Transcript of 104-10103-10112.pdf
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-QQQQQ 104-10103-10112] 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Ogdomtl Kd H7 CN
PriO: ACCOM POSED ACTION PLISIEI)
TO
MARKED FoR INDEXING Chief_
)
Special Affairs Staff
No Indexinc Required
INFO: ONLY QUALIfied
HEADQUARTERS OESK
CAM Judge_Indexino
FROM ABSTRACT Chief Of Station,
1
JMWAVE
Microfilm _
SUBJECT ational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRINK Operational Review
ACTION REQUIRED . Rz;ZR8 Cb3
PRIORITY
ACTION Request Headquarters decision on continuation or
termination of Project AMTRUNK _
1 Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress
report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March
Station views on the operation are summarized below
2 , The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-
nesses
p RE 0
A The_AMTRUNKers admit to_being_anti-KBARK and to be working
"with" KUBARK now only because there was no ojjher a Lternative Tt
3LYIUI te were to @ccouliah [ait misston In other words tnese agents
WiII cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage _ It
is believed that if the operation were to deve control would
diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the %peration,
since the need for KUBARK assistance will dectease as operational
successes increase It is believed that_AMICH27_would have_no
hesitation "gelling_out T} the operation to any one of the major re-
Tugee political groups at any time {hat he felt it advantageous to
do So It is believed that_
9
if he is not already doing so he is
most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es-
cambray headed by . Eloy _ Gutierrez Menoyo , or the MRP faction headed
by Manuel In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his
own way with the operation He helieves_that_he is receiying_special
attention_because Qf his ZRMETAL connecttons and he will not hes i
mte,togO behind KUBARK"E bcr to_ANIRUN 1 ACHREy @nd QOACT
or higher authority if the aperation O KUBARK handTing of the
AMTRUNKS does not progress tq his liking_ Since AMTRUNK/1 , accprding
to AMCAPE/1 "masterminded" this operatipn in the first place ik may
be assumed that the AMTRUNKS wil1 withhbld nothingk from AMTRUNKV1 _
Sz4L
ext TRUKk
19 -p-& #3 p1t
Distrcbutson;
C/SAS w/attchs Raa
{16
DATE TYPED DATE DISPATCHZD
apn 17 ;
~Anril 1963
3
CROSS REFERENCE TQed Ir;0 at_ DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
Ai, Coitzming 2n3
GWz
Ett
Eic ilon UFGA-8381 DESENSHTIZED
HEADQUARTERS FILE" NUMBER
arbcAia
@mmW
RETURN TO CIA
Backorouna Use Only
Do Reproduce
Oper
lop,
Ray _
STATE;
VoLsky
Usrtt
Not
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70m lsgli-klon OISPATCH SYMOOL AND Numder CQNTINUATION OF
DISPATCH UFGA 8381
AMTRUNK/1 in turn may
be_expected_to_keeg_AVCAPEL] fullyinformed_
nere 1S 7ho . KUBARK control over AWTRUNKZI or AMCARE
B_ This operation has 2 very high "flap_potential" if any AMTRUNK
agents are picked up by mhe opposition in cuba _ Not Only will
KUBARK stand to suffer_
9
but ODACID will be tied directly in to the
Operation
9 as may: also QKFLOWAGE_ by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed ,
and_AMCAPEZL and_his newspaper The latter could prove to be most
embarrassing and Should bc fully recognized as a possibility, if
not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into
Castro s hands _ wiuYagr_@E<
C_ The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects _
At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees
prior to the time the team was safehoused . Two of the_agents_;
AMICE/27 and AMICE/14
9
did not satigfactori5y resolve Ithe
#beif security during LCIFLUTTER tests It 16 believed tnat
@"Xco7z8f
withhording information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con-
tacts An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between
AMICE/14 AMTRUNK /3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on
29 March . This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14
the Cuban term for a homosexual the ultimate insult to a Cuban _
This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14 , with a
possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411)
)
has made
such an approach' to AMTRUNK/3 _
D, The commitments made to AMICE/27
or which AMICE/27 claims were
made to him are a matter of concern to the Station_ This is an
area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily
develop.
E The Phase I landing point appears highly risky . It is within
five miles of a_ cruise missile site radar , and in an area frequently
patrolled by sea - QAGzz
F This Aperation appears_pogsibly competitive withAMLco/3
opera-
tions aimed als0 at penetrating nigh miTftary Jevels for the same
purposes Given the lack Of control in the AMTRUNK operation , {he
possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same
individual will be present,
3 In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation_ the AMTRUNK
group as a whole represents superior agent: materiel Three Of the
four have been outs- tanding in training appear to . have a
Elyett; number of raifly wei Placed contacts on the inside whom ex-
pect to be able to.call on for assistance Although they have
been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods
ranging to two years this is frequently. the case in this type
of
"operatiote
The objective of the: operation is worthwhile .
4 Based on_the attached operational_reyiew and the advantages and
aIsaavantages outrined above Lit 1s [he recommendation 0f_JMWAVE
Station that this operation be rerminted ai 'the rerTiest ppss1ue
monent Shnce this operation originted at the Hedqurters Tevel
it is requested that Headquarters advise JWANE as to Its degiston
In tne meantime training and planning will continue If Head
quarters
decision
is to continue with the operation a t this lile
operational plars for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as
formulated.
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION PAGE No:
Form
5.60 53a use Previous Edition_ CONTINUed (401 S E C R" E T 2 .
and
Tlune3
They
they
See
)ik 3/748
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Salba
31 March 1963
PROJECT AMTRUNK QPERATIONAL_REVIEW
I STATUS REPORT ON: TRAINING AND_PROCESSING 4-31 MARCH _
The AMTRUNK Team ,
1
cons isting of AMICE/27 AMICE/14 , AMTRUNK /2
and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164
on Plantation Andrew S PARMERS KUROAR instructor from headquarters
was already at the training site when the; team
was
brought there
by the two case officers, Irving N _ PEGGINS
and Hobart J , VANDEBORN PARMERS remained at' the safesite
until 16 March during which time he conducted training in
clandestine; methods and techniques_ This training included
security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica-
tions agent spotting_ selection ,
9
recruitment and management
and operational planning and reporting _ The training included
group discussion and participation in a series of 'appropriate
operational situations
9
several problems and daily physical
training Durz this two week period either PEGGINS or
VANDEBORN visited the safesite every
9
spending an average
of or three ,hours with the group in operational dis -
cussions and processing _ During the week of 18 thru 23 March ,
both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts workin
out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing
their training on an informal basis The week of 25 through
30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading =
)
including two night problems and on weapons
familiarization and firing- During the period under dis-
cussion the AMTRUNK group were al1 LCFLUTTERED , were assessed
by the KUROAR assessment team
1 were given an initial series
of immunizations were Issued clothing , were processed for
allas documentation, were processed for disguises , and were
further processed on cover and finance problems The re-
sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters
under cover of UFGA-8111
) on 13 March 1963 _ Based on DIR
26430 , no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time _
Transmitted' as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS
report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as
attachment "B" are the results of tho assessments of the
0
tXZRuirggreport 1o ttaasweeked
week
af 25# tschment "C" is the
II AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE
J 1
The proiect AMTRUNK_Migsion_obiective is to overthrow the
ex1st1ng cuban government means of a conspiracy among 3 h4grZeve miZitary an @izzan Teders 01 whe governe
8
[
culminting in a coup detat which wili oustt bothh Casttro and
9 7
DESjNSHZeD
FEEICoRud
887 Mi OM-Hud
7
Key
ing
day
two
{
7-9"
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JRECMR Uein
2
thb Communists from power A secondary and subordinate
mission is to determine rne climate prevailing among the
populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable
of either passive or active_sabotage _ This secondary mission
is .exploratory in nature through the first phases of
the. project_ In order to accomplish the foregoing missions
9 the operation has been split into two initial phases _
)
which
will be compartmented from each other Phase One involves_
the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast
Of_Havana province_ These two individuals plan to g0 into
Havana for a period of approximately_two_weeks
}
and_then
exfiltrate black from the same point at which infiltrated_
Phase Two TnvqTying AMICE/27 and AMICEL1A will consist of
QIgr iniiltration through the_keys area on the north coast
of_ Matanzas These two individuals_ will likewise_ gQ into_
Havana for a period_of several weeks and then exfiltrate_black:
These two phases are discussed in detail in following para-
graphs _ ~Phage 'One_and PhaseTwo are preliminary infiltrations
designed_toset_up infiltration/exfitratmon routes and Tto
make_ 1nltial_ contacts among certain select_high level military
figures in Havana The following paragraphs discussing these
phases are not designed to be operational plans De tailed
operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de-
Veloped _
III PHASE I
A AMTRUNK Personnel
06
1 AMTRWNK/2 is a
@21Jyear old
Cuban who is mature for his
years and . in some degreeexperienced in clandestine opera-
tions _ He attended Catholic Social piversity_ in Havana for
two" years majoring in Social Studies Prior to Fidel 's
takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido
Autentico Which upheld the constitution of 1940 _ He supported
the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that
Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime _ During his
university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged
in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials _
Following the Playa Giron invasiona great many in the Havana
underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise He
continued this through 1961 and finally left
Jig air
{Bntuisyig6
Although A/2 does not consider
himselt 2n 2HIY % KUBARK he has been cooperative roughout
Histraining He a pensive individual who displays good
Judgement His present attitude 'towards KUBARK appears to
be one of "wait and see" In the meanwhile=
9
he is con-
scientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.
8; 2ENcaR EL7
s/pl
only ,
they
Cuba X894
is
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3 08
AMTRINNK/3 a
ez]year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2 1s
volatile , mmtture and impulsive . On the other hand he is
quite. loyal to A72 and his quick wit is appealing to his
fellow team members He worked under A/2 in the underground
a5 an action type principally engaging in sabotage_ His
underground work began while he was in secondary school
when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista _
In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and
began full time anti-Castro activities After the crack
down following the of Pigs invasion he avoided detection
and continued to engage in underground activities Finally
when Situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami 1@GugustJ1962_ While A/3 has performed satisfactorily
in his training up to date, his performance falls far short
of the other three members A/3 feels KUBARK should only
function a8 support for this operation and Should not inter-
fere in the actual Plans of {he operation _ Fartunately his'
role in this operation: is comparatively minor and he appears
Willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides Nevertheless
2 direct control 'of 4/3offers problems in the future
B. TASKS
1 Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira
08
KAMS 3785 I) and es tablish with the farm manager
04/3's father SJfarm in the
GG1e8
section ( (AMS 3885 III,
Coords 993614)]o6
2 _ Through contacts of A/3' obtain transportation for A/2
to Guanaba or Havana _
08
3 Although not definite A/3 may remain at his (Eather
S
farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine
communications Having completed this he would then be ex-
filtrated at Punta Jijira_
4 , A/2 will g0 to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational
support through his contacts _
5 _ A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with
high level connections within the Rebel Army
6 _ A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandes -
tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for
his exfiltration
7 Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido
(AMS 3885 II)
Go;maz
blpd
2 .4
Bay
theni
at
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INFIL-EXFIL_PLANS
1 The tentative date the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 963 _ The infiltrees will make their way to @4/3's father'9 farm one kilometer from the coast and ` from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to ' Guanabo or Havana _
2 The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after:
his infiltration: This arrangment .
9 as yet , is not definite .
3 The exfiltration
of A/2 1s tentatively planned for 31 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido _ A/3 feels
that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary. before final decision is reached _ Prearranged
telegram signal would indicate his preference _
4 , The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2
considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his
contacts
D OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA
1 Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3
the 24
two men will work thelr way to alferm owned jointly by 4/3 's
father and Santos SUAREZ located kilometer from the point
of infiltration;0 They Wilomake
contact with manager of the farm named @edro CRUZ J (CRuz is 35 to 40
Jyehes
of age , is married and has an elemertary school education _ He has
no record of underground activity A/3 will depend upon 06 (CRuzjto make the following contacts in order to obtain
transportation to Guanabo Havana :
08 HERNANDEZ who lives 2
OGew
kilometers away in (Sierra del Arzobispo (IERNANDEZ owns a smal1 farm and a 08 lbutcher ShopJin the area and also owns a truck _ He is 06 B7 to 40) years of age
)
married with six or seven children _
He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-
activities _
0
06
b If @Ruz]is
unsuccessful ingettingGHERNANDEZ] truck
he will contact lugusto MACHIN who a farm next '08 to (/3 's
father s farm _ He is
@be,8eates
old, married_ no Children, wife S name is/liciajob He was the: mayor of Santa "Czoz del Nortein' 1954, He owns a jeep.
8 BC R E T
14 - 6 . 8:1 !
fot
May
May
OC01
Goman_
revolutionaryog
Qlvd
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8 CiR; EiD
5
06
Another contact of A/3 1s Ramon CALZADILLE) age ,21 ,
single 8th grade education He provided support in
the form of food and safehousing te underground workers
in_ the past_ 'nier eucchedreno is (Corojo #1; Cotorro
Havana _ He owns @utchen shop in the (Cotorrosection
of Havana Subject will be contacted by A/3 ifqe needs
to be` safehoused in Havana _
2 The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after
arriving in Havana will be contacted in the order
listed _ Their function will be to provide safehouses and
vehicles for A/2 _
0b , 06.
a Elsa Maria NEGRIN
j
25Jyears of age
1
born in Havana _
A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University
of Havana majoring in Social Sciences Presently she
lives with her aunt in Havana A/2 has maintained cor-
respondence with her She has helped previously in
providing .safehous= for the underground _ She also has
a car 06, 06
0
8
b. IGLES IAS Betancourt _ age 55 born in Havana _
He is @hysiciap} who lives and practices medicine) in
Havana . OUIGLESIAS] has helped .A/2 in underground activi-
ties previously _ He has a brother
9
two daughters and
a son now
residing in the U,8 His daughters live in'
New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months
ag0 Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano
an anti-Batista group and was a professor of
Gedicigejos
at the Universi_ of Havana up until 1961 when he re
signed . (IGLES
'545748
also a close friend of @Elsa NEGRIN %
o8
C
Gergio 195 %ibogt Go2"
born in Cienfuegos _
) a
former Genator as well a5 the former head of the
56 Railroad system in Cuba 7 Subject was originally a member
of the Autentico and claimed, to be a KUBARK con-
fidante during Castro S
takeover. O6MMENDEZ
has an apart-
ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under-
ground activities _ He. has a daughter who works for thec
government but is not sympathetic to the regime _ The
6s
husband of this daughter however works for (Che Guevara]
A/2 has majztained with (MENDEZ
05
d _ @sabel MENOCOD};
age about 85
born in Havana single _
Subject 1s an (English who runs a Sma11 private
Itutoring] school in
@DstescheE
Havana She was A/2's
8 teacher and offered support to the underground. 'Suzgoco3
lives by herself has automobile and is a
close friend of A/2 and his wife _
0 @C RxEul
rolp;
os
They
and
ing
@ede
MENDEZ6 _
Party
gorrespondence
an
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6
06 06
e (Gloria BAMCIALEA ager
(23-24] born
in Havana _ single
9 mother and father deceased attended the University
of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960] She became
a close 8shend of A/2 during their student "days In
Havana 0 has no record of underground work She
lives in Guanabo Beach) during the summer A/2 felt he
06 (GightbotBeaet to contact her if she was living at
(GGuanabo ' Beach] in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary
3 The following two operational assets' will be contacted by
A/2 after he. is safehoused in Havana _ Their function will be
to spot officers disaffected the Castro Regime witk
a (Jorge
age
Gate
30s early 40s7 married _ Subject
holas the rank of
VCa9uty2,8,=
the Rebel Army but is not
presently on active duty He was a_ friend of Castro 's
during the revolution and A/2 claims maintains
some contact with Fidel_ He also
ciahke 1Aly] has
been
working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was
inally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo
groups ML(ALS) primary interest has been trying to or-
genize h1s_fri- rds within the Rebel Army against Fidel _
4/2 feels (VALS] a_ very discreet individual who has
not ,been .identified as an anti-Castro organizer by
the G-2 _ A/2 claims to be a close friend of WALS
&d
trusts him completely A/2 saw and talked to CALS]
9 (1962]prior to his flying out of as a
06
PBRUNGZ
@ose DUARTE Oropesa) age
early (4Os served
in the 06 @0.s Arny)during World War II Accor to A/2 , 06
06 (DUARTE) was made ogos38ef_ of the lth Military District
by Camilio_Gienfuegos 'Following the disappearance of
(Cienfuegos_ DUARTE removed from the post and pre-
sently lives on an
Iozayreeosean
as well as royalties
from property confiscated by the government He said
DUARTDstarted working against Castro within the MRP
under Manuel RAY For a timehe was thelilitary 06 secretary of the MRP and became quite involved 1r
plotting against Fidel .64/2 stated that it was
rumored at the time that @UARTE)was working for the
MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent Eventually
0b @UARTEwas PH)Ged on a G-2 suspec t but according
to A/2 WUARTE) able to evade detection _ Subject
has good connections Within the Rebel Army and re-
volutionary government _ A/2 trusts this individual
and has confidence in him as a potential operational
lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention 06 (DUARTDas
an opportunist.
83 EACEEFiL 1
8She
Army
@GALS
orig
refugez?
ding
aleo
list,
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14-00oo0
A/2 may also attempt to contact the following
Operational asset if he has an opportunity to make
contact _
06 05
GLester RODRIGUEZ)
age
Gate 30s early
40s , married,
former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano He
fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal
Following the Castro takeover he served as Qhead of
one of the military zones within Havana province trentsahebge
thinks he
nows "ozven esse assignments and A/2
INRA) in Oriente Province _
He claing BODRIGUEZ assisted his uUnderground
group during 196T by supplying trucks for transporting
weapons and materials
E COVER AND_CQMMUNICATIONS
Cover
A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee
of a local brewery in: Havana _ A/3 on the other hand will be
issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana _
Both will also be issued drivers Licenses and additional
items such as immunization certificates Cuban receipts , etc _
The two men will also be outfitted with disguises _
2 . Communications
Primary, communications wil1 be established through an SW
system Both men will be given SW instruction and will be
issued accommodation addresses in Miami This instruction
and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited
assets In PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops _ Pre-
arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place
and time of exfiltration_ Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency
OPERATIONAL AND_SECURITY EVALUATION
1 The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which
has considerable potential but also considerable risk_ The
area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile
site and its accompanying radar ~In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals _
Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before
24
their first contact_ However _ A/3 is leary of staying at his (father
S farm for any length of time and he does not want his z4 father to know of his presence in Cuba . For this reason the
will not be able to serve as a safehouse _ A/2 plans on leav the farm the same he lands This presents the problem of what to do Wizth4/3 On approach is to take 4/3
S E C
Area
Jos
farm
ing day
Zlnv
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S E '0 :R:
tb Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him_ This however may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and
patience necessary to put while A/2 goes about his busi-
ness _ He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under-
take a clandestine assignment on his own When A/2 3 step ashore in Cuba ,
9
control will vanish _ Fortunately 4/2
has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi-
ness competently _ Unfortunately 4/3 gives no such indication _
For this reason an attempt wi11 be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his father 's farm with maritime
reception capabilities 2y
2 A/2 , on the other hand , appears to have a sufficient numbe] of supporting assets segkUa de for hisafety while in Havana
However _ he has not and (DUARTE for over a year In
addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army
organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness
in recruiting Within the Station reports OREDUARTE con-
flict with A/2 's evaluation
"Oicthia
man _ While there is no evidence to verify that (DUARTE is pro-regime
1
there has_ been
a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an opportunist who might work for the_highes ,0 64/2's
rebuttal to these remarks is that
pae e)klg dde;
assisted him in
the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him
in his underground activities.ol This still leaves a question
mark next to the worth ofl DUARTE )which unfortunately can be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2 There are other security implications which should be discussed in this
evaluation . Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se- curity conscious _ While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in' Mlami which was to be transmitted by his case officer The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking
contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip
was in the dfing A/2 has written several other letters
not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres -
sion A3 on the other hand talked_quite freely_about_his_
operation to fourfriends in New York prior to coming to
Motami peing sntahoused He expiained that ne was Joining
AICE/ 27 and ATRUNKZ2 on an operation that would take them
first to Miami and me1d to Cuba _ Once there would g0 to his father s farm begin make contacts 4/3 also
stated that a man named @UARTE
toula
be one of their con- tacts This loose talk coupled with A/3 ' s attitude that
KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candi-
date for this operation_ However, if A/3 is exfiltrated
three -days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will
gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he
presents .
8 E"
stay
and
Army
only
and
they
tolpN
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S AEC
3 4 The above evaluation stresses the operational and security
weeknesses in this operation In contrast to these weaknesses
are the positive considerations of this 'mission A/2 has the intelligence competence _ and confidence to approach and re_ cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime
operations at a high level within the Cuban Army _ The results
which these .anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter
for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential_
Nevertheless if the operation continues it will bear close watching_ in terms Of security and
controi
for these factors
will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK s position
if not properly contained:
IV _ PHASE II
A, AMTRUNK_PERSONNEL
1. AMICE/?7 senior_member of the_AMTRUNK
group_is a 41
year oTd PBRUMEN citizen from a weaTthy high Class family.
His father_ now deceased _ was a prominent individual in law
and politics and was at one time a senator A/27 himself
graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising
lawyer In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Ctenfuegos _
Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959 ,
4/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities
In 1961 at which time he held the position of Under-
Secretary of Public Works = he felt that his underground
activities had come to the attention of the government and
he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan_Embassy _
He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late
1961_ Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti-
vated_ He has some experience in- counter-revolutionary
activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques He has a very large ego , and aristocratic pride is very sensitive and is quick to
take offense He 1s_frank to state that he has a Low opinion
of.KUBARK that he 1s not 2 KUBAR agent and he deepZy re
Sents any @pliction that he is wonking Jor"KUBARK He
States that he is working for the overthrow of rhe present
regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid
and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude
although not hostile is frequently critical =
9
and he pre-
sents a difficult handling problem_
2 . AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate . of the University of Havana He has been in-
volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities ,
Subject arrived. by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME , He
1s highly motivated, is intelligent and objective = and has
a very highly developed security consciousness_ deve loped
from his counter ~revolutionary experiences Fron January
to July 1961 he made fourblocl filtration/exfiltration
trips to and from Cubairanl QBIURaIA; and has an excellent knowledge 0f the northww Vi7s area _ He is easy to work
19 $
May
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8UELC R:Eut
10 1
with and has evidenced 'kittle of the hostilities or anti- KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE /27_
68
6
AMTRINK / 4 , Subject is a
@9Jyear
old fisherman from the Cardenas area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963 _
He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will
be used as a maritime guide _
B_ TASKS
Make pre lininary
black maritime infiltration by smaIl
boat onto Cinco Leguas (AMS 4085 III) to contact
individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil
'operations
2 , Through contacts on Cinco Leguas organize a ratline into the mainland
1;
including making arrangements
for trans
F portation into Havana
3. Through the mechanism established above move to Havana
and obtain safehousing. and operational
support,
4 . Make a11 necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-
tration and future infiltrations
5 Approach and recruit two individuals with contacts
among important military figures _
6 _ Establish internal and external communications _
Exfiltrate from ' Phase II
INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
It 15_tentatively planned toinfiltrate_AMICE/27 _ AMICE/14 ,
and AViRUNKZ ~ into the Cinco Deguas_ Keys area on or about 23 April Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor
into rihe area and remain in the area for approximately
three during which time they will remain black, keep
the boat
hidden
in the mangroves and contact individuals
known to them on Cinco Leguas _ will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts 0f AMICE/14
on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III
9
Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas Plans will be
workedout: at tine with these_contacts for 2 second #utration i thentter part or May, at Which time AMTck/2
and AMICE/14 wili again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz
del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV) _
5hE;C 'XAE
~Ipv
Key Map
Key
key
Keys
days
They
this
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8 ELC RET
11
D QPERATIONAL ASSETS_WITHIN CUBA
1 Cinco Leguas This is used for production of
charcoal and salt Residents are reported So lidly anti-
Communist A/14 has two contacts here that he used
for infils and exfils One is "Tango" (Garcia Lezcano
"8 eyiouslo
Tango is a' brother of @ustiquiano Garcia Lezcano
whom - A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation_ but who
was already being_utilized elsewhere" The other contact is
the owner of the Salina (salt drying beds) A/14 has not
been able to_ recall this individual S name
"'08
2 Finca Casualidad _ This area is directly south of Cinco
Leguas on the mainland contacts here are @ntonio
~Garcia (not related to Tango above) and @ablo Lopez both
of- whom have: Small farms in the area 0C
3 , Town of Marti Contact here 15"Per+c" LNU _ Subject is
about 50. years old
9
is employed by (INRA J %and has a_ jeep which
was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes
06
4. City of Cardenas
Contact is@Pedro Barbi owner of the 05Gate
Marino restaurant Subject is a close friend of A/14
who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime
receptions .ObGarb)) would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to
Havana - Owns a car
5_ of Ma tanzas A-14 has a friend here named (Carlos 0b
Pedraza who also A/14 in underground activities in
1961 Bubject is
{Bojafears
old, married, and is a forman
@f pubiic works itt gedrszt Subject has a
son Carlos)amow
in New York City will be contacted for transpor-
tation to Havana Owns a car
6 Varadero .
"Fifo" Dineird?wns
a car and was formerly a close friend of A/14 _ Subject was formerly active in the
undergroundolend might be Y6ed by A/14 in the event he could
mot use_Barbijor @edraza] obtaining transportation _ 06,66
(ineirois the brother Of the communist (Manolo Pineiro, aka
"Barba Roja" but is reported to be: anti-communist himself
Havana 06
a
@dolfina (Suarez) fvoeed More Subject is single and lives
with her mother Is of AMICE /27 (possibly mis -
tress) and_can
beolused
as safehouse_keeper Subject is 06
sister of (Rafael (Suarez) Morel a (Commandante imthe Navy]
who _ according to A/27 , was at one timel chief of naval 06 operations)
His present assignment or location is
unknown _
K C R € Ti
Cayo key
{8oi-30733820,66
yet
Key
"City
city
z3lmv
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S: BACBR
06
b Manuel (Garcia)_ Sanchez Is a close friend of A/14
and is unc le of(A/14's wife Can be used for operational
support, a car and Was formerly a Lt.
in Oriente under (Calixto
iRehouseka;;i
but no longer in army
A/14 believes he is now an adminstrator of some type of
industry in Havana
06
C Maria Josefa (Isalgue) Subject is aunt of 4/14
and can be used as safehouse keeper She is single.
1
lives
alone 'except for ten cats _ Does not have a car Was
formerly a= teacher but now a pension and does not work
0c
d_ Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torrej Subject 1s 'a relatije of
A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing.
Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his
sixties
31
Bebe_-Orozc?) To be recruited by "A/14 as his prin-
cipal agent in Havana Subject and 4/14 previously worked
together in the underground 06@rozco) was
in the Sierra
with Castro and aiso fought in Camaguey He res igned from
the army in February. 1959 , although he has maintained many
contacts within the Was one time active in the 06
Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was ' friend of (Capt _
Bernardo Corrales who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio _
Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain
arms and remained there 10 days _
9
infiltrating back into
Cuba without his absence having been known to the authori-
ties Was responsible for safehousekeeping(Vargas Gomez] &
for nearly one month when authorities were searching for
him _ Will be used for intel collection and spotting on
defectable army officers . He is also A/27 but
not well_ A/14 was last in touch with
dcozcogy
letter
about two months ag0
f_ Ramon (Guin) DLaz Subject to be recruited by A/27
as principaT agent Would be used for operational in-
teliigence and spotting among disaffected army officers
Would be kept kntirely compartmented from Orozco]ob Guin
1s an army Comandante
>
now managing a large INRA farm
complex outside of Havana _ He is known to A/27 and A/14,
both of whom be lieve he can be contacted Safely: He is
anti-Communistl and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos
officers contapted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an
overthrow of the government .
endlal
u LA
LubeLA
Ezal
J N { c1at'
2
8 E C R E T
306
has
army _
to
po.defe
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82@ [E7
13
g Target personalities
who are suspected of being _dis- affected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will
information in Havana are as follows:
attempt to gather
14 Comandante "Macho" Parra
2 , Cdte _ Oscar Guerra
3 . "1 Jose Pinares
5 ; Capt . FNU Lawton
Manuel: Avila
6 Cndte _ Rene de los Santos
Pedro Miret
8 Capt _ Juan Nuiry
9 . Cmdte _ Rafael Suarez More
10. Capt _ Fernando Fernandez Superville
11_ Capt . FNU Guerra Matos
12 _ Capt. Sandy Olivares
13 _ Jose Fernandez Alvarez
These_nanes have 2L1 been checked,through JMWAVE RI and in MOS € cases 2150 W0n 4WoER In a tnervee appears %o be some evidence
majority of cases
may be disaffected . In
to indicate the subjects
it would
the case of Jose Pinares however _
This
appear that he is completely loyal
to the regime information
was passed on to A/27 and 4/14 , RI files were negative: on Avila and Lawton ,
E COVER AND_COMMUNI CATIONS
AMICu?7 and AMICE/14 will live black during their
entire Cuba _ will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises _ Both of them have previously lived Havana area_ and know the city well will
in the
Secret Writing (SW ) and will plan to
be trained in
possible three agents in
train at least two and
lexfiltration .
Havana in SW _ prior to their own
AA/14 in OWVL _
In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and
will
At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans have been laid with the agents _ In the event that change in time or location of exfiltration a
an OWVL message could be sent to the
becomes necessary
immediate message
which might have
toagenter
sent
urgent and
during their short stay in Havana would be
the agents
open code system by commercial
on a prearranged
be worked out to cover
telegram _ Such a system will
ternal communications
several possible contingencies In-
and A/14 will
of whatever net 1s organized by A/27 be arranged by courier , cut-out, live and dead
F OPERATIONAL
AND_SECURITY_EVALUATION
1 TheLCRLUTTER exeninations
on both AMICE/27 and AMICE Werg -Iaomlusive TTthough it is the opinion
scase Officers and the training of both {ne
close contact with these
personnel who have been in individuals that both agents are
A9RHA
stay They
They
on
Any
by
drops
[14
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S.E.C R: E
4
highly motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point will
remain ' basically unresolved since it is almost certain that
A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER: examination" if asked _
It is helieved_that A27 _was_Withholding_information
theLCFLUTTER and subsequently me nature , seriousness
dyrind
possible consequences of this are as yet not clear
2 . 4A7 has_told at least_two_people sqmething about_this
operation Although he says that he did not give any details
of the "operation, he does admit to having discussed it in
very general terms with two individuals whom he named at
the time of the. LCFLUTTER test _ One of these i8 3_friend
Of_GutierrezMenoyo and one 2_friend_of_Vargas Gomez
Tixeh? & syne VsuP7z Lie 2a16-2 092x7
3 AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the for the
past two years _ Although it is difficult to assess how well
he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks ,
it is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts
might be considered really close AMICE/14 has been out of
direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961
4 . The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent
upon having a good guide in the boat At this time, Phase
II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/ 4 as guide_
5 _ Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking .
Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of
Withholding support to the operation Control however will
remain tenuous at best and A/27 . will continue to be a dif-
ficult handling problem _
6 _ On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre. of the
agents both of whom are well educated, astute and highly
motivated . Both_agents_have experience i0clandestine opera-
tionsparticularly 4/14 who has made a number of previous
clandestine entries and exits and has many operational con-
tacts To date both have performed in a superior manner in
training:
FUTURE_PLANS
Duringthe
week of 1 through 6 April
)
the team will receive
maritime instruction_ During the week 8 through 13 April
they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training_ dis-
guise training, and further operational planning sessions _
VI _ 'COMMITMENTS
1 According to_AMTCE/27 _ thefollowing 'principle_ which he
feels 1s a commitment rom ODYOKE was enunciated during his
initial to ZRMETAL : TODYOKE Will recognize a new Cuban
IS4 Eia7RWE
army
trip
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Cklanw
government which is anti-Communist and which operates on
Ms democratic principles ; 'ODYOKE does not desire to impose .a
government of its own choice upon Cuba" A/27 has made a
big point of discussing this "commitment" It is apparent
that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his
followers It is also apparent that in his mind he links
Batista and , KUBARK _
9
and fears that KUBARK would back Batis-
tianos in a post-Castro government _
2 , AliAMTRUNK groupmembers think that they_received a
commiinenr ta inLZRMETAL; tht QDYOKE would suport uneir
operational plan with funds training logisthcl Smpport
apd~technical assistance but would Teave contro of [he
operation entrely in thetr hands In @thar words cnel
are not woriing for ODYOKE or KWBARK in any sense On this
point are very Sensitive
3 Another commi tment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed
in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE Should give "official recognition"
to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful
coup d'etat following the coup in order that. these individual:
will not be treated as criminals by a future regime _
This means recognition of an individual S participation in
the conspiracy , a promise of recognition of a specific
government formed by the conspirators themselves _
4 _ Discussion of the above "commi tments" has been pressed
several times by 4/27 _ PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these
commi tments with 4/27 _ However A/27 feels that the com-
mitments have already been made' by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL _ PEGGINS
has told A/27 that he will report thebe "commitments" back
to ODYOKE to determine if in fact, ODYOKE considers them as
commitments _
5 _ The_onlycomnitment_made by_JMAVE_through PEGGINS has
been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured
while" on the mission ,thetr fanilies in_PBPRIME_would_be
Qo
assisted for 2 "reasonableamount of time financially
PEGGINS decTined to state what that time woula be or now much
financial assistance would be involved_
6 _ One further negative commitment has been discussed between
PEGGINS and A/27 _ PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no com-
mitment will be made at this time to support any internal
group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives i
end that this extends specifically to no promise to support
actiye sabotage with demolitions NL
8.EC-R E%e
1G - 6 . s4/
they
"ffo
politicai
not
Xer
U, B