Transcript of 104-10150-10004.pdf

================================================== Page 1 ================================================== GDCOQQ 104-10150-10004) 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F_ KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 2 October 1968 CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO ================================================== Page 2 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRZT October 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR; Dircctoz of Sccurity Dcputy Chicf, Socurlty Reaearch Staff FROM SUBJECT NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovicb 1. In accordancc with thc requcst of tho Deputy Circctox of Central Intelligeacc, attachcd J8_ 1 summary with conclusions ConC' erbing the bona ficcs 0 Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKo: Sub- conclusiong aro contalned in thc sumraJzy cocerzing scvezal area8 which wcre glven pritcazy coralderation ln tbe matter majox Of &h0 bopa fidos 0f NOSENKO. 2, Iacluded In thin 8umraary are cormeats concerning couclusione ia tho previous BUrinaty &2d an arccx contaicing *e- Earks On throe scpazate gubjectc relatcd to the NOSENK? caje. 3. In bricf, the conclusion of tbis summary i9 thal NOSENKQ i8 the peraon ho clims to bc, th:f he held bis clined positicis !n tho IGB during 1953 Jazuazy 1964, tbat NCSENKO was zot dia - patched by tbe KCB, and that iu previcus lics and exzgzerations aro not actually of material sisniricancc J: this time. Eruco L: Solie Attaciment: Sutm-TY OJu1C02 3iS;ko SECRET ================================================== Page 3 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECZI TABLE OF CONTENTS i Introduction IS Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since 30 October 1967 ZI. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO A_ Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be ? B Is the Claimed KGB Career of NOSENKO Plausible ? C; Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of His Motivation in Contacting CLA in 1962 and For His Defection in 1964? DS Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIA Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and Organization Reasonably Comrensurate With His Clained KGB Career ? E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be Considered in Toto 2s Having Resulted in Material Damage to the KGB and/or Has the Information Furnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefit to Western Intelligence ? F_ Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away" in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which Woul Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched by the KGB ? OOGLCC3 48834 SECRZT ================================================== Page 4 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ G_ Is There Evidence of a Political or Other Type Objective Which Could Justify & Dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Given a Specific Mission or Mis sions ? H_ Is There Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 Or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Prior Briefed by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB During These Contacts or ABelavig Deiectio_Objectives IV . Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO As NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU i of the cities or at the Places and Times He Claimed B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the Time He Claimed C. NOSENKO Did Not Scrvc in thc Amcrican Embassy Scction Throughout the 1953 5 1955 Period a8 He Claimed D_ the Period 1 955 1960, He Was Neither a Case Officer nor Deputy Chief of, 'eiehsevesezior Department American-British Commonwealth Sectior E. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chiei of the American Section nor a Senior Officer or Embassy Supervisor in the Section During the Period 1 96] 1982 (sic) F_ NOSENKO's Claims , That in 1962 He was Chief of the American-British Corronwealth Section and Was Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Are Not Credible Department, Ga NOSENKO Has no Valid Cla:m to Certainty That the KGB Recruited No America: Erbassy Personnel Betwee: 1953 and His Defection in 1964 8u 01604 2 Any Being Any Any Capa- During in, ================================================== Page 5 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Annex A 4 Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex 3 Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text Annex Annex C 5 The Cherepanov Papers 0001005 3 SECRET ================================================== Page 6 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 7 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SSECKEI I INTRODUCZION GRObP 00u1006 Excluded Iram autemallc SECRET downgradlng aad Gcclassi(laatlan ================================================== Page 8 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SZSaET INTRODUCTION Tbe following gummary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive , tbat is to contain a 8pecific comment on all organi - zational, operational, personality and cage type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do 80 would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather lirited area8 of primary concern. This summary will not contain a detailed psychological asse8sment of NOSENKO nor will it contain & recitation of the numerous tbeories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects of the NOSENKO cage. This Summary will be primarily directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO wag or was not dispatched by the KGB , whether his claimed KGB career i8 relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a reassessment of the entire cabe for or againgt NOSENKO. NOSENKO bas admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claimg that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance SECRET U801067 C;Wl? E1 Irjm ;nalic- 6ri; 33 ================================================== Page 9 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ but not to mislead this in any material matters of an operational or policy nature_ In order to avoid misunder8 of the phrase fides" as congidered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily on whether he voluntarily defected to this without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with repregentatives of thi8 Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aapects will be considered, but hie admitted previous errore, and exaggerationg will not per 8e warrant & conclugion that NOSENKO i8 not a "bona fide 1i defector. There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement ~gainst which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Reader8 may differ in whe regard to this arbitrary Standard i8 a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader _ to asse88 the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate_ The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami - nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, hag been considered in SECRET 2 00010G8 SECRET Agency any tanding "bona Agency lies iber ================================================== Page 10 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET esa propatatlon Of thla nunmnry: B wtll be commentad On Ln part end tble eumrary wIll Include conelustona correlatod wita the beven pzimery concluelona 8et fozth On pega 358 0f tbo above gumrary: Remarks concerning certain eTTOrB, Incenslsteneio?, omiaetons and unaupported conelubiont {n tba Pravious summary fa rosazd to epectflc cated or 8ab-afcad MII ba tecluded tn tklo pummary: Howevor, ejs summary FIll pot Lnclude polnt-by-polat compariton o{ a]] arc0* of @g7oomant Or dleagreement wth lalormetlon contained la tho provious opmmery: posidive decialon in rogard t NOSENKO baaed on al1 evallable:tnlormatlon 9ould be mado In tba Immediato futaro. Taore a*8 B0 knotd Bources cufrently avallabla & provida new pobitiva Infoxmatlon ceacerning NOSENKO and hie bona fdea. I I0 rocognized ebet thero I9 #lwaya 0 Pobeibullky la t80 futare a Dew BontCO O} BdurCo8 will bo abla to furnish addldonal Information in regard to NOSENKO. Howover, tbie pobetbillty I9 exceedlngly tenuoua and {t d8 Lelt tbero I8 eudflclant Informatlon avallable on wbich t base 2 conclusloa [a to NOSENKO mattor . 3 Cuuiecs ================================================== Page 11 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ II ================================================== Page 12 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ II SUMMARY OF DEVELQEMEATS IN NOSENKO CASE SINGE 30 OCTOBER 1967 Gali? 600101o Exciuded frcm zutomatlc SECRET tnazradieg and teclasslticatloa SECRET ================================================== Page 13 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET SUMMARY QF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known pergonally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO cage since June 1962. Interview8 have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular agpect had been covered during previous interview or interviews . NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the firat few interviews, bag been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activitie8. On occagion NOSENKO hag indicated & reluctance to make pogitive statements in certain areas previously congidered at a minirum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the SECRET C301011 17 Excluz:1 {Ja aozalic txsm; :C dnisjiicn X ================================================== Page 14 ================================================== 14-000O0 SECiET interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the interviewer, totally disappeared During the interviewing period; particularly in the first six monthe, NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects a9 his life, motivation for de- fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an exarple of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the meroranda included remarks concerning approximately(875} KGB officers, 100} KGB agents , 35 GRU officers, and' 400}other Soviet nationals . These lists were alpha - betically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO hag materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him during current interviews. Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field OfficelFBI in particular have given great asgistance in regearch and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter- viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizeng concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. 2 0001C12 F TET ================================================== Page 15 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEuaci Ia addtdlon, throo proloselonale Irom the SB Dl-dalon bave rovlowved &ho current Informatlon and ab1tod [n tho retrloval o provlono Lnlormatlon {rom NOSENKO and collation of current Intoxmatton wlta provlous Lnformatlon. The latter j0 a tremerdous taak bacanto 0I ta volumno ol matertaly t38 number of Indlvldual Caaod Inveived; and &e extenalvo Inlosmation In regard t KGB perdopelldet, proceduro8,_oxganiratlonal eeructuro and actsttios. Tbe 8B Dlvialon eleo Provlded ta Bervdca8 oI a3 oxport tzanoletor 6 renalate ta tapo8 af tbo 1965 {ntorzogatfoa of NOSENKO by Pots DERYABIN and Ope 0{ tbo preriouoly montioned threa pro - Leaotonale coroplotad new txanolatdoa 0f tbe 1962 Lntarvlewa wlth NOSENKO. In addltlon, transerlptlons &f certaln otter particulerly pertlnent previoua intorvleva of NOSENKO have beoa completed b7 t20 Oulco o SecurIty. Approxtmately 7000 pagos eraaecripta and related materlal bave beon comptled and diueeminated &inco lato October 8967 . Com- Dento coneeroing tba value ol tba Iniormation contained In &bo aboro mtessal} a50 coptalned In another section of ini8 quruary- A0 of tbo present t1ns , # corplote analyoia f9 not posbfbla bince & conalderablo portion af tko matarial hae not been Jully Ptocebbed. 6n te proparatlon J1 thla summary all area? 0f major siglflcance bava bden exarined Beceuse o &0 voluminou {nformatlon; aUl analytical &nd colledloa work bas no} been complalad; but It i8 not conaldered that, baged QQ # 3 03j1013 S5cT of ================================================== Page 16 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SCCRET avadlable Intormatlon, tbo remaialag vork wlll matorially adect tbo concluslons drewn Ln tlt Bummary: Tba polygraph latorview 6 NOSENKO wa8 Initlated o 8 Aaguet end concluded on 6 Auguat 1968. Appronimately etsty gue8clona al A pertlnont natare Vera [ncluded In eo polygrapb Later- now. No problema wero encouatorad t0 Polygraph letervdov and n0 addltlonal 0I NOSENKO {0 antlclpated: Attacbod ks & copy 0l m1 soLf-explanatory report on tbo roaulte o &0 polygrepa Intorvdov . Intarvlown wth NOSENKO bave continued elnce tho polygreph Intorvtaw on & temporarlly reduced scala {n order to permje 4 reriew of previoaa Informatlon and proparation o thle mmmary: Tnoro % po doubt that fnture intesvdewa with NOSENKO will revoal informatloa of intelllgene: valua; bu: information dereloped tbua far will PorIAlt decieloa &a tbo cada 0[ Yurly Ivanovich NOBENKO. Attaekmcnt; 22 68 Polygrapb Rpc 0081014 duriag tebtlog Aub ================================================== Page 17 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ uiil, Chief , Security Regearch Staff 12 Auguet 1968' FROM Interrogetion Research Division SUBJECT Yuriy Ivonovich_NOSENQ TRD 67491 IDINTIFYING DNTA Subject i8 e 40 year ola forter KGB Staffer who defected to the U,S. in 1964 in Geneve, BACKGROU Mr _ Bruce L, Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de- briefing ad interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to resolve the Lssue whether Subject was 8 dispatched egent of the KGB _ He hae conducted 8 vast emount of reseerch end checking with sourceg in an effort to eetablish the veracity of Subject 1 8 stetemente. PURPOSE The primary: purpose of the polygraph test was to determine: 1 Wbether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB; 2, Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr, Solte eny felse Information. PROCEDURE Subject was given 8 polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at & sefesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination wes conducted in the English language _ Subject 8 comprehension &nd the ability to expre8s himself in Engligh was completely edequate for purposes Of' polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in ell respectsE Subject diepleyed no evabivenebe and appeered to be completely fzank whenever he weg questioned or geve information on e topic _ The following relevent questions were asked during the firet tegt; I8 your true name Yuriy Ivenovich NOSENKO? Yeg , Were you born in the year 1927? Yes , Besides thbe Americans, did you tell enyone else about your intention to defect? No. 0001015 trow;' SECRET Zxclces Iv; Gulsnxc trjcn: 304 ================================================== Page 18 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ULUnc! IR 61424 ?age 2 Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB American Intelligence? No _ ebout your contact with Were You given ingtructions by the KGB Americen Intelligence? No. to get in contact with Vere]vou told %y the KGB to defect Intelligence mis8ion? No . in order to cerry out an Tne following relevant questions were ebked the becond tegt: Did the KGB ectually gend 8 communication tne USSR On the of' for your recell to your defection? No. Were you acquainted with CHEREPAWOV? Yes . Did you ectually travel to Gorkiy in CHEREPANOV? Yeb. Novenber 1963 to hunt for Are you deliberately withholding fron the KGB recrultment Of u6 any information ebout Americans? No . Doeg the KGB bave METKA and NEPTUNE 8o? Yeg , you the responaible Case Officer for Yes . John Abidian ' in 1960-617 Do you know the true neme pf' ANDREY or SASHA? No. Did You ever heve tuberculosis? Yes , Tne following relevant questions were esked on test three: Dia you serve In Intelligence fron 1951 to 1953? Yee, Wag (SHUBTI jin the USSR the period 1957 to.19592 Yee , To the best Of your knowledge , Depertnent et time? were you In the Seventh Yee , Did you telephone the GRU about SHUBIN) at this time? Yes , Zo the begt Of your knowledge , Of tbe Mr . ) 4a8 POROV conpronised because Winter8 mailed? Yes , 00u1016 during dey Were Nevy during thie letter ================================================== Page 19 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 11 ZRV To the KGB of your of the was On exposed to the Wes out from in Did you note8 youbrought exaggerate your personal Are Jou wIth Subject 8 your eception No. the no Bignificant Op on 'date fbegtions eskec, No 1n &nd not want Aot questions ,ege Vaskresued on 6 on 1968. Tne Du ' Join in ere you & KGB 1953? Yee _ 1953 to 1964? you & Yes _ Chier of the you only e Captain Yes _ et re You &n Yes; 3 to In the U,8. 19552 Ye8 _ 8958 end 1959. yOu in the Of the Of 1960 to Yeb . the 1961 vere Of: the You to e to 1962 were you the Yes . Chief of the' You @n In the ? of the operation First egainst end 0001.045 67494 P2g best knowledge , because PINKOVSKTY Yes. 1a85 surveillance the Britieh Enbessy? ther any misleading Information the Soviet Union? the No . intentionally GRTBANOV? No = asbocietion hiding any edverse information ebout polygreph beckgrouna? test reflected regerding Were relevant adninistered response8 tne ribk this indicative fatigue because further Astion. betting the polygreph examiner thus di possibly to ceuging Polygraphb edrenalin testing August aeked tegt four: following tne KGB March officer from Deputy Seventh Department? this time? Officer Mey Imbessy. Section from March were tibh-Canadlan the Deputy Section Chief Seventh American- Depertment? Jenuary December First Section the Deputy First Department? the January July Yes . Seventh Departuent? Firet Section officer time First Section, Stelingrad Yeb . Department: SCD, Benson, Mule ================================================== Page 20 ================================================== JiUKei IRD 67491 Page 4 The following relevant questions Tere asked on test: five: Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the Americen Embasgy besides ANDREY and | HOWARD? No_ Did the KGB know about the. notes you brought out? No = Heve you told 4s the coplete truth about your KGB cereer? Yeb . Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in cases in 1962 ana 1964 in order to miblead ue ? No _ Did you intentionally give ub any false operetional informetion? No _ Did GRTBANOV offer you the pobition of' Deputy Chief of the First Department? Yes , Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Department? Yes _ In early 1960 did CRTBANOV tell you that your primary rebponsibility was to work ageinst Americen Code Clerks? Yes , Other than you mentioned, are you hiding &ny other reabons for your defection? No, Are you deliberately withholding eny information on eny foreigners recruited by the KGB? No. Tne. following relevant questions were askea on test bix: Did you enter tbe KGB through the influence: of Generel BOGDAN KOBULOV? Yes , Did you succeed BAKHVALOV 88 Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes , Did GRYAZNOV succeed you &8 Deputy Chief of the First Section? Ye8 _ Mere the CHCREPANOV pepere pessea to the Arericens with KGB knowledge? No. 0001018 ================================================== Page 21 ================================================== SzCRET IRD Page:55 To your knowledge was there eny mi bleading information in the CIEEREPANOV papers? No. Dia you ever personally meet GOLITSY? No. Was there 8 cable sent to Geneve for you to asbi8t ARTEMEV In the BELITSKIY case? Yes. Did you personaLly make an epproach to(KEYSERS &t the Mogcow Airport? Ye8 . The, following relevant questiong were askea on test Beven: Did you actually review the KCB file on OSWALD? Yeb , Dia LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive KGB treining or es8ignments? No. Were there any microphones inetalled in the North of the U.S; Embessy in Moscow? No _ Was the review Of microphone reports one of your duties in 1960-61? Yes. Are vou withholding any Information Inov to vou coucering KCB microphones Or electronic ectivity &geinst the U,S. Eqbessy? No. Before your Officiel transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of' ABIDIAN to PUSHKTN street? Yes , Did You personally conduct & certain investigetion 0f SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneve ? Yes . Wes the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document to GORITY only 8 misteke by KASHPEROV? Yee , The following relevant questions were asked on test eight: While in the U.S. Enbessy Section did you obtain 8 typewriter for BORODIN for the preparation of' 8 letter to Eaward Ellis SMTTE? Yes , 0001019 67424 any Wing ================================================== Page 22 ================================================== ~LUGc} IRD 67l91 Pege_ Did you_read the official report of' KOSOTAPOV on hig contact with EEINER) on 8 train fronl Ileleinki to Moacow? Ye8 , Are you intentionclly withholding ey infornation concerning KGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moocow? No, I8 there any poGbivility that tne KCB woula di0patch en OfrIcer to defect to the Aexicene? No . Subject 8 polygraph test 0f. 6 August Likewise rezleated po indicetion8 Of deception. CONCLUSTON Beged 8olely on tpe overell onalyeis of Subject 6 polygreph teate, it 18 the opinion of the udercigned that the Subject nob been subetentielly truthful in anbwering the relevent_quegtione ebked , coOiC20' SECRET. Tatr;c cing '#4 ================================================== Page 23 ================================================== Ooooo ================================================== Page 24 ================================================== 14-000QQ SECRET IL. ANALYTICALCOMMENTS_CONCERNING _THE BONA FDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NCSENKO #mwi Exclted 5Jq d21tic 6001021 (sijiieimg SECRET Ceclissinication 21 ================================================== Page 25 ================================================== Ooooo SECRET ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to this S ummary , information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi - trary but realistic list of areag considered pertinent to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and 1964 contacts with represent -. atives of this Agency were known to the KGB: It wa8 noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exag - gerations would not per se warrant a conclugion that NOSENKO is not a I'bona fide defector. 11 The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A ~ H. A Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claimg to be ? B Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible ? SECRET 0081022 G;aw Excludad ireia automatic downgrading and declasslilcallon early ================================================== Page 26 ================================================== Ooooo C Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CLA in 1962 and for his defection in 19642 D_ Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi- zation reasonably commensurate with hi8 claimed KGB career? E Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be con- sidered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or hag the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Wegtern Intelli- gence ? F Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB ? G Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify & dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concez his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions ? 2 0001023 SECRET rning ================================================== Page 27 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET A Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts Or after his defection? 3 "Luu1624 SECRET ================================================== Page 28 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 29 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET IS_NOSENKQ IDENTICAL TQ THZ PERSON WHQM HE CLAIMS TQ BE? #7Mp Fxka: @en &-*z3tic] 0001025 SECRE Sangrading 36d Geclassi(lcation ================================================== Page 30 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET A Is_NOSENKO identical to_the pergon_whom he claims to be? During interviewa NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard to his family, his activities a8 a youth, the gchools he attended, ass0c ~ iateg of his father and mother , and his own associates. The period under consideration in this section i9 the period preceding his into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid- March 1953. Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and mother and his early life, ether with other information guch a6 a comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he i9 Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the 8on of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of building in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satigfactorily supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concern- other associates of his father and mother. Since, a8 indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt that Ivanovich NOSENKO is the 8on of the former Minigter of Shipbuilding, a detailed Study of hig life prior to 1945 18) is of SECRET 00u1025 Grdur Excluded fron aurqmallc] dn*n3raci6; ard (au) entry tog" Ship- ing_ Yuriy (age ================================================== Page 31 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET. little or no value in asgesging the bona fides or non-bona fides of NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions,. of which he has admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO was or was dispatched by the KGB. Obtaining any collateral first- hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of pegligible value, but there actually: is supporting information from Nikolay ARTAMONOV , a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at & military-naval preparatory school in Leningrad. NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute 8ince 1945. He has explained that he should have graduated in 1949 Since it was_ a four_ ~ear course, but failed the final examination in Marxism and therefore wa8 required to attend the Institute for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations. Baged on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co- students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this staterent 00u1027 2 not grad- SECRET ================================================== Page 32 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during hig first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation caused him to pre-date his actual into Navy Intelligence to 1950 instead of 1951 and his actual into the KGB from 1953 to 1952_ Tbe above action by NOSENKO i8 included in what NOSENKO ha8 characterized a8 his "stupid blunders. The latter i8 a rather apt characterization of his now admitted lie8 and exaggerations but i8 not evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB _ It i8 evidence of 2 certain personality trait of NOSENKO who hag in the past by his own admisgion tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate_ The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic area8 has been beriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 0001028 SECRET by entry entry early ================================================== Page 33 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEC,,_1 time are contained in & separate section of this summary, but it is considered that the recent interviewg of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub - stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953_ Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed by NOSENKO on 31, October 1967. This i8 & biographical gtatement con - cerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct grammatical errors or spelling 8ince to do 80 would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re- examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time. Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of 1955 rather than June July 1955 a8 indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "'cha_ racterization" (joiozg May SECRET ================================================== Page 34 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ L L' 44 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March 5 April 1955 rather than June 1955. Since the ungatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither' of the above changes are considered to be of a 9ignificant nature: An effort has been made during current interviewg to differentiate between errorg due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by NOSENKO. Attachment: 31 Oct 67 Memo 5 0001030 SECRET May ================================================== Page 35 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECIREO Operational Memo # N-2 SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich The following i8 a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following & requeet on 30 October 1967: I, NOSENKO, George, wae born 30 October 1927 in the city Nicolaev, Ukraine. family: the father 4 NOSENKO, Ivan, ba 1902, wab working at the ghipbuilding plant and gtudied at the Bhipbuilding inatitute, which he finighed in 1928; the mother NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI) b, 1908 , a houbewife; the brother 3 NOSENKO, Vladimir;' ba 1944, a btudent. In September 1934 I began to in the school (0 cla88) but atudied a ghort period of time becauge in October with the mother went in Leningrad where the father wag working at the ghipbuilding plant, "'Sudemech"! from gummer 1934. In Nicolaev I wab living at the Street Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living al9o in Nicolaev. In Leningrad I was living With parents in three places till 1938; at the Street Stachek (1934 summer 1935), St, Canal of Griboedov, 154 (1935-1938) , St. M, Gorky (short period in 1 938). From 1935 till SECRET UiU16.31 GIPd lip Exckuulcd Ira %1 aukomali: lzw,aul; D'i My 8tudy ================================================== Page 36 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Siuii] 1938 I Btudied at the gchoole, which were close to my place8 of living: In 1938 the father began to Work in Mogcow and Boon I With the mother went to live in Moscow in the end 0f this year. In Mobcow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2, Here I wa8 continuing to 8tudy at the gchool 585 (St. B; Polianka). In 1941 I finibhed 6th clag8 and went with parente to rest to the 8outh (Sochi) but boon began the war and we returned in Moscow. In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in Cheliabingk (Ural),, where I finighed 7th cla88 in gpring 1942. In Cheliabingk I lived in the pogelok ChTZ, being there f tried to run to the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in July-August we returned in Moscow. In Augugt I entered in the Moscowite military-navy 8pecial school, which wag evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finighed 8th claae in gummer. 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Mogcow, Thig gchool mugt be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I did not want to go there. With the Of father [ was accepted in the Baku '8 military-navy preparatory School and in August went in Baku, where I wa8 btudying at the second courge (9th clage). In thie 8chool I twice tried to be 8 ent a8 a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon 2 6001032 SECRET help ================================================== Page 37 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Uluml4 'after;that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Mogcow (January' 1944). In Mogcow [ studied at the courses (Rugsian word), finiehed 9th clag8 and wag accepted again in the military-navy preparatory achool, which wag located in Leningrad. In Auguet of 1944 I went in_ Leningrad. All cadets of this school were 8ent to foregt (about 200 kn. from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two months . In November I wounded by chance the left hand and wa0 in the navy hogpital, When I wag in the hogpital I decided not to return in the Gchool but to finish 1Oth cla88 in Leningrad about what I have written a letter to my father 39 king his and agreement with 8uch my decigion, With the help of the father'8 friend8 I quited with the gchool and entered in the shipbuilding college on the gecond courbe in January 1945 and gtudied there till the end of The WWI finished and I decided to return to Mogcow. The director of the 8hipbuilding college had given me a document that I gtudied in this college at the gecond courge and finished thie courge (though I wag not pa88ing exame). In Leningrad I wag living in the hogtel of thi8 college (St. Tolmachev). In 1945 I arrived in Moscow and wab living with parente (St. Granoveki, 3). 3 0001033 SFCRET put help May. May ================================================== Page 38 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Jcurici In Bummer 1945 there wa& created the ingtitute f the inter- national relationg in Mogcow and in July I entered in this ingtitute. In July my father Went in Germany with the group of engineer8 and he took me (I received & temporary rank of & Benior lieutenant, documents and a uniform). In 1945-1950 I studied at the ingtitute. In 1946 I acquaintedl with a girl 3 Shiehkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine ingtitute. I_ wag in cloge relatione with thie girl, becauge of the pregnancy I married her and she made an aborta parentg were againgt the marriage and We did not live together and we 8oon divorced. In the end of 1946 I wag acquai nted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and wa; going to marry her, re- ceived a flat in 1947 (St. Mira L former Igt Uecyehckad, 162/174). In November her father, General TELEGIN, wag arrested, but Imarried her. The marriage wag not guccessful. I foundout about her cloge relationg with the brother, and the child wag born with pathological changes . I wag not the father 0f this child, After that I broke With her and we were living geparately (end of 1 948 4 beginning 1949) . In epring 1950 before state exam8 in the institute wag working the commisgion, which wag deal with future works Of the gtudents of my Sth course, I expre8sed a wish to Work in any military organization 0001034 SECRZT My ~girl ing ================================================== Page 39 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Vluiici and 8oon I wa8 invited to visit pergonnel department of MGB (Miniatry of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the help of the father I began to deal With the pergonnel department of the intelligence of the minigtzy of military concerning my future work:' Paabing state exama I failed Marxism-Leninigm and With & group of faile I wag pagsing btate exams once more: In October 1950 I finighed the inetitute and received a diploma. I wab accepted in the navy intelligence in'the 13 of March 1951 and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th Fleet, 20 an interpreter of the information department). Before going to the Far Eagt I began my divorce with the former wife. At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Mogcow. Immediately after returning in Moecow I had a _ blood cough out. In the middle of Iwent to a tuberculoug Banatorium not far from Mogcow. In I July finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health I could not return back to the Far Eagt and the pergonnel department of the navy intelligence 78 ent me to Baltic Sea (a8 a senior interpreter of the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet 3 in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad'8 district). When I 8tudied at the institute Ia9 all the 8tudents received a rank of junior lieutenant of adminigtrative 8ervice after finishing the 0C01025 5 SEDRET navy May ================================================== Page 40 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ cLufcl 8econd 'courae in 1947. In 1951 the minis of navy had given me also the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence. In September-October 1952 I received a' rank 0f lieutenant. In Sovietsk the work wag not interested and for me it wa8 nothing to do: Begideg this the climate wag not good for my health and I decided to change the job. With thie purpobe before new Year at the end of 1952 I took a leave and went to Mobcow. January 1 Iwag with my parents at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV; whom I did not know before, but I knew hib gon-in-law Vahrushev Vabili 6 a former gtudent and my friend; I told him about my job and that now I wag thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV wag 8peaking with me_ on thig theme and propoge we work and his in MGB, but nothing more definite wa8 8aid about my work. Thig month I reported to the head 0f the perbonnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN about my decigion and that I will be working in MGB. In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous ganatorium, where I wa0 in,1952. In the dayg of funeral of STALIN I hag come to Mobcow and vigited the ministry where my father was working. There I have 8een General KOBULOV who hag come to the father and he said that he would gettle my question concerning my job. After geveral in the middle of March I have received & telephone call from MVD to 0001036 SECRET try help day8 ================================================== Page 41 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEC/+/ come to' KOBULOV _ There I have spent about two houre in the re- ` ception room of KOBULOV , but he wag too busy and his a8gigtant SA VITSKI gent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory SHUBNAKOV , who told me that there wag bigned an order and I wag accepted in the 1 department f 2 chief directory a8.a, cabe officer. SHUBNAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO (who 'wa8 acting a0 the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the department KOSLOV , Anatoli; wag appointed to the Bpecial department of extraordina= affair8 (invegtigation) ). SHUBNIAKOV and GORBATENKO gaid to me that I would.be working in the 1 8ection of the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department, wab acquainted with the chief of gection KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLov told me that I will be working against the American correepondents, showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officer8, who were working in thig room; KUTIREV , RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV The last officer must give files on the correspondent8 and agents. I wag 8aid to come next and began to work. When I wab reating in the tuberculoue ganatorjim I acquainted with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Mogcowite Univergity, and in June 1953 we married: Before it I wag living with my parents at St. Gorky , 9, but after marriage wag living with the wife at C001637_ Cnf rily day ================================================== Page 42 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Ocuici St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parente). In 1955 I received & flat_ at St_ Narodnya , 13, where wa8 living with my family. In 1954 I contracted & digeage '(gonorrhea) and on the advice of the friend IVANOV went to medic at St: Negliunya. Doctore abked to Bhow & document,, Ihad with me only MVD certificate and an operative pag8port and showed them the pasaport. Doctore had given me a treatment, after that twice made teete and aoked to core once more, but I did not come. wanted to Bee once more and ent a letter to the place of work, which wag written in the paeeport. The plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV , wab speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the' chief of the 2 directory, TEDOTOV 5 15 of arrest. The kombomol!8 organization also punished me. I received a strict reprimand and wa8 freed %f the head of komgomol'8 organization of the 2 chief director. I wae a member of komgomol'8 orgariizaton from October 1943. In the end of 1954 before leaving komgomol (becaube of age) the komeomol organization of KGB took off this 8trict reprimand. In 1955 on all officere of the 2 chief directory were written characterizationg (May-June). In my characterization wa written that I did not appropriate to the ] department 2 chief directory. In June - July I was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a ca8e 0001038 PTOrt point they They daye ================================================== Page 43 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ J J uii, gection. Thig gection was new created (the work officer of 2 PERFILIEV , the chief of the touriete). The chief of 7 department 2 bection GUSKOV. 28 a candidate in the Communibt Party' In 1956 I wag accepted lieutenant and a promotion a aoon received a of a senior Benior cabe officer: 1957 I wag accepted in the Party a8 a member_ In In Auguat 1956 my father died: a deputy chief of 2' bection. In In 1957 or 1958 I wa8 promoted till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to 7th department I wa8 working of the 1 gection in the 1 department 2 chief work a8 a deputy chief KLIPIN, Vlad, chief of the directory (chief of the 1 department, 1 gection KOVSHUK). condist of the wife and two daughters: Okgana, family wa8 in 1958. Oksana wae ill (bronchial born in 1954, and Tamara, born till 1963 2-3 montha wa8 in agthma) from: 1957 and almost every year thinking about change (temporary) of hogpitale. In 1960 Twas Pobgibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB livin g there wag a wa8 another question if I go from Mogcow in Lvov Odeg ga, But there At thig time the chief of the bection of I lo8 e the flat in Moscow. to me to go to work in Ethiopia 2 department, 'PIATROVSKI, proposed COciC39 SECRET againet got rank My place and and would ================================================== Page 44 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ~ZCRET (counter-intelligence Work among Soviet specialiste in Ethiopia). The chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided but in the lagt moment the pergonnel department of KGB did not agree. The reagong were the cage of 1 954 (illness and u8e of the pab 8port for' "cover) and & checking in the place of my (0om e of agenta report that drink and on thie bage have quarrele with the wife). I wag working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962, I wab appointed again inathe 7 department a8 the chief of the 1 bection (work againgt tourista from the USA and Canada) In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain. When I to work in the 7 department I knew that goon I must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free a place the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go to work in @stern Germany. In 1962 I wab appointed the deputy chief of 7 department (the chief of the department wag CHELNOKOV) and here [ wa8 wor_ king till January 18, 1964. my work in MVD-KGB I did not in any gchool, only in 1953-1954 wag visiting courbeg of foreign language8 of MVD- KGB at St, Kibelni; 10 080104 SECRET living began July During atudy ================================================== Page 45 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET W/ Five timeg I wag gent abroad: In 1957 I wag in England with a bport delegation; in 1958 wab again in England with & eport delegation; in 1960 I wag in Cuba with & delegation of gpecialist8 of nickel indugtry; in 1961 I wab bent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department.2 directory MVD; in 1962 I wag in Switzerland " the conference of die armament. Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leave8 for regt: In 1953 With the Wife I wa8 resting in the tuberculoue Banatorium. In .1954 I wag with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I wag rebting at the cottage: In March 1956 I wa8 regting with the Wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoblovakia. In 1957 I wae in Leningrad two weeke with the wife and then reated at the cottage. In 1958 I wa0 regting at the cottage: In 1959 I with the wife rested in Sochi, In January-February 1960 I regted with the wife in Kiblovodak. In 1961 3 August 7 I regted with the wife and daughter8 in Nicolaev. In October 1962 I reated with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963 Ireeted with the wife and daughtera in Anapa. CUU1C41 11 SECRET ================================================== Page 46 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 47 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET B_ IS_THE CLALMED KGB_CAREER_QE_NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE? {2 SECRET Zkz4 G aytomatic 0001042 #eTadhat and decksinetn ================================================== Page 48 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEu:4t B Is the claimed KGB career_%f NOSENKO plausible? In the past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO wa8 never an officer in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern- the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been 80 extengive a8 to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer. It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claired Departments during the claimed periods of time and gerved in the claimed pogitions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has not materially varied in his btatements in regard to the above gince his original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 a8 date of hi8 entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given in 1962). There have been 8ome variations in dateg of a minor nature, a8 indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or of trangfer from one Department to another and not congidered critical or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving falge information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic 8tory concerning SECRET 0001043 Exclided rom axiwwati: an: (loch~ ing day Ghair dwwczrauiag ================================================== Page 49 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ his KGB career i8 not Bignificantly different from the fragm_ version he gave in June 1962. Baically the is now congidered to have been the KGB career of NOSENKO: Mid-March 1953 late May 1955, Firgt Section, Firat Department; SCD Late 1955 December 1959 (1958 December 1959 3 Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh Department, SCD January 1960 7 December 1961, Deputy Chief of Section, Firgt Section, Firet Department, SCD January 1962 July 1962, Chief of Firbt Section, Seventh Department, SCD 1962 January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, SCD (NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is used throughout this but the better terminology probably i9 "Deputy to Chief, " The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, CIA, i9 not synonyrous with the "Deputy Chief" as used 2 0001044 . SECRET today entary following May July being summary, including term ================================================== Page 50 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Uluijli in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Regidentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy . This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in general hag 8upervisory functions over all the Department sections. The exception to the latter ig when the Chief of Department retains direct supervigion over what he may congider the most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions over degignated sections or organizational components.) During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKQ has furnished detailed information which it i8 considered substantiates his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remark8 on these topics are contained in separate sections of this summary. It i8 realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in both the Firgt Department and Seventh Department, SCD, hag stated that NOSENKO remained in the Firbt Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO wa8 not Deputy Chief of the Firet Section, Firgt Department, in 1960. It i9 impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the Firgt Department in late 1955 and wa s Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart- ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variance8 available 8081C45 3 SECRET only . May ================================================== Page 51 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRet at this time. On the other hand, it i8 not reagonable that NOSENKO would claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First 'tment, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 C 1961 and of his conferences with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time. NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officer8 of the SCD or former officers of the SCD who. transferred to the FCD with whom he wag personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN, A number of these officers were Officers whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy [ GUK, Vladimir A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV . The 8tatement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never perbonally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict with the statements of GOLITSYN that GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950'9, The description of GOLITSYN of thig meeting is that of a cagual encounter in the halls rather than a gpecific office visit, In light of the absence of reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an_ encounter and the absence of reagon for NOSENKO to lie on this 0001046 SECRET lay Depart from including he, this, any any ================================================== Page 52 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Scunz] it is eminently reagonable to conclude that the encounter took place but that NOSENKO gimply ha8 no recollection of it. There i8 no reagon to attach significance to this lapge of memory. The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed pogition of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960 1961 hag had the most merit in the controverey over his gtatements relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in detail in another section, but of note at this time i8 the controversy over what duties the pogition of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, entails or doe8 not entail. It is & fruitless exercise to attempt to judge whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 = 1961 on the bagi9 of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the Firet Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in CIA in regard to the activitieg of the entire Branch. Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB may or may not have gome similarities to the organizational gtructure of CIA, but any Gimilarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment 5 0001047 SECRET issue, during ================================================== Page 53 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET; a8 to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the bagis of a comparison of hi8 activities and responsibilitie8 with that inherent in a somewhat similar pogition in CIA. One of the most important differences between United States agencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bur eaucratic structure of agencies Or 'Organizationg in the USSR, including the KGB, i8 the Balary 8tructure. of a KGB officer i9 based on military rank and on actual pogition held with an additional percentage increage for longevity and language qualification. Actual position held i8 important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an' example, the difference in monthly galary between & captain and a major is rubles and the difference in Balary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increage in military rank alone hag limited pay advantages, a8 for example a Lieutenant Colonel who i8 only a Senior Cage Officer receives le8s pay than a major who holds the pogition of Chief of Section: current interviews, an effort hag been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responbibilities in the various claimed positiong. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the varioug claimed pogitions , in view of the absence of any factual CO01€ 48 SECRET Pay twenty During ================================================== Page 54 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ supporting Or refuting information, has necegsarily been baged to a congiderable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this i8 not the most Batisfactory way of resolving the questions , but it i8 the oly method possible at this time. 0801049 SECRET ================================================== Page 55 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 56 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET C: HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF HIS MQTIVATION IN CONTACZING CIA IN 1962 AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN CRwup 0081650 SECRET Bxcladed icm aytwm:tlc Cowngreding ax4 Deslassitizaiiga 19642 ================================================== Page 57 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET C. Has_NOSENKO given an 2cceptable_explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 19642 Of the eight listed categories which are given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO,; this category i8 Probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual support, There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor; full resolution of the motivation problem i8 not a paramount factor in whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at tbis late date have failed to disclose 8ome important events of a perbonal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defectors are bumans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which consider of a personal nature: On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a requeet, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, 3_ typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum , although not gramma correct, is quite understandable and is of review. The tenor of the memo- randum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime. SECRET COu1051 E#is] being deciding tbey tically worthy ================================================== Page 58 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET NOSENKO and other8 of his generation have lived in & Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment i8 at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized and boma not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees. NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence Of hig father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO i8 particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to hinself, that this was the primary reason. The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather 2s an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB_ His 2 0381C52 SECRFT ================================================== Page 59 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding: If a certain amount 0f speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who logt many pereonal advantages following the death of his father including a pereonal automobile, may have actually started 8oon after the death .of his' father: That NOSENKO i8 undisciplined is supported by hi8 adrissions relative to hi8 life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after bis defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to, women, liquor, and the material things which can be purchased with money Or obtained through influence. A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would gell "'two pieces of information: 11 NOSENKO hag stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he wag not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subcongciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat. 3 0001053 SECRET ================================================== Page 60 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans 80 that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclugion that he would offer to gell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a_ "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information, " he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO gtated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through (David MARK} whom the KGB congidered was with American Intelligence. The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "ltwo pieces of information, " almost immediately more information, made no Significant demands for money , and in fact hig price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standarde. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated, as he firat gtated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotou8 evenings. However , NOSENKO hag during current interviews Stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving_any_money from the Americans. 0001054 SECRET gave ================================================== Page 61 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Uluiili NOSENKO heo stated that tbe plght before ble dopartxro Irom Ganava to tho USSR ho gave serioes thougae to detection but W3d not emotlonally edapted to defoct st thet tmo. Followdng hla ratura to tba Soviet Ualon; NOSENKO, a perlod 0f timo, made Alo {lnal decleioa 6 defect 8t the fret opportunlty, reallslng that It meent leavdeg hls 5tlo.] ehuldred, and otbor membere 0f Nls famlly in *o @SaR- Some appectt & tbo motlvetton 08 NOSENKO aro obocura and wLU} probably 80 romela: K would be praterablo H an exnet datatlod chrenalogy of all %be factore involved could bo prepared or i{ ever certain obvdous factora could bo accuraroly dallneated: Tbero exe both Imponelbla &t thl: tme and probably % any Hme (a the futara. Xbt {a Impoxtant at thie tma Is & decleiaa &8 to whetbor tbo motlvation af NCSENKO was basad On personal ressone with no Impllcatlona of KGB diepatea It Ia contidored tbat &b eplanatton of NOSENKO concorelag Mo mottvattoa s acceptable and thet hia statement that Do O1o ercopt 0 Amerleens wae awaro ol tla conteets with tbe Amertcana in 1962 ox hie intent t detece &a 1964 do eupported by other Information 01 & collatoral pataze. (Sae Sectlon ML & ) ttachment: Tyzed c?y Memo Irom NOSENKO 5 Uuui055 ~CRET during ================================================== Page 62 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Operational Memo # N-4 SUBJECT: NASENKO, Yuri Ivanovich The i9 a typed furnished by on 1 copy of a handwritten 31 ' October 1967: Noverber 1967, memorandum' a requeet on What were the motif and the reasons which have led the decision to me,to breake with the Soviet Rugsia ? The only definite underatanding of the i8 an Bituation in the Soviet Ru88ia, the the methods of the of communigt regime, the and of the real interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the nea Of.the free world, right- It wag not & decision which was accepted or could in a month or be accepted a year, This decision wag think that growing in me; I the beginning wag in the with parente and in the circles of the and parent' 8 acquaintances I knew more there wag Written in and periodics and that newspapere was propagandized by radio and the Far Eagt TV . in and later in in different regiong and Ru8gia I found citie8 of out much better the life and conditions of the life of the people of the Soviet Ruggia, Ljuics6 GRQui' clded (rc;j aklgmallc p"rrne Jud following Subject following knowledge knowledge foreign glowly 8tudentship. Living my being my then Wor king being trips SECRET ================================================== Page 63 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ When I worked 1l year8 in MVD-KGB [ underetood and found out very many details and the real deal of the regime, about methods of the work of MGB -MVD-KGB and about their about hundreda of thouganda of the 'people of Rugeia who were (and btill are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom wab (and %till i0)} going an active work of all organg KGB. At the 8ame time when I wag several timee abroad I have been perbonally the go-called "decay" at the Weat. Ihave geen in how ig people. Several times when I wag abroad I wa8 about 8taying' at the Weot and not returning in Rus8ia, but only one wa 8 keeping_ me 3 my In 1962 in' Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the Americang . From my part "Ithe 8ell of the information" wa8 & real show. Iwag that would not believe me otherwise. In that period of the time there wab going & big 9truggle in me to abroad or to return home till the lagt of in Geneva' and even when I wae returning home in Vienna. In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my begt to go a8.8oon 28 pobsible abroad, 2 6UU1C 57 ornnct thing9, existing doinge reality living thinking thing family. thinking they atay daye living ================================================== Page 64 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Lluiili It wab not eaby to make thia decigion, it wa8 very difficult 'to leave the family for ever, And now in_gpite @f everything [ do not regret; 0881058 3 SFCDEI ================================================== Page 65 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ D ================================================== Page 66 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET D IS_THE INFORMA TION EUBNSHED BY_NOSENKO TO CIA CONCERNING_KGB QPERA IIONS,_PERSONALITIES, AND_QRGANIZATION BEASONABLY COMMENSURATE WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER ? r;J SECRET EEh; 0001059 ;7 ================================================== Page 67 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET D I8 the_information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations personalities, and organization_reagonably commen- surate_with hig claimed KGB career? The conclugion i8 that the infor- mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations , personalitie8, and organization i8 more than rea8_ onably commensurate with his claimed career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February 1964. In reaching the above conclugion, consideration has been given to his claimed departmental a88ignments and claimed pogitions in each departrent. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration given to whether there is any indication of deception or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind, There of cour8e, nu accurate gtandard of meagurement which would permit a pogitive deter- mination a8 to whether inability to recall certain detailo or events is actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events or could be attributed to willful deception. SECRET 00u1(60 Cio8? Exeluded (rom ajtomatlc Downzrading and declassilicalion being i9, ================================================== Page 68 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ bCudize An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areag where NOSENKO ha8 indicated he did not recall specific mattere or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas have been noted; NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory a8 evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely from recollection. In addition,: there hag been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discu8s his entire life, KGB officere he has kown , KGB organization and procedures, or other topice of interest. NOSENKO hag furnished congiderable detail concerning KGB officer8 whom he has known at varioug periods in hig: entire KGB career. He hag been very consistent in information' furnighed and has frequently added certain details which he recalled at a later date. Certain remarks Will be made in another section in regard to the volure and gcope Of information furnished by NOSENKO. This in- formation i8 not 6elective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was a89igned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed pogitiong. Con - sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB a89ignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to asge89 whether his indicated knowledge wag commensurate with his claimed position during 2 0001061 SECRET ================================================== Page 69 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEZZEL a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held; It i8 considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports hig claimed positions in the SCD. It hag not been possible to subatantially confirm through collateral sources' that NOSENKO served in his claimed positiona. Neither has it been pobgibla to obtain from other gourcee an applicable description of the duties or responsibilitie8 of an individuai holding any of the positiong NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in'the capacitie8 of junior cage officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 1957 . As regarda the dutieg and respongibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these varioug claimed positions, a_ considerable amount of pereonal judgment ha8 been necessary. This personal judgment hag been made in as judicial a manner 28 possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO. NOSENKO hag compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding office8 during the four mary periods of time: 1953 5 1955, 1955 3 1959, 1960 1961, and 1962 1963. He hag prepared specific memoranda concerning hie co-officers 3 0001C62 SECRET pri- ================================================== Page 70 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SC_l a8 well a8 diagrams and changes of personnel, and other pergonnel, 1956 Chiefs of the SCD during offices of the Chief and Deputy of the NOSENKO i8 internally consistent: Furthermore_ 1964. This material that this detailed information pogsibly have known at least in part, with & source be checked for accuracy, immediately mid-1964. If thege diagrams officer who bas defected gince or another who is pot relatiyely Correct, NOSENKO, memoranda were would hardly have voluntarily abtute in matters of counterintelligence, Thig type of information is the material in such detail prepared source Or by another for analysi8 by a knowledgeable peculiarly adaptable con- a ratber could, if not relatively correct, defector was lying O fabricating information: clusion that NOSENKO KGB information on NOSENKO hag furnished 1959, 1960 5 1961, and 1962 1953 3 1955, 1955 operationg during the knowledge i8 time. As might be expected, his 1963 of and attitude situation 1953 5 1955 period; but his own lees for the elgewhere, should be given 1955 1956, which are mentioned until information s0 event, he bas furnished adequate consideration. In any 1953 ~ 1955 is considered sufficiently that his claimed &g9ignment during though bis actual job performance undoubtedly substantiated even deserved a low rating: 0001C63 SECRET not could not could quite and pogitive permit and specific quite specific periods perbonal ================================================== Page 71 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SS[ The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cages, KGB operation8, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department and pogition a88ignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto_ i8 broader after 1957:than before, which i8 compatible with his claim %f increaged responsibilities. Hig knowledge 'of the work of other departmenta of the SCD from the late 1950'8*on i8 also more extengive, which i8 also a" further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions during thig period of time. 5 0r6id6y SECRET ================================================== Page 72 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ E ================================================== Page 73 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET E CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTOAS HAVNG RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGBAND/ OR HAS THE INEQRMA TION FURNISHED BY NOSENKQ BEEN OF SIGNFICANT BENEFIT TQ WESTERN INTELLIGENCE ? 0001C65 LRuu? SECRET Excluded froa avivnatle] domnzadleg an: Geciascilla}ida ================================================== Page 74 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKQbe_ considered in toto 28 having_resulted in material damage to the_KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been %f_ significart beneiit to Western Intelligence? Tbe conclusion in fegard to both of the above questions is .affizmative, even "'though it is realized that ultirate loss to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence aze botb partly Of &n intangible natuze 2nd not susceptible to accurate measurerzent NCSENKO has, a3 previously indicated, furnisbe& volurinous information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total 0f szecific cases is not possible at this tire and at best be only an intere- sting figure, the actual significance 0f Which would be marginal Practically every interview with NCSENK?, even at presezt, reveals iniormation oi counterintelligence interest and it is expected_that this production can continue for a_ considezable period of time: Tbis sbould not be construed as an indication tha: NOSENKO is intentonally with- bolding information, but rather that stinulazion of his memory tbrough nozmal stions and discussions has been 2rd can continue to be que 2zoductive. SECRE 0pe wotl 0001066 ================================================== Page 75 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ NOSENZO has furnished infoziation concerning perhaps{2, J01) KGB officers and(300) KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used <0 refer to Soviet nationals) , mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately(250former or current First Chief Directorate Officers and there i3 a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD: In addition, numerous Officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad' with delegations, tourist groups , and as visitors to various major exhibitiors such &s World' s Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the nunber of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out soretime in the future. There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this informatior to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be esti- mated. Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers Would be & necessary part of any dispatch o a KGB agent or officer to the West either for purposes 0f contact with Western Intelligence for a 2 OoO1( 67 SEGRZT ================================================== Page 76 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ lirited period O time or for the placing of the individual in a defector status_ However, idertification of KGB officers or agents to Western Intelligence is necessarily a matter Of concern to the KGB and the ex- posure of the identities 0 approxirnately(2, 000]KGB officers and(several hundred} KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance_ Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers' or KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a cosider- able amount of manpower and money is spent on' this activity. Even acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this S ummary would consider that the identifi- cation 0fl2,000) CIA employees and(several hundredhagent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise 0f valuable iniormation, Prior to tne defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has beer detailed and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States Intelligence community i8 hardly subject zo dispute, alchough analysts 8001068 'e 43 ================================================== Page 77 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECZET can differ a8 to the weight which should be given to the value of this type o information. NOSENKO has furnished information conc SCD, KGB , recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering the period of 1953 through 1963, This should not be interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all SCD recruitments _ eyen of Americans, this period. His infor- mation based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department: He has furnished information concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information Wag in general acquired indirectly from social or business conversations with other KGB officers_ NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a_ number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value 'of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be dismissed a8 of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded &s damaging to the KGB_ Furthermore, inasmuch a8 there is no reason to question his sourcing of information alr known, there is no basis suspicion of NOSENKO for his provided such information. COO1C69 erning during being eady for having ================================================== Page 78 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 1 _ NOSENKO has furnished inormation in regard to a number of recruitmentsby the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB agent of an individual previously knowp to be pro-Communist is of considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to have resulted in 8ome damage to the KGB. Admittedly , the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is Iess than that of a "politically clean" individuai However, "pro-Communist" or even "Communist"l are not synonymous With "Irecruited KGB agent " NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in which there was some previous but limited information:' In & nunber of these instances the additional informatic from NOSENKO has per- mitted identification of the individuals of interest and the of an "Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the inforration from NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since the incomplete information known previously would in cases not have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest. This category of cases must be considered as resulted in damage to the KGB and in benefit to Western Iptelligence. 5 0801C70 SFCReT on closing many having ================================================== Page 79 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ NOSZNKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited the KCB and concerning whor Western Intelligence had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist categoty, would probably never kzvt achuly materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be for various reasons 'ipcluding later refusal to cooperate, later geo- graphical inaccesgibility to the KGB, or pot either at the time of SCD recruitment or later in & position to furnish information of interest to the KGB_ In this regard, NOSENKO has Stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a "'recruitment" a8 a Statistic for the end-of-year report even though it wa8 apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be & potential in the future. NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in Which be has beer unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this tine. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research ard investigation. Until an identi- fication is made, the value Of any particular lead to Western Intelli- gnce cannot be estimated, but thai there may be a potential value COu1C71 SECRET by being ================================================== Page 80 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove: the "NATO Emergency Codes, deliver the codes to the KGB for photographing, and then' successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as yet unidentified, his,current access to iniormation affecting the security of the United States cannot be gauged. In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category %f cases where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant inior mation must be considered on balance a3 having resulted in material damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence_ Quantity alone of CI or FI information from & KGB defector is not a standard on which to judge bora fides. The question is whether the amount of his information i8 reasonably commensurate with his claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO hag been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper_ few examples from the above cited categories of information furnished by NOSENKO are listed below Thes e cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance. 0001072 ScZ? ================================================== Page 81 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 6uz: The cas e 0f Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case: of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous surmary. It can be coxsidered that both were exposed as a result of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON. Another American case is that of Herbert HOWARD, a USIA erployee who spent considerable tirne in the USSR in 1962 ~ 1963_ NOSENKO identified Herbert HOWARD)as having been recruited by the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive that(HOWARD furnished valuable information to the KGB. Whez interviewed in 1964, {HOWARD] did not adxnit he had Seer reciuited, but suspicion of HOWARD was greaz enough S0 that his cort-act witk USIA was not renewed. L indeediHOWARD) was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible to determine how much information would have been compromised by HOWARD} while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United States Embassy. There is reason to believe that if HOWARD was: recruited, it was he who was responsible for the comprorise of & potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whor CIA was atteripting to establish contact HOWARD)as intermediary. NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHARI" (appar- a KGB code nare, altkough NOSENKO tkougkt it was a tre 8 0001C73 SELZET good using- entiy ================================================== Page 82 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Ramo): Ho Idontlled "ZHARI" (pbonetlc) 49 a0 Amerlcan code clerk wao deloctet t0 tbv USSR In J961. An Iotoxnal a8ourptlon' 5ao made ponad On tbo origloal lead Anlormatlon from NOBENKO tbat "ZHARI" 020 Vletor Norrle HAMILTON, ax4 Fouzl Mltrt HINDALY, 0 formor NBA mmployoe wbo defectad t0 tha USSR In 1962 , and tle Inlormatdon {som NOSENKQ wrb DovoT dlobomleatad Or Invebtlgated: Pzior &0 tbo eurfeeleg ol Jobn Dlecoo SMITH by tbe Sovtota ta & &eu 0t 1967 , LnLormatlon concaralng KGB knoroledge 0} Amorican codo clerks V88 Inveotlgated; and Joha Dlacoe SMTH 5a: a leadlng euapoct, ' Afeer ta buriaclng 6I BMITH by * Sowloea, Jt bocuma appatont taat SMTH, Tathor tfan HAMILTON, WB0 dentical t0 "ZHARI 1i Lnvobtlgatton dlaclogd ta8 p0 deflalte lntormna - tlon could be eotablleaed In regerd to tbo acbtal waoreaboute & BMTK afer cltca mld-1960. It Eandot be pobitvoly otated that aPproprtato Javoetkgatioa Ln 1964 af tba "ZHARI" Jead would bavo led t0 &a Ideotd - Icatten & Jokn Dlacoo SMITH 08 nZHARL " Hovover, spch Aioutu- catlon would havo been o1 cona{doreblo [ntazodt t0 to Depertmaent ol 8tt0 ard Cla, and could very well Bava porraitted cortala actton wtteb woald Rave @2 Ieast leeoenod tbo propaganda e{leet ol &a eurprlao Rapouacemons by tbo Sorlot In @aa fl 0f 1967 . NOSENKO, Ia Juoo 1962 , fralahad Informatlon frorn wvalca Wutam VABSALL could ba qulckly Identlflod. GOLITSYN; Jn Jate '960 carly J961, bed turnlehad Information concorning # Sovtet pono - tratlon 0f @a Britiab Govarnmont On t0 bagie oldtftit #2 Brtueh (4 SFCURET bele8 ================================================== Page 83 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Sozvicon had complled a Llat af auopecta, tncludlng VASSALL. Evea tbouga It may be proeumod that Inveatigatlon ot ta cubpecta woeld Wdmately bave resulted {n & determlnation that VASSALL wz0 tbo agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnlebed certatn Informatlon; tne Informatlon {rem NOSENKO &n June 1962 regulted ta tba earller terml - setioa by to Brltieh Services o & BdUl valuable productive KGB agebt: Albtough not tbe cape ofa KGB agont, tbo mattor oIl taa mlcro- peonet la tho United States Embasty should also bo menttoned. GOLITSYN, tollowing hle defocttoa In December 1961, farnlabod cortela Informatlon ln regard to microphonea Ln tha Unlted Statee Embaety (Chancory): Stnce Ln {act e mlcrophonoa were connocted to contral cable8, locadon 0f On0 mlcropbone wonld logically bevo lod t0 the ozpobure o the entlro B6t of mlcrophonea. However, appro- priata actlon was not taken On thla Iniozmatlon and tha KGB woula bave beea awer8 that 30 actlon Wa8 taken prlor & June 1962 when NOBENKO {arot coaeacted CLA. L NOSENKO l8 & dlepatchod KGB agont, It [8 ot cloar mc KGB would attrac: speclflc attention to # 8yatem of mlcrophonas whlca mnst have 8tllI bad soma valuo a0 of June 1962 . A presurptlon may b0 mnado tbas & NOSENKO wa8 & dlapatebed agent, ee KGB had, 08 Q1 1962 , an advanced aystem o monltoring devicas whlch renderad sboro mlerophone gyatem obboleta. Howovet , no concrote evldence of puch an advanced Byatam 1s availeble and it 8hould be notad &bat It J0 U001075 SEGREO twonty twonty 7707 6 ================================================== Page 84 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SZCEET was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken' to locate and remove the microphone system to which GOLITSYN had given a lead in late December 1961 early January 1962. A few general corments in regard to the CI information fur- nished by NOSENKO waild be appropriate in this particular section: As regards leads furnished py NOSENKO to American cases: most Of these leads have been mentioned in the previous surmary. Current interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seveeteen new American leads which are being exarnined by the FBI The inter- views have also resulted in more specific information in regard to & number of cages previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus perritting additional 'development of these cases _by the_FBI: NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including nationals 'of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Mexico, Italy, and a number of Other countries. included in the more important o: these agent or Other leads are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks , to accesa agents forx American tazgets, to actual or possible illegal Cou1C76 1 3 SECRS ================================================== Page 85 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SE support assets. Also included az2 foreign correspondents, repre- sentatives of foreign tourist firms , and foreign tourists_ A summary of the foreign leads arbitrarily defined as of major significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly placed in their own government; four code clerks eight cases involving- definite American interest; and fouf access agents to Americans It also_ Shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions' in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western Erbassies (but not the British or American Erbassies). NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign national agents , his information-on several being derived during his three monthg in,Geneva in 1962. It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That are of signi- ficant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly subject to dispute. This evaluation must be even though there are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited at this time_ As a firal note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive 12 00010n6k Zc3ET they given ================================================== Page 86 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ JCUTE ! Intelllgenea Information {e po: & igaltleant b & detormiaattoa of Mle bona fldor. Taa qualliicatton Bhould, boweves, bo added that {8 Ix Do} Lelt tkat NOSENKO 28 0l talo beea dobrioted ta many 8563s of pobitive Intolllgeaed Intorest: 13 0001C77 SECRET {actor paB, tme, {ally ================================================== Page 87 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 88 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ IS_THERE EVIDENCE QE-KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY" IN INZQRMATZON FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKQ WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB ? CRW? Eoi7aEzatlo SECRET #% % 0001078 (13n ================================================== Page 89 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET F Is _there_ evidence_of KGB deception_or_"give away"' in information furnished by NOSENKQ which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKQ was dispatched by the KGB ? The conclusion in this bummary is that NOSENKO wag not dispatched by the KGB. In rea this conclusion, a full examination Of the above question has been both a necessary and integral part. It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is one of the factorg which should be given congideration in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. If NOSENKO wag dispatched by the KGB , the KGB would have surely been Willing to gacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO_ However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpoge or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown. An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1 962 and his beha vior during these contacts i8 particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. v; # aazallc SECRET 0001079 ching only cauir ================================================== Page 90 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEGZET NOSENKO has btated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea &8 to:wbat was mogt likely to be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a .contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he wa8 a "KGB counter - intelligence officer who wanted to give information, M he very Posbibly would be rejected: It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the !'two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters. If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that his 1962 contacts , would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any Suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead. a current review of his statements and remarks during hig five contacts in 1962 indicate that hig many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite typical of a braggadocio element in personality of NOSENKO and may als0 have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva. 2 0001080 SECRET he, during likely the ================================================== Page 91 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET his statements which contacts in Geneva, made in retrospect were of which could and the have raised tigation Tbe certain questions i8 & ligt of the NOSENKO: made more obvious areas in which gross exaggerations NOSENKO or made or impossible 5 NOSENKO claimed he M. personally was with GRIANOV, Chief of the recruitment the pitch to Jame8 STORSBERGF (This a lie and was an interview with (STORSB_ of photograph would have did that NOSENKO not participate. _ ) NOSENKO was ved in the approach to Russell recruitment LANGELLE. This wa8 a lie LANGELLE and was available ) (c) NOSENKO gaid he recruited (LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Horace- (Actually NOSENKO never met 3 8001C81 SECRET NOSENKO, during five many impos sible, inves only concerning following incorrect tatements_ (a) Oleg SCD, during ERCwith display discloged (b) invol- for interview. {LUNT LUNT; ) ================================================== Page 92 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET (d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with (Edmund STEVENS) who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met STEVENS and only had seen(STEVENS once at a distance. ) (e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time tbat RHODES, also & recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953 . "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952-1954. (f) NOSENKO said he, . GRIBANOV , and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH: (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining & foreign typewriter and papez for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation. ) (g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this , 11 or "'We did that," in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits U0u1082 SECRET Roy ================================================== Page 93 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Jj he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962 , both he and the KGB should have known that thege indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. ) In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962 . These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presurably have considered already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the Bimilarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent: The following are some examples of the similarities noted. (a) Both furnished information in regard to Johan PREISFREUNDI (b) Both furnished information in regard to a military code clerk case (James STORSBERG) (c) Both furnished information in regard to & trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in 5 '(C01253 ================================================== Page 94 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ #'Ji Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the assumed name which KOVSHUK used. ) (a) Both furnished information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow_ (e) Both furnished information in regard to Edmund STEVENS; and(Isaac Henry SHAPIRO} The above list i8 not complete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount 0f information furnished on any particular topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO_ To cite the above in detail in this summary is believed unnecessary Since the only 0f real interegt is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, Or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it i8 considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on Certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or greater detail GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed &s evidence C0j1884 SECRZT point by ================================================== Page 95 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECREX that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB_ NOSENKO ha8 during current interviews satisfactorily gourced his information in almost very instance. In a few instanceg he has said he did not recall how be learned of & particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are congidered to be in no way suspicious. The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 5 early.1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar ag the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering around Or in the First Department, SCD. It i8 the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer Of the First Sectior, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and' was Deputy Chief of the same 8ection in 1960 1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases Or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or Situation i8 not unusual or necessarily suspicious_ NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN 8001085 SECRET ================================================== Page 96 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECEZZ knew and was in contact With otker officer8 Of the First Section and GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his asgociation with certain officers in the First Department,.SCD. It is recognized that there are' certain conflicts in inforration furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not possible to satisfactorily: correlate ceztaiz information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 5 163 Of the previous summary refez to information frorn GOLITSYN which is characterized as (Information about KGB Operations Agairst Embagsy Code Clerks in 1960 5 1961. 1i The references are to information from GOLITSYN based on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department , SCD, and an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, auring 1960 4 1961, that his primary responsibility was Work against code clerks at the United States Ebassy in Moscow and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in the same Work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN SE6327 6j0ic86 ================================================== Page 97 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 ha8 been noted and commented on in another section of this summary. GOLITSYN hag furnished certain information which he re- ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it wag previously congidered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the pos bibility that the discrepancies between the two sourceg were; at leagt in certain instances , more apparent than real. In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate mentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, ma it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed a8 in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one pogsible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (a): (a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an 09 SECRET , GLU:t frag- king 0d01087 ================================================== Page 98 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow s0 that further work could be undertaken to effect her recruitment, He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German sounding' name. NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against Collette SCHWARZENBACH) who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. However, SCHWARZENBACH) was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, butf had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador) BOHLEN during 1955 1956 and from 1958 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow. The recruitment attempt against SCHWARZENBACH) according to NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD. 0001088 10 Qecoct ================================================== Page 99 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET (b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains infor-' mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation againgt an American Emba8sy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per 'cent sure" that the target would be recruited. This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of James STORSBERG)who was actually the gubject of 2 recruit- ment approach in 1961. There is congidered to be a good posgibility that GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was preparing for his as8ignment to Helsinki, Finland. This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January 1961 from Vladislav M: KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section) that Johan PREISFREUND}had recently been used in the successful recruitrent of an American employee of the Embassy. {Johan PREISFREUND} wag used in thelSTORSB ERG] operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also C001C89 1 1 SECRET ================================================== Page 100 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about PREISFREUND} since GOLITSYN wanted to use (PREISFREUND} in Helsinki. NOSENKO has stated he was not present during the above conversationa It is possible that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use (PREISFREUNDJ as an agent. NOSENKO has furnished extengive information in regard to the James STORSBERG} cage and with due congideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate bagis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report- ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV conc erning what i8 considered to have been the' James ISTORSBERG case and detailed information furnishea by NOSENKO conce rning the' James STORSBERG case. The exact date of the recruitment attempt againtiSTORSBERC) hag not been positively es tablished, but it is considered to have occurred before early 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement byl James GQOJ1C90 12 SECRET very May ================================================== Page 101 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET STORSB ERGj that it occurred in October 1961 is com pletely unacceptable and is even contradicted other statements by STORSBERG himself. (c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information fror GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding: in 1960. The: previoug summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in va rioug homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments . SHELEPIN did not exclude future use 0f the photographg which the KGB would hold in reserve. NOSENKO ha8 furnished information concerning the homogexual compromise of(Robert BARRETT, who was & guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELETV" and "IGRIGORIY"_ two homosexual 0081091 13 SECRET by May ================================================== Page 102 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ JLuii: agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted, Work against the United States Exhibition was the respongibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were participating under the direction of the Ninth Department. One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in involving BARRETT} in homosexual activitieg which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO, although the photographg were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitrent of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also gtated that the compromising material and information on BARRETT)was later given to the First Department and that BARRETT;wa8 recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he returned with another Exhibition in 1961 , and that NOSENKO, wag not involved in the recruitment operation. BARRETT, following his return 14 0001092 SECRET he, ================================================== Page 103 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET to the United States in January 1962 , confes sed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of compromising photographs which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow_ Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possible that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to the Robert BARRETTJ case. It should be noted that Robert BARRETT)could not actually be characterized a8 an "American employee of the Embassy in MoscOw. K (a) Page 162 of the previoug summary contains infor- mation from GOLITSYN that in the opring of 1 960 when he visited the First Section, Firgt Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had 28 an agent an Embagsy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB,with some information, that he was 15 8i01093 SECRET ================================================== Page 104 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET considered by the KGB to be & "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized,- GOLITSYN might have the code clerk a8 an agent in Helginki. NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither bas the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the congiderable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this i8 considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who wag in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 7 1961. It is also poggible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code 'clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki a8 well a8 his cited remarke in a-C could be clarified or at leagt additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on thege matters wag possible. The trip of Vadim V KOSOLAPOV to Helginki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparigon of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is 16 0OO1C24 SECRET ================================================== Page 105 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow_ The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was undoubtedly (John GARLANDjand the train manifest lists' John GARLAND} and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware Of the identity of John GARLAND' but claims no knowledge of the above trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although well aware of a previous trip. NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks , should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki , His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such a8 his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it_cannot be interpreted a8 evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB Since, if he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of. 0001095 17 SFCRET being ================================================== Page 106 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Scurel theory which hag previously been given congideration and warranted full consideration wag that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission wa8 to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it: should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews bas not made any remarks which could in any way be construed a8 derogatory to GOLITSYN, In addition, NOSENKO does not claim to have any detailed kowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD ha8 been broached with NOSENKO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD, M1 or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that. " In connection with congideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB 25 a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain events should be noted, GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, 'Switzerland, where he remained until 15 June 1962 . It i8 felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an asse8sment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, 18 8001096 QTo by any ================================================== Page 107 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECREX select NOSENKO a8 the individual who would be dispatched to counter- act the posgible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, #f NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB , it would appear that plans for this would bave predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that GOLITS any YN a8pect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original plan to dispatch NOSENKO In addition, if NOSENKO wab dispatched, it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA_ Tbe theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly CIA, This i8 a theory which should and hag been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually substantiate o1 refute this_theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist. Actually , as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts 19 0001087 SECRET ================================================== Page 108 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET of American counter -intelligence to determine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United States Government. The answer to this question seems to be that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelli- gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value. The specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con - sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow. In thig area hig statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American personnel in the, United States Embassy in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallig SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD; The basis for this expregged opinion of NOSENKO i9 considered elsewhere in this summary and analysts may differ a8 to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expresged opinion of NOSENKO. NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, ha8 never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an GJOice8 20 O;o# 0 only only ================================================== Page 109 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET example , he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities againgt members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, and individual8 in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or a component of the Soviet Government i8 extremely limited and at best mainly Of & collateral nature. NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD , nor does he claim to know all of the cage8 of which the Chief of the Seventh Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain note8 brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code name. These note8, according to NOSENKO; were made when he had an opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department and constitute the only kowledge NOSENKO had of these particular case8. 21 SZCRET 0001C99 ================================================== Page 110 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 111 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET G_ IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE QBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH QF NOSENKQ BY THE KCB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TQ CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MISSIONS ? CRO4? Excluze iro:n eurzaallc} SECRET Goeu6" 0001100 ================================================== Page 112 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SzC ET G Is there evidence_of 2 political or_2nyother type_objective wich could justify& dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB wich permission to_speak freely to_CIA concerning his knowledge of the KCB and withozt NOSENKO being_given & Specific mission r rissions 2 The above possi- bility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications 2re practically incalculable. The conclusion i8 tbat a8 regards NOSENKO, with the single exception detailed below , tbere is no evidence 0f a political or other type objective which could be corsidered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrart the dispatck 0f a KCB officer with the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being given a 'specific mission 0x missions by the KGB. It is accepted that the Soviet leader_ would be entirely capable of ins structing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for pezmanert defection to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission ard n0 limitations on the KGB intelligence information he miget reveal pzoviding that such act would, in the estimate 0f the leadersbip, result in 2 net political gain for the USSR. For such a pOSSibility to be seziously entertained by the Soviets, bowevez, it would Jae to involve an issue Of major importance to the Soviet leacerski; and presi_mably would Zave to 0O01101 SzCRET 1 'sbip ================================================== Page 113 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ be considered by them a8 the only or at lezst the best means of achieving #e desired end and of having & very high probability 0f siccess. The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy: the involverent of Lee Farvey Oswald in the assassination 2nd bis association with the Soviet Urion. Civen (a) specilation obtaining at the tirne tbat there was Soviet involvement in the assassination, (b) the premise that in fact theze was'no Soviet involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that tke Soviet leadership was deeply concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to irreversable actions, it i8 conceivable that the Soviet leadership might have been prepared to take extrere steps to convince United States authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (Tle passage to the United States Government Of the &llegedly complete Soviet consuiz= file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act. Tbe NOSENKO case Warrants exarination in the above zegard i: Jight of the fact that among the inforrnation NZSENKO provided was "nside " KGB information on OSWALD: information Waich purzoriec_y 00011C2 ================================================== Page 114 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Scumzi revealed the substance Of tbe content of tke KGB files on OSWALD_ This information clearly indicated trat there was no KGB relationship with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD, and that a8 a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with & continuing series of problems_ Upon examination, however , NOSENKO does not meet the requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of & free KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable: a, The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENIO's initial approachto_CZA' in June 1962 , 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kernedy. b While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is interes and pertinent, it is not, in nature, scope, and cortent, sufficiently convincing United States authorities to reasorably be expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof oz Soviet non-involvement. c It is implausible not to assume tbat the Soviets would assune that United States authorities , in any examination 0f the possibili-y 0f a Soviet (KGB) hand in tle ass2ssination, would prcsume 3 C0011c3 sting for ================================================== Page 115 ================================================== 14-00000 extrerely nazrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation ~ 5 8 corpartmentation which would exclide knowledgeability any KGB ozficez Other tban very sen:or persors &rd an individual 0f group o action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature_ The KGB career of NOSENKO would not perrit even serious consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the above very limited category. It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of & politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated. Tbe possibility ha8 also been considered that the KCB might bave theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officef, with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community wowld be practically neutralized for in exterded period of tire. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community would involve & major portion of its personnel and efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases Wiich had little or no curzent or potential value to the KGB_ The above 205 sibility cannot be 2rbitrarily eliminated witnoit full cozsidezation. It iS zor believed #22: 0001104 by ================================================== Page 116 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRE NOSENKO in the absence of azy evidence that he had any KGB mission ox rissions to fulfill cones within the above category, pazticularly since an overall assessment 0f bis inforation leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his infozmation would be quite damaging to the KCB_ Considezation Of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments by the KGB caused by legal &ction taken against individuals exposed by infozmation from the dispatched agent or officer. Tbe deterrent cffect on others Of the conviction and sentezcing of persons who have committed a crime or; crimes has long been a part of the legal theory 0i why Persons who commit & crime should be i iprisoned or pupished. Tbe detefrent effect On others 0f tbe trials and corviciiors Of William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen VINTKEN - BAUGH should not be underestimated, The KGB also could rot have known that information furnished by NCSENKO would not result in t.e trial and conviction 0f other KGB agents or recruitments concerning wbor NOSENKO had some knowledge. 5 0001105 ================================================== Page 117 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ H ================================================== Page 118 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET HS IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS Q NOSENKO IN: 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE_ KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKQ WAs EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHA VIOR OR KGB: @BJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFECTION? CB@uP SECRET Excluded fram 33Jmatic Comngrzdinz .4 Gecizse/*icalan 0001106 ================================================== Page 119 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET H. Is_thereany_evidence that the_contacts_of _NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior er KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The conclugion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB. The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous gections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest since it i8 a Sufficiently important area a8 to warrant individual consideration. It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such a8 the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or wag not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non ~significance of each item of available information. The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is Cas:? Ezcimdza i(jl JiJzallc @nifrim; 334 SECRE ( fa wiNii 0801107 ================================================== Page 120 ================================================== 14-00000 SECREI necessarily based in part on a judgment a8 to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control. One of.the particular area8 congidered wag his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it wag incomprebengible that he could have been under KGB control at that time. Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CIA were not kown to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was con- cluded that there was no bagi8 for Or information which would warrant serious consideration of the above pos 'bibility aside from the geparate conclugion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in KGB eyes by gending him again to Geneva where he would be free to defect. Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, dur his 1962 contacts , expressed considerable concern over hig personal security, requesting that knowledge conce rning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the 2 SECRET they quite ing 0j01108 ================================================== Page 121 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ cl;s United States Embassy in Noscow corcerning his contact with CIA and #at ke did not wish to be co.tacted &rd wouid not recognize ary atterpted contact within the Soviet Union. NCSENKO also furnisbed infozmation as to the reason fox bis concerr trzt ro iniormation regaraing his contact with CIA Jecome known in the United States Ernbassy in Moacow &nd the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact 0z attempted contact with NCSENKO in tbe USSR. It i8 zecognized that the above indicated concern 0f NOSENKO about his personal security is no: substantial evidence that NCSZNO was not under KGB control; howevez, it is evidence that NOSENKO Wes not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the USSR, which very likely would have been_ an aim of tbe KGB if NOSENKO was under KGB control. Tle material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been carefully reviewed to determine if there isany evidence that the XCB participated in any way in the assenbling of this rather unique ccllection of raterial. None of the material appeazs to have been of an accountable type and on the contrazy, it appears that NCSENKO could have #uznishcd all of the material to CIA and retirned to the Soviet Urion witbout the KG3 ever at @ later date beconi:g awaze tat the raterial wa$ actually rissi-g. The latter staterent even ircluces te travel docurent which zuskozized tbe trip of NOSENKO to Corkiy ir Decembez 1963 _ 00011c9 ================================================== Page 122 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ L ~Ji2: The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to NOSENKO, tuis pazticular docurent wa8 not accountable in tbat it was only necessary to turn it in when reque_ reimbursement for travel expenses. NOSENKO stated t.at %e had not claimed tne rather srall amount of money to wbich he was entitled &rd has also admitted that he really brought the document along because it gave him thbe indicated rank of Lieutenant Colonel. NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that ever a5 a Deputy Chief of Depart- ment he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to receive the rank 0f Major in 1964. NOSENKO Jas stated that giving hir the rank 0f Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was the error 0f KASHPEROV , tne oficer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, 2nd that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The above explanation by NCSENKO may well be consicered by readers with at least & Zegree 0f skepticisr_ Howevez, if NCSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seam that he could hava been pro - vided with sore a little more substantial to docurent his claim 0f the rank of Lieitenant Colorel. In addition, it would seern tbat tre KCB 0j01t1o SECREL stirg early thing ================================================== Page 123 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEZ cI could have provided NOSENKO with sone type 0f document whica would-support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, XGB, Zven tbe Cherepanov do not in any support the clair of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Caie: o2 the Fizst Section, First Department, SCD, in 1960 5 nor do even support the clair of NOSENKO that there was Such & position in the First Section in 1960 7 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959. 0001111 Papers way 1961, they ================================================== Page 124 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ IV ================================================== Page 125 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET IV_ COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIQUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TQNOSENKQ 0801112 6, SECRET Exciz= # #.m ================================================== Page 126 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SLCRET COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIQUS_CONCLUSIONS IN REGARDTO NOSENKQ Attached is & verbatim copy of pages 357 ~ 360 of the "'Examina_ tion Of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"' which contains seven (A G} primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence} and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments_ With the exception of "G, " the conclusion8 in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO 8erved in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953 , was a KGB officer March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the #KGB during the March 1953 4 February 1964 period. % For purpoges of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unles8 otherwise indicated. Attachment; Pgs 357-360 of "'Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" 0001113 [63s Zxcluced #&n aukcwatic) SFCRFT Cawngiaciaz Zad #lassiticalic; from Cpy ================================================== Page 127 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET PREVIQUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO As CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 360 OF "THE EXAMINA TION QF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following i8 a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO_ (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of thi8 gummary. } "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES" "NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively genior positions of aunoriy from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operationg against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his clair, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and opera - tions which, to the extent that it hag been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO'8 claims. According to sone of these sources, NOSENKO wag a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensive positions , who 8001114 rjncCt ================================================== Page 128 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ StG;i enjoyed congiderable authority and trust despite pergonal short- comings , and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever 8uffered 3 by Soviet Intelligence paralyzed the work of KGB Legal Regidency, and justified the formulation of plane to a8sas - sinate him. I "The examination hag compared each element of NOSENKO'& biography relevant to his claimed KGB Bervice with known facts and reagonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which hib accounts were put: whether his accounte are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has occupying the KGB positiong he claims to have held, In short, 18 he what he say8 he according to hig own accounts ?" "Thi examination had led to the following findings , arrived at independently: A= NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and timeg he claimed, B , NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed. C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American C001115 Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed. ~fart from i8, ================================================== Page 129 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ UU: D During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a s enior case officer nor Deputy Chief 0f, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section. E NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a Senior officer or supervigor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic) F NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. G. NOSENKO hag no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance. 01 "The above judgments , if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fideg. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are S0 extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently 0001116 SECRET in, they ================================================== Page 130 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ JLUil, cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claim8 to and thus he is not a bona fide defector." "Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it i8 necessary to attempt to determine hi true motiveg for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he hag given. Here, it mugt be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Neveitelesg, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has con veyed, the fact that some 0f his false c laims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO'9 future all require that at leagt a provisional judgment be made. "Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations , the chief ones are that he is a swindler poging as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers irom a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally , that he is a dispatched KGB 0081117 11 agent. afaocz be , ================================================== Page 131 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEcnei "The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe_ from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could derive from within the KGB itself: I "Second; as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO'8 actions and testimony are the product of a deranged pe rgonality or unbalanced mind." "It i8 somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who Served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exag- gerated his positions , rank and access to intormation, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asgerted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Aiso, NOSENKO's assertiong with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV'8 patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of 0001118 comment by other sources, CcODET only ================================================== Page 132 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations , we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB_ While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable. Ii "'In the abgence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuagive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor- mation should be assessed accordingly. 01 GO01119 ZECRET ================================================== Page 133 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 134 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET Ag NOSENKO DID NOT SER VE IN THE NAVAL RU IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND TIMES HE CLAIMED 0001120 cs6e? Exdndes i3m autsE3tic} temnzrzdnz and SECRET dectnssifica'ian ================================================== Page 135 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET_ A_ NOSENKQ did not_gerve in the_Naval RU in any of the capacitieg or at the places and times he claimed: (Previous conclugion) The above is conclusion "A" in the previous gummary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far Eagt and the Baltic areas i8 adequately substantiated and should be accepted. The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 becauge he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his clags. However, previoug efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted_ significance was given to the 1949 1953 period of time. It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders I as relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March SECRET 630UP 1 Excluded frgm &ul;naiie dowagradinz and de-teeslflcJhn early they 0001121 ================================================== Page 136 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ JLua}a, 1951 to 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on page8 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope. The statement is made in the previoug summary that "The gole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officer8 in either' the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admisgion, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in MoscOw , or through his visits to Geneva 11 Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntar: prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached wag not prepared a8 the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately(875KGB officers, (100KGB agents, 35 GRU officerg and{400} other Soviet nationals_ 2 0001122 SECRET early ily only ================================================== Page 137 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names Of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950'8 period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelli-' gence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 early 1953 period. 52 of the above summary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever Berved in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence and even quegtion his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 conc his assignment with Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum wa8 completed by NOSENKO without reference material and a review Of his diagrams indicates are quite accurate. NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almogt deserted fishermen' = 8 village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENK0 for this place a8 having the mail address of Sovetsk Primors] kiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of asgignment wa8 non- existent. A further check in the matter Would have disclosed that the place wag not nonexistent, that it i8 currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was FischhausS en. 3 {uu1123 FFrDTT Page erning Navy any they ================================================== Page 138 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Jiunci The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active commissioned service in the NOSENKO knew nothing 'of Soviet tradition, doctrines , or organization of procedures. It should be noted that there is & considerable difference between being a member of 'the Naval RU and an actual member of the Soviet_ The 8ituation could be compared to a career civilian employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence and & line officer in the United States Navy. Attachments : List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO Diagram8 and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO uji1124 SECRET NavY , Navy being Navy. ================================================== Page 139 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 4 kzenex_ Yrnid tile 495m &n 1lKz a Aerl_Eehik +nat Oh 4acwt ivelE gAcaY #ea 4 ehk % nty Eter & wud 6 dyd txak '4ku Jezrt" Svah ' AnA Jza Mutin) . 9 kcaed k #as 4 mva affach id 57DZtlzyhs 0, , bepLr Cl M:_ eod -clxk 7e ite RtYbet: St_hanerwuss 2equen _ 1 1ss7-1306 _ 3 _ Begdetezk t [R derrtj %kekic 'Iud L2e 2j Ject _( m Mext:) _ 1 #9T--V y, &Ek 0x1 "Kleen : ke naed_"tee ek_ ec 8 Ii Y TLet_i_Sovietxe kLinehz 'ts istuiet 6 11s2s , Uibs 6, [:50-4 a62z2 nrebx e It: _ detksfEnie LA 'tk 'kdapaet . 6 . 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ILc bene bLaLl ,Yeaeleuk;_esel_lus #rl Jealgaal 1 Snd Liint| kekoxe_ tee 6dkn) ts haey * tvct 6_ M Km Iainth {4 sist; 9k # Jeear"t "ha ore t-&: er- dehhesteol wetL S tinl; hrzs/ Tkue Ia3 a6'ZLez] Q "gewl:_"8terosEn L6 6 +n4C 4it 2 3-Y 'ek ma)_ ~ 441 Tu-ichehf Jh ILc Jeeeales J bck a Bcx" %44= ' aaid k4 24 mitl 0 ~zahsfene/ hi2 611 ettkcer eaze ma`l = Itenek Lsa 4 <l 6 & ekick_Eedy-&ktd "uce ' /v8 = 300113C 0rn7 5 itolliatuee_ prri.L "aglacu Iny kinxelsv , 'flixera talCacuee _ Irre:d Avfe _ kq. 241 "0e' agct MefaeeZi pe-s hex ~ &bsEiey mtzLey; nenfeusr eed ' iEEiesX ) k*d kesita Raeh ================================================== Page 145 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 146 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET B NOSENKO DI NQT ENTER THE KGB IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAMED E7; M SECRET C:i :lz & 6001131 dessi6.31N ================================================== Page 147 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET B_ NOSENKO did not enter the_KGB_ in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his entry was not facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV. Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he, entered on duty in mid-March 1953 28 a case Officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con- sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted: The conclusion of the previoug summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting Statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN. SECRET 0801132 CroH? Excluded 6om aulomatic doxograding and declzssitlzation only entry ================================================== Page 148 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET In 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949. The previous summary gave considerable weight: to the statemente of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV . An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement i8 accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by & high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 wa8 First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD The previous summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement i8 not contro- vertible and is accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO 0001133 2 SECRET fully ================================================== Page 149 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SOTIi wa8 not spongored by any person of influence a8 was the case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 wag the First Deputy to BERIYA_ The previous summary also states that according to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is & flat statement which it is doubtful any defector Or series of defectors could substantiatei namely: thatit never happened. Until and unless it is medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it i8 accepted that he did have tuberculogis in 1952 and was at & sanitarium 3" rest place in Kubinka_ It i8 also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB after mid-March 1953, The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously had tuberculogis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculogis i8 not and cannot be gufficiently substantiated. The previous summary contained & number of additional remarks and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there i8 considered to be no adequate basis at tnis time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953_ A conment was made that 3 0001134 SECRET fully ================================================== Page 150 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ UlUi.ci NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his processing for KGB and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. Thi8 gtatement makes no allowance for the influence of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, doe8 not consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD) The previou8 summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO gince the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the of NOSENKO into the Naval RU, As of 1953 , the MVD undoubtedly also had &' dossier on the father of NOSENKO since thie was still the STALIN era, The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to personnelofficers or visit the personnel office. It woul seem that the influence %f General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedur but NOSENKO hag during interviews stated that he com_ pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk after into the KGB (MVD). Page 70 of the previoug summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly Lj01135 SECRET entry, entry entry any es, entry ================================================== Page 151 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While NOSENKO ha8 claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was `the Second Chief Directorate and that it Bubsequently was redesignated the Firgt Chief Directorate, DER YABIN hag gtated this reversal of designation8 occurred in March 1953_ STALIN died in March 1953 and that game month the MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in June 1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less than & year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places it a8 the end of April or May 1953 . GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA a8 head of the MVD in April 1953 . 1i In the light of our inability to fix the effective date of the reversal 0f the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the debignation of hig Directorate at the time of his into the KGB (MVD). There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations Of the FCD and the SCD- NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV , which is 5 8J01136 SECRET early early early entry ================================================== Page 152 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ in conflict with the statements of DER YABIN, RASTVOROV and GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA wa8 rebponsible for the changes. As for the issue 0f who was responsible for the reversal of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. Howevei, the fact tbat he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in thie igsue_ NOSENKO is criticized in the previou8 gummary for not knowing the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia Or the history of the KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no contacts with either office during 1953-l955 and there i8 no adequate reagon to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicateg the KI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-l950's), but care should be used in statirg what NOSENKO should know if he held & certain position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations were organized or ceased to exist. 000t1a: SECRET ================================================== Page 153 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECZ; Tbe ha8 also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should bave ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General KOBULOV , was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO hag during current interview8 stated that he encountered no difficulties but i8 aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed byan officer from the Personnel Directory with an official Of the First Department. Under other circumstanceg NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV , his father could in no way be congidered a member of the BERIYA group. i-1138 SECRET point ================================================== Page 154 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 155 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET C NOSENKO DID NOT_ SERVE IN THE_AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION THRQUGHQUT THE 1953 ~ .1955 PERIQD ASs HE CLAIMED 0001139 SECRET ================================================== Page 156 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEURET C NOSENKQ did not_gerve in the_American Embasgy Section throughout the 1953 1955 period &8 he claimed. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclugion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer Of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late 1955 when he wag transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD. This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was not & very effective officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO i8 reluctant to admit that he was other than slightly_lackadaisical in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that hig personal be- havior was such as to cause him to be removed 3s Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization" SECRET 0001140 caatiz Excluded (rea aulanatic; daiigrading &d Cecizssi;ica#un May ================================================== Page 157 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ to be Prepared in 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some Other component. The influence of his 'family i8 quite apparent in the above since his father wag advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 wag that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB The question ha8 been raised &8 to how NOSENKO could remain in the KGB when after 1954 he wa8 not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding: NOSENKO hag stated during previoug and current interviews that following his into the KGB and until circa mid-l954 he was respon- Sible for work against American correspondents in Mogcow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news - paper correspondents already recruited was handled other officers. NOSENKO has explained that this time he was a "'new officer, indicating he could hardly have been expected to act &8 an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officer8 and his 2 0001141 SECREC early entry being by during ================================================== Page 158 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor respondents Was his a8signment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954. From circa mid-1954 until his trangfer to the Seventh Depart- ment in late 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he wag an officer of the First Section with the regponsibility 0f work againat the Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embasey in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 5 late 1955 period of time, that his primary work wag againgt members of the Office of the Military Attache,. but that_the quality of hig work undoubtedly left _much to be desired. In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed a8 Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance wag such that at least certain officials in the First Department degired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB_ Under these circumstance8, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the membere of the Office of 3 SECRET May May 6001142 ================================================== Page 159 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an officer of the First Section with the indicated as8ignment a8 related by him NOSENKO hag stated that the work against the Military Attaches wa8 not primarily directed toward development of recruitment possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR_ This attitude by the KGB would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception a8 retaliation for approacheg to Soviets in the United States in that period. NOSENKO hag been criticized because he did not know all the details concerning the Military Attacheg which it was congidered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attacheg during the indicated period of time. It is submitted that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his 0001143 SECRET ================================================== Page 160 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 4s#-gn21 fuzcticzs 6#rzk2s z0 & iwazce Ior the uncertair p2rsozi- stacus &NOSENKZ whose &ctua. .uiuze I# the KGB was Ir feopardy afie: _.c-.554. NCSZNKO ras prevously indicated ard still indicates 2 definitz Jack o: cwledge concerning his assigned targets during approxima:ely March 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was wher an ur- gatisfactory "characterization' 11 was beirg prepared on NOSENKO, a decision was being made on his case, and a period of time ir wkich ke Wert On 2 druak" which culminated in his spending aboit 40 days Ender _ospi-zl care Secause Of the possibility of recurrence c: his pzeviois tibezcilosis. Zages 84 7 87 of the previous Surnrazy suggeat tha: NOSENZO had zof fiznished Si_ficient Jetails about his alleged agent xetwo-k f= 3c6 2zai6t the Military Attaches. It is considered that N CSENZC i crrrert ixiervews has urrished adequa-e acceptable ceta__:, 2x& &5 a: exarple fuznished 2220f- iIforrration CGrce rning " % JLODINA 2"RAKZI " (+02 83). 3wcid appear that chere waa n0 et by NCSZIC -0 Wvithaoll icforzzafor cizceraig tese inciv:dials, biz +6 ~~Z 12.was mevez &_.e2" _ &23ly*3 >zevio_z cazile: [eies8328 :2038 Iiividur= 0001144 3 May "big ================================================== Page 161 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 'CCREI] The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late: 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fide8 of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually wag an officer in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information furnished by NOSENKO in current interview8 and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service a8 an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable_ SECRET May 0001145 ================================================== Page 162 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 8001146 ================================================== Page 163 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET D: DURING THE PERIOD 1955 ~ 1960, HE WAS NEITHER A SENIQR CASE QFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPAR TMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION 0801147 CR;x? Exclui:: ; z*malic SECRET d2i33radinz and Fez'~ sicatlja ================================================== Page 164 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET D_ During the_period_of_1 955 1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-Britigh Commonwealth Section. (Previoug conclusion) The above is conclusion "D" in the previoug summary. The current conclugion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959. During current interviews, NOSENKO ha8 furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject _ of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO wag personally in- volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of (Richard BURGL; in June 1956, contact withlSir Allen LANEJand (Arthur BIRSE}in the summer of 1 957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS)in 1958 , the re- cruitment of(George DR EWj in the spring of 1 959, the recruitment of 0001148 SECRET Exetrted 7: :utg.ti: 6867385 /i E:m May ================================================== Page 165 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET William Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of' David TAYLORI in the summer of 1959, the recruitment oflGerard MERTENSjin July August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsene FRIPPELjin 1959. The foregoing is not & complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claimg personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation hag been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target. Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY and David TAYLOR} were British} citizeng and the other above-named indi- viduals weref United States citizens . This would seer to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 December 1959 he wag an officer engaged in KGB operations againgt American-British Common- wealth tourists in the USSR. In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation againgt Martin MALIA; an American tourist who wa8 in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955, MALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, 80 at this time no particular 1955. case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the irdividual involved. C8u1149 2 SECRET ================================================== Page 166 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain United State8 Government officials, including Congregsional represent- atives to the USSR in 1955 7 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William 0. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed gervice in the Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth tourists during the late 1955 December 1959 period. NOSENKO has stressed that when he trangferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not available for operations against American and British tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the USSR was ju t in,a formative stage. NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent netwoxk he de- veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents , "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code names) , whose extensive use in KGB operationg has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com - promise operations. The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 T 150 in regard to the clained 1955 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in thoge 69294450 3 Qrnx T7O May ================================================== Page 167 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It i8 considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department during the period of late 1955 December 1959. Nor is it con- ceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretationg of various area8 of information were accepted without qualification, there is evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB . However , there are certain 38 sumption8 and interpretations which appeared in the previoug summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification_ On page 145 it is stated that the evidence guggests that NOSENKO was an English-8peaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter- intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterogexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit- ment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart- ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO wag "only an English - speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB Q2e-[ vien SECRET May any ================================================== Page 168 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not congidered to have any foundation in fact: Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operationg which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operatione were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE] Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER , (fnu) KARLOV; Norman FISK; Ralph MATLAW , Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William' TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cabes was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operationg other than to gay that he had recorded the name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Depart- ment in 1962 following his return from the First Department: The notes brought out by NOSENKO are congidered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review Of &ll of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his staterents as to how and he obtained the information in the notee are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate 3 separate listing of the approxi mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes, 0ju1152 5 SECRET why ================================================== Page 169 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ZU$.lmi During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including William" TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSB URG and John RUFES It should also be noted that certain of.the cages such a8 Marvin KANTOR and William TARASKA were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO hag given a satisfactory explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in discus sing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British "Common - Wealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was agsigned to a group of officerg in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of Section and were not under the 8upervision of NOSENKO. NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "ISHMELEV, M two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY M had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homogexual activity with individuals on whom reported but on whom no overt action wa8 taken by the Seventh Department, In some cases the individual 6001153 SECRET they they ================================================== Page 170 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR- NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the Patrick 'PRESSMANj and {Gerald SEVERNcages; and, the listing of thefSofia SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955 1959 period is in com- plete error since page 427 of the previous summary containg information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviewe the note8 which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing. The 'previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual. An examination of the cited cage8 does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents wer e used in two of the four cited cases, The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether Gisella HARRIS_ was necessarily a Seventh Department case. 0Ju1154 (FCRFT being ================================================== Page 171 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET This question seems superfluous since(HARRIS was in the USSR on 2 tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an indi- vidual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i. e. whether on & tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, a8 the invitee 0f an organization in the USSR, a8 a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, a8 a student attending . a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination Of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a buginessman. In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD. On pages 148 4 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utili tourist agents in the USSR This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information 0j01155 8 SECRET quite may zing ================================================== Page 172 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such infor- mation were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established_that NOSENKO had actually geen excerpts_of information pagged by George BLAKE. According to NOSENKO, the inforation which wa8 obviously partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come from an agent. The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Secret study on the subject of the use f tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his de - fection in December 1961). It wag noted that the 8ummary contained references to certain 1958 3 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter_ 8 intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO_ claimed he wag Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 SECRET only Top ================================================== Page 173 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRE? NOSENKO hag never clained to know all activities against American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 3 1959. Many of these travelers Would have been the responsibility of a section in the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Common- wealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was aware that certain of the American tourists in: 1 958 1959 were acting suspiciously from & KGB point of view- NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further a8sistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and follow_ G advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD. NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however , the descriptiq ENSENKO 10 SFCRET quite ing ================================================== Page 174 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ coxcezzing the distributicr cf rcspons o lities wisin ~e SCD foz vzziois categozies 0f ior--3 vis.tors to tki JSSR prcvides & logical exx-azicion for %ia izaz_iczity, Pzevois ?roblems iz this regard 272ea3 to have Sterred fzor: & r.sconcezticz O: ze mearing of tbe tezm "tourist" 8 i322 by tle KC3. Z38 38rezal tezi bas a specific reanizg % tze Secozd S_e Dizectoratei_Zazely, 2 "'toirisi" is & foreigner travell:zg to #e JSSZ 83 a touzist Visa_ Such a person was tbe responsib_ity oi the Fouzist Eection o: te Sevezth Dezart- ient. A lazze nuzbez 0: travelezs to te ~SSR, {=cltarg bisiness- mer, pezsons tavelli-g on #nvitation 0: & Sovis: Ozganizat-on, stidezts ettendirg & urivezsity , etc., ~ra _o: tousists _ tze KCZ Concez: and would not be #ze zeszonsioilty of #e Tourist Section 0: tbe Seventh Departmezt. Tie uresolved zroblem cozoidezed 0: ary s-3-ifcence 1n regarz to the 1955 G 1959 period i8 the accoiz: by NZSENKO of tka zresence of Arrerican citizen Jozn SZEUSINin tae USSZ 28 a tourist the Jate 195C Tce previous sumrazy 2o._ted Oit thet, sirce 'ohn SIC32V/d:d not kave a velid Unitad States passpozt betwee: 1940 2nc June 1961, it Was %?ossible iox %in to _ave been & touzist uncez true name in the USSR and, therefoze, a tazget of the Seventh Degzrt- Zen:, 2s NOSZNKC c_aiis . Alorgh sovezal avenies o. 2oss2b1y ~iuitil ixvestigation have rot yet beea #lly explored, tbere 0291158 :s ~0 ory 's. ================================================== Page 175 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All tat justifiably can be said at tbe presez: #ime is that,` even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, tbere is ro evidential reason such inaccuracy should be interpreted as izdicative of deception or dispatch, or for that matter as indicative tbat he wes not Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of tze Seventh Depaztment in 1958 1959; neitber would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimed service in 1962 ~ 1963 in the Seventh Department: 6301159 12 wby ================================================== Page 176 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 177 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET ES NOSENKQ WAS_NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR QFFICER OR SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE PERIOD 1961 71962 (sic) C801160 ORI UP Exclnted {r3m a tomatlc) SECRET Te ln; 221 %M ================================================== Page 178 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET E.' NOSENKO was neitkez_Dezuty Chief of the Amezican EmbaSSY Section nor a senior officer O7_supervisor in the Section during the period of 1961 1962 _(sic) (Previous conclusion) It i8 tie conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the Position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section)}, SCD, from January 1960 December 1961. The claim 0f NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960 1961 has been the most difficult claimed_position of NOSENKO to satisfactorily resolve and accept: Acceptance or nonacceptance of his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in a decision a8 to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career is valid. It is believed zeasonable to presure that if NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American-Britisb Commonwealth Section, Sevenzh Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief o Section auring 1960 1961. Position in the SCD, KG3 , and throughout the KCB is irnportant fror a ronetary point of viewv &5 well &s 2 prestige point of view. 3f SECRET 0d01161 ================================================== Page 179 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ NOSENKO was only in the First Section 2s a Senior Case Officer in 1960 5 1961, this Would kave been & dezrotion in position with resultant loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alore, his failure to have held tne position of Depity Chief in 1960 5 1961 Would raise con- siderable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position to 1960, as well a8 whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 5 1963 . It i9 apparent that the lowledge of NOSENKO concezning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Departrent, during 1960 1961 is incomplete when judged by What are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chiei in CIA. Duzing current interviews , an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities 0f NCS ENKO actually were in 1960 3 1961 and whether his staterents in this area were impossible O could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Sectioz. According to NOSENKO, in the 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chieis of Section in the entire SCD and in certain depa rtrents none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section: in addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacenent in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief wken he transferred to the First Section, First Departrnent. 0001162 prior early ================================================== Page 180 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ According to NOSENKO, tere Was not a job description for 2 Deputy Chief of Section znd #e du-:es oi the particular Deputy Chief were in actuality what the Ckief oi Department and Czief of Section decided would be his assigred duties . The previous sumary drew attention to an apparent conflict between staterents of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequert claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKVALOV a3 Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain matters which were a88igned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The previous surmary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions_ In the light 0f the present clearer picture of thg nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSZNZO on BAKHVALOV ara on the issue f wno NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is n0 reason to question that BAKHVALOV , with whom NOSENKO, incidentally , did not overla?, was 2 Deputy Chiei of Section in the First Section before NCSENKO, anc that ke Was respon- 3ibla for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the ofher 0801163 3 early he, ================================================== Page 181 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ hand, accoraing to NCSENKO, tne principal reason for his being 'ssigned to the First Section was to conceztrate Oz & new area Of emphasis {code clerks). There could of course have been =0 speci:ic predecessor for a S ubstaatvely new &rea. Therefore, in one serse BAKHVALOV was the predecessor of NCSENKO and in axother sense he was not: Tke interpretation of the various statements of NOSZNKO on this issue as in conflict appears to be tne result of coniusion on this point by all concerned. According to NOSENKO, at the tine of his transfer to the Fizst Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to NCSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy. NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips ard not active work towards possible recruitment. After a short period of time, NOSENKO wag informed by GRIBANOV tkat he, NCSENKO, had been trrsierred to sipervise the work against code clerks (also code mackine mechanics) a: #he United States Embassy. GRZBANOV defired th:s work as being 0f the greatest 60u1164 being assign ================================================== Page 182 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEcal: importance, and the recruitrent 0f code clerks as a priority ain of tne KGB. KLY PIN, who was Chief 0f the First Department, later re- peated the above ard a group consis sting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy 1. GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV wag formed with NOSENKO responsible for supervision Of the Wozk: GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV were not new KGB officers_ but instead were experienced officers although both a8 Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKC. NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV &nd KOSOLAPOV NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their work, According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary Work in the First Section and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his respon- sibilicies as follows: (a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Erbassy. (b) Responsibility for prelirinary review of re- ports from OTU {ZCB techrical unit} oi "'ta*e" from microphones in tke United States Embassy. 0001165 ================================================== Page 183 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ G (c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the Uzited States Embassy. id) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief,_ First Section, when KOVSHUK Was absent. As can be seen from the above,. the responsibilities of NOSENKO; by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of & Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst Can either accept or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence ox this point; Pages 151 5 261 of the previous summary contained corments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service oi NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Departm ent, 1960 1961, The previous primary conclusion wag that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy} Section nox a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for Work against code clerks. The matter of the responsibility of NOSZNKO for work against code clerks will be considered later _ Comments will first be race 0n the respon- sibilities listed in (a) (d) above. 0001166 ================================================== Page 184 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Eu Pages 205 6 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed basis for tne previous corclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB czse officer for John ABIDIAN The current conclision is that he was the responsible case off:cer :or ABIDIAN. Whether or not his Work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case Officer is immaterial; what is material is whether NOSENKO reas onably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB" for Work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt tnat the answer to this is that NOSENKO did. According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDLAN would lead the KGB to "azother POPOV , M1 and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework: Aamittedly NOSENKO was unaware 0f a considerable amourt of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the Other hand iz the staterents of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was to see if coverage of A3IDIA: Woild lead to "ancther POPOV , Mf it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have hzd 6j01167 ================================================== Page 185 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ little material value for the SCD. Tae FCD had advised the SCD prior to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR tkat ABIDIAN was corsidered to be "American Intelligence, " and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A_ LANGELLE, who was kown by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence" or not. The previous summary, pages 213 G 216, contains S0r e quite specific statements relative to ABiDTAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroreous. This invalidates one Of the bases for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. NOSENKO had previously Stated that in circa October 1960 he prepared an operational on ABIDIAN which included cortinuation of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until &t least July 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning tze above and the results invalidate the previous conciusion that FEDOROVICH could Kci rave treated the clothing and effects o: A3IDIAN with Metka pzioz to July 1961. cot11s8 plan ================================================== Page 186 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ABIDIAN has now stated that he arzived in Moscow in March 1960 with the intention tha: he would not employ a Soviet maid: Approxi- mately three months later his close association began with Myra KEMMER , a Department of State employee; this association continued until she left Moscow in mid-l961_ KEMMZR had Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH became the part-time mnaid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, accor to ABIDIAN, had uncontrolled access to his living quarters Since she had a. to permit entry for cleaning purposes. ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there is no reason to contradict the staterent of NOSENKO that the three Ukn { hall operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all showed evidence Of Metka. It is interestirg to note that NOSENKO in June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel: ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a.24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning & specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDZAN. The actual surveillance of A3IDIAN was the responsib Of the Seventh Directorite Which submitted reports to the 0001169 ding key ility ================================================== Page 187 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ First Section, First Department. NOSENKO , as the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give any appropriate guidance OI direction to the Seventh Directorate, but under the KGB organization he would not participate in the sirveillance activities of the Seventh Directorate: NOSENKO stated that had sur - veillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses Of _ ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them__ No personal weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV" remained unchanged. Pages 210 ~ 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN trips outside the USSR and that no effozt was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "'operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow: M1 The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reas onably be expected Woiild be Of little or no practical value to the SCD_ 0801170 10 during ================================================== Page 188 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Sec?E; Pages 216 3 221 of the previous summary contain a summary on the matter of the Pushkcin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that & current review of the 1964 - 1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and dia much to confuse the issue Current interviews, a8 indicated above, have not fully resolved the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas Of conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO wag not in the First Section, Firgt Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the tine or shortly after the event: There is no reason.to question his assertion that he read the report sin ~e his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent ina bility on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relateit to his change of a88ignmerts raises a question regarding when he actaally read the report. NOSENKO clairs ihat tne visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkr Street deaddrop area ledto the KGB settirg up a stationary surveillance post 6001171 1 } ================================================== Page 189 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ cW; near the site which was mairtained for three months and that he was inforied Or & daily basis of the results of this stake out (always negative). To take this statement literally would raisea further problem_ since, in addition to his transfer from the First Depart-nent to the Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO. went to Geneva in mid-March 1962. It is conceivable that, a8 he himself now raintains, he: was kept advised Of developrents Or nondevelopments following the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, 2 Chief of Department in the Seventh Directorate Who had been Inown to NOSENKO since 1 953 , or Vladislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV, Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Depart- ment. Even.80, how ever, his failure to call our attertion to this matter in June 1962 would Seem to require explanation, especially in view o the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mail- ings by ABIDIAN 5 e a warning which Would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring - summer of 1961. It is to be noted that during the June } 962 meetirgs NOSENKO was not specifically asked for any additional inforration regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDAN:' Beyond 12 0001172 ================================================== Page 190 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ tnis _ NOSENKO hims elf has Statec that :t did not occur to him to tell u5 because the Stake out had long Sixce been dropped, it had revealed nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else; and therefore he had regarded it as insignificant: This is not inplausible. Another possible explanation,. however, derived from the already noted iability 0f NCSENKO to pin down a date for the visit, i5 that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not of the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should be noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY case in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Street deaddrop undoubtedly becare the subject of widespread interest within the KGB_ That NOSENKO. is at a minimum Still confused about the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequerces is clear from the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has con- sciously exaggerated hie involvement with the visit and its aftermath, it is also possible that the evident distortions Of his accounts of the affair derive from honest confusion. Current interviews and & check of the tapes O previous inter- views leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware Of the visits of ABIDZAN to the upper Gorkiy Siree: area circa Varck 1961, These visits by ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operatioxal 0d01173 13 ================================================== Page 191 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEc.zi letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished drawings which substantiate, that visits,of ABIDIAN to a commission 2 next-door art and a local post office in the area were kown to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrarce to the art accor- to NOSENKO, was S0 situated as to be &n ideal place for pic up or placing a deaddrop, and a robile surveillance was placed on the art for a period of time following the visit o ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN a: the time and to the buildings described by NOSENKO_ Pages 216 220 of the previous summary contain no reference to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the visits of ABIDIAN.to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It i8 als0 clear from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that no, differentiation was made conc erning his statements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site (30 Decerber 1961). It is impossible at this tine to state tkat & detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would have pernitted the clarification of all issu28 including the above, but 14 6301174 CCRET shop, sbop; shop, ding: king shop ================================================== Page 192 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ there is no Coubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event, one is clear 55 since he may well have transferred out Of the First Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and rost certainly had transferred by January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO kas supplied confused information regarding the Pushkin Street aifair canot be used to impugn his claim to having been cae officez for ABIDIAN from 1960 urtil late 1961, Furthermore, the fact tzat NOSENKO is not able to properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the date right. In regard to (b), the respons= of NOSZNKO ior preliminary re- view of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of XGB} of "take" fror micro- phones in the United States Embassy: the prev ous conclusion was that his clair that he personally reviewed the KGB monitor: reports was not sustained. It is not felt that the previous conclusior made Sufficient allow_ ance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the respons: ibility actually entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone inter- cepts were given to a designated officer ioz distribution to the appropriaze case officer, but microphone reports , to prevent wice dissemination even within the First Section, were brought &aily t0 the Deputy Chief 080i175 or i-i his absence to the Chief and then wera distributed to the individual responsible 15 thing early: early ibility ing ================================================== Page 193 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chiez was aware 0f the total ricrophone "Itake" from the United States Embassy &8 received by the sectior. As regards political type infozratior, and according to NOSENKO this was considered t.e most irportant by the KGB and OTU , NOSENKO had no respons= ibility for review or ultimate dissemination Of the infor- mation to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee since this was the responsibility of & unit in the office 0f the Chief, SCD. NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the working microphones was "dying' M and that OTU in addition to having reception' difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining & sufficient nunber 0f iqualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from most microphones , but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts 0f,all conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been of interest to responsible officers of the First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more the routine answer 0f, "we cculd do so jf We had more personnel. According to NOSENZO, t22 tapes Were mairiained at OTU and could not be furnished zo the Zirst Section. An ofiicer of_ 15 gave 800ii76 ================================================== Page 194 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ First Section could listen to 2 particulaz tape but he had to go to OTU to Co S0 ard as a result this was &one very infrequently. It is believed that any presurption that the KGB recovered or transcribed all conversations even in the thirteen areas listed by NOSENKO as having active microphones is not reasonable or even realistic. It is also unrealistic to presue that any conversation con- ducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was roi cornpromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in any damage asgessment; it is not an appropziate basis for @ presumption_ that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because some- one had a conversation in one of the_rooms in which there was an active microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy. It i8 apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors to be cosidered such a8 whether the conversation could be picked Up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover 8ufficient portions of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, 2rd even if he did, whether he would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in vezbatim Or in summary form. In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO :hat he was responsible for maintenance oi the physical security fiie on the United States Embassy, 17 1z_ 6001177 ================================================== Page 195 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ it {s not considered that there is ax adequate basis for questioning this clain The previous summary contained & conclusion tha: the clain of NOSENKO that he was custodian Of the Embassy security file was an invention. The basis ior this conclusion was not then adequate and current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim on this point should be accepted, In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place of KOVSHUK, the Chief of Fizst Section, wken KOVSHUK was absent, it is considered that this claim is accepiable providing it is not con- verted into a presumption that therefore NOSZNKO kew everything that KOVSHUK knew. NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an example of this , NOSENZO has shown & lack of detailea kowledge of the work againgt diplomatic personnel in the United States Erbassy. He has stated he i8 Sire he Would kave kown of anything "important" auch &8 a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does noi claim to have reviewed all the rezorts 0f the Vzrious officers of #2 First 18 oju1178 SEGRET ================================================== Page 196 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEZZC. Section. His recognition 0f the raries: of individuals at tne United States in 1960 1961 and even their assignments seems adequate. The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names of most agents or operative contacts who Were part of the XGB network among the enous employees of the American Embassy , did not recognize their photographs, and did not sufficiert details con- cerning their specific activities is considered to be &n unwarranted criticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agents in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers. It is also apparent that tne philosophy in the KGB Was to maintain a single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that respon: for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agent had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case oificer othez than the handler oi the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particular interest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though he was the case oificer responsible ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV and GR YAZNOV worked against code clerks , did not have an agent network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent report- ing on or a specific activity agains: & particular target was normally 19 0001179 ZE6E1 Embassy indig give sibility for actively foz ================================================== Page 197 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ not &n adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agert and it ap2ears the KGB considers that t.e continuation of an established handler-agent relationship hag considerable merit. NOSENKO, a5 previously indicated, haa stated that ke %ad the responsibility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy during 1960 m 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims respon- sibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in early 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of the.work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Cennadiy I. GRYAZNOV , Vladimir DEMKIN and Yevgeniy' GROMAKOVSKIY_ GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN and GROMAKOVSKIY , who handled indigenous agents in American House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO in those cases where these agents were directed against code clerks _ It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the code clerks , code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 5 1961, was rich greater than his knowledge of any other categozy oi America: ersployees at the United States Embassy durirg this zeriod excezi foz AZIDLAN, 0001180 20 only ================================================== Page 198 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ The foliow_ comments are corcerned with several specific cases in Which, accordirg to NOSENKO, there was ar approach by the XGB, interestirg infozmation was developed, or in which at least 2 corsiderable amoun: of specific work was cazried out by NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV and GR YAZNOV . The first case, (Jares STORSBERG) is covered on pages 166 4 177 of the previous surmary. Little adcitioral cornmert iS consicered necessary on this case Since there does not appear to be ary &dequate reason to question the general story oi NOSENKO in regard to the KCB effort against STORSBERG;, It i8 recognized and mentioned els ewhere that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his persoral involvement in the case, particularly in placing himself a8 present with GRIBANQV when the recruitmert pitch was made toiSTORSBERG. NOSENXO has retracted this pazticular clair, but there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year in the planning and activities which preceded tne unsuccessiul approach to iSTORSBERGi An i8sue was previously made over the timirg of the approzch to STORSBERG} since STCRSBZRG)dated this as October 1961, NCSENKO has indicated about June : 961, ind information from GOITSYN, basec on 'remarks by KOVSEUK to him, Zad been incerpreted &s incicating the 22 6a 01181 ing ================================================== Page 199 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ approach occurred at the "end of 1960. " NOSENKO, during current interviews , has an acceptable account 0f the(sTORSBZRG}case. He has stated that he canzot precisely date the approach to STORSBERG), bit tnat it occizred before tke approach at the Noscow airport to (James KEYSERS} (June 16, 1961) because otherwise no action would have been taken,against(KEYSERS When recently zeinterviewed, (STORSBERG)continued to maintain that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the iciernal evidence in his description Of collateral events rakes it clear that the approach had to have taken place corsiderably earlier. iJoseph MORONE; another code clerk at tne United States Embassy , who will be the subject of further discussion below , has been irterviewed on the basis of statements byiSTORSBERC)that MORONE)was presert in American House the night of the approach. Analysis 0 the statereats of MORONE) clearly indicates that the events(STORSBERG describes could not have taker place later than the period February to early 1961. The best estimate poSsible at this tine is tha: te approach to STORSBERG occurred in March ~ April 1961, which i3 quite compatible with tke approximate dating oi the approzch by NOSENKO. In the face of this approximation 0f the date of the approacn to(sToRSBERC} it is 0001182 22 given May ================================================== Page 200 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ bel:eved reasoliable io assume that +.2 remarks of KOVSHUK to GOZITSYN in Janiary 1961, 25 #elated by GOLITSVN concernizg a Successful Operation agains: a militazy code clerk in Moscow at the ena of 1960, referred to 'SFORSBZRG; ard tka: KOVSHUX either was referring to a conprorise phase of the ozeration rather than the actual approach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success. Pages 178 ~ 181 o1 the previois Sumrary cotain infozmation in regard to the attempted defection operation against James KZYSERS} As 0f this time, it is considered that tkeze &re n0 discrezancies between record iniormation and inforration frorn NOSENZO which in ary way reflect agairst NOSENKO. KEYSERS] did not recognize & photograph of NOSENKO as the Soviet wko made a fast approach to hirn at the air- port, but this does not provide & valid reasor to disbelieve the statement of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to(KEYSERS} There are certain statements relative to the(KZYSZRSI case &s set forth in the previous summary which require specific corrent- (a) The statemert i8 made that ro KGB cfficer directly connected with the case could regard KzYSZRS a8 the replacement for STORSBZRG) In fac:, KEYSERS actually was bei:-g trained by(STOrS3zRGjas a substitute, not a replacement, even thoug-1 kis prirary assignnent 0001183 23 ================================================== Page 201 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 7 was not that 0f a code clezz. NOSENKO has durizg cirrent iiterviews related kOw he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations ?icked up by the microphone in the Military code rooina at tne United States Embassy that(KEYSERS} either was not a code clerk or had been away from code work for a considerable period of time In azy event, the irpression of NOSENKO was that STORSBERG}was havizg & difficult time expiaining the particular work to (KEYSERs; Tne observations 0f NOSENKO are of interest since KzYSzRS actually had not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained by STORSBERG} s0 that he could act &s a substitute. Under the circurstances, it is considered quite logical that the KGB would assume at the time that KEYSERS} was to be the eventual replacement of' STORSBZRGj: (b) Thne previous summary statea that, "'prior to his departure from Moscow, (KEYSERS acknowledged *0 his supervisors [Colonel URBAN/ his homosexual tendencies and he adritted involvement in tazee horosexual inciderts, all at the American House" (page 1 79). oju1184 24 ~cCGzT ================================================== Page 202 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Contrary to:this &sseztion, a review 0i the official memorancirn, datec 16 June 1961, of(Colonel URBAN}reflects that{KEYSERS] was not iniorred by URBAN}of the "allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union. " (c) On page 236 of the previous surmazy, the statement is made that, "In the sirgle case in which he INOSENKQI assert ed taat he relied on inforration pro- cured from microphones (KEYSZRS} failure to report receipt Of the defection invitation) he was in error," While the official record shows that KEYSERS did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to (Colonel} URBANin the office of(Colonel URBAN, it srould be noted that this occurred less than one hour before KEYSERS left the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in the absence of information to the contrary from microphone and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded chat KEYSERS) had not reported receipt of the defection letter and there- fore had decided to appzoach KEYSZRSjat the airport. In view of ikie s.ort tine betweez KEVSZRS zeport of receipt 0001185 25 ================================================== Page 203 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ of cne letter &nd hi3 Qeparture forn Noscow, it would have beez rernarkable if tle XC3 nad learned tkis in- formation in tire to call off #ne airport approach. The account: of NOSZNKO in tefKzYSERS} matter therefore is considered corpletely credible. Pages 181 184 oi the previous summary contain information in regard tolMatthew ZUJUS; who succeeded (James STORSBERG having arrived in Moscow in Septerber 1961. GRYAZNOV was tre responsible case Officer for ZUJTS) according to NOSENKO. The previous Sumrary states (page 183) that ZUJUs , during & routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the sumner of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian Woran, "'LILLIAN, " wno. visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic. "LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she claimed to be fror Vienna but traveling with her employer, 2 Czeck. Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport nad been issued to "LILLIAN, 11 and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN" replied that she had forgotten it, ther left, ard did not return. The previous Sumrary stated that the above incident had beer described by NOSENZO but in connection with attempts to entra? Joseph {VORONzl in not ZUJUS)in 1962. Ga01186 26 1960 ================================================== Page 204 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Page 194 of the pzevious surrmary relates informa-on from NOSZNZO that GRYAZNOV weat to East Berlin in early 1960 to obtain two Gerran woxien Ivko coild be used against t.e residents o American House. During cuzrent interviews, this matzez has been again covezed with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for these two women, agents Of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow under false docureatati one &s & West Gezran and the otker as an Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent, "HANNA, I1 as having the cover of a jouznalist, ana stated he believed "HANNA" had met MORONE at American House. In & recent irterview_ IMORONE; confirmed that in 1961 ke had met & West German girl at American Hous e who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO. Concerning the agent documerted as an Auatriaz,. NOSENKO re- ported that she was queried about her passport at American House and as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further attempts to use her at American Fouse, NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period a8 the "HANNA" case; i. e., 1960 1931. He has never suggested azy connection with ZUJUS) nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the exzerience oflZUJUS]} since this took place in the surnmer of 1 962, after NCSENKO had left the Anerican Embassy Section. 0001187 27 0n , early ================================================== Page 205 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ It was the conclusion of tne previous summary that NOSENKO dia no: kow ezough about ZUJUS) Or n:s background to have exercised ary supervision iz the develozrent of ZUJUS}: Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regard:ng ZUJUS, the fact is that NOSENKO left thne First Sectior, First Department, at the end 0f 1961 at wnich time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated: ZUJUS} who did not arrive in Moscow until Septembez 1961, remaized ir Moscow until January 1963. NOSZNKO could haraly be held responsible for lmowing anything about ZUJUS} after 1 January 1962. Pages 185 189 0f tne previous summary contain a Synopsis Of previous information from NOSENKO in regard to(Paul JENNER} Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that Paul JENNER} who was thought to be & code clerk, was coming to Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to s end Vadim V: KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as(JENNER) to Moscow. A female agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the train entered the USSR The fernale agent was to becoe acquainted with JENNER as a part of a future operation against JENNER) in Moscow_ and KOSOLAPOV was also to become accuainted with(JENNER} NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both KOSOLAPOV and the ferale agent made the acquaintance olzENNER; 28 00011L88 SEGRET ================================================== Page 206 ================================================== 14-00000 and that he, NOSENKO, read tke repozt 6 ubritted by KOSOLAPOV on ine trip from Ficlsinki to Voscow JENNER; after arriving in Noscow, reported that he was approached on the train izor Kelsinki by two young Russiars, "a ana a girl, probably university students, 1 wh0 struck up a corversation. According to (JENNER both said that might see(JENNERI in Voscow. About three months later JENNER) reported being approached again by the same girl, tnis time at the Moscow airport wheze he had gone on courier busines 5 _ There was 2 short corversation azd she 'JENNER}a phone number, insisting tka: he call &er. The Wozran als0 advised JENNER not to.mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO has stated'that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance, the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encourter JENNER}at the Moscow railroad Station or airport when he wert alone to meet couriers. Insofar as is known, JENNERhhas never been shown & photograph of KOSOLAPOV_ Although KOSOLAPOV waa approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed a8 & university student_ 29 6j01189 boy: tbey they gave ================================================== Page 207 ================================================== 14-00000 During current irterviews , NOSZNKO has repeated the same generzl story a8 regards Paul JZNNEZ; He still insisis tkat KOSOLAPOV was on the same traiz with JENNER :rom Heisinki. Collateral infor- 4 ration raises Cifficulties kere, however: Finnish train manifests indicate tnatiJENNER) was the only Moscow-bourd passenger Oz tke 31}March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has idertifiea aS an alia3 used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow The above obvious discrepancy has not beer and cannot be clari- fied with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was eifher on the same train a8 JENNER or he was not: Train mazifests indicate that KASOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the and girl, probably univer_ students M who, according to(JENNER; struck up a conver - sation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to(JENNER at the airport: There is no reason to question that tais girl was the female agert o CR YAZNOV I view of the conflict between the train manifest ard statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "lboy Student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV , or whether it may have been Sozr:8 other person entirely. OJ011s0 38 "boy sity ================================================== Page 208 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ It is not accepted that tke train manifests are incontroveztible evicence # at KOSOLAPOV coiic _o: have been On :ne same train as {JENNER} Neither i8 it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not & satisiactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the state-nent of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and 'JENNERi were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV did not travel wita JENNZR} tis does not establish anything moze taan tha: NOSENKO is wrong; it is evicence that ke Coes not kow 30r ething he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV , should have kown according to his own statements. Pages 190 ~ 192 contain a sunmary of previous information in regard to the John GARLAND} case. GARLAND} was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KCB was studying, but on whor no derogatory information was Geveloped. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to(GARLAND other tnan to identify him as a code clerk. GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered relates to the trip of GARLAND;fror Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 196 0. GOLITSYN reported that in Noverber 1960 the Helsinki KCB Residency received & cable fro Moscow advisi-g that an Amezican code clerk Would be arriving in Helsinki en rOlte to Noscow ard that 0j01191 31 Sm?F ================================================== Page 209 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ the responsible SCD case oificer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki uxder alias to strike up an acquaintazce with the code clerk which the SCD hoped to continte in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured foz KOSOLAPOV a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki to Moscow. The previous summazy also stated GOLITSYN had advised that later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "frox the Embassy Section" (First Section; SCD) about te case on which he had zelped KOSOLAPOV . According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to ciscuss the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must have resulted in a successful recruitm ent_ It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD ozficer frorn the Enbassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Department. GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under tke alias of SERGEEV (SERGZYEV), but was unable to furnish a first narze and patronyric for SERGEYEV . GOLITSYN referred to (inu) ZENKIN as from the American Department, SCD. It is considered that there is no doubt that the (inu) ZZAXIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the sare last mai2 32 0001192 being ================================================== Page 210 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ concerz whor NOSENKO kas furnished information. NOSENKO has identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall but pos is Yuriy) a8 an officer oi te Second Section, First Depart- ment, SCD. According to NOSZNKO, one group of the Second Section both before and after 1960 4 1961 was engaged in "operative games" against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of groip. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad ir connection with activities of the Second Section, bu: that he had no specific knowledge regarding the activities oi ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has fur- nisked soie fragmentary information which he learned in regard to ZENKIN and when the full name o SERGZYEV (ZENKIN) together with his photograph i8 obtained, this fragmentary information from NOSENKO may prove quite useful. As regards the KOSOLAPOV -GARLAND; matter and the opinion expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the. case (GARLAND) that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment , there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presurption. According to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this point, ZENKIN was in tne Second Section, not tne First Section, in 1960 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but a Senior Case 33 0001193 ning sibly this orly SELZET ================================================== Page 211 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was &n offcer of the First Sectior and the work against GARLAND; wa8 #e responsibility of tne First Section, it does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have knowof any developrents in the KOSOLAPOVIGARLAND)matter. The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists' John GARLAND}and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias Of KOSOLAPOV) as passergers. GARLAND} when interviewed in 1962 following the lead from GOLITSYN, deried having met any Soviet with te physical description of KOSOLAPOV or the Helsink-to-Moscow trip, ard denied ever approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBI and & polygraph interview did not indicate that he haa ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had evez knowingly been contacted any foreign intelligence agent: It i8 accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as (GARLAND}from Helsinki to Moscow. It is als0 accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960_ Travel for an SCD officer Outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not 0001194 34 SECZE? being by ================================================== Page 212 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ co matter that the incivicual kas previoialy traveled on a similar mission, each trip must have Specizc high-level 2pproval. The red tape which thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such 2 trip further supports the assumption tkat NOSENKO should have known about the KOSOLAPOV{GARLAND}trip. The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the staterent by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made sich 2 but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not kow anything about it He adds only that kad anything significan: developed in the study of GARLAND; he would have been aware of it. NOSENKO, 2s supervisor Of the group working against coce clerks , should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on & trip to Cuba from 15 Noverber 1960 to circa 17 December 1960_ The possibility exists that this could have accounted for his lack of kowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960. However, NOSENKO nas not attempted to use his Cuban trip &s a possible explanation for not kowing of the November KOSOLAPOV trip. As with the(JENNERLKOSOLAPOV case, it is rot possible at this tine to resolve the discrepancies pertairing to the_ {G-ARLANDt KOSOLAPOV The fact that NOSENKO denies any ka3lodsfg} 35 OcR trip' trip. ================================================== Page 213 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, a8 in tne JENNER case, of his rot: kowing S omething he, by his own statements , should have known. Viewed in the context Of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in he JENNERi case nor those in thelGARLANDj case, singly or corbined, in any way represert conclusive evicerce that NOSENKO was not super - visor 0f KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, howevez, was not substantiated in the previous S umma ry . Pages 193 ~ 199 of the previous summary cortain an account of KGB activity against code clerk Joseph MORONE;from various sources, including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962. According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work againstiMORONE was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that MORONE] and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name ofiBEGGS; were planring a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrargements were made with the UB (the Polish Security Service) for & female Polish agent to core to Moscow and travel from there *o Warsaw on the same train as MORONE) and BEGGS; The intent was for the agent, either on the train or sub- sequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise MORONE; sexually . She 0001196 36 ================================================== Page 214 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ V ciaci successfully accorp.ished this, but due to certain problems in KG3-UB liaison relations, it was zot possible foz the KGB to exploit this directly. The previous Summary Stated that with reszect to the ferale UB agent, there was persuasive evidence tnat neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV 2layed tke roles in thelMORONE) case described by NOSENKO. That Surnmary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba ard of KOSOLAPOV to Frnlanc at appr oximately tke same tire as the(MORONE trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSZNKO anc KOSOLAPOV being involved personally ir this part of tne(MORONz} case. NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish ferale agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw. MORONE and IBEGGS) departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not known when XOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the 16 November 1960 train manifest &8 departirg Helsinki for Moscow_ NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. Tne activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible Within the known time frame. It is clear that NCSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role in the MORONEJ case, particularly when he stated that he, NCSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that 0001197 37 SCX ================================================== Page 215 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent. NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the after the train arrived in Warsaw_ Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accor- dingly possible within the known time frame. It i8 rot con- sidered that the retractions NCS ENKO has made fror his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him. Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that MORONE; when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE; (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that MOR ONEfhad been intirate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement 0 MORONE} with "IVANOVA's friends 0 0001198 38 SELRET day ================================================== Page 216 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ NOSENKO, curing cuzrent intezviews, has indicated awareness least sore involvement of IVANOVA witr MORONE. He has fur- nished information on & developing operatior against Narine guara iGARCIA (Anthony A_ GARCIA) based on tne involvement of'GARCIA with IVANOVA. He has al80 stated that the possibility was considered of IVANOVA against MORONE to obtain compromising photographs. This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from the militiaman/KGB guard at the United States Erbassy that IVANOVA, her girl friend, 'MORONzland 2 Marine guzrd, possibly GARciA} had been "in the Li then returned to the "flat" of one 0f the Marines where the spent the night. This apparently placed the reliability of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pietro CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV, reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONZ_ The summa-y also states that MOR ONE was said by other Arnerican Embassy employees to be a cloge friend of CECCHI and that MORONE)had admitted black market money exchanges with CECCHI. During current interviews, NOSENKO kas stated that CECCHI furnished "pieces" of information conc erning MORONE) but he, NOSENKO, 0801199 39 SECRET ofat using city, girls ================================================== Page 217 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ knew of no black mazket ixvolvement ofMORONE with CECCHL NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everythirg 0f interest to the KGB. Tne KGB of course was aware that CECCZII was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he Zid and with whor is open to question; viz. the Maurice ZWANG} case below. The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that MORONE;met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting n Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment. review of oificial records indicates that MORONE) did repozt having met sore Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on & misinterpretation. Accordingly , since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is con- sidered C ompletely acceptable. 40 gju1200 S SPET ================================================== Page 218 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ cil A few corments are_ appropriate concerning r emarks in the previous summary on pages 1 99 204. Comments were made there concerning(five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY_ Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY; and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion i8 apparent that the reporting of NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The follow- observations may asgist in placing these cases in their proper perspective: (a) Maurice_ZWANG ZWANG}was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked during 1960 ~ 1961. The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against/ZWANG' was inadequate. First, reporting of NOSENKO on/ZWANC) contained no reference to the relationship oflZWANG} With his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has identifiea as &_ KGB agent. Although ZWANG) denied s exual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment: During polygraph examination ZWANG] reacted when he 41 60012C1 E3ZZ ing on" ================================================== Page 219 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual relations with his maid. Tne failire of NOSENKO to re- port on this rela tionship can be ascribed to ignorance, but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part 0f the maid to report details of this relationship to the KGB. Second, NOSENKO had not reported that (ZWANG} was involved in the currency operations 0f Pietro CZCCHI: (A fact that previous summary implied he should have known from KGB agent CECCHI. ) Fror the record, kow - ever, it appears that the dealings of' ZWANG}were not directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was eitner unaware of the involvem ent of(ZWANG;or, as NOSENKKO himgelf stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all details of his currency operations to his KGB handier. (b) John TAYLOR NOSENKO idertified {TAYLOR' as (a State Department code clerkjand target of KOSOZAPOV The KGB was aware of the involverent of TAyLOR}with his Soviet maid, but no atterpt was made to recruit(TAYLOR) before his departure in early 1961 since to do S0 migat 42 0301202 ================================================== Page 220 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ endanger the plars for a recruitment approach to (James STORSB ERG, who had been under development for almost a year and was consicered more valuable. The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG) was not approached until after the departure ofTAYLOR; the operation againstiSTORSBERG;was underway before TAYLOR became involved with his maid: Further; it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the ba8i8 of hig previous affair with his maid in Moscow. (c) Frank DAY NOSENKO identified Frank DAY as a State Department code clerkjwho was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about(DAY and no oper- ational measures were taken against(DAY: The previous summary noted that in July 1 961, (DA Yhtraveled to the Caucasus with his friend and(iormer overt CIA employee; {Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN. It was also stated that tne two were uncer surveillance by five persons 43 0001203 ================================================== Page 221 ================================================== 14-00000 SECSZL at all times on the above that found a "'repairnan" in their hotel room when #ey unexpec-edly returned, and that o anothez occasion an "actractive and available Soviet female" was believed to heve been planted in their train compartment. According to NOSENKO, surveillance and ary other local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the local organization was trying to do a thorough job on(DAYI and (BROWN; but it apparently was nonproductive. It does not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a trip which produced no results. (d) Robezt_DWELLYI NOSENKO hag related in con- siderable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KASOLAPOV to involve Robert DWELLY , 2 code clerkl in Moscow from April 1959 5 1960, in a homos exual com- promise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion(DWELLY} was & homosexual. 0301204 44 trip, they July SECREL ================================================== Page 222 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SCw ~ There :s ro reason to doubt the Staterent of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to cetermine when and where DWELLY was going "into the city" (Moscow) s0 that a homosexual comprorise situation could be arrarged: There were no specific developments from" their efforts, according to NOSENKO_ IDWELLY has categorically denied being & homo - sexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed DWELLY) &s a homos exual. There does not appeaz to pe ary reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO abouti DWELLY; as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO. (e) Joseph GAFFEY NOSENKO has identified Joseph GAFFEY as a(code The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure GAFFEY into downtown Moscow, usirg Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House. By way of comment, the previous summary stated that GAFFEYj arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that Fred KADERA had reported that GAFFEY had told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the Am 'CJ812C5 45 SECRET clerk) ================================================== Page 223 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ J U; Hous e. It was further noted tha:(GAFFEY) was recalled from Moscow in the Sixier oi 1962 oecause 0f drunken- ness anc durirg interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apart- ment and that she had claimed pregnancy. As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO; the following factors should be c ansidered: (1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part 0 December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years 1962. (2) In addition to the information previously mentioned &8 furnished by GAFFEY during inter- view, GAFFEYl also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 Decemnber 1961 and was als0 intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According toGAFFEY} IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about ; 0001206 46 SECRET Day May ================================================== Page 224 ================================================== 14-00000 1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has Stated he transierred to the Seventr Department. The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from micro- phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 S 236 of the previous summary contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the maiter of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and damage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusion was that his information did not Sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this sumary in regard to this previous conclusion: A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in & fuller Understanzins of the microphone matter. In the material brougat out by NOSENKO i 1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side hand - written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active ricro - phones (those which were monitored) in the United States Erbassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and neez not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character_ 7 ized in the previous surrary &s singular and it was stated traz NOSENKO 8801207 47 being ================================================== Page 225 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ has never plaus explained the circumstances which prompted his retention o the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva. During current interviews , the matter of the above list has been covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the judgment of the previous summary. NOSENKO has stated that in 1960 7 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV _ Chief of the Second Section; First Departmezt; desired s Ome "points" for uS e against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the terr "point" not as meaning just & microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit which includes microphones a8 Well a8 the necessary monitors and translators to cover the microphone and translate the "ltake. " The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, tkere was a transcription-translation problem. According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States Embassy . The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A KLYPIN , held & meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Vladislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV , and NOSENKO, the purpose 0f waich 0801208 48 SZERZT ibly ================================================== Page 226 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ was to discuss the possibility 0f temporarily discontinuing certain Embassy "points" 1 controlled by the First Section, and permitting PETROV to use these ''points I against targets of his section. According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list of names of certain tarzets to which he wished to give technical cover- age. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the United States Embassy and residences . When the meeting ended, NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office. Contained on the reverse side of the paper were tne following names in Russian: {LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, 'and Sipe BURTIi The name A= A. MIKFAYLOV was listed next to the name of(LUBIN; and the name of Y. Ea CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of SMITH} NOSENKO has explained that LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN; and 'Sipe BURTINiwere among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section. NOSENKO stated he kew nothing more about the four non-Soviet nam es except that were targets of PETROV . NOSENKO stated that he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it occurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Departmen:. (According to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as 0301209 49 Z2CRZT SESEZL they ================================================== Page 227 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ccu:o Chief of the First Departrent in circa rid-]961.) Research in regard to the four non-Soviet nares leaves no doubt that(LUBIN is George (LUBIN; and that Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTINlare correct names, with being the wife 0f Will 3URTIN) All three are American citizens who were in the JSSR circa June 1961, (SMITH} at this tine, has still not been identified. In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date Of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961. According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "lwoz copY . " This _ according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook issued to all officers in which were supposed to write all their notes, destroying any other notes. According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers; did not completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently loose notes in the notebook 50 that the notebook often acted as a file rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSZYZV C801210 50 SEXEZ (Sipe king they put ================================================== Page 228 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEZRCI when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPZN, and notes he had prepa red for lectures to the Seventh Directorate_ According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the growp Of notes he took when he Went to tne Seventh Department: In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKQ, it should be noted that he also brougkt with him in 1964 kis notes for the briefing of FEDOSEY EV and certain notes he obviously had also prepared while in the First Section; e.g. , his notes for a lecture to the Seventh Directorate in regard to & "ma8g surveillance" on the American Embassy . including a section (pages 236 ~ 239) on the kowledge of NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his information on this subject. NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, ne said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB reszonsible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading sore United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known CO01211 5] SESRET along By = ================================================== Page 229 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ZVi? to anyone in the First Section Of the First Departrent, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there is no reason to question kis Statement. In the previous summary (pages 240 248), the failures or successes Of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are notea. With the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the responsible case Officer for any of the listed CLA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL a8 CIA. Surely KOVSHUK knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however , that NOSENKO, 38 Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK: As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate_ (a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge Paul GARBLER was CIA, and GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic iniormation that Paul GARBLER was "American Intelligence. M GARBLER , however, did not 0801212 52 yet ================================================== Page 230 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ arrive in Moscow until Novernber 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the Firs: Section for tke Seventh Department. (b) The previous summary Stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that enej IMAHONEY; was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that(MAHONEY} reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow iror October 1960 to September 1961. The "'intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statements of (MAFONEY} and may pos= be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening. (c) (Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by NOSENKO as CIA_ William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being & CIA officer or cooptee. (d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, accor to NOSENKO, suspected of being & CIA officer. George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "F3I officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicata 0001213 53 SECREI Eugs sibly ding ================================================== Page 231 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Jluc: tbet tba KCB had reagona to conalder tho activltlab of BOWDEN Wtea gueplcion: It Ia pot bolleved tbat tho Mated fallures of NOSENKO to ldeatlly CLA efficeze are Of partlcalar pigulilcance {a eatabllehing @bat be we 03 +u Ddt Depaty Ceiel of tae Xirat Sactlon. Tdero 8T9 too mary nn- movR aacters alch would noad to; ba copatdered: Deepita Ou8 a8bump- dope @ to waat tba KGD Know8, It [8 podeiblo tat (0) &0 KCI d1 Bot lov 6f @o CIA adillletlon 0f t4vao people, (b) fa teforratlon Iowa % @0 KGD wab not avallbio at tbe Mrot Sectton, Tlrot Dopastmant, Jovel or (c) tnformatlon avaflablo to &a0 Cbdel 0l &ia Flret Baetion or to @ opeclde can0 ofHleor Wa: 0f no oftkclal conceza t0 NOSENKO and 5730 @ot pado avatlabl & hlm. T4o Jagt 0{ thode posoiblltiad t0 Buebestod {n #Plta of clalma by NOSIMKO that ho kad to have anowa wbatevor Va8 koown [n &ba Sactlon rogardlng CILA Idonttfilcattona; & PrOpenalty Qn 60 pazt 0I NOSZNKO to @reggerate tto area Qf ble own knowyledgeas{Ulty bat bcen een eleewQere do taie cege. Pagea 252 2 258 of previor? Jummary Contala & repost 0f tho }960 txdp of NOSENKO t0 Cuba and al0 1961 trdp t0 Belgaria. Wle {egard to ##0 Cabe trtp, ebare I0 coliateral ovidonco &f &o travel 20 describad by NOSENKO, @nd tbero J8 no onbstantive reaeoa to doubt bi9 accoua: of }ls actleldee on tale txtp. Tbe statement wB0 #raade Jn 54 0j01214 Kak ================================================== Page 232 ================================================== 14-00000 tke previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960 camaged kis claim that he was supervisirg operations against Embassy code clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is to say that no supervisor in the SCD woulc be permitted to make a trip abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which there is no supporting evidence. As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which there is no collateral information, the previous summary conaluded that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation againstlsTORSBERG)was reaching & climax and his subordinates were "apparently planning to exploit KEYSERS'; newly-discovered vulnerability, " it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dis - pensable. There wa8, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did not travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reas oning as to why his account of the purpose of the trip was untrue. As to thejSTORSBERG)case, while it cannot at present be proved that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria_ it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from MORONE} that it had to nave taken place before the time NOSENKO returned fror Bulgaria. Since no seriou3 Guesiion has evez been raised concerning €ati igice 55 ================================================== Page 233 ================================================== 14-QQQOQ of NOSENKO in Moscow at the tine this was made, it would appear that NOSENKO wa8 conparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this phase of thelSTORSB ERG)operation had been completed. As to the KEYSERS} case, there is no apparent problern since it is clear that the approach to KEYSERStook place aiter NOSZNKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did not becore aware that (KEYSERS) was a homosexual, and therefore potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made. In short, there is no reason to believe that tke accouzts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essertially true, or that if are true necessarily reflect on his clair to having been supervisor 0f code clerk operations . OjU1216 56 FRRET pitch they they ================================================== Page 234 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 235 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET F NOSENKO's CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEE QF_THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND WAs THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT; ARE NOT CREDIB LE 0801217 SECRET ================================================== Page 236 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET F NOSENKO's claims, that inl962 he_was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief_of_the _Seventh Department; are not credible. (Previous conclusion) The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he wa8 a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department thereafter. NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the pogition of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, Oleg M. GRIBANOV , Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position. According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was SECRET Erslsdz f i7ca c8ui218 axivinjilc: Grwin} Zd tecijzsiticeilch by {c5 ================================================== Page 237 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However , GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUKas a Deputy . Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would becore a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seers plausible and credible and indi- cates that GRIBANOV , the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to GRIBANOV , was as9isting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB. This section actually covers two periods in the claim ed career of NOSENKO; namely, January 1962 &8 Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart- ment. Since NOSENKO wag in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be geriously faulted for not having de- tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January July 1962. The previou8 summary (pages 268 ~ 291) contains remarks in regard to the January July 1962 period, including the period of March June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases 8201219 2 SfcPeT July ================================================== Page 238 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ JLuiii are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of (Wallace Everett JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS: Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cages constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed pogition of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, during January 8 July 1962. That there were KGB operations againsti JOHNSON, JONES , BIENSTOCK and_ BRAUNS} has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals _ A few additional rerarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it i8 considered that there are any subgtantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO hag said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because may provide additional clari- fication. In the(Wallace Everett JOHNSON}case, it was previously noted that (JOHNSON} arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary sug - gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend _ 5 encies of JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during curfeR}irztjviews 3 SECRET they ================================================== Page 239 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 'Euiic; has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of(JOHNSON; chance" soon after his arrival, "ISHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY_ two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where(JOHNSON stayed. met JOHNSON there and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies. In regard to the(William Carroll JONES) cage, NOSENKO during current interviews ha8 furnished additional information on the KGB operation against(JONES; including the woman Iudmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited 2s an agent to work against JONES and was used in another case, The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the(JONES} case are compatible with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department. In regard to the (Natalie BIENSTOCK;case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case officer but wag able to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she wag interviewed by the FBI: That he did not know all the details con- cerning the (BIENSTOCK case could be explained by hi8 claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case, In regard to the Horst BRAUNS) case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why' BRAUNS visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS} met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that 0001221 "by They SECRET ================================================== Page 240 ================================================== 14-00000 the Seventh Departrent was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, accord - to the previous S unmary, wag aware that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB through his visa application: In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners vigiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this i8 not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO. * Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally, the respon - sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the case was not taken over or agsigned by higher authority, to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that(BRAUNS) was & former Soviet citizen could very well have made 'BRAUNS) of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of the SCD. However, in the absence Of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility 0f the Seventh Depart- ment since BRAUNS} was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previou8 summary also indicated that BRAUNS listed on his visa appli- cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS} had a 1962 there had been & large reorganization in the SCD and in the Seventh Department. The situation was not the same 02013932. SerocT ing By ================================================== Page 241 ================================================== 14-00000 L' relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although {BRAUNSI when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concern- ing his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his Statement of purpose in visiting the USSR. Pages 282 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are geveral gpecific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO wag lying about hig knowledge of the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV. The more important aspect and the primary one i8 the difference in what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and infor- mation from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differ - ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differ - ences neces sarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case, NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the 0001223 SECZET give ================================================== Page 242 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR: The previous summary stated that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrange- " ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY'8 pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva. NOSENKO during current interviews hag indicated an awarenes8 tbat the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still-has dated the recruit- ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Bruggels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR_ There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis - crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are & reflection against NOSENKO '608i1224 SECRET ================================================== Page 243 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ the other hand, tbere is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962 , did not know the true story of the relation- ship of BELITSKIY with CIA. Tbere i8 a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he gince admitted to the KGB his asgociation with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial gtory of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe hig gecurity was endangered and 2s a result he told the KGB .of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events 2s the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA. The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY wa8 recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961: (a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was als0 reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to C201225 SECRET being ================================================== Page 244 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Scircu} George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead.to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under Bu8picion a8 having passed information to Soviet Intelligence. ) (b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CLA rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958 , the KGB would have khown of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover addres8 outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, B ELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail- ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR: BELITSKIY therefore 6001226 9 SECRET ================================================== Page 245 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ JU i: would not have told the KGZ how he actually made contact with American Intelligence in Ceneva #: 1962, but very well could kave told tbe KGB &e bad seen & particular woman whom he had previously kzowr, he was sure she worked for American Intelligence &nd it was through this woman American Intelligence became aware BELITSKTY was in Geneva. ) (c) BELITSKIY in 1982 in Geneva agreed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CiA_ However, his agreement was orly under certain stipulated conditiors, the most intere= of which was that the individual must be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, ary message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY witb CIA_ The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSKIY had not been under KC3 control between 1958 and 1961 and in 1961 gave tke KCB 2 paztial story 0f tbe 1961 events in Lorcon. 6ou1227 10 sting only ================================================== Page 246 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET As previously indicated, the conclusion i9 there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKTY case 80 that discrep- ancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be C osidered a8 a reflection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct poss: the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the BELITSKTY case. The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKTY "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA. i, The previous Summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY_ n There appearg to be no doubt at this time that the statement: by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA, 11 is a reas onably accurate description of what actualy happened in 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKTY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence while previously in Paris , France. G801228 11 SECRET ibility May ================================================== Page 247 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ U+Viie X It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the staterent by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKTY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as & loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA. Pages 282 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV . It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a 8eries of American tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV , he was unaware of the involvenent of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1 958 5 1959. The summary noted this wag during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart- ment. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 7 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi- mately 1957 . 12 0801229 SECRET ================================================== Page 248 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ cloger examination of the cases described in the previous summary a8 "CIA American tourist agents, u reveals there is no con- flict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Depart- ment. As an example, one of the cases is the case of(Edward McGOWAN NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally & Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department: Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with@ CIA officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland) and visited the USSR on & tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly gince apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport: It is agsumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such a8sistance and it is extremely u - likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat. 0001230 13 SECRET only ================================================== Page 249 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ULYIsi Pages 332 G 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he wag a Deputy Chief of the Seventa Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It i8 considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary Since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. During current interviews, NOSENKO hag furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position which substantiate his clair to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964. An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu- sion was based on inadequate information is tbe matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964. The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading: Prior to current interviews, an cffort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explan- ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes. During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa - tion conce rning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and' includes collateral support to his claim of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 7 1961. CO01231 14 SECRET being ================================================== Page 250 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Jcur:zi Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows: (a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Secti Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has gtated that he was in 1962 4 1963 respongible for gupervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department_ According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firmg and that the files of other recruited agents should be 8ent to the FCD or Archives . NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but als0 ex- panded the request to include all 1960 7 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand - written reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents , with information varying from agent to agent and even including gome human errors, Many of the above cases had previously been trans - ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about theif001232 15 SECRET on, ================================================== Page 251 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ inclusion support his gtatement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV 80 that he would have some "'pieces of information to CIA_ 11 (b) Notes by NOSENKO on other case8 which he learned of the 1962 J 1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had acces8 on at least two occagions, Most of his notes were not detailed but Were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and were sorewhat innocuous to maintain before hi8 defection. (c) Notes for lectures to fficers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 ~ 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 1963_ (a} Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1 961. (e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre- pared by the Chief Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO_ This was a_ briefing paper use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh 16 0201233 SECRET give during yet for ================================================== Page 252 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document. The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of thie material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the pobsession Of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately misged. Instead, he collected a con - siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that & search of his effects in the KGB after his depart- ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material wab registered and all could have previouely been deg - troyed by NOSENKO. The previoug summary Stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to; (a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegiur which has been mentioned previously. (b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did. 17 0001234 SECRET ================================================== Page 253 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Cl^+ytj (c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent: NOSENKO stated that there were two copieg in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information a8 to number of copieg typed. 8001235 18 SECRET ================================================== Page 254 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 255 ================================================== 14Q000Q SECRET G NOSENKO HAS NQ_VALID CLAI TQ CERTAINTY THAT THE KGB RECR UITED NQ AMERICAN ZMBAsSY PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTIQV IN 1964 0081236 tR81P SECRET Eclsded #37 clzmatic C-7m-ra n; 34 d2;.' esiris Iun ================================================== Page 256 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ Jcuazi G NOSENKO has no valid claim to cer tainty that the_KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and hig defection in 1964 (Previous conclusion) The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the @pinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy pesonnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and (Herbert'HOWARD; who actually was a USIA) employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy. The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted a8 absolute evidence that there were no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could bave occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitrent. This should in no way be interpreted 2s a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed of NOSENKO in this particular area. The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENOib3yl be examined and can be cited as follows. C6ji? Excluted Irsm axlomallc Corx;iGrzdinz #cd SECRET Gecle;silicziici opinion ================================================== Page 257 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ V 4&j6 (a) During March 1953 -late 1955 NOSENKO was a case officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he Would have known the details concerning any recruitments (other than "ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been he would have heard "something. M (6) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department: NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details _ (c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that tbere were no recruitments by the KGB of United States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details Of tbe)01238 case or cases. There is merit to this contention by 2 May ================================================== Page 258 ================================================== 14-00000 J~' NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who bad been an officer of the First Depart- ment since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department: (d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO a8 Deputy Chief of the First: Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department: According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently cloge during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would bave furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the Herbert HOWARD case from GR YAZNOV in 1962, although it wag not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually 0001239 3 SECRET ================================================== Page 259 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET Jearned of the name when the Firet Section, Flret Department; needed the gervIces of the Seventh Department (Third Seetion) {n obtaining a room in a certain hotel tor tbo Sovlet glr] Irtend of HOWABD In goneral tha &bove copstitatai tbo baala for tho.stated Opinlon ot NOSENKO tbat "ANDRE" a1d Hetbezt HOWARD]were tbe only Jucceseful KGB recrultmente dusing 195) December 1963_ It sapuld be poted that thore are nD Otber tdontlfled KGE recrultante during thie period o dlre wilch would epecldcally refute the oplnton of_ NOSENKO. Hovevar, b viow % the cltad ictual basta for the opialon of NOSENKO, ecceptanca o tho" opinlon of NOSENKO a8 an bonest oplnlon abould pot be converted Into a stetement tbat It [3 abgolute proof that apother recrultment could Dot have occurred" NOSENKO may be completely correct In hle optnlon; but ainco NOSENKO wax only In tbe Tlret Depattment 1953 D 1955 and 1960 1961 his opinion that he would have heard "bomethlng" about & recrultnent Ln 1953 # 1959 or 1962 1963 cannot be accepted a8 infallible. 0001240 SECRET belog ================================================== Page 260 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 261 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ V ANNEX Ci? Extluded #im #clzaz;. SECRET down raricg #f;as;ic? Isq SECRET CO01241 26d ================================================== Page 262 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ JECrE? ANNEX The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" cove pages .316 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A, 1i Staterents of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B, M Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition, there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The Cherepanov Papers_ "1 Attachments : Annex A Annex B Annex C SECEET 0001242 562w E0 60 0n63,6;0 Zim ring ================================================== Page 263 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 264 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET ANNEX B SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT 0001243 SECRET Ex:kut; G32a {xmx ================================================== Page 265 ================================================== 14-00000 ANNEX B SUMNARIES QF_CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT Pages 399 7 435 of the previous Summary contain summaries on the cases of[49jAmericans who, according to information from NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approacked by the KCB, or were actually recruited by the KCB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to tbe specific KGB positions %eld at pazticular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be Gsefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. Tke souzcing of these cases bas been explored in detail during the current interviews wita NOSENKO, and it is now possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB. It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of'49}cases, a5 well as all other cases concerning which NCSENKO has furzished information, must be considered, not necessarily for tbe importance or unimportance 0f the informacion, but to determine bow NOSENKO claimed to have learned of the case and whether bis Statements con - cerning each identified case are supported by collateral information. These factors are important in assessing tbe overall validity of infoz- mation from NOSENKO as well as supporting evBdhd2d-is claimed positions in tbe KGB_ G Enckn: # Ejiic o-otCt fully being ================================================== Page 266 ================================================== 14-00000 U_-_ To comment specifically on each of the '49]cases would require a vezy lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately 40}of the 49 cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps four cases. The indicated inability of NOSENKO to cornpletely source all/49 of the cases is not considered 8ignificant, pazticularly Since his having kowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB_ In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to source all of his inforration would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses Of memory Or failure to recal some - which was insignificant at the time it occurred. Without citing in detail any of thei49)cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of & number of the cases are considered important since there is & direct relationship to his claired positions in the KGB during 1960 G January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960 1961l; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January July 1962; and &s Deputy Chief, Seventb Department, July 1962 January 1964. Ceztain examples of the above are as follows: 2 0001245 SECRET thing ================================================== Page 267 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ (a) NOSENKO learned 0f a rumber of the Seventh Department cases which had occurred in 1960 ~ 1961, as well as several 1958 1959 cases from notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of tke First Section, Secozd Section and Sixth Section in 1963. Thes e notes Were Pre- pared at the request of NOSENKO who as a_ Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of these three sections; and the request was actually an ex- pansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief of the SCD, for information on recruitments 0f the Seventh Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Caief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of mary of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960 3 1961, was limited to information contained in the notes . From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his re- port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable to the request. (b) NOSENKO learred of several 1902 1963 cases Of the First Section, First Department, fror Gernadiy I, GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO &s Deputy Chief, 3 6)01246 SEC?ET ================================================== Page 268 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ~C. First Section, First Departrent. This information Was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO leazned of certain 0 the cases or was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Seventh Department to the First Section, First Department, for assistance or vice Versa. Ceztain of the49 cases listed were cases o the Seventh Depazt- ment prior to 1960 or in 1962 ~ 1963 waen NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of tbe cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 T 1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Departrent and Seventh Department, but doe8 support his claimed &ssignment to the Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962 7 1963 , and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 5 1961. It is difficult to specifically comment concezning these 49) cases since do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, constitute & rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summazy. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering & period 0z approxi- mately five and one~half years. It should be noted, the hogavfRAbat tbey they ================================================== Page 269 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ explanation of NOSENKO concerning bis kowledge o: #xe(49)cases is both plausible and compatible with hi8 claimed positions in tbe First Departnent and Seventh Department 1960 Januazy 1964. 0001248 5 Cf:f duzing ================================================== Page 270 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ ================================================== Page 271 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET ANNEX C THE CHER EPANQV PAPERS 0001249 JEiRET Excluced 73 -3: C9A 1 M 77165 !'ji ================================================== Page 272 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEC?ET ANNEX C THE CHER EPANOV PAPERS Pages 309 5 316 of the previous summary contain a description Of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOv passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow i= early November 1963 _ The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case Were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, in late 1963. The definite relations of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consid- eration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the paperg to the American tourist, Or if the papers contain "deception information, the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very 8erious question. NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department, SECEET 8d01250 Exib; 3,i,a hip #7 ================================================== Page 273 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ during 1960 mid-l961 when he was forced into retirerent from the KGB; During the above period of time, NCSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to kave had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except in the absence of tbe Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKO also claims to have participated jn the bunt for CHEREPANOV in December 1963 _ Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This theory seems to have little credibility since tbe papers contain ro information which would even support the claim 0f NOSENKO that he was in the First Section, First Department, 1960 4 1961. The papers also contain no information wbich Would indicate tbere was even & Deputy Chief of the First Section during 1958 7 1960. Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later &eveloped he had taken from the First Section prior to bis retirement because he was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB. There is no collateral evidence which contrdicts any o the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, tkere is 0301251 SECRET ================================================== Page 274 ================================================== 14-00000 nothing in either the form Or substance of the papers which provides a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the forr and Substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First Department. During current interviews, tbe CHEREPANOV case bas been covered in detail with NOSENKO. The Cherepanov Papers,- wbick were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection; hava also been covered in detail on a separate item -by-iter basis. Although NOSENKO does not claim 'to have specifically seen any particular item prior to 1964, bis statements in regard to the various handwritings, types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt tkat NOSENKO was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Depazt- ment, ard with First Department procedures. Certain additional research has been conducted in regazd to the papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared at & later date. It should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgmen: %as been necessary in making an assessment of thbe Cherepanov Papers since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material. Howevez, based on information developed tbus and tkere i3 no reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREZANOV was under KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive inf F8an8t1282" 3 faf, ================================================== Page 275 ================================================== 14-00000 or that the papers were other than tbe collection of material by a disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated, tae removal Of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to CHEREPANOV . The entire Cherepanov Papers bave been reviewed to determine if tbere i8 any information which; could be considered "deceptive inzor - mation"' either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas have been noted and given full considera: 1953 (a) There is no specific infd Ca-KL were any recruitrents by the KCB Ae 4 sonnel in the United States Embas nor is there any inforration sugge Oxect American source or American age' during that period of time. (b) Petr S. POPOV , a GRU an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January 1959 as a result 0f a letier mailing by Geozge Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CIA employee under Department of State coverhassigned to the Ebassy in Moscow_ The lette? , which was to POPOV, was obwained by the KGB after mailing by WINTZRS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS. 03)01253 4 A-ck 68 ) O1L 8+ ================================================== Page 276 ================================================== 14-00000 In regard to (a), the papers are a rather minute part of the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 5 1960: The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly indicates that the KGB made a recruitment Of an American in the Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 1960 period is only & ratter for consideration. It is not conclusive proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source' did not exist. Tbe papers Zo not contain a positive staterent on. either matter. In regard to,(b), the quite specific information in the papers that Petr S _ POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a_ resuit of KGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to' POPOV: in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibly inforration Of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY. The circumstances under which he wa8 recalled and collateral intor- mation have given adequate grounds for & belief that by Novenber 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence. It may be presumed tbat any lead to tbe KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more sped86}y54 5 Cc^ only ================================================== Page 277 ================================================== 14- QoooQ CIA, had a source in the GRU would bave come from an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish & lead to a penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully protected even within the KGB _ The possibility 0f course exists that a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established tbat it did nor is there any reason to believe the FCD could not Or did not have another agent Or agents who furnished information to the KCB pertinent to develop- ment of the case against POPOV . The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information in tbe papers and could only lead to the conclusion that the papers contain "deceptive inforration: " The conclusion in regard to the above is that the fact the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 i8 not incompatible with the distinct possibility that the KGB hbad previously obtained infoz - mation from an FCD agent or agents Which actually led to suspicion in regard to POPOV or actual identification of PC?OV_ 0001255 SECRET ================================================== Page 278 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ I information was received from an important FCD ageat such as George BLAKE or through another valuable FCD agent which led to KGB suspicion of POPOV prior to his return to Moscow in November 1958, it is highly unlikely such information would receive wide distribution withia the KGB, either in the FCD or the SCD. It is also pogSible the limited group Within the KGB who would be aware that the KGB had received infozmation leading to suspicion of POPov from a valuable agent would be very intezested in attributing the exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the lettez to PoPOV by WINTERS. The possibility should be considezed that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV theze was only & suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case against POPOV. Consideration bas been given to the possibility that CHERZPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papezs to tae American tourist and that it wag done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine Since this would have been the initial in what the KCB hoped would become a successful operation. The above theory has been rejected since there are a nember of factors which militate against it. These factors include the fact that 00)01256 SECDFT dee? step ================================================== Page 279 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SEJ __ tae latest iriormation ir the papezs was at least three years old, wiich woulc indicate CEREZANOV aad no current access and there was no indication CHEREZANOV was interested in & future contact. C00+257 ================================================== Page 280 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ 1 ================================================== Page 281 ================================================== 14-00000 SECRET INDEX ABIDIAN, John IV,E,5,7-15,19,20, 52 "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) IV, G,1-4 ARTAMONOV , Nikolay 2 II,A,2 ARTEMOV , Vladimir Lvovich IV,5,6,12,13 BAKHVALOV , Mikhail S IV,E,3,4 BALDIN; Boris Andreyevich IV,F,2 BARRETT , Robert) II,F,14,15 BEGGS, Frank} G IV,E,36,37 BELITSKIY , Boris 7 IV, F,6-12 BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovicb 7 IV, B,2,3, 5-7 BIENSTOCK, Natalie) IV,F,3,4 (BIRSE, Arthuz] IV,D,1,2 BLAKE, George 7 IV,D, 9; IV,F, 9; V,C,6,7 BOBKOV , Denisovich IV,F,15,16; V,B,3 BOHLEN, Ambas sador T II,F,10 BOWDEN, Lewis 4 IV,E,53,54 BRAUNS, Horst)- IV,F,3-6 BROWN , G. Stanley; IV,E,43 001258 Cz4w Exlide4 'e) 2ylJm)tic/ SECREi 8305ra1; i10 ~i Filip ================================================== Page 282 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ BUGA YEVA, Ludmila IV,F,4 BURGI, Richard G IV,D,1 BUR ~ IV,E,49,50 IBUR TIN, Will) IV,E,49,50 CECCHI, Pietro 7 E,39,40,42 CHELNOKOV , Vladimir Dritriyevich IV,F,2,16 CHEREPANOV , Aleksandr N. 5 II,H,4; V,C,1-4,6-8 CHERNETSEV , Y_ E. 7 IV,E,49 CHURANOV , Vladimir A_ III, B, 4 DAY, Frank IV,E,41,43 DEMKIN, Vladimir I IV,E,20,45 DER YABIN, Petr Sergeyevich IV,B, 5, 6 DOUGLAS, William O. 4 IV,D,3 'DREW George) IV,D,1 IDWELLY, Robert} 5 IV,E,41,44,45 FARMAKOVSKA YA, As 7 V,4,1 FEDOROVICH, Tatyana 3 IV,E, 8, 9 FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M IV,E, 49-51; IV,F,1 {FISK , Norman IV,D,5 FRIPPEL, Arsene) ~ IV,D,2 (GAFFEY, Joseph) IV,E,41,45,46 0001259 2 ornnrt TIN, Sipei 'IV , Olga 1- ================================================== Page 283 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECREK: GARB LER, Paul 5 IV,E, 52 iGARCIA, Anthony A} IV, E, 39 "IGARLAND, John) III,F,17; IV,E,31,33-36 iGINSB URG, Michaell e IV,D, 5,6 GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich II,B,3,4; III, E, 9-11; III;F,5-13,15-19; IV,B,5,6; IV,D,9,10; IV,E,,21,23,31-34; V,A,1 GRBBANOV , Oleg M: 5 II,F,3,4; IV, 6; IV , 6; IV,E,4,5,21; IV,F,1,2 "GRIGORIY" 5 III, E,13; IV,D,3,6; IV,F,4 GROMAKOVSKIY , Yevgeniy 5 II,B, 4; IV, E,20 GRYAZNOV , Gennadiy I. III, B, 4; III,F,8-13,15; IV,E,5,12,19-21,26-28, 30,43-45; IV,G,3; V,B, 3,4 GUK, Yuriy I. III,B, 4 HAMILTON, Victor Norris MI,E, 9 (aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri) "HANNA" IV, E, 27 HARRIS , Gisella IV, D,1, 7, 8 HORBALY, Wi lliam IV, E, 53 HOWARD, Herbert)- III, E, 8; II,F,20; IV,G,1,3,4 IVANOVA, Svetlana IV, E, 38,39, 45,46 JENNER, Paul) ~ IV, E,28-31, 35-36 JOHNSON , Robert Lee III, E, 8; II,G, 5 JOHNSON _ Wallace Everett J = IV,F,3,4 {JONES , Willian Carroll J - IV,F,3,4 0001280 3 SECRET ================================================== Page 284 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET KADERA, Fredi IV,E, 45 KANT OR , Marvin IV,D, 5,6 (KARLOV , fnu G IV,D, 5 KASHPER OV , Mikhail II,H,4 KEMMER, Myra IV,E, 9 KEYSERS , Jamesj IV,E,22-26,55,56 KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich ~ IV,E,5,48-51 KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) 5 IV , B,1-4,7 KOLOSSOV , Viktor IV, E,30,34 (Alias used by KOSOLAPOV) KOSOLAPOV , Vadim V III,B,4; III,F,8,16,17; IV, E,5,19-21,28-32, 34-39,42-44 KOSYGINA, Madame III, 1 KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. III,B, 4; I,F,5, 11,12; IV, E, 3,4,6,12,18,21, 23,49,52,53; IV,F,1,2; IV,G, 3; V, C, 2 KOZLOV , Veniamin IV, E, 12 KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich 4 IV,B,5 LANE, Allen) IV,D,1,,2 LANGELLE, Russell II,F, 3; IV, E, 8 "LILLIAN" T IV,E,26 LUBIN, George) 5 IV,E,49,50 LUNT_ Horace 7 III, F,3 MAHONEY , Eugenej IV, E,53 MALIA, Martin} IV,D,2 0001261 4 SECRET A, ================================================== Page 285 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECRET MARK, David III, C, 4 MATLAW , Ralph IV,D, 5 'MER TENS, Gerard E IV,D,2 MIKHA YLOV , A. A_ ~ IV,E,49 MINTKENBAUGH , James Allen III, E, 8; III, G,5 MORELL, William N. e IV,E, 52 MORONE, Jogeph' IV,E,22,27,36,37,39,40,55 MULE, Walter (Capt ) ~ IV,C,4 MC GOWAN, Edward) IV,F,13 PECHTER, Bernard IV,D, 5, 6 PENKOVSKIY , Vasilyevich 7 IV,E,13 PETROV , Vladimir Ivanovich III, B, 4; IV,E,48,49 POPOV , Petr S. IV,E,7, 10; V,C/4-7 PREISFREUND , Johan) ~ III, F,5, 1l, 12 'PRESSMAN, Patrick IV,D, 5,7 "RAKETA" IV,C,5 RASTVOROV , Yuriy IV,B,5, 6_ RHODES , 1 II, F, 4 RUFE, Jobn /- D, 5,6 SCHWARZENBACH, Collette III, F,10 0001262 5 SECRET Oleg 7 Roy IV, ================================================== Page 286 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU IV,E,32,33 (Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very Possibly Igor A_ SMIRNOV . ) SHAPRRO, Isaac Henry) III,F,6 SHA TTAUER, Sofia/ 5 IV,D, 5,7 SHAZLY, Sarwat el 5 IV,E,40 SHELEPIN, Alekgandr Nikolayevich 5 III,F,13 "SHMELEV" I,F,13; D,3,6; IV,F,4 SHUBIN, Jobn 4 D, 1l SHULCINA, Nataliya IV,F,11, 12 SMITH, Dayle Wallis III,F,4,20; IV, G,1 SMITH, Edward Ellis 4 III, F, 4 SMITH, John Discoe III, E, 9; IV,E,49,50 STALIN 6 IV,B,5 STEVENS , Edmund_ 5 III,F, 4,6 STORSBERG, Jame& III, F,3,5,1l-1l3; IV,E,21-24,26,43, 55, 56 (TARASKA, William' IV,D,5,6 'TAYLOR, David' I IV,D, 2 TAYLOR, Jobn 5 IV,E,42, 43 UMANETS , Ella 3 IV, E,38 00u1283 SECREC IV, IV,- ================================================== Page 287 ================================================== 14-QQQQQ SECT TRBAN, (Colonel); IV,E,24,25 VASSALL, William 5 III, E, 9; III, G,5; IV,D, 9 WASHENKO, Steve IV,E, 53 'WILBY, William Stanley 5 IV,D,2 WINTERS; George Payne, Jr. IV,E,53; V,C,4-7 ZENKIN , FNU IV,E,32-34 (Very possibly Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A_ SMIRNOV . ) ZUJUS, Matthew) ~ IV,E,26-28 ZWANC;, Mauric? G IV,E, 40-42 00012F4 SECRET Igor

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