.C1313 Top Copy ================================================== Page 54 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret CHAPTER III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY NOSENKO' s biography from birth to entry into the KGB is relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and his eventual eligibility for KGB service Below are summarized pertinent events in his early life his study at the Moscow Institute of International Relations and his RU service _ 1 as reconstructea from statements he volunteered as well as from the accounts obtained in repeated interrogations _ Birth to.1945 NOSENKO s Account NOSENRO was born on 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev , in the Ukraine _ At,the time ofhis birth his father 7 Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO was a shipyard mechanic and an evening student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute Shortly after NOSENKO began Kindergarten in Nikolayev_ in September 1934 his father graduatea from the Shipbuilding Institute ana the family moved to Leningrad , where NOSENKO started the First Class of school in September 1935 From 1935 to 1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his father was director of a Shipyard_ In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy People S Commissar of the_Shipbuilding Industry and the family moved to Moscow where NOSENKO` completea the Sixth Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out. NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for the next two years _ In one he said that on the outbreak of hostilities he was enrolied in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Lenin- grad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuatea to 6j01315 45 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 55 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret" (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY ) Baku) where he finished the Eighth Class in spring 1943 . In a secona version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class]' NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he ana his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk , where he completed' the Seventh Class in summer Of 1942 They returned to MOscow afterwards and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943 ; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku) After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class , NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School the equivalent of Annapolis - He has retracted both assertions NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku he resumed his studies there Early in 1945,, however NOSENKO received a gunshot_ wound in the hand , and after hospitalized for a month _ he left the Naval school 46 TS No. 197124 Top Secret being GOC1317 Copy ================================================== Page 56 ================================================== (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY ) NOSENKO ` completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship- building Tekhnikum in June 1945 , and he successfully passed_ the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that sumer. Birth to 1945 Summarx and Conclusion_ NOSENKO is virtually the sole' source of information On his early life However, this portion of his claimed biography: is consistent with the NOSENKO family' 5 where- abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father s death in 1956 and with' the existence of the schools he claims to have attendea _ Allowing for exaggerated claimg of; boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy , ana formal induction in and discharge from the' Navy) all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation NOSENKO S claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I NOSENKO and the substance 0f his claims about: his life antil: 1945. are accepted as true 47 0001318 TS No. ' i97124 Tcp Secret Copy _ 1O) ================================================== Page 57 ================================================== 3#-QQcoQ Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) Attendance at the MosCow Institute of International Relations (1945 ca. 1950) In all of his accounts , NOSENRO_ has stated that he entered the Institute' s Faculty of International Law and English in September 1945 He completed his first year in: spring 1946 In 1947 on completion of his second year at the Institute NOSENKO claims he received a commission as a junior lieutenant W in the reserves he does not recall: in what arm he received a commission other than being sure that it was not in the Navy _ Comment Soviet students completing their second year of higher institutions are commissioned, but in an arm (Army: Navy Air Force) of Soviet defense forces At that' time they receive their voyennyx bilet (military booklet) which reflects their assigned_ MOS and category. (sostav) CIA interro- gators were unable to resolve NOSENKO pleaded ignorance On this matter and concluded; it may relate in some manner to his claims to; subsequent commissioned service_ in the Navy. In 1947 also, NOSENKO ` married the: daughter of_ a Soviet Army Lieutenant General Augustina K_ TELEGINA 'just after her father had been arrested in' connection" with Stalin'8' campaign against Marshal: Zhukov S associates NOSENKO recalls neither the date Of that marriage in what season of the ;year it occurred_ nor how long after, her father s arrest '(The significance Of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO S contra- dictory statements about 'when and how he obtained his divorce See below ] 48 0001319 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy Top why ================================================== Page 58 ================================================== 14-00Q00 Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY ) NOSENKO has said at various times that the Irstitute course was of four years duration 2na that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years duration and that because he Failed a state examination he was graduated later in 1950; that it was of five years duration and he graduated in 1950,, on schedule ; and that it was of five.Years duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months _ Comment: See for report that NOSENKO joined the KGE upon graduation from the Institute in 1947 _ The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO ' s completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service , which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute Naval RU ' Service (ca. 1951 ca. 1953) NOSENKO claims that upon , completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he enterea the Naval RU _ serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post , finally successfully: 1t transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father s friend , KGB General KOBULOV . 49 0001320 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10_ Tcp P.367 Copy ================================================== Page 59 ================================================== Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHYY The ` significance 6f NOSENKO ' s RU service is the fact that he 'claims_ it launched his intelligence career and servea as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected _ The two or moxe years he claimed to have served in the RU represent: a Significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting Finally, the date 'of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is. critical to: determining the time' from which his claims about KGH Service: can be judged: credible _ NOSENKO volunteered extensive; comnent on his Naval RU service at his first meetings With CIA in 1962. After: his 1964' defection; it:was 'the topic on which he made one Of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false clain_ The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations; in 1964,. 1965 and 1966 However , throughout these interrogations 'challenges of his: assertions about ' his RU service: prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date; of entry into the KGB just as cha llenges On those_ latter topics prompted amended state- ments with respect;; to his RU service_ The extent of the still-unreconciled_ discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO S various accounts is best perceived in comparison' 0f his statements made in 1962 , 1964 _ 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO_ S Information-1962 4 NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 ana imediately_ reportea for duty- with the RU [He did not: amplify how he drew such an assignment: ] In September 1950 he' was offered assignments_ in Leningrad Moscow , ana in the Far East and he 'chose: the Far East "s0 no one woula think he would take advantage of his father 5 position 01 He was_ assigned to a radio signals' interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin) where he; collected Order of Battle information monitoring the communications of American units operating in 50 0001321 TS No. 197124' Secret Top by Top Copy ================================================== Page 60 ================================================== 14-00OQQ Top Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) Korea _ In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill. Returned to Moscow and given a medical examination he was diagnosed to have "a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone ana he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow for two months_ In summer 1952_ again eligible for duty, NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military-Diplomatic Academy but he rejected the opportunity because the curricuium was almost identical to that Of the Institute from which he was graduated_ In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of Primorsk, 1i the former German city Of Pillau t1 (Baltiysk, a larger city close by Primorsk , is the former German city Of Pillau. ] There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts II in which candidates from among Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teans and trained as stay-behind agents in the event of war- In early 1953 _ after less than six months in the Baltic assignment NOSENKO returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father s dacha KGB General KOBULOV_ First Deputy to then-MGB [KGB] Chairian Beria: KOBULOV on finding that NOSENKO did not care for his RU assignment , invited hin to consider joining the KGB _ NOSENKO' s ' Information-1964 Prior to NOSENKO ' 8 graduation he had been tentatively assigned by the Institute' 8' military commission to the RU and on the" instructions of the Ingtitute s I6 secret unit" he was interviewed by a RU Colonel. KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel Department _ After passing the state examination on the second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in. September 1950 when he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior lieutenant He also received orders assigning him to the Intelligence Staff Of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet. He left MOscow approximately 1 October 1950 , travelling for ten days by train to his unit, which was stationed near Sovetskaya Gavan He was there assigned to a Reports Section with duties which included translating American naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle information Of American naval forces in the Far East_ A radio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO ' s unit, but [contrary to what he asserted in 1962 and 1965] he was not personally concerned with that unit'8 activities 51 0001322 TS No: 197124 Secret 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 61 ================================================== Top Secret (PRE-KGB: BIOGRAPHY) In spring 1951' NOSENKO was promoted to the rank of lieutenant At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as: an "apprentice in the Agent-Intelligence Section near Sovetskaya Gavan an assignment which involved subchaser delivery and pickup of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin In early, 1952 NOSENKO filed:by mail for divorce from TELEGINA in a Moscow court_ In April 1952 he returned to Moscow on leave where he visited the, Naval RU Headquarters personnel' 6fficer Col_ KALOSHIN and requested a transfer from the Far East During May and June 1952 he was on leave accrued during his two years service in the Far East_ Following his leave in summer: 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to proceed to Rostock but he refused and took unauthorized leave (He could not learn what his actual assignment was to be in Rostock and he . heard that the Naval Intelligence_ Points in Germany Were being closed down ) He subsequently: was: assigned to the_ Baltic city Of_ Baltiysk where he reported for duty with the Intelligence Staff Of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet He was assigned to 'a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk_ (sic, see p 57):, a Small town JI in Primorskiy Kray near Baltiysk_ Comment; Primorskiy Kray' is in' the Far East , as NOSENKO' s interrogators: pointed out to him: at the time NOSENKO .subsequently claimed it was his earlier post Sovetskaya Gavan which was in Primorskiy Kray, a fact known to him Erom the' way his letters were addressed _ This is: also an' error See below In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents Coment NOSENKO also said that after refusing to go to Rostock he himself had received training in Moscow- and then was Sent to Rostock ana Sassnitz 52 0001323 TS No.. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 62 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY ) Comment: (Continued) in East Germany , before going to Baltiysk_ In retracting that claim he explained that he knew his CIA interrogators would not believe that he had successfully refused the assignment in Germany . In August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to MOscow for 7 to 10 days to complete the divorce proceedings which he had initiated in the Far East. This was not regarded as leave _ but official business He afterwards returned to Sovetsk _ but he dia not like his work there and in late 1952 he requested leave to return to Moscow to seek a transfer. When his unit: commander refused him leave 1 NOSENKO appealed to: Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk_ and because of the elder NOSENKO ' 8 influence was able to return to Moscow for a month ' s leave in January 1953 At the end Of January NOSENKO visited the: RU Personnel Officer KALOSHIN and stated his distaste It for his work _ KALOSHIN told him to look around" and NOSENKO spent February 1953 1t at the disposal of the Personnel Department It not doing anything. Since he wasn t working, he didn t receive his pay , and he lived with his parents _ Comment: Just before giving this account Of his January 1953 leave NOSENKO claimed" that he spent January and a part Of_February at the Kubinka Sanitorium He has never reconciled these two statements NOSENKO ' s Information-1965 Prior to his graduation from the Institute , a military commission tentatively assigned NOSENKO to the Navy _ after which he visited a special section at the Naval Ministry to file special forms for a security check _ Although nothing was said at the time, NOSENKO believed then that he was slated 53 0001324 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Copy ================================================== Page 63 ================================================== Secret (PRE -KGB BIOGRAPHY) to, join Naval Intelligence _ After passing all Of his examinations in the fall Of '1950 NOSENKO received orders calling him to- active Offered a choice :Of assignments_ NOSENKO chose the Far East to prove that he was now ready to. make' a man of himself" Arriving in Sovetskaya Gavan in Primorskiy Kray (sic) e 1 NOSENKO was assigned to a Reports 'Section @omment Questioned in 1965" on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO insisted: that it was located in Primorskiy Shown contemporary Soviet maps; clearly locating it in Khabarovskiy NOSENKO angrily asserted_ that the map had been falsified by his interrogators to confuse him NOSENKO ' s contention is somewhat: analogous to being Stationed in Oregon' for an extended period and thinking oneself to be in' California_ In Sovetskaya Gavan NOSENKO likea the work and dia a good job despite rigorous working and living conditions and during his service there he was commended as an out- standing officer_ NOSENKO. ana: his efficer colleagues: analyzed the : product 'Of some 300_radio intercept operators as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok In spring_ 1951 after about seven months service NOSENKO_ was promoted to lieutenant, the normally required time in grade Of one year having been reduced to six months for- Far East service In early 1952 NOSENKO published in a local newspaper his intent to: divorce his wife and he forwarded the ;necessary legal papers to Moscow NOSENKO ' s two-year tour wouid notend until October or November 1952 nor was he entitled to any leave before that time An: understanding superior however arranged for him to take leave in April 1952 SO that he coula return to: Moscow in time for his, father': birthday On 1 On 2 May 54 0001325 TS No. 197124 Secret Top duty - Kray. Kray May Top Copy ================================================== Page 64 ================================================== 14-QQ0QQ Top Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) he reported to the Naval Ministry and was told to return for reassignment at the end of his leave NOSENKO was on leave in May and June 1952 and he remained "at the disposal Of the Naval Ministry [According to his 1962 and 1966 versions , he was hospitalized during this period.] In the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the RU Military-Diplomatic Academy = to a special Naval espionage_ school and to a post in Germany but he turned them all down He rejected the opportunity to attend the academy because he had had almost all of the courses earlier at the Institute of International Relations 01 Sometime after his return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan NOSENKO completea the formalities to secure his divorce from TELEGINA _ [According to his 1964 account , NOSENKO visited Moscow later from his Baltic assignment , to 'complete divorce proceedings ] In August 1952 NOSENKO received an assignment to Sovetsk, in the Baltic_ where he arrivea in early September 1952 _ His assignment there was as a political officer 1 in which capacity he was involved with sailors being trained for wartime 'sabotage missions His main task was to prepare the training for the agents to instruct them in such subjects as The Foreign Policy 6f the USSR" and generally to see to their needs . NOSENKO did not care for his assignment in Sovetsk and in December 1952 he obtained leave to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow In January 1953 NOSENKO ana his parents visited KGB General KOBULOV at the latter' s dacha and KOBULOV _ learning Of NOSENKO ' s dissatisfaction with the RU_ suggested he consider working for the KGB After New Years in 1953 NOSENKO went II to rest for several days 1 at the Hertzen "House of Rest" located 65-70 kilo- meters from MOscOw near Kubinka There he met his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEWNIKOVA _ [In 1964 and 1966 statements NOSENKO claimed he was not "resting" but was hospitalized with tuberculosis for several weeks in January and February. ] 55 0801326 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 plan Copy ================================================== Page 65 ================================================== DOQQ Top Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY ) NOSENKO " s Information-1966 (Apri}) At an 'interview with the military placement commission at the Institute before graduation , NOSENKO. indicated that he wanted to work in Ii some sort of a military organization Sopn thereafter the_ chief of the Institute s special; section gave him a telephone number to call- NOSENKO recognized the number as one belonging to the MGB [the predecessor of and hereafter referred to as the . KGB ] NOSENKO was invited to an interview, with KGB : officials who queried him about his background and his knowledge of English_ Later 1 however , the chief of the Institute S special section informed NesENto to' thet KGis qDalifications During the summereofS9stableifer stategn- examinations were underway [in earlier versions NOSENKO claimed the examinations were over in June] NOSENKO began to process for entry into the Naval RU through Colonel KALOSHIN the Chief of the RU Personnel Department He filled_ out questionnaires in duplicate wrote: two autos biographies and _ in; August Or September submitted' copies of his diploma [Note that this version :0f events omits any reference to delayed graduation caused' by his having to take a state examination a second time _ J For the next nine months until March 1951 NNOSENKO awaited called to RU: service [In earlier versions NOSENKO claims: he entered the RU_ in 1949 or 1950.] On 12 March 1951 NOSENKO received: two' Orders ; Erom the Naval Ministry one cal him to active Naval service- ana thet ocher] thesSegeitg hieets a translator to the Intelligence Seventh Fleet- in Ehe' Far' East_ On 13 March On KALOSHIN S instruction NOSENKO reported to the Moscow Mili Commission ana was issued his,travel documents ana NOSENKO departed Moscow for his post on: 16 or 17 March. At the end of March NOSENKO arrived at- his post near Sovetskaya Gavan and began work in the Reports' Section of the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Unit_ 56 TS . No. 197124 Top Secret being ling City tary CO01327 Copy ================================================== Page 66 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY ) At the end Of April 1952 NOSENKO left Sovetskaya Gavan on leave arriving in Moscow on 28 Aprila (Note earlier versions in which he was transferred because of illness and that he was permitted to return to MOscow because of his father s birthday ] Whi le on leave he became i1l with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in May and June 1952 in a sanitorium near Moscow During the month of July 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet in Sovetsk , in Kaliningradskaya Oblast (at the head of the Bay Of Gdansk) Sovetsk was a small village located on the of lana between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk_ [The only Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast is located many miles inland Erom Kaliningrad _ in the opposite direction from Baltiysk_ When NOSENKO was shown their locations on contemporary Soviet maps , he insisted that he was correct, although Primorsk, where NOSENKO had said in 1962 that he was assigned while in the Baltic_ is located on a {spit Of land between ` Kaliningrad ana Baltiysk ] NOSENKO remained in " Sovetsk" but a short time and he returned to Moscow at the end Of 1952 to seek another assignment - Before his departure he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service_ (In previous versions he claimed to have become eligible for promotion and was promoted while in the Far East, after less then a year S service_ ] On 1 January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents were guests at the KOBULOV dacha NOSENKO indicated his dissatisfaction with his RU assignment and KOBULOV promised to find him a_ place in the KGB From the miadle Of January to the middle f March 1953 NOSENKO was under treatment at the sanitorium near MOscow where he had been hospitalized in 1952 and there he becane_ acquainted with his second wife Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA [NOSENKO ' s earlier accounts either omitted reference to this period of hospitalization, or indicated that it was of cons iderably shorter duration.] 57 0801328 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 410 spit Copy ================================================== Page 67 ================================================== ;14-0000Q Secret- (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) 'NOSENKO S' Information-1966 (October) In his most recent account in October 1966 _ NOSENKO said that before graduation from the Institute the: military placement commission sent him to the KGB but there he was toid that he was not: qualified as a: candidate because Of mediocre academic record and drinking habits , NOSENKO said he aid not mention this rejection;_earlier, because his interrogators_ would not have believed: that 'he ever became a; KGB officer after Once being rejectea. claioeGNto alve etereeetee the theal heuhad 19sea" Ihef Zabe 1 he said- he entered the RU: in March 1951 and was on active duty in the: Far East from 19,51 until 1953 Comment: This latest assertion discredits almost' all of his earlier claims regarding entry into the RU including the date f his graduation from_ the Institute the timing if not the fact of his promotion the number sequence and purposes: of his visits to: MoscOw his hospitalization with_ tuberculosis and his_ assignment to the Baltic Fleet Naval RU Service Summarx and' Conclusion According to NOSENKO S contradictory statenents which are still unresolved 'after interrogations over a; three- year period he graduated from the Institute: of International Relations in either 1949.:or 1950 _ Before graduation he (a) was selected for Naval assignment , (b) sought a Naval assignment , or (c), was_ selected for ana rejected by the KGB' ana then he sought an assignment to the RU; or immediately following graduation or three months or nine months later (in the following Year) he was called to 58 0001329_ TS No:' 197124 Top 'Secret Top Copy ================================================== Page 68 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY ) active Naval service and assigned to the RU _ With neither training nor indoctrination he was assigned initially to the Far East for nine months or three years; there he participated in agents operational training, or reports work _ In the latter capacity he was or was not involved in RU radio signals intercept operations _ He either never served in the Baltic. or if he did it was for three months or six months during which he either participated in agent training Or was an administrative or tical officer He was promoted to lieutenant in the Far East Or in the Baltic_ 1 after either seven morths. or thirteen months RU service . Despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy_ NOSENKO knows nothing of Soviet Navy tradition_ 1 doctrine organization_ Or procedures _ He discdaims know- ledge Qf RU organization other than at the posts where he served , "because Of his junior rank" However _ even at those posts he describes neither the staff the functions nor the personnel intelligibly nor does he describe the posts actual locations The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the personnel: chief Colonel KALOSHIN He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East intelli- gence staffs _ Some thirty GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service , but through social acquaintance , later, in Moscow 1 or through his visits. to Geneva _ Conclusion NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any Of the capacities at the places and times he claimed _ 59 1iil33o TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10_ poli Copy ================================================== Page 69 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret CHAPTER IV: KGB : ENTRY Comment: Stalin died in ;March 1953_ accompanied by an event which was The Ministries of exEnsordalaf repercussions State Security (MGB) Affairs '(MVD) and which Beriya became merged under the MD , Of a period of Minister There Eollowed the tioasfer idea?seas_ apseassaeozganazation entailing Beriya' 5 arrest just. four Of many personnel 1953 was followed months" later in -June bloodless) by another extensive (if cuoodleted Rurgee and reorganization which Statenacedritythegfreatioa of the Committee_ for and Evdokia (KGB) in March.1954 _ Vladimir DERYABIN PETROV Yuri_RASTVOROV_ and Petr of these eveotg otheon defected in the wake ,vided. as well as From information they proz sources CIA has from that,acquired Erom: other mation against a substantial amount of infor- period: may be which NOSENKO S accounts of this; For the benveizeece ""KGB M is used of the reader the term predecessor hereafter to refer as well to its organizations in 1953-1954 In statements volunteerea in his in Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO meetings with CIA MD /KGB in 1953_ In a;' mentioned that he had joined the after'his defection hove-graphe assetezenfe racteci_ededhetely began in, 1952, a Gate oeevesisted= asserted his_ KGB service reminded he had earlier said was correct even after produced a variety of dates 01951= Repeated interrogations from It the beginning 0f 1952" claimed KGB ranging were accompanied by modified to April 1953_ all of which of his (as well accounts of the circumstances as, of his earlier period of service 61 0001331 TS_No:' 197124 Secret 10 Top. early- entry entry Top_ Copy ================================================== Page 70 ================================================== 14-OQOOQ Top Secret (KGB ENTRY) in the Naval RU and of his date Of graduation from the Institute of International Relations) To the extent to which he has been consistent at all, he has cited March 1953 as the time of his entry to the KGB Date @f Entry NOSENKO at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962 , volunteered how and when he joined the KGB NOSENKO had just returned from his Naval RU assignment in the Baltic, he said, when he met KGB General KOBULOV and KOBULOV urged him to join the KGB _ NOSENKO stated that after completing his processing, he reported for duty in the Embassy Section Of the Second Chief Directorate s American Department in March 1953_ H just after Stalin died" (Stalin died on 5 March 1953_ J Comment: According to KGB defectors _ the precise date of entry to the KGB would not likely to be forgotten by a KGB officer_ The date is the basis for computing length of service and is a common entry on KGB administrative forms 5 periodically filled out KGB officers in the course of_ their service_ According to NOSENKO in January 1964 , he transferred to the KGB from the Naval RU "in something like 1952" "just after Yu_ I GUK transferred from the Second Chief Directo- It rate Comment: GOLITSYN had reported that GUK was transferred out of the Second Chief Directorate in January 1952 _ 62 TS No. 197124 Secret by 0001332 Top Copy ================================================== Page 71 ================================================== Top Secret (KGB ENTRY) In February. 1964 NOSENKO wrote a biographic statement in which he noted that he' entered the KGB' in 1952 and in which he back-dated by One year his 1962 account of his activities in the period 1945-1955 Although he was then reminded; Of his: 1962 statement and the contradiction was discussed with him after study he indicated his approval by signing an M official biographic statement (for the Intelligence Community) which indicated that he entered on with the KGB in about May 1952: 1 At the first:hostile interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was confronted with his contradictory clains In response NOSENKO stated that he returned to Moscow from the Baltic: in ] August 1952 [by most Of his other_ accounts NOSENKO returned in January 1953] and entered the KGB on 5-1 Septemberef952e By March 1953 NOSENKO stated he had already worked in the ] Embassy Section for some months against American correspon- dents and it was just after Stalin' s death after the reorganization" that he assumed responsibility 'for: operations 4 'against American Army Attache personnel [NOSENKO ultimately settled on June Or July 1954 as the time 0f' this reassignment See: Pa 84,] Chalienged_ in "April 1964 to resolve the contradictions of his 'earlier claims that he joined the KGB variously in January 1952 September 1952 Or March 1953 NOSENKO asserted that the truth was that his service dated from- March 1953 after Stalin s death_ He went on to-explain that he finished his Institute studies in 1949 (sic) "defended: his 6I D diploma and then failed one 0f the: four required State examinations: All four examinations he said, he haa to take over ~again and as a result he didn"t receive his;diploma until 1950 although he "officially 1t graduated in 1949 1 NOSENKO said that to avoia admitting "this unpleasant thing he claimed he_ joined: the KGB in 1952 and after claiming that to be a facti "did not want to. correct it, to twist it around 1 again Il NOSENKO went on to say that the actual date Of entry was while Stalin was still alive on It 12 or 15 March 1953 (I or about 15 March 1953 BI M 01 63 0001333 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 duty Copy ================================================== Page 72 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (KGB ENTRY) NOSENKO ' s explanation takes no account 83 2# Comment: fact that he had already said (in 1962) 22= he joined the KGB in March 1953 _ KGB defectors describe the period ir-zes-azely following Stalin" S death in the KGB as Cfs =z extensive reorganization and uncertaint: 3= which new candidates were not being accef-ee. Other evidence of the improbability of 3Ez}Io' s entering the KGB in March 1953 is discussez below_ NOSENKO repeated_during 1965 interrogations the Zae= 13-15 March 1953_ In 1966 however in a written statazent, he said he entered the KGB on 2 April,1953, but a wees later, in another signed statement , he Said it was the "mic:le % March 1953" In his final interrogation in October 1966 NOSENEO sai4 he entered the KGB in March 1953 _and he acknowledgee Eta= he had lied and had known at the time he was lying, wzej he had said he joined- in 1952 Asked by his interregezczs why he had lied NOSENKO said "There was no sense _ 28 went on to explain- that because he was only an averace student and a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable by the KGB. entry commission when he first applied i2 2930; he had tried to conceal this by adjusting his accou-t one year since his interrogators would not have belierea that he was eventually accepted by the KGB after an eazlier rejection_ The Role %f General Bogdan :Zaldarovich KOBULOT In all 0f his accounts NOSENKO has attributed tc Gazeral KOBULOV ' s initiative and intervention his entry to 22 TC5 In the account.which he volunteered in Geneva to CIA :5 1962 NOSENKO said KOBULOV was a friend f the elde= XZSENO whom he met when the KGB General "dropped by the 83SITTO dacha outside 0f Moscow and KOBULOV at the time ( =25i2 1953") was First Deputy to Beriya , the Minister 0f =re 64 0001334 TS Na- 197124 Top Secret Fc Cofy ================================================== Page 73 ================================================== Top Secret (KGB ENTRY) then-WD . NOSENKO: said that when KOBULOV learned Of NOSENKO ' s dissatisfaction with the Naval RU KOBULOV encouraged him to enter: counterintelligence and invited him to visit the 'General S office_ NOSENKO said he dia not, but nevertheless receivea a' week later a telephone call from the KGB Personnel Office asking him to appear at the secretariat of General KOBULOV and informing him that General KOBULOV: had already arranged for a building"pass _ NOSENKO gave a different_ somewhat more detailed account in April 1964 - In this version he first met KOBULOV _ a friend 'of the NOSENKO family , in February 1953* NOSENKO said KOBULOV had visited his father in the latter s office_ ana that evening the: elder NOSENKO brought him to the NOSENKO' dacha to spend" the weekend {NOSENKO had just before been informea his interrogators that- KOBULOV was at that time posted in Germany _ not in Moscow_ ]_ According to . NOSENKO, KOBULOV was in Moscow on a short visit from Germany My: father invited him to: spend Saturday night and Sunday- On Sunday we_ were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what I was doing, and I told him I was at the disposal of; the (Naval RU:} Personnel Department ana: that I didn' + want to return to the" Baltic_ NOSENKO said that KOBULOV: offered to call the KGB Personnel Office and have them look It NOSENKO over and NOSENKO assented after which he twice" visited the Personnel Office where he filed" completed forms NOSENKO asserted_ that_KOBULOV did not forget_ because "just as soon as 'STALIN died KOBULOV immediately returned from 0 _ Germany after being: summoned by Beriya Or someone and: on maybe the 10th Of March It NOSENKO receivea a call from KOBULOV s assistant NOSENKO claimed he reported to KOBULOV S office: and although he waited two hours to see the; General the latter was busy elsewhere Instead; of seeing KOBULOV however _ 1 NOSENKO said he was finally taken to the office Qf: 'Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief SHUBNYAKOV , who assigned him; forthwith to Ehe' Embassy Section Of the American Department In April 1964 NOSENKO introduced a new variant_ He: said that he met KOBULOV while: accompanying his parents on a visit in: January to KOBULOV ' s dacha [NOSENKO had previously graphically described KOBULOV S weekena visit at the elder NOSENKO ' s] KOBULOV intervened in his behalf and he was called to the KGB Personnel Office to be interviewed and to 65 6081335. TS No. 197124 Secret Copy 10 by Top ================================================== Page 74 ================================================== Secret (KGB ENTRY ) receive necessary forms _ NOSENKO stated that he heard 1 notnling further until after Stalin S funeral Fhen he was suoned to KOBULOV ' s office and afterwards assigned to the Second Chief Directorate_ During the July 1965 interrogations NOSENKO retracted nis earlier claim that KOBULOV and his father had been close personal friends He stated that his father S relationship with KOBULOV was not personal and that KOBULOV had never visited the NOSENKOs : In a biographic- statement written in April 1966 NOSENKO said that he had met KOBULOV but twice , once on 1 January 1953 at the latter s dacha . and the second and last time in the elder NOSENKO S office as NOSENKO ' s father and KOBULOV were departing to attend Stalin' s funeral On that latter occasion_ NOSENKO clained , KOBULOV promised to concern nim- self with NOSENKO ' s entry into the KGB and it was several 'days later that NOSENKO was sumoned to KOBULOV S office and told ne was appointed to the KGB _ Comment: General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV was a career 'security Official, but from the immediate' post- war period until after Stalin S death he was not assigned to KGB . Headquarters _ As:: Of 1952 , he was posted to Germany with the Chief Directorate_ Of Soviet Properties Abroad_ then directly subordinate not to the MVD but to the Council of Ministers and latterly to the Ministry of Foreign Trade Until he returned from Germany in March 1953 to assue the position of Beriya S deputy_ he had no office in KGB Headquarters_ KOBULOV was arrested with Beriya- in June 1953 and also later executea. In light Of the foregoing_ it is improbable that KOBULOV was instrumental in NOSENKO ' s appointment to the KGB at the times NOSENKO claimed If KOBULOV ever interceded in NOSENKO ' s behalf it is probable that NOSENKO woula later have been purged after KOBULOV ' s 66 0001336 TS No. 197124 1 Top Secret Top Copy ================================================== Page 75 ================================================== Top Secret (KGB ENTRY ) Comment (Continued) and Beriya 's arrest and execution_ NOSENKO ' s eventual retraction 0f his assertion that his father and KOBULOV were intimate acquaintances E makes it the more unlikely that KOBULOV played- any role at any time in NOSENKO 'S appointment to the KGB Eligibility Throughout the various versions_ NOSENKO has provided 31 about; his ;entry to the KGB. he has emphasized how influen- tial was: his father '8: prominent position in the Soviet Government 3 #P Comment In the period 1953-1954 ~during which NOSENKO claimed he entered the KGB it was_ KGB policy to avoid recruiting the children of senior Soviet officials 21 NOSENKO' asserts that ne was rejected for KGB appointment upon graduation from the Institute_ 0f Internationai Relations M Comment Other than_ claiming to have' completed an undistinguished period of service with the Naval I RU NOSENKO acknowledges 'that he was no 'more eligible in 1953 for KGB appointment than he was at: the time of his rejection_ 0 1 0801337 5 67 TS: No: 197124 Top Secret 10 Copy ================================================== Page 76 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (KGB ENTRY) NOSENKO states that in March 1953 he was already twenty- five and a half years old, a member of only the Komsomol and that he had not been recommended for Party membership_ He further claimed that on entry to the KGB he became secretary of the Secona Chief Directorate Komsomol organi- zation Comment: Eligibility for Party membership , if not membership itself is a requisite for KGB appointment - By Komsomol statutes Of that time , twenty-five was at that time the maximum age Thus at the time of NOSENKO ' s claimed KGB appointment , he was within six months of being dropped by the Komsomol as well as still unqualified for Party membership. He could not have been secretary Of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization _ as discussed NOSENKO Li 338 frequently to having contracted 1 tuberculosis for which he was periodically hospitalized. 'Comment: According to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time no 'candidate was accepted who: had ever haa tuberculosis_ KGB Processing for Entry NOSENKO has stated (in chronological order) that at his initial interview with a KGB personnel , it was not necessary for him to- complete any forms- or questionnaires since the KGB had his Naval RU file; that he was told that the KGB would request the Naval RU file and meanwhile he was given three copies of a four to six-page biographic form to complete at home ; and (at his last interrogation in 1966) that he 68 TS No. 197124 0001338 Top Secret Top Copy ================================================== Page 77 ================================================== Secret (KGB ENTRY) never. spoke to. any KGB personnel officers nor visited the personnel office (and thus_completed no forms provided by them) } 10 Comment: The most, important document. filled out by prospective KGB 'officers was a detailed 16-page personal history questionnaire Anketa spetsialngo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB ; which was completed in one copy only CIassified even when: blank, the form was not" permitted to be taken home KGB defectors have described completion of the form "as an experience not likely to be: forgotten Ii NOSENKO omits in all accounts- reference to 'other documents' which are known to have been: required 'in connection with a' KGB officer S processing for U NOSENKO 'insisted that: he took no physical examination in connection with processing for KGB 'entry_ Comment A: medical examination was a routine ana mandatory part; of a KGB candidate' s processing Former KGB defectors could think of no instance in. which the' examination could be' waived parti- cularly for a candidate with a recorded history Of tuberculosis_ L NOSENKO clains: in all of his: accounts: :that he entered the KGB building and with a pass obtainea at the Pass Office was permitted to proceed without escort NOSENKO specifically assertea that the: name 0f the interviewer did not appear on the pass _ 0001339 69 TS No:' :197124 Top Secret 10 Top 'auty: Copy ================================================== Page 78 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (KGB ENTRY ) Comment: Persons not holding a valid KGB identity document were not permitted entry to or move- ment in the building without escort The interviewer S name did appear on the building Bassi the Ebeuante intervietee tee'Basam name the asfentiewer 1 had complete responsibility for the visitor S cus- tody while on KGB premises _ Initial Service in KGB (1953) NOSENKO stated that_ in the period of Beriya,_ in March- June 1953 _ the two existing directorates were the First Chief Directorate_ J which was the foreign intelligence directorate , and the Second Chief Directorate , the counter- intelligence directorate_ The designations were later reversed for a few months he said; by Kruglov , Beriya' s successor. Coment: Beriya reversed the designations of the. First; and Second Chief Directorates in March 1953 and they were not changed back until March 'i954 . NOSENKO does not know how his Own directorate was: designated either at the time he allegedly entered on duty or during his entire first year Of KGB service_ NOSENKO described the KGB identity document of the period , but in spite of repeated questioning could not recall any- thing unusual about it. 70 0001340 TS No. 197124 Secret Top Copy ================================================== Page 79 ================================================== Top Secret 5 (KGB ` ENTRY) Comment : 'Twice following Stalin s' death in March 1953 and 'again following Beriya' s arrest in June 1953 all KGB identity documents: were temporarily recalled for revalidation On both occasions new stamps were placed on the: document, lacking which the bearer coula no longer enter the KGB installation KGB defectors state that the events were the topic Of numerous anecdotes at_ the time NOSENKO claims_ he received no training in the KGB , but was assigned operations responsibilities_ immediately upon reporting for duty_ He had explained that training was M unnecessary-because Of his; Naval RU_ experience Comment: NOSENKO s lack, Of training is unlike that Of any other KGB: ` defector: His 'Naval RU service by: NOSENKO s own' account provided: little if any preparation for his: subsequent KGB duties NOSENKO stated that his initial KGB' basic pay was 1700 rubles as, a cage 'officer_ plus secrecy language: 'ana longevity: pay, 500 rubles: 01 rank pay It :as_ a lieutenant. He_ recalled that there' was one year _ 1954 when KGB officers dia not receive the pay for rank _ UI Comment: KGB. officers rankwpay was: abolished in F september 1952 an not restored until April. 1954,. a period which covers NOSENKO ' s first year 0f claimed service in the KGB _ W} 71 6001341 TS-No. 197124 Top , Secret: 10 plus Copy ================================================== Page 80 ================================================== 14-00QQo Secret (KGB ENTRY) NOSENKO ` claimed that he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953 , shortly after joining the KGB . Comment: All promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time Beriya became Minister in March 1953 until late 1953 _ NOSENKO' s actual sequence of promotions has never been established He has also claimed this promotion occurrea in 1952 ; and in 1954_ See p. 351_ NOSENKO acknowledged that his qualifications for continued KGB service were probably reviewed in connection with the purges following both Stalin's death and Beriya " S arrest, during which reviews numerous negative factors in his back- ground woula have come to light_ He stated however that he could only assume that the important and influential position of his own father outweighed the negative factors _ Comment : NOSENKO has never mentioned any influence his father had on his KGB service aside from that exercised through KOBULOV , who was himself arrested and executed _ Other Aspects Relevant te 1953 KGB Service NOSENKO insisted that the KGB was organized from components Of the MVD not earlier than late 1954 Or early 1955 _ 72 0801342 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top 3 Copy ================================================== Page 81 ================================================== Secret (KGB ENTRY) 0 Comment:: The KGB was organized in March 1954 , in 0 reform 0f Beriya' s organization .a final security agencies_ Preceded of Soviet by a series of purges the inception of the KGB would Ul be memorable to a KGB officer serving in presumably: Headquarters at the time Moscow E NOSENKO stated that the_ MVD Intelligence Directorate (subsequently to become the KGB' First Chief Directorate) 4 was located in 1953 in four buildingsr including the Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI (Comittee 0f mation) Building" Infor- 1 M Comment: The Agricultural Exhibition ana the KI Building" were one and the same From his statement = NOSENKO is unaware that the KI (a combined foreign intelligence ceased to exist_ in 1951, a getceragerfa) unfamiliar to a KGB195fice;maeteingertaps at a substantially later timec but: one which other KGB Officers serving in Moscow in 1953- recalled easily NOSENKO did not know where 'the Chief Directorate Militia was located in: 1953-1954: of the Comment: According to KGB defectors_ 2 staff officer in the Counterintelligence Directorate at the time would: have had frequent Occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of the Militia_ 73 0801343 TS No. . 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Top ================================================== Page 82 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (KGB ENTRY) NOSENKO ' s aertioxs regazdIz; t46 68G9,4n ce in the 1953-1954 period throw no more light on the actual date Of his KGB entry than dia his claims Of when he transferred from the Naval RU; the contradictions and inconsistencies are interrelated. It is possible that a former KGB officer, relating the truth as he recalls it about events occurring ten years earlier, could be inconsistent; that he could forget his date Of entry, not remember what administrative procedures were fail to recall the circumstances of the organization he joined were be_ inaccurate about what his pay was and be vague on what his KGB identification document lookea like_ Recognizing that administrative regulations and procedures are on occasion honored in the breach , it is also possible that NOSENKO was accepted by the KGB despite the fact that he was the son of a- senior official, that he had tuberculosis_ that he was unqualified for Party member- ship, that he had been previously rejected and all at a time when the KGB was not accepting new recruits The probability of these events being coincident however , is remote On examination NOSENKO ' s latest admission, that he I actually" entered the KGB in March I953 is no better 1 substantiated than.earlier accounts citing other dates _ Conclusion NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner nor at the time he claimed: 74 0001344 TS No. 197124 Secret Top Top Copy ================================================== Page 83 ================================================== Top Secret CHAPTER V AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION QF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (ca 1953-June 1955) NOSENKO claims to have served in the American Embassy Section of the American Department (Second Chief Directorate) Erom his entry in 'the KGB until June 1955 His targets during this 'period were at first American correspondents residing in' Moscow and later Army Attache personnel 0f the 4 American Embassy. in Moscow_ His assignment involving American correspondents lasted_ anywhere 'from 'six to eighteen months '(depending on the various dates he claimed he entered the" KGB) His involvement with the Army Attaches lasted Il from sometime in 1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in: June 1955 NOSENKO has' sought: to avoid discussion of his Own or Other KGB activities during this entire period: which he- characterized: on ' occasion as: not relevant" or "of no consequence He has ' repeatedly stated 'that he "found himself only after this initial KGB 'service in the American Embassy Section Until then he asserted he' was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the; work" '(He has;Variously 'dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955 when he transferred to the Seventh Department; in June 1956; in connection with his participation in and award for: the BURGTLOL case; and after August 1956 when the death 0f his father forced hin to himself" together.) 8J Operations ' Against American Correspondents NOSENKO exempted himself: from reporting details of KGB work: against any specific American. correspondent in MOScOw in 1953-1954 by saying that, as a new very junior employee he had no access to operational files and dia not partici- pate personally in the handling of any Of the correspondents 75 0801345 TS, No:: 197124 Secret 10 {RR pull Top Copy ================================================== Page 84 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret EMBASSY SECTION ca, 1953-June 1955) (AMERICAN in Moscow who were Although able to idecenEg , COOSEsBOndeatss learned this information then recruited KGB agents 1 [V.A:] KOZLOV or either in conversations with his ledpeaiozEter he no longer at some and in sone Iadeetsed NOSEHKC made clear that was working against these targets _ for the more important he was not the case officer responsible with them the correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was ShACIko g,iithgthegsd S 06 chief of the section himself--with working with WHITNEY}6 wife I als0 know that IGEEOVawa: each of these persons and with [(Andrew J.) SGZIGEle whicoff did not see According there was an operational involved with [TEIGER} andol to NOSENKO , he was _ in no way who he alleged were [Edmuna STEVENS American correspondents recruited agents of the KGB _ SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by Comment: GOLITSYN in 1961 before the lead was received NOSENKO_U EHAPIRO" s_ KGB agent cryptonym from NOSENKO and GOLITSYN appears in the known to 309)_ The KGB CHEREPANOV papers: (see p. in April 1954 06 defector Nikoiay KHOKHLOV Wife of [HITNEY as ideecified the [@olish-born which she denied . a KGB agent , an allegation said his early months in the job were spent Of NOSENKO operational) files on a number reading personality (not: (none of Which indicated the the correspondents in Moscow status) and familiarizing ildividual S developmental or NOSENKO was assigned the himself with: KGB me thods Later personnel, and domestics It network' I or drivers clerical [SHAPIRO GILMORE ~C606,06 surrounding four Of the Zermespondeti his pefiodicaily SALISBURY and WHITNEYk% He met any important infor- to' determine Whether they had developed along to the meetings mation His superior KOZLOV often 'veathazale the agents and th NOSENKO , first to show him how to to wi- something interesting would begin afterward whenever according to NOSENKO KOZLOV would develop_ In fact, with these Soviet citizens-agents accompany him to meetings that something of interest might when there was even a hint 76 TS No. 197124 0801346 Tan Gecret Copy point agent agent agents Ide; ================================================== Page 85 ================================================== Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca - 1953-June 1955) " deve NOSENKO has described some Of these ` agents in general" terms but for all but a few he recalled neither 1 their names nor personalia concerning them _ 06 KGB Files on SIAPIRO TGILMORE} SALISBURY FHi U and TNEY On the Of his acceptance into the KGB NOSENKO stated that he was taken directly to_ the offices American_Embassy Section There he met of the; V.A KOZLOV who told;NOSENKO that the section clief_ work of_ the departing he would take over the TORMOZOV in case officer_ Captain Anatoliy MOScOw operations against American correspondents in Nhen, 'NOSENKO reported for Work the following 4 found a desk in Room 615 and 0I There he sitting there At first I was were three other guys; same time I was reading the "Eilegnoing_ traces and at the there: were seven files in all, on journalists I think NOSENKO listed and I didn' t see any other It these files as those on-Menry SHAPIRO GTLMORE (as well as ones 85-[GILMOREk s wife Eaavob,06 and her sister @HERNYSHEVAL' Earrison SALTSBURY CEREBRYANKOVA) 0 THI and TThomas 506 06 0b He JOiglKOat said identified-[SHAPIRO as an old agent of 'Ours" and WHITNEY "worked for uS- while he was in Moscow gave us some material but he_refused to work when: he left the country" N GILMOREI for uS active recruitment : target in 1953 EhaNOSSNKObstido was an did not. know whether he was 1954 but" NOSENKO not know the status Of recruited Likewise he dia' TALISBURY as of 1953 NOSENKO: stressed that; the files he was given to read during the early perioa of his 'KGB service were mental files (dele formulyar} rather than' the develop- files of the agents The aevelopmental files operational sensitive, and from them "you woula were less out whether +he (the:subject never be' able to' figure not NOSENKO Of the file) is an agent or another file oseselaipea that once a person became an agent the chief set up and these agent files were held by Of the section KOZLOV NOSENKO stated that read the files on the seven he extracts: for persons: S lowly and made sOme myself in my personal: log--such things as 0801347 77 TS . No. 197124 Top Secret 10 lop: day day TNEY): Copy I2IGR ================================================== Page 86 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca. 1953-June 1955) notations of their dates Of artiealilebiogs the cogeatmot remember" He was also the maids surrounding these corre spondents _ 1 their drivers and cooks Agents Reporting On Correspondents NOSENKO said he responsible for handling the agents wlo were reporting OiEBEA3RRo; DHf#Ner] ' EALISBURE and II 'angtthag (GILMORES and met them reguLarly to learn whether whom did SHAPIRO ] ieet , what might be interesting was new What might be suspicious in his behavior in his behavior He then reported to KOZLOV and whom he is contacting, of his conversations woula sometimes prepare a written report NOSENKO with the agents _ Asked to describe these meetings replied: m1 Let us take the same case of [SHAPiRO; I would about three times a_ month or even two meet drivers meeting I woula 'ask the driver what times Cbat the behavior since our last meeting, was in {SHARIRO' s with forei- whethel?(GHAPIRO had Suspicious contacts they about his meetings with Russians were conducted openly or , ` perhaps was {SHAPIR walking06 behind the person he met And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course if he spots suspicious he calls immediately, and I anything him the next morning. Otherwise I would woula see the meeting that I would see him tell him at weeks but if there was in about ten days or in two something interesting_ he` should call immediately. the same . with the maid and the cook _ Upon It was to the office I would have to report to returning meetings either orally or in KOZLOV about my [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of writing. If noassxageceioxy had a meeting with his the American Embassy immediately to KOZLOV _ agents, 1 he too had to report in the day If the meetings were taking place late lasted until midnight or later and there were and materials submitted at the meeting, I no written morning. coula go home and then report the next 78 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy Top given etc" nebb gners again Jzr 0001348 ================================================== Page 87 ================================================== 4-0oQoQ Secret I AMERICAN EMBAssy . SECTION ca 1953-June 1955) KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents: surrounding the correspondents _ II At_ first he- was 'teaching me Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, _ even when it hadn t yet begun to deve but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer: NOSENKO' s agent: network consisted mainly of domestic 'and clerical: personnel. in contact with the correspondents ana their families_ Asked to describe then he said: "My first' agent RSs a woman agent a cook = who: was working at GITMQRFFs place She also worked at the Associated Press later Her codename was AGLODINA a: funny one (Jhile reviewing a list of Soviets employed Americans in Moscow NOSENKO in the fall of 1965" identifiea' one Yelena S" KOSIENKO as his former agent Ii AGLODINA At that time he told: CIA that he had taken over KOSICNKO_ { from TORMOZOV upon entering the American Embassy Section in 1953; ana that she subsequently workea for and reported orAGITMORELs successor Richara 0L M KASISCHKE: NOSENKO Said; Ehat KOSTENKO never provided: any interesting information ) second agent was a_ Chauffeur whose cryptonym_ I think was SERGEY I think Te was driving for-QHITNEYS€6 V Then I also' had-[SHAPIRO' s chauffeur a_ funny little fellow In other words p6charwonen chauffeurs' this was mY agentura [agent network] Although NOSENKO: was able_ to:give a breakdown of this net- work in terms Of the number and type of agents targettea against particular: individuals_ he had 'forgotten_ their true names and could not provide personality information on any: 'Qf then He explained: I don t remember nOw _ They al1 passed: by like a river because. they were turned over often NOSENKO dia recall that it was he who selected ana handled the'agent Who; was ' placed: in' [HAPIROg )loffice as a secretary; this agent: had earlier worked in the offices 0f Moscow News . an English-language newspaper published in Moscow 0801349 79 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 110 Top lop by "My 8/rr Copy ================================================== Page 88 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret 1953-June 1955) II EMBASSY SECTIQN ca: (AMERICAN for handling estimated that he was the correspon - NOSrKelvet in ioad although _more ten to he said was a normal many as fifteen dents This Officers might have as case as follows : BJOBerKo described his Agents Target and the Two the contact , MEady driver; one operational_ and a 8eagiLgoRifs sister- & a girifriend of S Russian]wife= in-law ana [GILMORE 1 ( 06 0I SERGEY " One agent his driver, Thomas WHITNEY ISHAPIRO; S secretary Three" an ola Tenry SHAPIRO} Li_ and hishchaaffeurelatuve of woman who was a lived- with 06 [SHAPIRO" S wife and The Ehe {SHAPIRO;} in Moscow later secretary exenCezhfERODNE;t worked forTernetb BOSBNKO feported,onhin to took @HAPIRO} s % C6 [RoDNEz temporarily in_ Moscow {SALISBURY' s driver SALISBURY Two cleaning Harrison and a other of his agents as Vhouttal "eport: NOSENKO clessdidedotwaavthepeCitic toEgeOsGBAN' a Russian- in_ that they did Thesjirector o€ NOS His The first of these was: for foreigners in' MoscOw_ his true IaeguagettrainiRAKErograv I butONOSENKO cenadenceacbea in this cryptonyn wae ondKEVOLoDlNt '0 Was a female and name Theanecood in;cfooted some 'of the iar,cspcedelts the Same program who their homes ; he could refieeea of his Embassy employees in Fhen NOSENKO was he over true name of 'VoCoDtne" correepondents in 1954 American_ responsibilite for the case officers in the 1i I 'VOLODINA" 16 all of his to other Of RAKETA Attaches - 'Section With the in his work with Army Embassy continued to handle whom he 8 0 TS No. 197124 0801350 7-0 Cacret Copy responsible against operations agents experienced agentura cook agents GILMORE]CG girl; part-time agents plus ana} place; agents; girl_ part-time recali turned and agents exception i3/6r ================================================== Page 89 ================================================== '14-00000 Secret (AMERICAN EMBAsSY SECTION ca- 1953-June 1955) Operations Against U.S: Army Attache Personnel NOSENKO claimed Specific responsibility for work against American Army Attaches during twenty months of 1954-55 a period in which NOSENKO claimed no Supervisory responsibility to_ divert his attention Erom personal operational duties (NOSENKO explaining_why he did not know more details about the Embassy- Section S targets: while he was its deputy chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates _ Hence NOSFNKO continued_ he 'coula not be 'expected: to remember as many such details as would be possible had he been ,a_ case officer working daily on only four or five targets. Elsewhere ; he. contrasted. operations against tourists Wilo often' came and: went in a matter of a few days with the work against the service attaches and diplomats_ permanently stationed: in Moscow who coula be studied systematically and slowly_ ) NOSENKO has said in' different contexts that as the American Department case officer; responsible for operations- against' Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the . product Of a wide variety of sources_ on: the individuals who were:: his' targets He: has mentioned infor- mation received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelii gence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB / MVD / KGB ; and the microphones which were emplaced; about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department: A Comment NOSENKO has Said: variously that' the ' microphones in the Army Attache: "offices were his most valuable source of information- on his; targets of 1954-1955; that he knew nothing-of these mi crophones until he re-entered_ the Embassy Section, in 1960; and' that he learned of their existence during; 1953-1955 but not where any were located_ 81 TS No: 197124 Secret 10 Top C001351 Top Copy, ================================================== Page 90 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca - 1953-June 1955) also received according to NOSENKO from the Ietoxnationsoviet- chauffeurs_ cooks 1 language instructors network Of in the Embassy; permanent and roving and other agents outside the Embassy ; fixed observation Sosteileatceopatccoss" from and near the Embassy ; advance next toof intent to travel by the attaches ana their Zetneiczieor and reports from outside MOscOw including networks the Militia and the military. Thevecilance' cofeectieg and assimilating this information , The of to be able to know what the military NOSENKO said, was and thereby to control their attaches were doing in Moscow was intelligence collection activities Far less important of recruiting military attaches; NOSENKO knew of the instances when this was attempted 1 and all of only a few these efforts allegedly failed_ The KGB s principal interest in control rather than tment has been NOSENKO' s_ explanation for knowing little zboti_ the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated simply was not pertinent to the mission of control He" has also used this explana- primary his assertion that there were no recruitments tion to support during this period _ of American military personnel NOSENKO ' 8 assertion_ that the KGB "s mission was Comment: to control rather than to recruit American military attaches 18 contradicted by the emphasis KGB tradition and doctrine place on conducting operations the United States_ the main,enemy in the KGB"parlance _ 0 American officials with access to in this case residing in classified information_ who: were the' soviet' Union_ 1950i s In the USSR, especially in the early to the U-2 reconnaissance the Service Attache travel program was the primary means by which the U.S _ Armed Forces acquired intelli- information on the Soviet Union S gelfcainforaastcia?r complex _ The prevention or inhibition of this collection activity fell consequently to KGB components concerned with the security of military-industrial installations 82 TS No. 197124 0801352 Top Secret Top posts point goal against prior Copy ================================================== Page 91 ================================================== 14-Q0000 Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY' SECTION' ca_ 1953-June 1955) Comment: (Continued) with transportation facilities_ and with the' geographic regions to which the Service Attaches travelled Approval of Service Attache travel itineraries was not within the competence: of a case officer within the Embassy Section; the determination woula have to have been made by officials concerned with the USSR S military and industrial security and aware Of reciprocal privileges being extended to Soviet Service Attaches in the United States matters' involving the 'GRU as' well as; the KGB_ An Embassy Section case ` officer woula have as a matter Of course monitored reports of Service Attaches travel searching 1 for personal vulnerabilities among his targets and assisted local KGB elements in "setting up provocations outside of MoscOw NOSENKO , however_ has included neither f these latter functions as having been among his responsi 5 bilities. Cus 9f Case Files: On ` Army Attache Personnel Sometime in the first half of 195.4" NOSENKO said: he was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases; and from then until his transfer from the American Department: he handled KGB Secona:' Chief Directorate operations against_ the officer personnel: of the Army Attache 'S office NOSENKO S account of: the: turnover Of the correspondent files ( Eo his: successor and 0f the. acceptance, of the attache files is presented below_ ~8 "April 1964:- II I took over the Army ' Attache cases: from Nikolay KHRENOV _ When I was leaving in 1955; I turned the attache files over to Valeriy: BUDYLDIN_ 4 83 TS No: 197124: Top Secret Copy Top toay 6jC1353 310 ================================================== Page 92 ================================================== 14-00OOQ Secret AMERICAI CMBASSY SCCTION ca 1953-June 1955) ~10. April 1964 : II I made a mistake [when] I said I accepted the cases from KFIRENOV _ I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PAIIKRATOV_ This was in the beginning It of 1954 _ -15 April 1964 : NOSEIJKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F .V _ KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954) IJOSENKO asked when the PETROVs defected in Australia; he explained that he was not sure about KISLITSYI and coula have given them to another officer. It If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953 then it was to KISLITSYIT_ Otherwise , it was some- one else ~l8. June 1964: "l KISLITSYN cane into the. Embassy Section: in 1954 and I nim the files on American correspondents BUDYLDIN also joined the section' this year and took the fijes on the Army Attache ana his assistants from PANKRATOV BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to:me- Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955 and I gave Him the files.on the. Army Attache and his assistants, NOSENKO has_ also been indefinite as to: the date- he assumed responsibilities for the Attaches _ As noted above he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of .1954: Ile had earlier said that he worked on the corresz pondents JI only about six months" If the date of March: 1953 , which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB is correct, this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953_ On other:occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the' correspondent cases and began work against the Attaches in January 1954 on still others that this occurrea in 1954 _ In February 1965 _ MOSENRO said that he could not renember when he' changed assignments Agents: Reporting on Army Attaches Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against Army Attaches during this period which began in 1954 _ IJOSEMKO replied: 6I There were two maids a cook drivers about ten persons plus the agent SERVIZNIY ' and the one with the cryptonym DMITRIYEV' These additional two agents_ 0 about 12 or 13 agents altogether. 1t Mith one exception this 84 TS No. 197124 Secret Top gave May 0001354 Top Copy ================================================== Page 93 ================================================== Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca. 1953-June 1955) network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the American Embassy Section in mid-1955 He met each agent about once .a week _ except, for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. The Assistant Army Attaches used a pool of five drivers at randon , all of whom were his agents_ NOSEMKO said_ Apart from the permanent driver for the senior Attache none was targetted against specific members of the attache office Comment: As noted earlier, NOSENKO named Ii ~ VOLODINA u and RAKETA " as agents he used :against corre spondents and against Arny Attache targets but 'he never again referred to them and in describing his own activities he never indicated how or in what cases were used: According to' NOSENKO this network was "just a; supporting agentura, which' very seldom was worthwhile the main source Of Information on the Army _ Attaches being the microphones: in_ theiroffices Jewly added to the network whiie NOSENKO hela this position was a maid ; inserted to report on Army_ Attache. 0b-[Earl L MICKELSOM-and his successor Fillmore K MEARNSF-06 Her name NOSENKO thought_ 0 was NOVIKOVA_ She was an English-speaking_university graduate but hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters_ without taking them outside It Besides NOVIKOVA NOSENKO named one other maia who was his agent Mariya_ NEVEROVA cryptonym ' "SHVEDOVA_ 0 and she was targetted" against the Assistant Army Attache Ira; 66 RTCHARDS} He described NEVEROVA as a' "little, ola thin Woman from: whom he never obtained anything. of interest: 1 They_ met in a safehouse on_ Kuznetskiy: Most. 85 5/88 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 they 0001355 Copy ================================================== Page 94 ================================================== 14-00QOQ Secret (AMERICAIY EMBASSY SECTION L ca 1953-June 1955) Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs 1 NOSENKO named 0 Nikolay SHINYRYEV , who was used by various attaches_ He reported where they went , what they said , whether they took notes or photographs whether they had unusual packages with them and So on When viewing photographs (see below) in September 1964 , NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as his former agent JI SERVIZNIY" He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment , starting first as a messenger and , in NOSENRO ' s time performing clerical tasks VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Army Attaches and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954 _ The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy issued mon thly. 11 DMITRIYEV' s " true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV ; NOSENKO saw this nane on a 1962 phone list and thought , but was not sure, that this was his agent - An electrician who worked on the S electrical wiring systems and elevator "1 'DeIERbZEVY Eepoeced to NOSENKO on antenna wires and other wires he had observed on the top floors Like VOROBYEV "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Army Attaches Comment: Elsewhere NOSEMKO described an electrician who provided some ,technical; information on the Embassy but hne related him to his second tour in the American Embassy Section in 1960-I962 and dia not then claim that the electrician was his agent _ In September 1964: NOSENKO was shown a series: of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens erployed by the American Embassy in MoscOw Each cara contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photo- graphs ; NOSENKO did not identify the photograpils of SHNYRYEV 86 TS No. 197124 0001356 Top Secret Top boy Copy ================================================== Page 95 ================================================== Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSy SECTION ca 1953-June 1955). and KUKOLEV but said that the face: of VOROBYFV was familiar adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV_ hen shown the Embassy biographic cards on SIINYRYEV and KUKOLEV he identified each Of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated then to the B cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SFINYRYEV , when shown the biographic information , which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the military attache NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God this is my own agent _ He later said it was 2 3 good photograph of SHNYRYEV. AOSENKO ' s Targets Asked in February 1965 to' list the' Army Attache personnel a for whom he was: directly responsible during 1954 and 1955_ NOSENKO_orally_listed the following names : MICKELSON MEARNS RICHARDS _ FELCHLIN BEISON MULE STROUD and CARDELLA- 06,06,06; d6,06, 06, 0 6 Comment: In the order as- given' by: NOSENKO; the list comprises two: generations of Army Attaches in_ Moscow _ It is neither in alphabetical order nor chronological according to date or service in Moscow: It is, however in "descending order_of: rank; from [Colonef'MICKELSON through 06 8t Captains MULE nd [TRouD] to Chief Marrant Officer CARDELLA 06 #l 06 MICKELSON 1 NOSENKO" correctly identified Earl L MICKELSON as a_ [olonel and the Attacha in Moscow during 1954 ana 1955 PANKRATOV was the case Officer originally handling MICKELSON; 06 and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. Nhen asked about: agents: who might have: been working againstMTCKELSON 0b 0 NOSENKO saia that: there was one cook a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall and MICKELSONs maid,06 whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA : In addition to these two the only other source reporting on [MTCKELSoN was 06 his; chauffeur whose name NOSENKO also did not remember 87 cal1357 TS No. 197124 Top : Secret Top 66) Arny 42/885 ~10 Copy ================================================== Page 96 ================================================== 4-0oooo Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca. 1953-June 1955) : NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about 06 MICKELSON from concealed microplones telephone taps or surveillance , and that no 'operationai approach or recruit- ment was attempted_ There was in fact_ 1 no interesting or derogatory information on MMICKELSON from any source 0 Comment: MICKELSON' was involvea in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which 5 NOSENKO has not reported_ In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge Of having photographed a bridge _ In August 1954 Ci (MICKELsON} was arrested again for illegal photo- graphy south of Kharkov; on this occasion he was hela for two hours before being released _ It is judged that such events particularly those staged by the KGB would be known to the KGB case officer responsible for the attache officer concerned MEARNS NOSENKO accurately identified Fillmore K MEARNS as MICKELSON S replacement and said that he was the responsi- Dle case officer_ There were two agents ana one operational contact working against(MEARNJ} jL Of these = 1 ITOSELKO coula recall: the name only_ Of NOVIKOVA , the same maid who reportea earlier on MICKELSON} cbBesides being told to attempt to over- b hear (MEARNST conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find , but She never overheard or found_anything of interest to the KGB _ NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS " personal effects Db were searched by the RGB while they Were being shipped to MoscOw from the United States and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed _ (NOSENKO has told this same story' about {MICKELSON. ) NOSENKO described 06 MEARNS as being more active 0t in Moscow than (MICKELSON had 06 been ana said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps _ 88 TS No. 197124 Secret Top 0d01358 Top Copy 1uxSr ================================================== Page 97 ================================================== Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca 1953-June- 1955) RICHARDS 0b NOSENKO correctly identified Ira B RICHARDS]as a [Zieutenant colone}who servea as an Assistant Army Attache]) 08 in Moscow The one agent reporting on[RICHARDS whom 'NOSENKOOG 'coula name was: the maid Mariya NEVEROVA KGB cryptonym "SHVEDOVA" but she had never provided any worthwhile information aboutSRICIARDS]Ut In' addition some Soviet drivers reported: on-iRICHARDs put nothing useful was obtained from them - i Coment:: RRICIARDS servea in; Moscow Erom July 1954 to July 1956 There was_ a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with-WEARNSLAb6: RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA: was his maid and idescribed her as a 'mousy I1 wonan who had a; heart attack during the: period she was employed by him an incident which was not recalled NOSENKO For about four months Of his Moscow tour 06 RTCHARDS} took Russian-language lessons Erom Ludmila GROMAKOVA: in his apartment During_ Ehese lessons RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and on? One Occasion had her record her speech on: his tape recorder GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time - In another Context NOSENKO named GROMAKOVA: as a KGB' agent: during- 1960-1962_ butqdid not_ relate her to(RICHARDS]-oK or to the: 1953-1955 perioa: RTCHARDSkidentified one "Volodya "' (the OxxfE7 Of Vladimir) as lis principal driver: About_ 62 years old in 1954_ Volodya 8 father was a rich_ jeweler in Moscow at the time Of the Revolution Volodya himself: was well educated and on one occasion while picnicking: outside Moscow he spoke intelligently with 89. 6001359 TS No. 197124 Top. Secret 410 by: Copy J6/6R ================================================== Page 98 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret EMBASSY SECTION S ca, 1953-June 1955) (AMERICAN Comment: KCcntingedbout the Revolution 1 propaganda and 66 media_ did not know Of Volodya news @IcHAROSE&? driver, was NOSENKO' s agent who , as NOSENKO ' s Own account. FELCHLIN identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a NOSENKO correctly Assistant Army Attachel in lieutenant colonell who served as and hence Moscow By far the most aggressive Of his { FGecHLIN seeveao} the object of "Special interest , NOSEIJKO s0i3[9552 until in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part 0f recall being declared persona non grata NOSENKO did not the. names of houghgeets thorgnt Eicuinfigettea have egaast a maid 0X oX FELCHLIN although Additionally NOSENKO Who woula have been a KGB of cars and 08 saia, the Assistant Army Attache? shared a the drivers and these were his agenEs _ Unable to .recall of FELCIILIN 5 expulsion _ 1 NOSENKO related it to 0X precise date Soviets stationed in the United States some event regarding decided to reply in kind_ for which the Soviet Government used to expel NOSENKO' was imprecise as to the pretext which 6X[FELCHLIN; but: said the action was based on egfonaaticidehtal had: been accumulated from a number Of sources ana For example @FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photo- graphs and a report had been written; along with other of Similar indications of (EELCHLIN' s activities and reports in contact with EELCHLIN the report was filed away agents - future use NOSENKO was questioned further on for possible the February 1965 interrogations He said EhecHthal rELcALfhe alone had been declared non grata; X Ehen that attaches had been "Excidede =6o3. NOSENKO and that no other concerning this action explained his having but Seaceetates NosEeKOingd transferred by the fact that it took place after in from the American Department to the Seventh_Department 1955 _ NOSENKO knew nothing of (FELCHLIN s background. June 90 0001360 TS No. 197124 Secret by agene . pool (G/& Top Copy ================================================== Page 99 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY: SECTION ca 1953-June 1955) Comment ~ELCHLIN] visited the USSR as a merchant and a: diplomatie_ courier beforemerchvitgseaman July 1953 as Zan AssiSEant Army Attache in_ served in the latter capaci for one OXHe until July: 1954 when he was expelled yeHe had previously servea in Austria ana Nest Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU ' officers at both posts , as well as in the United States_ During his entire tour in; Moscow he was the object of intense KGB surveillance Shortly after his arrival in September 1953 FELCHLIN with fellowfAssistant Attache] 0X Martin J MANHOFF and Ewo.ir _Force Attaches Eook a train trip to Siberfa_ the ~first permitted, such Americans in many Years Six months later on 25 March 1954 the Soviet newvspaper: Trud_carried an article falsely alleging that[EELCHLILand his companions had lost some documents It on the train On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache , FFELCHLIN returned toOY his train compartment to find 2 scantily clad Soviet female in his berth _ NOSENKO recalled neither of these: incidents In June 1954, While in the company Of Lieutenant Colonel EjJ YEAGER an AgsiStanto6 Army Attache,FELCHLINwas arrested in Kiev by a Soviet officer for photographing mili target (NOSENKO has a YEAGERs: nane when tola the 'BameverdMeskeaned Tor an identification_ NOSENRO asked had heard iband that he said that he the Air Attache] ) thought YEAGER was 6 af A large crowa Gathered and ter some Jostling FFELCHLIN and} YEAGER were 06 taken to a Militia station where_ ordered to sign a - confession _ were eleven hours _ and their They were held arrest caused the American Ambassador to: deliver a 'strong protest notef6-EFELCILIN was told on 3 July 1954 to depart Ehe Soviet_ Union_within 48 hours Major Walter A McKINNEY the [American Aizho6 91 0001361 TS: No. 197124 Top Secret 10 7/gr Top ty Army trip spy ' 06,6 Army: tary they Copy ================================================== Page 100 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca, 1953-June 1955) Comment: (Continued) Attache ana one of FELCHLIN S travelling tI companions at the time the spY notes were allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same time Ambassador Bohlen success- fully insisted , against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCILIN and McKINNEY out_ In 06, 06 February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN] 06 lefta NOSENKO said he could not , inasmuch _ as he was no longer in the American Department at the time Told that the expulsion took place in 1954 , MOSENKO said this was not the correct date_ Queried concerning SHNYRYEV RRICHARDS] and FELCILIN] immediately recognized his phoEograph and name as one of the chauffeurs assigned to the office 0f the Army Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV_ Fe remarked that the Attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy (Nicholas the First) or " 'Nikolay Vtoroy II (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from another chauffeur with the same name FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV 06 drove primarily Tor the Army Attache himself but sometimes drove for the Assistant Army Attaches and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds and had continuing chest or lung trouble_ Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem_ 6 NOSENKO saia he was not_ aware of any 06 FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDQROVA was in her 50 ' s _ [hen she spoke with FELCHLIN 06 about a job_ she asked for about 120 rubles a month , which seemed excessive so FELCHLIN 06 offered 80 _ FEDOROVA refused and Ieft_ Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English Other maids came to the back door of [FELCHLIN S apartment to "chat" withO6 her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA . 1 FELCILIN teased her about it_ 92 0001362 TS No. 197124 Top Secret I3/R Top Copy ================================================== Page 101 ================================================== Top Secret 0 AMRICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca 1953-June 1955) 0 Comment: (Continued) FEDOROVA S Previous ' employer at the. Embassy gave. her full name: to columnist Drew Pearson with a_ statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss Ji of the Embassy net- f work Bearson printed the allegation: In the sumer of 1953 or 1954 according to[ELCHLIN; the maid approachedFFETCULIN-with the article M wavea it in his face ana accused hin of being Pearson S source NOSENKQO did not recognize FEDOROVA S name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident BENSON NOSENKO correctly identified his; target-EJohn S BENSON as a major and (AssiStant Army Attache] in Moscow He did 'pX 06 seia Ehe names of any agents; working_against-(BENSON but RQE said thatGBENSON] was: with(MULE and) STRQUD (see below) Gin 06,06 J0;,OEtsringzad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic spying" devices _ They were declared persona non grata The KGB had no other derogatory infor- mation onABENSONEfrom any other source STROUD NOSENKO ' correctly identified [ilriam R STRou] as a captainand an Assistant Attache] 0The only agents conceafedggicso him were Ehe Army At€ache drivers From 1 microphones thle KGB learned before STRouD] S 0 arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use Of electronic_spying apparatus; Ie' was with ABENSON and MULEL '06706 ID~inistaringraa and was declared persona non' grata along with 1 them (see below) Other than this _ NOSELKQ Said the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from source 0001363 93 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 10 CQ1RR Army any Copy ================================================== Page 102 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN CMBASSY SCCTION ca- 1953-June 1955) 06 Comment: STROUD with BENSOIT and MULE was the victim Of tile Soviets seizure of Eechnical equip- ment in {Stalingrad and was declared persona_/0 non grata on 7 May 1955 On 31 January 1955 0) he travelled to Kharkov fron Moscow with First Secretary Frank SISCOL; to interview an AmericanU defector living there According to NOSENKO _ ObGIscOr was suspected by_ the KGB of being a CIA 6fficer_ The visit of ex-FBI agent SISCOEL and 0806 a military fficer to an American defector is judged to be an event in which the KGB would have_ taken interest ana one which the Attache S KGB case officer would find memorable W 06 NOSENKO correctly identified Nalter MULE as an OX@ssistant . Army Attacha and as such Said that he was the case officer responsible for him NOSENKO described an operational 06 approach to(MULE in which he himself participated: In 1953 Or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States with the promise Of money and a new life_ After the KGB_ Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures MULE was selected .06He was on ly a captaln despite his lengthy service in the Army and infor- mation Trom concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other Attaches When [VULE received lettersl from home , he threw them in the trash and the maids turned these_ovef to the KGB _ From this mail it was understood Olthat MULE did not have a house in the United states but lived with his_ family in a trailer_ The father of two Cchilaren_ MULE _ had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for an abortion as a third chila would have imposed too great an economic burden On the basis Of all this the KGB appointed N.Mg BORODIN a recruiter of the American Depart- ment. to attempt to defect [ur]l& Together with BORODIN KOVSIIUR _ and L.A= LEBEDEV (Erom the Second Chief Directorate' s special technical section) NOSEITKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation _ LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MMULE' s hotel roon 94 0j01364 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy In/gr ================================================== Page 103 ================================================== Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SFCTION ca 1953-June 1955): 06 and BORODIN entered the room: to await kMULE S return [hen 06 MuLE]started to enter the' room , he 'caughtgight of BORODIN ana tried to back Out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape_ BORODIN O6reviewed forkMULE the facts the RGB.had accumulated about his lack 0f success in_ the:-Army the disdain of his fellow Attaches and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a consultant Ii BORODIN had either S5 ,000 or S10,000: in an envelope to_ encourage MULE to accept- According66 to NOSENKO , `{MULE refused outright, telling BORODIIT to out Comment MMULE reported this incident He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL , who offered hin S10 000 for "work" on a long-range basis . SIEGAL emphasized that MULE]wouia not be; required to 06 procure documents from the Embassy _ and Okconcezning) according_ to_MMULEL SIEGAL was aware of facts FMUEq S< personal life that coula have_been Obtained only from listening devices 06 in[Murg S: apartment or Office_ SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes having warned WULE] not 0( to report the incident_ MULE] identified SIEGAL/BORODIN `by photograph; " but was eaableeo identify NOSENKO KGB lack of: interest in- recruitments which NOSENKO elsewhere cited to" explain his ignorance of the personal backgrounds Qf his Army Attache_ I targets 1. is belied by the] MULE case 06 IJ BETISON MEE ana: STROUD Expulsion Erom the Soviet Union After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Seventh (6: Department in 1955 ,([BENSON MULEH and FSTROUD]were the targetsb of a KGB operation Which resulted in alr three men being declared persona non grata: NOSENKO gave the following account Of this incident: For some time the Second- Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of 95 C8u1385 TS -No. .197124 Top Secret 10 Top get 06,06 Copy I/Rr ================================================== Page 104 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca 1953-June 1955) electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers were known to be using during their travels inside the Soviet Union As early as the beginning of 1954 the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Committee .of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from the Americans provided that the success of such an operation was assured Before his transfer to the Seventh Department in 1955 NOSENKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attempt to seize the equipment frqm an Attache at a railroad station outside MoscOw [hilel BErson MULE traaterQ6;' ana 06 66 STROUD were on one Of their trips (after NOSEMKO S it was learned that they had the equipment with them and the KGB decided to take it from them in (talingrad:I0 The hotel rooms of BENSON OSTROUD (MuLz were watched constantly Erom a visual Observation post and it noted that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a pillow before they began to eat_ While they were seated at the table having dinner therefore the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to partially cover the illegality of tthvg act, it was decided to make a show of expelling(BENSON MULE and (SrRoun] from the 06 Soviet Union ana' this was done by havingithe Foreign Ministry declaring each persona non grata- Comment: The was seized from BENSON MULE and 88o8g orment= on 5 1955 and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May . 1 a month before NOSENKO Claimed to have transferred to the Seventh Department when the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level , that he did not directly participate in it_ but that he had been involved in the earlier planning_ to seize the equipment. It was pointed out to him that he had always said he Was in the Seventh Department at the time of this operation and that he had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Seventh Department in June 1955 _ NOSENKO offered no comment 96 Izjrr 0001366 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top Bna ~Owas May: Copy ================================================== Page 105 ================================================== Top Secret 1 AMERICAN_ EMBASSY SECTION ca 1953-June 1955) [ CARDELLA 06 NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there Was a 0 civilian administrative officer in the Embassy by the name of Uames CARDELIA D6 The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source and NOSENKO coula say nothing more about him_ Comment: As a member of the Army Attache ' s staff CARDELLA-also would have_been NOSENKO ' s. target: 0L: [Chief_Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in 'Moscow from September 1953 untii June 1955_ In 1964 a microphone was discovered in the Embassy office CARDELIA] had occupied _ The nicrophone was 6 believed to have: been ` emplaced in 1952 . See P 227 VAN LAETHEM 06 06 OXNOSENKO_incorrectly identified Eeorge VAIT LAETHEM as an CAssistant Air Attachelat the Embassy against whom an operation was attempted in; 1953 Or 1954 _ He saia that B during this period: a Russian actress Alla LARIONOVA , was placed on a train: going from Berlin to MOscow with the mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEMOL which: could be followed up in MOscow _ She succeeded in D 'meeting him: and' gave him her address ana telephone number Although she was certain that 'she woula hear from. him , he never did call her in Moscow _ NOSENKO said that he had: 4 heard 'about this Erom P .F PANKRATOV , the case Officer handling LARIONOVA . Ie added that_ CFURAIIOV was the case Officer re_ sponsible for (VAN LAETHEM along with other 06 members of thefAir Attacha" S office at that time NOSENKO knew of no other KGB interest in or activity concerning' VAN LAETHEM 06 97 8001367 TS: No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 FJRe ================================================== Page 106 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca 1953-June 1955) Coment: VAN LACTIE] was not an Air AttacheO& put an Assistant Army_AEtache- EEeacsga8tezing in Moscow fron ilarcin 1951 to Marci 1953 Winen VAN LAETHB D completed his two-year tour in HOSCOiv in Nrc_) 1953 (when NOSENKO said ne entered the KGB) he was succeeded by Nalter AULE_ for wilom NOSENKO has claimed responsi- bilfty_ The fact tnat ne was Assistant Armyox Attache and QULE" gpredecessor s-1ould be klown to the responsible KGB case officer in this case_ NOSENRO _ As (Cryptograpilic security 6X officer] and officer in charge of the Embassy (el [ode_ room VAN LAETHET had supervisory respon- Sibility for tie mili code clerks and mec_anics including Dayle SHIITH and he was on fairly close personal terms witil Sergeant Roy RIIODES until VAN LAETHEM S departure from 06 MOscow in Marcn 1953_ WAN LAETHEi7' s Juties 06 also included responsibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy _ VAN LAETHEH was again in Moscow from 19 Marc to 19 1955 Wilen NOSENKO claims to iave been tine KGB case officer for Army Attacies _ Altilougil this visit was a temporary as- signment _ it was represented to the Soviets as a permanent assignent_ of an Assistant Army Attache (and thus presumably NOSENKO ' s tar- get) because of the sensitive nature of his duties He was project officer for the entire signals collection program at tie Embassy and ne went to MOscO1 to review the program including tae planned use of te new electronic equipnent Wich was seized from BENSON MULE 06,06 and ETROUD"in Etalingradin @ay 1955 (wiilefy 08 TAN LAETFEI was stiii in Moscow) NAN LAETHEH 06 stated tiat no meeting suCh as the one IJOSENKO described with LARIONOVA ever occurred 98 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top Eary May only 0001368 Copy 07/8 ================================================== Page 107 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca 1953-June 1955) Additional Reporting Knowledge of another KGB eperation involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the American Embassy Section, against CIA officer and Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see p = 37 ) NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in the 86 operations against E.E_ SMITH in 1954-19553 The incidents which NOSENKO described however occurred in June 1956_ by which time NOSENKO , by his own account had been out of the American Embassy Section for a year and when he was involved in the Seventh Department recruitment of [RicharaO6 BURGI His involvement in the[BURGI case has been confirmed . NOSENKO has also described the KGB recruitment of military cipher machine mechanic M ANDREY II (Dayle SMITH , see p . 33 ) whose true name he claimed not to have known _ He dated the recruitment a8 occurring in 1949-1950" and "before he joined the KGB" although he said that he knew of the existence of the agent during his first tour in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955. However NOSENKO also related that 1i I6 ANDREY was recruited while Roy RHODES was in Moscow that RHODES II had spotted ANDREY Ii Ii ANDREY" and RHODES oVer- lapped in Moscow from April 1952 to July 1953 I ANDREY " fixes his Own recruitment as occurring in December 1953 and until his departure in April 1954 he was responsible for the entire Embassy code room In that capacity 0 ANDREY- II was a direct subordinate of the Army Attache Cryptographic security officer NOSENKO S target Grmy Captain Walter MULE} 06 If NOSENKO served in the 'Embassy Section during 1953-1955 as he claimed _ it .is difficult to perceive how he could have remained unaware of 0 ANDREY identity- American Embassy Section ca . 1953-June_1955: Sumary and Conclusion According to NOSENKO _ immediately upon entering on with the KGB he was assigned without training to what he describes as the most sensitive and important section Of the Second Chief Directorate_ There , after first handling agents covering American corre spondents resident in Moscow_ 1 99 TS No. Top Secret Copy 10 Slkr Top 'S " duty 4SL+94594 ================================================== Page 108 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca. 1953-June 1955) he was made the case officer solely responsible for opera- tions against the commissioned officers of the Embassy S Army Attache office until his transfer to the Seventh Department. Alleging: complete knowledge of all service attache operations 7 NOSENKO Elatly asserts that there were no KGB recruitments of American mili personnel during the period Of his assignment to the Embassy Section Pertinent to the consideration of NOSENKO ' s statements is his reluctance to discuss the 1953-1955 period and his inconsistent accounts of the dating and circumstances of his entry into the Embassy Section 0f his assumption Of responsibility as sole case officer for Army Attache tar- gets and of his transfer to the Seventh Department . Al- though NOSENKO could plausibly claim failing memory to ex- plain some areas of ignorance he does not do SO_ Instead , he is positive and insistent that his statements about his targets are a factual and complete account Of what was then known to the KGB His assertion that the KGB was not in- terested in his targets vulnerability to recruitment is belied by his Own statements as well as the MULE case ,06 as he himself related it_ He is uninformed about both At- tache personnel and agent-informants who , by his own ac- count _ were his targets and his agents _ Conclusion NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the March 1953-June 1955 period as he claimed . Specifically, he neither entered the Section in March 1953 nor transferred Erom the Section in June 1955 _ In whatever period he may have served _ he was not the sole case Officer responsible for comissioned officers in the office 0f the Army Attache _ Unaware of many aspects of KGB activities involving Army personnel and by his own account not involved with either Air Or Naval Attache personnel Or diplomats NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB re- cruited no American Embassy personnel during this period_ 100 0001370 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Vkk Top tary by Copy ================================================== Page 109 ================================================== Secret CHAPTER VI SIVEWEN DT PARTN?M' (June 1235-January 1960) Coznent: ~#OSTIKO S clained Saconr Chief Directorate service curing 1955-1960' in Flich he was involved :ith Seventl Departrent operations against Imerican and 'ritish tourists coin- cides #iti' the grokti of: a suistantial Tuerican and Sritis ]Intelligence progran aimed at 'exploiting Eourists visiting; the Soviet Urion _ Jcgimning in 1956 the growth of tourisn Whiicn followed the post-Stalin tliaiv in tile USS3 had growr to the point where it coulal be Use fully exploited CIA: Initially returning American tourists Ivere debriefed on tileir experiences in the Soviet Union anc particularly with regard to their acquaintances there with Soviet citizens: who might Je susceptille to eventual recruitment: Gradually, leads were 'Zeveloped to Americans planning to Visit the USSR, and from among these, agents were selected, trained in clandestine operational techniques briefed on intelligence requirements _ and instructea how to icentify and develop potential agents from arong their Soviet contacts Fhe American agents: performea a variety of clan - J destine tasks including passive assessment of Soviet candicates for recruitment= propa ganda activities_ and infiltrating equipment 0 ioading deaddrops or nailing letters bearing secret writing al1 destined for CIA agents in tlle; Soviet Union. Zhe program reached its"' heigiit in 1959 the end 0f: which over one hundred and fifty agents under tourist cover from CIA alone: ad perforred missions in the USSR;- by 101 C801371 TS No. 197124 10 Top Secret URR Top by hy Copy ================================================== Page 110 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVEIJTII DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Comnent: (Continued) then a substantial number of similar missions had also been launched by American military intelligence organizations and by the @British}l( and allied services _ It is a matter of fact, not of conjecture that as early as 1957 a large number of these agents were coming to the attention of the KGB within the Soviet Union _ Few were arrested _ Instead _ all were surveilled= ana some pro- vokea or en trapped = as the Second Chief Directorate and its provincial KGB counter- intelligence elements sought to identify the Soviet citizens with whom the American agents were in contact_ as well as the agents specific clandestine tasks the summer 0f_ 1959 the KGB had obtained from its British agent George BLAKF: _ complete details of;_the objectives and methods of CIA and Britishi Intelligence tourist programs together with a_ number of case examples It is within this context that one must examine NOSENIO S clains to KGB service in and consequent knowledge of Second Chief Directorate counterintelligence operations against American and British tourists in 1955- 1960 NOSENKO claimed he served with the Seventh Department from June 1955 until January 1960 _ According to him, the Seventh Department exercised counterintelligence functions involving foreigners then visiting the Soviet Union including businessmen seanen foreign delegations and sone tourists as wel1 as the hoteis and restaurants utilized by these visitors He said that by 1958 _ however the number reign tourists visiting the Soviet Union had grown appreciably and in June 1958 the Seventh Department Tourist Section was split, and two new sections were created _ NOSENKO explained that one of the new sections became 102 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret 2 'Fk BY 0.01372 Copy ================================================== Page 111 ================================================== Secret (SEVEITI:' DIPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) responsible for: coun terintelligence operations against American and British Comnonwealth conducted other section was charged with all nationals the other nationalities. It is 'convenient to divide the examination claims to service in the Seventh of NOSEMKO ' s periods The first of these Department into two 1955 until June 1958 _ covers the years from June case officer,handling and which NOSENKO said' he was a lities and Planning and recrui agents of all nationa- ties_ The second geziodmaovg;sS_oS.er operational activi- 1958 when he; clained to covers ITOSCNKO ' & service from June newly-Created' American have becone Deputy Chief Of the beginning 0f 1960 _ ZBritish Commonwealth Section , to the IOSENKO ' described his personal and direct in Seventhl Department operations participation half years as including; during tliis four and one- targettfegrthemng and handling Soviet citizen agents and agentura varied Zgaiunbe American tourists_ LTOSENKO ' s most Of whon were- number from eight to fourteen agents _ enployees Of Inturist; ~Mounting operations against fifteen principally Americans_ in thgasovietiUteen. foreigners to be: utilized ~Recruiting a pair %f Soviet homosexuals as agents nanaged tlizedingffostthezeigecrcicmenta; targets _ NOSETKO until tleir retirement recruitment in 1957 and 1958 in 1962 or 1963 Recrui and handling_rsene FRIPPEL the / 06 topneez meet_ Companyirepresentative in Moscow FNOSENKOAGontcnued [RIEREOFeven after 'the latter continued Moscow to New York ana after' NOSENTKO was transferred from tlie: Seventh Department.) was transferred from Fron personal involvement or otherwise NOSEITKO that he learned Of all the important clained against Anerican touristsedurpogtthtsoperioions Cosducted Department service_ period of his Seventh 103 0001373 TS No. 197124 Secret' 10 L Top during ting ting; Top Copy: Ilce ================================================== Page 112 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTE DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) NOSENKO S Soviet Agents The Seventh Department Tourist Section, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-l955_ had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists Consequently NOSENKO said he and the other case officers had to "start from the beginning" As a first step NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow Ii It officer to a number of trusted persons in Inturist_ These were not agents he explained , but "just persons a TGB man coula approach with questions about somebody or something" NOSENKO collected_ information on these and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitments By the end of 1955 , he estimated , he had a network of about eight agents all Of them Inturist interpreters During the following four years _ the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied _ Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another, some woula leave Inturist, and 1i things were sort Of changing all the time back and forth" In 1956 NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents in 1957 there were about twelve in 1958 about eight, 'and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately twelve The substance of IOSFNKO ' s descrip- tion of his agents is as follows : Larissa SOBOROVA An Inturist_English-language interpreter SOBOROVA was one Of Ehe first agents recruited in 1955 by NOSENKO within Inturist She reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as an interpreter She worked with NOSENKO when he servea as a guide for British subjects BIRSE and LANE in 06 06 the summer of 1957 During 1957-1959 she was involved and possibly sexually intimate with American travel Writer 06,66 Horace SUTTON_ SOBOROVA was NOSENKO ' s agent until 1959_ Ft when she married and retired 0001374 104 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy Sigk ================================================== Page 113 ================================================== QOQOQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMEITT June 1955-January 1960)_ Comment: SOBOROVA was an Inturist guide: for a number of American tourists including CIA agents between 1957 and 1959 TSUTTON has ideetified 06 her_ In 1959' she was the head of all English- language: interpreters at Inturist headquarters in the: National Hotel Moscow. Vladinir MUROMTSEV MUROMTSEV _ KCB cryptonym' Ii IEECDEV" was recruited by NOSENKO fxom Inturist in 1955 . He was IOSENKO' s agent: until called into the army in about 1959_ when- he was sent to a Soviet Air Force Academy in Central Asia to serve as an interpreter with 'Syrian students there : During that: period his file was hela by the KGB organization in Central Asia- Mhen he returned to Moscow he was re-employed by the KGB Secona Directorate Comment: NOSENKO nas said elsewhere that MUROMTSEV had been a Second Chief_ Directorate agent: "since 1958 It implying that someone eise recruited" hin and that he thus coulc not have_ been NOSEMKO S agent in 1955 . MUROMTSEV was identified in 1957 as an Inturist guide by two CIA sources Nikolay ROGOV ROGOV KGB cryptonym OZERO" was recruited in 1955 He F had " been formerly a confidential contact" Of the KGB _ He worked in the central Inturist office which assigned inter- preters to: British and American citizens visiting the USSR COU1375 105 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy' _ 1O ikr_ ================================================== Page 114 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Comment: CIA records refer only to one Alexander ROGOV who in 1960 was a senior official at the main Inturist office in the Hotel National in Moscow _ Nataliya SHULGINA SHULGINA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955 NOSENKO knew Ehat double agent Boris BELITSKIY [see P.282] reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA Coment: KGB-controlled CIA source BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent: CIA dia not warn hin_ SHULGINA was for two years the secretary-interpreter of NBC correspondent Irving R LEVINE after his arrival in Moscow in July 1955 She servea as a guide for an American musical troupe S visit in the USSR in 1956 and in 1956 ana 1957 she served as a for American tourists in MOscow _ According to BELITSKIY she was involved in the sexual entrapment and KGB recruitment of [British MP 06 Tom DRIBERT] NOSENKO ' s apparent ignorance of SHULGINA S involvement with LEVINE and other Americans 0 as well as with DRIBERG and of her0b foreign travel, belies his claim Ehat she was his agent during the 1955-1958 pertod. Shown her photograph in 1964 NOSENKO` failed to recognize it_ !hen he was then given her name , he. identified her not as his former: agent but just as a Second Chief Directorate agent once involved with BELITSKIY _ 106 TS No. 197124 Top Secret guide '0001376 Copy 2Ikk ================================================== Page 115 ================================================== Top Secret 0 (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June. 1955-January 1960) @ Tamara KUNGAROVA 5 KUNGAROVA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955 _ In 1957. 'or 1959 she was involved in a' KGB sexual entrapment operation Of an American professor bfJohn THOMSON] but there was no attempt to recruit him_ Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was targetted against American tourist 'and . suspect CIA agent @hilip_NIELSEI]] 03 (see" p:420) KUNGAROVA married NIELSENJand emigrated to England_ and: the KGB was still interested in [NIELSEN] at: 03. the time NOSENKO left the Seventh Department_ 4 Comment Elsewhere NOSENKO has; said` KUNGAROVA was an agent' who` came to the Seventh Department from- the British Commonwealth Department in 1957 or early 1958.: If true he coula not have recruited her Or have been her case officer in : 3 NheLS?5 S95c1s67 PoSiodo indidetegibeng 'Gitself was not involved ana' although: he 'commented on KUNGAROVA S role' he_ never mentioned that she was: or had been his agent KUNGAROVA was interviewed' by the FBI on the basis_ of NOSENKO ' s information and she confirmed that she had been; 06 intimate with THOMPSON} while {serving as an Enturist guiae as Well as with other Americans She denied however that she had ever colla- boratea with the KGB KUNGAROVA : died in 1965 _ : Aleksandr A. DMITRIYEV DMITRIYEV _ KGB ' cryptonym TOMO" when NOSENKO recruited him in 1958; , was a candidate member of the USSR Academy: of Sciences and a specialist on Japan and Thailand _ Ke Japanese and English and worked at the: Japanese' Exhibition in MoscOw. He was used against British and American nationals DMITRIYEV was also used against, communications 107 00C1377: TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Lolbr 0,os spoke Copy ================================================== Page 116 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) personnel at the Japanese Exhibit, but while he telephoned NOSENKO , he was meeting with another KGB case officer. DMITRIYEV accompanied a sports delegation to Norway and a Soviet circus to Japan Comment: DMITRIYEV ' s travel to Norway and Japan in 1958 is confirmed _ From NOSENKO ' s own statement he was aware of DMITRIYEV ' s activities but he was not his case officer (Fnu) IVANOV Once a recruited agent in the Baltic area when IVANOV moved to Moscow the' provincial KGB suggested he might be Of some use in the capital IVANOV was a lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade when NOSENKO became his case officer IVANOV was later turned over to the British Commonwealth Department which 'planted him in the British Trade Mission or some thing like that" Comment: CIA records contain no reference identifiable with IVANOV _ Marina RYTOVA RYTOVA , KGB cryptonym I KRYMOVA " was turned over to NOSENKO by another Seventh Department case officer, I.A= KONSTANTINOV in 1956 or 1957_ She was educated at the Military Institute Of Foreign Languages where she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages Ehen NOSENKO became her case officer she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow _ She continued this job until about 1960 _ when she became an instructor in the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations She reported to NOSENKO information 108 0801378 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top Copy ================================================== Page 117 ================================================== Ooooo Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January '1960) which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow ana on foreign delegates attending meetings at' the Ministry of Agriculture- where she 'served as an interpreter in English and Greek RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for Khrushchev and once participated in a conversation he had with the Iowa farmer [Roswell] GARST In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as an_ interpreter with a small' delegation visiting GARST s' 'farm in the United States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Nashington to_ report observations made enroute: and while there RYTOVA was .married to a captain or major who works in a military office in Moscow _ She had one daughter approximately 14 years ola Coment RYTOVA served as: an interpreter for Roswell GARST in the USSR in 1955 1959 and 1963 and she visited the U.S. in 1958 and 1962 Her biographic' data is consistent: with the infor-. mation related NOSENKO_ Yevgeniya; ("Jane) DANKo DANKO KGB cryptonym "OKSANA workea in the American Express Company Office in Moscow for AArsene FRIPPEL]O (NOSENKO S: agent; see P 137) and later for FFRIPRELFs 06 successor (Michael JELISAVCIC O< NOSENKO took DANKO over from Seventh Department case officer I.A: KONSTANTINOV in 1955-1957 She was usea to report on JELISAvco Comment DANKO was an Inturist guide in 1956 _ 1958 ana 1959 and she was working for the_Americanz? Express Company office_in 1960 db-ERIPPEL]left Moscow in 1961, by- which time NOSENKO had transferred from the Seventh Department 6861379 109 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top by 7868 Copy ================================================== Page 118 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Soviet Homosexual Agents The KGB operations which NOSENKO involved sexual entrapment described commonly which he claimed a of the operations in sexual agents KGB personal role involved the use of homo - against gesceptiGkeagelts whose homosexuality was exploited their officiai case male targets _ While NOSENKO was never entrapment officer in specific recruitment- "SIB YAK" operations It Ii he worked with "LUCH" If NIKOLAYEV" 'KOSHIKIN and II STROYEV" (Victor used in the compromise of Richard BELANOVSKIY _ Canadian Ambassador NATKINS) BURGH_ VASSALL , and the 06 personality information He provided virtually no their true names _ on them and usually could not recall ana YEFREMOV_ EOSENKQO such homosexuals however . VOLKOV claimed were his own agents NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited agent (cryptonym II SHMELEV" ) VOLIOV 1 a former (cryptonyn II GRIGORIY" and recruited YEFREMOV officer from the ) and to have been their sole case 1958 until beginning of their KGB careers in 1957 - become too well were discharged in 1963 because had and directed known _ He said he met them them in at least a dozen Erequently or other homosexual encounters _ entrapment operations them with him when he NOSENKO claimed he took in 1960 and Dackeagaentfnnefefyeds to the American Department Department_ in 1962 to the Seventh YEEREMQV ana VOLKQV publicBecilee he had been seen meeting a toilet in Moscow NOSENKO foreigner in a that A_ I VOLKOV-might be said the KGB concluded operational value a homosexual and hence of sOme homosexual agent of the verify this possibiliey in 1957 , a Department provoked VoeKOosfotoCziginal Investigations Then ` VOLKOV 1 who had into a compromi situation at this time inacbadepreasossncbeen a KGB agent but was NOSENKO interrogated was summoned by the KGB and after agreed to NOSENKO ' him, he admitted his homosexuality ana S proposal to work for the KGB among 0001380 110 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Vrr Top Many they they early sing Copy ================================================== Page 119 ================================================== Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) homosexuals _ VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the folloving Year to recruit a homosexual acquaintance Aleksey (patronymic not recalled) YEFREMOV _ The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO ' s direction; in addition to specific targets they had the general assign- ment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the purpose of spotting possible homosexuals _ NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: Ii Although I am a chief 0f section there I have all sorts of agents I have a good agent apparatus I have beautiful girls , whom I can use as I like I have homosexuals in particu- lar, one special pair_ I am afraid they are known to both you and the British I permitted this pair to work [without specific assignments ] on their own I give them money and tell them to go look arouna but Americans Look for American pederasts _ call me at night: Ivanovich_ There is a_ mister so-and-so here I say: Nell 0 let him [do what he wants] We ' 11 talk about it tomorrow So the next day they go' to a special hotel room We make photographs _ Then we think about what he represents Is he worth it? Then as Chief I recommend that he be recruited or not--depending on his position , what he can give 1 what he can tell If he can give some thing, I say: Well, let s have a go [igrat] After this , I speak to these Well go with hin again Do whatever is wanted All this is observed by the KGB : The [hotel] administrator enters _ [Jhat are you doing? The administrator calls the Militia_ An akt is drawn up . Well, you are a foreigner_ This is not our business Me don t know what to do_ with you Then the Chief arrives and a conversation ensues : Listen what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now on the basis of recent legislation , by up to eight - Understand if your friends find out that you are a pederast-- and how can they but find out 1ll TS No. 197124 Top Secret ~1 Top only They Yuriy boys : help 0801381 Copy ================================================== Page 120 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) When NOSENKO moved from the Seventh Department to the Second Chief Directorate S American Departnent in January 1960 , he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him_ were never used against targets in the American Embassy but , NOSENKO said_ the Seventh Department "used to call me on homosexual prospects' 6 VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB 'agents until some time in 1960 or 1961- After they were employed once more [against W.E. JOHNSON in 0 January 1962] it was decided that they were #too well known I} NOSENKO claimed that the agents were retired and that he himself sent their_ files to KGB Archives in 1962 or 1963 _ NOSENKO 8 Soviet Agents: Summary NOSENKO claims to have been these agents case officer for two to five years during which he met each regularly, assigned them operational tasks and received their reports _ With the exception Of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV however 1 NOSENKO can cite few instances of their operational use and he has but superficial knowledge of their personal backgrounds _ It i8 unlikely that this is merely the result of failing recollection_ He knows no more about the three whom he claimed he took with him to the Embassy Section where he continued to be their case officer for two more years , than he does about the others _ In the two instances where his agents were involved in KGB operational activity NOSENKO is unaware of SHULGINA S work with LEVINE and DRIBERG_ and was not involved when KUNGAROVA was targetted againse and married CIA agent Philip NIELSEN_ NOSENKO ' s familiarity with the nine agents he named appears to be that which would be acquired second-hand , not through personal contact as he claimed _ With respect to YEFREMOV and VOLKOV the evidence does not sustain NOSENKO ' s claim that he was their case officer in every operation from their recruitment in 1957 until their retirement in 1962-1963 He is unfamiliar with either agent 5 background He cannot say where either Of them lived or indeed how he got in touch with them when he required their services With the exception Of the[Tv.E. 06 JOHNSON |compromise in 1962 (see p.268) 0 all of VOLKOV S and 0001382 112 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 4k2 They 08,03 Copy ================================================== Page 121 ================================================== OOOQQ Top Secret (SEVEMTTHI DEPARTMENZ June 1955-January 1960) YEFRFMOV ' s. known activities with respect to Americans took place; in the ;course "Of less than Ewelve months in 1959- 1960 It_ is probable that IOSENKO ' s: claim_ that: he was their sole case . officer: during even . this relatively brief period is also, false: In the Period April- lovember 1959 apparently unknown to NOSENKO; , VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were involved with one Dutch and five American visitors (including three' CIAragents) in. thle Soviet Union Further in other contexts IJOSEETKQ has described their involvement Oith 0C Anericans MATLAW (see P.419 ) and ( KARLOVI in 1959 _ Of_ wlich NOSLITO" only learnec: when_he_ retired VOLKOv ' s and YEEREMOV ' s file in' 1962-1963 . YIKARLOV was a Swedish _ not an American_ citizen_ J 06 Operational Activities 1955-1958) Tourist Section Case OEficer According to"ROSINKO_ ie was among; the first 'case officers to arrive in tle {Seventh Department Tourist: Section when it was being formed; He_ took part With other officers in the acquisition of an agent network from :within Inturist in' the establislment of, facilities ana methods and generally "getting things' going" After several months he;partici pated in wllat ie_ says was his first operation against: an American tourist' This Ivas'" NOSENEO s behind-the-scenes (ana hence_ unconfirmed) and unsuccessful attempt to compro- mise; American student Martin MALI4Ob:NOSTIIO " 'S" next case (the first operation: in wilich his participation is confirmed) took place a_ year later in:' June 1956 when he assisted in the homosexual entrapment and recruitment 0f Professor Richard BURG]] Sometime in 1957 he: said he was personally involved in Ehe' attempted recruitment: of the kGerman] business- Il CGEIIRCKENSL and in tiwe sexual and: black-market: entrapment of 06: SUNDARL a Norwegianl journalist: [oth GGEURCKENgand EuNDAR] 06 admitted to having been tne, object of KGB recruitment attempts the former reluctantiy in a private interview and the latter publicly; in the press : It nlas been possible to 'question neither in detail.] NJOSENKO ' s presence in the I third operation in 1957 is_ confirmed: he accompanied the 113. 8001383 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 {lsk 06 Copy ================================================== Page 122 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTHI DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) 08,66 Rritish_ publisher Sir Allen LANE and the latter' s inter- preter IRSE on a tour of Soviet publishing houses According to NOSENKQ , it was for the purpose of observing 66 BIRSEL a suspected British intelligence ageng; Q Attempted Entrapment of MALIA] (1955) NOSENKO S Information Martin MALIA a graduate student , spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected by the KGB of having connections with American Intelligence Toward the end 0f his stay, while under surveillance MALIA was observed in 06 contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual- The Soviet was detained by the KGB and NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations CbwithJMALIA NOSENKO arranged for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent , and the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when( the introductions were made in a Moscow restaurane and from an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched 06 the KGB agent and MALIA in homosexual practices _ MALIA 0C insisted on the lights being turned off however and it was impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did not have infrared photographic equipment) and therefore no recruitment approach was made to MALID Db During this and a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious 06 and the KGB never succeeded in exploiting MALIA sl homo- sexuality for a recruitment approach. Comment: MALIA, a U.S Navy intelligence officer during Torld War II visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice in 1962 _ While buying books for the Library Qf Congress and . several universities in 1955 MALIA] travelled over 10 _ 000 miles throughoue the USSR, an event sufficiently unusual at the time to be publicized in the Soviet press On 1955 and 1962 trips he had contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and he smuggled to the West literature for publishing 0801384 114 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top yet Copy RsIGR ================================================== Page 123 ================================================== 008 Secret (SIVFETI DIPARTMEIFT June 1955-January 1960) Comnent: (Continued) 06 abroad In Deceriber 1963 MATIA}was the object of: an, attack in the Soviet press wilich charged that during 1962 he had 6i 'spent his: time in Mosocw looking for dissension in the ranks of 0 young intellectuals at drunken cebauches MALIA was then in periodic contact Mith CIA; 1nl Ehe spring of 1963 he: Zenied having had any involvement witli blackmarketeers homo_ sexuals or females inside the Soviet Union 06 MALIA has not been interviewec in: connec - tion With IOSEIKO ' s allegations Recruitment of BURGE] (1956) At the first meeting witil CIA in Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO gave a brief account of tile recruitment of Richard_BuRGI}; a 06 Yale professor zhe recruitment: was effected on the basis Of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow anc culminated witil an' approach_ in' Kiev in_ June 1956 This recruitment which occurred close in time to the death Of IJOSEiZRO 's fatiier was by NOSCMKO ' s later accounts a turning point in his personal and "professional: life_ Fron it, MOSENKO said ile acquired a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to {F grow I1 fron a wastrel into an;effective and successful_ KGD officer_ As a result of this operation,, the_ first successful recruitment in-the then slort iistory of the Tourist Section NOSEIIKO asserted he first came' into personal contact with General GRIBAITOV_ According to all accounts ne gave prior to October 1966 when ne retracted the claim, NOSEITKO received the first of a series Qf KGB awards for. operational performance because Obof the BURGI case--a letter Of commendation_ Within a month Of tnis operation NOSENKO, said; he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to_ captain_ 115 TS: No. 197124 Top Secret Top 0801385 J0_ Copy nkr ================================================== Page 124 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) NOSENKO S Information NOSENKO. stated that at the time of BURGI" s arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa) "maybe " an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI} s 06 anticipated date Of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union , and the results of file checks of the KGB main Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives . NOSENKO himself ran the file checks which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning 66 BURGI and since no other names were mentioned in the material available Qn BURGI) no other checks were made . The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that he was Ja professor of slavic studies] and therefore had contact with students who might eventually work for the U.S _ State Department , American Intelligence and for other target organizations _ NOSENKO did not recali who first suggested an attempt to recruit hin_ When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union he came in contact with a number of KGB agents _ ana their reports were placed in an informal file maintained by NOSENKO _ NOSEMKO could not recall how many such agents there may have been names or what they might have reported concerning tbrGr 06 (BuRGi] had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did not know Whether he was a RGB agent.) From some source name forgotten by NOSENKO the KGB obtained indications that OSBBURGI was a homosexual and it was decided to try to obtain grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise . NOSENKO therefore approached Yu, A LOPURHOV an officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY and asked permission to use BELANOVSKIY in setting up the compromise After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed hin to make BURGI} s acquaintance in a_ hotel dining room _ The fomphenise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met [URCI the fact of common homosexuality was recognized _ and BURGI was 66 invited to BELANOVSKIY 5 hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and directed the compromise although he did not meet BURGI at this time . 0001386 116 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 14,RR Copy ================================================== Page 125 ================================================== Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMEHT June ,1955-January 1960) As the result of NOSENKO s special request , the compromi 'photographs_ were ready bY the following A report of the compromise and a request: for: permission to attempt: recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO S superiors The request came back with the approving signatures of O:M_ GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV the Chief Of the American Department: of the First Chief Directorate_ 1 which had' expressed interest in;using [BuRGz] 06 in the United States 06 @uRGz 3itinerary called for him to from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and having called the Kiev KGB with instructions NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there to prepare the operation: BURGI arrived the next 06 morning and was met at the airport by fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY ,; an officer Of the Second; Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist cover In accordance 1 th the operational plan, the local KGB officer; toldC BURGT} enroute; to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at: the moment because of various conferences but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about . day in a private apartment in the center Of: town; he woula be moved to_ a hotel as soon as possible: Jhen the car arrived at the apartment 'bui:lding in Kiev NOSENKO , KOZLOV V-S_ PETRENKO = a local: KGB officer,_ 'ana: fnu) RASTYKAITE a woman housekeeper, were wai for then NOSENKO could not; 06 renember how or whether he introduced himself toFBuRGr The recruitment conversation_ he said_ was handled by KOZLOV- NOSENKO" but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who saia what II I don t remember what- I talkea 'about and I don remember what KOZLOV talked about Many things: 8 were discussed It started with how he liked his stay in the Soviet Union: Then we slowly ceeded _ to say_ how unfortunate it was: that informa- 0 tion haa been received about his 'conduct in Moscow We told him that his homosexuai activities were known that this was punishable under Soviet law N according to article so-and*so of the criminal code etc. that he was not a diplomat_ had no diplomatic immunity;' that he' coula be taken to court according to the Soviet law Hell, he was scared confusea upset= and; felt uncomfortable Then we S lowly proceeded to say that everything could be smoothed 117 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret 10 '516p sing day fly ting pro_ coc1387 Copy ================================================== Page 126 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) out, and the basis was prepared for the man to say: All right , I agree to help We showed him the pictures_ He was embarrassed of course-~he was naked , Then we prepared: the basis : You have a' noble task_ You teach; you have students ; the students may become future specialists on Russia or may work as diplomats etc but many of these students can be used by intelligence They may be sent somewhere with special tasks_ Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service_ how they are distributed , etc. During the first conversation everything was made completely clear He was not at all Willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence Fe was told that he must understand that in this case helping Soviet Intelligence was a very broad term I remember that I told him: Understand nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there or me if I should be there or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive activities that you organize explosions or murder. After_ the Soviet Union _ he was supposed to go to Italy to visit the Russicum of the Watican and OK 1 here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school He told us a bit about the @Russicum! and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the professors who teach Russian subjects _ According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about ffve 06 hours; at its end BURGI] signea a short statement that he agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence" (NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement 06 Erom @URGz} but later he coula not remember whether it was he or KOZLOV. ) BuRG2] was then taken to a hotel_ This was the Eilk time NOSENKO met (BURGIL Following the recruitment_ he' moved into the same hotel, a floor above 06@uRGz and for the remainder of[BURGI]' s stay in Kiev became 06 J his constant companion and guide An attempt was made to snooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up during the recruitment talk" NOSENKO took [BURGI] to an oia 06 0001388 118 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy iUkr ================================================== Page 127 ================================================== ~A-0po@ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) cathedral in Kiev;. with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO ' s grave in nearby . Kaniv. The subject Of homosexuality was not raised , again From 66 Kiev , RBURGI left the Soviet Union without returning to Moscow Before: the approach NOSENKO: had visited the American Department of the First Chief: Directorate and had D arranged with its chief, EEKLISOV_ for a recontact plan in New York should[BURGT] be' recruited @uRGr was 06 06 instructed how; to use a recognition signal for a first 0 meeting: in the: New York Public Library About five days; after returning to_Moscow NOSENKO 0 turned over all his naterials on the BURGE]operation_ to 06 the First Chief Directorate: Somewhat latEer Sergey-GUSKOV , Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section KOZLOV, and NOSENKO. visited American Department Chief' FEKLISOV 0 in' the- First Chief Directorate :and expressed an interest in further developments in the case FEKLISOV told them that 06 BURGI had been: observed to arrive for the first meeting but the KGB refrained from establishing contact The first actual_meeting in New York took place the second or third 06 time BuRGi-appeared and a KGB officer of the New York Legal Residency continued to meet with hin until the revolution in Iungary in late [October] 1956 when-(BURGIrefused to colla- 06 borate further NOSENKO later heard from someone in the American Department First Chief Directorate that the case was closed _ For their roles in this first recruitment of the Seventh Department ; NOSENKO said_ he ana KOZLOV: received letters of commendation and bonuses of one month S pay by: D order of SEROV Chairman of the KGB ; PETRENKO was 'given_ a letter Of commendation and half a month s salary; and even RASTYKAITC _ the ; housekeeper got a commendation 0 In 1964 NOSENKO: reported for the first time that his superior A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart- ment had also taken part in this. operation but that he 0 NOSENKO ; was the responsible case officer In August 1965 when asked who had recruited-(BURGIE ITOSENKO replied:,06 It ' "KOZLOV and NOSENKO : Asked who recruited him first 'MOSENKO said: KOZLOV ; naturally_ Ie was the' Deputy Chief Of the . Department _ The collection Of the materials_ [in: preparation for the approach] was in the hands Of Case Officer NOSENKO _ 119 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 10 Top ~City City 08u1389 Copy 8iRe ================================================== Page 128 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTII DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Coiment: In 2 22 Novenber 1957 interview with the FBI BL BBuRGI] had recounted how he was compromised and recruited by the KGB while in the USSR in June 1956 His version substantially confirmed that provided eight years later by NOSENKO _ 06 BURGI asserted (contrary to NOSENKO ' s account) Ehat the KGB officers knew a deal more about hin than what might have been acquired 0 during GURGZ s visit to the USSR, including O details of BBURGf] s close relatives his work 0K {0 with the Russicum in(Romel his earlier travel to Brazil G his military service in Korea , and his acquaintance with Alexander KERENSKY 9b On 25 May 1964 [BURGI] positively identified NOSENKO (from a photograph) as being the junior of the two KGB officers who recruited him_ The other KGB officer (KOZLOV) was 'the II controlling_figure and was in command 06 The BURGI case is the earliest confirmed instance of NOSENKO S participation in a KGB operation See for comment on the relevance of the BURGI case to the period of NOSENKO ' s claimed service in the Seventh Department NOSENKO S clain thatBBURGI: S compromise and recruitment was based' onky on information routinely acquired from BURGIT 5 Visa, applica-06 tion and from apparently chance meetings with KGB agents on his arrival in Moscow is contradicted by GBURGI}' s description Of the 06 KGB s familiarity with his personal life NOSENKO cannot sustain his claim of having personally traceal BURGI through First Chief 06 [Foreign Intelligence] Directorate files (the probable repository of information on @BURGH] 06 which the KGB recruiting: officers used) NOSENKO , as described elsewhere is unfamiliar with the mechanics Of KGB tracing procedures _ OL According to BURGI] S statement and NOSENKO ' s own eventual admission , NOSENKO lied when he 120 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top good P.39 0801390 Copy (5/6q ================================================== Page 129 ================================================== Secret 8 (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960)._ I Comment' (Continued) first claimed to' have: recruitedkBURGILunaided . NOSENKO has subsequently retracted all claims regarding the effect of this_ case on his career Contrary to his earlier assertions he now says it won him neither awards nor promotion Attempted Recruitment' 0E GEFRCKENS 1957) NOSENKO S Information NOSENRO made an unsuccessful recruitment_approach in;1957 0,o6 to Hamburg ghipping executive Hans GEHRCKENS on_ the basis O6.of [[EHRCKENSP: commercial ventures in Ene USSR: The responsi_ ble case officer originally was A:I VERENIKIN: of the Sixth 'Section of the' Seventh Department; this section was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen Since VERENIKIN no IGerman and-(GEHRCKENS was known: to speakog English_ NOSENKO was selected Eo make Ehe approach_because he 'knew English a little" When asked 'why a (German- 6 speaking KGB case Officer was nat used; NOSENKO answered: The higher-ups said go work on this case and;: that was all After being rebuffed . by-[GEHRCKENS] NOSENKO saw him several more: times during the 1957 visie to Moscow but when NOSENKO attempted to_ renew contact upon GEHRCKENS_ return 0; 4 to the Soviet Union in 1958,, the latter refused to see him Comment GEHRCKENS]was interviewed: by CIA on 19 July 1965 and while generally uncooperative described: a "mila approach in MOsCOw during 1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by NOSENKO (He was not questioned on the identities Of the Soviets involved GEHRCRENS] 06" continues to have extensive business 'Contacts with_ Soviet commercial representatives in Test | ( "Germanylana' was recently reported to have 0801381 121 TS No: 197124 Secret i2lgk Top spoke ; Top I0 Copy ================================================== Page 130 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Comment: (Continued) negotiated a sizablelShipping contract with the Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR. His principal contact at the Soviet Trade Mission in [Cologne has been a GRU officer. 10 Contact with LANE and BIRSE ( (1952) NOSENKO ' s Information The British subject Sir Allen LANE travelled in the summer of 1957 to the Soviet Union to visit various publishing houses and brought with him as an interpreter Arthur BIRSEI 0b The latter was of Russian extraction , having feft Petrograd (Leningrad) before the Revolution and he served in(British Intelligence] during the Second Worla [ar_ The casa was handled by another section Of the Seventh Department but because Of BIRSE]' s past, II some of our leaders decided that it would be good if one Of our workers could approach him, would get in on the case under the cover of the Ministry of Culture who would take care of this person who woula help him meet with all sorts of people representing our publishing companies _ The choice fell to me I was chosen for this job_ Taking along the KGB agent Larissa SOBOROVA as an interpreter and using the alias "NIKOLAYEV" NOSENKO Gaccompanied [BIRSE? and LANE in MoscOw and Leningrad during their there The only object was to watch BIRSE] 0L because he was suspected of having an intelligence mission and no approach was made or contemplated = NOSENKO explained that the use Of the NIKOLAYEV alias with[BIRSE] and LANE made_ 0G U6 it necessary for him to use the same name when travelling to Great Britain in 1957 and: in 1958 . Comment: LANE was interviewed subsequent to NOSENKO ' s defeetion, and he was able to identify NOSENKO ' s photograph as that of a It Russian official he met in Moscow_Who was introduced to him as "NIKOLAYEV" LANE saia that he coula remember 0801382 122 TS No. 197124 Secret IS/8Q Top stay Top Copy ================================================== Page 131 ================================================== Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Comment (Continued) nothing in particular; about NIKOLAYEV except that he appeared a Ii 'friendly , helpful man who had: @pened up considerably towards the end 0f my visit to Moscow in July 1957 Wi NOSENKO seems unaware of the probable_ basis for KGB interest in[BIRSEE 0G Born of [cottishPe parents]-in pre-revolutionary[Petrograd; 06 served with the-(British Military Missioz PEzH; in Moscow_during Dorld [ar II and was interpreter 06 for [Churchily] during the latter s: meeting with Gtali He was the [Eficial interpreterO & for the Royal Commisson] investigating Ehe revelations of KGB officers' Vladimir: PETROV and his wife who defected in 1954 in Australia NOSENIO apparently does not know that BIRSE] DL , returned on Similar trips to Moscow in 195.8 and 1959 (while NOSENKO was stili in the Tourist Section) and that in the latter year two KGB officers attempted to recruit him: Recrui tment' gf_lEgil SUNDARL 119532 NOSENKO S Information 8_06 In 1957 or 1958a Norwegian_journalist; (fnu SUNDAR visited the Soviet Union: and an attempt was made to recruit him A Second Chief: Directorate officer, N.A: ARKHIPOV 06 made [SUNDARys acquaintance and handied the entire operation against him but NOSENKO hinself Played a rale: NOSENKO presented himself to[SUNDAnLusing the name I SMIRNOV" or II SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter_ and told [SUNDAR that he 06 could find wOmen for hin_ A: party was arranged wieh a KGB 0agent as SUNDARI s_date and a Second Chief Directorate secre- tary as NOSENKO s _ Late in the evening NOSENKO. and his date excused thenselves and [SUNDAdhad sexual relations with theO6 female agent Photographs of the scene were taken by the KGB _ Ihen NOSENKO and- SUNDAR] saw one another the next 06 Ob-LEUNDArJannounced that he had some: articles cameras and the like, that he wanted to: sell on the blackmarket_ NOSENKO 123 '08613c3 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 112/88 day, Copy ================================================== Page 132 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) 06 offered to arrange the sale and took [SUNDARI to a dingy section of MoscOw . As they arrived before a small house , 06 NOSENKO asked (GUNDAR to give hin the things to be sold_ At this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached and arre sted the two for blackmarketeering At the Militia station 1 SUNDAR was recruited by K.N_ DUBAS then Chief Of the Seventh Department _ under threat of imprisonment . There was no further contact with [SUNDAR after he left the USSR,C6 however, because on his return to |Os lo) he published an IO article in which he described his experiences , "but not all of them" Comment: Egil SUNDAR, Cb,08,/0 a journalist for Aftenposten in Oslo travelled to the USSR in December 1957 as member Of a press delegation in connection with the opening of a new SAS air route to27 Moscow FSUNDAR} wrote an article on his return in which he described his arrest for blackmarket activities and his subsequent recruitment; he" also reported this to Norwegian authorities_ 06 According to SuNDAR} he was introduced to Moscow blackmarketeers by an artist whose name he did not know and was apprehended immediately afterwards ZUNDAR has not been ( interviewed on the basis Of NOSENKO ' s infor- mation _ Travel to London (1957-19582 NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside the Soviet Union was in 1957 when he was selected to accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit London As he explained, it was a KGB order that a security officer accompany any such delegation [NOSENKO elsewhere cited this KGB practice but later denied any such order was issued] The Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Direct- orate (responsible for designating Second Chief Directorate 0301324 124 TS No. 197124 Top Secret /ORR Copy ================================================== Page 133 ================================================== QoQu Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) officers for this purpose) telephoned R N_ DUBAS Chief of the Seventh Department _ to request an officer who spoke English DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to nake the trip NOSENKO replied = 8 I have never been abroad yet Hi NOSENKO, consequen travelled to London using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as the deputy chief Of the delegation_ He was specifically instructed to observe_ one menber of the_delegation 2 woman named MYARIMYAYE whose father had been kiiled in a Soviet prison and whose; political reliability was uncertain Additionally; he had: the general task of watching all members Of the delegation for posSibly suspicious contacts with foreigners _ The delegation consisted' of approximately 60 persons: and to, help him in 'carrying out these duties NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents ana several operational contacts among the.delegation members. He was the only KGB security; officer which. accompanied the group_ The Second trip to London took place_ a year later in the fall of; 1958 'again as a security escort_ This time he accompanied a delegation of eleven or twelve boxers; and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV ana the cover position of deputy chief Of the delegation NOSENKO: said he was the only security:officer with the delegation ana he had two agents and two operational contacts among the boxers _ His assignment was' general; no' one in particular was kept_ under observation; and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any member of the delegation NOSENKO used the' NIKOLAYEV: alias for travel to London because it was the alias used earlier with the British subjects (BIRSE) ana-EANE] NOSENKO explained this situation as follows OC "With JBTRSE and LANE I used_ the name NIKOLAYEV , Yuriy Ivanovich a representative of the Ministry of Culture And then when the question was_ raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England I was forced' to go there as NIROLAYEV_ Because Tof this], I went as the assistant head of the delegation_ again representing the Ministry of Culture I didn t go under my own name because it was decided that when these IBIRSE and' LANE ccli3cs 125 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Gjek Top not? "Why tly people ================================================== Page 134 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) went back to England they would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR] They would probably questionGIRSE]especially as one 06 who used to work in intelligence: BIRSE would say: There was this man Erom the Ministry Of Culture, NIKOLAYEV_ He was with us all the time 6 even went to Leningrad with uS So they would say: How does he look [what does he look like] ? ' He would say: He looked so-and-80 . I'd go there, and would look at me ana say: HOw come this man--his name is NOSENKO ana yet he is very similar to the one described byGGBIRsE} That was 0k why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV _ Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers , this woula be noticeable_ Comment : That NOSENKO (as NIKOLAYEV) took the trips is corroborated by British records according to|/ which, a Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV born 30 October 1927 1 arrived at London from Brussels on 20 August 1957 _ His visa application described hin as a member of a group invitea by the Light Athletics Association to partici- pate in contests in London He left on 27 August 1957_ Nith the same name and date of birth, NIKOLAYEV arrived again at London on 12 October 1958 with seventeen others _ all described as boxers _ His Visa application described him as an "office worker" but on his landing cara NIKOLAYEV was listed as a boxer_ He left London on 19 October 1958 On neither visit did NIKOLAYEV attract the attention of any British security service} 29 While these trips are corroborated_ they are not material to NOSENKO ' s clains to have served in the KGB positions he alleges he held at the time 0001386 126 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top they 5J6R Copy ================================================== Page 135 ================================================== Ooooq: Top Secret (SEVELTiI DCPARTMENT June :1955-January 1960) Operational Activities (1958-1960) Deputy; Chief @E Ehe American-British Commonweal th Section According to NOSENKO the seventh Departnent was reorgan- ized in June 1958 and NOSENTRO' s' section, which theretofore had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists from' all countries was split into two new sections one concerned with tourists from the United States and: the British Common[ealth and the other with tourists from Europe_ Latin America_ and all other countries NOSENKO claimed that at that time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the 'American-British Commonwealth Section It the most important section Of the Seventh Department Ji In September 1958 he claimed to have: personally recruited 0L: EGiseila _RRI; It was also in 1958 he said that he super- vised the sexual entrapment of[Virgi1 KRAFT Oalthough Seventh Department Chief DUBAs made the actual approach_ Beginning in the spring 0f 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV ana VOLKOV in a series of successful entrapments<DREN LUKIS 06 (TILBY TAYLOR 'and -[MERTENS:L NOSENKO stated that he_ also "06 used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compronising two 0r,06 American guides at the_ Sokolniki Exhibi BARRETTT and WILLERZ FORDI Finally, NOSENKO said he recruited the Moscow representative of 'the: American Express Company, FRTPPED]; 29,06 NOSENKO . claimed that his operational success during 1959 earned him a comendation from the KGB: Chairman. [He' has since retracted all claims to any awards. earned during his RGB, service 1: It was because of his position as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section NOSENR saia; that he' first became involved: with Lee Harvey OSWALD MOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of 'agents among foreign tourists was secondary to his department s principal mission the detection of Western intelligence Officers and agents among the . increasing flow of tourists visiting_ the Soviet Union In line; with that counterintelligence mission on General GRIBANOV S order in the fall of 1959 NOSENKO 127 G8l13s7 TS No_ 197124 Secret Copy 06,4 t7 Top J0 G/RR ================================================== Page 136 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) reviewed what the KGB knew through 1958 about tourists and tourist cover the use 0f It was from this task that bosFertewlaineelhegeace services _ all the important claimed he learned of tourists arrests and recruitments among American as recorded by the KGB at the time Recruitment %E[ARREs ](19582 NOSENKO ' s NOSENKO in 1958 recruited IGisella HARRIS] 29,10 the American Express Conpany in Salt Lake an employee Of ment was based on her romantic The recruit- a Soviet citizen, who told and sexual involvement with with Soviet authorities WARRIS that he was in trouble,06 to the police _ and persuaded her to accompany him the KGB in Salt HARRIS] agreed to meet and cooperate with 06 Lake Ci The case was turned First Chief Directorate_ and NOSEMKO over to the [0 further contact with her _ was unaware Of any ` 06,08 Comment: HARRIS _ a_ former German citizen visited the USSR on a_ tourist visa in 1958 statements made to the FBI 958i958ccchdipg_ to of her visit was to contact her purpose a Soviet soldier who badafatheredoheer _ lover_ Germany in 1953 She her child in divorce his Soviet hoped to persuade him to wife and her_ She described her recruitment bY two men one 0f whom resembled NOSENKO _ Nhen shown a photo- graph in 1964 , she tentatively identified NOSENKO as one Of the men who recruited her and said that, of the two involved _ he definitely the man in charge It while the other 06 to merely present and listened" According @ARRIS] she has had no further contact with Soviet intelligence 128 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top by Information6 Cityk: ty} marry "was "was 0901398 9/80 Copy ================================================== Page 137 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Compromise 0f KRAFT 0 NOSENKO S Information 06,08 Virgil KRAFT; a clergyman from Ehe Chicago areal with his wife visited the; Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958 _ ana: NOSENKO was assiged' as' the responsible case' officer. 06The KGB learned KRAFTfhad been intimate with a Soviet woman during an earlier to the USSR, an NOSENKO: arranged for her to come to Moscow, from" Leningrad where she was; then living, in order to compromise) KRAEJO6ERAFT and the Soviet woman were intimate: in the latter S room in the Grand Hotel: Photographs' were taken and then militiamen broke into the room_ findingJKRAFT and the woman unclothed, NOSENKO was in a nearby room supervising: the operation_ The recruitment approach was then made by DUBAS the Chief of the Seventh' Department_ (NOSENKQ had been the case officer and had handled the operation_ 1 but he took no part in the confronta- tion or recruitment approach "because DUBAs wanted it for himself II :) Although the recruitment was not firm KRAF:] 06 and DUBAs It had an agreement I that nothing would be : done about the compromise if KRAFTdid not criticize the Soviet 06: 'Union in lectures about his which he was to give in the United States DUBAS " again contacted KRAFT when he came06 to' Moscow in 1963 'and 'afterwards his file was turned over to_ the.First; Chief Directorate NOSENKO_ recallea that the First Chief Directorate said that KRAFT]was not in a gooa 06 region: of Ehe United States Ana also smelled like he- had: spoken of the. approach made to him; Therefore, NOSENKO concludea_ he;; probably had not been contacted in: the_ United States Comment According to the FBI ; some time before 1960 06(KRAFT wrote a pamphlet in which he described Ehe KGB approach, 'omi tting reference to his sexual compromise In a statement given to the FBI on 4 November 1964 KRAFT} who is an 0801399 129 TS No_ 197.124 Secret 10 trip 06 Erip: Top 12/8R Copy ================================================== Page 138 ================================================== Ooooo Secret- (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Commen€: (Continued) B8,10 Associate Pastor of Ehe_Peoples Church in Chicagq stated that he had visited the Soviet Union In 1956_ 1958 and- 1963 He confirmed NOSENKO ' s information in detail except that he denied' having been intimate with the Soviet woman involved He related that the "Chief who interviewed hin had II several photographs which portrayed him and the female in intimate compromis_ positions and which appeared to have been taken in her hotel rOOm KRAFT ] saia06 that he had told the "Chief ei that they could do him no possible harm : as "no one would believe that they were valid photographs M KRAri]denied 06 agreeing: to collaborate with the KGB at 'any time Recruitment of WREW (1959 NOSENKO ' s Information George DREI an American who visited the Soviet Union in the spring Of 959 was the responsibility Of case officer V.V_ IVANOV By chance however DREI became involved With 06 NOSENKO S homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV and they reported this to NOSENKO _ then the Deputy Chief of the: section' NOSENKO and IVANOV: discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly; GUSKOV the Section Chief and IOSEMKO flew alone to Lenirgrad to. rake the approach _ (IVANOV was: not judged qualified:) NOSENKO arranged for [REZ]to be06 compromised in a Leningrad hotel room Ivith a homosexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer PERELETOV the alias II Mr SERGEYEV" NOSENKO alone bb recruitea DRER] in an office of the hotel The KGB First_ Chief Directorate was interested in(DREV's recruitment D; because he might be able to spot other homosexuals possibly some in the U.S_ Government: 0801460 130` TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Top. ing ing Us q/6R Copy ================================================== Page 139 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Comment DREW reported the approach in 1959 describing a four-hour interrogation by "SERGEYEV in Leningrad: and generally confirming NOSENKO ' s account:of the operation Re-interviewed by the FBI on 12 May 1964 @Reu}identified NOSENKO 's 06 photograph as that of his interrogator and said that although NOSENKO was a young man , from the way everyone reactea to hin it was clear that he was the man in charge _ Another man was: present; (DREW said. 66 Recrui tment %f LUKIS (1959) NOSENKO ' s Information In June or possibly_July 1959 NOSENKO_personally recruited a British_ subject (fnu) LUKIS (or LUCAS) in a rOOm: of the 06 Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after LuKIS had been compromised 0G by NOSENKO' s homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV_ The case: was then turned over to Ye A TARABRIN at that time Chief of the British;Department Of the First Chief Directorate NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status but he believed the KGB has not been in contact withGEUKIS]subsequently: Comment: LUKIShas not_Yet been identified by the' British services 27 Recruitment OE WICBy (19592 NOSENKO ' s Information' Ol himself NOSENKO. recruitea/nilliam stantey WILBYhin a hotel in Moscow in July 1959 afEer[NILBY had been compro-0 mised' bY_either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV: _ NOSENKO ' s homosexual agents WILBY Jis a British citizen and his case was also 0 (like GUKIS; see above) turned over to TARABRIN 68614C1 131 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 BY Copy: "jyl6R ================================================== Page 140 ================================================== 14-0000 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Coment: WILBY reported the approach to British authori- ties in 1959 , saying that he was II brought up before SERGEYEV" (an operational alias some L times used by NOSENKO) He has not been re-interviewed since NOSENKO's information was received_ Recruitment of TAYLOR (1959) NOSENKO s Information NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow representative of British European Airwayg whose name 29 NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow during the summer of 1959 _ possibly in August _ The approach was based oni homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO ' s agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV _ NOSENKO explained that the Seventh Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives which was responsible for the BEA man That section had asked NOSENKO S section for 'They said they didn t have any. agents or any- thing and didn t know what to do. So somebody Said, Well look why don t you ask the chief Of the section? He" s a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you . So I wound up handling the case and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Direct- orate) said I shoula report to him_ [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself although he has always claimed he was Deputy chief Of the section_ 5/0 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top help. € Copy ================================================== Page 141 ================================================== Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960)' 06 Comment David-TAYLOR confessed homosexual, is described by British services: as a neyroticzy__ type who had Been' discharged Erom (he B4zt on grounds_ Of mental instability. In 1962 (before the. NOSENKO lead was received) TAYLOR admitted his recruitment to British authori=-L Eies; indicating that it took place in August 1959 on the basis of his homosexuality He reported in 1962 that the recruitment had been effected by a "Colonel SERGEYEV" and when' re-interviewed in 1964 , he II unhesitantly J identified NOSENKO as Colonel SERGEYEV adding that the mere sight Of NOSENKO' s photo- 1I graph sent shivers down his back TAYLOR also identified a photograph of VOLKOV J 1 Recruitment of MERTENS ](195.92 NOSENKO 's_ Information Gerard_ MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959'_ NOSENKO ' s homosexual agents VOLKOV 'and YEFREMOV; seeking out: American homosexuals accidentally met MERTENskin Moscow_ and reported their suspicions_ to NOSENKO _ NOSENKO wrote a; report of this contact and requested authority to take Compromising photographs in 3 preparation for a recruitment approach_ and DUBAS his Chief. then,assigned the case to him. MERTENS] had been 06 the responsibllity of A.A: VETLITSKIY another case: officer:) 3 Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and [MEERTENS] on two separate occasions in Moscow 06 [hen MERTENS]later travellea to: Uzhgoroa he was If arrested by: KGB officers (posing_ as militiamen): while he; was engaged 1 in relations with a KGB homosexual agent from Odessa whom NOSENKO had arranged by phone to bring to Uzhgorod (He did not recall his name ana could only supply CIA with a physical: description. ] MERTENS]was then brought before 66 NOSENKO , who recruitea him during a session lasting approximately five hours NOSENKO later travelled with 133 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 10 MRR Top 63014C3 Copy ================================================== Page 142 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the JSSR - NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George it with 6 MERTENS} but he coula not recall what last name he had given him. [hen he related the case in 1962 _ NOSENKO coula not recall the American S name . In 1964 he stated the name was MARTIN or MARTINS Comment : In a signed statement_given to the FBI on 5 August 1964 , MERTENSH an American professor,06 generally confirmed NOSENKO S account He names his recruiter as one "George PETERSON " 11 and stated that NOSENKO ' s photograph might be that of a person whom he had met while visiting the Soviet Union in 1959 MERTENS] C reported one KGB attempt to recontact him after he returned to the United States In September 1959 _ 1 according to arrangements made at the time of his recruitment , he received a letter signed "George PETERSON It telling him to be at a rendezvous point in New York By the time he received the letter, however _ the date of the meeting had_already passed ana S0 he ignored it_ [MERTENS] claimea 06 that there were no further attempts by the Soviets to contact himg Compromise of BARRETT (1959) NOSENKO S Information 86 Robert BARRETT a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in MoscOw in T959 had become friendly with the homosexual agents JOLKOV and YEFREMOV whom he met at the[airground: AithoughO} BARRETT was not an active homosexual VOLKOV succeeded after a long period of development in ruaoivingF him in homosexual acts which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room_ As case officer for VOLKOV ana YEFREMOV , 00014C4 134 TS No. 197124 Secret Top I2/R Top Copy ================================================== Page 143 ================================================== Secret 1 (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise_ was present when the photographs were taken and he has described the occasion in detail (There was much' complaining ` among the; photographic technicians because of the amount of time they spent waiting for VOLKOV: to succeed in his mission ana NOSENKO -recalled that_ he" provided them with drinks and treated them" well because they were a big' help to him in this operation.) The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to. use them in 1959 because of a general ban Placed_by the Central Committee on the recruitment ofLLES [Exhibition_guides due to Eisenhower S, planned visit to the Soviet Union NOSENKO reported, that BARRETT] was recruited on 'the basis 0f the 1959. photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961: The recruitment was carried out by the First' (American) Department of the KGB: Second: Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was not involved . Comment Immediately on his return to the United States in January 1962 , [BARRETT] confessea to the FBI that he had been recruited' in 1961 on the basis oE photographs depicting him in a homosexual act: with VOLKOV which had been taken during 4 his 1959 trip to Moscow He . claimed. that the photographs had been taken while he was_ unconscious after being drugged_ BARRETT was 06' 1 contacted: once the KGB in New York following his admissions to the FBI He was contacted by KGB officers; including SKVORTSOV 1 Of' the First Chief Directorate during later trips to the Soviet Union in 1963 1964 ana 1965 and arrangements were made for; meetings in the United States; No Soviets appeared at 0 such 'scheduled meetings i 135 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top by City '08014C5 ,10 Copy 4/e4 ================================================== Page 144 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) 06 Compromise %f WILLEREORD (1959) NOSENKO S Information (rooreterickingLERer?9s an American Negro] was BARRETT] during the 1959 exhibition] in S was a target of the Moscow Moscow_ Initially he G believed WILLERFORO] to be KGB Directorate which information on him, an FBI agent and had been collecting KGB element , VOLKOV Unaware of the interest of the other and XEFREMOV had made acquaintance and NOSENKO had WILLERFORD s 06 photographs to be taken of @fLLERFogeY for compromi hotel room NOSENKO watched and YEFREMOV in a Moscow 06 a two-way mirror and was hedUESLZesoRr and YEEREMOV, through 0G detail_ It was to describe the scene in had been obtained tkatftos these compromising photographs KGB Directorate NOSENKO learned of the Moscow department and S interest in WILLERFORD].:6 NOSENKO S own the Moscow Directorate then made request for operational a joint permission was refused approval to recruit WILLERFORD] but attempts at the time because of the ban on recruitment 0 6 Moscow KGB The case file was retained by the WOECORFORD] 'agaappacacne and NOSENKO did not know whether was approached subsequently. Comment: WILLERFORD was interviewed by the FBI in 1964 and advised emphaticaliy that-he had never been compromised by anyone nor did he feel that he ever coula be anyone except through the usengfouiued by he felt that he was too drugs _ since Soviets that he has smart and most ever met are aware of his 06 ERct WeLiERFORS taderts BARRETT has reported 66 had visited VOLKOV in his hotel room and was frlendly With him Ob GARRETT said that he had often wondered if WILLERFORD homosexual because of his manner and was aC bearing. 0801406 136 TS No. 197124 Secret Top Ilox City Sing only City City July Top 16/Sk Copy ================================================== Page 145 ================================================== 'ci Top Secret (SEVENTHI DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Recruitment of FRIPPEE](195921963) As ra member of the American -British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO in 1959 personally_participated: in the recruitment Qf the-Wmerican Express Company representative in Moscow Arsene_FRTPPEj: He continued Eo be One of this agent' s two KGB handlers even after transferring to the American Department in 1960 CERIPPEL] left Moscow in 1961 but returned on trips to: the USSR' in 1962 and 1963 when NOSENKO 0 met him_ The "only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever claimed: to. handle FFRIPREL confessed to his recruitment06. when questioned' by Ehe' 'FBI on the basis, Of the NOSENKO lead . 6Although the_ERIPPEL] case started during NOSENKO ' s " B first assignment to; the Seventh Department (1955-1960) it is 'described in its entirety through 1963 , for the conven- ience. of the reader H NOSENKO S Information At his second meeting with CIA in Geneva on 11 June 1962. NOSENKO described the circumstances in which an unnamed foreigner was,compromised.bY a: KGB female agent Klara Konstantinovna GORBACIIEVA_ He: aescribed the scene in detail including the attempt a KGB technician to take motion pictures through a two-way mirror ana the confrontation of the foreigner by the militiamen who: broke into' the rOOm J NOSENKO identified that ' foreigner:as FRIPPEMby name the 06 following while discussing; KGB successes in Moscow 1 "There was another agent TKGB cryptonym] Artur. He: was not :a correspondent He: knew me as George Yuriy Ivanovich_ and my iast name as NIKOLAYEV _ He was a permanent representative; not in the Embassy 0 but Of the American Express Company] in' Moscow 2 FRIPPEL Arthur FRIPPEL] He liked drinking , always drank: He: was also strongly attractea to women. I provided him with beautiful women Well, we decided to: have a talk with him_ Why? What coula he give? He now works in theE4merican Express 2 7 Company] [main office in New York City]: A new CC61AC? 137 TS No.197124 Top Secret 10 jubr only _ by: day: Copy ================================================== Page 146 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTI DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) department has now been organized for the Soviet Union ana the Peoples Democracies _ And he is chief of the department_ He is no longer in MoscOw, but he was here two and a half or three years We hope that he will return_ Ne are wai for him to come back . Ne know that the company wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian Zanguage very well He is _ 1 in fact_ an emigre _ T this URIPPED_ And he also did a good and intelligent job Of establishing relations with Inturist He had good relationships with ANKUDINOV the Chairman 0f Inturist_ and with other people both the chiefs and the Tow-level workers But why was FRIPPEL d6 recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely by whom _ by name , and how approaches were being made to our delegations [in the United States] I was interested in him from the point Of view Of counter- intelligence not intelligence What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by whom? This is what interested me But he didn t know anything He provided superficial information nothing more . NOSENKO was then asked whether FFRIPPEL woula not have been useful for coverage; of Americans visiting the Soviet Union He' replied no, that the KGB had already had great success in this by other means _ In Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings. ana interrogations , NOSENKO - made additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL recruitment as follows : In 1958_ after 1958 , when I became the Deputy Chief Of the section my area Of activity was narrowed down I didn t handle all the tourists at that time I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had: my Own little area--for the permanent representative Of the AmecicexaEpleess Company and besides that I began to collect all the 29 material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and which sena tourists to the USSR: Tt 138 0801408 TS No. 197124 Secret 6/3k Top ting very only Top Copy ================================================== Page 147 ================================================== Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Although he had personally recruited-{FRIPPEY] he did not do So alone Col:. VD_ CHELNOKOV , Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Seventh Department , was present and he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together 1 in September 1959_ NOSENKO was , however FRIPPED' s case Officer NOSENRO: met 'pretty steadily= I with[ERTPPEY]until: January 1961 and once NOSENKO and his wife 1 in company with CHELNOKOV ana his_Wife_ had dinner atFERIPPELI s , home where06 0b they met Mrs ERIPPEZ-(bfdette FRIPPELTwas unaware of her husband S status as a KCB agent,. .and Eherefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with FRIPPED) Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case Officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present NOSENKO explained: that he went because he "was 3 invited" ana' CHELNOKOV went because 'he was also involved in the' recruitment" J As Deputy Chief of a Tourist section of the Seventh Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief Of the American Embassy Section Of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with-FFRIPPEL] in Moscow hotels and 08 restaurants Throughout this period he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Berhaps one time I met with ERTPPEL]alone otherwise it was always with CHELNOKOV Usually: NOSENKO would arrange meetings with_ 6 FRIPREG] at CHELNOKOV S request ana the two continued to meet: with @RIPPEZObdespite his lack of production because they 'kept hoping he would give something (In_ a different context, but: speaking 0f CHELNOKOV NOSENKO explained that: GRIBANOV;' insisted that even Department Chiefs of the Second 3 Chief_ Directorate must each :have two or three agents ) Ihen NOSENKO began to work in the American Embassy Section 0f the American Department in 1960 he_ took{ERTPEEZ06 @ 06 with; him because FRIPPED was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy _ NOSENKO questioned FRIPPEL about the Embassy ana about Embassy officers George WINTERS and . Lewis I_ BOWDEN butJFRIPPEE never told NOSENKO anything useful: 06 139 TS. No. 197124 Top Secret 510 early CCC14c9 {@l } Copy ================================================== Page 148 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) continued to act as FRIPPEL s case officer after POSENKeft the Soviet Union ana after NOSENKO had been ErIRBEe] fed and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of_ the Seventh Department He met twice with FFRIPPEL latter period when ERIPPEE] visited the Soviet Union as 66 this 0f foreign V isitors _ Both of these a with groups NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV _ meetings were handled by The first meeting took place in the sumer Of 1962 after NOSENKO returned to Moscow from Geneva_ FRIPPEL] arrived 06 in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists_= (NOSENRO was unable to give the composition Of the journa- list group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Soviet Union . ) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen intended to ask Khrushchev during a scheduled interview; [subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice reguired Visiting journalists to submit their intended questions for Khrushchev in writing to Soviet authorities prior to interviews] After the interview he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their Ealk with the Soviet leader_ NOSENKO coula not recall their specific reaction to the Khrushchev interview but did remember that they were I satisfied" Another reason for Obcontacting {ERIPPESI} NOSENKO added in a_ later discussion , was to learn whether any; of: the journalists might have joined the group at the last moment in the United states , Which might suggest intelligence connections on their part; NOSENKO met GGERIPPEL_ alone for the second and last time 66 during March 1963 Since GRIPPEL] was a guide for tourists aboard the ship "Olympia 0 which Stopped for a day in Yalta NOSENKO flew to odessa from Moscow ana accosted #RiPege; defsa ' the lobby of the hotel where the' tourists were having_ dinner Finally able to get away from his group _ 06 FRIPPEL] called on NOSENKO in the latter S hotel room and Ehe two_ drank and talked_ NOSENKO had given {ERIPPEL]a bottle of vodka as a gift 1 and FRIPPED said he wantea to give NOSENKO some whisky in return _ They drove in NOSENKO ' s car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while FRIPPEL went aboard for the whisky- (He had invited NOSENKO 06 Eo visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him. ) 140 0001410 TS No. 197124 Top Secret duringb6 guide 66oC 14/6R Copy ================================================== Page 149 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January- 1960)_ When FRIPPELreturned he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover Inturist) On the spot The three returnea _ to the_ hotel and drank sone more; everyone getting drunk: During this contact ERIPPEL] reported nothing of importance" # ana his most interesting news was that he might_again be_reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express company representative;2.9 (NOSENKO said he_ later read a report thatFFRIEPEL] had been 0G assigned elsewhere 1 and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow This report was submitted by V.V KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV) G member Of the' KGB Legal Residency and, overtly an Inturist;employee in New York City who was a former secona chief Directorate: colleague of NOSENKO ZRIEPEt] provided no interesting information during NOSENKO S two meetings with him in: 1962_ ana 1963 when 06 [ZRIRPEL} returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide_ On 3 1964 , while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers (see (Sebrua58o ) in Geneva NOSENKO was 'asked about the_ following: passage dealing with FRIPPEL] which appeared in" the KGB. operational: plan against BOIQDEN 11 He [BOTDEN) showed , himself to: be an indiscreet person One as_ though by chance he [BOWDEN] blurted out to_ Our agent SHVEDOVA [the fact Of ARTUR S affiliation; with American inte_ iligence_ Asked who SHVEDONA was NOSENKO saia she was 'probably a" cleaning: woman 01 [Elsewhere_ NOSENKO_ described SHVEDOVA as his Own agent working against- American Army - Attaches _ 1 see p.a 85.] Askea what connection TFRIPPERthad: with American" intelligence NOSENKO replied that he coula not say _ To the inquiry why not, since he was (FRIPPED' s case officer, NOSENKO. was silent 206 Epencer ROBERTS [whose KGB recruitient is described On 2.424] in August 1962 became friends with a young Soviet male who acknowledged having: been a KGB agent used against French-speaking foreigners Included among the 141 @Bk TS No:' 197124 Secret 10 day, 0201411 Top Copy ================================================== Page 150 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) SEVENTH Soviet told ROBERTSL was FRIPPEZ whom the latter 1 the American ixtelligence agent. KGB suspected of being an tment but has never {NosrNkedtevoreeSGOBERoSberercui oEher KGB agents being targetted indicated awareness FRIPPEL} 0 FFRIPPED' s Information the nickname "Arthur was the @American 29 FRIPPEL' who uses in Moscow Trom 7 April 1958 Express Compang{epreeewaatiesinincecciewear on the basis to 3 January 1961. He was 1964 , and when shown a of NOSENKO' s information on 30 igted his recruitment by the 06 picture_ of NOSENKO , FRIPPEL admi interviews with KGB in 1959_ During this ana subsequent his' association the FBI FRIPPEL] has reported in detail on with that provided with the KGB . FRIPPED' : version coincides following NOSENKO to a considerable degree , with the by exceptions 8 asserts that at the time 0f his recruitment FFRIPPEQ information on American Ehe KGB wanted only general travelling Embassy Officials and American tourists 0X to the Soviet Unionl under American Express auspices According,to NOSENKO,(FRIPPEL] Was originally intelli- recruited to provide informafion on American to Soviets in the United States geaceeaplzoaeaeshtc gR1ieEB was not needea for O and he claimed visiting the Soviet Union coverage Of Americans 11 success Ii by other since the KGB had already great when he trans- means NOSENKO stated that later ferred to the American Embassy Section= he took OGhis agent[ERIPPEL with him to report on ECg8aind tances_ among the Embassy employees NOSENKO 6[FRIPPEL] agree that, with one exception {wheNTERS) FRIPPEE was queriea regarding BONDEN and TFRIPPELI was not so used _ 66 CERIPPEL, while acknowledging thcts OSFMeC BRItic] U6 in all meetings and on Occasion met stated that CHELNOKOV "was in charge of the alone , M entire operation" 0O0141? 142 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 06 against 06 pated Copy 21/86 ================================================== Page 151 ================================================== 1400000 Top Secret '(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) 4 EERIPPEL] c-laims that he saw NOSENKO- on three occasions , twice in Odessa while visiting the USSR in 1962 and 1 1963. NOSENKO insisted that he metEERIPPEmbut once 06 in Odessa and' once in MOscOw in that period 0 Comment: NOSENKO volunteered his' account of the FRIPPEL case in; Geneva in 1962 and 1964 Ie freely related the details of the: suer 1962 and February 1963 meetings' with ERIPPEL in the USSR. His account Qf (FRIPPED] s activities is 0 consistent with FRIPPED S version except as noted above_ M Lee Barvey OSWALD ' (1959-1960) 0 For continuity of presentation_ both 'periods Of NOSENKO " S alleged: involvement with_ OSTALD in 1959-196,0 and: in 1963 are described elsewhere: (See p.303.) .. According to NOSENKO he was involved with OSWALD: in 1959 because he Was: then Deputy:Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Sect: on of the Seventh: Department In that, capacity he : particibatzu in the decision that OSWALD was: of no interest to. the KGB and he shoula_ not; be_ allowea to' remain in the Soviet Union Comment NOSENKO s information on his involvenent with OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient; to serve as evidence confirming or refuting his claimed service as Deputy: Chief: Of the American Section of the Seventh Department in 1959 _ 143 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 0861413 6/8 _10_ ================================================== Page 152 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Operational Activities 1955-1960: Summary According to NOSENKO_ after an uneventful assignment in the American Department s Embassy Section in 1955 he was transferred to the newly-organized Seventh Department Tourist Section as a case officer_ Between 1955 and 1957 he assembled_ a network 0f agents and was involved in four KGB attempts to recruit_foreign tourists_ One Of these attempts that against [Richard BURGI was the first recruit-0g ment Of the Tourist SecEion; it won NOSENKO a commendation brought hin to the attention Of General GRIBANOV and turned NOSENKO into an effective and successful KGB officer In 1958 NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section_ He then' recruited the second member of his two-man honosexual team and in 1958 and 1959 participated in ten KGB attempts to recruit American and British visitors: to the USSR and one American resident of Moscow. NOSENKO' s success in the Seventh Department prompted GRIBANOV to transfer him pack to the American Embassy Section as Deputy Chief with the critical priority task of reviving KGB operations against American Embassy code clerks _ It is worthy 0f note that of the fifteen cases in which he personally participated , by his Own admission 1 NOSENKO became involved in nine not because were operations of his section but because the targets were the victins of homosexual or other entrapment_ In addition , three of the fifteen operations were not directed by his section , but by senior Seventh Department officers According to his Own statements , four others_ were specifically the responsi- bility Of other Seventh Department sections Of KGB elements including the Foreign Seamen Section (GEHRCKENS) Delega - Obtions Section LANE anaCBIRSE) Commercial Representatives 66 Obsection (TAYLOR) and WWILLERFORD] (Moscow City KGB) ERIPPEQ]OG does not relate clearly to ITOSENKO' s claimed Seventh Department service: NOSENKO states he was also used as an agent of the First Department_Embassy Section_ Even the remaining case, that 0f HARRIS was not necessarily a 0001414 144 TS No. 197124 Top Secret XIbR they Copy ================================================== Page 153 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Seventh Department operation 3 by NOSENKO s: other statements she was not a "tourist" and she would have been the target of the: Moscow Oblast KGB because 'of, her intention to marry a Soviet citizen_ While MOSENKO ' 6' participation in; the: attempted recruit- ment_ of the targets Ke Gescribes even where not confirmed is not' disputed, the evicence suggest that he was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment , not a counterintelligence officer responsible for the identifi cation 6f foreign agents among tourists or for the deve ment recruitment ana exploitation of agents for the KGB Nothing NOSENKO has said indicates that there was any material: change in his duties and; responsibilities after he was allegedly: promoted to; Deputy Chief; Of the American British Commonwealth Section_ The evidence is that he was more active but not that he had any' administrative and supervisory responsibilities Knowledge 'of other' Seventh Department American Tourist Operations 'NOSENKO ' said that upon his return to the' Seventh Depart_ ment in 1962 as Chief Of the American-British Commonwealth Section he ' reviewed' the section' 5 activities during his two-year absence e.g. January 1960 to January 1962 In the course of that review he made Written notes of the: section 's operational targets: during that period notes: which he. brought to Geneva in 1964 (See 2 319.) NOSENKO couia not describe the operations other than to say that he recorded the target S names: and: such details as he could "acquire: at the time of his review: Eleven 'Of the operations_ included in his notes were those: againstWernard PECHTER , 06,06,06,p6,06,06] Patrick PRESSHAN , John RUFE, Gerala SEVERN_ 1 Sofia SHATTAUER, '06,UG Enu_KARLOV, Noxman_FISK Ralph MATLAN Marvin KAITOR Michael 'GINSBERGI and (William TARASKAO6 4ll were from the perioa 1956-1959 and six_ of the eleven individuals were identified by the KGB as homosexuals All of these cases are described in Anrex B 145 TS. No: 197124 Secret 40 iop- CoC1415 Top Copy Skr ================================================== Page 154 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) Comment: NOSENKO has never resolved these cases , which predated the records he claimed he reviewed were included in his notes . More important , he never could explain why he was unfamiliar with American tourist cases which occurred at a time_ when he claimed that he was Deputy Chief of 'the American-British Commonwealth Section and was knowledgeable of all such cases _ KGB Counterintelligence Operations Anonq Foreign Tourists_ 1 1955-1960 Besides those operations in which NOSENKO claimed personal involvement Or about which he learned in his capacity Of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section , NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB knew Of the use of tourists in the USSR . by foreign intelligence services throughout the 1955-1960 period _ Information from other sources serves as a basis for judging the validity of NOSENKO s claim_ NOSENKO' 8 Information NOSENKO 5 Tourist Studx Sometime between May and October 1959 during the tourist season NOSENKO was ordered to gather facts for Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV" concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence services during the period 1955. through 1958 _ NOSENKO saia he assembled this material from the Seventh Department S annual reports of the years 1955-1958 supplenented by information he obtained from discussions with knowledgeable Seventh Department case officers NOSENKO recalled only that the 'Study incorporated statistical data on the growth of forelgn tourism; he did not remember the content of the study, any examples included in it, or what the study concluded about American or British Intelligence tourist 146 0001416 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top why Copy ================================================== Page 155 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) operations Nevertheless based on. his research for this study as we1l' as on his general and supervisory responsi-_ bilities in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asserted that he could: accurately describe KGB counterintelligence operations among tourists 'during the period 1955-1960 _ Extent of KGB Knowledge According to' NOSENKO- operations against foreign tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by; the KGB about the American Intelligence use Of tourism at the timew he wrote the study: in 1959_ No agents were; definitely identified among American tourists and no tourists were "caught in the: act" mailing letters servicing deaddrops Or contacting agents with one exception 6 MCGUIRE sic see below ) The Seventh: Department NOSENKO_ said developed ' suspicions concerning a number of tourists because of their apparent interest in photography ;or because they were 'disseminating foreign literature The KGB never established any firm intelligence connection however despite Various' operational measures taken such as. vyemka (covert baggage' search) and maneuvering KGB agents; In: contact with the suspect tourists No American tourists were definitely identified as American Intelligence agents_ NOSENKO concluded On related matters , NOSENKO asserted that dur_ his 1955-1960 service in; the Seventh Department the KGB acquired: no information regarding American Intelli- gence; use_ of tourism specifically the KGB obtained no documentary information on this topic from any agent source American Tourist Agents The one exception in which an American tourist Was observed performing a clandestine_ task NOSENKO said was one whose name: 'he recalled as MCGUTRE and who :mailed a 06 letter in Minsk in 1959 NOSENKO said he never: knew . what KGB operational activity lea to the discovery Of MCGUIRE S clandestine letter;mailing- 147 TS No. 24 Top Secret_ Copy; 1278 ing Zirr 0301417. ================================================== Page 156 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) 6 Comment: NOSENKO here is apparently referring to Edward McGOWAN} a CIA tourist agent who was in fact detected by the KGB while clandestinely maing an operational letter in Minsk , but in August 1958 06 There was a Robert Alan McGUIRE Iwho visited the Soviet Union during NOSENKO ' s Seventh Department service but he was not connected with' American Intelligence at the time and he mailed no letter McGUIREI however, was a_ former CIA staff employee He visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in April-May 1959, during which period he was the target Of numerous KGB provocations _ including black- market, females and a Soviet citizens request for assistance in defecting to the Americans_ Also a_ customs officer confiscated from 86.McGUIRE] a Radio Liberation Russian-language 6i, script; and McGUIRE was compelled to sign an acknowledgement of the event, although the reasons were left blank_ Interrogation has never resolved how NOSENKO knew the name of 06McGUIRE but not the background of the case or the background of McGOFAN s case , but not his name Information Furnished the KGB bY George BLAKE In 1959 the KGB obtained from its agent in MI-6 [George BLAKE _ 1 who was arrested by British authorities_ in April 1961] the complete details Of the CIA-MI-6 program for utilizing tourist agents in the Soviet Union In early June 1959 a three-day conference was hela in London between CIA and MI-6 representatives, at the conclusion of which a nineteen-page document was drawn up which described opera- tional doctrine on tourist operations including agent spotting agent selection agent assessment agent training, and agent tasks planned for the current (1959) tourist season The document stressed CIA planned use of tourists 0801418 148 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 7lkr Copy ================================================== Page 157 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret" (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) for spotting, con tacting, and assessing, and , even tually, communicating with agents in the' Soviet Union BLAKE confessed to passing the document to the KGB as soon as it came into his possession Comment:_ It is not ~advanced that NOSENKO should' neces - sarily have known Of BLAKE although his statements on the matter have been ambiguous Asked- in 1962 whether he knew of BLAKE (whose earlier arrest: had been ` publicized) NOSENKO affirmed that he did: but indicated that: BLAKE was a less important source than the Canadian Ambassador; (WATKINS) or the : agent in_ the British Admiralty (VASSALL) Nhen BLAKE' was mentioned in 196.4 NOSENKO asked "who S BLAKE? 01 The, significance Of BLAKE is that his confession established that the KGB was 'fully aware: of the- status and character of American and British Intelligence; tourist operations: while NOSENKO_alleges he was in the Seventh Department It 'is judged by measure as wel1 as by NOSENKO s statements about the; KGB , that the substance of the: information: if not the document- itself Would-be brought to the attention of a KGB counterintelligence Officer concerned the Deputy Chief Of the American-British Commonwealth Section which NOSENKO" claims was himself_ KGB 'ef American Inte_ lligence Tourist Operations In 1961 CIA: acquired a lengthy_ KGB Secret study on the subject:: of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union 'The KGB study draws recognizably upon the information supplied by BLAKE ana although concerned primarily with American tourist operations in 1960 , it also refers to American; agents whom KGB counterintelligence elements: identified among tourists in the: years 1958 and .1959. while NOSENKO claims he was Deputy Chief 0f the American-British Commonwealth' Section and during which. time he' clains the; KGB identified no American Intelligence agents 0801419 149 TS No._ 197124 Top Secret 10 any key study Top: Copy ================================================== Page 158 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960) SEVENTH DEPARTMENT 1955-1960: Summary and Conclusion NOSENKO S description of the activities of the Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department in this period is almost solely restricted to his account of these fifteen KGB operations Other than to allege that certain KGB officers he named were his subordinates he provided information to substantiate his claim that he had no supervisory or_ administrative responsibilities_ rhey_ feature Of the operations do not relate to NOSENKO ' comon description of the function of the Seventh S own Tourist Section or later 1 to the 'eeeyeathBrepastneotr S wealth Section Most were sexual tish Common- operations and he acknowledges or other entrapment conducted by KGB elements that several were operations short NOSENKO other than his Own section , In neea not have been in the Seventh Department sections_ as he: clains to have learned of in the activities he describes, Or participated graphic account of the Second 'Chieltborectoosteko Jives_ a own ) counterintelligence Directorate S (ana his coun terintelligence mission , 1 his knowledge is not Of three such operations. among tourists; in the only operations he describes _ the coun terinteliigence aspects were incidental- Contrary to his claims NOSENKO is aware neither Of all important KGB operations against American tourists during the period _ nor woaducaed know to the KGB about American was tourist operations Intelligence and British Conclusion While NOSENKO was associated with a KGB element conducting operations against American and other foreign tourists the period 1955-1960 _ he was neither a_ senior case officer nor Deputy Chief of the Seventh British Commonwealth Section_ Department American- 150 TS No. 197124 Top Secret during 0d01420 Copy ================================================== Page 159 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret CHAPTER VfI; AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960-January 1962 Deputy Chief %f the Section NOSENKO claims to have " servea as Deputy Chief of the American ` Embassy Section of the American Department KGB Second Chief Directorate from sometime in: January: 1960_ until the first days of January- 1962 This section, in his words , was working against I} the most important counter- intelligence -target in the Soviet Union the: permanent American representation in' Moscow , It regarded every American stationed there a possible SpY and ; ; Simultaneously a3 a target for recruitment TThe functions of the_ American: Embassy Section were described: by 'NOSENKO. as 'being to' monitor all contacts: by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens_ to collect all information possible on American Embassy ,employees and to use this information as a basis for: planning 'and imple- menting recruitments The Americans personalities jobs personal relationships_ weaknesses , dally routines security precautions contacts with Soviet citizens , ana the' major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives 'formed the basis_ for this work To gather such information the section" s officers employed large numbers of agents and informants among the indigenous employees 0f the Embassy , Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles and third-country nationals with American contacts The officers also benefitted from the reports Of numerous surveillance teams at their disposal , as well as information obtained from telephone taps and: microphones in Americans offices and homes _ Each officer had a limited number Of American targets with whom he attempted to become thoroughly familiar Annually, they Submitted detailed operationai pians for 151 0301421 TS: No: 197124 Top Secret 10 Copy ================================================== Page 160 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) ting the knowledge they had gained Of their targets . 1960 and 1961 NOSENKO said within the section During emphasis was placed on "identifying intelligence Sreicezs in the Embassy and actively developing them ciphers and painstakingly studying code clerks _ 1 aceuifigg the basis on which they can be recruited" As Deputy Chief of this section NOSENKO said , he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hiaden I1 from him On this basis he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB recruited no Americans associated with the Embassy , there were no KGB Americans assignea to the Embassy in this agents ana,g in fact, the KGB had recruitea no American period since 1i ANDREY IJ (Dayle SMITH recruited Enbasgg3eseennel331 From continuing friendships with ca- 1953 see p 1961, who remained in the his fellow-officers of 1960-and NOSENKO has also claimed section when NOSENKO transferred , certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time ne left the section in January 1962 until his January 1964 departure in Geneva Fransfer to the American Embassy Section In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief Of the American Section Of the Seventh Department , NOSENKO learned from the Department Chief DUBAS of plans to transfer him back to the American Department' s American Embassy Section , Chief _ NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move as Deputy and wanted to remain in the Seventh ` Department: 1i I was used to it there and wanted to continue_ I wanted to stay in the Seventh Department. This [the transfer] was no promotion _ Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there The American Department is, of course the most important_ But here I was working against American tourists This is also important _ Furthermore I showed [had proven] myself there in 55 , 56 , 57 _ '58 _ and 59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer_ And there, in the American Department , I must prove myself with new " people - 152 0001422 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy exploi ================================================== Page 161 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) NOSENKO therefore 'asked DUBAs to try to retain him: DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief 'Directorate Chief 0. M_ GRIBANOV on his behalf; but to no avail: In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued On the:day NOSENKO reported to V.A KLYPIN Chief Of the American: Department, to begin nis new: job_ he was; told to report to GRIBANOV ' s office NOSENKO expressed his misgivings about: the change of assignment to GRIBANOV GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had 'spoken_ to him but that he GRIBANOV: had his Own plans ana that was all"_ GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that he: 'thought NOSENKO.could bring 01 fresh air to the. American; Embassy Section' s ,operations and that he was- to" pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks the number one target" Predecessor 28 Deputy Chief Asked: on" 17' Aprii 1964 whom he had: relieved upon reporting for :duty in the American Embassy Section NOSENKO replied: "No one He assued responsibility for the Embassy security file from KOVSHUK Various case: officers earlier had been responsible for Embassy Security Officer Russell LANGELLE _ including MALYUGIN_ then : KUSKOV , KOVSHUK_ and KLYPIN; but LANGELLE had been expelled from the: Soviet_ Union in, October 1959 ana his successor John ABIDIAN= was not to arrive untii Marcn 1960 On several occasions_ between ' January 'and June 1964 NOSENKO had referred to a KGB officer' named Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV-but never in connection `with the American Embassy Section Thus in January he first identified: him' as Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV the : Deputy Chief of" the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department In February he identified a V.A ALEKSEYEV-as the alias of a Mikhail Fedorovich 1 last_ name not recalled who was Deputy Chief Of the Fifth Department_ In June 'in 'listing KGB officers who had received- various awards for their service NOSENKO included the name of Mikhail BAKHVALOV _ Deputy Chief Of' an unremem bered department" of the Second Chief Directorate 6a61423 153 TS: No: 197124 Secret' Copy 10 Top ================================================== Page 162 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret 1960-January 1962) '(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January asked to list the names of On 18 June 1964 NOSENKO was joined or departea the American all Officers who had either NOSENKO was transferred to Embassy Section from the time his return to the American the Seventh Department in 1955 to listed fourteen officers Embassy Section in 1960 _ NOSENKO five who had been trans- as having joined the eectiGt' diddNosvekonention BAKHVALOV . ferred out 0 In neither on 24 June 1964 NOSENKO stated A week later however in 1958 Mikhail Fedorovich_ that "in 1959 ana besutbichiet Of the American Embassy BAKHVALOV was the Deputy his position in 1960 and he Section_ I him in Chief" In september went to the Fifth Department REVBenvtyaghbeputy Chief [not 1964 NOSENKO assertea EhstegAcavAOVi _ had been LANGELLE S the others he had identified first mentioned that case' officer In 1965 NOSENKO responsible_ for maintaining BAKHVALOV not KOVSHUK = had been that BAKHVALOV had the Vmbovsycecurity ealonandiitatedothatpeaKiving code thereabaisk KOVSHUK responsibility clerk operations _ has never resolved con tradictions Comment: feteeeogaoSgNKoas cevefer accounts of what between from whom when he entered functions he asduned bebutedomsseetions that the Section_ 7 and his as Deputy Chief _ BAKHVALOV: was his predecessor Regpongibilities in the American Embassy Shortly after reporting_ hortdutscusstbe with GRIBANOV Section and following his short Department Chief KLYRIN NOSENKO saia hetuet ChtefAROVSEUR to discuss his responsi- and Embassy Section Chief the section_ Repeating what bilities and functions in that NOSENKO' s most GRIBANOV had said KIYPINbiffessed the section would_ be GRIOANOXtoaio3lalfegGooperattonai theisee; American supervision Of all KGB code clerks stationed in military ana StateeDefhetmeneriodes at the Embassy , KLYPIN Moscow As for the other 154 TS No_ 197124 0301424 Top_Secret Copy and replaced against ================================================== Page 163 ================================================== 4-0ooOo Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION' January 1960-January 1962) suggestea a division of labor under Which KOVSHUK would be re sponsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO woula supervise work: against the Army Air Force, and: Naval: Attaches: and their assistants NOSENKO was also to be custodian of Certain sensitive files in the: section NOSENKO : has signed a protocol which listed . his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It reads: in part 'During the entire period in 'the First [American Embassy] Section,. First [American] Department in 196.0 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief:0f Section My responsibilities were the following: ~General Deputy. to_ the Chief of the First Section Vladislav Mikhaylovich : KOVSHUK , and Acting Chief of Section in his absence SImediate supervisor for the' operational work against American code clerks In this capacity I; closely guided Ehe work of 'case: officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV: ~Case officer for American Embassy' Security Officer John ABIDIAN_ ~For about the first six months of 1960 super- visor 0f, the work against the offices of the Army , Naval and Air attaches: Comment: Before 1965 NOSENRO never claimed responsibility for' supervising operations against service attache targets In October 1966 NOSENKO for the first' time claimed he was personally responsible for (as contrasted to supervising) operational activity against Naval ana Marine: Officers of the office 0f the Naval Attache _ 155 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Cac1425 Copy: ================================================== Page 164 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) ~I maintained the file on American Embassy security. ~I maintained the log books for the reports sent to the First [American Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate_ 01 KGB , based on the information obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy I read all the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in the section In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV _ ~During this period I was the agent handler for agents SHMELEV ' GRIGORIY PROKHOR ARTUR and SARDAR [VOLKOV YEFREMOV [PREISFREUNDJ FRIPPELL ana MEISS respectively] 06 #hroughout &his entire period I sat in Room 618 Of KGB Headquarters: at House Number Dzherzhinskiy Square MoscOw GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this office with me throughout most Of this period _ Coment: NOSENKO S assertions with respect to each Of these claimed functions are examined in some detail in the following pages _ Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief Qf Section Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeatea interrogation that as general:deputy to KOVSHUK _ with the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK S absence he had access to and was obliged to keep current on all information relating to the section ' s activities_ On this basis he has assured his questioners that the KGB was 'completely unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his association with section officers made it certain that there were no such KGB successes even in the periods 156 0801426 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 3/8r 2 , Copy ================================================== Page 165 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) 1955-1960. and 1962-1964 ; when he was assigned in the Seventh Department His statements on: this subject during February 1965 were distilled in a_ protocal which NOSENKO signed on 20:February "As the only: Deputy to: the Chief of the American Embassy Section First Department Second Chief Directorate; KGB , Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK _ from January 1960 to January 1962 one of my functions was: to. serve as KOVSHUK S' general deputy and to assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief Of the Section during KOVSHUK:' S absence . In order to: perform this function I had the right and the `obligation of. knowing the details about every: important activity: of the section against the American: Embassy and its personnel _ No- activity of this nature was withhela from me M1 As' Deputy Chief 0f the" Section I know definitely that no: U 5 _ Officials serving in the: Embassy, were agents of the_ KGB or reporting unofficially in any way: .to the KGB during my service in the Section There; were 'no approaches or recruitments made: `by the Section during the period 'January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American: Embassy including personnel Of the Attaches (Army Navy and Air) the Department: of Agriculture and: USIA, including Marine- guards_ sergeants- State ,Department code clerks; except against STORS- L BERG-and KEYSERS both unsuccessful_approaches There: were no: approaches_ or-recruitments: made against any; employees Of the United States Govern- ment who: were assigned to; the: American: Embassy on temporary 'during this period_ I have read ana understooa this report and certifyit as correct 157 TS No:: 197124 Secret Copy _ 1O Army: duty 0381427 2/R7 Top ================================================== Page 166 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January. 1962) In the two years of NOSENKO S service in the section there were a total of over three months when he said KOVSHUK was 1ll or on leave NOSENKO recalled that he was Acting Chief during KOVSHUK S two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961_ although he did not remember precisely in which months He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the sumer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble ana for a week Or two some time in 1961, again when KOVSHUK was i11 He recalled that KOVSHUK was also absent for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower S planned visit to the Soviet:. Union in 1960 _ As Acting Chief in KOVSHUK S absence_ NOSENKO stated that he was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the entire section and 6 in particular for assuming KOVSHUK S work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the American Embassy . NOSENKO coula recall no operational decisions that he made as acting chief nor any specific or unusual occurrences during these times NOSENKO said that the specific responsibility of KOVSHUK S which he handled in the Chief' s absence Was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going;' out Of the Embassy Section NOSENKO stated he met none of KOVSHUK S agents during his absences nor coula he remember any of them except GLAZUNOV [whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his Own agent and later saia was "KOVSHUK S and FEDYANIN' s" ] and the American correspondent STEVENS [about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his activities in 1953-55] According to NOSENKO _ KOVSHUK had personal contact, under Ministry of" Foreign Affairs cover, with "some 0 American Embassy Officers , but the only such Embassy officer he coula identify was WINTERS and he knew of no details about KOVSHUK S relations with him_ 158 VGk 0301428 TS No: 197124 Top Secret Top only Copy ================================================== Page 167 ================================================== 614-Qoooo Top Secret '{AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: NOSENKO knows neither that William N MORELL' was identified; formally by Ehe Embassy to the Soviet Government to be 'a CIA employee nor that KOVSHUK (who was aware Of this fact) was In personal 'contact with(MORELD General Supervisory Duties In interrogations 0f January 1965` NOSEHKO was questioned in congiderable detail about his Supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section He didn t know 'what major" duties occupied most_ of his time nor which were the 1i most important:x He stated that ""everything was: important_ His subordinates were 'GRYAZNOV ` and KOSOLAPOV (responsible for: code clerk operations) [Vladimir] DEMKIN assisted bY [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSRIY (residents of America House) [N.A.] GAVRILENKO (Air Attaches personnel and the aircrews of the: Ambassador s aircraft) [I:Ya:] KURILENKO (Army Attache: personnel) ana [Victor] BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attache personnel) Except for M1 little questions It which the officers decided for themselves NOSEIKO saia he directed their activities_ discussed: With them: various aspects of their: work_ and: responded to their: questions as required_ If he coula not answer their guestions , NOSENKO stated or if the problem: Was not within_ his authority NOSENKO discussed; the matter with KOVSHUK If it was necessary NOSENKO claimed he thereafter: woula' discuss the matter with: American Department Chief: KLYPIN Or his successor [s M: ] FEDOSEYEV _ and on some occasions, with Second 'Chief D 'Directorate Chief: GRIBANOV : NOSENKO. stated he " accompanied his subordinates to some meetings with their-agents, not because he didn't trust them but to hear for himself what the agent was reporting. He cited as liypothetical examples occasions when DEMKIN might relay reports from Ella UMANETS Or Inga VARLAMOVA (agents working against America House residents) reports which NOSENKO wouId want to hear for himself personally: NOSENKO would not' estimate to his interrogators: what percen- tage; of Embassy Section ` agents he met in this fashion 159 TS. No' 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 0jui429 2I60 ================================================== Page 168 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) In addition o supervising his subordinates's of agents NOSENKO said he personally direction ("PROKHOR" ) ana(TJEIss] ( "SARDAR") managed (PREISFREUND06 Supervisor @f All Code Clerk Operations NOSENKO saia that, upon asse responsibility supervistng operations against American code cletks fohe found a very "difficult situation Prior to the of KOSOLAPOV to the American Embassy Section assignment all operations against code clerks had in late 1959 , MALYUGIN _ but MALYUGIN been handled by had been no S two years of effort there NOSENKO tookoveeztioeza approaches and no successes [hen over there were no active developmental operations against code clerks under way he stated ana the agents or operational contacts being used them were poorly educated maids ana waitresses against whom had accomplished anything of none of citizen agents were used importance _ No non-Soviet room in operations against code - personnel According to ` NOSENKO , in January or February of 1960 GRYAZNOV was assigned to the American Embassy Section second assistant to NOSENKO in his code as a Trom this point on NOSENKO ; KOSOLAPOV _ clerk activities _ the same KGB Headquarters office and GRYAZNOV: shared American code clerks There all KGB files on available as well as the files on all agents for work against them, were stored in one safe accessible to all three officers_ NOSENKO large all Of the section S work these supervised cations lines and no provo_ could 'haveobeeomisesn_ recruitment attempts or recruitments been planned Or carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement when he was in Moscow _ If NOSENKO was absent on a he would have been told about activity upon his return any such NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years discussing their cases with them, taking part in operational and approving or disapproving all operational planning, measures _ 160 0901430 TS No. 197124 Secret Top uming during only being along trip, 2lke Top Copy ================================================== Page 169 ================================================== 4-OQoog Top Secret (AMERICAN. EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Nhen NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks he read files on targets and agents discussed the situation with MALYUGIN DEMKIN (the American Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents Of America: House) GRYAZNOV _ and_KOSOLAPOV , and reported his findings and recommendations to his superiors KOVSIIUK and KLYPIN_ Several changes were made' as a result NOSENKO asserted_ In introducing a new program for the work of the section _ NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country nationals (neither American nor Soviet citizens) for 'agent work against code clerks ; in line with this suggestion he personally recruited a [Syrian military_officer Samih NEIss]-Orp & (see: P. 181) and directed him against the America House_ After his first few visits [EISSkwas_specifically targetted 0 6' against[military code-clerk Matthew zujuSI Another such 0luG agent_directly handled by NOSENKO' wasCthel Finnish business_ man Johan_PREISEREUND who figured_ in the case Of the 08 military code clerk James STORSBERG] (see Pa 166) NOSENKO also Suggested nitiating: activity against code clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR_ ana' specifically proposed that operational measures: .be undertaken or that Operational possibilities Je studied in Helsinki the city through which most of the: American code clerks. passed; on their way to MOscow _ Comment Questioned- later on individual cases NOSENKO retracted his assertion. that he read ana' studied= all the files on individual American code clerks stating instead that he did not study any although he may have Skimmed some He insisted however that in any event he read all the current_ incoming information on code clerks received_ from microphones agents and 'the like and routed the' reports to" the case officer concerned . 161 TS_ No. 197124 Top Secret 10 08,06 0301431 5JBR Copy ================================================== Page 170 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) GOLITSYN S Information About KGB} Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960-1961 The most significant collateral information about KGB operations against American code clerks in this period _ with which to compare NOSEIJKO ' s assertions [on this topic] is that provided by GOLITSYN after his defection in 1961. GOLITSYN identified KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV name and from photograph as being two veteran KGB officers_ personally known to him who were in 1960 "working against code clerks in the American Embassy in MoscOw _ Ii With respect to the priority attached to the recruitment of American code clerks in 1960 GOLITSYN commented in 1961 that: "The task of strengthening of work against Americans had been a standing requirement , both in the past and most particularly [in 1960] This work was particularly intensified after the appointment Of SHELEPIN to the KGB _ In 1960 _ it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the Embassy in Moscow and against American colonies in other; countries This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB_ Thereafter there was a' directive from SIIBLEPIN regarding the intensification of work against the American cipher-clerks_ II GOLITSYN said that NOSENKO was not assigned to the Embassy Section in 1960-1961, since if he had been GOLITSYN would have know about it. Preparing for his assignment to Ielsinki GOLITSYN in the spring of 1960 visited the Embassy Section and learned from GRYAZNOV that the latter had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki The code clerk had already provided the KGB with some infor Y mation and he was considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent. GOLITSYN Ias told by GRYAZNOV that if the code clerk ' s transfer materialized , GOLITSYN might have him in Helsinki as his agent - 162 0801432 TS No. 197124 Secret Top by Top Copy ================================================== Page 171 ================================================== OJQOQ - Top Secret AMERICAN: EMBASSY: SECTION January 1960-January 1962). GOLITSYN also. learned from: GRYAZNOV in spring_ of 1960 that the latter had aeveloped an operation against an Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was_ "99 per cent; sure that the target would be recruited GRYAZNOV informed_ GOLITSYN in April Or 1960 that an American employee 0f the Embassy in Moscow possibly a code clerk= was either recruitea or prepared for recruitment on the basis. of homosexual' compromise-beginning in 1959- and concluding in 1960 The RGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts but: SHELEPIN , who had just become Chairman Of the KGB at the time was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments SHELEPIN said that the homosexual blackmaii was in this instance "too dirty" ana the RGB should find another basis for recruitment SHELEPIN 'did not exclude future use Of the' photographs which: the KGB would hold in reserve While on a temporary assignment to Helsinki in November 1960 V.V_ KOSOLAPOV told GOLITSYN that he , had come to Helsinki in order to accompany an Embassy code clerk back to Moscow on the train KOSOLAPOV' planned; to strike up an acquaintance with: the code clerk: which he_ coula continue to develop in Moscow In September 1961 a friend Of KOSOLAPOV also visited_ Helsinki on temporary duty GOLITSYN tried: to him to: talk' about KOSOLAPOV' s November train operation but KOSOLAPOV' s: friend_ woula not discuss the case: GOLITSYN reasoned that there woula be no reluctance to discuss the case if it had' been unsuccessful ana that therefore' KOSOLAPOV must have been successful in developing the code clerk on: the train or afterwards GOLITSYN learned in' January 1961 from V.M_ KOVSHUK that ps the Finnish agent Johannes PRETSEREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment Of; an American employee of the' Embassy- 163 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 May get G861433 {8k Copy. ================================================== Page 172 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment : Two of GOLITSYN s leads may refer to (TORSBERG] 0 6 andGGARLAND] (see below) The other leads more than one of which may refer to the same H individual , have not resulted in an identifica- tion Of any code clerk target of the KGB Operations Against Military Code Clerks Comment: According to official U,S _ Government records , Service Attaches of the Embassy in Moscow as 0f 1960 shared a_ single cryptographic center and a Single military code clerk (except when two code clerks overlapped ' during periods 0f turnover) The military code clerk was respon ~ sible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic Of all three military services In' practice at least one other member of the Service Attaches offices in Moscow held a cryptographic clearance and was trained to replace the regular military code clerk when the latter was absent. James STORSBERG was the military code 06,C8 clerk_assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960 to September 1961= when his successor Matthew ZuJUS, arrived _ "TORSBERG] b6 himself arrivea in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961_ During the period of (STORSBERG S tour in Moscow back-up cryptographic dutes were per- formed by the Military Communications autieer Ok06 CIVO-2 HURLEY] HURLEY] performed these duties 06 on a number Of occasions including the night Of the KGB approach to [STORSBERG] and he could 0 be loosely termed a code clerk (Although NOSENKO has distinguished between (GTORSBERG s function as "military code clerk" and(WIURLEY" s U6 duties as "military code machine mechanic" he considered both to be within the general category 164 0801434 TS No. 197124 Secret Top only hlGR Top Copy ================================================== Page 173 ================================================== 4-00QOO: 4 Secret_ (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January_ 1962) Coment: (Continued) of II _ 'military code clerks "I NOSENKO ' reported that there was no KGB 'operation against Ok-TURLEz}- Additionally GURLEY performed repair 06 work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy DG[HURLEYS: tour in Moscow began shortly 6 before (STORSBERC' s in December 1959 and he served Ehere until June or July 1962 The only other person performing: Official functions in the 'military code roOm during the 1960-61, period wasd ames_KEYSERS who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960; and was assigned to the office 'of the Air Force Medical Officer As a concurrent secondary assignment KEYSERS 06 worked as a clerk-typist in the office of Ehe Air Attache Fron February until mid-April 1961 as a_ collateral duty KEYSERS{ worked in the joint military code room where he was in training: to serve as back-up cryptographer He was relieved of this 'duty in April 1961 for reasons of Iow aptitude and lack of interest; in" June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities 'The- significance of the following cases particularly that Qf[STORSBERd is the to which: collateral information corroborates or contradicts NOSENKO s claims to have been Deputy Chief Of the American Embassy Section to have supervised all KGB ' Operations against Embassy code 'clerks and to have certain know- ledge that no Americans in the" Embassy were recruited between ANDREY" (Dayle; SMITH) in 1953 ana NOSENKO s defection in 1964 6301435 165 TS' No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Top extento6 iX/R ================================================== Page 174 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG 6 NOSENKO ' s Information-l962 NOSENKO first ` alluded to a KGB attempt to unnamed American ' military code clerk recruit an meeting with CIA in 1962 : He during his initial (which he later claimed was describing a new technique the 1960-1961 to be his Own idea) introduced in in period to overcome the reluctance of Americans Moscow to develop friendships with Soviet citizens Beginning in 1960 the KGB instructea It Ii (Germans Frenchmen ; and Finns ; for third-national agents American Club on example} to visit the American enlisted Kreroikviaga%ae Naberezhnaya to cultivate one such agent of .NOSENKO there (GOLITSYN learned of had reported the KGB and the KGB concluded that GOLITSYN practise to the Americans because foreigners no_ longer were permitted to enter the America House billets freely for dances movies and the like the club there.) NOSENKO had at GOLITSYN in order to develop recruited the agent known to clerk Without an American mi litary code American identifying either the foreign agent or the target, NOSENKO provided further details on the case in subsequent meetings _ American Recruiting a military code clerk from the Embassy was- the a Embassy Section S "number one assignment" and for year NOSENKO was involved in an operation against target almost to the exclusion of all other such a case was considered to be the 01 number 0t duties _ The Chairman SHELEPIN one case and KGB GRIBANOV as_ well as Second Chief Directorate Chief was an impatiently inquired as to its progress . The who , themeGiciee sergeant with about 20 years service targe as a code learned wanted Zo retire and take a,position of aevedepiler? with the State Department: For the purpose OX visited the 'Jsske Etecger: NOSENKO recruited a foreigner who frequently The 0I third-national 0 placed in contact with the American_ agent was drinking bouts 1 and had several instructed together After about two months ; NOSENKO his agent to take the American to the hotel room and introduce him there agent s to a KGB female agent. S/6Q 166 0301436 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Army they Copy ================================================== Page 175 ================================================== J4Q0Q0Q Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Although the girl and the American were intimate no' photo- graphs were taken_ nor were photographs taken the next time the agent provided the American with a girl. On the third such occasion however; the KGB technicians did obtain incriminating photographs The :foreign agent also involved the American_ in an illicit currency transaction in Which the American . contributed 'S300 ..as his share to: finance the purchase and subsequent sale 0f some jewels _ The American was allowed to believe that he earned a S5,000 profit: the money was actually furnished by the KGB After a year' s development GRIBANOV decided that a - recruitment should be attempted _ through: another foreigner The Original foreign agent_ was withdrawn from the operation and -a KGB Officer; Nikoiay: Semenovich SKVORTSOV was introduced the American in' the .guise of wealthy French businessman Marcel; MICHAUD "1 SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD met: and drank: with the American several times 0 even at America J0 House It was SKVORTSOV ' s estimate that: the American was very careful, but that he_might; be; susceptible to recruitment while drunk After meeting with the American at the club in America House one evening_ SKVORTSOV : telephoned him and invited him to; SKVORTSOV S hotel: room to meet 1t two Dutch giris II When he arrived SKVORTSOV:explained that the girls had . refused to come: but that he could call another giri for the, American The. 'girl [identified by NOSENKO in 1964,as Inga: VARLALIQVA] wasa KGB agent' Of GRYAZNOV S who was usea for such operations: and she and the 'American were intimate in SKVORTSOV: S hotel room. In an adjacent rOOm were GRIBANOV 0 NOSENKO _ KOVSHUK and another KGB: officer In another adjacent room were technicians 6f the Operational Technical Directorate who' taped the American S conversations_ When the American left SKVORTSOV 's room at two 0'clock: in the morning he Was tipsy "II NOSENKO and another officer iitercepted him in the haliway- escorted him into the adjacent 4 rOQm and locked the door NOSENKO 'himself solicited the American 5: collaboration with the KGB in exchange for S20;000 in cash (which was offered in: two packages of Sio notes) and the promise of additional sums: [Jhen the American refused_ the KGB: officers: disclosed their knowledge of his plan to transfer to the State Department threatened to inform the Embassy: that he; had collaborated with the KGB in; which: case- he woula get neither the cash nor the job with 167 0861437 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 31 Top to "very They Copy ================================================== Page 176 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) the State Department_ 0 The American was adamant in his refusal_ although he was held in the hotel room all night long_ At about six 0 clock in the morning the KGB officers received a telephoned report that the ' Embassy Marine had called America House to advise that the American guard needed at the Embassy because an enciphered was arrived The American was then released telegram had The KGB 0 knew" that the American did recruitment not report the attempt. that circumstance for blackmail rather than the incriminating photographs the KGB planned another attempt to recruit him if he ever returned abroad _ When the non-Soviet agent used in the first Year of developing the American target had come to the attention of GOLITSYN _ GOLITSYN visited the, Embassy Section to see if he coula use him in First Chief Directorate NOSENKO was On leave at the time , but operations abroad _ another. Embassy Section officer_ GOLITSYN talked with touch him, he S ours" ffheceeievGOCETSYNE was told Don t discussed Of this incident is below. ] NOSENKO ' s Information-1964 At the second 'meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1964 _ NOSENKO identified the American military code clerk as (Jim { 06 STORSBERG The foreign agent NOSENKO recruited for the case was (Johannes PREfSFREUNDA(KGB cryptonym 'PROKHOR" ) a Einn.! In repeating the substance of his 1962 account Of the KGB recruitment attempt_ NOSENKO emphasized his role in directing both PREISFREUND] and the KGB 'ofiiceersonal SKVORTSOV /MICHAUD _ GRIBANOV and KOVSHUK not NOSENKO, actually made the recruitment attempt_ NOSENKO was not present; he waited qutside the room with_ GRYAZNOV _ Neither did NOSENKO PREISFREUND The latter was recruited by KOVSHUK Kohcecruit needed credit for the recruitment" although NOSENKO had initially cultivated the{Finn Under KOVSHUK S orders_ NOSENKO served as PREISFREUNE ' gcase officer although KOVSHUK accompanied him to operational meetings with the agent. 2/K 0001438 168 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Top Using Copy ================================================== Page 177 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) PREISFREUNDwas used in no KGB operation other than in the development Of CSTORSBERCOL His usefulness ` declined because he was suspected particularly by his fellow(Finns}, of having some re_ lationship with- the KGB Comment A 'report of thel Finnish]security service; advised CIA in December 1960 that PREISF "REUND ] "is a Soviet agent who calls at the America Club in Moscow and develops Americans in an attempt to penetrate Western circles M1 After 'GOLITSYN S defection [in December 1961] NOSENKO (who had by then: transferred: back to 'the "Severth Department) and KOVSHUK concluded that @REISFREUND] thereby had been identi-:06 fied as a KGB agent to American Intelligence; and that PRETSFREUND) should not be used: again against American Embassy: personnel NOSENKO was' told to use thecFinn in Seventh Department operations but: he was unsuitable since he knew: onlyGFinnishand Russian NOSENKO S: Information-1965 In the February-March 1965 interrogations NOSENKO 'providea some additions as well as further_amendments to what he had { related earlier "about M GRYAZNOV_ wrote the_ initial operational plan" which G-OOSENK3 read 'and approvea The : plan: calied for 'a detailed: study of STORSBERG QG and the creation of some basis on ` which to make an tional approach The case developed ' slowly in 1960opeFzom 2; female" clerk_ named (YAZHINSKAYA and other employees in the Tinnish_Embassy; PRETSFREUND ]obtained background information 0 on STORSBERG who sometimes visited: the sauna in Ehe Finnish 0 Embassy PREISEREUND]was directed to visit America House in order to strike up an acquaintance with STORSBERG, and when" he was successful he managed to lureC STORSBERG to. his hotel rOom where the KGB obtained incrimixating 0Y6 of(STORSBERG ana the--female agent . Inga_ 'Aifatovg PhotSgsaBkal06 66 Yisicea @REISFREUND] S rooms many times at different hotels in Moscow, but the KGB . took incriminating photographs on 169 0001439 TS No 197124 Secret 10 Top 0k 2Zi8k Top: Copy ================================================== Page 178 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) two occasions_ PREISFREUND] in- 06 SKVORTSOV and when had troduced [TORSBERG to invited {TORSBERG to his become acquainted' SKVORTSOV number Of occasions but rOOm at the Leningrad Hotel on a evening in the middie of {goRSBhoG always refused On one SKVORTSOV s invitation in the' however STORSBERG accepted non-Soviet girls: NOSENKO belief that he wouZd meet made arrangements with was in the hotel and he had Directorate to call the KGB Operational Technical at once if audio Etbessy indicated anythingewhich coverage of the American attempt. might affect the recruitment 0 6 While NOSENRO waited outside the to recruit{STORSBERG on room GRIBANOV attempted was translaEed BBEROSRUKdeoGSORSBE grounds ; his proposal given SKVORTSOV " S hotel room ETORSBERG; however must have the American : Embassy_ 1 becoose telereoGe number to someone at him someone called SKVORTSOV ' while GRIBANOV was talking to When this happened either s room looking for the American the door and advised GRYAZNOV or NOSENKO knocked for GTORSBERG_ The KOVSHUK that the Embassy was searching on terminated 1 uhsuccessegflitment attempt was thereupon NOSENKO II could not file on [TORSBERG COtIredesbezh if he 'had ever read the KGB consistently equatea cus "CoacrSbiag of KGB practice NOSENKO responsible case officer:] a case file with the reporting' although he had He had no interest in "earlier STORSBERG as came into read obzsentsnaterials concerning the Embassy Section _ 'Comment: NOSENKO at that time in 1965 with the substance 0f was then confronted cripts in which he the 1962 'meeting trans T operation claimed to have run_ the and to 1 to have been ` deeply involved in it, have personally spoken to {STORSBERG ] the recruitment attempt_ NOSENKO 06 interrupted the reading of the calling it "nonsense " I He shedthensasigtu at all the 1962 was drunk nervous in the meetings in Geneva and was presence of CIA officers_ Ie 0801440 170 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top only tney being they during 1!;GR Copy ================================================== Page 179 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY: SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Coment: (Continued) admitted that he haa I painted himself as somewhat more active and important than facts justified; but ;said this reflected only "white lies 0 which :did not affect the otherwise complete accuracy' of his' story with respect to the position he occupied at the time nor the events which then transpired NOSENKO S Information-1966- During the 1964 interrogations NOSENKO had been vague as to the timing and sequence of events in the STORSBERG opeza-OL tion, and in 1965 he: refused to specify dates for this or any other operation he 'described stating he could no longer be sure when any_particular incident occurrea Questioned again about the( STORSBERG case in- October 196.6 NOSENKO. insisted that he had directed the "entire operation from beginning to end and that it was his most important case_ At his interrogator S- insistence he provided the following chronology: January 1960: STORSBERG arrived in Moscow (NOSENKO accepted- Ehe actual date as supplied by the: 'interrogator:) Early 1960 or PRETSFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK mia-1960 : NOSENKO after retracting his claim_ he. recruited<RREISFREUND said he 0- first met PREISF I a week: or SQ 0 G after his- PecIG_RGOND] (which occurred accoraing to most accounts in early 1960): In October 1966 however NOSENKO said that: he and [PREISFREUNDJO first met "in the middle Of 1960 , in the sumer of 1960 " 0t Summer 1960 : PREISFREUND first provided a woman to STORSBERG 171 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 being Cou1441 'BR Copy ================================================== Page 180 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Early 1961: Compromising photographs of [STORSBERC] and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow _ About @REISEREUND] was withdrawn from the 1961: operation and SKVORTSOV was introduced about three weeks before the approach to IsTORSBERG= Db June 1961: Unsuccessful KGB approach to (STORSBERG in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow (Earlier in the 1966 interrogations NOSENKO had said that the approach was made Ii 3 month or a month and a half 6 before STORSBERG left Moscow" Told that ISTORSBERG was reassigned in November 1961 1 NOSENKO said that the approach was in June 1961 8 five months before [STORSBERG S departure.) 0. GTORSBERG] reported that the approach was in October 1961_ See below. ] 06 SToRSBERG' s Information STORSBERG] did not report the KGB recruitment approach unttl the NOSENKO lead Prompted his being interviewed by the FBI on 14 September 1964 - His reasons he said were that the KGB officers had warned him not do so and he feared that by reporting the approach he would jeopardize his chance for: employment with the State Department. He said that he provided no information to the Soviets during or after the approach in October 1961. Nith the exception of the timing Of the recruitment attempt , GTORSBERC} s 86 account of the operation is ` fairly close to that provided by NOSENKO , including the roles of)PREISFREUND and SKVORTSOV , 06 whom he positively identified their photographs He was unable to identify photographs of GRIBANOV , KOVSHUK , or NOSENKO . TSTORSBERG said that he first became acquainted with 06 PREISFREUND in February or March 1960 _ he was first intimate with a female procured by( PREISFREUND] "six months or so" 06 0301442 172 TS No. 197124 Secret I5/rr May: 06 by Top Copy ================================================== Page 181 ================================================== 4-0oooo Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) [e~9 ca June] after arriving in Moscow and it was not until more than a' year later, in September 1961,. that he Mi first met 'SKVORTSOV posing as the Frenchman Marcel MICHAUD" { ESTORSBERG was uncertain now he became acquainted with SKVORTSOV stating variously_ that he met him through State) Department code clerkdJoseph MORONE Dthrough friends at the Einnish] Embassy or_ that' he' became acquainted with SKVORTSOV whiie he, GETORSBERGowas serving as bartender in the America Club During September 1961 dSTORSBERG} was 06 intimate with female friends of SKVORTSOV on two occasions in SKVORTSOV ' s hotel room. In the middle of October '1961 on the evenipg_ of the KGB recruitment attempt STORSBERG ] saw . SKVORTSOV MORONE}Oand an unidentified female sitting' together in the America Club Comment: STORSBERGJ could not have metdMORONE with SKVORTSOV in October 1961 96MOROITE was trans- ferred: to Lisbon the previous August after. he himself was compromised by the KGB See P= 198 As far as CIA is aware MORONE) has never been 06 questioned regarding his alleged association with SRVORFSOV / MICHAUD or ZTORSBERY: 06 While MORONE was: dancing; with the unknown female "STORSBERG was invited to visit SKVORTSOV S hotel for drinks STORSBERGO 'and SKVORTSOV left the America Club anaESTORSBERG was again 0b intimate with a Soviet female in SKVORTSOV S hotei rOom It was immediately after leaving SKVORTSOV ' s_ rOom on this night when STORSBERG was accosted by: the KGB 0b In a signed statement which he 'gave a representative of the U.S . Air Force Office of Special:: Investigations on 29. 19650/ (STORSBERG]gave somewhat different details: According to this account three or four: months after arriving in the Soviet Union in November 1959 (sic) he' met 0bEEREIsFREUND}through friends at the @innish Embassy There after PRETSFREUND} became a frequent visitor to the America Club and a Eriendship developed between the two' On four 173 6861443 TS No. 197124 Top Secret rU July 410 Copy I6R ================================================== Page 182 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) 06 occasions STORSBERG was intimate with in DREISFREUNP' s hotel rooms O6ITORSBERG last saw PREISFREUND the end Of September or the beginning Of October 1961 when PREIS - Db FREUND]stopped coming to the America Club: about that time ne first met SKVORTSOV through (MORONB d8at the America Club_ 96 IMORONE left Moscow the previous August . ] (TORSBERd 06 was not sure of the exact circumstances Of his introduction to SKVORTSOV nor did he know the latter S relationship with MORONB) After meeting [TORSBERC SKVORTSOV frequently visited the America Club and acfively_cultivated GTORSBERC' s 06 friendship_ This soon led to an invitation to visit SKVORTSOV S apartment , where ISTORSBERG was intimate with a06 Soviet female acquaintance of "SKVORTSOV _ It was after a second visit to the apartment ; about a week after the first, that the KGB made its recruitment approach _ According to this- as well as STORSBERG"' s earlier account , the approach occurred in the middle or toward the end of October 1961 In gonnection with an OSI security interview on 5 August 196506 [STORSBERE denied. having furnished defense information to any 71 Communist intelligence agency" Ii or having ever agreed to do SO , that he had been contacted by a_ member 0f a foreign intelligence ' agency since his return to the United States , or that he knew of_ anyone at the American Embassy in Moscow. who had been contacted by a member 'Of a "Communist intelli- genceagency " He also denied having in any way witn PREISFREUND} to diamonds {jbo BioRsgERgFeed s" denial with respect to the diamonds is in contradiction both with the specific assertions of NOSENKO and with GOLITSYN S more general allegation that the unnamed American was recruited by- the KGB after being compromised by PREISFREUND] in illicit speculation_ 1 PREISFREUNDJ' s Information I0 CIA interviewed [PREISFREUND in 1965 in [NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND Tiezsia 36 woula confirm his story of the STORSBERG case bb,NhiTe (PREISFREUND]OG correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK NOSENKO and STORSBERG he maintained initially that he had a business relationship with KOVSHUR and NOSENKO _ that he never had anything to do with the KGB and that he did not even know what the initials "KGB hI stood for_ 0801444" 174 TS No. 197124 Secret Top femal9s4round buy July only 24'8r Top Copy ================================================== Page 183 ================================================== 4-Q0000 Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY :SECTION January:1960-January 1962) PREISFREUND}-finally admitted however_ that he had been involved in:a KGB operation against[STORSBERG]and he' agreed to tell_ the:: entire truth His version of the case while containing some internal contradictions only_partially coincided_with that provided `by: NOSENKO (EREISEREUND] 06: claimed to be hazy: on the date of: all events connected with his contacts with Ehe KGB : The dates; however could be reconstructed from the known ' dates of otherwise relateda events which he said occurred about the time he was recruited or 0b first met-ISTORSBERG or last visited the America House , and s0 forth::] He described being recruited 'by KOVSHUK_ first dating the: event as at the 'end of 1959 or the beginning Of 1960 , and later as March-April 1960. According to[PRE_s- 06 FREUNDL he was "cultivated neither by NOSEMKO or KOVSHUK The first time he met either was when he was: confronted and recruited by KOVSHUK , under threat of prosecution for black- market dealings [NOSENKO is unaware_ of that feature of 0b ERETSFREUNDs recruitment:] On* NOSENKO ' s and' KQVSHUK S instructions about six months after[PRETSFREUND S recruit- ment he became acquainted With (GTORSBERG and in the summer D6 of 1960 on one occasion he lured TSTORSBERG]into intimacy with 06 a female KGB Vagent (earlier identified by NOSENKO); in his hotel room_ He never saw (STORSBERG]again nor:: did he 0b6 participate in any other KGB operations Referring to the night STORSBERG was intimate with the E female KGB agent inf PREISEREUND s_hotel room PREISFREUND} bl; 06 Said he slept in the hotel corridor while(GTORSBERG and Ehe 06 girl: shared his bed_ At: one: point during Ehe evening he glimpsed NOSENKO in the hallway wearing 3 rubber apron: K He :deduced from this that NOSENKO had been involved in surreptitious Photography of' STORSBERG and the girl Comment: NOSENKO_stated: that photographs were taken Of STORSBERG and' a girl in PREISFREUNDI S hotelOg 0bL roOm He has: never said anything Eo suggest however that he ever personally was involved in photographing of the compromises he claims to. have arranged_ nor has he ever claimed any competence in clandestine photo- graphy - CjU1445 175 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 by: any '(7/r_ Copy ================================================== Page 184 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) 0b Before his last meeting with CIA; PREISFREUND mentioned that he was planning to visit Leningrad with his family, but that he had learned from business contacts in Moscow that Soviet authorities ' suspected him of ' complicity in NOSENKO ' s defection He was apprehensive and particularly concerned that the RGB might suspect that he had related his role in the ETORSBERG case to American Intelligence 06 During his final meeting with CIA on 13 July 19651 PREIS- 0b FREUND asked his interviewers for advice as to whether he should or should not travel to the USSRS He was told that if the situation was as he described ; it coula be quite dangerous for hin to return PREISFREUND stated then thatOg he agreed that he would not go to the USSR after all. Comment 8 PREISFREUND did shortly thereafter visit the Soviet Union as he planned _ and according to Finnish] official travel records returned to |O(Helsinki on 24 July 1965 _ From his apparent Immunity to. KGB pressure, it is concluded that 06 PREISFREUND is to some degree still under KGB control GOLITSYN S Information GOLITSYN who served as a KGB First Chief Directorate counterinteiligence Officer in Helsinki until his- defection_ in December 1961, reported that he had met in Helsinki on several occasions in 1960 a Finn by the name of PREISFREUND] 108,0G whom he wished to use operationally. In December 1960_ ([GOLITSYN S passport showed that it took place in January 1961] GOLITSYN visited the Second Chief Directorate S American Department in Moscow to request the permission KOVSHUK to use PREISFREUND against Americans in Finland} 856 KOVSHUK refused the request with the explanation that PREISFREUND] 1i helped in one recruitment now and it is necessary to be careful for about six months So as not to arouse American_suspicions" GOLITSYN learned from KOVSHUK that PREISFREUND had met the target at America Club in 0801446 176 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Is/8G Copy ================================================== Page 185 ================================================== ~-QOQ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBAssy SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Moscow and had involved him in speculatory activities and 'lured him into' intimacy with various: female KGB agents According to' KOVSHUK: the recruitment was accomplished in 1960' at the end: of 1960" ; PRETSFREUND] "had helped to the circumstances 01 and had been withdrawn' from the operation before the actual .approach which was made' by KGB officers The American target of,[PRETSFREUND from what KOVSHUK relatedeb to GOLITSYIT _ was either a code clerk or diplomat (GOLITSYN later expressed his personal belief that the individual probably was; unmarried_ and might have been a "military II man Coment: If GOLITSYN S leaa is not to STORSBERGI but to some other American code clerk against whom 0b @REISEREUND] was- used . NOSENKO S claim to" have; supervised all such "'code' clerk; operations is refuted: Attempted Recruitment off SroRSBERG Summary and Conclusion In the' absence JOf contrary evidence it is: judged that GOLITSYN"' s lead refers to(STORSBERG;N The role of BREISFREUNB] 0b is the key to this determination Nhile the time Of Ehe operation remains in dispute GOLITSYN {s_ timing is judged to be the most plausible because::of the circunstances under which he acquired his information These circumstances-- GOLITSYN s Visit to and 'discussion; with KOVSHUK in Moscow , about the use , oEfPRETSFREUND are confirmed :y NOSENKO and 06 the' date January: 1961 :s egtablished by paseport_ informa- tion It_ follows that the: operation against [TORSBERG]thus woula have taken place more than Six months' prior to Ehe time NOSENKO and (STORSBERG claimed Such a Significant inaccuracy D6 bY: NOSENKO ,: about an_ event which he said took place less than: a year before he described it to CIA (in June 1962) undermines his claim to the role he played in the case and- hence to his position as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section and supervisor of code: clerk operations 0861447 177 Iolkk TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy createol ~10 ================================================== Page 186 ================================================== 14-0Q00Q Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Attempted Defection @f JIKEYSERS 06 U,S Army ` Specialist Fifth Class [James KEYSERS served in Moscow from 20 December 1960 as an assistant to Embassy Medical Officer Donald C , MARTIN an Air Force Captain06,08 b KEYSERS was the replacement of {Staff Sgt 0 J.G. BRADLEY who 06 had been earlier withdrawn from Moscow because he was a homosexual Besides his duties with the Medical Officer KEYSERS was assigned administrative functions in the office 6f the Air Attache :D6{KEYSERS was trained also to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERGin theOb military code room ; but he was relieved of this duty in April 1961 0 Because Of his admitted homosexual tendencies , KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors on 16 June 1961. NOSENKO first spoke of what turned: out to be the KEYSERS case in Geneva in 1962 but without naming the KGB Earget or identifying him as STORSBERG}' s replacement The 06 KGB and Embassy officials almost simultaneously discovered the American to be a homosexual; he said ; and when the RGB found .out that the target was to withdraw from the Soviet Union a letter offering him asylum in the USSR was sent to the American: NOSENKO hinself followed up the letter by personally repeating the KGB offer to the American at the airport just before his departure_ On 24 January 964 NOSENKO described the KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG and then proceeded to repeat 1962 description of the KGB action taken_against" STORSBERG' s 06 replacement whom he_ identified as FZuJUs} 0 Several later_ NOSENKO telephoned, the Geneva ' safehouse and requested an urgent meeting with" CIA_ At the meeting he announced that he had made a mistake that STORSBERG S replacement was 06 not zuJUS} but KEYSER3O6 (KEYSERS Unot (ZUJUS bhe said was the homosexual code clerk whom he NOSENKO had personally accosted at the airport _ 0801448 19 178 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top his days I/ke Copy ================================================== Page 187 ================================================== Top Secret 4 (AMERICAN EMBAsSY 'SECTION January 1960-January 1962) NOSENKO S Information 0b_ KEYSERS]-wasl STORSBERG s replacement as military code clerk and the KGB sensed at once that he was a hono- sexual and the case preoccupied NOSENKO the exclusion of everything else NOSENKO and other KGB officers for example chasedl KEYSERSOa11 over Moscow attemptz (without_ success) to confront their target in compromising circum- stances The American ice_ baliet: (Ice Capades troupe)- came to Moscow and-(KEYSERg became involved at America House with sOme of its male homosexual members The. Embassy Security Officer learned Of KEYSERJ activities at about the same time 06 NOSENKO learned Of Ehem . through_ a KGB agent_ 6The KGB would have' preferred to; attempt :to- geczuit [KEJBEEzQ but it learned that he was to be: withdrawn the Soviet Union The KGB then sent a letter toBXEESERffoatt his rOOm in America House pointing out the trouble he was in, and ' offering him 'asylum in the KEYSERSldid:not: respond to the letter On the Of KEYSERSIT departure KGB surveillants reported that he had lef€ America House for the airport; accompanied by an Assistant: Army Attache NOSENKO . sped to the : airport: ana in the terminal building: found occasion to approach KEYSERS] 06 alone NOSENKO askea if KEYSERS; had . thought about Ehe Offer D6 in the letter but (KEYSERS dia not; _respond and imediately 0 reported_ the approach-to Ehe officer escorting him_ In: the 1965 interrogations NOSENKO' added:; only that at the time NOSENKO approached[KEYSERS at the airport, the. KGBO had concluded thatC KEYSERS had not reported receipt of the letter invi nim to defect, because no information to 0 this; effect was: obtained from microphones or telephone taps in the. Embassy KEYSERS Information Prior to.his;: departure from: Moscow KEYSERS] acknowledged D to his Superiors his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents all at America House He: was_ rebuffed by a Marine"guard in March 1961, and he twice : engaged in homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe in He denied ' any public:display of his, homosexuality but said he coula not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he_ and a 'homosexual partner were asleep 179 6801449 1648K TS No.: 197124 Top Secret 4 _ ing USSR Ub day; ting May ~ Copy ================================================== Page 188 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) In a debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961_ KEYSERS] 06 related the events leading to his withdrawal from MOScO1 On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache 6 Colonel URBAN who advised him that he was being transferred Erom MOscow the following for excessive drinking, and cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer _ Comment: NOSENKO ' s information generally coincides with that reported by KEYSERS and Embassy officials .06 However before the events NOSENKO described 6 KEYSERS behavior and reputation had already been discussed between Security Officer John ABIDIAN and Army Attache Icolonel HOFFMAN} 2 06 conversation which HOFFMAN concludes: was among those sensitive matters compromised by micro- phones later discovered in the Army Attache offices Similarly, (Colonel URLAN S conversa- 0l 06 tion' informing KEYSERSJof his impending transfer was concluded to have been monitored by the same KGB microphones_ from which the KGB would have learned con tary to NOSENKO' s assertion , that KEYSERS did report the receipt Of the defection letter to his superiors 6 KEYSERS] described the' Russian who approached him at the airport as. being 40 to 45 years old _ about 5 feet 8 inches tall approximately 225 pounds and having a dark complexion and light hair NOSENKO was then 34 years ola and he is several inches taller and not rotund. When KEYSERS was show photographs of NOSENKO , he did not recognize himg Accord to NOSENKO , the KGB " sensed at {t that (KEYSERS was a homosexual He is unaware Of certain information relating to 06 KEYSERSW' homosexual activities drinking, and difficulties with his superiors_ although that information was available through KGB agents in America House and had been widely discussed in Embassy offices in which microphones had been emplaced _ No KGB officer directly connected 180 iS/kr TS No. 197124 Top Secret day ing Dbonce 0201450 Copy ================================================== Page 189 ================================================== Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960~January 1962) Comment (Continued) 0 with the case could regard (KEYSERS as_ {STORSBERG s replacement OU[KEYSERS arrived in Moscow almost 2 year beforel STORSBERGs departure and' was 0b 5 assigned_ to the Air Attache office zuJU3,08 'STORSBERC s replacement arrived in Moscow and worked with [STORSBERG about three months before STORSBERG] departed Moscow.06-(KEYSERS stated NOSENKO was not the person who approached him' at the airport. NOSENKO , in asserting that he was forgot the name Of the single American target whom he ever personally confronted 0 Developmental "Operation Againstlzujus7og In February 1964 NOSENKO_reported that he had recruited and handled Syrian army officer Samih WEISS Bertbeat;ly the "main agent in a KGB deveTopmental operation against(u;s sergeant Matthew Pezer ZuJUs]: Ub(ZuJus arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume Ehe military code clerk duties ofl STORSBERGS and he remained there until January 1963 NOSENRO did not recail the (ZuJus case until he was reminded 'of it by a reference tol samih WEISS which was among his notes . which he : brought. to Geneva NOSENKO ' s Information NOSENKO recruited WEISS al Syrian from Damascus in , 1961 WEISS ` was a captain Gr major in the Syrian Armyt who was studying at the Tank Agademy Hez visited the America Club_ and when he identified[ZuJus by photograph as one of the 06 persons he had met: there he was told to develop him not to pay any attention_ to anyone else .0G (TEISS] and zujus Jhad 0{ eomething in comon in that ZUJUS had peen stationed in 05 Lebanon ana Ehe Syrian was from Damascusl only a short distance :ObWEIsSJmerely studied and developed ("uJus];06 during conversations at the America Club_ On one Occasion 06:when ujus]agreed that it woula be' niee to have some (Lebanese]y vodka Ehe KGB arranged for some to be sent fron the RGB Legal Residency in Beiruy 'and (WEISS presented it to Jzujus as a gift from friends 181 0ju1451 : TS No. 197124 Secret Copy _ 10 Army away SI/rr Top_ ================================================== Page 190 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) ZUJUS) case officer was GRYAZNOV and besides 06 "main agent" [TEISS _ NOSENKO supervised handling the with respect to Gujus OG NOSENKO read GRYAZNOV ' s activities rate file on the American_ the Second Chief Directo- as well as all reports as came into the Embassy Section_ and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV _ KOSOLAPOV DEMKIN the for America House) case officer responsible the and his own superiors_ GRYAZNOV wrote operational plan which called for thorough deve by WEISS, in order to learn everything about him and lopment introduce an agent to zujuS] through boetshiiagnd eregtessly was slow becausel ZuJUS_ was quiet and reserved and Progress stayed alone 1 even in America House Al- often EuJus became acquainted; dia though (WEISS and 06 On the [WEISS not become good friends planned to visit America House NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants , occurred never in safehouses _ This every week or two, depending on WEISS' availabili When met the following WEISSH WEISS would report such things as which with Zujustol drinking heaviiy and who at America Americans were which girls from foreign House was involved with America House once or gwicabasmces) month, Although_TEIss]visited 0l ZUJUS he ana drank there with reported little of interest_ The KGB learned 1i 'something" I about (ZUJUS United States the details of which STSziR} #aailv in the he was sure, however that there dia not recall: interest to the KGB about Zujus was nothing unusual or of was no information On ZUJUSI family background There 06 telephone taps or sonVZUjughceceired from KGB microphones 0b any vices or vulnerabili and the KGB was unaware of NOSENKO did ties which (Zujus }may have had not know of any other KGB agents working Zujusa The KGB did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS ihilegaust NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section _ If there had been recruitment attempt later after he left the a would certainly learned of :it from GRYAZNOV . Section , NOSENKO 0i Because no one else knew him" at the American ment 5 request NOSENKO continued to Depart 5 b with' ZUJUS] after NOSENKO manage {WEIsS}' contact 06 ment Zn' January 1962 transferred to the Seventh Depart- 6bthat WEIss] In March or April 1962 it was planned woula invite ZUJUS to a restaurant where he wou ld be introduced to i friend" but the Ok meeting had not 0801452 182 TS No. 197124 Secret Top they bto they days ty6 they day "Dtmeetings ZLJRR Top Copy ================================================== Page 191 ================================================== Top Secret U| (AMERICAN:, EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) materialized before NOSENKO 'turnea (WEISS over to GRYAZNOV and left for Geneva _ Nhen GEIss ieturned torfsyria] in Aprill( 1962 , he was not turned' over to the First Chief Directorate his file was sent to Second Chief Directorate archives _ 06 ZUJUS Information During 2 routine debriefing by U.S _ Army authorities in 0b 1963 zujuS confirmed an Embassy Security Office report that in the sumer Of 1962 ZUJUS] had been intimate with an 06 Austrian woman "Lillian (last name unknown) who had visited America House with soneone from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later_ when she was picked up by (Zujuseiy Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer 'Reerneq6 the' America House manager interviewed M Lillian and that she claimed to be from Vienna and to be travelling with her employer; a Czech_ When the Embassy Security Officer learned from the Austrian Embassy that no Austrian passport II had been issued to Lillian he asked her for her passport She' replied that- she had forgotten it; and then' left, "saying she was' going to her hotel for the passport: She never returned to America House comment NOSENKO' described this incident, but in ~Connection with KGB attempts: to entrap @doseph 66 MORONE in 1960'_ not ZUJUS in 1962 0b (See pa 194 )" NOSENKO was not in the Eibassy 'Section in 1962 Interrogation Of NOSENKO never resolved how he knew of this incident 6 Interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965 Zujus] said that as manager 0f the America Club he had frequent dealings with Ella_ UMANETS ObfzuJus Often used her an an interpreter in his dealings with Tother 'Soviet employees iof America House and was able 'to provide considerable back- ground information about her 183 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 110 6oC1453 '12/6r ================================================== Page 192 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 7v0 H Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: NOSENKO has in other contexts identified UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in America House _ He never related her to [ZUJUs In that same interview with CIA ZUJUS described havlng met in MoscOw a person from who had been in Beirug,lD or a person from Beirut had been in @Damascug cou la not recall which met him while acting as doorman at America House 'they conversed only for about 15 minutes )band ujug?coeia not recall what they had talked about He may nave seen the man on several other occasions but he did not know his name nor he was in Moscow and he could provide no physical description f6 ZUJUS dia not recall that this person gave him Lebanese vodka but he acknowledged he favored the beverage ZUJUS confirmed to CIA that his father_ Matag,kis gecretary Of the Lithuanian Roman Catholic 29 Alliance of America an: organization concerned with the liberation of Lithuaniali @ujUs]indicated that his father often travels abroad in 'Coanectiou with his emigre activities . Comment: Emigre organizations including the Lithuanian have been traditional KGB targets and most have been penetrated KGB agents The fact of the elder zujusnsenigre activities is almost certainly: to have been known to the KGB making VUJUS a matter of KGB concern for reasons quite separate from his cryptographic duties From NOSENKO ' s larity with [ZuJus' 06 father S activi tiey}tzuj ZUJUS intimacy with KGB ~agent II 'Lillian 0 and relationship with KGB agent 'UMANETS _ it is. concluded that NOSENKO ' s role in the case_ if any was limited to his rela- 'tionship with GEISS and that NOSENKO exercised no supervisory function in the development of Zujus; 0( 184 0001454 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top Damascugio' Swho Nhe bu Q6EuJus why emigre by 22/gr Copy ================================================== Page 193 ================================================== Secret: L (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTIOIT; January 1960-January 196.2) 0 Operations Against State Department ' Code Clerks KGB operations: against code clerks for which NOSENKO, claimed supervisory responsibility included those directed against State Department cryptographic_ personnel as well as; military cryptographers at the Embassy_ In several- such cases NOSENKO S claimed subordinate KOSOLAPOV figures prominently: Deve lopment 'ofl Paul JENNER 06 NOSENKO first mentioned the (JENNER] case in a,1964 interview with the FBI when he; was asked whether he had 0 ever heard: Of a case within recent -Years in which KOSOLAPOV had travelled to Helsinki to intercept ana establish contact with an American code clerk NOSENKO immediately recalled # such; an incident which happened in '1960-1961 He explained that because Embassy code clerks were not sufficiently accessible :to the; KGB after arrived in Moscow it was decided to send KOSOLAPOV: to Helsinki as, part of an' effort to. probe for a new to. get in touch with the 'code clerks; According to NOSENKO , KOSOLAPOV made but: one ' trip to Helsinki in this new effort; and -it was not tried again by others NOSENKO: identified KOSOLAPOV: s*target in this operation as: Paul JENNER 3 NOSENKO' s Information A month before-GENNER)- S4arrival in Moscow the Embassy Section received a copy of EJENNER S zanketa (visa application) [ listing' his; diplomatic title as:: Secretary Archivist and indicating when he was to enter the: Soviet Union from Finland by train I: at the: beginning of 1960 in' the middle: of the month" Believing him to be a code 'clerk (he was subsequently found to_ bella pouch the group I1;, decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with Ehe of [JENNER on the; train to Moscow to study GENITERL S; behavior acczopadying JJENNERland KOSOLAPOV were about the same" age KOSOLAPOV was Eo be accompanied by a} female agent of GRYAZNOV:' s. SOLISTKA " a Russian ballerina who was to board the train after it entered the USSR at Vyborg 185 TS No: 197124 Secret Copy 10_ 9 64 Top they way Zler {iseio 0301455 Top ================================================== Page 194 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approvai of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were assi gned to Moscow usually only for one year (thus 1lmitlrg their accessibility to the KGB for development] and that it was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even before they arrived in Moscow When the Chairman S approval was granted NOSENKO prepared the kharakteristika (official form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel Offsce_ KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explalning that he was coming for two or three days NOSENKO didn t sign the cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signa- ture and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European) Department of the First Chief Directorate for release There was no other correspondence with the Helsinki rezidentura concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow NOSENKO discussed the with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV ana It 'maybe It they discussed it with KOVSHUR the day before KOSOLAPOV left_ KOSOLAPOV had JENNER' s photograph and his name and expected that the Helsinki residency could obtain a ticket for KOSOLAPOV. on (JENNER' s train.Ob NOSEMKO dia not recall precisely when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow or under what- name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was' gone for about a week and he travelled both ways by train NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV ' s otchet (official account) of_ Ii his trip, and the: report of the female agent , "SOLISTKA According to those reports KOSOLAPOV became acquainted on the train with JJENNER] as pianned as dia "SQLISTKA whom GRYAZNOV took to Vyborg and placed in {ENNER]' s car 06 "SOLISTKA St gave (JENNER her Moscow telephone number While in Helsinki KOSOLAPOV had spoken with the Rezident and Deputy Rezident about obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks and about using Helsinki agents against American code clerks en route to Moscow . Nothing came of the discussion however; although the Rezident and Deputy Rezident said they would see about it, the Embassy Ji Section later Tearnea the Residency had more important Vt questions 186 0801456 TS No. 197124 Top Secret plan 06 5/4 Copy ================================================== Page 195 ================================================== Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY : SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Although the KGB later discovered thatFJENNER] was not a Fcode clerk but a pouch clerkk he remained a target for deve lopment Since he did not telephone "SOLISTKA Ii after 'one or two months _ the KGB arranged for her to encounter him at:the railroad station or 'airport when " he went alone to meet the couriers.OGENNER saw her but did not approach her turning_ away Tne KGB took no further. steps to cultivate DENNER The KGB "had: nothing on {JENER at all except a06 suspicion: he may have been a homosexual but there was no IJ proof- On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO confirmed the identification Of other 'CIA sources by identifying a photograph as that Of Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV / [born in Perm _ 19 February 1928] his former subordinate of the: Embassy: Section_ The `'photo- graph shown NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich KOLOSSOV employee 0f Vneshtorg born 19 March 1927 in Perm; who arrived in_Finland by train from the USSR on 31 March 1960 : [the"' UENNER left] and departed on 2 April NOSENKO: acknowledged" that that data accurately reflected KOSOLAPOV;' s alias cover and itinerary during his. trip to Helsinki' to accompany (JENNER] back to Moscow in 1960 . Ob On 26 : October 1966 NOSENKO was confronted with the Finnish train manifest showing that-(Paul JENNER was the 'single 06 passenger' departing Helsinki for Moscow: on 31 March 1960 and that-KOSOLAPQV/KOLOSOV- travelled on ,2. April::on a train carrying no Americans Repeating the substance Of the KGB Operation and citing his recollection Erom reading: KOSOLAPOV' s report_of: the trip_ NOSENKO' insisted that KOSOLAPOV travelled on the same train with UENNERAE ana' that 'the Finnish manlfests must be in error [See, accompanying exhibits.] JENMER S Information After arriving: in Moscow on 1 April '1960 JENNERJreported that he was approached: on. the train from Helsinki by two young_ Russians I1 a rand a girl probably university students" JI The: two Russians struck up av conversation and were soon bai him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States They said that might see GENNER] 06 in Moscow _ About three months later, on` 29 June {ENNERJ0b was performing his normal Of escorting Embassy couriers 187 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 10 'day; boy ting they duty 0301457 iz1R8 Copy ================================================== Page 196 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) to Sheremetevo Airport when he was approached_ by the Russian girl, "Yuliya It who acted ' surprised to see him and asked hin to go outside to talk: "Yuliya Ii explained that she was waiting to say : goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk (JENNER} had seen the Irkutsk flight0b depart a half hour earlier) and told (JENNER] that her male 06 companion on the train trip to Moscow Yura had returned to his studies in ' Vyborg _ Interspersed with "Yuliya obquestions concerning GJENNER]' 5 impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and hov he liked his job at the Embassy . [hen DENNER] said he must leave ; she gave hin her telephone number in MOscow and insisted that he call her She advised @ENNLR] Ob that "it would be better if you did not mention our conver- Ii sation to anyone Comment: As far as CIA: is aware JENNER has never been asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph_ Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey [JENNER also told U,S : Department of State security officiaTs about sexual- advances nade his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid_ Although 'IOSENKO has not identified either of Comment: these women as KGB agents_ he has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were IGB agents or informants, 0201458 188 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Copy again s " by: 7BR ================================================== Page 197 ================================================== 1.42080c Top Secret EXHIBIT 1 Complete Train' Manifests Helsinki-Moscow Luettelo matkurtoliste, 40 &2 1 9 5n" / "S}va124641 4 0 Lwu Aaat #ur4 Liertt bnets Kelt Mat 84o beuu 0b Jonncr _ Pow, Ficola, lar*18t,816/19.07.23. 0,3Ain_ 0.9_ Lbzk. I3_ "abatAtaskadtojc Eat.nIkoao- Zusboun B. Eepkkoron 31: March 1960 NOTE: JENNER]single_international passenger on' train Tsoviet passengers who: may have boarded train in USSR, including at: Vyborg would not be included .) Laettelo matiortedlsto pL J09411 S}a#244iao1 TzO [Eetutecat, Djun_vulbaln E4EHizEe;%612. 240me Aepake-Afrcllotovb? @o4,2Hsadt..6fia 1530349t/20.08 5 Eroltar: Nzbalea-lbgr./r Is_.egdu' Jraloecer: tkte; "aiiija pe.0v274 X04ta B1,_3*bst: copr*[Laab 07ea tanaaleIaqt Eobtoetita= Eexteeen_ Jeiue_Aene 22 07924e2 22lea Jeepepq Jegunm-lbr_4kue @H4I44e Eaulesa /rt EUAA_Zgexal,apuz /2;ez eretna [Jrveotna-0x4 (1s21.1,4a Px240454 ae KnuitLisrue J3.eo,3 Kotoo, 211_Relepa Kack 22,02,82 Lentt 141,Maro_Y#ljai Ka_kbpettaja _ As.92;& Labti-Zaprjo_ (1325,W= [iesale,_Mire Eotbs __ Mo_!Irer:bext__/8z.02 2 lgerlatons_rttt_Mert_V KoCK1r."ee_k?.0e.e 8as1es-%tto_AVlaa _ t5ttela le,12 42 P44424 Lyekt-botnttiaa Artet 6 #44st 22hthg.ee,e2 EarutopkI , Dato_KattasL_ Es.8tht: /13.18.10 spnlla @d. (15e1.TIJo Jasvldeds Aarpo_Iubapt G {ardptorde F?.01 .84 IolJela EAPzRan:_Juatth_Topaf-tda_ L toto.epul_ 63.03.16 ~Felati L 'eadtetattaataje 3a#AAkopo 7xanzz E: Gauktonen 2 April 1960 NOTE No Americans on train with KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV _ 6201459 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 2164 Copy ================================================== Page 198 ================================================== 14-0Q000, Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-Jaruary 1962) Information From Other Sources I. Ye _ SERGEYEV _ a KGBB officer and the Soviet Consul Helsinki; contacted thc chief of the Helsinki in 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance police On named ( Paul F _ JENNERL wilo in locating an American was Que to arrive in Helsinki the before SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with [JENNER) obut he did not specify its nature Reportedly, this was Eile first time that SERCFYEV had nade such a request of the police chief GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet intelligence from II about 1945 on" agent Develepment %E{ JLNNER: Sumary &nd Conclusion NOSENKO ' s version of the QEpEu] case in resembles less the facts about JEMETER than Iome adefveeies 0 6bdirected against Qohn GARLAND (see below) acti- Thick NOSENKO asserts never occurred.6 GARLAID , not JENNER 06 travelled on the same train as KOSOLAPOV and [GARLAND Dlo 0( GENNER travelled "in the middle Of the month I1 not Residency 5 'query to the Helsinki police chief The Helsinki indicates that KOSOLAPOV' s cable about JENNER 01 b GENNERZ iot just notice that contained information about It was at the airport in KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki_ 06 , "SOLISTKA II Moscow _ not on the train, that gave (ENNER her telephone number 1 an event which woula be presumably memorable to NOSENKO (as supervisor f b all code clerk operations) if because of his futile wait for JENNER to call Finally NOSEITKO is actions Of KGB ~ agents who were unaware of the From the foregoing it is employed as maids bX JENNER}:' 0l KOSOLAPOV ' concluded that NOSFNKO was neither S supervisor nor in this instance , supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks _ 0J01480 189 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top day vities only 15/R Top Copy ================================================== Page 199 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Development %f(John ' GARLAND The GARLAND case is of particular significance Jedgeng_ the validity of NOSENKO ' s clain to compleeetR: of all KGB operations against American code know- NOSENKO is not merely unaware of KGB action taken clerks _ respect to (GARLAND] he vehemently with taken _ asserts no such action was NOSENKO ' s Information NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans employed by the American Embassy in Moscow who were of interest for various reasons to the KGB _ He 6 statement concerning each Of the twenty- gave a short GARLAND about whom NOSENKO said_ "eode' clecng which was doing Later asked to review the list and but nothing additional information he might have _ 'NOsENKGuPElte any Obthe KGB was studying (GARLAND like the stated that gather enough incriminating material other code clerks , to The case officer to make a recruitment 0 was KOSOLAPOV_ NOSENKO did not recall any agents working against (GARLANDioho5 coula he recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND Ubut he have read reports concez rning hin as thought he must Embassy Section There they came into the for (GARLAND was no operational plan drawn up because the KGB developed no derogatory infor- mation concerning him; no recruitment thus was Or attempted _ NOSENKO could recall ever planned tion concerning GARLAND, tsuch no background informa- tances while. statloned as his travels and acquain- in Moscow _ Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence (see below] of KOSOLAPOV ' s trip to Helsinki to accompany GARLAND] back (b to Moscow on 16 November 1960 'NOSENKO there was no such was insistent that to Helsinki in that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once that the KGB hacotaeerico withGJENNER] in early 1960 _ and 0& taken no such action with respect to GARLAND: (NOSENKO had earlier reiterated that he KOSOLAPOV' s direct supervisor from January 1960 was January 1962 and he would have had to know and until to approve 0001461 190 TS No. 197124 Secret Top trip I2"RR Top Copy ================================================== Page 200 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBAsSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) in advance any operational travel performed. by his sub- ordinate outside Of the USSR _ ) Reminded that he transitted Ansterdam on a direct flight to Cuba on 15 November 1960 (the before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki with[GARLAND) 0b NOSENKO stated that he would have learned Of KOSOLAPOV S travel in case _ whether or not he was in Moscow 06 GARLAND) S Information (GARLAND was first interviewed on 17 1962 by the Regional Security Officer in Moscow as a result of the GOLITSYN lead:: [see below] In this interview-@GARLAND denied having met Soviet of KOSOLAPOV' s physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied hav: been_approached by Soviet Intelligence _ On 30 July 1963-[GARLAND} was interviewed by the FBI and on 31: July he was given a polygraph examination The latter according to the FBI I disclosed no information indicating that [GARLANDJwas deceptive in his statements to uS denying any association with Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying_ ever 08 knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence agent I GARLANDI by his: own statement_ took the train on 16 November 1960 from Helsinki to Moscow to assune the duties;as supervisor of the IState Department code room in the Embassy GOLITSYNs "Information GOLITSYN_ who was not posted to-Helsinki until July 1960, reported that: "about the' end: of 1960 about Novenber or- possibly by the beginning Of 196.1" the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residence advising that an American code clerk woula arrive in Helsinki. in transit to Moscow The telegram stated that the respon sible case Officer KOSOLAPOV 1 would be sent to Helsinki alias and under Vneshtorg cover for the purpose :Of striking up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow The Residency procured for . KOSOLAPOV a place' in the American S compartmenta GOLITSYN himself went to the train to 'see off a Soviet delegation returning to Moscow and he talked with KOSOLAPOV_ Later in the summer or fall of 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Secona Chief Directorate officer from the Embassy Section and he inquired 191 CO61462 TS No. 197124 Secret J0 Top day any july any ing 8/6Q Top Copy ================================================== Page 201 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV _ From the Embassy Section Officer' s refusal to discuss the case GOLITSYN concluded that it must have resulted in a success- ful recruitment; otherwise , the Embassy Section officer would have been willing to talk to him about it_ Shown GARLAND} s photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962 , GOLITSYN` failed to identify it 0t as being that of the unknown individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki with KOSOLAPOV" Information From Other Sources KOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960 . The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960 _ lists KOSOLAPOV (as KOLOSSQV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, and [John WT 6 GARLAND the only American [See accompanying exhibit. ] As he had with to (JENNER (see above) SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency_ in Helsinki on 11 November 1960 asked the iocal police chief (and KGB agent according to GOLITSYN) for help in locating GARLAND] an American who wou ld arrive there on 14 November . Development of (GARLAND} Summary &nd Conclusion or not [GARLAND was aware and contrary to NOSENKO ' s as seretbef[ GARLAND clearly was the target of a KGB operation entailing KOSOLAPOV s travel to Helsinki_ NOSENKO denies (with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately reflect) that KOSOLAPQV travelled to Helsinki except in connection With[JENNER Dand his assertion thus cannot be smissed as the product of faulty Reco}lestion in which he confuses the casescof (JENNER and GARLAND:; NOSENKO ' s denial of the facts of the(GARLAND case is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV ' s supervisor and that he supervised all KGB operationsagainst American code clerks Moreover, the KGB action in thel GARLAND case impugns NOSENKO ' 5l claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section he would necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy code clerks _ 192 0001463 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top regard 12/6 Copy ================================================== Page 202 ================================================== Ooooo Secret EXHIBIT 2. Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-Moscow Lpcttelo matkuelajistas jb Jwella 6i 3 8onat Fatolkkeled Suoaatta Lnaa '1S Ntad @05 Br,55lauu Kraetttoy Wbld ort Set EouravIove , Nopra {0O8,ntn. a4pl,_ Nallston 0a1ustto_ Lahetyeto._El_ (Paxve,. Ralf_ 5/ k1zje4lIJe 09 iobtt IbIopO17 Alexandro JAsplakura_ 41pL_ #J1tto/N-8 ,Kouttatuku Otonazvokl_ Alererdre CevfIlova, Laiia_ Iroura 1022 0ftt0_ {Folog-sz,-iaktor VIIALl1Jg 9.05.22 AcacJangv Carik 1922_ Akoleide,. Potr e1xkurtatt 1018 Leir, Jcan Eantlote AIpL,kur 42;98.07 Reneko Kcuttekulku: [carieza Jobn, Jr: eintoosL 2.93423 Dsi ; prav:tozz, xonry Chark e8 tete:81bt'/d4pl, Suomen WkoaeletnnInJator1O_ Joncelesoep, 'Aatu Ilgar; Krveen_0g, /14.41.19 Eulmok e.H.05 Et- okeenen ,: Freps_Ogkar ethe:geent g5.08.g2 LLnja,eo.8.89 , Ekt Tin 'Inenod0d,. Setkkl.Juhant Zetnopskandel,04..2 Eve! testob 23.0, Hkt. #Reaatotaxcaetaje; W:t.XIken0t: '11.7Duv 2. Fapkkonen 16 November: ' 1960 NOTE GARLAND and KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV travelled on same Erain 0j01464 TS No. 197124 Secret Top 12kk Top Copy ================================================== Page 203 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) KGB Polish UB Operations Against MORONE At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed: a female; Pozisn UB' agent in contact with an unnamed American from the Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw an later brought the agent to Moscow to further compromise the American On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against the American Embassy ana he replied that he himself introduced the idea of u9ing such agents to develop Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls _ He had several such agents_ he said_ and he sometimes askea the East German and Polish security services to supply him with such agents As an example NOSENKO cited the case of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who travelled to Warsaw The code clerk was intimate with a Polish female agent , whom NOSENKO had planted in their train compartment, on the train to [arsaw , and later in Moscow _ In an FBI interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO referred to the case again and when the nanes of code bclerk Uoseph MORONE ana Embassy Marine guard Frank BEGGS 06 were mentioned he immediately identifiea them as the men involved NOSENKO' s Information MORONE] s case officer was NOSENKO S subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations , KOSOLAPOV NOSENKO read 6 the file on [MORONE] and saw his visa_photograph but never saw him in person NOSENKO discussed the[TIORONE case With 86 KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of Occasions Several. KGB agents were employed against [MORONE including foreignexs as well as Soviet citizens . 0801465 193 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 7/8R J10 Copy ================================================== Page 204 ================================================== 14-0000Q Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) Svetlana IVANOVA a maid or waltress at America House reported to DEMKIN _ her case officer everything she saw heard concerning [MORONE C6 KOSOLAPOV visited her several or times with DEMKIN to discuss [iORONE} Dband NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe DEMKIN had at his disposal NOSENKO did not apartments that specific information from IVANOVA on [ORONE whechl any was interesting Or useful SARWAT EL SHAZLY an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy and an agent Of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate visited 5 America House and met MORONE, but he reported nothing of value that NOSENKO recalled 06 Pietro CECCHI an Italian cook at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV ' s agent reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV _ but NOSENKO recalled specific that CECCHI had reported about(MORONB nothing In 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German wOmen who could be used against the residents Of America House One of these , Hanna , a blonde was documented as a West German NOSENKO met her but instructed PREISFREUND (see the (STORSBERG) EegeEase} to take her to America House and Ieave her on her Own Hanna went several times America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing teatto she may have reported on NORONE]N The second East German girl was documented as an Austrian NOSENKO never met her but he recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there She replied that she had left them at her hotel left Anerica House_ and never returned_ (MOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred beyond the fact that he was still in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the tine ) From one of these agents Or possibly in some other manner the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to on leave in Warsaw NOSENKO , KOSOLAPOV _ and GRYAZNOV go decided to, employ a Polish female agent in an thereupon attempt to compromise him_ KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operatlonal plan for the attempt , which was approvea by GRIBANOV after 194 0801466 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 4/sR early Copy ================================================== Page 205 ================================================== 4-00000. Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) some editing ;by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK _ KOSOLAPOV witn a 'Polish UB counterintelligence next met quarters to discuss tne plan_ The officer in KGB Head _ Pole Ivas_ told that the target was an American 'Embassy employee but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately Poles , kept: from the As a result of this meeting , a Polish girl by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow was obtained arrival she was met: by_KOSOLAPOV by train Upon : her wo took her: to a Moscow hotel_ where he gave: ner instructions concerning in tne Operation Thle ' girl was told to meet (HORONE; role train flirt with him have him fall on the 06 continue the_ in love with her hin tat association and study him_ She was to tell she had been, in Moscow as a guest of her uncle a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Zoscow and that sne coula meet nim again on her next visit_ Arrangements were made witil the KGB ' Operational Technical J Directorate for a tec inician to be placed on the train in the: compartment next to that of[TORONE]anda his @EeGg; Eor audio and: visual (but not companion 06 Plotographic) coverage NOSENKO did: not recall walen (TORONE]-ana BEGGS left The Polish agent did 1 however:; succeed in LBEGGSg _eoKoNgsGov acquaintance_ and the tecnnician s 0 6 torate reported back to NOSENKO from tine Operationa] Direc- reached the after the train Warsaw Ihe tecinician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged, in sexual intercourse witinfMORONE during the 0 The: technician-also reported that tne trip tained: were Of poor quality recordings Obz N Comment: At this juncture in: NOSENKO ' s ne was reminded: that he was en ircetcogatiob to- Cuba on 15 November 1960 and did: not return to Moscow until mid-December and that State Department records indicated that(MORONE and '626 BEGGS]left zioscow on 13 Novenber and arrived on the foliowing NOSENKO responded that instead of naving talked to the technician personally ; he may: nave read the technician'8 195 0001467 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Top lier day 67 Eape: day 4/6R ================================================== Page 206 ================================================== @QoQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) Comment: (Continued) report and had seen Mi the film strips" after his return from Cuba NOSENKO _ it will be noted had said earlier that there was no photographic coverage of MORONE]' s train compartment Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper reguesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromi_ photography during her Visit The requests were sing by higher KGB authority [hen the girl arrived KOBooxeOv net her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a Ozioesea]lnafyoRored room The girl called MORONE] at America06 and MORONE] subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times _ during which photographs These were placed in the KGB ' s file on MORONE weia taken fall in love with the: girl, as the KGB had not had no further contacts with hoped , 1 and she him. Although the KGB had the compromis- photography , it was felt that there were ingufficiently incriminating to attempt to recruit MORONE U The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman , to catch him in sOme thing that was definitely prohibited For this_ purpose Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was, supposed to lure MORONE , out of 0X America House to somewhere in MOscOw _ but before anything further coula be: done _ the Americans ordered MORONE out Moscow before the end of his tour possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA : There - fore NOSENKO said , the KGB made no attempt to recruit MORONEZ 06 NOSENKO has also explailed (to the FBI) that no attempt was made- to recruit(MORONE because Khrushchev instructed the KGB to refrain from action which might affect the improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the United States _ 196 TS No. 197124 Top Secret OlHe ing 0f06 any 9/RR 0301468 Copy ================================================== Page 207 ================================================== 4-0ooop. Secret AMERICAN, EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) 0b ~MORONE s: Information Following receipt of information about his compromise _ received from a sensitive Polish source MORONE was first interviewed about the allegation in May 1961: On 19 1961 he was transferred from Moscow In an October 196ust securityinterview MORONE stated that he had travelled with b Frank_BEGGS to 'arsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her 1 what 'languages she spoke_ Later she entered his compartment 'and when he tried to engage her in sexual relations she 'slapped' his face A or two after arrived in Warsaw:; the contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her ropm where had sexual relations According tof MORONE} he had sexual relations with at_ least two other women while in arsaw He and BEGGS ]returned to Moscow without incident On 6 February 1961, after MORONE had returned to Moscow the Polish girl from_ the train called him at America House and the foliowing day he visited her in her room at the L Peking_ Hotel _ where they were 'again intimate On either this or an earlier occasion the ` girl told him that. she had an uncle in Moscowe MORONE thas, denied: being approached o* recruited_,by Soviet Intelligence Information From : Other: Sources A sensitive Polish source_ reported in 1961 that on 8 - November 1960 a Polish female an experienced : English- speaking agent of the Polish: UB arrived in Moscow where she was: met. by a- KGB case: officer named VOLODYA She stayed at; the Hotel Warsaw_ in Moscow The KGB case officer, apparently from: the American Department Of the KGB Second 0 Chief Directorate; on 10.. November 1960; (sic) pointed-MMORONE] 06: out to this agent: at a railroad station in Moscow _ Under KGB instructions;; the Polish female met MORONE]-and was Db intimate withi him on the train to Harsaw In Jarsaw on 12 November 1960 (sic) she was guite friendly with [ToRONE] 0b' but pursuant to instructions she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies_ The next she took(MORONE to a 06 Sui tably-prepared Polish UB safehouse where incriminating photographs were clandestinely taken of(MORONE fand herseif.0 The female agent again travelled to Moscow on February 1961_ 197 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top day they giri they 66' day 0801463 Copy EI8k ================================================== Page 208 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMCAsSY SECTIOM January 1960-January 1962 ) and stayed at the Peking Hotel Further compromi photographs were taken of ner and [MORONE on this The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13_February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and (MORONE]: 0b The Marine quard {BEGGS has confirmed that the Polish g L and MORONE were intimate on the train to Warsaw and Cbthat MORONE} had been recontacted by the Polish girl in MoscOw in February 1961 MORONE S fellow code clerks and residents 0f America House described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler 0 and a ladies man Various reports indicate that GORONE] was involved in a_ currency-speculation ring operated SARWAT EL SHAZLY _ the KGB agent mentioned by MOSEIKO anc MORONE confirmed that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the 6 fetzoesSEf%o of MORONE and other code clerks to Soviet females MORONE was intimate with_ one of them in SARWAT' s apartment in the spring of 1961 06 MORONE was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy cook ana KCB agent Pietro ObCECCHI ana MORONE had admitted that along with other Americans he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from CECCHI One report states that CECCHI asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE in the06 State Department code room (a restricted area to which CECCHI_ haa no access) A number of reports indicated that MORONE had been sexuaily intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA _ DEMKIN' 8 agent , and with Ella UMANETS another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO . 66 MORONE ) denied having been intimate with IVANOVA _ Ke said however that he had told his friends that he nad _ that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females IVANOVA dia and sexual relations ensued = The Army code clerk STORSBERG has reported that MMORONE f/ was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who , as 01 MICHAUD" was involved in the KGB attempt to recruit 86 STORSBERG (See p = 173.)O STORSBERG]recalled meeting MICIAUD at America House; MICHAUD had frequented the bar there In one version of his recruitment (STORSBERG saic that (MORONE] Ias 06 198 TS No. 197124 Secret Top sing trip. LY 030140 2Ikk Top Copy ================================================== Page 209 ================================================== A-OOQC Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) in SKVORTSOV S company the 'night.SKVORTSOV lureaGTORSBERGj b to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit hin @peration Against MMORONR Sumary &nd Conclusion NOSENKO relates: but one aspect of theGoRon;j case the use of the Polish UB, female agent: He is of information known to KGB agents (ana henceaten: the KGByare 0b such as-MORONELs sexual involvements with IVANOVA S friends and at SARWAT EL SHAZLY S apartment his;illicit currency dealings with CECCHI and his relationship with' UMANETS ObHe errs in relating to twoRONz] the East German female agent: Obseet to America House: the incident occuned but later; WORONE: was no longer in' Moscow nor was NOSENKO : himself_ still in the Embassy Section. (See p . 183. ) The KGB dia_ not lack- a sufficient basis for attempting. to recruit MORONE] if it refrained from the: attempt , it was for other reasons KGB inaction: did not relate' to Khrushchev :S concern for Soviet-United States' relations;; this was: the period between the U-2 incident: (May:1960)_ and the Berlin- crisis (August 1961) Even with respect; to the Polish UB agent , there; is persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV' played_ the roles NOSENKO described: NOSENKO was travelling to Cuba and: KOSOLAPOV:; was in; Finland in connection with the_ GARMAND} case It is concludea Erom the foregoing that 'NOSENKO in this instance'_ was: not- supervisor 0f all KGB operations against American code clerks nor would he necessarily have known of recruitments among_Embassy. personnel Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code Clerks In . connection with his responsibility for directing KGB operations against American: code clerks in 1960-1961 , NOSENKO has; commented on five_ other State Department code clerks who. served in Moscow during: that period Their brief treatment in this paper: reflects: not their unimportance but NOSENKO ' s linited comments and the lack 6f collateral 199 S/br 00C1471 TS No.. 197124 Secret Top tly Top_ ~10 Copy ================================================== Page 210 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) information The significance of these cases is the extent to which information provided by NOSENTKO accurately reflects the KGB s knowledge of each target, Maurice ZWANG] 06 NOSENKO identified JTANG as a_ State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on during the 1960-1961 period An Egyptian agent , 1 name not recalled introduced ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incrimi nating_photographs_ but the female did not like ZWANG and refused his sexual advances _ In January 1962 (when NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section) the KGB was engaged in no activity against ZWANG] 0 The KGB agents had no agents in contact with him and had no information indicating ZWANG was vulnerable . 0b Comment: In connection with 3 State_Department security ioseovkegi conductea after ZWANG returned from D6 Moscow FWANG related that in March or April 1961 an Egyptian introduced him to a Soviet female whom he visited in her apartment on several occasions but with whon he was not intimate Al though [WANG denied it, a poly- 06 graph examination indicatea that he was intimate with his maid during visits to her apartment 06 ZWANG S maid has been identified as a KGB agent 0 Various Americans stationed in Moscow have reported that ZWANG was active in currency 0b speculation and blackmazketeering with- the Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV' s agent , CECCHI 200 0801472 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top 06 IGR Copy ================================================== Page 211 ================================================== Qo0o. Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) John TAYLOR 0 b NOSENKO' identified-(TAYLOR as a State Department code clerk and: the target of KOSOLAPOV The KGB was inter- in4TAYLOR because of his intimacy with his' Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sympathy towards_ the 'Soviet Union and its peopie No . attempt was made to recruit TAYLOR] because of the lack: of compromising photographs of TAYLOR and the maid and because the KGB did not want to: Jeopardize the mors important [TORSBERG)case by risking a_ scandal with(zAvtor} 06 Comment: TAYLORJhas `acknowledged that he was intimate With his: maid from about September 1960 untii; his departure in early 19617 on one: occasion in a "friend apartment It in Moscow _ and_ that maid haa told: TAYLORIshe was pregnant and TAYtoR] gffered her money for an abortion TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961 and the RGB attempt to recruit (STORSBERG dia not occur 06 until June 1961, accoraing to; NOSENKO _ or October 1961 according to ETORSBERG: Frank DAY NOSENKO identified" DAY as _ a State Department code clerk; at the ' Embassy who was_ a target either of KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV _ The KGB: knew nothing interesting about him such as who his: friends in Moscow were Or his travel in Or outside of the Soviet Union The KGB had no derogatory information about him and was unaware of any .vulnerabilities he may 'have had _ No 'operational measures were taken against him_ 6i61473 201 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top uestea 06 I5JeQ; Copy ================================================== Page 212 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION L January 1960-January 1962) Coment: DAY was in MoGcow from May 1960 until October 1961 In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA 08, 0 employee , Agricultural Attache BROVNN The two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip_ On one occasion they found II 'repairmen 0( in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule ana on another an I attractive and available Soviet female MI was believed to have been planted in their train compartment. 0 Robert DHELLY Reviewing an American Embassy telephone list in September 1964= NOSENKO said that he believed" DWELLY] was 06 a code clerkduring the 1960-1961 period_ There was no (b approach_ to DWELLY and he knew no details of the opera- tional against @DWELLYnor the identity of any agent who might have been used against him_ DwELLY] s case officers were KOSOLAPOV ana GRYAZIIOV 06 Under interrogation in February 1965 _ however NOSENKO said that the KGB was Ii 100 perccent sure" that he was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior oheB EE: fang 06 a public men S room It There was a "big hunt 1I for DIELLY and on a number Of evenings when D1ELLY was known to be free 0L from work, NOSENKO himself, GRYAZNOV _ KOSOLAPOV , and NOSENKO' s homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that (DTELLY visit downtown Moscow and they could establish contact with him No photographs of DWELLY were obtained : there was no approach and no recruitment NOSENKO later added that perhaps GRYAZNOV ' s homosexual agent "VOLODYA " had spoken with @ELLY in a 0b public toilet in a museum or a and it was on this basis that he concluded (DNELLY was a homosexual . 06 202 6801474 TS No. 197124 Top Secret L/68 plan 66 woulaOb park Copy ================================================== Page 213 ================================================== Secret (AMERICAN ` EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) L Comment- DWELLY was assigned to Moscow as a code clerk From April 1959 to. July 1960. In a Department of State security interview in March 1966 (prompted by NOSENKO S information) he cate- 5 gorically denied being a homosexual He described two occasions: in' Moscow when while walking alone two men , who their general appearance and actions made him think were . "queer were: trying to attract his attention He recalled that on one of the two Occasions 1 one: asked him the way: to the toilet 06 Joseph GAFFEY 0b NOSENKO originally identified- GAFFEY as a mili enlisted man- in MoscOw dur= the 1960-1961 period ana an Operational: target' of DEMKIN In February 1965. however _ he identified: him as a: 'State Department code clerk for whom the responsible case: Officer was KOSOLAPOV whom . NOSENKO supervised TThe KGB attemptea to lure [GAEFEY into downtown DL Moscow using; Svetlana IVANOVA , the maid in America House_ who was: 'one of DEMKIN ' s agents but (GAFFEY Irejected her K repeated invitations The KGB was unaware of any vices "AFFEY lmight have had and had: no derogatory information regarding him Coment: GAFFEYkarrived in Moscow in September 1961 A feflOw resident Qf America House , {Fred KADERA reported:during a State Department Ou security interview that (CAFFEYZhad told him 06 that_ he had , been intimate with a girl at America House.6- [GAEFEY told[KADERA]that he did 06 not know she was Russian until he was wa lking: her home: and met IVANOVA who identified as such_ America House managerkgeter BevDhe] & reported rumors in America House that (GAFFEF]06 0801475 203 TS No_ 197124 Secret" Copy 10 BIGR Top by, they tary ing Top ================================================== Page 214 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) was having an affair with IVANOVA in America House He described {GAFFEY as the heaviest 0l drinker in America House and said that ccasion- 0b GGAFFEY]could not report to work due to his drinking In describing the KGB approach made to him in 1963 BBINDER (see 2.405 ) quoted his interrogator as Saying that (GAFFEY]U6 took IVANOVA to {BINDER} s rOom in America House , $ ( implying that he was intimate Iith her. at that time (GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 before the expiration of his tour because of drunkenness _ During_ a Stace Department' security interview TGAFFEY admitted 06 being intimate with IVANOVA at America House ana at her apartment db GAFFEY] reported that IVANOVA haa told him she was pregnant and had asked for money for an abortion Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations: Summary and Conclusion According to ` NOSENKO _ on transfer to the Embassy Section , operations against the American code clerks were the Section' s priority task and thus his most important single responsibility as Deputy Chief He asserts to be complete his awareness of what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time _ because Of his senior position his personal review of relevant files and correspondence 0 his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV _ and his personal participation in their operations_ Nithout exception, in every one Of the cases NOSENKO describes there are facts substantially at variance with his account in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information available _ Conclusion From the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither Deputy Chief Of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all operations against American code clerks_ Consequently, he woula not necessarily have known of recruitments among other . Embassy personnel - 204 0301476 TS No. 197124 Secret Top ally early 0b Top Copy &/68 ================================================== Page 215 ================================================== OooQQ_ Secret AMERICAN_ EMBASSY ' SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Case "Officer for Embassy_Security Officer: John ABIDIAN Coment John V: ABIDIAN served as the; Embassy Security_ Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962 approximately the Same period as NOSENKO. S claimed service in the Embassy Section of the American Department The State Department replacement for CIA officer Russell LANGELLE ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks including performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing: deaddrop emergency communications from CIA source GRU Colonel O.V_ PENKOVSKIY ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50. ana then secured employment With the Department Of State as. a clerk/typist He remained in Paris until 1954 . After Special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served Erom 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department 's: Office of Security- A large: part- 0f his work in: this period was accompanying foreign dignitaries Visiting the: United States including Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov in November 1956 ,. Mikoyan in the spring of 1959 and" Khrushchev at the ena of 1959 These 0801477 - 205 TS No:' 197124 Top Secret 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 216 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB Officers stationed in New York ana Washington as well as among the Soviet delegations _ One Of the members Of the Khrushchev entourage was KOSOLAPOV , NOSENKO' s subordinate in the Embassy Section During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN in several instances identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as "a CIA Officer" and describing his letter-mailing activities His knowledge Of ABIDIAN was attributed to his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGB case officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first time described ABIDIAN 1 S alleged servicing of a deaddrop in 1960 _ NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service_ and one of the most important counterinte lligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore Of the entire Secona Directorate _ Duties a8 2 Case Officer When he reported for duty in the Embassy Section NOSENKO was tola by KLYPIN and KOVSHUK that one Of his duties woula be case officer for ABIDIAN whose arrival in Moscow was then expectea in the near future: ABIDIAN was to be the only American target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially accountable while he served in this section KOVSHUK gave NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN_ Included was ABIDIAN S visa application , the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files and a report preparea by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate . According to that report, which was based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the Unitea States ABIDIAN 0801478 206 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 217 ================================================== Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) had served as_ a Department of State Security Officer concerned with 'the safety of Premier Khrushchev when he visited the United States in 1959; from ABIDIAN S behavior at that time the Legal Residencies concluded he was an in telligence officer, probably with' CIA: That report and the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell: LANGELLE as Security Officer_ made ABIDIAN one 0f; the most important counter- intelligence targets Of the: Embassy Section and therefore Of the entire Second' Chief Directorate NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later 'adopted' for him the cryptonym I ARSEN" used earlier by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate Of the Second: ; Chief Directorate: NOSENRO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN He visited the Chief of the American' Department of the . KGB First Chief Directorate but that unit had no information not included in its report NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residenczeginal the United States be asked for further detaiis but none ever received NOSENKO thus never learned of ABIDIAN S: were education and study abroad_ date Of entry into the Department of State promotions personal rank previous assignments military service or foreign service status Prior to: ABIDIAN' s arrival in Moscow the KGB decidea: not to work_aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated sOme personal vulnerability It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the; hope that, as LANGELLE S successor he might lead 0 to another POPOV" [POPOV a GRU Lieutenant Colonel 'and CIA agent according to KGB sources was apprehended in 1959 1 Because- ABIDIAN was considered: to be"a CIA officer +he was made a 11 special: target" of surveillance . from the date of his arrival He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams so that at: hour a team: was available' to cover him if he left the any The time this intensity-of coverage might eaYebbeey reduced NOSENKO said was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance Of the Embassy 6801479 207 TS No._ 197124 Secret _ Top only Top: Copy ================================================== Page 218 ================================================== 14-C Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage Of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case As the responsible case officer_ NOSENKO directed the' surveillance 0f ABIDIAN ana evaluated the operational possibilities offered by information from surveillance reports_ In line with the emphasis on surveillance_ the opera- tional plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960 called for no direct action but specified that: ~ABIDIAN S maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH an "operational contact" of the Embassy Section_ was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN S clothing and "NEPTUNE-80 " to his shoes _ TAccording to NOSENKO , these are surveillance aids Metka is a # thief powder (t applied to clothing pockets _ leaving a trace on anything with which it comes into contact _ Its primary purpose is to aid in the detection of operational letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers ana agents _ NEPTUNE-80 applied to a target 1 s shoes , leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long after- wards can follow with a dog . ) The only item Of information received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an affair with an" Embassy female employee FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN 5 apartmente ~Pietro CECCHI_ Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV ' s agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN ana report whatever he learned concerning him_ CECCHI never obtained any significant information on ABIDIAN S personal life 0 ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy" but NOSENKO dia not recall any specific report CECCHI gave to ABIDIAN that was of interest to the' Embassy Section: ~Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals 0f ABIDIAN S car if necessary. 208 0001480 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Ooop?:= Top Copy ================================================== Page 219 ================================================== Top Secret AMERICAN; EMBASSY ' SECTION January 1960-January 1962) ~All ether agents_and operational section were to be instructed contacts of the ABIDIAN (see below) to report every detail about Places-ShereiLBEDfe teams were to' be instructed to ABIDIAN might be mailing letters _ check all ~Coverage 'of ABIDIAN s mail was to be continued Apart from those specified by the other KGB agents Lyudmila GROMAKOVA operational iI plan, two agent whose_identity NOSENKO; ana KAMO" (a KGB involved with ABIDIAN dia not recali) were for Embassy personnel GROMAKOVA, a_ language instructor 'case officer GAVRILENKO as an agent hanaled by Embassy Section language lessons from ABIDIAN took I 'only several Russian whether these mererPI GRCeAXOVC and NOSENKO dia not know nothing of operational: or_class lessons _ He learned with ABIDIAN and chere 8135ifcczece from GROMAKOVA 'S contacts was no regular reporting from her Comment Although he had-earlier identified a KGB agent , NOSENKO GROMAKOVA as ABIDIAN until told never associated her with her students that ABIDIAN had been one 'of regular In actuality ABIDIAN: took tegeeaoneangiageouesiess from GROMAKOVA normally Shoeelonefbelfhhoua lessons per week , from from Moscow arrival until his departure The second KGB agent ; "KAMO" 'City KGB organization who: was an agent of the Moscow_ byaccident; Nhenlonfornedet ABIDIAN at: the Baku' Restaurant telephone number 'NOSENKO that ABIDIAN gave II KAMO" his deve a relationship 'KOthecBIDended that "KAMO" try 'to this was against theipolich ABIDIRi After arguing that provocative action against of no aggressive or agreed and KAMO" ABIDIAN , KOVSHUK and KLYPIN instructions ABIDIAN, phoned ABIDIAN twice 'on KGB however _ refused to meet. him_ and 209 TS_No. 197124' Secret 10 lop taking finally 08i481 Top Copy ================================================== Page 220 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) no further action was taken_ [See below account 0f a similar incident , for ABIDIAN S Armenia,] but one which occurrea in NOSENKO did not know the room number of in the Embassy or on what floor it ABIDIAN S office have checked , if was located _ 6 but he could phone heckefublfshecengatki- with 2_ copy of the Embassy tele- room number of each monthly, since it contained the office list contained American employee [TheEmbassy telephone ABIDIAN apartment_ 1 but not office room numbers . ] S office was in the Ii Zone of M office areas) NOSENKO said that Security (i.e secure (identity not recalled) a_ report from an agent ABIDIAN S Deficecdooedwhicdicatad that there was a on was no _ such sign .] NOSENKO said "Security Office" [There ABIDIAN had a secretary _ was unable to determine if ABIDIAN S office No dictation was monitored in there [In Igge bedicre no KGB microphone was installed found in the roona _ microphone , albeit then: inoperative was recalled no PECO1CoiciRied_ in 1960-1961 by ABIDIAN J NOSENKO aboatledIDfAPaobicunedi{ronteteetin? or important information from other microphones in the Embassy. NOSENKO did not know the location of in the Embassy building_ ABIDIAN S apartment "data of this nor how it was furnished since unless the nature was not operationally Significant target had shown 'vulnerabilities active development" I1 or was under Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR times while stationed in two or three which countries he went MoscOw , NOSENKO dia not know to were made or the time of year when the him as ABIDIEnch information woula have been of interest to 5 case officer since, 1 like LANGELLE abroad ,_ ABIDIAN S S earlier operational were presumed to be for the KGB to EDnaPoses - However there was no possibility for Embassy Section did where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the nothing could be "donestoblisit here ABIDIAN would travel, Residencies Of the RGB abort it because the foreign Legal accept a request for First Chief Directorate u would not diplomat coglegt Efon Soecotional Ii action against an American 210 TS No. 197124 Secret Top sign trips trips trips 0801482 Top Copy ================================================== Page 221 ================================================== Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) With reference to whether the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN_ S passport on his return to Moscow NOSENKO said that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph ' pass - ports 'Of. foreign diplomats ' entering the Soviet Union Ihile this procedure woula not be` impossible it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved:a Comment According to ABIDIAN he openly discussed_ his travel plans with Embassy. language teacher GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO s agent) and on at least some occasions used international telephone calls to arrange for accommodations at his destination in Europe. Also , the Foreign Ministry UPDK (which office provides adminis_ trative services to foreign diplomats in 'Moscow) to which ABIDIAN sent his passport for an exit visa for each departure , could have noted' from passport entries the- whereabouts of his earlier travel ABIDIAN took no trips in' the Soviet: Union outside of Moscow Since if_ he had ~NOSENKO would have known ana remembered then_ as it was his responsibility as case Officer 'to take certain actions Among the latter he listed: ~Receiving notification Of ABIDIAN S request to travel from" the UPDK (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which provides administrative: services to the: diplomatic community in_ Moscow) FAdvis_ the UPDK of KGB: approval for the.trip_ ~Advising appropriate local' KGB offices of ABIDIAN S' itinerary and 'giving them instructions for surveillance and- any other necessary operational activity ga01483 211 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top ing Copy ================================================== Page 222 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) 7 Receiving, reading , and filing all reports of surveillance and other operational activity carried out by various KGB units NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these if he were absent when such a steps _ Even he woula have request for travel was made _ seen all documents upon his return; he did not recall seeing any such documents in ABIDIAN S file. Comment: ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks the Armenian language with a high, degree Of proficiency, made a trip to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960 _ While in Armenia ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen _ their parish- ioners and an Armenian who _ had repatriated from Greece in 1946 _ ABIDIAN attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I and also visited some relatives of his in or near the of Yerevan After returning to MoscOw, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy , but ABIDIAN refused to see him_ After being told ABIDIAN had attended a service' celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos_ VAZGEN I NOSENKO recallea that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there This agent NOSENKO recalled . was a priest or a monk and the report concerned his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him_ NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN S With reference to ABIDIAN S travel to Armenia in October 1960 NOSENKO recalled having- been on leave at the time However , NOSENKO S reconstruction of the timing of his alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at the time of ABIDIAN S In 1966 _ NOSENKO stated that he had lied_ 1 that his 1960 leave was taken in January, not October. 0801484 212 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top city only trip_ trip_ Copy ================================================== Page 223 ================================================== Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTTON January 1960-January 1962) Except: for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate NOSENKO: knew none of ABIDIAN S close American friends in Moscow nor his close friends and professional contacts among foreigners there NOSENKO received and read transcripts' of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received- at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system_ but he recalled_ none of their names nor nationalities because there was nothing of interest in the conversations- At the end Of the ' January-February 1965 'interrogations concerning ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little' about this important KGB target He was "working badly" Ii as ABIDIAN s Case officer, he said,_ because he had had to concentrate_ on supervis the work against code clerks . A ABIDIAN s Letter Mailings During' the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO: in Geneva he reported KGB knowledge Of ABIDIAN S mailing of at least three clandestine letters in each case to KGB-controlled agents According to NOSENKO , the KGB' . detected; all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN through the use Qf metka_ He cautioned the CIA representatives from' further use of : Embassy employees for mailing letters to agents in the Soviet Union He noted that after LANGELLE no such ietters were mailed for a year and a half until ABIDIAN mailed several: He explained that-Embassy 'employees' servants applied an odorless substance (metka) to clothing pockets , and_ traces of the substance rubbed Off on any-thing it contacted such as a letter: All the letters mailed in Moscow were passed through a machine which identified letters bearing tracing of; metka' he said and this was; how letters ABIDIAN mailed were intercepted:o [NOSENKO said the machine was 'a fotoapparat' literally a camera but: presumably he meant some sort Of light-sensitive: device.] NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN haa mailed a letter to someone in Odessa and two to_ the Baltic area, probably to Riga and all were detected by metka not by ABIDIAN_ s; surveillants. According to: NOSENKO _ no new agents were discovered however since all of the agents to whom :ABIDIAN' mailed: letters were already controlled . by the KGB Ca01485 213 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 ing Copy ================================================== Page 224 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) NOSENKO ' s information is substantially correct , Comment: that no letters were mailed for one and a half years after LANGELLE S expulsion and that ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters including ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa No letters were mailed from February 1960 until ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the three letters ABIDIAN mailed I one was to Odessa and one each to Latvia ana Estonia. CIA has conducted tests to determine whether a_ substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device Ultra-violet_ 1 chenical and microscopic analyses developed_ one possible use Of a metka like substance Analysis of an article Of clothing Of a foreign diplomat in Moscow who served as a CIA support agent produced a sharply positive reaction later described how metka was to ABIDIAN S NOSENKO his maid ana how in particular this. led to clothing by Of the letters ABIDIAN mailea to the agent in the discovery Odessa and to his parents in the United States_ ABIDIAN ! s maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH_ She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV _ She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival I met her shortly after she began to work for ARIDIAN in order to acquainted with her in order to evaluate her and her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN _ I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall Of 1960 _ I wrote the operational on ABIDIAN in_ circa October 1960 _ At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN This operational statea that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN S clothing 0801486 214 TS No. 197124 Top Secret applied get give plan plan Copy ================================================== Page 225 ================================================== Top Secret E (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) 0 'FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN S clothing during the' entire period that She worked for him ~She did 1 this every two_ or three weeks except- for a few times when she was sick or on leave No one else, had: access to ABIDIAN S apartment: and therefore no Other person had the 'possibility of putting metka on his. L clothing: I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational 0U letter to the KGB double agent ARRHANGELSKIY (in Odessa) He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter 1 but the mailbox was controlled ana the letter to: ARKHANGELSKIY was found along with a letter to ABIDIAN S. 'parents Both Of these letters had netka on them , as I was told by SUMIN (a KGB secret writing: specialist) I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN. mailed this, letter except that it was sometime in 1961_ Comment ABIDIAN had no maid in Moscow until sixteen months after his arrival; FEDOROVICH worked for him part-time from July 1961 until he left MoscOw . Thus FEDOROVICH could not have applied the metka which as NOSENKO claimed resulted in the Interception Of the letter ABIDIAN mailed L April 1961 and probably was not yet' employed by ABIDIAN even at the time. the letter to ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2 July 1961- ABIDIAN S third letter was mailed: on 1 September '1961 while FEDOROVICH was working for; him 215 TS No. 197124 Top Secret - 10 6dO1487 Copy ================================================== Page 226 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN S clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing 1 NOSENKO insisted that no one but FEDOROVICH had access to ABIDIAN S apartment , that he himself briefed her on the use of metka' that the letters were intercepted' by use of metka , and that FEDOROVICH was responsible ABIDIAN S Servicing @f the Pushkin Street Deaddrop Site In 1967 NOSENKO reported for the first time that in 1960 or in early 1961 the KGB had surveilled ABIDIAN visiting what was believed to be a deaddrop site on Pushkin Street in Moscow He provided additional details when questioned again in 1965 _ NOSENKO S Information In 1960 or early 1961, while NOSENKO was his responsible case officer ABIDIAN was surveilled from the Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow A KGB stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile rather than in the car he normally used ABIDIAN S surveillance team followed the car to a bookstore Both Americans entered the bookstore, but shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone ana walked around the corner, where 'he entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin street The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him_ ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds _ This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Direct- orate and the building was inspected that same day by KOZLOV _ the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate_ and MATVEYEV _ the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate S American Department Taking into account the character Of the building and its inhabitants the duration and circumstances of ABIDIANT S visit [ and the suitability of the hallway particularly the radiator in it for use as a deaddrop site, it was decided by the leader- ship of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance 216 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 030i488 Copy ================================================== Page 227 ================================================== 1.4-00ona. Secret FH AMERICAN EMBASSY , SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up: to cover this location Because of the short time available_ it was not possible to place this post inside the building, SO it was set up across the street In addition, the radiator was checked daily to "See if any- thing_ such as a magnetic container , had been concealed behind it The: post was; manned around the: clock for 30 ` days after which it was_ maintained from; 0800_ until midnight for another two months If a_ package Or magnetic. container had been found behind the radiator which was_ checked every morning_ it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove ~the package At' the same time a member 0f the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building; out of sight from the hallway below_ During the three months that the post was maintained nothing was found concealed- behind the radiator nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building_ The "post was then" discontinued, but_ the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate_ The true- significance Of this location became known to the KGB later after the arrest of' PENKOVSKIY in_ 1962 NOSENKO first heard Of ABIDIAN s: Visit to the suspected deaddrop site on the it occurred_ He was sitting: in KOVSHUK S office when he received a_ telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident' Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN s case' officer and KOVSHUK was Chief Of the Embassy Section the: decision to place the stationary surveillance post at the site: was made at: 2 higher level; neither Of then was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post NOSENKO himself: visited 'the: building on Pushkin_ Street the following or the day_ after but he remained a_ few: minutes and did not recall any details Qf the hallway_ except that there was: a radiator there As ABIDIAN S case officer NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street buiIding and placing: this 'report in ABIDIAN s file (This case file NOSENKO turned over to his successor GRYAZNOV ; about 28 December 1961 _ just before he transferred to the: Seventh Department 217 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top only aay 'aay Only 8301489 Copy; ================================================== Page 228 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this mattex with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance_ and periodically after that_ These discus - sions took place either by telephone when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO' s office, or when NOSENKO visited KOzLOV ' s office in KGB Headquarters _ From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else , NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days _ On the basis Of these conversations with KOZLOV NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurrea during the period of the stationary surveillance _ NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections _ NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post had already been discontinued without anything unusual or suspiclous having been noted _ and he thought that this incident woula be of no particular interest to CIA_ When last asked whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there as he had earlier said , NOSENKO replied: I don? € remember I do not want to say that I visited the deaddrop. I don 't remember now whether I visited it or not It seems to me that I visited it, but I don t remember _ It seems that I visited it: with KOZLOV , but I cannot say yes and I cannot say no' 218 8801420 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 229 ================================================== Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Coment: ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop site:only once on 30 December 1961 , a full year after: the time reported by NOSENKO: NOSENKO reported _ accompanied by an Embassy Economic Officer ABIDIAN left the , Embassy in an official car with a_ Soviet driver and proceeded in a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin Street Leaving the bookstore 7 ABIDIAN entered the building where_ the site was located determined that the drop was empty , and left One minute later re- turning to the Embassy The deaddrop was proposed by PENKOVSKIY in August 1960, CIA officer Eugene MAHONEYI walkea 03 by the site: on 12_ November and 4 December 19.60 ; On 21 January 1961 MAHONEY briefly entered the 03 building to confirm the' site S precise location If" the KGB had surveilled QAIONEY S wisits and 0} had put the' site. under surveillance NOSENKO might_ be relating those events by mischance in attributing the visit to ABIDIAN In such a circumstance however NOSENKO , as ABIDIAN S case Officer would have known that his target visited a site which had been, previously noted in connection with the suspicious movements: of another Embassy Official Further, NOSENKO ' s description of ABIDIAN S route, companion and [ sequence of movenents is s0 precise as to refer clearly to' ABIDIAN Lastly, NOSENKO' dislcaims any knowledge Of MAHONEY or his activities; he: 0 asserts that MAHONEY was neither the 'object_ of_ KGB suspicion or concern: For reasons no combination of circumstances nor NOSENKO himself can plausibly explain NOSENKO can describe ABIDIAN S deaddrop: site visit although it occurred at a time when MOSENKO was no' longer ABIDIAN;' s case officer_ and when he was assigned to another Second Chief Directorate department If he turned over: ABIDIAN's file on 28 December 1961 to another Embassy Section officer, as' he claimed_ NOSENKO could not; have received 219 TS No.- 197124 Top Secret 10 S/er As GJOiasi Copy ================================================== Page 230 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) nor filed the initial surveillance report of ABIDIAN S visit to the Pushkin Street site_ If he transferrea to the Seventh Department two after ABIDIAN S visit_ 0 as he claimed (ana NOSENKO ' s participation in the M.E_ JOHNSON case OL indicates that he was working against tourists- by 5 January 1962) nhe coula neither have visited the site as he described nor could he have received thereafter the daily surveillance reports He coula not , Of his own knowledge , assert that the surveillance was terminated after three months since well before the three months surveillance ended he was abroad in Geneva _ Lastly, it cannot be for the reason NOSENKO claimed (that the surveillance was unsuccessful) that NOSENKO dia not mention ABIDIAN S activities to CIA in Geneva in 1962 _ Case Officer for_ John ABIDIAN Summary and Conclusion If for no other reason than ABIDIAN s security functions with the Khrushchev entourage_ files' of the First Chief Directorate woula recora his name : If NOSENKO states to the contrary that traces were negative, NOSENKO dia not run the traces himself nor know the results _ According to NOSENKO , ABIDIAN was "one Of the most important targets of the Second Chief Directorate {I all KGB resources were employed for two years including 24-hour surveillance, the exploitation of all agents with access to him, audio sur- veillance _ 0 and technical aids_ with aost absolutely negative results The results coula not have been negative: for NOSENKO to SO assert can only mean that NOSENKO was not informed of the results In the two instances NOSENKO cited of Embassy agents activities against ABIDIAN , he made fundamental errors: ABIDIAN S maid was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time NOSENKO insists she was applying the metka and GROMAKOVA , taught AfIDIAN Russian throughout his stay in MoscOw , not just hi several times ht NOSENKO acknowledges 220 13k 0801482 TS No. 197124 Top Secret aays Copy ================================================== Page 231 ================================================== Oooqo Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January: 1960-January 1962) that ABIDIAN S travel in the Soviet been approved by the KGB ana Union wouild have had to' officer would have issued that the responsible case side of Moscow and: orders for his surveillance out would have later received target' s activities_ NOSENKO reports of the sO" involved_ although he 'beKotedkyoveedzee that he was noc made' Lastly, although NOSENKO recalled one trip ABIDIAN Embassy Section claims to know _ from his the Pushkin Screeesigaaert; details of ABIDIAN S visit to when NOSENKO by his deaddrop the event occurrea' at a time present in the Embassy? account coula not have been physically section Conclusion It 18 concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO case officer Eor' Embassy Security Officer was not John: ABIDIAN Supervisor of Operations Against American Service Attaches Questioned in detail in 1964 on his the Embassy Section_ NOSENKO claimed responsibilities in operations against American no personal role in that when he arrived in service attaches_ He saia only sible case 'officer the section DRANOV: was the respon Embassy Marine for the Naval personnel _ including the guards and when 'DRANOV was transferred EbcoGl zobere:isef- his responsibilities were assumed Li the names and functions of Department personnei NOSENKO mentioned American Nikolayevich ALESHIN_ was Second Deputy tchpepaetgenty KLYPIN ALESHIN had: the special 'Department Chief Secona Chief Directorate assignment Of coordinating nilitary intelligerce activities against all foreign personnel including service attaches he Iad 1965"NOSENKO claimed for the first among his other responsibilities time: that of supervising operations as Deputy: Chief that against American service attaches_ 221 TS No: 197124 Top Secret 10 shortly by sting January Cd01453 Copy ================================================== Page 232 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) and for the first time claimed case officer responsibilities against American targets other than ABIDIAN_ He related how at his meeting with KLYPIN and KOVSHUK on entering the section in January 1960_ KOVSHUK suggested that NOSENKO assume super- visory responsibility for the service attaches while KOVSHUK supervised operations against the civilian diplomatic staff of the Embassy_ NOSENKO stated II supervising" It meant that the case officers for the service attaches referred their ques- tions to him, not to KOVSHUK _ These included case officers GAVRILENKO_ responsible for Air Attaches KURILENKO , for Army Attaches and DEMKIN for enlisted personnel of all services "While he was getting acquainted with the section on DRANOV ' s retirement" NOSENKO himself took case officer responsibility for the Naval Attache personnel This res- ponsibility was subsequently assumed by DRANOV s former assistant BELOGLAZOV _ NOSENKO could not initially recall how long he supervised service attache operations; he later said I1 several months" and finally "five or six months " Nejther coula NOSENKO recall what other pressing duty or duties caused him to be relieved of this function He said this resulted from KOVSHUK S proposal that supervision of the service attaches be assumed by ALESHIN who was Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate S American Department and coordinator for Second Directorate operations against military intelligence officers Of all nationalities Supervisor of Service Attache Operations: Summary &nd Conclusion Because of the tardiness of NOSENKO ' s claim to have been responsible for operations against service attaches and because he was not able _ when challenged to substantiate his claims by providing any details Of KGB activities against these targets;, it is concluded that this: aspect of his claimea KGB service is a fiction 0801484 222 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 233 ================================================== Ooooo Secret AMERICAN EMBAsSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962); Custodian of KGB File on Embassy Security As former Deputy Chief and 'Occasional Acting Chief of the American. Embassy Section 1 NOSENKO : claimed awareness Of KGB knowledge of its American Embassy target . Specifically NOSENKO claimed to have been custodian of the Second Chief Directorate_ S file on Embassy security NOSENKO s Information 'NOSENKO S knowledge of the' physical' layout of the Embassy derived both from his general supervisory functions during 1960-1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian 0f the KGB file on the Embassy security_ He received the file from the "Section Chief KOVSHUK, when he arrived in January 1960_ As was permissible under KGB_ procedures as long as the custodian was: still in the' same directorate, the file was charged to BAKHVALOV [See p 153 for NOSEMKO: S various assertions with respect to BAKHVALOV NOSENKO had cus 0f the file charged to. himself ana' from January 1960 until NOSENKO was leaving the section On 25-28 December 1961,' KOVSHUK NOSENKO and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (both Of whom shared NOSENKO ' s, office and: safe) had: access' to the file The' file consisted of; two- volumes _ one for the old building- On Mokhovaya Street ana the; second (about an inch tnick) on the new Embassy building occupied in 1953 on Chaykovskiy Street:: The file contained detailea floor plans and photographs Of both buildings_ No operational analysis or planning by NOSENKO_ Or others was done on the basis of this file dur NOSENKO 5 two Years in' the Embassy Section It was used for reference purposes since the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a "Soviet citizen- to penetrate the- secure areas of the Embassy because of the 'American security precautions in effect; 223 TS No_ 197124 Secret Copy ~1 Top tody only ing only 0301495 Top ================================================== Page 234 ================================================== 14-0pOQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) All Soviet employees Of the Embassy who entered the 01 restricted areas , the seventh through the tenth floors" were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest in these offices (The secure area barred to unescorted local employees is comprised Of the eighth through tenth floors 1 NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file while he was custodian None Of the information was of interest or important or useful enough for him to remember and he recalled none of the KGB agent sources _ [In another context NOSENKO cited an instance in which an unrecalled KGB agent had reported [erroneously] that ABIDIAN ' s office haa a sign on the door reading "Secuxity Office".] Nothing could be recovered from the Embassy classified crash 1 which was always burned at an unrecalled location by a non-commissioned officer or Marine guard accompanied by an officer_ [At the Moscow Embassy the Marine guard detailed for the purpose has always burned the classified trash alone NOSENKO may be unwittingly referring to a U,S_ military security procedure requiring a commissioned officer to witness and to certify the destruction of classified documents If NOSENKO is aware of any such procedure_ he has never indicated it in any context.] In 1960-1961_ when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief he either knew the location of all offices and personnel within the Embassy or he coula obtain them from the monthly Embassy telephone lists which the KGB received regularly from agents. The lists gave ffice numbers_ (The Embassy telephone lists contain names apartment numbers and telephone numbers , but omits office room numbers . ] In 1960 a "metallic chamber" {acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower S use and for secret conversations None Of the technical specifications of the room were known nor was its location An unrecalled source reported only that meetings were held in the room which was in the restricted area: 224 00014CG TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 235 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (AMERICAN EMBAsSy SECTION January 1960-January 1962) The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material 'during 1960-1961, A charwoman who was: an agent of BELOGLAZOv stole a' bag of papers from the Naval Attache office_ The torn and'' crumpled contents included a . draft: of a report of Navall Attaches observation of ships and factories on a trip to Leningrad The rreport was only of routine interest to: the KGB The charwoman was granted a cash award _ Custedian @f Embassy Security File: Summary and Conclusion NOSENKO cannot 'describe the location (even by floor) of any of his own targets such as ABIDIAN_ the military code room or the State Department communications center In fact; he cannot describe the location 0f the office of any individual or unit in the Embassy, even of the Ambassado When' 'challenged to substantiate his claim to knowledge of the Embassy security file NOSENKO assertea that he had never read it nor paid any I special attention' Mi to its content in the two years he was file custodian- It is concluded that NOSENKO S claim that he: was custodian of the file is an invention' Audio Operations Against; the: American' Embassy: NOSENKO s "know iledge of the 'KGB -microphone system in the Embassy derived from his alleged responsibi as Deputy Chief Of the Embassy: Section: for receiving ana rou to appropriate: KGB personnel 'the reports `Of; monitored 'conversav tions Also_ in his "capacity as Deputy Chief ana custodian of the: monitoring reports; logbook NOSENKO; Claimed to have attended a, meeting at the end of 1960 Or the beginning Of 1961 ab which he learned details 0f the locations of specific microphones hidden in the: Embassy_ Lastly NOSENKO . claimed he obtained information on the KGB audio operations against theEmbassy, ` even after he left the Embassy Section from his former subordinate GRYAZNOV NOSENKO regarded the information about the KGB microphones first mentioned in Geneva in 1962 the most important: he provided- CIA 225 TS ` No.` 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Top lity ting as 0301487 ================================================== Page 236 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) NOSENKO ' s Information Handling: @f Monitor Reports According to NOSENKO , only a limited number of KGB personnel, all in the American Department of the Secona Chief Directorate had access to the monitor reports These included Department Chief KLYPIN (but not his deputies) KOVSHUK NOSENKO himself_ and GRIBANOV , to whom important items were shown The existence of the audio operation and its product were concealed from personnel in other KGB Departments _ The reports were produced by the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate (OTU) The OTU Second Special Department has several sections one of which was the English Section under Colonel N _ Ya . KUZMIN KUZMIN S monitors fluent in English, listened to and transcribed the tape recordings Their reports of the preceding: day S product were brought daily by Tatyana GRISHNYAT (of the Second Special Department) to the American Department (In some accounts NOSENKO has said that he received the reports first, at other times that they went first to KLYPIN. ) NOSENKO reviewed the reports marked significant portions and usually within twenty-four hours. returned the reports to the Second Special Department _ In_ NOSENKO ' s absence either KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV reviewed the reports_ The Second Special Department: prepared sterile abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked abstracts which disguised the source Of the information contained: the abstracts were returned to the American Department for the reference of individual case officers in the Embassy Section and for filing in the delo-formulyar (developmental file) kept on each American employee in Ehe Embassy _ Location @f the: Microphones In the 1962 Geneva meetings with CIA , NOSENKO emphasized that the KGB was listening to all conversations of the service attaches and particularly to conversations held in the office of the 'Minister Counsellor_ In addition , he referred to "points I [microphones] in the office of an unnamed State Department employee in the Agricultural Attache office shared by BROWIT and HORBALY , and in the Embassy code room 226 0801488 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 237 ================================================== Top Secret ANERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) In 1964 at tile second mee ting with CIA, NOSENKO produced a handwritten note which he asserted listed all the micro: phones in the Embassy which were operative in the Years 1960-1961 - NOSENKO explained, that at the- end of 1960 or the: beginning of 1961 he and KOVSHUK met with Chief KLYPIN The purpose of the meeting was toegascuest the possibility of releasing monitors from some of the Embassy microphones so: could be assigned to Vladimir PETROV , Chief Of the American Department S Second Section for: use against non-Embassy targets (PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitors from the Second Special Section, but had been told that English linguists_ were engaged on priority targets _ At the meeting KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone' coverage of the Embassy 'chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value SO- that the monitors for those' microphones coula be released to PETROV s Second Section KOVSHUK used NOSENKO' s notebook in which: to list Embassy apartments and offices then be covered on; a full-time basis and to note those lesser importance KOVSHUK decided to relinquish of 'arily mon itoring Of , Embassy apartments He cosbinteapche monitoring of the code room despite the limited value of the information obtained At the end 0f the meeting KOVSHUK gave or NOSENKO took the` list , and NOSENKO retained it in his office safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964.. NOSENKO, S list showed that microphones were located in the following offices: Of the noted occupants "Office_ of the Minister Counsellor FREERS ; "Office Of the Naval Attache HOUGHTON; "Office of the Army Attache; URBAN; "Office Of the Air Attache, NEILSEN; "Office of the Assistant Air Attache_ WINDSOR; "Office Of the Assistant Air Attaches SENIO and SACHANEN "Office of the Assistant Army Attaches MASON REITZ and WILSON "Office of the Political Officer_ GLEYS TEEN "Office of . Agricultural Attaches HORBALY and BROWN Mili Code Room ; "State II Department_'Code Room ana Teletype Office Apartments 6f FREERS HOUGHTON URBAN and WEILSEN; 'Eighth Floor Bar (Marines) 06,06,b1 6du1429 227 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 2/kk they ing tary Top Copy ================================================== Page 238 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in building before the Americans occupied 1t, but the chancery were installed in all, how many he did not know how many KOVSHUK S list, or where" they were In any particular room on did recall that most of were located in specific rooms He wall_ the wall the mi crophones were emplaced in the outside 1 Chaykovskiy Street, as most f the offices faced nearest and microphones emplaced there were less: vulner- this street able to technical search and discovery. According to NOSENKO , there were no fixed micrephones in America House , the Embassy quarters_ Of enlditedssio1tofYusing In 1960-1961 there had been a discussion of personnel there to emplace temporary audio devices KGB agents employed at a time in the rooms Of the Americans , for one or two days These plans were vetoed as well as in the Embassy garage For the same however because of the risk Of discovery_ there was no attempt made in this period to emplace reason in Spasso House the Ambassador s a device temporarily of Embassy officers_ The residence or in the apartments and there would KGB was afraid that they, would be detected be a scandal: Performance Characteristics %f the Micrephones According to` NOSENKO in 1962 the audibility Of the microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear to zero, system was deteriorating_ The KGB coula but the microphone they could not access to do nothing about it because the. microphone in the inside of the Embassy. Referring to said that it was the Minister Counsellor s office NOSENKO becoming increasingly difficult towwork with its product The mi= crophone was fading, and the recording tape sosodeone if I somewhere far away somewhere in the cellar 0 as in a whisper KUZMIN the KGB officer respon ~ is speaking monitors 'said that soon the KGB coula recover sible for the then (in 1962) in about nothing . Of the microphones twenty no longer were operative referred to the microphone in the In 1964 NOSENKO NOSENKO learned from Minister Counsellor' 5 office Section of DMITRIYEV (Deputy Chief Of the English-language Special Department] how difficult it was io OTU . Second 228 TS No. 197124 Top Secret gain place again 03615OO Copy ================================================== Page 239 ================================================== QOQoQ Secret AMERICAN EMDASSY . SECTI ON January 1960-January 1962) monitor conversations in_ that office linguists were used but even they had to Jiyeey experlenced fifteen ,. even twenty times" in order to ondesteandteor of the_ record After NOSCNKO left the portions on several occasions in 1962-1963 GEYAZNovEnbiss Section ordinate and his successor_ referred his former sub- decline_ GRYAZNOV said the_ to the microphones_ only_ snatches of conved saheonicrohonet were picking up they would be complete that in a year or two told NOSENKO ly inoperative As a result 1 GRYAZNOV GRIBANOV was insisting: on the recruitment of code clerks at all costs Besides the fad_ the 'microphone'8 signal GRYAZNOV _ ing quality of attributed the KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEV: diminishing value Of the audio operation to the Embassy use of the room-in-a-room It [NOSENKO that in 1960-1961 the KGB had information said tion for President Eisenhower I1 that, in prepara; had been S visit, a steel chamber constructed within the 'Embassy where secure conver- sations could be held 1 Microphones in: the North Wing According to: NOSENKO _ no microphones or other audio devices were 'ever installed in the north from the, chancery): prior to the' Embassy S {(as distinct building in 1962 In' his first meetings with occupancy of the he described how he, knew. Nhen CIA in Geneva the' Embassy to construct it was decided to permit the north wing NOSENKO wrote_ a proposal that audio- equipment: be instailed held: up by KGB Chairman Shelepin who. had 'Approval was because: of the political consequences Qf afsceveations the time Shelepin approved the proposal two By later_ renovation was far advanced or three months Officer ABIDIAN was already ana Embassy Security opportunity was lost and the_ inspecting the premises The KGB 'installed' no microphones: Consequentiy_ NOSENKO suggested to_ CIA that the: Minister 'CounseLlor the: service attaches ana others occupying rooms in the chancery Which Rahenicropbenesy be_ moved gradually to the north where the KGB had neither audio_equipment; nor the capability of installing 229 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret 10 Top Only ing: wing wings any: Gju1581 Copy. ================================================== Page 240 ================================================== 14-0000Q Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Amount,' Type' and Value %f Audio SurveiLlance Production In 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information the KGB obtained from monitoring , NOSENKO referred only to the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the service attaches According to NOSENKO , Counsellor FREERS dictated Top Secret and Secret cables . If the contenc justified GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman immediately. FREERS. also dictated fitness reports on Embassy per sonnel from which the KGB learned of various American officers personal weaknesses Nith respect to the service attaches _ NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find out In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details _ He said that audio reception was good from the military code room but that the occupants rarely spoke= When one of them was monitored , the monitor report was sent immediately to the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers _ Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and teletype room because of the interference from the noise of the teletype machines The microphones in the apartments produced rarely anything of interest_ An exception was advance information obtained 0f a social affair for which the English-language Section Of the OTU Second Special Department woula" be asked to pay particular attention There was a microphone with good reception in GLEYSTEEN S (a political officer) office ; but no secret information was Obtained Similarly, the conversations were overheard in the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing Significant It was- obtained except something" which made the KGB suspect HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized his knowledge of the value Of the information obtained by the KGB via mie crophones in the Embassy: 230 0001502 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 241 ================================================== OQqQo_ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two Years from January 1960. to January 1962 _ The following is the information which I can remember as being important , interesting or operationally useful to the: KGB: Ii From the microphone: in the office of- the Minister Counsellor _ FREERS I remember that he_occasionally dictated cables about; the Embassy' s evaluation Of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on_positions for negotiations: with the USSRa This information was of such importance that special reports were written to. the Central_ Committee. of the CPSU _ However I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations: or recommendations made: in these; cables II Also from the microphones in the Minister Counsellor' s office , I remember that: he. dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy I cannot remember who' any Of these officers were or any details from the reports There was nothing in these reports which was of interest: Or useful to_ the KGB From the microphone in the-Army Attache S office I remember that the service attaches: regularly discussed plans for: trips within the USSR and the targets, that wanted to cover They also dis cussed the results 'of these trips after their return However I cannot remember any information about specific planned by specific service attache personnel or any: specific: targets that they: planned: to:cover or; specific operational activity taken by the organs: of the KGB against service attaches on within the USSR which was based on infor- mation obtained from this microphone; There was no interesting important, or useful information about the personal or :professional lives: or about: the vulnerabilities 'of anyone in'the service attache: offices (Army , Navy , and Air) obtained from this microphone lau15c3 231. TS No_ 197124 Top Secret 12 Top only they: trips any trips_ Copy ================================================== Page 242 ================================================== Top Secret AMERICAN ' EMBASSY SECTION, 'January 1960-January 1962 ) I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally: a code clerk would: read numbers These' numbers were only of 1nterest to the Eighth Directorate' (Comnunications and; Cryp- tology of the KGB _ I do nnot remember any conversa- tions; from this microphone_ There was no information from this microphone of any of the code clerks which was interesting, important , or useful to the Embassy Section First Department , Second Chief Directorate KGB During the approximately two years in which' I daily reviewed the production from all the micro-_ phones in_ the American . Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important or useful to me as the Deputy Chief Of the: Embassy Section except the points notea in the above paragraphs Results of Technical- and Physical Search NOSENKO s information (no action had been taken as a, result of GOLITSYN S earlier report that there was: a micro- phone_ in the Embassy office: occupied by the Minister Counsellor] was,_ as_ far as it went, confirmed a search of the Embassy-chancery in spring 1964 _ According to the USIB Security Committee "damage report which followed a_ microphone and associated probe was first discoverea in the outside :wall behind a' radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery . [In-4960. this room had been: the: office Of the Army Attache where NOSENRO reported a microphone_ was emplaced The microphone s cable: was traced to a major cable which ran horizontally (several inches): under the outside surface of the -east face 0f the: chancery to the roof area of the north annex A number of vertical cables were found- to run to the various: microphone installations Fifty microphones were positively identified [ultimately. fifty-four were found] although the system apparen- was devised for a considerably greater number: The ' microphone system covered all outside rooms on floors Six through ten with certain exceptions_ The USIB damage report concluded that the microphones were 1nstalled before the, Embassy took occupancy of the chancery in 1953 00015c4 232 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret by tly' Copy ================================================== Page 243 ================================================== 14-Q0Q00. Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) The discoveries in the chancery led: to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the north roof there were found three coaxial cables all terminating in the concrete floor of the north wing: attic The coaxial cables appeared to be of more recent installation probably' prior to the Soviets' evacuation of the north wing in 1962 Comment: While: not definitely established it is assumed that the Soviets before the Embassy occupied the north used_ it as a listening post for monitoring microphones in the chancery In preparation for American occupancy the main cable from the chancery was concealed and run from: the north roof to the basement_ ana presumably from there to a listening post e_ lsewhere_ The three coaxial cables may have . been either nstalled at that time or `earlier Their purpose is still unknown but. they: may: have been- a feature of a highly sophisticated electronic attack against the code room the existence or character of which NOSENKO did' not know ana need not have" Known When NOSENKO was informed in 1965 by: CIA that Ehere had been a technical discovery: in the north he Offered his personal_ assurances;that nothing :as_ installed in the north; wing and insisted that whatever was found must be something unrelated to an eudio system_ Damage Estimates With reference to_ the' damage caused by the:_ audio-penetra- tion_ the previously-cited USIB damage. report stated that "it must be - concludea that due to;the extensive' period of penetra- tion the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States _ The Soviets have , gained considerable 233 TS, No. 197124 Top Secret 10 wing wing_ wing wing , 0301505 Copy ================================================== Page 244 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union particularly the military attache colleciion program _ Soviet knowledge of U,S emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority in telligence and probably Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerabie information concerning the personal habits , problems attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes Of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future _ Ii Col Theodore F HOFFMAIT Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961 (a period coinciding with some eighteen months of NOSENKO ' s claimed two years service in the Embassy Section) has been more specific- Interviewed by CIA , Col HOFFMAN recalled instances which the KGB , by monitoring just the conversations hela in his. Office_ could have become aware of the vulnerability of service attache personnel As examples he cited the two occasions on which military code d6 clerk WTORSBERG was reprimanded for absenteelsm (unavailable for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl friends" ) ; HOFFMAN s conversations with America House manager [Peter BINDER (the personality problems_ drinking habits and other incidents re_ lating to America House residents and visitors to the America Club) and the detailed circumstances prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk KEYSERS) 06 from Moscow (homosexuality) [Besides his general duties as Chief of the. Embassy Section NOSENKO claims special responsi - bilities for each of the persons mentioned He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and residents of America House and_ asserts he was personally Sn8}vee in the KGB attempts to recruit_GSTORSBERG and (KEYSERS 46 The KGB attemptea later to recruit BNDERLas well.) ] In eumming up. his views Col_ HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I woula assume that some of our modus operandi, sOme of our targets_ some . 0f the results , and all Gf our personal weaknesses were compromised 234 68015C6 TS No. 197124 Secret Top Top Copy Gigr ================================================== Page 245 ================================================== 4-0oqQo _ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY. SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Audio Operations Against American Embassy Sumary and Conglusion Given that NOSENKO S information" about microphones #in the chancery has been confirmed _ that infornation S significance remains the extent to which it substantiates his claims e.g that his knowledge derived from his position as Deputy Chief and that he for two years reviewed the reports Of what the KGB , monitored from microphones emplaced in the chancery_ NOSENKO ' s 'knowledge: of the microphones existence i not proof that he was Deputy Chief Of the Embassy Section , (or even proof that he served in that_ unit) KGB sources serving elsewhere than in the Second Chief Directorate earlier reported the; microphones existence; 'GOLITSYN specificali_ identified One as being in the . Minister Counsellor_ s office NOSEITKO s acquisition; Of the list of microphones in 1960-1961 Ii is Singular (the more so since he never hinted Of the: list s; existence while describing. the: microphones_ in 'the chancery to CIA in 1962) He asserts that he had no Plan to defect in 1960-1961, when the list was acquired_ that for no apparent purpose: he: risked keeping a highly sensitive document: in; a safe- he shared with two -subordinates (GRYAZNOV ` and ' KOSOALPOV) ana keeping- it even after he' left the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department: NOSENKO has never Plausibly explained the circumstances:which prompted his retention;of the list until 1964 when he produced it for CIA in Geneva: According to NOSENKO he reviewed what must have been literally hundreds Of monitor reports- in the course Of two years_ inportant ones 0f_ which were forwarded to Second Chief Directorate Chief ' GRIBANOV and others of such signi ficance that they were: the subjects of special reports sent to the: Central Committee of the CPSU Yet when challenged se; Cites not a single: exanple despite the fact that_ this period included; such critical events affecting Soviet-United 0801567 235 TS No.` 197124 Top Secret 10 Copy ================================================== Page 246 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ %; Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB ) as the U-2 and President Eisenhower 5 visit Of the micro- phones which produced useful infornation , NOSENKO describes those in the Minister Counsellor S office the office Of the Army Attache and in the code roon; when challenged to cite examples of information obtained he:asserts that none produced any information of interest to the Embassy Section Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery microphones as sources of information on which he reied to direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy personnel _ he again can describe no actual instance In the single case in which he asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones KEYSERSI failure to 06 report receipt of the defection invitation)_ he_ was in error Conclusion From the foregoing it is concluded that,. NOSENKO ' s claims to the contrary his information on the chancery microphones does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief Of the Embassy Section or his claim that he personally reviewea the KGB microphone monitoring reports _ Cryptologie Attack on Embassy Communicationg As former Deputy Chief 0f the Embassy Section Of the American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable Of the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on Embassy communications _ He has consistently asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading' enciphered communica- tions of the service attaches [for which reason he claimed 236 8J015c8 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top e Copy ================================================== Page 247 ================================================== 14-00QoQ_ Secret ary.1962) AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION: January 1960-January 1962) st to the recruitment of_ a Of the micro-ask in 1960-1961] military 6i code clerk was his Priority "NKO describeslrectorate was feading however_ that the Eighth: office of nbassy traffic at least some State Department hallenged to rts that none bassy Section NOSENKO ' s Information chenceze reied to_ At his second meeting with CIA in 1962 , r Embassy oncern that the American Embassy in NOSENKO expressed f him an event which would Moscow: might be informed tance In reading all the State be fatal since: the KGB was elied on ecause' he saw the ateabepertmeetsccehezs He knew thiss 5 failure toubsequent meeting NOSENKO messages' every In 2 was in errorxplain; that while no 'revisea his earlier statement: to ead _ certain State service attache traffic was being_ ad only rarely seen, DebertIeat codes had been broken He t the most "ten_ or thelvleaimeert_ I of deciphered cables _ times during 1960 and 1961 The Russian text Of those, deciphered essages was sent to KGB 'Chairman State Department ENKO ' imes forwarded it to GRIBANOV "Chienichatheyge_ who some S claimrectorate GRIBANOV 1 of the Second Chief Y microphoneaterial to Vladimir at times forwarded Some of the: Deputy, Chiefepartment , <or 'KbyINAlessecessch KLYPIN_ Chief of the American arsonally aw such material; Successor _ S M_ FEDOSEYEV NOSENKO EDOSEYEV' on the desk of KLYPIN and later s. desk: but was never on 1kolay ZEMSKOV from the permittea to read it_ irectorate. brought a booSecoetazhataof the Second Chief epartment messages to KLYP con taining the broken State he book to certain IN or FEDOSEYEV : He wou la open_ LYPIN or . FEDOSEYEV pages , which had red paper and permit irectorate to- see the material This was EMSKOV material 0 but; NOSENKO did not -know Eighth- got ito At: times' where Or how ead aloud to NOSENKO portions of this material were osition of the by KLYPIN_ but concerned the ions: n political American Ambassador Or the U,S Government afrequently qheseioas and were: of no-significance to him. Of the aericans was mention of the expected who were not arrival of dgeable f 2a NOSENKO femembered Beztaneetlycassigned to' the Embassy ack: on zrival of a that. one such item concerned the_ erted that the POfitica2-Sec two-man commission to check the a communica;tate or the Section The attitude of the work he claimed rtain American Ambassador was demefimee Gecretsed of unremembered topics_ but NOSENKO expressed on took no interest TS; No: 197 237 08U15C9 TS No. 197124 Secret 10_ Top KGBhe "knew day they Copy Top Copy ================================================== Page 248 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent activities NOSENKO noted , however that the material concerned messages from the Secretary Of State to the American Ambassador Moscow All of this material was highly sensi 1 tive and few were permitted to see it or even to know Of its existence NOSENKO stated that it was treated more carefully than Top Secret informaton Unable to describe the techniques Of the KGB Eighth Directorate in breaking U.S Department of State crypto- graphic systems , NOSENKO nevertheless dia indicate methods as known to him_ One method mentioned by NOSENKO on 12 June 1962 , stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McS[EENEY ) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud When the texts were picked up on the KGB microphones the Eighth Directorate compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by other means NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate S interest in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations picked up bY the microphones in the State Department and military code rOoms II Now _ we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out Of the teletype office because Of interference [equipment noises which drowned out conversations] In the military code room--that was where (James STORSBERG and later Matthew P ZUJUS] worked-~we 0b didn t much . We could hear STORSBERG swear ingob on occasion and then he would mention a group of numbers This was of course all recorded and we turned it over at Once to the Eighth Directorate dealing with coding and decoding_ Of course ali other intercepts were turned over to them also. With respect to the use of code clerks by the American Department NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB was helped a great deal by (James H. ] McMILLAN (a military code clerk of the Embassy staff who detected in 1948] and by 0I ANDREY [Dayle SMITH see p . 33] It was thanks to 238 0801510 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 3/kr Top people H.16L get Copy ================================================== Page 249 ================================================== OoooQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) "ANDREY S help that the KGB were able to read State Depart- ment and ciphers. (At the time Of. SMITH S tour in Moscow a single code room was shared: by State Department and military code clerks As-the only cryptographic machine technician: assigned to :the Embassy SMITH had access 'to. both State and military cryptographic equipment ] NOSENKO also. named MARTIN and MICHELL [NSA mathematicians who defected to: the 'USSR in 1960] and_ an American code clerk brought to_ the USSR from India [unidentified but possibly John Discoe: SMITH _ State' Departnent comunica tions technician who defected to the USSR sometime between 1960-1967 when his presence in the USSR was publicized] NOSENKO' said the Eighth Directorate was submitting regular reports to_ Khrushchev and the Central Commlttee on their intercepts until the end. of 1961 or the beginning of 1962" He learned this from GRYAZNOV_ his successor in the. Embassy Section At about the same time he learned that various Embassy 'officers were less: often overheard from: KGB microphones in their offices discussing Significant information This development GRYAZNOV and American Depart- ment Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to a room-within-a-room installed in the . Embassy and other Embassy security measures (The acoustical room was installed: in December 1962:] After his own . departure Erom the Embassy Section ; NOSENKO also learned Of the KGB S loss Of its code breaking capability from Second' Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV GRIBANOV told-him that the Central 'Committee was exerting consider- able pressure_ on: . the KGB . Chairman for continuation of the Linformation formerly obtained in this manner; consequently ; che KGB Chairman; was demanding maximum effort 'from all KGB officers; concerned with the recruitment Of code clerks 0801511 239 TS: No: 197124 Top Secret 10 Top July Copy ================================================== Page 250 ================================================== 4-0oooo Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications: Summary and conclusion From USIB and NSA damage assessments following the discovery of the microphones in the chancery , it has been concluded that it was equally feasible for the Soviets to have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine emissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the period 1952-1962 and from enciphered State Department traffic during 1952-1959_ II ANDREY" (see p 33) the code machine mechanic the KGB allegedly recruited in 1953 serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service attache code room; his access was not limited as NOSENKO indicates to State Department traffic On the basis of these fundamental errors , it is concluded that NOSENKO was not knowledgeable of the extent of KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy . communications_ and that such information as he provided can not be related to his clain to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section Knowledge %f CI4 Personnel within Embassy As Deputy Chief and Occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section_ 0 NOSENKO claimed that he wou ld "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer under diplomatic cover within the Embassy. Nithin the section V6 'special emphasis " was placed on the identification and development Of American Intelligence: personnel , with the objective of an eventual recruitment _ The KGB believed that the Ambassador , code clerks and Marine guards woula not be used to perform intelligence missions : any diplomat , however , was noted as tI suspect 240 0j0i51z TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top Copy ================================================== Page 251 ================================================== 14-4 Ooooo Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January: 1960-January 1962) American Intelligence' II the notation referring to CIA Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to the Embassy during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who were known or suspected the KGB to be: CIA officers ana on .sOme officers; who were not Embassy Personnel Suspected to be CIA Officers Boris" KLOSSON FKzosson] was considered to be CIA Resident II in Moscow for reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced David MARKL who had been regarded as Resident" because of his behavfor under surveillance and of his clandestine_ letter mailing;0s[kLOSSONfs case officer" was MIKHAYLOV_ NOSENKO. recalled- the names' of none 0f the KGB agents working specifically: against-[LOSSON 06 He never read;any agent or surveillance report, indicating that(lKLOSSON was engaged in any clandestine activity NOSENKO was unaware 0f KLOSSON job in theEmbassy, whether his family was in 5 06 any other features 'of his personal life; 'of hiMoscovezs inside the Soviet Union the: identities of his .close American associates r any of his, Soviet contacts NOSENKO read KLOSSONs file_ never 06 06 Coment: KLOSSON was not a CIA officer and had no connection with CIA in Moscow_ John ABIDIAN of ABIDIAN was: considered to be a CIA fficer on the basis his conduct- as. a Department of State security officer and Premier Khrushchev' s 1959 visit to the United States because he. replaced known: CIA officer Russell LANGELLE Surveillance confirmed: that he clandestinely mailea tional letters and visited a deaddrop site in 'Moseowopesee P 206 ) (See 0801513 241 TS: No.' 197124 Top Secret O,'RR Copy 10 Top by auring ================================================== Page 252 ================================================== 14-00Q00. Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) Coment: ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA Although not a CIA staff employee_ he Ii was for all intents the CIA Resident in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961 , steve WASHENKO WASHENKO] was identified as a CIA officer on the basis Of his mai of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area Additionally from a KGB micro- phone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report Shortly: after he returned from a field trip 05 Comment: WASHENKO was a CIA employee detached from his Washington overt assignment as anCeconomic (X analyst to be assigned to Moscow _ He was used there for limited operational support activity, including clandestine mailings _ He reverted to overt CIA employment after his Moscow assignment , Lewis BOWDEN BOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons unknOwI to' NOSENKO _ KOVSHUK was in contact with BOMDEN under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover. Comment: BOWDEN had no affiliation with CIA_ 0801514 242 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Top ling ikR Copy_ ================================================== Page 253 ================================================== 14-00OQQ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION: January 1960-January 1962) "Richard FUNKHAUSER 'FUNKHAUSER as suspected of being a CIA officer because ne was a specialist on the ' Soviet Union particularly On economic matters NOSENKO remembered the names of no KGB agents,working against FUNKHAUSEk; nor any information about him which was regarded as derogatory by the KGB_ Comment: FUNKHAUSER had no affiliation With 'CIA William HQRBALY HORBALY; was suspected of_ being a CIA; case officer or cooptee because the- KGB monitored through a:' microphone in the 'Embassy his diecussion or 'dictation Of observations made on a field trip NOSENKO knew the names Of no KGB agents working against HORBALY nor whether the agents ever obtained: any derogatory information about him. The KGB did not try to recruit HORBAEY Coment: Like WASHENKO HORBALY - was an overt employee and economic 'analyst: of CIA before' being appointed to a State" Department position in Moscow_ where he openly: discussed the fact that he had formeriy workea for CIA_ In January 1962 he accepted an; appointment to the Foreign Agriculturai service Of the Department of Agriculture While in Moscow HORBALY-had no connection with' or knowledge Of. CIA clandestine activities 0ju1515 243 TS No.. 197124 Secret Copy _10, VRR Top ================================================== Page 254 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) George WINTERS WINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and special attention because of his was given POPOV case (see p. 207 ) RovsuuKOpesationel acti in the with WINTERS under the was in personal contact fairs In addi cover of the Ministry Of Foreign Af- tion he was overheard fromi a KGB dictating an intelligence report shortly after he eicecphoee from a field Comment : WINTERS was a CIA officer. CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB Stanlex BROWN NOSENKO did not recognize BROWY s name_ whose on a_ list which NOSENKO name was dicating tiat brougit to CIA in 1964 _ a list in- office BROWN shared an office with HORBALY _ In tnat there was a KGB microphone providing good but insignificant production_ reception, Coment: Like HORBALY and WASHENKO BROWN was an employee of CIA Wfo was Eransferred to overt the Dez partment Of Agriculture prior to being assigned to tne Embassy in: ioscOw He was engaged in no Elandestine ectivities during his tour Ins1960_ne:visited-Leningrad with WINTERS whOm NOSENKQ correctly identified as a CIA officer_ BROWN and another member_0f_ the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during 3 within the USSR in 1961} 24 244 8301516 TS No_ 197124 Secret Top vity trip. trip Top Copy 2RR ================================================== Page 255 ================================================== QOQQQ Secret ry 1962) 'ERICAN EMBASSY SECTION, January 1960-January 1962) "illiam N MORELLI a5 given MORELLOwas not suspected of being 'a' CIA officer etivity in the 1al contact Foreign Af- 3 . microphone Comment MORELL was an: overt employee of CIA 'who was he returned identified: as such- to .the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior: to his assignment to the 'Embassy as a Minister Counsellor In attempting to recruit [Francis -STEVENS (see @. 430) 0b a KGB officer: allegedly commented Eo[sTEVENs} U6_ 06that WOREEYjopenlygacknowiedged himself to be a CIA employee_ KOVSHUK under Ministry Of Foreign Affairs cover was cultivating- MOREE];0 Eugene MAHONEY 0s hhose: name: NOSENKO : identified [MAHONEY] S name as that of an employee a list in-; the E @uiloveyetuce Section of the Embassy_ Nothing was Y In tnat Jowm of as his previous career, whether he' 3 reception , Jew Russian when he arrived: or' departed: MoscOw or_ where 2' 'lived" wwhile there The KGB: dia not suspect that he was CIA officer- vas an overt 2d to the De- Comment MAHONEY was a: CIA Officer- who served in Moscow assigne Erom October 1960_ until_September 1961 askan3z engaged in assistant General Services @ffices: His Jis tour: specific CIA mission was to support communica- WINTERS wnc tions with PEIJROVSKIY- inside the Soviet_ Union CIA officer_ From the start of his tour he was active in bbassy staff attempts to familiarize: himself with Moscow a trip and. he frequently toured various areas of the city on foot: OZ (MAHONEY went to the vicinity of the Pushkin Street &eaddrop site on two occasions 'during: November and December 1960; 0001517 TS No. `1971 _ 245 TS No. 197124 Copy Top' Secret 10 Top wase Seing luring._ Copy I5IX ================================================== Page 256 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) and examined the site itself on 21 January 1961- See p . 219. ) Throughout his tour MAHONEY] was subjected to intense KGB surveillance On 25' October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that II I fmnd this type Of coverage five surveillantz on a recent trip to a_ barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of Similar rank . My only inference is that the KGB has at least strong suspicions of (MAHONEY' s primary role as a CIA 0 officer_ (ABIDIAN 5 own surveillance at the time was occasional and extremely discreeta) 02 MAHONEY livea throughout his tour in Moscow in America House 1 for which NOSENKO ' s subordinate DEMKIN was. case officer and which NOSENKO had described as thoroughly penetrated by KGB agents among the local employees MAHONEY] spoke Russian , and his administrative tasks exposed him more than most Americans to KGB agents and informants among Embassy local employees _ Paul GARBLER GARBLER was a naval officer in the office Of the Naval Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV _ NOSENKO knew the names of no agents working against GARBLER _ The KGB obtained no interesting information concerning GARBLER from microphones _ telephone taps _ Or surveillance NOSENKO "dia not know" whether or not he had read GARBLER' s file _ (It will be recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO saia that all Service Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence Officers < ) 246 0801518 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 4/8r Copy ================================================== Page 257 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: The CIA Chief Of. Station while in Moscow GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy in 1952_ and he served CIAiiunder Navai cover 32,10 in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955 He resigned his naval commission in 1955 and in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to the American Embassy in stockholm under the 32,10 cover of Second_Secretary_ and Political Officez He returned to active duty with Ehe Navy in June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally proposea as a candidate for the position: of Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow_ In response to a request: from the Soviet Naval Attache Office in; Nashington_ in September_ 1961 GARBLER forwardea to the Soviet Embassy an official- biographic: summary_ followed by an official call on the Soviet Naval Attache_ GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961_ Prior to_ his affiliation with CIA GARBLER had served in Korea where he was acquainted with George BLAKE GARBLER was a participant in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington in April 1960 minutes of which BLAKE had admitted passing_ to the Soviets _ (See p CIA thus assumed GARBLER to have; been 'identifiea to the `KGB as a @IA officer prior to his arrival in Moscow _ This assumption was confirmed by_ an article appearing in Izvestiya in October 1963 in which the: author alleged that GARBLER had earlier been involved in subversion and espionage inSweden: 247 6J01519 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 70 Top Copy 3/82 ================================================== Page 258 ================================================== 14-0OOOO Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Knowledge %f CIA Personnel in Embassy: ummary and Conclusion Nith the, exception of ABIDIAN there is a paradox connected with each of NOSENKO S identifications as is most evident in the cases of MORELL and GARBLER _ It is a 66 fact that both these individuals were known to the KGB as CIA officers a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware. His claim is thus false _ that he would necessarily know whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer and to the extent he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section , that latter claim is unsubstantiated _ Personal Handler %f KGB Agents NOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have handled while Deputy Chief Of the American Section during 1960-1961. YEFREMOV and VOLKOV NOSENKO continued to manage these two. homosexual agents whom he had recruited_ and managed during his assignment in the Seventh Department _ 1 and brought with him when he trans- ferred to the American Department (see p 1ll ) They were used in no operations during_ the period" 1960-1961 c (NOSENKO describea the compromise of Robert BARRETJ] in 1959 and knew 0b of his later recruitment in T961 (See p 134. ) NOSENKO does not know of BARRETT' s contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLkovOL in 1961 , when he claims to have been their case officer. ] 248 0801520 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top 3/6r Copy ================================================== Page 259 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret ( AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) FRIPPEL NOSENKO continued to; manage the MOscOw manager of the Auerican Express Company] during the 1960-1961 period as he had earlier during hiz_agsignment to the Seventh Depart- ment (See p 137. J@ERIPPED was an uncooperative and unproductive source reporting on his acquaintances in the 'American Embassy: DMITRIYEV NOSENKO s English and Japanese-speaking agent during the' 1955-1960 Seventh Department period was employed in the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow (See Pa 107 . ) He was not uSed operationally during 1960 or 1961 Marina RYTOVA: NOSENKO ' s agent from 1956. Or 1957 (see p. 108) at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not. used operationally during 1960-1961 'Maya' LEVIN4 LEVINA was a language teacher and librarian at the Embassy: used as an informant on her American. language students;, among :whom: were a number Of code clerks She- provided no -worthwhile information on any American nor was she: ever used in operations- At the ena 6f 1960 or the beginning Of 1961 she' was fired by [Paul SMITH and NOSENKO 06 curned_ her over to another Embassy Section officer. The British Department planned later to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies . [LEVINA was employed at the Enbassy from January 1958 through January 1962, (Cultural; 06 hffairs Officer SMITH left Moscow in September: 1961, ana could-not have been directly involved in LEVINA s termina- cion " LEVINA thus was- employed; at :the Embassy throughout XOSENKO 5 tour of, duty with the Embassy Section. ] 0001521: 249 24 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 07,; 5i8r Copy ================================================== Page 260 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) 06 PREISFREUND U Recruited KOVSHUK PREISFREUND was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against [TORSBERG (see p. 166) He was used in no other operation during 1960-1961 WEISS 06 The Syrian Army captain studying in Moscow was first targetted against America House occupants then usea in 06 the development of ZUJU3, G@TORSBERG S successor .OThe latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the Embassy Section in January 1962 Personal Handler_ of_ KGB Agents: Summary and Conclusion Of the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh Department assignment _ 1 none was used operationally during 1960-1961 If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed he would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy servea throughout his Embassy: Section assignment and was not fired earlier as he assertea.OPREISFREUND] ana(WEIss] OC are discussed in considerable detail in connection With the KGB operations agains€ (GTORSBERG and ZuJus]0G NOSENKO ' s claims regarding the agents he hand Ted during the 1960-1961 period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy Chief of the American Section responsible for code clerk operations , or provide conclusive evidence that he dia or dia not serve in the Embassy Section 0 Rr 0301522 250 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top by Copy ================================================== Page 261 ================================================== OOOOQ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Temporary Assignments Abroad NOSENKO claims that he was : scheduled_ to travel to the United States in November 1960 (a trip which was cancelled): and that he travelled: to Cuba in November-December 1960 and to Bulgaria in April-May 1961, on KGB assignments The Significance_ of his travel is the extent to which it relates to his claimed position and functions in the Embassy Section and to' operations in, Moscow for,which he claimed supervisory responsibility Planned Travel to: the United States In: one Of the initial meetings in 1962 NOSENKO statea that he had been in the United States He later amended this to explain that he had been_ scheduled to make a_ trip to the' , United States but that the trip had been 'cancelled He was to travel under true name he said; to avoid connected to the; niame NIKOLAYEV under which he 'czaveeied to the United 'Kingdom in 1957 and 1958._ In_ his early account he ' claimed that the. decision to use: his true name was his, personally; later he asserted that the decision was, made by Ii the people in charge of such operations' HI NOSENKO stated that he was to travel under the cover Of an employee Of the: state Scientific-Technical Committee (GNTK}: and: was to' accompany an automotive: delegation_ The' visit , however was part of the Soviet-U.S 3 exchange program_ and when the visit was postponed in' 1961 NOSENKO S travel was cancelled Comment The name of NOSENKO: appeared: along with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the Embassy _ in Moscow for visas for members of_ a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled: to visit the Unitea States in November 1960 NOSENKO was listed as an engineer; employed by the State Scientific-: Technical Committee 251 0801523 TS No_ 197124: Secret 10 Top Copy" ================================================== Page 262 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960) Nhen NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in 1962 in Geneva) he claimed that he travelled under the NIKOLAYEV alias_ and he provided colorful details of his activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy there for operational possibilities In subsequent versions NOSENKO asserted that he travelled in true name and that his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation as a security officer_ NOSENKO ' s Information In the latter part of 1960 _ at the same time as he was preparing for his intended to the United States _ a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan the Soviet State Planning Commission was preparing for departure for Cuba _ The delegation was a routine one consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union Since there was no one under any sort of suspicion_ the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Depart- ment of the Second Chief Directorate decidea it was unnec - essary to include a security officer_ Two days prior to the departure of the group , however 1 the Central Committee of the Communist ordered that a Second Chief Direct- orate officer accompany the group Because Of the short time remaining before the delegation S scheduled departure _ the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a Suitable officer who coula get his travel documents ready in time_ At tget piintecessar KUZNETSOV 1 Of the Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO_ who had been supposed to go to the United States and who had a valid passport (in true name) The Cubans, issued NOSENKO 2 visa immediately as dia The Netherlands a transit visa. NOSENKO ' s functions with the delegation were purely of a security nature He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there During this time he accompanied the delegation 0a01524 252 TS No. 197124 Top Secret trip Party Copy ================================================== Page 263 ================================================== OOQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASsY: SECTION January 1960-January 1962) everywhere it went_ to different plants and sentatives of the so-called Institute to meet repre- to discuss how to increase of Agrarian Reform assignment' was deputcrehsefPoeduneicei NOSENKO ' s cover before departing Moscow he the de legation_and shortly members as such He_ had was introduced to the other and. developed several Ii one agent within the delegation 'trip 'NOSENKO would confidential contacts "1 during_ the he known how not have' accepted the assignment had had really wanted and uneventful the was to be he to go to the United States. On' his return trip to Moscow NOSENKO mission _ As; he was leaving from was given 'a special Legal Rezident in Cuba, 4. Havana Airport, the KGB with instructions to deliver iEEtSEMOScC handed him a package know the contents Of the to Moscow 6 NOSENKO aid not Amsterdam en route package until :he arrived in (it was bound home There the wrappings became loose opportunity to by thin string) and NOSENKO' took the fepoeeunitkotandeterrhre that it contained copies Of "letters sugar and drafts '8f KagreeceetsConcerning the prices: of East' Germany Etigofiagreeeehcslbezkeen the Soviet Union and arrival at the Czechoslovakia ana Rumania_ On a message, had beezpcec in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was tola that' the ' Communist; received from the Central Committee of delivered 'JI atgentty" FGtchetGue_ that thetpackage was to be and_ was then itoj Che Guevara, who was touring Eastern On to Moscow NOSENKO Berlin; While the delegation con tinued The: Hague _ and in the: was driven to the Soviet Embassy in Netheriands he left late evening of his second in The errived in Berlin by train for East Berlin Then he Bungary_ anBeNOSENGOedefa was_ found to have left Berlin_ for in. Berlin rKoadeonteree the papers to: "Guevara s continued on to- Moscow_ Comment: Jravel records obtained by CIA, which include 8hotOSENROs taken" in both Amsterdam and Caracas NOSENKO ' s true name Service his passport photograph passport and a "minerals: confirm that: NOSENKO _ route to Gabenginesr 15 transitted Amsterdan en November 1960 was in 253 0001525. TS No 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 long trip only only Party Eurepe day deputy ================================================== Page 264 ================================================== 14-0000Q Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) Caracas on 17 November and departed Caracas for Havana on 19 November According to flight manifests on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in Amsterdam from Havana en route to Moscow and left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December _ NOSENKO was travelling on a service passport; he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity It is thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a courier bearing documents of the nature he described as he claimed NOSENKO ' s planned to the United States and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his claim that he was supervising operations ,during this period against Embassy code clerks in Moscow _ The occurred at the time his alleged target, State Department code clerk MORONEI was to be entrapped on the train en route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November in connection with another code clerk target , IJohn GARLAND 0b Travel te Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April 1961) In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent. to Sofia as a KGB response to a' Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (MVR) request that the KGB provide a Second Chief Directorate American Department officer to discuss opera- tions with Bulgarian counterparts_ While in Sofia NOSENKO asserted he played a role in the compromise of American professor Horace G_ LUNTI_ NOSENKO ' s Information Consul tation with the MVR NOSENKO first heard Of the Bulgarian assignment from S.I YEGOROV Chief Of the KGB unit handling liaison with Bloc coun terintelligence representatives in Moscow _ YEGOROV 0801526 254 Gr TS No. 197124 Secret 3/ Top trip trip ~May kex Top Copy ================================================== Page 265 ================================================== Secret {AVERICAN , EMBASSY SECTION 'January 1960-January 1962) said that Ehe Bulgarian Minister of the Interior had reguested the- KGB Chairman to provide an officer from the as Aerican Department Of the Second Chief Directorate' for hlight consultation with the MVR American Department_ in Sofia_ in na: Anerican Department. Chief KLYPIN . subsequently instructea_ :OSENKO to 'go _ NOSENKO was tola that he was going for cember consultations I and that KGB advisors wou ld discuss his sport; cuties with him: KLYPIN told NOSENKO only that he should is see how' the MVR worked- and tell them: how the KGB 'managed' 4*5 operations NOSENKO had no meetings or discussions with ~R representatives in Moscow before his, departure and knew,nothing: about the size or responsibilities 0f the MVR tes' Anerican Department_ the names of any MVR officers or what_ S che MR '$ particular problems were NOSENKO, flew from Moscow to Sofia in early April 1961 end was met at the airport by A.S . KOZLOV, a former "Second Chief Directorate: officer whom he had known in Moscow Tne following morning he was picked up in an official Vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV' s; office in the Bulgarian lerk MVR building: NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of hin and was told that It they want to know about how to work against the American Legation everything, right from Jetter A II NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia Mikhail YEGOROV , and to; the Chief of the MVR S American: Department after which he: was assigned an_ office: in the MVR building During: the ensuing weeks he' discussed both general: matters and particular cases with nt individual Bulgarian officers working against the American € target On one occasion he_ lectured interested- MVR officers on the:principles 0f operations against foreign military personnel in Moscow ana on 'another he visited an' MVR 0 surveillance post opposite the American Legation He an discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists He also addressed the entire American; Department: for about five 'hours to teli them "what is necessary; what to pay ettention to, how: to work" At the ena 0f his visit some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy Kinister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and his recommendations for improv operations_ against Americans ROV: 255' 0801527 7124 TS No: 197124 Top Secret Top ring ing 10 Copy ================================================== Page 266 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962; Coment: NOSENKO doesn t know why he was selected to consult with the MVR in Bulgaria- As far as is known to CIA, such consultation was a function Of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom NOSENKO himself described The American Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened in February 1960 By 1961 the MVR had demon - strated that it had lost none of its earlier demonstrated efficiency in controlling the activities of resident" forelgners and in establishing the basis for mounting operations against American diplomats There was no apparent necessity for NOSENKO' s Sofia assign- ment and therefore his account is judged to be untrue Compromise @ff LUNT In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of LUNT in graphic terms including his Own personal confron- tation Of [LUNT} In his subgequent accounts he had stated that while he never saw Zunn] personally he supervised the activities Of the MVR officers who dealt with LUNT About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria around the end of April 1961 NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of foreigners scheduled to visit Bulgaria, when he came across the name Of Horace G. LUNi]4k NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic linguist of that name had been reported to him in Moscow by VOLKOV Or YEFREMOV as a possible homosexual When MR officers confirmed that thisfLuni was a Slavic NOSENKO decided to check his Zecollection against KGB records for which purpose he telephoned Moscow: An almost immediate reply confirmed that this was the same {Lunr who DG had visited Moscow previously and that he was a homosexual The KGB had never exploited_ its knowledge of) LuNz] s homo- 06 sexual activities and the MVR had not known that LUNT was 06 a homosexual 2 256 0801528 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top specialist, 06 Id/gk Copy ================================================== Page 267 ================================================== OQQ= Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January: 1962) KOZLOV and the Chief of the. MVR American Department were very interested in NOSENKO'.s lead and KOZLOV appealed NOSENKO for his_help_ since "the MVR: had never recruited to: ican" The three discussed the matter with General an Amer the Chief Of the MVR Second' Chief Directorate and ROSKQKo suggestea that a MVR homosexual agent Should_ be employed an apartment prepared and preparations made: for 'clandestine photography They then advised YEGOROV , the senior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV in Moscow GRIBANOV prohibited/ NOSENKO ' 8_personal involve ment in the en trapment of [uiliand NOSENKO ' s role thereafter advising the MVR officers II who didn t know what was merely to do" NOSENKO , suggested that the MVR officers two: ts since "maybe GGUNT" wouldn t like: one of 06 homosexual I rund' agentvised them to weigh the time element in deending whether to. entrap LUNT with a view to attempting 06 to recruit him at once_ or merely; to obtain evidence for later blackmail: The MVR. American; Department Chief and his Tourist Section chief: were to attempt the recruitment NOSENKO remained in a MVR office where he coula be reached by .telephone in_ the event the MVR officers needed further assistance NOSENKO learned from the MVR officers involved that the recruitment_had been successful' and that LUNT] haa U6: agreed to meet them again On the: following NOSENKO 0 later was told- that the MVR did not give(GLUNfparrangements for a contact in the United States" because he was;" expected: to return to Bulgaria: for a Slavic Language conference in 1962, or 1963 LUNT S Information LoT travelled directly from Sofia to_ Belgrade and there on" 1961 he reported to American Ambassador George Kenhan and to CIA that he had been recruited under duress by the; MVR in Sofia on_ 5 . May. After being entrapped with a homosexual and accepting recruitment , he 'was instructed to meet clandestinely with a MVR Officer in Paris en route back to the United States. He was given no other tasks 0801529 257 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10_ get day May zlGe ================================================== Page 268 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) LUNT stated that while on an earlier trip to Sofia in November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions He had given ALEKSIEV American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to sell on the blackmarket 8 Once , while in LUNT]' s company , 06 ALEKSIEV had been recognized and questioned by the Bulgarian civil police OHEUNE] corresponded with ALEKSIEV after departing from Bulgaria in 1960 ana he had advised ALEKSIEV of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia Comment: LUNT' s account refutes NOSENKO S claims that Ehe MVR had no evidence of LUNT s vulnerabiiityob prior to receiving NOSENKO S information in 1961, and that NOSENKO:s personal partici- pation in the MVR operation was such that he knew that LunT was given no MVR contact in the United StaEes 06 NOSENKO ' s involvement in the Lunr ]case is unrelated to the assignment he Claims at the time Although NOSENKO cites thel LUNi case in06 connection with his' Embassy Section duties 1 it resembles most of all a Seventh Department operation NOSENKO' s presence in Sofia in 1961 (when he claims his operation against [TORSBERG 06 was approaching 3 climax and when his subor- dinates were apparently planning to exploit KEYSERS}' newly-discovered vulnerability) indicates that NOSENKO S presence in Moscow was dispensable The {LUNT case is thus not evidence supporting NOSENKO S Claimg regarding Embassy Section service in April-May 1961 _ nor regarding Supervisory responsibility for all American code clerk operations _ 03C1530 258 TS No. 197124 Secret Top May May (l/Gr Top Copy ================================================== Page 269 ================================================== [14-00Q0Q Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962): Promotion and Transfer te the Seventh Department (January 1962 NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh' Department resulted from, GRIBANOV;' s wish to promote him from Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section to Deputy Chief Of the whole American Department However according to: NOSENKO ; the new American Department Chief FEDOSEYEV wantea as his deputy KOVSHUK NOSENKO S superior_ Under the circunstances NOSENKO . said he preferred to be_ transferred back to the Seventh Department , in any capacity NOSENKO reported that he spoke to Seventh Department Chief V.D= CHELNOKOV ana the latter proposed that: NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV to be returned to the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section with the' understanding that 'he would be' appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as the incumbent deputy (B.A:] BALDIN retired in July 1962 NOSENKO asserted his proposal was made and* approved by GRIBANOV in 'September Or October 1961; ~GRIBANOV according to NOSENKO;, never indicated his reasons for planning to appoint him Deputy Chief Of the American Department or for later promoting him to Section Chief and' then: Deputy Chief 0f the Seventh Depart ment in 1962 In view of his impending transfer, starting in December 1961 NOSENKO said he spent" several hours each day in the: Seventh Department; There he stated he talked with Depart- ment Chief 'CHELNOKOV familiarized himself with certain files of the American 'Tourist Section and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the: Officers_ assigned to: this section_ NOSENKO said the formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25* December 1961 and within the next few NOSENKO officially-signed over the ABIDIAN' case file and the Embassy security file_ to his successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section GRYAZNOV As /he had when he 'transferred into the American Department in,1960 NOSENKO said he took his active agents with him when_ he returned' to the 'Seventh Department 259 TS No. 197124 Secret 410_ Top 'aays 6a01531 Top Copy ================================================== Page 270 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962 ) NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring "before Comment: defection Ii which he insists GOLITSYN S 1962 even after learning occurrea in mid-January from CIA that the correct date is 15 December 1961 Obliged to take the latter date into account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing chronology of his departure from the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Embassy Section and his assumption Of duties in the Seventh Department; Repeated interro- gation has never resolved the reason NOSENKO attached so much Significance to the date on which he believes GOLITSYN defected In claiming to have transferred from the Embassy Section just to 5 January 1962 (when his participation in the Seventh Depart- ment compromise f W.E JOHNSON]is confirmed) ,06 NOSENKO ` S account makes it impossible for him to have played the role he claimed in the events connected with ABIDIAN S visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop_ (See P. 216. ) NOSENKO S assertion that he was GRIBANOV' s candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief Of the American Department is implausible In contrast to NOSENKO s self-admitted undistinguished performance KOVSHUK was a former Deputy Chief Of the American Department- who had been personally invotved in such American Department operations of the previous decade as recruitments Of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH _ and the development 0f CIA officers WINTERS and MMORELII and the interro- 0f gation of CIA officer LANGELLE and the more recent attempt to recruit [STORSBERG: DL S/Qr 260 0001532 TS No. 197124 Top Secret prior Copy ================================================== Page 271 ================================================== Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) DEPUTY CHIEE @E the AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION 1960-1962 Summary and Conclusion According to NOSENKO between January 1960 and January 11962 he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section_ 0 in which capacity he was: occasional 'Acting Chief super- visor: Of all operations against code clerks: and for some months service attaches case officer for priority KGB target ABIDIAN custod:ian of the, Embassy security file and reviewer of all information obtained: from microphones emplaced in the . Embassy - From a comparison Of NOSENKO ' s assertions amendments, and retractions with collateral information he was none of these Further while he may have been familiar with the activities of sOme agents Of the Embassy Section his relationship with then was not in: the manner nor; circumstances he claimed From his position as Deputy Chief NOSENKO claims, complete knowledge Of KGB recruitments and recruitment: attempts among Enbassy personnel during the period 1960-1961 and thereafter of CIA personnel' identified by the KGB: on the Embassy staff end of the status of the KGB ` cryptologic attack on Embassy communications Hig apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK S rela- Eionship with[VOREEIO and KOSOLAPOV' s connection with EGARLAND] Gefute his contention- that he would have known 0f all KGB recruitment attempts; that he was: seemingly unaware of such events: while Deputy Chief demolishes his claim that he would necessarily have learned of them later nd while assigned elsewhere Contrary to his claim NOSENKO does not: know of CIA Personnel on' the Embassy staff who were identified: by the: KGB NOSENKO ' S information on the KGB cryptologic attack; reflects no: Special knowledge; it is superficial and in error Conclusion NOSENKO" was neither Deputy Chief of the American' Embassy Section nor a supervisor in that section 0801533 261 TS-No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top 2/6R Copy ================================================== Page 272 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret CHAPTER VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT Januarx 1962 te Januarx 1964, Comment: By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tour ist agent program in the USSR The 'information cb- tained from the KGB agent in MI-6 BLAKE in- cluded accurate detaiis of the objectives ana targets of those operations as we 1l as the practices employed for the selection _ recruit- ment_ training and briefing of the agents in- volved _ As a probable consequence of received from BLAKE as well as by the reports dent confirmation of tourist agents 'edendepeed in the USSR the KGB by 1961 was mobi lizing all of its resources to counter the threat _ The KGB S tasks were made no easier by the increase in bona fide tourists to the Soviet Union the numbers Of Which were increasing ! annually Evidently uncertain gfbYhehousceds of domestic measures it was taking eheukgess extended responsibility for countermeasures to KGB elements outside of the Second Chief Direc- torate_ To that end selected First Chief Directorate residencies abroad were instructed to exploit all of its facilities in developing tourist agent countermeasures_ In describing the magnitude of its tourist agent problen KGB Headquarters cited the scores Of American tourist agents who had been identified in just one year in the Soviet Union In fact, by the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department in January 1962 _ the threat against which the KGB was deploying had passed _ By early 1961 the tourist agent gram was suspended when technical cogeectlon- programs and other agent operations made the use of tourists unnecessary The statements of NOSENKO with respect to Second Chief Directorate Seventh counteri ntelligence Department operations aong American 263 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top 0301534 Copy ================================================== Page 273 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT F January 1962-January i964) Comment : (Continued) tourists during this period must be examined in light of the foregoing facts_ Since NOSENKO claims to have held key KGB positions from which, vantage he asserts he was particular ly wel informed about KGB operations against American tourists_ it is appropriate to hold him closely accountable for his statements NOSENKO s claimed assignment to the Seventh Department first as Chief Of the American-British Commonwealth Section ana then as a Deputy and then First Deputy Chief of the entire Department 1 extended from January 1962 until his de- fection in Geneva in January 1964 By the time NOSENKO res turned to the Seventh Department for this assignment _ the KGB reorganization Of 1959 had been completed and according to NOSENKO _ 1 the Department was divested of all Of its former functions unrelated to tourists_ A newly-created Service eluzhba) NOSENKO explained assumed responsibility for foreigu religious figures emigres Visiting the Soviet Union and persons: trave- lling to the USSR to visit relatives Seventh Department s former responsibilities The against foreign seamen _ commercial for operations delegations ana so forth were similarly transferred elsewhere_ In addition to performing supervisory and administrative duties NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally was involved with KGB operations launched against six Ameri- can tourists and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Of a disaffected KGB colleague from the American Embassy Section 1 A. N_ CHEREPANOV In this period , also, he travelled on two occasions to. 'Geneva on missions unrelated to his Seventh Department duties Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied during his period of service in the Seventh Department NOSENKO claimed full awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists , 0801535 264 TS No_ 197124 Secret Top Copy ================================================== Page 274 ================================================== 4-0oooo Top Secret (SEVENTH_ DEPARTMENT Janvary 1962-January 1964 ) Chief %f the American-British Commonwealth Section (January Ju lv 1962 As Chief of tne Anerican-Brtish Commonwealth Section NOSENKO said he was responsible for planning ana coordinating all KGB ' activities against American (and British and Canadian tourists in the USSR as well; as for supervising the operaticn- al work of fifteen subordinate case officers He had nc deputy and he did not indicate Who assumed his duties 1n hjs absence He required several months at the beginning of:1962 to "get; the feel of things ; "there were no accompl ishments on his part in" the initial period on this new job In mid:: February 1962 within a few weeks his transfer he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarma- ment De legation This involved discussions with the Eleventh (Soviet; Delegation) Department' of the Second Chief Directorate, as well: as with case Officers responsible for the nvestiga- 7 tion; Of one particular Soviet delegate to Geneva SHAKHOV NOSENKO claimed that his preparations for his trip were only part-time ana in addition to his 'other regular dutaes He spent: his early; weeks talking to:case 'officers;: reviewing reports of the section s activities during: the previous two years '0 and discussing plans* for the coming tourist_ season _ He proposed a study of representatives of" foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye to their recruitment by the KGB a proposal' which was 'accepted: [NOSENKO' elsewhere attributed the proposal to nis earlier assignment: in the Tourist Depart- ment in 1958-1960 which he: a lleged resulted in the recrut- ment of ERIPPEDE I;OC NOSENKO S Agents NOSENKO claimed that when he transferred to the_ Seventh Department he, brought;; with him the agents which he had been hanaling in; the American Department, Embassy Section Arsene FRIPBEL 4, 06 American Express manager FRIPPEL depar ted f rom Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he continued to be the 'Second Chief Directorate case officer since{FRTPPEE] had_ no 06. contact with the KGB in Newv York City; and that he met 6 FRTPPED] twice in the USSR in 1963' According to NOSENKO , 265 0001536 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Jof 5/kk ================================================== Page 275 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) FRIPPEL was a Weak agent : "he was afraid nothing_ {6 NOSENKO said and gave pract 1 - him, I 'honestiy that although he had recruite nevertheless speaking CRIPBE] was not an agent I The hoped that(ERIPPEL]would be KGBO6 Cow at some future date: (See reassigned to Mos - FRIPREQ case. ) p.137 for details of the 66 Comment: FRIPPED] agrees with NOSENKO that in the USSR in 1963 _ met he also met NOSENKO in Hodesez = ERIPPED]asserts which NOSENKO Odessa in February 1962 , to have planned to denies _ FRIPPED] i8 known b at that t trave] to the Soviet Union Jme and there is no apparent why he would Iake a false claim reason on this matter . Johannes PREISEREUND 06 The KGB considered PREISFREUND] Intelligence after GOLITSYN s compromised to Amer1can thus unsuitable for further defection (1n December 1961 ) and bassy in Moscow For thi use against Americans at the Em- 06 @REISFREUND with him S reason _ NOSENKO was told to take partment As the when he transferred to the Seventh De- he was of no use agent spoke Einnishlnd Russian , however met Riti @RSISEREUSBji Bsttheglattespeaking_ tourists_ NOSENKO but id noE use him in the latter s Visits to Moscow in 1962 _ any operations _ 06 Coment: PREISFREuig]asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the GTORSBERGloperation ana that although he saw NOSENKO (see P.175 , ( return visits to Moscow on his ffequent NOSENKO 1t was because sought a companion for wenching and drinking. 266 0301537 iwse TS No_ 197124 Secret Tcp 0L ally they twiceok flatly only only Tcp Copy ================================================== Page 276 ================================================== 14-000O0 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) VOLKOV and YEFREMOV According to NOSENKO he used the two homosexual agents in the entrapment of |W- E JOHNSON several days after 06 returning to the Seventh Department _ This was their first operational activity since 1959 because they were employea in no operations during the entire period he was their case officer while assigned to the Embassy Section After +he [JoHNSOM entrapment these agents were not usea again NO- SENKO claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired and he personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives {For details of VOLKOV S and YEFREMOV S activities see p.l1o Comment : There is evidence that VOLKOV was invclved in a KGB entrapment eperation directed against American tourist (William J ZUBONJin July 06 1962 (whi le NOSENRO claims he was still his case officer) an event of which NOSENKO ap- parently is uninformed : Samih WEISS After his transfer to the Seventh Department , NOSENKO claimed he was instructed a lso to continue directing' Syrian 0,0 6 military officer WEISJ who was targetted against military Olcode clerk ZUJUS (see p. 161 ) . NOSENKO continued to meet 06 WEISS during the first months of_ and in February or March he attempted to have WEISS arrange a social affair with ZUJUS so that another KGB agent could be introduced to the code clerk Just before leaving for Geneva for the first time NOSENKO turned WEISs} 8ver to- GRYAZNOV NOSENKO s suC - cessor as Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section.0b WWEISS was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962 , after which NOSENKO believed he returned to [Syria: ( Comment: Because of the political climate in [SyrwaL there has been no opportunity to query WEISS} regarding NOSENKO '8 allegations 0b 0301538 267 TS No_ 197124 Secret 10 'JQ Top 4+1962_ Top Copy ================================================== Page 277 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Marina RYTOVA Until 1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the Institute for International Relations RYTOVA obtained a job at a CPSU Central Committee school and thereafter ceased all agent work Nevertheless NOSENKO asserted that he was offi- Cially registered. as her case officer until his defection in 1964 _ NOSENKO ' 8 Agents: Summary and Conclusion NOSENKO ' s claims with respect to these agents do not sus- tain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this period 1 since none were utilized in Seventh Department opera- tions _ Operational Activities (January June 1962) As Chief of the American-British Comcnwealth Section Of the Seventh Department during the period January-July 1962 NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of(w.E. JOHNSON] 06 in January _ briefed himself on the Section S activities , and prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer with a delegation travelling to Geneva During March and June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and by his asser- tion supervised the case officer handling Of KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY Shortly after his return to Moscow in June he claimed he recruited Horst BRAUNS] OL Entrapment 0f W.E= JOHNSON] 0b NOSENKO S Information NOSENKO first referred to (JOHNSON in Geneva in 1962 _ when he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been used in the homosexual entrapment of a tourist FJoHNSON; a (26 young Baptist from California The KGB was angered that the American was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union Although the American agreed to NOSENKO S demand that he work with the KGB in the United States_ the American immediately reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy_ 268 TS No. 197124 0001539 Top Secret 6/8r Top Copy ================================================== Page 278 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) In February 1964 NOSENKO produced among cther notes which he had brought with him to a meeting with CIA (see J) one bearing the name of Everett Wallace[sic] JOHNSON and the: date 1i 5 . January 1962" Questioned about Ehe note NOSENKO recalled the significancerof neither the name nor the date' and; stated that the case was not a recruitment but 01 scme sort Of; developmental operation NOSENKO next mentioned EOHNSON on 17 April 1964 . Al- though not immediately reca Iling (JOHNSON 8 name he eventually remembered that it was something Tike @QHNSONl or EQunsTon] ana06 6 that he' was a Baptist from the California coast] NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in Ehe sumer of 1962. after his return to Moscow from Geneva because he also remembered he' wore no overcoat at the time.06FOHNSON who had come to the Soviet Union as, a tourist was discovered to be' a homosexual and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target.06 The Second Chief Directorate was not interested in [JOHNSON as an agent because he had: no access to important information and he lived too far from the KGB Legal_ Residencies in the United States for convenient con? tact_ 06 Several: days later KGB surveillance observed EoHNSON mailing; some letters: in Moscow _ When: read by the KGB they were founa to be II so: bitter towara the Soviet Union , angry critical that the, KGB decided something had to be done 01, to prevent his writing letters and making anti-Soviet. statements on his return to the United States; 0b At about the same time there was some Sign thatGoHNSONkwas a homosexual and it was decided to_ entrap' him on Enis basis The sole reason: was;to halt JOHNSON s criticism of the: USSR- No recruitment was 'to be; 'attemptea because_ neither the First nor the Secona Chief Directorate had any use for him as an agent; ana 'because the KGB had concluded that he was unlikely to accept recruitment NOSENKO did not know . why he was selected: to make the approach to JOHNSON) except that "BOBKOV said I should go (NOSENKO said he had reported on in the Seventh Department: cnly the day: before_ F D_ BOBKOV a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate supervised the' activities Of the Seventh Department.) NOSENKO S homosexual agents VOLKOV ana YEFREMOV were selected to compromisef JOHNSON; 0801540 269 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Copy _ 10L_ 13i66 2.319 06 duty ================================================== Page 279 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964} JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel_ They told (GoHNSON they had recently ar- rivea in Mosccw ana invited TOHNSOM visit their hotel rocm . GJoHNSON} agreed because Ii ondsogtsod each other right away _ TThey knew they were the same (i.e_ homosexuals) 1i Under the se of the hotel administrator and a militiaman KGB offi- cers burst in on the trio of the incident had been taken (but had yet not Dactoge-bloped) been A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and @ousoiog was then transferred to another room By this time NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office and he went into the rOOm where JOHNSON was being held _ oi The "militiaman described what had happened to NOSENKO _ in (OHNSON' s presence Addressing @OHNSONPsNOSENKO said: Ii How come? How coula you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and _ people are given from five to eight years for such relations It used to be three to five_ now it s from five to eight. II Frightenedt COHNSON wrote out and signed a promise not to criticize the Soviet Union in the future_ The following after the incriminating photographs had been developed_ NOSENKO approached [JOHNSON in the cafe Of the 06 Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise . When (JOHNSON said that he planned to do So NOSENKO 0 6 presented him with an envelope contalning copies of the photo- graphs and said that they woula be released to the foreign if@JoHNSON] were to break his promise The KGB later 6blearnea that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned _ according to a later--version) the Amnerican Embassy and the KGB thus assumed that he had reported the approach _ NOSENKO did not recall what name , if any , he had used during this operation In 1965 NOSENKO dated the entrapment operation as having occurrea in suer in either 1962 or 1963 Reminded that his notes paired [JOHNSON' sulname with the date of 5 January 1962 , NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the name that he recalled the operation as having taken place in summertime:0[NOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 29 the date of [JOHNSON' s entrapment since it occurred 1i immedia: Iy after his transfer back to the Seventh Department . ] 0801541 270 TS No. 197124 Top Secret ~that 06 they gui_ day = obpress i5/ce Copy ================================================== Page 280 ================================================== Ooooo Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)_ 0b JOHNSON 'S Information According; to: a statement given to the' FBI , prior to his visit to the USSR EOHNSON} had written a church Moscow requesting Permission to preach there. authority. in fcrmed that some official He was. in- permission: was needed [JoHnson-06 subsequently: travelled to Moscow as a tourist and he did preach on one occasion but he suspended further such ty on the advice of Russian Baptis:]) colleagues .24 activi- ten-day in Moscow CJOHNSON] Wrote; and Dur his some: twenty persons outside the USSR. posted letters to d 06 GoHNsON]reported to the Embassy in Moscow on '5. January 1962 that ne had; experienced an incident with "clothesmen at 'the_Hotel Metropol Soviet_Plain- who had arrived in Moscow earlier that day:: GJOHNson U6 on 31_ December 1961 explalned that he was dining alone at the Metropol restaurant evening of 4 January when he: was joined on the who identified himself Ii a Soviet citizen as a doctor from W The 'doctcr spoke English: poorly and EOHNSON agreea to.visit the dcctox s06 room at- the hotel on the following when the have with him a student friend who doctor wouid after GOHNSON arrived in the_ spoke English well. 'Soon student" made doctor S rOOm on 5 January the started to homosexual advances.06 OHNSON protested and 'in: the leave when two plainclethesmen guadenly appeared room and announced that al1 were:under arrest After Signing a statement in Russian @ousog was taken to another0 rOOm where he; was confronted with a man who identified hi self as Georgiy' Iyanovich NIKOLOV _ II the Chief m After threatening (JOHNSON With Of Police fered to dismiss the matter brovidegqgoeNsc "NIKOLOV" of commitment not to criticize the [JQHNSON woula 3 to the United States Soviet Union when he returned On 8 January (JQHNSON telephoned the Embassy to he had: been recontacted by the "Bolice Chief" report that of: hig pledge and showed him who reminded him ly taken 0f JJOHNSON and the "Stodeninati 06 ng photographs alleged in the hotel room pre- Shown' photographs of VOLKOV and NOSENKO [JOHNSON thought VOLKOV to. be "familiar but he could not identify the "Police Chief 01 NOSENKO as 0801542 271 J678r TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Copy: 10_ Top ing stay by Riga day" sign viously ================================================== Page 281 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Comment: From their modus operandi the "doctor from ii Riga is undoubtediy VoLKoV and the "student" YEFREMOV _ NOSENKO frequently used the tional pseudonym Ivanovich 'NIKOEAYBera- and was called Georgiy_ Although [JOHNSON 'appneently confirmed NOSENKO ' s rore , NOSENKO ' s version of the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual time frame According_ to NOSENKO ' s version , within five of GOHNSON S arrival06 in Moscow the KGB had discovered that he a homosexual concluded from was or three censored letters that he was a threat and ar- ranged his entrapment The rapid pace of events suggests that (JOHNSON S homosexuality 06 was already known to Ehe KGB (if not to NOSENKO; before [JOHNSON S arrival in Moscow NOSENKO ' s 0b ignorance Of JOHNSON' s preaching (probably the actual cause Of KGB concern) is further evi- dence that NOSENKO did not know the complete background Of the KGB operation_ and that his role was merely that of playing the "Police Chief 01 NOSENKO S participation in this case con- tradicts his assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American Department_ (See P. 260 . ) William_ Carroll JONES NOSENKO s Information JONES a wealthy (Baptist] layman visited the USSR on six 27: or seven occasions each time meeting with Russian {Baptistz; He is personally acquainted with President Johnson and Knew President Kennedy He was the target of Seventh Department 66 Zase officer Vitaliy DERA _ While visiting the Soviet Union in 1962 [JONES] became involved with a Soviet female she was not a KGB agent _ 1 the KGB took contrcl of Although ship with JJONES and on FONES" her relation- Union unsuccessfuliy tsubsequent trips to the Soviet sought to obtain incriminating photo- graphs _ 272 0801543 TS No. 197124 Secret Izugn Top Yuriy days "two Top Copy ================================================== Page 282 ================================================== QOQOQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Comment: Interviewed byi the FBI in June- 1964 @ONES} (the sponsorkof the annual 'Presidentialby prayer breakfast" in Washington confirmed Ehe substance 6E NOSENKO s information but denied sexual' intimacies with any Soviet fe- male . 0-FJONES claimed to have made 24 triips to the ' Soviet_Union and to have successfully smuggled Bibles) into the USSR on numerous occasions According to EONEs Obin 1963 Pravda,publicized an incident in wnich a num - ber Qf [Bibles ~were confiscated from his gage 08 A 1961 KGB document furnished CIA by, GOLITSYN cited[JONES name in connection0b with a description_ Of his [Bible-smuggling bR activities NOSENKO reported the '@ONEg case in 1962 in Geneva and stated thae the Seventh De- Partment' case officer_ DERA was NOSENKO 'S subordinate 'in the Section However NO- SENKO ' s 'ignorance. 0f_(ONES Bible smuggling d6,0 (the; activity which most likely_prompted KGB action) and Of the fact that( ONES activitieso6 had; been publicized in the: Soviet press _ in- dicate" that NOSENKO had no intimate; connection With the case Recruitment of Natalie BIENSTOCK NOSENKO S Information The KGB recruited @IENsPBcK]) duringher 1962 visit to the USSR The 'Seventh Department case officers were K:G_ KRUPNOV and A:G_ KOVALENKO Who were acting in behalf of the Leningrad KGB_ The latter: had become interested in: the American tourist wnile 'she was staying with a Soviet friend in Leningrad_ "(NOSENKO. himself wouid have the recruitment but he; was attempted Geneva' in April 1962 :) During thereeerizs to leave for recruitment the KGB officers did not disclose their knowledge that she was an American Intelligence: agent: ana tnat sne had been involved 273 0801544 TS -No. 197124' Top Secret 10 Top lug- by boy busy Copy 1irr ================================================== Page 283 ================================================== 14-000QQ Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964 ) in the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written message to a Soviet ballerina in the United States _ The ballerina received the message but passed it to the KGB , which concluded that BBIENSTOCK was an agent either of CIA 06 or of the FBI After recruitment , BIENSTOCK over to First Chief Directorate was turned 06 (Disinformation) officers of Department D If she returned to the USSR the KGB planned to secure her confession of her relationship with American Intelligence_ Comment : BIENSTOCK] was employed as an interpreter with a Bolshoi troupe touring the United States when she was asked by CIA to pass a letter to the ballerina, a letter destined for the bal- lerina S brother in the USSR- BIENSTOCK] re-06 fused , and the letter was delivered by other means _ Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO ' s information @IENSTOCK] acknowledged in 1964 that she had been recruited the KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in 1962 and that she had been intimidated KGB accusation of her by the involvement with the ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB withheld its knowledge of that involvement.) BIENSTOCK also admitted having contact in the United SEates, through secret writing with KGB officers untii the letters ceased at KGB in- itiative in late 1962 or early 1963 _ 0301545 274 TS No. 197124 6/6r Top Secret Top July by Copy ================================================== Page 284 ================================================== QQoQo Secret (SEVENTH ` DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962) NOSENKO. visited Geneva between 10 March and 15 June 1962 2s a security Officer 'accompanying the Soviet 'delegation: to the Disarmament Conference _ In addition to performing that_ function 1 NOSENKO: claimed he supervised the activities of another KGB case officer 5 meetings with a KGB-controlled CIA agent visited the KGB rezidentura 'in 'Geneva and assoz ciated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period Six days before his return to: the' Soviet Union, NOSENKO con' tacted CIA: Puspese %f Trip te.Geneva NOSENKO' arrived in Geneva on' 10. March 1962 listed offi- 'cially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af fairs: attached to the Soviet: delegation to the Disarmament Conference NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN s defec- tion in: Finland [in December 1961] an order was issued that no delegation was to be permitted to depart the Soviet Union without an accompanying KGB security officer_ [NOSENKO has since stated that; he can recall no_ such order ] Explaining in 1962 how he came to be designated, as the security escort NOSENKO said he arguea that he was needed to direct_ the fifteen case officers in his section but GRIBANOV statea that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading the: delegation 'and that someone of an appropriate senior rank Shoula accompany the delegation not just a senior case offi- cer but a section chief Or a deputy Chief or a chief of a department NOSENKO was the most junior section chief His imediate superior in the Seventh' Department approved the On: the basis: that it would last only & month: 0801546 275 TS Noj 197124 Top Secret 10 Top trip Copy ================================================== Page 285 ================================================== 14-000QQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) In addition to his general security duties with the delegation 1 NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor , Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV (see below) Dur the 1965 interrogations NOSENKO provided somewhat varng accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Geneva He said that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with his but that [S_ G. ] BANNIKOV _ the Deputy Chief of the aSecgnaent_ Directorate who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department made the selection_ The: latter department investigating SHAKHOV and BANNIKOV was concerned with the selection of 3 security officer because SHAKHOV who was suspected of being a Western agent , was to be in the delega - tion_ Because Of the seriousness attached to the Delegations Department wanted a chief of section case, the officer and when a request was made to the as case ment Chief CHELNOKOV . the latter Seventh Depart- agreed to NOSENKO S as - signment _ NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV his superior ana friend let him go to Geneva as treat even had just assumed his duties as Chief 'of the Yeeribough he British Commonwealth Section_ he had no deputy,_ and the trip was occurring on the eve of the tourist season Investigation %f SHAKHOV According to NOSENKO , M.G _ SITNIKOV representing the Soviet_Delegations Department conducted investigatlons Of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961 , but had been unable to resolve the KGB suspicions: about himg Because Of the failure Of these efforts _ the KGB decided to send_ a_ "senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962 _ and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up I1 Before leaving Moscow in March 1962 NOSENKO discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with LYALIN_ the Soviet Delegations Department case officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case He also read various materials on the including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN_ case, NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962 because he was working with different delegations at different conferences _ and there was some evidence that in Geneva ear- lier he was somehow connected with American diplomat W@avid MARR; 66 276 TS No. 197124 Top Secret ing "a early: 8301547 Copy IGR ================================================== Page 286 ================================================== OQooo Secret (SEVENTH_ DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964 ) who was (erroneously] considered to be a CIA: officer- SHAKHOV "maybe 0 had some contact with MARK] in. 196,0' or 1961,06 but NOSENKO did not know the suhstanceof - it_ A counter 7 intelligence officer Of the First Chief Directorate S . M. 0 GOLUBEV had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and' he had noted "little details" While SHAKHOV was in the United States; earlier , he had been terminated: {as an agent] by 0 KGB officers_ who had submitted: a report stating' that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites; States_ American products and money_ In that KGB: report: he was depicted as "not. good " and not wanting: to work as an agent NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV Had served with the Ministry of_ Foreign Affairs in the Unted States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB 'SHAKHOV was permitted to_ travel abroad even though suspected of an American agent because he belonged to the Mini of W Foreign Affairs and' the KGB coula do nothing about his abroad There was no proof only: suspicions and furthermore- SHAKHOV wwas a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K_ Tsarapkin According 3 to NOSENKO ; SHAKHOV was; not and never had been a KGB officer Coment SHAKHOV has : served in and visited the United 'States since: :1942 when he was assigned to the 'Soviet Consulate General in New York He at T tended the 1945. Conference on International Organization_ in San . Francisco_ ana he had at- terdea a number Gf sessions of the UN General Assembly Most recently SFAKHOV was assigned ' to the U,S:: in- 1963 as a member Of the Soviet Mission to the UN' KGB officer RASTVOROV iden- tified him as an JMVD (KGB] officer_ whom he 15 'certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph SHAKHOV s face "was familiar" An FBI source however , in_ 196.4_ said that SHAKHOV was a "pure: diplomat and that to his knowledge _ SHAKHOV had engagea in no Soviet intelligence activity until tnat time 0801548 277 TS No. 197124 Secret - 10 ikr Top being stry trips Top Copy ================================================== Page 287 ================================================== 14-Q0ooo (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT 1962-January 1964 1 of SOSENCC deseeibed the various in Geneva _ He ways he had tested watched for an indication gave SHAxiOv disinforma suspicien:s contacts _ SHAKHOV that ne passed it on tion anc tien tasks was tola to perform Eo his America; while other KGE by NOSENKO with counter surveillance forewarned officers checked for Sign3 imaginary agent _ revealed the Americans about the gns that SHAKHOV had checkea 'EtveSHaxsoy the location of 2 Finally NOSENFO materials later to seeOwhether KCBe dead and conclusionemalaced had been disturbed itha specially prepared and it wo3 his that SHAKHOV was absolutcly way . NOSENKO ' $ turned to KGB intention to report this free of suspicicn_ Headquarters fron Geneva wher he re- Security Escort Officer Soviet Disarmament NOSENKO said,that he Delegation man Soviet delegation was the so le KGB officer such he was to the Disarmament with the 94 - entire responsible for the secuanetf Soafeeeace and as eStHEAL delagavi8n" [KGB officers I.S and behavior of the Geneva with the delegation to MAYOROV and M.S_ To evaibefoin NOSENKC made` the Geneva but had left had the him in carrying out his foregoing statement to CIA _ ] Iho services of a number Of security functions NOSENKO pocteere berving in the dcfegoticooptedOSENRG"ants of the KGB in his what_ 1 if security checks [NOSENKO has never re- or what, if he ran on the providea him.] any , information his delegates informants andNOSENKO has never been precise of 'hiigttze in Geneva , but he has about how he spent his time as he saw indicated that he to do. He explained and for the nost disposed pleased because in 1962 that he coula part had little of the Ambassador zorfl knew Who come and go as he dokhethelegatios. No one paid him he was , as did most officer he was not 2 any attention It was and he could absent Ministry of Affairs at any time_ himself fron conference 278 0801549 TS No_ 197124 Secret January during meeting meeting days drop any finding for they any charge days fiti really Foreign meetincs Top Copy ================================================== Page 288 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal Residency Virtually every NOSENKO told CIA in 1962 _ he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva and if he stayed away for more than a or two , Legal Rezident S I GAVRICHEV would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himgelf GAVRICHEV according to NOSENKO treated him with deference , and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962 NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV S request, although it was only after some hesita- tion on- the part of the Legal Rezident that all of his subor_ dinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO _ In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance on several occasions 1 NOSENKO said he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use 0f an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands [NOSENKO was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva and his claims as to his activities there , aside from his meetings with CIA , can be neither confirmed nor refuted.] KGB Officers thin the Soviet Delegation NOSENKO claimed that he woula know Of any others ana he was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Dele- gation in 1962_ Among delegates he identified Oleg GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB GRINEVSKIY was one Of NOSENKO S own agents within the delegation: in Moscow he was handled by KGB officers Of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department Of the Secona Chief Directorate. Among other delegates NOSENKO describea A.K= KISLOV and V.C FILATOV _ According to NOSENKO , KISLOV was head of the Ameri- can Section of TASS and was: genuine correspondent" ; "de- finitely not an intelligence officer Coment: CIA had tentati identified all three of the delegates as KGB officers KISLOV was ob- servea in apparent KGB operational activity in both Washington and MoscOW . FILATOV served as an alternate contact with the KGB agent in NATO , Georges PAQUES BBritish Intelligence has re- | ( ported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the per- manent Soviet delegation in Geneva who handled Uju1550 279 TS No. 197124 Top Secret V8Q 410 Top day day wi only "a vely Copy ================================================== Page 289 ================================================== 14-0QQoo Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Comment: (Continued) a] British jabuble agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva at the time _ Aggociation with Other Soviets According to NOSENKO , the Soviets he saw most often in Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above) Yu.I GUK and M.S_ TSYMBAL . (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the ANDREY case: see p. 33 A.K. KISLOV TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other dele- gates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva _ NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV ' s name to. be given as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below) NOSENKO drank ana carousea with KISLOV while in Geneva and KISLOV was NOSENKO S companion in early June, when NOSENKO either squandered or was robbed Of KGB operatdonal funds [the lcss he asked CIA to make good] and on the night of 10 June when he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and women With reference to the threat posed his security KISLOV' s knowledge Of his profligacy , NOSENKO said that KISLOV was too drunk to know what was going on " and in any event constituted no threat. In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the United States ana that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in 1962 _ so that he could use KISLOV at the conference On the basis of NOSENKO ' s favorable report afterwards he said, KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return. In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the Ariane Hotel in 1962 , but did not name KISLOV . 280 0801551 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 1 I(Rr Top by Copy ================================================== Page 290 ================================================== QOQo Secret (SEVENTH , DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964). Yu I GUK Implying that their fr iendsilip was of long 'standing ; NOSENKO related in 1962 that he ana GUK were together near 'y every in Geneva where they went out' toi chat and have 2 few drinks As a consequence: i NOSENKO Was_granted access . t? the residency: and was able to elicit information about some of GUK 5 operations in Geneva He described his "1 'big. big friend J0 GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and tbe "only strong officer in the residency Comment ; In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962' to TSYMBAL 1 not to GUK M.S_ TSYMBAL' In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL S presence 1n 'Geneva ang identified him as Chief of the Illegals, Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate He a]luded to having spoken with him, but placed no. particular emphasis on their relationship In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he- had been dealing' with TSYMBAL since . 1960 or 1961 'hen he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back- ground woula have iade them suitable for the Specia] iIjlega]s! Directorate NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head- quarters ana: TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned_ to the United States In Geneva he and TSYMBAL' had dinner together several times a week sometimes: accompanied by KISLOV ana sometines alone It was TSYMBAL 5 influence NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access: to the residency in 1962 ana established the precedent Erom which he was granted access in 1964 _ 8801552 181 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top day Copy ================================================== Page 291 ================================================== 14-000Qo Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Association withBritish Eemale Secretarx NOSENKO has described his association with a British) secretary whon he met at a diplomatic one of an amorous pursuit: reception in Geneva as interest in the girl_ 'itterheevescladaee any operational longer reach her at her several dates NOSENKO could no had told her apartment , and he concluded that she superiors that he was a Russian and had believed him to be an intelligence officer pro- Coment : According to an [official British NOSENKO became too persistent in report , when and the secretary his attentions superiors reportea the contact to her she was withdrawn immediately from Switzerlana and she later resigned from Goreign Office: 29 the This same incident came to the attention of the (Swiss servicelllwhich later reported it CIA without details_ as an to to recruit the girl attempt by NOSENKO "after a time it According to this report , became evident that 'NOSENKO ' s interest in her was not sexual but also in information to which she had 1 course of her duties 1t access in the AlSwiss officiaj] in ( Geneva tola CIA that NOSENKO had definitely to recruit the secretary and that he tried to obtain "disarmament secrets 0 trbe hetempted her Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA BELITSKTY Agent NOSENKO S Information Among his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO a younger and less experienced KGB supervised KGB double agent BELITSKIY case officer' 8 handling of case under the code " He first I1 heard of the BELITSKIY American name BELKIN when he was working in the Embassy Section 0f the American Department _ He 282 6/rr TS No. 197124 Secret Top bably only 0j01553 Top Copy ================================================== Page 292 ================================================== 14-00QQo Top Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) learned 0f; the case ;through his friendship with the chief: of the Second ("Active Line" ) Section Of the American Depart- ment V.I PETROV BELITSKIY wasia KGB agent whom American Inteiligence had recruited in London : he had never been met by the Americans in the_ Soviet_Union_ NOSENKO did not know the date of recruitment but knew the case was; al ready in pro- gress during his, second assignment with the ' Embassy Section {January Ii 1960-January 1962) BELITSKIY had been a KGB ' agent for: a long It time and was a KGB agent when. he first 8 went abroad (prior to his' recruitment by American Intelli- gence) . The KGB S purpose in running the 'BELITSKIY operation was: to: lure American Intelligence into meeting the agent inside the Soviet Union to learn the channels and means through 8L which American Intelligence communicated with. agents" inside the Soviet Union This was the II most important task" of the Second Chief Directorate: Although: BELITSKIY in meeting with his American; case officers_ continually pleaded fear of contacts with American Intelligence in Moscow this was a ruse; the real; KGB intent was to use: BELITSKIY to lure Ameri-,' ~an Intelligence into contacting him in the Soviet Union After BELITSKIY was recruited in London . CIA "did not on with him didn t,hold any meetings_ with him" Nevertgeless _ he: said_ the. KGB "cherished the: hope to lead him in some- what-deeper "tt' The KGB First Chief Directorate_ with its own responsibilities "'and objectives was: unaware of 'Second Chief Directorate objectives in the BELITSKIY case The First Chief Directorate 'through Department: D, provided dezinformat- siya [disinformation] at the Second Chief Directorate S res quest but in. this case as in_ other:: "games II it did not know for what ultimate purpose the disinformation would be used (In such cases I I AGAYANTS _ Chief "Of Department D , did not even know_ in what country the "disinformation was to be used let alone the identity of the agent. ) Comment_ According to GOLITSYN Department D:runs its operations alone or in conjunction with (never subordinate to) other KGB departments _ 0801554 283 TS: No: 197124 Top Secret - long Copy ================================================== Page 293 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO: did not actively participate in the case until he received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L ARTE- MOV ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow either; he also had been sent to Geneva to work on counter- intelligence matters and only to direct BELITSKIY if the Ameri- cans should contact the agent _ BELITSKIY had been "inserted" in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA wou ld "find him" As a result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO jcned with ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY S meetings with the latter S American case officers _ BELITSKIY was first met in Geneva by the American case officer "Bob" and later by Henry" who was "called out from the States" BELITSKIY noted that the name on the door of the apartment where he met his American case officers was not the_ same as that of the. person whose apartment it was alleged to be , and that the apartment itself had an "un-lived-in II look- When the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament Delegation _ 1 NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from- the Soviet Foreign Ministry_ NOSENKO proposed instead that BELITSKIY claim to information from the head of the American Department of TASS _ A.K= KISLOV_ The information, Of course woula be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB _ In case the Americans woula check , NOSENKO and ARTEMOV ar- ranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV_ The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY S bona fides. From the KGB viewpoint , however while BELITSKIY was not a bad agent ! he was apt to go too far sometimes and "ada things on his Own " For this reason , the KGB limited BELIT- SKIY S time spent with CIA, to lessen the chance that the agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that he was a plant _ 0301555 284 TS No. 197124 Top Secret give get Copy ================================================== Page 294 ================================================== Qoooo Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Comment: NOSENKO"' s information about the BELITSKIY-CIA relationship is substantially correct except for some inaccuracies about the origin Of the case BELITSKIY, a commentator for Radio Mos cow_ as NOSENKO : described in Geneva did meet @ CIA. officers using the aliases 01 'Bob 0 and 'Henry in a safe apartment NOSENKO ' s version of his role in the case 0 however is implausible _ He asserts that BELIT- SKIY. a, prominent Russian with acquaintances among influential officials of the Soviet Govern- ment an; agent ostensibly under the control Of E CIA for several years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva to" resume contact with CIA_ The KGB _ ac- cording to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible case officer nor an officer of the KGB section responsible for the operation NOSENKO states : that the KGB instead' detailed a young and in- experienced" KGB "' officer who happened to be in Geneva at the time an officer who had' no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even knowledge" of operating conditions in Geneva _ NOSENKO further states that_ the KGB then: instruc- 'ted NOSENKO_ who had learned of the case unoffi- c? who haa no. experience or training in double agent operations ana; who was similarly in Geneva for other reasons to' guide the other inexperienced KGB officer NOSENKO can cite no guidance provided by KGB Headquarters al- though he claims he' exchanged messages with Moscow about the 'case ARTEMOV was not 'inexperienced_ He had had continuous service with the Second Chief Direc- torate at least: since 1958 and had been involved: with a 'series of:CIA American tourist agents in the Soviet Union_ Although allegedly familiar with_ ARTEMOV NOSENKO is unaware of the latter S : 285 TS No. 197124 Top. Secret Copy 10 1ly, 0d01.556 ================================================== Page 295 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964} Comment: (Continued) involvement with American tourist agents in 1958 and 1959_ during a period when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department S American Section_ Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know how when , or where the BELITSKIY operation started _ did not know the nature of BBritish involvement _ did not know the operational tails and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA did not know BELITSKIY ' s pattern of activity in Moscow or in Geneva and did not know the alleged objective of the KGB opera- tion , e.g. the substance Of the "disinformation" which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA: From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory func- tion in the BELITSKIY case Contact with CIA On 5 June 1962 U.S: Foreign Service Officer David MARR} reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached a Soviet: citizen whom he believed to be Ivanovich NOSENKO , a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation NOSENKO had merely suggested that get together for a talk on the following In late afternoon on 6 June_ NOSENKO told 06 MARKlprivately that he woula like to talk to UMHMARKI as soon as UG possible He was Ii not going to pump him for information Ii but simply wanted to tell him some things" Ii A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June ; although NOSENO indicated that he preferred an earlier date.1t MARK] advised CIA of: the appoint- ment and commented that the approach seemed sO unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection_ 6 At the 9 June luncheon with[ MARK NOSENKO identified hin- self as a counterintelligence 8fficer sent to Geneva to ensure the security Of the Soviet delegation_ He knew that MARR] had UL previously served in Moscow and [erroneously] believed him to 0801557 286 7l8R TS No. 197124 Secret Top by Yuriy they day Top Copy ================================================== Page 296 ================================================== QOOOo Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) be an American intelligence officer NOSENKO said ne needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB opera- tional funds which he had squandered on liguor and a prosti- tute in Geneva and offered for this amount to sell two items of information to American Intelligence- The first item was the identity 'Of an American a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow who was a KGB agent. 0t near ciphers in the Washing- ton area Tne second item was: the identity Of a Soviet citi- zen_ in Moscow who , although 'ostensibly a CIA agent= had been planted on CIA: by the KGB Although NOSENKO proposed a one- time_ transaction, 1 he acknowledged to | MARK that he might: be unabie to avoid deeper, involvement with American Intelligence 06 MARK introduced; NOSENKO to a CIA officer the evening Of 9 June and . NOSENKO was taken to the first Of five lengthy: meetings hela in a CIA safehouse At the initial meeting NOSENKO described himself as:" a KGB major experienced in opera - tions against the American, Embassy in MOscow and against American tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union He tola of his financial difficulties and: repeated his offer to sell the two specified: items of information. He said that the: need 'for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA although in: the ensuing_ discussion_ he asserted also that he_ was 'dissatisfied with the 'Communist regime in the Soviet Union NOSENKO ' emphasized that he had no intention of be- coming an American agent and that after his proposed trans- action he would have no further contact with CIA: Despite this assertion, after describing 'the cases of ANDREY Ii (Dayle SMITH see P 33 2 and the KGB. double agent. BELITSKIY (see p 282) NOSENKO_ supplied considerable biographic infor-_ mation about himseif: and also discussed in general terms cer tain additional KGB operations Fs well as KGB organization and operational: methods in Moscow He understood_ as he had told[QARK) earlier that CIA woula want mOre information and he, agreed to meet again two days later 0C' NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva With the second meeting on 11 June his initially expressed reservations disappearea almost entirely He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations most of his information being limited to. the Second Chief Directo_ rate: Besides Ji ANDREY and BELITSKIY he provided leads to more than a score of American citizens who had been compro- mised Or recruited by_ the KGB and information on the KGB 287 03U1558 24 TS: No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Copy Jlge ================================================== Page 297 ================================================== 14-00OOQ: Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian Ambassador WATKINS (see P 23 ) and described a British Ad- miralty employee (William VASSALL , see p 30 ) He talked freely of his activities in Geneva including his association with KGB officers there his visits to the KGB residency and his security duties wi th respect to the Soviet delega- tion. NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB officer with personal knowledge Of important and sensitive KGB operations_ He described his education his service in the Naval GRU _ his entry into the KGB and the general func- tions and operating techniques Of the various components of the Secona Chief Directorate in which he had served along with the approximate dates of his service_ Ultimately the restriction which NOSENKO placed on his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communica- tion with him in the' Soviet Union He was willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated wou ld occur about once every other year He said he would not consider defecting except in cir- cumstances in: which his personal security was endangered citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and fear Of KGB reprisal against them if he flea) his widowed mother S dependence on him, and his love of Russia.and the Russian people_ NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were made for him to do SO , when he came to the West again_ Meanwhile , he expressed the intention to do everything within limits imposed by concern for his Own security to obtain in- formation which he was informed was Of interest to CIA_ Attempted Recruitment @€ [orst BRAUNS Immediately after returning to MoscOw from Geneva NOSENKO claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit American tourist BRAUNS 288 0301559 TS No. 197124 Top Secret only rkp Copy ================================================== Page 298 ================================================== QOQe Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) )w NOSENKO s Information ian 4d - BRAUNS was Russian born anq he_lived in Leningrad until ed the Second Worid War when he fled when the Germans fetueateg} 06,08 ation ie eventually settled in the United States Where Ehe First Chief Directorate learned he had become a technician working 33 for an_ "interesting company making_computers adding machines , 3B and other instruments" When BRAUNS visited the Soviet .06 te Union ," NOSENKO assigned his subordinate [K.G.] KRUPNOV to in hanale the case and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take C- 06 GRAuns] out of the Inturist hotel and assign nim to a rOon in of another hotel where KRUPNOV met: him KRUPNOV "couldn t x9 Obanywhere M1 withl BRAUNS and he called on NOSENKO for help- NOSENKO joined him in GRAUNS' rOom 'and 'eventually secured 06 BRAUNSI agreement to cooperate with the KGB , under threat Of on impriSonment (for treason ((based on BRAUNS wartime_Elight fromO8 1icaz the Soviet_Union) 0GBRAUNS left Moscow Ehe next for Leninv grad and becaise NOSENKO . Ehought the recruitment was M1 shaky" 06 ne sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad to consolidate the recruitment_ very BRAUNS refused to see. KRUPNOV and_NOSENKO. went to Leningrad cir- ana again talked to BRAUNSCJS BRAUNS was so frightened_ how- ever that NOSENKO concluded Ehat he' wouid never work for the and RGB NOSENKO decided to terminate the case and BRAUNS] was sent a 'on: his way e NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNs] visited the Soviet_Union , nor was he able: to: identify any soviet citizens whom_ BRAUNS ] aet in the USSR thin In 1964 NOSENKO asserted: that: he had mentioned the BRAUNS inj cese: to :CIA in 1962, but coula: not at that time_ recall nis Jae' 0b 06 Comment' NOSENKO did not mention |BRAUNS} in 1962: BRAUNS ENKO arrived in the: Soviet:Unionon 24 June: 1962 uit after_NOSENKO had met with CIA in Geneva _ BRAUNSI version is consistent_ with the events as_ related NOSENKO' although he caula not identify NOSENKO by' photograph. In" other con- texts NOSENKO has explained : that the Seventh 289 0J01580 197124 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top get aay: by KIBe Copy ================================================== Page 299 ================================================== 14-00Q00 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Comment: (Continued ) Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates_ both of which were the responsibi- of other KGB elements NOSENKO acknowledges that the KGB knew that BRAUNS was a forner Soviet 06,08 citizenk& GBRAUNS' plan Eo visit relatives in Leningrad was informationaalso available to the KGB through his Visa application-bl [RAUNS] had corresponded for a year before his Visit with a former girl friend in Leningrad _ She spent the first week with him in Moscow (during which the KGB recruitment attempt occurred) The existence Of the girl friend was presumably known to the KGB , if not through mail censor ship, then from surveillance connected with KRUPNOV S planned ap- proach to BRAUN: in the hotel- NOSENKO was un- aware of these facts_ Chief Of the"AmericanaBritish Comonwealth Section; Summary and Conalusion According to NOSENKO , he requested transfer to the Seventh Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American Department over his then-superior the experienced and highly successful KGB officer KOVSHUK _ He is adamant that the trans- fer took place "before [the defection of] COLITSYN which he asserts occured in mid-January 1962 _ Among his other functions in the Seventh Department, he cites directing five agents whom he brought from the American Department In his initial capacity as Chief of the American Section NOSENKO claims in- volvement only in the WW.E_ JOHNSON case his time being spent Db either in reading in" on his new job or preparing for his initial trip to Geneva - He alleges that he was directed to accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended period in behalf of another Second Directorate Department _ over his objections_ when he had no deputy to assume his func- tions in his absence , and on the eve of the tourist season 5/8k 290 0a01561 TS No. 197124 Top Secret lity Copy ================================================== Page 300 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January' 1964) In Geneva he said he supervised the KGB double-agent BELIT- SRIY s meetings with CIA before contacting CIA himself to sell information for a relatively small su Back in Moscow imediately after participating in the KGB approach to [BRAUNS 06 he claims he' became Deputy Chief of the entire 100-man 4S Seventh Department. t Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO S account of seeking transfer " to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American De- partment" his dating of the transfer impugns his claims GOLITSYN defected' on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred as he said 'in mid-January 1962 his earlier participation in 06 the TJoHNSON-compromise (see p: 268) is not evidential Of his Sevehth Department service If he transferred just in time 06 for: thexJJOHNSON] operation_ he could: not have played the role_ he claimed in 'Ehe Embassy Section (re ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead see p. 216 Y_ In: the period with one excep tion, none Of his claimed agentura participated in a Seventh Department operation _ No Change marked his claimed increased responsibilities: and new functions upon being promoted to Section Chief Of the largest department in the Second: Chief birectorate- Of the five operations:. NOSENKO described as occurring during this period , all had aspects for which; by NOSENKO S description of the Seventh Department s mission they coula: have been in the jurisdiction of another Second 'Chief Directorate Department_ NOSENKO S various explanations {or his assignment to Geneva in 1962 prompt scepticism bez cause of: tortuous 'contradictions In Geneva he' neither directed the: investigation: of SHAKHOV nor supervised the BELIT- SKIY case as he claimed_ ns; Deputx Chief of the Seventh Department July 1962 January 1964) { In July 1962 _ in line with the personal' wish of the Chief the KGB Second Chief Directorate; General GRIBANOV , NOSENKO 0001562 291 24 TS: No. 197124 Top Secret 10 'drop '3Je Copy ================================================== Page 301 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief of the entire Seventh Department_ A year later he was made First Deputy Chief and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general" supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist operations The Seventh Department which had a strength 0f about 100 KGB officers was responsible for all operations against tourists in the Soviet Union From this period NOSENKO claimed to have learned either by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief or otherwise of a nuber of KGB operations against Americans including two arrests one recruitment , and investigations f a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey OSWALD_ NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB tion during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer the latter occurring just before NOSENKO re- turned to Geneva for the second time and defected : Recruitment Qf SvENCHANSKTY NOSENKO S Information In September 1963 NOSENKO took over from his subordinate , Seventh Department case officer Ye.N NOSKOV the management 0f KGB agent [Alexander SvENCHANSKIY] (cryptonym It ANOD" ) II [SVENCHANSKIY was the president of LAfton Tours a agency in New York City and the owner of a Chicago Russian- 10,68 language bookstorel There was originally some suspicion 06 that EVENCHANSKIY Jmight_ be an FBI informant and the KGB was cbalso concerned over SVENCHANSKIY S contacts with AMTORG per - sonnel in New York City ONOSKOV_ the case Officer at the time "felt" that (SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and recruited hin in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for blackmarketeering while; visiting the Soviet Union SVENCHAN - DSSKIY] S cooperation was secured against KGB promises Ehat Inturist would refer business to the: agent S New York travel agency . SVENCHANSKIY' s' task was to screen visa applications Of prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who might be connected with American Intelligence - If he suspected such a person he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly or making a small pin-prick or pencilled mark on the application form _ 292 0881563 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy Top posi- travel?h,0{ I0/BR ================================================== Page 302 ================================================== Ooooo Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) When NCSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September_ 1963 _ NOSENKO s name as the handling officer was entered in the single-volume case file although NOSKOV ac- companied,NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings with OlSVENCHANSKTY in Mos COw (in September 1963 and at the end G€ 1963) Comment: SVENCHANSKIY a Russian-born naturalized Fo American ciEizen, is-president oflAfton 291,10,24| Tours Tf New York City and the Cross world Books ana Periodicals in Chicagq His partner and: the actual operator 0f Tours i57 gonya SOKOLoig; reportedly & one- 06 time confidential secretary 01 of Jacob GOLOs] 'Dg,06 Allegations of GVENCHANSKIY] s_ Communist 06 sympathies and probable involvement in Soviet espionage date back to 'the Second Worla War: His involvement in espionage has been pub- licized in the press (notably in a 1953 New York Times account <of [Harry GOLD S 06 @llegatrons) 06 since FsOROLowmanages the Afton Tours]2q office_ Wnile SVENCHANSKIY] usually zs0: occupied. elsewhere with his other firm; he woula 'be unlikely to review and mark suspect: visa applications as NOSENKO alleged.06 (SVENCHANSKIY S bbackground is such as to have prevented his being interviewea on the: basis;: of the information NOSENKO provided: 05 NOSENKO' dia not refer to his association With GVENCHANSKIY spontaneously but describea it,only after referring to the written notes he;brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 {(See 319} Suspected EBI Source (Alfred SLESINGER] 06 *On 8 July: 1964 ' NOSENKQ reported on KGB interest in an American named [SLESINGER' a' proprietor of a photographic in New York who was suspected the KGB` of "having connections with the FBI 293 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top AftonT P:: shop City, by 0301564 Top Copy I5J8k ================================================== Page 303 ================================================== 14-00000 (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-1964) NOSENKO ' s Informatwon [SLESINGER came under suspicion the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his bus iness transactions with a number of Soviets who VIsited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLES INGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets 0 to .study them.0 (SLESINGER] had visited the Soviet Union several times Learning (SLESINGER] planned06 another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that he mignt make some contacts or do some thing interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union.06 The_ KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that [SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI _ The KGB haa a file on SLESINGERfbad a senior case officer in the American section of the Seventh Department , Yu. M_ DVORKIN _ was the responsible case officer_ An agent of the Seventh Department who was d1rector of a photo- graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly Cwith [SLESINGER] while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union and the two men later exchanged correspondence OGSLESINGER] went to Odessa to visit relatives and DVORKIN directed' the Odessa KGB to 01 surround" him with agents: who coula watch his behavior: If there had been any indication of intelligence activitles_ the KGB woula have attempted to recruit SLESINGER Obut since no evidence was developed, no approach was made GLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before 8 several times Comment: NOSENKO ' s information was subgtantially: correct_ Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGERL 06 reported to the FBI in 1962 of his June 1962 visit to MOs COw and Odessa _ In Odessa [SLESINGER' was contacted by a 06 Soviet official who exhibited m1 intlmate Ji knowledge of his business 1n New York ~City and had asked whether (SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI _ 06 294 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 08u1585 by July Copy 1S /Re ================================================== Page 304 ================================================== Ooooo (SEVENTH: DEPARTMENT january 1962-1964) Comment: (Continued) 06 to the FBI; that In 1966 ;rEsucgewlter a Moscow photographic he was in touch and he "described evidence_ shop proprietor in;him during his: visit to Of KGB interest Previous to vigiting the Odessa in 1962 (SLESINGER had been in & Soviet Union in' 1962 of Soviet officials contact with a numbe r from the' United Nations in describing how he learned NOSENKO was not a First Chief Directorate of GLESINGERI who may represent case 06 0b_ KOTEN S Arrest: in 1964,whether. he wes NOSENKO was asked'in CenevAmezican tourist-in_the involved in the arrest of an at 'once" NOSENKO USSR in the: fall of 1963 Almost_ a for identified the case as that of {@ernara an employee of Zfton Tours in New York City bove)hencehad Beeroyeeegted Alexander SVENCHANSKIY; seeeaboveOSENKO saia that(KoTEN,06 06 On ,homogexual charges- in Kiev. t 0f the_ KGB Scientific Was involvea with an_American egenNoSENKO did not know: the and Technical '(SET) Directorate 8 name= NOSENKO" s Information member of the American Communist KOTEN was a longtime after the Second World War Party 'ana' a frequent vhereohe had extensive contacts among to the Soviet Union Where and other Soviet citizens disgident literary figures Jews ENOSENKO explainea in particularly amotgakusheaRGy i9 wary of foreigners 'contacts another context that the.Israeli Inteliigence Service with: Soviet Jews because contacts J Because 'of these has- frequently insRizecssucbth the KGB First and Second Many Suspicious cootcftdeabeta€ ROTEN]might_ be a provocatia Difectorates had concle the ranks. of the 66 planted in_ or recruited from agent" in the United states _ Communist Party 295- TS: Nc. 197124 Top Secret reported specific KOTENAL guide agent OdOi566opy - 10 '1dsk ================================================== Page 305 ================================================== 1400000 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) On the eve of KOTEN 5 arrival in 1963 _ the Seventh learned from V.5 _ BARKOVSKIY of the First Delertgerectezzteds S&T Department that (KOTEA was. 0 Chief with him the: address of relatives of an- carrying_ S&T agent of- the New York residency and that Korevtint intended to visit the agent"' s relatives while in Ehe USSR The SET agent had asked: to be: repatriated to: the USSR, but when the: KGB' eventually assented, the balked arousing: KGB: suspicions When it was: Obzgent thatedorEE?HasE with- the: agent, the: 06 KGB concluded that {Fozc3uaevtae "eviaently received from American Intelligence an assignment to visit [the 06 s relatives] After KKOTEN visited the relatives agethe= Crimea_ the decision was made to arrest him as in 5 ROTEN was en- 06 a suspect American Intelligence agent. trappea with a KGB homosexual agent: and arrested_ although he was releasea when the American Communist Party and other orgenizations strongly protested_ ( NOSENKQ did not personally participate in the arrest nor meet [KOTEN although he supervisea the arrest from KGB Headquarters. 06 Comment: KOTEN' s arrest: on: charges of homosexual activities were publicized at the time in a report .datelined MOscow and quoting Inturist which was_ carried: in the New York Times In an interview' with representatives Of Ehe Department of State, KKOTEN described how he 06 had been arrested; by Ehe KGB in Kiev on 28 August' 1963+ accused of being: an American Intelligence agent,and interrogated for three days , and held in jail for a month GRU AgentlJohn: SHUBIN The name of [John Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth among the notes which NOSENKO brought to the 1964 were meetings with CIA in Geneva _ 296 0001567 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top Copy iziR} ================================================== Page 306 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secred (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO S Information' SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex" traction a Russian speaker and a university professor in' New-York City. UESHUBIN; who had visited the Soviet Union twice before visiEed the Soviet Union in 1958: or 1959 while: NOSENKO was serving his: first tour of duty in the Seventh Departnent_ At that time [uUBiN OL: was the target' of Seventh Department: case officer A.A_ VETLITSKIY NOSENKO heard later 'that ESHUBIN was 06 placed under surveillance and when: the KGB surveillance 06 observedTSHUBIN as' a passenger in a Jlinistry of Defense automobile the GRU was asked about the American 4I They very furti 'said that thev were interested in him; from ;which the KGB ` concluded that [SHUBIN was a GRU agent 06 In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted [SHUBIN s name06_ 'and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU. agent_ NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU'_General SOKOLOV ' s' office and informed: SOKOLOV of SHUBIN 5 presence (or_ according06 to another version, SOKOLOV ' s: office was advised by others) SOKOLOV S office even- tually apologized for having failed earlier to: notity the KGB of the: GRU: s interest inKSHUBIN: Coment 06_GSHUBIN had no valid' U:s passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period i+ was; not as an American tourist under his true name Consequently he could' not then have been the tourist target: of the Seventh_ Department: case_ officer_ as NOSENKO claimea. If NOSENKO erred_ and actually was referring 06 to [SHUBIN' s_ visit in 1961 / there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his nane while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department , because ne claims he was in the American Department at the time 297 TS No:' 197124 Top Secret 10 1Rr Top vely 0d01568opy ================================================== Page 307 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Arrest Qf BARGHQORN At the first of the 1964 meetings in described the provocation ana Geneva NOSENKO Professor Frederick arrest of Yale Uni versity most BARGHOORN in late 1963 _ NOSENKO ' s comprehensive statement , from Ivhich the following paragraphs wete largely drawn , was made on 9 June 1964 _ NOSENKO saia that the purpose 0f the KGB against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for operation action taken against three Soviets persona non grata the case of John W_ BUTENKO in New York City in secure a [in November 1963] and to hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet IVANOV) in the BUTENKO case who was jailed_ (Igor had asserted in Geneva , earlier , that the (NOSENKO against BARGHOORN to discourage ftbereperreics such as that of IVANOV , not arrests portance 0f IVANOV himself_ because of any special im- ") NOSENKO ' s Information In 1963 four KGB First_Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York_Legal Residency operational activity in the United were caught in three had diplomatic States Of the four, and haa immunity but one was a chauffeur a service passport_ The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released _ IVANOV _ the was arrested sinee he did not haVeANOpiomaeichamfeuty GRIBANOV _ Chief of the KGB Second Chief immunity_ learned of this arrest probably the iext Dizectozate directed by KGB: Chairman Semichase and was measures GRIBANOV to take necessary NOSENKO; A.G_ thereupon called to his office and KOVALENKO _ Chief of the Seventh Department; G.I GRYAZNOV and Ye_ M_ RASHCHEPOV from the American. Department. After describing the arrest , GRIBANOV asked what information: the Second Chief Directorate Departments had on any American Embassy employee or tourist, that coula serve as the victim of an [retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV ana GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three American Service Attaches in Ros or four opinion of the tov and that , in the be American Department, these officers might carrying electronic apparatus It was known that had cameras:, that had been taking had been -observed taking notes_ photographs_ and arrested in Rostov before coula be MoscOw _ took the return plane to 298 TS No_ 197124 Secret 0001569 Top "was only aay tnyy they they they They they Top Copy ================================================== Page 308 ================================================== 4-0ooOo Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT L January 1962-January 1964) GRIBANOV instructed the two: representatives: of: the American Department to write 3 report on what other possibilities existed: He also. told. them to request permission to arrest and search:: the' Service Attaches GRIBANOV: then asked what pertinent information was held by the Seventh Department; He was_ told that there were relatively few. American tourists in_ the Soviet Union at that time These included BARGHOORN , who was mentioned to ' GRIBANOV;along with one other (name not recalled) NOSENKO and ' KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no- "strong" materials to use t them _ They were ordered to make an immediate. study Of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible- Returning to the Seventh : Department , NOSENKO . and KOVALENKO 'gathered. the entire American Tourist Section in their " Office In a general 'discussion, it: was decided ~that BARGHOORN was the possible American targeta All information on BARGHOORN was gathered_ and NOSENKO and . KOVALENKQ took; it to GRIBANOV . GRIBANOV: reaa it and was pleased; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected' with American Intelligence: He then asked what" could be: done; NOSENKO and KOVALENKO' reported: that: BARGHOORN was' then in bilisi and :that, in fact_ 1 Ye_ N_ NOSKOV_ (case officer American Tourist' Section) was in Tbilisi with 2 WOman' doctor from the KGB "Operational Technical Directorate for: the" purpose_ Of working against BARGHOORN the doctor had: some "special substance: which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently iil that; he had to be_ hospitalized_ While he was- in the; hospital; a careful search had been made: Of his belongings but nothing of operational interest had' been found_ In addition; a KGB agent was placed: in BARGHOORN s room as 2 patient; he_ made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials" but BARGHOORN did not rise:to the bait_ At the time: of this meeting with_ GRIBANOV , BARGHOORN, was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow_ the fol lowing morning, and the KGB knew:_Erom a_ -phone tap that: he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of theOb: British_Embassy at the Hote] Metropol the following evening 299 0.01570 TS-Noj 197124 Top Secret Copy" 10 Top agains Only Zjkk ================================================== Page 309 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials I1 to BARGHOORN in MOsCOw NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation _ but GRIBANOV that this made no difference _ He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass the compromising material to BARGHOORN ana told then to write a summary of BARGHOORN S background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence I This was to be sent in letter form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV' s signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials_ (That the evidence was to be planted was not to be mentioned.) GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the Service Attaches to Semichastnyy- While the four S F NOSENKO KOVALENKO_ GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV were waiting, in GRIBANOV' s office for his return GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB organization informing him that the Service Attaches were in the air on their way back to Mos COWv _ Shortly thereafter 2. GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman 0f the KGB had approved the arrests of the Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN _ Khrushchev was absent from MOsCOw at the time but Semichastnyy had called BREZHNEV and securea his approval When GRIBANOV. learned from GRYAZNOV that the Service Attaches were already on their way back to MoscOw _ he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out II to do the job or die _ Ii Meanwhile arrangements were made with the Department D" (the KGB element responsible for dis - information _ subordinate to the: First Chief Directorate) to provide materials on missiles which could be passed to BA RGHOORN _ While these were being picked up NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to the arrest. BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow At 1810 hours a radio message wZs received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 Years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appoint- ment with |ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours ,06,21 but at 19000 hours a report was receivea that BARGHOORN TS No. 197124 300 0001571 Top Secret Top replied plan Copy ikr ================================================== Page 310 ================================================== 14-Q000Q Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTNENT January 1962-January 1964) had left the American" Embassy in the American Ambassador' s car He was alone but for the Soviet driver Nothing could be 'done while BARGHOQRN was in the moving car A cneck' on' (ORCHARD} established that he was in the downstairs hall 6f the hotel waiting: It was therefore decided to approach BARGHOORN wen he left the car at the hotel No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached are an American? I the agent askea. "Yes Vt Please 'taie it, the agent said_ The agent put the: packet containing the materials, on missiles in BARGHOORN S inside coat pocket ana then ran off BARGHOORN had taken one or two when he was seized byi NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV ancther case officer of the American Tourist Section , and told he was: under arrest A surveillance car pulled BARGHOORN was' placed in the car handcuffed (on up _ GRIBANOV S orders_ because the: Soviets arrested in the United: States: had: received similar treatment:): and driven: to" a Militia station where a room had:been prepared_ LS I YEFREHOV and K G KRUPNOV: Erom the American Tourist' Section were wai at the Militia station _ 1 KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN: and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station an "incident report" form-was fiiled out, and a document was prepared requesting permission to hola 'him 48 hours Between 0206 ana 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB' inner prison- At 0400 hours the Seventh Department case' officers were released with instructions: to report_ for at 09 30 hours NOSENRO and the others went home KRUPNOV began the ques tioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next Although BARGHOORN speaks, good Russian YEFREMOV remained in 'case he woula be needed to intereret: NOSENKO entered the room several: tines during these sessions_ (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to ,BARGHOORN because he knewv BARGHOORN would be released_ GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there Ihen they reached the point . where BARGHOORN was to tell how he 'obtained 301 TS_No. , 197124 Top Secret 0301572 10 I/ee "You only steps: ting duty day Copy ================================================== Page 311 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SZVEMTH DEP ARTMEMT January 1962-January 1964) the missile documents ) The first sessions concentrated on general matters , such as BARGHOORN s life history. After one and one half hours of questioning BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person He said that he thought 0 or something M that he dia not they were newspapers The package was then opened and know what they were it contained about 20 to 25 pages showvn to BARGHOORN ; of information on missiles "BARGHOORN was not , of ven a close look" at the materials _ course, Following BARGHOORN S admission another declaration was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV KOVALENKO , and GRIBANOV _ NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chlef Prosecutor where the incident report_ the first interrogation and the first and second declarations were reported to MISHUTIN_ the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV directed that all materials on BARGKOORN including information from KGB Archives be to the KGB Department of Prosecution so that they could begin proceedings against BARGHOORN _ After this 1 all letefrogeceedi were conducted by that departmenti KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter. Comment; BARGHOORN S version Of his, entrapment , arrest and interrogation coincide fairly 'precisely with the version provided by NOSENKO _ He identified NOSENKO from a photograph as a KGB officer present at one stage of the interrogation on the second of his arrest and said NOSENKO took some part in the pro- ceedings _ He recalled NOSENKO as being It clever and quick-Witted" and as "giving the impression that he was not a_ dedicated careerist_ 1 but opportunistic and adaptive: he seemed not to care about what he was I doing, but doing a job nevertheless _ Cj01573 302 TS No. 197124 Top Secret gi given day good Copy ================================================== Page 312 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT_ January 1962-January 11964) The OSWALD CASE NOSENKO S know ledge of the KGB S interest in OSWALD stemmed_ from his claimed Tourist Department ass ignments He asserted: that while Deputy Chief of_ the American Section in 1959 he participated in the KCB determination that OSWALD was 0f no operational interest In September 1963 when NOSENKO was: Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department he was informed .of OSWALD' s_ visit to the Soviet: Embassy in Mexico to 'apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following President' Kennedy S,assassination NOSENKO , as: Deputy Chief of the Tourist: Department_ reviewed KGB records of OSWALD' s stay: in the Soviet' Union including the; Second: Chief Directorate file On OSWALD. For continui of presentation both periods Of NOSENKO S alleged involvement with the OSWALD_ case (1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWAID 4 case is significant if:it substantiates NOSENKO S claimed positions in_ the KGB 'ana confirms the validity 'of his: claim that heknew- the' extent. of KGB: involvement with OSWALD- NOSENKO S Information Residence: in the USSR Prior to OSWALD S arrival in the USSR_ he was completely unknow to 'the KGB : Moreover upon receipt of his visa application, the 'KGB Second Chief Directorate determined thatahe was not of sufficient importance to jus- any special interest by the: Seventh Department Not until about October 1959 ; when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in_ the USSR did he come to the attention Of NOSENKO who was at that time Deputy Chief' of the American Section of the Seventlx Department All available materials: on him were thereupon collected and examined the visa application_ Inturist reports , interpreters reports reports from hotel agents and the results of a check Of KGB Archives _ NOSENKO s subordinate KRUPNOV: interviewed_ the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his wish to in the USSR_ 303 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top City ty tify stay C01574 Copy ================================================== Page 313 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEP ARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent e 1 the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because fI this would be' done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union I Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request , and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions KRUPNOV sent NOSENKO , his chief a memorandum on information which had been received concerning OSWALD_ The memorandun cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin_ where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturigt itinerary and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet Union A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO s section From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded that_ OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB_ and both agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal - I For this reason NOSENKO. instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the Inturist interpreter that he' would not -be permitted to remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa_ then seek re-entry as a permanent resident through normal channels: at the Soviet Embassy in Washington _ KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO' S orders and either that or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Inturist guide- This prompted a search and after several hours OSWALD was found in his hotel room , bleeding heavily from self-inflicted wounds After hearing of this incident_ from KRUPNOV NOSENKO then reported it to K.N= DUBAS Chief Of the Seventil Department_ NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV head of the KGB Secona Chief Directorate GRIBANOV uphela NOSZNKO ' s. original decision that the KGB Should not become involved with OSWALD and_ that 'OSWALD' should not be 'permitted- to remain in the USSR. Ii There was no attempt to_ debrief OSWALD because he was I not an interesting_person and wasn t normal_ OSWALD was never questionea on his' nor asked to write an auto- biography 0301575 304 TS No. 197124 Top Secret day past Copy ================================================== Page 314 ================================================== Ooooo Secret 8 (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO did not know who even tually granted OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR H or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permita The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live in the : Moscow: area Either the Soviet Red Cross or the H Ministry 'of_Foreign Affairs may have made this 'decision to assign OSWALD to Minsk_ The Seventh- Department updated his file and it was sent along with a cover letter pre- pared by' KRUPNOV, to. the' local KGB Organization in Minsk 4 KRUPNOV S letter summarized the case and specifically in- structed local authorities there to take no action con- cerning, OSWALD 'except to observe his activities passively to make sure that he: was; not an American Intelligence agent on temporary 0I sleeper" status:_ NOSENKO reaa this 'letter_ and it was S_ igned by DUBAS; . On the basis Of the instructions contained in the letter NOSENKO said, no active could 0 be taken in Minsk_Without: KGB Headquarters approval It was NOSENKO S opinion that, the_only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted Of periodic checks_ at his 0d place 9f employment, questioning of his neighbors and associates and coverage Of his mail After OSWALD S threatened second Suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its 1 hands_ of him" and that even ; though there was considered to be some possibility that he was; a 'sleeper agent, KGB : Headquarters interestin him while he was in Minsk was 'practically nil Request to Return te' the 'USSR 0 TheKGB Second Chief Directorate was not: concerned with OSWALD S return to the United States in June 1962 by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh 0 Department No: further word on him was received at KGB Feadquarters until he appearea at the: Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September: 1963 and requested- a visa to return to the Soviet Union_ The Mexico Legal Residency 1 reported his visit to KGB Headquarters: by cable re- questing information The KGB First Chief Directorate had no record on_ OSWALD. M:I. TURALIN Deputy Chief of 8 the First Chief Directorate S' Service Number: Two (Counter- intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD The Chief 0f the Sixth Section 0f the Seventh Department, V-K: ALEKSEYEV , received the call and reported the in- quiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO 305 TS No. 197124 Secret 310 Top steps 0001576 Top Copy ================================================== Page 315 ================================================== Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time ALEKSEYEV was given OSIALD ' s background including his suicide attempt ana the fact that he was not considered normal and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union ALEKSEYEV relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate_ NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico and he knew of no contacts between OSIALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere Comment: Independent sources _ however_ reported on visits by OSWALD to the Cuban_ as well as Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September ana 3. October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of 'any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office Of Seventh Department Chief K.N _ DUBAS when a cable arrived at Moscow Head - quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico The cable , which NOSENKO said he did not personally see reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico requesting permission to return to the USSR ana that the cable specified that OSWALD had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministzy personnel 8001577 306 TS No. 197124 Top Secret City City_ City only - Copy ================================================== Page 316 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January. 1964) Post-Assassination Review of 'KGB File NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD' s activities as a result of President Kennedy" S assassination. About two- hours after President: Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact in' a telephone call_ to his home from KGB 'Headquarters A short while later he was told; again by telephone that the President had died . About two hours later NOSENKO was tola; that OSNALD 'had' been arrested, and he and the other officers of the American Tourist Section were callea in to determine whether: the KGB had any information concerning hin_ After establishing OSWALD S identity from KGB .: files and learning that his file_ was still in Minsk NOSENKO phoned the KGB office in Minsk on GRIBANOV'"s orders The local KGB dictated over the telephone a summary of its file on OSIALD This summary: concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk had attemptea: to influence OSWALD: :in the right direction' II GRIBANOV. . had been 'greatly disturbed about the local KGB:' s efforts because it had; :been given specific instructions to carry out 'nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD there He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to OSWALD stay there as well as an explanation of the meaning; of the ;statement about influencing : OSWALD _ be flown immediately_ to Moscow by military aircraft ' NOSENKO personally read 'the explanation from Minsk ' concerning the meaning of this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWTALD S file when it arrived by:plane He then turnea the file over to: S .M_ FEDOSEYEV_ the Chief of the American Department of the KGB Secona' Chief Directorate, who prepared a twozpage summary memorandun for_ GRIBANOV _ This memorandum which NOSENKO read was forwarded to' KGB Chairman Semichastnyy and Semichastnyy_ in turn ~reported to the CPsu; Centrai Committee and to Khrushchev concerning it OSWALD: S' file from Minsk contained no information to indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with respect: to OSIALD contrary to instructions Erom KGB Head - quarters _ From the date of OSWALD 's arrival in the USSR' until his departure_ the KGB had no personal contact with him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner 307 TS_ No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 's '0d01578 ================================================== Page 317 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assign - ments If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had wanted to use OSTIALD in any way, it would have had to secure permission from the Seventh Department 1 which originally opened his case file_ In view of OSTIALD S apparent mental instability, no soviet intelligence organization particu- larly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage) Departnent _ 0 would have considered using him_ KGB Head - 0 quarters dia not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Minsk _ as it woula have done had OSIALD been f any operational interest The only KGB record on OSMALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him_ The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSTIALD; all information about her was kept in OSWALD ' s file_ There was no indication in OSIALD ' s file that the KGB had had any interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States_ Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file 01 and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes _ In October 1966 he again said that he reaa the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally. NOSENKO S assertion that the KGB First Chief Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect_ The consular file turned over to the U.S . Govern - ment by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSNALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier. That file contained Marina OSWALD S letter of February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from OSMALD , both of which indicated that OSIALD had 308 0001579 TS No. 197124 Secret Top Top Copy ================================================== Page 318 ================================================== 14-0000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Comment;: (Continued) earlier requested permission to return to the Soviet Union In: the last dated letter of the file one, of 9, November 1963 OSWALD advised the Soviet Embassy in,Nashington of his travel under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact with an official (whom CIA identifies as a KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City his contact: there with the Cuban Consulate and his efforts to reach Havana in order to visit the Soviet Embassy there Mithout regard to possible earlier correspondence OSNALD S request: for a Soviet visa addressed to the Embassy in ashington in July 1963 woula require the Washington Residency to report the' matter to; MoscOw: just as NOSENKO described the Mexico City: Residency later dia NOSENKO ' s: apparent ignorance of OSWALD ' s communications_ with the Soviet; Embassy in Washington discredits his claim to complete knowledge %f_ all aspects of' the KGB relationship with OSWALD _ The CHEREPANOV Papers Comment: On 4 November 1963 in: Moscow a MEZHKNIGA employee; claiming to be one: CHEREPANOV passed to an American;: book-buyer a package. which he requested the American to deliver to a trust- worthy person at the American Embassy Embassy officials found: the : package to contain a_ 'bundle *of *typed Or: handwritten documents which appeared to have roriginated in classified KGB files Fearing: a Soviet provocation which could- lead: to a denunciation of the Embassy for possessing classified Soviet Government documents Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next "day, 5 Novenber returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs_ 0001580 309 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 40 Copy ================================================== Page 319 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO related how a disaffected former KGB colleague A.N. CHEREPANOV , had stolen documents from the American Embassy Section and in November 1963 sent them through an inter- mediary to the American Embassy_ CHEREPANOV S treason was discovered _ NOSENKO said _ when the Embassy returned the documents to Soviet authorities _ CHEREPANOV fled Moscow and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search for him_ NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for CHEREPANOV The significance of the CIEREPANOV incident is twofold The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent: to the Embassy appear to have originated in the American Depart- ment S Embassy Section and the documents relate to KGB modus operandi' personnel, targets and technical devices employed in operations during 1958-1960 , during part of which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section The KGB document, the temporary duty authorization is an item of physical evidence NOSENKO has offered to substantiate his claim to personal parti- cipation in the CIEREPANOV case and to having held the rank Of KGB lieutenant colonel_ [The document does not itself refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner ] NOSENKO' s Information The KGB officer, A.N_ CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or 1921 = During World War II he was a_ KGB officer working with partisan groups behind the lines Later he was in Yugoslavia for four or_five years and was probably Deputy Chief Of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade_ Comment: CIA records contain references to an Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV a Soviet diplomat and suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in 1953 CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956 A Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in 1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an inte lligence officer 8001581 310 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 320 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) . Nhen CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow he had some (unspecifiea) problem getting a job_ but finally the KGB Second Chief Directorate took him into_ the American Embassy Section of the American Department working against State Department personnel: in the: Administrative Section of the Embassy He worked in the Same room as V.A= KUSKOV and was case officer for three KGB targets Richard SNYDER_and John McVICKAR_ Pe"goulej officers, and Marion ALBAMONTR _ Secretary to, thel6 perse officer CHEREPANOV' s work as a case officer was poor and as it grew_ worse the KGB decided to retire him_ Because of his Service in World :War II for which he: received three years pension credit for each year Of: military service he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for retirement Also,_ he was just over the minimum: age (40) for retirement from: the KGB _ Upon retiring in. July or; August 1961 CHERFBANOV : got a job: with MEZHKNIGA Unhappy about his enforced retirement and angry at the KGB he became even more dissatisfied when MEZHKNIGA turned; down his several attempts' to' go abroad Prior to leaving the KGB CHEREPANOV haa stolen draft copies; of documents he had handled in the , Embassy Section In one case he copied the contents of a report in his' own handwri evidently having been unable to steal the document itself All ;Of the' documents he had stolen were intended for destruction. In November 1963 Yu: I GUK brought NOSENKO news about 6i a catastrophe in the KGB GUK saia he had the. story from B D: MAKASHEV: a common friend of GUK and NOSENKO _ MAKASHEV had been in Foreign Minister Andrey: 'Gromyko S office when the_ CHEREPANOV papers were: brought there after 'their' delivery by Thomas FAIN of the Embassy_ MAKASHEV saw the name Of (Second Chief: Directorate Chief) GRIBANOV on some 'of the papers and saw: that: one of them was a plan for agent opera- tions against an American. He noted that one of the documents was' at least an inch thick Gromyko immediately called KGB Chairman Senichastnjy , who 'notified GRIBANOV _ GRIBANOVAs;:: deputy:wentto Gromyko 'S office and: picked up the papers The KGB then began an investigation of all the personnel assigned' to the American Department during the time period covered by the papers 1959 to 1960 ;or 1961- 8001582 311 TS No. '197124 Top Secret 10 ting; zkkr Copy ================================================== Page 321 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB provocation ana they wondered what the Russians were trying to do _ The Embassy officials photographed the documents and on the next returned them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs _ [hen the Americans gave the documents to the Ministry, the KGB wondered why the Americans gave them back The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during its investigation for 20 or 25 days _ When the KGB examined the documents some were found to be in CHEREPANOV ' s hand - writing, but no documents were found which pertained to CHEREPANOV ' s own case work , or that of the American Embassy Section The KGB found no documents dated later than 1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959 1960 and 1961- Thus there were a number of indications pointing towards CHEREPANOV who had left the section in 1961 The KGB did not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him, but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into sone precipitous action a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him. who _ in the course of conversation mentioned the great disturbance in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents to the Americans . CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the news and was quite cool about the matter The next the surveillance post observea hin leaving his house in the morning at his usual time apparently on his way to work_ but the surveillance post at his office soon reported that he had not arrived at work _ He had II 'simply dropped out Of sight" An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued , then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls were tightened photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to Republic and local KGB and militia offices and all means of transport were covered , Reports began coming in from various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV ' s description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there_ Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast strongly indicated the possibility of CHEREPANOV ' s presence there , so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check _ 0301583 312 TS No. 197124 Secret they day day Top Copy ================================================== Page 322 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO went: to" 'Gorkiy on the fourth: after CHRRE - PANOV ' s disappearanie The area- was covered with very: deep woods "where a person could_ l0s himself for life" 10 On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku where he was on hhis way to the Iranian horder A special' plane wis imnediately sent to Baku carrying "'S.M_ FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi cers. They ,brought CIIEREPANOV immediately back to. Moscow interrogating him on the plane He immediately confessed to having given the documents to_ the Americans Nhen asked: why he said he was 16. angry at the KGB' very angry and besides , he thought he mi ask the Americans for some money in return- for the documents He confessed that on 4 November he had: passed the documents to: 'an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books He saia he: had given the docunents to the American in_ the entrance hallway in the buflding of the: Ministry of Foreign Affairs_ the building in which the:Ministry .Of Foreign: Trade was also housed Because CHEREPANOV nad eluded the: KGB: between the two fixed surveiijance posts which: had been established the Secona Chief Directorate suffered.considerable. criticism for not putting: CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance CHEREPANOV himself 'however told the: KGB: that if he had detected his surveillants he woula have written to: the government ana newspapers a letter f protest against "such_ an indignity such persecution and then_ wou ld, have committed suicide leaving: the KGB without proof_ of his guile. Comment NOSENKO S assertions with respect to :the CHEREPANOV case however are not material to his claim that he_ was Deputy Chief: f the Seventhi Department at the time 0301584 0l] 313 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 day ght Copy ================================================== Page 323 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH- DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Contents gf the CHERFPANOV Package The KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package totalled 103 pages in the original Russian version divided almost requally between typewritten reports in final form and hand - written draft reports or notes plus two copies of letters written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. Tne longest single document was a 33-page Secret report, dated 18 April 1959 entitled "Operational Conditions in the U.S.A= and the Activities of American Counterintelligence Organs against Soviet Installations ana Soviet Citizens in the U.S.As in 1957-1958" The report was signed by Colonel A FEKLISOV , {alias FOMIN the former KGB rezident in Nashington] whose title is given as "Chief First [American] Department , First Chief Directorate" The rest of the documents refer to KGB coverage of various American Embassy and American diplomats in Moscow during the 'period August 1958 to 15 October 1960 _ Most of the documents were prepared by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section First Department Second Chief Directorate Major V_ KUSKOV _ (NOSENKO has identified V.A= KUSKOV as: an officer of the Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV from about 1958 to 1961.) Two reports were on Americans who 'had left the Soviet Union Edward L KILLHAM, Second Secretary from 1957 to July 1959 and Nallace L. LITTELL Attache from June 1956 to 1958 There were operational plans for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed in MOscow = 0 Richard HARMSTONE Lewis [v LOIYDEN James As RAMSEY and George WINTERS Other documents- included were an agent S report of her relationship with WINTERS a summary Of LANGELLE S activities while in the USSR_ a list of Soviet citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted by the KGB , a handwritten summary (signed by CHEREPANOV) . of derogatory information on a Soviet youth who had been in touch with American Consul Richard SNYDER , and various hand - written drafts and notes on the foregoing Americans _ 0001585 314 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top Top July July Copy ================================================== Page 324 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)- The operational plan on WINTERS_ as an example _ 'indicated that WINTERS had already been ' identifiea as- an intelligence officer and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence activities the KGB was to employ round-the-clock surveil- lance technical aids metka and: NEPTUNE-80 " audio surveil- lance _ and investigation Of his contacts among Soviet citizens: The plan reflected that while the KGB. judgment was that: WINTERS It had a hostile attitude toward the USSR and that there I _ was no basis: for recruitment care shoula be taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country prematurely since there still might arise an opportunity to attempt to recruit him NOSENKO said. that he had never seen the documents CHEREPANOV passed" tq the Embassy _ although: he was familiar with their substance: Comment The information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had said earlier in 1962 regarding WINTERS LANGELLE HARMSTONE _ and Embassy Section operational techniques such as the use_ Of metka NOSENKO S Travel Document When' NOSENKO first relatea to CIA in Geneva in 1964 his knowiedge of. the CHEREPANOV case , he produced- a document (see Ii accompanying exhibit) which he said was his 'official KGB_ temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast 1 to search for CHEREPANOV . The document 'signed by General 'GRIBANOV authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to travel: to Gorkiy during the_ period immediately before NOSENKO s, trip to Geneva_ 15-30 December 1963_ NOSENKO. acknowledged that it was to have kept the document and to have brought it with him from the Soviet Union He did he saia to show CIA: 315 TS_ No. 1197124 Top Secret 10 Viilegal" iti 0j01586 Copy ================================================== Page 325 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTTENT January 1962-January 1964) Comment: NOSENKO has never provided a satisfactory explanation for his retention Of the docunent nor for bringing it to Geneva According to an earlier KGB defector the bearer Of a temporary duty authorization is held strictly accountable for the document which has to be turned in with the financial voucher What- ever NOSENKO S purpose 1 the effect of presenting the document to CIA was to corroborate his statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate his clain that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel_ NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350) , When he eventually said in 1966 that he was only a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to explain how he came to possess an official KGB document signed by General GRIBANOV and identifying him as a lieutenant colonel . NOSENKO asserted that it came about mistake" Return to Geneva (January-February 1964) NOSENKO was detailed a secona time to perform security escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference ana he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to defect. He brought with him a considerable number Of hand - written notes to which he referred when .describing to CIA officers KGB_ operations Of which he claimed he learned at KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963 _ His delegation . security duties. were not onerous He visited the Geneva Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration fron Switzerland tentatively scheduled for some three weeks later_ A little more than a week after his arrival, however NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once , because he had received cabled instructions to return to the USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was taken from Switzerland to Germany , and on 12 February he was brought to the United States_ 316 0001587 TS No. 197124 Top Secret "by Copy ================================================== Page 326 ================================================== 4-00oOQ Top Secret Exhibit 3 Temporary Authorization for Lt_ Ivanovich `NOSENKO, 15-30 'Decembeolo3s} FRONT @2 :E7 KArstueuhQa Eezouactoc7d Committee for Stete Security Under_ 77+0dcc6 the Council of Ministers USSR 71363 15.December 1963 1937 {Xle0e47lecY4dntodepeze Issued: to Lieutenent Colonel NOSENO Ivenovich For to: UKGB of Gor Oblast Length of temporary Roma essignment '15_ deys through: 30_December 1963 Authorizetion = directive Of Chief of a Chief Directorete Effective _ on presentation of identity docunent No_ NK-2513 0 Chief S [GRTBANOV 0f' Directorate of Department @ H22Z Committee for State Security Under the Councii of Ministers USSR e 337746 meerncicbe 4 OCCR 0801588. TS No. 197124 Secret Copy l Duty Yuriy Yuriy duty kaya tetz Top ================================================== Page 327 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Purpose %f Geneva Trip NOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that had him to Geneva that he was allowed to travel as treat beotghthei it appeared to be the last occasion he might have to travel to the [est_ [NOSEITKO said in 1962 that when he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department , as he expected to become he woula travel to the Nest every two or three years. ] He had. discussed the possibility Of the trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV , and secured his agreement _ He also talked with officers of the Soviet Delegations Department , but after it had been decided that he should go , the Chief of that Department, [N T.J ZHARIKOV _ suggested that it might be unnecessary for a security officer to accompany this particular delegation [A.G. ] KOVALENKO , the new Chief 0f the Seventh Department supported NOSENKO ' s assignment as a personal favor_ Although at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he has later asserted that GRIBANOV was not involved and that if GRIBANOV haq learned of NOSENKO ' s plans , he would: not have permitted NOSENKO to go _ NOSENKO.! s ' only ~mission was to concern himself with the general security of the delegation , as he had done in 1962 _ He had no specific tasks such as on nis earlier assignment (e.g. investigating MAKIDV or supervising the BELITSKIY L operation) Comment: NOSENKO has never satisfactorily explained why a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department wou ld draw an unrelated assignment abroad which would last many weeks if not months In another context_ NOSENKO had described a KGB conference to_ take place about this time where plans were to be drawn up for KGB operations during the coming tourist season : he acknow- ledged that he was expectea to attend , but nevertheless went to Geneva. 0001590 317 TS_ No. 197124 Top Secret 10 "a Copy ================================================== Page 328 ================================================== Ooooo Secret EXHIBIT 3 Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO , 15-30'` December 1963 REVERSE KoueuaupQB@ AnNa #c DobR#cc 3-Rkebhoro cpo*a mo Jojdpe#icbra 87 Io" Wabx"Pobka Ogrbed_OPCXCTebrTR]_088bcobka Otrct 06, IIPaCIOKobIbbeIt CBIJD Komabxapobroa cyrwar: Npe poxyrcene Opocakhoro 6bxcTa cPcxrrcatb zex JOP' reccy Kokab Iepoboarog] Yzoctobcpedee_ AAa_ re-orehdn {okdoctcpe: NOTATIONS OF' PRESENCE IN PLACES OF OTMETKH 0 WXEEELIBAHL B DYHKTAX KOMAHAHPQBK TEMPORARY DUTY ppA6bITHI% 3abepenhble L5%;; Kt. Kcb91 RtiltUs I0 Arrived in' city of Gor'kiy SUez 16 December ` 1963" Teer nvlrtno $ 4cA7 Arrived in city. of Shakhun 'ye 3 10-16866a+ 21 17 XII 1963 Did not use ~oe Utar7xeer free quarters= m Ml soess 8s-L YSscx 13 2 lezyr` S . IChief of. Shakhun 'ye Jedn eTier "fae Chief Militia Section, mepsebaKel 2a77 Militia Major_ Zi 7371;-3879e0.4 (Illegible Tocnwx "Departed .Shakhun 'ye 17/XII-63 TMETKH YiPABAELA: Did not use free querters" Towmes3793EEZZ MHHHCTPQ S . /Chief of Shakhun' ye. y6ua xs MocKBu 96 Chief Militie Section, Mpr6Na Mockby Militie Mejor_ Hai. cerpemapuama Ieaatb (Iilegible) PK8OHTETA TOCYAAPCTBEHHOH TEROmACHOCTH "Left 'Gor'kiy 17 December .1963 Tt DPE COBETE MHHHCTPOB CCCP' Did not use free querters Buzano: AbaBc *e 'paczo4u no KoMaEAupoeke "eyywo Illegible) Py6: IopeaosoaExo rpegosazaa NN DOSEGI #o_ TaAOBbI Ea nAagROpry NN Cm. 6gnaxmep 0j01589 TS No:: 197124 Top Secret Top ~e Viwx Meje 0 mJu 00s8_ Copy ================================================== Page 329 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTII DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Visits to Legal Regidency As in 1962 _ NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Resi- dency daily_ According to strict rules he explained _ an officer in his status [temporary assignment which was independent Of Residency] should not do SO , but his case was exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief Of Department and because of the relationship he established in 1962 through the intervention of M.S_ TSYMBAL Illegals Direct- orate Chief TSYMBAL NOSENKO related in 1964 was an old friend; they had become acquainted in Moscow before meeting again in Geneva in 1962 when dined together TSYMBAL S wife once had taught NOSENKO in school frequently. TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in sGhooliegads Directorate NOSENKO asserted that TSYMBAL ' s introduction of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO to frequent the Legal Residency in 1964 _ Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the Residency to his "old friend Yuri GUK I not TSYMBAL He mentioned TSYMBAL ' s. presence in Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance Availability for Meetings with CIA In 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official responsibilities or any demands. on his time 1 and he was willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA_ He saia that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation coula be explained as IJ security duties I since everyone on the Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer_ From the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February_ NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings usually lasting for five or six hours _ By mutual agreement most of the meetings started in the afternoon On two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings continued until past midnight. 00u1581 318 TS No. 197124 Secret Top duty they Top Copy ================================================== Page 330 ================================================== QQooQ Top Secret (SEVENTH -DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO ' s Written Notes After returning to KGB Headquarters 'from Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO said_ he had availed himself of various opportunities to record what he learned of KGB operations in order to inform CIA, ana to pilfer appropriate KGB: documents to which he had access when he could safely do So He: brought to Geneva in 196.4 three KGB documents_ and a large number of handwritten notes; The latter reflected items which he had excerpted from various documents to which he had access principally the Seventh Department Chief S special file con taining- periodic sumaries of all Seventh Department operations He last had access to this special file he stated , in" connection with: his review of it_ in December 1963 to confirm that it was intact after the CHEREPANOV affair_ While the file contained no true names he claimed he learned such true identities as were contained in his notes by asking KGB Colleagues For ' safekeeping NOSENKO said he 'kept the notes and documents in a wall safe A] Of the office which he occupied alone , as Deputy Chief 0f the Department Questioned repeatedly' about the KGB : operations referred to in his notes NOSENKO in-many instances could not expand on: what: he had written: He insisted he: had written: everything he could discover ana knew no more. 4 8 Comment: NOSENKO S ~sourcing for the notes does not explain how he learned 0f: the cases described in the notes dating: from 1957-1959 a period not coverea by the documents NOSENKO claimed: he 4 reviewed Neither can NOSENKO explain . why he was not knowledgeable_ without the notes of operations Which occurred while he was Deputy Chief of- the Seventh" Department's American- British_ Commonwealth Section NOSENKO acknow- ledges that his access to a personal safe in 0j01592 319 TS No_ 197124 Secret 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 331 ================================================== Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Comment: (Continued) which to keep the notes was just:fortuitous , since neither all offices had such safes , nor even all offices of Deputy Chiefs _ NOSENKO s Defection On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva. phase on 24 January 1964 _ NOSENKO saia that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series he had decided to defect_ He explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, 1 and that because Of the stature ana responsibilities of his new job there woula be few if any opportunities for him to visit the West in the future Therefore , he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once leaving his family. behind He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children permitted to leave the USSR for the "1 next twenty years NOSENKO tola CIA that It the hardest thing is: to part with my family" He had however _ carefully considered their fate as the close relatives Of: a defector and he felt that, because of his mother s position in Soviet society, no harm woula cOme to them _ NOSENKO was tola that CIA accepted in principle his decision to defect_ NOSENKO felt that it woula be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace leaving all his personal possessions behina; he assumed that CIA woula exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States . He wanted to carry out this' plan as soon as possible but the CIA: officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to 1 remain in place for at least' three- weeks more The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were : ~The desire to obtain further information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet_delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access ; 320 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret 14.0008R_ being 0201593 Copy ================================================== Page 332 ================================================== 1400000 , Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January ,1962-January 1964) The value Of having_NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known to CIA through NOSENKO; 5 The potential: value to be derived from NOSENKO ' s in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva ; The necessity Of making arrangements acceptable to NOSENKO _ for his' defection and resettlement_ In a three-and-a-half hour meeting on 26 January NOSENKO : emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary: and useful for him_ to remain in; place until GRIBANOV visited Geneva , he wanted to; defect as soon as possible thereafter On 28"January NOSENKO reported that 'GRIBANOV might not be: coming to 'Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman Semichasthyy was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna_ NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV 1 S by the end of the week . On 30 January NOSENKO' said that there 'appeared to be' little likelihood that: GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris_ (From: 77 to 10. February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris; where he was seen on the street with_ a Soviet identified as a KGB counterintelligence officer.] by NOSENKO to: defect right away: He cited as Therefore_ he wanted reasons the emotional strain Of any further: delay and the fact: that: he*and his case officers were wasting- their time working against the local KGB Legal: Residency which had no worthwhile or promising targets _ He also felt: that nothing Of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because: " Tsarapkin himself doesn t_know what he will say until he: is told: by Moscow the before CIA' handlers , however delayed the defection for one week by obtaining_NOSENKO' s agreement to assist in an- audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening' devices in the offices Of the KGB Legal Residency_ and NOSENKO said he_ would check certain physical of the. delegation buildings As the best time fozspeets defection he suggested Saturday morning 8 February because he probably wou ld not be missed until the Eoilowing 321 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Top only trip: day 0a01594 ================================================== Page 333 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (SEVEITTH DEPARTMCNJT January 1962-January 1964) Ilonday This date was tentatively scheduled , ard IO:FIKO again repeated his desire sinply to "digappear without a Ii trace He also asked about exfiltration plans On 31 January NOSEIIKO reported the results of his reconnaissance bf the KGE Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation 1 which woula involve: microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current_ He told CIA he had accidentaliy overheara in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator and therefore the scheme woula not work He repeated his Willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers_ (see p.309) which he was tola were en route from 'Washington _ He explained that Ile had been alarmed at the previous meeting because the delegation was supposed to move from its hotel to a Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappea - rance would be noticed more quickly: This move as he had now learned has been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from MoscOw_ At NOSENKO S request on 1 February , it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place on the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would Le by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States , and his case officers confirmed his assumption On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHERFPANOV materials The defection was still scheduled for Saturday , 8 February. NOSEMKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel roOn in the early afternoon of 4 February and said: II I want to come now and not go back II After arrivirg at the CIA safehouse he explained that when he dropped: by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB con fererce on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly: to Moscow via Paris the following day and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO ' s duties as security officer for the Soviet delegation in Geneva _ Before he had left for Geneva .in January, NOSENKO then related , the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had 0d01595 322 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 334 ================================================== 14-QQ000: Top Secret (SEVENJTII DEPARTMENT January, 1962-January 1964) agreed to open a number of new cities and' tourist itineraries in this connection Semichastnyy had decided that it was time to call a conference to ciscuss new Mi. tactics and stra- tegies" for handling the increased number of tourists_ expected_ Since 'ITOSENKO . had" been placed" in charge_ Of the entire conference he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling_ of tourists; the report woula be read to the conference either .by hinself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB. or the Second Chief: Directorate_ NOSENKO explained that he Was_ the on ly one who coula, do this jol as Lt Col A.G . KOVALENKO _ the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this 'line of operations having been there only four 3 or five years, perhaps less . NOSENKO also told CIA that-"by great_ coincidence It he had learned , just before' the cable arrived he was. being moved to the 'Soviet villa on the morning of 5 . February_ He had arrangea for a Soviet chauf feur to bring a car around at '0930 hours the next' morning_ for the move His absence would be noted: at that time and therefore; "the main is to cross: the Swiss border ] before morning NOSENKO . felt, however that there woula be considerable confusion among the: Soviets in Geneva' for a time following his disappearance and that there: would be 8 no real_ concern until the' evening To foster Soviet uncertainty; he' had left his clothing lying arouna his 'hotel room and had brought: no personal effects to, the CIA Safe- house NOSENKO estimated the first: Soviet queries to Swiss_ authorities would probably be_ made late on 5 February Or early: On the_ 6th d NOSENKO Was driven to Frankfurt: the' night of 4,February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February when press publicity about the defection and Soviet denands for an immediate: interview with NOSEMKO' dictated that he be brought to Nashington as soon: as- possible_ He arrivea in the: United: States on' the evening 9f-;l2 February 1964 323 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 thing C001526 Copy ================================================== Page 335 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVEMTTE DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Knewledge @f Other Seventh Department Operations The notee NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see P.319 ) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB 1 Oparatione conducted: egeinst what NOSENKO described 4s touriste during the 1962-1963 period _ For reesona cfted in the deecrIption of these operetions in Annex B these Opefationg ere not material to TOSENKO ' s claim to service in 1962-1963 38 either Chief of che American-British Contonwee leh Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depertment. 0301587 325 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 336 ================================================== Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-Jaruar 1964). Operational Activities; July 1962-January 1964; Summary To substantiate his claims to havina served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period HOSENIKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of GVENCHANSKIYOG 06 the arrests ofdKOTEN and: BARGHOORN_ and the investigat ons bof [SLESINGER} OSWALD and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV 6l his discovery that [SHUBIN was a GRU agent 1 and his agsignment to Geneva Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described there are substan- tial reasons why they might; have: been conducted: by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department) they are atypical with respect to NOSEIIKO' s own Gescription of Seventh Depart ment operations_ They do not 2ccurately characterize as NOSENKO claims KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Departmert service NOSENKO ' s. explanations for his assignment to Geneva' in 196.4' are n0 more plausible than for his earlicr assignment there in 1962 HJOSENKO has asserted that; he; was not 'a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indiceted; but a captain a rank incongruous with a' Deputy Chief of Department and;one from which he presumably would have been . promoted: as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held 0 9 KGB: Counterintelligence Operations 8 Anong American Tourists 1962-1963 Because of his position: as a Deputy Clief then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department ; NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture Va;_ with rcspec} to 0301588 326 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Copy Top 4/6r ================================================== Page 337 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENTT January 1962-January 1964) tourist operations_ and specifically, awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists _ Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE The KGB agent" in MI-6 , George BLAKE in 1959 furnished the KGB with a documentary account 0f the joint CIA-MI-6 meeting in June of that year (see p.148 ) and he was to furnish other information by which the KGB could keep current on such hostile operations Another CIA-MI-6 meeting was held in Mashington in April 1960 , of which a twenty-one page summary was made BLAKE also passed this document as soon as it came into his possession to the KGB KGB Study American Inte lligence Tourist Operations The lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier (see p.149 ) reflects the detailed and accurate information in possession Of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO ' s alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963_ Pertinent portions are quoted-as follows : It It has been established that the Intelligence organs Of the: USA are displaying special activity in the utilization of legal channels specifically_ in tourism for the purpose Of conducting subversive work against the USSR Numerous facts indicate that American tourists and members of various US delega- tions, in the USSR strive to visit areas ana instal- lations to which employees Of the Embassy and mili- tary attaches have no access , establish oontact with Soviet citizens_ and collect intelligence informa- tion_ In this regara the channels of tourism to the USSR are used to dispatch experienced intelligence agents to develop individual Soviet citizens with the objective of their eventual recruitment. In line With the preparation and dispatch of such agents among the tourists the Americans also make extensive use of persons not directly connected with American In telligence organs _ These latter agents are given one-time assignments such as collecting information leading to the ideological development of Soviet citizens _ 8801589 327 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 310 Of Copy ================================================== Page 338 ================================================== OQooo Top Secret (SFVENTH DEPARTMENT ~January 1962-January 1964) "Nith the Objectives Of accomplishing subversive activities a so-called Information Center; has been ` established in the; US with the participation 0f the Department of State The 'Center Officially: advertises: that its, purpose is to; inforn intending American tourists to the Soviet Union about the opportunities and restrictions existing there Actually however _ the 'Center' is involved in the ideological preparation of American tourists' whom it instructs regarding their conduct in the Soviet Union and the methods to' be used there for andi the American of life The "centepag-_ collects information "about the Soviet Union from returning American tourists including the political attitudes 0f certain Soviet citizens their addresses , etc The direction of the 'Center" i controlled by experienced intelligence officers of CIA "Candidates for; missions to the USSR- are 'selected carefully- They ordinarily possess sknowledge of the Russian language know the fundamentals 0f photo-_ graphy have . specific technical training and must look: upon their mission as- a responsible_ assignment and: not;as a pleasure: American Intelligence Organs prefer to use persons Who:have_previously visited the: USSR and person: having relatives there "II Once: selected; , the American tourist agent is instructed as to his intelligence assignment and lis route and he} is acquainted with the security conditions in the USSR,_including passport controls documentation and custons controls the hazard of bothphysical and technical: Surveiilance_ as well as: the possibility -Of provocations ana compromise making _ the agent vulnerable to blackmail: 11 Among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks there are included visual observation and clandestine photography_ the establishment 0f contact with Soviet citizens, and spotting aong such citizens persons who may be developed as sources of information For American Intelligence_ Soviet citizen, 1 regardless Coo16G0 328 TS No. 197124 Top Secret zing way trip: any Copy ================================================== Page 339 ================================================== 14-0000 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) of his social status or his personal access to important information , is of interest _ because of his ability to travel to regions of the USSR whicn are of interest to American Intelligence_ I1 American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB agents Soviet citizens who too openly express anti- government sentiments who volunteer information about friends or relatives who work in secret establishments who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but display an awareness Of security principles who quickly request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a good' knowledge 0f foreign languages_ Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet Union Erom 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960 , the docu- ment instructs a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residen- cy abroad Ii to utilize all its resources to expose among American tourists persons suspected of belonging to the enemy in- te_ lligence or counterintelligence organs II Promising its" assistance _ KGB Headquarters instructs the Legal Residency, Ii to inform KGB Headquarters of foreigners temporariIy visiting the USSR who are Of operational interest in the work against the main eneny [the U.S. ] with this aim the Legal 'Residency shoula intensify its work against local services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence work in the USSR; determine thle role played by anti- Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; ex- ploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR = with the aim of obtaining information regarding tne firms being exploited by hostile intelligence services ; and telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Head- quarters regarding tourists believed to be Of operational interest, including the individual s surnane name pat- ronymic , date of birth_ 1 profession date to arrive in the (JSSR _ 1 means of travel _ 1 tinerary description 0f group with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent information available to the Legal Residency about the 0J01601 329 TS No. 197124 10 Secret Top Top Copy ================================================== Page 340 ================================================== OoQqQ Top Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) tourist. The Iegal Residency is clude nGere Rosslble emsodencouristurtreuodizected to in- Residency informing KGB groups agents .of the presence and advising how HeadgKGEtecs in advance of their agents in the USSR if it KGB could contact the tie Legal Residency isitnsboucebecomerceieasa5y" Lastly_ aid; including financial to provide all possible favorably disposed tcitheagSSRtaace SO that persons objective of' tileir recrui can visit there; with the' purpose %f exposing tment: in the Soviet Union for the tourists_ intelligence agents" among Eothehe NOSENKO S Information NOSENKO insisted that the operations ly reflected the extent of: KGB he,described accurate- Gevegtheepa:tmeoirte;t 8f_KGg 6ount863-19.3 gervi_ operations Department_ In response: to service in the terrogation_ NOSENKO asserted that tqeeseventhducing his in- bile his absence in 1960-1961, had Seventh Department_ tourism had increased and: that noted tilat It automo -' increased its use Of multi-national toerican Intelligence had that tne Seventh: Department tourist groups_ He stated 1960-1961 regarding Amer received: no information a cover for espionage; 'ican Intelligence use Of tourism conducted in He was aware he said; from as American the KGB after; GOLITSYN: S the damage opericionInteldocence-had ?btafeed a KGS documereconotc that a document_which: had been on tourist Department {written in the Seventh Comment NOSENKO does not' know thne ment_ which he describes content Of the docu- vey similar to the as a statistical sur- 1959 (see: p he himself drafted in 0301602 330 TS No. 197124 Secret enemy during only during survey study: 146) Top Copy ================================================== Page 341 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 27 Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) KGB Sounterintelligence Operations Among Aerican Tourists; Sumary BLAKE S confession and evidence obtained KGB docuents establish the KGB from internal American tourist concern for the threat of actions to 'tzwatt ageat operations and the scope of KGB statenents is that tnreat _ The effect of NOSENKO ' 8 tourist tne KGB did not know of the American aescribeageccurzcgfan He averred that the operations he detefibgencecopetatioepdGten the nature Of KGB counter- operations the period SEVENTH DEPARTMENT 1962-1964: Summary ana Conclusion GenercorGRrg to NOSENKO 1 in January 1962 , at the direction GRIBANOV he was appointed Chief of the of partment American-British Seventh De_ that he soon would 'beonaoedealte Section in the expec - Department. As a Section named 2 Deputy Chief of the Seventh and supervised all Second Chief he personally handled agents American and British Chief Directorate operations against scribes four_ In shiSonacioaalos tourists ; Of which he de- unrelated of period NOSENKO also was assigned the Soviet serving as a security escort officer with delegation traveliing to Geneva in which a vestigated a delegate of suspected capacity he in- Geneva he drew also the assi loyalty , SHAKHOV _ While in case officer S gnment of supervising another KGB On that visit toaGegevent of the KGB double agent BELITSKIY _ 1962 NOSENKO ciafesevh NOSENKO first contacted CIA In of tnree that as GRIBANOV promised he became one this Deputy Chiefs Of tie entire Seventh position he learned of all KGB Department; in can tourists _ In this connection operations against Ameri- as well as his accidental he described five operations American GRU agent_ and discovery Of the identity of an disaffected former tne investigation and search for a KGB colleague _ In '1963 NOSENKO states 0001603 331 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top during tancy duty: July July Top Copy ================================================== Page 342 ================================================== 4-0ooQo Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) he became First: Deputy Chief of: the Again assigned to escort a Seventh' Department 1964 _ NOSENKO met CIA delegation to Geneva in January notes' Of KGB operaCionsedreweititives again and delivered last meeting with CIA in f962ichE he had learned since his time a KGB travel docuent He; also presented at this Of lieutenant colonel to- substantiate his claimed rank a telegrenareccolonglhinFtoalosco he announced the receipt 'Of CIA to accept his igediate defect an event which prompted defection: NOSENKO ' s. claimed date of transfer into partment is in dispute because the Seventh De- regarding his Embassy Section of- contradictory clains he made formation sustaining his tloinactinaveeb He provides no in- American-British Comonwealth have' become Chief Of the his functions does not 'aeffer Maceioai nis description of connection with his ear dieferlditegigez7 from that given' in tion as a case officer and service in the same sec- nor supervisorf; fespoesibildtiesdesgonees no adinistrative with one exception was None of his claimed agents tions' he described employed in Seventh Department flicts in his Because. of con tradictions and tne opera- NOSENKO Eibes forying accounts neither Of the reasons con is credible- In: his assignment: to Geneva in 1962 or 1964 the feveslegatIonGenegaA it 18 implausible that he conducted dia not supervise SHAKHOV as he claims and he clearly SKIY_ the, Ilanagement of the double agent BELIT- NOSENKO ' offers nine 01 tourist served: in the_1962-1964 perioa cases as evidence that he of the time as Deputy Chief in, ehe Seventh. Department part religious figuree 'Evo Chueficanhes cases which included two suspected FBI agent a Fiesicchieonirecto one , emigre_ one tended to a_ Soviet citizen Directorate targetewho in- resident or formerpermanent a hostage ; and a permanent have aspects for:which KGB resident Of the `Soviet Union all Department have `been elements other than the 'Seventh anomalies Of NOSENKO: s; responsible This fact and the the cases are 'evidence: EGccuNos of the cases aside_ however period: in the Seventh that NOSENKO diq serve the suasive of his claim to DeRavemeeer 'although are not per that latter claim must rest been Deputy Chief A judgment of primarily on_ an appraisal of other 0301604 332 TS No. 197124 Secret Top_ marry: may during they Top Copy ================================================== Page 343 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964 aspects of his statements_ including supervisory duties and to tne those relating to his torate operations nature of Second Chief Direc- against American and other foreign tourists. NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he ant colonel_ a rank was a lieuten- Deputy Chief of appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate promoted beyond teearanene; and asserts that he was never rank Of captain_ in Most damaging to NOSENKO ' 8 claims that he the Seventh Department is his was a supervisor describes KGB Coupterieteliigece opertico that he accurately particularly American tourists _ epeeations against foreign officer would be aware of 'thetsecondsehicf Seventh Department occupation with American tourists : Chief Directorate s pre- the extent of KGB activities If NOSENKO is unaware Of tourists_ he was not a Seceioin_ connection with American Seventh Department_ Chief of Deputy Chief of the Conclusion NOSENKO ' 8 claims_ that in 1962 he was Chief Of American-British Commonwealth Section the Deputy Chief of the Seventh and was thereafter a Department . 1 are not credible _ 333 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top c2O1ec5 Top Copy ================================================== Page 344 ================================================== 14-00ooo_ Secret CHAPTER IX OTHER ASPECTS QE NOSENKO S KGB SERVICE Most of NOSENKO ' s assertions can be examined in a chrono- logical fashion , as has been done in the proceding sections _ Some can most easily be examined separately _ since they relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor to any specific position he claimed he occupied but to his entire KGB career_ The principal aspects in this category of claims are those he made about his relationship with Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV his Party status, his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures his sourcing of KGB operations 1 awards he earned for KGB service , and his KGB rank Relationship with General GRIBANOV From his first meeting with CIA in 1962 _ NOSENKO main- tained' that he had a close personal and professional rela- tionship with Major General GRIBANOV Chief Of the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together conversations had on operational matters the role which GRIBANOV played in his promotions , awards and assignments_ and their after hours carrousing_ According to NOSENKO , GRIBAIIOV was wholly responsible _ against NOSENKO S wishes for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the American Department' Embassy Section in 1960 and when NOSENKO later rejected GRIBANOV S offer to make him Chief of the entire American Department it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section ana Fho shortly thereafter appointed him a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department 8801606 335 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Tcp they Top Copy ================================================== Page 345 ================================================== 1A-QOOOQ Secret (QTIER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S KGB CARECR) NOSENKO ' s' Information Post 1964 Immediately' following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special: and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO ' s KGB service Under interrogation however NOSENKO could not sustain this clain_ The 'extent NOSENKO s statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence is seen from the following exanples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that coula be given (Retracted GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO ' s fitness reports) NOSENKO and 'GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO Retracted NOSENKO recalled only two occasions and 'coula relate only One in any detail:)i recruitea Edward SMITH (see P: 3 7) together with NOSENKO (Retracted NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit? ment attempt ana was not in Embassy Section at time. ) NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplonatic_receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that Trench Ambassador Dejean was GRIBANOV ' s agent (Retracted _ "NOSENKO accompanied 0001607 336 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy Top 1Ge ================================================== Page 346 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (OTEER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S KGB CAREER) GRIBAIJOV on only one such occasion ana learned from "friends" in 1958-1959 about (DeJean) GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy Section in 1960 as Deputy Chief to supervise code clerk operations (Contradicted NOSEMKO was not Deputy Chief and did not supervise code clerk operations) ; GRIBANOV NOSENKO ' s operational plan for MOROITEl' s reGRUBtment apReovected.O6 The plan was written by another KGB officer.) GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to prepare on foreign intelligence services use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed fecall with GRIBANOV . ) ; GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly to lieutenant colonel from the rank of captain and (subse- quently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to lieutenant colonel (Retracted; NOSENKO never was promoted past the rank of captain.) ; GRIBANOV was instrumental in NOSENKO ' s receiving personal commendations from the KGB Chairman the Orders of the Red Banner the Red Star and the Order of Lenin (Retracted NOSENKO received 1 awards . ) ; GRIBANOV ordered NOSEMKO: to Geneva in 1962 such (Retracted _ NOSENKO went at the request of the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department.) ; GRIBANOV orderea NOSENKO to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted_ NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.) ; GRIBANOV allowed NOSENKO to go, to Geneva in 1964 _ a_ personal favor" (Retracted GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO was to return to Geneva a second time.) : and finally, GRIBANOV was NOSENKO ' s patron (Retracted Their relation- was no closer than their relative rank and position indicated.) Conclusion NOSENKO s contradictions and retractions with respect to his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single and most important unretracted claim that NOSENKO , on GRIBANOV ' s appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department _ 0001608 337 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top study "as ship 2/kr Top Copy ================================================== Page 347 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S' KGB CAREER) Communist: Status In addition to other 'for the KGB must nothellytbengemnu requirements, candidates members_ The Significance ef CCOSENKGt or: Komsomol his Party status is tceneetent NOSENK?_ S statements about With what is- to which are consistent sithONOSElsot activity in the egconsiatent s account of.his KGB and career_ NOSENKO said his formal Eceigomsenc began in late 19_ Rarticepatio_ Or- in Communist Komsomol at the .Naval 1944 when he joined was a casual: one "eeNazid, Pzezaratozy in Baku The thought Iainl} beceuseidiland he took it without much Ee' continued his pro Eorma of his friends were joining in the Naval ana when he menbership in the Komsomoi while Spring_ 1953 _ he transferred transferred It to the KGB in_ organization from his Naval routinely to the KGB Komsomol He was registered with RU : Komsomol unit in the referring the matter_ the KGB Komsomol he said eiEhotic_ to his former Baltic thout Komsomol unit Comment: According to knowledgeable KGB member S acceptance in defectors a is contingent upon the another Komsomol unit individuai "S former endorsement of the by the KGB Komsomol unit; NOSENKO ' s acceptance matter to.his without: referring the impossible- I1 Komsomol unit in the Baltic In Ehe fall of 1953 NOSENKO secretary of the Second Chief claims he was elected zation: He was' elected , he Directorate Komsomol organi- Komsomol membership_ said; at a meeting of the 6O016C9 338 TS No_ 197124 _ Secret Top Party Party they known Party- Party early step RU _ "is Top Copy ================================================== Page 348 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO' S KGB CAREER) Comment: The Komsomol membership elects the Komsomol Committee _ The latter elects the secretary. NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol tary in any specific manner . He does not know who secre- secretary Of the KGB Komsomol was the describe his dealings with chafrgEfizatio_ nor could he official's office _ Comment: The secretary Of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization is directly subordinate to the KGB Komsomol secretary and woula have occasion to deal with the latter frequen 1 NOSENKO stated that he dia not know whether there Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol was a Second Chief Directorate, but that the secretary of the ordinarily held yearly Congresses were Comment: The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was 1 hela in March 1954= entailing considerable work by every Komsomol nenber and especially by the unit secretaries _ As Komsomol secretary NOSENKO collected the dues of the members of his unit: Aii members paid in the percent of their monthly salaries _ amount of two 339 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top only tly. 0j01610 Copy ================================================== Page 349 ================================================== Ooooo Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' $ KGB' CAREER) Comment: Komsomol dues were calculated scale in which members on a sliding monthly paid 5 percent earning 500 rubles; 1500 rubles: paia one those earning 500 to earning over 1500 reblesceata and those' paid 1.5 percent NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-1954 the Komsomol.member was 26 years:of maximum age for a member until he became age , and that he: was a Special privilege cameestenage in October 1954 ana that no to him: Comment: According to Komsomol statutes the maximum at the time_ would be 'age was twenty-five' a fact which known . by :a person who served Komsomol secretary at the time_ as a have thus been excluded NOSENKO would he became overage in from the Komsomol when claimed 11953 , not in 1954' 2s he The' March 1954 Komsomoi the 25 year age limit, bot Poogieed fetained year extensions in, certain providea for two-' age at the time ana- cases Because of position as, Komsomol because : of his claimed would_ have been of vital secretary the matter if the facts_ he; related interest: to' NOSENKO- were true From the' time he was dropped from Of age until he was acceptea the: Komsomol because Communist Party in Janccepte956; a candidate member of the was the officer in the KGB. NOSENKO claimed that he organization who was a member of neither 340 0801611_ TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Top only Copy ================================================== Page 350 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S KGB CAREER) Comnent: NOSENKO is the only Soviet official known to CIA who claims to have occupied a position of trust and who claims he was not a Party member at the time In the period following, m1 to show his eagerness It and Ii improve hinself" NOSENKO asked for Party assignments_ Foc more than a year he ran errands and collected performed other such tasks . He stated that aenepslaeerf_ and Party membership in January 1956 was 'acceptee a8piled a eandidate member in 1956 and that he was accepted as a full Party member in 1957 _ Conclusion NOSENKO ' s claims about his activity do not sustain his claims to KGB service and suffer from identical discrepancies with respect to chronology, plausibility, ana contradiction by independent sources_ It is concludea that NOSENKO was never a Komsomol secretary and , if a menber at all was no longer a member after reaching his Sixth birthday in October 1953 The period in ibicheheyh had no Party status was twenty-eight months not the fifteen he claimed and it covers the period of his first tour in the Embassy Section as well as a portion of his initial Seventh Department assignment _ An officer unqualified for Party membership is ineligible: for KGB service _ Consequently the evidence provided by examination Of NOSENKO S status indicates that he was not serving in the RGB through at least a portion of the 1953-1956 period_ 0001612 341 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Party they Party Copy ================================================== Page 351 ================================================== QoooQ Secret '(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S KGB CAREER) Knowledge %f Certain KGB_ Formg: and- Procedures In the course of his various occasion to comment generally on interrogations_ NOSENKO had procedures _ Interrogation various KGB forms and thatwhile he was on these points however developed unexpectedly thesegeeeeasome faniliar with' various aspects of these topics are some of which he was ignorant, Some his KGB and described on page in connection with others which are described below KGB Forms NOSENKO was familiar with the tnetouesStatement; inciuditg tbe anketa, the KGB Personal the_ questions included, ana the appearance , the nature of However he maintained' that it purpose: of the document in two "copies ; that it was required to' be completed_ premises _ and that it coula be completed outside of KG? consisted of four to six pages Comment The.anketa is a_ detailed, naire As: a sensitive sixteen page question- 'from ` KGB premises _ document _ it is not taken completion as Ii an Defectors describe its forgotten 1i If experience not soon to be claimed he WOLlNOSecki was 'a supervisor as he' personnel files inrefazh the form from reviewing prominent basic which the anketa is a document_ Partosgukotianntifeed that_ he had never heard 6f an Questionnaire_ Listok the Communist_ filesemplat NOSENKO stated thagtfe paa Uchetu,Kadrov) Shown but had never himself filled 'seen it in personnel personnel files he: had seen the one out Asked in whose those 9f Civilians "icteeereteesdoctcent NOSENKO first said his belief that the KGB dia etc) and finally expressed not use the: document 0001613 342 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top entrye (Lichny Copy ================================================== Page 352 ================================================== 14-00OQQ Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S KGB CAREER) Comment: The form is completed by every KGB officer and while it is not of critical importance to the KGB itself 1 a copy is filed in every officer S personnel file a fact known to any Komsomol secretary or supervisor responsible for reviewing KGB personnel files _ NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the name of the KGB personnel action form, and said he did not know of it When its purpose was described to him, he gave a superficial description Of its content. Comment: A senior KGB officer would be familiar with the form_ 1 which he would see on every occasion in which one Of his subordinates was promoted or transferred_ NOSENKO was familiar with the Employment and Service Recora (Posluzhnoy Spisok) but he claimed he filled it out in 71958, or 1957" Comment: The Employment and Service Record is completed on entry on with the KGB In citing 1957 r 1958 NOSENKO is claiming that he completed it only four o five Years after entering the KGB : 34 3 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 only duty 0001614 Copy ================================================== Page 353 ================================================== 4-DQQQQ Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF' NOSENKO ' s KGB 'CAREER) Visitor: S Pass' Procedures NOSENKO has described procedures visitor' s gaining access: to :a entailed in a non-KGB maintained that the feterfzeweKGB ianealiation; but he visitor s pass (See S name did not appear On the p 7.0 . ) Comment The interviewer' s name does a fact which a senior appear On the pass decade ' s KGB officer Of more than a since he would deadveafteru service woula recall, visitors. to KGB 'bueldieguent occasion to admit Checks of KGB Central Files NOSENIKO on 'many occasions claimed his direction of an operation that in connection with check of the: target S: name he personally performed the among" these_ cases, were BUrGigaseet KGB files: Prominent (see P.115 ) . and ABIDIAN (p:205) Comment NOSENKO could not describe performed the name checks he specifically how he description contained claimed _ and' his Among: these were numerous errors Of; fact. retained court assertions that: the Militia ana that the F records of all Soviet citizens criminal thdefisepaSveeiaroDepaftment_ holds its security card separate: from political and with the KGB tend iGee: NOSENKO was unfamiliar clearance check spetsproverka_ me- a he performed Despite NOSENKO' 5 clain that personnel henahe checks Of American Embassy Of the fiies heleadedthencfance of any aspect rate, where by the First Chief Directo- kept any KGB recora on foreigners is 0001615 344 TS No: 197124 Top Secret {UK Top Name aning Copy ================================================== Page 354 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S KGB CAREER) Conclusion NOSENKO ' s ignorance of the foregoing forms and procedures is evidence that he did not occupy the position nor perform the functions he claimed during his alleged KGB service_ Awards and Decorations Since 1964 NOSENKO has claimed to have received various awards commendations ana decorations for his KGB service _ His assertions are material to any judgent of his general credibility and as well of the validity of his claims to having occupied various KGB positions _ In January 1964 NOSENKO mentioned that in 1962 , shortly after meeting with CIA in Geneva , he received the Order of Lenin for ideas which he developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality ii of Second Chief Directorate per- sonnel in Moscow In the April 1964.interrogations NOSENKO was asked about his awards and he first saia he received the Order of the Red Banner then corrected himself to. say he received first the Order 0f the Red Star He confirmed that he received the Order of Lenin in 1963 [Earlier he had said 1962 "just following Visiting Geneva" . ] He claimed he received the Order of Lenin for his performance in his Seventh Department , assignment , but when he was askea what recruit- ments justified his receipt Of the award_ he said the main task Of the Seventh Department was not to make recruitments _ 1 but to counter the hostile intelligence service operations_ [For his contradictory statements regarding the Seventh Department' s mission_ see pages 103 and 326 ] The Order Of Lenin was the highest decoration for which a KGB officer is eligible NOSENKO said_ and besides hinself , the Chief and former Chief Of the Seventh Department received it_ NOSENKO said he received in 1962 the Order of the Red Star he "thought" 0t for his service in the Embassy Section in '1960- 1961_ not for Seventh Department service; no explanation accompanied that decoration _ 8001616 345 TS No. 197124 Top Secret J0_ Copy ================================================== Page 355 ================================================== 14-00oQo Top Secret (OTIIER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO S KGB CAREER) The question 'of NOSENKO' s awards orders and decorations were 0f some interest to the interrogators since. they might reflect the importance the KGB attached to. particular operational activities in which NOSENKO engaged _ However before_ the April 1964_ interrogations were suspended _ NOSENKO retracted his- claim. that; he received the Order of Lenin saying that it was just_ an idle boast GRIBANOV NOSENKO explained had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO CHELNOKOV _ and KOVALENKO woula receive the Order of Lenin It for creating the Central Operational Communications System of the Second Chief: Directorate within the Seventh Department but the award had not materialized before NOSENKO left for Geneva in January 1964 _ Comment: Earlier NOSENKO claimea he receivea the Order for ideas he developed to enlarge the experi- ence: and improve the quality of Second Chief Directorate personnel Questioned NOSENKO reverted to the earlier claim_ In the} April 1964 interrogations . NOSENKO was asked, to list the dates. reasons, and types Of awards decorations and bonuses: he had received in his KGB: career He replied that: he received,nothing: from 1953 until 1956 when he received_ a commendation and one month S pay for the recruit- ment of[BuRGf] [see P.115 ] by order of the KGB Chairman Serov' GRIBANOV informed him of the commendation NOSENKO said and NOSENKO saw his name on the list of recipients which was circulated; No written certificate accompanied the commen - dation_ according to NOSENKO , but personnel recorded the event in each KGB recipient s: personnel file. Almost every- year after 1956 , NOSENKO stated he received some thing "perhaps on: the KGB anniversary, or May i' or Army Day In 1957 or; 1958 NOSENKO did not recall exactly; he received 'something" from GRIBANOV _ Ii 'maybe on the anniversary Of the Soviet: Army" GRIBANOV ! s, deputy _ PEREILYEV _ made the presen- tation at an assembly of officers in the KGB Headquarters audiEorium NOSENKO said he received in 1959 a second commendation and one month S pay from KGB Chairman Shelepin IRk 346 TS No: 197124: Secret Day 0001617 Top Copy ================================================== Page 356 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF IOSEITKO S KGB CAREER) for M1 several recruitments including 06 06 36 FRIPPELV " and three British Americans MMERTENS) , DRET not recall_ citizens whose names he could Along with a large group of KGB officers NOSENKO received a commendation from GRIBANOV in 1960 he said 6t good work in general It He received in 1961 the for Red Star he statec with a Order of the case officers "for group of Second Chief Directorate general good work" ; IVASHUTIN made the presentation 1 which included a medal and a certificate which the officer may retain_ Comment: A week later , NOSENKO said that he received this award in December 1962 _ He said he recalled that the presentation was planned for the KGB Anniversary on 20 December but the presentation Ias delayed and not made until the end of the month _ In 1962 = NOSENKO claimed he received another from GRIBANOV for "general good work" and he elscoreeedvedon the Unblemished Service Award for ten years service _ Comment : At this juncture his interrogators reminded NOSENKO that his most recently claimed date 0f entry to the KGB was March 1953 _ and that in 1962 he would have had nine years service IOSENKO said that he coula not under- stand why , but he was certain he received the service award after his return from Geneva in 1962 (The date is consistent with NOSENKO"' s earlier retracted claim that he entered the KGB in 1952.) The following NOSENKO announced that he recalled he received the medal in 1962 rather than in 1963 ; the medal was awarded to servicemen as well as to KGB officers_ 0 and prior military service is taken into account in computing KGB officers time 0001618 34 7 SlRk TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 only day why Copy ================================================== Page 357 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret: (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO S KGB CAREER) Comment: (Continued) in; service NOSENKO entered the 1950 , he said_ and: should Naval RU: in medal in 1960 _ but did have received the administrative not_ because of sOme eventual claim (See p.56 for: NOSENKO ' s that he entered the RU _ in 1951.) In 1963 NOSENKO saia he received GRIBANOV ` for #i general good work" 'another commendation from: with others he would and: GRIBANOV told him that inspiring the Seventh receive the Order of Lenin for KGI; anniversary_ NOSEMevastiente On 20 Decenber 1963 the he did not actually said Lecause he left for Geneva_ in Geneva on 19 receive the medal _ [NOSENKO: arrived January. 1964.} receitecrogatae in August 1965 regarding his claim a commendation from' KGB Chai to. recruitment: of the three : Americans rman Shelepin for his in,4959 _ NOSENKO . said that he and three British Citizens of the. Red Banner for these was nominated for the Order did not receiveeitfOErobebey sbecesseuhe recruitments; but- he American Embassy Section at tbecatsae he transferred to; the time Comment NOSENKO 'apparently is referring practice Of to the KGB Bngtecsafy,C%0fBecenge decorations on KGB transferrea to tbecembess- NOSENKO claims he Embassy Section in January. Withheim OSENKO' &.clains to various KGB 'awards him during. the October 1966. was reviewed that during his KGB service he had interrogations, he said_ Army anniversary medal and an received only the Red tion of: ten . years service , anawaha for satisfactory comple- award , decoration, or that he had received no KGB commendation for his operational work 348 TS No. 197124 Secret Copy Top mixup along having 0OC1619 Top ================================================== Page 358 ================================================== 4-0oooo Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S KGB CAREER) Conclusion NOSENKO ' s claims to having been the recipient of various awards for KGB service are inextricably linked with his clained operational successes _ his rank , and GRIBAIIOV S patronage , on all of which topics he had made virtually categoric retractions_ NOSEIJKO S Sourcing NOSENKO cited four general sources for KGB operations he has related, and in all four there have been inconsistencies , contradictions and retractions_ Three of these categories, each with an example typifying the difficulty of judging the validity of his sourcing, are personal participation N . E . OCJOHNSON P. 268) cases learned in the course Of specific Obofficiai duties (SHUBIN, p. 296) and information obtained informally from KGB colleagues Robert Lee JOHNSON P. 24 ) The fourth, category of sourcing relates to the notes of KGB operations which he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 _ Regarding the notes , NOSENKO said he collected then at various opportunities in order to bring them to CIA_ He kept them in a wall safe in the: office which he occupied as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department _ [In this connection , NOSENKO admitted that not all offices had such wall safes , ana not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments_ but asserted that his did.] Most of the notes are in NOSENKO ' s handwriting: Those that are not include the copy of a typed .top secret sumary report from one Of the Seventh Department section chiefs a similar handwritten report by another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon copy of a KGB document which summarized the recruitment of an Austrian] ( businessman _ NOSENKO said he: copied the date for the remaining notes from such sources as the "Special File" which was held ordinarily by the Seventh Department Chief. According to NOSENKO , he obtained access to it for various 34 9 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 '(sgt_ only Cu01620 Copy S/BR ================================================== Page 359 ================================================== 14-0QOOO Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF ' NOSENKO S KGB CAREFR) reasons from tine to time The Special File m contained: true names; however_ and , NOSFNKO' said he obtained no names as were included in his notes such true officers for them - Questioned_ by asking Various: case on case: after case which appeared in his notes: NOSENKO insisted: that he had, written everything he coula learn and could add nothing more Conclusion NOSENKO S sourcing for many of the events he has related is not credible: NOSENKO S Rank When: he €irst: met with CIA in Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO identified himself as: a KGB officer holding the rank of major He said: at that time that he had served the requisite time in grade and expected to be pronoted shortly rank Of lieutenant; colonel to the said that he On defecting in 1964.NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel_ In the course of his career; as he initially; described ite his military rank motions had generally parallelled his pro- success= greater Spezvieoredresponsibiptices? Of in his becoming Deputy Chief of the Seventh culminating Under interrogation however queseigevegtaboeparisent; rank has: evokea 2 series of inconsistent and contradictory ments leading to his eventual assertion that he had state- advanced beyond the rank Of captain The matter of never statements about his rank is significant with NOSENKO ' s general_ credibility, to the fact that he_ respect to his in 1964 a KGB document identifying brought to Geneva colonel and to the him as a lieutenant he held paradox that as a company grade officer supervisory positions in which KGB officers of significantiy senior rank were his subordinates_ 0001621 3'50 TS No. 197124 Top Secret KGB Jively Copy ================================================== Page 360 ================================================== DoooQ Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' s KGB CAREER) In June 1962 NOSEITKO volunteered that he was then a but that he woula soon be promoted to lieutenant colonel In 1964 in Frankfurt awaiting transportation to the United States_ NOSENKO reviewed and approved a biographic statement which included the claim that he had been a senior lieutenant in the American Embassy Section from 1952 (sic) until 1955 , that he was promoted to captain in 1956 _ to major in 1959 , and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963 In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO claimed that at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954 [not in 1952] he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant. When it was pointed out to him that that was less than a' year after he. entered the KGB _ he asserted that his Naval RU service was taken into consideration_ Asked in June 1964, to list his promotions, chronologically , NOSENKO asserted that he became a senior lieutenant in 1953 in 1956 a captain in 1959 a major and in October [in Geneva _ just afterwards he said November] 1963 he was advised by Personnel that he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and afterwards was personally congratulatea by General GRIBANOV _ NOSENKO dia not recall the month 0f his earlier promotions Comment: KGB ' defectors have commented that it woula be unusual for a KGB fficer not to recall his date of rank , from which he computes his seniority and time in grade towards his next promotion _ In January 1965 while discussing his role as case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN NOSENKO volun- teered out of- context that he had never been a major nor was he promoted to captain in 1956 as he had clained earlier_ He explained that he became eligible for captain in 1956 _ but his promotion was withheld as punishment because he had obtained treatment for a venereal disease under an alias 1 351 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret 10 Top major 8001622 Copy ================================================== Page 361 ================================================== 14- QooQo _ Secret (OTHER' ASPECTS OF NOSENIO' $ KGB , CAREER) with the use of KGB operational thus he was a senior lieutenant documents He stated: that GRIBANOV had: promised him still in 1959 , and although to major at that time'_ that: he would be promoted directly the personnel office_ ana administrative error was made in Instead of rectifying the he was just promoted to captain persuaded him to: remain mistake NOSENKO said GRIBANOV: he became eligible for a captain until: (if a major) in 1963 In October 1963 , he promotion_ to lieutenant. colonel. the rank of lieuteear8ncllded he was_ promoted directly to he had served as eeaiorcoleueen he was never a major ana a captain from '1959 to 196eutenant fron 1953 to 1959 and Coment: According to this chronology_ NOSENKO a captain when he claimed was Chief of the American to have been Deputy still a 'captain Eocanchbass€ Section and was Deputy Chief " Of the the time that' he Seventh Department In August 1965 interrogations NOSENKO he was Proposed for advancement still Claimed that stated that he was not to captain xin 1956 _ but his work: [He earlier pzomotednbecause Of shortcomings in for misuse Of operational' claimed he was punished interrogator S question_ NOSgurentepi In response to his earlier in 1962 and 1964 to replied that he had: claimed thought the truth woula have been 2 major because he not have been believed. In a voluntary statement written alleged that he had been in April 1966, NOSENKO lieutenant in 1956 [he promoted to the rank: of senior December: 1959 [he cobedeactiereClaimed 1953] to captain in and that at the end Of 1968 previously remember the month] of: major_ 'Cont he_ was recommended for_ the rank rank of lieutenant NOSENKO saia he had never held the brought to 'Geneva Kologe]' and the travel order [which he {colonel was' filled out 4] indicating his rank as lieutenant erroneously; G0C1623 352 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret Top merely he: being inuing Copy ================================================== Page 362 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO ' S KGB CAREER) NOSENKO said in October 1966 interrogations that he had lied when he had claimed in 1964 to be a lieutenant colonel , that actually he had been but a captain_ Asked he had claimed in 1962 that he had been a major_ NOSFNKO denied that he had ever even mentioned his rank to CIA in 1962 Conclusion NOSENKO has stated that he became a senior lieutenant in the KGB in 1952 April 1953 1954 , or 1956 _ He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1956 or September/October/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; ana a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963 He brought to Geneva in 1964 , an official KGB document dated Novenber 1963 identifying him as a KGB lieutenant colonel In retracting his clain that he was ever a major or lieutenant colonel NOSENKO asserts that nevertheless as a captain_ he held the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department . NOSENKO !s contradictions and retractions with respect to his KGB rank parallel and are apparently related to his contradicted and retracted claims regarding Naval RU service_ date of entry to the KGB _ KGB assignments. and positions held, ana in short, to the totality of his claims regarding KGB service, few of which are credible_ 00u1624 35 3 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top why Copy ================================================== Page 363 ================================================== Secret CHAPTER X PSYCHOLOGICAL. AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT Because of the incidence Of deranged persons CIA has' encountered' among' many would-be defectors the question of NOSENKO " S mental stability was a matter considered' early after his;defection in Geneva _ From the time Of his arrivai in' the United States: he has' been under psychiatric observa- tion In addition, he has undergone psychological examina- tion_ The CIA psychiatrist and psychologist besides: being highly-qualified professionals have both had extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors_ Their findings were reached independently 0 Esychological: Examination In April 1964;,NOSENKO was administered a series 6f psychological tests by the CIA' psychologist_ After monitoring numerous interrogation sessions, the psychologist interviewed NOSENKO for fourteen-days during : 3-21 April 1965 in an attempt to develop sufficient insight into NOSENKO' S: persona- lity to permit the obtaining of a_ truthful account of_ his life Findings NOSENKO is a rationalizer, a distorter and an evasive 1 person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons He_ is not a compulsive liar; He is' inclined to relate what he thinks 'he is expected: to rather than to teli: the truth as he knows it He lies by design as well as for effect_ however _ and he does not always embroider just to- bolster his ego. He is neither JI insane nor psychotic and he suffers from no_ "delusions NOSENKO ' s- rationalizations are not the product of derangement # 0001625 355 TS: No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 Top say ================================================== Page 364 ================================================== Secret (PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT) esychiatric Examination Since April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation of the CIA psychiatrist Besides monitoring interrogation sessions_ the many 0f the weekly for the first psychiatrist has visited NOSENKO what year, monthly until 1967 and at some- less frequent intervals since_ Findinge NOSENKO is neither Psychotic nor neurotic. Of above average intelligence, he is shrewd perceptive and highly adaptable _ His memory is not defective Besides. suffering from ordinary lapses of memory , however he sometimes falsely claims lack of recall_ NOSENKO " S thought are unimpaired; he is rational and fully processes guishing fact from fiction capable of distin- PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT : Conclusion The findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel the notion that NOSENKO S behavior and his other than willful_ statements are Cou1626 356 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top Copy ================================================== Page 365 ================================================== SUMMARY QE CONCLUSIONS CQNCERNING NOSENKO S BONA FIDES NOSENKO claims- that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of au thority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope character ana results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963 . To substantiate; his 'claim he- provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which to the extent that it has been confirmed' is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including ,intelii T gence officers_ have generally corroborated NOSENKO ' s claims The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO ' s biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, ana whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held In short is he what he" says he is according to his Own accounts? 0801627 357 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top Copy ================================================== Page 366 ================================================== 14-0000 Secret (SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIOITS ) This examination had led to the folloving Eindings _ arrived at independently: ~NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed ~NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed ~NOSENKO did not serve in the American. Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he clained ~During the period 1955-1960_ he was neither a senior case officer in , nor Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart_ ment American-British Commonwealth Section ~NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962 _ ~NOSENKO S claims _ that in 1962 he was Chief Of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department , are not credible . ~NOSENKO has no_ valid. claim to certainty that the KGB recruitea no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964 _ These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance The above judgments if correct, rebut presumptive evidence 0f NOSENKO S bona fides _ The contradictions in NOSENKO ' s accounts of his 1ife and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO ' s above claims are impugned by fact or probability or contradicted or retracted 1n his Own statements . NOSENKO is not what he claims to be , ana thus he is not a bona fide defector_ 3 5 8 60u1628 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top they Copy ================================================== Page 367 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS) Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for con tacting American Intelligence ana for providing the information he has given_ Here it must be recognized that the evidence largely. consisting of NOSENKO S own assertions does not permit unequivocal conclusions_ Nevertheless the question cannot be ignored _ The character Of the information NOSENKO has conveyed_ the fact: that some of his:false claims have" been corroborated by Soviet offi- cials and the necessity to; make decisions about NOSENKO ' s future all require' that at least a provisional judgment be made Of the reasonable explanations_ advanced for NOSENKO S misrepresentations_ the chief ones . are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged person - ality or unbalanced mina; that he has greatly exaggerated his" actual rank status and access in the KGB for simply personal reasons Ori finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent The first two possibilities are easily dismissed _ That: NOSENRO is not' simply:a swindder who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB : officer is evident; we believe from the confirmed details Of KGB organization personnel and; Operations which he has provided and. which could derive from within the KGB itself Second as notea in the text_ extensive: psychiatric and Psychological examination bY qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO S actions and testimony are the product Of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind It is somewhat more plausible that' NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for sOme or all of the time periods that: he claims_ but who greatly exaggerated his positions _ rank and: , access to infor- mation and invented some matters outright , to achieve greater status with American Intelligence_ This explanation however ; fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior 0001629 359 TS No: 197124` Secret 10 only_ Top. Copy ================================================== Page 368 ================================================== 14-ooqon Top Secret SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS) positions in the KGB _ Also , NOSENKO ' respect to his rank_ GRIBANOV ' S assertions with telegram and the like S patronage the recall invention, since these cannot be just a product of his own sources _ were the subject Of comment by other Because none' of the above the data developed in explanations is consistent with are left with the 'hypotheeisoghatovo and investigations we the KGB While this that NOSENKO was dispatched by anomalies, none Of themPfendezon does not reconcile all the renders it untenable In the absence of further other persuasive' evidence to tevelotions by NOSENKO , or the evidence establishes con trary, CIA finds that dispatched by the KGB and presumption that NOSENKO was that he be regarded' as atdlbeleeres that prudence requires that his information should responsive to KGB control, and be assessed accordingly. GaC16.30 360 TS No.197124 Top Secret Copy ================================================== Page 369 ================================================== 14-0QQOQ Top: Secret Annex B Summaries' o€ Cases Not' Examined in Text There follow NOSENKO 8 descriptions of KGB involving Anericans which : do not clearly operations KGB Positions he held at relate to specific could not be usefully particular times and which thus; service_ The employed in examining his claimed KGB cases include, for: example , Seventh operations o f which he said he learned while Department American Department and vice serving in the conducted . by KGB elements versa; as well as operations orate_ Unless other than the Second _ Chief Direct- o. f the iWflesticheroSEe specified each 'entry reflects a11 NOSENKO Provided ACTORAPROCTOR NOSENKO ' 8 Information American known as AcTOR ox GRo?tor] Firstv Chief Directorate is a 'valuable Western agent Who travelled overtly to which Europe: and' there obtained other docunents With: t,o continue 'clandestinely to; the USSR: Comment The lead may refer. 'to: one Vernon W _ who visited the Soviet Union in, the PROCTOR of 1963 _ The s ummer NOSENKO 'S investigation is not complete information was linfted to- that contained: in notes he brought to Geneva in 1964 399 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10. JBr_ An 0001631 Copy ================================================== Page 370 ================================================== 14-0oooq Secret (Annex B ) ALBINGER= Donald NOSENKO ' : Information ALB INGE R an American citizen born in 1937 US SR in 1963 and there Was the visited the in Sochi because he target 0f a KGB investigation gence was believed to be an American Intelli- agent _ In Sochi ALB INGER] was in touch with agent , "TRAPEZUND" a KGB By NOSENKO ' 8 account, the AALB INGERI by a Provincial KGB element case was directed the Seventh while NOSENKO was ass igned to Department in Moscow. Comment: According to the Donald the Soviet Union in 1963 and ALB INGER] visited Sochi, was associated while there, in with one Gazarian OHANNES (sic Probably Oganes GAZARYAN)" a Lebanese national who in the 1920 ' 8 repatriated to the USS R O8(ALBINGER] OHANNES allegedly 0 ffered O6 [ALB INGER intelligence-type s aid he refused photos which: to accept . ALLOYAN Lawrence] NOS ENKO ' s Information An American 0f Armenian USSR in November 1963 and background LALLOYAN visited the KGB officers that he contacted the KGB _ He stated to had been asked by an American captain and military intelligerce officer Army KGB 0 f American 9 to inform the School _ The Intelligence use of the Konterey Language and the KGBeplanzedaEcaiore name is Po88 ib ly VAN KRAKOV & when to contact him_ NOSENKO noted the ALLOYAN; a tourist , first contacted the KGB cas e through a Seventh Department cas e in Mos cow officer. G0C1632 400 TS No. 197124 Secret Top FBI , Army Hugo Top W8Z Copy ================================================== Page 371 ================================================== 14-000Q0 Secret Annex: B ) Comnent Interviewed by the FBI in January 196 5 bFazotar denied having been in the JUS S R in 1963 stated that he was acquainted with VAN_ KRAKOW who had a son of the a@"go 06 disclaimed knowledge_ that same name , 'ut the latter was an tain.0CAZLOYAN said he had not the sQn for; twenty years The seen KRAKOW was interviewed youngerANob that he by the FB I and: said was discharged from the in 1953 as a staff sergeant and that. he contact with [LLOYAN was not in 06 NOSENKO ' $ information was liited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964: APISSON; NOSENKO; S; Information An American citizen of Armenian (sic) was: recruited by the KGB origin EBISON April 1963 on ideological of the Armen an SSR in believed not to have grounds The recruitment :Was Rianned to been_firm; however and the' KGB DBEPisoN had {renew it.if__ EPIS ON returned -to the USSR in 1964 York @ubadbaccess to: a military instalfation in the New Comment APISSON a, naturalized owner: of a hotel and: American and the Peing]~ N.Y_ visited restaurant near West 'do 19.64 he the USSR in 1963 In Soviet acknovledged 'having had contacts with officials in 1963 in Armenia_ ) where he may have coveyed an impression of to See them if should later Viliingess; Poind; OC ApIssov claimed he did Eotigee west/o approach was for realize the NOSENKO ' s i3fofnEeioiseace Purposes _ contained in was: limited to that notes brought to Geneva in 1964 0001633 401 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Top Army cap Army Henry Henry Henry they- Top Copy {|5/6r, ================================================== Page 372 ================================================== 14-0ooodz Secret (Annex B ) ARMS TRONG , Robert NOSENKO S Information 06, OX ARMS TRONG , the American Amb assador ' & the KGB to be . a aide is known by of the Danish Embassy , boaofekual affair with a lcode clerk Or,0G close friend o f another Johannes BUHLE ARMS TRONG is a Embassy, Gtephen EOFbeANhOseeeraal officer 0f the American (see below) Comment: Recalled from Moscow and basis 0 f NOSENKO ' interviewed on the acknowledged the S allegation, GRMSTRoNg 06 Before truth 0f the allegations _ in resigning from the Department 0 f State August 1964 , he asserted that he had had contact with the KGB while n0 NOSENKO Provided serving in Moscow . mation n0 source for his infor- regarding GRMS TRONG which was a Embassy Section case at a time when 06 claimed to be serving in the NOSENKO ment Seventh: Depart- BARTHELEMY _ Thomas Franklin NOSENKO ' 8 Information BARTHELEMY twice led American in 1959 _ durfng which visits tourist groups to the US SR Anergcan Inteliigence the KGB assessed him to be an one Iv.4 LAINE , a 'Fien]geot_ He was subsequently in contact with who was a KGB agent 06 NOSENKO learned of the GARIELExy] contact with CAIN] while Visitig cas e and 0 f his ObGARTHELEM]" S Seventh the Leningrad KGB in 1963 _ been under sureeeifhnde int1e5g file indicated that he had tion he had graduated in 1959 because the KGB had informa- from an intelligence school _ 402 TS No. 197124 Secret Top having 665)) only (aC1634 Top Copy Iziek ================================================== Page 373 ================================================== OQQoQ Top Secret (ANNEX; B)' Comment BARTHELEMY was a' CIA contact whose'intelligence connections were &ss-umed: to have been compromised during his visits tiathe USSR= He reported his contacts with LAINE 0 CIA _ BARTHELEMYs' name 06 aPpeared in the KGB document 0n Western tourist operations which GOLITSYN provided CIA: (See P ~ 149- BERMAN Harold NOSENKO ' 8 Information While: on one :0f; his frequent visits to the Soviet Union; American lawyer and prominent Professor of law BERMAN was 06 surrounded by KGB agents , but the KGB "could do nothing with him Comwent: BERMANLis a professor' at Harvard University Who is a specialist in the Soviet legal system. He',has visited the' USSR on several occasions for study and research , and he had described several incidents which ~occurred in Moscow which appear to have been KGB provoca.tions _ NOSENKO: did not indicate the source_ of_ his 06 infornation.on[BERMAN nor- did he provide the date he acquired the information BINDER Petec] NOSENKO S Information The sergeant in charge of America House BINDER K was involved with 2 Soviet female employee at America House,. with whom at various times he had been: intimate in his room He obtained for her, items of clothing from the United States" Since the KGB had been una ble to obtain compromising photo- 06' graphs of BINDER and the Soviet girl, it had no means to exert Pressure on and a recruitment attempt thus: failed. 403 0001635 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 DX Dk top him, IQER Copy ================================================== Page 374 ================================================== 14-00Qo0 Top Secret (Annex B) BINDER , Peter (Continued) NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI , a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher Vladimir DEMKIN Q f the Embassy Section was the case officer Obvorking against GINDER; and the Chief 0f the American Department S < M_ FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment attempt , in 1962 , by which time NOSENKO had transferred to the Seventh Department .and thus knew n0 further details . 06 Co@ment : (U.S _ Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER served as manager 0f the America Hous e from 16 March 0f, 01 1961 to 22 January 1963_ On 15 January 1963 he reported to Embassy officials that he had been abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothes _ men , taken to a Militia station, and interro_ gated on the substance 0 f a letter alleged to have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his interrogators threatened to send to the Ambassador The letter alleged that BINDER]O6 0i had lived with MORELLI as man and wife" from 25 November 1961 , had warned Soviet employees against Embassy Securi Officer John ABIDIAN that MORELLI had told BINDER she was pregnant 06 06 and BINDER instructed her to get an abortion had engaged in blackmarketing BINDER had 0C told ABIDIAN S replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY had told him not to worry about it, and that BINDER]had told MORELLI that Embass y Officer Richard C JACOB was a "well-trained and that she and other Soviets should be wary of himg When BINDER denied the allegations and ul challenged €he interrogators to send the letter on to the Ambassador , he was allowed to g0 free-bBINDER] acknowledges that he was intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her gifts of money and clothing; and that she s aid she thought she was pregnant in February or March 1962 ; she never mentioned_ an abortion and made n0 other demands 0 f B INDER- B INDER 404 TS No. 197124 36 Top Secret ty 8py" Gol1€z Js/3R Copy ================================================== Page 375 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (Annex B) Comment : (Continued) states that; MORELLI disappeared T1_ in- Juneior July 1962 , while BBINDER was on leave 06 Except for dating the recruitment attempt in 1962 instead of 1963 NOSENKO '8_ fragmentary information coincides with BINDERI' s account. 06- NOSENKO asserts that the notes brought to: Geneva in 1964 contained a11 information. he 0 was ab le to discover. NOSENKO claims to have been. Deputy Chief of the 'Embassy Section in_ 1961 , supervisingm B INDER 8 and MORELLI s . case 06 0 officers,; but he relates his. knowledge 0 f" the case neither to; that period nor to the: position he then he ld 0 BROCHES Adam '06 NOSENKO ' s Information BRQCHES] born in 1896 visited the Soviet Union. with 2 tourist group in, 1960 He has relatives in the USSR, and he was.recruited in September 1960. by the: KGB on ideological grounds Commen BROCHES Was' born in 1890: His brother 06 Alexander was born in 1896 GOLITSYN reported Ehat a Seventh Departnent officer told hin in 061960 that (Adam BROCHES had been a {Soviet agent in the 1920' s. and 1930 S in Paris and that when he visited: the US SR as a tourist guide in 1959 or 1960 the KGB suspected"that he might: be on an American Intelligence mission to contact V < M. ZARUBIN his one-time Soviet. Intelligence superior in Paris According to GOLITSYN the KGB placed B ROCHES under S urveil- 06 lance and the 'Chief of the Seventh Department was planning t.o discuss: with ZARUBIN what action the KGB: should take. 405 TS No. 197124' Top Secret Copy 10 Top 0001637 /gr ================================================== Page 376 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (Annex B ) Comnent : (Continued) Interviewed by the FBI , BROCHES said that he escorted tours to the USSR three times in 196,0 , and that on his last in September 1960 he was approached by Soviet officials for information on members 0 f his tour group . BROCHES claimed he refused to cooperate and denied that he had ever been a Soviet agent . 06 GBRocHE;] said however , that the allegation might refer to another 0 f his brothers, Ggnacy,ob now dead _ NOSENK0 ' s information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964 _ NOSENKO claimed to have been in the American Department when the Seventh Department recruited BROCHES 06 0L BUNDARIN, Eugene Petezh NOS ENKO ' 8 Information BUNDARIN; born in 1917 the son o f a Russian emigre , and an emp loyee of the Winds Travel Agency in New York 29 was recruited by_ the KGB in 1962 on ideological grounds _ He left thelrour Winds agency and his case is Zq inactive because the KGB 18 waiting for him to open his own 6X travel bureau fo [BUNDARIN Was handled Seventh Department case officer G DERA Comment : BUNDARINE born 25 April 1917 , the son 0 f an emigre and an employee of the Eour WindsZq agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen days in 1962 - He left the Four Winds agenc772h in 1962 to travel abroad and he now works for Hermes Travel 0 f California) Interviewed 6C Ehe FBI 9 B UNDARIN denied connection with Soviet Intelligence FBI reports indicate 406 TS No. 197124 00C1638 Top Secret Top trip , "Four City, by by any Copy TIUSR ================================================== Page 377 ================================================== Ooooo Secret (Annex B ) Comment (Continued) 06 BBUNDARIN and parents associate with members and Participate in' CP front CPUSA tion activities:: organiza NOSENKO ' & information was limited, to that contained: in his written notes which he: brought to Geneva in 1964 CHRISTNER Robert_Charleg NOSENKo ' s Information While reviewing after his defection in 1964 Americans who had visited the a list- of 6 that one (CHRISTNER? had been Soviet Union , NOSENKO noted Soviet UnIon by automob ile arrested while touring the or ;date; 0f his He: did : not indicate the source acquisition:-of. the_ information" Comment: As described in Press accounts 0 f and stated in a KGB: the: period tourists which document on American was GOLITSYN provided @HRISENER]: 06 arrested in; the: Soviet, Union on 0f espionage in the sumwer 0f 1961: charges CIA miss ion at the He had a he had time but he reported_ that managed to maintain his tourist., throughout his intensive_ cover the summer of 19.61 wosEeKOnteziegateons. In U Enbassy: Section" of' the claims he was in the Anerican Department 0b Thomas NOSENKO; S Information FAIN an. "American consul stationed visited Mos cow in 1959 in Yugoslavia NOSENKO 0 ` S that visit he encountered agent ,' 'VOLKOV, who reported his suspicion that 00u1633 40 7 TS No: Secret 138124 Copy n/ke Top FAIN' During. Top ================================================== Page 378 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (Annex B) FAIN Thomas (Continued) FAIN was a homosexual There was insufficient time 6 FAIN S visit to arrange his entrapment during FAIM/ was assigned Permanently later in Moscow and the KGB planned at that time to entrap him with a homosexual Comment: In a Department 0f State security interview FAIN has stated that he recalled n0 Soviets whom he had met during. his five-day visit to Mos cOw in 1959 _ except a female Inturist guide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist _ He reported n0 noteworthy incidents during his later permanent a88ignment in Moscow. 06 FINK _ David NOSENKO ' s Information FINK is an American professor from Philadelphia and frequent visitor to the US S R whom the Leningrad KGB hoped to recruit on an ideological bas i8 and through the us e of a female agent _ Becaus e oflhis sister' s love affair With a Soviet he was refused a visa in 1963 _ but the KGB has arranged S0 that he will be admitted to the US SR if he applies again _ NOSENKO learned of the case when the Leningrad KGB objected to[FINKI' s being denied a visa: NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time_ Comment Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964 , 06 FINK] acknowledged that his sister was trying 08 to marry a Soviet citizen] but that she had been refused visa to visit the USSR for the Purpose .6 FINR admitted involvement with a female in Leningrad , during his visit to the 408 OJu1640 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Izlsk Top Copy ================================================== Page 379 ================================================== 14-00000 Top' Secret Annex B) Comment (Continued) US SR in,,1961 but denied recruitment FINK '06: asserted that he had visited: Europe 'every summer since: 1957 (except in 1959_ when: hee. went;to Mexico)" and_ that he had only visited the USSR once, in 1961. 06 FISK Norman NOSENKO ' s Information FISK visited the USSR as: a tourist' in 1959 when he: was ass essed to be a" homosexual : The KGB planned to attempt t0 recruit him if he returned to the Soviet Union _ NOSENKO Obnoted FISKK S name while reviewing files :of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV (see P: 145) in 1963_ Comment FISK visited the US SR with his wife and Parents: in 1959 _ In an_ interview with the; FBI in December 4964 he claimed. that his- only Soviet contacts:.in the US SR were with Inturist Personnel' and a Spinster niece_ NOSENKO has neverv explained why he learned of the case only: from the files :of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in 1963' since he claims he was their case officer at. the time FISK visited the Soviet Union in 1959 GINSBERG, MichaelT NOS ENKO 's Information A profes sor GINSBERG visited the USSR in 19537 or 1958 when operational contact was established between him and the KGB c001641' 409 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 &igr Copy ================================================== Page 380 ================================================== 14-Q000Q Top Secret (Annex B) Comment: One Erofessor Michael of ficials in Hels inki GINSBERG reported to U,S . had been the in Augus t 1956 that he target 0f a Soviet attempt earlier in Moscow . His recruitment been identified by CIA contact has 0l CINSBERG as a KGB officer whom according to the has met subsequent visits to the USSR . NOSENKO ' s information contained in his was limited to that brought to written notes which he Geneva in 1964 . 0l GROVER , Rresto] NOSENKO ' s Information PonGeoxiz; currently (in 1964) Gssociated in Mos cow, is a recruited Pres 8 corres_ Tenth Tbntelligensia and KGB agent handled by the Second Chief Dieectora:d Correspondents} Department 0 f the 06 Comment: Preston GROVER retired in 196 5 in France with his wife . and now lives born in Russia and DERovER' & wife was about the time 0 f thePige; emigrated at met her in Moscow_ 1917 Revolution _ GGRovER] 06 Pondent for a where she was a corres _ FBI reports 9 sheeash newspaper . According to Communist8. in teeagscceated with known earlier United States an n0 s ource essi8n18*5 his; here _ NOSENKO indicated information on 06 0JU1642 410 TS No. 197124 Top Secret FBI , during Ely during GROVER}' G1BR Copy ================================================== Page 381 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret 1 (Annex- B) 06 HAMZAVI Charles P NOSENKO 's Information An American, one' Charles KHAMZAI (sic) was the object 0f considerable interest to the KGB during' his 26 October-l November 1963 visit to th.e. USSR_ A KGB officer under cover was in contact with him in Moscow and the KGB Planned to resume this contact in the United States The Seventh 0 artment ac€ion with respect to KHAMZAT was in response '06 to a ~request: from the First Chief Directorate for assis - tance in developing; a contact with him in Mos c Ow . H Comment: NOSENKO ' s lead has been identified as' Charles 06 P HAMZAVIL, who has been noted in, frequent contact with Soviet officials from 1955, when he immigrated to the United States' until 196,3 According. to- the FB I he was in Moscow in 1963 when he was in contact with a Foreign Ministry officiai which CIA identifies as, KGB officer I,Da BORISOV . HARMSTONE, Richard NOSENKO s Information In 1958: or 1959 the American Department_ S Embas sy _ Section attempted to recruit HARMS TONE a_ Second or Third Secretary oL,08 at Ehe Embassy Both male and fewale agents_ were used against him, and photographs were obtained 0f @ARMs ToNE' s, 06 homosexual a8 well as . heterosexual activities When confronted , Olhowever_ HARMS TONEI refused to collaborate with the KGB HARMS TONE reported the approach to American officials but asserted that he was involved Just_ in heterosexual compromise NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV documents (see' P:-3.09) in 1964 , including the KGB plan. of operations against HARMS Iong: 06 NOS ENKO confirmed the subs tance and eventual succes s of the Plan , which was to get HARMS TONEL drunk and photograph him 0001643 411 TS' No._ 197124 Top Secret 10 Il6R Top Dep Copy ================================================== Page 382 ================================================== 14-00006 Secret (Annex B ) 06 HARMSTONE , Richard (Continued) while in intimate relations with a Soviet KGB concluded that HARMSTONE had girl. Becaus e the sexual compromise , it not reported the homo- OC again later, when was Planned to attempt to recruit him HARMS TONE he was transferred elsewhere abroad _ If had reported the homosexual have been monitored by the KGB compromise, it would Minister Counselor" over the microphone in the S office_ In later Juestioning NOSENKO stated that he HARMS TONE cas e from KOVSHUK . learned 0f the KGB case officer He could not recall who had left was , but was certain that the latter the Embassy Section _ If HARMS TONE had his compromise , he surmised , he would reported 66 immediately from Moscow, and FHARMS have been withdrawn Soviet Union TONE did not leave the 06 Prematurely . Comment: Richard C HARMS TonB; who served in Moscow October 1957 to October 1959 as Second from secretary; reported to the Enbassec8ad.C?Zy Officer on 23 1959 that a KGB officer had tried to recruit him after threatening 06 shovth doctored photographs Pezpeffiegetposure show HARMS TONE' s homosexual activities STONE HARM- subsequently identified from 2 visa applfcation photograph the KGB officer as "KOMAROV" an overt contact 0f Embassy colleague WINTERS. HARMS TONE left the Sovieto6 Union six months later, admitted homosexual activities and resigned from the of State _ The relevant Department Portions 0 f the CHEREPANOV Papers confirm [ARMS TONE]' 8 admissions 0 6 with respect to KGB agents with whom he involved . "KOMAROV" has been idenfified as KOVSHUK, NOSENKO ' s as 8uperior in the Enbassy Section and the source 0 f what NOSENKO said he learned 0 f the case. 412 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Top bbthe May 0001644 12188 Copy ================================================== Page 383 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret I (Annex B) @OEEMAN F St ePhen 06 NOSENKO S Information 06 An American Embassy. official and a_ friend 0 f the 0 Ambas sador 8 aide Robert ARMS TRONG (see' above) HO FFMANOL: 15 known to have engaged- in homosexual acts with an Armenian in Yerevan. The KGB currently (in 1964) is planning .to attempt to compromise and, recruit-JHoFFMAN: 0 0 Comment : Intervieved on the bas is of NOSENKO ' 8 allega - '06 tion, HOFFMAN in a State Department security interview denied homosexual activities Informed that the results of a ' polygraph examination' indicated he had practiced_ deception 'on 'that question 9 HOFFMAN resigned from the Department of State on 31 July: 1964 HOFFMAN 06 a8serted that he had' n0 contact with the KGB while ass igned ip Moscow an_ assertion supported by the polygraph examination. F NOSENKO claims he was assigned to_ the Seventh' Department at the time HOFFMAN was 06 the target 0 f the' Eubassy. Section of the 1 American Department 0 HOwARD, Herbert NOS ENKO S Information HOWARD a US IA empieyee] was a88igned temporarily for four months to the Embassy: in Moscow in 'spring 1962 as a ] lications procurement 0 {ficer]: AHe was recruited by _ the KGB G.I GRYAZNOV- of_ the American Department Embassy Section, requested NOSENKO' s in obtaining a hotel Ioom adjacent: to HOWARDs_ hfor a woman from_ Leningrad 613 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Pub_ he lp 8001645 Iz/RR Top Copy" ================================================== Page 384 ================================================== 14-0QOOO Secret (Annex B) Comment : HowARD denied recruitment the in an interview with tndicgEedalehoagh a Polygraph: examination 06 he was disturbed on related HOWARD had earlier declared his questions . divorce his American wife and intention to national. His marry a Soviet December 1964 acon zectC with] USIA expired in 28 was not renewed - NOS ENKO claims to have been Seventh Department at the serving in the target 0f the Emb time (HowARD was a a88y Section _ 06 0b HUSTON Hayden NOSENKO ' 8 Information Onel HUSTON (fnu) travelled to the Government business from his US S R on official U : S _ 0l Moscow HUS ToN) was photog aphedssig8nent in (Belgrade In |0 in a taxi, but the KGB did a blackmarket deal HUSTON did not again visit not exploit the incident because the US SR_ Comment: US IA employee 08,06 viewed on 30 Hayden AUSTON was inter- that he had beetober 1963 regarding a report 1954 as a result arrested in (Yugos lavia] in 16 HUsTON of his sexual activities _ Trom _ ig5erved in (Yugoslavia for eight years-|( until January 1962 interview he stated that that 10 @elgrada] he made two his tour in asserted that to the US SR_ and he Yugoslavia there were n0 other incidents in Which eouza%_ elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc be used to compromise Currentiy on a (US IA himg has not been igerdlewedge5t in Taiwan HUSTON NOS ENKO ' s ewed with respect to allegation 414 TS No: 197124 Top Secret Top FBI , Henry making Henry During during trips 0au1646 Copy I&IRR ================================================== Page 385 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (Annex B) JAFFE Sam 6 NOSENKO S Information JAFFE an,ABC corresg8ndeng in Moscow , is an active KGB who was: cultivated: and recruited .V.A a KUSKOV _ In' 1963; vhiie in the Seventh. Department , NOSENKO asked Ameri- can Department: Enbassy: Section officer GRYAZNOV for an agent who` could be used againgt:a visiting American delegation and GRYAZNOV: suggested GAFFB 766 Comment Before NOSENKO ' s information was received , JAFFE] reported his recruitment by: one "Slava KISLOV". in October 1962 _ In a CIA interview 06 in December 1966 [JAFFEldid not recognize A. Ke KISLOV' 8 photograph but identified a photo-: graph, of KUSKOV as being' the KGB officer Who recruited him_ in 1962 JAFFE] was expelled from the USSR in October 1965 . As far as CIA is aware he has not been interviewed on ' the basis , '0f NOSENKO ' s information 0 KANTOR Marvin NOSENKo: s Information D Me lvin (sic) KANTOR a Harvard Student was recruited: 0n ideological grounds' in 1961. His case; was turned over to the First Chief Directorate 0 1} Comwent Marvin KANTOR a 'Slavic-language instructor at the University of Michigan, visited the US SR in 1958 or: 1959 When interviewed, by CIA in 19617 be admitted having had contact with Soviet 0 Intelligence officers in the Soviet Union in 195,9 but asserted that he then had flatly refused to collaborate with Soviet intelligence Cau1647 4.15 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 216R by Copy ================================================== Page 386 ================================================== OQQoQ Secret (Annex B ) Comwent: (Continued) When interviewed in 1963_ KANTOR s aid he not travelled to the USS R s ince 1959 had NOSENKO ' 8 information was limited to written note8 brought in 1964 to Geneva . NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh 1959 , at the actual time Department in ment of KANTOR S recruit- 9 and does not explain the wa8 included KANTOR cas e among cases he noted as having occurred while he was in the Enbassy in 1960-1961 _ Section KAZAN_KOMAREK] 06 NOSENKO ' s Information KOMARER; an American 0f Czech descent and connected with a tourist service somehow been identified by the in the United S taes = has contact with Western Czech Secret Police as being in to locate him. The 'CIecllliaeeci and have been trying Possibly visit the Soviet have learned that KKOMAREK]migh that he be arrestedcon Union and have requested [the KGB } The Soviets have arrival and deported to Czechos lovakia. to induce agreed and Inturist is curren KOMARER into Visiting the Soviet Union attempting 0 Gomment : The subject 0f NOSENKO ' s lead was [ladinir 06 Joseph KAZAN-KOMARER_ a naturalized citizen and the operator of the American Tourist Agency in Cambridge, (Harvard Travel 21,/0 He ha8 never had any covert Massachusetts CIA or other U . S _ relationship with August 1963 the FBI intelligence agencies In was advised by another source of the Soviet-Czech plan to lure KAZAN _ 06 KOMAREK Ito the Soviet Union and take him Czechoslovakia where he wuld be tried forto espionage _ 416 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 7/68 Top why they tC tly 0jC1648 Copy ================================================== Page 387 ================================================== Ooooo Top Secret (Annex B )" Comment (Continued) NOSENKO 's information, which he reported onty to the: FBI; was substantially accurate:. In October 1966 2fter being warned of the risk by the FBI IKAZAN-KOMAREK] visited Moscow 0b for an Inturist travel agent 6 . conference and , en route back: to Paris was arrested in Prague when his AEROFLOT flight was diverted NOSENKO' s "8ourcing for this lead , which presumab ly re lates to his 1962-64 service in the Seventh Department 9 had not been estab lished CIA did not: learn 0f NOSENKO S report on KAZAN= 0 b_ KOMAREK untii the latter was arrested in ; {ncefcoEarabia hid 1966' &bspehded_ which time' NOSENKO' s MATLAW,_ Ra lph NOS ENKO S Information; 1 One MATLO (sic) visited the USSR, in 1959 , and the KGB 'concluded that he was a homosexual. 'and Planned to attempt to recruit him if he should return to the Soviet Union 1 NOSENKO noted the information while reviewing_ YEFREMOV and VOLKOV S file: prior to their retirewent Comment:_ The identity of NOSENKO ' & . lead has been m confirmed to be one Ralph MATLAW.0b The case is s till under_ invesEigation NOSENKO_ claims to have been YEFREMOV ' s and VOLKOV' s case off1ger at the time one of them was in touch Ml Cwich MATLAW ]in_ 1959 but learned of the case only Tater when reviewing those agents ' files 0001649 417 TS No- 197124 Top Secret 10 6/5r Copy: ================================================== Page 388 ================================================== 14-00Q= Secret (Annex B) 06 NIELSEN , NOSENKO ' $ Information NIELSEN] visited the US S R Because he made the the' first time in 1957 Moscow and tried to acquaintance of some or 1958 . Telephone acquire from them Ii in with Directory, the KGB a copy 0 f the Moscow and CIA U WIELSEN was kept suspected that he was al1 subsequen t undef surveillance connected intelligence tasks On wa8 never observed this fell in love with one of his visits in other used her in the KGB agent Tanera KUNGAROVA to Moscow, WIELSEN 06 as8essment, Ebonaevelogaeer _ 0f NIELSEN: 06 For and the KGB 06 OGintrodueed to (IELSEN Seventh Departnent Purposes 0 f with n0 in the role of officer ) was and CuNcRRoUtibe result NOSENKO Re GUNGaRovA: Eather: but 06 had married and were later that WIELSEN] U6 in London_ NOSENKO was involved in cnseble intelligence stafuthendeternination 0 f WIELSEM $ and LEONOV on hi8 first 06 KOPEYKIN was also Yoerican Departmeit case Bes ides involved officer Viktor Comment 8 NOSENKO has OCUNGAROvAin41983ted variously that he until 1960 , and that she was his recruited in 1958 and that she was agent when she_trangferred an agent Department fron" the British into the Seventh ment 06 Commonwealth NIELSEN a CIA Depart - the Sovfet Union agent at the tasks on this in April 1958 _ One "isited telephone was to obtain a his later book-D6@IELSEN met EUnGAROvXet in on a 0 6 warnings that he was espite CIA to be a 'KGB involved in what her in Moceo?perafaon-WIELSE rethrsedPeeazed Person in 1960 to see06 (eeresenElng hinself and there met a OSob atheedOLGELSEM returned as KUNGAROVA' 8 06 KUNGied KUNGAROVA; and to Moscow in 1962 _ KUNGARovA died in moved to France _ 2 0 France in 1965 . In January 418 TS No_ 197124 Secret ~ls Top Philie "teddy boys ' trips, during but living trip . already time, trip trip, January 1959 _ January they Cju1gso Top Copy ================================================== Page 389 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (Annex B) Comwent: (Continued) 1960, when NOSENKO claims ersonal knowledge 66 0f WNIELSEN 8 meeting with KUNGAROVA, S "father",06 he was not in the Seventh Department but in the American Embassy Section 06' NIXON, Dwi NOSENKO S Information 06 An American: tourist, NIXON was recruited; by Seventh: Department case:officers in June 1963 NOSENKO was not in Moscow: at the time, and knew n0 further :details Comment: Interviewed the' FBI on the basis of NOSENKO ' s information, NIXON admitted having been recruited while visiting the Soviet Union He was not contacted by the KGB in the United States although such arrangements had been made at the time 0f his recruitment On' a visit fo_Moscow in 1964 : after NOSENKO ' s defection . NIXON was again contacted by the KGB and he agreed to collaborate_ for fear of reprisals against relatives in- the USSR OMELICH, Paul NOSENKO S Information E OMELICH: was contacted by KGB offfcers during the Winter Olympics at Squaw Valley , California: Although he was not recruited, he was to be_ recontacted by KGB officers later M in Switzerland.D When COMELICH visited Moscow in August 1963 Seventh Department American Section' case officer Ka G KRUPNOV. arranged for First Chief Directorate officer (fnu) ZAYTSEV to meet the American: 6U 419 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 {8R triy by 6001651 Copy ================================================== Page 390 ================================================== Top Secret (Annex B ) Comment: In 1963 [OMELICH with Sovfet office isted his earlier contacts denied that he had at He or that ever met KGB officers Sritzefland,mefticg affangements were made given 9 although he admitted for the impression 0 f may have sympathy toward Soviets" T OL PECHTER , Bernard NOSENKO ' s Information PECHTER was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1959 _ Comment : In December 1959 _ 6L return from the a month after [ECHTER' s had revealed his the FB I learned that he recruitment by theoxGsexaai compromise and group . NOSENKO to a member of his tour from memory, 'kot cited the PECHTER] case not D6 to Geneva in 1964froalths written notes brought Seventh tment Although_Presumably a 0 it to his service NOSENKO did not relate indicate the there in 1959 9 nor did he source of hi8 information 03 PRESSMAN. NOSENKO S Information wilbatriel (sic) PRES SMAN visited: a delegation. of American the US SR in October 1957 at that time by the KGB _ The metallurgists and was recruited over to the First Chief cas e was afterwards turned Directorate_ 420 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 2/8r Squaw Valley . later, "he USSR , Depar case, Aron 0001652 Copy ================================================== Page 391 ================================================== 14-00000 Top Secret (Annex B) Comment NOSENKO S lead is believed :o relate tolZren 06 PRESSMAN} a longrtime Communist and a friend 06 o Gernard KOTEN (see.P.295 ) ` whose sister has resided in the Soviet Union since her 1945 marriage to a Soviet citizen who has been identified: as a courier for Soviet Intelligence PRES SMAN aecompanied a delegation of metallur ~= gists from NYU on an exchange visit- to the; Moscow Mining Institute in 1957; he himself surveyed Soviet language training Programs during this visit. He denied any recruitment approach. was made to him there or on subsequent trips to the USS R 06 NOS ENKO cited_ the PRESSMAN case from his_ written notes brought to Geneva in 1964 . He did not relate it to:his Seventh Department service nor: did,he indicate the source of_ his information_ PROCTOR fnu 'See AcTOR] Db RASK Walter NOSENKO S Information D6, RASK, the president 0f World Wide Toursk was recruited in the US SR ip 1960 _ He has returned to the USSR several times since He 18 used for spotting tourists suspected of having intelligence' affiliations,L The KGB has received_only one open: code message. fromRRASK since recruitment RASK was recruited by Seventh Department: case officer Ye N ; NOSkOv while NOSENKO was a88igned to the American Department On subsequent_ visits to the USSR. he was met by Seventh Depart- ment case officers of the American-British Commonvealth Section_ 6001653 421 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 '4d6s ================================================== Page 392 ================================================== Top Secret (Annex B) Comment : RASKI a former CIA contact who vis ited the US SR Several times reported the KGB recruitment approach in 1961 _ NOSENKO ' 8 information was limited to that contained in written notes he brought to Geneva in 1964 _ He did not relate the case to his 1962-1964 Seventh Department service 06 ROBERTS = Seencer NOSENKO ' s Information ROBERTS was recruited at the end 0f 1962 after being compromised with a homosexual in Sochi, US SR_ The case was turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and @oBERT;] 06 was recontacted by a KGB officer in the United States _ 06 RoBERTS confessed his recruitment to the FBI, news 0f which reached the KGB and his KGB case officer in the United States was hastily recalled to Moscow ROBERTS was handled by the American Department because he was 2 former emp loyee of the: Embassy in Moscow _ The case officers were V,M. MIKHAYLOV, V.A. KUSKOV, and V.M_ KOVSHUK_ NOSENKO learned 0f the events in the U. S _ from B . 4, SOLOMATIN a First Chief Directorate American Depart _ ment cas e officer. 06 Comment : ROBERTS had been coopted as a CIA represen- tative in Moscow in 1950 , while he was a State Department officer a88igned to the Embassy in Moscow . He- confessed his recruitment by the KGB to the FBI in the fall 0 f 1962 _ He was contacted by a Soviet official from the UN in New York in mid-196 3 , That official apparently suddenly departed the United States in December 1963 _ NOS ENKO did not indicate the original source of his information on ROBERTS} 06 422 UoU1654 TS No. 197124 Top Secret R/BR Copy ================================================== Page 393 ================================================== QoooQ Top Secret Annex B ) ROSS, Johanna NOS ENKO ' : Information The former governess to the American Amba8sador'8 family who_ now (in 1964) teaches at the American schooi} in Moscow was_ recruited by the KGB on the basis 0f sexual involvements The case was handled_ by the American Department at the- time NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department _ Comment NOSENKO S information was limited to- written notes brought to_ Geneva in 1964 _ He does not indicate the source of his information 06 Rosskreported'to the American Embassy- of her arrest: in Kiev in 1958 on charges of immoral behavior with a Soviet citizen In a May 1965 FBI interview she admitted contact in Moscow in September 1963 with the KGB ; which stemmed from her continued relationship with the same Soviet citizen but she denied that the KGB attempted to recruit her or contact here thereafter U RUFE John" 1 NOSENKO ' s Information The: KGB discovered that RUFE was a' homosexual during his visit to the USSR in 1959 _ When he returned to the US S R in U 1962 he was entrapped and recruited The case was "only, 0f marginal value :to the KGB and it wa,8 terminated in 1963 D 80u1655 423 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy . __1O S/ER ================================================== Page 394 ================================================== Secret (Annex B) Comment: RUFE a New York Ehat he had been attorney , has admitted the US S R in 1962 compromised while visiting and that he was in contact with KGB officers in the United November 1963 _ States until NOSENKO did not relate the RUFE specifically to his Seventh cas e when he cited it from veitenDeoaefne:c_ service Geneva in 1964 , nor did notes brought to of his information . he indicate the source was recruited His notes state that GUFE] 0 on homosexual grounds by the Gaeeici )epattse Commonwealth Section 0 f the Department , jointly with the UKGB 0 f Leningrad Oblast _ 66 SCHWARZENBACH Collette) NOSENKO ' 8 Information fefSCHRARZEEBAc love who was working in Moscow at the time with a male KGB agent and unsuccessful KGB recruitment was the target of an KGB had incriminating attempt in 1958 or 1959 . The believe it wa8 used the photography , but NOSENKO did not her affection for the SevKce appeal based solely on the American people _ V.M_ MIKHAYLOV 0f tion _ NOSENKDepevene:eadnbase? Section directed the opera- later 8aw it onqewee read the ICHWARZENBAcB] €ile, but he the incfiminafing photographs. O6 Comment: S CHWARZENBACH vas during 1955 and 06,08,07 to' Mrs BOHLEN the 1956 secre- Ambas sador wife of the American and' director of the Anglo-American School lin Moscow. In 1956 and 1957 she for Gezry SHAPIRO , United Pres 8 worked 06 in Moscow (see P . 76 ) . While e correspondent 06,68 SHAPIRO she became mployed by I S ERGEYEV , acquainted with one Viktor a Soviet lishing functionary. 424 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 4, Top City being Eary pub 8oQ1656 Copy ================================================== Page 395 ================================================== Oooo Secret (Annex B) Comment: (Continued) In January 1959 she was approached in Riga by a KGB officer who confronted her with incrimi- nating photographs and solicited her cooperation in providing information on the U . S Embassy 0 She: imnediately reported the event_ to [SHAPIRO,OL .who informed then-Ambassador THOMPSON and FSCHWARZENBACH left the USSR shortly: thereafter 0 In early 19593 She' Provided details of the KGB recruitment attempt to a State _Department Regional Security 0fficer in (Geneva] on' 4 June R 195.9 @id Io NOSENKO not recall from whom he learned 0f the (SCHWARZENBACH cas e which was directed the: American Department Emb assy Section whiile 0 he was ass igned to- the Seventh Department W SEREBRENNIKOV; Eugene Sergey NOSENKO ' s_ Information 21 In 1955-1957 SEREBRENNIKOV] {an employee..of. the Library of Congress] visized Moscow with a Congressional delegation- 06_ SEREBRENNIKOW} had 'a brother who was a Soviet citizen , a doctor living in Sverdlovsk _ 6 Assigned to the Seventh Department at the: time NOSENKO himself arranged for the brother to- be brought to Mos cow and briefed' him for a Obmeeting at which- | SEREBRENNIKOVIwould .be "felt. out 1 as a Prospective collaborator with the KGB The meeting took Place = but the_ brother told the: KGB that he had- had no opportunity to discu8,8 with SEREBRENNIKOV the Poss 1b 06 of his helping the Soviet Union. SEREBRENNIKOV was in Moscow only for a few days 9 and here was no opportunity for another meeting The KGB concluded that (SEREBRENNIKov' S 06 sispicions were aroused his brother:' s behavior 6001657 425' TS No. 197124. Top Secret Copy 10 I2/8r Top: by 111t86 by ================================================== Page 396 ================================================== QQQo Secret (Annex B) Comment: According to his 1964 interview with 66 SEREB RENNIKOV visited the the FBI in the Soviet Union in 1956 company 0 f Senator H_ Jackson:_ On his las t night in Moscow he hotel room a received in his telephone call from a Person claiming to be his brother from Sverdlovsk, whom he had not seen s ince 1918 . requested a mee The "brother" convinced from the but GEREB RENNIKOV was 06 and other caller S uneducated speech sign8 that he was not in fact [SEREBRENNIKOV' 8 brother , and he refused to s ee Sen- GEKECk5o.1s87 Jackson 0f the immediately advised Embas 8y incident as well as officials After[EREBRENNIKOV 06 returned to the United States , the incident was described in an article in magaz ine Newsweek CC SEVERN Gerald NOSENKO ' 8 Information ISEVERN KGB cryptonym " EDVIN" by the seventh was recruited in' Moscow grounds He Department in 1958 or 1959 on ideological is a valuab le officer was V. M. IVANOV . all-purpose agent . His cas e Comnent: SEVERN} a naturalized American name originally was [Gennadiy citizen whose Russian-born SEVASTYANog; had 06 Parents . He enjoys special residence arrangements in Moscow _ and Prior to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he to be a KGB agent Ol(SEVERN was suspected United States has not visited the s ince and he has not been interviewed by . the FBI NOSENKO ' 8 information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he to Geneva in 1964 _ brought 426 0801658 TS No.197124 Top Secret Top Henry ting, 1961 , Copy IORR ================================================== Page 397 ================================================== OoQo Top Secret (Annex B ) SHATTAUER, Sofia Greta NOSENKO' 8 Information'; In Septenber 1962 GHATTAUER] visited the Soviet Union and was recruited by Seventh Department case officer D.A. DITYATEV _ She had 'originally been recruited <in Poland in 1946-1947 but she was never contacted again because the KGB believed her to be known to American Intelligence _ 06 Comment: In 1962' an FB I source; reported that SHATTAUER stated she was looking_ forward to her trip to the USSR and "to being away from the imperia- list_policies of the United States 0i and that 0I 06 SHATTAUER "appeared enthusiastic about Russian ideology In' July: 1964 [SHATTAUER] adnitted. to 06 the FBI that she had_ had Intelligence contact with Soviet 0fficers in Po land in 1947 and that 7 she was recontacted by the KGB in September 1962 in Moscow after which she periodically met a KGB officer in New York City until May G 1964 NOSENKO ' s information was limited to that contained: in his_ written notes brought to 0 Geneva: in 196.4; He did nn€? fndicate the source' of his information 0 SOCHUREK Howard K NOSENKO S Information 06,0G The former Time-Life correspondent in Moscow SOCHUREK was probably recruited the KGB and was. an agent o f Vadim BIRYUKOv .06 JSoCHUREK returned briefly to Moscow in 1962 when seventh Department surveillance noted his ass0ciae tion with BIRYUKOV , a KGB officer of the Tenth (Intelli- B gens ia and CorresPondents) Department of the: Second Chief Directorate 0001659 427 TS No. .197124 Top Secret 10 8lgr 06_ by_ Copy ================================================== Page 398 ================================================== QoQoo Top Secret (Annex B) Comment : S0CHUREK} who was I960 , reported E0a€h8gEudE t0 Mos cow in 1958 - instances in which a number of to Pressure him or Soviet_ officials at tempted with identified KGB which he was in touch named BIRYUKOV a8 EhefEiiees FocHUREK] has 06 who invafiably guide and interpreter stationed in EhecfSsRanied him while he was indicated the NOS ENKO has not SOCHURER: 80urce 0 f his information on 04 STEVENS , Francis 06 NOSENKO ' 8 Information S TEVENST an American Union in 1961 as a tcurisorreleondenf]' visited the Soviet Department officers He was the target 0f with a Soviet KOVSHUK and KLYPIN, who American him into female , accused him of entrapped him 06 #SERGEEC aCSEEVEFS recruitsenth His rape 9 and . blackmailed attempt in ETEVENS; hovever , "descfibedGEhetrecszi was the a letter to his mother recruitment The letter was which he deposited at Minister Counsellor, who opened and read by the gummarizing the events Jesgnededtil L ecfeced a cab le Departmnent of state _ The KGB in the letter to the through the microphone in monitored the dictation First Chief Directorate the Minister Counsellor' 8 resume contact with 9fficers neverthelese office _ 0 (STEVENS in New York planned to Although a tourist 06 concern of the and a [orres adent, STEVENS member of the Ebbassy Sec;ion becaosd he was the Enbassy s taffl was a former 428 TS No. 197124 Secret Emb assy Embassy . City. {o016680 Top Copy Io/bk ================================================== Page 399 ================================================== 4-800 Top Secret (Annex B) 0G Comwent STEVENS; after his compromise: concerned for 6is safety for the remainder of his 1961 visit to Moscow, did deposit with the Embassy a letter to his mother However, he also gave Ambassador Thompeon a written report of the KGB entrapment immediately after the' incident and he was interviewed about the matter by the Minister Counsellor the following Inter- viewed: periodically-by the FB I following his return to the United .States 'in 1961 ,ESTEVENS] has denied any further contact with the KGB According to the notes which NOSENKO brought to Geneva in 1964 on the basis of which he reported the(STEVENs7 ease KEIEVENg'06 recruitment was accomplished jointly the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department and: the American Depart; ment ' s Embassy Section TARASKA WilTiam NOSENKOss Information TARASRA ,_a New York City_PolTcenan had been developed the_ KGB while visiting the Soviet Union in 1958; Although considered in 1958 a "stupid and unpromising target" the Ukrainian KGB. was still: interested in attempting to recruit him while he was in the: Sovieet Union in June 1963 Comment TARASKAZ who had 'visited the soviet Union in 1958 was recruited by CIA for a - mission in 1960 When he returned to the United States he reported that the KGB had attempted to recruit him on both visits TARASKA] returned 06 to the US SR in 1963 and' later reported to the FBI that the KGB had aga in attempted to recruit him duting that visit. 0801661 429 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 day . by by. Copy S/Re ================================================== Page 400 ================================================== -QQQoQ Secret (Annex B ) Comment: (Continued) NOSENKO does not indicate the information on TARASKA source of his Ol THOMESON John] NOSENKO ' 8 Information OC American Pro fessor (THOMPSON, a specialis t literature or Russian History, in Russian KUN GAROVA, a KGB became involved with Tamara with KUNGAROVA andgenc Within Inturist He was intimate The KGB did not adtemptiti":eccgiphOicgrapes were caken . Planned to continue to recruit him, however , but grounds for his his assessment and establish additional When he did not recruitment if he returned to the US SR and recommended Eeaurth_ NOSENKO reviewed THOMP SON' 8 file06 the cas e be retired to KGB Archives . Comment : Dr John M THOMPS ON His at Indiana Associate Professor of by the FBI in Uni versity was interviewed KUNGAROVA ' April 1965 _ He identified guide 8 photograph as that 0f his Inturist and during a outside Moscow in 1959 admitted having been intimate with When he returned to her sought out Moscow in 1960 he had been {enoteduNGARova who told him she had ldeclared in Inturiet because 0f her Philip intention to marry an American (see NIELSEN) THOMP S ON a ls0 visited the Soviet Union In .1964*06 EHOMPSON he was unaware of stated that might have and ckaenyePhasogeaphs the KGB by the KGB he was never approached on either 0861662 430 TS No. 197124 Top Secret &/6 Top 6,OX tory trip OX,06 D 6 trip. Copy ================================================== Page 401 ================================================== QoQoo Top Secret (Annex.B) Comment: (Continued) KUNGAROVA was tinterviewed by the FBI in June 1965 She confirmed that she had been intimate withdTHOMPSON in 1959_ but denied that 06 had been instructed_ toccompromise him. NOSENKO has claimed KUNGAROVA was" his agent in 1959 although he_ has not related that claim to his des cription 0f' her role in the_[THOMPSON 06 case: 06 TORREY , Carmen NOSENKO 's Information TORREY who was' in love with a Soviet citizen, was recruited by Seventh Department case officers on that bas is in, 1960 and turned over to the First Chief Directorate, which helped her obtain emp loyment at the UN (also given as NATo) NOSENKO. was in the American Department at the time Comment : In 1960 it was reported- thate TORREZ] planned to defect: to the USSR because she was in love with a Soviet 'citizen. In 1961 she married an American In 1962 GOLITSYN reported KGB attempts to recruit an American identifiable olas(TORRE_}during her October or_ November 1959 visit to Moscow JO6TTORRE7L worked for theCian2 9 American Union in 1954-1959 , but there is no 0 indication that she was ever employed by: the UN or by NATo_ NOSENKO_ has not indicated the source of his information on; (CORREx:-BIn 1959 , when GOLITSYN reported the KGB attempted t'o recruit TORREY 06 NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Depart- ment, not the American Department 0001663 431 TS No::. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 she [%/G&i ================================================== Page 402 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Top Secret (Annex B ) 06 IQAROG , 6een] NOS ENKO " S Infofma[ ion An American 0 f Russ ian Russian "epegre REe:saf_ EWARoq] -i8iced Literature and a fluent 01 1963 Iheltarget the Soviet Union in 1962 Kc G . KRUPNov pLEwARoc] 0 f Seventh Department case officer KGB agent , Jf which {hes lured into intimacy with a female KGB took incl iminating one point Seventh Department phocographs was placed 1n direet contact case officer Yevgeniy NOSKOV attempt was made becaus e with TWARog; but no recruitment 06 incriminating the KGB had concluded that the succes s The Rlg Eaefephe were not sufficient to ensure expected return to deke sed Sodieurthes action Pending [wARod' S O6 Union in 1964 or 1965. Comment: In a 1965 interview wich he had visited the the TWAROG] said and 1964 On USSR in 1957, 1960 , 1962 , his 1962 he had met and befriended one Nina S . PETROVA, and occaston on one friends 0 f attended a Party accompanied by hers , a Soviet couple The name was Yevgeniy OLCWARo; S was later stated that he confforeedib}iaate with PETROVA, but was never (after by anyone about that fact In 1964 was NOSENKO ' s defection) EwARoc]stated , he 06 approached in the US S R Arthur HAMAN Es tonian whom he had met in an Massachusetts in 1962 HAnACanbhadgez in Sweden in 1955 _ who had defected 1962 redefected to the US SR in 196,000^ff8zdARB to (TwARod] HAMAN offered 06 TWAROG would Provide summaries of members 0f his background 06 threatened him with the tour group and- C6to the US S R if denial of future entry stated that TWARod] did not comp ly _ TwARod 06 he refused , and no further was applied pressure NOSENKO provided the information from notes in Geneva in 1964 < on TwARoG] 06 0001664 432 TS No. 197124 Top Secret At FBI , trip they man ' by Copy I5/e ================================================== Page 403 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret (Annex B) VOLKOL,_ Vasiliy Andreyevich NOSENKO S Information tvoLKov construction company employee and an American, was' recruited by. & Seventh Department case' officer in the I summer of; 1962 while visiting the Soviet Union. He was to' be used in emigre operations 1 Comment VOLKOLthas been identified as a carpenter living in? California who travelled to the Soviet Union in 1962: He Is a religious fanatic with a record 0f many arrests , and he may be :mentally disturbed . In' an FBI OGinterview @OLKov} denied that he had been recruited Ey the: KGB NOSENKO does not indicate: the source 0f his: information; which was contained in notes brought to_ Geneva in 1964 VOLSKIY, Bori8 1 NOS ENKO 8S' Information The President of American Iravel Abroad VOLSKIYIwas recruited a Seventh Department case officer in 1962 on E #deological grounds . His mission i8 to advise the KGB by open code;of any tourist whom he suspected 0f having Some connection with American Intelligence_ 0 12 Comment Interviewed: by the FBI in 1964 VOLSKIYI advised that he travelled' annually to the US SR on: tourist business and has frequent contacts with Inturist officials in the Soviet Union He denied having any intelligence contacts with one Pos s ib le exception _ In about 1962 he was; visited in his Mos cOw hotel room by ' a 0801665 433 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top by" May Copy '8/6k ================================================== Page 404 ================================================== 14-QOQOO Top Secret (Annex B ) Comment : (Continued) 0 pers on represent ed co b e an Inturisc official who solicited VoLSKIY s aid in cuftailing foreign rourists distribution 0 f Bibles and literature in the USSR WoLsKiy a8 serted that O he was in n0 Pos it i0n t0 Provide such as8 is = Y taice, and he was not contacted again NOSENKO ' s information is limited to that contained in written notes brought to Geneva in 1964 OC WALLACE; Williaw NOSENKO ' s Information A student at the University of (Vienna, WALLACE was recruited on ideological grounds while visiting the Soviet Union in 1961 The Seventh Department made the recruitment , and turned WALLACE over €o the First Chief Directorate, which was s€il1 managing the case in 1964 . 10_ Comment: Interviewed in February 1965 in Wienna O6WALLACE] a dmitted having been approached by an unidentified Soviet during a visit to the US SR in 1961: He claimed he refused to them" and said there had been n0 further attempts t0 contact him_ NOSENKO ' s information is limited to chat contained in written notes brought to Geneva in 1964 ; he has not indicated the source of his information 6001666 434 TS No. 197124 Secret 2/6R J0 ,0 6 "help Top Copy ================================================== Page 405 ================================================== KaQoooQ: Top Secret (Annex B ) 06,06 YOUNGER, Ralph an EveLyn NOSENKO ' s Information The: YOUNCER Jcouple were identified as American Intelli- gence agents and arrested and recruited by the KGB while ~they visited the' USSR in 1961: However, later they_ failed to meet their KGB case officer as planned , in Denmark . The case was, handled the American Department while NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department NOSENKO ' s former subordinate, V.V _ KOSOLAPOV , was directly involved_ in the case Comment: TheyOUNGERs? were 0n a miss,ion for the U e S _ Army at the time 0 f their arrest, and 6 reported their recruitment immediately upon leaving the Soviet: Union KGB officer KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen under alia8 in; 1961, at. the time when the[YOUNGERs were 06 scheduled to meet with the KGB: in Denmark NOSENKO did not indicate the source 0f his information which :he related to CIA in Geneva 8 in 1962 _ ZIRING, Stanlex M NOSENKO !s Information ZIRINGH a "student who visited the DSSR in 1960 was recruited by the KGB after being apprehended in biackmarket J dealings - Comment: Interviewed in London in 1964 ZIRING] adnitted blackmarketeering but denied recruitment British authorities concluded that he may have given the impression of willingness to cooperate without realizing the Purpos e 0f the Soviet offer. British authorities report n0 evidence of subsequent contacts between_(ZIRING and Soviet . officials NOS ENKO claims he was in the American Depart - ment at the time (z IRING (wwas. recruited by: the Seventh Department 06 435 0001667 TS No_ 197124 Top Secret 10 IRK by they 0b: Copy ================================================== Page 406 ================================================== Secret Index of Pergonalities ABEL , Col. Rudolf Ivanovich 34 ABIDIAN John V _ 153 , 155 , 180 , 194 , 205-222 224 , 229 , 241" 242 , 246 , 259 260 , 344 , 35 1 , 40 4 ACTOR, fnu {see PRocTor)cd 399 AGAYANTS Ivan Ivanovich 2 8 3 "AGLODINA" (KGB cryptonym for Yelena S . KOSIENKO) 79 ALBAMONTE , Marion 3 11 ALBINGER, Donald 4007 ALEKSEYEV > Aleksandr Ivanovich 2 5 3 ALEKSEYEV_ Vladimir Kuzmich 305 , 306 ALEKS IEV Georgi Ve lev 258 ALESEIN Yevgeniy Nikolayevich 221, 222 , 390 ALLOYAN Lawrence 400 , 401] 06 TANDREY" (KGB cryptonym for Day le Wallace SMITH) 33 -37 99 , 152 , 165 2 38 , 239 , 287 ObJNDREYEV _ Igor Ivanovich 376 , 3917 ANDRIANOV _ 9 Vladimir Nikolayevich 7387 ANKUDINOV _ Vladimir Mikhaylovich 138 06_ "ANOD" (KGB cryptonym for Alexander SVEN CIANSKIY 2 92 APISSON Henfy 401 Ii ARKHANGELSKIY" 215 216 ARKHIPOV , Nikolay Alekseyevich 123 JARKHIPOV _ Petr Mikhaylovich 372 ARMS TRONG Robert 402 , 413] ARSEN" (KGB cryptonym for John V ABIDIAN) 207 ARTAMONOV , Nikolay Fedorovich (De fector) 47 , 373 ARTEMOV_ VladImfr L'vovich 214 2 8 4 285 "ARTUR" (KGB cryptonym for @rsene FRIPPED) 06 137 , 156 06(AvDEYEV . Vladimir DmitriyevTch 38 9 39Q]7 BAGRICHEV , NIkolay Grigoryevich 35 36 BAKHVALOV MIkhail Fedorovich 15 3 , 154 , 223 BALDIN . Bortg Andreyevich 259 BANNIK , Maj . Gen _ (See BANNIKOV) 389 BANNIKOV , Sergey Grigoryevich 276 , 384 , 390 BARGHOORN Frederick 2 9 8-_302 _ 326 BARKOVSKIY Vladimlr Borisovich 296 O6GARRETT. Robert 127 , 134-136 , 248 7 437 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 Is/68 Tcp 225 , 22 , 395] 0 6 0001668 Top Copy ================================================== Page 407 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret_ BARTHELEMY_ Thoma& Frank lin 4.02 403] 06_{BEGGs Frank 193 195 1973-498 BELANOVSKIY Victor (KGB cryptonym STROYEV" ) 110 116 BELITSKIY Boris' Yefimovich 106 , 268 , 280 , 282-287' , 291 317' 331, : 332 _ 3 3 7 "BELKIN" (KGB cryptonym for Boris BELITSKIY) 282 BELOGLAZOV 1 Viktor 159 , 221, 222 225 , 246 BELOV Iven Andreyevich 391 BENS ON John S 87 "93796 98 @ENYAMINOV Aleksandr Alekgandrovich 5.0_ 3.6 3 BERMAN Harold 403] BIENSTOCK, Natalfe 273 2747 BINDER , Peter 203, 204 , 234 , 403-405 BIRSE Arthur 104 114, 122 123 125_ 126,_14,4 BIRYUKOV , Vad Iw . Os 1povich, 427 42.8 BLAKE George 30 102 148 149_ 247 26 3 3,2.7, 3,31 BOBKOV Filfe Denisovfch 169 BOLSHAKOV Georgiy NikitovIch T(GRU) 398 BORODIN Nikolay Mikhay Iovich (aka Norman M_ BORODIN) 35 _ '94 , 95, BORISOV, Ivan Dmttriyevich 411 BORISOV _ Petr Pavlovich 377 BOwDEN Lewis W:, 139 141, 142 242 314. 06 BRADLEY Jerome 6 '1787 BRAUNS Horst 26 8 288_2917 BROCHES Adam 405 406 RROCHES Alexender 405 DECWKs_ Ignacy 406 BRODNEY Eenaeth_ 80 BROWN G _ stanley 202 226 227 244. BUBNOV , Oleg Sergeyevich 32 BUDY LDIN Valerty 8 3 84 BUHLE Johannes_ 402, BUNDARIN Eugene Peter 406 407 | 0 BURGI RIchard 99 110; 113 115-120 146 344 346 BUTENKO _ John W 29 8 368 O6(CARDELLA Jame8 8 7 9 7 CECCHI Pietro 194 198 199 '200 208 CHELNOKOV, Col: Vladimir Doitriyevich 18 29 , 139 , 140 , 142 259 276 , 292 305' 34.6 CHEREPANOV Aleksandr Nikolayevich 76 264 , 309-313 , *319 322 326 , 381 , 411 412 [CHERNYAVSKIX, VIktor Petrovich 387 2390 395 CHERNY SHEVA, fnu (Eddy GILMORE S s {Ster-4n ~ law) 7.7 (CHRISTNER = Robert Charles 407 CHUCHUKIN, Vladimir AleksandrovLch 3.70_, 372 CHURANOV_ Vladiair Aleksandrovich 30-31 , 9:7 0001669 TS No. 197124 438 Secret 2y160 Top_ Ob Copy Top ================================================== Page 408 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Secret DANK0 , YevgenLya "Jane" 109 DAY Frank 201 , 202 DEMK IN Vladlmir mnu) 15,9 , 161,. 182 , 194 , 2 22 , 2 / 6 , 406 DERA Vitalfy Grigoryevich 272 , 2 73 406 DEREVENSKOV , Gennadiy Georgiyevich 370 DERYABIN 9 Petr Sergeyevich (KGB de fector 1954) 17 , 380_ 3 8 1 , 396 DITYATEV, Dmftriy Alekseyevich 427 "DMITRIYEV" 84 DMITRIYEV_ Aleksandr Anatolyevich 107, 108 , 249 DMITRIYEV, Sergey Georgiyevich 228 DRANOV _ Vasil1y mnu) 221 , 222 DREW George 127 130 131 347 DRIBERG _ 9 Tom 106 112 | DUBAS Konstantin Nikitovich 124, 125 , 127 , 129 , 130 , 133 , 152 153 304-306 DUKKOV Gen _ 'tbuig- MVR) 257 DVORKIN Yurfy Mikhaylovich 294 DWELLY Robert 202 , 203 0 7 EDVIN" (KGB cryptonym for | Gerald SEVERN 426 EL SHAZLY , Mohaamed Sarwat 194 198 199 O6EPISON Henry (See Ilenry AP ISSON) FAIN. Thomes 408 ) FARMAKOVSKAYA, A _ 392 , 393] FEDOROVA = Dora 9 2 , 93 FEDOROVICH ratyana 208 , 214 , 215 216 FEDOSEYEV , Sergey Mikhaylovich 159 , 229 , 239 , 259 , 30 7 , 313 , 406 FEDYANIN Vladlmir Petrovich 158 FEKLISOV _ Aleksandr Semenovich 117, 119 , 314 O6EELCHLIN, Howard L _ 90-937 FILATOV, Vladimir Geras imovich 279 , 294 06@INK _ DavId 408 409 bl FISK, Norman 145 409 FOFANOV_ Fedor (mnu) 725 _ 2 7 FOMIN (aila8 of A FEKLISOV) 314 , 36 8 GEREERs _ 9 Edward L 227, 230 _ 231 238 KERIPPEL , Argene 103 i27 137-144, 249 265 _ 266 , 347 | FRIPPEL Odetce (Mrs Arsene FRIPPEL ) i39] FUNKHAUSER 9 Richard 243 66 [GABELKo, Sergey S tepanovich 376 06 GAFFEY Joseph 203 , 204 GAMKREL IDZE , Revas Valeryanovich 386 , 38 7 GARBLER _ > Paul 246-248 GARLAND John 189_1 92 , 199 , 254] GARST Roswell 109 GAVRICHEV , Sergey Ivanovich 279 , 318 6j01670 4 39 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 i3'8R Top 20 3 , 61 , 2 77 , 407 , 01ga 237 , 8 7 , Copy ================================================== Page 409 ================================================== 14-00000 Secret GAVRILENKO Nikolay' Aleksandrovich 159 211, 222 GAZARYAN Oganes 400 GEHRCKENS Han 9 113 121 144 JGILMORE Eddy_ 76_ 7.7 78 7 9 80 YlGINSBERG Michael TGS_ 409 410 GLAZUNOv Sergeyevich 158 TGLEYSTEEN Culver 227 2.30 LGOLD Herry 293 GoLTTsyN Anatoliy Mikhaylovich 17-19 30 38 39 6 2 , 76 162 16.3 , 16 6 , 168 ` 169 17-6 , 189: 191, 192; 2 3.2 23.5 266 273 ; 2 83 290 330 36 4 376 380 381,, 38,3: 396 403 `405,403 431 GOLOS_ Jacob 29.3 GOLOVKO , Admfral Arseniy Grigoryevfch 5 3 GOLUBEV_ Sergey MIkhaylovich 277 , 384' , 38 5 GORBACHEVA; Klare Konst antinovna 137 "GRAY" 392 GRIBAnOv General Oleg Mikhaylovich 15 , 20 , 37 38 , 115 117 127, 144, 146 153 154 159 466 16 7 16.8 170. 172 19,4 235 237, 239 25.7 259 260 , 275 276 291: 298-302 304. 30 7 311, 815-317 321, 331, '335-337 346-349 352 360 367 , 368 , 384 , 38 5 , 387-392;. .394 "GRIGORIY": (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey YEFREMOV) 156 GRINEVSKIY Oleg: Alekseyevich 279 GRISHNYAT Tatyana mnu). 32 22*6: GROMAKOVA; 2 Ludmfla 89 , 209: 211 220 GROMAKOVSKIY Yevgeniy (mnu) 1,59 GROVER Preston 710 GRYAZNOV_ Gennadiy Ivanovfch: 155 '156 159 160-16 3 168-170 , 182 185 186 193 194 202 204 , 217 = 223 225 226 229 235 '239 2595 26 7 298 300 382 4.13 41S= GUK Yuriy Ivanovich 6 2 280 28 1 311 , 3.18 383, :384 , 387- GUSKOV ASergey MIkhaylovich 119 130 HAMAN ~Arthur 4 32 HAMZAVL, Cheries P Li_ 01 ~"Hanna" lnu 194 HARMS TONE Richard 314 315 411,--412 HARRIS Gisella 127 J 128,-144 HAYHANEN ReIno (KGB defector 1957) 34 EOFFMAN F sttephen 402 413 HOFFMAN Col Theodore__F '18 232] HoRBALY , William 226 , 227 243 244 KOUGHTON tain J 22] HOwARD , Herbert 413 414] HURLEY , Wilifam S _ i64 165 06 HUS TON Heyden_Henry 414 "0001671 4 4.0 TS No. 197124 Secret Top Ilya Cap Copy Top 16/6R ================================================== Page 410 ================================================== 14-000oo l0p betret ILYIN Sergey Aleksandrovfch 2 5 ISAKOV _ Viktor Fedorovich 36 6 IVANOV , fnu 108 IVANOV_ Boris Semenovich 50 , 32 4 , 3 6 2 , 3 6 3 , . 366 _ 36 9 , 370 , 374 , 38 6 IVANOV , Igor Aleksandrovich 298 IvaNoV, Vladfmir Maks imovfch 428 IVANOV Vladfmir Vladimfrovich 130 IVANOVA Svetlana N _ 194 , 196 , 198 , 199 , 20 3 , 20 4 IVASHUTIN Petr Ivanovfch 347 JAcKSON Henry H _ 426 JACOB Rfchard C_ 404 JAFFE Sa m 415 SELISAVCIC , Michael 109 O6(JENNER, Paul 164 , 185-190 , 192] JORNSON Hedv1g (Mrs , Robert Lee JOHNS ON ) 2 8 JOHNSON Robert Lee 22 , 24-27 , 349 , 38 0 JOHNSON Wallace Everett 112 220 2 60 , 267-272 , 290 , 2 91 , 349] JONES HIlliem Carrell, IiI 272 , 273] RADERA Fred 20 3 KALNINSH , Khariy Yanovfch 38 5 KALOSHIN Colonel (RU) (fnu) 51-53_ 56 , 06 KALUGIN Oleg Daniilovich 3 72 , 373 #KAMO" 209 KANTOR, Marvin (or Melvin) 145 , 415 , 416 KARETNIKOV _ Veny amin Zas imovich (or Venedikt Vas ilyevich) 25 , 27 KARLOV , fnu 113, 145 KASISCHKE Richard 79 KAZAN-KOMAREK , VladImfr Joseph 416 , 417] KEYSERS Jameg G _ 157 , 165 , 178-181 234 , 236 , 2 5 8J KHAMZAI Charles (See Charles P _ HAMZAVI) KKODAKOVSKIY fnu 117 KHOKHLOV Nikolay (KGB defector 1954) 76 KHRENOV , Nikolay (nnu) 8 3 , 8 & KILLHAM, Edward A 314 KIPTENKO 1 VadI0 A 374 RISLITSYN F1lfp- Vesflyevich 84 3 KISLOV, Aieksandr Kons tantinovich 279 , 2 80 , 284 9 415 KISLOV _ S lava (alfas 0f and 8 ee V,A, KUSKov) 415 Kosson Boris 241 KLYPIN Vladimlr Alekseyevfch 153 154 , 159, 161, 186 , 206 , 209 222 , 226 , 227, 237 , 255 _ 428 KOBULOV _ Genere 1 Bogdan Zakharovich 49,51, 5 5 , 57 , 6 2 , 64-66 , 7 KOLOBASHKIN Aleks ey Mikhaylovich 3 807 RoLosov (al1as 0 f V.V _ KOSOLAPOV) KOLOSSOv , VIktor Dm i triyevich (alia8 0 f V. V . KOSOLAPOV) 187 , 192 68u1672 441 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 16/8R 46 , 2 3 , 59 Copy Top ================================================== Page 411 ================================================== QQ YR 0P%mr 0 KOMAREK (See KAZAN-KOMAREK) D KOMAROV Vladimfr MIkhaylovich (a11es 0 € V.M_ KOVSIXUK) ;333 _ 412 KONSTANTINOV Ivan Alekseyevich 108 , 109 KOPEYKIN VIktor 418 L KOROLEV , Yurty Dmftrfyevich 396 , 39 7 KORNIENKO _ Georgiy Ma rkovich 36 6 "KOSHIKIN 110 KOSIENKO , Yelena S _ (KGB cryptonym AGLODINA" ) 7.9 KOSOLAPOV Vad 1m Viktorovich 155 156 _ 159 , 160-163 , 182 185-196 _ 199-204 , 206 , 223 , 235 254 , 261 , 435 KOSTYRYA, Vledimir Viktorovich 141 ROTEN Bernard 295 296 , 326 , 4217 KOVALENKO Anetoliy _ Grigoryevich 273 , 298-300 , 302 , 30 5 , 317 , 323 , 346 0 KOVALEV, Felik8 36 6 KOVSHUK Vladislav Mikhaylovich 33-36 , 78 9 5 , 153-159 161 163 , 167 168 , 172 174-177 , 186 195 209 217 0 222 223, 226-229 , 242 , 244 , 245 250 , 259-261, 290 , 412 422 428 KOZHEVNIKOVA, Lyudmila Yulianovna 55 , 5 7 0 KOZLov, Anatolly Sergeyevich 117-120 _ 255 , 257 KOZLOV , Veniemin Alekseyevich 76-79 , 216 , 218 OCRRAFT , Virgtl 127 , 129 130 0 OLRrorxov, Yurty Vegilyevich 372 KRUPNOV KIo Georgiyevich 273 , 289 , 290 , 301 , 303-30 5 , 432 "KRYMOVA" (See Marina RYTOVA) KUKOLEV , Dmf 86 _ 8 7 0 06 KULEBYAKIN _ NIkolay Panteleymonovich 370 , 374 , 379 , 394 , 3987 KUNGAROVA , Tamara 107 , 112 , {G18 419155430 , 431 KURILENKO , Ivan Yakovlevich T59 , 222 (KUROCHKIN fnu 372 KUsKov , Vyaches lav Aleksandrovich 153 , 311, 314 ,. 415 , 422 KUZMIN Nikolay Yakovlevfch 226 228 KUZNETSOV Aleksandr Ivanovich 152 bILAINE _ V.A= 402 . 403) LANE SIr Allen 104 114, 122 , 125 144 LANGELLE , Rusgell 153 , 205 , 261 ,2Zi0 , 213 , 214 , 260 , 314 315 LARIONOVA; Alla 97 , 9 8 "LEBEDEV" (See Vladfmir MUROMTSEV) 06 EEBEDev Anetolfy Aleksandrovich: 362 TEBEDEV , Lev Aleks androvich 25 , 9 4 LEONOV = Mikhafl 4 418 I LEONTIYEV , Yurty mnu) 8 4 LEVINA , Maya mnu) 249 , 250 LEVINE , Irving R, 106 , 112 [ 442 TS .No. 197124 Secret ic{q 94 h06, 419 , ttiy 241, . 27 , 60u1673 Top Copy ================================================== Page 412 ================================================== 14-0ooOO# 6 "j #erfet "iill1an" 183 , 184 iITTELL , Wa llc e L 3 1 6 ~ai LOPUKHOV , Aleksandrovfch 116 "LUCH" 110 LUKAS (See LUKIS) LUKIs fnu 121, 134] LUKYANOV _ Pave l Pavlovich 36 8 LUnT ) Horace G , 256- 2 587 LYALIN fnu 2 76 LYsov, Vasilyevich 36 2 37 52 MAHONEY Eugene 219 , 245 , 246 MAKASHEV Boris Dmitriyevich 311 MALIA Martin 113-115 MALYUGIN_ Aleks andr Stepanovich 15 3 , 160 , 161 MANHOFF Martin J 917 MARK David 276 , 2 8 6 MARTIN Captain Donald C . 178 7 MARTIN William Iamilton 239 MASON Ma Jor Anthony 227) JATLAW (a180 MATLO) Ralph 113, 145 , J6MATLO (See MATLAW) 410 MATVEYEV , MIkhail Georgiyevich 216 , 217 MAYOROV Sergeyevich 2 78 Mc GOWAN Edward 148] McGUIRE Robert Alan 147 1482 McKINNEY , Walter A . 92 McMILLAN James H _ 2 3 8 Ob(HcSWEENEY , John M. 238 ] Nc VICKAR , John 311 MEARNS Filleore K . 8 5 , 88 , 89] MEDVEDEV , Viktor Sergeyevich 383 _ 384 MERTENS Gerard 127 , 133 134 , 367 MICHAUD , Marcel (alias 0 f N.S _ SKVoRTSOV) MICKELSON Earl L 85 , 8 7 88 , 89 | 173 , 198 MIKHAYLOV Aleksey Mikhaylovich 241 MIKHAYLOV Valentin Matveyevich 424 , 426 MINTKENBAUGH 3 James Allen 2 8 MISHUTIN fnu 302 MI" TCHELL , Bernon 239 MONTGOMERY Hugh 40 4 MORELL , Wiiliag Jr. 159 , 245 , 260 , 261] MORELLI , 404 405 MORONE Joseph 173_ 174 , 183 , 193-199 , 2 54 , 3377 MULE, Walter 8 7 _ 94-96,. 98-100] MUROMTSEV , Vlad imir (mnu) 105 MYARIMYAYE , fnu 125 0001674 443 TS No. 197124 Secret 10 235R Yurfy 254 , Yuriy 241, Igor 91 , 8 7 , 167 , 422 , 23 , N. , 248 , Galya Top Copy ================================================== Page 413 ================================================== 14-00000 Sate O6NEVEROVA _ NIELSEN 0( GIELSEN P:: : NIKOLAYEV (a:: 25 2 NIKOLAYET _ :4 4884# us ed by NOSENKO ) 122 , 12> . NIKOLOV_ #SENKO) 271 NIXON Deftf!, NOSENKO , Ive& :_ NOSKOV_ 39), 299 , 30 1 , 421; 432 NOVIKOVA 'c1 OHANNES Gat&::a "OKSANA" (Scc 201 OMELICH Pa;! ] OSNALD , Lee %63' Jc )-J09 , 326 OSWALD , Ma 5:: ORCHARD , Theo?te ~OZERO" _ (Sec 5:< PANKRATOV _ Pere: PAQUES _ PAVLOV _ Gleb (CPECHTER, Ferze:_ PENKOVSKIJ _ C?: T<6 205 208 , 217 , 219 , 245 36 9 PERELETOV , S8 ::' PERFILYEV _ $ic; 2; 146 PERFILYEV _ Yw:: } : J797 PETERSON , Sec: [& TEQ} 134 PETRENKO, 684 :& 09 PETROV 1 Evdck? 6 ! PETROV , Vlad4= :; PETROV VladJe? } bcscr.1954) 84 _ 12 3 , PETROVA, Aa, PETUKHOV Iva < POCHANKIN . Di0:> J#) _ 384 PoPov Col . (Cer } 707_ 266 PoPtSOv_ Pe€ 5 (.529' PREISFREUND Jces8$ 'P{orye PROKHOR" ) 160 , 161 PREOB RAZHENSE:" PRESS MAN Afo? A: PROCTOR , Vefsc; 1 "RROKIOR" (Ke: TE' CEREunD)] 156 , 160 RAKSEY Jaze $ KASHCHEPOV , Yc*{* # J00 0001675 TS No. 197124 Secret I| Ixk Tem Ye:: Ke : +: Ge?: Yctece : } Georee Ax: < 17 , 61 , :$ & , Top Copy ================================================== Page 414 ================================================== 14-00od0 Secret 4Sk RASK , Walter 4 2 } , RASTVORoV L23 (KTk RASTYKAITE , fnu 17 , 6 1 , 277 , 396 O6IREITz . James T _ 11 1$ 2 2 RESHETNYAK 9 RHODES _ Timc: € , 389 RICHARDS _ Ira. 833-37 RoBERTS Spencer } ; 66 KoGov ,_ Nikolay (mnu) ROss _ Johanna 42 3 OkRUFE , John RYTovA_ Merina L'vovna -72 SACHANEN Felix 106_ :1 729 _ 26& SAGATELYAN Mikhail 833 SALISBURY Harriaol Rac ja;;'. '`0] TSARDAR" (KGB 76 - ; F SARWAT EL SGBZEE Rseeyyc {orDa: "sJ 156 160 SCHWARZENBACH _ Mohazze < $^ :#a{ {L SMAZLY) Collette SENIO , Welter P . 2 2 ; JEREBREANKSSI Eugene 4:5. 436] fnu 7; V TSERGEY" (KGB cryptony m , ideet{:> "SERGEY" (KGB "nknoco) 8 0 SERGEYEV or GofrygERGER forEra: {$ STETENS] ul SERGEYEV , Ivan SERGEYFV (2]: A $ a#d b % #OSENKO) 130-133 Yefimovich ]$4 S ERGEYEV , VIctor I 42 4 6 "SERVIZNIY" (KGB crypfonyr {or FJnd f8 ] 4 v SEVASTYANOV , Gennadiy (S2e Gera ! & SE#E;)JoROBYEV) 8 6 SEVERN Gerald 145 4 26 SHAKHOV , Pavel Fedorovich 26: 276 - 278 , SHALYAPIN _ Mikhefl Aleksardrow' c h 28 291 , 317 , 331 , 332 , 39 8 SHAPIRO , 76 _ 8 0 , 3 96 42 & , 62 $ | O6 SHATTAUER , Soffa 145 , 4 2 7 SRCHERBAK , Maj . Gen . Fedor Afekseyevich SHUBIN John Andrew 2 96 2 9.7 , 326 _ 38 9 SHUBNYAKOV , Fedor Grigoryevfch 6 5 3497 SHULGINA,_Nataliya 106 _ 112 SRUSTOV , Vlediair Viktorovich 36 L "SHMELEV" (KGB cryptonym for 4.; _ FOLKo:) SANYRYEV; Nikolay (mnu ) 86 9 7 9 2 156 "SHVEDOVA" (KGB cryptony m fcr Xa::"a XETEROVA ) "SIBIRYAK" 110 141 SIEGAL_ 9 Jeck (alias N . M. AORWo:s) S ISCOE, Frank 9 4 3 9 5 0{ 4 6 5 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 10 Top Yurly ce : : < : Nikolay Roy 145 , 3 80 , 2 -] , +00 06 Ser}"y 79 , 123, 84 ,. Henry 8 5 , 89 , 0201676 Copy 2UR ================================================== Page 415 ================================================== 14-0000O Secret SITNIKOV , Mikhafl G _ 276 SKVORTSOV , Nikolay Senenovich 135 167 170 , 172-174 198 , 199 SLESINGER = Alfred Lazarevich 293-295 , 32 6 SMIRNOV (elfag used by NOSENKO) 123 SMITK Day le W . (See ANDREY" ) 9 8 , 2 38 , 239 , 260 , 287 SMITH , Edward Ellis 37-39 , 336 SMITH_ John Discoe 239 OL[MITH Paul 2492 SNYDER , Richard 311, 314 SOBOROVA, Lar1s8a 104 , 105 122 Ol [SoCHUREK. Howard 427 , 428 KOKOLOV 9 Gen (GRU) Vsevolod Sergeyevich 297 (6[sokolow Sonya 2937 "SOLISTKA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown) 185-187 , 18 9 SOLOMATIN Boria Aleksandrovich 422 SPRECHER , George Herman 377 378] STEIGER , Andrew J , 76 STEVENS 1 Edmund 76 158 STEVENS _ Frencis 345 429 | STORSBERG , Jame8 15 7 161, 166 165 , 166-179 , 194 , 198,, 199 , 201 , 238 , 2 50 260 , 266 06 STROUD , Dflliam R 8 7 9 3-96 '9 8 TSTROYEV" (KGB cryptonym for Victor BELANOVSKIY) SUMIN 1 Aleksey Konstantinovich 215 SUNDAR, Eg11 113= SUTTON Horace 104 , 12165324] SVENCHANSKIY Alexander 292 , 295 , 326] SVIRIN Vas Grigoryevich 392 SYCHEV Alekeandr Anfimovich 390 TARABRIN Yevgenfy Anatolyevich 131, 132 , 391 , 394 TARASKA , Willfam 145 429 430 TAYLOR_ David 127 , 9 132 , 133, 174] TELEGINA, Augustina Konstantinova 48 , 52 55 TITOV, Col. Viktor NIkolayevich 362 ,_381 THOMPSON John M, 107 , 381 , 430 , 431 "TOMO" (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey A DMTTRIYEV) TORMOZOV Ana tolly 79 TORREY , Carmen 431] TTRAPEZUND" (KGB cryptonym for Oganes GAZARYAN) 400 TSYMBAL Mikhail Stepanovich 278 2 80 , 281, 318 TULAYEV_ Vladimir Yevgenyevich 373 TURLLIN Mikhafl Ilich 305 06 TWAROG , Leon 432 UMANETS Ella 159 183 _ 184 , 198 URBAN Peter 180 , 2277 VAN KRAKON_ 9 Hugo 400" 401| U6 VAN LAETHEM, George 97 , 987 0001677 446 TS No. 197124 Secret T0p 3 3 , 36 , 99 , 99 , 428 , 234 , 293 , iiiy. Top Copy 2zike: ================================================== Page 416 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Tcp Secret VARLAMOVA , Inga 15 9 167 , 16 9 VASSALL , Willlan John C . 1 8 , 2 3 30 , 31 , 110 , 149 VERENIKIN Aleks andr Ivanovfch 121 VETLITSKIY Arsen fy Aleks&ndrovich 133 , 29 7 VLADIMIROV Vladimir Viktorovich (alias 0 f V, V . KOSTYRYA) 141, 362 -364 , 36 9 VLASOv Gennad iy N . 3 8 0 VLASOV Ivan Pavlovich 372 VOLKOV Anatoliy Ivanovich 110-113 , 127 , 130-136 , 202 , 2 48 256 , 267_271, 407 , 409 , 417 06 VOLKOV Vasiliy Andreyevich 433 | ~#VOLODINA" 10 (KGB. cryptonym , Identity unknown) 8 5 Volodya, lnu 8 9 90 "VOLODYA" (KGB cryptonym, Identity unknown) 202 Volodya, lnu (unidentified KGB officer) 197 06 VOLSKIY , Boris 433 4347 VOROBYEV , Vladislav (KGB cryptony Ii "SERVIZNIY") 86 , 8 7 WALLACE William 434 WASHENKO , Steven 242-2447 WATKINS J, B 110 , 149 WEISS Samib_(KGB cryptonym "SARDAR" ) 160 , 161, 181-184 , 250 , 26 7 WHITNEY . Thomas 76- 80 WILBY , Willlam Stan ley 127 , 131, 132 WILLERFORD , Frederick 127 , 136 , 144] OX(WILSON Charles 227] GXWINDS OR, David M. 227 WINTERS George P _ 139 , 142 , 158 , 244 , 260 , 314 , 315 , 412 6EYAZHINSKAYA . > fnu 169 O6[YEAGER, F.J 9 1 YEFREMOV , Aleksey mnu) 110-113, 127 , 130-136 , 202 , 248 , 256 , 267-270 _ 272 , 409 , 417 YEFREMOV _ LeonLd Ivanovich 30 1 , 302 YEGOROV, Mikhail (onu) 255 25 7. YEGOROV _ Sergey Ivanovich 254 YEREMEYEVA . 9 Nina Ivanovna 38 3 06 YERMAK , Yevgenfy Ivanovich 3727 YOUN= Ralph and Evelyn: 435] Txuliya lnu 18 8 "Yure" inu 18 8 ZARUBIN Jes1lfy Mikhay lovich 405 ZAYTSEV, fnu 419 ZAYTSEV, Valentin Aleksandrovich 36 3 , 3647 ZEMSKOV _ Nikolay 237 ZHARIKOV_ Nikolay Timofeyevich 317 ZIRING , Stenley 435 ZuB ON William J 261 ZUJUS Matas 1847 ZUJUs Matthew P _ 161 , 164 , 178 , 181-184 , 2 38 , 250 , 2677 ZwANG , MMauri.ce 2003 447 TS 500163824 No. 10 Top Secret 2o/rk 24 , 80 , GER ; Copy

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